[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ONE YEAR LATER: HAVE TSA AIRPORT SECURITY CHECKPOINTS IMPROVED?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 15, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-92
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
------
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman
TOM LANTOS, California TOM DAVIS, Virginia
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN L. MICA, Florida
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts CHRIS CANNON, Utah
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
DIANE E. WATSON, California MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts DARRELL E. ISSA, California
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York KENNY MARCHANT, Texas
JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina
Columbia BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota BILL SALI, Idaho
JIM COOPER, Tennessee JIM JORDAN, Ohio
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
PETER WELCH, Vermont
Phil Schiliro, Chief of Staff
Phil Barnett, Staff Director
Earley Green, Chief Clerk
David Marin, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on November 15, 2007................................ 1
Statement of:
Kutz, Gregory D., Managing Director, Forensic Audits and
Special Investigations, Government Accountability Office,
accompanied by John Cooney, Assistant Director, Forensic
Audits and Special Investigations, Government
Accountability Office; and Edmund ``Kip'' Hawley,
Administrator, Transportation Security Administration...... 11
Hawley, Edmund ``Kip''................................... 27
Kutz, Gregory D.......................................... 11
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Davis, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Virginia, prepared statement of......................... 7
Hawley, Edmund ``Kip'', Administrator, Transportation
Security Administration, prepared statement of............. 31
Kutz, Gregory D., Managing Director, Forensic Audits and
Special Investigations, Government Accountability Office,
prepared statement of...................................... 14
Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida, letter dated March 28, 2006.............. 41
Sali, Hon. Bill, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Idaho, prepared statement of............................ 66
Watson, Hon. Diane E., a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, prepared statement of................. 62
Waxman, Chairman Henry A., a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, prepared statement of............. 3
ONE YEAR LATER: HAVE TSA AIRPORT SECURITY CHECKPOINTS IMPROVED?
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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2007
House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry A. Waxman
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Waxman, Cummings, Tierney, Watson,
Higgins, Yarmuth, Braley, Sarbanes, Davis of Virginia, Shays,
Mica, Issa, Westmoreland, and Sali.
Staff present: Phil Schiliro, chief of staff; Phil Barnett,
staff director and chief counsel; Kristin Amerling, general
counsel; Karen Lightfoot, communications director and senior
policy advisor; David Rapallo, chief investigative counsel;
John Williams, deputy chief investigative counsel; Steve
Glickman and Susanne Sachsman, counsels; Earley Green, chief
clerk; Teresa Coufal, deputy clerk; Caren Auchman and Ella
Hoffman, press assistants; Leneal Scott, information systems
manager; Kerry Gutknecht and William Ragland, staff assistants;
Sam Buffone, special assistant; David Marin, minority staff
director; Jennifer Safavian, minority chief counsel for
oversight and investigations; Keith Ausbrook, minority general
counsel; Janice Spector and Christopher Bright, minority
professional staff members; John Cuaderes, minority senior
investigator and policy advisor; Patrick Lyden, minority
parliamentarian and member services coordinator; Benjamin
Chance, minority clerk; Meredith Liberty, minority staff
assistant and correspondence coordinator; and Todd Greenwood,
minority research assistant.
Chairman Waxman. The meeting of the committee will please
come to order.
Today we are holding a hearing on airport security. Last
year, the Government Accountability Office tested the
effectiveness of airport security checkpoints by conducting
undercover missions to bring explosives through airport
screening security checkpoints at 21 locations. The
Transportation Security Administration failed all 21 of those
tests. The purpose of today's hearing is to determine whether
TSA has improved over the last year. GAO is here again to tell
us about the results of its most recent investigation.
This committee comes to this issue in a bipartisan manner.
This investigation was jointly requested by our ranking member,
Tom Davis, Benny Thompson, the Chair of the Homeland Security
Committee and myself. A bipartisan approach is critical,
because explosives on airplanes are a dangerous threat.
In August 2006, terrorists plotted to bring liquid
explosives onto eight flights bound for the United States. The
British thwarted that threat, but there are new ones on the
horizon. The terrorist threat to our airlines is constantly
evolving. The question is, is the Transportation Security
Administration keeping up?
To help answer this question, we asked GAO to do another
round of covert tests. Congress and the traveling public we
represent have the right to know whether TSA is effectively
addressing this threat. Unfortunately, the news is not good.
GAO's undercover agents once again succeeded in getting
dangerous materials through airport security checkpoints.
Last year, the co-chairman of the 9/11 Commission spoke
publicly about the fact that TSA failed GAO's tests. Thomas
Kane said he was dismayed because ``I thought the Department of
Homeland Security was making some progress on this, and
evidently they are not.'' And Lee Hamilton stated that ``The
fact that so many airports failed this test is a hugely
important story which the American traveler is entitled to
know.''
The Homeland Security Department promised to plug these
holes. But what we will hear from GAO today is that the
Department is not succeeding. The Transportation Security
Administration has had 6 years and has spent billions of
taxpayers' dollars, yet our airlines remain vulnerable. That is
an embarrassing and dangerous record. I hope today's hearing
will begin to point the way toward reforms that are urgently
needed. We have to fix this problem.
I want to now recognize Ranking Member Tom Davis.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Henry A. Waxman
follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
very much for holding this hearing. It is indeed bipartisan;
this is not about red or blue, it is about red, white and blue,
and defending the homeland.
In several days, families in record numbers will begin
their travels to celebrate Thanksgiving. For many who travel by
plane, their journey will start with long lines to reach the
airport and then to park. These will be followed by even
longer, more agonizing lines to get boarding passes and check
luggage. These will be followed by the most torturous line of
all, the one that leads to the Transportation Security Agency
checkpoint.
Since 9/11, people have become accustomed to the added
security procedures associated with air travel. Although it
takes longer to board an aircraft and there are more
restrictions on what can be carried onto a plane, the public
generally has been willing to endure these inconveniences for
the benefit of safety. It is safe to say, though, that the
flying public would not be so understanding if people came to
believe these inconveniences do not assure security.
In August 2006, British authorities discovered a plot to
blow up trans-Atlantic aircraft using explosives made from
common liquids. In response to this new threat, TSA implemented
what is known as the 3-1-1 or the 3-1-1 policy, which permits
passengers to carry 3 ounces of liquids or gels aboard a plane
in 1 quart-sized plastic bag. In theory, strict limits on the
amount of liquids that passengers can carry will prevent a bomb
from being constructed.
Today, we will hear testimony from the Government
Accountability Office on how its agents successfully got past
TSA checkpoints at several airports with common liquids that,
when combined, could have constituted an explosive device large
enough to bring down a commercial aircraft. That is obviously
not what Congress or the public want to hear.
A little more than 2 years ago, I chaired a similar hearing
on the adequacy of TSA's security at airports. Then TSA leaders
testified the solution was more time, more resources and better
technology. They have had all three. Unfortunately, as this
latest GAO report shows, TSA still cannot consistently detect
or prevent prohibited items from being carried onto aircraft.
We have to do better.
I understand the threat evolves, as our enemies learn more
about our improved security and take steps to react. TSA has to
do the same. In fact, TSA just can't react, the agency has to
be proactive and stay on offense.
I am pleased to see Administrator Hawley in his opening
statement acknowledge what GAO was able to do and the need for
TSA to do better. But his words need to trigger strong actions
and tangible results.
Mr. Chairman, as we approach the beginning of the 2007
holiday season and the flying public begins to travel, it is
important to remember the American people rely on TSA to do
everything possible to ensure their safety. It is not enough to
identify gaps. These gaps have to be addressed aggressively and
consistently.
Flying these days is stressful enough. The commercial air
travel industry is straining under serious cost and performance
pressures. But no one can afford to let security challenges get
lost in the shuffle. We need to understand how TSA proposes to
strengthen the system, increase vigilance and deter those who
seek to exploit the vulnerabilities of so fragile a network.
The next baggie of prohibited liquids may not be a test.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Tom Davis follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Davis.
Ordinarily it would be just the two of us making opening
statements. But we have had a request from Mr. Mica, who is the
ranking member of the legislative committee on transportation
issues, so I know he wants to give a statement. Let me invite
any Member who wishes to make a statement to do so at this
time.
Let me recognize Mr. Mica first.
Mr. Mica. First of all, Mr. Waxman, you are going to
probably fall out of your chair, but I want to take this
opportunity to publicly thank you. I think what you are doing
today is probably one of the best hearings that we will do for
the American public this entire year. Henry Waxman, I really
appreciate your following up on one of the most important
threats we face as a Nation. You have also done something that
I was unable to do, make the public aware of the failure of our
security screening system. I think that is very important.
In fact, I thought of even breaching security or classified
information when I first asked GAO, when I was chairman. And
your staff did an excellent job of detailing what has taken
place in previous tests and previous failures. If this was just
this failure, it would still be a problem. But this is
unfortunately a record of failure, which you have detailed and
you also have made public. This is an open society, and the
public has a right to know.
Mr. Hawley is going to tell you about a layered security
system with 19 levels of security. I read his testimony. The
last one is the public. I am telling you, this is one of the
most serious threats that we face as a Nation. Because these
people are out to get us. This has been a cat and mouse game
since before September 11, 2001. No one should let down their
guard on this. If you just look at the history of what they
have tried to do, they scoped the system in 2001, they found
our vulnerabilities. We didn't have standards for screeners, we
didn't ban box cutters, we didn't have rules in place to deal
with a hijacking of a plane, the failure of government.
If you look at the sophistication of what they have done
just of late, the Richard Reid shoe bomb was a very
sophisticated effort to take down multiple aircraft. If you
look at the liquid bombs in the London case, the same thing, an
evolving sophistication to take down multiple aircraft. If you
think 9/11 was something, folks, using non-traditional
explosives like Mr. Cooney and GAO has used is the next step in
this process. We have tried to put in place layers of security
to deal with that.
I have some very specific questions, because I didn't feel
that the hand-off to the Democrat side was well done. And I am
going to go into the details of the meeting that took place
when we really handed this off to the other team, who has the
same interests that I had. I don't think that they got the full
story, and today we are going to hear the full story due to
what Mr. Waxman has been able to make public.
So finally, the good thing about what this is going to do
is make the public aware that they are the last link in this.
We have put other links in, and Mr. Hawley will describe them,
not as fast and not as well with technology or training of
personnel or placement of personnel to deal with this
situation. But we do have a failure of a system. It needs to be
publicly known, and the public can help us, because they can be
alert. Probably the best thing that they are going to deal with
today is congested aircraft, which will mean that those planes
are full. But they are full of Americans and people who can
help us in an effort to detect this threat. You are going to
hear more about it.
So Mr. Waxman, I thank you on behalf of the American people
for what you are doing today and making them aware. They are
going to have to be partners with us to make certain that we
don't repeat a national catastrophe. Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Mica.
Let me call on any other Member--Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, I too thank you for holding
this hearing. I am glad that it is truly a bipartisan hearing.
I, like Mr. Mica, am a senior member of the Transportation
Committee. I am chairman of the Coast Guard Subcommittee. We
spend a phenomenal amount of time and resources trying to guard
our ports. It seems that we had taken for granted, while we
were trying to make sure our ports were safe, that our airports
were very safe.
And the fact is that so many people, when I think about GAO
testing 21 airports last year and getting through every single
one of them, I didn't say 20 of them, I said every single one
of them, it makes you wonder. The fact is that my constituents
are paying more for airline tickets, and part of the increase
in price is to cover the TSA. Then they of course stand in the
long lines and they are very patient, everybody from the little
children to senior citizens going through all kinds of
procedures, only to find out that we could do better.
Mr. Chairman, a few years ago, many years ago when I
visited Israel, I will never forget a statement that they said
to me, and it is something that I have thought about a lot.
What they said was, if we are not better, we will not be. If we
are not better, we will not be. I think we have to be better.
And I think we can do better. Americans across the country will
be traveling next week for the Thanksgiving holiday. They are
going to go through a lot. But they will be under the
assumption that they are safe because they see what they go
through.
So I am hoping that this hearing will shed some light, but
most importantly, I am hoping that it will let us discover what
the true problems may be. Are we mired in an atmosphere of
mediocrity? Are we in need of better detection equipment? Are
there human error issues here? I don't know. We need to find
out all of these things, so that we can be the very best we can
be. We must, by the way, have very, very high expectations.
It is in the DNA of every cell of my brain and probably
every American's brain, seeing those planes on 9/11 fly into
the World Trade Centers. We never want that to happen again. So
Mr. Chairman, I think this hearing will go a long way toward
making sure that we are better. Because if we are not better,
we will not be. With that, I yield back.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Cummings.
Does any other Member wish to be recognized? Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A 30 second
intervention to thank you, Mr. Chairman, as well, in working
with Mr. Davis and Mr. Thompson. The issue for me was
heightened in the early 1980's when a plane was blown out of
the sky because of drug terrorists who were involved. We were
shown back in the early 1990's that just a bottle of gin with
basically liquid explosives next to a radio next to a carton of
cigarettes, and the radio was the detonator. And another one
was just a mat on the bottom of a suitcase that was an
explosive, non-detectable.
I will just end by saying what is extraordinarily alarming
to me is this isn't 21 break-ins, in a sense, out of 100. This
is 21 out of 21 and that to me is extraordinarily unsettling
and makes me question whether we are going to see any success
in the near future. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Shays. Do any other Members
wish to be recognized? If not, I want to welcome our witnesses
here today. We have with us Mr. Gregory D. Kutz, the Managing
Director of Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, from
the Government Accountability Office. He is accompanied by Mr.
John Cooney, Assistant Director of Forensic Audits and Special
Investigations, Government Accountability Office. And the
Honorable Edmund ``Kip'' Hawley, the Administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration.
We are grateful to you for being here today. It is the
practice of this committee that all testimony is taken under
oath, so I would like to ask you if you would please stand and
raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Waxman. Let the record indicate that each of the
witnesses answered in the affirmative.
Mr. Kutz, I want you to start off. Your prepared
statements, all of you, will be in the record, and we would
like to ask you to try to limit the oral presentation. We won't
be strict about this, but we will have a clock that will
indicate when the 5-minutes is up. Thank you.
STATEMENTS OF GREGORY D. KUTZ, MANAGING DIRECTOR, FORENSIC
AUDITS AND SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN COONEY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
FORENSIC AUDITS AND SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; AND EDMUND ``KIP'' HAWLEY,
ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
STATEMENT OF GREGORY D. KUTZ
Mr. Kutz. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to discuss airport security. In March
2006, we reported that investigators boarded commercial
aircraft with explosive devices in their carry-on luggage. At
the request of this committee, we performed additional covert
testing of airport security in 2007. Today's testimony
highlights the results of our testing.
It is important to note that we worked closely with TSA to
make sure that my testimony does not have any classified or
sensitive security information.
My testimony today has two parts. First, I will discuss
what we did; and second, I will discuss the results of our
covert tests. First, using information available on the
Internet, we were able to identify devices that could severely
damage an aircraft and jeopardize the safety of its passengers.
The first device was an improvised explosive device [IED],
containing two parts. The first part, a liquid explosive; the
second part, a low-yield detonator.
Our 2006 work showed that the detonator itself could
function as an IED. However, using this detonator to ignite the
liquid explosive results in a more powerful device.
The second device was an improvised incendiary device, or
IID. These types of devices do not explode, but instead create
intense fire, heat and noxious fumes. Our incendiary device was
created by combining products prohibited by TSA from carry-on
luggage. The components for both our devices were purchased at
local stores and on the Internet for less than $150.
We tested the effectiveness of our devices in partnership
with a local law enforcement agency and at a national
laboratory. As you requested, I will show a short video at the
end of my presentation that shows the results of these tests.
As the video will show, our devices could cause severe damage
to an aircraft and threaten the safety of its passengers.
Using only publicly available information which we do for
all of our covert testing, we devised methods to conceal the
components for these devices in our carry-on luggage and on our
persons. As with all FSI testing, this was a covert, or Red
Team test. In other words, very few people at GAO knew what we
were doing and nobody at TSA was aware in advance of our
testing.
Moving on to our results, we successfully passed through
TSA checkpoints with components for several explosive devices
and an incendiary device. These prohibited items were concealed
in our carry-on luggage and on our persons. Our testing was
done at 19 airports across the country, including those that
employ private screeners. We found no difference in the results
for TSA employees and the privately contracted screening
employees.
In most cases, security officers appeared to follow TSA
procedures. However, we did identify several vulnerabilities.
For example, most travelers are aware of the 3-1-1 rule,
prohibiting certain liquids and gels aboard the aircraft. We
were able to bring a liquid component of the incendiary device
through checkpoints undetected by studying policies related to
this process.
Also in two instances, our investigators were selected for
a secondary inspection. However, in both cases, the security
officer did not detect the prohibited items that our
investigators carried on board the aircraft. One of our
suggestions for TSA is to consider improved search techniques,
including enhanced pat-downs.
In conclusion, our testing shows that a terrorist group
using publicly available information could bring explosive and
incendiary devices on board an aircraft undetected. TSA faces
the monumental challenge of balancing security with the
efficient movement of passengers. Our work clearly shows the
increased security risk of the current policy of allowing
substantial carry-on luggage aboard aircraft. Absent changes in
the carry-on policy, we believe that risks can be reduced
through improvements in human capital, process and technology.
As you requested, we will now show a short video. I want to
just briefly discuss what the video will show. The first part
of the video is the IED detonator I described, which you will
see used on an automobile. The second part of the video is the
liquid explosive, which is ignited by the IED detonator. The
third part will be the incendiary device that I mentioned.
So if we could show the video.
[Video shown.]
Mr. Kutz. Mr. Chairman, this ends our statement. Special
Agent Cooney and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kutz follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cooney, did you have a statement?
Mr. Cooney. No, I don't, Mr. Chairman, but I will be able
to answer your questions at the appropriate time.
Chairman Waxman. Very good. Thank you.
Mr. Hawley.
STATEMENT OF EDMUND ``KIP'' HAWLEY
Mr. Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Davis,
members of the committee. I also thank you for having this
hearing and drawing attention to these issues. I particularly
appreciate the work of the chairman and the ranking member and
their staffs, along with my colleagues from the GAO, to protect
sensitive information. I think this is, as Mr. Mica mentioned,
an extraordinarily important issue that we deal with openly and
transparently.
The videos that we saw a minute ago and the play on the
television are noteworthy and certainly get your attention. I
think the key point to it is, there are vulnerabilities in
every system of security. What we are engaged in is risk
management. As we look at risk management, it looks at an IED
that would have the capacity of taking an airplane down. There
are many, many, many steps, including making the bomb, getting
components through, perhaps assembling them, all those various
steps. And we look at the whole system.
And the 19 layers of security that Mr. Mica mentioned and I
put in my opening statement are like numbers in a combination
lock. If you find one number to a 19 number combination, you
have one number. What we have done is identify and understand
the vulnerabilities in our system, and there are
vulnerabilities, and then put in place other layers to
compensate for them.
I would like to just give a quick summary. In August 2005,
we identified, I came on the job in July 2005. We looked at
what are the vulnerabilities. We looked at the technology
vulnerabilities, we looked at the people vulnerabilities and we
looked at our strategy vulnerabilities. We identified that we
had work to do in all three areas. We needed to dramatically
upgrade the technology that we have at checkpoints for the
point of eliminating the possibility of bringing on IED
components, not the assembled bomb, but the components, a much,
much more difficult task.
So we re-trained the entire TSA work force with
professional bomb techs directed at that, and changed our
protocols to require us to train and test to the standard of
IED components. And to put these tests in context, and I
appreciate the work, they are done for a good purpose, they
yield valuable information, but it is important to stay
focused, not get panicked by looking at one particular number
in that combination lock and worrying about the whole system.
There are issues that need to be addressed and I welcome
discussing them.
But to put it in context, if the number of tests that the
GAO did for this were measured in miles, there were 38 tests,
that would be roughly from here to Baltimore. The Office of
Inspector General has done roughly 300 tests, this is in a 3-
month period of this year. That is approximately from here to
Philadelphia. And in a 3-month period at TSA, we do 225,000
tests. These are physical tests with actual bomb components
going through, with real people smuggling through the
checkpoint. That is the equivalent of going around the world
eight times.
So I think the trip to Baltimore, one can learn interesting
things. But what we do every day and the 225,000 over 3 months
or over a million a year gives us very focused information on
what we know terrorists work on. We know their capability. We
focus our efforts on what will actually take down a plane as
opposed to what might severely damage. My pen can do severe
damage.
We look at what can take a plane down and work backward
from there each one layer. So yes, there are vulnerabilities in
technology. I will address what we are doing about those. So we
have put aside a significant amount of money to buy new AT
machines, new checkpoint carry-on machines. We have announced a
purchase of 250 already in October. We expect to double that,
using fiscal year 2008 funds, should the Congress appropriate
that money and the bill be signed.
But 2008, we expect to move that number up to 500. To give
you an idea, there are about 2,500 lanes in the United States,
500 and some checkpoints. So this is a very, very significant
technology upgrade that we will be deploying in 2008 that will
be the first significant technology upgrade since the 1970's on
carry-on luggage. That is in progress. We identified it
earlier, and now fortunately it is being deployed.
On the strategy we identified in 2005, we are too check-
list oriented. If our TSOs are looking to find a certain number
of prohibited items and pull them out of bags, they are not
thinking ahead. I think as Mr. Davis mentioned, we have to go
on offense. We can't sit back at the checkpoint looking through
a prohibited items list and fishing out peoples' objects. We
have to be aware that they change their technique. When we move
one direction, they will find a way around it. We have to play
offense, we have to be nimble. That is why we do so many of
these other IED component tests at our checkpoints every day,
every shift, every airport. It is the crux of what we do.
Then we said, in addition to being more flexible, better
technology, we need to change up what we do. We can't be a
sitting duck at the checkpoint with the same process. We have
added layers. We have added the behavior observation layer,
which is for people to identify suspicious behavior, such as
you would find with surveillance or pre-attack planning. They
are not bringing prohibited items. They are not breaking any
laws. They are doing their surveillance feeling they are
protected because we can't get them because they are not
carrying prohibited items. Not true any more. Step into a U.S.
airport, we have 600 behavior detection officers out there and
they will pick you off in the public area.
Then on top of that, we have added the ticket document
checker, with the support of the Congress, and I appreciate
that, to take over the critical point at which somebody shows
up and shows identification. Now we have Federal officers there
checking identity who have much better briefing who can then
tie in with the behavior piece. On top of that, we have added
our VIPR teams, which bring our Federal air marshals who are
not flying on aircraft, they are now able to move undercover
and overtly to do unexpected patrols everywhere in the airport
environment. We also work, I should say, with our transit
partners to help there, too.
On top of that, we have added a program in the back of
airports, where we have the equivalent of 1,000 headcount now,
that we have developed to spend their time in the backside of
airports. We are not just sitting at the checkpoint. We are
looking at what are employees doing in the back, what is
happening at the fuel dump, we are looking at what is happening
in the parking garage, we are looking at who is driving into
the airport. All of those things are now added. Those are
additional layers that have been added since 2005.
So we addressed, we identified the vulnerabilities in 2005.
I told you on the technology we are after that with AT and the
millimeter wave, I should say, and backscatter, whole body
imaging, that gets us out of this pat-down issue. The GAO
mentioned enhanced pat-downs. We know what that means. The TSA
officers can do very enhanced pat-downs. It has not been
acceptable to the public. If that is something that we have to
do, we will do that. The better answer is millimeter wave or
backscatter, which allow people to have privacy protections to
go through and eliminate that possibility. So technology would
fix that.
Now the most important, the people. Our TSOs, we have
trained them, I mentioned that. We have career progression now
where our employees can move up and enhance their skills. We
have a pay for performance program. Our attrition is
dramatically down. Our attendance is up. The people who flew on
August 10th know that our TSOs stood up that day and changed
the entire security process overnight. That is not an easy
thing to do. It is nimble, it is fast, it shows a commitment by
our security officers.
So we know our vulnerabilities, and we are addressing them,
and we need one more thing. That is the support of the public.
Mr. Mica mentioned this, and I think it is absolutely critical.
We need the passengers back in the game. We are on the same
side and we need your help. Our officers come to work at 4 a.m.
They came to TSA, they are coming to the airport to protect
you. We need your help. This is not something to be gamed. We
need you to separate out when you pack your bag, be very clear.
Here are the components of what I am bringing on and let the
officer quickly assess that is not a problem. The more we give
clean bags to our TSOs, the less places there are to hide if
you are a terrorist.
So we ask for help on participating, we ask for help on the
respect and appreciation of our officers who are doing a great
job. I have to say, working with my international partners,
that I believe the transportation security officers that we
have are the best in the world. The layers of security that we
have added are more than other countries. I have had many
discussions with a lot of these countries. We work closely to
align our security measures.
The last point on 3-1-1, it not only works for us, but it
was adopted by 170 countries around the world. The EU announced
it and followed our lead. We are working together with our
partners. So we need to partner with our public, we need to
partner with our international colleagues and we need to be
very direct in saying yes, there are vulnerabilities. We can't
be squeamish and say, oh, my goodness, they brought some
firecrackers through and put it in the trunk of a car. Well,
you know what? That is something you have to face up to and
say, we need to stop all things but we have to focus on what
truly does us harm.
So I appreciate the committee's time and look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hawley follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much for the testimony, Mr.
Hawley. We want you to be successful. The American people are
willing to do whatever is necessary. You can see that every day
at an airport where people wait patiently. When the change was
made about liquids, people became attuned to it and wanted to
cooperate. I appreciate your appeal to people to even cooperate
further.
But while that all sounds very good, we still have this
report, which is extremely troubling. And it follows another
report a year ago where we found that in 21 out of 21 incidents
where GAO sent people to get on the planes, they were able to
get through. Mr. Kutz and Mr. Cooney, you heard Mr. Hawley's
testimony. He said he has additional layers now. It is not just
bringing in something that is not appropriate. They are looking
for the most serious, the most serious thing that could be
brought in that might lead to taking down an airplane.
Did you and your people that did this study, did they take
something that was serious enough to take down an airplane?
Mr. Kutz. Again, the only way to determine that is actually
to have an airplane. But you saw the video, you saw some of the
explosion. Certainly it would cause severe damage to an
aircraft and potentially harm some of the passengers. Whether
it would bring an aircraft down, we don't have an aircraft to
actually prove that. But certainly people we have consulted
with that there is a possibility, what is going to happen at
that many feet in the air I don't really know. But I think it
is serious enough and I think that they would agree that this
is a serious threat. Mr. Hawley did mention that in his opening
statement. So I think we are in agreement with that.
Chairman Waxman. Serious threat. Now, the airports, were
they just at one airport or how many different airports were
used for the GAO investigation?
Mr. Kutz. Well, as you mentioned, last year we did 21, and
this year we did 19. In each of the airports, two of our
investigators went through and as we always have, we have cover
teams. So there are follow investigators in case our
investigators run into any trouble. So we did, I guess, double
the number of airports, 80 tests over 2 years.
Chairman Waxman. Well, you did this first test last year in
2006. And it was requested by Congressman Mica. And in that
investigation, GAO conducted undercover tests in 21 airports.
After you delivered your report, it was leaked to the media and
the results were broadcast on national television. I want to
play a clip from NBC Nightly News, this was on March 16, 2006.
[Video shown.]
Chairman Waxman. Well, when that report came out, Mr.
Hawley, you testified, and your response to last year's
investigation was that TSA was implementing new training
members that had not yet ``burned in'' to your transportation
security officers. You promised that things were going to get
better. Do our airports continue to have security
vulnerabilities? I am pretty disturbed by the GAO report.
Should the American people feel that you are going to be able
to control this and protect the American public?
Mr. Hawley. Yes. Yes. The American public can be confident
traveling with the security system in place. You mentioned my
testimony previously saying we were moving in that direction.
We have accomplished that. Those were distributing the extra
bombmaking kits, basically, the training devices to every
airport, all the checkpoints. That is in place, that is
operating today, and it is part of the training improvement
effort. It works both ways, because you get the guy who is
doing the test to figure out, how could I beat my own system,
then they get somebody, another Federal agent unknown to bring
it through, and then the TSO identifies it, in which case they
congratulate them, or they don't, in which case they train
them.
Chairman Waxman. Let me ask, since my time is up, Mr. Kutz
and Mr. Cooney, should, based on your investigation, the public
think that our airports are secure?
Mr. Kutz. I think Mr. Hawley is correct, there is a broader
picture to this, including the intelligence. The best
prevention here is to keep the terrorists from getting to the
airport in the first place. I firmly believe, I don't know if
he necessarily agrees with that, but I think that is the
solution to this. Once you are at the airport, there are a lot
of other layers here.
But I would point out with respect to the 2006 and 2007
tests that the components that we brought through, and I am not
allowed to say how often we got through, but the components we
brought through both times were the same. Plus in 2007, as I
mentioned in my opening statement, we had the liquid explosive
in addition to those. So again, I don't know what processes
were put in place between 2006 and 2007. But I don't think they
were necessarily effective totally in looking at what we are
talking about.
Chairman Waxman. Still, a discouraging result.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Yes.
Mr. Mica. I would like to ask a unanimous consent request
that a letter that I sent to then-Attorney General Alberto
Gonzalez, March 28, 2006, in regard to the leaks, which took
place, which you just showed there, and I have a partial
response in September from the Department of Justice.
Chairman Waxman. Without objection, the document you wish
to put into the record will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Mica. Mr. Chairman, I am not trying to put in something
to cover the administration. They never properly responded or
investigated the leaks, which revealed national security
information. Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you. Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you.
Mr. Kutz and Mr. Cooney, let me just ask, a lot of the
material we are talking about that came through, this was gels
and liquids, is that correct?
Mr. Kutz. Some.
Mr. Cooney. Some, yes, sir. Some. No gels.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. OK. And right now, if you go through
metal detectors, there is no way really to detect liquids, is
that fair to say?
Mr. Cooney. I can't go into the methods we used, but they
were----
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I am not saying everything. I am
just saying, if I were to walk through a metal detector today
that you have at the airport, that doesn't necessarily get
liquids, is that correct?
Mr. Cooney. No, it does not pick up liquids.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. So if I have a vial in my pocket
with 4 ounces or 5 ounces of liquid it wouldn't be detected
going through the detector, is that fair to say?
Mr. Cooney. It is fair to say depending on what material
the vials are made up of.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. But in some cases, some of the
things that could be used to assemble a bomb or an IED would
not be detectable?
Mr. Cooney. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kutz. Mr. Davis, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, some of the things we brought through the
checkpoints were carried on our persons.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Right.
Mr. Kutz. So I think that addresses your point.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. So Mr. Hawley, that is a hole right
now, correct?
Mr. Hawley. Absolutely. An object on a person is something
that needs mitigation.
But the question is overall, if there is a vulnerability
one place, such as a magnetometer, what are you doing elsewhere
to make up for it.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I understand. And some people you do
pull aside and pat down.
Mr. Hawley. Yes.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I understand you have intelligence
and you have everything combined. But it didn't work with the
GAO, I guess that is my question.
Mr. Hawley. Well, there are two ways to improve what we do
in the walk-through. One is the millimeter wave answer, or the
backscatter, which is a technology answer. It has some privacy
issues. Highly effective but very good. The other is the
enhanced pat-down, as the GAO has suggested, which has had some
very significant concerns in the American public. Our officers
are capable of doing it, but those would be the two directions
to go for closing any vulnerability that specifically you
mentioned. Obviously there are other ones in front and behind.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I just want to focus on that,
because I think that is understandable to, at least I
understand it. Do we have any technology that can discern
banned liquids and gels from those that are OK?
Mr. Hawley. Yes.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. And are we working on equipment and
machinery that may be able to detect that?
Mr. Hawley. Yes. We have purchased 200 already and we are
purchasing an additional 400 in fiscal year 2008 should the
appropriations bill go through.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Mr. Kutz, if that were to be in
operation, that would really cut down on the vulnerability,
would it not?
Mr. Kutz. I don't know enough about those machines to tell
you for sure. I would defer to Mr. Hawley, because he knows
what we brought through, so he would be able to answer that
question.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. OK. Do you feel that would
significantly cut down on some of the----
Mr. Hawley. Very, very significantly add to the risk
management.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. If the technology does not exist
today, are we taking a chance by allowing liquids and gels even
in limited amounts aboard a plane at this point, as we look at
it today?
Mr. Hawley. It is a risk management process. And we did
originally ban everything. That was before we understood in
detail all aspects of what the terrorists were planning. We
have shared that with our international partners and have come
to the agreement of all of us, based on intelligence and
science and security issues, that the 3-1-1 is effective.
Because if you ban all liquids, then you are putting a lot more
pressure on the checked baggage system. That can create its own
problems in terms of just even the volume of checked bags.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Getting at Diet Coke or something,
if it is labeled and you buy it inside, it shouldn't be a
problem. Since the limitations on gels and liquids came out of
the U.K. threat last year, what does the U.K. do to address the
threat in terms of screening passengers for liquids and gels?
Mr. Hawley. One of the things is allow one carry-on bag,
not one plus one as we do in the United States. So that was one
thing.
I should say we are in constant communication with the U.K.
on all of these matters. We are of common mind and common
strategy. In fact, we are both buying these advanced x-ray
machines for checkpoint, both working on the millimeter wave
and both developed the 3-1-1.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. In Israel, how do they handle this
threat?
Mr. Hawley. They have a different security process, in that
they have one major international airport. So they have a very
aggressive, I think as you know, the questioning on the up-
front, and if they are doing a pat-down, it is significantly
different from what you get in the United States.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Let me just ask finally, if
mandatory pat-downs were in place, let me ask Mr. Kutz, if
mandatory pat-downs were in place, would you have likely been
caught, at least during the banned substances that were hidden
on the bodies?
Mr. Kutz. I think it depends on the person doing the pat-
down, it depends on the aggressiveness and what parts of the
body are patted down.
Mr. Cooney. With the pat-downs that they have in place
right now, that TSA implements, I believe we would not have
been caught. That has to be changed.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I appreciate it. Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. This testimony is very troubling. I am
wondering whether we have some low expectations here. Mr. Kutz,
you are, I guess for you all to conduct these tests, you know
what procedures are in place?
Mr. Kutz. We use only publicly available information. So to
the extent that it is something we have either observed going
through an airport or see on the Internet, we try not to do our
tests with any insider information.
Mr. Cummings. OK, so you are just like Joe Citizen?
Mr. Kutz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. That might be even worse. What I am saying
is, you were able to--what were your expectations? I guess that
is what I am wondering. Because I hear Mr. Hawley talk about,
and I still don't fully understand it, the combination lock and
the 19 layers. But the bottom line is, this stuff still got on
the plane. Duh. It got on the plane.
Mr. Hawley. It actually did not get on the plane.
Mr. Cummings. It didn't?
Mr. Hawley. In theory, it might have. But in theory, I can
dunk a basketball.
Mr. Kutz. No, it got on the plane. I would disagree with
that. It got on the plane----
Mr. Hawley. Not what you saw on the video.
Mr. Cummings. Excuse me, excuse me, gentlemen. I will come
back to you, Mr. Hawley, because I want to be fair. Did the
items get on the plane that you, when you conducted some tests
and you showed the results of the devices, the kinds of things
that you were able to get on the plane, did those things get on
the plane?
Mr. Kutz. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. OK. And Mr. Hawley, as I listen to your
testimony, you talk about all of these layers. Can you explain
that combination lock thing again to me, because I missed that
one.
Mr. Hawley. You bet. What does it take to do a catastrophic
terrorist act? You have to plan it, you have to procure the
materials necessary to do it, you might communicate with other
conspirators. All of those represent opportunities to stop the
attack if you are tightly lined up with intelligence and law
enforcement.
Then you might have to travel to go to a training camp or
to come to the United States or travel in the United States.
That is an opportunity. Then there is the surveillance. They
are going to have to see what it is they want to do. That is an
opportunity.
Mr. Cummings. I got you. Now, let's fast forward to the
checkpoints.
Mr. Hawley. You bet.
Mr. Cummings. How important are the checkpoints?
Mr. Hawley. Very important.
Mr. Cummings. And would you say that they are the most
important?
Mr. Hawley. No.
Mr. Cummings. OK. So if the security checkpoints, they are
critical, though, is that right?
Mr. Hawley. No, I think that is one of the problems, is
that Americans focus that the whole thing is the checkpoint.
And the security system is a layered security system. Because
if they say the checkpoint is all buttoned down, then the
attack comes through the perimeter, the attack comes in front
of the airport. There is a ManPad attack.
There are thousands of ways to attack. If you put all your
resources at the checkpoint to make that bulletproof, they say
thank you very much and go someplace else to get in. So you
have to secure the entire environment at a basic level and then
you have to upgrade in an unexpected, unpredictable way.
Mr. Cummings. Let me ask you this. All these people are
standing in these long lines, everybody in this room. They are
standing in long lines, thinking that the checkpoints are
critical. Are you telling me that they are not?
Mr. Hawley. I am telling you they are a piece of the
puzzle. And the lines are not extraordinarily long. I would
expect next week we are going to be tested by the largest load
of passengers. I am looking forward to the challenge and our
officers are looking forward to the challenge.
Mr. Cummings. Now, the other layers of security you refer
to deal mostly with intelligence gathering. And certain
individuals making sure that certain individuals don't get to
security checkpoints in the first place. Are you talking about
racial profiling?
Mr. Hawley. No, no, no, no. No, because terrorists use
people who specifically don't ``look like'' terrorists. If you
rely on what you think a terrorist looks like, you are going to
miss them.
Mr. Cummings. Well, I can tell you, Mr. Hawley, it seems
like at the rate we are going, and I really didn't expect the
testimony that you provided us, because it sounds like we are
almost, you are saying that, I think, that you know we can, you
think we can do better, but we are just going to have to tread
water until we get there.
Mr. Hawley. No, no, no. We have to do better every day.
That is why we do all these tests. That is why every test every
day, to improve. But we have to stay ahead of the threat,
because if we just focus on what we saw in the video, yes, we
can guarantee that won't happen.
Mr. Cummings. But doesn't that upset you, that 19 of 19 or
whatever it was could get through and get on the plane?
Mr. Hawley. No. I think that it is instructive and helpful
and is a data point. But as I said, we do 2,500 a day every
day. And we target it to our vulnerabilities. We know what they
are. Those tests allow us then to close the gap. Frankly, some
of the stuff we saw here is not a concern, honestly. There is
some of it that is a concern.
So we focus on the piece that could do serious,
catastrophic damage, take an airplane down. That is what we go
after. We know that if somebody goes up and puts on a flash in
the plane, that is not a good thing, they will be arrested and
other passengers will certainly take it out on them. But we are
not going to put our resources against things that are
scientific demonstrations. We are looking for the terrorists.
The terrorists are very smart. They know what takes a plane
down. That is the enemy we have to stop. We like the coaching
and the information we get from the GAO. Very helpful, good
partner. But it doesn't get to the point of what the terrorists
are doing.
Chairman Waxman. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank
you, Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. At the end of 2005, I asked GAO to
conduct studies and tests of performance at TSA. There are
three types of testing that have gone on. One is the Inspector
General of Homeland Security, TSA test itself and then
independent GAO. I asked GAO because I was made aware, and
again, we are in a deadly, a very deadly game. But you don't
have to be a rocket scientist to figure out that terrorists or
folks who want to take us out are looking for the next level of
vulnerability. We are always putting something in place that
deals with the last incident.
What disturbed me about this 2006 leak, and I don't know
who leaked this, but after you concluded your tests and before
I even got a copy of the test, information was leaked. Mr.
Waxman showed it here. Do you know anyone who leaked this, Mr.
Cooney or Mr. Kutz?
Mr. Kutz. No. No one is aware, and FBI did not do an
investigation based upon yours and the Comptroller General's
request.
Mr. Mica. OK. What disturbed me in that is because this
information was given to me, was to be given to me and I did
learn of the failure. This failure is not new that you just
released in your report, is that correct? This failure is not
new. It mirrors what took place in your last test a year ago,
is that right?
Mr. Kutz. It mirrors it plus the liquid explosive we
mentioned.
Mr. Mica. OK. And one of the reasons I asked you to conduct
a test is because TSA had not conducted those kinds of tests,
is that correct, Mr. Hawley?
Mr. Hawley. We started doing liquid tests in 2006, before
the liquid plot in the U.K.
Mr. Mica. When we met in April of this year, I asked you if
you had done similar tests to what GAO had done. And you had
said, yes. Then you came back and you told me you had to
correct, with the meeting when we had the hand-off to Mr.
Costello and the others, then you came back and you told me no.
You corrected yourself. Which is the case?
Mr. Hawley. Well, the GAO has done a number of different
types of testing. So it gets into the technical----
Mr. Mica. Well, again, the specific type of test that we
saw displayed here. You had done that or you had not done that?
Mr. Hawley. If we are talking about chemicals, yes. If we
are talking about the exact same chemicals, no.
Mr. Mica. You had not?
Mr. Hawley. No.
Mr. Mica. Sort of non-traditional explosives, which I
consider our biggest threat at this time. You were at that
meeting. The other thing that was at the meeting is that they
sort of pooh-poohed, TSA sort of pooh-poohed the results of
that explosion with that material. Is that correct?
Mr. Cooney. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. OK. Have you had that material tested to see if
it would do catastrophic damage?
Mr. Cooney. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. And what were the results?
Mr. Cooney. We have had two independent opinions on that,
and the results are that placed in the appropriate place on an
aircraft, and I can't say where that is at this hearing, that
it could possibly do catastrophic damage.
Mr. Mica. OK. See, I am not out to, Mr. Hawley, I just was
disturbed by again not giving the other side as they took over
all the information. I wish I could talk more about that.
OK, we failed. Now, of course, when I learned this, I would
have been negligent, too, if we didn't do something or Mr.
Hawley didn't do something. And he learned about this back a
year ago. We know what can make up for problems at the
checkpoint. One, we started putting behavior analysis people in
place. We still don't have that done, do we, Mr. Hawley?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, we do, 2,000.
Mr. Mica. At every checkpoint?
Mr. Hawley. The President signed a budget amendment last
week, so we will be able to----
Mr. Mica. But it is not done yet? I am not giving you a
hard time. I just want to say that we learned that.
Mr. Hawley. 600 in place.
Mr. Mica. When you did your tests most recently at the 21
airports, Mr. Hawley, do you know how many of those had our new
protocol?
Mr. Hawley. I do not. In terms of the BDOs? Are you talking
about the BDOs or the 3-1-1?
Mr. Mica. The behavior analysis trained personnel that we
started putting in place after we learned that the technology
in place would not handle this.
Mr. Hawley. We do not know.
Mr. Mica. I want to know. I want to know how many of those
people, that should have been the first thing we did is find
out if what we put in place failed. That is just--I can't
accept that. That is beyond belief that we would not know what
we put in place.
Now, the technology is there also to deal with some of
these non-traditional explosives, is that correct?
Mr. Hawley. That is correct.
Mr. Mica. OK. Could I have an additional minute by
unanimous consent?
Chairman Waxman. Well, if you want to make one last
question, do it. You said nice things about me, so I am going
to give you 1 more minute. [Laughter.]
Mr. Mica. One of the last things, my last question, you
test, Mr. Hawley, your personnel on performance. USA reported
in October statistics that have been publicly made available,
maybe they were classified but they are here. What concerns me
even more, and I have the past performance levels, this seems
to indicate that there is not improvement, in fact, it looks
like we have lost ground in passenger screening.
Mr. Hawley. No. And let's be clear. If you want good
scores, I will deliver you good scores. What we are saying is--
--
Mr. Mica. No, I know we----
Mr. Hawley [continuing]. We are going to take on the
toughest assignment, which is they are bringing improvised
explosive devices in component parts, and we are going to train
and test against that. That is really, really hard. I would
suggest there might be any number of facilities within 10 miles
of here that would have a very difficult time to detect all
these things. We are focused on the toughest, toughest part of
it, we train and test on it. That article was something about
training. There was not data in there about test results.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Mica.
I am confused about one point, just to clarify for the
record. Mr. Cummings asked whether the materials got on the
plane, and as I understand it, Mr. Kutz you said yes and then
Mr. Hawley, you said no. What would be the basis for your
saying that on GAO tests, it didn't get onto the plane?
Mr. Hawley. My understanding is that what was in the video
was not what was brought through the checkpoint. The reason
that is significant is that you would have had to assemble the
bomb past the checkpoint. And there are measures in place
between the checkpoint and the aircraft that would make it more
difficult for somebody to therefore get there. So as I said,
you can get through a piece of it, you can get a piece through
the checkpoint, perhaps. But there are other barriers on the
way. And I just wanted to make clear it was not a completed IED
that went through and got on the aircraft.
Chairman Waxman. Well, we are talking about GAO's--what was
the situation?
Mr. Cooney. Mr. Chairman, we did not, after we got through
the checkpoint, we did not construct the device. We brought all
the components onto the aircraft. That is to say that we could
have constructed it on the aircraft. We could have simply gone
into the lavatory on the aircraft once the plane was airborne
and constructed the device there. So we did bring all the
components onto the aircraft.
Chairman Waxman. It did get onto the plane.
Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a couple
of observations. Mr. Hawley, you had indicated at the beginning
that TSA officers have the best interests of the flying public
in mind and that the flying public should be more, presumably
tolerant of the work that TSA does to protect them. The thing
that kind of concerns me about this panel is that there seems
to be an adversarial relationship TSA and the Government
Accountability Office, where in fact my sense is you have the
same primary objective, and that is to protect the public, and
the flying public in this particular circumstance.
I understand that there are layers of security and that
risk management is not a perfect science, that you have to not
only take into consideration possibility, but also probability.
So when I look over the testimony and this seemingly
adversarial history that exists between TSA and GAO, that
fundamentally raises some questions and concerns, because my
sense is that GAO is not conducting this to embarrass anybody,
but knowing that a security system in its many layers is an
evolving process that takes into consideration information that
may not have been presumed when originally security systems
were put in place, that it has to be flexible, it has to be
elastic, it has to be evolving.
Your thoughts?
Mr. Hawley. I would just like to say, although we
definitely are sparring a little bit today, we have a
surprisingly good relationship in that, the reason I have said
certain things was to have the record be clear. Because I think
it is a key point, the difference between catastrophic failure
and something unsafe on the aircraft. I think we are absolutely
in lockstep in terms where we end up. I think we agree strongly
with GAO's suggestions as to what goes forward. The value they
bring is in some other areas other than the ones that I am
disputing.
So I take it as an indication of our respect and sort of
professional relationship. But it actually is a very good
relationship.
Mr. Higgins. On behalf of the flying public, we want to
encourage you to work together and to continually improve the
security system.
Mr. Kutz. Yes, we do often spar over the facts. But I think
the important part is, as you said, the suggestions we have, if
they consider those seriously and where appropriate, implement
them, that is the most important part at the end of the day and
hopefully that is what they will walk away with from this.
Mr. Higgins. Great. Just a final question, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kutz, you had said that one of the recommendations to TSA
was increased pat-downs. I am just curious, is it a more
comprehensive pat-down per incident, or is it more incidents of
pat-downs that you are recommending?
Mr. Kutz. No, it is actually the pat-down being, if I could
say a little bit more thorough.
Mr. Higgins. Thorough, OK.
Mr. Kutz. Yes.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you very much. That is all, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Higgins.
We are being called to the House floor for a series of
three votes, which ought to bring us back here in a half hour.
So we are going to recess then reconvene to complete the
hearing. So we stand in recess.
[Recess.]
Chairman Waxman. I want to call the hearing back to order.
We will start with Mr. Yarmuth.
Mr. Yarmuth. Let me start by saying I am a little bit
uncomfortable with conversations like these, as I am sure you
are, recognizing on the one hand our obligation to provide
oversight on airport security and also the security of striking
that very delicate balance between trying to make the public
confident that we are doing what we need to be doing, and also
not scaring them to the point where they are afraid to fly.
I remember back in my journalist days, back right after the
9/11 crashes, and I was doing an interview with the director of
the airport in Louisville, and asked him, going through a
number of the measures they were taking, whether these measures
in fact were designed to provide real security or the illusion,
the perception of security. He was quite candid and said, this
is basically to create the perception of security, because
there is a limit to what we can do to provide real security. I
probably won't get any serious disagreement out of you on that.
But with that premise, whether you accept it or not, I
would like to ask a couple of questions, because we all go
through security on a weekly basis. And by the way, I will say
the TSA people in my airport in Louisville are terrific, they
work hard, they are very considerate. I have no complaints
about them. But it seems like a lot of the measures that are
taken don't focus on what you talked about, focusing on the
priorities of not bringing a plane down, but to again create
some kind of an illusion which, when you get behind them, don't
make any sense. This is going to sound a little trivial, but it
is parochial and important to me.
We make Louisville Sluggers at Hillerich and Bradsby in
Louisville. You can go on a tour of the museum there. They sell
souvenir baseball bats. Souvenir baseball bats are about 15
inches long and probably not much bigger around than this
pencil, and you can't take them on a plane.
Now, I will guarantee you, and there is a big display when
you go through the TSA line that you can't bring these little
bats on the plane. Now, I guarantee you, I am carrying, every
time I am on the plane, things that I could do more damage with
than those baseball bats. It seems to me that is one of those
instances in which we focus on things that don't make any
sense, don't provide any security and may in fact, if we are
relying on people who are stressed and have to cover a lot of
people and so forth, we are making them deal with things that
don't make any difference in the final analysis. Would you care
to comment on that, Mr. Hawley?
Mr. Hawley. I think you have raised a number of good
points. Specifically on that one, we are looking right now at
the prohibited items list, and we are doing it in conjunction
with our partners in Canada and the European Union and other
places, so that we can have a common framework. As you know, we
made the decision on scissors and small tools, and recently the
lighters, based on risk management.
So we specifically are looking at the baseball bats as well
as the rest of the prohibited items list, because we have to
stay flexible. Again, I want to get away from the checklist
mentality, where we are just looking to take things away. We
need to look for the person who is bringing a novel threat.
Mr. Yarmuth. And I guess the other question I would have
is, you may have alluded to this earlier, but it seems to me
that in most cases, the greatest protection you would have in
terms of things that go on in the passenger cabin are the other
passengers. And not necessarily things that you would do going
in. Richard Reid was ultimately stopped because it was a
passenger who pointed out that it was unusual that somebody
would try to light his foot on the plane.
Mr. Hawley. I would like to address the charade issue,
because I hear it a lot, I see it on the blogs. We directly
address that in the IED component piece. We can get high scores
on testing, etc. But our officers know in reality what is real
and what is charade. In order to get them prepared and
motivated and switched on to look for the difficult threat,
they have to believe that what we are really doing is security.
So we have really worked hard in the last couple of years
to openly communicate with our work force about the threats.
What we do we do because we believe it is a security matter.
And we do need the support of the Congress and the public when
we do change a security measure, because you can always come up
with a scenario that says I can use X to do Y. And all of it is
risk management. It is very difficult. Any one issue you can
fight over. But you have to fit the whole thing together. I
think it is a pretty complex equation. It is important that we
address these vulnerabilities publicly, so the public knows
that is involved.
Mr. Yarmuth. Along those lines, I am not sure I have ever
heard an announcement from a flight attendant inside a cabin
about, and I know you don't want to make people so
hypersensitive that they will report things that are just
normal behavior, but when you get paranoid people, but that you
need to be alert to what people are doing in the cabin and if
you see any suspicious activity to report it. Has there ever
been any thought to utilizing the crew to actually enlist the
passengers in those precautions?
Mr. Hawley. Well, certainly the crews are enlisted. We
don't make any announcements. Actually you would be surprised,
we probably get two or three a day of disruptive passengers
subdued by other passengers. So I think we all travel at a
heightened state of alert. I am very confident, given the track
record we have, that people doing suspicious activities are in
fact reported.
Mr. Yarmuth. Good. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Westmoreland, I think you are next.
Mr. Westmoreland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hawley, I just want to go back to a couple of things.
One was the point about whether this material that we saw on
the video actually got on the plane or didn't get on the plane.
I think it was Mr. Cooney that said it did get on the plane.
And you said that it may have, but not in a form that could
have caused the damage.
You mentioned that there were some other points, I guess,
between the screening location and where it would have actually
got on the plane. So are we to be under the assumption that
these people would prepare this thing prior to boarding the
plane or once they boarded the plane?
Mr. Hawley. Of course, they could attempt either. From the
checkpoint to the boarding gate, there is a significant amount
of security that is not seen. As you know, we have a
significant number of Federal air marshals flying every day.
They are undercover, they are in airport boarding gates. Part
of their job is when they are not actually on the aircraft to
be patrolling in those areas, on the lookout for this. We know
exactly what can bring a plane down, we know the
characteristics of that chemistry and what you have to do to
mix it properly. So there are some tell-tales that you can pick
up on that would make it very, very difficult for someone to
get away with it.
I think the point Mr. Cooney raised, on the aircraft, in
the restroom, is something that we pay attention to, and
certainly flying air marshals and flying flight crews pay
attention to it. But we look at, we really look across the
board.
Mr. Westmoreland. OK. Let me ask you this. I think that you
mentioned that there has been too much attention, or TSA agents
are having to pay too much attention to carry-on baggage. Just
from experience, in doing quite a bit of flying, there are some
people that carry on everything but the kitchen sink.
Supposedly, it is a one bag carry-on, one carry-on and one
personal item. Would it help if we start enforcing that to
where you could spend more time on the person, on the physical
person, rather than having to go through all these bag checks?
Some people get in line, they have five of the gray trays and
then some other stuff going through. When can we have some
enforcement of that, where you are kind of given a little more
flexibility in looking at that individual?
Mr. Hawley. It is a shared responsibility with the
airlines. We looked at this during the liquid plot with the
U.K. They went to one bag, we did not. Our concern and my
concern was, you get a duffel bag and toss your two or however
many it is in there and zip it up and say, voila, here is my
one bag. Then that gets, that is too congested for us really to
give an easy look. So you have to do a bag check and then that
is a nightmare.
So it really is, that is why I say partnering with the
public, that we have to fight through 10 million images a day,
and the extent to which the public can make them less
cluttered, it gives terrorists less room to hide and it speeds
the process.
Mr. Westmoreland. So you don't think that would be an
alternative in trying to get the airlines to more enforce what
they are doing?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, I would focus on the weight. I think the
weight is a bigger problem than the number. Because we injure
our folks sometimes when picking up a bag and it is way too
heavy. But we have to operate in the world that exists and not
unduly do commerce. Our challenge is it is our job to find the
bomb part, no matter what is thrown at us. And that is what we
hold our officers to.
Mr. Westmoreland. And I know that you are probably going
through all the training and trying to get everybody through
the training. I know that Mr. Mica had mentioned the behavioral
interviewing or whatever. I am sure that is a much more
difficult process or more training that you have to send
somebody through, and they probably have to have a certain
tendency to be able to do that.
But it does concern me that these tests were run in several
airports, and you, or the TSA doesn't seem to know if this
behavioral part was there, and if it did any good or whatever.
I don't know how much information you have shared back and
forth about the test and the airports and who it was. But I
would like for you to comment on that if you would.
Mr. Hawley. Yes, it is a key point. Part of the protocol,
and I respect the protocol, is they don't give us advance
notice. So we don't know when they are coming, and whether they
know it, the BDOs or not. We in fact are working on tests of
what we call the behavior detection officers. It is, we are
finding it is difficult to simulate the actual stress of
somebody with hostile intent. So we are working with other
countries who have capability there, as well as with our
research arm at the Department, to get the scientific data that
will say how good our officers are, just on the behavior.
Mr. Westmoreland. Mr. Hawley, I want to thank you for the
job that you are trying to do with TSA. I know it is a big, big
undertaking. I appreciate your coming here today. I know it was
probably similar to having a root canal. But I do want to thank
you for that.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Westmoreland.
Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for holding this
hearing.
Mr. Hawley, I wouldn't want your job. I want to say that up
front. I think it is one of the most difficult jobs. I think it
is a no-win job. But I was uncomfortable with the morning part
of this hearing, because I felt like we were making, giving us
the sense that we have 19 points, so they got through 1, and
that is not good, but don't lose sleep over it. And I am losing
sleep over it, and I don't have your job.
Mr. Kutz, my understanding is you attempted 21 times to
bring in explosive devices. Is that correct?
Mr. Kutz. It was 21 times in 2006 and 19 in 2007.
Mr. Shays. Now, of the 21 times, how many got through?
Mr. Kutz. I can't discuss that specifically. That is
considered sensitive security information.
Mr. Shays. Did a majority get in?
Mr. Kutz. I am not supposed to--I can say we got through.
Chairman Waxman. If Mr. Shays would yield to me, Mr. Davis
and I have had a briefing with the intel people and we didn't
think it was productive to get into any kind of numbers.
Mr. Hawley. I could offer that the numbers are not
necessary to get the learning from it. And I think we derive a
significant amount of learning. So we would stipulate that
there are learnings to be had regardless of the numbers.
Mr. Shays. OK. I am going to go under the assumption, then,
because I don't know, that a majority got through. And given
that, I would like to ask this question. Mr. Kutz, if you had
attempted 19 times, 21 times and 19 times to get through and
none of them got through, would you have still written the
report and would we have been able to say to Mr. Hawley, this
is pretty fantastic. Or if you had had a total failure, would
there have been no report?
Mr. Kutz. We always write the results of our work. That is
part of our protocols. We always go through the same briefings.
We gave them all the details of where we went, what we did,
several detailed briefings. We always report externally the
results.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Hawley, I was troubled by your comment that
none of the weapons grade material, or the bombs got in because
they weren't assembled. It seems to me like that is a lawyer
talking instead of the fact that GAO was able to get this
weapon grade material through, they were able to get the
detonation through. And is that not correct, they were able to
get it through and get it on the plane, is that not correct,
Mr. Hawley?
Mr. Hawley. You have to ask them as to what they actually
did.
Mr. Shays. What got on the plane? Did you stop----
Mr. Kutz. The devices we described, the detonator, the
liquid explosive and the incendiary device components.
Mr. Shays. And everything you showed us on the film was
what you got on? There is not two different examples? You
didn't have a bigger explosive on the TV screen. What you got
through was what you detonated or similar?
Mr. Kutz. Similar, correct.
Mr. Shays. OK. What would have been involved with
assembling the weapon, the bomb?
Mr. Cooney. We practiced assembling the weapon. It took
approximately 12 to 15 minutes to put it together once.
Mr. Shays. So that is a pretty long time. If you were to
take that, if someone was sitting next to you, that would be a
pretty difficult thing to assemble in front of someone,
correct?
Mr. Cooney. If we were on a plane, we wouldn't assemble it
in our seats. We would assemble it in another area of the
plane.
Mr. Shays. OK. Let's just say you went to the restroom.
Would you have had to carry a case into the restroom?
Mr. Cooney. I can't go into that, Congressman, based on the
confidentiality and the classification of the report. I will be
happy to discuss that with you in a closed session.
Mr. Shays. I guess what I want to know is, would it have
been noticeable to a flight attendant or someone else that
someone was having to carry on something that was noticeable,
or would it have been able to have been disguised?
Mr. Cooney. It would have been disguised.
Mr. Shays. So Mr. Hawley, why should I take any solace in
the fact that you say, well, they weren't taken on the plane
because they weren't assembled? Why is that meaningful?
Mr. Hawley. Thank you for asking the question. This is not
an exact analogy, but it is like bringing the watch parts
through and then saying, I am going to assemble it----
Mr. Shays. Bringing the what part through?
Mr. Hawley. A watch, you know, I have my watch and I bring
watch parts through. It is very sophisticated chemistry to get
the right everything, as well as certain matters of assembly.
There are some telltale indicators when one is doing that, and
it is not trivial to assemble one of these things so that they
work. You have to ask yourself that, given the Richard Reid
issue, there is a certain bar of effectiveness that they would
want to do before they would expose themselves to discovery.
And that bar is reasonably high.
Mr. Shays. OK. Well, I will just end by saying, it is
unsettling to think that so much explosive device could get
through. And I make an assumption that a good amount did get
through. I would like to have thought that maybe 1 out of 19 or
1 out of 21 would have been the number. So I wish you well and
I hope that we are doing everything that we can to help you
succeed, Mr. Hawley.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding this bipartisan hearing. I think it is doing us a lot
of good to at least make sure the American public understands
the need for ongoing improvement.
I think maybe, Administrator, the kindest way to start this
off is with something that will be good for the public. I had
this shown to you earlier, and it is entitled deluxe 16-piece
carry-on kit. For the record, if someone goes and buys one of
these kits where they can get little teeny amounts of what they
need to travel that may not otherwise be available or may cost
a lot of money to buy, are they allowed to use that?
Mr. Hawley. Pretty much yes, assuming it has a zip top bag
under there, which I believe it does.
Mr. Issa. Right, but the individual bottles themselves?
Mr. Hawley. Yes.
Mr. Issa. And I would hope that after today's hearing,
universally, TSA people who don't get it, who routinely I have
seen, because I travel every single week, twice a week, I have
seen them turn people away with, oh, there is no marking on
that. They do not seem to understand that, while these are
being sold, and while in many cases the only way, and I don't
want to sound sexist, but for a woman to have a multitude of
different, small items, make-up needs, and carry it on, they
need to have that, particularly if you look at what is often in
a purse. I see a lot of grinning by the men and women behind
you. But I think it is important that when we say we care about
commerce and we care about the traveler, that there be a
uniform understanding that this doesn't have to be the answer,
which is everything I took from the last hotel I stayed in.
[Laughter.]
It was 2 days worth, I didn't take any more than my share.
But I think it is important, because my line of questioning
will not be on security. And it won't be on security because
one, I spent time in the military, in EOD, and I am going to
predict that 20 years from now you are still going to be
playing cat and mouse. We were playing cat and mouse with the
STFs in the 1970's. I don't think it is going to change.
Having said that, I am going to ask you a question, which
is, given that we continue to fund you at the levels you
request and that you continue to ask for bucks for Buck Rogers
type innovation, do you believe that you will reasonably be
able to stay ahead of these ever-moving and improving target
characteristics?
Mr. Hawley. I do, but it won't be through Buck Rogers
technology. I think we have to have technology that is
reliable, that is sophisticated, that is affordable. But
getting on the cutting edge of technology I think is expensive,
not reliable, and can usually be engineered around. So we will
always have the human factor, and I take your point about
generational conflict and that this is a long-term thing. When
we do something, they are going to react to get around it.
Therefore, for our technology purchases, you will see fewer
purchases of those big trace portals and more purchases of
portable liquid explosive detectors, portable explosive
detectors that we are in fact using even with some of our
foreign partners. So the flexible mix of technology and the
business process where our officers and all of our folks,
including Federal air marshals, can continue to adapt and not
give the enemy a stationary target, I think that is the
critical thing and I don't think, we are not going to have a
silver bullet.
Mr. Issa. Because you kind of led into this, you are going
to be a labor-intensive industry for a while, for the
foreseeable future, that technology per se is not going to
eliminate the need for the men and women in uniform who handle
the luggage, look through it, or who, out of uniform, plain
clothes, who observe after you go through the primary
checkpoint. Then can I ask for something very straightforward
in this hearing? Because this is the Oversight and Government
Reform Committee. I travel throughout Europe and the Middle
East, but usually go through Europe commercially on my way to
the Middle East.
For some reason, the Europeans have figured out that to
have a TSA-equivalent person shuttling little gray trays back
and forth is a huge waste of a trained individual. I travel
through Dulles, I travel through San Diego, Sacramento, a
number of other airports. They all vary, but none of them
reached level of moving the trays from where they get left off
back to the other without human intervention, meaning that in
every one of your airports, you have somebody like the
uniformed person behind you who is doing a task that requires
absolutely no training, absolutely no expertise, for which we
are paying for training and expertise. I would hope that you
would commit to us to make the dollars available to automate
the trays or the equivalent, so that we not waste valuable
Government employees on something that, quite frankly, anybody
can do and no one should have to do in this automated day and
age.
Mr. Hawley. Yes, that is the perfect use of technology to
make it more efficient. I totally agree.
Mr. Issa. Thank you . I will end on that high note, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Issa.
Mr. Kutz, last year, GAO conducted a similar undercover
operation and managed to get liquid explosives past security
checkpoints in all 21 airports you tested. In February 2006,
when GAO completed its investigation, there wasn't a public
hearing such as we are having today. Instead, GAO privately
briefed TSA officials, including Mr. Hawley, on its results.
Mr. Kutz, in your February 2006 briefing with Mr. Hawley,
did you warn him about the vulnerabilities your test had
exposed?
Mr. Kutz. The February 2006 briefing, we did not have
liquid explosives on the 2006 testing. It was the other two
devices, the incendiary and the IED detonator we showed today.
The liquid explosives were on the work we did for your
committee as part of the 2007. So we did not do that. They were
certainly aware, as Mr. Hawley said, that liquid explosives are
a significant risk here. And that was one of the reasons, I
think, that we attempted to do that as part of our second test
for your committee.
Chairman Waxman. But you did brief him on what you had
found in your investigation?
Mr. Kutz. In 2006, that is correct. Yes.
Chairman Waxman. And following your briefing to TSA, did
TSA change its policies or procedures to fix the gap in
security that your tests highlighted?
Mr. Kutz. I don't think any procedures were changed. What
they represented to us, that people were alerted to what we did
and there was additional training. That is what we understood
happened after the last report.
Chairman Waxman. Instead, Homeland Security Department
officials made statements to the press criticizing the GAO
investigation, stating that they were a bit far-fetched. Mr.
Hawley, you were quoted in an NBC story as saying, TSA wasn't
interested in materials that would set off an interesting
firework display in an aircraft but can't bring the plane down.
Mr. Kutz, do you think the substances that GAO smuggled in
were nothing more than fireworks, as Mr. Hawley had suggested?
Mr. Kutz. I would go back to the video that we showed, the
first video of the automobile trunk and the floor of the
automobile being blown out, that was the item we brought on in
2006. And the incendiary device that was the intense heat
burning was the other device we brought on. Whether they would
bring down an aircraft or not, I don't know. But they would
certainly threaten the passengers and could cause serious
damage.
Chairman Waxman. Do you think that they were minimizing the
true dangers with that statement?
Mr. Kutz. To call it a science experiment or something, I
think that trivializes it, yes.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Hawley, you appear to think that these
GAO tests are insignificant. You say that you are only focused
on the serious threats. We all just saw the video of the
explosions and that is a serious threat.
In this morning's Washington Post, this is what TSA says:
``There is nothing in the report that is news to us.'' Last
year, you failed to prevent explosives from getting onto
airplanes, you promised to improve your performance. But now we
learn that GAO was again able to bring explosive materials onto
planes.
The problem is that the news is the same, it is not getting
better. And that is unacceptable, you are failing. Here is what
else TSA said: ``We don't change security procedures in knee-
jerk fashion.'' GAO's first report was issued in February 2006.
That was 19 months ago. I want to know what you are going to
change now, so that we are not here next year facing exactly
the same situation.
Mr. Hawley. I appreciate the question. The answer is that
all this training I was talking about in terms of the
checkpoint drills that we now do throughout the system every
day, that is added. I believe that is probably the best thing
that we can do at this point, is actually from our own covert
testing, which drills down into the specifics of the
vulnerability, that was identified and they recommended this.
We followed the recommendations of our covert testers.
I think the technical issues about what the GAO tested are
a separate debate, and we probably don't completely agree on
it. However, the results of it I take. I think it is a valuable
lesson to learn, and the issue of explosives or homemade
chemicals, whether they work or don't work. We have to be alert
to it. I should also say, as I said in my opening, that I
identified and TSA identified those vulnerabilities in 2005. So
we know what the vulnerabilities are. As I laid out, we have
put in place quite a few measures, and I think I have provided
the committee with that, that are directed at improvement.
And have we closed the vulnerability? No. But we do 2
million passengers a day and 38 tests over 3 months is probably
not statistically significant. It is directionally significant
and I think we have to take it as valuable input. But it is not
something on which the public should panic or should be
concerned about the overall system. These are known
vulnerabilities. The GAO is helping us in terms of addressing
them and that is really what the story is.
Chairman Waxman. Last year, you said you were going to do
more training of personnel as well. I guess the point I want to
drive home is that we are going to ask for this GAO report
again next year, and you are on notice. We don't want to have
to hold a hearing where we get a report that GAO came in and
gave us a very discouraging picture. We don't want TSA to
minimize it, we don't want to scare people but I don't want you
to minimize it. I think you should take this one seriously, and
I didn't feel that you took the first one as seriously as you
should.
So I hope that we can continue to talk about all the
efforts that are going to be made to assure the public in
reality that as many of the vulnerabilities as we face are
going to be reduced and that we are going to get safer and
safer in our transportation.
Mr. Hawley. I can assure you that everybody at TSA has no
question about the seriousness of which I take IED penetration
drills and the significance of this. So yes, sir.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you.
Mr. Davis, any further comments?
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I just have a couple. I want to
clarify a point that was talked about earlier. Mr. Hawley, as
you understand it, and then I will ask Mr. Cooney and Mr. Kutz
to comment, was what the GAO got past security the same
elements that were in the video played earlier? What is your
understanding?
Mr. Hawley. My understanding was that they were in fact
different.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. OK. Mr. Cooney, Mr. Kutz.
Mr. Cooney. They were the same as in the video.
Mr. Kutz. Yes, Mr. Cooney is one of the ones that actually
did the testing. So he has first-hand knowledge of what was
brought onto the plane, because he is one of he ones that had
it in his bags and on his person.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. OK.
Mr. Hawley. I think the issue, it is not a trivial issue
that in the sense as we evaluate the layers of security, if in
fact what you brought to the checkpoint was able to blow up a
plane, that is one thing. And if you have to----
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Well, they never said it was able to
blow the plane up. They could obviously cause damage, right?
But there is no allegation here that it would blow the plane
up?
Mr. Cooney. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Hawley. So I think I would just stand with----
Mr. Davis of Virginia. You could open up the door, the
emergency door of the plane and do damage as well. I think they
were very careful not to make the allegation it would blow it
up.
Mr. Hawley. The key point for the public is that we are in
agreement on the need to continue to close down vulnerabilities
everywhere in the system. I think the differentiation is,
because of the distinctive nature of the video, people say, oh,
my goodness, this could happen to my plane. And the situation,
that is not what is actually portrayed in this data. The data
points out and recognizes vulnerabilities that we recognize
exist, they discover they exist. And we all agree they need to
be closed.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. TSA has recognized the threat of
explosive bomb components being brought on board in carry-on
bags some time ago. You spent millions of dollars funding the
development of a high quality auto explosive detection system
to meet the threat, a technology that is successfully used to
screen checked baggage, is that correct?
Mr. Hawley. And now recently carry-on baggage.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. OK. What has your agency done to
advance this technology at a passenger screening checkpoint?
Mr. Hawley. The science and technology division of DHS does
the R&D for the Department. My understanding is they put
something close to $1 billion of investment into the IED
research and development area. The key point for us is the R&D
discoveries in the next short period of time aren't immediately
deployable. Our job is to use what is available today to limit
the gaps until future technology is developed.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. So you are using AT machines today
as opposed to the EDS? Or could you use both?
Mr. Hawley. We use both. There is the old-fashioned x-ray,
which is a single source----
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Right, AT machines, as I understand
it, don't provide a 360 degree view.
Mr. Hawley. No, but they can get pretty close.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. And they don't provide a 3-D image
for the screeners to view the baggage?
Mr. Hawley. That is correct as far as I know.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. But they do provide a cheaper price?
Mr. Hawley. Exactly. And we can deploy them extraordinarily
widely. And they have very low maintenance. So that is a
factor.
I think a mix is important. The auto EDS, as they call it,
very excellent technology. We are buying 20 more, I hope, in
2008. But if we can get 500 of the ATs out, that covers a lot
of ground and is upgradable over time with better software. So
I think that is a good business decision.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. For 2007, the President initially
requested $80.52 million for emerging technologies, is my
understanding. In addition, he requested $25 million for
checkpoint explosives detection equipment and pilot screening
technologies in the emergency supplemental, for a total of $105
million for emerging technologies in 2007. Congress provided
the requested funds, but the agency still only spent $50
million on the emerging technology, checkpoint technologies.
Mr. Hawley. Those numbers don't match what I have in my
head. I clearly can go back and reconcile those.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I guess the question is, we have
provided close to $105 million, my understanding is it has not
all been spent. I guess what we would like to know from a
committee perspective is, what hasn't been spent, why not, what
is in the pipeline, just so----
Mr. Hawley. I will have to get back to you on what has been
spent. We have asked for $136 million in checkpoint
technologies. It is perhaps a different category than what you
are talking about. But we have significantly spent in that
area. We used up to buy the 250 AT machines, I believe what we
had in 2007. I will have to confirm those numbers. But we have
continued to request significant additional funds in 2008.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. The last thing I would ask you is,
how are we in coordination with other nations at this point?
Some of them have, many of them are not as strict as we are.
But they are subject to the same kind of vulnerabilities that
we are.
Mr. Hawley. Yes.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. How is that coordination?
Mr. Hawley. I think that is absolutely critical. Because if
we get our U.S. domestic secure and somebody is able to board a
flight overseas and hijack it or blow it up, that is the same
result. So we depend on our international partners. We have
created a new group at TSA that does this global strategy. We
moved our head of intel, intelligence, to the head of that, so
that he would have the credibility with other nations in
discussing security matters, for instance, on shoes. We feel
very strongly about shoe screening and working with our
partners to do shoe screening is something that is not popular,
but we think is effective from a security point of view.
So I think over the next 5 years and beyond, the degree to
which U.S. security measures tie in with our international
partners is a big opportunity and important.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Well, no question. But I guess my
question is, how is that partnership?
Mr. Hawley. That is it.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Are they all responding? Are we
having some that are balking a little bit at it?
Mr. Hawley. We have extraordinary cooperation with our
neighbors to the north and south, Canada and Mexico. The
European Union, clearly the U.K. we are very close with. I have
just returned from working with some of our Asian partners. I
expect that closes the loop.
The big opportunities are in Africa and South America.
There are a lot of governments there that want to do first-rate
security. Our job is to give them the training in something
that is accessible. We can't give them million dollar pieces of
equipment and say we want you to deploy this. We have to find
things that are less expensive but do provide security value
that can in fact be deployed around the world.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
I want to thank the three of you for your presentations to
us, and the GAO for your excellent work. We hope that next
year, when we look at a GAO report we are going to see a lot of
improvement and we will have better news. Because at this time
of year, people want the good news and their anxieties eased.
There are too many vulnerabilities. And we want those
vulnerabilities fixed.
Thank you very much. The committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[The prepared statements of Hon. Diane E. Watson and Hon.
Bill Sali follow:]
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