HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, SOUTHERN COMMAND, AND AFRICA COMMAND

HEARING HELD
MARCH 13, 2008

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2009
CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2008

HEARING:


APPENDIX:

Thursday, March 13, 2008 ...................................................................................... 41

THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 2008

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, SOUTHERN COMMAND, AND AFRICA COMMAND

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Committee on Armed Services ................................................................................................................. 2

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1

WITNESSES

Craddock, Gen. Bantz J., USA, Commander, U.S. European Command ............ 4

Stavridis, Adm. James G., USN, Commander, U.S. Southern Command .......... 6

Ward, Gen. William E., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command ..................... 7

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Craddock, Gen. Bantz J. ................................................................................ 45

Stavridis, Adm. James G. ............................................................................... 97

Ward, Gen. William E. ................................................................................. 131

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

Mr. Cummings .............................................................................................. 155

Mr. Skelton .................................................................................................. 155

Mr. Taylor ................................................................................................... 155

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:

Mrs. Boyda .................................................................................................. 159
FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZA-
TION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, SOUTHERN COMMAND, AND AFRICA COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:17 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Good day.
The committee will come to order.

We will address the posture of three commands representing significant geographic diversity: the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the new Africa Command (AFRICOM). Our witnesses are General John Craddock, Admiral James Stavridis and General Kip Ward.

It is great to have each of you here, and we thank you each for the work that you do as well as for the young men and young women within your command.

General Craddock, I remain deeply concerned about our efforts in Afghanistan. There has been a great deal of discussion about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) ability to lead the fight there, hampered in part by the caveats that many of our NATO allies have placed on their troops.

Recently you said, “These caveats, like shortfalls, increase the risk to every soldier, sailor, airman and marine employed in theatre.”

General, I couldn’t agree with you more. I am seriously concerned about these caveats and NATO’s unfulfilled commitments. I also believe the United States can and must demonstrate better leadership in Afghanistan. We are deploying an additional 3,400 marines to shore up the fight in the south and train and equip the Afghan national security forces. But when our military and civilian leadership says that in Afghanistan we do what we can, rather than do what we must, I think that sends a strong signal to Europe that we ourselves are not completely committed to a successful outcome. And I would have you address that.

General Ward, Admiral Stavridis, our committee has given a great deal of thought recently to your roles in the missions of the armed forces, and the weakness in the interagency system and note
that both of you in your commands are undertaking groundbreaking work to integrate the interagency partners. I commend you for that. And I hope we will hear something more from each of you on that.

Combatant commands, particularly SOUTHCOM, have excelled in providing short-term humanitarian emergency assistance after natural disasters. I am interested in the example that SOUTHCOM and emerging AFRICOM are placing on the promotion of internal security, trade, and economic prosperity within your areas of responsibility.

Let me say a word about strategic risks. Our attention is so focused on Iraq, we are hard-pressed to devote the necessary attention to emerging security issues in other parts of the world. Within the last month, we saw a serious effort to topple the government of Chad and a brief but potentially serious border dispute between Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. We must re-balance our military to be prepared for these sorts of unexpected challenges in the event that they turn into truly serious contingencies.

Before I recognize any of you gentlemen for your testimony, I ask my friend serving as ranking member today, Jim Saxton, the gentleman from New Jersey, for any statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Today this committee will consider the challenges and opportunities that face the U.S. European Command, the U.S. Southern Command and the newly-formed U.S. Africa Command. These combined areas of responsibility of these commands include over 120 countries and cover almost 40 million square miles. In fact, the range of possible topics today is broad as it reaches throughout these commands.

I would like to thank General Craddock, Admiral Stavridis and General Ward for appearing before us today to provide their unique insights and assessments and to explain how the President’s fiscal year 2009 budget request reflects these operations, exercises and initiatives within their respective Areas of Responsibility (AORs).

General Craddock, I would like to begin by highlighting a concern that Ranking Member Hunter has, who of course regrets that he is not able to be with us today. He discussed it at the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) hearing last week, and that raises some questions regarding NATO and associated issues.

In the coming weeks, the United States will deploy 3,200 additional marines to Afghanistan and over 2,000 of these men and women will bolster the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) presence in the southern part of the country.

Yet there appears to be some ambiguity about the command and these additional forces. From your perspective, Mr. Hunter would like to ask, will these marines fall under NATO ISAF or CENTCOM operational control? What will be the missions of these forces? Under which rules of engages will these forces operate, under ISAF’s or the United States?
More broadly, does the current ISAF and CENTCOM division of labor make sense and does it maximize the effectiveness of the capabilities provided by U.S. forces?

The division of labor in Afghanistan also leads to a number of NATO-specific questions regarding our European allies' military capabilities and ability to operate in a combat environment.

I note that despite NATO's minimum military requirement, that allies spend at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on their militaries, fewer than half of the 26 allies actually do so. I didn't know that. It seems that the alliance's emphasis on transformation coupled with the European Union's (EU) nations' growing focus on security and defense has not resulted in noticeable increases in expenditures and capabilities.

For example, NATO nations have long recognized a significant shortfall in strategic airlift. Yet these nations' combined acquisition of C–17s relies in large part on U.S. contributions.

So, Mr. Hunter wonders how can we persuade our friends to transform and modernize their militaries so that we can effectively participate in these combat operations? And at the outset, let me say that I know General Craddock is very mindful of these issues because he and I talked about them I believe just yesterday.

Developing our partners' military capabilities is also a common theme within the new Africa Command, especially given the potential of the vast ungoverned spaces on the continent to become safe havens for terrorists. I call them hot spots. There is little argument that partnering with African nations can result in more secure borders, more responsibility, and more capable military forces and security institutions that are more responsive to national governments and can help to close the doors of any safe havens located there.

However, we do understand that the European Command has long worked with those nations and there remains some skepticism that the creation of the new geographic combatant command is necessary or even politically acceptable to the African national governments and the African Union (AU).

General Ward, please provide your perspective on why the creation of the African command is in the U.S. national security interest and how your command will expand on those partnering efforts traditionally undertaken by the European Command.

Finally, Admiral, if you would—we understand the focus on transnational security challenges in your area of responsibility. The challenge of combating illegal drug production and trafficking continues to require the cooperation of our regional and interagency partners. Drug dealers in the region are adaptive and creative, using self-propelled semi-submersibles to move drugs as well as traditional overland and oversea methods.

I am interested in learning about SOUTHCOM's efforts against narcotrafficking, especially the use of semi-submarines and its work with partner nations to address counterdrug challenges.

In particular, some experts have noted that as a result of U.S. assistance Colombia has been emerging as a regional leader in democracy and as a counterbalance to the socialist movement led by Venezuela President Hugo Chavez and his left-leaning supporters in Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Cuba. However, I understand
that despite Cuban officials’ repeated request of his neighbors to deny safe havens to terrorists, it was necessary for Colombia to raid the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) terrorist base more than a mile into Ecuador earlier this month.

Also, it is reported that documents found in several FARC computers may indicate possible complicity of senior Ecuadorian and Venezuelan officials.

Admiral, please provide your insights into these tensions caused by narcotrafficking and terrorism in the region and how your command is addressing the military and security needs of our partners there. I am also interested in your perspective on Colombia’s role as a regional democratic leader and the future outlook for the U.S. military presence and support both in Colombia and within the region as a whole.

Chairman Skelton, thank you again for permitting me to make this statement. And I will look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman from New Jersey.

We will ask the witnesses to testify.

General Craddock, you are up at bat.

STATEMENT OF GEN. BANTZ J. CRADDOCK, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

General CRADDOCK. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, it is indeed my privilege to appear today as the commander of the United States European Command.

Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a written statement and I ask that it be made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the written statements of each of the witnesses be admitted without objection.

General CRADDOCK. Thank you.

And I am also privileged to be here today with two gifted combatant commanders and long-time friends and I indeed could not ask for a more capable wingmen than Admiral Jim Stavridis and General Kip Ward.

Over the past 15 months, I have had the honor of commanding the men and women of the European Command and I am here to report that they remain absolutely committed to our mission. The Nation is well-served by these remarkably talented, dedicated and enthusiastic soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and coastguardsmen and the families that support and sustain them.

And if you would permit me, I would like to introduce my senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) in the European Command, Command Sergeant Major Mark Farley.

Mark, would you please stand up.

It is important that he is here today, because he represents all members of the EUCOM force, the officers and the enlisted, and he is continually out and about across the command checking on the quality of life, the training conditions and the morale.

He and his fellow noncommissioned officers are essential to what we do every day. Their deeds embody the warrior spirit.

Thank you, Sergeant Major.

[Applause.]
General CRADDOCK. American forces, those of the NATO alliance and 16 other nations, are now serving together in operations on three continents. The more than 60,000 troops currently deployed under my command as the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe are a visible and effective demonstration of our continuing resolve to project stability and to deter, disrupt and defend against threats to the alliance wherever they occur.

As you know, every day European Command forces are also deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The service members assigned to EUCOM are included in our global force pool and stand available for missions as required.

While support for the global war on terror is our overarching priority, EUCOM is also focused on sustaining Europe as a global partner in furthering U.S. security relationships. Our objectives include promoting lasting security and stability, maintaining the ability to employ the full range of capabilities across the spectrum of conflict and fostering the growth of partner nation capacity and capability.

Our forward-based and rotational forces are powerful and visible instruments of national influence and our international commitment. Central to EUCOM's efforts is the completion of our strategic theatre transformation plan. Our transformation plan is synchronized with the Department of Defense (DOD), the joint staff, individual services and NATO to ensure that our efforts are mutually supportive.

A key development over the past year was the initiation of the United States Africa Command, created in recognition of the growing importance of Africa. The establishment of AFRICOM remains a work in progress. European Command has provided and will continue to make available personnel, subject matter expertise, and resources to ensure AFRICOM's future success.

NATO remains committed to collective security and increasingly to a broader and more comprehensive view of security in an interdependent world. It has taken the lead for security and stability in Afghanistan and now has over 47,000 troops deployed to the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF. This effort remains NATO's most important and challenging mission.

NATO's Kosovo mission will continue following that country's declaration of independence. KFOR, the Kosovo force, is well-trained, well-prepared and committed to providing a safe and secure environment. The European Command fully supports this effort. Approximately 10 percent of the 16,000 international troops currently in Kosovo are United States forces largely from the Army National Guard.

In summary, the dedicated men and women of the United States European Command remain steadfast in their commitment to our Nation and to our mission.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. I look forward to answering the committee's questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Craddock can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Admiral.
STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN,
COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

Admiral Stavridis. Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member, all the members of the committee, thank you very much for taking the time to come and listen, to ask us questions and to have this dialogue and discussion.

I have to echo John Craddock. I feel very blessed to be here with John Craddock and Kip Ward, two fine professionals. In fact, I feel very safe as a Navy guy to have two Army four-stars on either side of me.

I am often told that, “Admiral, what you are doing is important because this part of the world is America’s backyard.” I don’t think that is quite the right expression. It is not our backyard. It is a home that we share together here in the Americas.

And so in this vibrant and diverse part of the world, where $1.2 trillion of U.S. trade and economy goes, where there are many challenges, I think it is important that we focus as a nation and that I, at SOUTHCOM, focus as your senior military commander in the region, on an area of the world that I believe will be of increasing importance as days go by.

There are enormous challenges, starting with poverty, but also drugs and illegal trafficking, which the chairman alluded to. Terrorism, we see both narcoterrorism on the part of the FARC in Colombia, as well as nascent, the beginnings of Islamic radical terrorism.

We see violence in crime. Cuba continues as a problem in that it is the last remaining dictatorship in the Americas. Every nation in this region is a democracy, save one, and that is Cuba.

Haiti continues to be a nation that is trying to overcome extreme challenges of poverty, and today a United Nations (UN) force is there, and I hope to talk about some of their successes.

And last, we are all aware of the regional tensions that have riddled this region over recent years, most recently, as the chairman alluded to, tensions between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Thankfully, those appear to be diminished, but I am happy to talk about them today.

At SOUTHCOM, we approach our military-to-military role in ways that try and address some of these unique challenges in this region. Responding to natural disasters, working on the counternarcotics problem but in an interagency way, with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), with the Coast Guard, with other interagency partners. We conduct large exercises, like PANAMAX, which focus on defending the important Panama Canal from potential terrorist attack. That is an exercise with 20 partners. It is in every sense an international and an interagency sort of event.

We are also very focused on human rights and we have a large human rights division that works with partners throughout the region to try to inculcate good practices, and we work very hard at that.

And finally, we focus at SOUTHCOM on issues of language and culture, trying to understand the region so we can better interact with our partners.

So we are doing, I think, a reasonable job for you. I would like to talk about that today and take your questions.
Again, I thank this committee for its support to SOUTHCOM, to the Department of Defense, and, above all, to the men and women who serve our Nation at sea, shore, and in the air. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis can be found in the Appendix on page 97.]

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you very much.

General Ward, welcome.

STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM E. WARD, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

General WARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Hunter, and distinguished members of the committee.

It is an honor as commander of the United States Africa Command to present to Congress our first posture statement and also to be here with my teammates to the right, Admiral Jim Stavridis and General Jim Craddock, who I am personally thankful for their personal commitment to my efforts in standing up this command, and my thanks goes to you.

Also, as was pointed out by General Craddock, the importance of our enlisted force, I have with me my senior enlisted leader, Command Sergeant Major Mark Ripka and all the things—Mark, would you stand up?

All of the things that General Craddock said about Sergeant Major Farley certain apply here. And as importantly, with what we want to do, providing our partner nations to help increase their capacity, the role of the noncommissioned officer in that endeavor is essential.

Command Sergeant Major Ripka is an excellent example, as well as leader, in helping us promote those interests that we have as we deal with our partner nations.

Thanks, Sergeant Major.

[Applause.]

General WARD. The creation of this command signals a new focus on United States strategic interests for Africa and its island nations. Working with our African partners, interagency friends and others, we are building a new organization that will benefit the citizens of the United States and the peoples of Africa and provide a model that advances interagency cooperation in conducting security assistance.

We look forward to pioneering the Department of Defense’s vision for a joint interagency command. Africa Command will optimize the military’s contribution to achieving U.S. national security objectives in Africa. We will move forward in a deliberate and sustained way, committed to partnering with the people and nations of Africa to help create a secure and encouraging future.

Our goals for African security as well as the work that this command will oversee are a continuance of established United States activities. This will not preclude some new ideas of our own to add value to existing programs, but sets the stage for continuous improvement.

The United States has provided security assistance through a variety of programs to build capacity in African militaries and their security organizations. In my face-to-face meetings, African mili-
tary and political leaders have made it clear that they want these programs to continue. We will sustain our current efforts, and through Africa Command will improve military programs through our strategy of active security.

We will orient our programs on stability in order to prevent conflict. We will seek to enhance capacity building and those efforts that we carry out with African militaries and their standby forces. Our intent is to enable them to provide for their own security. Active security includes sustained support to our U.S. interagency partners such as the State Department’s Africa Contingency Operations and Training Assistance, the ACOTA program, which has helped prepare thousands of African military personnel for international peacekeeping operations.

ACOTA-trained forces participate in United Nations and African Union peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Darfur and other areas of conflict. U.S. Army and Marine Corps personnel conduct military-to-military training and professional development at the individual and unit level. Active security includes U.S. Air Force assistance in terms of airlift and logistics support to African peacekeepers and support to programs to assist in air domain safety and awareness.

We also provide special operations counterterrorism training teams to strengthen national capabilities and enhance multinational cooperation. Our force also supports humanitarian efforts. U.S. military programs complement the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). We have conducted de-mining in former conflict areas as well as promoted HIV/AIDS relief awareness programs in African militaries.

Additionally, the U.S. Navy’s Africa partnership station and U.S. Coast Guard activities are helping African nations increase their maritime safety and security through training activities and programs that enhance maritime awareness.

It is my honor to serve with our uniformed men and women as well as our interagency partners who are making this new command a reality.

Again, thank you for your support, and I too look forward to taking your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Ward can be found in the Appendix on page 131.]

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you.

Before I ask there to be any questions, Mr. Saxton has a comment.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

It is my pleasure and in fact an honor to welcome a new member to the committee, Mr. Rob Wittman. Rob is here with us this morning, sitting in the front row. Rob is from Montross, Virginia. He is taking the place of our great friend, the late Jo Ann Davis in the First Congressional District of Virginia. He will be serving on the Seapower and Readiness Subcommittees.

Rob’s wife is Kathryn, and he has two children, a son named Josh and a daughter named Devon.

So, welcome aboard.

[Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
I will just ask one quick question and save my questions for later.

General Ward, what is the genesis of your command? Who came up with it? Would you tell us about it, since you are brand new.

General WARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The idea of an Africa Command is not a new idea. It has been talked about for many years within the Department of Defense as a way of looking at the continent of Africa as Africans look at Africa.

About two years ago, this discussion was continuing, and I was not a part of it. But as I understand it, Chairman, the Secretary of Defense made a recommendation to the President that, as we look at how we conduct our business in providing military assistance to the continent of Africa, and recognizing the growing strategic importance of the continent, to focus our efforts in a more effective way in working with the various partners who are responsible for doing the work that they do on behalf of our Nation on the continent. An organizational construct within the Department of Defense that recognizes the totality of Africa as Africans see it was in our best interest, as far as how we focus the delivery of our security assistance programs, and how we, as the Department of Defense, look at the continent of Africa.

That recommendation was made to the President December of 2006 and in early 2007 President Bush signed the directive announcing the stand-up of United States Africa Command with an initial operational capability effective 1 October 2007 with a full operational capability to occur in October of this calendar year.

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you very much.

Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. General Craddock, let me just turn to a subject that you and I have talked about before.

In the coming weeks, the United States, as I said in my opening statement, will deploy over 3,000 men and women to Afghanistan. There appears to some to be ambiguity about the command of these additional forces.

From your perspective, will these marines fall under NATO or ISAF or CENTCOM operational control? And also, what will the missions of these—what will their missions be? And under what rules of engagement will these forces operate, ISAF’s or those of the United States?

General CRADDICK. Thank you, Congressman.

With regard to the question of the marines, 3,200 of which 1,000 will be under U.S. command, Central Command, for training purposes. The remainder, 2,200, will be assigned by transfer of authority to ISAF. They will be under the operational control of the commander of ISAF, General McNeill. And he has the authority, then, to leave them under his command or either provide them to regional commanders under an operational control assignment or a tactical assignment.

I have talked to Com ISAF. He said that will depend upon the mission and the task that those marines are given. The missions will be largely in regional command south. They can expect to be out and about in patrols and come in contact with the opposition
militant forces, the insurgents, and they will be in a combat role. They will operate under NATO rules of engagement.

And I specifically got that authority for the ISAF commitment from the Secretary of Defense. I asked him, “Will they be sent under ISAF or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),” and he said they will come under ISAF, transfer of authority to ISAF, the term we use in NATO, and they will work for Com ISAF.

Mr. SAXTON. With regard to the question you asked earlier from Ranking Member Hunter, does the command and control laid down make sense? This is one of these I think unique situations, that it briefs terribly, but in reality on the ground it works well. It is hard to explain, but because over several years in application and because this is largely a combat situation and lives are at risk, commanders have been able to work through processes and agreements to do so.

The fact that Com ISAF is a U.S. commander also is I think a leveling factor in the command and control apparatus.

So at this time, and this is my judgment between NATO, ISAF, the United States coalition, Operation Enduring Freedom, it is functional. I have asked Com ISAF that. He said it is working fine with him and he sees no reason at this time to make a change.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

Let me just ask you the other NATO question with regard to the level of commitment of our NATO allies relative to NATO’s minimum military requirement and the seeming failure of roughly half the 26 allies to meet that requirement.

General CRADDOCK. Thank you. There are two points here I think.

First of all is the commitment in Afghanistan. NATO gave allied command operations, my headquarters and all my subordinate headquarters, a task. We told them what we needed in terms of the numbers of organizations, military capability to do that, and the NATO nations have yet to provide that full capability.

We are still short maneuver units. We are short of functional capability, what we call key enablers, rotary wing aviation, heavy medium-lift helicopters. We are short intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability.

So they are continually I guess I would use the term “tin cupping” our nation’s back again and again and again to try to get a political commitment to provide that capability. It exists in the alliance.

When I talk to my counterparts, they acknowledge it. There is an understanding that they could provide, but the issues are political in nature.

Now, the second part, the level of commitment to the NATO nations to their defense establishments. NATO has set a benchmark of two percent of GDP against the defense sector as an objective. It is my understanding today based on my accounting and there is a little bit—nations have a different perspective. But the way we are looking at it, of the 26 NATO nations, 7 have met the 2 percent benchmark.

The trends for those seven are not positive. Some of those seven we find the commitment, the percent, going down. And of the 19 remaining, we find a mixed bag. But I would say overall we do not
see a general trend of increasing of the commitment to the security sector to get to the two percent across the board.

Mr. SAXTON. I guess that would be fairly troubling to someone in your position. Is there an effort through your interaction with the commanders and the political structures in the 26 countries to try to rectify the situation?

General CRADDOCK. Indeed there is, at various levels. I interface routinely with chiefs of defense, encourage them, one, to contribute more capability to Afghanistan and ISAF; second, to work with their political leaders to increase the level of budget authority given to the defense sector.

I have taken this argument, if you will, this dilemma, to the defense ministers repeatedly, administrators, and also to the foreign ministers. I have appeared before the North Atlantic Council several times with the same appeal. They need to continue to increase the budget share, the GDP share, so that several things can happen. One, they can support operations, which are costly. Two, they can then support transformation of their forces to 21st century expeditionary deployable capable forces.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

Let me just ask General Ward, General Ward, you have got a unique set of challenges, I am sure, in your new job. And I am just wondering if you could just kind of tick off the top three challenges that you have for us. What makes your job particularly difficult? And if you like, tell us about some of the successes that you have had so far.

General WARD. Thank you, Congressman.

As you know, the command is just standing up, and so clearly the challenge of forming a brand new organization is there. I attribute success on any given week when I make a phone call and the same number that I used to contact one of my staff's offices is still in effect, or I walk down the hallway and the office that I think someone is in, they are still in that same office over a week's period of time.

We are building a team. We are bringing together a diverse mix of civilians and military personnel that will come together and cause us to be more effective and comprehensive as we plan the activities that we will conduct in helping our nations who we partner with on the continent of Africa and their supporting organizations be more capable of providing for their security.

As we do that, we are dealing with nations who are in varying stages of democracy. Their maturing levels are at varying stages. And so therefore we have to do it very cognizant of the fact that one size does not fit all. We have to be very understanding of our partners, cultural appreciation, understanding of historical relationships, so that we deliver a program that in fact does what they want to do, what we want to do, and our combined interest of building capacity in ways that provide for long-term stability on the continent of Africa.

This is a long-term endeavor. I am not known as being a very patient individual, but I know I have to be, because this is something that we realize, quite frankly, not in days and weeks, but over time.
So as we build this command, sir, causing the expectations to be metered or checked in a way that one keeps the enthusiasm for what we want to do present but at the same time recognizing the realities of the situation so that we in fact do bring value added and do no harm to a very important part of the world through programs that mean a lot for our own internal stability as well as our national security and, importantly, the security of the African continent.

So working through that, putting programs in place, putting campaign plans, if you will, in place, that are well-understood, so that our intent is better understood, so that it is not misrepresented. So we have a challenge in our strategic communications. We are working that aspect of it. So we don't confuse our true intent and when we do that, it is in fact met with positive results. The challenge is that is a time-consuming endeavor as well, and it is one that we must repeat over and over again.

And so it is those sorts of things that we are doing that we have to be focused, we have to remain dedicated as we do them.

The aspect of this entire endeavor, Congressman, and I will tell you, remains very encouraging for me as I travel around the continent, and my senior staff, my two deputies, one of whom is a senior member of the Department of State, the ministerial counselor, my deputy for civil military affairs, we receive good support for our efforts of helping them be more capable of providing for their own security.

They appreciate that attention and focus and the recognition that this command illustrates of their importance is something that is well-received.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, I have some questions about SOUTHCOM which I will hold for a little bit later and give some other people a chance here.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have a second round.

Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Stavridis, good to see you, sir.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, good to see you. Thank you.

Mr. ORTIZ. Welcome to our witnesses today.

I was just wondering if you have any concerns about any increased presence of Islamic radicalism in the Southern Command region? And what is your assessment on any current terrorist training activity that might be being conducted in the region or funded through illegal drug trafficking? And does the relationship that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has developed with Iran concern you?

The other day, we had the commandant of the Marine Corps, and I asked him about what was happening then, breaking relations with Colombia. Another question is, we don't know what type of equipment he has bought, unless maybe we do have the intelligence. I know he has been buying equipment from many, many places.

I know I put a lot of questions there, but maybe you can at least touch on some of them, Admiral.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I certainly can, sir.
Let me start with terrorism in the region, and I think it is important to recognize there are sort of two levels or two forms of terrorism in this part of the world. There is narcoterrorism, which we think of most clearly associated with the FARC in Colombia and the Sendero Luminoso, the Shining Path, in Peru. These are groups that have Marxist-Leninist views, and are using narcotics and kidnapping as a means of raising funds. So they are using terrorist methods for political upheaval that they are attempting to direct against democratically-elected governments.

So that is narcoterrorism, and that is a force that must be contended with, and I am very encouraged by how our friends in Colombia are responding to the FARC, who has been reduced from a high of about 18,000 members down to somewhere around 8,000 or 9,000. So that is narcoterrorism. It is a constant struggle, and it is one that is going fairly well in Colombia.

Islamic radical terrorism is a much less immediate force in the region, but it has the potential to become of greater concern to us. At the moment, I would say at an unclassified level it is largely centered on proselytizing, recruiting, money laundering. It is hooked somewhat into the narcotics trade. And above all, it is a means of generation of revenue, largely for the Hezbollah Islamic radical organization. Moneys are garnered here in Latin America and go back to Hezbollah. So that is of concern.

Iran, as we know, is a state sponsor of terrorism, has links to Hezbollah, and so I am concerned about linkages between the Iranian state and nascent Islamic radical terrorism in this region.

Now, sir, you asked also about the issues in Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia. As I think most of us know, about two weeks ago there was a flare-up there involving a border incursion by the Colombian military and an attack against a FARC leader. Diplomatic relations were broken or about to be broken among several of those states.

There was some movement of troops toward borders. I am happy to report that the leaders in the region, and this is an important and positive thing, that the leaders in the region have settled that amongst themselves at a summit that was convened in the Dominican Republic last week.

In addition to the good work by the leaders of the states involved, there were also the good offices, President Lula of Brazil, President Bachelet of Chile, and other regional important actors.

So the region came together to solve that problem, and that is very encouraging.

Now, finally, sir, you asked about the equipment that the Venezuelans are obtaining, the military equipment, and I will tell you, as I did last year, I am concerned about it. It seems like a high level of weapons purchases. Let me give you some examples: 25 high-performance aircraft, 50 new attack helicopters, over 100,000 AK103 very advanced automatic rifles, military transports, diesel submarines, very advanced technology.

I personally have difficulty understanding why that level of weapons would be needed by the Venezuelan state, because as we have just seen, this is a region that is not prone to going to war, but has the capacity to solve peacefully disputes.
So I think I have tripped along through a whole series of questions there, but hopefully I got to where you wanted to go, sir.

Mr. ORTIZ. You answered them well, but before my time runs out, General Ward, we are happy to be in Africa, but sometimes our country goes to places where maybe we are imposing or maybe they don’t want us to be there. But I think that in your opening statement you mentioned that we were welcome there, that you talked to the political leaders and the community.

Are we going to be welcome there? The first question I must ask is do they want us there?

General WARD. Thank you, Congressman.

They want what we can offer them in assistance as they work to build their capacity. How we do that is a very important—and your point is one that we pay strict attention to—the notion of being there insofar as how we deliver security assistance.

Yes, sir. They do want us there. They want us there to assist them as they help increase their own capacity as they be more proficient, as they cause their transforming militaries to be militaries that are respectful of human rights, that are responsive to elected civil authorities, that also abide by the rule of law.

Our example, our relationship with them, helps them move in that direction.

The presence issue with respect to where we go and how we go, is an issue that is a bit more complicated, and the deliberateness of anything that we do is taken with that in mind.

And so at this point in time, there are no intentions from the standpoint of rushing through the continent in the traditional form of establishing a headquarters or bases or things of that sort.

As we continue to deliver programs, as these programs are desired by the Africans, as these programs are in keeping with our foreign policy objectives, our national security objectives, and if it is determined that a presence will be something that will be more supportive of that, then that would be pursued when those conditions are there with our African partners, with obviously our government here, and full transparency of the fact that what we do is something that we all want to occur.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. My time just ran out. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

John McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, you were are all very gracious to each other in your opening comments, appropriately so.

I should tell you, we are all very fortunate to have three such distinguished gentlemen in service to this Nation and we thank you all for that.

General Craddock, you wrote in your written statement about the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. Could you tell us a little bit more about that? Obviously, terrorism is a concern we all have. We just heard Admiral Stavridis talk about SOUTHCOM and the dangers that exist there.

But as we look across the globe, certainly up in the Maghreb and certainly throughout the Horn, et cetera, is a very troubling spot. And I would be interested in exactly how the partnership is work-
ing and how, if at all, you are working with General Ward to kind of bring that big continent together in that initiative.

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Congressman.

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Program is a program originally initiated with the Department of State and Department of Defense, so there are two components to this.

The overarching program Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Program, and that is a State lead. And that is bringing many of the civil aspects of building institutions, enhancing infrastructure, to that area. And then the other side of that is Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara (OEF–TS), the DOD side, where we are working with the nations there in the Maghreb area, to build their capabilities, security capabilities and capacities, for better control and self-defense in their own interest.

I would tell you that the OEF–TS side of that is fully funded. My assessment is it is working well. We have used the SOCEUR, the Special Operations Command of Europe, personnel through the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCETs) over the last couple of years to great extent and great advantage. And we are working very well with our partner nation militaries there to enhance their capability.

I would tell you that the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Program is working. But it has not been funded to that same level that the OEF–TS is. So we are hoping to be able to get that up and move that along a little faster.

The threat, as you know, I am sure, is the affiliation now of Islamic terrorists in that region with al Qaeda. The al Qaeda, AQIM, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, now has become, if you will, a franchise. We are seeing linkages and we are seeing financial and logistic support and training support also.

It is becoming bolder in terms of its attacks and increasingly a greater threat to the nations of that region.

Now at this time, the OEF–TS, Trans-Sahara, the DOD part of the effort there, is still in the hands of European Command, because AFRICOM has not stood up to the extent that we can transfer that function. We are in the process, a very complex but amazing effort by two staffs, particularly the AFRICOM transition team, to identify all the missions, activities, programs, operations and exercises, and it is an enormous undertaking. And then timeline a transfer of that authority and responsibility to AFRICOM.

So the OEF–TS has yet to transfer. We are working to ensure that Kip Ward’s folks are onboard, trained, and then ready to transfer that over. So we all have it, I think, for the next several months; obviously, the objective, by the end of the fiscal year.

But I am, again, encouraged with the military-to-military effort that is ongoing. We are working with our State Department colleagues to enhance the capability of the Trans-Sahara program from their aspect.

Mr. MCHUGH. We all look forward to that, to Kip Ward getting both feet and both hands, as I know he can do, on that as well.

Let me ask you, I am going to give you your choice because we have got very short time here. You also mentioned in that regard your concerns about some of the lack of interoperability of foreign military sales and also the concerns you have with military sat-
ellite (MILSAT) architecture. Pick one of those and tell us what the problems are.

General CRADDOCK. Let me deal with the interoperability. I think what we have to do is have a—and it is not just, I don’t think, EUROC or AFRICOM. We have to have a more coherent approach to our capabilities, if you will.

Working with nations, determining what it is they think they need, and then understanding what it is we want them to achieve, what capabilities are needed in today’s world, and then working with the security cooperation folks and Office of Secretary of Defense to provide coherent packages so that we apply the same equipment, if you will, capabilities, particularly in some of these high tech electronics, to all the nations as opposed to randomly selecting certain types for each nation and then they never work together when we need them.

And we just haven’t done a good job, and we have got to get a more coherent approach.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to ask how information flows and what you all’s roles are.

Admiral Fallon was here on March 5 testifying as the combatant commander for Central Command—and by the way, I consider the five of you geographical combatant commanders just the pinnacle of what is good about America. We greatly value your service and your expertise. You are a combination of soldier, diplomat and wise people, and we appreciate you.

Admiral Fallon, in response somewhat to Ms. Sanchez’s question and Mr. Thornberry’s, I believe, at some point said that he needed 2,000 additional troops, primarily trainers, in Afghanistan. Now, he didn’t talk about NATO troops. He was talking about he needed 2,000 more U.S. troops in Afghanistan. He didn’t mince any words about it.

The following day we had the commandant of the Marine Corps, and I asked him if he could provide the 2,000 troops and he said, no, not without changing the dwell time issues and the whole issue of the frequency of deployment.

On March 12, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) was here, Admiral Keating, and I asked him—he had expressed some reservations in the press about he was down 30,000 troops overall. I asked him, what if somebody asked him for 2,000 more troops now, and he said he could provide them. He repeated and emphasized he had 280,000 troops and he had the ability of coming up with 2,000 troops.

So my question is, we are a nation at war in two places, one of them being Afghanistan. There is no controversy, I don’t think, in the minds of the American people or the Congress, about Afghanistan.

We have the combatant commander, Admiral Fallon, testifying publicly he needs 2,000 more troops. We have another one of your colleagues, Admiral Keating, testifying that he can provide the 2,000 troops. What am I missing here? Why is that, given the incredible respect that we all have for you and I think the Pentagon
and the military has for you, where is the disconnect in the flow of information?

General CRADDOCK. Let me start, if I could, Congressman.

I am surprised also. Look, if I were asked, if you are asking me, can I provide 2,000 out of European Command, the answer is no, because my forces are in the global force pool. My forces are rotating into Iraq and into Afghanistan, and my forces are managed by the joint staff and they are available for assignments as required.

So in our global——

Dr. SNYDER. So you are what we call a force receiver, not a force provider.

General CRADDOCK. I am a force provider to OIF and OEF, from my assigned forces in European Command. I do not receive forces unless I go back with a request for forces for a specific purpose and ask for them.

Dr. SNYDER. Right.

Admiral S TAVRIDIS. I think I'll probably be in the same position as General Ward, but in my personal situation, sir, first of all, we have only at any given time less than 4,000 troops deployed throughout this region of the world. I am not a heavy demand in any sense.

I have no assigned troops. I simply go to the pool that General Craddock is talking about.

So my needs are met. I don't have any excess. And in terms of the specific question you have about Admiral Fallon and Admiral Keating, I am sorry. I just can't address that.

I am a satisfied user of what I think is a sensible system.

Dr. SNYDER. And I assume, General Ward, you are in that same——

General WARD. That is correct, Congressman.

Dr. SNYDER. You understand our confusion.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I do.

Dr. SNYDER. I mean, we want to win these wars.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. Regardless of people's views about how we got into Iraq, we want the best outcome we can have. And we have somebody at your level saying I need 2,000 troops. It is concerning. It is very, very concerning.

I wanted to ask the same question I asked Admiral Keating about Admiral Fallon, which is, because of my great respect for you all and the information that you provide both privately and in these public settings, while you all can be replaced tomorrow, there is always concern created when something happens like what has gone on the last week with Admiral Fallon.

My question is, do we have to have any reservations that the wrong signal is going to be sent to the three of you that the information you are going to provide us, both publicly and privately, is somehow going to be constrained by what has occurred in the last few days with Admiral Fallon's resignation?

General CRADDOCK. Congressman, when I took this job, as I have previous assignments, I will be forthright and answer your questions without any hesitation. I have no reservation or concern with that regard.
So in terms of what has happened here recently, today I know what I read in the papers, and that is probably not enough. But I will continue to respond as I always have, to the best of my ability, to answer the questions where they lie.

Admiral Stavridis. As I think we say on Capitol Hill, I want to associate myself with General Craddock’s remarks. I agree completely.

The essence of all these jobs is honest and integrity, and I will continue to answer all questions put to me honestly and with integrity.

General Ward. Representative, that has been my way of doing business for 36-plus years and I will not change.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
The gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country.

There is an old Indian saying that you shouldn’t criticize a person until you have walked a day in their moccasins. We are unsympathetic when Russia complains about the enlargement of NATO into countries that were once a part of the Soviet Union and when they complain about the installation of military facilities in those countries.

General Craddock, I would like you to image for a moment that we had lost the Cold War. NATO is gone, but the Warsaw Pact is alive and growing. And from time to time, new countries are added to the Warsaw Pact. This time, the countries that are being added to the Warsaw Pact are Mexico and Canada.

How do you think you would feel, sir, in that situation?

General Craddock. As a citizen in a democracy, I would be concerned.

Mr. Bartlett. You see, I have some trouble understanding how it is in our long-term national security interest to antagonize Russia by extending NATO, which was set up specifically to counter the Warsaw Pact, by enlarging NATO into countries that are directly on their border and then putting military facilities there.

I am all for a European goodwill society. I just think that naming it NATO is inherently threatening to Russia.

And when I put myself in the position of Russia, imagining that NATO is gone, the Warsaw Pact is enlarging and the next two member nations joining it would be Canada and Mexico.

I really don’t need a response sir, I just wanted to get this on the record. Just one member’s observation, trying to sit in another person’s seat and see how they see the world from that position.

Thank you all again, very, very much, for your service.
The Chairman. Ms. Sanchez, please.

Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, once again, for being before us.
I have a couple of questions. I think the majority of my other question with respect to the troops in Afghanistan and the information we had from Admiral Fallon and others I think was taken up by Mr. Snyder, so I appreciate you following up on that, Mr. Snyder.
I have a question for Admiral Stavridis. In your written testimony you articulate that your command facilitates military and defense exchanges, numerous defense seminars and mobile training teams throughout the region, and you go on to say that training at the security institutions continues to be very popular and beneficial toward the partners in the region and access to funded billets as a U.S. school significantly diminishes the draw of extra-hemispheric military influence.
So I would like to ask you about a specific security institution since I didn't see it mentioned in your 47 pages of written testimony. As you know, each year the House of Representatives votes on whether to cut funding for the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, or WHINSEC. And as you know, I am on the board of visitors of that institution for this committee. It is at Ft. Benning.
And last year the House had a very close vote on whether to eliminate the funding for WHINSEC, a vote of 203 to 214. So, Admiral, is WHINSEC a priority for your command? And if so, how do you rank its importance within the other priorities of your posture statement?
Admiral Stavridis. WHINSEC is our premiere opportunity for high-volume, high-quality training for military officers and senior enlisted from the entirety of Latin America. And it is important to say it is not just the students, ma'am. There are also 200 on the faculty, including representatives from 18 different countries, on the faculty, as you know from your time on the board of visitors.
About 1,000 students at any given time, so the throughput is very high. It represents about 60 percent of our total available methodology for bringing our military partners from throughout Latin America, the Caribbean and Central America.
I want to hit a bell that is very important and that, again, as you know from being on the board of visitors, is absolutely central to this is the human rights curriculum there. And that is about 35 percent of the total curriculum that any given student receives. And to have that centralized is very, very important and powerful for us.
So I would put WHINSEC very near the top, if not the top, of this particular segment of our outreach and ability to get into the region. And I continue to be very supportive of it.
I should also mention, if I could, ma'am, that Mexico is not formally part of SOUTHCOM. It is part of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). But I have had many conversations with General Renuart, my opposite number at NORTHCOM, and he is equally strong a supporter of WHINSEC as I am.
Ms. Sanchez. And, Admiral, how does having graduates of WHINSEC, I don't know how many they would number at this point, but we have had the school for a long time now——
Admiral Stavridis. Thousands.
Ms. SANCHEZ [continuing]. As you know, former School of the Americas. We had some problems with that. We changed it over.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Right.

Ms. SANCHEZ. How does that affect your cooperative posture with respect to your counterparts or people under you who deal with these different countries as we try to figure out what the security situation should be for the western hemisphere?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, as you can imagine, it is just a powerful human linkage. If we think about how we in the United States try and send our message into the world, there are a lot of ways to do that. You can do it with film, you can do it with television, you can do it with radio, you can do it with publication. But human contact trumps all other forms in the transfer of information.

So that human-to-human dimension that occurs when 1,000 students a year come, live in a beautiful place like Georgia and are welcomed into the homes of the families who are sponsoring them. It creates an absolutely indelible bond that then pays off in the sense that if you think what we are doing in the U.S. military is right, generally, and we sure make our mistakes, but generally you think what we are doing is right, I think you should feel good that we are attempting to transfer some of that value system into our partners and neighbors.

And also I have to say we learn a lot from them. We learn an enormous amount about the region from having students from 13, 20, 25 countries, come through that course. We learn about their culture, their language, their approach, what they value, what they don't value.

So that exchange becomes very powerful as you get into a situation where, for example, there are regional tensions, and yet there are students, former students from each of the countries, who have served, who know each other, who know people in the United States. It allows us to help defuse tension, as simply one example of the payout of WHINSEC.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the gentlelady's inquiry on that school.

Admiral, as you know, there have been in years and years past complaints about graduates from that school, or its predecessor. To your knowledge, have there been any problems or complaints or such, human rights violations, of graduates in recent years?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No, sir.

And I would like to add that first of all it is utterly transparent. We are happy to have any Member of Congress, any reporter, come any time. And we also have an open house day when any member of the public can come. Last year we had 1,000 people come, including some people who disagreed with the former school, the old School of the Americas.

And we simply are trying to show that this is not the School of the Americas. This is a new institution that is absolutely centered on human rights and the exchange of information with Members of Congress, such as Congresswoman Sanchez, Senator Levin, and others who are on the board of visitors, to help make sure it fulfills the correct ambitions that we all have for it.
Mr. Hayes.

Mr. Hayes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And gentlemen, again, let me echo my thanks to all of you and the men and women who serve under your command.

General Ward, in your command, I know special forces will play a very important role in terms of helping with training, indirect action, and other supporting activities. Would you comment for the committee on how that is working out and just talk about the positive aspects of our participation there?

General Ward. Thank you, Congressman.

As General Craddock pointed out, at the current time the activities on the continent are still being conducted under the auspices of U.S. European Command and General Craddock’s Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) still is in charge of those activities where special operation forces are doing work in Africa.

U.S. Africa Command does envision a theatre of special operations command. That command is being formed now, as is my headquarters, to be doing similar work that is being done by SOCEUR on the continent.

Those activities include military-to-military training activities, basic unit tactics techniques, and procedures in conducting security operations that helps those nations provide for their own internal defense as well as the capability and capacity to participate in like-minded activities that help counter the terrorist threats that exist in their regions.

And so there will be a theatre of special operations command as a part of U.S. Africa Command that will have the mission of providing for extremist response should that be required, as is currently the case through SOCEUR. And this theatre of special operations command will exist with capabilities similar to the capabilities that exist in any geographic combatant headquarters as it pertains to their special operations command and its capabilities.

Mr. Hayes. Thanks to those comments, I think we are all appreciative of the role that they play there. And given the emerging status of Africa as it relates to oil and other resources, again, they are even more important.

General Craddock, would you like to comment as the general in charge at the moment as well?

General Craddock. Thank you, Congressman.

I can only endorse what General Ward said and what you just said. They are very important.

Because they are out and about in these JCETs, these exchange training activities, let me give you an example. Recently there was some instability in Chad and it was very fast paced and actually was a bit unanticipated. Because we had JCETs in the region training counterparts, we were able to quickly put them in the right position with some fixed-wing lift capability and to assist the ambassador with a communications capability with the opportunity then to provide him a command and control capacity that he would not have had, and to quickly work the ordered departure that was implemented by the State Department for the embassy there.

Now, that happens because we have got those forces, those Operational Detachment-Alpha Teams (A-teams) and those JCETs en-
gaged in the theatre with small capability. But again, it is a little bit in a large theatre that goes a long way.

So I will tell you that SOCEUR, Special Operations Command Europe, is extraordinarily high tempo engagement in Africa that will transition to Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF) at the appropriate time.

Mr. HAYES. Thank you for those comments.

I think it is important for the public to know how much of a role those forces—and all our forces are special, make no mistake about that—but in prevention of conflicts and other things.

General Craddock, drug flow from South America through Africa to Europe, what is AFRICOM, and I'll pass it on to you, too, General Ward, mission in that regard? We know that is happening as well.

General CRADDOCK. At this time, with regard to EUCOM, since we still have that mission and we are watching closely in West Africa, and the lines of communication, both for smuggling of drugs and actual persons and arms also, through West Africa, up through the North Africa Maghreb, and into the southern part of Europe. There is great concern that that is also a potential foreign fighter flow through that area and onward movement toward the Middle East.

There is concern in Europe also. I won’t say we partner, but we coordinate closely with SOUTHCOM. There is a new counterdrug office organization set up in Spain, I believe.

Admiral Stavridis. That is in Lisbon, Portugal.

General CRADDOCK. That we are monitoring, SOUTHCOM is working closely with, so we can enhance the picture that we have, it is ongoing, increase the intelligence gathering means in that region, and then be able to have a common operating picture across the combatant commands (COCOMs).

Now, when AFRICOM comes onboard, again, we transition that to them. But we are seeing more and more great concern and sensitivity of the European nations, and they are participating in this to a greater extent, and that is a good thing.

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

We have, it appears, I am told, two votes. One is the Lee amendment and the other is a quorum call for the purposes of swearing in a new member.

Mrs. Davis.

MRS. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to all of you for your long-standing service to our country. It has been exceptional. We appreciate it.

I wonder if you could turn specifically, General Craddock, to talking about the 1207 authority and the use of funds from the DOD to the stabilization efforts but nonmilitary efforts through the State Department. Have you been able to use that authority? And has the response been what you would expect?

I know that this is relatively new, but we are going to be looking at that authority again.

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Congresswoman. I appreciate that.
The 1206, 1207, and 1208 authorities indeed are relatively new, but they have been in this short time, in my judgment, very powerful. The title 22 funding through the Department of State into regions for the purposes then of foreign military financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) is all very helpful, but here is another opportunity with authority from State Department, funding from the Department of Defense, to be able to provide another avenue for building partner nation capability and capacity in counterterrorism activities.

And we are finding throughout Africa and I think also in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, if you will, this is helpful because these terrorist organizations are embedding themselves into criminal organizations and using centuries-old lines of smuggling, if you will, to move back and forth, not only persons but weapons, arms and other contraband that they use, obviously, to gain financial advantage.

So this authority provides us, 1207 particularly, some infrastructure capability to assist partner nations to come onboard and increase their capacities to deal with this.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. When do you think is a fair time to assess the extent to which they have been able to really capitalize on that, to be able to bring those individuals forward?

General CRADDOCK. Well, I don't think it is right now. First of all, the 1206 we got first, and we are using it now to greater advantage. The 1207 has come onboard. Quite frankly, in this huge system we have, it takes a while to understand what we can do to work through the legal framework of what the limits of the authority is and then apply it. We have to get it out to our offices of defense cooperation.

I think it will take a couple to three years to really see the value.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Is there anything that we can do to be more helpful in that regard?

General CRADDOCK. I think that enhancement of the 1206; I think we are limited now. We have asked for more. It would be helpful. And then second, watch that and continue to cascade that into the 1207, as we come back and give you positive results.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate that.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Can I just add a comment to that from the SOUTHCOM perspective?

First of all, I believe General Craddock is on point in everything he said. I would only add to it, it is important to know, it is kind of a dual-key approach. It is both State Department, as in the ambassador, as well as the combatant commander, who sort of close that switch together. So it is a real example of sensible interagency partnering and, thus, I think is a powerful tool.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Do you think it could also stimulate our European allies or our allies generally in NATO to be engaging in similar efforts? Is it something that we see on their part, and does it define in any way the threats as they see them in the region?

General CRADDOCK. Let me provide two responses and I hope they are not flip.

One is, if it costs money, they probably are not interested. Second, when we talk counterterrorism, they view it as a public secu-
rity issue, not as a national security issue. And that will be difficult.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

General Ward, could I just quickly—when I happened to take a trip to several of the African countries, I wondered to what extent are we using contractors, military contractors, to train our African military there in Africa?

General WARD. Congresswoman, the ACOTA program, the Africa Contingency for Operations and Training Assistance, a State Department program, is a program that is implemented through contractors. This program is supplemented where we can by uniform military members as well, to help provide a current and living example of those attributes through a uniform serving member.

But that ACOTA program is a State Department program and it is implemented through contracts.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. If we had the personnel available, would we prefer to have that done through the Department of Defense?

General WARD. I think the example that is provided by uniform members, there is none any more powerful.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. And thank the gentlelady.

We will recess for the two votes and return.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the witnesses’ indulgence. We not surprisingly may have additional votes soon. But we will forge on.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And Generals, Admiral, thank you for being here today.

I have the perspective of being a Member of Congress representing Parris Island, representing Pt. Jackson, the Beaufort Marine Air Station, the Naval Hospital at Beaufort. Additionally, I am a veteran, 31 years. But more importantly, I have got four sons serving in the military, three in the Army Guard, one a Navy doctor who has served in Iraq. And so I am very proud of our military. I am very appreciative as a parent of your service. I have never been prouder of the American military and I want to thank you.

General Craddock, this is such an exciting time, with victory in the Cold War, with the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe. I have worked very closely with the Republic of Bulgaria. I am the co-chair, along with Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher.

This developing free-market democracy two years ago for the first time in their 1,225 years of existence, their national assembly voted for NATO bases, American bases, to be located in their country.

Can you tell us what the status is of the new bases in Bulgaria?

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Congressman.

First of all, let me just thank you for your support and those of your sons. We appreciate that, their service and your support for their service, and all the service members.

With regard to Bulgaria, Joint Task Force East, as you know, is the name given to the construct to put a joint task force head-
quarters stationed in Bulgaria, Romania and some of their facilities there and then rotate forces through that.

We have received the funding required for the projects, in order to put the brick and mortar together to accomplish that. We are almost complete now with the finalizing for both countries, Romania and Bulgaria, of the technical agreements. I think 11 of 12 at the last time I checked, which was a few weeks ago, have been completed and are in place.

My deputy went down to sign off on several of those recently.

So I think that we are well on our way to reaching agreement with the how of what we are going to do, the brick and mortar is going in to provide the structures that we all need.

And then the last part, the forces available to do the rotation, and then jointly with the Bulgarians and the Romanians, accomplish the, one, the engagement, and, two, the training for us as well as them.

Now, we are a bit short on the forces. We are using forces out of European Command to do that, because of the intensity and the requirements of OIF and OEF. Our request for forces is yet unfilled.

We all continue to do that. I have talked to the commander of European Command and we are confident we can put together the required forces. The key here is engagement.

Mr. WILSON. Additionally, I have visited Russia a number of times and I am still hopeful for a positive relationship with that country. We have shared interest of fighting terrorism, of also the threat of nuclear proliferation.

What has been our contact, inter-military contact, with Russia?

General CRADDOCK. European Command meets regularly at the staff brigadier, major general, one- and two-star level, with Russian counterparts. They do that to work through work plans for exercises, engagements, where we will exchange type units for a period of two or three years.

Recently we finished that for the coming years. That was brought back. And that document, the work plan, was signed by the chairman of the joint chiefs with his counterpart, the Russian chief of defense.

So we have an ongoing engagement. This year, we completed in December Torgau, which is an annual exercise. A bit more robust this year, we were encouraged, than in years past. We are hoping to be able to increase that for the future.

The engagement between EUCOM and the Russian forces, I would characterize as difficult. We have not lost any ground, but we are not gaining ground because of the political influence rolling into the military engagement.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

In lieu of the last question, I just want to extend, every time I see General Ward, my open invitation for a home for him, for he and his command, in Charleston, South Carolina, on behalf of the Charleston Metro Chamber of Commerce. Indeed, we have a whole list of reasons why Charleston would be perfectly situated for AFRICOM.

Thank you and congratulations.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is out of order.
Mr. Wilson. We have got a home for you, too, in a condo, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]

The Chairman. I have lost my train of thought.

Mr. Johnson, please.

Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good afternoon, gentlemen. Thank you for your service to the Nation.

Admiral Stavridis, is Cuba a threat to the United States’ security?

Admiral Stavridis. I do not believe that in today’s environment Cuba is a military threat to the United States.

I think the unfortunate aspect of Cuba is that it is a dictatorship. Three months ago, 614 seats in their legislature were filled by 614 candidates who ran for office. Power passed at the fiat of Fidel Castro to his brother, Raul, without changing anything, without improving human rights, without improving conditions for dissidents and without opening economically, without anything that would relieve the oppression of decades.

So I think of Cuba not as a military threat but as a threat to democracy in that they are the last remaining nation in this region that does not follow the rule of democracy, and I think that is deeply unfortunate.

Mr. Johnson. Thank you, sir.

General Ward, AFRICOM’s mission requires it to work with both non-DOD and non-U.S. Government organizations. Can you describe your experience so far in establishing relationships and partnerships with non-U.S. Government organizations conducting stabilization and reconstruction activities within the area of operations of AFRICOM?

General Ward. Thank you, Congressman.

As was pointed out, we have not taken over those missions just yet from U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Pacific Command.

Mr. Johnson. Are those operations that are ongoing?

General Ward. The operations that are ongoing are being done through mechanisms that we have been using. What I have attempted to do is reinforce the fact with these nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and agencies that it is not our intent to do their work. What we want to do, quite frankly, is to have a better understanding of their activities and where we can, through our actions, be supportive of them, we want to understand and do that.

I have met with representatives of various NGOs as well as other international organizations. I have met with USAID. USAID has hosted several of these meetings that I have conducted with nongovernmental organizations so that we can understand more clearly, firstly, what they are doing; second, where there are common lines of mutual support, where we can pursue those. And then working in ways that we can achieve that mutual benefit.

I think as I have done that quite frankly, Congressman, there has been receptivity to the approach. There has been a welcomed appreciation for the outreach that we have extended and wanting to know better. And I think the important thing—another important thing is, where we see a contact line that just isn’t appropriate, then we certainly would honor that and stay away.
Mr. JOHNSON. Typically, what are some of the things that the NGOs and other potential partners value about American involvement in that region of the world? What is it that they want from us?

General WARD. The NGOs that are working there that we have been in contact with, some of them, see our ability to get into the environment, the sustained nature of our presence in building relationships.

As an example, we have conducted exercises whereby NGOs, and I'll use one to cite one, Project Hope has been a part of the exercises. We have gone in and worked with a Hope nation in addressing their medical capacity requirements. We then also have done partnering with NGOs.

Mr. JOHNSON. But these are not military operations. These are more soft-power type operations.

General WARD. Correct. It is a blending of the soft power with what we do. Exactly correct, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. If you could, describe for us the overall Department of Defense involvement in stabilization and reconstruction activities in Africa, including activities funded by DOD, State, USAID and other agencies where DOD plays a lead or supporting role.

General WARD. Sir, the Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTRs) are projects that are operated under the auspices of our foreign policy, State Department, established through those programs. Where we are involved is in the transformation and modernization of armed forces of those nations. And we do that through our military-to-military training. We do that through the administration of various programs, the International Military Education and Training Program, whereby the professionalization, the NCO leadership, officer leadership, the professionalization of their militaries, is a part of the SSTR, we have a role in doing those sorts of activities. And we do that in greater support of the greater programs of stabilization and reconstruction within a particular nation and its military's uniform services.

Mr. JOHNSON. What has been your experience so far in the development of a workable interagency process? And in particular, how closely are the State Department and Department of Defense coordinating on plans for the command and on U.S. military efforts in Africa in general?

General WARD. There has been a very close level of cooperation and coordination with the State Department. The State Department was involved in the planning of the command, during the transition team activities. They remain involved with the input of my deputy to the commander for military activities, who is a senior State Department ambassador, who is one of my two deputies. And the planning that we do is done in very close coordination with the Department of State, both at my headquarters as well as main State here in Washington.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Georgia, Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Chairman Skelton, thank you.

In a way, I am going to continue on, really, the line of questioning from my friend from Georgia, Representative Johnson.
I am going to direct most of my questions, though, to Admiral Stavridis.

But General Ward, what you were just saying in response to Congressman Johnson is, I think, this interagency approach, soft power, combined, of course, with the traditional military command, that you so ably are tasked to do now with this Africa Command. I think we are all pleased with what we have heard from you and General Craddock as well in the European Command.

Admiral Stavridis, in your written testimony to us, I'll make attention to page 35, where you describe pretty much what we were just talking about, an interagency approach in Southern Command, in Central Command, indeed, and Africa Command.

The chairman was kind enough to create an ad hoc committee on roles and missions that Jim Cooper from Tennessee chaired and I was the ranking member, co-chair. And we are right now looking at that. And very possibly we are talking about a—maybe this is an overstatement, but a Goldwater-Nichols two type approach to speak softly but of course, indeed, always carrying a big stick.

So I am very pleased, Admiral, in regard to what you talk about in these three or four pages. In my five minutes I don't have time to go through that, but I really like that. I like that very much.

I did want to go back to my colleague from California, Ms. Sanchez, who serves with me on WHINSEC board of visitors, as you know, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. I think it is hugely important, and you described to her some of the things that are done. You called it, I think, that school at Ft. Benning, WHINSEC, a premiere volume opportunity for training 1,000 students at any one time. Eighteen to 25 different countries, mainly in the area of the Southern Command, 60 percent of our training opportunity with them for that region. Thirty-five percent of the curriculum based on human rights.

You went on to say that WHINSEC is a powerful force, creating an indelible bond in the region.

I want to ask you this specific question: if we lost that, and unfortunately 201 members of our House of Representatives voted to make WHINSEC go away last year, and I don't know how many maybe, one, have taken the opportunity, your invitation to come visit and see the good work that is being done down there and the great instruction.

But if we lost that vote this year, who would fill that void? What would be the scenario, if we didn't have that, when we are looking at, we mentioned about Cuba not being a military threat, but, you know, Hugo Chavez and others. Elaborate on that for us a little bit, if you would.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Again, there would be no quick way to reconstruct the capability for close, integrated cooperation with the many, many nations of this hemisphere who want serious, honorable human rights oriented, military-to-military connectivity, training and exercising together. There simply would be no way to rapidly reconstruct that.

And I would argue that if our primary concern is in fact militaries in the region who are responsible members of their societies, who are subject to civilian rule, where admirals and generals come and testify before civilian politicians, the way we do so appro-
priately here in the United States. If that is our goal, then we should be very pleased with the kind of instruction that goes on at WHINSEC.

And again, I can only reiterate my invitation, not only to Members of Congress, but to other concerned citizens who are interested in coming and spending a day at WHINSEC. We will accommodate that. I believe in showing people what is going on.

People are concerned about things that happened decades ago. It is not an institution that we should be anything other than extraordinarily proud of today.

Dr. GINGREY. Admiral, thank you.

And in my concluding seconds, let me also thank General Craddock and General Ward. This committee has been honored to hear from you on a number of occasions and you do us proud. We thank you so very much for your service.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Ms. Shea-Porter, please.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

And I would like to thank you for being here.

I would like to state that I realize we need to be involved with the continent, with the countries of Africa, and that there is a role to play. But I am not comfortable with the role that we are choosing to play right now. And I would like to read, General Ward, something from your statement.

It says, “Building regional stability and security will take many years of sustained and dedicated effort. There is no conspicuous finish line. Therefore, enduring Congressional support is indispensable.”

That sounds an awful lot like Iraq, you know, the same kind of logic, that it is going to take us many, many years to build stability and security. And I am not sure that we can play on different continents at the level that we have been, and to finance the way we have been financing, and clearly you are asking for financial support here. And as you go on read, you all see that you will.

And I am looking at other areas of the world, and I am concerned. So I am going to ask you a series of questions because, as you know, we are limited in terms of money—time and money.

First of all, you referred to our partners. Could you please name our partners in Africa who are—

General WARD. There are nations in Africa that have very willingly asked that we assist them in increasing their capacity.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Can you name them?

General WARD. I can. Senegal, Ghana, South Africa, Liberia, Gabon, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Morocco. There are many nations. There are security organizations. The African Union, the regional economic communities of the African Union, especially the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have all said, can you help us in increasing our capacity. And that is who I am referring to as I say partners.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And they want us to actually have a physical presence?

General WARD. They want us to be present with them as they are increasing their capacity. Yes, ma’am.
Ms. SHEA-PORTE. Okay. Because last time, we said there was only one country that could be named publicly.

General WARD. What I wouldn’t put into that—that refers to a headquarters presence, different from the activities that we conduct with them.

Ms. SHEA-PORTE. Are these countries that you just named wanting us to have a headquarters on the continent and would be willing to host us or have us in their particular nation?

General WARD. Liberia has.

Ms. SHEA-PORTE. Okay. So just one.

All right. The other thing is, you mentioned terrorist threat. Do you have any idea how many al Qaeda are on the continent or in northern Africa right now? Do you have a guess that you could say? Is this a big problem or something that you are looking out?

General WARD. It is a problem. General Craddock pointed to the flow of foreign fighters from North Africa that go from North Africa into the Middle East. The nations of North Africa, in addition to being concerned about that, are also concerned that these foreign fighters who flow into the Middle East and do whatever they do, those who survive that and then return to their home nations, them foment discontent within their nations as well.

Ms. SHEA-PORTE. Are they al Qaeda?

General WARD. They are al Qaeda.

Ms. SHEA-PORTE. Do you have any idea how many?

General WARD. I can’t put a number on it. No, ma’am.

Ms. SHEA-PORTE. Okay. Would you say small, large, you know—

General WARD. It is a disturbing number. It is more than a few.

Ms. SHEA-PORTE. One would be disturbing, obviously. I think we could agree on that.

You mentioned that they want us to enable them to provide for their own security. Is that the same number of countries you named before? And what are they looking for? The last time we talked, it was that they were actually looking for some weapons as well as some advice.

General WARD. It is not weapons, per se. It is professionalization of their military. It is causing them to be able to plan, conduct, and sustain things in a very legitimate way. As Admiral Stavridis pointed out, doing things in accordance with respect for human dignity, human rights, respect for the rule of law.

It is those sorts of professionalization activities that they seek our assistance, so that they can become more professional in the conduct of their security operations.

Ms. SHEA-PORTE. Okay. Well, my worry, again, is because there is a lot of instability there, and if we do provide weapons and they do have a conflict, that they will use the weapons that we have provided. Do you have some concern about that?

General WARD. Congresswoman, the provision of weapons is not what we are talking about. We are talking about, quite frankly, sustaining a level of interaction that causes their professionalism to be such that those weapons will not be turned to use against their own populations. And that is where we seek to increase our active security with them.
And that doesn’t happen with—we run a risk of the situation that you just described being there when we aren’t engaged with them on a sustained basis. This long-term point that I made is the fact that if we build our relations with them over time, sustain our contact, quite frankly, cause a way of doing business and ethos if you go to emerge that is less likely to lead to the situation that you just described.

Ms. Shea-Porter. But we have seen that in other areas of the world, where when they have conflict it turns out they have U.S. weapons, and this is my concern, that if we don’t succeed at the vision that you have of stabilizing it, that we all have that.

And the last question is contractors. Any contractors involved?

General Ward. Contractors are involved. Contractors are being under the auspices of the State Department, the ACOTA program that we have in place. But there are contractors involved.

Ms. Shea-Porter. And you will be using them?

General Ward. Not for those missions that we are responsible for. We seek to use through the request for forces process uniformed members to do the mission, to help us as we perform our security assistance.

Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Lamborn is next on the list.

Pardon me. Mr. Franks is next on the list.

Thank you. Then Mr. Lamborn.

Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. My apologies to Mr. Lamborn here.

I always want to thank the leadership of the U.S. military for their courage and for their sacrificial commitment to human freedom. None of what we have in America could be possible apart from your noble courage and commitment to those things, and I hope I never miss a moment when I get to address some of you to express that.

With that said, General Craddock, on page 21 of your testimony you express the growing threat of ballistic missile. And, of course, this is something that I am extremely concerned about and agree with you completely.

You indicate that Iran might deploy Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) that can reach Europe and the U.S. as early as potentially 2015. And of course the President’s budget asks for $241 million for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to conduct both the interceptor field and the expand radar site for the European site and a total of $720 million for the hardware and construction.

Without asking you any question related to the budget itself, my question is would a delay in the deployment of this site put the onus on you to assume some increased risks, some increased level of risk to U.S. forces forward in our NATO allies?

Let me make sure you hear the question right. I am saying, you know, we recognize the ballistic missile threat. We have got funds that the President has asked to put in place for that. If for whatever reason the deployment of this site is delayed, does that potentially increase the risks for some of the forward deployed forces and the United States, in your opinion?
General CRADDOCK. If the timelines as they are correlated for development of a ballistic missile capability from Iran is in any way accelerated, the answer would be a delay in placement of a third site would increase the risk.

I don't know where they crossover, but indeed a delay, given what we project would in my judgment potentially increase the risk to our forces deployed.

Mr. FRANKS. Obviously I think you are absolutely right, and I still quote from one of my colleagues here. I know that question gets the blooming obvious award. But I appreciate you being forthright about it.

And so let me, if I could do something a little bit unusual and ask the chair, just in terms of what may happen if the Strategic Forces Subcommittee perhaps should mark up a portion of the National Defense Authorization, if there is a cut in the European site, much as there was last year, and as you know, Mr. Chairman, I tried to restore funding to ensure that General Craddock's area of AOR is sufficiently defended against ballistic missiles.

If I offered an amendment to increase that funding after it had been cut in the Strategic Forces Committee, if I offered the amendment here, would that be considered advocating for an earmark?

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know what the future earmark rules will be. I am waiting with great anticipation, as I know you are.

That is a good question, though.

Mr. FRANKS. I think it is a very important one, and I hate to redirect the focus here of the meeting, but some of us find it extremely important, because being totally aware of the earmark abuse, I understand all of that. But, you know, we don't want to be in the process of rewriting the Constitution here.

Some of the challenges that you face are very, very real. And the Constitution of the United States says in Article 1 Section 8, and Section 8 may be just a sad corollary there, I know that some of you know what Section 8 is in the manual, “The Congress shall have power to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States and to do this in part by raising and supporting armies and providing and maintaining a navy.”

If we do exactly that in this committee by offering amendments that we think are important, and that is somehow tangled up in this whole earmark thing, and I may not have the opinion you think I do on earmarks, Mr. Chairman, I am not sure. But that is not the point. My fear is letting the constitutional duties of this committee and the Congress get tangled up in that. And if we are not careful and if we don't make very specific definitions of what an earmark is, we will be rewriting the Constitution.

And so I am hoping the chairman will consider that, given the gravity of what we are dealing with in making sure that these folks have enough to defend us.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman for his advice.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, gentlemen, for everything.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate you gentlemen being here.

Admiral, I am curious, what is the status of negotiations with the Ecuadorian government as to our forward operating base in
Manta? Have we been given a drop-dead departure date? Is it still under negotiations? What are the alternative sites you are looking at? That would be one thing.

The second thing is, I fear one of the unintended consequences of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that we have been ignoring our neighbors to the south. Prior to these conflicts, we have a very active—and even during the Bosnian conflict, we had a very active program of building one-room schoolhouses, water wells for people whose children were dying of contaminated water, and a lot of things to build goodwill in a region of the world where we had a lot of goodwill.

I suspect that has been put on hold, and I would take it a step further. I would be curious, in your budget, how much of your budget goes toward paying the pilots of DynCorp to fly the eradication missions over Colombia at the same time when American troops are apparently providing security for President Karzai’s brother, who is reported to be one of the largest drug dealers in Afghanistan, and whether in your conversations with the other commanders you don’t find that inconsistent. Because I do, that on one hand we are spending hundreds of millions of dollars a year to DynCorp and others to eradicate drugs in Colombia, while we are apparently turning a blind eye to allies in Afghanistan who are up to their noses in the drug business? Wouldn’t that money that we are spending on DynCorp to fly those eradication missions be better spent going back to our traditional approach of the one-room school house, water well and the medical clinics.

Admiral Stavridis. Thank you for that question, sir.

Let me catch up on Manta. The lease expires in late 2009. We have not at this time to my knowledge been formally asked to leave at the end of that lease, and the negotiation to attempt to stay, which we would like to stay, is being conducted by our ambassador with the government of Ecuador. She continues to work that.

I would say that based on the public statements of the president of Ecuador, which have been clear, it seems unlikely to me that we will be permitted to extend that lease, despite the fact that I think it would be very desirable, both for Ecuador and for the United States and for the nations of the region.

So we are looking at alternative sites in other friendly countries through the region, and I wouldn’t want to get into specifics of that, but it is still a very open process, and we would be interested in——

Mr. Taylor. Without you getting into specifics, could I make a request for the record that you supply to me or even better to the committee——

Admiral Stavridis. Happy to.

Mr. Taylor [continuing]. What sites you are looking at and the cost associated with those other sites to take the place should we lose Manta.

Admiral Stavridis. I will be happy to do so, sir. Thank you.

The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 155.

On the second part of your question about DynCorp eradication flights, those fall under the State Department budget as part of the
Mr. TAYLOR. To the best of your knowledge, what is the dollar amount associated with that?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I would be guessing, and I would——

Mr. TAYLOR. Can I ask that for the record?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir, you certainly can. And I will provide that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 155.]

Admiral STAVRIDIS. And as to the Afghanistan piece, I don't really know anything about that aspect of it. Perhaps General Craddock does. I do not.

General CRADDOCK. Congressman, with regard to security for President Karzai's brother, I do not know that that is provided by NATO ISAF. If it is, within 24 hours I will direct it not be. I cannot speak for U.S. forces, because they belong to CENTCOM.

Mr. TAYLOR. But, General, again, this is coming from people who live within Afghanistan. And when our ambassador to Afghanistan appeared before this committee and I posed that question to him, is the president's brother one of the biggest drug dealers in Afghanistan, he did not deny it. He had every opportunity to say it is not true.

So again, doesn't that, considering that we have to the best of our knowledge at least three Americans in captivity in Colombia, captured on a counterdrug mission—am I the only person who finds this somewhat inconsistent, that we are spending a heck of a lot of money in Colombia, trying to eradicate drugs, and have taken what is at best a blind eye toward the drug problem in Afghanistan.

General CRADDOCK. Well, Congressman, I would, with all due respect, disagree about the blind eye. There is much activity. More is needed. The drugs in Afghanistan go to Europe. It is heroin. And the drugs in Colombia go to the United States.

Mr. TAYLOR. With a straight face, General, and I have heard this said before, would you like to tell your NATO and my NATO allies that what goes on in Afghanistan is okay because the drugs go there?

General CRADDOCK. I didn't say that, Congressman.

Mr. TAYLOR. No, sir, but you said the drugs go to Europe.

General CRADDOCK. That is a fact.

Mr. TAYLOR. So does that make it okay?

General CRADDOCK. I didn't say that. It does not make it okay. That is why we are trying to stop it.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LAMBORN. I am always happy to defer to Mr. Franks, happily so.

I would like to ask you, Mr. Craddock, General Craddock, about some statements on page 21 of your report, just to follow up on what Representative Franks introduced a few minutes ago.
You said there that the Iranians may have an intercontinental ballistic missile capability by 2015. Is there any plausible defensive reason they have for that kind of capability?

General CRADDICK. Congressman, to my knowledge that is not a defensive weapon.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. And then my next question then is, even if it is true, as the recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) said, which I am skeptical about, that their nuclear weaponization is on hold, given the fact that they are still proceeding with nuclear enrichment 100 percent, as fast as they can, how difficult is it for them to take that capability and knowledge and progress and transfer that over to weaponization if they choose to do so in the future?

General CRADDICK. Well, if the weaponization is on hold, it wouldn’t be transferred. But if they decided to change the weaponization decision, and the enrichment continues and proceeds, then it would be easier rather than harder and take less time.

But an intercontinental ballistic missile does not necessarily have to have a nuclear warhead. It can have a conventional, and it could still yield quite a destructive capability.

Mr. LAMBORN. Is there anything in the budget request that you think—and as was said earlier, there is about $720 million to put a radar antenna interceptors in Poland and Czechoslovakia, or Czech Republic. Could you elaborate on the risk we would have if we start cutting into that $720 million, as some may try to do because we know some tried to do that last year?

General CRADDICK. Based on the assumption that there is a threat, if the development of the third site is delayed and the threat continues, based upon projections and the intelligence community, the risk would increase, because we would not have a site in place at a time when we would need it if there are delays in implementation.

Mr. LAMBORN. Are there any capabilities whose development and/or fielding you would like to see accelerated?

General CRADDICK. I probably am not qualified to answer that because it is a technical question and the Missile Defense Agency still controls the program. I think the key here is that as a risk develops and becomes apparent, which influences our security, we would like to have a countermeasure in place in time.

Mr. LAMBORN. And then as I finish up here, in the same statement, on page 21, you talk about efforts to reach out to the Russians and explain and demonstrate and show them that these are defensive efforts. How is that effort going and is there anything more we can do along those lines?

General CRADDICK. Over the last couple of years, Missile Defense Agency, along with EUCOM in military-to-military talks, has done that, we thought with some progress. But unfortunately the receptivity militarily has probably been stymied by the political developments.

It is ongoing. We are hopeful that there might be a breakthrough to where there could be some accommodation and a realization that this is no threat to the strategic nuclear force of Russia.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you very much.
Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Generals and Admiral, thank you all for being here this morning; or this afternoon, I guess. Admiral Stavridis, the Colombia Free Trade Agreement might not be intuitively be something we would think we would talk about this afternoon, but it is going to come up on the Hill, it may have already come up on the Hill. Can you talk to us about your view of its importance, either in passing or failing, would have on our impact and relations within Colombia? The Defense Minister Santos was here this week and is obviously keenly interested in this thing passing, both as a, kind of a pat on the back to Uribe and his colleagues who in my view have done a particularly good job of turning that circumstance around from a country headed to a narco-controlled failed state to one that has made great strides addressing some grievous issues that they have had.

So would you mind spending a couple of minutes visiting about your perspective on the Colombia Free Trade Agreement? Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I'll be glad to. I think to have any conversation about Colombia, you need to go back 10 years and look at Colombia of 1997. And Colombia 1997 as, as you just alluded to, sir, a country on the brink, really on the edge of the abyss of falling into narcoterrorism.

In the 10 years since then, with a relatively modest level of U.S. assistance, the Colombians have reduced murders in their country 80 percent, have reduced kidnapping 70 percent, have reduced killing of trade unionists, very important statistic, 80 percent. Their economy has grown every year by an additional 1 percent and this year will hit 7 percent. President Uribe, the leader, enjoys an 84 percent popularity rate. The FARC has been reduced from 18,000 members to 9,000 members. Thirty thousand rightwing militants have been demobilized. By every objective measure, there has been enormous progress in Colombia. Are there still problems in Colombia surrounding human rights? Yes. However, the Colombians are dealing with them with extraordinary forthrightness. And I believe that when you look at that span of improvement, you look at a nation that has stood with the United States in a wide variety of circumstances, and you look at the countervailing forces in the region who are watching this debate very closely, I will tell you from a national security perspective, and I would not begin to talk about the economics of the issue or the politics of the issue, but as your national security observer in that region, I will tell you that it is very important that the free trade agreement be passed, from a national security perspective. And I hear that not just from senior people in Colombia, but from my interlocutors throughout the region. They are watching closely to see what happens to a nation that stands with the United States for a decade or more.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you. You may have already covered this in your opening testimony, and I apologize, but a couple of sentences on Chavez's bullying tactics earlier last week with moving troops, or purportedly moving troops, and Colombia's response.
Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, as I mentioned in my remarks, but I am happy to embellish slightly, the events of 10 days ago in which three nations were breaking diplomatic relations, in which troops were being moved toward borders, I am pleased to tell you that that situation has largely been resolved through the good efforts of the nations themselves. And I feel both the Colombians, the Ecuadorians and indeed the Venezuelans have walked back from a very tense situation.

In terms of Venezuela, I am, as I mentioned in response to an earlier question, we are concerned about the level of arms purchases in Venezuela. Naturally, we are concerned about anti-U.S. rhetoric that emanates from that government. It is unfortunate. The United States has historically enjoyed an excellent relationship with Venezuela. They are a strong trading partner. I would for one hope that we could work our way to a better relationship. But at the moment, it is a very difficult relationship. It is the only country in the hemisphere with the exception of Cuba with which we do not enjoy very good military-to-military relations at this time.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, General.
I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman from Texas.

General Craddock, you stated that the caveats have been impediments on our operations in Afghanistan. I think we have a classified list of the caveats or the limitations on the various NATO nations’ troops, but would you be kind enough to give us an updated list of them as they now stand? They hopefully might have changed——

General CRADDOCK [continuing]. Could I provide that for the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything that we could do, the United States could do, to demonstrate more leadership to urge the various nations that have those caveats, that have those limitations on what their troops may do? Is there anything more that we can do to urge them to eliminate those or to change those caveats or limitations? This is very bothersome to those of us on this committee.

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Chairman.
I will provide that updated list, the recent list that we have got, for the record, if I may.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 155.]

General CRADDOCK. With regard to what can we do, I think what has to happen is that we have to provide consequences of those caveats. The impacts of those caveats on day-to-day operations on the ground, in stark terms, not only to military leadership in the nations that hold those caveats, but also it has got to transition into the political arena.

I think that many of you are on parliamentary committees with NATO parliamentarians, and that is an outreach opportunity. Whenever there are heads of state here at the Congress visiting, another opportunity to talk about it in a way that it makes the reality of the constraint real world. And what it means to the service members, the soldiers, the marines, the airmen, on the ground in Afghanistan in that it increases the risk to them every day in their
operation because of these functional and geographical constraints known as caveats.

The CHAIRMAN. So what can we do to better urge them to eliminate those caveats?

General CRADDOCK. Well, as I said, I think it is an engagement at every level and opportunity, whether it be counterpart here or another means.

I think that there is a recognition by the chiefs of defense, the military leadership of the nations that have those caveats declared, that they understand the impacts. That needs to be relayed with a compelling, irrefutable argument into the political arena, because essentially those caveats are mandated from governments.

So I think that is the key. There has to be increased emphasis and increased energy applied in that area.

The CHAIRMAN. For the record, what countries within the NATO community do not have caveats or limitations on their troops in Afghanistan?

General CRADDOCK. I don’t have, Chairman, the list in front of me. I can provide that for the record, but I don’t have the list here. There are several, but I don’t have them offhand.

The CHAIRMAN. That would not be classified.

General CRADDOCK. Not to my knowledge, no.

The CHAIRMAN. We would appreciate that very much.

General CRADDOCK. Certainly.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 155.]

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Well, General Craddock, Admiral Stavridis and General Ward, thank you so much for——

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman? Congressman Cummings has asked that we have a question for the record, if I may, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Please proceed.

Mr. TAYLOR. Generals, this is from Congressman Cummings, who is at another meeting.

The question is, as you are aware, President Sarkozy addressed Congress in November. In his address, he stated that the European Union emerges from 10 years of discussions on its institutions. They will still have a stable presence, a more powerful high representative for foreign and security policy. With that development, President Sarkozy concluded that the European Union must have the proper construction of a military capacity. Specifically, he noted that there are—and I am quoting—“There are more crises than there are capacities to face them. NATO cannot be everywhere. The EU must be able to act, as it did in the Balkans or in the Congo, as it will in the future on the border of Sudan and Chad.”

General Ward, General Craddock, what are your thoughts on this? Do you believe the development of the EU military could change the dynamics of NATO, the European Command or the development of AFRICOM?

In addition, what should we expect to hear about the interactions between the European Union along with its associated military headquarters and defense acquisition agency and NATO as a result of the upcoming summit?
If you are comfortable now, or if you would like to answer it for the record, whatever you prefer.

General CRADDOCK. That is a very comprehensive question. First of all, with regard to President Sarkozy's statement, I would not want to judge his statement, but I think the time is right now for there to be engagement to find opportunities to cooperate, not continuing to have the reality of competition between NATO and the European Union.

NATO is essentially a military organization with a political component. The European Union is largely political, economic with a military component. We have to find the—if those are two circles, we have to find the overlap and then diagram where we can engage and leverage each other's capabilities to a greater extent, and I think that is where the effort must lie.

It is not about dual-hatting formations. The fact is, NATO can't fulfill its requirements today with its formations. If those formations are dual-hatted with an EU hat, then we have compounded the problem. We are in competition. We can't have that.

We need to look for, where capabilities exist that are complementary, as I said, not competing. That is I think where we must head for the future.

General WARD. And just briefly, Congressman, as it pertains to AFRICOM, right now the formal procedure that would cause AFRICOM to work with the European Union does not exist. Obviously it is the U.S. European Command with NATO.

But I will tell you, the nations of the European Command have expressed a willingness to work with AFRICOM in pursuit of common objectives on the continent of Africa, and we do that on a bilateral basis.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Did either one of you wish to furnish Mr. Cummings’ question further on the record?

General CRADDOCK. Yes. Chairman, I will follow up with probably a more comprehensive response.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 155.]

The CHAIRMAN. We would appreciate that.

If there are no further questions, we again appreciate you being with us, your testimony, and we look forward to seeing you again soon.

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

March 13, 2008
STATEMENT OF

GENERAL BANTZ J. CRADDICK, USA

COMMANDER,

UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

13 MARCH 2008
INTRODUCTION

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND STRATEGY

   Strategic Approach
   Security Cooperation
   Strategic Theater Transformation

COMPONENT COMMAND ACTIVITIES

   U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army
   U.S. Naval Forces, Europe
   U.S. Air Forces, Europe
   U.S. Marine Forces, Europe
   U.S. Special Operations Command, Europe

THEATER INVESTMENT NEEDS

   Theater Infrastructure
   Quality of Life Programs
   Theater C2, Communications Systems, and ISR
   Strategic Mobility and Maneuver
   Pre-positioned Equipment
   Partner and Coalition Interoperability
   Enhancing EUCOM’s Mission

EUCOM AND NATO

   Operational Imperatives
   NATO Transformation
   Partnerships and Engagement
   NATO Enlargement

CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION

Over the past year, the United States European Command (EUCOM) has pursued U.S. security interests in an ever-changing security landscape. The most fundamental commitment of the United States Government and EUCOM is to provide for the security of its citizens. Security, economic interests, and shared political values provide the impetus for engagement with our international partners and form the basis of our Strategy of Active Security. Despite an ever-changing security landscape, there are a number of strategic imperatives that endure, all of them necessary for protecting America and its interests as far forward as possible: defeating terrorism; building effective partner and coalition capabilities for both present and future threats; sustaining the trans-Atlantic relationship; preserving security in Europe; and maintaining our warfighting capacity.

EUCOM’s mission is to defend the homeland forward and support U.S. strategic and economic interests by maintaining ready forces for full spectrum operations, securing strategic access and global freedom of action, enhancing trans-Atlantic security through NATO, and promoting regional stability. We achieve this through forward presence, security cooperation, and support to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our strategy emphasizes security cooperation activities with partners, Allies, and potential coalition members.

A key development over the past year was initiation of the standup of U.S. Africa Command, (AFRICOM) created in recognition of the growing importance of Africa. The establishment of AFRICOM remains a work in progress. Until its standup as a fully operational command this October, AFRICOM is a sub-unified command reporting to EUCOM. EUCOM has provided, and will continue to make available, personnel, African subject-matter expertise, and resources, all of which will help ensure AFRICOM’s future success in becoming a self-sufficient Unified Combatant Command.

Upon AFRICOM reaching Full Operational Capability (FOC), the EUCOM AOR will reduce in size from 93 to 51 nations. This allows EUCOM to better prioritize and focus our activities in Europe and Eurasia to achieve our strategic and theater objectives.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Today, the EUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) includes Europe, Russia, the Caucasus, most of Africa, Greenland, Antarctica and the waters within these borders (see Enclosure 1). Composed of 93 sovereign nations, the AOR is home to approximately 1.4 billion people, 23 percent of the world’s
population. Their 1,000 plus ethnic groups speak more than 400 languages, profess over 100 religious affiliations, experience the full range of human conditions, and live under a variety of systems of government.

Regional Approach

The extent of U.S. interests and relationships within the theater requires a distinct regional approach focused on engagement in Europe and Eurasia. At the same time, transnational challenges consistently cross traditional geographical, political, and organizational lines. Often the events in one region are directly associated with effects in another. Our activities and responses to these challenges must account for interregional linkages and secondary effects and require theater-level coordination.

Europe

For six decades, Europe’s democracies have experienced an unprecedented period of security, stability, and prosperity. NATO remains the world’s premier security organization. For over a decade NATO has undertaken major missions outside of its members’ territories, most recently leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Not all trends, however, are positive. The defense budgets of many NATO nations have fallen to levels that jeopardize their ability to make long-term strategic military commitments to meet the Alliance’s 21st Century missions.

Over the last 15 years, EUCOM has taken the opportunity offered by the emergence of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe to shape defense reform, emphasize rule of law enforcement, and assist in training deployable units to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Extending NATO membership to a number of Central and Eastern European nations has also helped facilitate the spread of democratic values and institutions. Defense reforms through targeted security cooperation activities helped bring about significant military interoperability with U.S. and NATO forces. Direct interaction with U.S. forces has succeeded not only in developing useful military capabilities, but also in establishing reliable Allies whose political and material support has proven invaluable.

Kosovo, due to its controversial nature, continues to be a source of instability in the greater Balkans region. After 8 years as a UN-administered Serbian province, Kosovo declared independence on 17 Feb 2008. The U.S. recognized the fledgling government and is encouraging the 27 members of the EU to unite in recognizing Kosovo. EUCOM expects political and diplomatic efforts to continue throughout 2008 as Kosovo prepares to implement the tenets of the Ahlisaari recommendations. Second order effects may include challenges to Pristina or International Civilian Office authority north of the
Ibar River in Kosovo and the potential for the Republika Srpska to advocate for secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) is the most respected security organisation in Kosovo and is well positioned, well trained, well prepared, and committed to provide a safe and secure environment. KFOR has close to 16,000 troops from 35 nations. EUCOM will remain committed to Kosovo for security cooperation, security assistance, and defense reform for the long term through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs. EU COM will purchase uniforms for the incipient 2,500-man Kosovo Security Force (KSF) recommended by the UN Special Envoy. Additionally, EU COM will assist NATO in training an ECU corps within the KSF and support NATO in the stand up of a Ministry of Defense for Kosovo.

Significant progress has been made in defense reform in the Balkans despite difficult political, economic, and social challenges. EU COM is focusing its security cooperation and assistance programs to help integrate the Balkan nations into the Euro-Atlantic community. EU COM supports the Adriatic Charter nations (Croatia, Macedonia, and Albania) for NATO accession at the Bucharest Summit in Apr 08 and advocates Intensified Dialogue for Bosnia-Herzegovina and will engage Serbia to move closer to NATO integration. EU COM will engage aggressively by utilizing all resources to accelerate defense reform in the Balkans and address their toughest issues. These include: training/equipping a deployable force to contribute to stability operations in Iraq or Afghanistan, human resource management, multi-year budgeting, organic logistics capability, and building defense institution capacity. A robust military-to-military relationship, including high-level visits, State Partnership Program events, and EU COM component activities will increase regional stability. EU COM believes our security cooperation activities should combat the transnational threat of terrorism potentially resourced by the abundant stockpiles of small arms, light weapons, ammno, and man-portable air defense systems endemic to the Balkans region. DTRA estimates that a weapons destruction facility would require eight years to destroy these excess stockpiles. EU COM will work with other agencies to assist and advocate for the destruction of these stockpiles. EU COM will encourage Balkan nations to become contributing members of the trans-Atlantic family since it fosters security and stability throughout the region. NATO presence is a critical enabler toward that goal in this potentially volatile area of Southeastern Europe.

A secular democracy with a Muslim population, Turkey is a globally accepted example of the successful integration of these two elements. It is also geographically, economically, politically, and militarily critical. Turkey’s geostrategic location, European orientation, and enduring
relationship with the United States make it a bridge of stability between the Euro-Atlantic community and the nations of Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. Its international lines of communication are an important factor in energy security. Its proximity to Iran, Iraq, Syria and Russia ensure Turkey will continue to play a vital role in international efforts to combat the transit of foreign fighter terrorists.

At the same time, PKK/KCK terrorist attacks that emanate from Northern Iraq and strike military and civilian targets in Turkey strain the relations between Iraq, Turkey and consequently threaten the stability in the region. Hardest dialogue can help facilitate the resolution of this problem. EUCOM, with CENTCOM support, is providing intelligence assistance to Turkey's efforts to counter the PKK/KCK. While there is no solely military solution to the PKK/KCK terrorist issue, improving Turkey's ability to prevent the organization's freedom of action to cross the border between Iraq and Turkey is an essential step to decreasing reach and influence of the PKK/KCK. This will also improve the stability of northern Iraq, possibly facilitate Turkey's acceptance into the EU, and contribute to the overall stability of the region.

**Black Sea/Eurasia**

Russian nations face a multitude of strategic decisions relating to future economic, political, and defense reform challenges. Economic difficulties, inter- and intrastate conflicts, insurgency, deteriorating infrastructure, ethnic tensions, and demographic trends make reform both imperative and urgent. Russia continues to demonstrate its traditional interest and is a major power in this region.

Russia creates challenges for U.S. policy with its position on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. Its unilateral suspension of the treaty is regrettable and not in the interests of long-term European security. Equally troubling is Russia's opposition to U.S. missile defense initiatives, its aggressive tactics vis-à-vis Georgia, its position on the future status of Kosovo, and its willingness to use energy as an instrument of foreign policy.

Despite political differences, EUCOM engages Russia where it can, seeking Russian participation, but not concurrence. EUCOM's relationship with Russia is a pragmatic one based on realistic expectations. Coordinating all U.S. military-to-military security cooperation activities with Russia, EUCOM strives to improve the quality and complexity of these activities to make our forces more interoperable and to promote mutual understanding. Demonstrating their desire to engage with U.S. forces, the Russian Ministry of Defense has taken considerable steps in funding their own participation in activities with U.S. forces -- a significant change over previous years. Russia's cooperation
with U.S. forces is a major element in fostering military cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area.

However, Russia continues to require our attention. Its desire to influence its neighbors in the so-called "near abroad" nations, extensive nuclear capability, significant weapons trade program, and influence on the international energy market all have an impact on the EUCOM AOR. Buoyed by the high price of fossil fuels, Russia has seen consecutive years of impressive economic growth and is increasingly reasserting itself globally. Russia has the potential to be a cooperative partner; how deftly we and our European partners engage it will be a significant factor in what role Russia will play.

There are military-to-military opportunities with Russia, such as those created by the threats of violent extremism and the challenges of addressing proliferation. The NATO Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement opening the way for improved military engagement was signed last August. Russia's cooperation with the U.S. and NATO is a major element in fostering security in the Euro-Atlantic arena. EUCOM has, and will continue to play, a leading role in this bilateral military relationship.

The Caucasus' geostrategic location makes the region an important area for the U.S. and its Allies. Caucasian nations actively support IRAQI FREEDOM and ISAF. They provide alternative hydrocarbon sources from the Caspian Sea and alternative routes of access to Central Asian hydrocarbon reserves. It is an important region for European energy diversification.

Georgia actively seeks NATO membership and is the number one OIF coalition contributor per capita and second only to the United Kingdom in terms of total troops. Georgia has also offered forces for Afghanistan. Like Ukraine, Georgia recently requested favorable consideration of a NATO Membership Action Plan offer. EUCOM is actively assisting Georgia as it works to bring its defense sector to NATO standards. Some specific assistance examples include development of Georgia's Special Forces capabilities, expert assistance in forming strategic defense policy and transforming defense organizations, and tactical training support as Georgia develops organic capability to train and equip its national forces for coalition operations.

Azerbaijan has taken deliberate steps towards Euro-Atlantic integration. Its close proximity to Iran, Russia, and Caspian Sea energy resources makes it important to U.S. strategic interests. Azerbaijan and Georgia provide access to Central Asian hydrocarbon reserves, which, together with Azerbaijan's own resources, provide an important alternative energy source for our European Allies. An example of the region's growing importance to the global market is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, bringing oil from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean.
Furthermore, Azerbaijan's support to the U.S. in global security has been substantial, including being a troop contributor to Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Currently Azerbaijan has deployed 150 troops to Iraq. In January 2007, Azerbaijan extended blanket diplomatic overflight clearance for U.S. government and contract flights in support of OEF and OIF - extremely important from both a political and operational point of view. Some nations of the Caucasus region are exporting security by actively supporting the GWOT, but continued corruption and a lack of transparency limit progress with defense reform efforts in this region. Intermittent conflicts also continue to challenge security and long-term stability in the region. Armenia and Azerbaijan are stalemated over Nagorno-Karabakh, while South Ossetia and Abkhazia continue moves to assert their aspirations for independence from Georgia. These conflicts will remain a significant obstacle to long-term regional stability. Casualties continue to occur in low-level actions. Russia attempts to maintain status quo. Russian incursions into Georgian airspace and misapplied linkages of regional issues with Kosovo independence make resolution difficult. The Caucasus require sustained and coordinated interagency efforts. Early optimism on Ukraine as a result of the Orange Revolution has faded as crisis and uncertainty undermined domestic politics and increased tensions with Russia. Ukraine, however, remains an important bridge between East and West. Its strategic location, contributions to international operations and its government's policy of Euro-Atlantic integration make it an increasingly important regional ally. Ukraine's desire to achieve Western standards of political, economic, and defense reform represents a sharp break with its Cold War past. Like Georgia, it has recently requested favorable consideration of a NATO Membership Action Plan offer. EUCOM is actively assisting Ukrainian reform efforts. For example, we are facilitating the development of an NCO corps across the Ukrainian Armed Forces and we are assisting in the development of Ukraine's Joint Rapid Reaction Force. Ukraine has shown its willingness to contribute to international security by deploying forces to Africa, Iraq, and the Balkans. It is the only non-NATO nation providing forces to all four major NATO operations. EUCOM supports eventual NATO membership for Ukraine, but recognizes that this is a Ukrainian decision first. In the Middle East, the EUCOM-Israel military relationship is based on strong bilateral cooperation, which includes robust programs of exercises and military contacts. The goals of this cooperative effort are enhancing stability in the eastern Mediterranean, improving Israeli missile defense, and strengthening its border security. Israel is a long-term supporter of U.S. interests and remains globally the largest recipient of U.S. Foreign Military
Financing, enjoying well-established agreements with the United States that further the U.S.-Israel goal of deterring aggression in the region.

**Transnational Terrorism**

There is a growing awareness among many nations in the EUROCOM AOR of extremist threats to their populations. Recent attacks in Europe demonstrate our enemy's intent to continue to attack and spread the battlefield beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Terrorist activities in 2007 include: two attempted car-bombings in downtown London; an attack at the Glasgow airport; the arrest of violent extremists in Denmark and Germany while in the advanced stages of attack planning and explosives procurement; and the December arrest of 14 extremists for conspiring to use explosives to free a convicted Al Qaeda terrorist plotter from Belgian custody. EUROCOM continues to deal with the threat of terrorism in all its forms.

Many violent extremist groups are integrally tied to criminal and smuggling networks. Illegal activities such as narcotics trafficking, document forgery, and credit card fraud help fund extremist operations while Europe's open borders facilitate travel across the region. Europe and Eurasia are used as sanctuaries and logistics centers for extremists. Additionally, there is a growing trend of Western European citizens being recruited, trained, and returned to Europe by extremist organizations to launch attacks targeting U.S. and Allied installations and personnel.

**Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)**

The acquisition and potential employment of Weapons of Mass Destruction by state and non-state actors pose a security threat to the United States and our partners and allies. The majority of the world's nuclear weapons are located within the EUROCOM AOR. Furthermore, in Europe and Eurasia, stockpiles may become vulnerable to access and removal by international and internal threats as state and non-state actors continue to improve their capabilities, or via corruption, criminal activity, and inadequate border monitoring. Coordination between our nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts is increasingly important.

**U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND STRATEGY**

The EUROCOM Strategy of Active Security is based upon two overarching Strategic Objectives: "Defend the Homeland" and "Create and Maintain an Environment that Advances U.S. Strategic and Economic Interests." Our objectives in Europe include promoting lasting security and stability, maintaining the ability to employ the full range of capabilities across the
military spectrum, and fostering the growth of good governance, strong institutions, and civil society.

Strategic Approach

EUCOM’s strategy looks out five years, focusing on proactive security cooperation activities while maintaining a high state of military readiness. Our strategic approach promotes stable environments, protects U.S. interests, and reduces the likelihood of crises that trigger contingency responses by: mitigating risk while the nation is at war; maintaining and strengthening alliances, partnerships, influence, and access where we have long-standing relationships; and, creating and expanding influence into new areas of the theater.

Theater Objectives and Priorities

Our strategy identifies a number of Theater Objectives that provide focus and purpose for EUCOM’s activities and align us with the larger Strategic Objectives. These objectives include: ensuring EUCOM forces are trained and ready for global deployment; actively working with Europe as a security partner in order to solve common problems; transforming EUCOM and NATO militaries to ensure effective expeditionary capabilities for the conduct of out-of-area operations; building partner nation capacity necessary for the provision of their own security and the sustainment of regional stability; protecting Allies and partners within a stable Middle East; preserving basing and access to ensure strategic freedom of action; averting local crises and preventing those that do arise from becoming regional conflicts.

In the near term we are focusing our activities and resources on the following strategic priorities:

- Support for Operations IRAQI and ENDURING FREEDOM
- Maintain relevance of, and U.S. leadership within, NATO
- Increase integration of EUCOM activities with the rest of the U.S. Government; especially combating terrorism and WMD proliferation
- Engage Russia or mitigate its potentially negative influence
- Support improved energy security for Europe, Eurasia, and the Black Sea region, to include NATO and EUCOM
- Ensure the successful transition of AFRICOM from a sub-unified command to a fully-operational Combatant Command
- Support NATO transformation for out-of-area operations
• Adjust EUCOM transformation and basing to ensure EUCOM has the capabilities to conduct both security cooperation activities and wartime missions

The Global War on Terror

EUCOM’s number one theater-wide goal remains the defeat of transnational extremist organizations that threaten the United States, its Allies, and interests. Our multi-layered approach integrates the U.S. Government activities of building partner capacity to combat terrorism, working with partners to promote regional stability in order to and diminish the conditions that foster violent extremism, and denying extremists freedom of action and access to resources.

We will continue our work to deter, interdict, or defeat violent extremism wherever it appears. These efforts involve close cooperation with U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Government agencies and departments, and perhaps most importantly, a growing list of foreign government partners with the same desire to protect their societies from the threat of terrorism. While much of this collaboration remains outside the public arena, it is vitally important to sustaining a shared view of the enemy threat and enhancing mutual support for counter-terrorism efforts.

As detailed in the Component Activities section below, EUCOM-stationed forces continue to be heavily engaged in ongoing combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa, as well as in building partner nation and coalition capacity supporting these operations. Over 70 percent of our coalition partners in Iraq and Afghanistan come from the EUCOM AOR.

Outside of direct support to combat operations, EUCOM-based forces are in the forefront of promoting the transformation of European militaries. The engagement with, and support to, our Allies and partners underlines the importance of persistent presence of U.S. forces for building effective expeditionary capacity for multilateral theater and global operations.

Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is an interagency effort to assist traditionally moderate regional governments and populations to combat the spread of extremist ideology and terrorism. The program is an integrated, approach that draws resources and expertise from the Department of State (DoS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense (DoD). This is a multi-faceted multi-year commitment focused on improving individual country and regional capabilities to defeat terrorist organizations, disrupt efforts to recruit and train new terrorist fighters, particularly from the young and rural poor, and counter efforts to establish safe havens for domestic and outside extremist groups. The multi-year strategy is focused on strengthening regional counter-terrorism
capabilities, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region’s security forces, denying public support and sanctuary for terrorists through strategically targeted development assistance, promoting good governance, developing public diplomacy strategies to define good governance and values and discredit terrorist ideology, and normalizing bilateral military ties with the Sahelian countries. The DoS and USAID funding in support of TSCFP was $13.6M in FY05, $10.9M in FY06, and $36M in FY07. The DoD funding in support of TSCFP was $6.8M in FY05, $43M in FY06, and $81M in FY07.

TSCFP maximizes the return on investment by implementing reforms to help nations become more self-reliant in security and more stable in governance. Concern over the expansion of operations of violent extremists in the Pan-Sahel region, approximately the size of the United States, further underscores the need for TSCFP.

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM - TRANS-SAHARA (OEF-TS) is the DoD contribution to DoS’s Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCFP). The partnership comprises the United States and nine African countries: Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia. OEF-TS supports TSCFP by forming security relationships among all of the Trans-Sahara nations. OEF-TS strengthens counterterrorism and border security, promotes democratic governance, reinforces bilateral military ties, and enhances development and institution building. It is designed to assist governments seeking better control of their territories and to prevent terrorist groups from using the region’s vast open areas as safe havens.

OEF-TS uses Special Operations Forces, as well as EUCOM staff and Component personnel, to train partners on the conduct of counter-terrorism (CT) operations. EUCOM provides mentoring on military leadership and responsibility as well as equipment and advice to partner nations’ armed forces, thereby increasing their capacity and capability to deny violent extremists safe haven and ultimately to defeat their extremist activities. Our cooperation strengthens regional counter-terrorism capabilities and assists participating nations in halting the illegal flow of arms, goods, and people through the region.

OEF-TS provided Military Information Support Teams (MIST) to assist DoS Public Diplomacy efforts to counter extremist ideology messages in Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Nigeria. Civil Military Support Elements (CMSE) in Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger have identified projects to help the local population to reject extremist ideology. To enhance regional cooperation, EUCOM conducted a regional CT exercise and a command post exercise that include all nine OEF-TS partner nations and three of our European Allies. In addition, U.S. forces provide and exemplify democratic ideals of civilian control of the military. OEF-TS is scheduled to transition to AFRICOM during
the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2008. EUCOM will continue OEF-TS actions until AFRICOM assumes full control.

Theater Posture and Transformation

Forward-deployed forces in EUCOM are the primary tool for maintaining U.S. influence within the AOR and projecting power beyond it. Forward-stationed units, rotational forces, and installations are visible manifestations of U.S. commitment and enable us to apply influence, assure access when and where needed, and preserve a leadership role in NATO.

For decades, the trans-Atlantic security relationship was based primarily on providing collective security on the Continent. In recent years this relationship has evolved to increase the focus on exporting security from Europe. Forward presence provides more frequent engagement at all levels, builds habitual relationships and trust and provides critical continuity, and serves as a role model and catalyst for transformation efforts among European militaries. Partner confidence and willingness to contribute to coalition operations are increased when their militaries are trained to U.S. standards and with U.S. formations.

As EUCOM continues its Strategic Theater Transformation, the contributions of the Reserve Component (RC) are increasingly important. On any given day, approximately 4500 members of the RC are deployed across the theater. Without this support, EUCOM would be unable to fulfill many of its staffing and force protection requirements. The contributions of our Guard and Reserve forces have enabled us to mitigate risk, and programs such as the National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP) have helped us achieve our theater goals.

Security Cooperation

Security Cooperation (SC) programs remain the foundation of EUCOM’s strategy to promote common security. These programs contribute to building the vital relationships that bolster U.S. strategic interests, enhance partner security capabilities, provide essential access, allow access to en-route infrastructure, and improve information exchange and intelligence sharing.

Security cooperation is central to EUCOM’s Strategy of Active Security implementation because it is future-oriented and offers the most intense form of foreign partner interaction in peacetime. Through these partnerships and funding activities, such as the Coalition Warfare Program, we anticipate not only the extension of our relationships with existing Allies, but also the development of new relationships with additional partner countries.

Identifying low-cost, high impact engagement initiatives to build relationships that will shape the future landscape in which we engage is a
critical component of our SC program. A major focus of our efforts is building relationships with strategically important nations seeking to maintain their own security.

Through SC programs, EUCOM’s assigned units provide frequent engagement at all levels, building habitual relationships and trust, and providing critical continuity. EUCOM facilities and programs, ranging from airborne exercises to non-lethal weapons instruction, provide practical and state-of-the-art training that strengthens relationships and increases the capacity of our Allies and partners. As an example, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) assisted the Polish Land Forces to prepare for their FY2007 deployment to Afghanistan by hosting two battalion-level mission rehearsal exercises in at the Joint Multinational Training Center.

EUCOM’s assistance in the development of capabilities to conduct effective peacekeeping and contingency operations helps mitigate the conditions that lead to conflict. These efforts will ensure that we can work effectively with our Allies and partners should conflict arise. The deployment of EUCOM-stationed forces to Iraq and Afghanistan constrains its ability to resource theater SC requirements. EUCOM SC efforts require consistent and predictable investment in order to have an impact on the multitude of strategic, security, economic, and political challenges we face.

Security Assistance Programs

EUCOM also develops partnerships by executing security assistance programs using our 44 Offices of Defense Cooperation and Component mil-to-mil engagements in concert with host U.S. Embassy Country Teams.

International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Expanded IMET (E-IMET) provide education and training opportunities for foreign military and civilian personnel. The EUCOM portion of the FY 2008 IMET appropriation was approximately $41.5M, down 13 percent from FY07. IMET remains our most powerful SC tool and proves its long-term value every day. For a relatively small investment, IMET provides foreign military and civilian leaders access to U.S. military training, builds relationships, and enhances influence. Indeed, today’s IMET graduates are tomorrow’s Chiefs of Defense, Ministers of Defense, and Heads of State.

Title 22 funding under the TSCTP program provided $13.75 million for Mobile Training Teams to build five new light infantry companies, train tactical military intelligence personnel, build a tactical intelligence company, and provide better air mobility capabilities in Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Today, we continue to see the value of this program in the professional development and transformation of militaries in such
established partners as Poland, Romania, Tunisia and many other countries. The importance of IMET cannot be overstated, and we seek Congress’ help in sustaining this excellent program.

**Foreign Military Financing (FMF)** provides critical resources to assist strategically important nations without the financial means to acquire U.S. military equipment and training. EUCOM’s FMF has continued to increase over the past years. This is deceiving however, and is due solely to increases in the earmarked funding for Israel. When the earmarked amounts for Israel are removed, the remainder of EUCOM’s FMF has steadily decreased. [FMF for Europe and Eurasia: FY 03 $236M, FY 05 $212M, FY 08 $137M] Along with the decrease of available funds for Europe and Eurasia, additional earmarks further limit the amount of available funds. This will ultimately result in delayed or cancelled scheduled programs to improve Allied and partner abilities to productively work with our forces.

FMF is an essential instrument of influence, building allied and coalition military capabilities and improving interoperability with U.S. and Allied forces. When countries buy U.S. military equipment through the FMF program, they also buy into a long-term commitment with the U.S. for spare parts and training. Failing to fully fund vital FMF programs in any of these nations can unintentionally send incongruent messages.

I therefore seek Congressional support to ensure the Department of State’s FMF program is fully funded.

**Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)** demonstrate our nation’s continued commitment to the security of our Allies and partners by allowing them to acquire U.S. military equipment and training. FMS and DCS sales are vital to improving interoperability with U.S. and NATO forces, closing capability gaps, and modernizing the military forces of our Allies and partners.

Section 1206 of the FY07 National Defense Authorization Act coupled the authorities of DoS with the resources of DoD to rapidly build and enhance the military capacity of our key partners. In FY07, EUCOM received $50M to conduct innovative train and equip programs for partners interested in assisting the U.S. in the GWOT and providing security and stability throughout the AOR. In Africa, NAWEUR expanded the Maritime Safety and Security Information System to 16 countries, while SOCEUR conducted OIF-TS operations in eight countries. This authority and corresponding appropriations are key GWOT tools and should be expanded for FY09 as part of the Building Global Partnership Act (BGPA).
The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) continues to be one of our most effective SC programs, with 28 states currently participating (see Enclosure 2). By linking American states with designated partner countries, we promote access, enhance military capabilities, improve interoperability, and advance the principles of responsible governance. The unique civil-military nature of the National Guard allows it to actively participate in a wide range of security cooperation activities.

In 2007 alone, the National Guard conducted over 90 SPP events and along with members of the Reserve, participated in over 150 of 527 Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) activities. For example, the Oklahoma Army National Guard (ARNG) and its SPP partner Azerbaijan executed an extremely successful SPP medical outreach exercise that administered medical examinations and care to thousands of Azerbaijans.

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation is among our highest priorities as the majority of the world’s nuclear weapons are located in the EUCOM AOR. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) works in concert with EUCOM to cover the entire spectrum of this unique mission. Cooperative Threat Reduction programs address the non-proliferation of known WMD; detection programs address counter-proliferation, particularly interdiction of unknown items; and DTRA’s exercise programs address our consequence management responsibilities, reassuring our partners and Allies regarding EUCOM capabilities. Programs, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative, which seek to deny access at the source and build capacity for interdiction in transit, form the most effective framework to prevent WMD use. In this regard, the Nunn-Lugar program has been very successful in mitigating the risk posed by WMD through non-proliferation projects to reduce and secure WMD materials and weapons. In recent years, the Nunn-Lugar program has expanded to build partner capability to interdict WMD in transit, making it a significant aspect of the counter-WMD effort.

Train and Equip programs continue to develop partner nation GWOT capabilities. EUCOM recently completed the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program II (SSOP) to prepare Georgian forces for deployments in OIF and now use this as a yardstick for success for future similar programs. Georgia is now the third largest contributor to OIF, providing over 7,800 troops since 2004.

The Georgia-U.S. mil-to-mil relationship is an excellent example of a partnership that significantly benefits both the partner nation and the United
States. The United States and Georgia have developed a solid, cost-effective partnership dedicated to promoting peace and stability and countering terrorism. With three land force brigades forming the core of their armed forces, Georgia is the largest per capita contributor of forces to OIF after the United States.

Additionally, for the past three years the U.S. Army in Europe (USAREUR) has provided tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and management training to our NATO Allies, to include Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Recently, the initiative led to the training of the HUMINT force in the Romanian Army. As a result, Romanian HUMINT teams have been embedded within U.S. forces during the last two Balkan rotations. We look forward to expanding this program to other countries in the AOR eager to build needed military capabilities.

Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Programs are a way to shape perceptions and place the U.S. in a positive light, especially in areas susceptible to adopting extremist ideologies. EUCOM’s HA programs continue to steadily increase in scope and importance. EUCOM HA consists of three programs: the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Program, the Humanitarian Assistance-Other (HA-Other) Program and the Humanitarian Assistance Program-Excess Property (HAP-EP).

Our projects complement USAID efforts, enhance regional security cooperation, and are a vital tool for advancing U.S. interests throughout the region. They are an avenue for training U.S. troops while promoting U.S. interests abroad. Humanitarian Assistance helps stabilize and secure regions, generates positive public relations for DoD and the U.S. government, bolsters a country’s capability to respond to disasters (thereby mitigating future DoD involvement), and serves as an example of what a professional military can accomplish. While the EUCOM HA budget is small compared to other SC activities, it has a disproportionate impact as a highly visible and a very positive engagement influence activity.

FY08 HA program funding is $15.9M (including $12.3M for Africa) for projects to be conducted in 57 different countries, ranging from providing medical care, building and furnishing schools and clinics, digging wells, providing clean water in rural and austere locations, to providing disaster relief. This is a 53 percent increase over FY07 funding of $10.4M.

U.S. military engineers have engaged in projects as part of Department of State-led initiatives in the Congo and Niger and are supporting USAREUR-led operations in Romania and Bulgaria. Projects identified for community support included the renovation of schools, medical facilities, and orphanages in these emerging partnership countries. The impact of these 36 engineers and a
mere $282,000 in construction materials solidified critical relationships in theater and improved our ability to work jointly with new partners.

EUCOM is an active participant in the U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Program, executed by DoE, DoS, and USAID. HMA assists in relieving the plight of civilian populations experiencing adverse effects from landmines and explosive remnants of war. EUCOM’s efforts span 15 nations on three continents, with a focus on training the trainer and providing a mine action force multiplier capacity.

The Caspian Regional Maritime Security Cooperation Program is designed to coordinate and complement U.S. government security cooperation activities in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. U.S. Naval Forces Europe continues to promote Maritime Safety and Security and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Caspian Sea through routine engagement with Azerbaijan. These efforts are targeted to create an organic ability within Azerbaijan to “observe, evaluate, and respond” to events in their maritime domain. Russia, the only other EUCOM nation bordering the Caspian, has rejected involvement of non-Caspian nations in the region.

Additionally, the Caspian Sea’s location on the seam with CENTCOM, and the critical support Caspian nations provide for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM make coordination of efforts between NAVFIC and Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) critical to promoting security efforts in the region. To this end, NAVFIC and NAVCENT have begun shared flag-level interactions, shared responsibility for Theater Security Cooperation events, and have assigned staff points of contact to provide for coordinated interaction and unity of message.

EUCOM Regional Center for Security Studies providing professional development of emerging civilian and military leaders, reinforcing ideals of democratic governance and stable apolitical militaries, and facilitating long-term dialogue with and among current and future international leaders.

Co-sponsored by the U.S. and German Governments, the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies located in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany is EUCOM’s leading proponent for security sector education. The Center has built a strong reputation in the region and has proven to be an essential asset in the execution of EUCOM’s regional strategy. Its alumni represent a networked community of more than 5,000 security sector leaders from over 100 nations, including nearly 200 distinguished alumni who have risen to parliamentary and ministerial leadership levels of government or who have become senior defense officials or their nation’s highest ranking
military officers. This network has proven invaluable for harmonizing views on common security challenges in the region.

The Marshall Center provides a range of resident and non-resident security educational programs that are essential to EUCOM’s effort to enhance the security sector capacity of our Allies and partners. It is developing partner capabilities for democratic governance, combating terrorism, conducting stability operations and homeland defense. Marshall Center programs and activities are vital strategic communications platforms, greatly enhancing our ability to explain and elicit partner nation support for combating a host of shared security challenges facing the AOR.

The Defense Environmental International Cooperation (DEIC) program is another low cost, high impact program that is reaping dividends beyond its focus area. Established in FY01, the annual worldwide DoD budget for the DEIC program is between one and two million dollars with the FY08 DEIC funding level for the EU COM AOR set at $562,000. The cost of a typical project or event ranges from $10,000 to $80,000.

The Baltic Sea Spill Response Exercise, focusing on host nations’ capabilities, plans, and procedures as they relate to spill response, is a recent example of the DEIC program. Representatives from the Republic of Azerbaijan, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, and Ukraine participated in this successful exercise in response to an environmental spill. A second recent DEIC engagement activity was the Sustainability Workshop, held in October 2007 in Bucharest, Romania. The focus of this workshop was on the new strategy for the Romanian military and its effect on the environment. Discussions in the workshop centered on sustainable training ranges, land rehabilitation, and Geographic Information Systems.

Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises support efforts to deepen defense and military cooperation between the U.S., NATO, and PfP partners. Enabling PfP with DoD Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF) has proved successful in building partner nation participation and cooperation in theater. FY08 WIF funding for the EU COM theater is $11M, an increase of 16 percent over the FY07 funding level of $9.2M. DoD WIF provides an important source of funding for a number of partner countries that would otherwise be unable to participate in these important activities. DoD WIF pays for partner participation in NATO/PfP and in the Spirit of PfP exercises and conferences, the Civil Military Emergency Preparedness Program (CMERP) and OSD interoperability events that include U.S. participation. The focus is on peace support operations, search and rescue, emergency response, and consequence management interoperability events.
Regional cooperation through PFP greatly facilitates U.S. access to bases and overflight rights in the prosecution of campaigns such as OIF and OEF. Several PFP nations have provided basing, force protection at bases, and personnel to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Through exercises, Eastern European and Central Asian states became familiar with U.S. forces, methodologies, and leadership. Without this pre-established relationship, support to these U.S. operations would be harder to secure and incorporate. WIP-supported PFP activities have also been remarkably successful in preparing nations for full NATO membership. Ten PFP states (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) have become NATO members since the program's inception. These new NATO members and twelve other PFP states (Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Finland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine) provide forces to OEF/OIF and Kosovo.

EUCOM's Clearinghouse Initiatives ensure that U.S. SC actions are coordinated with other nations involved in the same region or issue. Clearinghouse Initiatives help deconflict programs to avoid duplication and to find ways to collaborate on matters of mutual interest. They exist in Africa, the South Caucasus, and Southeast Europe, and enable interested countries to share information about security assistance programs. The goal is to capitalize on limited resources by merging various SC programs into a comprehensive, synchronized regional effort.

Strategic Theater Transformation

Our forward-based and rotational forces are powerful and visible instruments of national influence and international commitment. Central to EUCOM's efforts is the completion of our Strategic Theater Transformation (STT) plan. This involves a basing strategy that seeks to sustain and leverage commitments to our long-standing Allies and U.S. operations in other theaters, such as OIF and OEF.

EUCOM's STT plan includes retaining eight fighter aircraft squadrons in the UK, Germany, and Italy. For ground forces, it includes two permanently stationed infantry brigade combat teams – a Stryker Brigade Combat Team in Germany and an Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Italy – along with two heavy Brigade Combat Teams in Germany that will return to CONUS in 2012 and 2013. EUCOM's STT is closely synchronized with OSD, the Joint Staff, Individual Services, and NATO to ensure that global efforts of other Combatant Commands, NATO, and the results of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission process in the U.S. are mutually supportive. STT aims at improving our
effectiveness and operational flexibility, but it has at the same time significantly reduced costs.

Since this process began EUCOM has closed 43 bases and installations and returned approximately 11,000 servicemembers and 16,000 family members to the United States. Current plans anticipate the closure of several hundred other bases and installations, the return of over 32,000 more military personnel and over 43,000 more family members to the United States, and the downsizing of 14,500 DoD civilians and host nation employee positions by 2013.

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

The spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the ballistic missiles to deliver them is one of the central security challenges confronting the U.S. and its Allies. Iran already possesses ballistic missiles that can reach parts of Europe and is developing missiles that can reach most of Europe. By 2015 Iran may also deploy an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capable of reaching all of Europe and parts of the U.S.

The U.S. proposal for Missile Defense (MD) in Europe is to base a tracking radar in the Czech Republic and 10 long range interceptor missiles in Poland (similar to the interceptor missiles based in Alaska and California). The Central European location optimizes the defense of both Europe and the U.S. against longer range threats launched from the Middle East. While the U.S. system will provide initial long-range protection to much of Europe, areas of southeastern Europe would still be threatened by shorter-range ballistic missiles. NATO nations are already pursuing shorter-range MD systems that could improve their ability to defend against short-range ballistic missiles. In essence, the U.S. would focus on long-range defense while NATO systems handle shorter-range threats. Our combined efforts will help keep U.S. and NATO collective security closely linked by providing all members of the Alliance with defense against the full range of missile threats.

Russia has expressed opposition to this initiative, claiming it would threaten its national security. The system would be purely defensive in nature - it does not even carry explosives. The planned 10 defensive interceptors do not pose a threat to Russia's strategic deterrent, which includes hundreds of missiles and thousands of warheads. Moreover, the location of the site in Europe, while optimal for defending against longer-range missiles from Middle East, is such that U.S. interceptors would be incapable of catching Russian missiles in flight. The Russians are aware of these facts and the U.S. has gone to great lengths to consult with them on its plans at very senior levels - even offering to host Russians visits to U.S. MD bases in Alaska and California.
COMPONENT COMMAND ACTIVITIES

EUCOM's four theater Service Components - U.S. Army, Europe, (USAREUR), U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVAIR), U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe (MARFOREUR), and its functional subordinate unified command for special operations, Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), are responsible for the implementation of our mil-to-mil programs across the AOR. Headquartered in Heidelberg, Ramstein, Naples, and Stuttgart, the Components provide critical capabilities necessary to build military capacity among partners and Allies, support military requirements, and promote vital national security interests through the use of military power.

U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR)

USAREUR-assigned U.S. Army forces continue to provide extensive support to ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are heavily engaged in EUCOM's efforts to build partner military capacity and provide an expeditionary stance through strategic positioning of forward-stationed forces.

Support for GWOT. USAREUR remains heavily engaged in the GWOT. During the past year, all USAREUR combat forces returned from or deployed to OEF and OIF. The 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 1st Infantry Division recently returned from Iraq and is currently reconstituting. The 1st Armored Division headquarters with its 2d BCT is currently serving in Iraq. The 2d Stryker BCT is also in Iraq. The 173d Airborne BCT is deployed to Afghanistan. In addition to these combat forces, USAREUR has provided the 12th Aviation Brigade, the 18th Military Police Brigade, one Military Police battalion, the 18th Engineer Brigade, an Engineer battalion, a Signal battalion and several companies and detachments in support of OEF and OIF. As a forward-postured headquarters, USAREUR also continues to provide key logistical support to forces in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Africa.

Building Partner and Coalition Capability. The protracted nature of irregular warfare has significantly increased the importance of partnership capacity in meeting common security objectives and with it the need for persistent forward presence to help partners build such capabilities. Despite the deployment of its own units, USAREUR has played a leading role in promoting the transformation of European armies into effective expeditionary partners for ongoing and future operations.

Since 2005, USAREUR's Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTTC) in Germany has trained over 19 battalion equivalents from 22 partner nations in the EUCOM AOR for OEF or OIF, ISAF, and the Kosovo Force mission (KFOR). JMTTC training focuses on building individual partner expeditionary capacity, as
well as developing robust interoperability among partner militaries through collective multinational training.

In 2007, JMTCD conducted training for the soldiers and staff of the 43rd Multinational Brigade as the unit prepared to assume command of ISAF’s Regional Command (South). The brigade, built around the Netherlands’ 43rd Mechanized Infantry Brigade, consists of soldiers from 20 NATO countries with a headquarters comprised of members from Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. These examples highlight how the JMTCD prepares NATO partners to fulfill critical military roles in Afghanistan and Iraq that had previously been performed by U.S. forces.

Recognizing the importance of its contribution to EUCOM’s Strategy of Active Security, USARMEU continues to execute a robust schedule of bilateral and multilateral exercises in Europe, Africa, and the Caucasus. While deploying, sustaining, and redeploying forces in support of OIF and OEF, USARMEU uses remaining forces, heavily leveraged with National Guard and Reserve units, to execute over twenty engagement exercises per year. In 2009, USARMEU will conduct exercises in Georgia, Israel, Russia, and Ukraine, as well as a host of others throughout the AOR. These exercises are designed to enhance partner interoperability in support of current and future U.S.-led coalitions, and provide HA support in the form of Medical and Dental Civic Action Programs.

Setting an Expeditionary Stance. USARMEU continues to reduce its installation footprint on a timeline synchronized with BEAC requirements and the modular transformation of enduring Army forces. Last year, USARMEU returned the 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Armored Division and the 3d Corps Support Command to the U.S., and inactivated V Corps Artillery headquarters. By 2009, USARMEU will have transformed into the new Seventh Army (7A) configuration, a process already begun through the merger with V Corps to form 7A headquarters. When all transformation actions are complete in 2013, 7A brigades and battalions will be fully restructured and efficiently garrisoned across six Main Operating Bases (MOB) (Wiesbaden, Grafenwoehr-Vilsack/Vohenfels, Ansbach, Baumholder and Kaiserslautern, Germany; and Vicenza, Italy). 7A will have the 2d Stryker Calvary Regiment stationed at Vilsack; the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team stationed at Vicenza, Italy; and Joint Task Force-East (JTF-E) headquarters established and operating from Romania and Bulgaria, with Forward Operating Sites (FOS) in the Black Sea Region.

Although we are reducing our footprint, our forward presence affords unique advantages in building partner and coalition capability. It serves as an expeditionary role model, catalyzes transformational efforts through more frequent engagement and continuity, builds habitual relationships and trust, and provides opportunities for partners to train alongside U.S. units, thereby
building partner confidence and willingness to participate in coalition operations.

**U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (NAVEUR)**

U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR) continues to build and maintain naval core competencies of leadership and combat readiness to counter any adversary. NAVEUR’s presence not only strengthens relationships with enduring Allies and emerging partners, it also develops maritime capabilities in the AOR's southern and eastern regions.

NAVEUR's main-pillar activity is building maritime partnerships. Over the past few years, NAVEUR has shifted course to focus increasingly on international efforts in the Black and Caspian Seas, as well as in Africa. NAVEUR is using its maritime expertise to support and encourage prosperity and development by improving regional Maritime Safety and Security (MSS).

NAVEUR-led Exercise BALTOPS 07, conducted in the Baltic Sea, demonstrated the ability of 10 NATO and PfP nations, to include Russia, to form and integrate multinational and regional task forces. These structures enhance regional maritime security and contribute to proliferation security initiatives, while improving interoperability and command, control, and communications.

The multilateral Exercise SEA BREEZE 07, led by Ukraine and the U.S., enhanced the capabilities of PfP nations within the Black Sea region in the areas of maritime interdiction, security and stability, and expeditionary operations, as well as improved regional cooperation.

In the Caspian Sea, NAVEUR is promoting Maritime Safety and Security and Maritime Domain Awareness with Azerbaijan. These efforts will assist Azerbaijan in developing an organic capacity to observe, evaluate, and respond in their maritime domain.

A critical aspect of Maritime Safety and Security is awareness of activities in the maritime environment. Maritime Domain Awareness provides participating nations the capability to network maritime detection and identification information with appropriate national defense and law enforcement agencies. Transparency and partnership are vital to its success.

The first step to achieve Maritime Domain Awareness is the Automatic Identification System (AIS). Similar to the FMS system for aircraft identification, AIS is utilized around the globe but data has not been widely shared. Through NAVEUR initiatives, 31 nations now share unclassified AIS data through the Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS). $5.8M of Section 1206 funds for FY08 will equip and train 16 African nations with MSSIS. To develop this initiative further, DoD has requested authorization from DoS to negotiate and conclude information sharing agreements.
agreements with countries in the EUCOM and AFRICOM AORs for MSSIS (Circular 175).

NAVEUR’s commitment to enduring partners remains steadfast through force contributions to Standing NATO Maritime Groups. These exercises have the benefit of enhancing the Alliance’s capability and readiness to conduct full spectrum operations. We continue to work closely with the AOR’s coastal states to encourage participation and cooperation in the program.

In addition to pursuing EUCOM’s SC strategy, NAVEUR continues to maintain its core warfighting capabilities and fleet assets. FLEXIBLE LEADER ‘07 tested NAVEUR’s ability to operate independently aboard the USS MOUNT WHITNEY command ship. As a result of these and other efforts, NAVEUR is certified as a headquarters under the new Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) certification process and the first numbered fleet to be certified as a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Headquarters (JFMCC HQ).

Developing Navy leaders is an enduring priority. NAVEUR’s mission requires some skill sets not previously emphasized for U.S. Navy professionals. Several initiatives are in place to develop regional knowledge and expertise, including use of the Navy’s Center for Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (CLAREC); the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS); and the Naval War College. Additionally, the NPS Regional Security Education Program (RSEP) provides insight into the religion, economics, history, culture, and politics of countries surrounding the Black and Caspian Seas. Partnering with our Reserve Components, NAVEUR is placing Maritime Assistance Officers downrange to assist country teams with maritime activities, enabling and enhancing our execution of security cooperation. Their presence provides insight into maritime culture, attitudes, and capacity—all necessary in understanding where we can best assist each country in building Maritime Safety and Security.

NAVEUR has continued its transformation with the closing of several facilities. In September 2007 all bases in the central London area were closed and Commander, U.S. Naval Activities United Kingdom was disestablished. Also in September, the USS EMORY S. LAND departed for a new homeport in CONUS. Naval Support Activities La Maddalena, Italy, was disestablished in February 2008. Naval Support Activity Naples Department Gaeta, Italy, continues to reduce its presence as well.

NAVEUR is developing manning and logistics requirements for supporting AFRICOM and EUCOM as AFRICOM attains Full Operational Capability (FOC) in October 2008.

U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE)

USAFE is a key force provider in the form of tactical combat air forces and airlift assets for OIF and OEF. In 2007, USAFE units flew over 17,000
combat-fighter hours and nearly 6000 tanker/transport hours supporting 
Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, OIF, and OEF. Furthermore, USAFE has deployed seven 
of its eight fighter squadrons, nearly 100 percent of its heavy airlift crew 
and aircraft, and nearly 50 percent of its forward-based Airmen in support of the 
GWOT. To plan and execute EUCOM’s quick-strike capability, USAFE operates 
a fully functional Falconer Air Operations Center (AOC).

USAFE’s Control and Reporting Centers have provided 100 percent of OEF 
tactical-level battle management command and control capability in Afghanistan 
since 2005. In addition, they are responsible for operations at Al Udeid AB, 
Qatar through September 2006.

Direct support of the GWOT is provided by virtually all USAFE bases and 
units. USAFE main bases and Geographically Separated Units (GSUs) throughout 
the EUCOM AOR enable Global Attack, Global Mobility, Coroner, Air Bridge, 
Force Extension and Theater Support air refueling missions. USAFE air 
mobility hubs at Incirlik AB in Turkey, Ramstein and Spangdahlem AFBs in 
Germany, Moron AB and Rota NAS in Spain enable crucial logistical support of 
U.S., Allied, and coalition forces fighting in the CENTCOM AOR. Meanwhile, 
Lajes AB in the Azores (Portugal) serves as vital throughput for combat air 
and mobility air forces alike. Furthermore, the 435th Contingency Aeromedical 
Staging Facility at Ramstein processed over 12,000 patient movements – as many 
as 120 in a single day – during the past year. Sick and wounded patients 
received at Ramstein AB are treated at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center or 
are sent on to the U.S. for additional care.

In addition to fully supporting the GWOT, USAFE fulfills a variety of 
missions in support of EUCOM. Supporting both combat operations and 
humanitarian assistance, it is EUCOM’s lead agent for personnel recovery, 
Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) rotation support, manned space flight 
support, theater mobility control, and medical evacuation. USAFE plays a vital role in EUCOM’s SC strategy, having participated in over 
200 TSC events in 45 countries.

Two operational highlights include USAFE support to NATO and Mobility 
Operations. USAFE provided continuous Combat Air Patrols in the skies over 
Riga, Latvia during the NATO Summit. This effort included fighter, mobility 
and support forces from five separate USAFE Wings. Approximately 500 Airmen 
deployed to seven European nations to support the Baltic Air Policing 
activities with additional aircraft, communications and maintenance support. 
Following that effort, a squadron of F-16Cs deployed to Skydrum, Denmark to 
improve tactical interoperability with our NATO partners. Also, in December 
2007, USAFE completed the seventh deployment in which Airmen have assisted in 
rotating Rwandan troops in and out of Darfur. This latest phase airlifted 
4200 troops and 18 personnel carriers in support of the African Union 
peacekeeping mission in the region.
USAFE is a key player in executing EUCOM Security Cooperation strategy. USAFE-led Exercise MEDCURE 2007 in Moldova, a multinational medical training exercise. This Peace Support Operations exercise integrated the Air National Guard (ANG) and 434 participants from 13 different countries in Crisis Response, HA, DR, and Foreign Consequence Management operations. During the medical outreach portion of the exercise, Moldovan civilians were screened and treated for diabetes and hypertension and given pediatric dental care. Participants also orchestrated Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) projects involving a kindergarten renovation and an artesian well supporting a village of 2,700 residents.

A vital component of USAFE’s presence in theater is cooperation and interaction with our NATO allies. USAFE conducted 19 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises in 16 different countries. USAFE-led Exercise NORTHERN VIKING 07, conducted in Keflavik, Iceland, provided training and experience in joint and combined air defense, sea surveillance, public relations, and counter-terrorism for U.S. and NATO forces. With no permanently stationed U.S. forces in Iceland, NORTHERN VIKING 07 successfully demonstrated continued support to U.S. treaty commitments to Iceland.

USAFE is also working to grow and sustain a strong, mutually beneficial relationship with the Russian Federation Air Forces (RFAF). Engagements in 2007 included Exercise TORGAU '07 and the Moscow Air Show. Numerous USAFE engagement activities, including weapons training, Deployable Air Traffic Control, Operational Airlift, and Close Air Support and Tactical Air Control Party engagements, are scheduled for implementation in 2008.

To further interoperability and extend capacity of limited U.S. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, USAFE continues to explore expansion of its traditional intelligence exchanges, while investigating new opportunities with partner nations. USAFE aggressively pursues the opportunity to work with partner nations which now possess, or are developing, airborne ISR capabilities. Robust coalition operations can be realized by building on these relationships and standardizing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

In addition, USAFE and partner nations are simultaneously pursuing methods to integrate ISR architectures and leverage coalition assets to satisfy mutual requirements. For example, USAFE is engaged in an intelligence initiative with the United Kingdom to develop a shared/integrated net-centric ISR capability to support coalition partners. These actions have provided much-needed manpower relief and additional insight into complex problem sets for both USAFE and CNTCOM. Moreover, USAFE’s Distributed Ground Station, DGS-4, began SIGINT Mission Management last fall and obtained a multiple-intelligence methods collection capability, improving accuracy and timeliness of actionable intelligence for theater warfighters. Of note, USAFE is
currently planning the deployment of the 603 Air Operations Center to Romania in April, 2008. This will be a combined operations engagement which will entail 24 hour operations in support of the NATO Summit in Bucharest.

USAFE is the lead agent for the Air Force in working with AFRICOM and EUCOM to develop the construct and missions for the new Air Force Component to AFRICOM. USAFE will initially be in general support and will then exercise Administrative Control (ADCOM) of Seventeenth Air Force (17TH AF) after stand-up.

Looking toward the future, USAFE continues to restructure and streamline, reducing manpower by 3500 personnel and its Command headquarters by 50 percent. This will result in an increased reliance on technology and on assets in the U.S.

U.S. Marine Forces, Europe (MARFOREUR)

MARFOREUR continues to conduct operations, exercises, training, and SC activities in the region through the employment of a small staff of both active duty and RC Marines. Its streamlined posture affords flexibility to adapt to the dynamic demands of the GWOT, including its participation with EUCOM/SOCEUR in numerous OEF-TS activities, strategic prepositioning programs, maintenance support (including assigned personnel) to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, logistical throughput for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles to OIF, as well as administrative support to Marines transiting to CENTCOM's AOR.

Marine Forces Africa (MARFORAF), as a Component of AFRICOM, is preparing to stand up by FY09. MARFOREUR is diligently laying the foundation of success for this focused command by infusing it with its already-developed regional knowledge base and preparing Marines for any and all contingencies on the continent. This includes developing appropriate courses of action for the short- and long-term geographical array of this new command and its organisational requirements.

In FY07, MARFOREUR conducted 15 exercises (11 of these being multi-service joint exercises), 31 mil-to-mil events (20 in Europe and 11 in Africa), and 14 DoS-sponsored ACOTA events. The areas of focus for the majority of these activities were West Africa/Gulf of Guinea and the Black Sea/Caucasus, and we will see an increase in the number of programs in FY08, with 30 events scheduled for Europe (20 in the Black Sea/Caucasus region). In short, MARFOREUR's SC activities continue to provide maximum impact with minimal forces.

MARFORAF conducts exercises in the region involving Marine units up to the battalion/squadron-size level. Support to the Joint Exercise Program relies largely on the Marine Corps Reserve, offering unique annual training
opportunities to U.S.-based forces while offsetting the impact of limited active duty force availability.

Non-Lethal weapons (NLW) continue to play an important role in supporting EUCOM's Strategy of Active Security. Through engagement, training, and capacity building, we expand our ability to positively impact Allied and partner nations across the AOR. Throughout 2007, as the executive agent for NLW, MARFOREUR has conducted NLW education and training programs aimed at both existing and emerging partners. This year, by integrating NLW weapons training in exercises SEA-BREEZE and NOBLE SHIRLEY, we have conducted NLW training for over 500 military personnel from Armenia, Georgia, Germany, Israel, Macedonia, Moldova, and Ukraine. NATO engagement has increased dramatically and will continue to grow in the future, as EUCOM actively participates in the newly created NATO governing body for NLW and continues to conduct NLW Professional Military Education at the NATO schools. Similarly, we continue to educate and train EUCOM forces in the employment of non-lethal capabilities in order to provide them with the flexible response options they require. NLW training is now a standard part of the Kosovo Force pre-deployment training package. By expanding our development of tactics, techniques, and procedures, we are making the most out of existing capabilities. Our greatest challenge in this arena is the technical limitations of the non-lethal capabilities that exist. Continuing focus on emerging technologies will allow greater expansion in this critical area.

The High Speed Vessel (HSV) is another program that enables more frequent, diverse, yet focused engagement activities with coalition and emerging partners across the EUCOM AOR. The vessel provides persistent "soft presence," enhances our strategic lift capability, and enables a broad spectrum of activities to include Phase 0 Theater SC. Continued support of the High Speed Vessel and Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) is critical to demonstrate commitment through presence and provide a broad spectrum of traditional crisis response and irregular warfare options throughout the EUCOM AOR.

The MARFOREUR Hospital Liaison Team (HLT) personnel at LRM continue to provide the best care possible for wounded Marines medevaced out of the CENTCOM AOR in support of OIF, as well as facilitate the visits of family members that travel to Germany to visit these wounded Marines. From the beginning of the GWOT through October 2007, approximately 1700 wounded Marines have been treated at LRM.

U.S. Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR)

SOCEUR GWOT-efforts in 2007 focused on expanding strategic partnerships and building counter terrorism capacity of North African partner nations through OEF-TS. COMSOCEUR was also designated the director of the NATO
Special Operations Coordination Center, the core element of the NATO SOF Transformation Initiative. This is a North Atlantic Council and U.S. Government approved and supported product of the Riga Summit, chartered to enhance SOF capacity among NATO partners. Finally, following the stand up of AFRICOM, SOCENUR implemented a transition team to support the establishment of SOCAPRICA.

SOCENUR’s operations in the Trans-Sahara region gained momentum and made progress towards building a capable counter-terrorism capacity to enable governments to conduct operations against violent extremists operating within their borders. Partner enthusiasm and support for this capacity building was evident during Exercise FLINTLOCK in August 2007, when nine African and three European partner nations came together to conduct a counter-terrorism exercise across an area larger than the entire continental United States. This highly successful exercise forged relationships and developed a common understanding among participants about how to proceed against an insidious and shared problem set.

SOCENUR conducted 29 Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events in 17 countries during 2007. These events have continued to develop our OFT-T5 partner nations into more capable, professional militaries, with the added benefit of increased political support and commitment from their political leadership.

SOCENUR also continues to focus on transformation, and the command took the lead in promoting the transformation of NATO and partner nation SOF with the designation and stand up of the NATO Special Operations Coordination Center (NSCC). This initiative speaks directly to EUCOM’s goal to generate greater capacity through NATO and European partner SOF by providing them with required capabilities. This will enable them to take a more proactive role in global defense efforts where our national interests intersect, and thus reduce the strain on U.S. SOF. COMSOCENUR was designated the Director of the NSCC and took on his first task the delivery of a SOF strategic assessment and overarching SOF strategy recommendation to the ISAF Commander. Beginning with just a handful of loaned U.S. personnel, the NSCC became a true coalition organization by the end of 2007, reaching Initial Operational Capability with voluntary national contributions of 81 personnel from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK, and the U.S.

In addition to its transformational role, SOCENUR expanded its efforts into Afghanistan by deploying a Special Operations Task Unit (one U.S. Special Forces company and associated staff officers) to support ISAF. This deployment was a tangible example of U.S. commitment to NATO success and demonstrated the ability to further increase NATO SOF capacity in Afghanistan. The NSCC’s establishment as the NATO SOF proponent has already generated a desire and willingness on the part of Alliance and partner nations to
contribute SOF to NATO operations in Afghanistan. Since the NSCC's initial assessment in February 2007, the number of NATO Special Operations Task Groups in ISAF grew from two to seven by the end of 2007, more than tripling NATO SOF combat power.

In FY08, SOCEUR plans to conduct 90 different engagement events with 23 countries in Europe and Africa. In addition to JCETs and bi-lateral training, SOCEUR supplements its tactical efforts by bringing senior officers and civil authorities from partner nations together to attend seminars and courses to promote exchanges about military aspects of good governance and interagency coordination. Furthering these themes, the command's information operations and civil affairs actions have focused on humanitarian activities, with messages designed to erode popular support for violent extremist organizations.

SOCEUR continues to deploy component forces and staff members in support of OEF/OIF, and contributes to EUCOM's initial crisis response force. During 2007, the Command deployed teams in support of EUCOM to Guinea and Zimbabwe to assist the DoS in preparing for potential non-combatant evacuation operations. In the 4th quarter of 2008, SOCEUR will conduct a major SOF exercise in Central and Eastern Europe, involving up to twelve nations and multiple U.S. agencies and military commands in order to further develop partner SOF capacity and validate the command's crises response capabilities.

THEATER INVESTMENT NEEDS

EUCOM's ability to continue its transformation and recapitalization in Europe will depend in large measure on the investment provided for military construction (MILCON), Quality of Life programs, Theater Command, Control and Communications Systems, ISR, and Pre-positioned Equipment. The MILCON program is a critical aspect in enabling EUCOM to correctly align its assigned forces.

Theater Infrastructure

MILCON investments are programmed for those enduring installations that support EUCOM's transformation. We must, however, use sustainment, restoration and modernization (SRM) dollars and other resources to maintain non-enduring installations to acceptable standards until all the Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, civilian employees and their families stationed at these locations redeploy. We do not invest MILCON resources in non-enduring installations.

Previous annual MILCON authorizations and appropriations have allowed EUCOM to begin to modernize and rationalize our basing and housing facilities. These authorizations and appropriations have supported our theater strategy by providing enduring infrastructure from which to operate. As these were
discussed in detail in the 2007 EUCOM posture hearings, they will not be recapitulated here.

We must anticipate infrastructure requests beyond FY 08 for our future force structure. To that end, the FY 09 President’s Budget requests a total of $783.3M in MILCON funds for EUCOM (Enclosure 3). This investment will enable us to eliminate substandard housing and includes projects that will pay dividends as we divest non-enduring bases and consolidate our forces into more efficient communities.

**STT and Operational Programs**

Future requirements resulted in the FY09 MILCON request that includes $492.3M for six significant STT and operational programs:

- $119.0M for the 7th Army Theater Command and Control Facility at Wiesbaden, Germany, beginning the consolidation of 7th Army command and control capability and eliminating split-based operations (signal assets in Mannheim, intelligence capability in Darmstadt and Army headquarters in Heidelberg);
- $19.0M for operational facilities supporting the Shadow Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) operations at the Grafenwoehr/Vilseck MOB;
- $30.0M of the $173M required ($46M was funded in FY08) for completion of Army infrastructure at MOB Vicenza, Italy, and to consolidate the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), the only split-based brigade in the Army;
- $46.0M for a DLA-funded Logistics Distribution Center, at Germersheim, Germany, to meet EUCOM’s theater cross-docking requirements and streamline the distribution operations to support current and future contingencies;
- $27.4M for fuel storage tanks and distribution at Souda Bay, Greece, providing additional fuel storage capacity and replacement of an existing but deteriorating JP-5 fuel line from the Marathi Depot to NSA Souda Bay;
- $7.4M for construction of a fully AT/FP compliant Large Vehicle Inspection Station at RAF Lakenheath, United Kingdom
- $132.0M for an expanded Ground-Based Mid-course Defense (GMD) system and a GMD Battle Management Fire Control and Communication In-Flight Interceptor Communications System Data Terminal.
- $108.6M to support the European Mid-Course X-Band Radar (EMR) site, with a single operations, maintenance and storage
facility, BMDS Communications Support Complex, security and entry control facility, power plant, fuel unload & storage, and all supporting infrastructure.

**NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP)**

EUCOM continues to advocate for NATO support to U.S. operational infrastructure requirements that can be directly linked to supporting the Alliance. Since 1996, EUCOM has been allocated over $1B to perform projects ranging from harbor dredging to constructing medical treatment facilities. NATO identifies infrastructure requirements through Capability Packages (CP), which is a statement of military capability required to meet NATO military requirements. Other future projects may include improvements to fuel and aircraft infrastructure. This program has expanded operational capability throughout our AOR, particularly Ramstein AB, Germany, Aviano AB, Italy, and RAF Fairford, UK. NSIP reduces the need for MILCON and SRM money to fund many of EUCOM's requirements.

**Quality of Life (QoL) Programs**

The well-being of EUCOM's servicemembers and civilians and their families directly supports readiness, retention, the reinforcement of core values, and mission accomplishment. Our warfighters and their families continue to endure real and perceived hardships in an operational overseas environment impacted by transformation, extended deployments, record lows of the U.S. dollar compared to foreign currencies, and countries where off-base health care and dental support is unfamiliar. I am committed to helping sustain appropriate entitlements that compensate our servicemembers for their sacrifices. Our collective efforts should match their commitment to duty and country with a pledge that we will strive to provide them with a standard of living comparable to the society they have committed to defend.

EUCOM's top QoL issues are: deployment and counseling support for servicemembers and families; Child, Youth, and Teen program support; dependent education programs provided by the DoD Dependent Schools - Europe (DoDDS-E); and improved access to health care and behavioral health counseling services. Paramount to achieving improvements to these programs is the need for adequate Operations and Maintenance (O & M) funding to sustain day-to-day operating requirements of these functions at an appropriate level. The importance of these programs is magnified in an overseas environment where members and families cannot rely on off-base options as they do in the U.S.

**Deployment and Counseling Support**
EUCCOM has strengthened counseling services for servicemembers and their families. With the challenges of accomplishing the mission in today's high operations tempo environment, programs and services are required to assist personnel in coping with the rigor of serving, living, and deploying while overseas. Supplemented overseas counseling through off-base providers is extremely challenging due to differences in language and standards of care. Component commanders have identified the current need of over $18M for additional Family Advocacy Program treatment staff, community mental health staff, and post deployment outreach programs to meet existing servicemember and family needs. EUCCOM will conduct a Deployment Support survey this spring to continue to identify requirements. It is imperative that EUCCOM be able to continue to provide servicemembers, their families, and our support personnel with adequate and available behavioral and mental health counseling and services.

Child, Youth and Teen Needs

EUCCOM and our Service Component commands consistently receive requests for increased support of child development centers, school age programs and youth and teen programs and services. Forty-four percent of EUCCOM's civilian and military personnel have children. Consequently, EUCCOM is dedicated to increasing funding for child, youth, and teen programs such as the child care subsidy, after school programs, summer camps, summer enrichment and summer school programs, gang prevention and awareness programs, and Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.).

A recent EUCCOM-wide survey identified a gap between our members' and families' child care requirements and the level and funding available to provide programs that meet their needs. Addressing this gap will improve EUCCOM's ability to conduct and sustain our diverse missions, especially in this era of continuously high operational tempo. Off-base options for child, youth and teen programs are limited by culture, language barriers, lack of U.S. standards of care and quality, availability, and above average costs compared with those at U.S.-based military communities.

Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) Schools

EUCCOM works with DoDEA and DoDSS-E to provide our children with quality educational opportunities. Ensuring DoDSS-E delivers a first class education is essential to EUCCOM families, whose overseas location lacks the off-base schooling options found in the U.S. DoDSS-E has 90 schools serving EUCCOM's 36,500 students. These schools represent almost half of DoDEA's inventory of 199 schools, and operating and maintaining them requires constant attention.
Delivery of a quality education depends on good facilities. This means DoDDS-E must modernize the aging schools in Europe. Some DoDDS-E schools are in facilities constructed prior to World War II.

With 45 percent of DoDEA’s schools and 43 percent of DoDEA’s students in the EUCOM theater, the health of the DoDEA budget is essential to the well-being of our educational infrastructure in Europe. While EUCOM has benefited from DoDEA MILCON funding across the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP), it still has over $1.2B in critical MILCON school requirements for Army and Air Force installations in Europe. The result is that projected annual DoDEA MILCON funding is inadequate to meet EUCOM school requirements. Adding to this difficult infrastructure challenge is DoDEA’s inability to provide adequate SHF funds to maintain existing aging facilities. The inevitable outcome of this situation is being played out in Europe, where our children are cramped in long-standing temporary buildings, unable to clean up after physical education, rushing through multiple-stage lunch periods, etc. Keeping in mind there are virtually zero off-base schooling options, we support an increase to DoDEA’s MILCON funding to help meet EUCOM’s requirements.

EUCOM appreciates continued Congressional support to make school construction a top quality of life priority for overseas families. Giving students and their families an education comparable to what they would find stateside will mean improved recruiting and retention.

Medical and Dental Care

Family member access to both medical and dental care is challenging overseas. EUCOM’s military medical treatment facilities (MTPs) must prioritize their limited resources to ensure a ready military force. Many of EUCOM’s health care providers are deploying to support the GWOT, further worsening availability of care.

As a result, the already-limited, space-available care may not exist and our families are frequently referred off-base to receive host nation medical and dental care. EUCOM family members must often use local community medical and dental services characterized by providers who speak a different language, manage care according to the standards of their culture, and are difficult to access and understand when compared to on-post care in a MTP.

The unique circumstances overseas dictate reliance on U.S. medical care professionals and liaisons to assist family members in accessing care in an often cumbersome, routinely frustrating health care system. The weakened dollar further stresses families, as upfront costs are higher and insurance limits (expressed in U.S. dollars), especially in dental care, are reached much sooner than in the U.S. This presents a huge challenge to EUCOM’s ability to sustain an adequate QoL. Our success in strengthening programs,
obtaining resources and deploying beneficiary awareness campaigns will lead to healthier communities.

**Family Housing**

EUCOM QoL construction investments affirm our commitment to servicemembers and their families. Our request for family housing construction, renovation, and replacement projects provides housing for the 7th Army move to Wiesbaden and meets the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) requirement to eliminate inadequate housing, ensuring our forces have quality housing and barracks. Investment in commissaries and exchanges ensures our servicemembers and their families have access to the supplies and services they need.

Our programmed family housing investments will meet DPG standards by FY09. Also, NAVFUR and USAREUR continue to improve their housing inventory through the Build-to-Lease (BTL) program. Through this program, USAREUR has begun the process of improving Grafenwoehr with 1,600 new units and is planning to acquire 215 more Build-to-Lease units in Vicenza. Each Component continues to explore additional BTL housing opportunities throughout Europe to meet their housing requirements.

EUCOM requested $291.0M for family housing construction, renovation and replacement as QoL projects in the FY09 MILCON submission:

- $133.0M to construct 326 housing units at Wiesbaden in support of 7th Army consolidation;
- $71.8M to construct 182 replacement housing units at RAF Lakenheath, UK;
- $86.2M for renovation of 372 housing units to meet the family housing requirements at Wiesbaden, Germany; RAF Lakenheath, Alconbury and Menwith Hill, UK; and Lajes AB, Azores.
- $65.0M for Exchange and Commissary projects at Spangdahlem and Ansbach, Germany and Vicenza, Italy.

**Theater Command, Control, and Communications Systems, and ISR**

Communicating and sharing information across an expansive theater is a critical capability and an essential enabler to EUCOM's strategic mission. Whether conducting activities in the EUCOM or AFRICOM AORs or in a supporting role to CENTCOM and PACOM operations, the ability to talk, share information and command forces over three continents is provided by EUCOM and its partners' Command, Control, and Communications (C3) network infrastructure.

The U.S. increasingly relies on its network of coalition partners to carry out missions abroad. Each participating nation brings unique hardware, software, and data structures for command and control purposes, driving the
required investment in international communications standards. Information sharing initiatives remain key requirements for the EUROM AOR. These capabilities are essential in improving our Allies’ and partners’ abilities to share intelligence information and provide for robust command and control for coalition operations and collaboration on non-military projects which respond to humanitarian crises and other related regional threats.

In both the EUROM and APRICOM AORs, investment in international communications standards will promote “plug and play” capabilities for sharing of operational command and control information across national boundaries, thus increasing the timeliness and effectiveness of coalition communications during combined operations. EUROM is ensuring a seamless transition with APRICOM to ensure that current information sharing initiatives which are focused on Africa are not lost, reduced or disrupted as APRICOM approaches FOC.

Additionally, maintaining a robust Combined Interoperability Program solidifies coalition communications capabilities and security to support EUROM’s SC program. Our overall communications strategy is to continue to build partner nation capacity for information sharing and to execute internal and cross-boundary operations.

Our Strategy of Active Security places forces in regions not currently supported on a day-to-day basis by the DoD Global Information Grid (GIG). Establishing network capabilities to support operations in remote areas can only be accomplished with reliable satellite resources. This satellite network enables the joint force by providing secure access and distribution of critical C2 ISR, and logistics information. In order to achieve a high level of agility and effectiveness in a dispersed, decentralized, dynamic and uncertain operational environment, our MILSATCOM architecture must be robust and ready.

Today, current MILSATCOM systems are fragile and over-utilized. The proposed replacement architecture is plagued with delays and unacceptable disconnects between space and ground segments. We need to commit resources to address architectural inadequacies or accept that we will have serious shortfalls and a loss of our current capabilities that are already stressed.

Our increased reliance on networked capabilities and the value of information riding on those networks has become more critical each day. While a network-centric, web-enabled force offers a tremendous advantage in carrying out nearly every dimension of our national strategy, it will be our greatest vulnerability if left inadequately protected. What has been characterized as a “cyber riot” in Estonia this past summer was a demonstration of the potential havoc that can be created by a better-resourced and technically advanced opponent. The network is our most vital non-kinetic weapon system.
We need continue prioritizing investment to safeguard the most powerful tool we have in this century: information and the knowledge it can engender.

Strategic Mobility and Maneuver

Strategic and tactical airlift are essential elements of EUCOM’s Strategy of Active Security. Meeting the objectives of this strategy, particularly robust Theater Security Cooperation, requires dependable and available airlift. Further, we envision increased lift requirements as a result of the increased engagement in Africa facilitated by APRICOM. Equally important, our ability to respond rapidly to crises depends on readily available strategic lift platforms capable of covering the vast expanse of our AOR. For example, the distance between Central Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa is equivalent to that between Europe and California. EUCOM’s current fleet of C-130s, which cannot carry out-sized cargo, lack the range or capacity to support the rapid movement of forces or humanitarian assistance throughout the theater. To this end, EUCOM will continue to pursue increased organic tactical and strategic lift capability to enable the full range of engagement and contingency activities. We appreciate the support in the FY08 NDAA for the Strategic Airlift Capability and look forward to the successful implementation of the SAC program and its associated MOU.

The mobility infrastructure within Europe and Africa continues to be an integral part of the national strategic mobility effort. In recent years, EUCOM has inherited significantly increased responsibilities in, and through, our theater directly supporting the War on Terror. EUCOM is meeting these challenges, and our existing mission requirements of training and engagement with Allies and partners, through key programs of support.

In the near term, EUCOM is actively addressing emerging requirements to the South and East, including en-route expansion possibilities and locations, new air and sea port uses, and continued support to APRICOM. EUCOM’s infrastructure is evaluated through the TRANSCOM Global En-Route Infrastructure Steering Committee and the Installation Planning Review Board in order to shape EUCOM’s strategy and funding requirements. From FY06 to FY11, EUCOM has requested $91.8M in MILCON for seven EUCOM en-route infrastructure projects. Additionally, the NATO Security Investment Program provides cost recoupment opportunities for EUCOM while increasing the capabilities of the Alliance.

Future EUCOM en-route infrastructure requirements will continue to be shaped by emerging global access demands from changes in the long-term EUCOM force posture, seam regions such as the Caucasus and Central Asia, trans-regional mobility support to CENTCOM, transition planning for APRICOM, and NATO/ISAF operations.
Pre-positioned Equipment

Continued support of the Services’ Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel (PWRM) programs demonstrates commitment through presence and preserves a broad spectrum of traditional crisis response and irregular warfare options globally. As we transform and transition to a more expeditionary posture, there is a heightened need for PWRM equipment sets in strategically flexible locations.

All four Services maintain PWRM in EUCOM’s AOR, either on land or afloat. USAFE continues to maintain PWRM in theater, with centrally managed storage sites in Norway and Luxembourg. Equipment includes Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resources (BEAR) kits postured for CENTCOM and PACOM, as well as multiple classes of flightline support equipment for exercises, maneuvers, and operations in the EUCOM AOR. USAFE also maintains a stock of pre-positioned equipment in the UK for support of Air Combat Command bomber beddown.

Many stocks have been drawn down to support OEF and OIF and they will not be reset until at least 2015. Over two-thirds of the Marine Corps Pre-positioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N) and the Maritime Pre-positioned Force (MPF) programs are being used in direct support of OIF and OEF. Equipment was also drawn out of the EUCOM MPF program to outfit additional combat units in support of the Marine Corps expansion. The Department of the Army’s Heavy Brigade Combat Team pre-positioned set from Camp Darby near Livorno, Italy, is being used to support OIF and OEF as well.

Continued Service investment in this capability is necessary to ensure that a fully flexible range of options remains available to Combatant Commanders globally. EUCOM is actively involved in DoD-led studies examining the global disposition of PWRM and is working to ensure our strategic direction and operational requirements are incorporated in these studies and ultimately in an overarching DoD PWRM strategy.

Partner and Coalition Interoperability

COMBINED ENDEAVOR (CE) is the largest and most powerful Security Cooperation, Communications, and Information Systems exercise in the world. It is sponsored by EUCOM and brings NATO, PfP members, and other nations together to plan and execute interoperability scenarios with national systems in preparation for future combined humanitarian, peacekeeping, and disaster relief operations. Further, results are published in the CE Interoperability Guide, enabling multinational communicators to rapidly establish command and control systems for the force commander. The rapid integration of past participants into the UN Mission in Lebanon, tsunami relief, ISAF deployments...
and multinational divisions in OIF were salient examples of COMBINED ENDEAVOR’S effectiveness. CE ‘08 emphasis includes network security, multinational common operational picture, friendly force tracking, as well as information sharing and collaboration with NGOs. CE ‘08 will provide communications support to Exercise MEDCEUR, affording CE participants a venue to address TTPs in an operational environment.

The Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (CWID) is an annual event that enables the Combatant Commands (CCOMs) and the international community to investigate command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) solutions that focus on relevant and timely objectives for enhancing coalition interoperability. CWID investigates information technologies that will integrate into an operational environment within the near term. CWID is also a venue for information technology development or validation of fielded or near-fielded commercial, DoD, and partner systems to reduce fielding costs or programmed transition timelines.

Our efforts to build partnerships and improve interoperability with nations in the EUCOM AOR are progressive and ongoing. Sharing common equipment with our partners and Allies is an ideal way to minimize interoperability problems and maximize the benefits of shared costs. However, we are challenged by a lack of coordination among the individual Services’ Foreign Military Sales (FMS) activities. Breaking down these stove-pipes will help enhance our coordination and strengthen the overall TSC effort in theater.

There are also policy challenges that are preventing us from fully pursuing the intent and the means of Theater Security Cooperation. For example, the U.S. has sold secure communications equipment to partner nations. While our national policies have enabled us to share keying material for coalition activities, the same policies prohibit our partners from using the same material for their own national purposes. They are often compelled to purchase additional equipment from other sources to gain that desired capability. By leaving our partners unable to use U.S.-sponsored capability internally, we have in some ways left them less capable than they were prior to obtaining this equipment. The U.S. must carefully but expeditiously remove roadblocks to building our critical trust relationships and better coordinate military sales and technology transfer efforts.

As has been described above, EUCOM has significant competencies, relationships, and resources to draw upon in order to promote security and stability throughout the region. One of the primary ways that we mitigate the risk to our own security is through building strong relationships with our partner nations. Our Theater Security Cooperation programs form a foundation for shared and interoperable capabilities to respond to contingencies.
Legislation enabling the Combatant Commander to build partner nation capacity will enhance our nation’s flexibility to build enduring relationships that will empower other nations to address common threats to the free world.

**Combatant Command Budgetary Authority Flexibility** is essential to maximize COCOM responsiveness and agility in confronting the constantly changing geostategic landscape in which we operate. This budgetary authority requested would be the ability to redirect resources to align financial authorities with the operational responsibilities of the COCOM.

Another way to provide the COCOM the agility to adapt to the evolving environment would be to expand current authorities to fund partner nation training. Section 1206 capacity building authority allows Combatant Commanders, working jointly with Ambassadors, to rapidly train and equip partner nation forces for urgent or emergent counter-terrorism or security cooperation missions. From project nomination to implementation, this is a coordinated, dual-key program that is more flexible than other traditional programs. FMP operates on a two-year budget cycle; 1206 is designed to respond to emerging crises or opportunities. Given the tremendous need for capacity-building and to meet emergent threats and opportunities, I fully support both the extension of Section 1206 authority and the $750M in the President’s Budget for FY09.

**Reform of the Security Cooperation Structure** is crucial to streamline the process where COCOMs, in coordination with the interagency, plan and conduct SC activities. We need reforms that will significantly improve our ability to help friendly nations develop capabilities to better govern and secure their interests and to work effectively in concert with our forces. A reformed SC structure must increase the speed and efficiency with which we can start programs to meet emerging requirements and ensure we have the right resources on hand. It must assist with logistical support and equipment for our partners deploying alongside of, or instead of, our own forces. It must enhance mutual understanding and build relationships by increasing shared education, facilitating common doctrine, and increasing our ability to work closely with Allies. It must also increase our flexibility for both planned HA and stabilization activities and for commanders to provide immediate assistance during operations to meet the critical needs of local populations.

Theater security cooperation relies on many different sources of funding, only a few of which are directly controlled by EUCOM. The DoS’s Foreign Assistance process covers numerous program areas ranging from counter-terrorism, to stabilization operations, to disaster readiness. Institutional barriers and resource limitations hinder effective coordination, within DoD.
and across the interagency, in the planning and implementation of existing security cooperation programs such as PFP and IMET. The resulting lack of unity of effort limits our ability to capitalize on emerging opportunities and degrades EUCOM's ability to build the capacity of partners and Allies in the AOR.

Legislation geared toward streamlining current Title 10 and Title 22 statutory SC authorities would certainly increase the agility and effectiveness of the designated agency responsible for executing these programs. Section 1206, Building Capacity of Foreign Military Forces, legislation enacted in 2005, remains an important framework for a more comprehensive SC reform effort and should be continued. An improved process will better achieve our nation's foreign policy objectives.

**EUCOM AND NATO**

We recognize that many of the challenges in the current security environment exceed the capacity of any one nation to resolve. Today’s threats require a strategic partnership among nations and a comprehensive approach by the international community, involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments. EUCOM’s efforts are coordinated with, and complementary to, a broad range of national, international, and regional actors. Most notably, EUCOM remains the focal point for the U.S. commitment to the NATO Alliance. Across the NATO Military Command Structure, U.S. military leaders are privileged to hold positions of influence, with responsibility to assist in development of the Alliance agenda and support execution of its military operations.

**Operational Imperatives within the Alliance**

NATO’s efforts to address common security challenges, including terrorism, consist of a wide range of initiatives and practical activities. With a clear unity of purpose, American forces, men and women of the Alliance, and 16 other troop-contributing nations are serving in operations on three continents - in Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Iraq, the Baltic states, and Africa. The more than 60,000 deployed military forces currently under my command as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) are a visible and effective demonstration of our collective resolve to project stability and to deter, disrupt, and defend against threats to the Alliance, wherever they occur.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) remains NATO’s most important and challenging mission. With over 47,000 forces, including more than 18,000 U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines, the Alliance has

42
responsibility for ISAF operations throughout Afghanistan. Working alongside additional U.S.-led coalition forces of OAE and other international actors, ISAF’s mission is to provide security and stability, establishing the conditions in which sustainable reconstruction and development can take place, and supporting the Afghan government in extending its authority across the country.

The 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) under ISAF are the leading edge of NATO’s efforts for security and reconstruction, bringing civilian experts together with military personnel in order to address unique regional needs in a coordinated manner.

Building an effective Afghan National Army (ANA) is crucial for long-term security in Afghanistan. While the development of the ANA lies primarily with the U.S.-led coalition, provision of direct support to the ANA remains one of NATO’s key military tasks. Indeed, one of our most significant priorities lies in the commitment of Operational Mentor, and Liaison Teams (OMLT) in order to create an enduring Afghan force, capable of independent and sustained operations. NATO has yet to meet its commitment for training the ANA and must do better, both in quantity and quality.

The Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission will continue under NATO leadership, providing a safe and secure environment following Kosovo’s declaration of independence. NATO reaffirms that KFOR shall remain in Kosovo on the basis of UNSCR 1244 and KFOR will continue to execute this mandate in an impartial manner in accordance with its Operational Plan. NATO will respond resolutely to any attempts to disrupt the safety and security of the population of Kosovo. KFOR is the most trusted security organization in Kosovo and is well positioned, well trained, well prepared, and committed to provide a safe and secure environment to stem any large-scale violence. EUCOM remains fully committed in its effort to support NATO and KFOR, and contributes approximately 10% of the 16,000 international troops currently in Kosovo. The vast majority of U.S. troops located in Multi-National Task Force East at Camp Bondsteel are National Guardsmen, who will remain in Kosovo until December 2008. Due to recent violence and an uncertain political climate which threaten stability, KFOR will operate in a manner of increased vigilance.

Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (OAE), the only operation currently conducted under Article V of the Washington Treaty, is focused on defending against terrorist-related threats in the Mediterranean. Maritime forces of OAE are patrolling sea lines of communication, sharing relevant intelligence and information, escorting ships, and conducting compliant boarding of suspect ships. Non-NATO contributions to this mission in 2007 included the integration of ships from Ukraine and Russia into the NATO Task Force.
The Alliance supports Iraqi security forces through NATO's Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) both in Iraq and at educational facilities across Europe. NATO has established the National Defense University in Baghdad, focused on training mid-level and senior officers. Most recently, the Alliance initiated a gendarmerie training program. Additionally, NATO has facilitated the acquisition and delivery of military equipment donated by NATO nations for use by Iraqi security forces.

NATO has assisted the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in expanding its peacekeeping mission in Darfur by providing airlift for troop rotations of peacekeepers, providing staff capacity-building activities in key African Union (AU) headquarters, and deploying mobile training teams to work with their AU counterparts. NATO’s capacity-building approach to increase stability and security on the continent complements EUCOM’s efforts to deliver long-term effects with minimal, focused resources.

**NATO Transformation**

In parallel to EUCOM’s transformation, NATO is embracing an ambitious transformation agenda to develop more agile, flexible, full-spectrum expeditionary military forces. It is in our nation's interest to ensure that our collective efforts are complementary and contribute to joint and multinational interoperability.

The NATO Response Force (NRF), an initiative proposed by the U.S. and adopted by the Alliance at the 2002 Prague Summit, remains a vital part of the Alliance's strategy to rapidly respond to emerging crises and conduct the full range of military missions at strategic distances. This joint and multinational force further serves as a catalyst for transformation and interoperability, improving NATO’s expeditionary capability in key areas such as multinational logistics and deployable communications. Current operational commitments across the Alliance draw on significant forces and reduce access to capabilities that might otherwise be available to the NRF.

While the high operational tempo of the NATO forces limits a sustained fill for the NRF, any potential losses in transformational effects are mitigated as NATO’s forces rotate through the ongoing ISAF, KFOR, and CAB theaters. It is clear however, that sustaining the NRF in the long term will prove valuable for improving training postures and hastening transformation of member nation militaries, especially for those members with smaller militaries.

In an attempt to sustain the NRF as both a transformational entity and a crisis response force during this period of high tempo, NATO modified its force generation process. Through a priority fill methodology -- referred to as the Graduated Response model -- this new process works to fill a core of
capabilities. The concept is that this core element has the capability to rapidly deploy, sustain itself, and conduct at least one of the designated missions without further force generation required. For other missions which may be assigned, the remainder of required subordinate forces would be generated from Alliance members’ high readiness force pools.

A key enabler for the NRF and NATO operations in general is the Intelligence Fusion Center (IFC) in support of NATO, located in the United Kingdom alongside the intelligence analysis element of EUCOM’s Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC). The IFC provides NATO operational forces with theater-level intelligence support much like that provided to U.S. theater and component commanders. It is the first theater-level intelligence capability of its kind within NATO. The IFC, which achieved full operational capability (FOC) in December 2007, is comprised of over 140 intelligence personnel from 22 NATO nations. Despite having reached FOC just recently, the IFC is already receiving high marks from NATO commanders, particularly for the intelligence support being provided to ISAF. On behalf of DoD, EUCOM provides infrastructure and other support services to the IFC as well as over half of its personnel. The relatively small investment made in the IFC has paid large dividends already, not only with regard to the intelligence support provided, but also in that the IFC is a reflection of NATO’s commitment to transformation.

Missile Defense is not a new issue within NATO. There is a shared perception among Allies that a ballistic missile threat exists, as well as a shared desire that any systems deployed by the U.S. and NATO should be complementary. The Alliance intends to pursue a three-track approach to missile defense.

First, NATO will continue the ongoing NATO program, called NATO Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (NLATMD), which would provide a “theater missile defense” package to protect deployed troops from short and medium-range missile threats by 2010. Second, NATO has committed to fully assessing the implications of the U.S. missile defense system for the Alliance. The objective is to determine the possibility of linking the NATO and U.S. defense systems to ensure that all Alliance territory and population centers would have defense against missile threats. Finally, NATO is committed to continuing the existing dialogue with Russia on theater missile defense, as well as consultations on related issues.

Transformation for U.S. and NATO forces involves more than developing new technologies and compatible military equipment. Transformation depends in large measure on the ability of disparate units, headquarters, and nations to work together. Such interoperability among Allies and partners is a key enabler and is recognized as an important force multiplier.
With regard to Transformation, the ISAF operation has revealed that the Alliance military formations do not have enough of the key capabilities needed for the 21st Century low intensity operations. These shortfalls in capabilities include rotary wing lift, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) for intelligence and surveillance purposes and medical formations. We are working hard to reach agreement on the Alliance Ground System -- a system comprising off-the-shelf Global Hawk air platforms and a cooperatively developed command and control capability -- that will provide NATO with a needed capability to monitor and support crisis management operations as well as conflicts. The ISAF operation further highlights the requirement to rapidly adjust training programs to effectively counter the rapidly changing enemy tactics -- for example, the need to train techniques to counter improvised explosive devices. In order for NATO member nations to acquire and maintain the required capabilities for tomorrow's challenges, the Alliance will need to invest in the training and equipping of their militaries today. This transformation of NATO member's capabilities will contribute to NATO's ability to address the emerging threats of the 21st century.

Finally, one of NATO's most significant initiatives in progress, from both an operational and a transformational perspective, is the development of an Alliance capability for strategic airlift. Fourteen NATO nations, plus Sweden and Finland, are currently working to purchase three C-17 aircraft to be flown by multinational crews with a multinational command and control structure. The U.S. has committed to participate alongside our Allies in this program. Sustaining U.S. support will be vital to the long-term success of this strategic initiative. The goal is to receive the first C-17 aircraft in late 2008, with full operational capability in 2009.

Partnerships and Engagement

As with U.S. national engagement initiatives, there is a strategic value to NATO's partnership framework. The varied partnership mechanisms in place continue to deepen and broaden to meet both NATO's new priorities in the evolving security environment and the aspirations of the myriad nations with which the Alliance engages. Partnership programs and initiatives cover the full spectrum of efforts, to include promoting dialogue with interested nations, building stable democratic structures, and developing defense capabilities that are interoperable with those of NATO. EUCOM provides the preponderance of U.S. forces that contribute to the success of many of these Alliance programs.

The NATO-Russia relationship has matured since the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and establishment in 2002 of the NATO-Russia Council. This visible, pragmatic relationship continues to be a component of international efforts to promote stability and understanding. There has been more
cooperation between our respective military forces to make them more interoperable, though our expectations on what is realistic and achievable remain modest. Russia has security interests and concerns—concerns about missile defense, NATO enlargement, and arms control. These are complex legal and political issues that are not easy to resolve and currently pose significant problems for the NATO-Russia relationship at the political level. NATO Allies are committed to working with Russia, in the NATO-Russia Council as well as in other international fora, on these and other difficult issues. We also continue our efforts for practical cooperation in areas where our interests clearly converge.

NATO Enlargement

NATO has been clear in its declaration that the door to new members remains open. Although no decisions have been made with regard to extending further invitations at the Bucharest Summit in April, three nations with aspirations for full membership (Albania, Croatia and Macedonia) currently participate in the Membership Action Plan. Both EUCOM and NATO entities have worked closely with these three aspirants to assist them in preparing their defense establishments to meet the military standards expected of a candidate for NATO membership. In addition to the three aspirant nations, Georgia and Ukraine participate in an Intensified Dialogue with NATO, an important step in the commitment to a closer relationship with the Alliance and its members.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. European Command is fully and actively engaged in addressing the challenges of this diverse and expansive area of responsibility. Even as EUCOM supports combat operations in other theaters, we are transforming our posture to shape the evolving security landscape in our AOR. We, however, are not transforming unilaterally, but in coordination with our NATO Allies.

While the U.S. military can help set the conditions to create a stable environment, it is but one facet of the comprehensive governmental and non-governmental approach required in order to achieve lasting stability and security. New and deepened partnerships within the U.S. government and among other COCOMs are required to more effectively counter the transregional trends and issues which define our globe: threats of terrorism and WMD, intercine regional conflicts, unresolved territorial disputes, complex geopolitical relationships, and humanitarian needs. Moreover, global partnerships are required to better counter the threats to our collective security. EUCOM remains committed to working with European, African, and Eurasian partners in collaborative efforts that meet our common security challenges.
The leadership and the capabilities our nation contributes to the NATO Alliance will remain fundamental to preserving trans-Atlantic security, now and into the foreseeable future. NATO remains an alliance of shared values, committed to the common defense of its member states. Nations will continue to use the Alliance as the essential forum for trans-Atlantic security consultations and cooperation, confronting threats to our security in a unified manner. The Alliance is well-placed and, with the proper resources and political will, capable of accomplishing great things. It is in our national interest to ensure NATO succeeds.

Global posture shifts and U.S. military transformation have fundamentally changed our strategic positioning in the EUCOM AOR over the last decade. These efforts will culminate in a force posture capable of operating across the broad spectrum of conflict. The success of our engagement, however, hinges on ensuring the presence of relevant capabilities in our theater—and the environment we are facing is far from certain.

The assistance of the Members of this Committee is essential in ensuring EUCOM’s effectiveness in its ongoing programs, operations, and initiatives. Your efforts underpin EUCOM’s ability to operate across the entire spectrum of potential military missions. Committee support also sustains effective engagement with, and credible support to, the Alliance and our regional partners. Since 1992 the dedicated men and women of the U.S. European Command have remained committed and able to achieve our national goals. Your support allows them to continue this proud tradition.
Enclosure 3: EUCOM LINE-ITEM MILITARY CONSTRUCTION/FAMILY HOUSING PROJECTS PROPOSED FOR THE PRESIDENT’S FY 2009 BUDGET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comp./Agency</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Appropriation Request ($000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAEUR</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Kaiserslautern</td>
<td>3rd Army Theater C3 Facility</td>
<td>119,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAEUR</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Grafenwoehr</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial System Operations Facility</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAEUR</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Vicenza</td>
<td>173rd Brigade Complex-Maint and Ops (Increment 3)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAEUR</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Vicenza</td>
<td>Brigade Complex- Barracks &amp; Support (Increment 3)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAEUR</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Kaiserslautern</td>
<td>Replacement Construction, MAAP</td>
<td>43,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAEUR</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Kaiserslautern</td>
<td>Replacement Construction, AUKAM</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAEUR</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Kaiserslautern</td>
<td>Replacement Construction, MAAP</td>
<td>38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAEUR</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Kaiserslautern</td>
<td>Replacement Construction, AUKAM</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Colmar</td>
<td>Large Vehicle Inspection Station</td>
<td>7,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Lakenheath</td>
<td>Replace Family Housing (60% 5)</td>
<td>71,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLA</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Germersheim</td>
<td>Logistics Distribution Center</td>
<td>48,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLA</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Souda Bay</td>
<td>Fuel Storage Tanks and Pipeline Replacement</td>
<td>27,761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>SMDS- European Interceptor Site</td>
<td>32,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>SMDS- European Midcourse Radar Site</td>
<td>168,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$697,149</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NON LINE-ITEM MILITARY CONSTRUCTION/FAMILY HOUSING PROJECTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comp./Agency</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Appropriation Request ($000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAEUR</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Kaiserslautern</td>
<td>Whole Neighborhood Improvements, Hainerberg</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Leiria</td>
<td>Improve Family Housing</td>
<td>41,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Belvoir</td>
<td>Improve Family Housing &amp; Infrastructure</td>
<td>11,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Henworth Hill</td>
<td>Improve Family Housing</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Alconbury</td>
<td>Improve Family Housing</td>
<td>13,153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NON LINE-ITEM TOTAL** | **$86,178**

**TOTAL MILITARY CONSTRUCTION/FAMILY HOUSING PROJECT FUNDING REQUEST** | **$783,327**

1 Defense Logistics Agency
2 Missile Defense Agency
3 Ballistic missile defense system
4 For budget submission, (1) total request is $661,380,000, and (2) balance ($528,780,000) will be requested with the FY 2010 budget submission
5 For budget submission, (1) total request is $176,100,000, and (2) balance ($67,540,000) will be requested with the FY 2010 budget submission
POSTURE STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, UNITED STATES NAVY
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

BEFORE THE 110TH CONGRESS

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

March 13, 2008
INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the United States Southern Command and our work in Latin America and the Caribbean. I would like to thank all the Committee members for your support over the past year and for your continued support as we face the challenges and opportunities of this promising, yet complex 21st Century.

U.S. Southern Command is charged with promoting security cooperation and conducting military operations in Central America, the Caribbean, and South America in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. Successfully accomplishing this mission enhances the security and stability in the Western Hemisphere and ensures the forward defense of the United States.

Our efforts are significantly influenced by our understanding of the complexities of the hemisphere and our ability to foster cooperation with – and among – willing and capable partners. As globalization trends continue, we are certain that our security will involve deeper cooperation with multinational, interagency, and public-private partners.

2007 was an important year for U.S. Southern Command. We celebrated our headquarters’ tenth anniversary in Miami, conducted numerous bilateral and multilateral exercises, responded to several natural disasters, built new relationships and strengthened existing ones, launched a series of valuable medical missions, and put the command on track for a reorganization to meet the security challenges of the new millennium. With the ongoing support of the Congress, we hope to continue our progress.

Today in the Americas, from northern Canada to the tip of South America, 45 nations, territories, and protectorates are interdependent in many ways. While each of us celebrates our
uniqueness and diversity across the hemisphere, we also share tremendous linkages and natural alignments that bring us closer together with each year that passes. As our hemisphere “virtually” shrinks, each of our nations – working together – becomes more important in facing the challenges posed by this new century.

Last year, in my first posture statement, I reported on the status of the diverse region we are assigned. I discussed the tremendous linkages that we share with Latin America and the Caribbean – important geographic, cultural, economic, and geopolitical linkages. I outlined some difficult underlying conditions faced by the region – led by poverty and unequal wealth distribution – and how they contribute to specific challenges such as crime, violence, and illicit trafficking of drugs, people, and weapons.

This year, I would like to give you an update on our region, discuss the challenges we still face, report on U.S. Southern Command’s key initiatives, and detail our efforts to modify our organization to meet current and future security demands.

**ECONOMICS AND CULTURE**

**Economic momentum.** According to the United Nations’ Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean, this past year was an encouraging one for the region in terms of economic growth, with all of Latin America and the Caribbean benefiting from five consecutive years of positive economic performance. The year 2007 ended with an average overall economic growth rate of 5.6 percent, with some individual economies growing as much as eight percent. From a historical point of view, the region has not seen an equivalent sustained economic performance in over three decades.
A key contributor to this growth was the increase in formal employment, with an overall reduction in the unemployment rate to eight percent and an increase in real wages of about 1.5 percent – all leading to a rise in household consumption and a slight decrease in poverty levels. These positive economic indicators, coupled with expanding credit and rising commodity prices, stimulated the region’s demand-driven economic performance.

“Our is a region of cruel contrasts,” wrote one of the current Presidents in the region. Despite its economic growth, great wealth, abundance of natural resources, and the vast potential of its creative people, Latin America and the Caribbean still suffer from widespread poverty, unequal wealth distribution, and social exclusion. The level of these social ills does vary, however, by region, country, and the economic policies and practices of each government. But, as a developing region, notwithstanding its recent year-on-year growth, Latin America and the Caribbean are still lagging behind other developing areas.

In terms of trade, the rest of the Americas continue to be a major trading partner with the United States, with almost 40 percent of total U.S. trade – imports and exports – flowing north and south in the hemisphere. From important sources for oil, metals, and other commodities, to key destinations for our exports such as machinery parts and other technical equipment, the nations of the Americas are increasingly interdependent and important to the United States. In fact, we are either the primary or the secondary trading partner with almost every nation in the Americas. This continuous two-way flow of materiel, ideas, and people is reshaping the hemisphere. In essence, our economic exchange is the lifeblood of the hemisphere, sustaining our economies and ultimately providing security and prosperity for our people.

The Free Trade Agreements we have with our partners in the region help facilitate this beneficial exchange and contribute to the demonstrated growth of all of our economies, thus
contributing to security and stability. I would like to thank the Congress for its support of the Peru Trade Promotion Agreement late last year – this is extremely important for security in the region. Additionally, we currently have a unique opportunity to strengthen our economic ties to two key friends and allies – Colombia and Panama – by passing Free Trade Agreements that could help bolster their economic security, and in the case of Colombia, help solidify the significant gains it has made towards achieving peace and stability for its citizens. Both agreements would help the overall level of security in the region.

Dynamic Cultures. The Americas are an interacting system – a diverse, yet interconnected community, which in every sense of the word is our home. We have tremendous geopolitical, economic, and social linkages that make up the foundation of this home, and Latin America and the Caribbean are an integral part of its structure. Frequently, this important region is offhandedly referred to as the “backyard” of the United States – an image that is inaccurate and inappropriate – especially since it is vitally important to our hemisphere and to the future of the United States. It is not our “backyard,” nor our “front porch.” The Americas are a home we share together. A clear indication of this is the mixing and merging of cultures we see in the region, with a significant amount occurring here in the United States.

To see some of the linkages, all you have to do is turn on the television or walk down the street. Fifteen percent of our population traces its heritage to Latino origin. Almost 50 million people, who as a popular commercial once said, “live in English, but feel in Spanish.” By the middle of this century, almost 30 percent of the U.S. population will be of Latino descent.

In fact, the Latino advertisement sector is booming and seeks to attract this growing Latino population – a population with a combined economic power of nearly one trillion dollars.
Steadily, more channels and broader programming are available in Spanish, with viewers concerned about issues affecting their population and that of their countries of origin.

This past year, the United States probably became the second largest nation of Spanish-speakers in the world – behind only Mexico, but ahead of Argentina, Colombia, and Spain. Four of the top 15 surnames in the United States are now of Latino origin, and as the U.S. Census Bureau statistics illustrate, seven of the top ten largest cities in the United States are now arrayed in states along our southern border – San Jose, Los Angeles, San Diego, Phoenix, Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio. This represents a huge population density shift from 100 years ago, when all ten major cities were in the Northeastern part of the United States.

What does this great mixing of cultures in our country mean? For starters, it represents a U.S. population interested in and connected to Latin America and the Caribbean. It represents a linkage to the hemisphere that we should leverage along with our various other natural alignments. We should couple this human connection with our country’s natural generosity and ability for innovation and ultimately apply them to solve our shared challenges.

**CHALLENGES**

When it comes to security challenges, fortunately, we do not see any conventional military threats to the United States developing in the region, nor do we foresee any major military conflict between nations in Latin America or the Caribbean. Although some historical competition and occasional tension between neighbors do exist, we are confident that any disagreements will be resolved through dialogue – a strength in the region – and not through state-on-state violence. However, public security threats – such as crime, gangs, and drug
trafficking and use – pose the principal near-term security challenges to the region. Given the depth of our linkages in the Americas, these ills pose a threat to the United States as well. For example, the U.S. Department of Justice’s National Drug Intelligence Center reports that there were an estimated 5,500 U.S. deaths that listed cocaine poisoning as a factor in 2004 – a 43 percent increase from 1999. If this statistical trend continues at the same rate, and considering all cocaine-related deaths – such as accidents and homicides – it can be assumed that several thousand more people will die in the United States this year related to cocaine, most of which comes from Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia in the Andean Ridge of South America.

Poverty and inequality. In many cases, the underlying conditions of poverty and inequality provide fertile soil for the principal security challenges in the region. Although recent positive economic growth has begun to make a dent in poverty rates, still about 35 percent of Latin Americans are living in poverty – subsisting on less than two U.S. dollars per day.

Moreover, about 13 percent of the people in the region live in extreme poverty – less than one U.S. dollar daily – and nearly 80 percent of the entire region lives on less than 10 dollars per day. When you add these poverty figures – which represent millions of people trying to provide for their families – to the world’s most unequal distribution of wealth and a high level of corruption, you have a strong catalyst for insecurity and instability. Poverty and inequality – although not uniform across the region – make whole populations susceptible to the lure of illicit activity – such as an involvement with the drug trade, crime, gangs, or illegal immigration. It also creates a large constituency predisposed to vote for any demagogue espousing political or economic changes that might improve their financial circumstances, regardless of the ultimate consequences. This also provides a basis for terrorists seeking to exploit such conditions.
Drugs. Drug trafficking is one of the greatest threats to public order in our hemisphere. The Andean Ridge in South America is the world’s only significant source of coca cultivation. Cocaine is the fuel that feeds many public security ills in Latin America and the Caribbean – from criminal violence, to corruption, to political instability. But the drug trade’s toxic effects are not isolated to our south. As mentioned earlier, we estimate that several thousand people will die in the United States this year due to cocaine-related events that can be traced to illicit drugs from this region.

The global business of illegal drug production, distribution, and consumption is devastating societies in Latin America and the Caribbean. Narcotraffickers continuously adjust their operations to adapt to law enforcement efforts by developing new trafficking routes and consumer markets. Consequently, nations that were once isolated from the illicit drug trade are now experiencing its corrosive effects. Most nations in the hemisphere are now struggling to counteract the drug trade’s destabilizing and corrupting influence.

Each nation that finds itself affected by the drug trade will need to increase cooperation and dedicate more resources to combat this growing and adapting threat. Drug traffickers are innovative, adaptive, and organized. For example, as we interdict their shipments along coastal routes, they re-route west of the Galapagos Islands to avoid detection. And as we stop them on the high seas, they build and operate self-propelled semi-submersibles that skim along the water line to avoid visual and radar detection. Through international and interagency efforts, we have interdicted several such semi-submersible vessels, which are showing improved capability and technology. Last year, a “ship building” site was discovered in the Colombian jungle where five semi-submersibles were being built – each with a capacity to bring several tons of cocaine into
the United States. To put this threat into perspective, each load aboard one of these vessels is the rough equivalent of one cocaine hit for each U.S. high school student – all 18 million of them.

Fortunately, we are making progress in Colombia – the major global source of cocaine. Colombian efforts have significantly eliminated key leaders involved in the drug trade. In September 2007, Colombian authorities captured Diego Leon Montoya Sanchez, one of the world’s most dangerous drug traffickers responsible for nearly two-thirds of the hundreds of tons of cocaine exported from Colombia each year. Experts attribute nearly 1,500 murders to this ruthless criminal. Through fear and corruption, Montoya, like Pablo Escobar before him, played a huge, destabilizing role throughout Latin America. His arrest marks a major milestone for Colombia – a nation that has labored for years to build a foundation for legitimate governance and rule of law.

Here in the United States, illegal drug use continues to be a serious challenge that needs to remain a high priority on the national agenda. There are legitimate needs on the “demand side” as well as on the “interdiction and supply side.” Every effort devoted to solving the drug abuse epidemic in this country and preventing the flow of illicit drugs is an effort well spent in directly saving the lives of U.S. citizens, enhancing our national security, and stabilizing fragile democracies in our hemisphere.

U.S. Southern Command’s unique counter-narcotics task force located in Key West, Florida, is a role model for the kind of innovative cooperation and fusion of capabilities we need to counter this dynamic and pernicious threat. This Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) combines the efforts of international partners, the U.S. armed services, and numerous U.S. and international departments and agencies, including Panama Express, an interagency Strike Force of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) supported by the Department
of Justice dedicated to maritime interdiction originating in Colombia and related investigations.

Thanks to this cooperative and effective arrangement, large quantities of narcotics moving through the region are interdicted each year. Last year this task force stopped approximately 210 metric tons of cocaine from entering the United States and facilitated the capture by law enforcement or partner nations of hundreds of drug traffickers. These efforts prevented the equivalent of roughly one billion cocaine hits from reaching our streets. More must be done, however. Drug traffickers respond to pressure by changing their tactics, as well as by diversifying their markets, such as in Europe and beyond, thereby compounding the global drug problem. JIATF-S has an outreach plan that includes interaction with European law enforcement agencies and liaison with most of the U.S. geographic combatant commands.

Our task force uses a multinational and interagency approach that bridges the gap between the military’s role of detection and monitoring and law enforcement’s role of interdiction and apprehension. We will continue to address this problem with all available resources.

**Violence and crime.** Violence and crime have become a major threat to the security of many nations in the Western Hemisphere. In fact, murder is one of the five main causes of death in several Latin American countries. The annual homicide rate for Latin America and the Caribbean is one of the highest in the world at 27.5 murders per 100,000 people. This murder rate stands in stark contrast to 5.5 in the U.S. and 1 in Western Europe. Recent surveys in Central America report that two-thirds of the respondents cite crime as the number-one problem facing their countries – six times the number of respondents choosing poverty.

These crime rate trends are exacerbated by the growing influence of gangs and are severely challenging security and civil society throughout Latin America, with some gang population estimates reaching over one hundred thousand in Central America alone. Primarily, these are
urban gangs comprised of disenfranchised youth, thus creating a challenging long-term and
generational aspect to this threat. Central American street gangs – maras – are known for their
brutal initiations and their extortion of “protection” money – or “War Taxes” as the locals call it.
These gangs do not just pose a concern in Latin America. Central American gangs routinely
cross borders and operate inside the United States.

The size and reach of these gangs severely stress regional law enforcement capabilities.
Partner nation law enforcement units are often out-gunned, out-manned, and overwhelmed when
attempting to counter these criminal enterprises. As a result, partner nation military forces are
often called in to support their law enforcement counterparts. These militaries then turn to the
U.S. seeking assistance and advice, yet U.S. military forces are legally prohibited in our ability to
provide such support. Support in these areas often resides in Department of Justice, Department
of State, or U.S. Agency for International Development programs, underscoring the fact that
coordinated interagency solutions will be required to confront these threats.

In recognition of these dynamics and the need for broader interagency involvement on crime
and gang issues in the region, U.S. Southern Command has worked with counterparts in the
intelligence community, in federal development agencies, and in domestic U.S. law enforcement
organizations to improve mutual understanding of these complex social issues. Gang challenges
and the need to address broad rule of law issues regionally have also led, in part, to expanded
personnel representation at U.S. Southern Command by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
U.S. Agency for International Development, the State Department, and the Drug Enforcement
Administration.

In September 2007, we hosted a major Interagency Coordination Group conference on gangs
in Latin America and the Caribbean. This conference underscored the pivotal role U.S. law
enforcement and development agencies play in countering the regional criminal threat, linked disparate U.S. agency and law enforcement representatives, facilitated information exchange, and reinforced understanding of why U.S. military involvement in such efforts remains appropriately constrained.

**Colombia.** Colombia continues to be a focus nation and valued partner for U.S. Southern Command. Colombia is a strategic ally, an important friend, and a crucial country for the future stability and security of this hemisphere. Colombia has access to the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans, shares a border with Panama that forms a natural land bridge to the United States, and is the second oldest democracy in the hemisphere. Yet Colombia continues to face challenges; it has been waging an internal struggle for peace for over four-decades, and it remains the source for most of the world’s cocaine.

Overall, Colombia continues to make great progress in its complex struggle for peace and security. There is a building momentum for real peace in this long troubled country. I encourage the members of the Committee to visit Colombia to experience first hand the sense of accomplishment and hope most Colombians feel today. A tour of Bogota – recently named by the New York Times as one of “The 53 Places to Go in 2008” – will quickly highlight the economic growth and progress the country has made. Cartagena is an international tourist destination and a UN World Heritage City on the Caribbean coast. New construction is booming, citizens flock to the malls, restaurants are packed, and ordinary people routinely drive across the country in relative safety – all activities unheard of a decade ago.

With the steady support of the United States, Colombia is on the brink of winning its peace and making its successful gains against terrorism and social disorder irreversible. Desertions by members of the various subversive armed groups continue to rise. For example, Colombia’s
main narcoterrorist group - the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) – has been reduced to an estimated 9,000 fighters today – a significant decrease from the 17,500 fighters in 2002. The Colombian armed forces have had numerous operational successes against the FARC with the clearing of former FARC strongholds and the removal or bringing to justice of numerous high-ranking FARC leaders, such as Negro Acacio and Martin Caballero. Over the course of the last five years, homicides have decreased by 40 percent, kidnappings for ransom decreased by 76 percent, and terror attacks against civilians decreased by 61 percent – due in large part to the current Colombian administration’s strategy of establishing security and governance throughout its sovereign territory.

Colombia has made these difficult gains within an increasingly open and transparent political and judicial system. The press in Colombia has free reign to investigate and publish on any subject that it wishes. Just as in the United States, as illegal activity becomes known, accusations are made public and trials take place in an open legal system. Like many nations fighting for peace against capable and well-resourced foes, Colombia has uncovered some excesses and abuses linked to corruption and human rights violations. To Colombia’s credit, regardless of the level of implication, they are attempting to prosecute these cases in a transparent and public manner.

All of these and many other hard-fought successes are the result of dedicated effort on part of the Colombian government with the assistance of the United States. Continued U.S. support at current levels for the next three years is critical, and we believe it will enable Colombia to achieve irreversible gains as it moves into the consolidation phase of its peace plan. During this important phase, as the Colombian government extends effective government services and security presence throughout its territory, we predict this key strategic ally will benefit from
progress toward peace, while the ability of narcoterrorists to grow, process, and ship illicit drugs will be significantly reduced – ultimately saving U.S. lives and resources.

Over the next three years, support for the Colombian armed forces’ campaign to defeat the FARC and for their interagency efforts to bring governance and economic opportunity to areas recaptured from the FARC is essential. Paramount to this support will be training, mobility, and sustainment of key infrastructure programs to provide long-term self-sufficiency. Our continued support over the next three years will be critical through the “nationalization” period, as the Colombian government assumes responsibility and funding of the majority of current programs through the resources raised by its tax system – specifically $3.7 billion that Colombians have agreed to generate between 2007 and 2010 to increase their defense budget by 12 percent.

**U.S. Hostages.** For five years, U.S. citizens Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell, and Thomas Howes have been held hostage by the FARC in Colombia. Their safe return to the United States is a top priority for U.S. Southern Command. Unfortunately, the FARC are extremely capable and experienced at holding and hiding hostages in the dense Colombian triple-canopy jungles. We are hopeful that our efforts and those of Colombia and the international community will soon see Marc, Keith, and Tom returned to U.S. soil alive and well. Last fall, a videotape seized from FARC operatives by Colombian authorities showed our three U.S. hostages alive. Since their capture in February 2003, we have maintained vigorous 24/7 activities in pursuit of their recovery, including tens of thousands of hours of surveillance and intelligence gathering in concert with our Colombian partners. We dedicate numerous personnel to this end, and have recently conducted a review of all activities and procedures to expand coordination, integration, and cooperation with our interagency partners and international efforts to achieve their repatriation.
Terrorism. Since 9/11, the potential for terrorist activity in the region is a growing concern. We consider Latin America and the Caribbean to be potential bases for future terrorist threats to the United States and others in the Americas. The conditions in parts of the region – easily skirted borders, black market economies, corruption, poverty, established illicit trafficking routes – all could provide maneuvering room for any form of terrorism to exploit, to include Islamic radical groups. The alleged plot to bomb the gas lines leading to John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York and the leading suspects’ roots in the Caribbean raise the specter of Islamic terrorist activity gaining traction. We believe members, facilitators, and sympathizers of Islamic terrorist organizations are indeed present in our hemisphere.

As with all of the Department of Defense, U.S. Southern Command dedicates significant effort to remaining vigilant of terrorism. We have a unique regional plan to combat this threat through multiple avenues – including shaping the strategic environment through humanitarian operations that deter radical organizations from gaining a foothold in the region, and building partner nation capacity to detect and defeat threats in a cooperative environment. These efforts will help ensure the forward defense of the United States and increased security of our partners. We thank the Committee for providing us the resources dedicated to this mission. We appreciate any effort that will provide flexible funding sources, such as those requested in the Administration’s Building Global Partnerships Act, to help us rapidly address emerging capability gaps of our partners as the strategic situation develops. U.S. Southern Command will continue to work with our interagency and regional partners to ensure our nation and those of our friends remain secure.

Guantanamo Bay. We conduct safe, humane, legal, and transparent care and custody of the less than 280 detainees currently at the facility. More than 500 detainees have left Guantanamo,
and all activities there occur under close supervision and in full compliance with U.S. laws, Common Article Three of the Geneva Convention, the Army Field Manual, and the Detainee Treatment Act. Hundreds of reporters and legislators have visited the facility and observed the operations there first hand.

Of particular note, the task force and the detainee camps exist on the grounds of U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo. Whatever the future holds for the detainee facility, the U.S. Naval Station, which reports through the U.S. Navy chain and not to U.S. Southern Command, will continue to be an important strategic location with both port and airfield facilities for the United States in the Caribbean.

**International Competition and Cooperation.** There is much debate over where Latin America and the Caribbean are heading in a geopolitical sense. Some argue that there are “two Americas” with various distinctions between the two – left or right, pro-U.S. or not, market friendly or protectionist. Our job at U.S. Southern Command is simply to build cooperative security relationships and to promote U.S. interests in the region. Unfortunately, some trends in a few countries impede security cooperation as their governments espouse vocal anti-U.S. messages and undertake policies that portend a less stable and secure hemisphere.

Additionally, there are other international actors – notably Iran – who are establishing political and economic inroads in the Americas. Unfortunately, they often espouse anti-U.S. messages, and, in the case of Iran, bring the potential for radical Islamic activity into this hemisphere.

In order to counter these trends, we need to continue to engage proactively in the region and to counter anti-U.S. messaging with persistent demonstrations of our goodwill. The U.S., in general, needs to be capable of assisting our partners in addressing underlying conditions of
poverty and inequality, while U.S. Southern Command needs to build relationships and create innovative security initiatives with cooperative partners to confront transnational security threats.

**Cuba.** Cuba continues as a vestigial colony of the failed communist system. It literally and figuratively stands as an island of oppression and tyranny amidst the democratic nations of the Americas. Over a year-and-a-half ago, Fidel Castro’s failing health sparked renewed hope that Cuba might soon join the community of democracies. Despite Fidel Castro’s recent comments indicating he will not serve as the President, Cuba appears to remain entrenched in its repressive past. To the detriment of its people, the Cuban regime continues to embrace totalitarian control and the subjugation of its citizens. Consequently, we saw the highest levels of migration activity from Cuba last year since the 1994 migrant crisis, and we are prepared to support interagency efforts, if necessary, to respond to a mass migration emergency.

**INITIATIVES**

Throughout the year ahead, U.S. Southern Command is committed to executing innovative initiatives to build capacity and capability to counter security challenges, enhance our own readiness, and increase linkages with our neighbors.

**USNS COMFORT.** A very visible and successful recent initiative was the deployment of the hospital ship **COMFORT** to the Caribbean, Central America, and South America. For four months last summer, this unique ship – with its specially tailored joint, interagency, international, and private sector crew – traveled to twelve countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to bring modern medical care to almost 100,000 men, women, and children through nearly 400,000 patient encounters. This symbol of goodwill brought renewed hope to those who
might have given up on a healthy future and to those who might have previously been sympathetic to anti-U.S. rhetoric. This one deployment alone directly changed the lives of many and indirectly touched the lives of several hundred thousand throughout the region.

More than just a medical mission, USNS COMFORT provided dental care to about 25,000 patients, conducted medical training for almost 30,000 host nation students and medical providers, and sponsored over 20 construction and restoration projects at local schools and health care facilities. USNS COMFORT also extended veterinary services throughout its journey, treating and vaccinating thousands of animals, which constitute the livelihood of many families.

It is difficult to assess precisely the overall impact of a training mission with humanitarian benefits of this scale. But based upon the positive local and international press, the number of national leadership visits, and the vast number of people touched by the USNS COMFORT mission, we believe it was a significant success. Certainly, there are many lessons learned from this first-ever deployment to Latin America and the Caribbean – and we will incorporate them into any future deployments – but the integrated and cooperative nature of this mission really serves as a model for the future of engagement and training: Joint ... Interagency ... International ... Public-Private. We plan to conduct similar missions on a regular basis.

**Disaster Relief.** Also demonstrating U.S. goodwill, last year, U.S. Southern Command directed military forces to provide disaster relief to six of our partner nations in times of dire need. These disaster relief operations, which were integrated with USAID-led efforts and those of the international community, helped alleviate the suffering of many and assisted affected regions in their recovery. Specifically, we provided much needed flood relief to Bolivia in March, and quickly provided relief to Peru following an earthquake in August. Also in August, we assisted Belize after the passage of Hurricane Dean. We were critical first-responders to a
Nicaraguan request for relief following Hurricane Felix in September, arranged the procurement of firefighting equipment for Paraguay during a widespread wildfire also in September, and assisted the Dominican Republic after Tropical Storm Noel ravaged the island nation in October.

In almost every case, our Joint Task Force – Bravo (JTF-B), located in Soto Cano, Honduras, was a major contributor to the success of these disaster relief operations. Essentially a small, joint air wing comprised of 18 helicopters, JTF-B is our only permanently deployed contingency force in the region. JTF-B responds to crises as a first-responder and routinely participates in humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, search and rescue, personnel recovery, and non-combatant medical evacuations. JTF-B has a long history of answering the call for assistance and is a tremendously valuable asset to U.S. Southern Command’s partnership and goodwill efforts in the region.

**Humanitarian Assistance.** Throughout the year, U.S. Southern Command’s Humanitarian Assistance Program augments traditional military-to-civilian engagement activities in order to increase our partner nations’ ability to respond independently to natural and man-made disasters. Our program helps local populations who could benefit from completed projects such as schools, clinics, community centers, orphanages, emergency operations centers, disaster response warehouses, wells, and potable water systems. Last year we completed 49 construction projects and provided critical training programs for first responders, disaster managers, firefighters, and disaster warehouse managers.

A close corollary to the Humanitarian Assistance Program is the New Horizons series of joint and combined humanitarian assistance exercises that U.S. Southern Command conducts with Latin American and Caribbean nations. These exercises provide readiness training for U.S. Engineer, Medical, and Combat Service Support units, but also provide great benefit to the host
nation. Each New Horizon exercise lasts several months and usually takes place in remote areas. U.S. Southern Command strives to combine these efforts with those of host nation doctors and civic personnel. In 2007, we conducted these exercises with four nations – Belize, Guatemala, Panama, and Nicaragua.

Along with the New Horizons exercises, U.S. Southern Command also conducts medical readiness training exercises to bring medical aid to needy rural, isolated populations and to provide valuable training for our medical units – primarily from our Air Force and Army Component Commands. These demonstrations of goodwill reached over 200,000 patients in 13 countries. Complemented by our coastal USNS COMFORT mission, these unique training exercises had tremendous humanitarian impact inland across the region at 63 separate locations – changing lives, influencing opinions, and spreading goodwill through quality donated medical assistance.

**Global Fleet Station – Pilot Deployment.** Last summer, U.S. Southern Command sponsored the pilot deployment of a new U.S. Navy program called Global Fleet Station. The new concept provides a modular platform for sustained engagement tailored to each unique region. U.S. Southern Command quickly realized the great benefit for this program, given that all but two of our partner nations have direct access to the sea. Last summer, the High Speed Vessel (HSV) SWIFT conducted a seven-month tour of the Caribbean Basin with visits to seven countries.

The focus of the HSV SWIFT deployment was to train local security units on port security operations, small boat operations and repair, and small unit tactics. This floating theater security cooperation platform hosted more than 1,000 military and civilian personnel and involved a joint, multinational, and interagency approach at each training site. HSV SWIFT also conducted
community relations projects in each port to refurbish local schools and community centers and to deliver tons of donated goodwill materials. As with USNS COMFORT, this deployment represents the future of engagement – visible, persistent, scalable, and cooperative engagement that trains our personnel and demonstrates the goodwill of the United States while building partner nation security capabilities.

The return on investment of the HSV SWIFT is very high. It is relatively inexpensive to operate; it can maneuver into very shallow ports; and it supports modular, tailored security cooperation missions. Providing more of this type of capability would greatly facilitate the achievement of U.S. Southern Command’s mission.

**Partnership of the Americas 2007.** For the second year in a row, U.S. Southern Command conducted a maritime Partnership of the Americas (POA) event in our region. Evolving from the initial one-month event in 2006, POA ’07 involved a six-month Navy and Marine Corps mission throughout Latin America and the Caribbean that focused on enhancing relationships with regional partners and improving operational readiness and interoperability. During the deployment, a four-ship multinational task force circumnavigated South America, participated in several multinational exercises sponsored by U.S. Southern Command, and conducted theater security cooperation and community relations events on shore. Our POA events serve as visible symbols of U.S. commitment to bilateral and multilateral military cooperation and have evolved into comprehensive engagement missions that maximize exposure to international partners and local communities.

**Operation Enduring Freedom-Caribbean and Central America (OEF-CCA).** This year, U.S. Southern Command began OEF-CCA as a key initiative to address potential terrorist threats in the region. Within a cooperative regional environment, OEF-CCA seeks to improve the
capabilities of Caribbean and Central American partners to interdict and disrupt terrorists who might leverage illicit transnational routes and uncontrolled areas to threaten the United States and/or our neighbors. OEF-CCA is a long-term endeavor and will create a multi-layered counter-terrorism posture of mutual benefit to the United States and regional partners.

**Exercises.** In 2007, U.S. Southern Command sponsored numerous military and security force training exercises throughout the region. Our largest exercise, Fuerzas Aliadas (Allied Force) PANAMAX, brought together 19 nations from three continents, all operating in a combined task force to simulate the defense of the Panama Canal and surrounding region from traditional and non-traditional threats. PANAMAX also involved representatives from the United Nations and the Organization of American States. As one of the Department of Defense’s largest exercises, PANAMAX ’07 was a resounding success. The exercise placed thirty ships, numerous aircraft, and several brigades of simulated ground forces under the control of multinational staffs, and all participants left with an improved understanding and capability for multinational cooperation.

We also conducted a multinational exercise – TRADEWINDS – that focused on transnational threats in the Caribbean Basin. This successful exercise brought together security forces and interagency personnel from 18 nations to practice coordinated first-responder, fire, police, and military responses to security threats. The exercise scenario emphasized basic security operations, counter-drug activities, and disaster preparedness in a field environment with a focus on regional cooperation.

We conducted two multinational peacekeeping exercises (PKO NORTH and PKO SOUTH) designed to improve the capability of partner nations to plan and conduct peacekeeping operations. The emphasis of this exercise series was operational planning, command and
control, and interoperability with regional armed forces assigned to UN missions and involved the integration of non-governmental agencies and international organizations.

Another of our exercise is FUERZAS COMANDO (Commando Forces), a skills competition and senior leadership seminar designed to enhance cooperation and trust between international Special Operations Forces while improving their training, readiness, and interoperability. Eighteen countries from throughout the region participated in this U.S. Southern Command-sponsored exercise in 2007. Each year, this exercise assembles anti-terrorism experts to exchange information and share tactics, techniques, and procedures for counter-terrorism operations.

Another significant exercise is our UNITAS maritime exercise program that we conduct on both the Atlantic and Pacific sides of South America. These two exercises sponsor multinational maritime forces to enhance security cooperation and improve coalition operations. UNITAS is our longest running exercise program and is coming up on its 49th year. Last year’s exercises were conducted as part of our Partnership of the Americas event and trained each participant in a variety of maritime scenarios designed to practice operations within a multinational force.

Building Partnership Capacity. Throughout U.S. history, our nation has depended upon external partners to help maintain our own security and to spread the benefits of security and stability to ensure a cooperative worldwide economic system. This is true now more than ever, as today’s transnational security threats cross borders, use distributed networks, and leverage information technology to threaten peace-seeking nations worldwide.

In addition to conducting exercises that build understanding and multinational cooperation, U.S. Southern Command conducts a comprehensive Theater Security Cooperation program to
develop the capability and capacity of our partners to respond to mutual security threats – either independently or with regional partners.

U.S. Southern Command participates in the Regional Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program that sponsors seminars, symposiums, and tactical and operational training designed to build the counter-terrorism capability of participating nations. Our training involves information collection and sharing, professional development, port security procedures, quick-reaction force actions, explosive device response, and civil-military responses to terrorism.

Another of our partnership capacity building programs is ENDURING FRIENDSHIP (EF) – a multi-year maritime security assistance program that enhances the capability of select Central American and Caribbean partner nations to patrol their sovereign waters and share information. EF provides interceptor boats, operation and maintenance training, command and control systems, and a common operating picture to improve maritime domain awareness and interoperability. This key program shares U.S. information on illicit traffickers and builds or improves partner nations’ ability to detect and interdict illicit trafficking along their shores.

Besides our peace operations exercises, we also assist with the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which is a Department of State-funded and Department of Defense-executed program. The intent of GPOI in our region is to train a multinational peacekeeping battalion from the Conference of American Armed Forces (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and two multi-role engineer companies from Paraguay to prepare them for deployment on UN peacekeeping missions. Through GPOI, U.S. Southern Command assisted in the establishment of a regional training center located in Coban, Guatemala, which became operational in 2007 and is the primary location for peacekeeping training, unit qualifications, and exercises. This important training center will also receive instructor and
curriculum support from Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay – who already have their own well-established peacekeeping training centers.

The State Partnership Program (SPP) is another example of successful partnership building that has had a tremendous benefit and return on investment. The SPP links 26 partner nations to 18 U.S. states using the U.S. National Guard as the executive agent. Last year, state National Guards conducted 113 separate training events that developed core competencies in regional military forces, promoted the concept of citizen-soldiers as public servants, and reinforced our bilateral relationships.

In order to build understanding, U.S. Southern Command conducts or facilitates military and defense exchanges, numerous defense seminars, and mobile training teams throughout the region. We also facilitate International Military Education and Training (IMET), which invests in the professional development of key military officers and senior enlisted leaders of our partners. IMET improves the professionalism and interoperability of partner military and defense forces and builds a sense of mutual understanding between the United States armed forces and the partner nation armed services. Training at our security institutions continues to be very popular and beneficial to our partners in the region, and access to funded billets at U.S. schools significantly diminishes the draw of extra-hemispheric military influence.

A significant tool for building capacity is the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. FMF represents a powerful method of supporting military relationships, ensuring interoperability of equipment in coalition operations, regional cooperation, and developing partner nations’ response capability to mutual threats and challenges. Although U.S. Southern Command’s focus region covers one-sixth of the globe and represents a region with significant linkages and shared challenges with the United States, FMF to this region in 2007 amounted to a slight fraction of the
worldwide total. The FMF we did receive was spent on critical capacity building programs with our partners.

A number of nations from this region were previously subject to sanctions under the American Servicemembers Protection Act. I would like to thank the Congress for the recent lifting of the sanctions on those nations. This will have an enduring and positive effect on building long-lasting partnerships.

**Human Rights Initiative.** All of our exercises, training evolutions, and partnership building activities are done within a framework of respect for human rights. U.S. Southern Command has a unique and dedicated group of experts that assist the region’s militaries and security forces in the human rights arena. Several nations in Latin America are still dealing with a not-so-distant history darkened by abuses committed by uniformed militaries, militias, and guerrilla groups. We sponsor a Human Rights Initiative in a unique public-private partnership with a Costa Rica-based human rights organization. This initiative has created a consensus document on human rights through which the militaries and security forces of nine nations and a multinational organization have committed to advance an institutional respect for human rights and promote a zero-tolerance environment for violations. We support development of doctrine, education and training programs, internal control systems, and civil-military outreach efforts by military and security forces of the region.

**AN INTERAGENCY APPROACH**

The 21st Century security environment presents us with some significant new challenges, both globally and regionally, such as the global reach of radical organizations, nation states
fighting in unconventional settings with unfamiliar tool sets, and growing environmental security concerns to name a few.

These global conditions and the already described realities in this region, all require an interagency-focused approach. With the approval of the Secretary of Defense, we are initiating action toward reorganizing the command along more interagency lines – with interagency, multinational, and even limited private sector partnering as core organizing concepts.

This is a critical and logical step towards better accomplishing our mission. Our goal is to establish an integrated interagency team with senior representatives from key departments and agencies assigned throughout the command. Toward that end, we are coordinating closely with those other departments and agencies in ensuring that our goal can be met in a manner that is consonant with their core mission interests and resources. This new organization will have functional divisions that reflect the types of missions we face in the 21st century. We will focus on teaming with the U.S. State Department and will seek new and expanded partnering arrangements with the nations and territories in the region. Despite its new integrated structure, however, U.S. Southern Command will always retain a principal competency to conduct military operations, with an unbroken and capable military chain-of-command and authority.

Fortunately, we already have significant interagency integration at U.S. Southern Command. Over the last year, we created a directorate designed to foster collaboration with interagency partners. We have exchanges, liaisons, and/or representatives from 17 federal agencies and departments that participate in our planning efforts and help coordinate command activities. We have hosted extremely successful interagency conferences, exercises, and coordination group meetings on a number of strategic topics related to our assigned region. Each of these events,
from the tactical worker level to senior interagency leadership, gave all participants an improved understanding of complex issues and a baseline for future cooperation.

In addition to our interagency integration efforts, we have also created a staff section dedicated to understanding and developing public-private cooperation. This unique group reaches out to the private sector and finds where we can legally build synergy in our efforts to engage in the region. To date, we have coordinated the delivery of tons of donated goodwill material to the needy of the region and have facilitated the delivery of higher-end needs such as donated ambulances and operating room equipment. This effort, which truly has the potential to harness the good nature and resources of the U.S. private sector, will add depth and breadth to our interaction with our partners in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Together with our partners in the U.S. government, private sector, and international community, we should be able to better defend the United States and to enable a secure, stable, and prosperous hemisphere of cooperating and democratic nations.

LOOKING AHEAD

Looking forward, we have identified critical capability requirements that will allow us to confront the challenges we see in the region today and the security trends noted for the future.

Fusion. In order to coordinate joint, multinational, interagency, and even limited public-private efforts in our region, U.S. Southern Command needs the physical and virtual capability to fuse information from diverse entities and to operate from a location that facilitates idea exchange and integrated planning. This location will allow our diverse partners to integrate into our organization in a transparent manner, allowing them to participate in daily activities while
building mutual trust and cooperation. Our new headquarters building and the information systems scheduled for installation will serve to meet this requirement. We thank the Committee for its support in authorizing the new construction of our headquarters, which we are scheduled to occupy in 2010. The construction timeline should greatly enhance our effectiveness once complete.

**Persistent engagement.** As discussed above, the capability to forge willing and capable partnerships throughout the region and to create a sense of goodwill towards the United States are essential to achieving our mission. In order to do this, we need persistent engagement. We plan to conduct deployments similar to the *USNS COMFORT* and *HSV SWIFT* on a regular basis. We need military and civilian, public and private exercises and initiatives throughout the region, with more microbursts of assistance, as well as long-term initiatives integrated across the federal government. In short, we need coordinated, whole-of-government, persistent efforts that meld with the efforts of the international community and the private sector.

In order to strengthen and/or gain partners, first we need to earn and maintain their trust. This will require a unified approach with consistent, effective, and flexible engagement. It will require cohesive strategic messaging and innovative and earnest information sharing across the board. It will require innovative ways to make our various exercises, programs, and partnerships more inclusive and more effective in reinforcing our connection to the peoples of the region.

Along with this engagement, we need to ensure our message gets out effectively and that we understand the impact of our efforts. Over the past year, U.S. Southern Command has refocused efforts on strategic communication, making it a priority at all levels of the command.

**Capable partners.** Continued globalization and the diffusion of high technology have made it certain that the United States cannot ensure its forward defense alone. Working alone, we
cannot stop drug traffickers from penetrating our borders; nor can we locate and neutralize terrorist threats abroad without capable partners willing to cooperate with us. Persistent engagement will go a long way toward building willingness, but we also need to identify capability shortfalls with these partners and flexibly expend resources to build overall regional security capability and capacity. Just as important, we need to be able to rapidly address capability shortfalls with key partners to meet emerging transnational threats.

**Sovereignty and peacekeeping.** As our partners build capability and capacity, we need them to be able to deny transnational threats from using their sovereign territory. We need them to be able to "see" these threats, whether on land, in the air, on the sea, or in cyberspace. This involves the appropriate awareness systems – coastal radars and air surveillance radars, for example – as well as physical assets such as patrol boats and aircraft with crew trained and proficient to operate and maintain them. It will also require the ability to share information with the United States and with adjacent neighbors in order to build a common operating picture in a regional sense.

We also need these partners to be able to conduct peacekeeping operations. Already, we see many nations in the region contributing to international peacekeeping in places such as Haiti. By developing a regional capability, we will reduce the demand for U.S. forces to perform peacekeeping missions, while also increasing the legitimacy of peacekeeping forces by diversifying international representation.

**Interagency core.** Besides the ability to fuse information and efforts across the command, we also need to create an environment where the various U.S. government agency representatives are willing and authorized to integrate into our efforts. We need to create a whole-of-government program where integrated planning and career exchanges are the norm. It
should be a positive career step for someone from the military to fill an exchange in one of the other federal agencies, and the converse should be equally true. By working together and building a regional focus point for policy implementation, we should be able to reduce redundancy, gain resource efficiencies, and ultimately better ensure our security and that of our partners.

**Flexible access.** The use of the sea affords us tremendous flexibility for maritime partnering with the nations in the region. But in order to maintain persistent engagement and more fully cooperate with our partners, we are looking for more flexible land and aviation access agreements under the Secretary of Defense’s Global Defense Posture. Our current access agreements limit us to aerial counternarcotics detection and monitoring missions from existing cooperative security locations and to a single, more flexible agreement at the forward operating site of our Joint Task Force-Bravo. We are looking to establish improved regional access that supports broad-spectrum operations and that is mutually beneficial to the host partner nations and the United States.

**Understanding.** The last of our required priority capabilities is probably the most important – the ability to understand the region, know what transpires, and how to act or interact with our partners. Modern information systems, extensive language capability, and cultural training and study are the tools necessary for this command to achieve this understanding. The importance of Latin America and the Caribbean to the United States cannot be overstated. It merits frequent high-level visits to see first hand the tremendous linkages and challenges we share and to demonstrate U.S. interest and commitment to our partners in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Thanks to the support of Congress, this year is already on track to be another good year for U.S. Southern Command and the pursuit of our mission in the region. We will be planning and executing numerous multinational exercises, exchanges, and humanitarian events. We are building on lessons learned from last year and are further integrating joint, multinational, interagency, and public-private efforts into as many of our actions as possible.

Soon the aircraft carrier \textit{USS GEORGE WASHINGTON} will be sailing around the region as the centerpiece of our Partnership of the Americas event. As we did last year, this deployment will encompass much more than just traveling around the region; it will encompass our major maritime exercises and other smaller exercises. We have the perfectly named ship for this event, \textit{USS GEORGE WASHINGTON}. Washington was an early idol of Simon Bolivar, who was the father of liberty in South America and an iconic “American” in the broadest sense of the term.

We also are revamping our land engagements this year, with the beginning of a program called “Beyond the Horizon.” This program will maximize the impact of our land events by increasing the number of “microburst” engagements – engineer construction, small unit familiarization, subject matter exchanges, medical readiness training exercises – as well as establishing longer-term programs that integrate the efforts of other U.S. federal agencies, host nations, and the private sector.

Also this year, we will be conducting \textit{CONTINUING PROMISE}, a multi-month training mission with the \textit{USS KEARSARGE} – a large deck amphibious ship – which will continue the successful mission of the hospital ship \textit{USNS COMFORT} from last year. This deployment will
highlight persistent engagement with innovative interagency, multinational, and public-private cooperation.

We will continue our Regional AirSpace Integration (RASI) initiative with a focus on improving Central American capability to detect and monitor aircraft in their predominantly unmonitored airspace. This initiative involves integrating the civil, military, and security air domain in the region, modernizing air traffic management, and building a multinational common operating picture through a regional surveillance center and new surveillance radars. A complementary program to RASI is our Regional Aircraft Modernization Program (RAMP), which conducts surveys to identify gaps in the aviation capability of our partners to respond to transnational threats. Ultimately, RAMP aims to promote regional air sovereignty through increased cooperation, interoperability, and modernization of regional air security assets, with cooperating nations better prepared to perform humanitarian and air sovereignty missions.

We have numerous other programs and initiatives coming on line – all working to advance our mission in the region. We are progressing steadily on our reorganization efforts and have received significant support from our sister agencies on this effort. We continue to track along our command heading: understanding the linkages the United States shares with the region; working together with partners to overcome shared challenges; and fulfilling the promise of a secure, cooperating, and prospering hemisphere through innovative and effective strategic initiatives.

CONCLUSION

I take great pride in our exciting and important mission and in the tremendous efforts of the men and women of U.S. Southern Command. I believe we have made good progress over the
last year; and that this year and those to come promise to see solid return on Congress’s investment in the region. I would like to thank all of the Members of the Committee and indeed all the Members of Congress for your support of U.S. Southern Command and the hard work we are doing for our country in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Although the likelihood of large-scale military combat in our region remains very low, this region continues to play a critical role to the continued security and prosperity of the United States. Despite some challenges, I believe that through the sharing of ideas, economic interdependence, cultural understanding, and an integrated approach to partnering, the United States will continue to be a welcomed partner of choice in this hemisphere. At U.S. Southern Command, we will work hard to help make this vision a reality. We are committed to being the military partner of choice and will continue to harness innovation and to develop the relationships necessary to accomplish our mission.

Finally, I would like to say a word about the superb Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coastguardsmen, and civilians – active, reserve, and guard – who serve in the region. They are volunteers and patriots, and I am proud and lucky to serve with them everyday. Our greatest strength is our people, and I ask continued support for the programs that support them and their families.

I thank you for your support and am prepared to answer your questions.
STATEMENT OF

GENERAL WILLIAM E. WARD, USA

COMMANDER,

UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

13 MARCH 2008
INTRODUCTION

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
  Political Geography
  Demographic Trends and Crime
  Transnational Terrorism
  Regional Issues

AFRICOM COMMAND STRATEGY
  Strategic Approach
  AFRICOM Support to the Global War on Terror
  Regional War on Terror
  Theater Security Cooperation
  Security Cooperation Activities

PROGRESS TOWARDS ESTABLISHMENT AS A UNIFIED COMMAND
  Key Missions
  Mission Transfer and Staff Training
  Building the Interagency Team
  Component Commands

THEATER INVESTMENT NEEDS
  Enhancing AFRICOM’s Mission
  Command Stationing
  Theater Infrastructure
  Strategic and Tactical Mobility
  Pre-positioned Equipment
  Quality of Life Programs

CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION

It is my privilege as Commander to present to Congress the first ever United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) Posture Statement. This development in our Unified Command Plan structure signals a renewed focus on U.S. strategic imperatives for the African continent and its island nations. We are excited about this opportunity to enact the Department of Defense’s (DoD) vision of a joint Command with significant interagency and intergovernmental involvement, which will become an effective multi-dimensional instrument in pursuit of our national interests and the shared interests of our global partners.

AFRICOM was created to provide a strategic, holistic DoD approach to security on the African continent. Our past command organization did not facilitate an in-depth understanding of, or attention to, African security issues. Establishing AFRICOM will enable DoD expertise and capabilities to be better applied to Africa’s unique security environment, which differs substantially from that of EUCOM, CENTCOM or PACOM.

Strengthening our security cooperation efforts and bolstering the capabilities of our African partners are key ways of achieving our African security objectives. Through persistent, sustained engagement focused on building partner security capacity, supporting humanitarian assistance efforts, and providing crisis response, AFRICOM will promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign and national security policy. On October 1, 2008, AFRICOM will assume mission responsibility as a Unified Command, and serve as the Department of Defense (DoD) lead for support to U.S. Government (USG) agencies and departments responsible for implementing U.S. foreign policy in Africa.

AFRICOM is pioneering a new way for a Unified Command to fulfill its role in supporting the security interests of our nation. From inception, AFRICOM was intended to be a different kind of command designed to address the changing security challenges confronting the U.S. in the 21st Century. We are integrating interagency personnel into our structure to improve both the planning and execution of our duties. By incorporating interagency representatives into our structure, we will provide better informed and more effective support to initiatives led by civilian Departments and Agencies, such as the Department of State (DoS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Through persistent engagement with our African partners and integration of this kind of USG-wide expertise into our structure, AFRICOM will improve support to U.S. policy objectives in Africa.

Our immediate task is to build the AFRICOM team and to prepare to assume the Africa missions currently conducted by other commands. We consider our African partners as part of our team building efforts; thus, we continue to
invest the time and effort required to understand their needs and interests. By doing so, we can enable their work in support of their own security.

As a new Unified Command, we look forward to supporting our interagency, international, and African partners as we work together to promote security in Africa.

**STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT**

Africa presents a challenging strategic environment, but also ample opportunity to achieve positive change in the lives of millions of people.

**Political Geography**

AFRICOM’s AOR covers more than 11.7 million square miles, accounting for 20 percent of the Earth’s land mass. Africa’s nations include approximately 900 million people, constituting 14.2 percent of the world’s population. More than 400 ethnic groups live in Africa, speaking more than 2000 languages and dialects and practicing a wide variety of religious traditions. The issues currently impacting AFRICOM’s AOR include terrorism, enduring conflicts, drug trafficking, territorial disputes, illegal immigration, and natural disasters.

While rich in both human capital and mineral resources, many African states remain fragile due to corruption, endemic and pandemic health problems, historical ethnic animosities, and widespread poverty. Africa, according to the United Nations (UN), is the world’s most impoverished continent, and contains 25 of its poorest nations. Highlighting the devastating economic impact of armed conflict, a recent Oxfam study states that conflict alone has cost the African continent over $300 billion between 1990 and 2005.

Despite these problems, there are distinct signs of progress. Economic growth is at an eight-year high, and 20 African nations have registered growth for each of the past five years. Six major African wars have ended in the past six years, and more than 60 presidential-level democratic elections have taken place in the past four years. In 1990, Freedom House classified 24 sub-Saharan African countries as free or partly free. By 2007, that number had improved to 33. Additionally, an increasing number of African nations have made progress in developing peacekeeping capabilities. Today, 30 percent of UN peacekeeping forces are supplied by African nations, with total troop numbers totaling in the tens of thousands.

Today more nations are free, peaceful, and prosperous than at any other point in history. These positive trends are found in Africa. In Africa, as is the case globally, there is a shared desire for security and stability. We will sustain this progress in AFRICOM’s AOR through persistent engagement and a dedicated effort to build and strengthen our bonds with the nations of
Africa. Through partnership, we will help develop their capability to pursue the security and stability necessary for a better future.

Demographic Trends and Crime

African demographic trends are troubling. Rapid population growth, particularly a disproportionate “youth bulge”, will exceed governments’ ability to provide basic goods, services, and jobs. This trend has already led to a large pool of undereducated and unemployed youth who present a potential source of social and political instability.

Vast coastal areas provide havens for smuggling, human and drug trafficking, illegal immigration, piracy, oil bunkering, and poaching of fisheries. Piracy and theft are major concerns along the Gulf of Guinea coast--an area that stretches for nearly 2,000 nautical miles. Large-scale oil theft in the Niger Delta is a significant problem. Shipping ports, transit areas, harbors, oil production, and transshipment areas are largely unobserved, uncontrolled, and vulnerable to attacks by terrorist groups, criminal gangs, or separatist militias. Corruption and complicity at all levels of government only serve to exacerbate this problem.

Transnational Terrorism

Violent extremism is a source of instability affecting our AOR. AFRICOM will support partner nations in the fight against transnational terrorists who undermine friendly governments, recruit foreign fighters for combat operations in the Middle East, obtain terror funds through illegal activities, and conduct attacks against U.S. interests, and those of our partners. This is, in particular, an issue in the Maghreb and the Horn of Africa.

The uncontrolled regions of the Trans-Sahara and the Horn of Africa offer sanctuary to Islamic extremist terrorists, smugglers of drugs and contraband, and insurgent groups. In Algiers on December 11th, 2007, Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a self-declared Al-Qaeda affiliate, claimed responsibility for a vehicle-borne bomb attack against the UN facility housing the offices of the High Commission for Refugees and the UN Development Program. AQIM also claimed credit for a near-simultaneous attack against the Algerian Supreme Court and Algerian Constitutional Council, and is believed to be behind the December 24th attack that killed French tourists in Mauritania. We are seeing increased collaboration between Al-Qaeda and North African terrorist groups. Violent extremists here continue to coordinate activities and interact with networks in Europe, and there is evidence that North Africans are being recruited to serve as foreign fighters in Iraq.
Regional Issues

AFRICOM adopts a regional approach to this strategic environment, and our African partners have encouraged this viewpoint. We will concentrate and prioritize our activities in the five African Union (AU) designated regions: North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, and Southern Africa.

In North Africa, broad expanses of uncontrolled areas remain havens for extremists, terrorists, and criminals. Current economic systems cannot meet the needs of a youthful and growing populace, and hinders the emergence of an economically independent middle class. Additionally, a rising percentage of Europe’s oil and natural gas imports come from North Africa, tying European economic security to North African stability. Political instability in the Maghreb threatens overall regional stability, and is a threat to U.S. interests.

West Africa is home to approximately 250 million people (more than a quarter of the continent’s population) covering 15 countries aligned under the Economic Community of West African States. The region has experienced insurrection, coup d’états, natural disasters, high crime rates, and pandemic disease. Leadership challenges and inadequate funding often pose serious obstacles to the development of capable indigenous security forces. The absence of credible maritime security capacity has led to the depletion of fisheries through illegal fishing, piracy, drug trafficking, damage to oil company platforms and property, and theft of oil. Meanwhile, land forces have difficulty securing large tracts of land, and this contributes to insecurity by providing safe havens for terrorists, smugglers, gangs, and warlords. Despite these difficulties, U.S. Department of Energy figures indicate that the Gulf of Guinea region supplies more than 15 percent of the hydrocarbons imported by the U.S., and by 2015 this region may supply more than 25 percent. In the next 10 years, the Gulf of Guinea is projected to provide the bulk of U.S. imports of sweet crude oil.

In Central Africa, insurgency movements, political instability, and numerous rebel wars have caused massive human suffering as well as political and economic stagnation. Chad and, to a lesser extent, the Central African Republic, both have active rebel insurgency movements and continue to see spillover from the Darfur crisis in bordering Sudan. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) remains an obstacle to lasting peace in the region. In spite of significant challenges, we are encouraged by the positive relationships we maintain with the military and civilian leadership in Central Africa.
Covering an area the size of the continental U.S., East Africa is experiencing violence in Darfur and Somalia, tension along the Ethiopia/Eritrea border, and uncertainty in Kenya. Yet, even with the challenges facing East Africa, there have been positive developments. The international community continues to work with the Kenyan government to secure successful implementation of the recent political compromise, and a subsequent return to stability. Rwanda is recovering from the genocide of 1994, which had a profoundly destabilizing effect on the region. Additionally, we have a solid working relationship with the military and civilian leadership in the majority of East African states.

Southern Africa is a region that is strategically critical to the U.S. South Africa’s professional and capable military is contributing over 3,000 soldiers to UN and AU missions in Sudan, DRC, Burundi, the Comoros Islands, and along the Ethiopia/Eritrea border. However, economic and health problems continue to afflict the southern Africa region. Poor governance, hyperinflation, and refugee outflows from Zimbabwe present challenges to Southern African nations. While HIV/AIDS affects the entire continent, Southern Africa is the most afflicted region in the world, with HIV/AIDS infection rates averaging in the high 20 percent range. The security forces across Southern Africa are being compromised by HIV/AIDS, as their ability to conduct operations is reduced and key personnel are lost.

AFRICOM COMMAND STRATEGY

A peaceful and prosperous continent is clearly in the interests of the U.S., Africa, and the global community. AFRICOM is developing a theater strategy that supports our national objectives as specified in the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and other USG policy documents. We are listening to our African and international partners, and seek to benefit from their experience and insight. In cooperation with our African partners, AFRICOM’s theater strategy will embrace a new interagency paradigm to support and advance U.S. and African interests.

Strategic Approach

AFRICOM’s theater strategy will be based on the principle of Active Security. Active Security is defined as a persistent and sustained level of effort oriented on security assistance programs that prevent conflict and foster continued dialogue and development. The goal of Active Security is to enable the work of Africans to marginalize the enemies of peace and prevent conflict, thereby enabling the growth of strong and just governments and legitimate institutions to support the development of civil societies.
Societies require security to flourish, for security provides the foundation for political, diplomatic, and economic development, which is essential to building long-term stability. AFRICOM will contribute to this goal by employing a wide range of tools at its disposal—from conducting security cooperation activities to prosecuting combat operations—to promote security.

AFRICOM’s theater strategy will support broader national efforts, in coordination with other USG agencies, to:

- Confront transnational threats to security;
- Counter the threat posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), illegal arms, and narcotics;
- Mitigate violent conflicts;
- Promote Stability, Security, and Reconstruction efforts; and,
- Turn the tide on HIV/AIDS and malaria.
- Strengthen democratic principles by fostering respect for the Rule of Law, civilian control of the military, and budget transparency;
- Foster the conditions that lead to a peaceful, stable, and economically strong Africa;

Ultimately, AFRICOM will focus its effort on promoting the following theater objectives:

- African countries and organizations can provide for their own security and contribute to security on the continent;
- African governments and regional security organizations possess the capability to mitigate the threat of violent extremism; and,
- African countries maintain professional militaries responsive to civilian authorities and that respect the Rule of Law and international human rights norms.

In support of vital national interests, AFRICOM’s security goals and effects work to prevent attacks emanating from Africa against Americans, secure U.S. strategic access, and preserve unhindered movement along the AOR’s lines of communication.

To achieve these ends, AFRICOM’s strategy of Active Security will focus on establishing and sustaining reliable partnerships while developing security partner capacity at the theater, regional, and state levels. AFRICOM will help develop capable militaries among our partner nations, and promote civilian control of the military through continued professionalization of
African military forces. AFRICOM will strengthen regional security capacity, and promote the development of our African partner’s deployment capabilities.

When appropriate, AFRICOM will also provide support to USG and non-governmental organizations. As one example, healthcare is often at the forefront of the needs of emerging nations, and AFRICOM will consult with interagency partners to ensure that its medical civic affairs programs and activities are compatible with broader State Department, USAID, and international efforts. Collaborations lead to greater support for similar missions and demonstrate the grass-roots level value of AFRICOM and U.S. engagement in Africa.

AFRICOM’s strategy of Active Security guides the development of our support to a holistic interagency effort to meet the challenges facing Africa today. However, Africa requires an approach focused on more than just security. To that end, we recognize and support USG efforts to further strengthen and resource our interagency partners such as DoS, USAID, and others. These agencies have lead responsibility and are crucial to bringing a balanced team approach to capacity building—not only in Africa, but globally.

AFRICOM Support to the Global War on Terror

AFRICOM’s number one theater-wide goal is to promote security and stability within its AOR. By strengthening our partners through capacity building efforts, we will deny terrorists freedom of action and access to resources, while diminishing the conditions that foster violent extremism.

Regional War on Terror

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM - TRANS-SAHARA (OEF-TS) is the Department of Defense contribution to the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). OEF-TS strengthens counterterrorism and border security efforts by assisting the governments of nine nations that are trying to prevent terrorist groups from using their uncontrolled areas as safe havens. The increasing audacity and lethality of AQIM attacks, as well as its declared intent to target the U.S., France, Algeria, and their allies, highlights the vital role played by OEF-TS in containing and disrupting AQIM and other regional terrorist groups in North Africa. We will continue to work with the OEF-TS participating nations, our Embassy Country Teams, and DoS to enhance this program.

Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) works with Horn of Africa governments to build local and regional capacity, support professionalization of militaries, and assist other U.S. government agencies in helping partner nations diminish the underlying conditions that extremists seek to exploit. Efforts here contribute to building a strong relationship
between the U.S., the host nation, and other countries of the region. Camp Lemonnier and our enduring presence in the region will play a vital role in AFRICOM’s future activities. Currently, CJTF-HOA conducts activities and security cooperation programs in Kenya, Southern Sudan, Djibouti, Yemen, Ethiopia, and the coastal waters of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean, and across existing unified command boundaries in Uganda, Tanzania, Mauritius, and the Comoros Islands in accordance with agreements with PACOM and EUCOM. CJTF-HOA focuses its operations, training, and humanitarian missions on helping nations in this region improve their capacity to combat terrorism, deny the safe havens and material assistance that support terrorist activity, and prepare for other challenges such as natural and manmade disasters.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and nuclear weapons-related capabilities or resources is perhaps the most fundamental threat to U.S. security and global stability. The nexus between terrorism and WMD proliferation is a grave threat to the U.S. and its vital national interests. The possibility of employment of WMD by non-state or rogue state actors is at the forefront of our war on terror concerns, and is an element of our OEF-TS and CJTF-HOA efforts. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) works with AFRICOM to cover the entire spectrum of this unique mission: Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, along with State Department non-proliferation initiatives, address the non-proliferation of known WMD; detection programs address counter-proliferation; and, DTRA’s exercise programs address our consequence management responsibilities, thus reassuring our partners and allies regarding AFRICOM capabilities. Terrorist groups have professed their intent to acquire and employ WMD. AFRICOM will work closely with our interagency and African partners, as well as the international community, to ensure that this intent does not become reality.

Theater Security Cooperation

Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs remain the cornerstone of our strategy of Active Security and promote common security through persistent engagement. These programs build lasting relationships, promote common interests, and enhance partner capabilities for providing safe and secure environments. Cooperative security efforts provide for essential peacetime and contingency access and infrastructure, and improve information sharing. TSC programs are vital to AFRICOM’s efforts in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives.

We must assist our partner nations develop their ability to protect civilian populations, conduct disaster relief, and provide humanitarian
assistance. Assisting our allies and partners in maturing their capabilities to conduct operations with well-trained, disciplined forces that respect human rights and the Rule of Law, helps mitigate the conditions that lead to conflict. Providing training and equipment through TSC prepares African forces to better address shared challenges, strengthens legitimate sovereign governments, and makes less likely any U.S. requirement to conduct operations directly. These programs require consistent, sustained investment.

Security Cooperation Activities

AFRICOM will implement security assistance programs in concert with U.S. Embassy Country Teams. Well-managed TSC efforts are essential to building the capacity of partner nations, thereby reducing the likelihood of problems developing into crises.

International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Expanded IMET (E-IMET) are DoS foreign assistance programs that provide education and training opportunities for foreign military and civilian personnel and are critical to building long-term relationships. Officers and enlisted leaders who received U.S. IMET training fill key positions in many partner African nations. Today, for example, 11 of 14 serving General Officers in the Botswana Defense Force (BDF), as well as the BDF Command Sergeant Major, are U.S. IMET graduates. Similarly, IMET funding for Senegal allowed that country to host a regional seminar on Defense Resource Management and conduct a Military Justice Seminar. The IMET program has also contributed to the excellent reputation the Senegalese military has earned during numerous peacekeeping deployments, and continues to contribute to the military’s positive and responsible involvement in civil affairs. Returning Senegalese IMET graduates are immediately assigned to key leadership or staff positions, and their professional attributes make them well-suited to assume leadership positions in international military operations. Sustained support for a robust IMET program is a long-term investment in the future and directly supports long-term U.S. interests.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provided by the DoS assists partner nations who otherwise lack the financial means to acquire U.S. military equipment and training. FMF has generally been allocated for and has become essential to long-term capacity building and sustainment. A lack of FMF funding or inconsistent year-to-year distribution can compromise long range objectives, turn our partners towards other sources, and inhibit peacekeeping operations. Senegal, for example, would not have been able to meet its Darfur commitment without ACOTA equipment and help from France. Mali and Niger
receive ACOTA training, but cannot deploy due to a lack of equipment, and may be forced to stop their participation in ACOTA due to shortages. The poor condition and maintenance of the equipment of African militaries can even inhibit or prevent them from deploying for peacekeeping duties. Current FMF funding does not meet Africa’s security requirements. FY08 FMF numbers currently total approximately $18M, of which $11.9M are going to Tunisia and Morocco—leaving under $6.5M for all of Sub-Saharan Africa. Whereas IMET provides the required professional military education, FMF provides the essential hardware necessary for putting IMET training to work for the greater good of Africa, and other regions where African peacekeepers serve. Both IMET and FMF are investments in long-term relationships, and must remain fully funded—for these and any other permissible uses of the funds—and even expanded where possible.

The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS relief is a successful program directed at a source of misery and instability on the African continent—the HIV/AIDS pandemic. AFRICOM plans to support this effort by addressing, HIV/AIDS in the military context, thereby improving the readiness levels of African military units and increasing the number of forces that can be used for peacekeeping duties throughout Africa and elsewhere.

Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Programs perform a dual purpose—not only do they improve security by reducing a cause of instability, but they affect perceptions and place the U.S. in a positive light—especially in areas susceptible to extremist ideologies. State and USAID carry out humanitarian programs across the continent to prevent and respond to humanitarian crises and for improved capacity for African nationals to prepare and respond. DoD has played a supporting role as well, and is expected to program $12.3M in FY 08 for Africa for projects such as providing medical care, building and furnishing schools and clinics, digging wells, providing clean water in rural and austere locations, and providing disaster relief. HA helps stabilize and secure regions, bolsters a country’s capability to respond to disasters (thereby mitigating future USG involvement), provides training opportunities for US forces and serves as an example of what a professional military can accomplish. While the Defense HA budget is small compared to State and USAID which have primary responsibility in this regard, it has a disproportionate impact as a highly visible and positive engagement activity in support of our efforts to create an environment inhospitable to the influences of terrorism.

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a DoD program to train, equip, lift, and sustain peacekeepers that is planned and implemented in consultation with DoD. In Africa, GPOI funds enable the ACOTA program to provide training to meet UN peace operations standards. ACOTA is a crucial
African engagement program and directly supports the U.S. national objectives of promoting stability, democratization, and military professionalism in Africa. It is important for AFRICOM to maintain close coordination with ACOTA, and we ask your help in ensuring that GPGL, and through it ACOTA, receives adequate funding so that sustainable African peace operations forces can be further developed and used to address peace keeping needs in Africa and elsewhere.

Other forms of Cooperation:

The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) continues to be an effective TSC program. By linking our states and territories with designated partner countries, we build long-term relationships, promote access, enhance military capabilities, improve interoperability, and advance responsible civil-military relations. The unique civil-military nature of the National Guard allows it to actively participate in a wide range of security cooperation activities. Seven countries in Africa currently have SPP partnerships, and we will continue to expand this program.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) is the DoD regional center that supports our efforts to counter ideological support for terrorism, harmonizes views on common security challenges, and promotes civil-military relations. The academic training conducted by ACSS for uniformed and civilian leaders from African nations and their regional organizations contributes immensely to professionalization and more effective security structures. These conferences and seminars help enhance policy understanding, enhance security communities and relationships, and improve sustainable institutional capacity to enhance national, regional, and international security. The effectiveness of ACSS could be further enhanced through increased funding.

Maritime Domain Awareness initiatives are designed to assist partner nations to address numerous maritime challenges. The Horn of Africa, the Southwest Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea present complex maritime challenges such as criminal activity, piracy, environmental and fisheries violations, resource theft, arms smuggling, and narcotics and human trafficking. Projects such as Maritime Safety and Security Information System and Regional Maritime Awareness Capability Joint Capability Technology Demonstration demonstrate the capabilities of off-the-shelf surveillance technology in shared regional maritime awareness networks. These initiatives will help partner nations address their maritime safety and security challenges.

PROGRESS TOWARDS ESTABLISHMENT AS A UNIFIED COMMAND
Since 1993, the Unified Command Plan has divided Africa among three Combatant Commands: European Command (EUCOM); Central Command (CENTCOM); and Pacific Command (PACOM). AFRICOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) will include the African continent and its island nations, with the exception of Egypt. Egypt will remain within CENTCOM’s AOR, and AFRICOM and CENTCOM will have overlapping but distinctly different relationships with Egypt, which will be addressed under separate memoranda of agreement (MOAs).

AFRICOM’s primary mission will be to promote African security by building the capacity of partner nations and organizations. AFRICOM will assume existing missions or support roles from EUCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, and other agencies to include: Operation ENDURING FREEDOM TRANS-SARARA (OEF-TS), Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), support to the GFOI’s Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Gulf of Guinea. AFRICOM will maintain traditional military duties, to include execution of existing Africa-based contingency plans, implementing the African components of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and other operations. In addition, AFRICOM will be prepared to conduct newly assigned missions and develop new initiatives within the AOR.

We are aware of the significant stress placed on U.S. forces by combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The creation of AFRICOM acknowledges that, with relatively modest theater security cooperation and capacity building resources, much can be done to help prevent crises from occurring if those resources are applied in a sustained and consistent manner. AFRICOM, like all Unified Commands, will be capable of addressing any challenge presented in its AOR.

Key Missions

AFRICOM’s first task is to complete the building of a team that will ensure a seamless transition of the missions, activities, programs, and exercises currently conducted by EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM. This includes responsibility for OEF-TS and CJTF-HOA—the two largest U.S. military operations in Africa.

OEF-TS: OEF-TS is scheduled to transition to AFRICOM during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2008. AFRICOM will continue to work with DoS and the interagency to request and program the long-term resources and financing, specifically FMF credits, required to achieve our desired OEF-TS objectives and effects.

CJTF-HOA: In our planning with CENTCOM, the intent is to transfer command and control, personnel, resources, security assistance offices, and
legal authorities necessary for AFRICOM to assume responsibility for CJTF-HOA by September 30th, 2008.

Mission Transfer and Staff Training

AFRICOM is working with the other commands to develop Memoranda of Agreement to outline the details of the post-September 2008 support AFRICOM will require until its full capacity is realized and its components fully developed. We have also devised, in coordination with Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the JFCOM Joint Warfighting Center, a staff training and exercise program to facilitate AFRICOM’s ability to accept missions. The rigor of this effort are designed to ensure mission transfer is based on measured, exercised, and reviewed methodology.

Building the Interagency Team

AFRICOM is structured with interagency relationships in mind. Incorporating interagency personnel into the command will boost DoD’s ability to support security, stability, and humanitarian assistance efforts.

Today, a DoS official fills the Command’s Deputy to the Commander for Civil–Military Activities (DCMA) position, and a DoS official from the Bureau of African Affairs is the AFRICOM Foreign Policy Advisor. In addition, the Development and Humanitarian Assistance Advisor position, reporting directly to the DCMA, is filled by an official from USAID, and a U.S. Treasury official is working within AFRICOM’s Strategy, Plans, and Programs Directorate (SPP). Soon SPP will also have an additional three Coast Guard officers from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

As we continue to build our interagency team, we intend to integrate personnel from across the interagency, to include the U.S. Department of Commerce, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Energy. We are also seeking expertise from Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, and the Transportation Security Administration. We are confident that a close partnership with DoS and other U.S. departments and agencies constitutes the best means for supporting U.S. foreign policy.

As the Secretary of Defense remarked in a recent speech at Kansas State University, other Departments and Agencies also need to increase their capability and capacity to contribute to stabilization and reconstruction operations abroad. We encourage further U.S. expansion of these capabilities, and look forward to working with our interagency partners as they enhance their capability to project civilian skills, where needed. Increasing the ability of the USG, as a whole, to deal with both crises and day-to-day issues throughout our AOR will reduce the strain on our military forces and match the
right expertise to the right task at hand. Congressional support for this broad approach is critical.

With its broad applicability, Stabilization and Security assistance authority (Section 1207) has proven its value in Somalia, Yemen, and the Trans-Saharan region of Africa. Success here has shown the need for the type of authorities that allow DoD to transfer funds to DoS to provide assistance to aid police forces, improve governance, Rule of Law, economic development, and humanitarian assistance. A nation that maintains a professional military but lacks the capability to control domestic security and meet non-military stabilization needs cannot provide the conditions necessary to facilitate the economic development required to improve conditions. Broader, flexible authorities, including a long-term extension and expansion of 1207, will contribute to establishing stability and development. By bringing civilian security and stabilization efforts to bear early in these nations, we reduce the risk that US forces will be required to deploy there in the future.

Component Commands

AFRICOM continues to identify component support requirements, and is working with the Services to determine the best means for meeting these requirements.

U.S. Army, Europe (USEUR)

USEUR is tasked by the Army to support AFRICOM as it moves towards assuming the responsibilities of a Unified Command. In this capacity, USEUR will provide general support as the supporting Army Service Component Command for AFRICOM until a specific U.S. Army component is established. The U.S. Army component will not have any assigned forces other than selected capabilities required to support AFRICOM TSC operations. As currently envisioned, these capabilities would be limited to planning, directing, and providing oversight of operational intelligence, communications, and some operational sustainment support. As AFRICOM mission requirements are defined and solidified, a more robust capability may be necessary.

U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (NAVEUR)

The Navy has chosen to implement a single, dual-hatted Navy Component Command in support of both EURCOM and AFRICOM. Meeting the requirements of an EURCOM in stand-up and a EURCOM in transition, while maintaining flexibility to adapt to a dynamic transfer of missions to AFRICOM, was the primary consideration in developing the Navy’s course of action. This structure will
be evaluated and adjusted as AFRICOM transitions to its status as a Unified Command.

**U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE)**

USAFE is the lead agent for the Air Force in working with AFRICOM to develop the construct and missions for the AFRICOM Air Force component. USAFE will initially be in general support and will then exercise Administrative Control of the Air Force Component of AFRICOM, 17th Air Force (17th AF), after it is stood up. The concept consists of having 17th AF provide full spectrum Air Force capabilities to AFRICOM in support of partnership building, security cooperation, and mutual U.S.-African interests. Initial operational capability for 17th AF will be no later than September 30th, 2008, with its full operational capability to follow at a date to be determined.

**U.S. Marine Forces, Europe (MARFOREUR)**

Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFOREUR), as the United States Marine Corps Service component to AFRICOM, anticipates achieving full operational capability in early FY 2009, with a target date of October 1st, 2008. An initial small MARFOREUR staff is in Stuttgart and currently embedded within the MARFOREUR staff.

**U.S. Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR)**

Following the Presidential direction to establish AFRICOM, SOCEUR designated a transition team to plan and execute the establishment of AFRICOM’s Theater Special Operations Command (SOCAFRICA). The transition team is working with Special Operations Command Pacific, Special Operations Command Central, SOCEUR, AFRICOM, EUCOM, and U.S. Special Operations Command, to determine requirements and obtain resources for SOCAFRICA. SOCAFRICA is projected to be fully operationally capable in March 2009 as a functional subordinate unified special operations command for Africa.

**THEATER INVESTMENT NEEDS**

**Enhancing AFRICOM’s Mission**

Building partnership capacity provides the foundation for many of our strategic objectives. As we continue building the AFRICOM staff, we solicit your support not only for our own efforts, but for the development of the capabilities of other U.S. government departments and agencies whose civil expertise is critical to stabilization and capacity building missions overseas. While our traditional military experiences and background allows us
to bring extensive mobility, logistics, and command and control capabilities to bear in support of USG efforts, we remain concerned that, if interagency capabilities are not better resourced, non-traditional tasks will, out of necessity, default to military elements.

A holistic approach to Africa’s problems and challenges is, with AFRICOM in support, the best way to further U.S., international, and partner nation interests. However, building regional stability and security will take many years of sustained and dedicated effort. There is no conspicuous finish line. Therefore, enduring Congressional support is indispensable.

The key area where legislative assistance would improve AFRICOM’s capability to work in partnership with other USG departments and agencies is as follows:

- Provide budgetary flexibility to Combatant Commanders and Ambassadors, including making Section 1206 Global Train and Equip authority permanent and expanding it to meet the demand State and DoD have seen over the past three years;

**Combatant Command Budgetary Authority Flexibility** is essential to maximize Combatant Command responsiveness and agility in confronting the constantly changing geopolitical landscape in which we operate. Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act to Build the Capacity of Foreign Military Forces has proven its worth when it comes to responding to emergent security challenges by rapidly building and enhancing the military capacity of key allies and partners. Africa’s unique challenges in the arena of security for the individual citizen (personal security), coupled with our strategy of Active Security, make the extension and expansion of these authorities a tool of the utmost importance. Making the train and equip authority permanent, increasing the ceiling, and establishing an annual baseline appropriation will help prevent problems from becoming crimes by providing the flexibility needed to respond rapidly to challenges within our AOR. This authority is a vital element of the GLOM.

We support the Secretary of State’s request for a Civilian Response Force, and also strongly support the significant increase in the number of people that DoS and USAID are seeking in the President’s 2009 budget. We also support an increase in foreign assistance funding. These measures contribute to a greater ability to achieve U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives without committing U.S. forces.

**Command Stationing**
Command presence is an important issue, but is not a matter of urgency. With this in mind, we have established our initial operating facilities for the Headquarters (HQ) in Stuttgart, Germany, with the intent to focus first on how we can best serve the objectives of the Command and the needs of the AOR.

In the near term, AFRICOM will focus on working with our Embassies, Country Teams, and Offices of Defense Cooperation to strengthen existing bilateral military-to-military relationships. AFRICOM presence will be determined by the benefits, improvements, and enhancements we can bring to programs that serve the interests of our African partners, the USG, and the international community. AFRICOM’s efforts and presence on the continent will reflect coordination with the Department of State, the desires of our African partners, and consistency with U.S. foreign policy objectives.

**Theater Infrastructure**

Camp Lemonier is the enduring primary support location for the Horn of Africa region. It is part of CJTF-HOA and currently rests in the CENTCOM AOR, and will transition into AFRICOM’s TSC blueprint. As AFRICOM matures, Camp Lemonier will transition to supporting long-term TSC efforts and establishing strong and enduring regional relationships. Camp Lemonier will be a part of supporting and developing regional African capability and capacity; thus, its funding support must continue.

Camp Lemonier and CJTF-HOA operations have largely been resourced from the GWOT emergency supplemental appropriations to establish expeditionary infrastructure and rapidly achieve operational needs. However, we envision Camp Lemonier as an enduring forward operating site (FOs) in the AFRICOM AOR. Its current and programmed projects are an integral part of the Camp’s installation master plan and are required to support existing and projected mission sets. The FOS at Camp Lemonier and any other access needs in the region will be included in AFRICOM’s 2009 Master Plan.

A CSL is a host-nation facility with little or no permanent U.S. personnel present. It may contain pre-positioned equipment or provide for pre-coordinated logistical arrangements. The CSL may be used to support security cooperation activities or provide access during a contingency. The current EUCOM master plan identifies designated Africa CSLs—some of which have recently been used in support of OEF-TS. The establishment of AFRICOM provides an opportunity to conduct a fresh assessment in the context of AFRICOM’s mission and determine the CSL arrangements needed to meet theater security cooperation and humanitarian assistance engagement needs across the African continent. Pending the completion of this assessment, Africa CSLs in EUCOM’s current (FY2009) master plan remain in AFRICOM’s plan.
Strategic and Tactical Mobility

Our ability to conduct TSC and other activities on the African continent is directly tied to mobility. Vast distances, combined with very limited civilian rail, road, and air transportation infrastructure, constrain the full range of AFRICOM engagement and contingency activities. There is limited intra-theater commercial airlift, and EUCOM’s current fleet of C-130s does not possess the range or capacity to support rapid movements throughout AFRICOM’s AOR. While African airlines account for only four percent of world travel, they experience 25 percent of the world’s air disasters. The expanse of the African continent, coupled with limited commercial airlift availability, requires military airlift to ensure mission success. In cooperation with other DoD organizations, AFRICOM is conducting an analysis to identify the requirements for military aircraft.

In the long-term, the U.S. must encourage the improvement of civilian transportation infrastructure and its security across the African continent, but the near term requires an increase in the quantity and capacity of military air and rapid sealift platforms made available to AFRICOM.

Pre-Positioned Equipment

Continued support of the Services’ Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel (PWRM) programs demonstrates commitment through presence and provides a broad spectrum of traditional crisis response and irregular warfare options globally. With AFRICOM missions supporting State and USAID capacity building and humanitarian assistance, this will require the Services to re-assess the PWRM equipment sets that are strategically located in our region. Disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and capacity building equipment and supplies are very different from traditional PWRM sets. AFRICOM is actively involved in DoD-led studies examining the global disposition of PWRM and is working to ensure our strategic direction and operational requirements are incorporated in the study reviews and ultimately in an overarching DoD PWRM strategy.

Quality of Life (QoL) Programs

Already designed as an enduring location, the Stuttgart area is a superb location to stand up the Command. While the influx of new personnel will initially strain some facilities, overall quality of life is excellent, and AFRICOM remains relatively close to, and within the same approximate time zones as, the African continent. Additionally, the EUCOM staff is nearby, which eases the challenges associated with the mission transfer process and ensures overall mission continuity.
Quality of life (QoL) construction investments affirm our commitment to AFRICOM’s team members and their families. We support EUCOM’s Family Housing renovation and replacement projects and unaccompanied personnel facilities, which will ensure that our personnel are afforded quality housing and barracks. Investment in medical facilities ensures that our people and their families receive first-rate medical care comparable to that provided in CONUS. Support for facility improvements in the Stuttgart will ensure that the AFRICOM team receives the required support while not overtaxing the community's current QoL foundation.

The quality of the Department’s dependent education programs is a major contributor to the QoL for the AFRICOM team. Continued investment in our Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) schools provides high quality education facilities for dependents. AFRICOM is committed to partnering with DoDEA and Department of Defense Dependents Schools (Europe) to provide the children of our military personnel, civilians, and contractors quality educational opportunities. We endorse the DoDEA Master Plan initiatives to increase the capacity of the Panzer elementary and middle schools, and to construct a new Stuttgart community high school.

CONCLUSION

AFRICOM represents an exciting and new approach to DoD’s long-term commitment to strengthening ties with Africa, as well as a new operating approach within DoD itself. This Command’s design constitutes the implementation of a new concept that can better address the complex challenges of the 21st century. AFRICOM is a work-in-progress. We are a listening, growing, and developing organization dedicated to partnering with African governments, African security organizations, and the international community to help the people of Africa achieve the goals they have set for themselves. We will enable the work of Africans through preventative, sustained, and persistent engagement, and thereby support U.S. security and foreign policy objectives.

The Command will continue to build its interagency team. Our focus is on adding value to our African engagement efforts, while ensuring that we neither disrupt nor confuse current and ongoing USG or international efforts. This command exists to support U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa. Your support, not only for AFRICOM but to our interagency partners, is critical to our ability to provide and improve the quality of what we as a team can accomplish.

You can help modernize our nation’s approach to national security by supporting the development of other USG departments’ and agencies’ ability to
project their unique expertise in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives. This is critical, and will assist in our collective effort to prevent disputes, poverty, and instability from leading to extremism, violence, and armed conflict, thereby better protecting U.S. interests and the American people.

It is my honor to serve with the uniformed men and women as well as our interagency partners and civilians who are making this new Command a reality. Your sustained support will allow their good work to continue in service of their country.
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

March 13, 2008
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON

General CRADDOCK. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] [See pages 37 and 38.]

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR

Admiral STAVRIDS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] [See pages 33 and 34.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CUMMINGS

General CRADDOCK. Development of robust EU Security capabilities would be a welcome and positive contribution to the Trans-Atlantic community. The EU will not replace NATO and NATO will not replace the EU. It is in our national interest to encourage our European Allies to strengthen and build the complimentary Security Defense capacities of the European Union to share in the risk and responsibility for protecting and advancing our common interests and freedom. The EU brings development aid, human rights standards, anti-corruption programs, police trainers, election monitors, and most importantly, the capacity to put these capabilities together in the right combination for the task at hand—especially financial resources—when working together, NATO and the EU can combine the best of both organizations for a truly comprehensive and complimentary approach to our shared security and defense challenges. We will, in any case, continue to pursue bilateral engagement with NATO allies and EU member states, 21 of whom are members of both NATO and the EU, in order to continue to develop and to coordinate our approaches in both forums. European Command and Africa Command both play a key role in our bilateral engagement. This will not change. In the end, NATO and the EU are tools of their memberships. Both bring potentially complementary and mutually reinforcing comparative advantages. Our combatant commanders play an important role in harmonizing the actions of all our international partners and in focusing them on the tasks at hand. As for the EU’s development of a military headquarters and an acquisition agency, they are not quite there and so on these two aspects, the EU Military Staff and the European Defense Agency; I would not expect to hear anything about them in the upcoming summit. [See page 39.]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 13, 2008
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. BOYDA

Mrs. BOYDA. Admiral Stavridis, SOUTHCOM’s 10-year usage rights for Ecuador’s Manta air base expires in November 2009, they can expect to be evicted in favor of China based company named Hutchison Port Holding (HPH). HPH is the world’s leading port developer and operator as well as an industry leader in the application of technologies to strengthen the entire transportation and logistics chain. It mentioned that the Manta base is not geopolitically important for US national security, but SOUTHCOM currently uses it to combat illegal cocaine trade in the “source zone” of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. The Air base also shares a common runway with the International Airport and currently houses 475 US Military Personnel. What operational impacts does this have on your organization? Is there a plan to perform the same functions in another South American country? Is so, where? If not, why not?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]