[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-126]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST AND STATUS OF SPACE ACTIVITIES
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 5, 2008
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
RICK LARSEN, Washington MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
JIM COOPER, Tennessee MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
Bob DeGrasse, Professional Staff Member
Rudy Barnes, Professional Staff Member
Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
Zach Steacy, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2008
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 5, 2008, Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense
Authorization Act--Budget Request and Status of Space
Activities..................................................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 5, 2008......................................... 17
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 2008
FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST AND
STATUS OF SPACE ACTIVITIES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Everett, Hon. Terry, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking
Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee.......................... 4
Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., a Representative from California,
Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee........................ 1
WITNESSES
Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command,
U.S. Air Force................................................. 5
Large, Hon. Scott, Director, National Reconnaissance Office...... 8
Payton, Hon. Gary E., Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for
Space Programs................................................. 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Kehler, Gen. C. Robert....................................... 21
Large, Hon. Scott............................................ 61
Payton, Hon. Gary E.......................................... 47
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Mr. Everett.................................................. 94
Ms. Tauscher................................................. 79
FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST AND
STATUS OF SPACE ACTIVITIES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 5, 2008.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:02 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ellen Tauscher
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Ms. Tauscher. The hearing will come to order.
The Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets this afternoon to
receive testimony on national security space activities from
General Robert Kehler, the Commander of Air Force Space
Command; Mr. Gary Payton, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air
Force for Space Programs; and Mr. Scott Large, the Director of
the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).
I want to thank each one of our very distinguished
witnesses for being here today.
This hearing is an important opportunity for the
subcommittee to consider the posture of our Nation's space
assets, their importance to our warfighters, and to reflect on
the fragility of our space systems.
I want to warn everybody this is a long statement--not warn
them, because it is not an important statement--but we are at a
time now when we believe on the subcommittee, and in the
Congress generally, that space is one of the most important
issues that we need to be looking at, and understanding, and
have oversight for.
I want to congratulate my colleague, Mr. Everett, my
Ranking Member, for all of his work over the many years on
space; and to make it clear that one of the reasons why this is
going to be a long statement is that we really want to
highlight the work that is done, not only by our fabulous men
and women in uniform, but by the amazing cadre of civilians
that have done this work quietly, without a lot of fanfare,
without a lot of attention, for decades.
So, as I was saying, we want to reflect on the fragility of
our space systems. This fragility was highlighted recently by
the failure of an experimental NRO satellite early in its
mission, and by the President's decision to destroy that
satellite before it reentered the atmosphere with 1,000 pounds
of frozen hydrazine fuel in a titanium tank.
By successfully intercepting the failed satellite about 130
miles above the Earth's surface--just above the upper edge of
the atmosphere--our Nation took responsibility for eliminating
a risk to human populations that we, ourselves created. At the
same time, the United States executed the intercept consistent
with international norms discouraging creation of dangerous
space debris; the vast majority of debris created by the
intercept has already reentered the Earth's atmosphere, or will
reenter in the coming days and weeks, and disintegrate.
I also applaud the open and transparent manner in which our
military leadership has explained and executed this mission. I
know that each of our witnesses today played a key role in this
effort, and each of you, as well as your whole team, should be
commended for a job very, very well done.
The recent U.S. intercept stands in sharp contrast to the
secretive anti-satellite (ASAT) test that the Chinese performed
a year ago, last January. Without alerting other spacefaring
nations, as required by international norms, they destroyed one
of their own aging weather satellites over 500 miles above the
Earth's surface, creating a debris field with thousands of
lethal objects that will remain in low earth orbit (LEO) and
threaten satellites, the Space Shuttle, and the International
Space Station for decades to come.
As a Nation critically dependent on space, I would like to
ask our witnesses today to address the following question
concerning our space posture: If our space assets are attacked,
do we have the appropriate contingency plans for closing the
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) gaps that
our warfighters would experience?
Last year, testifying as commander of United States
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), General James Cartwright, who
is currently Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),
commented that not every problem in space requires a solution
in space. He went on to express concern about a possible arms
race in space.
Last week, we received testimony from Assistant Secretary
of Defense Michael Vickers who stated, ``DOD seeks to promote
compliance with existing legal regimes, acceptance of
international debris mitigation guidelines, and development of
additional voluntary guidelines for safe and responsible space
operations.''
In this context, I would also like to hear what each of our
witnesses thinks about the merits and drawbacks of establishing
additional international rules of the road to govern operations
in space.
Let me be clear: I want to make sure that my subcommittee,
as well as the Department of Defense (DOD), is doing everything
we can to ensure that our warfighters retain the advantage of
space-based systems and that this advantage is not degraded by
the Chinese test or any future attacks.
But we must be prepared for more than just the possibility
of a direct ascent ASAT. Future attacks may come from a ground-
based laser or electronic jammers. An enemy might directly
attack the ground-based components used by satellites, or an
adversary may use cyberspace to attack vulnerabilities in our
satellite systems.
One of the most basic requirements for protecting our
satellites, which I am concerned does not receive sufficient
attention, is to know their current status and to understand
the threats they face. Space Situational Awareness (SSA), as it
is known, has not always received the attention it deserves in
competition with the desire to field new space systems with
improved capabilities.
It was with this concern in mind that our subcommittee
advocated for and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
for Fiscal Year 2008 directed the development of a national
space protection strategy. The Secretary of Defense, in
conjunction with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI),
must prepare a strategy focused primarily on protection and
space situational awareness requirements by July of this year.
Today, I would like to ask our witnesses to discuss the
Administration's progress toward establishing a space
protection strategy and, just as importantly, to address this
question: Do you think we have struck the right balance in the
fiscal year 2009 budget between investing in new systems and
efforts to improve Space Situational Awareness?
With an aging generation of systems on-orbit, the national
security space community has been struggling to develop and
field new systems for the past decade. In that regard, I know
our witnesses must be proud of the payloads that were
successfully delivered on-orbit this past year, including the
last Defense Support Program satellite, the first Wideband
Global SATCOM Satellite, and two additional Global Positioning
System (GPS) birds.
And I want to congratulate each of our witnesses, today, on
the 56th consecutive successful launch of a medium or heavy
payload that took place on December 10th last year, launching
into orbit a satellite developed by the NRO.
Yet, as we well know, even with these successes, we face
potential gaps in key satellite capabilities during the next
decade. Many of the replacement systems, such as Spaced Based
Infrared System (SBIRS), the Defense Support System (DSP)
replacement, have been plagued by inaccurate cost estimates and
optimistic predictions of technical maturity.
More generally, I am concerned that the space acquisition
system is fundamentally broken and would ask our witnesses to
discuss what is being done to fix the process. In particular,
how can we be confident that the back-to-basics strategy that
you have adopted will result in better acquisition outcomes?
I am well aware of the benefits space-based assets provide
to the warfighter, and I am committed to maintaining these
capabilities without any gaps. Over the past few years,
Congress has slowed the development of selected systems through
the budget process due to concerns about the pace of these new
programs and the emphasis on transformational systems designed
to skip a technological generation.
While the Administration adopted the back-to-basics
approach partly in response to congressional concerns, this
year we are concerned that you may well have overcorrected by
delaying fielding of the transformational communications
satellite (TSAT) by at least two years. TSAT will be required
to provide the necessary bandwidth to support protected
communications on the move for systems, such as the Army's
Future Combat System (FCS). We hope that our witnesses today
can help us understand why $4 billion previously designated for
TSAT was removed from the five-year defense plan.
While we have many questions, I want to assure you that the
Congress is committed to working with the Department and the
intelligence community (IC) to put our national security space
programs on an affordable, sustainable track; one which
accounts for the change in the threat environment and will
protect our warfighters and the American people.
Before we proceed, I would like to remind my colleagues and
the witnesses that we are in open session and to take care to
keep our questions and your answers unclassified.
With that, I would like to thank the witnesses again for
being here today, and I look forward to your testimony.
Now, let me recognize my very good friend and colleague,
Mr. Everett of Alabama, the Ranking Member of this
subcommittee, for any comments that he might have.
Mr. Everett, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. TERRY EVERETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA,
RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Everett. Thank you, Chairman Tauscher.
I also want to extend a warm welcome to our witnesses for
appearing before us today.
Welcome back, General Kehler, and congratulations on your
new position.
I am privileged to welcome Mr. Payton and Mr. Large in your
first appearances before the subcommittee.
Let me start out by congratulating our witnesses for their
successful interception of a disabled NRO satellite last week.
This mission was not one you had envisioned or had much time to
prepare for, yet you did a great job, and you safeguarded the
public from potential harm. I commend the transparent manner in
which these plans were executed.
This will continue to be a challenging budget year. We have
immense budget pressures and competing defense priorities.
However, I cannot stress the point enough that our modern
military force is dependent on space, and our investment in
space cannot be shortchanged.
A case in point--the chairman mentioned this--TSAT is the
only STRATCOM system planned to provide wideband-protected
communications. Over the next few years, over 200 Army-Marine
units will be reliant on unprotected communications, as will
the Army's Future Combat System brigades once they come online.
Each Predator, Reefer, Warrior, Global Hawk unmanned
aircraft system (UAS) fielded by the services will be
unprotected communications. These forces are the most
susceptible to jamming, yet the Department has chosen to cut $4
billion from TSAT. I do not want to take anything away from
Wideband Global Satellite (WGS), it is a great capability, but
I do want to know why protected communications is not a
priority requirement.
I understand that the Department is revisiting this. I
would ask you to come back and brief this committee once your
analysis is complete.
We are now a year away from the Chinese ASAT test. Last
year, this committee asked for a comprehensive space protection
strategy to guide the investments. This year's budget should be
the Department's first opportunity to make changes in the Space
Situational Awareness and space protection budgets. I hope you
can discuss efforts in this area.
In addition to capability investments, I also remain
concerned about how our military would operate in a space
threat environment. For instance, do war games and exercises
include space denial, and has there been a deliberate hard look
at our war plans?
General Kehler, as you had mentioned last year, if you take
away space from the fight, the impact on our forces is a
reverse time machine.
Under the chairman's leadership, our committee has
continued its strong oversight of space acquisition. I
appreciate your assessment of current state-of-space
acquisition, and the status of some key programs in this year's
budget--GPS III, SBIRS, Space Radar (SR), and Operationally
Responsive Space (ORS).
Before closing, I want to thank you again for your service
and leadership in the space community. I think space--in
particular national security space--is one of the most exciting
things this Nation and this Congress does.
I thank you, Chairman. This is an extremely important
budget year and hearing to have. So thank you for calling the
hearing, and for your leadership.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Everett, very much.
General Kehler, Commander of the Air Force Space Command,
welcome; and we appreciate the fact that you have an extensive
and comprehensive statement you have submitted for the record.
If you could summarize that, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
SPACE COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Kehler. Madam Chairwoman, thank you very, very
much. Congressman Everett. Members of the subcommittee.
Yes, I have appeared before this subcommittee before, a
year or so ago, but this is the first time as the commander of
really magnificent 39,000-plus men and women who are active-
duty airmen. They are guardsmen, they are reservists, they are
government civilians, and they are contractors, and they are
doing a spectacular job. And I am very, very proud to be
associated with them.
So thanks so much for inviting us here today, and thank you
for the subcommittee's support of this subject.
Madam Chairwoman, I think you have summarized it very well,
and I am not going to say anything more in terms of an opening
statement, other than to completely agree with you.
Space is a very, very important place for the United States
military, for the national security apparatus, and for the
United States of America in general. There is no question that
space is an important place for us militarily, economically,
and it has really been woven now into the social fabric of how
we all conduct our daily lives; something that should not be
lost on any of us as we think about the potential of space as a
contested environment in some future conflict.
We believe that the evidence is clear. What we observe
today with many, many actors around the world shows to us that
there are those determined adversaries out there who will seek
to remove the advantages that the United States has with its
space capabilities in some future conflict.
We do not just see that in evidence through the Chinese
ASAT test of a little over a year ago, but as you pointed out,
we have seen jamming all the way back to Saddam Hussein
attempting to jam GPS. We have seen the proliferation of
jammers for GPS and other communications signals. We know that
the jamming activity will be there in a future conflict, just
as they have already been in a past conflict.
We have seen the demonstration, in some cases the
development, of other potentially troubling anti-satellite kind
of things, as well; ground-based things that we have seen, in
terms of laser development and other activities, that could
serve to blind our assets or otherwise disrupt those, as well
as some of the things that we have now seen in evidence with
the Chinese kinetic anti-satellite test. These are not
necessarily new threats, and certainly the Chinese test, while
very troubling, was not a surprise.
So the question now becomes: If this is going to be a
contested domain, what do we do about that? And that was the
first of the questions that you posed. Do we have gaps? And I
would answer, quite frankly, in some cases, we do. We know that
there are some of our assets today that are more susceptible to
some of these threats than others.
In some cases, our space assets are very well protected
today, because we knew during the Cold War that we would face
the same kind of a determined adversary--saw the same kind of
evidence out of that adversary--and so we prepared ourselves,
in some cases, to deal with that kind of an adversary. And the
result of that preparation are systems that are on-orbit today
that are quite effective against some of the threats that we
see developing.
In other cases, that is not true, and we will need to
address those. In some cases, we have done that
programmatically; and so programs like GPS III, programs like
Advanced Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA), Advanced Extremely
High Frequency (AEHF), and some of the other activities that we
have ongoing are designed to try to deal with some of these
threats.
The number one concern that we have is to improve our Space
Situational Awareness, and that you will see--although those
are not large budget dollars when you consider the overall
scope of the budget, in fact--has had a budget increase from
fiscal 2008, the budget that you enacted; to the request that
we have sitting before you today.
My opinion about Space Situational Awareness is that
perhaps the most effective use of the money that we can have
this year is to make better use of the sensors that we have.
And so you will see a request for some improvement in things
that do not sound, on the surface, to be very compelling or
appealing, but we think will go a long way toward helping us
improve our SSA early on.
Thank you for your comment about the very large joint team
that conducted the successful intercept. I will tell you the
lesson that I took away from that was the value of high-quality
Space Situational Awareness because, if you have high-quality
Space Situational Awareness and high-quality space
surveillance, we can begin to characterize--in this case, we
were able to characterize with very high precision--what was
actually going on with an object in space, what it looked like
in terms of tumble, et cetera; all things that would be
important for us in the future as we look at understanding what
is happening to us in space, discriminating whether or not it
is a natural event that we have just experienced or a
determined attack, and being able to attribute those kinds of
differences. All of those are important to us.
And so let me just conclude by, again, thanking you. We
look forward to the rest of your questions. I certainly look
forward to your questions. I will not try and go down that
entire list right now, but you certainly have whet our
appetites for a further dialogue.
[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in
the Appendix on page 21.]
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you very much, General Kehler.
Under Secretary of the Air Force Payton, welcome. Your
statement is put in the record, and if you could summarize, the
floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. GARY E. PAYTON, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE
AIR FORCE FOR SPACE PROGRAMS
Secretary Payton. Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Tauscher. You are welcome.
Secretary Payton. Again, Chairman Tauscher, Mr. Everett, I
greatly appreciate the opportunity to talk about military space
with the committee today. We have a superb relationship with
this committee, and we view it very highly.
Let me answer one of your questions in my opening
statement, maybe save a little time that way. You asked about
evidence that back-to-basics was working. I would point to the
GPS III program, a program that is, at its heart, designed to
counteract enemy potential adversary degradation of GPS
service. We call it NAVWAR.
The evidence that we have that back-to-basics is working is
because a critical part of back-to-basics is what I call a
block approach: Incremental deliveries bite off smaller chunks
of new capability, build on proven technology before we start
full-scale development of the new system.
GPS III is a perfect example of how we have done that in a
program. We worked with the combatant commanders, as
represented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and directly with
Strategic Command, and the services, and in the GPS case, even
Department of Transportation (DOT), other Federal agencies,
because GPS serves such a wide variety of users. We identified
those first critical, most important new functionalities that
the GPS III constellation should supply. We packaged that into
something called Block A of the GPS III program.
This spring, we should be able to award the full-scale
development contract for Block A of the GPS III program. We
have already defined a tentative Block B that would come after
Block A, and then finally a Block C that is the definitive end
state of the GPS III constellation. And so to me, that is
evidence that we are making progress in back-to-basics.
We have the proven technology for the GPS III A
acquisition. We have been spending two years proving those
component technologies. We have competitive bidders with their
designs for that spacecraft under evaluation right now, and we
should be able to award a full-scale development contract for
the GPS III A program this spring.
And so, again, it is an example, a near-term example, of
how we think the back-to-basics acquisition strategy is showing
success. We are not out of the woods. There are still several
programs. I am sure we will turn up rocks with lizards
underneath them. But there are some promising signs that back-
to-basics is working.
And, again, thank you for the invitation today, and I look
forward to your other questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Payton can be found in
the Appendix on page 47.]
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Under Secretary Payton.
The Director of National Reconnaissance Office, Mr. Scott
Large, welcome. It is your first appearance before the
committee.
Mr. Large. Thank you. Yes, it is, thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Tauscher. Congratulations on your appointment.
Mr. Large. Thank you.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you. Your testimony is put in the
record, and please summarize. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. SCOTT LARGE, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
Mr. Large. Very good.
Madam Chairman, Mr. Everett, other members, thank you very
much for the opportunity. As the chairman said, this is my
first opportunity to address the subcommittee.
Hopefully, by seeing the three of us up here together, you
may get some insight and a good feeling for the state of
integration across what I will term national security space.
There is a lot going on in the national security space
environment, as both General Kehler and Mr. Payton have
described.
The NRO is a strong and integral member of that national
security space team. And while today's setting is an
unclassified setting, and I will not be able to go into great
details and particulars to some of the questions you may have,
what I would like to stress is that we are what I believe is a
vital part of direct support to the warfighters; a member of
the team addressing space protection, which of course, is one
of the most important topics we are discussing today. But,
also, as far as acquisition, the back-to-basics, the NRO is on
a path that we have charted over the last year or so to try to
move past some of the challenges we have faced in the last
several years. And I think we are making progress.
In a future setting with the committee, the subcommittee, I
would like to go into great detail on exactly what we are doing
to try to recover our position in effective acquisition of
space systems.
The other thing that I would leave with you quickly is
that, while we talk about space protection, we talk about
acquisition. We also are concerned where we are going in the
future, the investments in research and development (R&D), and
the fact that we are jointly involved with our other
spacefaring agencies within the DOD, and actually the civilian
community in pushing forward some of the limits of space R&D.
With that, I look forward to answering your questions.
Hopefully, we can address some of the specific issues you have
today.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Large can be found in the
Appendix on page 61.]
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Director.
I will tell the committee that we are working with our own
schedule to have a classified briefing with the director and
others. Perhaps General Kehler and Mr. Payton could also
attend. It will be as soon as we can find the time, and it will
be, as I said, a classified hearing.
I want to get back to one of the questions I asked, because
I think it is fundamentally what we really care about the most,
and that is about what we would do if our assets were attacked.
Do you have appropriate contingency plans for closing the ISR
gaps that our warfighters would experience, regardless of who
attacks us and what method they use? Do you feel confident that
we have an appropriate Plan B?
And, second, how would you judge the process of the
Operational Responsive Space program's efforts to develop
systems that might fill these potential gaps?
General Kehler.
General Kehler. Ma'am, thank you.
First of all, let me describe that as the Commander of Air
Force Space Command, we are a force provider to the Commander
of Strategic Command, who really is the one who deals with the
question of operational planning and contingency planning.
Having said that, however, there are operational plans that
are certainly contingency plans, not only with U.S. Strategic
Command, but across the regional combatant commanders as well,
for dealing with a number of potential outcomes here. What I
cannot do today is sit here and say that as we look to the
future that we always have in place a way to compensate for the
loss of space assets.
What I can tell you is we are working on that very hard,
and we believe that that is a central piece of our strategic
approach to how we would deal with the potential loss of our
space assets. In some cases, we are very confident today that
we have alternative ways, if not to completely address the loss
of a space asset, to certainly compensate for that in
warfighting terms.
In other cases, we do not have as much confidence as we
look to the future--for example, GPS. I mean, that is why we
are looking to improve the GPS constellation in incremental
blocks as we go forward, as Mr. Payton described.
In some cases, we think that we have fairly good capability
today to accomplish some of our intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance missions with air platforms and other things,
but that is situationally dependent also. And so what I do not
want to leave you with is the impression that all of our
concerns are addressed. They are not.
I also do not want to create the impression that we are not
working on this and, in some cases, I cannot go into the
specific details, but what I can tell you is that a key part of
our strategy as we look to the future and we think through how
do we address the notion of space becoming a contested domain
or space capabilities becoming challenged in one way or
another, a large part of this is understanding how we can use
the assets in all of the domains in order to bring to the
combatant commanders the full range of capabilities that then
makes this very difficult for an adversary to address.
We do not want to be one dimensional, for sure. On the
other hand, there are some things that we do best, and in some
cases, can only do from space for our warfighters. And so in
those cases, we are going to have to pay particularly close
attention to make sure that we have addressed those needs and
have appropriate compensation measures; perhaps even an
operationally responsive way to replace or augment those
capabilities if, in fact, they are threatened. That is where
ORS begins to come in.
Now let me take just a second, if I might, to describe to
you that operational responsiveness in our mind is not just
about small platforms and small launch vehicles. Operational
responsiveness starts on the ground, and we believe that, in
many cases, we can get more operationally responsive with
changes that we make on the ground using our existing assets,
and that is where we always start.
But as we look in the tool bag of things that we would want
to have available for the future, one of those tools needs to
be a way to put smaller, single-purpose, shorter-lived
platforms on-orbit in response to a specific warfighter need,
or in response to an augmentation request or in response to a
reconstitution request. So we are looking at ORS as if it is a
national strategic capability for the future, and today, what
we are doing is we are working on the building blocks to make
it so.
So, as we work our way through this budget, we are going
from fall to walk to, I hope, run by the end of this time
period, this five-year time period, so that we can present to
the combatant commanders, in our case through the Commander of
U.S. Strategic Command, an appropriate way to supplement, or
replace, or reconstitute critical assets when those are
absolutely necessary.
Ms. Tauscher. Okay.
Under Secretary, Director, do you have anything to add to
that?
Mr. Large. I would suggest the ORS program is doing both
enablers for ground control or new sorts of spacecraft, plug-
and-play spacecraft in particular. We are continuing the TacSat
series; we flew TacSat-2; we are going to launch TacSat-3
within a few months; and we are designing TacSat-5 right now to
demonstrate one of the critical enablers, which is that notion
of rapidly assembling from flight quality parts already on the
shelf, a plug-and-play spacecraft that can be fine-tuned to the
combatant commanders' needs. Tentatively, that is one of the
objectives of TacSat-5.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you.
Mr. Large. So we are making progress.
Ms. Tauscher. I appreciate that.
We have just been notified that we are going to have a
series of four votes.
Mr. Everett, I am going to go to you, and perhaps we can
quickly get through some questions.
Four votes sometimes turns into 45 minutes very quickly,
although that is not the way the clock is meant to work.
Mr. Everett.
Mr. Everett. Thank you. Chairman, I am specifically going
to touch on TSAT.
Ms. Tauscher. Sure.
Mr. Everett. That is something you have already covered in
your opening statement, but it concerns me that--and, General
Kehler, we have talked about this--in a few years when TSAT is
scheduled to come online, we could have as many as 400 units,
Marines, ground folk that would be using unprotected
communications, and I am wondering if there is any workaround
on that. Should we slow walk some of the stuff like Future
Combat Systems, the UASes that would depend on TSAT for
protection com work? And, as we know, UASes are becoming
extremely important in our warfighters' plans, as well as ISR.
General Kehler. Sir, I----
Mr. Everett. So I guess my first question is: Should we
slow walk some of these other systems?
General Kehler. Sir, I think it is premature to slow walk
that. Let me back up here for a second. Military satellite
communications, as you all know, are critically important to
us, and today, we get satellite communications with a large
participating from commercial satellite companies and
providers, and they do a spectacular job. In fact, over half
support what we do today through satellite communications is
done through commercial communications, and so that mixture, we
believe, at some level, will have to continue into the future.
At the same time, we have just started to deploy WGS, the
first of six satellites, which is going to be critically
important for expanded wideband communications, and we are
within a year, we believe, of launching the first AEHF. So we
are progressing.
The question then becomes: How do we then get to the next
most important issue that the warfighters have raised, and that
is protected communications. The decisions that we made last
year on TSAT, which were made largely in response to the need
to purchase a fourth AEHF satellite, rippled through the Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP). But, at the same time that ripple
occurred, we were asked to participate with a team inside the
Department to come back and take a hard look at how this should
now go forward, given the fourth AEHF, and how we keep all
these pieces together, and address the warfighter needs.
That review is going on as we speak today, and I cannot
tell you what the answer is yet about how we intend to address
the warfighter needs. What I can tell you is the warfighters
are at that table; and as we look to come back to you, we will
look to come back to you with a balanced way forward that
addresses their needs synchronized with when those needs are
and, again, we know that there is growth coming out there, both
in terms of bandwidth, and we know that there is growth coming
in terms of our requirement to do protected communications.
What we do not have yet is a revised answer in light of the
insertion of the fourth AEHF in the net flow, and that answer
we owe you.
I think, at this point, sir, it would be premature for us
to try to decide that there was some different phasing out
there. I think our first objective is to come back and see if
we can come up with a plan that continues that phasing the way
the other services are requiring it.
Mr. Everett. Thank you, Chairman.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Everett, I think we all have the same
concern about TSAT. Perhaps we will ask General Kehler when he
has that answer to give us a call, and we will have a small
informal meeting.
If you do not mind, sir, we would like to have you come
back, and we will gather as many people as possible.
General Kehler. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Tauscher. But we do think that before the bill that we
are writing gets built any further, we need to have an answer
to that.
Mr. Larsen of Washington.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General Kehler, can I just put a finer point to paraphrase
what you just said, see if I understand it? Regarding TSAT, the
original launch was scheduled 2016, but since there has been $4
billion or so, at least from our analysis, taken out of TSAT,
you do not know what that date is. It might be 2016. It might
be later. You just do not know whether this fourth AEHF is
going to fill that need until such time we can get to TSAT. Is
that----
General Kehler. Yes, sir. I think that is a good----
Mr. Larsen [continuing]. I understand? Okay. Thanks.
Regarding international opportunities, I am not sure who to
ask. Perhaps I will start with Secretary Payton. Last week--and
Madam Chair mentioned this in her testimony. Last week, Mr.
Vickers discussed voluntary guidelines and rules of the road.
Now, in his answers to questions, someone asked whether or not
the Administration at least had a plan in mind for rules of the
road in space, or whether this is just some sort of general
discussion about rules of the road and there is really nothing
yet more behind it.
Do you have any idea, thoughts on the merits of rules of
the road in space, or other international regimes, short of
treaties, that just sort of discuss the Coast Guard rules like,
make sure you have a green light on the right of your boat and
a red light on the left of your boat?
Secretary Payton. In some regards, there already are tacit
agreements amongst most spacefaring nations.
For instance, one of the biggest sources of debris is spent
upper stages that still have propellant on board. The United
States, Europe, as a routine for that last rocket stage that is
in orbit near the satellite, we take that and vent the
propellants out of that rocket stage so there is much, much
less likelihood of that rocket exploding a few years from now.
Up at geosynchronous (GEO), the geosynchronous belt is a
very high-value piece of space real estate. Again, tacit
agreements. As upper stages deposit a spacecraft there, that
upper stage then moves higher than geosynchronous so that it
does not become a navigation hazard. And also operators of
geosynchronous spacecraft, whether they are commercial or
government, as the spacecraft runs out of propellant for
station keeping, they tend to dispose of them in a higher
graveyard orbit, again, so that they do not present a
navigation hazard.
So some of the problem becomes convincing all spacefaring
entities to abide by those rules. I believe China has just
recently bragged about how they can do that with their last
uppers, their last stage, from one of their geosynchronous
launches.
So those are tacit agreements that have been developed out
of best practices and shared amongst the reputable space
operators. So there are some valuable, critical rules of the
road, if you would, already in place. Now the first step, I
would contend, is a function of getting all players to abide by
those tacit agreements.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks.
Another question about international opportunities: In
2007, the Australian Government agreed to invest in the
Wideband Global System. Are there other opportunities across
the space portfolio for greater international cooperation?
Secretary Payton. Yes, sir. In fact, on the AEHF program,
we have participation from the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom, and Canada, and then the----
Mr. Larsen. Can you discuss what they will get out of that,
or is that something we need to discuss----
Secretary Payton. I believe it is rolled up in conjunction
with the North Atlantic Treaty Orgnization (NATO)
communications agency, and how those countries contribute to
NATO's communications bandwidth, and they do it through AEHF;
and we are always looking at other opportunities because
geography counts, especially in Space Situational Awareness,
geography counts.
Mr. Larsen. Madam Chairman, that is where I will end here.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Franks from Arizona.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
I thank all of you for everything that you do. I do not
know how the country would survive without your cutting-edge
focus, and we really appreciate it.
General Kehler, I might say to you--and carbon copy
everyone else that had anything to do with it--this satellite
shootdown continues to be a real source of excitement on the
part of a lot of us. I do not want to use the word pride
because that is when we get in trouble, but----
Ms. Tauscher. You can feel proud of it, Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. I just think that you all did a magnificent
job. And I think one of the things it did, in my mind, is that
it demonstrated the inextricable and intrinsic relationship
between national security space and missile defense. Because,
in a sense, we saw a missile defense asset accomplish a space
mission. And with all of the things that you have to juggle, as
it were, whether it is cyberspace challenges or the missile
defense capabilities, could you give us some perspective on the
cooperation between the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the
Air Force Space Command, and why it is important to make sure
that there are not only cooperation there, but you have the
flexibility to interact in these areas without us creating any
artificial barriers?
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
First of all, let me say that, again the Air Force Space
Command's piece of this activity was a piece of a much larger
activity that was a joint activity extended into the Missile
Defense Agency, et cetera, under the command of the Commander
of Strategic Command. And so, first, I think we should feel
very gratified that the joint team did what the joint team we
know can do when they come together. It also extended elsewhere
in the government. Of course, Mr. Large's organization and
others were deeply involved, NASA as well. And so this was a
very large team of folks that came together to make this
happen.
Our piece of this primarily in Air Force Space Command was
space surveillance; and the space surveillance network that we
operate on behalf of the Nation, when combined with the sensors
that the Missile Defense Agency has put out, in combination
with other government sensors, proved to be a decisive
advantage for us. And so I would offer that the single largest
lesson that I took out of this was the value of us being able
to use sensors that were created for different missions
together, and that is a model that we are going to try to
follow as we get to better, and better, and better Space
Situational Awareness.
It really is the combined use of all of the sensors
together, being able to display the information from the
sensors, and make that useable for decision makers that enabled
this to happen, and that does not take anything away from
anybody on the team who had many, many, many different roles to
play. It certainly takes nothing away from the great United
States Navy, but it was a large team.
And what I take away from this, in terms of cooperation
with Air Force Space Command and Missile Defense Agency, was
the use of the sensors, the command and control, and the
networking that was done.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Madam Chair.
Just one other question, Mr. Large.
Mr. Large. Sir.
Mr. Franks. Within the constraints of an open meeting here,
I am trying to make sure that I couch this question in a way
that does not put you in any awkward position at all.
I have several open letters here from Admiral Keating, from
others, that delineate some capability that the Space Radar has
that are pretty unique and pretty irreplaceable. With that in
mind, you know that Congress made some significant cuts in that
regard, and we cited, you know, affordability, and program
scope, and technological----
Mr. Large. Yes, sir.
Mr. Franks [continuing]. And a lot of things. So my
question to you is, within the limitations of an open session
here, can you discuss the measures that you and the Department
of Defense have taken toward defining a Space Radar program
that effectively balances cost, risk, and performance? I mean,
are we on the right track here, given the importance of this
system.
Mr. Large. Sir, within the constraints of the situation
where we are right now, I would say that between both the
Department of Defense and the intelligence community, the DNI,
I believe we have mapped out what we believe is an alternative
approach that addresses, first of all, the Congress's concerns
about affordability, scope, timelines, and so on. We are in the
process of socializing that certainly between both communities,
the IC and the DOD, so that we are prepared to bring that
forward to you.
We believe we have a solution set. We are working with the
Air Force acquisition piece, the Department of Defense, other
acquisition pieces, and the interests of, certainly, the DNI
and his acquisition requirements. But I am uncomfortable going
beyond that at this point.
Mr. Franks. Close enough.
Thanks, all of you, for what you do.
And thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Franks.
Director Large, can you give us a sense for when the
scoping memo that you are talking about may be prepared and
when we could actually get access to it? Are we talking 45
days?
Mr. Large. I am hoping that within 45 days we will be able
to come back to the committee with more details of what the
plan is.
Ms. Tauscher. Good. We will see you in 46 days.
Mr. Large. Yes, ma'am. I will write that down. [Laughter.]
Ms. Tauscher. Gentlemen, thank you so much for your
service. Thank you for the leadership you provide to the tens
of thousands of people that work in your area of responsibility
(AOR) and under your command, and the civilians and the
contractors, many people, as I said earlier, who are without
thanks, who work very anonymously, and do great service to the
American people, and certainly advance our cause protecting the
warfighter and making sure that we are safe here at home.
We have four votes. It will take us about 45 minutes. So we
are going to relieve you of duty, right now. Thank you very
much for being here. We expect to see you in a classified
session in 45, 46 days or so.
Thank you very much, again, for your service and thank you
for appearing before the committee.
[Whereupon, at 3:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 5, 2008
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 5, 2008
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 5, 2008
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, how would
you describe the rationale for the February 20th intercept of the
failed U.S. satellite?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. The President directed the
satellite intercept to mitigate risk to human life from the 1,000
pounds of toxic hydrazine fuel onboard the non-controllable U.S.
satellite that was about to reenter the Earth's atmosphere. In a
controlled satellite reentry, risk is managed by causing the reentry to
occur over the ocean or sparsely populated areas. This satellite was
non-functional and unable to be commanded or controlled, making it
impossible to predict the exact time or location of satellite reentry/
impact.
Modeling and analysis gave high confidence that the intercept would
be successful. The time, location and geometry of the intercept were
carefully chosen to maximize the success of fragmenting the hydrazine
fuel tank, minimize the risk of reentering debris hitting populated
areas, and to minimize the risk of debris to other space objects.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, Please describe Air
Force Space Command's role in the February 20, 2008 satellite
intercept.
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. Air Force Space Command
(AFSPC) operators provided high quality space surveillance and space
situational awareness (SSA) information to USSTRATCOM via the Joint
Functional Component Commander-SPACE (JFCC-SPACE) Joint Space
Operations Center (JSpOC).
AFSPC's Space Surveillance Network provided tracking and
characterization data that enabled prediction of the satellite's
location and relative position. This data was fused with other sensor
data and forwarded to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and Navy to
support the engagement.
AFSPC Overhead Non-imaging Infrared sensors provided information
during engagement and reentry to include IR detection of the hit/kill
and prediction of potential earth impact for any large pieces of
debris.
After the satellite intercept, the Space Surveillance Network
tracked the resulting debris and provided both piece count and
positional data to support analysis of the debris field. Data was used
to predict potential hazards to active satellites, perform conjunction
analysis for satellite owner operators (to include commercial and
foreign entities), and monitor decay of debris reentering the earth's
atmosphere. That tracking continues today.
Finally, the 30th Space Wing's (Vandenberg AFB) HAZMAT team was on
standby to support potential recovery operations as part of the
Consequence Management Response Team.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, the
Pentagon's annual China military modernization report will be released
March 3rd and is expected to build upon last year's report that China
continues to develop a multi-dimensional counterspace program. What
implications do these developments have on our national security space
posture?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. The number of space faring
nations is growing and it should be noted China is not the only country
to possess counterspace capabilities. We now operate in a contested
space domain and, therefore, Space Situational Awareness and Space
Protection are high priorities for National Security Space (NSS)
systems. While some of our space capabilities are protected, we realize
that we will likely face a wider range of threats to not only the
satellites, but also their ground infrastructure and the links that
control/connect these systems
The most recent National Space Policy reinforces our commitment to
the peaceful use of space, yet acknowledges the fact that we have a
right of self-defense. Because of the growing number of threats, we
need an integrated National space protection strategy that synchronizes
the many disparate vulnerability assessment and protection activities
across the NSS and that addresses these multi-dimensional threats
through a holistic and systematic process across all NSS capabilities.
To address these issues, Air Force Space Command and NRO
established a Space Protection Program (SPP) on 31 March 2008, to help
make informed decisions about how to best preserve our space
capabilities via comprehensive vulnerability assessments, protection
strategies and concepts, protection technologies investment, and
protection capstone requirements definition with roadmaps to define
integration of protection capabilities into future systems.
Additionally, we are increasing our efforts to develop Operationally
Responsive Space (ORS) capabilities to allow us options in the future
to quickly replace or augment existing satellite capabilities.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, how should
the investment strategy be restructured across the Air Force and NRO
space portfolios to avoid single-point vulnerabilities as highlighted
by the Chinese ASAT test last year? Does the 2009 budget request
reflect any programmatic or operational changes?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. We recognize space is a
contested environment and considered this in our investment strategy.
The Air Force is exploring what methods we need to ensure survivability
of space capabilities. In the FY09 budget request, we have programs
like Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) which seeks to develop the
capability to rapidly augment, replenish or replace space capabilities,
when necessary. Additionally, Air Force Space Command formed a Space
Protection Office in conjunction with the NRO that is dedicated to
mapping a way ahead for this effort. We also increased our investment
in space situational awareness, especially in areas that will help make
better use of existing sensors and their supporting systems.
Additionally, the FY09 budget request includes funding for a
vulnerability assessment center and additional intelligence analysts to
provide more timely support to space operations centers.
Outputs of these efforts will be reflected in integrated space
architectures produced by the National Security Space Office (NSSO) as
well as in future budget requests for the DOD and the IC. Integrated
Space Architectures, which cover the next 10 to 20 years, are intended
to optimize investments across the National Security Space Community,
while the National Security Space Plan (NSSP) will identify those
investments required in the near term to achieve the architecture
vectors.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, we
understand the Chinese ASAT test was a good example of how intelligence
was ``operationalized'' to provide near real-time support to military
users. As threats to space increase, so too will the demand for greater
space intelligence support and resources. How does the Department plan
to address this requirement?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. This question properly falls
to the NRO and we defer to Mr. Large.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, the FY
2008 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of
Defense and Director of National Intelligence to develop a space
protection strategy. What do you see as the key challenges in this
area? Are they material or non-material?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. We see several challenges and
opportunities, both material and non-material. The key challenges to
developing a National Space Protection Strategy will be in integrating
the DOD and Intelligence Community requirements, establishing the
minimum space capabilities that need to survive and operate through an
attack, and prioritizing protection requirements and investment
decisions. A key element will be to remain agile and responsive to
emerging threats, while maintaining the proper balance between the
space, ground, and communication link segments. This will require
integrating the capabilities across the National Security Space (NSS)
Community, both DOD and Intelligence Community (IC), in new and in some
cases unprecedented ways.
Another key element, will be fostering collaboration among the
military and intelligence organizations within the NSS, as well as
ensuring civil, commercial and Allied representation. To enable this,
Air Force Space Command and the NRO have established a Space Protection
Program (SPP), which in addition to developing the Congressionally
directed Space Protection Strategy, will serve to consolidate multiple
protection efforts, conduct comprehensive NSS vulnerability
assessments, and identify alternatives for senior leadership to
consider. The recommended options from the SPP will span both materiel
and non-materiel capabilities. These could include changes in space
system designs or changes in the way these systems are operated.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, what is
the Department's overall protection strategy for assured access to
space? How does DOD examine and analyze the benefits and cost of
different strategies? Given the historical experience during the Cold
War, can space systems be cost-effectively protected?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. The National Security Space
Office's (NSSO) architecture process includes analysis of various
alternative architectures, including assessments of performance
benefits and costs. The NSSO has worked with stakeholders to produce
the Protection for Space Mission Assurance (PSMA) architecture. PSMA
identified a number of steps (classified) the U.S. could take in the
near-, mid-, and far-terms to cost effectively protect space systems.
The Air Force Space Command and NRO Space Protection Program (SPP) and
other initiatives have begun incorporating PSMA findings and
recommendations into their efforts.
For cost effectiveness, it is not only space systems that require
survivability, but more importantly the space capability architectures.
Through an architectural combination of protection features (safeguard,
avoid, preempt, suppress, restore) and an intelligent strategy for the
assumption of acceptable risk, sufficient mission assurance can be
achieved in a relatively cost effective manner. In this regard,
Operationally Responsive Space efforts are working to provide the
ability to rapidly augment or reconstitute space capabilities. Because
of the evolving nature of the threats, protection architectures must
also be flexible and adaptable. As a result, protection features will
not always be unique to the individual systems but must be considered
part of the NSS enterprise.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large,
historically, SATCOM requirements exceed the capacity of our government
systems. To make up the difference, the military spends over $400
million a year for commercial SATCOM. In Operation Iraqi Freedom over
80% of our military SATCOM requirements were met by commercial
carriers. Does national security require the development of a
Commercial Satellite Communications Policy much like the National
Remote Sensing Policy? What are we doing to ensure our warfighters are
getting the necessary communications capability in a timely and cost
effective manner?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. Additional policy is not
needed at this time. Our SATCOM needs require varying levels of
protection and security based on the information being transmitted and
the mission being supported. Much of that need can be, and has been,
satisfied by commercial providers.
To ensure timely and cost effective communications capabilities are
provided to the warfighter, we are currently fielding Wideband Global
SATCOM (WGS) satellite, and will begin launching Advanced EHF
satellites in FY09. WGS provides DOD-controlled wideband
communications, while AEHF will provide a 10-times increase in
bandwidth for secure, anti-jam, Low Probability of Intercept/Detection
(LPI/LPD) communication to replace the Milstar constellation. At the
same time, we are working to reduce risk in preparation for the
development of the next-generation Transformational Satellite
Communications (TSAT) satellite.
These systems will continue to be augmented with commercial
satellite communications, where the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Networks, and Information Integration (ASD(Nll)) provides acquisition
policy and oversight and the Defense Information Systems Agency
provides acquisition procedures, lifecycle oversight, and a qualified
workforce to acquire quality products and services that satisfy our
warfighters' needs at fair and reasonable costs to the government.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, what is
your assessment of the synchronization between the launch of military
SATCOM systems and the fielding of compatible user terminals? How are
you ensuring that user terminals are fielded to keep pace with new
capabilities introduced on WGS (already on-orbit), AEHF (1QFY09), and
the Navy's MUOS (FY 2010)?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. The majority of AEHF, WGS, &
MUOS users will initially utilize the backwards compatibility services
found on these new satellites to bridge the transition period from the
legacy systems to the new networks.
-- Since the first WGS launch last year, over 885 currently
fielded terminals, including Ground Multi-band Terminal (GMT) and the
Air Force Wideband Enterprise Terminals (AFWET), are able to use the
system's legacy X-band capability. At the time of the sixth and final
WGS launch, 4,586 joint terminals capable of using the new WGS Ka-band
capability are programmed to have been fielded.
-- At the time of the first AEHF launch, over 1,290 currently
fielded, joint terminals will be able to use the system's legacy
MILSTAR-like capabilities. The first Air Force terminals to start using
the Extended Data Rate (XDR) capability from AEHF will be the Secure
Mobile Anti-Jam Reliable Tactical Terminals (SMART-Ts) in FY10. At the
time of the fourth AEHF launch, 83% of programmed joint terminals
utilizing the new AEHF waveform are programmed to have been fielded.
-- At the time of the first MUOS launch, over 61,000, currently
fielded, joint terminals will be able to take advantage of the system's
legacy UHF Follow-on (UFO)-like capabilities. At the time of the fifth
MUOS launch, 1,300 Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) terminals,
capable of UHF SATCOM, will have been fielded. These JTRS terminals
will be able to take full advantage of the new MUOS capability.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, how are space assets
modeled in warfighter operational plans (OPPLANS) and contingency plans
(CONPLANS)? How do OPPLANS and CONPLANS account for scenarios where our
space assets are attacked or denied?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. United States Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM) has primary responsibility for the mission of
space protection and works with all combatant commanders on the use of
space assets in various OPPLANS and CONPLANS; Air Force Space Command
(AFSPC) provides space forces to USSTRATCOM for inclusion in USSTRATCOM
OPPLANS and CONPLANS. USSTRATCOM models space assets within its OPPLANS
in accordance with the Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, dividing
space forces into four types; Space Control, Space Force Enhancement,
Space Support, and Space Force Application. USSTRATCOM then goes on to
identify several capabilities available for each type of space force
and generally how they will be used in each phase of an operation.
Detailed planning of the use of space forces and how they will be used
to support the Combatant Commanders is done by USSTRATCOM in their
CONPLANS. USSTRATCOM CONPLANS, through the Joint Force Component
Commander for Space, plan for three types of space control operations;
defensive operations, offensive operations, and space situational
awareness (SSA) operations. SSA capabilities allow U.S. forces to be
knowledgeable of ongoing activity in space and the location of various
assets which provides us with the knowledge and battle-space awareness
needed to more clearly identify when our space assets are threatened or
attacked. SSA operations provide the foundation for effective action in
defensive and offensive operations. SSA information directly feeds
activities under USSTRATCOM CONPLANS to account for the threat of
attacks or denial of freedom of action through the use of a Space
Threat Conditions system. Additionally CONPLANS include possible course
of actions (COAs) for dealing with GPS jamming, communications link
jamming, laser attacks on satellites, attacks on our ground stations,
and various types of ASAT weapons. Taken together these plans provide
USSTRATCOM, the Combatant Commander, and the President or SecDef with
multiple COAs for ensuring freedom of action for U.S. and friendly
nations for operations in and through space.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, to what degree do
current military exercises and wargames incorporate scenarios where our
space assets are neutralized or attacked, and scenarios where
redundancies or alternatives are exercised?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. Air Force Space Command
(AFSPC) units and personnel participate in approximately 35 exercises
and wargames annually. In these exercises and wargames, we support
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), United States Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM), other Combatant Commanders (COCOMs), Air Force,
other Services and our own AFSPC training objectives. We undertake
these exercises and wargames both in the Continental United States
(CONUS) and in other Combatant Commanders areas of responsibility
(AORs) because AFSPC is specifically charged to communicate its mission
and provide support to all military Services and Combatant Commands.
Let me give you some examples from some recent exercises and our
most recent Schriever series wargame. In exercises TERMINAL FURY 08 and
in BLUE FLAG 07-2 our space events included: Global Positioning System
(GPS) jamming, satellite communication (SATCOM) system interference and
jamming, laser dazzling of optical surveillance satellites, an attack
by an anti-satellite system, satellite anomalies requiring the use of
other capabilities, space weather effecting space capabilities and
other space control missions. We also relocated our forces in order to
be able to continue operations as we demonstrate annually during the
USSTRATCOM GLOBAL Series exercises. All of these actions are taken by
our forces in the field and obviously some of these events were
simulated.
Schriever wargames postulate actions that could be taken by an
adversary; we then determine available countering courses of action.
Our most recent example from the Schriever IV Wargame, set in 2025,
explored U.S. and Allied reaction to space attacks by a near-peer space
power. These space attacks attempted to take away U.S. and Allied space
capabilities. We responded with an Operationally Responsive Space
concept to preserve and restore lost space capabilities. The findings
from Schriever IV are being used to further develop concepts for
defense of space. This includes exploring expanded cooperation with
Allies, investigating senior-level policy and decision-making in
response to space attacks, and developing a Space Campaign Plan to
ensure a proactive, unified response to space attacks.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, what is our military's
response posture and options for various attack or denial scenarios?
For example, what actions and response would the military take if its
SATCOM system, Wideband Global System (WGS), were jammed?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. United States Strategic
Command has primary responsibility for the mission of space operations
and protection and works with all Combatant Commanders on the use of
space assets. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) provides space forces
through 14th Air Force (14 AF) to USSTRATCOM. The 14th AF is also the
Joint Functional Component Command for Space and manages day-to-day
operations of joint space forces provided to USSTRATCOM. Working with
the various Combatant Commanders, joint space forces continue to
identify ongoing denial of service problems; not only communications,
but also Global Positioning System, and warning data. Space forces have
developed tactics, techniques and procedures to overcome these
situations. The first action is determining the source and who is
responsible. Next, we take into account the strategic situation,
whether the jamming is hostile or non-hostile, if it was intentional or
unintentional and the source. Based on this understanding and the
impact of the jamming, the Combatant Commander recommends the best
response option.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, what are the
warfighters' capability needs and priorities in space and how are these
shaping the Air Force and NRO space investment strategies?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. At Air Force Space Command, we
are focused on meeting the warfighters' ongoing and future needs. We do
this through a delicate balance of sustaining and maintaining our
enduring capabilities, and fielding new or emerging capabilities as
early as possible. The warfighting commands express their needs in
several mission areas to include: intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; precise position, navigation, and timing; military
communications; space situational awareness; and nuclear deterrence to
name a few. The Air Force provides all of these on a daily basis. Every
year, the Combatant Commanders develop an Integrated Priority List
stating what capabilities need focus or attention. We utilize these
documents heavily in determining our overall investment strategy as we
leverage and integrate space capability across the National Security
Space enterprise, to include organizations within both the Department
of Defense and the Intelligence Community. Today, our investment
strategy follows three basic principles: win the war; take care of our
people; recapitalize for the future.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, what plans do you have
to meet these needs and how are they reflected in the FY 2009 budget
request?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. Our Integrated Planning
Process (strategic planning process) is the methodology we use to focus
our capabilities on the warfighter needs. These needs are identified by
our COCOM (USSTRATCOM) in the form of an Integrated Priority List,
Operations Plans and Joint Capability Documents. We analyze the COCOM
requests and assess what current and future programs are required to
provide the desired capabilities. This is communicated back to
USSTRATCOM for consideration in their Function Solutions Analysis,
which is submitted to the JROC.
One of the products generated through this process is the
Warfighter Required Force. This document provides an unconstrained
force structure view in satisfaction of COCOM priorities. We understand
this view is fiscally un-attainable; however it is used as a guide for
POM development. Ultimately, we aim to provide the required
capabilities within the constrained resources available.
The FY 2009 budget request optimizes our investment to support
COCOM priorities and to provide those required capabilities to the
warfighter. For example, among other capabilities, the budget request
supports missile warning, through plus-up of the Space-Based Infrared
System (SBIRS) program; warfighter positioning, navigation and timing
requirements, through additions to Global Positioning System (GPS)
programs; and warfighter communications requirements, through
investment in the Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) and Advanced Extremely
High Frequency (AEHF) programs. Let me assure you, Air Force Space
Command is focused on delivering space capability to the warfighter.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, last year's defense
authorization bill added $125.0 million for advanced procurement of
AEHF-4 to mitigate the risk of a protected communications gap. The FY
2009 request contains no funds to complete procurement of AEHF-4. Why
were no funds requested?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. Gap analyses on Milstar and
AEHF 1-3 showed there was no urgency to procure SV4 in FY09. Funding
AEHF-4 in FY10 allows the Department to meet Congressional intent to
produce the 4th AEHF and maintain communications capability. There is
an on-going study within the Department of Defense to determine the
MILSATCOM way-ahead within fiscal constraints.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, TSAT is a keystone
system in the DOD's future communications architecture providing
wideband protected communications and communications-on-the-move
capabilities. However, this year, the DOD and the Air Force have
removed $4.0 billion out of the TSAT program and delayed the launch
date from FY 2016 to FY 2018.What has changed in the Air Force
portfolio that TSAT is no longer a critical program? What were the
higher priority needs that required the funds from TSAT? Describe the
planned users of TSAT. What impact do the $4 billion cut and schedule
delays have on planned users of TSAT? Given the proliferation of SATCOM
jamming systems, how important are the protected communications
features of TSAT? Can these features be incorporated into other SATCOM
systems?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. The Department remains
committed to acquiring the communications capabilities required to
achieve the 21st Century net-centric warfighting vision. Responding to
Congressional direction, the FY09 President's Budget Request provides
full funding for AEHF-4 in FY10 while remaining committed to providing
future TSAT capabilities. The on-going MILSATCOM study will provide us
with a roadmap to address future communication requirements, especially
as the needs of the planned users continue to evolve. The planned users
include all Services--Army ground forces, Navy and Marine forces and
airborne ISR.
While the reduction to the TSAT baseline delays first launch until
the 2018 timeframe, strategic users requiring survivable and endurable
communications have worldwide coverage until 2021 using the Milstar and
AEHF constellations. The transformational capabilities provided by
TSAT, including communications on the move, more protected
communications, greater number of and higher rate communications paths
and finally net-centric capabilities, will be delayed. However, the
MILSATCOM study continues to evaluate various options to address these
issues.
Today's commercial SATCOM systems plus DOD assets such as the WGS
system are susceptible to intentional jamming by relatively
unsophisticated, inexpensive means. Ensuring the DOD satellite
communications capabilities are endurable and survivable have long been
a requirement of strategic SATCOM users. These users require systems
that provide anti-jam communications, nuclear survivability, and Low
Probability of Intercept/Low Probability of Detection communications.
These capabilities are built into the Milstar satellites on orbit today
and the AEHF system planned for 2009 first launch. TSAT will provide
continuity beyond Milstar and AEHF for these users and also
significantly increase the quantity and capability of protected SATCOM
links to strategic and tactical users. Incorporating the features
planned for TSAT onto the WGS or AEHF satellites would be very
expensive and result in delays to deployment of these next generation
systems as both systems are far beyond the design phase.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, please
describe the problems encountered on the Space-based Infrared System
(SBIRS)-High program. What are the plans to resolve these problems and
what are the schedule and cost impacts? Would a schedule delay increase
the risk of a missile warning gap?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. In late summer 2007,
shortcomings in the SBIRS flight software subsystem (FSS) were
identified, requiring a realignment of functions between two flight
computers and software code rework. Additionally, both internal and
independent teams determined that streamlining the code logic, i.e.
deleting code not required for the operation of the SBIRS satellite,
could improve the efficiency and timeliness of code execution.
The flight software subsystem (FSS) recovery plan is divided into
two blocks. Block I code was delivered on May 17, 2008 and is currently
in test. An Interim Design Review for the Block II code was completed
on April 2, 2008 and the development team is now proceeding with Block
II coding. Block II code delivery is scheduled for August 28, 2008.
With regard to the schedule and cost impacts, the FY2009
President's Budget (PB) projects launch of the first GEO satellite for
December 2009, which is an approximate one year delay to the previous
launch date. As a result, the FY2009 PB includes approximately $400M
across the FYDP (FY09-13) to account for this one year delay to the
overall program completion.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, the
planned launch for the first GPS-III satellite has slipped one year
from FY 2013 to FY 2014. What caused this delay and what is the risk of
a potential GPS gap between the last GPS-IIF launch and first GPS-III
launch?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. The first launch for GPS IIIA
has slipped from FY13 to FY14 due to a delay in the GPS IIIA contract
award to May 15, 2008 (first launch is scheduled 72 months following
contract award). Key factors were the finalizing requirements for the
incremental acquisition and resolution of a potential contractor
dispute regarding the prior MUOS source selection.
The risk of a PNT gap between the last GPS IIF and first GPS IIIA
is low. The launch of the first GPS III satellite is currently
scheduled approximately 6 months after the launch of the last GPS IIF
satellite in October 2013 and Air Force Space Command has developed
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) that could be employed to
further mitigate risk.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, last year the Air
Force proposed acquiring GPS III capability in three blocks. Has the
acquisition approach been finalized and agreement reached with the user
community on the capabilities in each block?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. The GPS III program of record,
as approved by OSD(AT&L), is based on acquiring three blocks of
satellites. GPS III requirements are documented in the GPS III
Capabilities Development Document (CDD) approved by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in July 2007, as updated by the
interim CDD (iCDD) which the JROC approved in October 2007. These
documents validate requirements for GPS IIIA and define the desired
capabilities for GPS Blocks IIIB and IIIC.
Requirements for GPS Blocks IIIB and IIIC will be reviewed prior to
initiating development on each respective block and, if necessary, the
Air Force will update the CDD to reflect any required changes and bring
the new/modified requirements to the JROC for validation.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, the
committee understands the Space Radar program has been restructure in
response to Congressional concerns about affordability, requirements,
technology maturity, and concepts of operation (CONOPS). Please
describe your view of the restructure, the level of commitment from the
DOD and intelligence community, and the status of the analysis of
alternatives study requested in the FY08 defense authorization bill.
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. We are working closely with
our Intelligence Community (IC) partners to leverage the lessons
learned and the solid technology maturation performed to date. Any
Joint Future Overhead Radar Program must meet the requirements of the
DOD, IC, and coalition partners, while being acquired in affordable
increments of capability. Additionally, we must ensure that the system
can provide the high-quality and timely information needed to support
senior leaders.
The Intelligence Collection Architecture (ICA) process we are
participating in offers a vehicle to analyze user needs and acquisition
options to include the possibility of a tiered architecture similar to
the one recently recommended for Electro-Optical systems. A tiered
approach works best when all tiers are synchronized. Each element
provides commonly accessible information while appropriately optimizing
(or focusing) on the primary consumer of that tier.
The jointly led ICA, co-chaired by USD(I) and ODNI, plans to report
the results of this radar needs study this summer. These inputs will
inform an analysis of the available alternatives to satisfy the
identified and revalidated user needs. The results of the analysis of
alternatives are scheduled to be finalized before the end of FY08.
We are committed to developing this capability, as are our IC
mission partners.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, please
describe the potential operational concepts and value that
``operationally responsive'' space (ORS) solutions provides to the
joint forces. What is your assessment of the ORS program office
implementation and its responsiveness to warfighter needs?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. The ORS Office is developing
architectural and system concepts to enable rapid reconstitution or
augmentation of space capabilities, to support the warfighter. For
example, the ORS Office is developing a modular, open systems
architecture for spacecraft that should greatly reduce the cost and
time required to integrate new space capabilities. The ORS Office is
also maturing the supporting ORS enabling capabilities, including
launch systems, ranges, payloads, satellite buses, and Tasking,
Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TCPED) that
are critical components in delivering responsive space capabilities to
warfighters.
The current ORS office structure is well suited to performing dual
missions of: 1) responding to current Joint Force Commander's needs, as
prioritized by Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and 2) building a
national strategic capability to responsively provide a robust space
reconstitution and augmentation capability by 2015.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, do you believe the
current management reporting chain for the ORS program office provides
the greatest flexibility or should they be moved under Air Force Space
Command to better reflect the warfighter's requirements?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. The current management
reporting chain for the joint ORS Office provides great flexibility as
well as a clear tie to warfighter requirements. As Congress intended,
the ORS Office operates under the authority, direction, and control of
the Department of Defense (DOD) Executive Agent (EA) for Space, with
the Director of the ORS Office reporting directly to the DOD EA for
Space. Additionally, the ORS Office works closely with United States
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), whose Commander is responsible for
validating and prioritizing the ORS requirements of all Combatant
Commanders.
The focus of ORS is on developing architectural concepts and
enabling technologies to responsively provide a robust national space
reconstitution and augmentation capability by 2015. The joint office
with an abbreviated chain of command provides the opportunity to
maximize the contributions of the services and agencies. At the same
time, the ORS Office continues to provide support to USSTRATCOM in
identifying alternatives and actions required to support the Urgent
Operational Needs of the warfighters.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, space
acquisition has a poor history of performance. What is your assessment
of the current state of space acquisition and what indicators do you
use to make this assessment?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. The state of space acquisition
is improving. Over the last 12 months, we have several demonstrated
successes: a new record of 58 consecutive successful Medium and Heavy
National Security Space (NSS) launches; deployed the first Wideband
Global Satellite (WGS) for operational use; and launched and begun
operations on two GPS IIR-M satellites. In October 2007, we implemented
a new GPS ground segment with no impact to PNT services.
We recognize challenges remain with cost growth and schedule
impacts in some areas of space acquisition and are actively pursuing
solutions. Our efforts are guided by a Back-to-Basics philosophy
identifying clear requirements and applying disciplined systems
engineering and effective management/planning, while providing the
program manager the appropriate resources to ensure success.
Historically, programs perform better when they have clear, stable
requirements, technology at the appropriate level of maturity, and
high-confidence cost estimates early in the acquisition process. We
continue to focus on these areas, and are starting to see indications
that this approach is working. For example, GPS IIIA and FAB-T recently
completed independent technology assessments supporting their
transition to Preliminary Design Phase.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large,
affordability and executability of space programs is a bipartisan
committee concern. Do you think the National Security Space programs
have adequate funding to make sure they can be executed in a timely
manner in support of the various missions?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. Yes, the funds requested for
National Security Space programs in the FY09 President's Budget reflect
our commitment to ensuring continuity of mission across the entire
portfolio. Specifically, the FY09 budget request supports the near-term
delivery of additional capabilities in Missile Warning, MILSATCOM,
Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT), and Space Situational
Awareness. Simultaneously, the FY09 budget request continues investment
in transformational MILSATCOM and next-generation PNT to ensure we can
meet growing joint warfighter demand for these services.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, what do
you see as the limiting technology in future conflict scenarios? How
are space science and technology investments addressing this need?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. Air Force Policy Directive 61-
1, ``Management of Science and Technology,'' requires Air Force Space
Command (AFSPC) to provide requirements and recommended program
guidance/direction to the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) for
consideration in planning and programming for Space Science and
Technology (S&T) investments. To meet this requirement, AFSPC produces
a Space S&T guidance document that identifies the limiting technologies
needed to acquire the warfighting capabilities necessary to meet
AFSPC's vision and also prioritizes technologies for AFRL
consideration. AFSPC's most recent Space S&T guidance identified key
limiting technologies in space situational awareness (SSA); the ability
to provide rapid, responsive space capabilities; strategic deterrence;
and next-generation pervasive space technologies. As AFRL's proposed
Space S&T investments ultimately make their way forward for Air Staff
consideration and incorporation into the annual President's Budget
request, AFSPC, Space and Missiles Systems Center (SMC), and Air Force
Materiel Command (AFMC) all have an opportunity to assess how these
planned investments address future technology needs as identified by
AFSPC.
Currently, Air Force S&T investments provide for a range of
technologies to find, fix, characterize, and track new and existing
space objects in support of SSA; concentrate on plug-and-play
technologies, spacecraft autonomy, and automated design tools closely
integrated with the Operationally Responsive Space vision to enable
responsive space capabilities; focus on developing and demonstrating
more reliable, more accurate, and less expensive guidance components/
systems, coupled with research in advanced propulsion, plasma effects
and mitigation, and seismic data, to provide for strategic deterrence;
and support a variety of pervasive technologies to include radiation-
hardened electronics/processors, solar cells, focal plane arrays and
cryocoolers, high-temperature materials, and guidance, navigation, and
control.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, the Space and Missile
Systems Center is looking at standing up an organization with new
acquisition processes that will focus on technical and operational
demonstrations while emphasizing innovation and flexibility. Please
describe this organization further, the expected value and benefits,
and tell us where you intend to put this organization.
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. The Space and Missile Systems
Center (SMC) is actually consolidating early demonstration activities
into the existing Development Planning (SMC/XR) office at Los Angeles
AFB and the Space Development and Test Wing (SDTW) at Kirtland AFB, New
Mexico, rather than standing up a new organization. SMC/XR and the SDTW
will leverage current and future efforts, to include the Space Test
Program and Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) efforts. The
acquisition processes these offices will follow are not new, but
represent a disciplined, structured approach of complete, up-front
concept and systems engineering prior to program initiation.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, in 2007,
the Australian Government agreed to invest in the Wideband Global
System (WGS). Where are there other opportunities across the space
portfolio for greater international cooperation?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. Historically, Australia (AUS),
United Kingdom (UK) and Canada (CAN) have all been involved with the
Air Force in many facets of the space mission, dating back to the late
1950s, early 1960s. These Allies, along with others, participate in
missile warning; space situational awareness; positioning, navigation
and timing (PNT); and communications systems.
The U.S. has a long history of missile warning cooperation with all
three partners. We have mutual defense cooperative agreements covering
existing Defense Support Program and Space-based Infrared Systems and
Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment agreements.
In addition to the success of the Wideband Global SATCOM System
arrangement with Australia, we have active Allied participation with
the UK, CAN and the Netherlands regarding the Advanced Extremely High
Frequency (AEHF) communication system. Additionally, over the years the
U.S. and the UK have shared capacity on the UK SKYNET and the U.S.
Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) programs.
Positioning, navigation and timing are extremely critical and GPS
is the world standard. To foster further collaboration on this
essential capability, we have integrated officers from AUS, CAN,
Germany and France into GPS Program Office. Additionally, there are
numerous efforts underway in the area of GPS equipment development and
CONOPS cooperation, with interoperability and coalition warfighter
support as key ingredients.
Finally, regarding Space Situational Awareness we have longstanding
relationships with several of our key Allies (UK, CAN) and are building
the foundations with others to cooperate and integrate resources in
this mission area.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, what are
the merits of ``rules of the road'' in space or other international
regimes to promote the safe and responsible use of space?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. The U.S. carefully upholds its
obligations under the four principle international agreements on
space--the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue and Return Agreement, the
Liability Convention and the Registration Convention. In fact, we have
advocated universal adoption of these measures. We believe that there
is no need for any additional treaty on space and do not see any
problems for arms control to resolve. Given that the use of space is
growing and likely will continue to grow, we believe there is value in
exploring ways that the various users can act responsibly in space.
Rather than using the term ``rules of the road,'' which implies legally
binding terms, we instead support efforts being considered through the
UN Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) to look at
``best practice guidelines'' for safe space operations. We believe that
the community of space-faring nations could constructively share their
``best practices'' and together a set of voluntary guidelines would
serve the broad interests of all nations.
While we are determined to keep sufficient flexibility to protect
national security interests, we also recognize that some emerging
challenges to space activities can require new forms of international
cooperation with allies, friends, and other responsible space-faring
nations to preserve the principle of unhindered access to, and
operations in and through, space by all nations for peaceful purposes.
We are witnessing a period of unprecedented cooperation in space. As a
result, we believe that the establishment of best practice guidelines
is the appropriate tool.
Pursuing best practice guidelines avoids the rigid and drawn out
negotiation processes that are often characterized by undercurrents of
differing political agendas. A notable success in the establishment of
best practice guidelines is in the area of debris mitigation. This
stands in sharp contrast to difficulties in international negotiating
settings like the Conference on Disarmament where for years the
progress on key objectives has been held hostage by a small number of
countries linking unrelated issues. There is considerable dynamism in
space operations as a result of the inexorable march of technology. The
best practice guidelines approach has the flexibility to evolve in step
with technical advancements.
Today there is a rich array of space operators from individual
nations, international consortia to commercial operators large and
small. Pursuing best practices guidelines provides a setting within
which all participants who have something to offer can contribute.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) is developing the Space Tracking and Surveillance System
(STSS) and has other ongoing space activities. How is your office
involved in coordinating MDA's space programs with the rest of the
Department?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. The Air Force has a close
relationship with the Missile Defense Agency on multiple levels. The
Under Secretary of the Air Force is the Air Force principal at the
Missile Defense Executive Board, the senior DOD body on ballistic
missile defense. The Under Secretary of the Air Force is also a co-
chair, along with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition, the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, Space, and
Cyber Operations, and the MDA Director, on the AF-MDA Board of
Directors (BoD). The BoD keeps the Air Force leadership fully informed
of MDA activities and serves as a forum for addressing AF-MDA issues.
AFSPC is engaged with MDA in preparing STSS experimentation plans
for space situational awareness, technical intelligence, and
battlespace awareness, and annual AFSPC/MDA focus days further promote
collaboration on space activities.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, MDA has developed or
plans to develop several land, sea, and space-based sensors, such as
the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar, Upgraded Early Warning Radars, and
STSS. What utility might these sensors have for providing space
situational awareness?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. The new MDA X-band radars have
the ability to enhance the space situational awareness (SSA) mission.
In particular, the Sea-Based X-band radar has two possible benefits for
SSA; it is well-suited toward characterizing space objects and it can
be positioned geographically where we currently have no SSA ability.
Additionally, the Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) program is
upgrading both the PAVE Phased Array Warning System (PAVE PAWS) and the
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radars that currently
support the SSA mission. The UEWR program adds the potential for
improved space object characterization, while also adding multi-mode
flexibility which will enable those radars to perform their missile
defense and SSA missions simultaneously. Used in conjunction with the
Global Sensor Integrated Network (GSIN) initiative and a MDA net-
centric architecture, the UEWR sites could inject data directly into
the AFSPC net-centric services to tie legacy and non-traditional
sensors together in an interoperable unified framework. AFSPC is
currently funding the SSA sensor fusion, data dissemination, and
command and control efforts through the Integrated Space Situational
Awareness (ISSA) and Space C2 programs. The end goal is to evolve
current SSA fusion demonstrations into tailored products for end users.
MDA is also developing the Space-based Tracking and Surveillance
System (STSS) to track, surveil and self-cue space events, enabling us
to gain custody of new launches very early in the process and alert/cue
other sensors sooner.
To aid future system development, AFSPC is constructing a National
SSA Roadmap to be used as an interim SSA architecture in response to
National Space Policy guidance. This effort includes MDA and the
contributions their sensors will bring to an integrated solution.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, the Air Force is
undergoing a ``force shaping'' effort to downsize its personnel by
40,000 by the end of Fiscal Year 2009. Operations personnel will see a
nine percent reduction and Acquisition personnel will see a four
percent reduction. How does this personnel reduction impact the space
operations and acquisition missions? To what extent will your
contractor support workforce be affected?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. We were able to mitigate the
impact of Program Budget Decision (PBD) 720 reductions to the Command's
operations and acquisition missions. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC)
reduced active duty end strength by 1,670 positions, and incurred a
civilian reduction (180 positions) and a contract dollar reduction in
excess of $1.03B across the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). We
mitigated the impact to the operations and acquisition missions by
shifting the reductions to other career fields. Only eight percent of
our active duty manpower reduction were incurred in the operations/
acquisition specialties--100 space operator positions and 55
acquisition officer and civilian billets were deleted. While only 55
Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) acquisition billets were cut,
124 acquisition-qualified officers accepted voluntary separations.
The dollar reductions also impacted our contractor workforce.
Advisory and Assistance Services and Systems Engineering Technical
Advisory contracts were particularly impacted at SMC locations. Our
AFSPC wings also suffered, as they rely on Operations and Maintenance
contracts for base operating and mission support.
While this drawdown does cause temporary turmoil, it is necessary
to ensure resources are available to recapitalize our air and space
systems.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, how would
you describe the rationale for the February 20th intercept of the
failed U.S. satellite?
Mr. Large. The satellite in question failed shortly after its
launch in December 2006, an uncontrolled reentry was inevitable. The
rationale for the 20 February 2008 intercept of the satellite was
always to mitigate the potentially harmful effects of the 1,000 pounds
of hydrazine propellant aboard the spacecraft. There was a significant
concern that the titanium propellant tank and much of the full load of
toxic fuel would survive the uncontrolled reentry, posing a very real
danger to human life across much of the inhabited portions of the
Earth. For that reason the President of the United States decided to
take proactive action, appropriate for a responsible space-faring
nation, to reduce the risk to people and property by ordering a missile
intercept of the non-functioning, decaying satellite under strictly
controlled conditions.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Large, what you can tell us about the failure of
the satellite? Has DOD been able to ascertain why it failed so quickly
after reaching orbit?
Mr. Large. No. After an exhaustive formal failure investigation,
and three different independent review team investigations, the cause
of the failure and what failed was not determined. The failure
signature suggested that abrupt, multiple failures occurred. The formal
investigation was conducted over a ten month period and included over
30 different organizations from government, industry, national labs and
academia.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Large, do you see technical and/or design
problems associated with the recently destroyed U.S. satellite that can
be fixed in future satellite system designs?
Mr. Large. Although our exhaustive analysis of the spacecraft
design and test program did not identify the root cause of the failure,
it did identify several opportunities to make improvements in mission
assurance standards which have been addressed in the requirements for
current and future satellite programs.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, the
Pentagon's annual China military modernization report will be released
March 3rd and is expected to build upon last year's report that China
continues to develop a multi-dimensional counterspace program. What
implications do these developments have on our national security space
posture?
Mr. Large. Space capabilities have become integrated into our daily
lives and are vital to our national security and the global economy. At
the same time, potential adversaries continue to seek means to counter
the advantages we obtain from space and to use space capabilities
against us. Our space capabilities face a wide range of growing threats
including radio frequency jamming, laser blinding and anti-satellite
systems. The threat exists end-to-end and requires a new way of
thinking and a new way of addressing the challenges facing the space
community.
The maturation of these threats, including China's anti-satellite
capability, require a broad range of capabilities, from diplomatic to
military, to protect our interest in space. We are working with the
interagency to assess the strategic implications of China's maturing
counterspace capabilities in the context their overall military
modernization effort. The recommendations from this on-going assessment
are carefully factored into our space systems architecture planning and
resulting investment priorities. Our investment strategy for space and
space-related activities is a balanced approach to achieving these
capabilities. Our space control investment strategy, for example,
balances the need for space situational awareness, protection of our
space capabilities and protection of terrestrial forces and the
homeland from threats posed by adversarial use of space.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, how should
the investment strategy be restructured across the Air Force and NRO
space portfolios to avoid single-point vulnerabilities as highlighted
by the Chinese ASAT test last year? Doe the 2009 budget request reflect
any programmatic or operational changes?
Mr. Large. The operational and programmatic implications of China's
anti-satellite (ASAT) test and other counterspace capabilities require
thorough and deliberate examination. Our space capabilities face a wide
range of threats including radio frequency jamming, laser blinding, as
well as ASAT systems. The maturation of these threats, including
China's anti-satellite capability, require a broad range of
capabilities, from diplomatic to military, to protect our interests in
space. Such a manifest approach to address counterspace threats
requires a national-level strategy.
For our part, the National Space Policy acknowledges that space is
vital to U.S. National security and directs the Department of Defense
(DOD) to develop capabilities, plans, and options to address these
threats to our national security space systems. The National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is working with U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) and the Intelligence Community (IC) to better understand
the nature of the threat to our space systems. The assessment of the
strategic implications of China's maturing counterspace capabilities is
currently on-going. Once complete, the recommendations of this
assessment will be carefully factored into the national security space
systems architecture--including both Air Force and NRO programs--and
their associated investment priorities.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Large, what type of space situational awareness
(SSA) and space protection capabilities do you think will be needed in
the future to combat threats to space?
Mr. Large. A broad range of capabilities, from diplomatic to
military are required to protect our interest in space. The National
Space Policy directs the DOD to develop capabilities, plans, and
options to ensure freedom of action in space. In implementing this
National Policy, the DOD will continue to:
-- Encourage all nations adhere to established principles
outlined in current treaties and international agreements for the
peaceful use of space by all nations;
-- Promote responsible behavior and safe space operations by
supporting space situational awareness needs of all peaceful space
users; lead efforts to develop guidelines for responsible behavior in
space such as guidelines for debris mitigation and collision avoidance;
and cooperate with other counties on the peaceful uses of outer space;
-- Modernize space situational awareness capabilities to ensure
ample waning of hostile acts and improve protection plans to ensure
required capabilities are available in a contested space environment--
includes the use of ground-based radars, optical telescopes, low Earth
orbiting systems with capability to detect small objects out to
geosynchronous orbit; and means of making each satellite its own sensor
and capable of monitoring its health and status and detecting any
anomalous activity;
-- Develop architectural solutions, including Operationally
Responsive Space concepts, to ensure capabilities are available when
needed;
-- Establish an operations posture, to include appropriate
planning and exercises, to respond to attacks on U.S. space interests
and to ensure required space capabilities are available in a contested
environment; and
Ensure capabilities are available to deny adversaries the use of
space advantages to ensure our terrestrial forces and homelands remain
safe.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, we
understand the Chinese ASAT test was a good example of how intelligence
was ``operationalized'' to provide near real-time support to military
users. As threats to space increase, so too will the demand for greater
space intelligence support and resources. How does NRO plan to address
this requirement?
Mr. Large. One significant step in space protection is the key role
the NRO is taking, in concert with USSTRATCOM and Air Force Space
Command, in laying the foundation for defensive space capabilities.
Such capabilities, while vital to our space systems survival, have also
helped establish a framework for further cooperation.
The complete protection picture also requires we take a careful
look at the vulnerabilities on the ground as well as those in space;
these vulnerabilities take many forms. As the NRO plays an increasingly
visible role in the defense of our Nation, we can also expect to
increasingly become a target as well. The NRO is committed to
protecting the information and assets that help us maintain our
Nation's freedom and security.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, the FY
2008 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of
Defense and Director of National Intelligence to develop a space
protection strategy. What do you see as the key challenges in this
area? Are they material or non-material?
Mr. Large. Our nation currently is completing a comprehensive
protection and survivability strategy for space--one that spans the
defense and intelligence communities and addresses policy and strategy,
architecture planning, system acquisition and requirements definition,
science and technology development, and training and operations--and is
to be delivered to Congress in July 2008. The implementation actions
for this strategy cover material and non-material initiatives.
-- The key challenges in the development of a space protection
strategy include:
-- Balancing all appropriate elements of national power
(diplomatic, informational, military, and economic)--to reduce risks in
all domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyber) and deter the deployment
of threatening capabilities; (Material & Non-material)
-- Lack of funded requirements for protection of all essential
National space assets; (Material)
-- Congressional oversight over this issue is fragmented among
the Science, Defense, International Relations, and Intelligence
Committees; and (Non-Material)
-- New or additional legal regimes or arms control agreements
related to space ``weaponization'' may complicate our ability to
protect U.S. national security interests. (Non-Material)
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, what is
the Department's overall protection strategy for assured access to
space? How does DOD examine and analyze the benefits and cost of
different strategies? Given the historical experience during the Cold
War, can space systems be cost-effectively protected?
Mr. Large. A. What is the Department's overall protection strategy
for assured access to space?
Defer to Air Force Space Command
B. How does DOD examine and analyze the benefits and costs of
different strategies?
Benefit and cost analyses are based on capabilities derived
from user needs, technical maturity/viability, and the
analytical community's assessments of the threats that must be
mitigated. These recommendations are done at the architectural
level and shared with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
and Mission Requirements Board and then implemented by the
appropriate program offices.
C. Given the historical experience during the Cold War, can space
systems be cost effectively protected?
Cost effectiveness is related to national security
consequences that are realized if no protection action is
taken.
A broad range of protection options covering diplomatic,
information, military, and economic actions can be employed in
cost-effective manner. Experience shows that if a design
requirement is added to a system at the earliest stages of
concept design costs are manageable; however introduction late
in development results in cost increasing dramatically.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large,
historically, SATCOM requirements exceed the capacity of our government
systems. To make up the difference, the military spends over $400
million a year for commercial SATCOM. In Operation Iraqi Freedom over
80% of our military SATCOM requirements were met by commercial
carriers. Does national security require the development of a
Commercial Satellite Communications Policy much like the National
Remote Sensing Policy? What are we doing to ensure our warfighters are
getting the necessary communications capability in a timely and cost
effective manner?
Mr. Large. To provide additional communications capability to the
warfighter, we are building and launching secondary payloads on our
National Systems to transmit critical intelligence information directly
to deployed forces. Using this approach, we can deliver the
communications capability in a very cost-effective manner.
NRO/COMM provides Tactical Communications to warfighter with use of
the Exercise and Operational Communications System (XOCOMM) and
Integrated Broadcast Service Simplex (IBS-S).
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, what is
your assessment of the synchronization between the launch of military
SATCOM systems and the fielding of compatible user terminals? How are
you ensuring that user terminals are fielded to keep pace with new
capabilities introduced on WGS (already on-orbit), AEHF (1QFY09), and
the Navy's MUOS (FY 2010)?
Mr. Large. Defer to General Kehler and/or Mr. Payton.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, please
describe the problems encountered on the Space-based Infrared System
(SBIRS)-High program. What are the plans to resolve these problems and
what are the schedule and cost impacts? Would a schedule delay increase
the risk of a missile warning gap?
Mr. Large. We respectfully defer to the Air Force.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, the
planned launch for the first GPS-III satellite has slipped one year
from FY 2013 to FY 2014. What caused this delay and what is the risk of
a potential GPS gap between the last GPS-IIF launch and first GPS-III
launch?
Mr. Large. Defer to Air Force Space Command.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, the
committee understands the Space Radar program has been restructure in
response to Congressional concerns about affordability, requirements,
technology maturity, and concepts of operation (CONOPS). Please
describe your view of the restructure, the level of commitment from the
DOD and intelligence community, and the status of the analysis of
alternatives study requested in the FY08 defense authorization bill.
Mr. Large. The NRO is working closely with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence on the Space Radar restructure. Support for the
restructured way ahead has been strong within both the DOD and the IC.
This restructure includes standing up a Joint Future Overhead Radar
(JFOR) program office within the NRO, examining application of
commercial and international radar data and/or systems meeting some DOD
requirements and other near-term efforts. The JFOR activity is being
defined through ongoing efforts including the Integrated Collection
Architecture (ICA) and Radar Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) studies.
The ICA GEOINT Balance Team (GBT) will be providing interim results
and data that will enable us to kick-off the Radar AoA in May. The
remainder of the GBT activity and the AoA are expected to provide
results in September 2008.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, please
describe the potential operational concepts and value that
``operationally responsive'' space (ORS) solutions provides to the
joint forces. What is your assessment of the ORS program office
implementation and its responsiveness to warfighter needs?
Mr. Large. The Implementation Plan (approved by DepSecDef 28 Apr
2008) identifies the DOD processes and staffing resources for
operationally responsive space (ORS) and serves as the initial charter
for the ORS Office. To make an assessment on the ORS Office's
implementation and responsiveness maybe be a bit premature. Since its
establishment and standup in FY 2007, the ORS Office has been engaged
with the IC, DOD, and the Services on ORS proposals to develop space
based solutions to support the Warfighter's urgent needs. Over time,
the Warfighter will be able to truly assess ORS Office's effectiveness
and its ability to rapidly respond to the Combatant Commanders
(COCOM's) needs as well as facilitating integrated ORS concepts and
solutions.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, space
acquisition has a poor history of performance. What is your assessment
of the current state of space acquisition and what indicators do you
use to make this assessment?
Mr. Large. The era of Acquisition Reform is over. It has left the
NRO in a fragile state with a poor history of performance.
Recently the space community has recognized its shortcomings and
has pulled together to set new standards and strengthen acquisition
execution, with emphasis on gated processes, mission assurance, and
test-like-you fly verification. As these measures take effect, we will
monitor the number of problems that surface after the control gate that
should have caught them and focus on further process improvements to
discover and resolve issues earlier in the acquisition lifecycle.
In addition, the NRO has taken action to internally establish a
strong corporate governance model to support critical business
processes. The first priority was our acquisition management and the
system engineering processes. This process definition is coupled with
clearly defined leader roles, responsibilities, authority, and
accountability. These actions will begin to reverse the damage brought
by acquisition reform. Clearly our recovery from ten plus years of
acquisition reform will take time, but I'm confident that our people
and contractors will meet this challenge.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large,
affordability and executability of space programs is a bipartisan
committee concern. Do you think the National Security Space programs
have adequate funding to make sure they can be executed in a timely
manner in support of the various missions?
Mr. Large. The NRO operates under the DNI guidance by funding
programs to the DNI Cost Analysis Improvement Group Independent Cost
Estimate (ICE). For current NRO programs, adequate funding is available
to cover the ICEs. The current FY 2009 President's Budget also contains
programs in early acquisition stages where an ICE has not yet been
performed. Emerging programs are adequately funded in the request and
will be subsequently addressed when ICEs are performed.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, what do
you see as the limiting technology in future conflict scenarios? How
are space science and technology investments addressing this need?
Mr. Large. History cautions us to be wary of defining future
conflict scenarios. If there is one thing we can be sure of, it is the
fact future conflicts will take unexpected paths. For this reason, our
space science and technology investments are structured to anticipate
the unexpected and to produce capabilities that will serve the broadest
needs of our warfighters, civil agencies, and national decision makers
in the widest range of contingencies.
As uncertain as the future may be, we can anticipate several
technology challenges. Among these challenges will be the evolution to
more cyber, more wireless, and more encryption--along with the
continuing demand for more bandwith. All of this will occur at a pace
of more rapid evolution/revolution against a backdrop of less defined
actors, targets that are more agile and more deeply imbedded, less
predictable threats, and less sanctuary in space.
To address these challenges, we have developed a science and
technology investment strategy that emphasizes the development of
capabilities embracing fundamental attributes that will allow us to
deliver timely, accurate information in an adaptive, secure and
survivable environment. Our portfolio includes technologies to increase
overhead persistence, enhance area coverage and crate value-added pre-
processing. Our Science & Technology (S&T) investment program
establishes the framework for integration of the entire intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance enterprise in a service oriented
architecture that fosters multi-INT collaboration and processing, while
providing user access to required content with necessary security and
confidence levels on timelines that support mission objectives.
Some examples of these technology thrusts include investments in
information technologies multi-INT services, the development of light
weight optics and electronically steerable arrays. These capabilities
could improve collection access, help the integration of multi-INT
virtual mission centers to connect our expanding base of customers, and
enhance collaboration with mission partners to solve the largest and
most difficult intelligence problems.
In summary, we're preparing for a challenging, unpredictable future
by developing technologies to transform our processes from individual
collection stovepipes to a services oriented architecture delivering
timely, accurate information in an adaptive, secure and survivable
environment, and enabling insertion of new capabilities on rapid
timelines.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, in 2007,
the Australian Government agreed to invest in the Wideband Global
System (WGS). Where are there other opportunities across the space
portfolio for greater international cooperation?
Mr. Large. Defer to National Strategic Space Office within OSD.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, what are
the merits of ``rules of the road'' in space or other international
regimes to promote the safe and responsible use of space?
Mr. Large. Our National Space Policy (NSPD-49) sets out specific
policies which guide our use of space. Inherent within the policy are
principles for safe and responsible space operations established by
treaties to which the U.S. is a signatory. These international regimes
include the Outer Space Treaty which sets a number of general operating
principles for signatory countries that operate within space, and the
Liability Convention which establishes specific rules for assessing
damages within space and as a result of interference. These treaties
are familiar to the countries which operate within space, and they
generally abide by them. However, outer space has become a more
complicated operating environment and we have learned a great deal
about safe operating practices since those treaties were established
nearly four decades ago.
Today globalization is driving nations to modernize technologically
and connect with the international community to achieve commercial and
security goals. Space capabilities are seen as a means for states to
benefit from commercial growth, improve national security, and obtain
global prestige. As the ``space club'' grows there will be an
inevitable increase in the amount of ``space traffic'' generated over
time leading to a need among international stakeholders to conduct
their space operations while ensuring that people, property, and goods
are adequately protected. Satellites are generally costly and delicate
instruments subject to interference both natural and man-made.
`Rules-of-the-Road' can help reduce the prospect of operational
misunderstandings arising between nations from instances where
apparently provocative or threatening actions are observed but not
readily explained. Similarly, rules can help reduce the possibility of
on-orbit collisions and proliferation of deadly space debris.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Large, despite being originally set up for
national-level users, today more than 80% of the data that comes from
the systems built by the NRO provide direct support to the warfighter.
That is unlikely to change anytime soon. How does NRO ensure that its
national intelligence satellites are integrated with the military's
tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED)
infrastructure and processes to ensure timely support for battlefield
intelligence? How does NRO ensure that warfighter requirements are met
and receive sufficient advocacy and funding during the development of
new systems?
Mr. Large. Since the lessons learned from the first Gulf War, the
NRO has focused on delivering its data and data products to the
Warfighter on responsive timelines. These efforts accelerated
dramatically with beginning of the global war on terrorism following 9/
11, first through the fielding of more operational prototypes, followed
by the Strategic Framework published in 2005, and now through the
effort to transform the entire NRO focused on improving the content,
access to, and timeliness of what we deliver.
Our Mission Partners, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
and National Security Agency (NSA), have also had transformational
efforts underway focused on the same goals delivering intelligence to
that tactical user on more responsive timelines. We are working in
close partnership with them to move toward an increasingly integrated
ground system for tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and
dissemination, following guidelines, standards, and policies handed
down from the joint efforts between the DNI and USD(I). Throughout
these efforts, we are working across multiple systems engineering
activities to ensure that our systems join seamlessly and securely to
the DOD architectures (DCGS and the GIG) in which they are investing
billions of dollars to deliver data worldwide to Warfighters.
Regarding requirements for acquisition of systems, we work
continuously with NSA's and NGA's community efforts to understand,
document, and validate (through the IC's and DOD's processes) the
requirements for each acquisition before it is approved. We also carry
out extensive user engagement to educate the Warfighter on our
capabilities, and understand the context in which they use our data.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Large, do you think that the current joint space
programs with the intelligence community are supporting the
warfighter's intelligence requirements? How would you change the
investment strategy to better support the warfighter in theater?
Mr. Large. Yes. While we are not in a position to speak for the
Joint Staff or STRATCOM as to how well their intelligence requirements
are being met or what changes they recommend, I defer to the
aforementioned entities to answer these questions. In response to the
second question, NRO is now doing all things possible to invest in
those programs that will deliver to the Warfighter continuously
improving access, content and timeliness.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. EVERETT
Mr. Everett. General Kehler and Mr. Large, I understand the Chinese
ASAT test was a good example of how intelligence was
``operationalized'' to provide near real-time support to military
users. As threats to space increase, so too will the demand for greater
space intelligence support and resources. How does the Department plan
to address this requirement?
General. Kehler. The space intelligence community coalesced to meet
the operational challenges presented by the Chinese ASAT test. There
remain a number of materiel and non-materiel measures that are being
taken or considered in order to meet the future threat.
Several initiatives have been taken to address the need for more
and better qualified space intelligence analysts. Recent billet
additions at AFSPC, NASIC, DIA and CIA have taken place through
internal reallocations and external over guidance approval. NSA has
reprioritized for better space analysis and USSTRATCOM J2 is
reestablishing space analysis. Overall analytic resources will remain
insufficient, despite the improvement cited above, and will require
active efforts to increase efficiency and collaboration.
AFSPC is hosting an interagency forum to review/refine intelligence
shortfalls and to seek interagency solutions. AFSPC has also conducted
a review of its sensors and capabilities to provide Space Situational
Awareness (SSA) and has created a road map for improvement. Studies are
underway to determine all potential contributors that will provide
information and intelligence to support the characterization portion of
SSA.
A number of efforts are underway to make space collection and
analysis more efficient. The Defense Intelligence Space Threat
Committee under NASIC leadership has been established to oversee and
coordinate a wide variety of complex space/counterspace analytical
activities. The Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Agency has begun the process of incorporating Air Force Space Command
sensors and capabilities into an intelligence master plan. In addition,
processes to automate space intelligence preparation of the battlespace
and to transition to predictive battlespace awareness are well
underway. Space/counterspace intelligence requirements have been
revaluated and are now being reprioritized and rewritten to more
clearly focus the intelligence community.
Training is also a critical element of Air Force efforts to address
adversary space threat. AFSPC recently expanded the Space Professional
Development Program to include the Air Force intelligence community.
The National Space Security Institute (NSSI) has begun a comprehensive
review and expansion of Air Force Space Command's space professional
training courses in close cooperation with the HQ AFSPC/A2 (ISR
Directorate) and intelligence community at large.
Mr. Everett. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, describe the planned
users of TSAT. What impact do the $4 billion cut and schedule delays
have on planned users of TSAT?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. The $4 billion reduction to
the TSAT baseline delays initial launch capability approximately two
years. Users requiring survivable, anti-jam, strategic communications
will continue to have worldwide coverage through the Milstar and AEHF
constellations through 2021, while the fielding of the Wideband Global
SATCOM (WGS) constellation will greatly increase DOD's organic wideband
communication capability. Particular impacts from the delay of TSAT's
additional capabilities, including high data rate protected
communications (XDR+) and protected Comm On The Move (COTM) for ground
forces, are being assessed as part of the Deputy Secretary of Defense-
directed MILSATCOM Investment Strategy study. This study was initiated
to reassess when the specific communication capabilities planned for
TSAT are needed by the user community and to determine if there are
solutions available to realistically deliver these capabilities in a
more affordable manner than the current TSAT program. The Services and
Combatant Commands are involved in this study, and findings and
recommendations are expected to be briefed to the Deputies Advisory
Working Group in June 2008.
Mr. Everett. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, given the proliferation
of SATCOM jamming systems, how important are the protected
communications features of TSAT? Can these features be incorporated
into other SATCOM systems?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. Critically important.
Proliferation of SATCOM jammers and the understanding of their value in
warfare is a growing threat. For relatively little money an
unsophisticated adversary can put much of our unprotected
communications at risk, with potentially grave consequences. Our most
essential communications must be protected from jamming and, as our
warfighting forces' information dependence grows, the requirement for
anti-jam communications grows with it. Next year, the Advanced EHF
system will begin supplanting Milstar to provide an order of magnitude
increase in protected SATCOM capability. However, even that will fall
short of needs within a decade and we must do more. TSAT will be sized
and phased according to results of the ongoing DOD MILSATCOM investment
strategy study to meet that greater need and to enable a leap forward
in net-centric warfighting concepts. That study is considering whether
some portion of the protected SATCOM mission can be satisfied by other
programs. The Air Force will continue to meet warfighter requirements
for protected communications via the SATCOM architecture the Department
determines to be optimum.
Mr. Everett. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, space acquisition has a
poor history of performance. What is your assessment of the current
state of space acquisition and what indicators do you use to make this
assessment?
Secretary Payton and General Kehler. The state of space acquisition
is improving. Over the last 12 months, we have several demonstrated
successes: a new record of 58 consecutive successful Medium and Heavy
National Security Space (NSS) launches; deployed the first Wideband
Global Satellite (WGS) for operational use; and launched and begun
operations on two GPS IIR-M satellites. In October 2007, we implemented
a new GPS ground segment with no impact to PNT services.
We recognize challenges remain with cost growth and schedule
impacts in some areas of space acquisition and are actively pursuing
solutions. Our efforts are guided by a Back-to-Basics philosophy
identifying clear requirements and applying disciplined systems
engineering and effective management/planning, while providing the
program manager the appropriate resources to ensure success.
Historically, programs perform better when they have clear, stable
requirements, technology at the appropriate level of maturity, and
high-confidence cost estimates early in the acquisition process. We
continue to focus on these areas, and are starting to see indications
that this approach is working. For example, GPS IIIA and FAB-T recently
completed independent technology assessments supporting their
transition to Preliminary Design Phase.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Payton and Mr. Large, the Pentagon's 2008 China
military modernization report finds that China continues to develop a
multi-dimensional counterspace program, ``China's space activities and
capabilities, including ASAT programs, have significant implications
for anti-access/area denial in Taiwan Strait contingencies and
beyond.'' What implications do these developments have on our national
security space posture? Do our military operational and contingency
plans account for these potential space-based ``anti-access/area
denial'' scenarios and their implications for surface, air, and other
forces? Do military war games and exercises include such scenarios and
are potential redundancies or alternative capabilities exercised?
Secretary Payton. The number of space faring nations is growing and
it should be noted China is not the only country to possess
counterspace capabilities. We now operate in a contested space domain
and, therefore, Space Situational Awareness and Space Protection are
high priorities for National Security Space (NSS) systems. While some
of our space capabilities are protected, we realize that we will likely
face a wider range of threats to not only the satellites, but also
their ground infrastructure and the links that control/connect these
systems
To address these issues, Air Force Space Command and NRO
established a Space Protection Program (SPP) on 31 March 2008, to help
make informed decisions about how to best preserve our space
capabilities via comprehensive vulnerability assessments, protection
strategies and concepts, protection technologies investment, and
protection capstone requirements definition with roadmaps to define
integration of protection capabilities into future systems.
Additionally, we are increasing our efforts to develop Operationally
Responsive Space (ORS) capabilities to allow us options in the future
to quickly replace or augment existing satellite capabilities.
Combatant Commands (COCOMs) consider space based ``anti-access/area
denial'' scenarios and implications in their military deliberate/
contingency planning. COCOMs are required by their Unified Command Plan
and other Strategic Guidance to consider employment in all domains (to
include space) as they develop their operational concept(s).
Multiple war games include exploration of concepts associated with
space vulnerabilities. Examples include: Unified Engagement, the Air
Force Future Capabilities Wargame, and the Schriever Wargames (held by
Air Force Space Command, with Joint and Coalition partners). These war
games specifically look at space vulnerabilities and impacts of denied
capability. A common theme of all these activities is the absolute
criticality of bolstering fidelity of space situational awareness.
Mr. Everett. Mr. Payton and Mr. Large, the Pentagon's 2008 China
military modernization report finds that China continues to develop a
multi-dimensional counterspace program, ``China's space activities and
capabilities, including ASAT programs, have significant implications
for antiaccess/area denial in Taiwan Strait contingencies and beyond?''
What implications do these developments have on our national security
space posture? Do our military operational and contingency plans
account for these potential space-based ``anti-access/area denial''
scenarios and their implications for surface, air, and other forces? Do
military wargames and exercises include such scenarios and are
potential redundancies or alternative capabilities exercised?
Mr. Large. Note: This response is broken into three parts below.
Part 1: Space capabilities are vital to our national security. At
the same time, potential adversaries continue to seek means to counter
these advantages. Our space capabilities face a wide range of growing
threats. The threat exists end-to-end and requires a new way of
thinking and a new way of addressing the challenges facing the space
community.
The recommendations from on-going assessments are carefully
factored into our space systems architecture planning and resulting
investment priorities. Our investment strategy for space and space-
related activities is a balanced approach to achieving these
capabilities. Our space control investment strategy, for example,
balances the need for space situational awareness, protection of our
space capabilities, and protection of terrestrial forces and the
homeland from threats posed by adversarial use of space.
Part 2: The complete protection picture requires that we take a
careful look at the vulnerabilities on the ground as well as those in
space; these vulnerabilities take many forms. The NRO is committed to
protecting the information and assets that help us maintain our
Nation's freedom and security from any threats. Unfortunately, the
unclassified nature of this forum precludes me from discussing any
specific details. Any further details must be discussed in a closed
session.
Part 3: Our military wargames and exercises have developed and
matured over decades resulting in a robust capability that includes a
wide variety of scenario. Any further detail must be discussed in a
closed session.
Mr. Everett. General Kehler and Mr. Large, I understand the Chinese
ASAT test was a good example of how intelligence was
``operationalized'' to provide near real-time support to military
users. As threats to space increase, so too will the demand for greater
space intelligence support and resources. How does the Department plan
to address this requirement?
Mr. Large. I respectfully defer to General Kehler.