[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-92]
ARMY STRATEGIC INITIATIVES
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 26, 2007
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Tenth Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina DUNCAN HUNTER, California
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
ADAM SMITH, Washington California
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
RICK LARSEN, Washington JEFF MILLER, Florida
JIM COOPER, Tennessee JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam TOM COLE, Oklahoma
MARK E. UDALL, Colorado ROB BISHOP, Utah
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
NANCY BOYDA, Kansas CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
KATHY CASTOR, Florida
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member
John Wason, Professional Staff Member
Margee Meckstroth, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2007
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, September 26, 2007, Army Strategic Initiatives........ 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, September 26, 2007.................................... 49
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2007
ARMY STRATEGIC INITIATIVES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 3
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Casey, Gen. George W., Jr., USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army....... 9
Geren, Hon. Pete, Secretary of the Army.......................... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Casey, Gen. George W., Jr.................................... 64
Geren, Hon. Pete............................................. 53
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Equipment exhibits submitted by Gen. George W. Casey, Jr..... 75
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Spratt................................................... 81
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Abercrombie.............................................. 89
Mr. Loebsack................................................. 92
Mr. Ortiz.................................................... 85
ARMY STRATEGIC INITIATIVES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 26, 2007.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:45 p.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Ladies and gentlemen, we will come to order.
We are pleased to have the Secretary of the Army with us
today and the Army Chief of Staff. We will officially welcome
them in just a moment. Two matters before we begin.
I notice there is a soldier in full body uniform. And I
hope your sergeants will not ask you to keep that on the entire
time. So feel free, after you have been properly introduced a
few moments from now, to remove that, because it gets hot in
here, even with a suit coat on, so feel free to remove that.
Also we meet today on our chief of staff Erin Conaton's
birthday, so I want to say happy birthday to Erin Conaton.
Secretary of the Army, Honorable Pete Geren, Army Chief of
Staff, General George Casey, we welcome you as our special
guests.
We know General Casey to be an outstanding leader,
dedicated soldier, and the Army is very much in capable hands.
We hold this hearing today at General Casey's request. He has
asked for this opportunity to present to the Congress his
assessment of the current state of the Army, providing his
insight into what the future holds for it, and then describe
for us the set of priorities as he guides the Army forward.
I want to stress how this is an example of the sort of
partnership that should and does exist between the Department
of Defense and our committee. Of course this committee is
charged with oversight of the Department of Defense, and
sometimes we have to be directive in our dealings. But we are
certainly happy to provide a forum to discuss important aspects
of our national security as well.
And, General Casey, we appreciate your request.
I might say that the Secretary and the General had a time
limit on their testimony. They were kind enough, in mind of our
vote, to extend it to 6:15. And we will do our best to have all
the members ask questions by then.
General Casey, the Army has a good story to tell. It is
stressed today, and I expect we will hear exactly how stressed
it is in a moment. I am certainly going to say a few words
about that. But at the bottom of it, it is still a good-news
story. Even in the face of all the stress, your soldiers, your
civilians, your Army families continue to meet the challenges
before them, as they have done for 232 years.
But the Army stands on the edge of a cliff. Six years of
war in both Afghanistan and Iraq threatens to push it over. The
Army's people are exhausted by repeated combat rotations, and
your equipment is worn. This is first and foremost a question
of strategic risk.
Gentlemen, during the 30 years I have had the honor to
serve in Congress, this country has used military force on 12
separate occasions. In most cases, the United States was forced
to act, with little warning. It will happen again, later, we
hope, and undoubtedly sooner than we would like.
That lesson drives my present concern about the readiness
of U.S. forces, particularly the Army and their ability to
deter, deploy, and defeat potential adversaries of the United
States.
Congress is charged with providing our military with what
they require to safeguard our national security. The most
critical task we face, therefore, is to attend to the readiness
of those forces. Readiness is about having the right people in
the right numbers and providing them with the best leadership
and educational opportunities available. It is about forces
that are properly equipped and thoroughly trained for any
contingency. It is also about ensuring that those trained and
ready forces are aligned with the proper set of roles and
missions. In short, it is about reducing strategic risk.
In 1921, Major General Leonard Wood published a book
entitled, America's Duty. In it, he wrote that, ``Americans are
cheerfully confident that an untrained American is as effective
in war as a highly trained and equally well-educated foreigner
of equal physical strength and intelligence. There is a lack of
appreciation of the fact that willingness does not mean fitness
or ability.'' Those words of General Leonard Wood remain true
today.
General Wood wrote those words almost 30 years before Task
Force Smith was sent to repel North Korea's invasion of South
Korea in the summer of 1950. In the intervening years, we did
not take his warning seriously. Undermanned, underequipped,
undertrained, the soldiers of Task Force Smith were unprepared
for the attack that came their way in the result of a
humiliating retreat to the Pusan Perimeter. Those soldiers in
our Nation learned the hard way that sending unready forces to
war can have disastrous consequences. Today we would do well to
keep General Wood's words and Task Force Smith's fate in mind
when we consider the state of our military.
The Army has degraded to an intolerable point. We broke it
so badly in the years following Vietnam that, in 1979, Army
Chief of Staff General Shy Meyer warned Congress of a
``hollow'' Army. We skip forward to January of this year when
your predecessor, General Peter Schoomaker, appeared before
this committee, and I asked him if he were comfortable with the
readiness of his force. He replied, ``I do have continued
concerns about the strategic depth of our Army and its
readiness.''
The parallels are alarming. We cannot risk breaking the
Army again. This is not a comment on your willingness, but
recognition, as General Wood recognized, that will alone is
insufficient. We must set about the task of rebuilding the
Army. But rebuilding it in a way that it was before the wars
will not be enough. As we reset it, it must evolve so that it
develops the resonant capabilities required to conduct the full
range of missions that it will face in the coming years: high-
intensity combat, to be sure, but also counter-insurgency
missions like those that have bedeviled us in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
I look forward to your thoughts on how we move forward
together to make sure our soldiers have what they need to meet
the demands of the future, not just the equipment, but the
training and the installations they need as well.
The modern equipment, challenging training ranges, and
robust installations are worthless without the right sort of
people in the ranks. The Army has some of the finest people in
the world, but I am worried about them, and I am worried about
your ability to retain them after so many rotations to combat
that their heads must be spinning, particularly the mid-career
sergeants and the lieutenants and captains, upon whom the
future of this force depends.
I am worried about our ability to recruit them in the
numbers we need, even as we grow the Army, without relying on
measures that threaten the quality of our force. And I am
worried about your ability to care for them, should they become
sick or wounded.
The common thread running through all of those challenges
involving your soldiers is that they have families they care
about and who care about them. Parents have to know that, when
they send their sons and daughters to you, they are going to
get the best of everything: the best leadership, the best
training, the best opportunities, and the best care. Married
soldiers have to know that, when they are deployed, their
families are going to be taken care of. And Army families have
to know that they are going to have a chance to be a family
again, to live a relatively stable life together for a
reasonable period when their soldier returns.
The Army's recent decision to increase funding for family
support programs is a good step. But the question is, how long
will the support continue?
I look forward to hearing about all of this, and, again,
General, thank you for suggesting this hearing.
And we would like to hear from our ranking member, our
friend from California, Duncan Hunter.
STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Hunter. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you for
holding this hearing.
And it is great to welcome Secretary Geren back to this
committee, as a guy who sat on the committee for a number of
years and impressed us all with his leadership, with his
intelligence, and with his eloquence. And, you know, Pete Geren
was the epitome of the tradition of this committee, which is
bipartisanship.
And I remember, when this Administration first started, Mr.
Secretary, you had a number of members of this committee,
equally split between Democrats and Republicans, who wrote the
Administration and said that you were one invaluable public
servant who should be in the Department of Defense, helping to
shape policies. It is really great to see you. And thanks for
your great tradition of bipartisanship, because that is what we
need in large supply right now.
And to the Chief of Staff, General Casey, I would like to
welcome you back. You have been before the committee as a
former Vice Chief of Staff. A lot of us have seen you in Iraq
as a former commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq. Today
you sit before us as the 36th Chief of Staff of the Army. So a
special thanks to you, as well. And you have gone through the
hoops and lots of bumps and tough challenges in those last
several years and, I think, always given us a good,
straightforward presentation and good, straightforward
leadership. And we appreciate your appearance before us.
You know, we are fortunate to have each of you serving us.
And as I have already said, the Army asked to have this
hearing so that the Secretary and the Chief of Staff could
present the committee with a set of strategic initiatives that
they have developed to set the Army on a strong course for the
future.
So, General Casey, it is my understanding that, based on
current demands, you believe the Army is out of balance, and
that these strategic initiatives that you are here today to
discuss are intended to restore this balance and to prepare our
Army for a period of persistent conflict.
The war we are fighting today is, without a doubt, wearing
on our force. However, I would ask both of you, are we supposed
to only fight the wars that improve military readiness? No one
will argue that the readiness of our military is absolutely
crucial to the national security strategy. However, should
declining readiness trends spur us to throw up our hands and
give up, or should these trends be a warning to all of us and
compel us to identify, fund, and fix the shortfalls that put
our Nation at risk?
The holes in the yard, which General Schoomaker talked
about at great length, which are the shortfalls in equipment
that existed when the war started, the sustained combat
operations in extremely harsh conditions, and the simultaneous
effort to transform the Army while we are having a warfight in
two theaters, all stress the force.
So, gentlemen, thanks for being with us today to talk about
your strategic initiatives. We have, at times in our history,
been caught off-guard and forced into a reactionary mode. That
is never good. It is a reflection on your leadership and
character that you are here today not at our request but at
yours, to alert us of your concerns, your needs, and your
strategic vision for the Army.
I am glad to hear that one of the areas you intend to
concentrate on is support for our soldiers and their families.
And I absolutely believe that taking care of soldiers and their
families, no matter where they are, is our top priority.
I would also like to point out that when it comes to taking
care of soldiers and their families, this committee has a
reputation for stepping up to the plate. For many years, the
committee has raised the issue of increasing end-strength. In
fact, the Committee Defense Review, last year, recommended just
that to the Administration. And many members on this committee,
individually, have worked on that issue for a number of years.
And, as a matter of fact, we have increased, to some degree,
the end-strength of the United States Army, as well as the
Marine Corps. But I think we all welcome the increases that are
recommended in this year's budget.
I am also reminded that when you ask us for money for
reset, this committee authorized every penny that you asked
for. And I think that is a reflection on the credibility that
you bring to the committee when you make requests that go
straight to the heart of readiness and force effectiveness.
So let me just make it clear that there should be no doubt
that the committee will again take the lead to ensure that the
Army gets the necessary funding that it needs to take care of
soldiers and their families for both the current and the future
force. In order to do so, we must know what is required. And my
challenge to both of you is for you to control the bureaucracy;
don't let the bureaucracy control you. If our Army needs
something, tell us.
And our record, again, gentlemen, has been that this
committee responds very quickly and very effectively to
straight talk, to candid requests. And I think we stand ready
to do that right now.
So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing.
And, again, to Pete Geren, thanks for coming home. And it
has always been great to work with you. And you are the epitome
of bipartisanship, in the tradition of this great committee.
And, General Casey, thank you for being with us. I look
forward to your testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.
Before I introduce Secretary Geren, I might comment, I bet
we look a little bit different from that side of the table than
when you were sitting here looking toward the table. We
appreciate your service very much, and we will ask you to
testify for us now, and then followed by General Casey.
Secretary Geren.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETE GEREN, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
Secretary Geren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr.
Chairman, thank you for hosting this hearing.
And, Congressman Hunter, thank you, as well.
And thank this committee for the extraordinary support of
the United States Army day-in, day-out, year after year.
Mr. Chairman, the view is a little different from this side
of the table. I think the air conditioner doesn't work quite as
well on this side of the table either.
A little different setting from this perspective, but it is
truly an honor to be here. This committee and this Congress
always has made soldiers a top priority, always made the United
States Army a top priority. And I speak for a million men and
women in uniform and a couple hundred thousand civilians when I
say ``thank you'' to every one of you for standing with the
Army during all the time, but certainly during these most
challenging six years that we have been through during this
first six years of this century.
I also want to thank so many of you for going to theater.
It means a lot to soldiers to know that their elected officials
see them where they are doing their work, where they are doing
the hard work of freedom. And they appreciate it very much. It
means a great deal to them. It is a great boost for their
morale. And I know how hard it is to leave the District, I know
how hard it is to leave here. You are awfully busy. And that so
many of you have gone over there, time after time, means a
great deal to the soldiers. And thank you for doing that.
We have 150,000 soldiers today in harm's way. We have those
who have just gotten back, and we have those who are preparing
to go. The 150,000 soldiers we have in harm's way today are the
best-led, best-equipped, and best-trained soldiers we have ever
put in the field. And today the Chief and I are here to discuss
with you what your Army leadership plans to do to ensure that,
5 years from now, 10 years from now, 20 years from now, we can
still say the same thing, that our soldiers will remain the
best-led, best-trained, and best-equipped.
The Chief is going to talk about four imperatives: to
sustain, to prepare, reset, and transform our force. I would
like to focus on three subsets of those imperatives, three
fundamental building blocks to ensure that we are prepared for
the threats of the future and the threats of the present, what
we need to do right now to make sure we meet the needs of
soldiers and what we need to do in order to make sure we remain
ready over the coming years.
I am going to talk about the all-volunteer force and the
role of the Army family in the health of the all-volunteer
force, talk about health care and what we owe to our soldiers.
Mr. Chairman, you said that moms and dads who send their
kids into the Army, they expect the best, and we expect that we
are going to give them the best. I can assure you that that is
our commitment.
And, third, an issue that has come on the screen lately, a
very important issue for the long-term health of this Army, and
that is acquisition, contracting, logistical support to
soldiers. Wherever in the world we send them, we have to make
sure we are going to be able to get them what they need and
when they need them.
I am going to talk about these three issues today.
We believe we are in an era of persistent conflict. Where
we are today is the new normal. September 10, 2001, is a
distant memory. We are never going to return to that era of
organizing our Army, equipping our Army, training our Army. The
new normal is the era we are in now. And, as we look into the
future, we believe it is going to be an era of persistent
conflict, and we have to organize training our Army
accordingly.
The all-volunteer force is a national treasure, and it is
not very old. The all-volunteer force is only 34 years old,
really a blink of an eye when you consider the history of armed
forces of the world and certainly even the armed forces of the
United States.
And the all-volunteer force is not just the soldier; the
all-volunteer force is a soldier plus the family. The soldier
volunteers; the family volunteers to stand with him or stand
with her. And if you are going to have a strong all-volunteer
force, you have to have a strong soldier but you also have to
have a strong family.
And when October 7th rolls around next month, we will be
moving into the seventh year of combat operations in
Afghanistan. This is the third-longest conflict in the Nation's
history. It is the second-longest conflict we have ever been
through since the Revolutionary War with an all-volunteer
force. Since the Revolutionary War, we have never asked an all-
volunteer force to shoulder this kind of a burden for our
Nation for this length of time.
And the demographics of this Army are different than the
demographics of any Army we have fielded before. We have a
million soldiers, but half a million of those soldiers are
married--more than half a million. And more than half of those
spouses are employed and work outside of the home. There are
700,000 children in the families of the United States Army
family. When a soldier deploys, a married soldier, he or she
leaves a single parent behind and all the challenges associated
with that family dynamic. When a single parent deploys, that
single parent leaves a child in the care of others. Twelve
months was asking a lot of those families, and 15 months is
asking more. And we, as an Army, are stepping up and doing what
needs to be done now and planning for the future to meet the
needs of those soldiers and those families.
In the 1970's and 1980's, the issue for the future of the
all-volunteer force was pay, and there was a crisis in pay. And
the Congress and the Administration, in the early 1980's,
stepped up and met that crisis and adjusted the pay accordingly
and have continued. This Congress has led the way since then to
make sure that our soldiers had the compensation that they
needed.
In the 1990's, also led by Congress, we saw a housing
initiative that was pushed by the Congress that has done more
than any other single factor to improve the day-to-day quality
of life for our soldiers: the Residential Communities
Initiative, which, led by Congress, we have since, as an Army,
invested $1 billion; the private sector has invested over $10
billion. And we have built wonderful homes in neighborhoods for
families all across our force.
And for those of you who have seen it, I know you know what
I am talking about. We have built great neighborhoods, and the
soldiers appreciate it a great deal. For the members who have
not had an opportunity to see the product of the Residential
Communities Initiative, I urge you to do so. I think you will
be impressed and proud of what you have done for soldiers.
Now the focus is on the family in an era of persistent
conflict: the family after six years of war; the family
anticipating that this war is going to go on; and what do we
need to do to support that family.
In recent years, the Army has increased by 40 the number of
child-development centers, and we have in our budget plans for
22 more. We built more fitness center, more chapels, more youth
centers. And last summer, Mr. Chairman, as you know, we moved
$100 million out of existing programs into family programs to
dramatically increase funding to higher family readiness
support assistance. We have doubled the funding for child care.
We have provided additional respite care. And we have expanded
youth programming across the Army.
Soon, in the next couple of weeks, we are going to announce
and launch an Army Family Action Plan. We are going to add
additional resources to family programs working to improve
education, health care, employment opportunities, improved
housing, and providing additional funding to existing programs.
The Army Family Action Plan will be an important step
forward, but we have to always remind ourselves that support
for the family is going to be a dynamic effort. The needs of
the family are going to change; the demands on the soldiers are
going to change. And we look forward to working with the
Congress to continue to meet the needs of families.
Health care: What happened at Walter Reed was a tragedy for
soldiers, and it was a tragedy for the United States Army, but
it was a wake-up call to the United States Army. And I am proud
to see the way that soldiers stepped up and worked to change
that system, stepped up to make that system work better for
soldiers.
And, Mr. Chairman, I think this poster we have in the
corner captures a spirit of what we have done at Walter Reed
and all across our system to do a better job of meeting the
needs of wounded warriors. The soldier in the picture is
Sergeant Major Brent Jurgensen. He was twice badly wounded in
combat in Iraq, and he is now the Sergeant Major for our
Wounded Warrior Program. He is a great leader, and he is
leading us and making sure that we do what we need to do, what
our soldiers deserve in supporting them.
We have made tremendous changes since the revelations at
Walter Reed. I think the mission statement also captures the
spirit of the change out there. The mission statement now of
our soldiers who are wounded, who are under care throughout our
system, ``I am a warrior in transition. My job is to heal, as I
transition back to duty or continue serving the Nation as a
veteran in my community. This is not a status but a mission. I
will succeed in this mission because I am a warrior and I am
Army-strong.'' That is the spirit that we are taking to serving
the soldiers who are wounded. And across our entire system we
are building these warrior transition units. We have made great
steps forward in meeting the needs of those soldiers.
I would like to switch now to an issue--and, Mr. Chairman,
I have spoken with you about this one--one that has come up
recently on our screen but one that poses great challenges for
our Army. We have had contractors in the field since George
Washington led our Army. But with the drawdown that we
experienced in the 1990's, we have come to rely more heavily on
contractors in the field. Right now, our force in Iraq is about
55 percent soldiers and about 45 percent contractors, with
contractors doing many of the jobs soldiers did in the past.
And as we look to the future, an era of persistent conflict
and our need to be able to deploy anywhere in the world
whenever the Nation calls, we have to make sure that our
contracting system is able to support soldiers, provide them
the base support they need, transportation support they need,
and any other services that we cannot provide organically
through our Army.
But we have lately discovered that we have some flaws in
that system, and we have an aggressive criminal investigation
effort to rout out those flaws. We, in the Army, are working to
address the cultural failings that allow Army soldiers to make
the decisions that they have made and violate their trust.
But we also are looking to the future. And this conflict,
six years of war, and anticipating this era of persistent
conflict, has caused us to focus on our soldier support system.
We have appointed a commission, under Dr. Jacques Gansler, to
look at the future needs of our soldiers in combat anywhere in
the world. And we will be coming back to you over the coming
weeks with our plan, and look forward to working with you to
make sure that we are properly organized, trained, and equipped
to meet the soldiers' needs.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for the opportunity to
appear before you today and, again, thank you for your support
of soldiers. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Geren can be found in
the Appendix on page 53.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Secretary Geren.
General Casey, this is your first appearance before us as
Army Chief of Staff. We welcome you before us today, and we
thank you for your service. You are recognized, General Casey,
please.
STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, CHIEF OF STAFF,
U.S. ARMY
General Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. And while I am more than willing to share credit for
whose idea this hearing was, I do welcome the opportunity to
come before you today and talk to you about what I have seen in
my first almost six months on the job and the direction that
the Secretary and I think we need to move the Army, with your
help, over the next three or four years.
As the Chairman said, our Nation has been at war for over
six years. Our Army has been a leader on the front lines of
this war and back here at home. And, over time, these
operations have expanded in scope and duration, and, as a
result, our all-volunteer force has been stretched and
stressed. Over these last six years, Congress has responded to
the Army's request for resources. And that kind of commitment
to the Army, our soldiers, and their families is both necessary
and deeply appreciated.
We live in a world where global terrorism and extremist
ideologies are real threats. And, as we look to the future, I
believe that the next decades will be ones of what I call
persistent conflict. And what I mean by that is a period of
protracted confrontation among states, nonstates, and
individual actors that are increasingly using and willing to
use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.
And there are several emerging global trends that are
likely to exacerbate this period of protracted confrontation.
Just a few: globalization--now, clearly, globalization has
positive impacts around the world but can also create have and
have-not situations that can be exploited by extremist groups
to undermine government in societies. Population growth and the
youth bulge that accompanies that can increase opportunities
for instability, radicalism, and extremism. Demand for energy,
water, and food for growing populations will increase
competition and possibly conflict. Climate change and natural
disasters, as we have already seen, can cause humanitarian
crises, population migrations and epidemic disease.
And the two that worry me the most: The proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction has the potential for catastrophic
attacks that will be globally destabilizing and detrimental to
global economic development. And, finally, failed or failing
states that are unable or unwilling to maintain control over
their territory; these can provide safe havens for terrorist
organizations to export terror regionally or around the world.
So, while analysts generally agree on those trends, they
also agree that we will be unlikely to predict the time,
location, or scope of coming conflicts. We do know, however,
that the Army will remain central to our Nation's security and
that we need agile forces that can rapidly adapt to unexpected
circumstances.
The Army has a vision to build those forces, and we are
already executing it. We intend to transform the current force
into a campaign-quality expeditionary force that is capable of
supporting combatant commanders across the spectrum of
conflict, from peacetime engagement to conventional war, in the
21st century. That is what we are about.
So, Mr. Chairman, as we look to that future, we do so with
an Army that is already stretched by the impacts of six years
of war. And while we remain a resilient, committed,
professional force, today's Army, as Congressman Hunter said,
is out of balance. The current demand for our forces exceeds
the sustainable supply.
We are consumed with meeting the demands of the current
fight, and unable to provide ready forces as rapidly as
necessary for other contingencies. Our reserve components are
performing an operational role for which they were neither
originally designed nor resourced. Our current operational
requirements for forces and the limited periods at home between
the deployments necessitate a focus on counterinsurgency
training at the expense of training for the full spectrum of
operations.
Soldiers, family, support systems, and equipment, as the
Chairman said, are stretched by the demands of these repeated
deployments. Overall, we are consuming our readiness as fast as
we can build it. But, with your help, we can act quickly to
restore the balance and preserve the all-volunteer force,
restore the necessary depth and breadth of Army capabilities,
and build capacity for the future.
Four imperatives will frame what I think we need to do here
in the coming years, but implementing these imperatives will
require several years, considerable resources, and sustained
commitment by Congress and the American people.
First imperative: We need to improve the manner in which we
sustain the Army, soldiers, families, and civilians. The
Secretary already talked a lot about what we think we need to
do for families, and the importance of families in the
readiness of the forces. But recruiting, training, and
retaining our soldiers, the centerpiece of this force, can only
be done for transforming our quality recruits into soldiers who
are physically tough, mentally adaptive, and that live the
warrior ethos. These warriors are our ultimate asymmetric
advantage, the one thing that no enemy can duplicate now or in
the future, and we need to keep them with us.
I mentioned that we recognize a strain on families, and we
also recognize that they play an increasing role in the
readiness of this all-volunteer force. So we will ensure that
their quality of life is commensurate with the quality of
service that they provide.
We will also ensure that our wounded warriors are cared for
and reintegrated into the Army and society. And we will never
forgot our moral obligation to the spouses and children and
families who have lost soldiers since September 11th.
So, first, sustain; second, prepare. We need to continue to
prepare our forces for success in the current conflict.
With your help, we have made great strides in equipping our
soldiers, and we are continually adapting our training and
equipment to keep pace with an evolving enemy. We remain
committed to providing our deploying soldiers with the best
available equipment to ensure that they maintain a
technological advantage over an enemy that they face. And I
will show you some of that here in a few minutes.
We also will continue to provide tough, demanding training
at home stations and in our combat training centers to give our
soldiers and leaders the confidence that they need to succeed
in these complex environments. Military success in this war is
tied to the capabilities of our leaders and soldiers, and we
will not fail to prepare them for success.
Third, the Chairman mentioned reset, that we must continue
to reset our units and to rebuild the readiness consumed in
operations to prepare them for future deployment and future
contingencies.
And the notion that the Chairman mentioned about resetting
for the future rather than resetting for the past is exactly
the track that we are on. Since 2003, equipment has been used
at a rate of over five times that program in harsh, demanding
desert conditions.
In addition to fixing, replacing, and upgrading our
equipment and retraining for future missions, we also have to
revitalize our soldiers and families by providing them the time
and the opportunity to recover from the cumulative effects of
sustained operations.
Resetting our force is critical to restoring the readiness
that you spoke about, Mr. Chairman. And reset must continue as
long as we have forces deployed and for several years
thereafter. The commitment to providing resources to reset our
forces is what is essential to restoring the strategic depth
and flexibility to the country.
Last, transform: We must transform our Army to meet the
demands of the 21st century. Transformation for us is a
holistic effort to adapt how we fight, train, modernize,
develop leaders, base our forces and support our soldiers'
families and civilians. It is a journey for us, not a
destination.
Let me just say a few words about one element of our
transformation, and that is modernization. We believe we must
continually modernize our forces to put our Cold War formations
and systems behind us and to provide our soldiers with a
decisive advantage over any enemy that they face.
With your help, we will continue to rapidly field the best,
new equipment to our fighting forces, to upgrade and modernize
existing combat and support systems, to incorporate new
technologies spun out of Future Combat Systems research and
development, and, finally, to begin to field the Future Combat
Systems brigade combat teams themselves.
We are ultimately working toward an agile, globally
responsive Army that is enhanced by modern networks,
surveillance sensors, precision weapons, and platforms that are
lighter, less logistics-dependent, and less manpower-intensive.
It is a truly 21st-century force.
So four imperatives, Mr. Chairman: sustain, prepare, reset,
and transform.
Each of these imperatives requires resources. And at the
start of fiscal year 2007, Congress, as Congressman Hunter
mentioned, provided the Army with sufficient base and
supplemental funding to support the war, fund reset, and to
maintain and train the force. With the start of fiscal year
2008 fast approaching, it is imperative that we work together
to ensure that funding is once again available at the start of
the year. This is essential to maintain the momentum to put us
back in balance. Since it looks like we will start fiscal year
2008 under a continuing resolution, I ask, Mr. Chairman, that
Congress provide the necessary resources and authorities to
maintain this momentum.
In closing, your Army is the best in the world at what it
does. We are that way because of our values, because of our
ethos, because of our people and because of your support. We
have magnificent soldiers, leaders, and civilians. They are
ordinary people who are doing extraordinary things for our
country. They have made hard sacrifices, and they will make
more. We have lost over 2,400 soldiers and had over 20,000
wounded, a quarter of those from reserve components. We have
also awarded a Medal of Honor, six Distinguished Service Cross
medals, over 260 Silver Stars and 6,700 other awards for valor.
But it will require more than the courage and valor of our
soldiers to ensure that our Army can continue to fight and win
the Nation's wars in an era of persistent conflict. It will
require clear recognition by national leaders like yourselves
of the threats and challenges that America faces in the years
ahead and of the need to ensure that our armed forces are
prepared to meet them. I am optimistic that we can meet these
challenges together.
Thank you for your attention, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee.
If you would give me five minutes, I would just like to
give you a quick show-and-tell here on some of the equipment
that, one, has come out of the Future Combat Systems research
and development effort and that is in Iraq now, and to show you
how we continue, again, with your support, to improve what we
are doing for our soldiers.
And on Tuesday, we issued the one-millionth set of
equipment to soldiers. When we started out in 2002, there were
15 items, and today there are 84 items. And I will show you
those. But, first, let me just show you a couple----
The Chairman. General, let me say thank you for limiting it
to five minutes. We know that you must leave here, at the very
latest, at 6:15. And we appreciate you extending your leave
time.
And I would like to announce we will have a five-minute
break, no longer than that, at 5 o'clock.
General, you are recognized.
General Casey. Okay. If you just look over here to the
right, I would like to just point out three systems that are in
Iraq now that came out of Future Combat Systems research and
development.
The first one is the Micro Air Vehicle, we call it. It is
also called the ``beer keg unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)'' or
the ``scrubbing bubble.'' But this is a squad- and platoon-
level unmanned vehicle that you can run down an alley, look
around the corner, look up on a roof and see what is up there.
I think you can see the great potential that has for our
soldiers. There are 50 of them in Iraq right now with the 25th
Infantry.
Second, I will point out the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle.
This is a robot that has already been used about 30,000 times,
and it gets credit for diffusing 11,000 improvised explosive
devices (IEDs). There are 5,000 of these in-theater. And you
can also see that sending a robot up to diffuse an IED is much
safer than having a soldier do it.
Hold up one of those unattended ground sensors, if you
would.
These are critical for us. A soldier can take this and put
it in a building or along a road and watch it back in his base,
so we don't have to leave soldiers out inside buildings because
they can watch them through these different cameras, and that
is a great capability.
Again, those first three came out of Future Combat Systems
research and development, so we are reaping the benefits of
that now.
Point to the JTRS, Joint Tactical Radio System.
Now, while this is not fielded, this is the system on which
we will provide voice, data, and video to individual vehicles
and individual soldiers. So if you think about that Verizon
commercial where he has the army behind him, this is the system
that is going to bring that level of knowledge down to the
individual soldier.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 75.]
General Casey. And last, Sergeant Cantrell, will you stand
up, please?
This is Sergeant Joshua Cantrell. He has been sitting here
patiently and ready to go take his stuff off. But this is the
Rapid Field Initiative equipment that we have been issuing to
our soldiers and improving over time.
I am going to ask Frances Aden here, from our project
manager soldier, to talk a little bit about where we are with
this.
Mr. Aden. Sir, we have made this system a lot lighter than
the current body armor that we have right now. We added an
extremely important feature to it where it will allow a soldier
to quickly toss the system in case of emergency, vehicle fire,
rollover. We have added an emergency quick-release to the
system that the soldier is going to demonstrate right now, only
to be used in the case of emergency: vehicle rollover, a fire
or a drowning.
Go ahead and execute.
And the system just falls apart, and the soldier is able to
get out of the vehicle in case of emergency.
General Casey. This system is now the second generation of
individual body armor that we fielded. And so we are continuing
to improve what we are giving to the soldiers over time.
So that is probably less than five minutes. I yield the
balance of my time back to the Chair here.
[The prepared statement of General Casey can be found in
the Appendix on page 64.]
The Chairman. General, we thank you, sir, and we thank your
soldiers so much for being with us.
I just have one question, General. I asked a question of
your predecessor back in January, and I will ask you, General
Casey, today. Are you comfortable with the Army's readiness for
an unexpected serious military challenge?
General Casey. As I mentioned in my opening statement, Mr.
Chairman, I am not comfortable that we could respond as rapidly
as we would like to. It would take us time to reverse
directions, especially for a conventional threat, to train up
to that level.
But I will tell you that this is a combat-seasoned force
that should not be taken lightly in its ability to adapt
quickly. But it would still take longer than I am comfortable
with.
The Chairman. Thank you so much.
Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, again, gentlemen, thanks for appearing before us
today.
You know, last year, on the reset piece, you folks told us
back in June that you were going to have problems with funding
for reset. And so we called you in, we had hearings, some
classified, some open, and you laid out the exact dollar
amount. And I can't remember the exact dollar amount, but it
was--I thought it was $18 billion. Is that right?
Secretary Geren. $17.1 billion.
Mr. Hunter. And we had a subsequent hearing, because I
believe in November we looked at the amount that had actually
been executed at that point and it was something like $3
billion. It was a fairly small amount of that money. And so the
question became--because we had checked, the committee had sent
out teams to the depots to ensure that we had capacity when we
marked up the $18 billion-plus to make sure we had capacity in
the depots to, in fact, do the work that you needed the money
for. And there was a pretty good degree of head room there,
quite a bit of head room, and apparent capacity.
You had a few--we had some problems, I know, with getting
the so-called carcasses of vehicles back in, the ones that were
being reset, that were being worked on, flowing them back in
the country to make sure that they could be refurbished.
How is that piece of reset going? Have we accelerated that
process, and is that smoother now? Or is it still going at a
fairly slow rate? What is your take on that?
Secretary Geren. We are operating the depots right now not
at max capacity, but we are operating them at optimal capacity
considering the load that we have to flow through them. Because
of the surge, we don't have as much in the queue, in reset, as
we would have expected, had it not been for the surge. Next
year, a lot of that equipment will be coming home.
But we have committed 98 percent, I believe is what I was
recently briefed, of all those funds. We have reset 25 brigades
through the depots over the last year. The program is running
well. We have good accountability for the system. And we
believe that we are operating at the optimal level, not maximum
capacity level. Next year, the system will have a greater
demand on it based on what comes back from theater.
General Casey. If I can just add, the reason that we were
able to do that is because of what I said in my opening
testimony. We had the resources from Congress at the beginning
of the year, and we had resources for operations and
maintenance and procurement.
The other thing I would add, Congressman, is not only are
the depots operating at increased capacity, they are operating
more and more efficiently. And they are being recognized
nationally for their efficiency efforts. There is an award
called the Shingo award. It is a public-sector award for lean
manufacturing. In 2005, none of our depots won one of those
awards. This year, 12 did. And so, we are operating with the
money that you are giving us more efficiently here.
So the reset process is going well. If we continue to get
the resources in a timely fashion, we will maintain the
momentum.
Secretary Geren. Let me mention one other thing quickly on
this point. Not only resources are important, but authorities
are important. You all will likely be funding us with a
continuing resolution (CR). And not only do we need the money,
but we also need the procurement authority in order to procure
long-lead items.
One of the reasons it worked so well last year: We had the
money and authorities ahead of time; you could purchase the
long-lead items that take months, in some cases, to get the
depots. If you do a CR, we ask that you give special
consideration to that need, not only the money but the
authorities to procure the long-lead items.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, gentlemen. I think it is smart of
you to let us know early we need to keep it flowing, and keep
it flowing with the authorities.
And, Mr. Chairman, I think it is wise to have this hearing
at this time, and I think it is incumbent upon us to try to
make these bulky packages that are tough to pull through the
political wickets, get them through the wickets, get the money
going and to keep the authority going and to keep the reset
going.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman from California.
Mr. Spratt from South Carolina.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you both for your testimony.
Mr. Secretary, can I get it clear, again, what the reset
costs are likely to be on an annual basis, as the war goes on?
And then afterwards, after the war has faded down, what is the
likely cost going to be over a five-year period of time?
Secretary Geren. I don't have the five-year number. For
next year, we have budgeted $13.5 billion. And I will have to
get you the outyears. I will provide that to you for the
record. But $13 billion for 2008.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 81.]
Mr. Spratt. General Casey, you refer repeatedly in your
testimony to stress and strain on the standing Army. Would you
tell us how exactly how, in your perception, this stress and
strain is manifested? Family problems, lack of military
proficiency?
General Casey. It is certainly not lack of military
proficiency.
What we are seeing is, one, the families are the most
brittle element of the force. There is no question about it. My
wife and I traveled around and talked to Army families all over
the world in the first four months, and it was clear to us that
the families are affected.
And it is a cumulative effect. One spouse stood up at Fort
Bragg and said, ``You know, General, it is not the same,
running a family readiness group, for the second deployment as
it was for the first, and for the third deployment as it was
for the second.'' And people are getting stretched. That is
probably the most significant stressor that we see.
The other stressor, as I mentioned in my opening statement,
the fact that we are only home for 12 months. And so, we can
only focus on the counterinsurgency aspects of the coming
mission, and I don't have the time to train for full-spectrum
operation. So those skills will atrophy over time. We are not
in a bad point right now, as I said, because of the combat
experience of our force, but that will atrophy over time.
Mr. Spratt. I had a visit from some spouses recently,
wives, who felt that the family wasn't adequately involved,
particularly with patients who have symptoms of post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD). That it was a family problem as they
came home, and the identification of these problems and making
the children included to understand what was going on was
critically important. They simply didn't feel that they were
getting that from the active forces or from the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA).
General Casey. We recognize that, as well. And about
probably six weeks ago, we started a chain teaching program on
PTSD and mild traumatic brain injury. And there was a family
version, and there was a soldier version. And the intent was to
have each member of the chain of command teach this to his
subordinates so that we, one, increased awareness and, two,
started working on eliminating the stigma that is attached to
seeking mental health care. So that is working its way to them.
Now, we are also challenged by the lack of availability of
mental health specialists, both inside the Army--I think we are
under 80 percent--and in the civil sector supporting our bases.
And we are taking measures to increase the number of mental
health specialists that are available to soldiers and families.
Mr. Spratt. One last question, a slightly different topic:
the mine resistant ambush protected vehicle (MRAP). The Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has just approved a
substantial increase in the requirement for the MRAP. I believe
the additional costs could be as much as $16 billion. How do
you assess the MRAP? Given the threat we have gotten, is it the
answer to the problem with IEDs?
General Casey. There is no panacea for IEDs, Congressman.
The MRAP will provide our soldiers increased protection against
particularly deeply buried IEDs. And so, there will be an
enhanced level of protection with the MRAP vehicle, but it is
not a panacea. And I think you have been told before that you
must attack the whole IED system and defeat the system, not
just protect yourself against the blast. But it will be an
enhancement.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to follow up on what I thought
was an excellent opening statement that you gave here a few
minutes ago.
Let me just begin by saying I came across a report from The
Heritage Foundation here recently, entitled, ``Four Percent for
Freedom: The Need to Invest More in Defense.'' And if I may
quote from this, ``The United States military has reached a
crossroads. In many respects, American armed forces are better
off than ever before. The all-volunteer force is a proven,
mature, and successful model. America is protected by the
finest service men and women in history, who employ the most
advanced arsenal on the planet. Yet the number, size, and
duration of military deployments have increased dramatically
since the end of the Cold War, while defense spending has
remained at a historically low level.
It is clear if a clearly delineated policy is not
established now to ensure stable funding, the military risks
becoming a hollow force. A hollow force rings loud and clear in
many of our ears. Historically, we have had a pretty good
record on defense spending. During World War II, we spent just
under 35 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). During Korea,
we spent just under 12 percent of GDP. During Vietnam, it was
just under 9 percent. And of course, during the 1970's, we
developed what is known today as the hollow force. We built
back up to six percent during the Reagan buildup. In 1991,
during the first Gulf war, we were 4.6 percent. And today,
according to this Heritage Foundation report, we are at 3.8
percent.
They suggest that robust and consistent funding of the
military is fully within America's capability. Currently, the
U.S. spends only 3.8 percent of GDP on the core defense budget.
That is far lower than during the Cold War and almost a full
percentage point lower than the hollow-force era after Vietnam.
I guess my question is this. They go on to suggest here
that we ought to have a stable funding level of 4 percent of
GDP. If we were to boost defense funding along the lines as
suggested here or along some other line that provided for a
significant $25 billion to $35 billion on an annual basis, my
question is, Mr. Secretary and General, where would be the
prime areas for the Army to invest their share of that
increase?
Secretary Geren. Each year, at the request of the
committee, we provide a list of unfunded initiatives for the
Army, and that would be a place to start.
I think one of the most important things for the Army is
predictable funding. An organization of this size has a very
difficult time managing rapid radical changes in either the
timing or the level of funding. And if I look to the future,
consistent funding and predictable funding would be one of the
most important things that we could ask for. It would allow the
Army to plan, allow the Army to look down the road.
And it is not to say that we can predict what is going to
happen three years from now, five years from now; and we are
always having to tweak budgets on the margins. But in the time
that I have been involved with the Army, the predictability of
funding and the lack of predictability, frankly, has posed some
of our greatest challenges in managing our resources.
But as far as additional resources, I think we would
probably do the same things sooner, rather than do many
additional things.
Chief.
General Casey. I don't really have much to add to that.
Equipment is probably the area that would benefit the most from
additional resources right now. And, as the Secretary said, it
would allow us to do things that we know we need to do sooner.
Mr. Saxton. Like the Chairman, I am very concerned about
readiness. This report also points out some patterns in defense
spending that this committee and others in the Government are
responsible for. The first example it gives is the Pentagon
purchased, on an average, 78 scout and attack helicopters each
year from 1975 to 1990, but only seven each year from 1991 to
2000. Second, an average of 238 Air Force fighters and five
tanker aircraft were purchased between 1995 and 1990, compared
to only 37 from 1991 to 2000. And the third example they give
is the average age of the Air Force in 1993 was just nine
years. The average aircraft age today in the Air Force is 24
years.
And so, Mr. Chairman, I am concerned, like you. I think we
have some challenges ahead of us, particularly given the
persistent conflict that looms in our future.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome our witnesses today. It is good to see my
good friend who was a very valuable member of the Texas
delegation, congressional delegation, for many years and now to
see him as Secretary of the Army.
And, General Casey, Chief, good to see you. And we thank
you for your service, for the good work.
One of the things that worries me is the prepositioning
stocks. Over the past several years, the Army has drawn much of
the equipment that was in the prepositioning stocks. This
equipment has gone to support ongoing combat operations and
also to fill our shortages in units preparing for deployment.
The Army has indicated it will be soon sometime before the
stocks are restored. This is concerning, because the combatant
commander expects to use this equipment to respond to emerging
contingencies in the area of operations.
What actions has the Army taken to mitigate the strategic
risk of having withdrawn equipment from the stocks? And when
will the preposition stock be fully restored?
I know that a few moments ago you said that we might be
able to respond slowly. But what about the equipment when we
have to respond? And this really worries me, because this is
part of my Subcommittee on Readiness. When we look at the
resetting and when we look at the lack of equipment that we
have, this really worries our Subcommittee on Readiness and,
overall, this committee.
So how do we respond to that? And maybe both of you can
help me.
General Casey. At this level of classification,
Congressman, I think it is fair to say that we have consumed a
good portion of our preposition stocks, and we recognize, as do
you, that they need to be replenished.
A lot of that equipment has been sent in with the surge
forces, and the expectation is that it will come out with the
surge forces, need to be reset and then reconstituted. And I
think there is a supplemental addendum coming up here, and a
portion of the money in that is to begin the replenishment of
our Army prepositioned stocks (APS).
I share your concern, but, again, all the preposition
stocks are not consumed. We still have some flexibility. But as
you said, we need to replace that to give back our strategic
flexibility, which is exactly what I talked about in my opening
statement.
Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Geren. I don't have anything to add.
Mr. Ortiz. I know that there has been talk about, both from
the Administration and from Members of Congress, about
redeploying and withdrawing.
We want to be sure that if we were to do that, that we can
do it in a way that it would protect our soldiers as we either
do one or the other. And, of course. I hope that we can win
this war. I know that we cannot predict any future conflict,
but we must be ready just in case.
And I just wanted to see, Mr. Chairman, if later on we can
have--because there are a lot of things that worry me. The
things with Blackwater. I know that between the State
Department and Army, we are paying about $1 billion in
contracting out. We were just wondering the other day, I wonder
how much $1 billion will buy as far as soldiers that we can put
in? I know that we might have to visit end strength, and I
don't know if we are ready to revisit that or not. But
sometimes I hear different testimony about the need for more
soldiers, and I just hope that one of these days we can have a
hearing so that we can all be singing from the same page so
that we can work toward having a victory in Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, thank you so much.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from New
York, Mr. McHugh.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, Chief, welcome. As I have stated in other
forums and I will repeat here today: As a Nation, and certainly
as a committee, we are so fortunate to have great leaders like
you in such challenging times, and I compliment you for
stepping forward and actually asking for a hearing. I am not
sure what that says about your sanity, but it says a great deal
about your bravery and about your concern about the men and
women.
General Casey. As I said, I am willing to share credit for
that.
Mr. McHugh. Fair enough, Chief.
I will tell you, like my friend from Texas who just spoke,
the gentleman from New Jersey who spoke just before him, and of
course the Chairman of the full committee, I too am concerned
about readiness. I know you both are as well. I would tell you,
Chief, in reading your written testimony, your comment that,
quote, ``The current demand for our forces exceeds the
sustainable supply. We are consumed with meeting the demands of
the current fight and are unable to provide ready forces as
rapidly as necessary for other potential contingencies'' is
just downright frightening.
As I said to General Petraeus when I had a chance to visit
him over the August recess in Baghdad, it is awfully
disconcerting to know that as we find ourselves in such a
conflict in Iraq, that one of the key inputs of our strategy
has to be the sustainability and the size of the force.
However, I don't believe the way you win an unnamed war is
to lose the one you know you are in. So that always brings me
back to end strength. And I want to pay you all a compliment.
When we had a Personnel Subcommittee hearing a few months ago,
it sure did not look like you were going to be able to set your
recruiting goal of 518,400 new recruits. That was your Army
objective that went beyond end strength to a grow goal because
we were increasing end strength. And from what I see in the
most recent data, you are going to make that figure and, in
fact, you are going to go a bit beyond that 519,000.
Congratulations on that. That is a real tribute to your
recognition of the importance of recruiting. It certainly keeps
you on schedule to the 2012 date of increasing end strength to
547,000 in the active Army.
And the question I simply have now as we go forward, how
does this committee and this Congress provide you with the
tools, with the resources necessary to continue that successful
recruiting in what admittedly is a very difficult recruiting
environment?
Secretary Geren. It is a tough recruiting environment and
we are on track. The final numbers are not in, but we are
projecting that we will meet the recruiting goals. Active and
Reserves, Guard will fall a tiny bit short but will still meet
their end strength numbers. The Army when you consider active,
Guard, and Reserve, we recruit a force the size of the Marine
Corps every year, and it is a tribute to the young men and
women of this country that in the middle of a war we have that
many people step up, raise their right hand, and join the
regular Army knowing that they are very likely to be sent to
conflict.
We have a strong economy and that makes recruiting
difficult. The recruiting bonuses that you all have authorized
for us have helped us compete in that environment. Some of the
retention bonuses--when we look to growing the Army, adding the
74,000 that we plan across the three services, the retention
issue is a big part of that growth. And the different
initiatives that we have to retain soldiers, these highly
qualified soldiers that have many attractive offers on the
outside, keep them in the service. Meet the needs of their
families. So part of it is financial.
Also as a Nation, and as Members of Congress, your support
for the Army, your support for our forces in harm's way sends a
very important signal to moms and dads that, yeah, I am going
to give you the most valuable thing in my life to my military.
That kind of statement from our leaders sets a tone that allows
us to recruit in this difficult environment.
But we have to continue to fine-tune the effort, fine-tune
the bonuses, fine-tune the approaches. We are working with the
Guard on an active first program. As you are probably aware,
the Guard has been very innovative in their recruiting. They
have tried to turn every Guard a recruiter. We are going to be
partnering with the Guard this coming fiscal year and give us
the strength of their reach into the communities. It is a
challenge but American men and women are stepping up and
meeting the challenge.
The Chairman. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me add my
congratulations to you, Mr. Secretary. And also thank you and
General Casey for your service.
First let me thank you for bringing in the Future Combat
Systems gear here, because last year we actually had some of
these items tested at Fort Bliss and the soldiers gave the
ultimate endorsement, which was they wanted to take this
equipment back with them when they redeployed back to Iraq. So
we appreciate giving Members of Congress an opportunity to see
the products of Army transformation and Future Combat Systems
here. And I thank all the soldiers for being here with us as
well.
I was curious, General Casey, I looked back at your remarks
from your change of command ceremony earlier this year. I know
that both our Chairman and Mr. Saxton were in attendance. You
said at the time, ``We are locked today in a war against the
global extremist network that is fixed on defeating the United
States and destroying our way of life. This enemy will not go
away nor will it give up easily, and the next decade is likely
to be one of persistent conflict,'' as you said here today. You
finished it up by saying, ``We are engaged in a long war.''
I know that I speak for everyone in this room that agrees
that we need to provide all our soldiers and their families
with everything that they need to achieve their mission, come
home safely, and have a good home to come to. As has been
stated here by a number of my colleagues, it is a costly and
intensive endeavor.
Perhaps my question is: Can you help us understand how the
Army is balancing the present and pressing need, urgent need,
to take care of those engaged in combat, and, at the same time,
looking long term at preparing for and modernizing our
equipment and our ability to prepare for future conflicts?
It is something that we as a committee--as I think you have
heard here today and before--really wrestle with. You have
heard concerns about readiness. You have heard concerns to make
sure that we take care of our wounded. Also our military
families. Can you give us a perspective from both you, the
Secretary's viewpoint, and you, General Casey, as well?
Secretary Geren. Striking the right balance, as you
describe, is very difficult. But we feel that the budget that
we have submitted to the Congress does strike the right balance
between the needs of the future and the needs of the present.
And it is not to say that we don't have to make changes along
the way, and we do. We are constantly working within that
budget to meet needs as they are identified. But our
modernization program, our most significant modernization
program in 30 years, the Future Combat System over this 5
years' Defense budget will take less than 5 percent of the
budget. We believe that is an affordable investment in the
future. It is an investment that we need to make. It is hard to
make right now.
Anytime you are engaged in a conflict, as we are, there are
immediate needs, and the Congress has been very supportive in
two supplementals. We have been able to meet those immediate
needs. But the Future Combat System is our investment in the
future. We never want to send our soldiers into a fair fight.
We believe the Future Combat System is going to prepare
soldiers for those conflicts in the future.
General Casey. Congressman, as I went around before I took
over this job talking to former chiefs, every one of them said,
Chief, never forget you are the future's guy. Everybody will
get so consumed by the current requirements that they will take
their eye off the ball, and your commitment to the country is
to deliver the type of Army that the Nation needs down the road
so we don't run into situations like Task Force Smith, as the
Chairman mentioned.
And so what I laid out today in my testimony--sustain,
prepare, reset, and transform--those are the four things that
we are working to balance, to bring ourselves back into balance
here in the next three or four years. Thank you.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you both very much for your testimony
and for your service.
Our staff always prepares for us a memorandum for these
hearings. I wanted to ask you a couple of questions related to
this statement that has been prepared for us. It says that the
Army is reporting that training, equipping, and personnel
readiness levels for nondeployed forces have fallen to
unprecedented lows. Is that true?
Secretary Geren. The readiness of the forces that we deploy
to combat is at the highest levels. The soldiers----
Mr. Bartlett. But this addresses the nondeployed forces
have fallen into unprecedented lows. The tip of the spear is
very sharp, that is true. I just wanted to see if you
identified yourself with this statement.
Secretary Geren. You used the term ``unprecedented.'' I
don't choose that word. But I will say for the deploys and
next-to-deploys, we provide soldiers that are prepared for this
conflict. For the soldiers that are not preparing to deploy,
when you look at the total range of strategic needs that the
Army could be asked to meet, our readiness is not at the levels
that we want it to be. We need full-spectrum readiness, and the
readiness figures that are referred to in that document are
talking about our ability to respond to the full range of
strategic challenges of our country, and we do not--at present
time we could not offer the full spectrum of readiness that is
our goal.
Mr. Bartlett. I think ``unprecedented'' to most people
would mean lowest ever. And if that is true or comes close to
being true, we really need to be addressing that problem, don't
we?
Secretary Geren. Addressing the readiness challenge is a
very high priority for us, Congressman. And we continue to
invest to try to achieve greater spectrum or fuller spectrum of
readiness. But when you are in a fight as we are, resources are
devoted to meeting the needs of that current fight. But
continuing to reinvest in the future and making sure that we do
have a full-spectrum trained force is a challenge. And that is
an area that we need to work with the Congress and we need to
continue to invest to improve in that area.
Mr. Bartlett. This staff report goes on to talk about the
operational risk associated with reduced equipment readiness
for units in the strategic base. And then it makes this
observation: This risk is evident in the degraded readiness
posture of ground units not currently deployed in depleted
prepositioned war stocks and in National Guard units who do not
have all the equipment needed for training.
This fairly represents the factors that produced this state
of unreadiness?
Secretary Geren. Well, you noted in your--the parts you
read about the National Guard, I want to make sure that this is
properly understood. Before a National Guard soldier deploys--
and the soldier will not deploy unless he is certified as ready
and fully trained--they do not have all the equipment at their
home station to be able to do all the training there, and as
they move closer to their deployment point they are--equipment
is made available to them and they are trained. And before they
leave, they have the training that has prepared them to go, and
they will be certified as ready.
But we do not have the Guard fully equipped. In fact over
these 5 years, 2005 to 2013, we are putting nearly $40 billion
worth of investment in Guard equipment. In the next 2 years we
have $13 billion in investment in Guard equipment. We are not
where we want to be with investment in Guard equipment, but we
are improving and we are giving them, across the whole range of
equipment, the top-of-the-line equipment, whether it is trucks,
helicopters, aircraft. We are making an unprecedented
investment in the Guard.
Mr. Bartlett. I read these statements because I thought it
was important for the American public to know the assessment
that has been made by our professional staff who are generally
right on in their assessment of these things.
And talking about end strength, it notes that in 2006 the
Army failed in all three of its categories to meet the
requirements. Failed particularly in Army Reserves. There are
obviously three things that we could do to fix this, in
addition to increased aggressiveness which we are doing in
recruiting. One is that we might turn to a draft. A second is
that we could reduce our use of the forces so that we wouldn't
have to be recruiting more. And, third, and this is maybe the
most important one, we could reconfigure our Army.
It is obvious today that our Army cannot fight without
Guard and Reserve. Many of the skills for fighting are resident
only in the Guard and Reserve. And I noted the most critical
shortfall was in the Army Reserve. We need to address this
challenge to see which of these routes that we will be able to
follow in the future to fix the problem.
I thank you all.
General Casey. Mr. Chairman, if I could make one short
comment for Congressman Bartlett. When I listened to the words
you read from the staff document, that to me sounded like what
I was saying: We are out of balance. And that is what I
described in my testimony. And that is what last year Congress
began to assist us in fixing. And the $17 billion for reset has
already started to show an impact.
But the challenge you have is that it takes two years, once
we get the money, to get equipment in the units. And so as
these things get out of balance, we can't snap our fingers and
put them back in balance. It takes time. We have identified it
and we are moving out with your support.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Before I call on Dr. Snyder, who, by the way, celebrates
his birthday today and we wish him happy birthday tomorrow.
Dr. Snyder. Tomorrow. Don't rush it, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We will be glad to have another hearing
tomorrow to officially compliment you.
Before I call on you, Dr. Snyder, let me--General, I know
of your sense of military history. Reflecting on the words of
Major General Leonard Wood in 1921 about the unpreparedness of
our Nation.
Reflecting on what happened in 1950 in Korea and the Pusan
perimeter and the Task Force Smith, reflecting on what General
``Shy'' Meyer, your predecessor chief of staff said in 1979
that we have a hollow Army, reflecting on your predecessor Pete
Schoomaker in January of this year telling us he was
uncomfortable with the readiness of our Army, how can we
restore that readiness that we need to deter or to prevail
should the unexpected happen?
General Casey. Sustain, prepare, reset, and transform. And
work in partnership with us to make the resources available to
allow us to do that on the timelines. And I believe we can put
this back in balance in three or four years, but it is going to
take that long.
The Chairman. Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here. You are referred to as
the future's guy, General Casey, and I have several questions
that I wanted to ask. I will ask them quick, if you would give
me quick answers.
As you look ahead to the future and your putting together
your numbers what level of forces we need, we currently
probably have in the range of 30- to 40,000 contractors in Iraq
or Afghanistan that are involved in security. And if they
weren't there, probably we would have to have additional
uniform military people.
As you are looking ahead to your numbers, do your numbers
include that there will be a significant contractor security
force, or are we looking to where we are not going to allow
those kinds of contractors in the future? Or is that not a
consideration at this time?
General Casey. In the work that I am doing right now, I am
not looking at replacing security contractors as an element
that we deal with. So I am not looking to increase Army force
structure to provide personal security detachments for
different elements.
Dr. Snyder. So if we were to reach a point as a Congress or
military that we decided that the detriments outweighed the
benefit to have a contractor force, that would put more
pressure on the work that you are trying to do to get the force
where it ought to be?
General Casey. It would certainly add another element. And
I would just say, if I could, I think the estimates of 30- to
40,000 is probably high. I think it is probably in the range of
7- or 8,000. But I don't think anyone really knows.
Dr. Snyder. That is one of the issues, isn't it.
My second question, I thought you had a very good written
statement about looking ahead at some of the issues and the
tensions that will lead to future conflicts. But you talked
about an enemy being immersed in populations. One of my
concerns for some years that I don't think that we meet very
well is the foreign language skills of our military people. And
I have had some folks tell me that one of the reasons is that
the leadership in the military, they have never been expected
to have much in the way of foreign language skills. That
because of that, they are not going to require that for their
juniors down below to have foreign language skills. And the
result of that is that every time we have a war in a new area,
we are scrambling around running classified ads, trying to find
interpreters and people that we cannot get security clearances
on.
You are citing that that is the wars of the future.
Secretary Geren is talking about we are going to be in
persistent conflict. Why are we not starting foreign language
skills in boot camp from day one and say, an hour of day for
the rest of your military career we are going to reach this
level of proficiency. Yours is Farsi, whatever the other
languages are. Why aren't we doing that?
Lack of interpreters is a big problem. The lack of cultural
sensitivity is a big problem. As you are looking ahead to the
future, are we looking to doing more of that?
General Casey. We are, Congressman. And I will tell you we
draw our soldiers from the society. My take is our society is
fairly insular anyway. And so that is where we start. But
clearly we need several levels of language proficiency, one
area for our foreign area officers and for our special forces
that interact with other population. Then there is another
level that I call operational language, where we can send folks
to short-term school and give them some incentives to pick up
the language for the mission that they are in.
Dr. Snyder. Anyway I will finish with that point. But we
are always running behind if we do it that way. We will always
be behind. And being able to ask somebody, Which way does that
road go or where is the bathroom is not the kind of foreign
language proficiency that we need to avoid the problems that we
have.
My third question is you and I talked about this the other
night. Has there been consideration as you are looking ahead as
to what the role of the Guard is versus active component? You
and I have talked about we have 26-, 27,000 troops in Korea.
Has there been consideration to look at some of these missions
around the globe and saying, Why don't we let almost that
entire South Korean mission be Reserve component? It is the
kind of mission where the turnover probably does not matter
that much. We could make the rotations much shorter instead of
a year long.
Do you give that kind of consideration? Seems like we have
done the South Korean mission about the same way for some
decades now. Is that something you all are looking at?
General Casey. Right after dinner we started looking at it.
Dr. Snyder. That is a good enough answer.
General Casey. As you know, we are already using the Guard
in rotation for missions in Kosovo. And as part of our
rotational model, we intend to have four to five Guard brigades
available for deployment. So the notion of deploying them to
Korea is something that is worth looking at, as I told you.
Dr. Snyder. And just my final comment that Secretary Geren
referred to the persistent conflict, and you went through an
eloquent discussion of what is going to lead to the tensions
and the conflicts in the future. We as a Congress have to do a
better job of looking beyond the military as being the power of
this country. And you mentioned epidemics and disease and food
shortages, and we don't spend nearly enough time as a Congress
looking at those kind of things.
Thank you for your statement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz [presiding]. The gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you guys
coming in. The bad thing being this far down the list is many
of the good questions are taken.
Pete, you mentioned earlier about us going to theater. I
came back from this past weekend with two vignettes that I want
to get in the record. One was from our trip to Baghdad. We flew
into Ramadi Saturday afternoon and went to a place called 17th
Street. There is a joint security station there. And we are
standing out in the street, little kids running around between
us and the Marines and doing what little boys do. And the
leader said, six months ago had we stood in that spot, we would
have drawn gunfire. Dramatic change there. That is a vignette
that I bring back.
The other is how adaptive our team is. We were with a
provincial reconstruction team in Nangarhar province in eastern
Afghanistan on Sunday afternoon, and we were having a
conversation with Colonel Pressler. And it is basically
Economic Development 101. It could have been a Chamber of
Commerce meeting: Where do we need roads and electricity and
those kinds of things? And the morning before, he had been in a
four-hour firefight with the bad guys. The next day he has to
put on the ED, economic development, hat. So we have a very
adaptive team and one that we are all very proud of.
The Future Combat System has no shortage of critics. We
have not talked much about the risks that some of these ideas,
particularly the heart of it--the radio is working but the
heart of that network and the risks associated with that. How
do you currently view Future Combat Systems in its current
state? And folded into that there were some comments earlier on
about make a deployable on a C-130. And yet the ground unit is
currently too heavy for a C-130.
So please share with us about the Future Combat Systems and
the current state of risk and development.
The final question, if we could ask Sergeant Cantrell how
long it takes him to put that stuff back together?
Secretary Geren. Many of these products that you see here
in the room are products that have come out of the research for
the Future Combat System. With the conflict we are in, we have
put additional emphasis on spinning out the technologies of the
Future Combat System so that they can help soldiers now. And it
has been successful. Many of the requests that we get from
theater for capabilities, we find that the answers to those
questions come through technologies that have been developed as
part of the Future Combat System.
Mr. Conaway. Speak to us about the heart of it, the
integration of all of that into one unit. The individual pieces
I agree, but what about the network itself and how well that is
going?
Secretary Geren. Well, early on, there were challenges and
the program now is on track. It is on budget. The systems are
coming together. And that is the secret, really, the magic of
Future Combat System is how it empowers the individual soldier.
The knowledge, the situational awareness which now is only
known to commanders, we will be able to take it all the way
down to the company and platoon and eventually all the way to
the soldier level. But there has been great progress in that
regard.
It is still a technological challenge. There is
technological risk in this. We are doing something that has not
been done before. But the progress is good. It is steady and we
are confident that we are on track that the program is going to
succeed. Every time we have to readjust the budget based on a
decision of the Congress, it causes it to stretch out some. And
when you stretch a program out it make its more expensive. But
we are confident of where we are now and believe it is on track
and the technology side of it is moving ahead well.
Mr. Conaway. And the C-130 issue?
Secretary Geren. I can't--I know--I don't know, Chief, if
you could----
General Casey. We are continuing to work that and, frankly,
we are working with the Air Force to decide whether that is
something we still think ought to be a key requirement of the
system.
Mr. Conaway. Sergeant Cantrell.
General Casey. How long does it take to put that back
together?
Sergeant Cantrell. About two minutes, sir.
Mr. Conaway. I yield back, sir.
Mr. Ortiz. The lady from California, Mrs. Tauscher.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Geren, General Casey, thank you both for your
service and the fine men and women that you both command.
General Casey, in your testimony, and also you, Secretary
Geren, you both acknowledge that the Army is stretched. As you
know, in August the House passed H.R. 3159, which is my bill to
mandate minimum periods of rest and retraining for regular and
Reserve components of the armed forces between deployments.
My bill mandates a one-to-one rest deployment ratio for
active duty, and two-to-one rest and deployment ratio for the
Guard and Reserve. This is far less onerous than the Pentagon's
own policy, which is a two-to-one ratio for active duty and
five-to-one for the Guard and Reserves. A majority of the
Senate voted for the same language twice. So we have passed it
out of the House and the Senate has voted for it twice.
What is stunning to me is that while the American people
and the House and the Senate seem to see the need to rest and
retrain our troops, Secretary Gates has recommended a veto
against this bill.
In your testimony, General Casey, you say that current
operational requirements for forces and limited periods between
deployments necessitate a focus on counterinsurgency to the
detriment of preparedness for the full change of military
missions. And we all know that we have a stretched military
that is doing the best it can. Don't have a force big enough to
deal with contingencies.
I want to ask you both the same question. Why is the
Pentagon opposing a measure that will bring relief to our
troops that is less onerous than the Pentagon's own policy? I
also want to know when can we expect you to get back to an
improved dwell time. If you don't agree that this policy is the
right thing to do, to mandate it.
General Casey, how long in your opinion--and please be
specific--do you think the Army can sustain current deployment
and rest ratios, considering they are now 15 months deployed
and 12 months rest period?
Secretary Geren. Well, regarding your bill, as you and I
discussed earlier, we share your goal. When we moved from 12-
month deployments to 15-month deployments, that was because we
needed to do that to meet the demand, to meet the combatant
commanders' needs in the field. Our goal is to get to a point
where a soldier is deployed for a year and home for two; in the
case of the Guard, deployed for a year and home for five.
We can't do that right now with our current force and meet
the demands of the commanders in the field. We have to
organize, train, and equip based on what the needs of the
commanders are. And----
Ms. Tauscher. Secretary Geren, there is a bigger issue
here. If there wasn't a question--if there was no question at
all that we were relatively without any other conflicts or
contingencies that we had to deal with, I think that we could
all deal with a short-term stretch of the military. But I don't
think we live in a very safe world. I think we live in a very
dangerous world. And I certainly don't think for us to say that
because we are pinned down in Iraq right now, that we can
sacrifice--because General Casey said he is the Chief of the
future--we can sacrifice future preparedness and readiness.
I need you to tell me how long do you think you can sustain
this 15-month on, 12-month off, and still maintain the
readiness that we need for future contingencies? I think you
are telling us in somewhat obscure language that you can't.
So I really don't think that I should sit here as a Member
of Congress and say I am going to let you continue to have a
policy that continues to feed soldiers into Iraq, that
sacrifices our future ability to deal with the contingency that
may be in five years, could be in five minutes.
Secretary Geren. We have to manage the troops based on the
needs of the commanders on the ground. Has to be driven by the
needs of the commanders on the ground. And, again, we share
your goal. We would like to have the soldiers home more. We
would like to have them deployed less, and would like to have
them have more time with their families, and would like to have
more time to train them. But their decisions have to be based
on what is going on on the ground. It is not something that we
can dictate from here.
Our goals are the same. But we are going to provide the
fighting force that our combatant commanders need, and we would
not be able to do it with those types of restrictions that were
proposed in your bill.
Ms. Tauscher. With all due respect, our jobs are not the
same. Our job here in the Congress is to not only look at what
current fights are and current demands are, but also to make
sure that we are living up to our constitutional responsibility
and oath to protect the American people for anything that is
going to happen. And without this bill, we are going to find
ourselves, I am convinced, in a situation where something bad
is going to happen, and, because of both of your testimonies,
we are not ready.
Secretary Geren. Well, let me say in that respect, our jobs
are different. There is no doubt about that. But when it comes
to our duty to protect the American people today and into the
future, we have got the same job. And it is our duty--the Chief
just said we are the future's guys--to look over the horizon.
But we have to meet the needs of the present and we have got to
look over the horizon as well. I think I would disagree with
you that our jobs are different in that regard. I believe we
share that same responsibility.
Chief.
General Casey. If I could, one I laid out today here was
some thoughts on how to put ourselves back in balance. And I am
personally working on these rotation schemes to get us back not
only to one-to-one, but beyond that. And to do that as rapidly
as I can.
I can't tell you right now when I am going to be able to
say we are off of 15 months. I can tell you I have every
intention of doing that as soon as I can. But the worst thing I
could do now is go out and say off 15 months, and then have to
go back on that. So as the Secretary said, we support what you
are trying to do. We believe we are very capable of doing this
and with the interests of the current and the future force in
mind.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Jones of North Carolina.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And to the
Secretary and General Casey, thank you so much for being here.
Mr. Secretary, I wanted to read some comments that were e-
mailed to me today by a former Army general: The stress of
third and fourth deployment on soldiers and their families is
crushing. The spirit of the force is at risk. Units are filled
90 to 120 days from deployment with young soldiers, right out
of basic training with inadequate and inexperienced
noncommissioned officer (NCO) leadership. The foundation of NCO
leadership is seriously degraded. Lieutenants are almost all
right out of basic school, which is now only four months in
duration. Experience is seriously lacking in a mission which
depends on platoon-level competency. Battalions and brigades,
weeks away from deployment to war, are struggling with
nondeployable rates as high as 15 percent. Bottom line, our
Army is at a breaking point, and, without serious mobilization,
cannot continue the current cycle of deployments.
Along the line of what has been said before me, does anyone
at the White House understand what is happening? I just
cannot--this general, like you, General Casey, you know him. I
mean we are hearing this all over. That is what Mrs. Tauscher
is talking about. What do we do in--you are saying that--let me
see my note right quick--how do you fix the shortfalls? How do
we fix the shortfalls? I think it is impossible to fix the
shortfalls. If this is what is happening, it is happening in
the Marine Corps, too. This just happens to be an Army general
and he has been to Iraq a couple of times and he is making this
evaluation from a trip he made recently. And I don't have his
permission to use his name or where he was.
But I will read the last comment--this was the first
comment: The Army is in decay due to the current cycle of
deployments, a mission without an overreaching regional
strategy, and a country not mobilized. Nothing new.
Who is speaking to the White House to make them understand
what is happening? God bless these men and women in uniform. I
love them and respect them, but we have a constitutional
responsibility to treat them fairly, to make sure that if they
are going to give their life or their limb for this country,
that we are giving them everything they need from training to
equipment and to compassion. I am not angry at you. I want to
make that clear. I am at the White House.
Secretary Geren. The Chief spent most of the last three
years in Iraq, and I think it would be valuable for him to
offer his assessment of the troops. There is no doubt our
troops are under stress. But I would dispute the
characterization that that general made of our Army. It is a
resilient force. Our soldiers are reenlisting at rates that
exceed our goals, but there is no doubt we are asking a
tremendous amount of them. We are asking a tremendous amount of
their families.
But you have been over there. You met with the soldiers,
and you meet with them here. We have got a committed force, a
resilient force, and a determined force, and we are asking a
great deal of them. But they believe in what they are doing.
And I think any comparison of this Army today to the Army that
was called the hollow force in the seventies, I don't think
that is apt at all. This force is stretched, but it remains
strong.
I would like the Chief to speak. He has firsthand
experience leading troops.
Mr. Jones. Real quickly, and my time is going to go and if
the General could speak when the Chairman brings down the
gavel, that would be fine. I don't know how you could not say--
and not you personally, because you did admit that the troops
are stressed--but tell me, when generals have said, including
McCaffrey, other generals, that by the spring of this year,
what happens when the Army breaks? Can you tell me what happens
when the Army breaks?
General Casey. Congressman, the Army is not going to break
in the spring of this year. We are beginning now to work the
implementation of the strategy the President announced to begin
drawing the force down. That will help us significantly in
increasing the dwell time at home.
I talked in my whole testimony, we are out of balance.
There is no question about it. Out of balance is not broken. I
came into hollow. I know what hollow is, and we are not there.
Mr. Jones. I thank the Chairman.
The Chairman. Before I make the next call, General you
talked of restoring balance to the Army. And we know some of
the reason for drawing down from the 20 brigades to 15 brigades
in Iraq is the sustainability of the level of forces. And even
with 15 deployed brigades in Iraq, a significant percentage of
our soldiers there will be under continuing strain on the
force. So what will be the impact on the readiness of the Army
of continuing a 15-brigade commitment in Iraq?
General Casey. Obviously, that level of commitment, Mr.
Chairman, would be harder on us than a continued decreasing
commitment to both Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Chairman. Can you do a better job of describing
``harder'' to us, please?
General Casey. The lower the number of brigades we have to
deploy, the greater the time can be spent at home in
preparation for the other units. So it is a supply and demand.
I would also remind the committee that we are continuing to
increase the number of combat brigade teams in the Army. In
this modularity program we are a little over halfway done, and
we started off with 33 brigades about 3 years ago. We are at 38
now, with 5 more standing up. And so by the end of next year we
will have 42 brigades, going to 48. So it is a combination of
decreasing the demand and increasing the supply of the brigades
that will also help put us back in balance.
The Chairman. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr.
Secretary and Chief Casey, for being here, for your service.
I wanted to just start by acknowledging, I think, some of
the passion I feel in your presentation when it relates to the
military families. And I appreciate that. I think that it is
important that we have that. And in many ways I think it has
been missing to a certain extent. And I wanted to just ask you
to try to embellish a few of comments that you made.
You said in your testimony, we will build a partnership
with Army families and improve family readiness by
standardizing existing family programs and services. And you
put out increasing access for the quality of health care. But
one of the problems that we have in that is that we have been
converting, as you know--engaging in the kind of civilian
conversions in Army medicine, which means for many of the
families they don't have that accessibility in the way that
they anticipate, the way that they expect.
Is there something then that is going to change as we try
and focus more on how do we support and help our families,
particularly in this area? Could you expand on your comments in
that area?
Secretary Geren. The issue of accessibility, when I travel
around the country and meet with families I hear that over and
over. Access to health care, the long delays that they often
experience, and the problems exacerbated by the war. Many of
our uniformed soldiers are down range. They are in theater,
they are supporting the fight.
I also hear from many families about the availability of
TRICARE physicians, the availability of physicians in the
TRICARE network. We are examining that, looking to expand the
participation in the TRICARE network. We have got areas where
the participation is very low and we are trying to understand
why. Is it a question of the bureaucracy? Reimbursement rates?
Or is it a question of not good education?
Mrs. Davis of California. I think, Mr. Secretary, what I am
looking for, if in fact we are going to have soldiers in
theater for I don't know how many years, even as many as
perhaps 10, then this is not just because of the war. This is
because of the problems that have been exacerbated because of
the war. And what I am looking for is what is it in the way
that we are working with our recruits or our academies; is
there something that we are going to be doing that is really
different to address these needs?
Secretary Geren. In the health care area specifically?
Well, we are putting additional resources, we have a hiring
effort right now to hire 300 additional mental health
professionals. We are trying to make the TRICARE network work
better for soldiers, and that is the capacity in the TRICARE
network we believe is not fully tapped. We need to work better
in that area.
But we are hiring both civilians and into the--I mean into
the Army, and we are exploring joint efforts to meet the needs,
medical needs. But it is an area that we are working very hard.
We recognize the challenges there.
Mrs. Davis of California. Are we likely to curtail the
conversions, the civilian conversions, or is that something
that we expect is going to continue or even increase?
Secretary Geren. Well, the issue of mil-to-civ conversions
is something that we are looking at hard. The effort, lately we
have slowed it down because we are not able to fill the posts
with civilians. And so we are slowing that down. But we are
looking at other ways to build capacity.
Mrs. Davis of California. Thank you. Well, I know certainly
in the mental health area, that is an area that obviously has
to grow.
I wanted to ask you some more about that because that is a
real need and we are hearing about that. I know that in San
Diego I think we are working hard on that issue. And
particularly as people transition to the VA system. But we are
not there yet, even beginning. And it needs a lot of work.
I did want to ask you, though, about the four imperatives
that you identified, General Casey, is to grow the Army and
provide and sustain sufficient forces. How does that factor
into the approximately 7,000 of the forces that are a result of
our stop-loss policies? Is that stop-loss policy likely to
continue? Because I think that is an area where certainly we
have a morale problem from our soldiers and one that needs to
be addressed.
General Casey. It will, Congresswoman, over time. We don't
like the stop-loss policy, frankly, any better than anyone
else. And we are looking that as the demand comes down and as
the supply goes up as we bring in new soldiers and increase the
size of the force, that we will gradually wean ourselves off of
stop loss. But I would expect it will stay on for a while
longer.
Mrs. Davis of California. You can define ``a while'' for
the benefit of our service members and give them a better idea?
General Casey. No, I would be guessing, but it will be
probably--gradually start weaning ourselves off after we come
back to 15 brigades. So it will be before next summer before we
start weaning ourselves off of that. And it will be a gradual
process. For example, it is now 90 days before you go. We will
probably cut that back a little bit.
Mrs. Davis of California. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. May I make reference, General, you testified
a few moments ago that the Army has issued one Medal of Honor
to one soldier during the present conflict. During the Vietnam
conflict, my records show that there were 159 soldiers who were
awarded the Medal of Honor.
Is there a different standard being applied to the awarding
of the Medal of Honor in this conflict as compared to previous
ones?
General Casey. I would say not. I have not seen it,
Congressman. It is a much different-level fight at the tactical
level. We are not fighting battalions, brigades, and divisions.
We are fighting individuals. So it is a much different level of
fighting there. I have not seen a different standard applied.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wilson of South Carolina.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Secretary,
thank you for being here. Over the years I have enjoyed having
breakfast with you often. Additionally, General Casey, I want
to thank you as a Member of Congress but I particularly want to
thank you as a parent. One of my sons served under your command
for a year in Iraq. And our family is very grateful for your
service and your leadership.
And I also want to give a brief update. I had the privilege
of serving on the congressional delegation (CODEL) led by
Congressman Abercrombie. It was hard-charging, relentless, he
kept us going, and so Congressman Larsen and I were there. But
it was extraordinary to go to Iraq and Afghanistan, to visit
with General Fil in Baghdad. What an extraordinary leader he
is. He took us to the Khark community, joint security station.
We could see the joint efforts of the American and Iraqi forces
and the success.
We visited with General Roberts in Ramadi. It was
extraordinary to be in the capital of Anbar province and find
out the day before there hadn't been a single attack. To be
there as there were local officials coming to discuss not
security concerns, but concerns about trash collection. So I am
just very, very pleased.
Additionally, I had the opportunity to visit with General
Bob Livingston, the South Carolina National Guard. I was in
that unit for 28 years, the 218th brigade. They are making
extraordinary progress training the Afghan police. Record
reenlistment.
And, finally, we visited the provincial reconstruction team
(PRT) in Jalalabad. Again, I had been there in June. The young
service people serving there are quite an inspiration. And
everywhere we went, we would have breakfast, lunch, and dinner
with people from our home State, junior officers and enlisted
personnel. And as a veteran, I believe that we have the most
competent and capable people serving our country, equipped.
They are very positive about their mission.
As I say this, I am concerned as a former member of the
National Guard with three sons currently serving in the Army
National Guard. There are reports that indeed the Guard is 40
percent equipped. I was very pleased to hear your comments,
both of you, as to the initiatives for $13 billion the next 2
years, $40 billion in the next 5 years. And I like, too, to
hear that it was unprecedented in terms of the equipment that
is going to be provided.
If you could maybe fill in some more of what those of us
who so much appreciate the National Guard, what should we
expect?
Secretary Geren. The 39 billion is from 2005 to 2013. But
66 percent of all of our production in the medium tactical
trucks will be going to the Guard. A high percentage of the new
helicopters will be going to the Guard. Our goal is to equip
the Guard as we equip the active duty. In the nineties, the
changes that we made, we started moving in the direction of
being one Army, and as you correctly note we rely heavily on
the Guard. There is no way we can do what we do today without
being a total force, active, Guard, and Reserve.
And one of our initiatives is focusing on what we need to
do to fully operationalize the Guard component, Guard and
Reserve. What changes do we need to make to transition from a
strategic reserve to part of the operational force? We are
going to have to train differently. We certainly are going to
have to equip differently. We are going to have to have in the
Guard the same quality of equipment that we have in the Guard
as in the active component, and the investments that you are
making now are leading us in that direction.
General Casey. I can't add anything to that.
Mr. Wilson. Another concern I have is how quickly the MRAPs
are going to be delivered to our troops. I am concerned in that
I did not see them. And when I would ask persons what the
status was on the MRAPs, they were looking forward to their
arrival.
So what is the status of MRAPs for our forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan?
Secretary Geren. Well, the JROC has approved for the Army
10,000 MRAPs. The MRAP program is a joint program with the
Marines as executive agent. It is being run out of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense. I happen to have the production
figures for the Army in front of me now: October, 90; November,
298; December, 728; January, nearly 1,200; February, 2,000;
March, 3,400; April, 4,000.
So we are ramping up very quickly. We wish it were quicker,
but we are ramping up quickly and we are moving them into
theater as quickly as we can. The way the MRAPs are apportioned
will be decided by the central command between the Marines and
between the Army. The figures that I gave you, that's the
fielding schedule for the Army.
Mr. Wilson. And as I conclude, one example of success. I
was shown a picture of a Humvee that had been attacked in Camp
Phoenix at the entrance and the vehicle-borne IED vaporized.
The only thing left was the rear axle. We had one soldier
injured but all survived, thank you very much.
Secretary Geren. Thank you.
Mr. Abercrombie [presiding]. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, gentlemen, for helping us out today.
General, a few questions for you. As part of the group that
went over to Iraq and Afghanistan with Mr. Abercrombie, we met
with the PRT in Jalalabad, and a few questions came up as we
talked to these folks maybe you can help us out with.
At one point, one of the folks said they will do whatever
they need to do as an Army soldier, as a member PRT, but they
would love to get back to being a soldier, get back to
soldiering.
So the question I had, one question I have has to do with,
I think, a verbal statement you made. I did not find it in your
written testimony. Had to do with being home long enough to
complete the training that you need beyond just
counterinsurgency training.
And so if you can answer quickly, cause I have a second
question that is related to that, what training does the
average soldier not get when they are home as a result of the
deployment schedules we currently have?
General Casey. Right now, it is a question of time, and my
estimation is that until we have folks home for at least 18
months, and they won't be able to do the conventional war
fighting skills where they maneuver platoons and companies and
battalions against a fixed enemy and integrate the different
elements of artillery, direct fire, indirect fire, those types
of things.
Mr. Larsen. So if they are home for 12, they get some rest,
obviously, and then they start their training up again, but it
is usually now focused on counterinsurgency and it would be
another 6 beyond that to really get the full complement of the
training that they would need to do whatever we might ask of
them.
They may not be going back to Iraq or Afghanistan, they may
be going somewhere else for all we know. So it brings up the
second question, because earlier this year, as well, the
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) put out the call for volunteers
in the military to help fill billets in the PRTs, because those
billets were not being filled by folks from other civilian
agencies.
I talked with some of these folks who happen to be in the
Air Force, a couple of young Air Force guys who were happy and
willing to do it. They were a little surprised going from a 4-
month deployment to what has turned out to be a 16-1/2-month
deployment; but they are going to do it, they are excited and
they are developing a great skill.
But I have a question for you as you are thinking about the
future Army. Are you making an assumption that the future
Army--since failed states are going to be an issue for us, that
the future Army is going to continue to be the developing
world's public works department, or that we are going to have
soldiers who are actually going to get back in the business of
soldiering and only be in support of postconflict
reconstruction.
What is your thinking on that?
General Casey. That is a great question. Here is my
thinking after watching it for my time in Iraq:
We are the most capable organization of reconstruction in a
hostile environment; there is no question about it. But my
concern is that unless we have the authorities and the
resources that go with the ability to conduct that
reconstruction, we are never going to get past the friction
that we have now. And I think it is something that the
government--we all need to think our way through. Who is going
to do this? And whoever we decide has got the mission ought to
get the resources and the authorities to do it.
So right now it could be something that the Army takes on,
but I am reluctant to take it on unless I get the money to do
it.
Mr. Larsen. I started out thinking that it should be your
job, part of what you all do. But more and more, as we move
forward in Afghanistan and Iraq, I am thinking that it ought to
be only part of what the Army does and in a supporting role as
opposed to a leading role.
Not because you couldn't do it. To the last person, every
one of these folks we talked to said, if you want us to do it,
we will go do it; that is our job, we will go do it. But we
would love to get back to doing what we are first and foremost
trained to do and be in support of other agencies who are using
their expertise, especially in this PRT setting, which is
probably a model that we are going to be using in the future
if, in fact, this plays out in the future; and I believe it
probably will.
General Casey. And I think it is something that the other
eight agencies of the government ought to think about in terms
of creating a culture that deploys people to help in these
environments.
Mr. Larsen. I absolutely agree.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Abercrombie [presiding]. Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, gentlemen. I, first of, all want to
thank you as well for being here at this committee, and staying
this late so some of us in other assignments can actually get
down here. It can't be easy for you.
I also want to thank you for your service in this country
and the men and women who serve underneath you.
I recognize that you have an unusual responsibility that
covers a whole lot of areas. I don't want to sound parochial,
but I am going to. Also, if you can probably find a question
mark in anything I am going to say, you are doing better than
I. But I recognize the difficulty that we are having here.
I appreciate this committee and the chairman of the
subcommittees, as well as the full committee. I think this
committee works in a bipartisan way to come up with good
prioritization, although I think a lot of our problems could be
solved if we had more money that we were putting into our
authorization and which I think is woefully underfunded
compared to everything else we are doing.
I also look at the money that is flowing, and I recognize a
lot of the money--it appears to me, especially on our military
construction (MILCON), to be going to base realignment and
closure (BRAC) areas and BRAC bases or to support BRAC
movements when we were supposed to have savings and that that
hasn't quite materialized yet.
But here is where the parochial part comes. Tooele Army
Depot in my district, for example, has spent since--from their
igloos more ammunition into Iraq and Afghanistan than any other
depot facility in the Nation, and yet there is nothing in the
fiscal year defense plan (FYDP) as far as MILCON projects or
that installation, nor has there been anything for the past 12
years.
Once again, I don't want to compare other services, but I
am. The Air Force does try and plow six percent back into their
depots to remodernize, and I realize that the technology is
important in those particular efforts. I also have another
facility, Dugway, which is part of the biochem mission, which
has increased its mission low at 800 percent since 9/11, and
yet the MILCON flow has not gone there, part of which I
understand was kind of an ownership effort as to which actual
entity is responsible for MILCON applications to those
particular areas.
What I am simply saying is that I realize, in all of this,
the weighty issues that you have been hit with just in this
hearing, that there are also some MILCON issues that deal with
areas that may be considered second tier installations, but
nonetheless have a significant role in maintaining the warrior
and the supplies to the warriors going through there. And
somewhere along the line we may be looking at the
infrastructure needs that are essential in those particular
areas.
I told you I was going to be parochial. And I really am
searching right now for how to end this with a question so you
can respond to it in some way other than--if you want to say
something in general, you can go about that. But there is
concern I have, that as you are looking at the overall
planning, what may be considered second tier installations, are
suffering in some way and there needs to be some kind of
consideration on the MILCON going into those areas in the
future.
Secretary Geren. Let me just say, recapitalizing our
assets, part of our depots and all of our infrastructure is a
challenge. As much money as we have in our MILCON and our BRAC
funding, it still falls short of what you would do in the
private sector to recapitalize your assets.
And also the maintenance and support for these facilities,
we have worked to try to put more resources into the operations
and the maintenance, as well as recapitalization.
In my year as Under Secretary of the Army, I spend a great
deal of the time moving resources around trying to meet the
needs at various facilities; and we get to the end of the day,
and we have got more needs than we have resources in those
accounts.
But your point is well made, and I will certainly take a
good hard look at it. But recapitalizing some of those assets
is a challenge for us and something we have continued to try to
improve and get the recapitalization rate into a more
sustainable level.
Mr. Bishop. I thank you, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Bishop, you have another minute if you
would like to go into another area.
Mr. Bishop. I was actually going to compliment the
subcommittee under whom I serve for what they do here. I do
truly enjoy the bipartisan nature and the prioritization this
committee does.
However, I do understand all of our problems could be
solved if we actually did put greater investment into making up
some of the backlog that needs to be made up just in the
military. We are not spending enough in this particular area of
our budget.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am done.
Mr. Abercrombie. You are welcome, Mr. Bishop. Thank you.
And I also thank you for serving with you in other committees,
where you were also prepared to tell us what we need to do in
order to accomplish all we need to do.
Mr. Bishop. Mr. Chairman, I am just waiting for the time
when you actually follow my instructions.
Mr. Abercrombie. Well, perhaps right after Ms. Shea-Porter
gets finished.
Ms. Shea-Porter. This is probably a good time for me to
jump in. Thank you very much.
And I want to thank you both for appearing today. I am
going to ask some questions that are tough for me to ask
because my husband was an Army brat when Reserve Officer
Training Corps (ROTC) served. I was a military spouse.
I am very worried about the Army. And I don't see it the
way this report showed it. And I am sorry, I am going to have
to ask you a few questions about this. I am going to quote you.
You said, ``With authorization to increase the Army's size
by 74,000 soldiers over the next 5 years, we will achieve this
as fast as possible.'' Now, when you wrote that, did you take
into account that the President has a possible 10-year plan for
Iraq? Because that is going to make it much more difficult for
you to bring 74,000 more troops in.
General Casey. We have laid out a plan to do that,
Congresswoman.
Mr. Abercrombie. General, could you just pull that mike a
tad closer to you, please. Thank you.
General Casey. We have laid out a plan to do that,
Congresswoman, based on what we believe that we can recruit and
retain. And we have looked at it very, very carefully. We don't
think it is a kind of pie-in-the-sky number; we think it is the
number that we are going to achieve this year and the number
that we will continue to achieve.
Can I tell you, in the first 9 months of fiscal year 2007,
the one that is going to end here in a couple of days, 250,000
men and women enlisted or reenlisted in the Army Guard or
Reserve. That is a quarter of a million folks, and there are
still a lot of people out there.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Let us talk about those numbers. The age
for a private has now been raised to age 42; is that correct.
General Casey. That is the maximum age that someone can
come in.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Right, which has increased from when my
husband served.
I understand that you have 10 percent on moral waivers,
which can mean a variety of issues, but it could be a problem
for military discipline.
Is that true, that it is now 10 percent moral waivers?
General Casey. It is. But I will tell you that 80-plus
percent of those are more misdemeanors.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Okay. I just worry about the problems for
other soldiers if they have soldiers that lack discipline in
there, coming in with problems.
A high school dropout rate: you have had to allow more high
school dropouts.
General Casey. Not exactly. We have taken in more soldiers
who do not have a high school diploma. All of them have a high
school equivalency. We don't take anybody in without a high
school education or equivalency. And it is less than 10 percent
more.
Ms. Shea-Porter. And $20,000 bonuses, if they went in by
the end of September, right, which would not be sustainable if
you have to keep giving $20,000 bonuses for people to come in
over the long term.
And these are just my worries here. There has been talk
about gang activity, some gang activity inside the Army because
we brought the wrong people in. And I know that most of these
troops are great men and women. I worry about them having gang
activity on the outside bases. That has been an escalating
problem; am I right?
General Casey. It happens. But to say it is an escalating
problem, I wouldn't necessarily agree.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Okay. Let's keep going over the list.
These are just my worries here.
My understanding is almost half of the West Pointers are
not reupping now. These are the men and women that we have
trained to take leadership positions in the future. And I am
looking 10 years and 20 years down, as you are, to see what the
military can look like and should look like.
Are we losing West Pointers at that rate.
General Casey. We are losing West Pointers about five to
seven percent more than the historical rate at the six-year
point when their term is up, so it is a slight increase.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Okay, and then also what is the top dollar
being offered for reenlistment? I heard some enormous numbers
the other day for those that are really in very specialized
jobs. Is it true that we are offering more than $100,000
bonuses?
And the question I want to ask is, is Blackwater stepping
in and replacing and taking some of our men and women and also
taking some of the wages?
General Casey. I couldn't tell you what the top
reenlistment bonus is. I do know that a year or so ago we
worked a special bonus for Special Forces that were concerned
that some of the senior, most experienced Special Forces,
noncommissioned officers, were in fact being hired away by
Blackwater. And we instituted a further substantial bonus
program and that was reversed.
Ms. Shea-Porter. There seems something crazy about having
Blackwater working alongside instead of just having our own
troops, our terrific troops, who are on 24/7, who have
dedicated their lives to this, and now we have this group
Blackwater. And it seems as if we are sending some of our best
people to them.
And then we are paying Blackwater and we are paying our
people not to go to Blackwater. It doesn't sound very
efficient. It sounds insane, really.
Could you just address that? I know you have about two
seconds. I am sorry.
General Casey. I kind of lost the thread on that Blackwater
piece.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Well, I just can't understand why we are
paying Blackwater more than we pay our own brave troops, and
then we pay our brave troops not to go to Blackwater. It seems
like we have fallen into a cycle.
Should we get rid of Blackwater? Do you need Blackwater?
General Casey. I don't believe we have hired Blackwater for
any security tasks. We have in the past, but right now we don't
have any current security contracts with them. I do believe
that for the foreseeable future there will be a requirement for
the country to have security contractors to provide personal
security for people deployed in these environments. I don't
think we are going to be able to get away from that quickly.
Ms. Shea-Porter. And then we will lose some of our troops
to them.
General Casey. That is a constant tension. But as I said,
the bonuses that we have offered have reversed that trend.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you. And, again, thank you both for
your service.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you.
Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple quick
questions.
I wanted to just ask you, the first thing off, it is my
understanding that the Army has the lowest research and
development (R&D) budget of the three services.
Secretary Geren. I believe that is right.
Mr. Akin. And then the biggest R&D item in the Army budget
is Future Combat Systems; is that correct?
Secretary Geren. Yes. It is our major modernization
project. It is.
Mr. Akin. And then this is really the only major
modernization project in the Army for quite a number of years,
isn't it, in terms of a major, really big one?
Secretary Geren. Yes, it is. This is the largest
modernization effort we have had in the Army in decades.
Mr. Akin. Now, I see some of the different parts of that
that are being spun out for the soldiers in the field that are
up here. I assume those things have been working reasonably
well, and you have confidence in the program.
Secretary Geren. We do. Some of the technologies you see
here today have already been spun out and are operational
working in the field and are doing well. All of these systems
are--in addition to being R&D projects, they are coordinated in
heavy involvement of soldiers who have ground combat
experience. So we making sure that we don't have just eggheads
producing technology. We have got to make sure that they are
well grounded in what the needs of soldiers are.
So as we are developing these technologies, we are making
sure we have got input from the ground up so that we are
keeping the technologies relevant to the immediate needs of the
soldiers in the field.
Mr. Abercrombie. Let me interject just for a moment. I want
to make sure we understand the questions; and perhaps there is
a misunderstanding because this committee has funded more than
$20 billion in projects other than--in R&D other than the
Future Combat System (FCS). But if I heard you correctly, you
were saying that was the ``only.''
Secretary Geren. No. It is our primary modernization; it is
not the only. I may have misspoken if I said that.
But it is our major modernization initiative. It is our top
priority. There are other smaller initiatives. And we have got
an R&D budget that funds a number of areas. But our major
modernization initiative is FCS.
Mr. Akin. And because of the fact that you have the troops,
hands-on, working with the equipment, you are comfortable with
the direction that that is going and feel that should be a
major priority then and you still have that commitment.
Secretary Geren. We are comfortable with the progress. We
have made--in early years there were some issues. The issues
have been addressed and the program is on track and on budget.
Mr. Akin. That is good to hear.
Now, this committee I believe decided to cut the budget by
25 percent of Future Combat Systems. Would that have a pretty
significant effect in terms of having to rescramble all of the
very complicated logistics of how the systems have to talk to
each other and the computer discipline of making these
platforms all interoperable?
Secretary Geren. The cut that was authorized by the
committee would pose a serious challenge for us in the Future
Combat System. We are working with the committee trying to make
sure that they understand our perspective on it, respect the
committee struggling with very difficult challenges across a
range of fronts.
But it would be--if the cut were to stand, it would pose
significant challenges for the program. It certainly would.
Mr. Akin. I think many of the different people who have
asked you questions all have that same pressure of the budget,
and how do we get the squeal out of the nickel and how do we
prioritize things. And certainly that is something we all
struggle with. But this was a pretty big cut, a 25 percent cut.
So you are saying that would be big.
Well, I am glad to hear that it is on time, on budget and
that you are pleased with what is going on. And it sounds like
you wouldn't be saying that if the troops that were using the
equipment didn't have a good sense of excitement about it and
felt that it would really advance us in terms of our ability to
protect our soldiers and to really basically produce a more
effective Army.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Abercrombie. You are welcome.
Mr. Sestak.
Mr. Sestak. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
General, could I ask maybe two questions of you and one of
you, Mr. Secretary.
You have a readiness reporting system. And basically now
your men and women are training primarily for insurgency. So
people go off. That means there is no unit sitting here at
home. And I saw, before the surge, the classified slide, so I
am not sure his comment about ``unprecedented'' is wrong. It
depends how far you go back.
So not one Army unit is really ready, for instance, trained
to--let's just take one scenario--protect the 30,000 troops in
South Korea. So when Admiral Fallon came through the House
Armed Services Committee and we asked him who are those that
are going to protect them, since the Army is not ready to
deploy forward to protect them if there is an attack, he said,
the Air Force and the Navy, and he was comfortable with that.
So my question to you is, are you comfortable with that;
and if so, does that mean the war plans for 5027 for Korea, can
we now assume when Iraq is over we don't need to plan any
longer for three or two, or whatever Army divisions, for that
contingency since we are comfortable with it now?
General Casey. I am not sure what----
Mr. Sestak. Admiral Fallon on his way through here, on the
way to Central Command (CENTCOM).
General Casey. First of all, there are Army units that are
trained for Korea. There is an Army division and an Army
brigade in Korea. And they just completed Ochi Focus, which is
a major joint exercise with the Koreans, so they are training
for that conflict.
Mr. Sestak. So they are C1 or C2. Those right now are C1 or
C2, the units you just mentioned?
General Casey. I couldn't put the ratings on them. But your
comment was that they are doing only counterinsurgency
training. That is not true for the forces in Korea.
Mr. Sestak. Having looked, though, are there any units here
at home C1 or C2 that could deploy to Korea.
General Casey. When you get into----
Mr. Abercrombie. General, excuse me, before you answer.
Some of this--I think we are going to wander into areas that I
don't think we can talk about at this hearing.
General Casey. That is what I was saying.
Mr. Sestak. On the state of readiness that they could
deploy, are you comfortable with their state of readiness they
could deploy?
General Casey. And as I said in answer to the chairman's
question, no. And I said in my opening statement that we are in
a state of--the forces who are not in Iraq, their levels of
readiness do not permit them to deploy as rapidly as we would
like to places like Korea.
Mr. Sestak. Could I ask a question then?
You oversaw as J3, or participated in or as director of the
Joint Staff, a series of war games on J8--marvelous work; I
forget what they called it--where 101030, do you remember all
that, and speed mattered, of deployment? And these, you say,
aren't ready to rapidly deploy there, but speed seemed to
matter in those war games. And the assessment of those games
over several years was, we had the number about right of how
many Army troops we needed if they could rapidly deploy there.
So my question comes: You said in your opening statement
that we are building a 21st century Army that will be less
manpower intensive. And yet we are getting 65,000 more troops.
And I am not sure the Army has yet presented what support
troops they need for those; I don't think that has been brought
forward yet.
So my question is, are we buying these troops, in view of
those war games and now the future, saying they are less
manpower intensive because of Iraq?
General Casey. No.
Mr. Sestak. And then, if not, those war games had the wrong
assessment?
General Casey. I am not exactly sure how far back you are
going on these war games. But when I talk about less labor
intensive and a smaller footprint, that is what we are trying
to get out of the Future Combat System.
Mr. Sestak. Less manpower intensive?
General Casey. Less manpower intensive.
So in a brigade combat team the number of mechanics between
a tank brigade combat team and a Future Combat System brigade
combat team is down by about 1,300. It requires less people to
maintain. The FCS brigade combat team can sustain itself for 72
hours.
Mr. Sestak. Are we going the wrong direction then building
up our troop structure?
General Casey. Two different issues. One is how we are
going to design our forces for a 21st century environment. The
second issue is the number of forces we need to do operations
in general.
Out of the increase, the 74,000 increase that we have been
directed to make, only about 40 percent of that is going into
brigade combat teams; the rest are going into enabling forces
that we need for full spectrum operations.
Mr. Sestak. As we always do?
General Casey. As we always do.
Mr. Sestak. I have one more. Should I just wait until the
next round?
Mr. Abercrombie. You can do that. I am the next round, so
why don't you go ahead.
Mr. Sestak. If I can come back to Representative Shea-
Porter's questions, I had thought that diplomas for the
military personnel who you are recruiting, that their diploma
rate had gone down--actually having gotten a diploma, not a
GED--a diploma went to 92 to 81 percent.
But with your GED effort that you are doing--I think it is
TAR or S or something--you have got it from 75 up to that 81.
But let's set that aside.
For the first time since 1990, we are recruiting in
categories 3A and 4, the lower two below average mental
category; 40 percent of our recruits are coming from those two
categories. We haven't been that low since 1990. So even though
we may be getting the bodies in, if what you said--this 21st
century, less manpower intensive, but much more technological--
because I do think FCS, built around the information network,
bodes a lot for the future brought about right. But it is going
to depend upon a soldier who is really--where you were going--
is the best and the brightest.
Is that of concern to you that having watched the Army
transition through all post-Vietnam years and all and gotten to
getting--you know, basically you could only recruit 0.1 percent
in category 4. Now you are at the max you can at four percent,
so you are leaping over into category 3A.
Is that of concern to you for your future since those are
the ones that are going to run this FCS system come 20 years
from now?
General Casey. It is something that bears watching for
sure. And I agree with you, what you are saying about the
mental capacity of these troops to operate these new 21st
century systems.
Mr. Sestak. Is there any initiative, though, to try to, I
mean, attract those you used to attract in 2004? Because this
has all changed since 2004.
General Casey. Sure.
Mr. Sestak. Not just numbers, which I know is a challenge,
but the quality.
General Casey. In fact, the Secretary and I have directed
kind of a clean sheet of paper: Look at how we are recruiting.
Because this is the first time that we have had to recruit an
all-volunteer force in a protracted conflict since the
Revolution. And so there are things we are sure we need to do
differently to get the caliber of folks in that we need.
But I would say that I went out and talked to drill
sergeants when I first got here; and I said, How is the quality
of the troops that you have? And some of them said, I am
spending too much of my time helping some of these guys.
And so I said, Okay, tell me about it. And they said, Well,
look, about 20 percent of the guys and gals we are getting in
are really good. I was surprised to find out that 20 percent of
the West Point Corps of Cadets is prior service. Now we are
taking in a pretty high-caliber folks. I met one kid that was
going to London School of Economics after he graduated, who
came up in the ranks.
The second part of that is--I lost my train of thought
here, Mr. Secretary. Can you help me out?
Secretary Geren. The drill sergeants.
General Casey. The drill sergeants. Thank you.
About 60 percent are your solid middle, and then you have
got 20 percent that are problems. Of those 20, they said about
10 percent are never going to make it, and they are the
problems.
So I said, Wait a minute; you are telling me you are
spending 90 percent of your time with 10 percent of your
people? And they said, Yeah. And I said, Well, that is what I
have been doing since I came in the Army 37 years ago.
Mr. Sestak. Mr. Chairman, I beg your indulgence to just
follow up with him, or I will go after you.
Mr. Abercrombie. Let's finish up.
Mr. Sestak. Can I ask you one final one?
Do you believe we need to go below the surge level to get
to an Army that is not one where you are uncomfortable or not
happy with the strategic readiness in order to confront the
other challenges around this world?
General Casey. Congressman, as I said, demand is a factor
here. And the sooner we get demands down to sustainable levels,
the easier it will be for us to do the things we know we need
to do.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you.
The chairman had said that we would finish at 5:00, but I
am the last one to speak. With your permission, is it all right
if we just go ahead and then we can finish up?
Secretary Geren. Certainly. What is your pleasure.
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Secretary, I am delighted to be able
to welcome you as a colleague and friend as Secretary. I am
sure you have already been told by others on the committee how
happy we are for you and how proud we are of you. And it is a
particular personal pleasure for me to offer you my aloha
today.
Secretary Geren. Thank you very much.
Mr. Abercrombie. That is the good news.
Secretary Geren. I am bracing myself.
Mr. Abercrombie. No, no, not at all. Because this is a
hearing on strategic initiatives, I am going to let the Future
Combat System discussion go to another forum, perhaps as we go
to the conference. Inasmuch as my subcommittee made the initial
recommendation on the reallocation of funds, I always get a
little concerned when we throw words like ``cut'' around.
I didn't consider it a cut; I considered it--as did the
chairman and, finally, the rest of the committee--a
reallocation of funds based on some of the commentary that has
been utilized today of meeting readiness demands and proper
allocation of funds considering where the Future Combat System
is today in terms of its ability to produce. But I will say
that just as an observation on the commentary of this point.
For my part, General Casey, I want to refer to your
testimony, almost two years to the day ago, in your capacity as
the multinational commander when you came to speak to this
committee on September 29, 2005. I am going to quote a few
things to you, not with the idea of saying, Aha, you know, here
is what you have said, I have trapped you in some kind of
previous commentary; but rather to try to establish a
perspective for today on strategic initiatives.
The sum and substance of your statement had to do--and what
I am going to quote to you as quickly as I can--had to do with
strategic as well as the broad concepts that you had. And your
testimony is based on your summary of your judgment over the
past 18 months--starting in June of 2004, and you were speaking
at the end of September in 2005--about the capacity of the
Iraqi Security Forces in terms of--qualitatively and
quantitatively in terms of their increase.
And you said, ``So over the past 18 months we have built
sufficient capability to begin preparing for the transition of
the counterinsurgency mission to capable Iraqi Security
Forces.''
The reason that you stated for wanting to do that, you
referred to a closed study of history that showed, without
strong indigenous partners, counterinsurgency operations have
not fared well.
And then you went on to say, ``The longer the Coalition
carried the brunt of the counterinsurgency fight, the longer
they would carry the brunt of the fight itself. This gets to a
dependency issue.''
Then you went on to indicate, in reducing the visibility of
the Coalition forces across Iraq and, ultimately, as conditions
warrant, to begin to reduce our presence in Iraq away from an
element that fuels the insurgency--and I am quoting you now--
``that is the perception of occupation.''
You went on to cite the number of security forces in the
hundreds of thousands, et cetera.
The third point under the strategy was that the more
capable security forces are, the quicker--excuse me, increased
Coalition presence feeds the notion of occupation and
contributes to the dependency of Iraqi Security Forces on the
Coalition and extends the time it will take Iraqi Security
Forces to become self-reliant and exposes more Coalition forces
to attack at a time when Iraqi Security Forces are increasingly
available and capable.
Finally, your fourth point, and I am quoting directly,
``Reducing visibility and ultimately the presence of Coalition
forces as we transition to Iraqi security self-reliance is a
key element of our overall strategy.''
I cite those things because you felt in September, two
years ago, after 18 months of trying to put this together along
those lines--and I hope you feel that I have accurately or
adequately summarized your points--we now find ourselves, 2
years later. And I would like to know what would lead me to
believe, then, at this stage, after three years and eight
months, that we are any further along toward meeting any of
those four points. Or if we are further along, at what point
are we going to be able to make the transition?
You probably also recall that in that talk that you gave
then, you indicated the average counterinsurgency, from
previous times presumably--I am not quite sure whether the
``strong indigenous partnership'' was mentioned, but you
mentioned nine years as an average.
Well, here we are, three years and eight months into it. I
would like to know if you felt that you were ready to make that
transportation two years ago? What is your strategic assessment
today, then, in terms of the capacity to fulfill any of those
four or all four of those points that you made.
General Casey. I would say, I said, ``begin the
transition.''
Mr. Abercrombie. Oh, yes. And I read that to you because I
understood that you would zero in on that.
But the beginning was two years ago.
General Casey. And we have begun the transition, and it
continues in Iraq.
Now, I don't do Iraq anymore, obviously. I have a different
view that I have laid out here today. And I represent the
interests of the Army as an institution.
Mr. Abercrombie. But the difficulty, General Casey, is that
absent this particular reference that I have made, one would
think, and I think the country thinks now, it is almost as if
we are just starting today.
If you go back to General Petraeus' commentary, it is as
almost--and this where, Mr. Secretary, I think you are going
have a difficulty here--it is--almost every hearing we have, it
is as if we are just beginning to make our transition.
Well, this is the 65th hearing, or the 3 years and 8 months
down the line in which we have begun to make the transition;
and at a certain point it almost gets to a ``crying wolf''
situation.
At what point do we actually make the transition? Do you
have a projection? Because that fundamentally informs what we
will be able to do in terms of strategy initiatives.
General Casey. I will tell you there are 7 provinces that
have already transitioned, and that was part of the strategy, 7
of 18. Now, it is clear that the sectarian violence that was
spawned by the attack on the mosque in Samarra in February of
2006 complicated the situation.
Mr. Abercrombie. But that takes place, that kind of thing
can take place all the time; that is what I call events getting
in the saddle and riding you.
What is the projection now today in strategic initiatives?
What is the projection of when we are going to make the
transition? Let's assume for our conversation's sake that you
are able to keep control of events.
General Casey. Congressman, that is a question for General
Petraeus. I can talk about the history, but I can't talk about
the projections for today. That is his bailiwick now.
Mr. Abercrombie. Well, I am disappointed in that answer,
because that--it does relate, this kind of thing directly
relates to, say, funding for Future Combat Systems and all the
rest of it. We have got to make decisions here about what we do
in terms of funding and what policies we direct.
I guess I will put it to the Secretary.
What is the projection, Mr. Secretary? How do we reconcile
what this committee has to do in terms of putting a Defense
budget and policies together with regard to the strategic--this
commentary that I am quoting General Casey on was with regard
to the strategy we are going to pursue.
Secretary Geren. The circumstances on the ground will drive
those decisions. And I can't--I don't have a crystal ball. I
couldn't add anything to what General Casey told you now or
General Petraeus told you earlier.
Mr. Abercrombie. Because we don't have all the time in the
world, if that is going to be the case, what you are saying is,
third parties are going to determine the strategy of the United
States.
It has to depend on our policies. If conditions on the
ground determine everything, we are supposed to determine what
we want to do about the conditions on the ground.
Secretary Geren. And that is General Petraeus' job. And our
job is to provide him properly organized, trained, and equipped
resources to do it.
That tension is never going to go away: Meeting the needs
of the present and also making the proper investments for the
future. It is a struggling that we have today, and I am
confident we will have 10 years from now, using the
supplemental to fund the war effort; and I don't know how long
we will continue to approach it that way, but we have got the
base budget, where we try to balance the needs of the present
and the future and use the supplemental to meet the immediate
needs of the war effort.
Mr. Abercrombie. But the supplemental, you are familiar
with my argument that I don't like to do things that way.
You may recall, in 2006 I made a motion to try and pay for
the war--I was defeated--try to pay for the war on our budget.
And I was defeated because, you may recall, the then-chairman
of the committee said, ``We will take it up in the
supplemental.'' And I said, you know, this is a whole brand-new
way of doing things.
From a statutory point of view, I think that that puts you
in a very difficult position in terms of trying to reset the
Army.
Secretary Geren. No doubt the uncertainty of the future,
the uncertainty of tomorrow, makes projecting our allocation of
resources difficult. We have to look at the circumstances that
we have and balance those investments in the present with the
needs to invest long term.
I think if you look over the history of our country,
frankly, we have not done a very good job of that. We tend to
underinvest in the future and find ourselves short when the
future gets here. We have done it in many conflicts. We have
often done it following on the heels of conflicts. We don't
properly guess the future and we invest improperly.
I think back on my time on this committee and my time in
the Congress, and we looked into this century. I voted with the
majority and we drew down the forces from 780- to 482,000. When
I look back on it, it wasn't a very good decision.
We are constantly having to look over the horizon and
render our best judgment knowing that we often will get it
wrong. And our best insurance against getting it wrong is
investment in full-spectrum readiness so that we can be as well
positioned as possible for whatever happens next.
Mr. Abercrombie. Well, I value this discussion because it
strengthens--in me, at least; I don't know how others will
conclude--that we need to set the policy and not have the
policy set by actions that take place outside of the decisions
made here. We need to set where we want to go and not go where
we have to go, because we let events get in the saddle, as I
said, and ride us.
So unless the chairman has further commentary, I want to
thank you both for spending the time with us today and, more
particularly, for taking up the question of a strategic
initiative and how we can best address that from the point of
view of the Defense bill.
And I hope to be able, at some point, Mr. Secretary, in
particular--be able to extend my congratulations to you even
more personally.
General Casey, thank you very much. I also appreciate your
hospitality in recent days as well.
With that, unless there is anything else, Ms. Shea-Porter,
I will bring the hearing to a close.
[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 26, 2007
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
September 26, 2007
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SPRATT
Secretary Geren. Reset funding is not programmed across the Future
Years Defense Plan. Reset requirements depend on forces deployed and
deploying in support of current operations; the amount of equipment
returning from the area of operations; wear on that equipment; battle
losses; lessons learned; capability gaps; continued use of theater
provided equipment; and restoring Army pre-positioned stocks. Future
Reset requirements are estimated at $13-14 billion a year. This funding
is necessary for 2-3 years beyond the cessation of the current
conflict. [See page 15.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
September 26, 2007
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ
Mr. Ortiz. Secretary Geren, General Casey stated that the Army is
``consuming readiness as fast as we can build it,'' yet you stated that
the Army's depots are not operating at maximum capacity. At the same
time, when asked what you would do with more money, you said you would
put it in equipment. Please explain the disconnect between these
statements. If the Army needs more equipment, why aren't its depots
operating at maximum capacity to return equipment obviously needed for
operations and training?
Secretary Geren. The depots return the Army's current equipment up
to the readiness standard but they do not fill Army equipment shortages
(the holes in the yard). Only new procurement can do that. The depots
are operating at the capacity level required to expeditiously repair
the equipment as it comes out of theater. Unit rotation schedules drive
the rate of return of equipment from theater. Depot production
schedules are based on the return of equipment and Army Force
Generation (ARFORGEN) requirements. Operational decisions made by these
commanders continue to drive our depots' operating capacity. For
example the decision to leave the 4th Infantry Division combat systems
in theater to be used by the 1st Cavalry Division affected the amount
and timing of work required in the depots. The requirement for us to
surge five additional brigade combat teams this year and the decision
to extend unit deployments from 12 to 15 months reduced, in the near
term, the amount of equipment returning from theater. As we redeploy
the surge brigade combat teams and return to shorter deployment times,
the amount of equipment returning from theater will increase which will
drive the need for higher resources and capacity at our depots.
Currently all depots are working multiple shifts to meet the
ARFORGEN requirements. The depots are finalizing production schedules
for this fiscal year, and they continue to order necessary parts with
varying lead times to ensure our depots can operate at the appropriate
level to reset the force. It is imperative that we receive sufficient
supplemental funding early in the fiscal year. If received on time, the
U.S. Army Materiel Command does not anticipate the need for additional
funding to increase production capacities in fiscal year 2008.
Although the depots have the capability to substantially increase
their production in most areas, such an increase would have to be
undertaken over time, and in response to clear requirements. For
example, the repair parts needed for Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems
can take up to 18 months to procure; parts for the M1 can take up to a
year. Without adequate parts, depots cannot repair weapon systems. Some
shops at the depots, such as the painting, sandblasting, metal work,
and other process shops are currently working 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week. To prevent these from becoming bottlenecks that impede increased
production, we continue to use Lean/Six Sigma to reconfigure, and
expand our core depot operations.
Specific details on the current depot work schedules follow:
Anniston Army Depot is accomplishing 74% of its
production on 1st shift (working 11 hours per day, 6 days per
week), and 26% of its production on 2nd shift (also working 11
hours per day, 6 days per week plus 25%). Painting,
sandblasting and chemical treatment operations are conducted on
Sundays. This leaves only 2 hours per day plus 1 day per week
(Sundays) for maintenance and upkeep of the maintenance
facilities.
Red River Army Depot is accomplishing 82% of its
production on 1st shift (working mostly 10 hrs per day 4 days
per week, plus 24% overtime), 16% of its production on 2nd
shift (also working 10/4 plus overtime), and 2% of its
production on a 3rd shift in the rubber products division
(which works 3 8-hour shifts per day seven days per week).
Corpus Christi Army Depot is accomplishing 78% of its
production on 1st shift (standard 8 hrs, 5 days per week with
21% overtime), 16% on second shift (also 8 hours, 5 days per
week with overtime), and 6% of its production on third shift
(same as the other shifts).
Letterkenny Army Depot is accomplishing 85% of its
production on 1st shift (8 hours, 5 days per week plus 10%
overtime), 13% on second shift (same), and 2% on third shift
(same).
Tobyhanna Army Depot is accomplishing 86% of its production on 1st
shift (8 hours per day, 5 days per week plus 17% overtime) 4% on second
shift (same), and 10% on third shift (same).
Mr. Ortiz. General Casey, what is your estimate of the
``considerable resources'' that will be required to implement your four
imperatives and over what time frame?
General Casey. The Army greatly appreciates increased support in
both base and supplemental appropriations. We rely heavily on
supplemental funding to ensure readiness in deploying forces, to
achieve readiness in our next-to-deploy units, and to build strategic
depth.
We face significant challenges as we balance the current needs with
future demands. With the continued support of Congress and OSD, we are
developing a comprehensive resource strategy to sustain our Soldiers,
Families, and Civilians; prepare Soldiers for success in current
operations; reset to restore readiness and depth for future operations;
and transform to meet the demands of the 21st century.
Our goal is to match the base budget to assigned missions, which
includes transitioning appropriate supplemental funding to the base.
Mr. Ortiz. General Casey, what specific training and leadership
programs are planned to ensure future Army leaders are ``culturally
astute''?
General Casey. The Army has incorporated culture awareness into
training and leadership programs at all levels. Our intent is to
develop cultural understanding over the course of our Soldiers' entire
careers, not just develop it when their units are preparing for
deployment. The Army's goal is to develop the right set of competencies
to operate across the full spectrum of operations in coordination with
other Services and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational partners and allies.
The Army will train leaders to master a portfolio of professional
competencies for operations around the world, which can profoundly
influence the outcomes of U.S., allied, and coalition operations at any
time. The integration of cross-cultural competence and regional
expertise is essential to the planning and execution of all operations.
We are training Soldiers and leaders to understand the key factors that
define cultures and the peculiarities particular countries or regions,
e.g. identity groups, values, beliefs, and relevant economical,
historical, and political processes. Ultimately, Soldiers and leaders
will understand how people from other cultures and regions perceive
themselves, their neighbors, and the United States.
We have incorporated culture training for enlisted leaders starting
in the Warrior Leader Course (supported by the Sergeants Major Academy)
and for officers in the Basic Officer Leader Course (supported by Army
War College). At the Command and General Staff College and the Army War
College, we conduct regional studies electives and symposiums to better
educate and train our mid-grade and senior leaders. We have also begun
to develop cultural understanding in pre-commissioning programs,
Reserve Officer Training Corps and the U.S. Military Academy.
The Training and Doctrine Command Culture Center (TCC), at Fort
Huachuca, Arizona, integrates the cultural component of initial
military training for Soldiers. The TCC also deploys mobile training
teams to operational units and distributes its educational products
across the Army to enhance the cultural capabilities of our Soldiers.
We also employ civilian and military role players at mobilization sites
and training centers to reinforce our Soldiers' training.
The Army is building learning into all Soldiers' career paths to
develop, sustain, and balance the right combination of language and
cultural proficiency with their traditional warfighting skills.
Education and training will begin early and be sustained throughout the
career life cycle. The Department of the Army believes that improving
the ability of our Soldiers and units to work with people from other
cultures is important for effective operations today and in the future.
Mr. Ortiz. General Casey, given that you stated you would not be
comfortable with the Army's response to a conflict in which
conventional warfare skills were required because limited dwell time is
constraining full-spectrum training, how will the Army ensure its
Soldiers are fully trained in traditional warfighting skills in
addition to providing counterinsurgency training?
General Casey. With limited time to reset and train in between
deployments, Army units are challenged to find enough time to train for
their core, full-spectrum mission while also ensuring they are prepared
to assume their next assigned mission. As we grow the Army and increase
the dwell time between deployments, we will be better able to train our
units for full-spectrum operations.
With enough time in between deployments, our units will first focus
their training on their more general ``as-designed'' or core mission.
Their core mission is designed to address fundamental capabilities
required to execute full spectrum operations (offense, defense, and
stability operations) in the contemporary operational environment. Our
units do this by employing various operational themes (limited
intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, and major conflict)
throughout various types of conflict (unstable peace, insurgency, and
general war). For Brigade-level units and above, the Army plans to
publish a list of essential tasks for each unit's core mission, or Core
Mission Essential Task List. This will provide a standardized focus for
training and readiness reporting. Units not assigned a specific mission
will ensure proficiency in their core mission.
Mr. Ortiz. General Casey, with a 5 million acre maneuver deficit
for CONUS units, how will the Army ensure its Soldiers are provided the
training needed to ``succeed in the current conflict'' and ``keep pace
with an evolving enemy''?
General Casey. Answer. In 2003, the Army G-3 approved the Range and
Training Land Strategy (RTLS). The purpose of the RTLS is to address
the increasing land deficit facing the Army. The RTLS serves as the
mechanism to prioritize Army training land investment, and helps to
optimize the use of all Army range and training land assets. The RTLS
provides a long-range plan for the Army to provide the best range
infrastructure and training land to units. The RTLS is updated
periodically to address the Army Campaign Plan.
The Army Sustainable Range Program (SRP) continually takes steps to
maximize the capability, availability, and accessibility of all Army
training lands. The SRP actively identifies and changes internal Army
and governmental processes and practices in order to maximize use of
current Army lands.
The Army examines the land status of other Federal entities to
mitigate land deficits at Army installations. Land that borders Army
installations, held by the other services, the Bureau of Land
Management, or U.S. Forest Service, has the potential to transfer or to
be leased to the Army after a comprehensive approval process that
includes the National Environmental Protection Agency and other public
reviews.
Army Compatible Use Buffers (ACUBs) allow the Army to preserve or
enhance an installation's current training land capabilities by
influencing land uses outside the installation. By forming
partnerships, the Army can deter encroachment by securing off-
installation land-use agreements that are compatible with Army
training. ACUBs serve to insulate Army training from encroachment and
to reduce environmental restrictions to training. Land buffers are very
effective and generally popular among local communities. ACUBs do not
provide additional training land.
The Army will pursue land acquisition where feasible and
doctrinally sound. The Army will not be able to address its training
land shortfall by land acquisition alone. The Army will pursue land
acquisition at locations with the capability, accessibility, and
availability for land acquisition.
Mr. Ortiz. General Casey, in light of the fact that units deploying
to theatre now may have to conduct their mission rehearsal exercises at
home station, how will you ensure that Army forces train at the combat
training centers?
General Casey. The Army's primary choice to prepare deploying units
is through a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) conducted at one of our
Combat Training Centers. The decision to conduct the training at home
station instead of executing a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation is
made by the Army senior leadership on a case-by-case basis.
Units that conduct Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRE) at home
station, instead of at a CTC, do not experience significant differences
in training readiness. The tasks trained during a home station MRE are
the same tasks that are trained during a CTC MRE, with the exception of
reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) tasks. There
are some differences in the type and amount of maneuver area between
these venues. However, we mitigate potential risks by ensuring the
fidelity of the Contemporary Operating Environment and instrumentation,
the participation of joint enablers, the appropriate level of live-fire
exercises, and the export of critical resources from CTCs. This enables
our home station training locations to fully prepare our units for the
combat mission they have been assigned.
Over the past four years, operational requirements have
necessitated that we train five BCTs through home station MREs to
preserve time. Let me assure you, conducting an MRE at home station is
the exception and not the rule, and CTCs remain the primary venue for
unit MRE training prior to deployment.
Mr. Ortiz. General Casey, what is the Army's plan to speed up
implementation of Army Force Generation by two years, from 2013 to
2011? How will this acceleration be implemented?
General Casey. The Army has mature strategies for manning,
equipping, training, sustaining, modernizing, funding, reporting
readiness, mobilizing, deploying and educating the force to conduct
continuous full-spectrum operations. Currently the demand for our
forces exceeds the sustainable supply and readiness is being consumed
as fast as the Army can build it.
We are acting quickly to restore necessary depth and breadth to
Army capabilities and build essential capacity for the future in order
to restore balance and to preserve the All Volunteer force.
The most critical and initial step is that we must grow the Army
faster. We have a plan in place to achieve the Active Component end
strength of 547,000 by FY10; and the Army National Guard is on a ramp
to achieve 358,200 even sooner. This growth will enable us to
revitalize and balance the force, reduce deployment periods, increase
dwell time, increase capability and capacity, and strengthen the
systems that support our forces. This accelerated growth will not
immediately restore readiness, but is a step in the right direction.
Second, we are implementing a reset model to both sustain and
prepare forces for future deployments. This model includes actions and
necessary improvements to Title 10 processes required to rebuild
readiness consumed in operations. Most important, reset encompasses
those tasks required to reintegrate and care for Soldiers and Families,
then organize, man, equip, and train, a unit. Reset is organized around
the premise that we must enable Soldiers and Families the opportunity
to recover in order to reverse the cumulative effects of sustained
operational tempo. The first six months after return from deployment--
referred to as ``Reconstitution''--is structured to maximize Soldier
and Family reintegration. The 15-month model will set the conditions to
move the Army to Objective ARFORGEN by FY11.
Mr. Ortiz. General Casey, what is the Army's timeline for
reconstituting its prepositioned stocks and thus eliminating strategic
risk, or in your words, ``providing strategic depth''?
General Casey. The answer to your question is classified;
therefore, I have provided a separate response.
Mr. Ortiz. General Casey, how will the Army's military construction
program support accelerating Grow the Force?
General Casey. The Army's military construction program is
synchronized to complete construction of primary and supporting
facilities for five additional Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in a
sequence which supports their stationing requirements. Specifically,
the facilities for the five BCTs will be programmed in the Army's
upcoming Future Years Defense Program. Quality of Life projects which
will support the BCTs are programmed a year later than the primary
mission facilities to meet the accelerated standup of the Grow the
Force units.
Mr. Ortiz. General Casey, the delay of certain quality-of-life
construction projects at 2005 BRAC gaining installations would not
appear to support efforts to ``build a partnership with Army Families
and improve Family readiness''? How will you overcome these budgetary
constraints and reduce the strain on families?
General Casey. The Army is committed to making quality of life
(QOL) improvements by ensuring that required facilities are in place
prior to re-stationing. The Army has identified requirements for 104
QOL facilities--37 Child Development Centers, 8 Youth Centers, 21
Fitness Centers, 25 Chapels, and 13 Fire Stations. The Army will
continue programming additional construction improvements of QOL
facilities to reduce the strain on Families. Additionally, we are in
the final stages of approving an Army Family Covenant which will
represent a $1.4 billion investment in fiscal year 2008 to improve our
Families' quality of life. We are committed to providing similar levels
over the next several years, and we will need your continued
partnership.
Mr. Ortiz. General Casey, what efforts are being taken to identify
and analyze ``less necessary skills''? If much-needed reserve forces
are shifted into the active component, how will you backfill the
strategic reserve?
General Casey. Since 2003, the Army has continued to identify and
analyze the force to meet the major warfighting requirements,
operational demands and Homeland Defense missions related to the
persistent conflicts in our National Military Strategy. Our focus is to
mitigate capability shortfalls by increasing high demand skills and
reducing ``less necessary skills'' across all three components while
maintaining balanced force capabilities, transitioning the Reserve
Component to an operational force, and ensuring strategic depth across
all three components. In maintaining the balance of capabilities across
all three components, we avoid the risk of creating a requirement to
``backfill'' skills in any one component. Instead, by conducting
continuous, holistic reviews of the force requirements needed to ensure
strategic depth across the Army, we shift capabilities within and
across the components to meet most effectively our current and future
Global Force Demands.
Mr. Ortiz. General Casey, how will the Army prioritize and fund the
elements identified under Army Business Transformation, i.e.,
management reform; acquisition reform; consolidation of administrative
and compensation processes comprehensive redesign of organizations and
business processes that generate, deploy and reset forces;
consolidation of bases and activities; military to civilian conversion
processes; and performance measurement enhancements. What is the
funding plan for these activities?
General Casey. Army Business Transformation is an enabler that
exists across the Army and within its organizations, systems, and
processes. The Army is prioritizing its Business Transformation efforts
by focusing on the four Army imperatives: Sustain, Prepare, Reset, and
Transform--and has internal resource review processes that bring
competing needs together for review and funding. A separate process
exists for the operational needs of the Soldiers and units both in
theater and heading to theater. The Army is also using business best
practices such as Lean Six Sigma to help prioritize our efforts.
Funding for Business Transformation efforts comes from a variety of
sources: explicit line items within the budget (e.g., BRAC); implicitly
within other line items; process reengineering and organizational
realignment that increases efficiencies, and rebalances and
reprioritizes workload, for example the HMMWV reset line at Red River
Army Depot was reengineered to increase production from 0.5 per week to
125 without any increase in cost; and reprioritizing funding within
reprogramming thresholds to provide modest central funding for the
Army's Business Transformation office and Lean Six Sigma training.
Mr. Ortiz. General Casey, what statutory changes are needed to
adapt the reserve component to an operational reserve? What
consultations are being held with the state governors to ensure their
access to National Guard forces in times of emergency if reserve forces
are operationalized?
General Casey. The Army is examining the role of the Reserve
Components (RC) within this era of persistent conflict. The Army
leadership decided to expand the operational role of the RC to assist
the total Army employed on a cyclical basis to add depth to the active
force. It is currently premature to identify statutory changes which
might be required to enhance the accessibility of this force. Once the
requirements for the operational force are identified, if necessary,
the Army will begin the legislative process to Congress for
consideration at the earliest opportunity.
The Nation's governors have unimpeded access to their National
Guard forces in accordance with provisions of state law provided they
are not mobilized for federal missions. The National Guard Bureau is
their formal channel of communications with the States on all matters
pertaining to the National Guard and the NGB staff is in regular and
ongoing communication and consultation with state leaders.
The Chief of the National Guard Bureau has communicated to the
States the goal to manage National Guard mobilizations in ways which
leave States with at least 50% of their National Guard forces in the
state and available to the Governor at any particular time. Throughout
this persistent conflict the National Guard Bureau was successful in
this goal.
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact provided depleted
states (over half of their forces mobilized due to military necessity
the access to adequate National Guard forces from other states should a
disaster or other domestic emergency arise. This mechanism of sharing
National Guard forces across state lines to aid an affected state in
times of even catastrophic emergency was proven effective in the
response to Hurricane Katrina.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE
Mr. Abercrombie. General Casey, the FCS program has numerous
technical, software, and integration challenges to overcome, meaning it
is not a sure thing to succeed. Does the Army have a viable alternative
it can fall back on in the event that FCS cannot deliver the needed
capability for the agreed-on cost?
General Casey. Future Combat Systems (FCS) is ground-breaking
development of a System of Systems for which there is no alternative.
The FCS program is not a traditional one system program. FCS is the
Army's first full-spectrum modernization in nearly 40 years. The FCS
(Brigade Combat Team (BCT)) is the material solution for the future
force and is the Army's principal modernization strategy that is the
embodiment of the modular force, a modular system designed for ``full-
spectrum'' operations. It will network existing systems, systems
already under development, and systems to be developed to meet the
requirements of the Army's Future Force. It is adaptable to traditional
warfare as well as complex, irregular warfare in urban terrains, mixed
terrains such as deserts and plains, and restrictive terrains such as
mountains and jungles. It is also adaptable to civil support, such as
disaster relief. It is a joint networked (connected via advanced
communications) system of systems. When fully operational, FCS will
provide the Army and the joint force with unprecedented capability to
see the enemy, engage him on our terms, and defeat him on the 21st
century battlefield.
As with all major weapons system development programs, the FCS
program also faces technical, software, and integration challenges;
however, these challenges are not insurmountable. The issues are
successfully being addressed and resolved within the Army's cost and
schedule parameters. To overcome these challenges, the FCS program has
implemented risk mitigation plans to reduce the impact of the
technical, software, and integration challenges. ``Currently, the FCS
program is on cost and on schedule and is poised to provide mature FCS
technology to the Current Force as soon as FY10 with spin out
technologies.'' The early fielding and spin outs not only provide proof
of FCS capabilities, but also serve as risk mitigation strategy to
correct any development or integration issues before the FCS core
Milestone C decision.
Mr. Abercrombie. General Casey, does the Army have firm,
quantifiable criteria that it can use to determine whether FCS is
demonstrating needed technical and cost performance before a commitment
to production is made? In your mind, what would constitute the
thresholds that FCS must meet to stay viable?
General Casey. The Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) determines
the FCS program's approval for the production and deployment phase
(Milestone C). Milestone C approval is based on whether the FCS program
successfully meets or exceeds the SDD exit criteria and Milestone C
entrance requirements. Further, the FCS program's cost and performance
criterion are firmly embedded in the Acquisition Program Baseline
(APB). The APB includes objective and threshold values for: RDT&E,
procurement, average unit procurement cost, and program acquisition
unit cost. The status of these cost metrics are reported to the
Congress on an annual basis in the Selected Acquisition Report. In June
2006, the Office of the Secretary of Defense submitted the FCS
Independent Cost Estimate. This report identified risk areas that could
lead to potential cost growth and schedule delays in the FCS
development. The Army will re-assess and adjust, to align with the
Department of Defense acquisition priorities and affordability
constraints, if the risks identified in this report materialize.
The Army has established a review process to ensure that the
program continues to meet its cost and schedule goals. Annual reviews
with Army and OSD leadership discuss current program status against set
criteria, such as technical maturity and affordability. The Army
evaluates the progress toward production readiness of the LSI by levels
of engineering maturity. The Army will verify the engineering maturity
criteria set forth in the contract at each milestones (preliminary
design review, critical design review) leading up to Milestone C, where
the engineering maturity level will be verified for readiness for
entrance into low-rate initial production.
Mr. Abercrombie. General Casey, independent estimates of FCS cost
are some 30% higher than the Army's estimate, which forms the basis of
budget estimates. Why does the Army believe its estimate to be more
realistic, and what is the contingency plan in the event that the
Army's estimate proves optimistic?
General Casey. Much of the difference between the Army's estimate
and the independent estimates is driven by potential risks that, to-
date, have not manifested themselves in negative cost performance. The
Army acknowledges these risks and, has established program metrics and
risk mitigation strategies to minimize the likelihood of the risks that
lead to cost growth. At this point, it would not be prudent to plan and
budget the program to a set of potential risks. Higher independent cost
estimates are generally driven by potential program schedule delays
that are assumed to be the primary impact of the identified risks. This
means that in the event that some of the risks do come to pass, the
program would face a total RDT&E cost issue, not a funding/
affordability issue. In other words, any extension of the RDT&E
schedule would free up near-term planned procurement expenditures,
thereby allowing the program to move forward without the need for
additional resources. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Army intend to re-evaluate the FCS program if the program faces
significant cost growth.
Mr. Abercrombie. General Casey, recently, the Army announced its
intention to award initial production of the core FCS systems to the
Lead System Integrator. This decision seems to go against the Army's
stated philosophy of keeping the LSI focused on development and
avoiding organizational conflicts of interest by not giving the LSI a
stake in production. Why the reversal in position? Why was it necessary
to make a sole source announcement in 2007 when initial FCS production
does not start until 2013--6 years away?
General Casey. The Army is not reversing its philosophy of keeping
the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) focused on development. The 2007 sole
source announcement provides mature FCS technology to the Current Force
in three separate spin out increments before the FCS core production
decision scheduled in FY13. Additionally, the NLOS-C production effort
is to meet the Congressionally mandated fielding date of FY 2010. The
Army intends to conduct separate Milestone C decisions for each of the
efforts described in the spin outs and NLOS-C efforts.
The Army initially determined that implementation of a LSI was the
best program management approach for developing and managing the
complexities of the Concept and Technology Development and SDD phases
of the FCS program. The Army has further determined that the use of an
LSI remains the most viable approach for the Spin Outs and the initial
NLOS-C efforts. Additionally, the employment of the LSI concept has
been approved for the FCS core program LRIP phase by the Milestone
Decision Authority. It is critical to continue the employment of the
LSI concept through the LRIP phase to hold the LSI accountable for the
success of the SDD effort. During the LRIP phase, the FCS program will
conduct the required test and evaluation of the FCS System of Systems
to gain approval of the full rate production. As such, Boeing is the
only contractor capable of fulfilling the LSI role for the subject
major contractual efforts without seriously impacting performance,
cost, and schedule.
The first two initial production efforts, NLOS-C and Spin-Out 1
(SO1), will be performed concurrently with the FCS core SDD effort, so
it is essential that the same contractor be accountable for
integrating, managing risk, budgeting, and scheduling between the
efforts. While delivering the overall LRIP schedule is extremely
challenging, the inclusion of synchronized Spin Out technology
development timelines with a Congressionally mandated NLOS-C fielding
add significant complexity to the schedule. Therefore, the acquisition
strategy and long-term arrangements must be established well in advance
of actual production start to allow the precision planning and
coordination essential to the execution of the multiple layers of the
FCS LRIP efforts in parallel with on-going development. The timing of
the NLOS-C effort (long lead, facilities, tooling, during 1st quarter,
FY08) and SO1 (long lead, facilities, tooling, during 2nd quarter,
FY08) dictated that key decisions be made during FY2007 to determine
the acquisition strategy for the LRIP effort.
Mr. Abercrombie. General Casey, by the time of the 2013 initial
production decision, the Army will have requested nearly $20 billion in
production money for FCS. With development money, the total investment
in FCS at that point will be around $40 billion. Is it conceivable that
the Army could change its mind about FCS after that much investment? Is
the production decision in 2013 in essence a foregone conclusion?
General Casey. FCS embodies the key requirements we have identified
to improve the current force and make an effective future force, and
that has been reinforced by what we have learned from current
operations. No production decision, though, is a foregone conclusion.
Some of those requirements may be modified based on further lessons
learned and the results of testing and the systems delivered may be
modified. The Army will not buy equipment for its Soldiers that do not
work. It also needs to be said that it is not really conceivable that
the future Army will be able to maintain its dominant edge without
networked systems providing extensive sensors coupled with unmanned
systems in concert with robotic improvements and tactical dominance
enabled by the Manned Ground Vehicles the FCS program is developing.
The research and testing this program has paid for is necessary to
develop those capabilities and will also enable greater developments in
the future.
The most recent budget justification material provided to Congress
shows planned RDT&E budget requests of about $27.5 billion and planned
production budget requests of about $9 billion (both figures are
through FY13 for the core FCS program). Since the bulk of the planned
production budget request in FY13 would not be spent until after a
positive Milestone C decision, the total investment in FCS up to
Milestone C is, in reality, about $30 billion. While this is still a
significant figure, it represents less than 20% of the total planned
acquisition investment (and the production investment is only about
2.5% of the total planned production program). It should also be noted
that there will be other program decision points prior to the Milestone
C. A Defense Acquisition Board decision is planned for early 2009,
after the program preliminary design review. The program will only
reach the Milestone C decision after the Army has ensured its
modernization priorities and FCS are properly aligned.
Mr. Abercrombie. General Casey, during the hearing, both witnesses
referred to the Small UAV, Small UGV, and T-UGS, U-UGS as ``programs
developed within FCS research''. However, all three of those programs
were originally developed outside the FCS program and subsequently
moved inside FCS. For example, it is my understanding that development
of the SUAV began within DARPA, the SUGV was originally developed as
the ``Pakbot'' program, and the T-UGS/U-UGS were developed in part
under the REMBASS program. In order to clarify this issue, please
provide the following information for each of the three programs, as
well as FCS Class IV UAV: Funding history, to include: project name(s),
budget line(s), PE(s), and funding amount(s) for each budget year
during U.S. government-funded development prior to incorporation into
the FCS program; the number of systems currently deployed in Iraq or
Afghanistan; and the capabilities, in comparison to threshold
requirements, of any prototype systems currently deployed in Iraq or
Afghanistan.
General Casey. The U.S. Army attempted to retrieve the requested
funding information from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
but did not receive a response in time for this Question for Record
response submittal. Even if the data was available, it is unlikely to
provide a satisfactory answer to the question as asked. Here is the
reason why: Generally, all major development programs incorporate (and
mature) selected technologies and capabilities that are derived from
basic and fundamental research efforts. The primary aim of basic
research is a fuller knowledge or understanding of the subject under
study, rather than any practical application. It is the first stage of
the Research and Development process. The program elements funded under
this basic research involve pre-Milestone A efforts. In fact, that is
the reason for the existence of basic research and technology base
efforts. The predecessor programs you mention are just a few examples
of technology base efforts that have transitioned into Future Combat
Systems (FCS). They tend to be the most visible because they resemble
individual FCS ``platforms.'' However, it must be noted that there are
significant differences between these predecessor systems and the
threshold FCS platforms. Because of this, the funding history being
requested may yield misleading results. In particular, not all of the
development dollars related to the above predecessor programs are
relevant from a FCS perspective, nor are the FCS dollars being spent on
the corresponding threshold FCS platforms necessarily based on the
prior work (i.e., besides maturation activities, there are significant
unique development efforts). Beyond the fact that the requested cost
data would likely be misleading, it is also difficult to know where to
draw the line in terms of what constitutes a prior government-funded
development effort for predecessor platforms and/or technologies.
According to the Army G-8, there are currently 416 PACBOT variants
in theater. These are comprised of several variants, each with a
specialty. There are 14 Micro Aerial Vehicles (MAVs) in theater, which
are a variant of the Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (SUAV) you
referenced. There are no fielded Unmanned Ground Sensors (UGS) or Class
IV Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). There are significant improvements
in the Class I UAV that will greatly increase its capabilities over the
MAV currently deployed. One of these improvements is that the Class I
UAV has a more capable camera, and features a laser designator and
laser range finder. The Class I UAV also has a quieter and more fuel
efficient engine. Most importantly of all, the currently deployed UAVs
do not have the FCS battle command capabilities of the Class I UAV that
will greatly increase the Soldier's situational awareness. In regards
to the SUGV, the improvements over what is currently in theater are
also significant, including the addition of FCS battle command
capabilities. The FCS Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV) is lighter
in weight than its predecessors, easier for Soldiers to carry and the
controller is smaller and easier to use. The SUGV can also laser
designate targets, has an improved capability to maneuver on slopes and
operate in an increased range of climates, and has a Global Positioning
System enabling Soldiers to pinpoint its location. These improved
capabilities for the Class I UAV and SUGV will greatly enhance their
military utility for Soldiers across the full spectrum of combat.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK
Mr. Loebsack. Secretary Geren and General Casey, I have three
primary Army National Guard battalions in my District. The 224th
Engineer Battalion was deployed for OIF from October 2004-December
2005. When the 224th deployed to Iraq, it was at 100% equipment
readiness. When it redeployed, it was forced to leave most of its
equipment in theater, leaving it with 30% of its required equipment,
most of which was borrowed from other units. Secretary Geren and
General Casey, when the 833rd Engineer Company was recalled to OIF
after only 14 MONTHS of dwell time, they had no equipment on which to
train. The Iowa National Guard was forced to borrow equipment from
other states. If it were not for the ingenuity and resourcefulness of
the Iowa National Guard, the unit would not have been able to properly
train before their redeployment. Since the 883rd's redeployment, the
224th Battalion's retention rate--which had previously maintained 98%
personnel strength--has struggled to meet Iowa's retention rate of 85%.
To say that this training, equipment, and readiness situation is
alarming is a gross understatement. Iowa leans heavily on its National
Guard for emergency response. Guard units operating with 30% of their
equipment and with only 14 months of dwell time are simply not in a
position to respond to an emergency at home. How do you intend to reset
our National Guard's equipment? How long do you believe it will take to
fully reset the National Guard's equipment?
General Casey. The Army is committed to ensuring units deployed and
units stationed at home have the necessary equipment to train and
respond to future contingencies. We have established a plan to resource
342 dual use items to ensure state units can respond to local and Title
32 emergencies. The Army will provide approximately $26 billion through
fiscal year 2013 (FY13) to fill Army National Guard (ARNG) requirements
which include the 224th Engineer Battalion. The fill of equipment will
take some time, but by FY15 we estimate that average fill of ARNG units
will be 77 percent, and we are committed to achieving 100 percent.
Until that time, we will work to mitigate current shortfalls of
equipment by transferring equipment to units preparing for deployment
or responding to contingencies. For ARNG equipment left in theater, the
Army captures the requirement and restores that equipment to the ARNG.
The FY07 Supplemental specifically provided $1.8 billion to replace a
portion of the ARNG equipment left in theater. The National Guard
Bureau submitted the 224th Engineer Battalion's 1225.6 payback requests
for 507 items with a total value of $20.3 million. These items include
M113 tracked personnel carriers, tractor trucks, and dump trucks. All
the 224th's items were validated and are scheduled for payback to ARNG
by the end of FY09.
In regards to dwell time, the Army is pursuing three initiatives:
Grow the Army, balancing the force, and implementing Army Force
Generation, or ARFORGEN. The goal is to achieve a 3:1 dwell to
deployment ratio for the active component and 5:1 ratio for the reserve
component. The combined effect of these efforts will be greater
capability for our Army's strategic depth, 100 percent equipment fill,
and longer dwell between rotations.
Mr. Loebsack. The 833rd's quick redeployment has not only affected
its readiness, it has devastated its morale and has had a significant
emotional impact on the Soldiers and their families. An Army study
found that consistency and predictability are vital to military
families. Do you intend to continue to deploy Guard units with short
dwell time? What effort is the Army taking to provide greater
consistency and predictability in deployment?
General Casey. The planning objective for mobilization of National
Guard and Army Reserve units is one year mobilized to five years at
home. However, today's global demands will require a number of selected
Guard/Reserve units to be remobilized sooner than this standard. We
intend that such exceptions be temporary and move to the broad
application of the 1:5 goal as soon as possible. In order to provide
Soldiers and their Families more immediate predictability, we are
working hard to alert Guard and Reserve units at least 12 months before
mobilizations and limit their mobilizations to 12 months. This will
enable Soldiers, their Families and employers more reliability in their
planning for mobilizations. Our policy is that every Guard and Reserve
Soldier receives at least 12 months of demobilized time prior to being
mobilized again, even if the Soldier volunteers. We are working hard to
restore balance to the Army over the next several years, and we will
move as quickly as possible to provide our Reserve Component Soldiers,
Families and employers with five years in between mobilizations.