[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-101]
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND
COUNTERING IDEOLOGICAL SUPPORT
FOR TERRORISM
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
NOVEMBER 15, 2007
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TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
MARK UDALL, Colorado K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
KATHY CASTOR, Florida
Kevin Gates, Professional Staff Member
Alex Kugajevsky, Professional Staff Member
Andrew Tabler, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2007
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, November 15, 2007, Strategic Communications and
Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, November 15, 2007...................................... 27
----------
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2007
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND COUNTERING IDEOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR
TERRORISM
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee 1
Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Ranking
Member, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee................................................... 3
WITNESSES
Doran, Dr. Michael, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Support for Public Diplomacy), Department of Defense.......... 9
MacInnes, Duncan, Principal Deputy Coordinator of the Bureau of
International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State... 4
Pittman, Capt. Hal, USN, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Joint Communication), Department of Defense........... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Doran, Dr. Michael........................................... 52
MacInnes, Duncan............................................. 32
Pittman, Capt. Hal........................................... 39
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 31
Documents Submitted for the Record:
How to Win The War Of Ideas, by Robert Satloff of The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy.................. 65
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Questions submitted.]
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND COUNTERING IDEOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR
TERRORISM
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Thursday, November 15, 2007.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Smith. Good morning. We will go ahead and get the
hearing started as close to on time as possible. I look forward
to hearing from our witnesses.
We are gathered today to talk about strategic
communications in the global war on terror, which is a
critically important part of that effort and one that I think
we need to place greater emphasis on, greater focus and,
ultimately, greater resources as well.
When you look at the battle that we are fighting against al
Qaeda and similar ideologies, it is a broad-based ideological
battle. And I think that the closest analogy you can draw is to
the Cold War and communism. And there were many, many aspects
to the Cold War, certainly. Sometimes the Cold War involved
military confrontations, in Korea and Vietnam and elsewhere.
But it also overlaid the larger issue; it was communism versus
capitalist democracy.
And we went out and made the case that our system, our
ideology was better. And we made that case comprehensively.
And, ultimately, that had as much to do with our success as
anything. As I have facetiously said that, you know, the war on
communism can best be summed up as we took people from the
Soviet Union, said, you know, ``Look at your grocery store,
look at our grocery store, we win,'' which is a bit of an
exaggeration, but that was certainly part of it.
And, more importantly, we had a comprehensive strategic
plan for how to do that and many other messages about what was
better about our ideology and what was deficient about the
ideology of communism. And slowly but surely, the rest of the
world, even in the Communist world, agreed. They came across to
our way of thinking ideologically. We basically won a marketing
campaign. And that had as much to do with our success as
anything.
Now we face a similar struggle, an ideological struggle
against Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda and a very dangerous ideology
that they are spreading. And it is my judgment, at this point,
that we are not doing as well in that battle as we should be.
We clearly have the better ideology. We clearly have more to
offer people of all faiths, from all places in the world, with
freedom, openness, democracy, opportunity, than what Osama bin
Laden has been offering.
When the Taliban ran Afghanistan, it was a complete
disaster, by everybody's estimation. That is what they have on
the table. And yet we haven't been able to sort of get up on
the other side of that and begin to win that argument,
certainly in the Muslim world. You know, you look at various
polls and various indicators out there. It is clear that the
Muslim world still has way too much sympathy for Osama bin
Laden and al Qaeda and not enough understanding and
appreciation for the West.
But it goes beyond the Muslim world, even in Europe. I was
in Afghanistan last spring, meeting and talking with various
folks about our efforts over there. And while the leaders of
some of the key European countries have bought into what we are
doing in Afghanistan, a lot of their citizens have not, and
that makes it extraordinarily difficult for our commanders over
there.
I will always remember General McNeil talking about the
various countries that were involved and then the list of what
they would and would not do militarily. Any military commander,
I think, would shudder at the notion of a bunch of troops under
his command that are choosing what they will and will not do. A
lot of that has to do with the difference of opinion about
going about conducting the broader battle. We have got to start
winning the battle for ideas, and we have got to do a better
job of promoting that.
And I will say there are many issues--and I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses today about how we can better
coordinate that and what we need to do--but the two that strike
me and the two I am most interested in: One is interagency
cooperation. There are many, many people who touch this issue,
on all levels. Certainly the State Department is the lead
agency. The Defense Department has a lot to do with it. But all
across various segments of our Government, right down to the
captain in Baghdad trying to persuade, you know, a local tribe
to be on our side in the battle against al Qaeda in figuring
out how to do this, there are many, many different layers. Are
we maximizing those resources? Are we getting the most out of
the various pieces that are involved in this and coordinating
them in a comprehensive way that makes sure that we are getting
the most out of what we have?
But second is the matter of resources, and we are not
spending very much money on this strategic communications
effort. When you look at what we were spending at the height of
the Cold War versus what we are spending now, it is a joke. We
haven't even really, significantly increased our efforts at the
State Department in public diplomacy, in strategic
communications, since 9/11. It is pretty close to a flat line.
And I think the world of what our military has done since
9/11. I think the way they have pulled together, coordinated,
maximized their resources is a real testimony to how great a
military we have.
On the other hand, when you look at that, you can look at
the Department of Defense (DOD) budget from 9/11 forward and
see it going like this, and you can look at the State
Department public diplomacy budget and see it going like this,
and hopefully have a little sympathy for the folks who are
trying to do the strategic communications/public diplomacy
piece. We need to invest more resources in it if we are going
to get the results that we desperately need in this battle.
So I look forward to the testimony. And, with that, I want
to turn it over to the ranking member on the committee, Mr.
Thornberry, for any opening remarks he has.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS,
RANKING MEMBER, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
opening comments, and I agree with them.
I would ask unanimous consent that an editorial from The
Washington Post from last Saturday by Robert Satloff of The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy be made part of the
record.
Mr. Smith. Hearing no objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 65.]
Mr. Thornberry. I think this is only the most recent
article, with a big stack of studies and articles, that
expresses the view that we are not adequately fighting this war
of ideas, in part because it is a hard, unnatural thing for our
government to do. And I sympathize with each of you in the
position that you are in. But I also think it is important for
this subcommittee to focus on those issues and try to encourage
us to be more successful.
The point of this article is that we operate as if this war
of ideas barely exists and have focused our energies on the
wrong problem, trying to gain popularity rather than trying to
help the struggle within the Muslim faith itself. And it goes
on to point out some suggestions on how and the way we can do
that better.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, I have been interested in this
for some time. I have dug out the Defense Science Board Task
Force report from September 2004, part of which I have
introduced as an independent bill to try to gain the expertise
of the private sector on behalf of this effort. But I am
concerned that we are moving too slowly in really waging this
struggle and that this struggle is an absolutely essential part
of our national security at this point in time.
So I appreciate this hearing. I appreciate the opportunity
to hear from these witnesses and the increased attention that
this part of national security is achieving.
I yield back.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mac.
And before I introduce the witnesses, just one more quick
comment. As you are making your comments, basically we are
trying to win a campaign here, a campaign of ideas. And to do
that, you have to develop a message and deliver that message in
the mediums where your audience is going to get their
information. So as I hear your testimony, I am curious to know
what is our message, how are we delivering it, what do we think
are the critical mediums to reach those populations that we are
trying to reach?
And with that, I will turn it over to our witnesses. I will
introduce all three of them.
And we will start with Mr. Duncan MacInnes, who is the
Principal Deputy Coordinator of the Bureau of International
Information Programs at the Department State. The Department of
State is the lead organization on the ideological piece, on the
strategic communications piece of the global war on terror. And
the International Information Programs Bureau is the lead piece
of the Department of State's effort.
We also have Captain Hal Pittman from the United States
Navy, who is the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Joint Communication; Dr. Michael Doran, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Support for Public Diplomacy, also with
the Department of Defense.
And we will start with Mr. MacInnes.
STATEMENT OF DUNCAN MACINNES, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY COORDINATOR OF
THE BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. MacInnes. Chairman Smith, Congressman Thornberry and
distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, thank you for inviting
me here today. And thank you for those opening statements,
which summarized some of the issues that we do face today.
Combatting ideological support for terrorism poses a
variety of daunting new challenges for U.S. public diplomacy.
Terrorists have shown themselves to be adept at exploiting the
freedom of the Internet to spread their propaganda directly to
young Muslims around the world, using effectively video
messaging, imaging and text.
Our traditional communication tools are designed for
mainstream media and have had little impact in this new
information battlefield. Our audiences have also been stretched
beyond the traditional opinion leaders, and it leads to the
general public and specifically the youth, who are the target
of extremist propaganda.
During the Cold War, we fought a traditional enemy in the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and our tools
included traditional public diplomacy tools such as educational
programs, rule-of-law programs, democracy promotion,
publications, mainstream media. These strategies remain
relevant and powerful still today, but we need to continue to
develop new tactics to counter an elusive and decentralized
nonstate foe who is adept at exploiting the Internet and new
technologies in spreading its ideology of violence.
We have come a long way in coordinating our efforts on
strategic communications across the interagency. On April 8,
2006, the President established the interagency Policy
Coordinating Committee, PCC, on public diplomacy and strategic
communications. As chairperson of the PCC, Under Secretary
Karen Hughes leads our international strategic communications
efforts within the Administration.
Over the past year, Under Secretary Hughes has reorganized
the PCC to ensure more active interagency coordination and
synergies in the struggle with violent extremism. She
established the interagency Counterterrorism Communication
Center (CTCC) and created sub-PCCs to work on the issues of
State-DOD coordination and cooperation and also set up
additional sub-PCCs on research and analysis and on branding.
State and DOD now are working closely together on
coordinating our efforts. Last week, for example, Dr. Doran,
Captain Pittman and I were together discussing strategic
communications at the Global Synchronization Conference held by
SOCOM in Tampa.
The week before that, we met together at the State-DOD sub-
PCC on coordination and planning. In that sub-PCC, we are
exploring ways to enhance our cooperation and develop shared
communication strategies. Already in the works are initiatives
on coordinating Website activities and content, video
production, blogging, and a renewed effort to identify and find
ways to empower credible Muslim voices, to develop shared image
databanks, and to strengthen the effectiveness of Military
Information Support Teams (MIST) teams working in our overseas
missions.
Overseas in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Europe, our
public affairs officers at the embassies work closely with
military public affairs and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)
officers. Military information support teams, MISTs, are
integrated into the work of an increasing number of U.S.
missions overseas.
Let me talk a little bit about the Counterterrorism
Communication Center which was set up. Under Secretary Hughes
established the Counterterrorism Communication Center last
summer to coordinate overall overt U.S. strategic communication
messaging in the war of ideas and to produce and disseminate
effective messaging to counter terrorist ideology, especially
in the Arab-Muslim world but also in Europe and elsewhere.
The CTCC, as they call it, is a small but truly interagency
organization, with staff currently drawn from the Department of
State, the Department of Defense, the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC) and the intelligence community. Working with
State, DOD and other U.S. agencies, it produces strategic
communication plans, develops effective narratives and themes
to undermine and counter terrorist messaging, and produces
specific messages for use by State and DOD commuters. It
responds with talking points to breaking-news events and works
closely with our rapid response unit at the State Department's
public affairs office to put out a regular antiterrorism
message.
CTCC messaging goes to more than 2,000 key U.S. Government
communicators, including combatant commands and all U.S.
embassies. Those communicators build on the themes and
information in those messages, customizing them for local
audiences in order to achieve the greatest impact.
Our efforts focus on undermining and putting extremists on
the defensive by exposing how terrorists recruit and exploit
young people; destroy religious sites and mosques; murder
women, children, men and innocent victims, such as in the
tragic events last week that resulted in the deaths of 59
schoolboys, five teachers, police officers and other innocent
adults in an effort to target members of the Afghan parliament,
six of whom were murdered.
We have also set up a digital outreach team. It was
launched one year ago as a pilot initiative to counter
ideological support for counterterrorism on the Internet. It
employs Arabic speakers to post entries into influential Arabic
blogs, challenging misrepresentations and providing accurate
information about U.S. policy, our society and our motives
overseas. Our bloggers speak the language and idiom of the
region and know the culture references and are often able to
converse informally and frankly, rather than adopt the more
formal persona of the U.S. Government's spokesperson.
This is a major departure from our previous way of
conducting public diplomacy. It requires both creativity and a
new set of skills. We are currently in the process of expanding
the original team of three up to 10, including an Urdu speaker
and two Persian linguists. We are also exploring how we can use
other cybertechnologies, such as cell phones, Second Life, in
our war against the terrorists.
Our Bureau of International Information Programs is also
fully engaged in expanding public diplomacy and countering
terrorist extremist ideologies through the Internet. Our
English-language Website and six foreign language sites,
including both Arabic and Persian, are being transformed to use
more videos, more blogging, podcasts, Web chats, that are
designed to reach younger audiences. Our Arabic Web site
attracts more than 200,000 visitors per month, with the top
users coming from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Gulf and Morocco.
The decline in favorable overseas public opinion toward the
United States has resulted in an increased skepticism about the
motives that drive our policies. On the practical side, this
has led to a distrust that undermines the effectiveness of our
messages against extremists. We are addressing this issue by
working with our embassies overseas and with the American
Muslim community here in the States to reinforce credible
antiextremist voices.
For example, we have sent out dozens of American Muslims to
predominantly Muslim countries to engage in discussions with
their counterparts. These citizen dialogue programs directly
counter al Qaeda's negative propaganda message that the U.S. is
at war with Islam.
The CTCC collects and disseminates antiterrorist statements
and editorials and cartoons made by Muslims from around the
world in order to amplify their voices in the fight against
extremism. We are in the process of finding new ways to empower
credible Muslim voices in the Muslim world, because this is a
key issue we have to work on.
The strongest messages are sent, however, not through words
but through deeds, what Karen Hughes calls the diplomacy of
deeds. She talks about the importance of waging peace by
showing the United States as a positive force for good in the
world, in stark contrast with the destructive ideologies
espoused by al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Americans are
generous, committed to helping others, and we have the largest
number of people working in voluntary organizations. We have
worked closely with DOD to promote understanding among foreign
publics of our humanitarian efforts. These cooperative efforts
have included telling the dramatic story of our emergency
relief for tsunami and earthquake victims in Indonesia and
Pakistan.
Another initiative of Karen Hughes' is the pilot country
program, which provides funding for special projects in key
countries with predominantly Muslim or sizeable Muslim
populations. Funded through the 2007 emergency supplemental for
the war of ideas, the pilot country project seeks to find ways
to counter ideological support for terrorism through innovative
projects that are identified by the Ambassador and senior
Embassy staff members. The focus of these projects is to reach,
often, young people who are vulnerable to radicalization and
help them develop the skills and confidence they need to resist
recruitment and become committed extremists.
Mr. Chairman, I have given you and the members an overview
of our current and new initiatives to counter extremist
ideologies. I have also highlighted the very positive trends
toward greater interagency cooperation between the Departments
of State and Defense.
This struggle against the evils of terrorism will take many
years, and we still have a great deal more to do to meet the
challenges of violent extremism. We believe that we have made
major strides in adapting to the new and sometimes daunting
media environment of the 21st century.
These initiatives, however, do not stand in isolation.
Public diplomacy and strategic communications must continue to
deploy all instruments at our disposal and must rely on the
best and most up-to-date research data. We need to expand our
use of the Internet and other new media, while continuing to
support effective and more targeted educational exchanges,
democracy programs, youth initiatives, et cetera.
More importantly, we must continue to work harder to
integrate our overall U.S. Government efforts, embrace new
communication technologies and enlist the support of our allies
overseas. We must continue to work toward a proactive position
instead of one that is only reactive.
The battle for the hearts and minds is one that will only
succeed if we embrace innovation and use our Nation's great
communication talents and creativity to the best effect.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. MacInnes can be found in the
Appendix on page 32.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. MacInnes.
Captain Pittman.
STATEMENT OF CAPT. HAL PITTMAN, USN, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (JOINT COMMUNICATION), DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Captain Pittman. Chairman Smith, Congressman Thornberry and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, good morning.
First, I would like to thank the subcommittee members for
all you have done to support our military men and women in
uniform. I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today
about the Department of Defense's efforts in strategic
communication.
As a military officer and a professional communicator by
trade, I have served in multiple joint assignments, and I have
observed firsthand many of the communication challenges we face
today against a cunning adversary that does not have to tell
the truth.
While the U.S. military conducts a largely kinetic campaign
complemented with communication efforts against violent
extremists, our adversaries conduct an information campaign
punctuated by kinetic exclamation points--suicide bombings,
spectacular attacks and the like--to highlight their cause. In
a long war where the real battle is a battle of ideas,
America's enemies place a premium on telling their story,
regardless of the truth.
How we engage in this sphere is important. I believe in the
need to maintain the credibility of our military and also in
the need for transparency. At the same time, we must
collaborate and synchronize our actions, words and images
within both the Department and the interagency to maintain that
credibility.
Above all, strategic communication is a process, and the
process of communication integration will require a long-term
commitment and sustained effort by the Department in support of
the U.S. Government.
Today I will focus somewhat on process and try to briefly
describe for this subcommittee some of the efforts to date that
the Department of Defense has undertaken in this regard,
specifically: the Quadrennial Defense Review Strategic
Communication Execution Roadmap; the Strategic Communication
Integration Group, or SCIG, process, which is the Department's
strategic communication planning effort; support the State
Department and the interagency; and education efforts focusing
on helping strategic communication thinking occur naturally in
every action.
In September of 2006, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon
England signed the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Strategic
Communication Execution Roadmap. Mr. England cited three
primary objectives in this document: first, to institutionalize
a DOD process by which the principles of strategic
communication are incorporated in the development of policy
formulation, planning and execution; second, to define the
roles, responsibilities and relationships and develop doctrine
for strategic communication and its primary communications-
supporting capabilities--and those primary supporting
capabilities include public affairs, aspects of information
operations, principally PSYOP, visual information, DOD
activities of military diplomacy and defense support to public
diplomacy; and third, to properly resource military departments
and combatant commands to organize, train and equip DOD's
primary communications-supporting capabilities.
One of the most significant successes of the roadmap to
date is the establishment of both an integrating process and
creation of a Strategic Communication Integration Group, or
SCIG. The SCIG secretary coordinates and synchronizes
communication plans and concepts within the Department. And a
SCIG Executive Committee, or EXCOM, provides oversight and
guidance. And I am the Director of the Strategic Communication
Integration Group Secretariat.
The DOD has also significantly increased in communication
collaboration with the interagency. My office participates in
working groups and has joined Under Secretary Hughes' Policy
Coordinating Committee and sub-PCCs on a variety of topics and
issues, including research, new media engagement, and content
sharing, as Mr. MacInnes has indicated. We attend a
collaboration group with DOD, State and United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) and a weekly fusion cell
meeting as well.
DOD had direct input into the national strategy on public
diplomacy and strategic communication through the SCIG process
and has provided military manpower and expertise to the
interagency Counterterrorism Communications Center, which was
recently established and just mentioned.
The Defense Department has also conducted multiple
strategic communication education and training initiatives over
the past two years to help institutionalize strategic
communication as a process. Strategic communication and public
affairs blocks of instructions are being incorporated into the
joint professional military education, working closely with the
war colleges. Advanced and expeditionary joint public affairs
training courses are being developed as an Strategic
Communications (SC) roadmap task, and they will be taught at
the Defense Information School at Fort Meade.
Simultaneously, DOD and State Department are exploring ways
to leverage training resources. Interagency participants
attended the first-ever DOD strategic communication interagency
worldwide seminar in July 2007. And a State Department public
diplomacy officer just attended the DOD strategic communication
workshop which was just held a couple of weeks ago in Monterey,
California, at the Naval Postgraduate School.
In summary, we have come a long way in the past four years,
particularly in the past two years since the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (DASD) for joint communication was
established. But the Department has a ways to go yet in
realizing our long-term goal of institutionalizing strategic
communication across the Department.
We certainly appreciate your support of our efforts and the
interest that you have shown by conducting this hearing. And I
look forward to answering your questions.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Captain Pittman can be found in
the Appendix on page 39.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Dr. Doran.
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL DORAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE (SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. Doran. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank
you for inviting me to speak on the issue of countering
ideological support for terrorism.
My written testimony provides more detail about this
concept, but I would like to devote a few minutes in my oral
remarks to highlight a few key aspects of it.
The war we are fighting today is an information war, a
global conflict of perception. Terrorist attacks, even ones of
the magnitude of 9/11, are not designed to cripple the United
States but, rather, to generate the perception of American
weakness and vulnerability among key audiences across the
globe. The spectacle of the attack is as important to the
terrorists, sometimes more important, than the destructive
effect itself. At their essence, terrorist attacks against
America are tools in a contest for power and authority within
Muslim societies.
Our goal is to purposefully join and influence a political
process, an ongoing multi-sided conversation that is proceeding
independently of the United States.
The recent success enjoyed by General David Petraeus and
his Iraqi allies has dramatically demonstrated to us the
primacy of intra-Muslim politics in counterinsurgency and in
countering ideological support for terrorism. The General has
taught us that coordinating our statements and actions is an
important component to influencing the internal Iraqi debate
over legitimate political authority in that country.
But countering ideological support for terrorism is not
primarily about creating brand America. It should not be
reduced solely to executing public diplomacy campaigns whose
objective is to burnish the image of America. Those are
laudable efforts, and we fully support and encourage them, but
they are not the essence of what countering ideological support
for terrorism is all about.
The key question is, how do we join and influence this
intra-Muslim conversation in order to undermine the
intellectual and perceptual underpinnings of terrorism?
Terrorists actively foster the perception that the global
Islamic community is under severe threat. To counter this
perception, we must inject critical doubt among key populations
about the terrorists' vision of hate and fear.
For their vision to have any credibility, terrorist groups
seek to foster a sense of doom, a sense that midnight is fast
approaching. To manufacture this threat, al Qaeda and others
argue that the United States and our allies are somehow placing
the global Islamic community in peril. To counter this, we must
chip away at the bleak picture of helplessness and
vulnerability that supports it.
Our enemies foster a culture of blame to foment anger,
hatred and a sense of victimization. They offer their violence
as the only solution to the challenges of today. To be
successful, we must focus on the self-perceptions of key
audiences rather than perceptions of America. Our core message
must outline an alternative future that is more attractive than
the bleak future offered by the terrorists. This positive
narrative must contain more than just antiterrorist rhetoric.
It should include elements that will positively impact the
future lives of Muslims everywhere.
To promote this objective we cannot simply focus on getting
our message out. Success requires taking actions that make the
alternative narrative real. Thus, key components of the
successful strategy include civil affairs, security, education
reform and economic opportunity.
In Iraq's Al Anbar province, we are beginning to see the
process of combatting ideological support for terrorism done
correctly. Just a few short months ago, public commentary in
this country widely suggested that al Qaeda was firmly
ensconced in Iraq. In fact, we now know that al Qaeda is not as
welcomed in Iraq as outside commentators claimed, especially
after the Anbar Salvation Council emerged in late 2006 to
oppose al Qaeda's violence, extremism and attacks on civilians.
This trend appears to be accelerating, since, just last
week, Major General Joseph Fil, Commander of U.S. forces in
Baghdad, told the media that al Qaeda in Iraq has been cleared
out of the Iraqi capital and that Iraqi families are returning
to their homes.
By countering ideological support for terrorism, we seek to
appeal to the self-interest of local communities whose values
and aspirations find no expression in al Qaeda's world view.
Although it claims to speak on behalf of all Muslims, we should
not be taken in by al Qaeda's propaganda or endorse its
inflated sense of its own ideological appeal.
Our countering-ideological-support-for-terrorism approach
seeks to force al Qaeda to live as an actor in our alternative
pro-future narrative. The reality is that governments and
citizens today are fighting against al Qaeda. I am not
declaring universal success, but to paraphrase a famous quote
from Winston Churchill: In Iraq, what we are seeing is not the
end, it is not the beginning of the end, but it is, perhaps,
the end of the beginning.
With that, I conclude my oral remarks. My written testimony
will be submitted as part of the record, and I look forward to
your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Doran can be found in the
Appendix on page 52.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you all for your testimony.
I will pass, and I yield to Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. I yield.
Mr. Smith. Ms. Castor.
Ms. Castor. Good morning.
How do you divide the differences and responsibilities in
missions of the Department of State and the Department of
Defense? I know you all work together and collaborate on a lot
of different initiatives when it comes to worldwide
communications, but I would like you to detail how they differ
and where your concerns lie with, maybe, mission creep of one
agency to another.
Captain Pittman. With regard to my specific area of
expertise, it is the Strategic Communication Integration Group,
essentially the development and staffing of strategic
communication plans on behalf of the Department of Defense.
Obviously any efforts that we make are designed to plug into
the greater effort of State Department.
But, you know, the process of staffing plans and
development is a time-consuming process of ensuring that all
the offices with tasks and responsibilities in a particular
communication plan come together in harmony, horizontally
integrating all of those efforts kind of across multiple lanes.
A perfect example is the recent Afghanistan strategic
communication plan that we worked on. It took probably about
four months to complete that plan, but once completed, it had
elements of interagency support. It was nested with the plans
that were already in place from the State Department and
through North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF). And it had, specifically,
execution pieces that were the responsibility of Central
Command elements, of other elements within the theater of
operations there.
It is a challenging responsibility, but we have multiple
meetings on an ongoing basis with our colleagues, kind of,
across this spectrum and in larger groups. Again, it is about
integrating the process. It is not about creating new
stovepipes or organizations, but, rather, making sure that we
are all working in harmony and synchronization. It is a
challenge. It is hard to align those efforts, but we are
working to that end.
Ms. Castor. Are the DOD communications efforts concentrated
on the Central Command (CENTCOM) area and then, of course,
through Special Operations Command (SOCOM) especially?
Captain Pittman. I would offer to you, ma'am, that there
are certainly discrete efforts across all the combatant
commands. And I use the CENTCOM example because it is one
example of a pretty robust plan that we recently tackled, but
there are multiple efforts.
Obviously, there is a lot of time and energy currently
spent on our activities and operations in the Central Command
theater, so there is a lot of effort that goes into that. There
is a lot of resources, and a lot of people working at different
levels, kind of across the spectrum, on those particular
issues, just because they are so dynamic and they involve our
Government to such an extent.
Mr. MacInnes. For the State Department's view, two things
mentioning what Captain Pittman talked about. We are actually
doing a lot more things than in the past. I mean, the scope of
what we have to handle is global, and the borders for Internet
and other activities don't exist.
And we have a very close coordination relationship with
public affairs. That is traditional; that has always been that
way. PSYOPS and operations that were theater-based, meaning in
areas of active war, are now global because of the nature of
the global war on terror. In other words, it has moved beyond
being localized.
And that means that we have had to learn how to coordinate
our efforts globally on issues like information operations,
PSYOPS and public affairs and public diplomacy. It is not an
easy thing, and, actually we didn't do it well, certainly at
the turn of the century.
But we actually have taken this on. We have realized that,
because so many different elements are now involved in this
activity of what you might call strategic communications writ
large, that we do need these coordinating mechanisms to be able
to sort out and to reinforce and to not duplicate but to also
not stumble over each other. And we have actually created, I
think, ways that we are moving in that direction quite robustly
right now. I think that was missing before. But that is all.
Dr. Doran. If I could just add to that, since Duncan set up
the CTCC, that has been enormously helpful for us. We in the
Department of Defense recognize that State has the lead on
this, and we need their leadership.
The problem that we had before the CTCC existed, I think,
was not so much that we were getting in each other's business
but that we were synced up and that we weren't working as
closely together as we might have been. And we hadn't
explained, I think, to State what we need from them by way of
leadership in this area.
Now that the CTCC is there, we have developed processes and
relationships that I think allow for the two agencies to
understand each other much better and to work much more
effectively together in this area.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Drake.
Mrs. Drake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Well, first, is there anything that Congress needs to do,
or the executive branch, for you to be able to work more
effectively together? Or, under the current structure, do you
have what you need? Is there anything we need to do to help
you?
Mr. MacInnes. I believe that we have actually moved--we
have set up mechanisms that are beginning to really show that
we can do this and we can do it well. And what we are trying to
avoid is setting up layers and big bureaucracies. I mean, the
Counterterrorism Communication Center is really 12 people. That
is a very small group, but what we need to do here is
coordinate, not reinvent. And so, I don't see, particularly,
any new authorities that we need.
Captain Pittman. I would second what Duncan has indicated.
A lot of the sub-PCC efforts are now working at looking at
efficiencies and the sharing of information and content, things
like a shared databank of photography imagery, shared
strategies on engaging new media and that sort of thing. These
are the sorts of things that we are working toward right now.
On the resourcing side, how I would respond to your
question, ma'am, is that there is a strategic communication
roadmap which lists a variety of discrete issues which
represent capability gaps across the spectrum, or across the
enterprise for strategic communication. There are specific
issues about developing the capabilities of the Department to
be more robust and to be able to meet all of our challenges.
And that roadmap actually looks at funding across the Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP). It is not a short-term effort,
but rather it is a longer-term effort.
I will give you a couple of quick examples. For example, in
fiscal year 2008 funding, we have allotted $10 million to the
Digital Video Transportation System (DVTS), which is a portable
satellite communications system that is predominantly deployed
in the Central Command theater but also deployed in other
areas, that allows our commanders and subject-matter experts to
be able to broadcast live, real-time, back to organizations in
the States to be able to address the media in real-time.
Another example is the Joint Public Affairs Support
Element, which is based at Joint Forces Command down at the
Joint Warfighting Center in Suffolk, $3.3 million allocated in
fiscal year 2008 funding for that evolution. And that is a
capability, a small unit of about 50 people, that is able to
deploy in expeditionary instances around the world to support
the public affairs, public communications efforts of the
Department.
So these kinds of things.
Another example is, just within the Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs, $2 million that will go toward the Defense
Information School for bolstering courses and the development
of a couple of courses which essentially meet the requirement
for roadmap tasks to provide intermediary and senior courses
for our communicators.
So these kinds of efforts are discrete, and they are kind
of built in to separate budgetary requests from different
offices of primary responsibility. But they go a long way
toward developing the capabilities of the Department.
Mrs. Drake. And I am going to assume that the bulk of your
message is sort of a moderate Muslim message, as opposed--to
kind of offset the extreme message? I mean, I didn't get the
impression this is a U.S. message. This is more in support of a
moderate Muslim message?
Dr. Doran. I was putting the emphasis there. I think it is
both. We definitely have to get our message out. But I was
putting the message there, the emphasis there, because I think
there needs to be a culture shift in how we perceive the threat
that we face and how we develop the tools to deal with it.
And that is how I would answer your original question,
about what you might do. I think you can help us in shifting
the culture.
To give you a more specific example, our intel communities,
both within the Department of Defense and the intel community
writ large, they tend to collect against threats, against
specific terrorist threats to the United States. And they don't
tend to collect against open source, public discussions about
politics and public opinion and so forth. And in some elements
of the intel community, you find out that they don't consider
public opinion to be part of intel collection.
But if you consider the example that I gave in my oral
remarks here of Iraq, the appeal of the terrorist message in
Iraq among Sunnis is not so much the intrinsic content of the
message but the sense that Sunnis had that they were going to
be dominated by Shias as a result of the change in Iraq.
So focusing in on the domestic Iraqi debate about relations
between Sunnis and Shia would have been or should be a central
U.S. national security objective. But our intel community,
coming out of the Cold War, is much more inclined to look for
that terrorist who might be about to carry out an attack. That
is very important to do, but there is this wider spectrum.
Representative Thornberry's bill, 2800, has one mechanism
for bringing about this kind of shift and developing the kind
of cultural sensitivities that we need to develop.
Mrs. Drake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mrs. Drake.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MacInnes, the digital outreach teams, can you talk to
us a little bit about how you oversee that or the oversight to
make sure that they are staying on message? And that when you
use the word ``creativity,'' how do you make sure that it stays
within the white lines that we think is appropriate, given that
this, I suspect, is being conducted in Arabic or Farsi or some
language that not many of us can interpret?
Mr. MacInnes. That is a very good question. Those are
questions we struggled with when we set this up.
It is clearly difficult for a government organization to do
blogging, because blogging tends to be a very informal, chatty
way of working. And, of course, it is actually very dangerous
to blog, because when you make a statement to the press in a
press conference, you know what you are going to be saying; in
a blog, you have to actually have a conversation rather than
just a lecture, so it is very difficult.
But what we have, though, is we developed a technique and a
paradigm. We have a senior State Department--a very experienced
officer who served in Iraq who understands the Muslim world,
and he is the supervisor for that group. They discuss each
posting before it goes up and look at it. And we do not make
policy there. We stick with policy. But what we are doing is
getting at the issue sometimes of motivation.
Many of the things that are on the Web ascribe to America's
bad motivations for what we do. You know, they may be perfectly
aware of what our policy toward Iraq is, but they are doing it
because you are there to destroy Iraq for Israel or you are
there for oil or other things. Our job is to address that
motivation issue and show them that is not the motivation.
You need the creativity and what I call the bridging.
Because you can't just say, look, here is our policy and drop
it into a blog. You have to have what I call a bridge. And we
use bridges, we use sports, poetry, current events to do those
bridges that are noncontent-related but allow one to get to be
in a conversational mode with people.
What we have found, though, most interestingly--because we
worried that we would be, in the parlance of the Internet,
flamed when we came on, well, ``These Americans, get the heck
off my site,'' you know. What we found instead--and we deal
with mainstream sites; we are not actually going to the
hardcore terrorist sites. We are going to the mainstream sites,
because we believe that we must convince the general public in
the Arab-Muslim world not to support terrorism even tacitly,
and we are trying to counter those messages. But what we found
is people were very glad that we were there. We had postings
like, ``We don't like your policies, but we are sure glad you
are here talking to us about it,'' or, ``We appreciate the fact
that you have taken the time to come and speak to us.''
Mr. Conaway. Right.
Given that we have got a message, can you talk to me a
little bit about your perception, any of the three of you, as
to why the moderate Muslim world, the vast majority of peace-
loving, peaceful Muslims, have not been a better help to us? I
mean, my simplistic view is this is a battle for the heart of
Islam. And it is not our fight, in the sense that I don't know
that I could effectively have that kind of input.
But the 80-percent-plus that are moderates, why have they
not joined the ruckus to say and to be more open and more vocal
in terms of trying to reclaim this religion from the far
extremists, and being more of an ally for us as opposed to
simply a silent majority out there that does not seem yet to
have taken sides the way I would have expected them to?
Dr. Doran. I am not sure that I would put it that way,
exactly.
If I go back again to the example of what is going on in
Iraq, you see the Sunnis in Al Anbar are risking their lives
standing side by side with us against al Qaeda, whereas a year
ago they weren't. So it isn't love of the ideology, and it
isn't an inherent weakness in people, because these people are
being very courageous today. It is a set of local circumstances
on the ground.
I think, more often than not, it is a lack of a tradition
in the Middle East of participatory politics, and it is fear:
fear from the security services and fear from al Qaeda. And
when those circumstances are changed, then we find people
standing up. So it is a whole complex of issues.
Mr. Conaway. Excuse me, Dr. Doran. What about the folks who
aren't in those security positions, who aren't threatened daily
by--let us get out of Iraq and--poor phrase from my side of the
aisle--and look at the Muslim population at large across the
world. You know, they are not all directly threatened. But why
is the mindset that it is okay for them to sit on the sidelines
and allow the extremists to hijack their religion? Any insight
there? I don't have any.
Dr. Doran. I think the single most important factor is a
lack of a tradition of participatory politics. You just don't
find them organizing for any issue, not just along this.
Mr. Smith. The gentleman's time has expired. If you have
one more quick one, I will let you fire it off there.
Mr. Conaway. I will wait for another round.
Mr. Smith. Thanks.
Mr. McIntyre.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing today.
If I could ask you a couple of questions in my time
allowed, so let me ask the first one. If you can tell us, does
the U.S. Government have a human capital strategy that supports
our national strategic communications effort? And,
specifically, does that human capital strategy--how does that
impact on recruiting, retention and personnel management?
Mr. MacInnes. For the Department of State, we have very
little trouble recruiting, certainly. We have a long waiting
list of people trying to come in. We currently and at all times
have always needed more people. I mean, in fighting wars of
ideas, you have never done your job, because there is always
something else to do.
I think getting area expertise has been very important and
getting language training. We have made a major effort at the
State Department to increase our cadre of fluent Arabic
speakers to be able--and that has paid some results now. We now
have people that have come through that system that are going
on the air and speaking in Arabic on television and radio.
But we have always had a strong area of expertise, but that
is an area that we actually have to expand that even further.
And language has been one of the key issues for us.
Mr. McIntyre. So if recruiting is not a problem, is
retention a problem?
Mr. MacInnes. Retention has not been a problem. The biggest
problem, I think, is overall numbers maybe are not at the level
we would like to have. We have more positions than we have
people, at this time.
Mr. McIntyre. Can you tell us, with regard to personnel
management, if there are issues there, as part of your human
capital strategy? Are you comfortable with the personnel
management as it is in place, or do you think there need to be
improvements made?
Mr. MacInnes. Well, there always can be improvements. One
of the problems that those of us who work overseas a lot have
encountered is that the dynamic of serving overseas with
families is harder, because spouses expect to work. The dual-
spouse working is standard now. In the 1950's and 1960's, you
could go overseas and basically the spouse did not work.
Nowadays, there is a different expectation level for that.
And the other is it can be difficult for people with
children, because levels of schooling vary widely across the
regions out there. And school matters a lot to people.
So those are issues that we work on all the time, that we
have made a lot of accommodations for tandem couples and for
people working together and for other things. But, of course,
more needs to always be done on that.
Mr. McIntyre. So are you saying it does not negatively
impact, though, your retention of personnel?
Mr. MacInnes. It has not.
Mr. McIntyre. And when you say there are more places
available than people but yet you say there is not a problem
recruiting, how do you solve that issue? Do you think you need
to be more proactive in recruiting or what?
Mr. MacInnes. I think we have certain ceilings that are set
in terms of numbers we are allowed to have. I am not sure. I
could take that question, because I am not really--personnel is
kind of a little far from my area of expertise. I wouldn't want
to venture----
Mr. McIntyre. If you could check into that and get back to
us on that.
Mr. MacInnes. I will.
Mr. McIntyre. If you would do that by the first week in
December. Can you do that?
Mr. MacInnes. Yes.
Mr. McIntyre. All right, thank you.
The other thing is we obviously need to be from a legal
standpoint, being the legislative branch, whether there are any
legal or regulatory impediments that we need to address in
Congress or that you believe the executive branch needs to
address to make this strategic communications effort more
effective. Can any of you speak to that?
Dr. Doran. I think it would be worth looking into something
like the 1206, 1207 authorities, so that when you have
situations on the ground where, let us say you have a moderate
imam who is preaching a message that we think should have a
larger listening audience, and you find out that the Department
of Defense has part of a broadcasting facility and USAID has
another part, that the two of them could more easily transfer
resources. If the heads of both agencies agreed, I think that
kind of thing could be very helpful for facilitating exchanges
in the field.
We often find a situation where the Department of Defense
has lots of resources and the authorities or responsibilities
fall to the Department of State. And if there was a more
streamlined mechanism for moving resources back and forth, it
could be helpful. It is worth at least looking into.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Saxton.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And I want to thank the ranking member for calling our
attention to this piece that was written by Mr. Satloff of The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. I think it has a
real nugget of value in it. It talks about what we need to do
to be successful in this situation. And he says here, ``This
requires a conceptual revolution. Rather than expand effort on
winning Muslim friendship for America, our engagement with
Muslim publics--what we call public diplomacy--should focus on
identifying, nurturing and supporting anti-Islamist Muslims.''
I think that says a great deal in just a few words.
And I have watched our Republican Administration, I have
watched the previous Administration try to deal with programs
to accomplish what I think we can all agree is a very
worthwhile and necessary goal. But we, it seems to me, for the
last 15 years, almost 16, going into our 16th year, in the last
two Administrations facing this situation, it is natural for us
to view this situation and how to achieve that goal based on
our perception of success, based on our perception of what
values in the West and around the world should be, and, I
think, a very basic failure on our part to be able to cross a
bridge, a bridge of understanding other cultures, particularly
the Islamist culture.
We have advocated education programs. We have advocated
economic advances in Muslim countries. We have advocated
establishing and supporting democracies in other countries. And
I think that we have not crossed that bridge of understanding,
of understanding what motivates people from the countries that
we desire to have an effect on.
I think of Lebanon often. And I was never there when
Lebanon was in its glorious years, influenced by the West,
ruled by a democratic process, with a great economy. All of the
elements in a Muslim country that we would like to see today,
from a Western perspective, were there, and we all know what
happened.
And when we look at the countries where we are engaged
today, there are failures and there are successes. And I would
submit that the successes, in establishing Satloff's well-
stated goal, I would submit that the successes that we have had
have been partly because of us but mostly because of Muslims
who have been influenced by the situation.
In the Anbar province, for example, great successes today.
In the Diyala province, success is perhaps not as good, but
great successes, because somehow tribal leaders, Muslims,
Sunnis, became influenced to help carry out this goal. And so,
somehow or another, we crossed that bridge, at least in a
couple of places, in order to carry out the goal that we would
all like to see carried out.
And I guess I would just conclude, and then ask for your
comments on this--I would just conclude by saying this. One of
the understandings that seems to be prevalent, at least in
Anbar, in the Diyala province, is that tribal leaders became
convinced of two things: Al Qaeda was bad, and the United
States and the West wasn't going to go away; we were going to
stay there and support them.
Mr. Saxton. And to the extent that we should learn from
those lessons, Lebanon on the one hand and Anbar and the Diyala
Province on the other hand, there are some real lessons to be
learned there in how to carry out and achieve Satloff's goal.
What do you think?
Mr. Smith. And you have 10 seconds to express your thoughts
on that. I will give you slightly more to that. We have got a
vote coming up shortly.
Mr. MacInnes. I would say on--I mean, Iraq is a very
special case because it is deeply into war; and actually, when
you talk about the broader Muslim and Arab world, one of the
things in terms of getting our values and talking to people
about these issues is that we have sent out quite a number of
American Muslims to talk about precisely those issues: about
what it means to be--what it means to have a site engaged, and
discussing and fighting back against extremists.
We also have brought a lot of clerics--several hundred
clerics from overseas, Muslim clerics--to the United States to
look at how we do diversity and religion and how society can be
supportive of religion and opportunities.
And, last, a lot of our programs overseas look to try to
create the kind of economic and political opportunities to keep
people--they make people involved in a positive way in society.
Mr. Smith. Ms. Gillibrand.
Mrs. Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have two areas of inquiry that I want to cover if I can.
The first is, you are here to talk about communications
strategy, and I want to talk about the use of language, because
one concern I have is that this Administration has painted all
terrorists as Islamo-Fascists, and if we look at this article,
How To Win the War of Ideas, by Robert Satloff, he calls them
Islamists.
Now, if we are trying to win a war of ideas using the
fundamental tenet of Islam in the middle of a world that
connotes terrorists, is that an effective communication
strategy? It seems to me that when we are creating our foreign
policy to deal with various elements that we are concerned
with, they have different leadership, they have different
values, they have different goals; they will require a
different attack strategy. And so to paint them with one brush,
I would find as--if you painted a Christian group with a
Christian label and framed it as a terrorist group, I would be
offended.
So have you heard or is there any feedback from your
expertise that this broad brush is actually counterproductive?
Mr. MacInnes. Yes. Two things.
One of the things that we look at when we do messaging in
the Counterterrorism Communications Center and with DOD is, we
have to be keenly aware of what we say--what we say may not be
what they hear--and that you want to be saying things that they
hear the way you want them to be hearing it.
When we say ``Islamo-Fascism,'' whether that term has
meaning or not, what they hear is, ``We are Islam, attacking my
religion.'' When you say ``Islamist,'' they don't; they hear
``Muslim,'' you know. And as one of my Arab friends said once,
you don't start a conversation by poking a stick in the eye of
the person that you are trying to talk to; and that is--when
you say ``Islamo-Fascism,'' it is the verbal equivalent of
poking a stick in somebody's eye.
And they do not--and bin Laden has been very good at taking
our words and turning them to his advantage by saying, See,
they are actually at war with Islam. And we fall into the trap
of, you know, of having to answer that question, like, Have you
stopped beating your wife? You can't answer that well.
Mr. Smith. If I could interrupt, I want to draw a point on
this.
I think what you are saying basically is, the word Islam-
Muslim should be no part of how we describe al Qaeda and who we
are fighting. Again, that is something we have struggled
against, the Islamo-Fascist comment, ``Islamists,'' no matter
how you put it. And I have been through this over the years
figuring out how to put it, because you think, well, logically
they have a certain religious bent.
But I think the ultimate answer, what Ms. Gillibrand is
pointing out, is, there is no way you can put Islam in there;
and is that a decision that our strategic communications folks
have made? Let's call them--you know, al Qaeda, call them Qutb,
which is one person that they followed--find something else to
call them that does not give them any piece of the Islam label.
Is that a decision that you have made?
Mr. MacInnes. We basically call them terrorists, murderers,
what--basically what they are. But when you want to talk to
them as Muslims, you are better off using a positive Muslim
voice saying that.
When we talk about Islam, we are not credible in terms of,
you are not a Muslim. So what we actually have examined--and
Dr. Doran talked about it earlier--is, we are looking at
getting and collecting those positive statements made by
leading Muslims against terrorism. And they can say--you know,
they can use the word ``Islam'' and talk about Islam, and they
are very convincing. And we are finding that there is a lot
more of that going on now than was previously.
I mean, there are editorials. There are great concerns that
poke fun at terms. And I think that Muslims are concerned very
much about their religion being hijacked. But, as Dr. Doran
said, they are not a society that tends to have a lot of public
debate.
Mrs. Gillibrand. And what is your experience in the
military? Are we beginning to change our terminology?
Captain Pittman. I think lexicon is always important, and
we look at these kinds of things when we are working together
to develop messaging. And we have some people who have studied
these areas quite a bit. We are always focusing on trying to
get more regional, cultural expertise, et cetera.
But part of the challenge is pushing it down to the very
lowest levels because when you have operational, you know,
activities going on in a country, then you need to be able to
have specific cultural expertise in that area.
Mrs. Gillibrand. Do you make these recommendations to the
higher levels, too? Because this is something--I mean, if you
watch the Presidential debates, you will have Presidential
candidates using this terminology, you will have the
Administration using this terminology.
Have you made those recommendations to the higher-ups that
if you are going to have a better communication strategy,
choice of identifying language is something that has to be a
priority.
Captain Pittman. I think language is something that
leadership focuses on. I think that phrases like ``violent
extremists'' as opposed to using ``Islam'' in a
characterization or whatever, I think that is something that we
have evolved to over time. I don't think it is something that
we naturally can bow at the beginning of this.
Mrs. Gillibrand. I would encourage you all in your
positions of expertise and advocacy to help improve how we
address this issue.
The second question I just want to raise quickly is, in
your digital outreach teams, you only have two individuals
doing it now. What kind of recruiting are you doing on college
campuses? This is an area where I would think, for the
military, there are enormous numbers of young individuals who
would love to be part of winning the war on terror, whom we
could develop to look to become foreign language experts, to
work in a different capacity for the military to do things like
blogging and reviewing Websites.
What is your long-term plan, strategy to build that
capability?
Captain Pittman. I will address that from the defense side,
and Duncan can roll in as well.
There are actually--I mean, the digital outreach team at
the Counterterrorism Communication Center is one cell. But
there are also discrete operations within combatant command
headquarters. For example, Central Command has a blogging
capability that they used at that headquarters level.
There are new media-type engagement efforts at lower
levels. The Joint Forces Command, for example, has a blogging
engagement capability, and they have written a pamphlet or a
brochure on how to go about doing that. So it is an area that
we are moving into.
The Department of Defense has new media engagement as well.
Now, does that mean that we have Arabic speakers or Farsi
speakers? It doesn't necessarily mean that. Sometimes in the
field there may be contracted capabilities that are working in
these areas to address these types of new media. But it
certainly is an area that we are sharing with State in trying
to better our knowledge.
Mrs. Gillibrand. But are you actively recruiting on college
campuses for these new kinds of talents that could be brought
into either our diplomatic side or our military side to really
add value to our mission here?
Captain Pittman. I would tell you that I don't believe that
it is drilled down to the extent that we are specifically
seeking those skill sets. Rather, for example, in recruiting
military personnel, we would look for a background, perhaps, in
media. I mean, almost all young people coming into the military
today have some experience in using new media, and much more
than people our age, for example.
Mr. Smith. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mrs. Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. I have just a couple of questions.
One, in terms of how our audience in this war of ideas gets
their information, you know, what is the best medium for
reaching them? And there are a whole bunch of different mediums
out there, depending on who your audience is and where they get
their information.
From my own campaign experience when I was first running,
you know, for Congress, there were a lot of different ways to
reach the people in my district, the ones who are going to
vote--radio, mail--but just sort of walking around and having
grown up there, I knew that television, if you will, that is
the killer app. If I had a limited amount of money, and I did,
it should all go there because that is where they are going to
get the bulk of their information.
That was 12 years ago, so things may have changed.
But in the audience out there, sort of the disaffected
Muslim world, the ones we are trying to persuade, have you
discovered sort of what is that best source of information?
Where do they get their information? When they develop an
opinion, where is it coming from? And what have we done to try
to get into that medium in the most effective way possible?
Mr. MacInnes. That is a very good question and one we
grapple with all the time.
First of all, what happened in the modern 21st century is,
audiences have segmented a lot.
Mr. Smith. It is a lot more difficult.
Mr. MacInnes. I watch television a lot--news. My son, who
is in high school, never watches television, but gets lots of
information off the Internet.
Mr. Smith. There are hundreds of channels.
Mr. MacInnes. So, for the general public in the Muslim
world, television is the most powerful medium, without
question. For the youth audiences in much of the Muslim world
that is well connected to the Internet, it is Internet
without--okay. So we need to do both.
But what happens is, there is a relationship between the
Internet and television. You know, bin Laden puts a video on
the Internet and if it gets picked up by TV, TV runs something,
the segment gets put onto YouTube.
So we need to do both.
Mr. Smith. And if I may make the observation, based on a
previous hearing we had on this subject, we need to do a lot
more on the Internet.
And I think you guys get it. I think the people in the top
leadership now understand that. We have not--and this sort of
follows up on Ms. Gillibrand's question, we have not put the
resources into it. I mean, once I discovered that television
was the thing, I stopped doing everything else, and every
nickel I could, you know, I put into that.
I don't sense that we have seen--we have done the same with
the Internet. We are vaguely aware of it. We don't have enough
people involved, and we need to do more, dramatically more; and
we would like to be helpful here on this committee and in
Congress in doing that.
Is that a fair assessment?
Mr. MacInnes. I think that is a fair assessment. I think we
have identified that we are weak there and we need to move into
it.
One of the things, to answer--Ms. Gillibrand's earlier
question was on recruitment. One of the things we are looking
at for Internet is, do we need to have it done within the
government? Is that the most effective way to be doing it?
We need to be doing some of it. But we also have been
working, like, with the University of Southern California
School of Diplomacy on, are there ways we can get people
outside the government to be doing it? Because they will be
more effective. They can be freer. They can say, I don't like
this policy, but--which we--we are in somewhat of a
straightjacket.
So we would like to seek out ways that we can get
nongovernmental organizations involved in using the Internet
against extremist terrorism in ways that amplify, because the
Internet is best done, often, as a decentralized----
Mr. Smith. I just have one more question, and we are going
to have to wrap up.
We are blending a new regime now. We are actually doing
votes now in 15 minutes, instead of a half hour, so I have to
let members go to get over there in time.
And that is: Who is really in charge of the operation?
Because we have heard a lot of different organizations, I sort
of get the sense, that the CTCC coordinates; and on the other
hand, we have the position that Karen Hughes is currently
occupying and leaving. Someone will be taking that post.
You know, if we were to say, Who is the person in charge of
strategic communications within the whole government, and State
is the central, but is it the CTCC? Is it Karen Hughes's shop?
Is it you?
I mean, who really is in charge of the overall operation?
Dr. Doran. Karen Hughes.
Mr. MacInnes. Karen Hughes.
I do have a proviso there on overt strategic
communications. We don't have authorities on the internal side.
And there are things that need and have to be done on that
side.
Mr. Smith. Understood.
And it is really, I mean, the covert piece--I mean, there
are a lot of different things going on. I think it is more of
the overt piece that we are interested in.
And so it flows from Karen Hughes, down; the CTCC then
coordinates.
So does the head of the CTCC then report directly to Karen
Hughes on a fairly regular basis?
Mr. MacInnes. Yes, very much so. But again, the CTCC is
interagency. The deputy director is a DOD officer, and it is
interagency in its nature and makeup.
Mr. Smith. But from a hierarchy standpoint, they then
report up and go on from there?
Mr. MacInnes. Yes.
Mr. Smith. That is all I have.
Do you have anything to wrap it up?
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a few
questions in the limited time we have.
I just mentioned--in response to the point you were asking
about, my understanding is that for a substantial segment of
the Muslim population, short-wave radio is still a big deal,
and yet too many--there is some issue of funding where we are
no longer funding some initiatives of the government that we
have funded in the past. And so, while I agree with you
completely on the Internet, different strategies, different
mechanisms seem to make sense in different places.
I want to get briefly back to Mr. Saxton, because I think
he very eloquently laid out the heart of this issue and not
everybody had a chance to respond.
I am looking back at that Defense Science Board report I
mentioned before, and it talked about building on an in-depth
knowledge of other cultures and factors that motivate human
behavior, which it does seem to me is the heart of the matter.
He laid out the contrast between Lebanon and some of the recent
successes in Anbar.
Dr. Doran, on a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate our
in-depth knowledge of other cultures and factors that motivate
human behavior as are applied to our strategic communication
strategies?
Dr. Doran. I would give us a five or a six. It differs in
different areas. I think we can do a lot better on that.
But I would put the emphasis on, as I said before, the need
for a huge cultural shift. It isn't because people aren't
trying, but the institutions and the processes that we have set
up are really geared for another era and another threat.
Mr. Thornberry. I guess that is--let me ask you.
Mr. Smith. I apologize. I have to run. I will let you wrap
up the meeting, if that is okay, and finish your questions, but
I have to get to my office before I get to the floor.
Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry [presiding]. Mr. MacInnes, how many folks do
you have working at the Communications Center?
Mr. MacInnes. The Communications Center is 12 people. We
have kept it deliberately very small because we are not trying
to be a production unit, but more of a----
Mr. Thornberry. So you don't intend to expand?
Mr. MacInnes. We don't intend to expand. We might go to 18,
but I doubt more than that.
Mr. Thornberry. This may be an unanswerable question, but
what you have essentially described, an interagency cooperation
collaboration, that seems really hard to make effective in a
time when communication goes at the speed of light.
Now, if you are to develop a--you know, I think maybe you
said earlier, before you post on a blog, you have to talk about
it and make sure that posting is going to be okay. How can that
possibly be effective?
Mr. MacInnes. It can be effective, but the turnaround time
needs to speed up, there is no question.
One of the things Karen Hughes set up is this rapid
response unit because we used to, like, read the news in the
morning and get somebody on the air about 5 in the afternoon.
Well, in Europe, that means you have missed the nightly news;
it means you missed 24 hours of the cycle.
Now we actually have it so that, by 7:30 in the morning, we
have heads up; we will get somebody on the air to answer a
question in Europe by 11 in the morning, which means you get on
the nightly news.
Doing that on the Internet requires greater efforts on our
part. It requires more robust efforts and a more 24/7 effort.
It is true when we have the cycle, it is relentless and it
is very difficult. And we are grappling with that because
bureaucracies do not move as fast as--we need to be more
entrepreneurial. We need to figure out ways to be more
entrepreneurial in how we deal with this, because the
traditional ways do not work, often.
Mr. Thornberry. And wouldn't you agree, in power, people on
the front lines--understanding they may make a mistake here or
there, but you are going to have to tolerate that; we are going
to have to tolerate it too, by the way--in the interest of
speed.
Let me ask one other question. Then I am going to have to
go. I may have some others for the record, if you don't mind.
How are the things you all do plugged in to the NCTC
because as I understand it, the overall planning in the
government for the war against terror is by the NCTC. Defense
Science Board and everybody else says you can't have strategic
communications as a plug-in; you know, it has got to be an
integral part from the beginning. And so the work you do, to be
effective, has to be integrally plugged in and integrated to
the strategic planning that the NCTC does.
Are you integrated yet?
Mr. MacInnes. We are very integrated. We have a full-time
NCTC person sitting in the office. He is one of the 12 people,
and he does 4 days with us, one back at NCTC.
We also, when we do messaging, we run it by the NCTC
analytical unit. In fact, we use the intel to inform how we
think about addressing these issues.
Mr. Thornberry. But do you have folks at NCTC to be part of
the planning process?
Mr. MacInnes. There are State people there, but probably
not--I don't know if they are in the planning division.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay.
I appreciate the work you all do, and I appreciate your
being here. I am sorry we are cut short a little bit. We are
going to have a whole bunch of votes. We may have some
questions for the record, if that is all right.
Thank you again, all of you, for your testimony and for
your work.
And with that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:23 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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