

ASSESSING THE FIGHT AGAINST AL QAEDA

HEARING
BEFORE THE
PERMANENT SELECT
COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

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Hearing held in Washington, DC, April 9, 2008
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Printed for the use of the Committee



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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 2008

44-478

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
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ASSESSING THE FIGHT AGAINST AL QAEDA

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 2008

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 12:05 p.m., in Room 210, Cannon House Office Building, the Honorable Silvestre Reyes (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Reyes, Boswell, Eshoo, Holt, Ruppertsberger, Tierney, Thompson, Schakowsky, Langevin, Schiff, Hoekstra, Gallegly, McHugh, Rogers and Issa.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

Good afternoon. Today we will focus on an issue at the top of this committee's agenda, the threat from al Qaeda in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. We believe that Osama bin Laden and his most senior deputies use the largely ungoverned border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan as a safe haven to plan terrorist attacks against the United States and our allies. I think that today's open session is an important companion to the committee's classified work on this very important subject to our country. This is one of the biggest threats that we face, and the American people deserve to know about it. The committee plans to hold additional hearings on al Qaeda, both open and closed, in the coming months in order to focus on this threat and on our progress in countering it.

Today we will receive testimony from three experts on al Qaeda. The first is Mr. Peter Bergen, a senior fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C., an Adjunct Lecturer at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is also a research fellow at New York University's Center on Law and Security. He is also the author of numerous books on al Qaeda. Mr. Bergen is both a widely recognized expert on al Qaeda and is one of the few Westerners to have actually met and interviewed Osama bin Laden.

Second, we will hear from Mr. Robert Grenier, who, during his 27-year career at CIA, served as the Chief of the Counterterrorism Center, as the Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia on the National Intelligence Council, and also as Special Assistant for Near East and South Asia to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Mr. Grenier is as accomplished as an intelligence officer can be. We are fortunate to have him here today to offer his insights to our committee.

Finally, we will receive testimony from Steven Emerson, the Executive Director of the Investigative Project on Terrorism. Mr.

Emerson is also a well-known commentator on terrorism-related matters, and we look forward to his testimony.

Thank you all for coming this afternoon. Welcome.

On September 11th, 2001, Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda attacked this nation. Immediately following the attacks, we knew that Osama bin Laden was responsible; we knew where he was; and we had the support of the entire civilized world in our efforts to pursue him and to pursue his organization. Yet, 7 years later, bin Laden remains free, and al Qaeda, incredibly enough, remains a threat.

Most disturbing to me is that, while bin Laden continues to plot and to inspire extremism and hatred for the United States, the bulk of our troops is bogged down in Iraq, pursuing a war of choice against an enemy that did not attack us on 9/11. While over 4,000 Americans have been killed in Iraq and hundreds more in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden remains alive, apparently comfortable enough to continue issuing statements from, of all places, what is believed to be a safe haven in Pakistan.

As Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, I am anxious to hear from our experts on how we got here and what we should do about it.

In 2003, President Bush told the American people that al Qaeda was “not a problem anymore.” He was wrong.

As the National Intelligence Estimate released last summer states, al Qaeda—and I quote—“has protected or regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability, including a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas, operational lieutenants and its top leadership,” end quote.

In other words, al Qaeda has the freedom to recruit, the freedom to train and the freedom to plot new attacks against the United States.

Clearly the threat from al Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region is real. Frankly, I am not confident that the United States has a winning plan to defeat the al Qaeda threat despite the efforts of our men and women in the Intelligence Community as well as those in our military and diplomatic corps. I look forward to hearing the panel’s expert views on why we have not eliminated this threat.

Further, the committee appreciates the panel’s assistance in helping us understand the operational relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the effect that the war in Iraq has had on our efforts to neutralize al Qaeda, and a reevaluation of our strategy in our conflict with al Qaeda.

Thank you all again for joining us here today.

Mr. REYES. I will recognize the Ranking Member of our committee Mr. Hoekstra for any statement that he may wish to make.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to the witnesses for appearing with us today. This hearing today gives us a chance to discuss before the American people the continuing threat our nation faces not only from al Qaeda, but, from my perspective, the larger threat from radical Jihadist terrorism.

I believe it is beneficial for the American people to hear more about the al Qaeda threat. I believe the committee will benefit from

having this open hearing, but it is very positive, Mr. Chairman, to hear you state that we are going to have a series of hearings to evaluate the al Qaeda threat, both closed and open hearings. Obviously, these individuals may have information that may be classified or may have gotten access to classified information or whatever, but in this forum, they do not have the latitude to talk about it, so much of what we will be discussing today will be an incomplete recognition of what is actually on the record.

More than 6 years after 9/11, our nation still seems to be—or we now seem to be at a crossroads. On the one hand, it is clear that our homeland has not been attacked since that tragic, fateful day. This cannot be called anything other than a success, and it is a testament to the hard work and dedication of the men and women of our Intelligence Community and of our military.

On the other hand, there is a clear tendency by some in America and in this Congress to look at our success over the past several years as a cause or as an excuse to let down our guard. They have confused al Qaeda's failure to successfully carry out an attack on our homeland as a lack of intent or as a lack of capability on the part of al Qaeda.

The reality, from my perspective, is that al Qaeda has well expressed its intent and, I believe, has the capability to carry out an attack on our soil. What they have lacked over the past several years is the free rein to plod in the shadows and to do so without fear of a U.S. response.

With our nation and freedom under attack, the smoke and the dust still billowing from the ruins of the World Trade Center, President Bush huddled with his national security team to discuss what needed to be done to protect our nation from another catastrophic attack. The President's advisors told him the tools and the methods the U.S. intelligence agencies needed to track and to combat radical Jihadist groups like al Qaeda. Thus were born many of the highly effective antiterrorist tools that have helped keep this Nation safe: the Terrorist Surveillance Program, the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, the High-Value Terrorist Detainee Program. These programs were all briefed to congressional leaders, including to the Speaker. In fact, not a concern was raised until these programs were leaked to the press, unfortunately, turning them into political fodder instead of the valuable, clandestine counterterrorist tools that they were designed to be.

I have to mention the fact that, as we are having this hearing, our intelligence capability to protect the American people, our embassies, our embassy personnel, troops overseas, and our allies continues to erode. As Senate Intelligence Chairman Jay Rockefeller declared on the Senate floor in February, the quality of the intelligence that we are going to be receiving is going to be degraded. It is not enough to discuss al Qaeda and the Jihadist terrorism and to ignore the erosion and the tools that the Intelligence Community says it needs, the very same tools that have kept our homeland safe for more than 6 years since 9/11. We need to strengthen our Nation's terrorist surveillance capabilities by fixing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

Some have asked, why does the United States need to employ tough counterterrorism programs? The answer is because the rad-

ical Jihadist threat did not end with the 9/11 attacks, nor did the responsibility of the President and Congress to protect our nation. If you listen to the statements of Osama bin Laden and of his deputy Zawahiri, it is easy to understand the seriousness of this threat, its global implications and the determination of radical Jihadists to strike America's homeland.

Osama bin Laden declared war against the United States with little fanfare in 1996 when he issued a fatwa titled Declaration of War against the Americans' Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places. He acted on this so-called "declaration of war" with al Qaeda attacks against the U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, against the U.S. Cole in 2000.

Bin Laden claims parallels between the American presence in Iraq and the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. For example, according to a strategy document posted to a Jihadist Web site in 2003, with guerilla warfare, the Americans were defeated in Vietnam, and the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan. This is the method that expelled the direct crusader colonialism for most of the Muslim lands.

The purpose of al Qaeda's terrorist campaign is supposedly to establish Osama bin Laden's brand of radical Islam over what he calls the Caliphate, a region that, in bin Laden's mind, constitutes historic Muslim lands expanding from Iraq to Indonesia. He said in 1998 that the pious Caliphate will start from Afghanistan.

Zawahiri made a similar statement in October of 2005 in a letter when he wrote the goal in this age is the establishment of a caliphate in the manner of the Prophet. In 2006, Zawahiri said the reinstatement of Islamic rule is the individual duty of every Muslim with every land occupied by infidels.

Some have asserted—and I expect we will hear this a lot from the other side—that the radical Jihadist threat in Iraq is very limited or unreal, and that the U.S. should withdraw to focus on the so-called "real war on terror," which some claim is confined to Afghanistan and the FATA in Pakistan. I cannot help but wonder if those who are focused on forcing our withdrawal from Iraq would be more comfortable with our invading a sovereign, nuclear-armed nation.

As challenging as our relationship with Pakistan has been at times, it is also true that Pakistan has helped us capture more al Qaeda terrorists than any other nation. Others here today will say that the only reason al Qaeda is in Iraq is because we are there, but this ignores the fact that al Qaeda, like a moth drawn to a flame, will attack America and our people anywhere they can. I refer you again to the al Qaeda-led attacks against our embassies in Africa and against the Cole. This point of view also ignores bin Laden's unequivocal 2004 statement that Baghdad is the capital of the Caliphate.

In July 2005, Zawahiri gave this detailed four-stage plan for Iraq in a letter to Zarqawi, the now deceased head of al Qaeda in Iraq: The first stage, expel the Americans from Iraq; the second stage, establish an Islamic authority or emirate, then develop and support it until it achieves the level of the Caliphate over as much territory as you can to spread its power in Iraq; the third stage, extend the Jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq; the fourth

stage—it may coincide with what came before—the clash with Israel, because Israel was established only to challenge any new Islamic entity.

We have seen the world over that the threat from radical Jihadists is a global threat. It is a sophisticated threat that has spread its message; that has recruited followers; and that has planned terrorist attacks using the Internet, satellite television, and even computer games. Al Qaeda activity has been reported in dozens of countries, including China, Canada, Sweden, India, the Philippines, Thailand, Serbia, and Yemen. In the past month alone, al Qaeda allegedly has attempted two unsuccessful mortar attacks against our embassy and embassy personnel in Yemen.

Our Nation, indeed, stands at a crossroad, and the choices we make in the days and months ahead are more than about this administration or even the next. They are about the future of our great nation and the security of her people.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing. I look forward to the hearings that we will be scheduling in the coming weeks. With that, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hoekstra.

Thank you for putting at least some of the things in perspective, because you are absolutely right. The next administration and future generations are going to have to deal with the mess that has been created over the course of the last 6, 7 years. The greater challenge, I think, is the one that calls on all of us to work collectively together to make sure that we have given the professionals charged with our national security the tools to keep us safe, at the same time balancing the rights that we all enjoy as Americans, because if we somehow do not have a balanced effort, then the terrorists will have won. So I think all of us are pledged to do that.

I think all of us are pledged to continue to work jointly together, both with this administration with the time that remains for it and also with the new administration, to make sure that future generations are proud of the efforts that all of us are making to keep this country safe and the world safer for everyone.

With that, I will now—

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. I would ask unanimous consent that all of our opening statements be placed in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. With that now, Mr. Bergen, you are recognized for your opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF PETER BERGEN, SCHWARTZ SENIOR FELLOW,
NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION**

Mr. BERGEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member, and thank you for this invitation and to the other members of the committee.

We were asked to address three questions. One is: How is the hunt for Osama bin Laden and senior leaders of al Qaeda going? Two: What is the status of al Qaeda today? What might it be in

the future? Three: What policy responses? We have 10 minutes each, so I will be brief.

One: How is the hunt against Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri going? I think it is fair to say that it is going very poorly. There are all sorts of reasons for that, not the least of which is that bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are not making the kinds of mistakes that fugitives normally make. They are not talking on cell phones. They are not talking on satellite phones. The people in their immediate circles are not motivated by cash rewards. So the hunt is going poorly.

Does it really matter if it is going poorly? My answer to that is very simple. To suggest that bin Laden is not in charge of the al Qaeda global jihadi network is to ignore the global communications revolution of the last 10 years. Bin Laden does not need to call somebody and ask for something to be done. He just releases a videotape or an audiotape. These are placed on the Internet. These are some of the most widely distributed political statements in history. Millions of people read about them, hear about them, see about them. Now, to everybody in this room, those statements probably seem very repetitive: Kill the Jews. Kill Americans. Kill Muslims who disagree with us, et cetera. In fact, many of these statements have specific instructions, and I will give you two or three examples.

Bin Laden has made it official al Qaeda policy to attack the Saudi oil industry because he has a narrative about the United States that we can be bankrupted by the actions of al Qaeda. That is one of the reasons that we had an attack in 2006 on the most important oil facility in the world, the Abqaiq oil facility in Saudi Arabia. Luckily, it was unsuccessful. If it had been taken off line, that is 10 percent of the world's oil supply.

There is a direct relationship between what the jihadi network will do and what bin Laden says. Similarly, both Ayman al-Zawahiri and bin Laden have called for attacks in Pakistan in the last several months. Pakistan is now suffering the largest epidemic of suicide attacks in Pakistani history in the past year. There are many other examples.

So finding bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri is orders of magnitude more important than finding the other al Qaeda leaders we have found so far. It was great to find Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, but he has no ideas. It is people with ideas that change history, and both Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden have a readily coherent set of ideas, which unfortunately quite a lot of people have signed up for.

So now for the status of the al Qaeda organization. As you know from the NIE, it is resurgent. What is the evidence for the resurgence? One, the July 7, 2005 terrorist attack in Great Britain, in London. This was the largest terrorist attack in British history. It was poorly understood by both the British press and by the British Government at the beginning as a bunch of self-starting radicalized guys who got together and launched the attack. We now know more about the attack, two of the lead suicide attackers trained with al Qaeda in Pakistan. Two of them released videotapes with al Qaeda's video production arm. It was an al Qaeda-directed attack.

What is interesting about the London attack is it looks a lot like the Cole attack of October 2000. It took them about a year to plan. It showed al Qaeda's ability to stretch out thousands of miles from its base on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

Then more broadly what is going on in Britain right now. You know from the public statements of John Evans, the head of MI-5, that there are 2,000 people in Britain they regard as serious national security threats, many of whom have links to al Qaeda in Pakistan. Four hundred thousand British citizens visit Pakistan every year on completely legitimate trips because they are British Pakistanis; if 0.01 percent of them hook up with a Kashmiri militant group or al Qaeda. That is 40 people with training.

The other aspect of al Qaeda's resurgence is what is going on in Afghanistan. In my view, the senior leadership of the Taliban and al Qaeda have morphed together ideologically and tactically. If you look at the suicide attacks in Afghanistan, they only really took off after they saw how effective they were in Iraq. There were almost no suicide attacks in Afghanistan in 2001, 2002, 2003; 27 in 2005; and 139 in 2006, geometrically progressing in number. That is because al Qaeda has learned from Iraq, and the Taliban have learned from the playbook in Iraq. IED attacks have doubled. Suicide attacks have quintupled. Attacks on international forces have tripled in the last year in Afghanistan.

Another indicator of al Qaeda's resurgence is, of course, what is going on in Pakistan, where we are seeing 60 suicide attacks last year compared to 5 the year before. Another indicator of al Qaeda's resurgence is that other militant groups are joining al Qaeda: the GSPC, which is the largest Algerian group. The Libyan Fighting Group in the last several months, which is the largest Libyan Islamic group, has also joined al Qaeda.

Then, of course, there is al Qaeda in Iraq. Al Qaeda in Iraq did not exist before the invasion. It has had a disproportionately large effect on what is going on in Iraq. It got the U.N. to pull out. It attacked the Jordanian Embassy, which got Middle Eastern countries to pull out their diplomatic representatives. By attacking in Najaf and Samarra, it sparked a civil war.

There have been 900 suicide attacks in Iraq, which is more suicide attacks in one country, in one place than there have been suicide attacks in history. Eighty to ninety percent of them are by al Qaeda in Iraq.

Al Qaeda in Iraq is obviously taking some hits right now, but declarations of their being over, I think, would be premature, because whatever happens with United States policy in Iraq, we are obviously going to draw down. Drawing down will help al Qaeda in two ways. One is it will help their narrative that we are a paper tiger. That narrative is based on Vietnam, Beirut and Mogadishu. Two, it helps their strategy, much more importantly. They want to regroup and to get in a safe haven. So whatever drawdowns we do must take this into account.

Other elements of al Qaeda's regrouping, of course, include its video production arm, which has produced more videotapes last year than it did in its history previously, 90 videotapes. Videotapes imply cameramen. It implies editors. It implies distribution sys-

tems. This is a group that takes its information operations very seriously, probably more seriously than we do.

So that is a snapshot of where al Qaeda is today. Given that snapshot, what can they do in the future? I am not going to discuss Chicken Little scenarios like nuclear weapons, but I think there are two things they can do in the next 5 years that are very plausible. One, they can bring down a commercial jet—it does not have to be American, it can be anywhere in the world—with a rocket-propelled grenade or a surface-to-air missile. They tried to do this in Mombasa, Kenya, with an Israeli charter jet. It almost succeeded. This is something that they have the ability to do, and this is something they have a strong interest in doing, and it is something that we have seen them try to do before.

Another thing they can pull off plausibly is an attack on a major European city with a radiological weapon. Such an attack would have a nasty effect on global investor confidence. It would not be a weapon of mass destruction, it would be a weapon of mass disruption. Nonetheless, it would seem to be a 9/11-style event. Likewise, bringing down a commercial jet would have a very nasty effect on global tourism and aviation.

I believe that al Qaeda's ability to attack the United States is extremely constrained looking at it in the next 5 years. The reason I say that is look at the plane plot of the summer of 2006. This was al Qaeda's fifth anniversary celebration, as it were, of 9/11. The plane plot was very interesting, the plan to bring down as many as six American airliners. It was interesting for two reasons. First of all, they selected the hardest target imaginable, commercial aviation. They are not interested in attacking Des Moines malls. They are interested in attacking New York, Los Angeles and D.C. and commercial aviation. Two, they decided to do it in Britain. Why did they decide to do it in Britain? Because they have got people there. If they could have done it in the United States, they would have done it. There have been attacks by jihadi terrorists in the past, the World Trade Center attack in 1993, the attempt to blow up Los Angeles International Airport in 1999, and the 9/11 attacks. All of these attacks were conducted by people coming from outside.

It is a lot harder to get into the United States right now. The Government has made it safer in a number of ways. The American public is more vigilant. Al Qaeda, while it is resurging, it is still not at the point it was on September 11th, 2001. So, while it is plausible that people acting in the name of al Qaeda might produce small-bore terror attacks domestically, in my view, a major al Qaeda attack is not so likely.

The impact of the Iraq war was touched upon in the opening statements. Donald Rumsfeld famously complained: What are the metrics for losing or winning the war on terrorism in 2003? Well, one metric that I thought was relevant is terrorism figures. A colleague of mine at NYU used a very conservative methodology in a RAND database, and we found that if you compare the period between September 11th and the beginning of the Iraq war and the period from after the invasion up to September 2006, you find that the rate of jihadi terrorist attacks went up sevenfold around the world.

When I say jihadi terrorist attacks, they are attacks that kill at least one person or more. Of course, a lot of that happened in Iraq. A good deal of it happened in Afghanistan because of copycatting or learning on the job in Iraq by Afghans, mujahedin and Pakistanis. Also, a good deal of it happened in Europe—the London attacks, Madrid, the Glasgow attempts—and, of course, around the Arab world.

Now, when I mention this, I am not making the absurd statement that the Iraq war caused all of these attacks, but it certainly energized the jihadi terrorist movement around the world in a way that, if you do the thought experiment where if the Iraq war had not happened, we might be in a slightly different place.

Am I running out of time, by the way?

The CHAIRMAN. You have got about 50 seconds.

Mr. BERGEN. Okay. Some quick ideas about what we should do about this.

I think one of the most critical things we can do is to create a universal database shared across all elements of the U.S. Government which looks at all insurgents, all terrorists, all of their clerics, and all of their friends and family. Friends and family are how you get into the jihad. I know that we are looking at the Iraqi insurgency in Iraq, and we are looking at the Afghan insurgency in Afghanistan, but we need to think about this globally. We need to look at the interconnections. We need to find who are the clerics who are disproportionately inciting young men to go to the jihad. This would be useful not only from an intelligence point of view, but also from a policy point of view. With such a study, we could say to the Governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, where so many of these suicide attackers are coming from, it is this particular cleric and this particular mosque that are producing a disproportionate number of the suicide attackers. We are not saying this just because it is in our best interest, but that it is also in yours, because when these conflicts are over, this will blow back in your face as much as anywhere else.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

[The statement of Mr. Bergen follows:]

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Assessing the Fight Against al Qaeda.

April 9, 2008

Testimony of Peter Bergen, a Schwartz senior fellow at the New America Foundation; CNN's terrorism analyst; an adjunct lecturer at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University; fellow at New York University's Center on Law & Security, and the author of *Holy War, Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* and *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader*.

My written testimony will consider three related questions.

- 1. How is the hunt for Osama bin Laden and other senior al Qaeda leaders going?**
- 2. What is the status of al Qaeda the organization today, and the outlook for the organization over the next five years?**
- 3. What new policy responses might help the US government to defeat al Qaeda?**

*

1. How is the hunt for Osama bin Laden and other senior al Qaeda leaders going?

The hunt is going poorly. It's now more than six years since the 9/11 attacks, yet al Qaeda's leader Osama bin Laden remains at large. Some reading this may think: But what's the proof that he is still alive? Plenty. Since 9/11 bin Laden has released a slew of video-and audiotapes many of which discuss current events. In two such tapes released in March 2008 bin Laden accused Pope Benedict XVI of aiding a "new Crusade" against Muslims and promised there would be a "severe" reaction for the 2006 Danish newspaper cartoons lampooning the Prophet Mohammad.¹ In the other tape he said the suffering of the Palestinians was amplified when Arab leaders supported an Israeli-Palestinian peace conference hosted by the US government in Annapolis, Maryland last November.²

Could these tapes be fakes? No. Not one of the dozens of tapes released by bin Laden since 9/11 has been a fake. Indeed the U.S. government has authenticated many of them using bin Laden's distinctive voiceprint.

Ok, but he isn't he ill? No evidence of that. Press reports that bin Laden has kidney disease³ were wrong judging by his appearance in videotapes released in the past few years where he shows no signs of illness.⁴ In fact, bin Laden looks much better today than he did in a videotape released following the battle of Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan in late 2001 where he narrowly escaped being killed in massive American bombing raids.⁵

So bin Laden may be alive and well, but isn't he irrelevant now? After all, he doesn't run his terrorist organization as he did before the fall of the Taliban. Unfortunately bin Laden remains all too relevant. Today he doesn't need to pick up a phone to order terror attacks as he did before 9/11--he just releases a tape to the Internet

giving him a world audience of millions. The most reliable guide to what al Qaeda and like-minded groups will do has long been what bin Laden says.⁶ In the past several months, for instance, al Qaeda's leader called for attacks against the Pakistani government. Last year saw the largest number of suicide attacks in Pakistani history, most directed at government targets.⁷ (In the section below is a more expanded discussion of the influence that bin Laden and his number two, Ayman al Zawahiri, continue to wield over al Qaeda and the wider global jihadist movement.)

Given bin Laden's continued importance to al Qaeda and the jihadist terrorist movement worldwide; what then is the American-led hunt for bin Laden turning up? Nothing. The US government hasn't had a solid lead on al Qaeda's leader since the battle of Tora Bora. And there may be no leads on bin Laden for years into the future as those in his immediate circle are not motivated by the tens of millions of dollars in cash awards that have been advertised for those who might drop a dime on him.⁸ And al Qaeda's leader hasn't used a cell or satellite phone for years knowing that they can be intercepted by American signals intelligence.⁹

Also it can be difficult to find any fugitive, even one who stands out as much as bin Laden. Think of Eric Rudolph, the object of one of the most intense manhunts in U.S. history, who remained on the run for five years after bombing Atlanta's Centennial Park during the 1996 Olympics. Now imagine the challenge of capturing bin Laden, who is likely in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) on Afghanistan's border -- an area of 30,000 dauntingly inhospitable square miles.

2. What is the status of al Qaeda the organization today and the outlook for the organization over the next five years?

Al Qaeda Today.

It's conventional wisdom that al Qaeda the organization has been largely destroyed and an ideological movement inspired by al Qaeda has replaced it, spawning a new generation of "homegrown" or "self-starting" terrorists that have implemented attacks such as the one in Madrid in 2004 that killed 191 people.¹⁰ Also in the "homegrown" category are the seven terrorist wannabes arrested in Miami in the summer of 2006, who allegedly plotted to blow up federal buildings in Florida.¹¹ They had embraced al Qaeda's doctrines of destruction, yet had no ties to the terrorist group itself.

The rapid spread of the al Qaeda ideological virus in the past several years should be cause for considerable concern, but it would be quite wrong to conclude that therefore the central al Qaeda organization is no longer a threat. Such a view underestimates the resiliency of al Qaeda, which is a criminal organization, animated by strong ideological/religious beliefs, which also draws strength from several local insurgencies such as those along the Afghan-Pakistan border, in Kashmir and in Iraq. Because of these ideological/religious beliefs and its ties to vibrant insurgencies, al Qaeda is able to withstand multiple blows to its leadership and infrastructure of the kind that would put an ordinary criminal organization, such as a Mafia crime family, out of business.

In fact, more than at any time since September 11, Osama bin Laden's deadly organization is back in business.

Evidence for the resiliency of the al Qaeda organization.

1. The London attacks of July 2005, and al Qaeda's alarming reach into the United Kingdom.

The London bombings on July 7, 2005 were a classic al Qaeda plot. A British government report published in 2006 explains that the ringleader, Mohammed Siddique Khan, visited Afghanistan in the late 1990s and Pakistan on two occasions in 2003 and 2004, spending a total of several months in the country.¹² The report goes on to note that Khan "had some contact with al Qaida figures" in Pakistan, and is "believed to have had some relevant training in a remote part of Pakistan, close to the Afghan border" during his two-week visit in 2003. According to the report, Khan was also in "suspicious" contact with individuals in Pakistan in the four months immediately before he led the London attacks.

Further, Khan appeared on a videotape that aired on Al Jazeera two months after the attacks. On that tape Khan says "I'm going to talk to you in a language that you understand. Our words are dead until we give them life with our blood."¹³ He goes on to describe Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri as "today's heroes." Khan's statements were made on a videotape that bore the distinctive logo of *As Sahab*, "The Clouds," which is the television production arm of al Qaeda. Khan's appearance on the *As Sahab* videotape shows that he met up with members of al Qaeda's media team who are based on the Afghan-Pakistan border. In 2006 a similar videotape of another one of the London suicide bombers appeared also made by *As Sahab*, further evidence of al Qaeda's role in the bombings.¹⁴

The grim lesson of the London attack is that al Qaeda was able to conduct simultaneous bombings in a major European capital thousands of miles from its base on the Afghan-Pakistan border. While far from a 9/11-style attack, the London bombings showed the kind of planning and ability to hit targets far from its home base seen in pre-9/11 al Qaeda attacks such as the one mounted on the USS *Cole* in Yemen in 2000. Al Qaeda has therefore recovered sufficient strength that it can now undertake multiple, successful bombings aimed at targets in the West.

The plot that was foiled in the U.K. in August 2006 to bring down half a dozen American airliners with liquid explosives, an event that would have rivalled 9/11 in magnitude had it succeeded, was directed by al Qaeda from Pakistan, according to the January 2007 testimony of Lt. General Michael Maples, head of the US Defence Intelligence Agency.¹⁵

On November 5 2007, Jonathan Evans, the head of Britain's domestic intelligence service MI5, said there were 2,000 individuals in the U.K. that the British government

believed to be a threat to security. Evans noted that the “terrorist attacks we have seen against the UK are not simply random plots by disparate and fragmented groups. The majority of these attacks, successful or otherwise, have taken place because al Qaeda has a clear determination to mount terrorist attacks against the United Kingdom...Over the last five years much of the command, control and inspiration for attack planning in the UK has derived from al Qaeda's remaining core leadership in the tribal areas of Pakistan.”¹⁶

2. The vitality of al Qaeda's propaganda division, *As Sahab*.

Bin Laden has observed that 90% of his battle is conducted in the media.¹⁷ Al Qaeda understands that what the Pentagon calls IO (Information Operations) are key to its successes. *As Sahab*'s first major production debuted on the Internet in the summer of 2001 signalling a major anti-American attack was in the works. Since then, has continued to release key statements from al Qaeda's leaders and has significantly increased its output in the last year or so. In 2007 *As Sahab* released more audio and video-tapes than any year in its six year history; at least eighty.¹⁸ These tapes are increasingly sophisticated productions with subtitles in languages such as English, animation effects and studio settings. *As Sahab*'s increasingly sophisticated and regular output is evidence that al Qaeda has recovered to a degree that it is capable of managing a relatively advanced propaganda operation. That operation is unlikely to have a fixed studio location, but it does include a number of cameramen as well as editors using editing programs such as Final Cut Pro on laptops.

3. The continuing influence of bin Laden and Zawahiri.

Bin Laden may no longer be calling people on a satellite phone to order attacks, but he remains in broad ideological and strategic control of al Qaeda around the world. An indicator of this is that in 2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the then-leader of foreign fighters in Iraq renamed his organization “Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers” and publicly swore *bayat*, a religiously binding oath of allegiance, to bin Laden.¹⁹

Moreover, the dozens of video and audiotapes that bin Laden and Zawahiri have released since 9/11 have reached hundreds of millions of people worldwide through television, newspapers and the Internet, making them among the most widely distributed political statements in history. Those tapes have not only had the effect of instructing al Qaeda's followers to kill Americans, Westerners and Jews, but some tapes have also carried specific instructions that militant cells have acted upon. For instance, on October 19, 2003 bin Laden called for action against Spain because of its troop presence in Iraq, the first time that al Qaeda's leader had singled out the country.²⁰ Six months later, terrorists killed 191 commuters in Madrid.²¹ And in the spring of 2004, bin Laden offered a three-month truce to European countries willing to pull out of the coalition in Iraq.²² Almost exactly a year after his truce offer expired, an al Qaeda-directed cell carried out bombings on London's public transportation system that killed 52 commuters.²³ In December 2004, bin Laden called for attacks on Saudi oil facilities and in February 2006, al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia attacked the Abqaiq facility, arguably the most important oil

production facility in the world. (That attack was a failure.) In September 2003 Zawahiri called for attacks on Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf. Within three months Musharraf narrowly survived two serious assassination attempts organized by al Qaeda.²⁴

4. Al Qaeda's influence in Iraq.

Al Qaeda only established itself in Iraq in October 2004, well after the U.S. invasion, when its leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi, fused his "Tawhid and Jihad" group with Al Qaeda by publicly pledging allegiance to Osama bin Laden.²⁵ Indeed, Zarqawi's initial Iraq operation was limited to Kurdistan, part of the no-fly zone established by the United States in northern Iraq that was outside of Saddam Hussein's control.²⁶

The foreign fighters in Iraq have had considerable strategic influence on the war. In August 2003 Zarqawi's group bombed the United Nations' headquarters in Baghdad, prompting the UN to withdraw.²⁷ And Zarqawi also provoked the civil war. On August 30, 2003, his group exploded a massive car bomb outside a Shiite mosque in Najaf that killed 125.²⁸ Zarqawi's strategy to attack the Shiites has, unfortunately, proven wildly successful. The tipping point in the slide toward full-blown civil war was al Qaeda in Iraq's February 2006 attack on the Golden Mosque in Samarra.²⁹

According to figures tracked by Mohammed Hafez of the University of Missouri, as of October 15, 2007, there have been 864 suicide bombings in Iraq that killed more than 10,000 Iraqis.³⁰ The U.S. military estimates that Al Qaeda's foreign recruits have been responsible for up to 90 percent of such attacks. Al Qaeda in Iraq may be relatively small compared to the largest insurgent groups in Iraq, but it has punched above its weight in terms of both its strategic impact on the war and the trail of body bags it has left in its wake.³¹

Since Zarqawi's death in 2006 his Egyptian successor, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, seems to have strengthened ties with al Qaeda Central. In July 2007 U.S. forces captured an Iraqi al Qaeda operative, Khalid al Mashdani, who told his interrogators that he had acted as a conduit between the top leaders of al Qaeda in Iraq and bin Laden and Zawahiri.³² According to the US military, Mashdani revealed that there was "a flow of strategic direction, of prioritization of messaging and other guidance that comes from the Al Qaeda senior leadership to the Al Qaeda in Iraq leadership." Also Masri, a member of Egypt's Jihad group is likely to have longstanding ties with Ayman al Zawahiri.

Today Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is probably more of a wholly owned subsidiary of al Qaeda central than the nominally affiliated but independent operation it was under Zarqawi. However, since AQI is, for the moment, under so much pressure it's hard to see how al Qaeda central could leverage its relationship with AQI for funding or help with a terrorist attack outside of Iraq in the short term.

For the moment, Al Qaeda in Iraq is a wounded organization. The number of foreign fighters coming in to Iraq has declined from 120 a month in 2007 to 40 or 50 today. According to the US military foreign fighters are now trying to leave the country.³³

However, future withdrawals of U.S. troops from Iraq will obviously help Al Qaeda's ability to operate in the country. Al Qaeda has a 'paper tiger' narrative about the United States based on American pullouts from Vietnam during the '70s, Lebanon in the '80s and Somalia in the '90s. American drawdowns from Iraq will be seen as confirming this narrative.

More importantly, Al Qaeda also has a strategy laid out by Ayman al Zawahiri who wrote in his November 2001 *Knights under the Banner of the Prophet*, that "victory by the armies cannot be achieved unless the infantry occupies territory. Likewise, victory for Islamic movements against the world alliance cannot be attained unless these movements possess an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab region."³⁴ Obviously, securing such a safe haven in Iraq is a primary goal of al Qaeda and will remain so whatever the scale and timing of an American withdrawal.

It's worth recalling that foreign fighters continued to arrive on the Afghan-Pakistan border after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 to fight the Afghan communist government that replaced the Soviets. Indeed, one of the fighters was Zarqawi. So too the Shiite dominated governed in Iraq will continue to be seen as puppet of the U.S. and 'apostate' by al Qaeda whatever the disposition of American troops in the country.

5. Al Qaeda continues to attract other militant groups to its standard.

In addition to Al Qaeda in Iraq stating on several occasions over the past three years that it takes overall direction from al Qaeda central, in September 2006 the Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) announced that it was putting itself under the al Qaeda umbrella.³⁵ GSPC is considered the most significant terrorist movement in Algeria. Abu Musab Abdul Wadud, the leader of the GSPC explained that "the organization of al-Qaeda of Jihad is the only organization qualified to gather together the mujahideen."³⁶ And in May, 2006 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who leads a key militia fighting US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, pledged allegiance to bin Laden and al Zawahiri on a tape broadcast by al Jazeera.³⁷ In November 2007 the Libyan Fighting Group merged with al Qaeda.³⁸ The fact that militant groups continue to join al Qaeda is indicative of the organization's continued strength.

6. The rapidly deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan over the past year is, at least in part, the responsibility of al Qaeda.

The use of suicide attacks, improvised explosive devices and the beheadings of hostages--all techniques that al Qaeda perfected in Iraq--are methods that the Taliban has increasingly adopted in Afghanistan, making much of the south of the country a no-go area. Hekmat Karzai, an Afghan terrorism researcher points out suicide bombings were virtually unknown in Afghanistan until 2005 when there were 21 such attacks.³⁹ US sources say there were 139 suicide attacks in 2006.⁴⁰

Mullah Dadullah, a key Taliban commander gave two interviews to Al Jazeera in 2006 before he was killed, in which he made some illuminating observations about the

Taliban's links to al Qaeda. Dadullah said, "We have close ties. Our cooperation is ideal," adding that Osama bin Laden is issuing orders to the Taliban.⁴¹ Indeed, a senior US military intelligence official says that "trying to separate Taliban and al Qaeda in Pakistan serves no purpose. It's like picking gray hairs out of your head."⁴² Dadullah also noted that "we have 'give and take' relations with the mujahideen in Iraq."⁴³

7. Pakistan

To the extent that al Qaeda has a new base, it is in Pakistan. From there bin Laden and Zawahiri have released a stream of audio and videotapes. Evidence of al Qaeda's growing strength in Pakistan can also be seen in the advice and personnel it is offering the Taliban in its campaign of suicide attacks in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda today clandestinely operates small training camps in Pakistan, "People want to see barracks. [In fact] the camps use dry riverbeds for shooting and are housed in compounds for 20 people where they are taught calisthenics and bomb making" says a senior US military intelligence official.⁴⁴

The fact that Pakistan is the new training ground for al Qaeda recruits indicates that the organization will continue to be a significant threat. Terrorist plots have a much higher degree of success if some of the cell's members have received training in bomb-making and operational doctrine in person. For example, two of the London July 7, 2005 suicide bombers received al Qaeda training in Pakistan.⁴⁵

In Pakistan, al Qaeda has also been able to deepen its cooperation with Kashmiri militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Al Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah, for instance, was arrested at the home of a Lashkar-e-Toiba leader in Pakistan in 2002.⁴⁶ The same year Jaish-e-Mohammed and al Qaeda cooperated together in the kidnapping/murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl.⁴⁷ The Kashmiri issue is also being mobilized by al Qaeda in Pakistan to bring in recruits.

The future of al Qaeda over the next five years.

1. The leadership.

The single biggest variable about the future of al Qaeda is what happens to bin Laden. For six years he has already survived the most intense manhunt in history. It would be wishful thinking to believe that he won't survive another five years. However, if he were to be captured or killed that would have a devastating effect on al Qaeda.

On several occasions bin Laden has said that he's prepared to die in his holy war – statements that should be taken at face value. In the short-term, bin Laden's death would likely trigger violent anti-American attacks around the globe, while in the medium-term, his death would deal a serious blow to al Qaeda as bin Laden's charisma and organizational skills have played a critical role in its success. However, bin Laden does have eleven sons, some of whom might choose to go into their father's line of work.

Already Saad bin Laden has played a significant role in al Qaeda (although he is presently under some form of house arrest in Iran and is therefore, at least for the moment, not able to do much.)⁴⁸

Should bin Laden be captured or killed, that would likely trigger a succession battle within al Qaeda. While Zawahiri is technically bin Laden's successor, he is not regarded as a natural leader. Indeed, even among the Egyptians within al Qaeda Zawahiri is seen as a divisive force. The loss of bin Laden would likely challenge the unity of the organization, a unity that al Qaeda's internal documents indicate has often been fragile.

2. Haven on the Afghan-Pakistan border, and al Qaeda's ideology and tactics increasingly being adopted by the Taliban.

The Pakistani military and its intelligence agency ISI have proven either unwilling or incapable or both of destroying al Qaeda and its Taliban allies in their country, although, as considered later in this testimony, it is possible that the new Pakistani political environment may change that.

Unless the Pakistani government takes real action the safe havens that Taliban and al Qaeda enjoy in Pakistan are unlikely to be extirpated unless there is a significant attack in the U.S. or U.K. that is traceable to the tribal areas, and subsequent intense political pressure from those countries results in the measures necessary to destroy the militant organizations and movements in Pakistan.

This has unfortunate implications for countries with large Pakistani diaspora populations such as the United Kingdom, whose citizens make 400,000 visits to Pakistan each year.⁴⁹ A tiny minority of those visitors end up training with terrorist groups in Pakistan including al Qaeda. That problem is less pronounced in North America and Europe where Pakistanis make up a relatively small proportion of the Muslim population, but already in Spain and France, terrorism cases involving Pakistani immigrants are emerging.

In addition, the Taliban on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border are increasingly identified as the true guardian of Pashtun rights, but at the same time they have also increasingly adopted both al Qaeda tactics and ideology. As the Taliban and al Qaeda merge both tactically and ideologically, this could give al Qaeda a political constituency of sorts. This is worrisome as the Pashtun tribal grouping--the largest such grouping in the world--numbers some 40 million people on both sides of the border.⁵⁰

Further, should Afghanistan slide into chaos--at this moment a real possibility--that would also benefit al Qaeda as it would increase the number of safe havens along the border regions.

3. The influence of European militants in al Qaeda.

The Islamist terrorist threat to the United States today largely emanates from Europe, not from domestic sleeper cells or--as is popularly imagined--the graduates of Middle Eastern madrassas who can do little more than read the Koran. Omar Sheikh, for instance, the kidnapper of *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl, is a British citizen of Pakistani descent who studied at the academically rigorous London School of Economics. The 9/11 pilots became more militant while they were students in Hamburg.⁵¹ Indeed, Robert Leiken of the Nixon Center has found that of 373 Islamist terrorists arrested or killed in Europe and the United States from 1993 through 2004 an astonishing 41 percent were Western nationals, who were either naturalized or second generation Europeans or converts to Islam.⁵² Leiken found more terrorists who were French than the combined totals of Pakistani and Yemeni terrorists!

Future terrorist attacks that will be damaging to American national security are therefore likely to have a European connection. Citizens of the European Union, who adopt al Qaeda's ideology, can both easily move around Europe and also have easy entry into the United States because of the Visa Waiver Program that exists with European countries.

The most likely perpetrators of another major terrorist attack on American soil come from an unexpected quarter: citizens of the United States' closest ally. Militant British citizens of Pakistani descent are the most significant terrorist threat facing the United States. Most of those arrested in the 2006 plot to bring down American airliners over the Atlantic, for instance, were young British Pakistanis.⁵³

The threat posed by militant British citizens of Pakistani heritage is not a new one. Since 9/11 British-Pakistanis have been responsible for a wide range of terrorist attacks and plots around the globe. They mounted suicide attacks in London in July 2005⁵⁴ plotted to blow up a huge fertilizer bomb possibly aimed at Heathrow airport in 2004⁵⁵ carried out a suicide attack in Tel Aviv that killed four in 2003⁵⁶ and attempted two separate suicide operations against US airliners in 2001 and 2006.⁵⁷ They also participated in the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl in Pakistan in 2002.⁵⁸ In a number of these cases, al Qaeda either trained or worked with the British terrorists.

The danger to the United States of the nexus between British Pakistanis, al Qaeda and the Kashmir issue was underscored in August 2004 when British police arrested eight individuals--many of them British citizens of Pakistani descent--for involvement in an operation to attack financial landmarks such as the New York Stock Exchange and the IMF in Washington, targets they surveyed between August 2000 and April 2001. The leader of the cell, Abu Issa al-Hindi, a British convert to Islam, was radicalized by his experience fighting in Kashmir, while the cell was broken up after the arrest in Pakistan of al Qaeda computer expert Mohammed Noor Khan in July 2004.⁵⁹

More broadly, European Muslim militants, both converts and immigrants will provide foot soldiers for al Qaeda. Muriel Degauque, for instance, a Belgian baker's

assistant who converted to Islam, carried out a suicide attack for al Qaeda in Iraq directed at an America convoy outside Baghdad in November 2005.⁶⁰

Three out of four of the 9/11 pilots and two key 9/11 planners, Khaled Sheik Mohammed and Ramzi bin al Shibh, became more militant while they were living in the West. It seems that some combination of discrimination, alienation and homesickness turned them all in a more radical direction. And this is true for other anti-Western terrorists. *Los Angeles Times* researcher, Swati Pandey and I examined the biographies of 79 terrorists responsible for five of the worst anti-Western terrorist attacks in recent memory -- the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the Africa Embassies bombings in 1998, the September 11 attacks, the Bali nightclub bombings in 2002, and the 2005 London bombings. We found that one in four of the terrorists involved had attended colleges in the West.⁶¹

Similarly, researchers such as Dr. Marc Sageman argue that many terrorists affiliated with al Qaeda are either immigrants to the West or second-generation Muslims who have not integrated into their European host countries. For demographic reasons--the native populations of most Western countries are in steep decline-- and for economic reasons- -the economies of many Muslim countries are in free fall- -there will be an exponentially growing number of Muslim immigrants to the West in coming years, some of whom will feel alienated, adopt bin Laden's world view, and volunteer to become part of al Qaeda.⁶²

How critical this issue becomes depends to a large degree on the ability of imams and Muslim community leaders to turn the younger generation away from radical ideologies. There is some evidence that imams in Europe are beginning to take steps to tackle this radicalization.

5. The impact of the Iraq War on the global jihadist movement.

a. A recruiting tool for al Qaeda.

The Iraq War increased radicalization in the Muslim world and provided al Qaeda with more recruits than it would otherwise have had. Some have claimed that Iraq will reduce terrorism by drawing jihadists to the country like moths to a flame--where they can be killed or captured before doing damage in the West. President Bush has continued to put forward the so-called "flypaper" theory for fighting Al Qaeda in Iraq saying in 2007: "If we were not fighting these Al Qaeda terrorists in Iraq most would be trying to kill Americans and other civilians elsewhere—in Afghanistan, or other foreign capitals, or on the streets of our own cities."⁶³ But this assertion is unconvincing, because it based on the faulty premise that the world contains a finite number of jihadist terrorists. In fact, the pool of potential terrorists has expanded in the past five years. As the 2006 National Intelligence Estimate explains, "[T]he Iraq War has become the 'cause célèbre' for jihadists ... and is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives."⁶⁴

To test that thesis empirically, Paul Cruickshank of New York University and I compared the period after September 11 through the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 with the period from March 2003 through September 2006. Using numbers from the authoritative RAND terrorism database and a conservative methodology, we found that the rate of deadly attacks by jihadists had increased *sevenfold* since the invasion. And, even excluding terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, fatal attacks by jihadists in the rest of the world have increased by more than one-third since March 2003. Iraq, of course, did not cause all of this terrorism, but it certainly increased the tempo of jihadist attacks from London to Kabul to Amman.⁶⁵

Nor has the Iraq war diverted al Qaeda from continuing to plot spectacular anti-American terror attacks. The ‘planes plot’ of the summer of 2006, for instance, if it had succeeded would have brought down six American airliners departing the United Kingdom and would have cost hundreds or thousands of lives. The head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. General Michael Maples, testified before a congressional committee in 2007 that the planes plot was directed by al Qaeda from Pakistan.⁶⁶

b. “Blowback.”

As did the Afghan war against the Soviets, the current war in Iraq may generate a ferocious blowback of its own, which could be longer and more powerful than that from Afghanistan. Foreign volunteers fighting U.S. troops in Iraq today will find new targets around the world after the war(s) in the country end. Those fighters have already aligned themselves with al Qaeda.

Several factors could make blowback from the Iraq war even more dangerous than the fallout from Afghanistan. Foreign fighters have conducted most of the suicide bombings in Iraq--including some that have delivered strategic successes, such as the withdrawal of the UN and sparking the civil war. Fighters in Iraq are more battle hardened than the “Afghan Arabs” led by bin Laden, who fought demoralized Soviet army conscripts. The foreign fighters in Iraq are testing themselves against arguably the best army in history, acquiring skills in their battles against coalition forces that will be far more useful for future terrorist operations than those their counterparts learned during the 1980s. Mastering how to make improvised explosive devices or how to conduct suicide operations is more relevant to urban terrorism than the conventional guerrilla tactics used against the Red Army. U.S. military commanders say that techniques perfected in Iraq have already been adopted by militants in Afghanistan.⁶⁷

In the short run, the countries most at risk from blowback are those whose citizens have travelled to fight in Iraq. Thus Arab countries bordering Iraq are particularly vulnerable to “blowback” as demonstrated by the November 2005 bombings in Amman, Jordan.⁶⁸ The country perhaps most vulnerable to returning jihadists is Saudi Arabia because Saudis make up the largest bloc of foreign fighters in Iraq. Given Saudi Arabia’s strategic importance to the United States, this is of great concern. In November 2007, for instance, more than 200 Saudi and foreign militants were arrested over their alleged involvement in various plots, including assassinations and a planned attack on an oil facility, Saudi officials say. A Saudi official said 112 of those arrested were “linked in

with elements stationed abroad who facilitate the exit and travel of those to conflict zones" such as Iraq.⁶⁹

There is also evidence of Iraq War recruits from Europe beginning to return back home. To date there is no evidence of any individuals traveling from the U.S. to fight in Iraq so the number of "returnees" to the United States is likely to be minimal. However there is a risk that foreign fighters in Iraq will begin to migrate to Western countries (a trend that will be accelerated if these veterans are not allowed to return to their home countries, as was the case after the Afghan jihad).

Al Qaeda's ideas have found more fertile ground among Iraqis than was the case among Afghans, who are culturally quite different than the Arabs who form the core of Al Qaeda. What's more, there is the growing Iraqi refugee population: Already there are two million Iraqi refugees outside the country, most of them Sunnis, and two million more have been displaced internally.⁷⁰ Those numbers are likely to increase significantly as the United States draws down in Iraq. We know from the experiences of the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan that refugee populations can be breeding grounds for militants, such as the Taliban. Considering that there are substantial refugee populations in places like Jordan and Egypt, this could prove a significant problem to important American allies and a destabilizing force throughout the region

c. What has al Qaeda 'learned' in Iraq?

The Iraq war saw the strategic innovation of a massive and effective campaign of suicide attacks; the most intense and widespread campaign in history, a campaign that did much to embroil Iraq in chaos. In one month, for instance, in July 2007, there were 54 suicide attacks in Iraq. Contrast that with the 76 suicide attacks conducted by the Tamil Tigers in the 14 years between 1987 and 2001 counted by Robert Pape in his 2005 book *Dying to Win* who describes the Tigers as "the world's leading suicide terrorist organization."⁷¹ No more. Al Qaeda in Iraq, which is responsible for at least 80% of the 860 suicide attacks in Iraq in the past five years, has conducted around ten times more suicide attacks than the Tamil Tigers has done and did so in a third of the time span.

The suicide campaign in Iraq saw the innovation of the use of double suicide bombers, for maximum impact. For instance, the attack on the Hamra hotel in Baghdad in 2005 used two suicide attackers driving bomb filled vehicles.⁷²

The suicide campaign was characterized by the increasing use of female suicide bombers, something that salafis jihadist groups have generally eschewed. And the campaign also saw the use of husband-wife suicide teams as was the case in November 2005 when Muriel Degauque, a female Belgian baker's assistant, along with her husband were recruited by al Qaeda in Iraq. They both carried out suicide attacks on American convoys. This operation was noteworthy also as it was the first time that a female European jihadist had launched a suicide operation.⁷³

Another innovation has been the use of chlorine in bomb attacks in 2007, although the insurgents seem to have stopped this tactic of late, perhaps because it has not been especially effective, and/or because the use of chemical weapons is seen as beyond the pale.⁷⁴

Iraq was the first war waged as much on the Internet as on the battlefield. All attacks are filmed and then posted to jihadist websites. It was in Iraq that beheading videos, first seen in the kidnapping of American journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan in 2002, became a commonplace of jihadist actions and propaganda.

The manufacture of IEDs went through warp-speed innovations in Iraq beginning with simple 'passive' trip devices, and progressing to cell phone-triggered devices, IED 'daisy chains', infrared-triggered devices, and EFPs that shoot pellets of molten metal through almost any armored vehicle.

Al Qaeda in Iraq in November 2005 launched operations in other countries, for instance, simultaneous suicide bombing attacks in Jordan bombing three American-owned hotels in Amman that killed 60.⁷⁵ The group also rocketed two US warships in the Port of Aqaba in August 2005 killing one Jordanian citizen.⁷⁶

In a November 2006 audiotape Al Qaeda in Iraq's leader al Masri said that his organization "would not rest from Jihad until...we have blown up...the White House."⁷⁷ Other insurgents organizations in Iraq are nationalist and don't identify themselves as part of the wider global jihad as Al Qaeda in Iraq does.

However, Al Qaeda today is more likely to be able to organize a terrorist attack against the United States from Pakistan than from Iraq. Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell testified in February 2007 that the next terrorist attack in the United States was most likely to emanate from Pakistan.⁷⁸

5. Tactics and Targeting al Qaeda will use in the future.

a. Attacking Western economic targets, particularly the oil industry.

Since the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda and its affiliated groups have increasingly attacked economic and business targets. The shift in tactics is in part a response to the fact that the traditional pre-9/11 targets, such as American embassies, war ships, and military bases, are now better defended, while so-called 'soft' economic targets are both ubiquitous and easier to hit. The suicide attacks in Istanbul in November 2003-- directed at a British consulate and the local headquarters of the HSBC bank-- that killed sixty are indicative of this trend. The plotters initially planned to attack Incirlik Air Base, a facility in western Turkey used by American troops, but concluded that the tight security at the base made the assault too difficult. Therefore, the plotters transferred their efforts to the bank and consulate because they were relatively undefended targets in central Istanbul.⁷⁹

Al Qaeda also learned an important lesson from 9/11: disrupting Western economies and, by extension the global economy, is useful for their wider jihad. In a videotape released in October 2004, bin Laden pointed out that for al Qaeda's \$500,000 investment in the 9/11 attacks, the United States economy sustained a \$500 billion loss. Bin Laden crowed over al Qaeda's leveraged investment: "Every dollar al Qaeda invested defeated a million dollars."⁸⁰

Al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist groups are also increasingly targeting companies that have distinctive Western brand names. In 2003, suicide attackers bombed the Marriott hotel in Jakarta.⁸¹ The same year in Karachi, a string of small explosions at eighteen Shell stations wounded four⁸², while in 2002 a group of a dozen French defense contractors were killed as they left a Sheraton hotel, which was heavily damaged.⁸³ In October 2004 in Taba, Egyptian jihadists attacked a Hilton Hotel.⁸⁴ In Amman, Jordan in November 2005, Al Qaeda in Iraq attacked three American-owned hotels-- the Grand Hyatt, Radisson and Days Inn-- killing 60 people.⁸⁵ Around the same time a Kentucky Fried Chicken was attacked in Karachi killing three.⁸⁶

Al Qaeda attacks on oil facilities accelerated sharply beginning in 2004. Suicide bombers struck Iraq's principal oil terminal in Basra on April 21, 2004.⁸⁷ In Yanbu, Saudi Arabia, al Qaeda's Saudi Arabia affiliate attacked the offices of ABB Lummus Global, a contractor for Exxon/Mobil, on May 1, 2004 killing six Westerners.⁸⁸ Four weeks later, in Al Khobar, Saudi Arabia, al Qaeda attacked the office buildings and residential compounds of Western oil firms. Twenty-two were killed.⁸⁹ On December 16, 2004, bin Laden drew unusually specific focus to al Qaeda's operations in Saudi Arabia and the need to target oil interests, stating in an audio recording, "One of the most important reasons that led our enemies to control our land is the theft of our oil...Be active and prevent them from reaching the oil, and mount your operations accordingly."⁹⁰

And, as noted above, in February 2006, al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia unsuccessfully attacked the Abqaiq facility, perhaps the most important oil production facility in the world. Al Qaeda will continue its attacks on oil installations, pipelines, and oil workers for the foreseeable future in both Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the two countries that happen to sit on the largest oil reserves in the world.

b. Attacking Israeli/Jewish targets

Attacking Jewish and Israeli targets is an al Qaeda strategy that has only emerged strongly post- 9/11. Despite bin Laden's declaration in February 1998 that he was creating the "World Islamic Front against the Crusaders and the Jews," al Qaeda only started attacking Israeli or Jewish targets in early 2002. Since then, al Qaeda and its affiliated groups have directed an intense campaign against Israeli and Jewish targets, killing journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi, bombing synagogues in Tunisia⁹¹ and Turkey⁹², and attacking an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombassa, Kenya, which killed thirteen. At the same time as the attack on the Kenyan hotel, al Qaeda also tried to bring down an Israeli passenger jet with rocket propelled grenades, an attempt that was unsuccessful.⁹³

In the future, al Qaeda will likely intensify its campaign of attacking Jewish and Israeli targets. For that reason, bin Laden's statement in October 2004 that Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 inspired his desire to attack the United States is worrisome, as bin Laden has now moved the Israeli-American alliance to the centre of his justification for al Qaeda's attacks against the West.⁹⁴

c. Al Qaeda is increasingly likely to deploy female suicide bombers.

As mentioned above, on November 9, 2005 Muriel Degauque became the first woman to conduct a suicide operation for al Qaeda, detonating a bomb in the town of Baquba as she drove past an American patrol. She was killed immediately but inflicted no casualties (BBC, 2 December 2005).⁹⁵ And only hours after Degauque's attack, Saijida al-Rishawi, a thirty-five year old Iraqi woman walked into a wedding reception at a Radisson hotel in Amman Jordan, dressed festively like the man accompanying her, Hussein Ali al-Samara, whom she had married just days earlier.⁹⁶ Under their clothes, they were both wearing explosive belts. According to a televised confession she later gave, when her belt failed to explode her husband pushed her out of the hotel and exploded his. The couple had been dispatched by Abu Musab al Zarqawi as part of an operation that killed sixty.⁹⁷

Historically there had been a powerful taboo against the use of women in combat among the Sunni militants that make up al Qaeda. Now, al Qaeda, like Hamas and Chechen militants before them after overcoming initial reluctance, has turned more to females because they give operations a greater chance of success. They attract far less suspicion and are less likely to be flagged for security checks. Also, in 2005, Islamist terrorist groups used female suicide attackers for the first time in Egypt and Kashmir.⁹⁸

6. Al Qaeda will continue to plug into the spread of the Internet jihad.

A few years ago there were a dozen jihadist websites. Now there are something like 4,000 websites spreading militant ideology, training manuals and allowing potential terrorists to meet online.⁹⁹ The power of the Internet to foment jihad was underlined in June 2006 with the arrests of suspected bombing plotters in Ontario. The suspects reportedly became radicalized through militant Web sites and received online advice from Younis Tsouli, the Britain-based webmaster for Islamic extremist sites who called himself "Terrorist 007," before he was arrested in March of last year.¹⁰⁰

Increasingly, al Qaeda strategy, tactics, and even operational instructions will be posted in password protected jihadist forums.

7. Tactics that al Qaeda is likely to deploy in the next five years that it has hitherto not used successfully.

There are two tactics that al Qaeda might successfully deploy in the next five years that for differing reasons would have significant detrimental effects on American interests. Both tactics are well within the capabilities of the organization so they do not represent Chicken Little scenarios (such as the use of nuclear devices).

The first tactic is the use of RPGs (Rocket Propelled Grenades) or SAMs (Surface to Air Missiles) to bring down a commercial jetliner. As mentioned above, al Qaeda already attempted such an attack against an Israeli passenger jet in Kenya in 2003.¹⁰¹ That attempt almost succeeded. A successful effort by al Qaeda to bring down a commercial passenger jet anywhere in the world would have a devastating effect on both global aviation and tourism.

The second tactic would be the deployment of a radiological bomb attack, most likely in a European city. Such an attack would have a much greater ability to terrorize than the small-scale chemical and biological attacks that terrorists have mounted in the past, as it would seem to most observers that the terrorists had “gone nuclear” even though, of course, a radiological bomb is nothing like a nuclear device.

In June 2004, a report in the *New Scientist* magazine, based on records from the U.N.’s International Atomic Energy Agency, indicated that the risk of a radiological “dirty bomb” attack is growing.¹⁰² In 1996, there were eight incidents of smuggling of radioactive materials suitable for such a device. In 2003, there were fifty-one such cases. The dramatic rise in smuggling has coincided with efforts by al Qaeda to acquire radioactive materials and to deploy and detonate a “dirty” radiological bomb, a task described by the al Qaeda ideologue Mustafa Setmariam Nasar as a necessity (Bergen 2006, 347-8). A radiological bomb attack in a Western city would kill relatively few people but would cause enormous panic and likely severely damage global investor confidence.

The study by Swati Pandey and myself of the biographies of the 79 terrorists responsible for five of the worst anti-Western terrorist attacks since 1993 that is referred to earlier in this testimony has some sobering implications for the use of chemical, biological, radiological and even nuclear weapons by al Qaeda in the future.

In our sample 54% of the terrorists had attended college. (52% of the American population has attended college). The most popular major for the terrorists was engineering followed by medicine. In other words, the terrorists who have succeeded in carrying out spectacular attacks against Western targets in the past have been the type of college-educated, technically proficient men who are capable of manufacturing and deploying chemical, biological and radiological weapons.¹⁰³ At some point they could also assemble a crude “gun-type” nuclear device and detonate it in a European city. In my view this extremely unlikely to happen in the five year time frame considered in this testimony.

8. Al Qaeda’s strategy over the next five years.

As al Qaeda’s number two, Ayman al Zawahiri, explained shortly after 9/11 in his autobiographical *Knights under the Prophet’s Banner*, the most important strategic goal of al Qaeda is to seize control of a state, or part of a state, somewhere in the Muslim world. He writes, “Confronting the enemies of Islam, and launching jihad against them

require a Muslim authority, established on a Muslim land that raises the banner of jihad and rallies the Muslims around it. Without achieving this goal our actions will mean nothing."¹⁰⁴ Such a jihadist state would then become a launching pad for attacks on the American homeland. We have seen al Qaeda do this once before in Afghanistan. Now the goal is to establish a jihadist mini-state in Iraq, in the heart of the Middle East, rather than on the periphery of the Muslim world as al Qaeda was able to do under the Taliban. This will be al Qaeda's main strategic goal for the next few years.

Another key goal will be to maintain their base on the Afghan-Pakistan border. Al Qaeda seeks a safe haven that replicates some of the features of its Afghan haven before the fall of the Taliban. The tribal areas along Pakistan's western border are proving a congenial place for al Qaeda to regroup.

Al Qaeda's aim in the next five years will also be to stay relevant and to stay in the news. The organization will be opportunistic in spinning hot-button issues for Muslims around the world for their purposes, as they did during the Danish cartoon controversy and the month-long conflict in Lebanon in 2006.

It's possible that al Qaeda may also seek to aim more attacks at Christians in the coming years. Attacks on the Pope both verbal and literal should be expected.

The situation in Darfur is also likely to be a flashpoint. Al Qaeda seems to view western humanitarian interventions in Darfur in the same way as it viewed the humanitarian mission in Somalia in the early '90s--as a western attempt to colonize Muslim lands. Al Qaeda fighters are likely to become embroiled in the Darfur conflict in the next few years.

9. Will al Qaeda (rather than "homegrown" terrorists) be able to attack the United States itself in the next five years?

In my view it is a low-level probability that al Qaeda will be able to attack the U.S. in the next five years.

In the past, when al Qaeda terrorists have tried or succeeded to launch attacks in the United States they have done so only after arriving from somewhere else. Ahmed Ressam for instance, who lived in Canada before he tried to blow up Los Angeles International airport in December 1999, was an Algerian who had trained with al Qaeda in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, the nineteen 9/11 hijackers hailed from countries around the Middle East. Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the first World Trade Center attack in 1993 that killed six, was a Pakistani who had also trained in an al Qaeda camp.¹⁰⁶ None of these attackers relied on al Qaeda " sleeper cells " in the US and there is no evidence that such cells exist today. Moreover, the US is a much harder target than it was before 9/11, and the ability of an al Qaeda terrorist to enter the country and mount a successful operation has been greatly diminished by US government actions, the heightened awareness of the American public, and the weaker state of al Qaeda itself. This is not,

however, to imply that American homegrown terrorists inspired by al Qaeda might not carry out a small-bore terror attack inside the United States in the next five years.

An area of concern is American citizens of Pakistani descent traveling back home to Pakistan to acquire terrorist training and direction from al Qaeda as the London bombers did before the July 7, 2005 attacks. There are indications that some have tried to take this route. The FBI says Syed Ahmed, an American citizen of Pakistani descent, traveled from Atlanta to meet with a cell in Ontario, Canada to discuss possible additional attacks in the US after attempting to attend a terrorist training camp in Pakistan.¹⁰⁷ And in June 2003, Iyman Faris, a US citizen born in Kashmir, pled guilty to helping al Qaeda plan attacks in the United States, including a plot to bring down the Brooklyn Bridge.¹⁰⁸ Faris admitted to meeting Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, in 2002 in Pakistan to plan those operations. However, the American Muslim population as a whole is far less radicalized than in Europe and therefore the number seeking training or contact overseas with al Qaeda is likely to be near zero.

Of course, al Qaeda itself remains quite capable of attacking a wide range of American economic interest overseas, killing US soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, and targeting US diplomatic facilities in Asia, the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East.

10. Al Qaeda's long-term strategic weaknesses and the extent to which they may weaken the group over the next five years.

a. Al Qaeda keeps killing Muslims civilians.

This is a double whammy for al Qaeda as the Koran forbids killing civilians and fellow Muslims. Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia lost a great deal of support after its campaign of attacks in 2003 that killed mostly Saudis. Ten percent of Saudis have a favorable view of the al Qaeda terrorist network, according to a survey released in December 2007 by Terror Free Tomorrow, an international public opinion research group based in Washington. Similarly, in Indonesia where Jemaah Islamiyah, the al Qaeda affiliate, has killed mostly Indonesians in its attacks over the past four years the militants have lost any vestiges of support they once enjoyed. Popular revulsion also followed al Qaeda in Iraq's 2005 attacks against the three American-owned hotels in Amman, Jordan that killed mostly Jordanians.

b. Al Qaeda has not created a genuine mass political movement.

While bin Laden enjoys personal popularity in much of the Muslim world that does not translate into mass support for al Qaeda in the manner that Hezbollah enjoys such support in Lebanon. That is not surprising--there are no al Qaeda social welfare services, schools, hospitals or clinics. Even al Qaeda's leaders are aware of the problem of their lack of mass support. In a 2005 letter from Zawahiri to Zarqawi, al Qaeda's number two urged the terrorist leader in Iraq to prepare for the US withdrawal from the

country by not making the same mistakes as the Taliban, who had alienated the masses in Afghanistan.

c. Al Qaeda's leaders have constantly expanded their list of enemies.

Al Qaeda has said it is opposed to all Middle Eastern regimes; Muslims who don't share their views; the Shia; most Western countries; Jews and Christians; the governments of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Russia; most news organizations; the United Nations; and international NGOs. It's very hard to think of a category of person, institution, or government that Al Qaeda does not oppose. Making a world of enemies is never a winning strategy.¹⁰⁹

d. Al Qaeda has no positive vision.

We know what bin Laden is *against*, but what's he really *for*? If you asked him he would say the restoration of the caliphate. In practice that means Taliban-style theocracies stretching from Indonesia to Morocco. A silent majority of Muslims don't want that. An interesting poll in Saudi Arabia in 2003 gets to this.¹¹⁰ In that poll 49% of Saudis admired bin Laden, while only 5% wanted to live in a bin Laden-run state. Many Muslims admire bin Laden because he "stood up" to the West. That doesn't mean they want to live in bin Laden's Islamist utopia. Sudan under Turabi, Afghanistan under the Taliban, and Iran under the ayatollahs don't look very attractive to most Muslims.

The four strategic weaknesses of al Qaeda we have just considered have already led to declining support both for bin Laden and for terrorist attacks on civilians in a number of Muslim countries. However, although these long-term tragic weaknesses will damage al Qaeda over time, they are unlikely to have a significant impact on the group over the next five years because all Qaeda is drawing energy, support and new recruits from insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan--conflicts that are likely to go on for longer than five years. In an authoritative study of 91 insurgencies in the past century, Seth Jones of the Rand organization found that it takes 14 years for the government to win against the insurgency, and 11 years for the insurgents to win against the government.¹¹¹ Either way, we are in for protracted conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Those conflicts will energize and fuel al Qaeda over the next five years.

3. Strategic and tactical steps to eliminate al Qaeda from its safe haven on the Afghan/Pakistan border.

(Thanks to Laurence Footer, fellow at The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies; for his input in this section.)

Recent events in Pakistan may be the best potential positive development in the fight against al Qaeda in years. Because jihadist terrorists allied with al Qaeda have unleashed some sixty suicide attacks in Pakistan in 2007 support for suicide operations have precipitously dropped in the past five years among Pakistanis from 33% to 9%. Similarly, favorable views of bin Laden have plummeted from 70% to 4% in the past nine months in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan where US officials have long believed bin Laden to be hiding. And the jihadist terrorists may have made a serious strategic error by carrying out a campaign that has principally targeted Pakistani policemen, intelligence officials, politicians and soldiers.¹¹²

This campaign may finally create the political will among the Pakistani establishment and military to do what is necessary to eliminate al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan. So far that is something that they have proven unwilling or incapable of doing. And if they don't do it this year when the Pakistani public has overwhelmingly turned against the jihadist terrorists it's not clear that they ever will have a better opportunity.

The United States should take a back seat in all this. Nothing has damaged Pakistani officials fighting al Qaeda more than the charge that they are American stooges. The campaign against the jihadi terrorists in Pakistan must be understood by the Pakistani public to be in their own interests. And it is.

1. **Understand it's a Regional Problem.** Just as it would be absurd to have an American strategy for Palestine without reference to Israel, so the US government must adopt a "joint" strategy on Afghanistan and Pakistan rather than having individual strategies aimed at both countries. This should be reflected in Afghanistan/Pakistan desks at State and the Pentagon and Afghanistan/Pakistan accounts at the various intelligence agencies and other relevant government departments. The United States must also engage more with settling the Kashmir issue, something the Indians and Pakistanis have been moving forward on for the past several years. Kashmir is a core grievance for many Pakistani Muslims and is also a training ground for jihadist terrorists, some of whom end up working with al Qaeda. A Kashmir settlement would reduce the importance of this grievance and curtail Kashmir's use as a training ground for extremists.
2. **Publicly State that the United States is in Afghanistan for the Long Term.** For obvious reasons the United States will never again make the mistake it made in Afghanistan in 1989 when it closed its Embassy there and then washed its hands of the country during the early 1990s. Instead, the U.S. has plans to stay in Afghanistan

for at least 15 years. As this is already a fait accompli American leaders should announce that the U.S. will be in Afghanistan for the long term, which will send an important signal to NATO allies, the Afghans, the Taliban and the Pakistani government all of whom will have to adjust their hedging strategies accordingly.

3. **Aid Pakistan's Efforts to Wage an Effective Counterinsurgency:** Encourage Pakistan to conduct counterinsurgency operations in Waziristan. Invite Pakistani army officers to train at Fort Bragg or Leavenworth in best counterinsurgency practices, including the use of clear and hold tactics, isolating the insurgents from the population, and neutralizing insurgent propaganda. Increase military aid, but condition it on Pakistan hiring, equipping and training more counterinsurgency troops and adopting counterinsurgency best practices.

In order to grow the force size, the US should assist Pakistan in creating a counterinsurgency academy and a police academy. Because Pakistanis are intensely nationalistic and 74% oppose any direct US military action to go after the Taliban or al Qaeda in Pakistan, such counterinsurgency training should be done at the invitation of the Pakistani government and should be achieved with a very light American footprint.¹¹³ Bolster the Frontier Corps on the Afghan/Pakistan border with embedded Green Berets.

4. **Attempt to Transform Pakistan's Tribal Belt:** This area is a vital national security interest of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States, and NATO countries because that is where the Taliban has a safe haven and al-Qaeda is regrouping.

-The President should coordinate a regional conference including Pakistan, Afghanistan, NATO, China and the United States to develop a roadmap to regional stability.

-New infrastructure and other development projects (focusing on jobs creation as well as construction of roads, schools, and hospitals) should be initiated. A proposed \$750 million in U.S. aid to the tribal region should be conditioned, in part, on letting international observers and journalists into the tribal areas. Right now there is no independent information about what is going on these areas.

-In addition, the United States should quietly advocate for political reform in the seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to allow the emergence of secular political parties to represent Pashtuns and provide a political alternative both to the Pakistani Taliban and the religious parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam which are presently the only parties allowed to operate in the FATA.

5. **Universal Database to Trace and Track Foreign Fighters, Insurgents and Terrorists:** More than six years after the September 11th attacks, the U.S. government still does not maintain an integrated database of jihadists (foreign fighters, insurgents and terrorists). The database needs, above all, to map the "facilitative nodes" that bring young men (and increasingly young women) into the jihad, such as websites, operational planners, financiers, and jihadist underground networks. A building block of such a database should be identifying the suicide attackers in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a process that can be accomplished using DNA samples, accounts on jihadist websites, good intelligence work, and media reports. We know from former

CIA officer Marc Sageman's investigations of the histories of hundreds of jihadist terrorists that friends and family are the ways most terrorists join the global jihad, and so this investigatory work should include an effort to identify friends and/or family members who brought the suicide attackers into the jihad.¹¹⁴

-Mapping the social networks of the terrorists, as outlined above, must also include identification of the clerical mentors of the suicide attackers, as it seems likely that only a relatively small number have persuaded their followers of the religious necessity of martyrdom. Armed with that intelligence, the United States and NATO can turn to the government of Pakistan where most of the suicide attackers in Afghanistan originate, and insist that it reins in particularly egregious clerics.

6. **Without Fanfare Redouble Efforts to Find Bin Laden:** Given the continued importance of bin Laden the bin Laden unit at CIA should be reopened and be run by one person who reports to the Director of National Intelligence to coordinate all CIA activities related to capturing or killing bin Laden with the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, and foreign intelligence services. Similar units should be set up targeting Ayman Zawahiri and Mullah Omar. These steps should be taken without fanfare so as to avoid providing al Qaeda with a propaganda victory.
7. **Learn to Speak their Language:** As illustrated by the fact that only three dozen FBI agents speak any Arabic at all, a new emphasis must be placed on teaching Arabic, Farsi, Pashtu, Bengali, Urdu and Punjabi.¹¹⁵ The funding at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) should be adjusted to support an increase in the number of students annually from 2,000 to 5,000 with an emphasis on these targeted languages. As language skills are perishable, ongoing investments in language maintenance should be made for DLI graduates. DLI's activities should both be coordinated with colleges and universities to attract new students as well as web-enabled to facilitate remote learning through online training. In order to increase the number of teachers, a National Language Institute should be created to train tomorrow's language instructors. Tuition grants and other financing should also be increased to reward students for reaching fluency in desired languages.
8. **Streamline and "Smart-line" the Security Clearance Process:** Certain hiring procedures which are relics of the Cold War have created obstacles to recruiting new talent. To make it easier for intelligence agencies to hire linguists and country experts, the President should mandate the streamlining of the hiring process, especially those background check policies that exclude new hires simply because they have lived in foreign countries. Right now, the process is too onerous and time-consuming, turning off potential recruits who are required to wait a year or more for clearances. The process needs to be "smart-lined."
9. **Report on Metrics:** To monitor public opinion, democracy-promotion, nation-building and terrorism metrics, an Office of Metrics should be created at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. To inform policy, this new office should provide regular briefings to the public and Congress. The United States will know it is gaining ground when the following results occur: Consistent declines in the number of attempted Jihadist attacks; fewer terrorist and insurgent safe havens in the Muslim

world; a rise in the level of good governance and open societies in the Muslim world; a steady rise in the number of leading Muslim figures critiquing al-Qaeda and its affiliates; a falling number of jihadi web sites and level of jihadi Internet activity; a continuing drop in support of suicide bombings in the Muslim world; a constant decrease in the level of support for militant jihad ideology; an improvement in world public opinion of the United States; and a decrease in the cost of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.

10. **Monitor “Ungovernable” Regions:** al-Qaeda and its affiliates have targeted the ungovernable regions within Gaza, Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia to establish safe havens, and they may be achieving success in certain areas. Areas such as these should be regularly monitored, al-Qaeda and affiliate activities should be disrupted and al-Qaeda should not be permitted to establish safe havens within these territories. As many African nations face the greatest threats from ungovernable regions, the U.S. should increase its annual funding for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.¹¹⁶
11. **Hydrogen Peroxide Controls:** The U.S. Government should increase the monitoring of sales of industrial strength hydrogen peroxide, as it was the weapon of choice for terrorists in the London 7/7 2005 bombings, the failed plot against American airliners in the summer of 2006 in the U.K., and the failed attack directed at a US base in Germany in 2007.¹¹⁷

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The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Grenier, you are recognized for 10 minutes.

**STATEMENT OF ROBERT GRENIER, MANAGING DIRECTOR,
KROLL, INC.**

Mr. GRENIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Hoekstra. I want to thank you and the other members of the committee for inviting me here today. This is a privilege for me.

I should begin by reminding you of something that you already know, and that is that I am almost 2 years now out of government, and there is much that I do not know now in terms of current privileged information beyond that which is openly available, nor do I have particular insight into the methodologies that are currently being employed. So I have not come here today to provide you with new information.

What I hope I can do is to provide you with certain judgment and perspective based on many years as a partitioner in this area, and I hope that that will be of use to you in your very important oversight role in questioning and in testing assumptions and in challenging current practice in countering terrorism.

I should point out further that I am a very strong personal believer in vigorous oversight, and all the more so now that I am no longer directly subject to it.

With regard to Osama bin Laden, here we are 6-plus years after 9/11, and the man remains at large. As Peter has pointed out, that is a very serious state of affairs. It is important that we effect his capture, although, I think we may differ on the degree to which it is important.

I will tell you, quite frankly, that I am not terribly surprised that he is still at large. Tracking down bin Laden is going to be very, very difficult. Most of us who claim some expertise in this area, as Peter has already pointed out, believe that he is most likely hiding out in Pakistan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, I suspect somewhere north of the Khyber Pass and south of Chitral. It is a very, very difficult area. It is mountainous. It is fractured both demographically and anthropologically. It is a very hostile area not only to us as outsiders, but even to other Pakistanis who are not from that area. His location in that area actually is a guess. I mean, for all we know, he may be hiding in an apartment in Karachi certainly, for all that I know.

What I think is almost certain is that, wherever he is, he is keeping a very low profile. I doubt that he is moving at all. The number of individuals who are directly knowledgeable of his whereabouts, I suspect, is extremely small. As Peter has already pointed out, it is certain that he and his confederates are using very careful and very disciplined tradecraft in controlling his communication, whether it is by videotape, audiotape or otherwise.

I would point out that Eric Rudolph, the American terrorist responsible for the attack on the Olympics in Atlanta and for a number of other bombing attacks in the United States, managed to remain at large for over 5 years in the mountains of North Carolina despite the fact that he was at the top of the FBI's most wanted list, that there was a \$1 million bounty on his head, and that there were very active efforts, both official and nonofficial, to effect his capture.

Bin Laden has a great many advantages over Eric Rudolph given where he is, given where he is hiding, and given the capabilities that are at his disposal. So, again, I am not terribly surprised at all that he has not been captured. Quite frankly, I think that it is quite likely that he is going to remain at large for an indefinite period of time.

In terms of methodologies that one might employ to effect his capture, well, there are a great many things that have been done that could presumably be done, but I think that they fall in two broad categories. One I would call a network-based approach. Since bin Laden does communicate at least to some degree, the theory is that there is some sort of a human chain that extends from him to others outside the immediate area where he is hiding, and that if you were to capture an individual somewhere in that chain and interrogate that individual, you could then trace the chain back to bin Laden.

There are two very obvious problems with this. The first is that you have got to capture someone in that chain alive. It is most likely that the individuals who have even indirect knowledge of the network that is being employed by bin Laden in order to communicate are in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. We have not captured anyone alive in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas for quite some time. There have been a number of terrorists who have met their demise there, but they have all been the victims of lethal strikes. They have not been captured. Those close to them have not been captured, and we have not been able to recover their material, either documents or electronic media. So that is a real problem.

Secondly, even if we were to capture one of these individuals, as Peter has said, the tradecraft that is being employed, I suspect, is probably not terribly sophisticated. In fact, its great merit, I would imagine, is in its simplicity, but our ability to follow the trail, as it were, the human trail, back to bin Laden would be reliant on mistakes on their part, because it is quite easy and it is quite simple to effect what we would call nonpersonal communications so that there are firebreaks in that human chain leading back to bin Laden. Again, it would require a mistake, a breakdown in discipline on their part, in order for us to unravel that.

A second broad approach that we might employ would be what I would call a local informant-based approach. That assumes that wherever bin Laden is hiding, there must be some resultant anomaly. If he is hiding in a compound somewhere in a remote area of northern Pakistan, presumably, there are outsiders who occasionally travel into that area in order to effect communications with bin Laden. There may well be an unused guesthouse on a compound which historically has been used and no longer is being used, and nobody knows why. There may be anomalies in terms of the amount of food that is being provided to a particular location that is not consistent with the number of people who are known to be there.

None of those indicators would be in any way definitive, but if you had one or more of those indicators, that would be an indication that you ought to follow up vigorously with some sort of a local investigation. In order to do that, however, given the atomized na-

ture of the areas in which bin Laden is most likely hiding, you would have to have a great number, a great many informants, any one of which would only be able to cover a very small, localized area.

You cannot do that for all of northern Pakistan. What you can, perhaps, do is to set some priorities of areas that you would particularly want to look at. I think that there are some criteria that you could set for which are the areas that you particularly want to look at hard. Then you would have to move about very vigorously and systematically to identify and to recruit informants in each of those areas. It is a very, very difficult, time-intensive, manpower-intensive effort. I do not say that it cannot be done, but even if you did everything right, you would also have to be very lucky, I think, to succeed in the end.

Particularly when we are talking about a local-informant and investigation-based approach, that has the further problem associated with it that it would largely be unrelated to the larger effort to kill, to capture or to otherwise neutralize senior members of al Qaeda who are hiding in the safe haven in the Northwest Frontier. I might differ a little bit from Peter in that as important as I concede the effort to locate, to capture or to otherwise eliminate bin Laden and Zawahiri, I think it is actually much more important in the near term that we continue the effort to kill or to capture senior lieutenants who, unlike bin Laden and probably unlike Zawahiri, are directly involved in the effort to launch terrorist attacks across the border in Afghanistan, in Western Europe and, perhaps, much farther afield. That is a very broad topic, and perhaps we will get into it in the Q&A portion.

I will just make two broad points here. One is that what we are trying to do in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas are two broad things, two broad objectives, and they work in direct conflict with one another. The first is that we are trying to kill or to capture senior terrorists who are engaged in plotting against us. At the same time, we are trying to deny them safe haven in that area. Progress against one of those objectives works directly against our efforts in the other respect, and vice versa.

The second broad point that I would make is that the only way that we are really going to get an arm around this problem, and the only way that we are going to make anything like permanent progress, is to deny the FATA as a safe haven for bin Laden, for al Qaeda and for related extremists. I believe that the only way that we are going to do that is through a long-term counter-insurgency effort that will be multifaceted and that will be as much economic- and political- as it will be military- and intelligence-based. It will be something that can really only effectively be done by the Pakistanis, but once we have convinced them that they must do it, then it will require a great deal of vigorous support on the part of the United States in a very long-term commitment to sustain that effort.

With regard to the much broader, literally global struggle against al Qaeda, again, that is a very, very broad topic. I would just like to stress three points there. The first is that I agree with Peter that it is absolutely vital that we sustain the progress that has been made and, in fact, make further improvement in the situation

with regard to al Qaeda in Iraq. It would be tremendously dangerous for us if al Qaeda were able to establish an effective safe haven in the Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq.

Secondly, one of the things that is often overlooked, I think, is the fact that we rely absolutely on the effectiveness of our allies in the war on terror. We do not tend to think so much about it in terms of resources. We do not tend to focus on it nearly as much, but we would be essentially dead in the water were it not for the vigorous efforts of our allies. I think that, therefore, capacity-building is an extremely important part of our international program that is often relatively overlooked.

The third has to do with the war of ideas, this whole issue of whether we are creating more terrorists than, in fact, we are killing and capturing. I believe that currently we are, and that unless there is effective engagement in the so-called "war of ideas," we are not going to turn a corner on that. I do not think that we have engaged in that battle at all. I think to the extent that we have thought about it, our thoughts have been confused. However, I think that the keys to progress in that area are in two areas that, frankly, should be great national strengths of ours. The first is a commitment to justice. The second is a commitment to democracy.

With that, I will end my statement. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Grenier.

[The statement of Mr. Grenier follows:]

Statement for the Record
Hearing Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
April 9, 2008

Testimony of Robert L. Grenier
Managing Director and Chairman for Global Security Consulting
Kroll

Mr. Chairman:

I want to thank you and the members of the Committee for inviting me to testify today on a topic of great importance to the security of the United States. In doing so, however, I hasten to remind the committee that I have been out of government for nearly two years now, and thus have not had access to privileged information beyond what is available through open sources, for quite some time. Further, I have no special knowledge of current policies or approaches being taken in the counter-terrorism struggle by the Intelligence Community, or other elements of the Executive Branch. Thus, as the Committee will appreciate, I do not pretend to offer to the committee new information or insights into current policies or intelligence collection methodologies. What I believe I do bring to the table, however, is a certain amount of judgment and perspective, based on long experience in dealing with the topics being discussed today. I therefore hope that the insights and opinions I offer today will be of assistance to the Committee, in its important oversight capacity, in testing the assumptions and challenging the current, established practices of the Intelligence Community, and indeed of the U.S. policy community, as they seek to protect the U.S. homeland and our allies from the terrorists who are sworn to do us harm.

Regarding the ability of Osama Bin Laden to evade capture by the U.S. or its allies, I do not think this is so terribly surprising. Before delving into the reasons for this view, however, I should perhaps describe the assumptions upon which this view is based. Like most experts, my strong suspicion is that Bin Laden is most likely taking refuge in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas on the Pakistani side of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, somewhere north of the Khyber Pass and south of Chitral. I suspect he is being hosted by a faithful adherent in a residence compound in that remote, hostile and mountainous area. I doubt very much that Bin Laden is traveling at all, and suspect that the number of individuals aware of his location is extremely small. Assumptions regarding Bin Laden's location may be wildly incorrect, of course. It's possible he could be hidden in an apartment in a densely populated part of Karachi. What I believe is almost certain, however, is that Bin Laden is minimizing his exposure by remaining in one place, keeping a very low profile, and keeping the number of those aware of his location to a minimally small number. Perhaps Bin Laden's greatest point of vulnerability is his regular, though infrequent communications via audio and, occasionally video tape. While the technology necessary to make these tapes is readily available and demands no special infrastructure, the dissemination of these tapes presumably relies upon a courier or couriers, and thus is a point of vulnerability for Bin

Laden.

Under these circumstances, however, and provided that discipline is maintained, I believe that Bin Laden could remain successfully in hiding for an indefinite period. We should not forget that Eric Rudolph, a high-profile terrorist at the top of the FBI Most Wanted List, was able to avoid capture in the mountains of North Carolina for over five years, despite active efforts both by officials and by private individuals to effect his capture, and despite a \$1 million reward on his head. From all accounts, Rudolph had little if any assistance, and had to move widely to forage for food. Bin Laden is most probably in a far more advantageous position to elude capture.

Broadly speaking, I believe that a successful effort to identify Bin Laden's whereabouts would have to rely upon one of two general methodologies. The first we might call a "network-based" approach. The idea would be that for Bin Laden to communicate as he does, and even to retain minimal contact with his organization, he would have to rely upon at least a minimal number of trusted personnel to act as couriers. Even if a highly disciplined program of compartmentation were employed, the capture and questioning of a senior Al-Qa'ida (AQ) official having even indirect contact with Bin Laden would have to be able to identify an individual, or at least a methodology by which communication reached him. This would offer at least the possibility of tracing the network back to someone with direct knowledge of Bin Laden's whereabouts.

Use of the network approach in these circumstances is problematic, however. First, it would most likely rely on some compromise of AQ's strict discipline, either involving its compartmentation of information, or its use of what we would call impersonal communications, which serve to create "fire-breaks" in the human chain leading back to Bin Laden. AQ, as we know, is a highly disciplined organization. Second, it relies upon the ability to capture alive a knowledgeable AQ official. It is most likely that such knowledgeable AQ officials are themselves located in the Tribal Areas. While a number of senior AQ officials have met their demise in the Tribal Areas in the years since 2001, all have been as a result of lethal strikes. These strikes preclude the capture of individuals, their documents, or of their electronic media, which might provide hints of Bin Laden's whereabouts.

The second broad approach we might refer to as a "local informant" approach. This approach assumes that wherever Bin Laden is hiding, there must be at least some resultant anomaly in the area, such as the occasional appearance of unknown, outside visitors; a guest house on a compound to which local visitors are never granted access; or food consumption at a compound out of keeping with the apparent number of its inhabitants. Such indicators would not be definitive by any means, but would be triggers for systematic investigation. The areas of northern Pakistan and Afghanistan of concern to us here are not only extensive, but highly atomized demographically and anthropologically, and the inhabitants of these remote valleys are highly suspicious of outsiders. Thus, the search for the anomalies described above would rely upon contact with an extensive number of local informants, each of whom would be very limited in the geography he could cover. Clearly, to have any chance of acquiring useful lead

information, one would have to greatly narrow the number of areas to be examined, and those would have to be strictly prioritized. I believe it is fair to say that there are certain areas which are more likely than others to be hiding places for Bin Laden. Bin Laden is less likely, for instance, to be hiding in an area dominated by Shi'a, or by Isma'ilis. He is probably more likely to be hosted by someone whose links to the Taliban or to local Islamic extremist groups, such as the Tehrik-e Nafaz Shariat Muhammadi (TNSM), are well known, and predate Bin Laden's flight from Afghanistan. This approach would require a great deal of demographic, anthropological, tribal and organizational research, as well as a very disciplined and systematic approach to acquisition of informants who would normally be well below any threshold of interest on the part of intelligence collectors.

Clearly, neither approach is easy, and the latter approach has the further disadvantage of being unconnected to the broader effort to identify, locate, and capture or kill senior AQ cadres.

Although the effort to locate and neutralize Bin Laden is important, it pales in comparison with the importance of the broader effort to counter AQ in the Pak-Afghan border region. The fact that AQ has been able to reconstitute a fairly effective safehaven in parts of the FATA, and has increased in strength, particularly since September 2006, is rather well-documented, and is not something I would explore in depth here. It seems clear, however, that AQ currently has both the physical and psychological space it needs to plan, encourage, and support terrorist activities not only in the region, but in Western Europe and therefore, I would argue, in the U.S. as well. A series of actual and would-be serious terrorist incidents in Western Europe, extending back to the London transit bombings of July 2005, have been tied, to one degree or another, to support from the Pakistani tribal areas. Given the relative ease of travel between Europe and the U.S., it seems likely that the trend will extend to the U.S. as well. Indeed, it is somewhat surprising that it has not done so yet.

The effort to roll back AQ in the border area and deny it safehaven is as difficult as it is important. I will not attempt in this short statement to completely deconstruct and examine the many different aspects of this effort which will be necessary to achieve success. I will, however, cite a number of factors at play, and invite your questions, so that I and my colleagues on today's panel can attempt to elucidate them. First, I would like to stress that the twin, connected challenges of effectively attacking AQ in the Pak-Afghan border area and permanently denying it safehaven there cannot be accomplished by the U.S. unilaterally. The U.S. can, through its policies, either greatly help or hinder the effort, but it will be utterly reliant upon the Afghans and, in particular, the Pakistanis, to achieve success. Second, we must remember that the two broad elements of our CT strategy in the area – to kill or capture AQ terrorists and to isolate them and their dedicated supporters from the local population so as to eliminate their safehaven – inevitably work against each other. That does not mean that we can cease one in favor of the other, but we must be prepared to accept that there will be inherent contradictions in our approach which will have to be carefully managed. Third, our task is being progressively complicated by the increasingly close cooperation among AQ, the Afghan

Taliban, and local Pakistani extremist groups falling under the loose umbrella of the Tehrik-e Taliban. This progression has its roots in the period immediately after 9-11, and is unlikely to be reversed. On the positive side, however, the combination of unrelenting intimidation of the extremists against local tribal leaders in the FATA, many of whom they have murdered, and the wave of suicide and other attacks perpetrated against innocent people in the tribal areas, in other parts of the Northwest Frontier, and even in settled areas of Pakistan -- to include the assassination of Benazir Bhutto -- have helped to galvanize popular opinion against AQ and the extremists who support them throughout Pakistan, to include the Tribal Areas. As a consequence, there have been at least some nascent indications that local leaders in the FATA may be motivated to counter the extremists. These efforts must be vigorously supported.

Signs of popular motivation to counter AQ and the extremists are particularly important. Such locally-based efforts represent the only long-term, sustainable way of countering the extremists and denying safehaven to AQ and to those who pose a threat to our own security. As in Iraq, locally-based opposition to the extremists would be an important element in an effective counter-insurgency program whose ultimate goal would be to more fully incorporate the tribal areas into the rest of Pakistan, and thus bring these areas under effective governmental control.

With regard to the larger, global threat posed by AQ, and the possible policy changes necessary to counter it, I would stress three elements. First, Iraq: It is critical that the commitment of indigenous elements in the Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq to counter AQ in Iraq be maintained and sustained. This is all that stands between us and an established AQ safehaven in western Iraq. As it seems most unlikely that a Shi'a-dominated government will move vigorously or systematically to provide an institutionalized basis to maintain the U.S.-backed Sunni militias, a sustained U.S. commitment to these local institutions, in some form, will be important for some time to come. I believe that such a commitment can be maintained with far fewer U.S. troops than are currently deployed in Iraq.

Second, I would stress the importance of our cooperative international relationships to the world-wide struggle against AQ. Without this worldwide web of relationships with cooperating intelligence and security services, the U.S. would be virtually powerless to confront AQ beyond our own shores. Therefore, capacity-building -- the enhancement of CT-related intelligence and investigative capabilities on the part of our partners -- is among the most important elements of our overall global CT strategy, though it gets relatively little attention and, in the zero-sum contest for resources in the Intelligence Community, is often relegated to the status of a neglected step-child.

Finally, I would suggest the importance of a serious U.S. engagement in what is often referred to as the "War of Ideas." It is widely understood that in a contest in which our enemy is more properly understood as a popular movement, rather than as a discrete, unified and disciplined organization, countering the enemy's propaganda and undermining his popular appeal become critical elements in the strategic battle. Otherwise, we run the serious risk of waging a highly competent and effective tactical

struggle, at the potential cost of strategic defeat. While the need for such engagement is widely understood, from my perspective there has been little coherent, realistic or effective thought given to the issue within government, and still less effective policy implementation. This is not the place to provide a lengthy explanation of how to win the war of ideas, but I would like to make a number of relevant, fundamental points. First, I think it is important to understand that although the U.S. in particular, and the West more generally may be the main targets of AQ, this is fundamentally not our war. Rather, the War on Terrorism is fundamentally a struggle within the Islamic world for control of the Islamic world. The reason for AQ's focus on the U.S. and the West are both symbolic and practical. AQ and those who share its Salafist ideology see the U.S. and the West as the main props beneath unpopular Muslim governments which would otherwise fall before an Islamist wave. They see attacks on the West as a means of driving the West from the Islamic world, thus setting the stage for their own political domination. Second, they see the U.S. and the West more broadly as enemies of the Muslims, either attacking Muslims directly (as in Iraq and Afghanistan), or consistently supporting (or at least failing to effectively counter) non-Muslim countries who are popularly seen as oppressors of the Muslims, whether in Palestine, in Kashmir, in Bosnia, in Chechniya or elsewhere. This latter element of the AQ narrative is a primary motivator in their efforts to recruit terrorist cadres and, equally important, a primary means to appeal to the broad mass of the Muslim population -- opposition to the U.S. being one of the few things upon which a majority of the Muslims can agree. This perception of the U.S. on the part of many in the Islamic world is particularly damaging in two primary respects. First, it makes it very difficult for Muslim governments which otherwise are natural allies of the U.S. in the war on terrorism to cooperate with us openly, given the unpopularity of their doing so. Second, it creates a strong climate of ambivalence within the mass of the otherwise moderate majority of Muslims, who would otherwise not be inclined to support the terrorists, but who are not motivated to actively oppose the terrorists so long as they are seen to be good Muslims opposing the perceived oppression of the U.S. Thus, quietly supporting Islamic governments to effectively oppose terrorism and working to undercut the AQ narrative are important elements of the overall struggle.

I think it is important to stress up-front my view that in their long-term effort to consolidate political control over the Islamic world, AQ, related terrorist organizations, and the Salafist movement from which they spring are destined to lose. Their program has little inherent appeal to the broad majority of Muslims. Moreover, their repressive and intimidationist tactics make potent enemies for them wherever they hold sway. We have seen this clearly in western Iraq, and are beginning to see it in South Asia as well. The fact that AQ is destined to lose in the ideological struggle over the Islamic world is not a cause of satisfaction, however, as the struggle promises to be a long one, and in the meantime the lethal threat of Islamically-inspired terrorism in the West will remain a clear and present danger. Thus, even if one accepts the conclusion that our enemies are destined to lose the "real" struggle for dominance in the Islamic world, effective engagement in a "war of ideas" will be a vitally important element in our efforts to contain and foreshorten a lengthy conflict in which terrorist losses in the West, to include the U.S., could easily and perhaps catastrophically mount.

In countering the AQ narrative, however, it is important to understand the real problem, which is U.S. policy and the perceptions of it. All too often, Americans -- very much to include U.S. officials -- misperceive our problem as one of being misunderstood by the Muslim world. They believe the solution, therefore, is one of better PR: If only we could explain ourselves better, we would counter negative perceptions of us in the Islamic world. This is a fundamental misperception on our part. Make no mistake, there is much misunderstanding of the U.S. throughout the Muslim world, which often falls victim to conspiratorial thinking, particularly where the U.S. is concerned. The main problem, however, is U.S. policy, where the U.S. has consistently failed to use its considerable power and influence to settle endemic problems -- particularly in Palestine and Kashmir -- which have festered for generations now, and which fundamentally color Muslim perceptions of U.S. intentions. It is not so much a matter of settling endemic situations in which Muslims are perceived to be victimized on terms completely favorable to the Muslims. The point, however, is to solve them.

In creating a policy environment in which we are able to effectively counter the AQ narrative, I believe there are two watchwords which are key, and which should play to U.S. strengths: Justice and Democracy. If U.S. policy were more clearly oriented, both rhetorically and substantively, toward addressing instances of fundamental injustice in the Islamic world and elsewhere, it could have a profound impact in countering the AQ narrative. Again, this does not necessarily mean bringing about a solution to endemic conflicts which meet maximalist Muslim goals, but it does mean solving them in a manner which fairly addresses fundamental needs and concerns of the Muslims.

Secondly, a far more sincere, effective, and consistent advocacy of democratization in the Islamic world could be a critically important part of the effort to counter AQ and its Salafist adherents. It is important to remember that terrorism is the tactic of the weak. Terrorism will be embraced by some -- and tolerated by many more -- when legitimate means of redressing grievances are unavailing. If we wish to counter terrorism as a tactic for addressing grievances, we must work clearly and consistently to make legitimate, democratic means of redress available. In recent years, the putative U.S. commitment to democracy has been largely abandoned in practice, which has only fed cynicism within the Islamic world concerning U.S. intentions. This does not mean that democracy promotion should be simple-minded and heedless of the differing realities at work in different countries. Steady promotion of democracy, albeit at different paces and through different means in different places, however, will be a necessary element of any effective, long-term U.S. effort to counter the use of terrorism.

The CHAIRMAN. We have got less than 8 minutes left in the vote. We have got three votes. I want to recess the committee and then come back with Mr. Emerson's opening statement.

Thank you. The committee is in recess.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.

With that, Mr. Emerson, you are recognized for 10 minutes.

**STATEMENT OF STEVEN EMERSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
THE INVESTIGATIVE PROJECT ON TERRORISM**

Mr. EMERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity here, and I thank you and your fellow Members for holding this hearing.

I would like to say that I was very impressed with my colleagues' testimony. They leave me very little to say, of course, but I will try. I apologize for the length of my testimony. It was designed to relieve any of you of the need to take any Ambien.

So I would say, first of all, that the first problem we face right now is the new government in Pakistan. As you know, Musharraf had attempted to broker peace with the tribes and militia, and it culminated in a counterproductive deal between the tribal and militant leaders in northern Waziristan. According to the deal, foreign fighters were to leave north Waziristan, and then tribal leaders were to clean house. It did not happen. The insurgency in the FATA area grew emboldened by what could be seen as an official government sanction of these illegal armed groups. Regardless, the deal ended when Pakistani forces crushed militants who seized control of the infamous Red Mosque in Islamabad in July 2007. Since then, tribal and militant leaders have denounced Musharraf and have even carried out 36 suicide bombings against military targets alone.

Now, with the new recent elections, there is a lot of uncertainty. Musharraf played both sides of the house, but largely it was a 51-49 deal in working with the U.S., but also in knowing that his flow of new fighter jets and lots of billions of dollars depended upon the ability to keep finding new al Qaeda leaders. Miraculously, one leader after another was captured almost on a regular basis, on a yearly basis, but the new Pakistani Government led by the People's Party will likely seek, unfortunately, a Northwest Frontier policy and a Federally Administered Tribal Area policy that differs markedly from Musharraf's policy.

I think one of the basic recommendations that I would come out with is that we need to make sure that the new Government of Pakistan sees that it is in its own best interest to be as aggressive as possible in the Taliban areas of Waziristan and in the FATA area in the Northwest Frontier Province, and to allow the United States the latitude to unilaterally conduct cross-border strikes and Predator strikes at high-value targets as had been done just several weeks ago.

As far as the hunt for bin Laden, my belief is that, if we look at bin Laden, he was certainly the pinnacle of his organization that was reached on September 10th, 2001. Since then, it has been dispersed. It has been largely incapacitated as an organization, although it has reconstituted itself with new leaders taking part in

replacing two-thirds of the leadership that had been taken out, either killed or captured, since 9/11.

There is some good news as to a high-ranking leader that we identified in the testimony, Abu Obaidah al-Masri. Today, it was revealed that he was found dead. I do not know the circumstances of his death, but at least that is one more major leader who has been taken out.

Now, having said that, al Qaeda is both an organization, again, really constituting lots of miniorganizations or other organizations like the Islamic Movement of the Maghreb, GSPC, the Egyptian Islamic Vanguard, the al-Zawahiri acquisition back in 1995.

It is also a movement. I think, as a movement, frankly, it is almost more dangerous than as an organization. In that respect, we see what is happening in Europe in terms of the plots that have occurred in Denmark, in the U.K., in Madrid, and most recently in Germany. Germany was quite interesting because this converges directly with what the Director of the CIA said 2 weeks ago, that we are about to see a new type of profile of Islamic militants come through our borders, one that will not be as detectable as the other proverbial types, meaning that the two major members of this cell in Germany that were about to attack Ramstein Air Force Base as well as nightclubs and American bars frequented by Americans were Germans who had converted to Islam. Their arrests have resulted in some incredible interrogations and confessions that have revealed how they transited to al Qaeda-affiliated camps in Pakistan on their own volition. As a result of going there, they hooked up and got trained in how to carry out bombings.

The same can be said for the Danish plot. The same can be said for the July 2005 bombing of the trains in London. Then in other countries such as Italy and Belgium, we find also other plots. Some of them do not show a linkage directly to al Qaeda.

For example, the Hofstede Group carried out the killing of Teddy van Gogh, a Dutch filmmaker who had made a film called "Submission." It was particularly horrifying when it was carried out several years ago because it was simply a group of young Muslims based in Belgium—not in Belgium, but in the Netherlands—who basically said, we are going to kill anybody who insults the Prophet or who insults Islam. They stabbed him, and they shot him multiple times, as a result of which colleagues of his—eight colleagues of his and members of the Parliament had to go into hiding. Today there are at least seven members of Parliament there who are still members or who are former members who are in hiding as a result, including Geert Wilders, who just made a film called "Fitna."

Even though the film can be considered anti-Islamic, I would refer you to the very good article written by the Ranking Republican Mr. Hoekstra, who wrote a piece in the March 27 issue of The Wall Street Journal in which he stated, reasonable men in free societies regard Geert Wilders' anti-Muslim rhetoric and films like "Fitna" as disrespectful of the religious sensitivities of members of the Islamic faith, but free societies also hold freedom of speech to be a fundamental human right. We do not silence, jail or kill people with whom we disagree because their ideas are offensive or disturbing. We believe that when such ideas are openly debated, they sink on their own weight and attract few followers.

The fact of the matter is that there has been a reconstitution. When we look at the larger picture, what are we facing? This hearing is supposed to focus on al Qaeda, but my contention and my testimony, half of my 50 pages—and I apologize for the length—focuses on al Qaeda or on al Qaeda-linked plots in Europe, on the use of the FATA area and the Northwest Frontier Province to launch attacks, on the use of self-anointed franchises in Europe, and then on homegrown franchises in the United States or in Canada or in London that attach themselves to al Qaeda's ideology.

It is my basic contention that we cannot decouple al Qaeda from the larger battle against radical Islamic etiology from which it stems. If we do, we are guaranteed to lose the war against al Qaeda. Al Qaeda was born out of an organization, as are almost all other Sunni movements, called the Muslim Brotherhood. That is what drives al Qaeda. It also drives Hamas. It drives Islamic Jihad. Their etiology—it is the etiology of al Qaeda as well—is intrinsically hostile to secular democracies that value pluralism, the separation of church and state, free speech, minority rights, and freedom of religion.

A former member of the Clinton administration, who I worked with in combating terrorism back in the 1990s, Richard Clarke, stated in testimony in 2003 that the issue of terrorist financing in the U.S. is a fundamental example of the shared infrastructure levered by Hamas, Islamic Jihad and al Qaeda, all of which enjoy a significant degree of cooperation and coordination within our borders that commonly carries the extremist Muslim Brotherhood. All of these organizations are descendants of the membership and etiology of the Muslim Brotherhood. So, therefore, I think that it is imperative that we look at the larger problem of radical Islamic etiology of which al Qaeda exploits and propagates, but that also is propagated by a host of other organizations that were derived from the same parent, parental organization, the Muslim Brotherhood.

As you probably are aware, in the Holy Land Foundation trial that was held last fall in Texas, more than 100,000 documents were released that were probably the most important national security documents released in the last 30 years. In those documents they revealed the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood itself had implanted itself within American borders with the same intent as al Qaeda, but to do it internally; that is, to carry out an internal jihad from within—a “civilizational jihad” they called it—to sabotage and to subvert U.S. democracy from within.

I call this almost the stealth jihad. On one hand, you have open attacks which we recognize as terrorist attacks. Then you have infiltration. That is as dangerous an attack as well, because that undermines our whole basis of democracy.

The fact that a Hezbollah member was able to infiltrate the CIA and FBI recently, and the fact that a member of the Hofstede Group infiltrated AIVD shows that these Islamic radical groups are trying to penetrate Western intelligence, and they have already penetrated Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian intelligence organizations. One only has to look at ISI in Pakistan to see how much they have been compromised historically and how they are still compromised and are unwilling to admit that they have far more

knowledge about where bin Laden's likely whereabouts are or al Zawahiri's than they have admitted publicly.

So I believe that we cannot afford to basically isolate the problem only as al Qaeda. One only has to look at what happened after the Danish cartoons, which resulted in 24-hour protection for Hirsi Ali, who is a member of the Dutch Parliament, and for other parliamentarians.

Now, in the United States itself, I am submitting for the record an actual wanted poster, printed in an Arabic newspaper, of a woman named Wafa Sultan, who resides in the United States. She emigrated from Syria. She was a Syrian Muslim. She has spoken out against radical Islam on television, on al-Jazeera of all places, and has debated even the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood's use of al-Qaradawi, who has himself issued fatwas calling for the killing of Americans in Iraq and for the killing of Jews. Well, he declared that Ms. Sultan insulted Islam. Then this poster came out that said that she was a vilifier of Islam; it said "Wanted for Justice." That poster, which I am holding up here, is clearly the first time, I believe, that an American—she is an American now—has gone into hiding on her own volition, without the protection of the FBI, because of the threats stemming from the larger etiological confrontation spawned by radical Islam.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Emerson.

[The statement of Mr. Emerson follows:]

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Testimony of

Steven Emerson

Before the

**United States House of Representatives Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence**

April 9, 2008



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Introduction:

The 2001 invasion of Afghanistan was successful in obliterating much of al Qaeda's command-and-control structure. Due to a robust and successful counter-terrorist policy made up of good intelligence gathered by the FBI, asset forfeitures and designations by the Department of the Treasury, and other good work by the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies within the intelligence community, the U.S. has fortunately not been hit with another attack since 9-11. Moreover, in the six and a half years since the those horrible, al Qaeda's direct orchestration of acts of terrorism on the operational level has been somewhat constrained. This is not to say that al Qaeda has not been involved in terrorist attacks and plots since 2001 (training and guidance provided by al Qaeda in the 2005 London transit bombings and foiled 2006 Heathrow plot prove otherwise), but the group's leaders have relied largely on the power of self-anointed franchises and recognized the power of spreading its message and ideology via the Internet. Extremist Muslims throughout the world have responded to this message and have sought to execute a number of attacks. While most have been stopped, some have been successful, killing hundreds and injuring thousands more, resulting in propaganda coups for al Qaeda and its leadership.

Parallel to franchising the al Qaeda ideology, the group has successfully regenerated its operational capabilities in the sanctuary of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. According to the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of July 2007 entitled, "The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland," al Qaeda "continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in the extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities,"¹ and thus remains the primary terrorist threat to the United States.

The 2007 NIE also notes the threat posed by al Qaeda affiliate groups – particularly al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) – not just to our military personnel deployed in Iraq, but to the homeland itself. In that capacity, another al Qaeda affiliate deserves equal attention – al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the successor organization to the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (known by its French acronym, GSPC). Aside from its impressive operational and training competence, the fact that members of GSPC and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) – the original modern Algerian terrorist group – have targeted both the U.S. homeland and American targets in Europe makes AQIM an enemy that cannot be underestimated.

Al Qaeda strategy memos, intercepted letters and events themselves indicate that al Qaeda seeks to establish operationally capable affiliates elsewhere in the Middle East, particularly in the Palestinian territories, Jordan, and Lebanon. Terrorist plots in Europe over the last several years speak to al Qaeda's continued desire to launch attacks on the European continent and against the West in general.

Due to the reconstitution of al Qaeda's command-and-control structure in a geographically isolated sanctuary, the increasing capabilities and sophistication of al Qaeda affiliates, and the ongoing inspiration of extremist Muslims living inside the United States, I agree with the NIE assessment that the terrorist threat from al Qaeda and its affiliates to this country is at its highest

¹ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland," July 2007, http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf.

point since 2001. As reported by the 2007 NIE, we can expect plots against high-profile targets that seek to inflict mass casualties and/or create fear and uncertainty in both our economy and populace. This written testimony will focus on a number of issues, including the reconstitution of al Qaeda in FATA, the emerging second-generation leadership of al Qaeda, the threat posed by existing al Qaeda affiliate groups and the establishment of additional affiliate groups, the marked increase in al Qaeda propaganda over the past several years, notable plots and attacks since 9/11 in the West, the risk of infiltration by al Qaeda agents and operatives, and security gaps previously exploited by terrorists that have yet to be closed. Perhaps more importantly, this testimony will also address the larger problem of the global Islamist movement and U.S. missteps in trying to counter that ideology and failure to recognize the dangerous threat that it poses to the U.S. and the free world.

Reconstitution of al Qaeda in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA)

While U.S.-led military operations reportedly eliminated 80% of al Qaeda’s core leadership, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and other key leaders managed to escape across the mountainous border to Pakistan, finding a safe haven with Pashtun tribes. Since then, al Qaeda has rebuilt its command-and-control structure in concert with a host of entities, including tribal groups, Islamist parties, Kashmiri terrorist groups, criminal elements, corrupt police officials, and rogue factions in Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). To understand how such a phenomenon could happen, it is important to understand the environment that exists in FATA and, to a lesser extent, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).



Figure 1: FATA and NWFP

Pakistan is composed of four provinces and two federal territories, of which FATA is one. FATA is a mountainous territory, composed of seven districts, or agencies, that has historically kept a certain amount of autonomy, due to its tribal and rural character as well as its difficult terrain. It is bordered by Afghanistan to the west, NWFP and the Pakistani Punjab to the east, and Baluchistan to the south. The Afghan border is notoriously porous and has never been effectively controlled by the Pakistani government or the British colonial government that preceded it. The Pakistani government attempts to wield a certain amount of control through political agents and tribal agencies, but corruption and the independent nature of the Pashtun tribal structures render this system ineffective. After the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Afghan Taliban militia and officials, al Qaeda members, and Uzbek extremists retreated to FATA. They were welcomed by many tribal leaders, while coming into conflict with others. This shift in the power dynamic of FATA led to the so-called Talibanization of the region, not just due to the Afghan Taliban but also because of the rise of Pakistani Taliban and extremist militia organizations independent of their Afghan brothers. Thus, FATA quickly became a sanctuary for insurgents fighting NATO and Afghan troops in Afghanistan.

Talibanization and the increasing hostility of the Pashtun tribes in FATA, especially in Waziristan, also led to a low grade insurgency against the Pakistani government. Under pressure from Washington to resolve this issue, President Musharraf sent the Pakistani military into FATA, which has always been infamous for its hostility to external military power, even if that power is technically a part of the same country. Predictably, the Pashtun tribal and Taliban militias went to war with the Pakistani Army, resulting in high casualties for the Pakistanis, which peaked in 2004. President Musharraf then attempted to broker peace with the tribes and militias. This effort culminated in September 2006 with a counter-productive deal between Musharraf and tribal and militant leaders in North Waziristan, including several men wanted for arrest by the Pakistani government. According to the deal, foreign fighters were to leave North Waziristan and the tribal leaders were to clean house. Of course, this did not happen and the insurgency in FATA grew, emboldened at what could be seen as official government sanction of these illegal armed groups. Regardless, the deal ended when Pakistani forces crushed militants who seized control of the infamous Red Mosque in Islamabad in July 2007. Tribal and militant leaders denounced Musharraf and refused to come to terms with him. Since then, the tribal and Taliban forces have been fiercely engaging the Pakistani Army, kidnapping large groups of soldiers – sometimes entire companies – and performing public and sometimes taped executions. In 2007, there were 36 suicide bombings in Pakistan against military targets, many of which have been blamed on these Taliban militias.

It is in this environment that al Qaeda has managed to survive and rebuild, relying on the protection of their tribal hosts and Taliban militias. In concert with these allies, al Qaeda maintains training camps and a sophisticated propaganda operation. One of these allies is Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella organization of the Pakistani Taliban groups formed in December 2007. This group is led by Baitullah Mehsud, a native of South Waziristan in FATA, who was once quoted as saying, “Only Jihad can bring peace to the world.”² He was recently implicated in the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (although he denies involvement). TTP has a presence in all seven agencies of FATA and from many districts

² “Profile: Baitullah Mehsud,” *BBC*, December 28, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7163626.stm.

in NWFP. Mehsud reportedly commands 5,000 fighters and operates with relative impunity in FATA.

These tribal and Taliban militias, however, are vulnerable in one sense: there is a certain amount of tension and discord stemming from disagreements and inter-tribal distrust. One example of this is an apparent schism between Mehsud and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, another Taliban leader in Waziristan and deputy commander of TTP, Mehsud's organization. While Bahadur and Mehsud are leaders of the same organization, they are of different tribes. Bahadur was among the signatories of the peace deal between the Pakistani government and North Waziristan in September 2006, mentioned above. Bahadur has resisted Mehsud's efforts to coordinate attacks in North Waziristan, which is Bahadur's turf. Bahadur has even negotiated independent cease-fires and truces with the Pakistani Army and told Mehsud to steer clear of North Waziristan.

The recent elections in Pakistan have created a great deal of uncertainty about Pakistan's future policy in its border regions. The new Pakistani government, led by the People's Party, will likely seek a FATA and NWFP policy that differs markedly from Musharraf's policy. The People's Party holds 84 out of 342 seats in Pakistan's National Parliament and has partnered with the Pakistani Muslim League (N) to form the first civilian government since Musharraf took power in a military coup in 1999.

Recently, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, briefed the new government on the situation in FATA. The meeting ended with the civilian officials stating their intention to pursue peaceful dialogue, especially with Pakistani Taliban groups like Mehsud's TTP. They expressed an unwillingness to use force at the expense of negotiation. The new government will be strongly opposed to U.S. covert cross-border incursions and Predator strikes. It is almost certain that this policy will only lead to increased Talibanization in FATA that will continue to spread to NWFP.

Relation to the Situation in Afghanistan

FATA serves as both a sanctuary for al Qaeda's global jihad and for the Afghan Taliban insurgency being waged against the Afghan government and NATO troops. It is important to take note here of the situation in Afghanistan as it directly relates to issues in FATA and regional security in general.

In February of this year, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates traveled to Europe to appeal to our NATO allies to increase their levels of support for our combined efforts in Afghanistan. Gates' pleas were met by a range of responses from indifference to contempt.

Despite fierce fighting in recent months, and a heightened security threat to the West by Taliban gains and improvement in battle and terrorist techniques, the American request for more troops to shore up the efforts fell on deaf ears. Some European allies have demonstrated a reluctance to allow their troops – currently deployed in Afghanistan – to serve in areas where much of the fighting is taking place, opting to keep them in already safe regions, working on much needed

reconstruction projects, which, for the time being, are of secondary importance until the Taliban forces can be defeated and the Southern region of the country brought under NATO control.

European leaders have cited the difficulty of increasing troop levels amidst a climate of public opinion that is heavily against both the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite this, key European military leaders seemingly understand the importance of the situation. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has called for two more battalions to be added to the current forces in the Afghan theater.

The lack of European support for our necessary efforts in Afghanistan at this crucial time - especially while the U.S. is shouldering such a high percentage of the burden in Iraq - is, so say the least, extremely unfortunate. The general position of the European governments betrays a lack of understanding of the gravity of the situation, and a placement of short term political desires over long term strategic and security needs.

Worse, in an effort to calm public opinion, European allies have placed dangerous and ineffective combat restrictions on its troops, in an effort to prevent deaths which will then be reported by an unfriendly media to a population already hostile towards participation in the war in Afghanistan, cooperation with United States foreign policy in general. Such restrictions minimize the actual level of help from our European allies in a war that is not yet over.

If various reports from the Department of Defense are accurate the U.S. will soon be sending several battalions of Marines from Iraq to support the allied effort in NATO, increasing the already high percentage of the U.S. burden. Further efforts must be made on the part of the Bush administration to impress upon our allies the need for not only vocal support for our combined cause in Afghanistan, but also for further financial and cooperation through increased troop levels, as well as military help, by way of various Special Forces assets to match our influx of Marines. The consequences of failure in Afghanistan are immense, as it was the base Al Qaeda used to launch the 9/11 attacks. Allowing the Taliban to reconstitute its control over more areas of Afghanistan is an intolerable situation, both to the United States and Europe. Europe has been the victim of terrorist attacks planned in the tribal areas that transcend the Afghan-Pakistan border, and is a much closer and accessible target of these extremists than is the United States. As such, Europe needs to recognize the necessity of increasing its levels of support to ensure an allied victory over the Taliban and its allies in Afghanistan, for its own safety and security.

Al Qaeda Leadership

During Operations Enduring Freedom and Anaconda many senior al Qaeda leaders were captured or killed, including Operations Chief Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Military Chief Mohammed Atef, and Senior Operations Facilitator Abu Zubaydah. Notably missing from this list were the most senior of the al Qaeda leadership, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, who, after escaping various American or allied strikes, remain free.

Bin Laden and al Zawahiri have shown a keen ability, as has the al Qaeda network as a whole, to change and adapt. When leaders are killed, new figures emerge from within the organization to fill the post. When strategies fail, new strategies are applied – as evidenced by the flurry of new media productions in the ever-expanding information war.

It is in this context that a new crop of al Qaeda leaders has emerged to fill the void left by the capture and killing of many in the so-called old-guard. Many of these individuals are, as former CIA Associate Director of Operations, Robert Richer, told the *New York Times*, “far more capable than the mujahideen who fought the Soviets ever were” due to the fact “they have been fighting the best military in the world, with the best technology and tactics” on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Much as the old-guard has largely been replaced by new leaders with changing approaches to the global jihad, the leadership of the new guard is also faced with frequent turnover. A list of these senior leaders that are in the crosshairs of U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere includes Abu Yahya al-Libi, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, Abu Obaidah al-Masri, and Khalid Habib. This testimony will provide a brief profile of each of these men, charting their ascent to positions of prominence and how it has impacted the changing war against al Qaeda – and thus, the changing tactics that we must employ in fighting it.

Abu Yahya al-Libi

Abu Yahya al Libi’s rise to prominence came following a July 2005 high-profile escape from the high-security U.S. prison at Bagram Air Base near Kabul, Afghanistan. Prior to his capture by Pakistani forces in the wake of 9/11, al Libi had long been committed to the jihad movement as a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG, elements of which have now been folded into al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; see below) – an al Qaeda connected organization dedicated to ousting the Qaddafi government. Al Libi’s older brother was also a crucial figure in the radical Islamist group.

Al Libi’s experience with the global jihad movement went far beyond LIFG, however. Like many Libyans in the movement, al Libi found his way to Afghanistan in the early 1990s, but was soon sent back to Africa to study Islam. After completing his studies, he returned to the Afghanistan, which had been taken over by the Taliban, and began attending training camps to impart extremist Islamic ideology upon the next generation of jihadis. As an Islamic scholar, it appears that al Libi’s military training was minimal.

Al Libi told the dramatic story of his imprisonment and subsequent escape in an As Sahab video release. Of his arrest after 9/11, he said:

Subsequently, the sweeping campaign of arrests began, targeting all Mujahideen residing in Pakistani soil, and not only the Mujahideen but also foreigners residing in Pakistan, including those legally studying in the religious schools and so on, and others. So during this oppressive, sweeping campaign, many of the Mujahid brothers were arrested, and we received our share of these arrests and I was arrested on May 28th, 2002, in the city of Karachi, at the hands of Pakistani intelligence and police but with the guidance and direction of American intelligence. And as your know, America has declared its all-out war on all Mujahideen, and not merely al Qaeda or Taliban. Its campaign was against all Jihadi movements in general and I was affiliated with a Jihadi group, the well-known Fighting Islamic Group [of Libya] and as part of this campaign, I was arrested and taken to one of the police stations in Pakistan, and after only six hours, I was handed over to the Americans, who were running a prison in Karachi. And that's how I was arrested.

He made claims that he and his fellow prisoners were subjected to torture and coercive measures in Karachi and later in Kabul and at Bagram Air Base. Of the Americans he encountered, he said:

The truth is, we found the American character, or the American soldier with whom we had long-term contact, to be a mix of doctrinal, behavioral, moral, and ideological deviation. I have not found a description more precise and fitting than His statement, Exalted be He: "And those who reject Allah enjoy [this world] and eat as cattle eat; and the Fire will be their abode."

Al Libi had only high regard for Taliban leaders he met in prison, illustrating the continued close relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban that is likely to persist should al Libi's position in al Qaeda continue to rise.

But I swear by Allah and testify for His sake that the brother Taliban whom we met in prison were among the best we have seen of Allah's worshippers – whether in terms of piety and fear of and devotion to Him or in terms of their disassociation from and rejection of the unbelievers and their methodologies or in terms of their loyalty to the believers, to the extent that they feel that they have been neglectful of your rights. He feels that what happened to you – and you're now together with him in prison – is his fault and that he didn't protect you sufficiently. So those Talib leaders whom we saw were of the highest standard and truly deserve to be leaders of the Ummah, and I don't say this out of exaggeration, [empty] praise, and excessive flattery which oversteps the bounds, but I say it as testimony for Allah's sake about which I will be questioned in His presence.

He later addressed the defeat al Qaeda was dealt in Afghanistan in 2001-02 and praised the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, saying:

Without a doubt – and this is something we must recognize – the Mujahideen have paid a price in the campaign which the US has waged against them. But this is not a shame or defect – we don't say that it is a shame or defect. We call ourselves Mujahideen, and they are those who raise the slogan of Jihad, and what is Jihad? Jihad is made up of exertion, difficulty, exhaustion, and hardship, and in this, they take pride and find prestige. So this campaign involved some of the heads and leaders of the Mujahideen and some of their role models and some who sacrificed themselves, and their time for the sake of championing Allah's religion. We mention as an example the Mujahid hero Khalid Shaykh Muhammad. The Ummah (Islamic nation) doesn't appreciate the importance of this man, nor the services which he rendered to Allah's religion. And how sorry we were that this brother fell into the hands of the Americans, but Allah – Exalted is He – wanted something and there's no doubt that what Allah chose for him and the Mujahideen will be better for them.

Another portion of his speech is lengthy, but is worth quoting because it foreshadowed the role al Libi has undertaken in al Qaeda: that of the doctrinaire who unflinchingly challenges the Sunni ulema (scholars) to support global jihad. When asked if he had a message for the ulma, al Libi stated:

I say to the Muslim Ulema: Muslim Ulema, what is you're waiting for? What is it that makes you refrain? I say this to some of the Muslim Ulema who have disowned the Mujahideen, repudiated their actions, and dedicated their pens, pulpits and mouths to slandering the Mujahideen. I say to them: don't you know that one day you shall stand in front of Allah? Don't you know that you shall be questioned about every word you say? Don't you know that you will be held accountable for each testimony you give – whether for unbelievers or against the Mujahideen? Don't you know that this world is short-lived and will pass and end, after which you will harvest the fruits of what you do today?

Muslim Ulema: who will awaken the Ummah from its coma? Who will arouse concern in this Ummah? Why do we always hear from the Mujahid scholars, "Go and perform Jihad; Jihad is obligatory in Iraq"? Why don't we ever hear a Mujahid scholar say, "Come to Jihad?" Why don't we hear them say, "Come on, come to us"? Why aren't there scholars in the arenas of Jihad? If Jihad is an individual obligation, is it obligatory on the youth only? What has exempted you? Your knowledge? What has excused you from this duty? Muslim Ulema: it is essential that you free yourselves from this painful reality. You must repudiate these puppet governments which terrorize and frighten you. I swear by Allah you shall never taste the sweetness of faith, nor the dignity of the believer, nor the glory and power of true belief and certainty in Allah until and unless you enter the arenas of Jihad and experience the Jihad firsthand instead of from a distance.

So we request the Muslim Ulema to stand beside their brothers and not confront them nor be a burden upon them, nor force the Mujahideen to sacrifice some of their energy and effort to respond to their misconceptions. We expect the Muslim Ulema to themselves be providers of fatwas, guidance, education and motivation. Regarding the duty of motivation, this great duty which Allah assigned to His Prophet, saying: "So fight in Allah's Cause – you are held responsible only for yourself and rouse the believers." (An-Nisa 84) if the righteous, sincere Ulema don't carry out this forgotten act of worship, who will? Who do we expect to say to the Mujahideen, "Go ahead"? Who do we expect to say to them, "Make sacrifices"? Who do we expect to say to them, "Slay the enemies of God"? Why do we always – or almost always – find many of the Ulema standing as an obstacle in the path of Jihad?

Is there a clearer and purer banner than the one that the Mujahideen have raised in this era, whether in Afghanistan or Iraq or Palestine or elsewhere? If the Mujahideen have made some mistakes, then that's because of your negligence and absence from their midst. They're making every effort for their actions to be in conformity with the tradition of the Prophet, peace be upon him, and mistakes befall them because they're human or because of their lack of knowledge due to your absence from the field. So if you refrain, it's not the duty of the Mujahideen to join you in refraining and abandon the fields of Jihad and let the enemies of God, kill, slaughter, violate honor, and demolish mosques, for us to say, "Leave the Jihad, the Jihad has brought nothing but corruption, destruction, and calamities upon the Ummah." The Jihad which has exposed these puppet governments which have raised the banner of total loyalty to the enemies of Allah, the Jews and Christians, were it not for this Jihad, they wouldn't have been exposed.

It was statements like this and his formal training as a scholar that allowed him to fill a position that had not formally existed before, that of al Qaeda's scholar. This was a role that neither bin Laden – an engineer by trade – or Zawahiri – a medical doctor – could always credibly fill. They issue their own fatwas and pen complex religious texts, but al Libi can be taken more seriously on Islamic doctrine by other scholars and learned Muslims due to his formal schooling.

This fact has proven to be of vital importance when examining al Qaeda's As-Sahab media releases since 2005. Al Libi has appeared in at least a dozen different video recordings put out by

the organization in the past year alone –more often than either bin Laden or al Zawahiri. At a time when the fight against al Qaeda is largely an information war, al Libi serves as the poster child the new, post-9/11 al Qaeda central. In many of these videos he has lashed out against ulema who do not support al Qaeda, groups insufficiently dedicated to the jihad, the Saudi government, and Shiites. Various reports indicate that al Libi, while possessing little to no tactical experience, is well-positioned to succeed Osama bin Laden in his roll as head of the global Jihad movement.

Mustafa al-Yazid

Mustafa al Yazid is by no means a new face amongst the al Qaeda leadership. Unlike many of the other emerging leaders who are in their 20s and 30s, al Yazid, now in his 50s, is a well-seasoned veteran who was methodically assigned to a post in Afghanistan in order to reassure al Qaeda insurgents of the war's turning tide.

Much like al Zawahiri, al Yazid, an Egyptian, got his start in the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Around this same time, or shortly before, al Yazid became acquainted with al Zawahiri. After serving time in prison, al Yazid was released and later made his way to Afghanistan, where he became a founding member of al Qaeda's Shura leadership council and a close confidant of Osama bin Laden.

Since that time, the senior leader has served in many capacities and locales for the al Qaeda organization. During the 1990s, al Yazid was financial manager for Osama bin Laden's business enterprises while the organization was in exile in Sudan. It also has been suggested that he may have been involved in arranging funding for the failed June 1995 assassination plot against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Later, al Yazid is said to have applied his business expertise to the 9/11 mission by supplying the mission's ringleader, Mohammad Atta, with the necessary funding. Due in part to this role, the September 11th Commission identified al-Yazid as al Qaeda's "chief financial manager" in its comprehensive report.

While there is evidence that al-Yazid initially opposed the strategy outlined for the 9/11 attacks, due mostly to a fear that a U.S.-led retaliation would negatively impact his close friend Mullah Omar's Taliban regime, it is clear that he has carried on as a loyal supporter of the organization's overall mission.

Al Yazid's most recent appointment as "General Leader" in Afghanistan is significant in two ways. First off, al-Yazid's close relationship with Taliban-leader, Mullah Omar, could help reassure locals that, unlike the case in Iraq under foreigner Abu Musab al Zarqawi, al Qaeda is focused on the interests of the locals in Afghanistan. In another regard, his appointment is important because it shows an overall confidence on the part of senior al Qaeda leadership that they are well on their way to winning out against the U.S. and NATO. In short, a well-entrenched and well-respected leader such as al Yazid can handle problems in Afghanistan while bin Laden and al Zawahiri can focus attention on the larger-scale global strategy. Additionally, the public manner in which al Yazid was appointed to his new role, via As-Sahab (al Qaeda's

media production house), could suggest that he has assumed the more prominent position as liaison to other militant groups in Uzbekistan and along the Afghan-Pakistani border.

Recently, al Yazid has emerged as a leader in charge of the Benazir Bhutto assassination plot late last year. According to various foreign news sources, al Yazid personally called reporters to claim responsibility for the attacks. In one call to Asia Times Online, al Yazid reportedly called Bhutto's killing the "first major victory against those...who have been siding with infidels...in a fight against al-Qaeda and declared a war against mujahideen." While these reports have not been verified by U.S. authorities, and the Pakistan Interior Ministry holds Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud responsible, it is clear that Mustafa al Yazid is as relevant as ever before.

Atiyah Abd al-Rahman

Like many Libyans who have assumed senior leadership positions in al Qaeda, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, like al Libi, is a veteran of the anti-Qaddafi LIGF and of the jihad against the Russians in Afghanistan. Born in Libya in 1968, al-Rahman is said to have first met bin Laden on the battlefields of Afghanistan in the years prior to the establishment of al Qaeda. After returning to Algeria for some time to fight in his homeland, al-Rahman came into conflict with the leadership of the Libyan Islamist movement and was kidnapped and detained. This experience led him to temporarily leave the movement once escaping from jail and the country.

However, al Rahman proved that he could not stay away from the movement for long, and a few years later made his way back to Afghanistan, bin Laden, and the al Qaeda organization as a whole. In short time after 9/11, and the killing or detainment of former leaders, al Rahman began to ascend up the al Qaeda ranks. It is at this point that he emerged as a senior operative and the organization's point person in Iran. He also had a great deal of interaction with AQI leader Abu Marzuq al Zaraqawi in the days and months prior to al Zaraqawi's death.

Intelligence reports state that, in his capacity as Iranian contact for al-Qaeda, al Rahman is in charge of forging ties between Iranian Islamist groups and the core leadership of the Sunni al Qaeda network. This work is vital to the mission of the Sunni organization, who sees as its first mission the ridding of infidels from Muslim lands and the destruction of Israel and so-called corrupt Muslim leaders. Only once this is achieved, the core adherents to the al Qaeda ideology believe that Sunnis should begin fighting the heretical Shias. As a point person in Shia Iran entrusted with bridging the gaps between Muslims against the common enemy, al-Rahman is a valuable asset for al Qaeda's leadership. His skill as a unifier, not to mention an explosives expert and Islamic scholar, separate him from the pack.

Al Rahman's adherence to the al Qaeda line is quite evident from his 2005 letter to Abu Musab al-Zaraqawi – the Jordanian fighter who, while operating under the al Qaeda name, was known to have had a rocky relationship with al Qaeda leadership due to his unwillingness not to attack Shiites in Iraq. In the letter, signed simply "Atiyah," al Rahman reprimanded the leader for alienating rival insurgent groups in Iraq, rather than bringing them into the fold, and for attacking

valuable Shiite partners. He sternly noted to Zarqawi that, if unwilling to fall in line, he could be replaced once a competent leader was found.

More recently, al Rahman has returned to his roots by negotiating a pact with Libyan Islamists – successors to those that kidnapped and detained him – to fall under the al Qaeda umbrella.

Abu Obaidah al-Masri

Little is known about the identity of Abu Obaidah al Masri, the shadowy Egyptian who is said to be amongst al Qaeda's inner-most circle. With an assumed name meaning only "Egyptian father of Obaidah," all that is known about al-Masri is that he is in his mid-to-late 40s and a veteran of the wars in Afghanistan. Al Masri allegedly rose dramatically into al Qaeda senior leadership following the death of fellow Egyptian, Abu Hamza Rabia.

He has served as a field commander in the Afghan province of Kunar and may have traveled to Saudi Arabia to help organize an al Qaeda affiliate there. Prior to this, al Masri is said to have fought in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Chechnya, where he lost two fingers in the fight. It appears that he later found his way to both Germany and Britain before returning in 2000 to Kabul, Afghanistan to teach aspiring jihadists at a terrorist training camp.

There is evidence to suggest that, at present, al Masri serves as operations chief for al Qaeda. He is said to be connected to the 2005 London transit bombing cell as well as the failed transatlantic airliner plot in the United Kingdom in 2006. Those found to be in charge of plotting the latter attack, which called for detonating liquid explosives in the false bottoms of containers while the plane was airborne – were said to have reported to al Masri.

Numerous attempts have been made to neutralize the threat posed by al Masri; up until now, all appear to have been unsuccessful. In two such attempts, one on January 13, 2006 and the other on October 30th of the same year, al-Masri displayed his ability to avoid the fate of those assuming his position before him. His current status cannot be officially confirmed, and it is unknown for certain whether he is dead or alive.

The fate of al Masri tells a great deal about the workings of today's al Qaeda network – regardless of where the truth lies. If he is, in fact, alive, al-Masri is living proof of the resilience of the al Qaeda network: an adept and competent individual who rose from a mid-level leadership position to fill the void left by those before him and who is dedicated to widening the war against the West. If he has perished in allied attacks, then by now, yet another shadowy figure has almost certainly risen to fill the void.

Khalid Habib

Khalid Habib, another member of the al Qaeda leadership's new guard, shares a great deal in common with Abu Obaidah al-Masri, including the fact that little is known about his personal life, nor his current status. What is known about Habib, who is also known by the alias Khalid al

Harbi, is that he first emerged into the public spotlight in a November 2005 videotape entitled "Defeating the Cross," in which Habib was named commander of southeast Afghanistan alongside Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, who was given the reigns over the country's southwest region. The two were said to have worked closely together in crafting the resurgent al Qaeda insurgency in Afghanistan prior to al-Iraqi's capture and subsequent transfer to the Guantanamo Bay detention camp – where he remains to this day.

Of unknown origin – possibly either Egyptian or Moroccan – Habib is said to be quite competent and experienced in insurgency; so much so, in fact, that CBS News reported last year that he has "replaced Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the operations leader of al Qaeda." The news report went on to quote a top FBI official who deemed Habib "one of the five or six most capable, most experienced terrorists in the world."

Like al-Masri, Habib's current status is unknown. While first reports showed that Habib was killed in the same January attack in Pakistan as al-Masri, later evidence suggested otherwise.

Al Qaeda in Iraq and Developing al Qaeda Affiliates

AQI has become the most powerful al Qaeda affiliate group aside from, perhaps, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It has also been designated by al Qaeda leadership as a vehicle for the development of other al Qaeda affiliates in Jordan, Lebanon (where two al Qaeda affiliates have existed under the radar for some time), and the Palestinian Territories. Thus, it is important to be familiar with the rise of AQI and its goals – both short and long-term – in the greater Middle East.

Before the ongoing threat of AQI is examined it is important to address the effect of the invasion of Iraq on al Qaeda and its motives, as this matter is often misunderstood. The invasion of Iraq and the ensuing occupation has benefited al Qaeda in several ways, providing the group with a windfall in propaganda, recruits, and funding. Al Qaeda has been given the opportunity to direct attacks against American military personnel – attacks that they have infamously video taped and publicized. Through such acts, al Qaeda's prestige has risen somewhat, as they could portray themselves as heroically defending Muslim lands rather than launching offensive raids in non-Muslim lands (9/11). This affect has been countered in part, although not totally, by al Qaeda's incessant targeting of Iraqi civilians, both Sunni and Shiite, which has opened the door towards active collaboration between U.S. forces and former Sunni insurgent groups, weary of al Qaeda's tactics.

In light of such efforts, a precipitous withdrawal of American troops would serve to strengthen the narrative promoted by al Qaeda that the United States is a paper tiger that need not be feared. Such a withdrawal would be counterproductive if not disastrous as it would undoubtedly lead to more al Qaeda attacks and insurgencies against the United States and her allies in the region and beyond, such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Israel and possibly Egypt. Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and other al Qaeda leaders have made this abundantly clear in many of their recent speeches. Al Qaeda recently released a strategy memo detailing how the resources of AQI will be directed toward Israel and the Palestinian territories upon American withdrawal.

To be sure, al Qaeda would be actively targeting the U.S. whether we invaded Iraq or not. The invasion of Iraq had no impact on the ideology and motivations of al Qaeda. While al Qaeda figures and publications often cite "grievances" over our military actions, their ideology is not dependent on it. In the eyes of al Qaeda, our most unforgivable crime is that we support un-Islamic systems of government at home, abroad, and especially in the Muslim world. This is a direct transgression against God because, according to their ideology, sovereignty in governance can belong only to God. Thus, any system of government anywhere in the world that recognizes the sovereignty of the people, such as a democratic republic, directly contravenes the will of God and must be fought until it is destroyed. To suggest that al Qaeda would be satiated by an American withdrawal from Iraq and adjustments to our foreign policy would be counterfactual. A precipitous American withdrawal from Iraq would only serve to strengthen al Qaeda further. Osama bin Laden has cited past American withdrawals from Somalia and Lebanon as proof of the fragility of American power.

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)

Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the founder and late-leader of AQI, fled his Herat, Afghanistan-based training camp to escape the invading forces led by the U.S. in 2001. He had operated his training camp independently of Osama bin Laden, with whom he did not always have a cordial relationship. Al Zarqawi and his followers made it across Iran and regrouped in the camps of Ansar al Islam, a Kurdish terrorist group, in northern Iraq. Al Zarqawi began rebuilding his own group, which became dedicated to driving out the American occupation after the invasion in 2003 and replacing the Iraqi regime with an Islamic government. His group eventually became AQI, drawing upon resources and recruits from Ansar al Islam. It took more than a year after the invasion of Iraq for al Zarqawi to pledge his loyalty to Osama bin Laden, but he still remained fairly autonomous, drawing criticism for his alienation of Sunni tribes and indiscriminate killing of Shiites from Ayman al Zawahiri and other al Qaeda leaders. Al Zarqawi built an effective terrorist network, drawing recruits from Europe, North Africa, and the Gulf Arab states, many of whom infiltrated into Iraq from Syria. In 2005, AQI turned its attention outside of Iraq, dispatching a cell to bomb hotels in Amman, Jordan. The attacks provoked a widespread backlash in Jordan against AQI and al Qaeda as the attacks killed 60 Arab Muslims, including guests at a Palestinian wedding. While AQI is likely to be more discriminating in its targets in the future, this attack indicated that AQI did not intend on limiting its operations to the Iraqi theater.

In January 2006, the Mujahideen Shura Council was founded as an umbrella organization led by al Qaeda for Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq. Al-Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. air strike in June 2006, but the organization survived, strengthening its ties with al Qaeda's central leadership and cultivating leaders more in line with their strategy rather than the maverick tactics of al Zarqawi. In October 2006, the Mujahideen Shura Council was replaced by the Islamic State of Iraq. AQI has largely been defeated by U.S. forces and U.S.-sponsored Sunni tribal militias in the western al Anbar Province, which was formerly the stronghold of the group. Still, AQI remains a viable force in Iraq and is looked to by senior al Qaeda leadership as a vehicle to establish other al Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East. Just months before his death, al Zarqawi stated, "In Iraq we are very close to al-Aqsa Mosque of the Messenger of Allah, so we fight in Iraq and our eyes are on Jerusalem, which can only be restored by the guiding Quran and the sword of victory."³

In 2007, both Ayman al Zawahiri and the (possibly fictional) leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, Abu Omar al Baghdadi, both claimed AQI would serve as a base for jihad throughout the Middle East.

Al Qaeda in Palestine

"Then He will help them (Allah Willing) to be the point of departure towards the blessed Aqsa Masjid, so the Mujahideen from outside Palestine will meet their brothers inside it iterate another Hitteen battle (Allah Willing), then the Muslims will be victorious."⁴

³ Abu Musab al Zarqawi, "A Message to the People," April 25, 2006.

⁴ Osama bin Laden, "The Way to Rescue Palestine," March 21, 2008.

Osama bin Laden recently released this call for the liberation of Palestine. This is one of a series of public statements that indicate a growing interest on behalf of al Qaeda to launch operations in Palestine. Al Zawahiri has focused on Palestinian issues in many of his recent speeches, criticizing Hamas for taking part in a nominally democratic system of government and condemning Fatah for supporting a two-state solution.

Earlier this year, al Qaeda released a strategy memo entitled, "The Timing of the Entrance of al-Qaeda Organization in the Palestinian Territories." The memo laid out a three-year plan that began last year to establish an al Qaeda presence in the Palestinian Territories. Of this new affiliate organization, the memo stated that "attacks against the Jews will not be limited to occupied Palestine but will continue to reach all the areas in which Jews have a strong influence." As the al Qaeda narrative insists that Jews have inordinate influence throughout the Western world, it is reasonable to state that Jewish individuals and institutions in the United States are possible targets.

In February 2008, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas said, "I can say without doubt that al-Qaeda is present in the Palestinian territories and that this presence, especially in Gaza, is facilitated by Hamas."⁵ His comments seemed to be supported by Israeli officials who have long said that al Qaeda was in Gaza and more members had entered the territory when Hamas blew up the security wall on its border with Egypt. In January, a group called the Army of Believers, al Qaeda in Palestine Organization, attacked the private American International School.

Al Qaeda in Lebanon: Fatah al-Islam and Asbat al-Ansar

May 2007 witnessed the emergence in the public consciousness of an al Qaeda affiliate in Lebanon which had been in existence for several years. Originating from several of the Palestinian refugee camps where Sunni extremists can more easily blend in with the local population, the presence of al Qaeda linked groups in Lebanon should come as no surprise.

Fatah al-Islam

Based in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al Bard near the Lebanese city Tripoli, Fatah al-Islam (The Conquest of Islam) was formed in November of 2006, and designated by the State Department as a terrorist group in August 2007. Several months earlier, in May of 2007, Lebanese government forces had fought a pitched battle with Fatah al-Islam members in Nahr al Bard, which ended with the shelling of the refugee camp by the Lebanese army, in which as many as 39 Fatah terrorists were killed.

Fatah al-Islam's leader, Shaker al Abssi, a Palestinian from Jericho. Al Abssi was arrested by the Syrians in 2000, but later released in subsequently went to Iraq to fight alongside al Qaeda members, where his ties with the group are alleged to have strengthened. The Jordanians had sentenced him in absentia in 2004 for his role in the assassination of Laurence Foley. The Lebanese government claims that Al Abssi was killed by government forces in September 2007.

⁵ James Hider, "Al-Qaeda 'in Gaza with Hamas help,'" The Times, February 28, 2008.

In September 2007, the head of Lebanese Army intelligence, Brigadier General George Khoury, asserted:

All the investigations have confirmed that the Fatah al-Islam organization is linked to Al-Qaeda and is in continuous link and contact with it. This connection to Al-Qaeda was revealed through all the investigations that were carried out with captured elements, communications that occurred between Al-Qaeda cells outside Lebanon and confessions of captured individuals.⁶

Al Mustaqbal, a Lebanese newspaper reported on March 26, 2008 that a man named Ahmad Mar'i, who was arrested with nine forged identity cards, confessed to being the liaison between al Absi, Syrian intelligence, and al Qaeda. Mar'i admitted to performing services for al Qaeda leader Atiyah Abd al Rahman, profiled earlier in this testimony.⁷

Asbat al-Ansar

A lesser known, but older and more active group, Asbat al-Ansar, had led a campaign of terror in Lebanon since the mid-90's. The head of Asbat al-Ansar (League of Followers), Abu Sharif, has claimed that several of his followers had died fighting U.S. forces in Iraq, once threatened the U.S. directly from his then-base in the notoriously radical Palestinian Ain al-Hilwe refuge camp. The U.S. has long known that this group has been associated with al Qaeda.

⁶ Rim Ghazal, "Murr warns fresh political crisis could mar army's victory," Daily Star (Lebanon), September 5, 2007.

⁷ Al-Mustaqbal website, Beirut, in Arabic March 26, 2008, from BBC Monitoring Service, April 4, 2008

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

AQIM has a long pedigree in the global jihadist movement. It began with the outbreak of civil war in Algeria in 1992. National elections were set to take place, but when the Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won a landslide victory in the first round of elections, the Algerian military intervened and cancelled the second round. Violence erupted and Algeria fell victim to a brutal civil war, with massacres on both sides of the conflict. FIS leaders who rejected peaceful settlement found the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) shortly after the civil war began. Algerians who had fought the Soviets in Afghanistan joined the GIA, and attacks were launched against civilians, civil servants, and European expatriates. The GIA quickly established a logistical support network in Italy, France, Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in Europe that funneled supplies, money, forged documents, and weapons to their terrorist brethren. In 1994, GIA operatives hijacked an Air France flight from Algiers to Paris, killing three passengers before French antiterrorism police secured the plane. The next summer and fall brought GIA bombings to the streets of France. Larger attacks were planned, but failed, such as a plot to bomb a Christmas market in Strasbourg.

In 1997, the Algerian public, tired of brutal massacres against civilians, turned against the GIA. Other terrorist organizations around the Middle East also condemned the GIA. Hassan Hattab, a GIA commander who had left the organization the year before, stepped into the vacuum and founded the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in 1998. A captured GSPC operative claimed that he had witnessed telephone conversations between Hattab and Osama bin Laden during which the Saudi terrorist leader encouraged his Algerian brother to establish GSPC and even suggested the name. The GSPC inherited the vast logistical support networks of the GIA which spanned across the Europe and even to Canada.

While GSPC has targeted U.S. interests abroad, it is also one of the few al Qaeda affiliates that have attempted to launch attacks on the U.S. homeland. Rachid Boukhalfa, aka Abu Doha, was a high level GSPC operative until he was imprisoned in the United Kingdom. Abu Doha directed the operation that became known as the millennium bombing plot that targeted the Los Angeles International Airport (see insert below).

After the establishment of AQI, GSPC arranged to funnel newly trained recruits from North Africa to Iraq where they would fight or serve as fodder for suicide attacks.

In November 2005, the Moroccan security services revealed messages between an al Qaeda liaison in Europe and North African terrorists. One of the messages spoke of GSPC plans to pledge loyalty to al Qaeda, which had already happened in 2003, and alluded to plans to eventually unite all of the terrorist groups in North Africa under the umbrella of a group to be called al Qaeda in the Arab Maghreb Countries. This goal was officially realized in January of 2007, but Ayman al Zawahiri had sanctioned the merger months before in a videotape released on the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. While AQIM is spearheaded by GSPC veterans, it is also composed of remnants of the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group, the Tunisian Combatant Group, and the LIFG.

The Millennium Bombing Plot

Abu Doha supervised the millennium plot, managing the cell after having met Ahmed Ressay, the individual arrested at the Canadian/U.S. border, at an Al Qaeda training camp in Khalden, Afghanistan – a camp Doha founded with direct permission from Osama Bin Laden. Doha left Afghanistan and headed to the United Kingdom, settling in London, where he was arrested in 2001 in connection with a plot in Strasbourg, which was to bomb a Christmas market, after which Doha had planned to flee to Saudi Arabia.

British authorities searched Doha's home and found documents on bomb making materials and counterfeit identity documents. Doha had been facilitating the training and movement of Algerian jihadists to Afghanistan for placement in terrorist cells in Europe and Canada. Ahmed Ressay, while training at Doha's camp in Afghanistan, plotted along with other Algerians to rob Canadian banks to finance an American terrorist attack.

By 1998, Ressay, Doha and others had begun planning a bombing operation in the United States, set to target LAX. Abu Doha told Ressay that he would finance the operation and facilitate Ressay's return to Algeria after the attack. By September 1998, Ressay had left Khalden and moved on to another camp in Toronto, Afghanistan to complete his training. There, Ressay spent a month and a half learning how to manufacture and assemble explosives.

By February 1999, Ressay has returned to Canada, via Pakistan, and, ironically, Los Angeles. Ressay then settled – illegally, after having been denied asylum – in Montreal. By the summer of 1999, Ressay has begun the final preparations for his targeting LAX. According to Ressay, in September of 1999, he “started buying electronic equipment and electronic components, small electronic components that will be used in putting together electronic circuits” and then in November in Vancouver he “started collecting chemical materials [to concoct] an explosive substance similar to TNT.”⁸

In November 1999, Ressay and Abu Doha spoke by the telephone, Doha reconfirming his earlier pledges to pay for the plot and facilitate Ressay's escape back to Algeria.

On December 14, 1999, Ressay, in a rental car packed with explosives, was detained by customs officers at the Port Angeles, Washington border facility.

He drove a rental car packed with their explosives onto a car ferry that traveled from Vancouver to Victoria and then on to Port Angeles in Washington state. Once inside the United States, the plan was to take a train to Los Angeles, scope out LAX, and carry out the operation. He hoped to then return to Montreal and escape to Europe and eventually Algeria.

Source: Steven Emerson, *Jihad Incorporated* (Prometheus Books, 2006).

Since the official establishment of AQIM, the group has plotted many attacks, but thus far has only met limited success outside of Algeria. The largest of these attacks was a December 2007 suicide attack on the offices of the United Nations in Algiers, which killed 41 people. Most recently, the group claimed responsibility for kidnapping two Austrian tourists on March 10 in the Tunisian desert. The victims are likely being held in Mali. AQIM demanded the release of 10 terrorists held in Tunisia and Algeria and five million euros in ransom for their return. The group then changed their demands, asking for the release of a Muslim couple held in Austria and an end to Austria's participation in the occupation of Afghanistan, which consists of a presence of four Austrian military officers. They extended the deadline for their release to last Sunday.

⁸ *USA v. Mokhtar Haouri*, S4 00-CR-17. “Trial Transcript.” P. 576 (SD NY July 3, 2001).

When their demands were not met and the deadline expired, the group released a statement on the Internet that said, "We have done all we can but it seems that Austria is not serious about preserving the lives of its citizens and it is now ... alone responsible for the lives and the unknown fate of the kidnapped."⁹

AQIM has kept up a steady tempo of attacks. In February 2008, AQIM claimed responsibility for an ambush on eight Algerian paramilitary police. On Christmas Eve 2007, four French tourists were killed in Mauritania by men who had trained in AQIM camps.¹⁰ In January, a vehicle bomb was driven into a police station in eastern Algeria, killing four people.¹¹

AQIM's European Infrastructure

As mentioned earlier, North African terrorist networks have been operating in Europe since the early 1990s. These networks are highly durable and provide logistical support, forged documents, weapons, funds and other resources. These networks could potentially become operational and launch attacks throughout Europe. AQIM has often criticized France and other European countries and expressed intentions to launch future attacks in Europe.

⁹ "Austria responsible for hostages' 'fate' – Qaeda," *Reuters*, April 7, 2008.

¹⁰ Lydia Polgreen, "Shooters Are Sought in Israeli Embassy Attack in Mauritania," *New York Times*, February 2, 2008.

¹¹ "Al-Qaeda Maghreb group claims Algeria bombing," *Agence France Presse*, January 30, 2008.

Europe: The Main Battleground in the West

Europe has been and remains the main front in the West in the global struggle against al Qaeda, its affiliates and Islamic militancy. Al Qaeda and its affiliate groups have been launching attacks in Europe since the early 1990s. In the past year, several plots linked to al Qaeda have been discovered and dismantled. Several more with no direct links to al Qaeda have also been revealed.

As stated earlier, after the al Qaeda hierarchy was mostly destroyed in Afghanistan in 2001-2002, al Qaeda was forced to devolve from a group with a physical command-and-control structure into an ideological presence, outsourcing operational autonomy outward to various affiliate groups and to other willing parties. Al Qaeda's ideology spread like wildfire across the globe and its cause was adopted by extremists around the world, including those in the West. Since then, there have been a number of plots, some successful, by militant Islamists with no connection whatsoever to al Qaeda. The most famous network of this sort was the Hofstad group in the Netherlands. On the other side of the spectrum, there are an increasing number of operatives that have been dispatched by al Qaeda and her tribal allies in FATA to Europe to carry out attacks. Networks found somewhere in the middle of the spectrum have been responsible for most plots in Europe since 9/11. The cell that carried out the London transit bombings in July 2005 is a perfect example.

The London Transit Cell: Connections to al Qaeda

In a series of four coordinated suicide bombings, 56 people were killed and over 700 were injured. The bombers were Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Hasib Mir Hussain, and Germaine Lindsay. All of the bombers were Britons of Pakistani descent who had been born and raised in the United Kingdom, with the exception of Lindsay, a Jamaican by birth who had moved to England. As shown below, there was extensive al Qaeda involvement in their training and possibly in the planning of the actual attack, but Khan, Tanweer, Hussain, and Lindsay all radicalized autonomously and sought out al Qaeda and affiliated groups for assistance on their own accord.

All four of the bombers traveled to Pakistan – some more than once – where they made contact with terrorist organizations linked to al Qaeda (Lashkar e Taiba, Jaish e Mohammed, and Harakat ul-Mujahideen). Hussain spent time in Pakistan in mid-2004. Khan and Tanweer traveled to Pakistan individually and later spend three months there from late 2004 to early 2005. During Lindsay's trip to Pakistan, he may have crossed the border into Afghanistan. All four of the cell members claimed they lost their passports upon their return home, in order to keep their travel patterns hidden from authorities. Pakistani security officials claimed Khan and Tanweer attended an al Qaeda training camp. There, they were likely instructed in explosives by Abu Hamza Rabia, a prominent al Qaeda leader killed months after the London transit attack, and Abu Ubaida al Masri, the infamous current Al Qaeda external operations chief profiled earlier in this testimony. Authorities know Tanweer maintained contact with a stolen cellular phone in Pakistan up until three days prior to the transit bombings.

The main issue of concern regarding the Pakistan trips is the men with whom the 7/7 terrorists met and the organizations with whom those men are associated. Khan and Tanweer met with someone tied with al Qaeda in a hotel in Karachi at which the two stayed for a week upon their arrival in Pakistan. After leaving the hotel, they traveled to Lahore where Tanweer attended a madrassa that has been identified as having ties with militants. Pakistani authorities have claimed that Tanweer was in touch with terrorists from Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-i-Mohammed, two terrorist groups affiliated with al Qaeda that chiefly strive for Kashmiri independence. It is also believed that Khan and Tanweer may have attended a training camp in Pakistan or Afghanistan during this trip where they were received instruction on explosives.

While Khan was in Pakistan, he met with Muhammed Junaid Babar, who pled guilty in the U.S. in 2004 to providing material support to al Qaeda. He has also admitted to setting up terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and aiding in a failed plot to bomb British pubs, train stations and restaurants in 2004. Babar was a main player in the Al-Muhajiroun terrorist group's cell in Queens, New York.

Al Muhajiroun was founded and led by Omar Bakri Muhammed in London in the mid 1990s and its leadership has repeatedly expressed solidarity with bin Laden. Omar Bakri Muhammed has even claimed to represent bin Laden on occasion. His organization has repeatedly referred to the 9/11 hijackers as "the Magnificent 19" and has insisted that the U.S. is a legitimate target for Muslims to attack with any weapons that may be available.

Khan and Tanweer also met with a Briton named Zeeshan Siddiqui in Pakistan. Zeeshan Siddiqui, who was arrested in May 2005 in Peshwar, Pakistan, is also a friend of Mohammed Junaid Babar. They spent two and a half months together in Lahore. Interestingly, Siddiqui's close friend in college in West London was Asif Hanif, a suicide bomber associated with Al-Muhajiroun who carried out the bombing in a Tel Aviv pub, Mike's Place, in 2003. Authorities found numbers of known al Qaeda terrorists and Islamists on Siddiqui's phone, many implicated in an August 2004 bombing plot in London. His diary also displayed knowledge of a nonspecific operation called "wagon" that may have been the 2005 London attacks, which some have speculated were scheduled for the spring, but postponed until July. This theory meshes with information garnered from Abu Faraj al Libbi, a Libyan who was captured in May 2005 in Pakistan and has been alleged to have been the third-in-command of the al Qaeda network. Authorities have claimed that al Libbi directed al Qaeda cells in London. During interrogation, he revealed knowledge of a plot to attack London's transportation system that was to take place in May 2005, but it was cancelled or postponed.

Another figure of interest in the 7/7 plot is Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan, a Pakistani in his mid-20s who has admitted to administering al Qaeda communication networks and websites. Noor Khan admitted to his Pakistani interrogators that he spent 25 days training at a terrorist camp in Afghanistan in June 1998. He was also in contact with the brother of the Jemaah Islamiyah figure, Riduan Isamuddin, AKA Hambali. Information obtained from his computer files and his interrogation were instrumental in the investigation and apprehension of the eight men implicated in the August 2004 London bomb plot-- the same men whose phone numbers were found with Zeeshan Siddique.

Consequences of al Qaeda Sanctuary in FATA for Europe

It seems that there are two main consequences of an al Qaeda sanctuary in FATA. The first is, tribal and Taliban militia leaders have taken to threatening Europeans in Afghanistan and in Europe itself. This demonstrates a global character to the motivations of groups that before were exclusively concerned with regional issues. The second consequence is a marked increase in Pakistani ties to terrorist plots in Europe, most famously demonstrated by the London transit cell as explained above. Recent plots in Europe have fit two patterns that both exploit the heavy presence of ethnic Pakistanis in Europe – especially in the U.K. where as of 2001, the population numbered 750,000. The first pattern is characterized by Pakistanis with no direct ties to Europe, increasingly being dispatched to the Continent by al Qaeda and tribal allies for the express purpose of carrying out attacks. Speaking of such plots, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted on a recent trip to Europe:

Many who have been arrested have had direct connections to al Qaeda. Some have met with top leaders or attended training camps abroad. Some are connected to al Qaeda in Iraq. In the most recent case, the Barcelona cell appears to have ties to a terrorist training network run by Baitullah Mehsud, a Pakistan-based extremist commander affiliated with the Taliban and al Qaeda – who we believe was responsible for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.¹²

In June 2007, a video of an al Qaeda/Taliban terrorist graduation ceremony was released on the Internet. It showed Taliban leader Mansoor Dadullah introducing teams that claimed to be from America, the UK, Canada and Germany. According to Dadullah, all had come to Pakistan to seek out terrorist training. Some analysts dismissed the video as propaganda, but others, such as Richard Clarke, believe we should not be so quick to dismiss it. The cases examined in this testimony clearly show that al Qaeda and the Taliban are training European Muslims and sending them back to Europe to execute attacks. It is possible that some of the men involved in these plots were members of this graduating class of terrorists.

Barcelona Plot

Recent arrests in Spain speak to a plot that fit the first pattern. In January, 14 men were arrested by Spanish authorities in Barcelona, 12 of whom were Pakistani. They were in possession of bomb making equipment and were part of a network allegedly planning attacks in Spain, France, Germany and Portugal. Six of the cell members were designated as suicide bombers – three of whom had arrived in Spain from Pakistan within four months prior to the arrests. One of the plotters reportedly told an informant, “If we attack the metro [in Barcelona], the emergency services can’t get there. Our preference is public transport, especially the metro.” Baitullah Mehsud, the Waziri Taliban leader addressed earlier in this testimony, was responsible for the operation. The informant claimed the cell leader told him, “Only the leadership of the organization knows what requests the emir [Mehsud] will make after the first attack, but if they are not carried out, there will be a second attack in Spain, and a third. And then in Germany, France, Portugal and the United Kingdom. There are many people prepared there.” Baltasar Garzon, the senior Spanish anti-terrorism magistrate, said of the cell, “That these people were

¹² Jim Garamone, “Gates Connects NATO Afghanistan Effort With Terror Threat in Europe,” American Forces Press Service, February 10, 2008, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=48917&reason=0>

ready to go into action as terrorists in Spain - that came as a surprise. In my opinion, the jihadi threat from Pakistan is the biggest emerging threat we are facing in Europe. Pakistan is an ideological and training hotbed for jihadists and they are being exported here.” When considering the impact of foreign policy on terrorist groups like al Qaeda, this case is significant. Spain famously pulled its military out of Iraq in the wake of the 2003 Madrid attacks, which shuttled a new government into power. However, this has not diminished the desire of Islamist terrorist organizations to strike at Spain.

German plot

The second pattern is characterized by Muslims from Europe – whether they be converts or Muslims by birth – who seek out training in Pakistan, as the 7/7 cell did. Another example of such a cell is that which allegedly targeted Ramstein Air Base and the Frankfurt International Airport last fall. Other targets may have included bars and nightclubs frequented by Americans. Two German converts, Fritz Gelowicz and Daniel Schneider, and a Turkish resident of Germany, Adem Yilmaz – had been making explosives in a small town north of Frankfurt when German authorities raided their home and arrested them. They had enough explosives to make bombs bigger than those used in the London transit bombings and the 2003 attack in Madrid. The three had been trained in an al-Qaeda-affiliated camp in Pakistan by the Islamic Jihad Union, a splinter group of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and had attended schools in Syria and elsewhere.

Authorities have said that the radicalization of Gelowicz and others in the German cell traces back to a fundamentalist mosque in a poor suburb outside of Stuttgart. It is there that an Egyptian imam, Yehia Yousif, preached his vitriolic brand of Islam to a congregation of Turks, Arabs, and various German converts. It is thought that Gelowicz was eased into the extremist movement by friend, and German resident of Turkish descent, Tolga Duerbin. As has been feared for some time with Germany’s large Turkish population, Duerbin’s radicalization appears representative of the growing threat posed by radicalized Turks to the security of Western Europe – especially when taking into account Turkey’s natural geographic and ethnic connections to neighboring countries along the path to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Yet another member of the same cell, an ethnic Turk named Cueneyt Ciftci, became Germany’s first suicide bomber on March 17, 2008, killing two American soldiers in Afghanistan.

Adem Yilmaz was believed to have been a ringleader of the cell along with Gelowicz. Authorities believe Yilmaz had organized a recruiting network that funneled young extremists to the Pakistan-Afghan border for terrorist training. It was along this route that he sent Ciftci. Ciftci was born in Freising, Bavaria to a Turkish family that came to Germany in the 1960s. He never made an effort to become a German citizen. When he moved with his family to Nuremberg, Ciftci became increasingly religious and began attending a mosque that had already attracted the attention of the German authorities. He married and had two children with his wife. In April 2007, he quit his job and left the country with the help of Yilmaz.

The investigation into this cell began in November 2006 when the CIA was trying to find information on a man they knew only as “Muaz” who had lived in Germany and had been

involved in training camps for the Islamic Jihad Union. The Agency believed that Muaz was involved in a plot to attack the Hanau U.S. Army base in Germany. They traced Muaz's e-mails to an Internet café in Germany at the same time another Turkish-German named Attila Selek, a friend of Gelowicz's, was online. It has been alleged that Selek and Gelowicz traveled to the army base and drove around it very slowly. Selek insists he is innocent.

Danish plot

On September 4, 2007, Danish Security Intelligence Service (PET) agents, along with armed police, arrested eight individuals suspected of planning a terror attack. In coordinated actions, eleven different locations were raided throughout the greater Copenhagen area. The detained men were described as "militant Islamists with international connections involving direct relations to Al Qaeda."¹³ The eight suspects were between 19 and 29 years old, and of Pakistani, Afghani, Somali, and Turkish origin. One of the Pakistani-born suspects underwent terrorist training in Pakistan. Six of the eight suspects held Danish citizenship, while the other two held Danish residence permits. Six suspects were immediately released after questioning, while two suspects, both of Pakistani origin were remanded to custody for twenty-seven days. All of the suspects had been under surveillance for an extended period of time and according to the Danish police, investigators had liaised with security services in other countries. The suspects were arraigned on charges of planning a terrorist attack and accused of storing and manufacturing unstable explosives "in a densely built-up residential area of Copenhagen."¹⁴ Information about the possible targets and information on the suspects has been withheld due to the ongoing nature of the investigation, however, it has been speculated that the target was the Nørreport train station, Denmark's busiest that serves 300,000 people daily. After the arrests, Matas, Denmark's largest drug store chain, also announced that it was cooperating the PET, keeping tabs on the sale of certain chemicals and substances that could be used to make bombs for terrorist attacks.

In August 2006, twenty-five suspected Islamic radicals, all homegrown British Muslims, mostly London-based and mostly of Pakistani descent, were arrested by the London Metropolitan Police and Scotland Yard after a series of nighttime raids. The plotters were accused of planning to carry liquid explosives aboard several North American-bound aircrafts from Heathrow airport, and then detonate the bombs while the planes were above U.S. and Canadian cities. In the raids, British authorities uncovered bomb making materials and martyrdom videos. Several arrests were also made in Pakistan.

Eight of the alleged cell members are on trial in London as of the writing of this testimony. Prosecutors played for the jury the martyrdom video of alleged cell leader Ahmed Abudllah Ali, which invoked al Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden. Ali stated that the attack would be payback for the West's failure to heed Bin Laden's warnings to leave Muslim lands. Cell members had purchased an apartment in Northeast London and transformed it into a bomb making factory. The plan was to smuggle hydrogen peroxide and other chemicals onto the planes in soft drink bottles and transform the bottles into bombs once on board the aircrafts. All of the flights were

¹³ "Statement concerning terror-related arrests on 4 September 2007," *Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (PET) Danish Security and Intelligence Service*. September 4, 2007. <http://www.pet.dk/Nyheder/Pressconf.aspx>

¹⁴ Ibid.

scheduled to take off within 2 ½ hours of each other, and the terrorists were planning to blow up the planes simultaneously. Several of the alleged cell members are said to have trained in Pakistan with Abu Ubaida al Masri, the al Qaeda leader mentioned above in the context of the 7/7 bombings.

It is clear that there is increasingly a Pakistani nexus in al Qaeda's efforts in Europe that are defined, and enhanced, by their sanctuary in FATA.

The Other Side of the Spectrum: The Hofstad Group

The Hofstad group is an example of an autonomous homegrown terrorist network. It was composed of young Muslims with no connections to terrorist organizations abroad. They radicalized in the Netherlands and sought to launch attacks against what they saw as an infidel system. The group began when a number of young men began meeting at a phone center in Schiedam, a suburb of Amsterdam, to discuss their views on Islam, world events, and the Netherlands. Two of the young men, Nouredine El-Fatmi and Mohammed Bouyeri invited everyone to their apartment and the meetings moved there. By the winter of 2002, these meetings had attracted the attention of Dutch authorities. In these meetings, the young men watch videos of terrorists and insurgents in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan and Chechnya. They cheered when non-Muslims were killed. Satellite meetings were held elsewhere in Amsterdam. By the summer of 2003, a core of fifteen to twenty members was established. *Submission*, the film directed by Theo van Gogh and written by Ayaan Hirsi Ali, enraged the Hofstad members.

In November of 2004, Bouyeri, shot filmmaker Theo van Gogh to death and, after unsuccessfully trying to decapitate him, pinned a letter to the victim's chest with a knife. The letter read:

Islam will conquer by the blood of martyrs. It will spread its light to every corner of this Earth and it will, if necessary, drive evil to its dark hole by the sword.
This unleashed battle is different from previous battles. The unbelieving fundamentalists have started it and Insh Allah, the true believers will end it.¹⁵

Days later, when authorities attempted to arrest some of the Hofstad members in an apartment, a fourteen-hour siege ensued that resulted in the injuries of four officers by a hand grenade thrown by one of the terrorists. Nine members of this homegrown network were convicted in March of 2006 on various charges, including attempted murder, membership in a terrorist group, terrorist activity, and possession of weapons. However, many of the network members remained either un-convicted or untried.¹⁶ In October of 2006, six Hofstad members went on trial for plotting assassinations and terrorist attacks against government buildings.¹⁷

¹⁵ Mohammed Bouyeri, translated by Nesser Petter, "The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker – Religiously Motivated Violence or Islamist Terrorism in the Name of Global Jihad?" *Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI)*, February 2, 2004.

¹⁶ Sebastian Rotella, "The World; Dutch Court Hands Down Terror Verdicts," *Los Angeles Times*, March 11, 2006.

¹⁷ "Dutch Radicals Taken to Trial," *The Statesman* (India), October 17, 2006.

There is another interesting dimension to the Hofstad group. Outman Ben Amar, a Moroccan national, was working at the Dutch intelligence service, AIVD, as a translator when he was arrested in September 2004, two months before Bouyeri murdered van Gogh. He was charged with betraying state secrets to the Hofstad group and was convicted in December 2005. This is not necessarily a case of cut-and-dry infiltration as there is no evidence that Ben Amar was a member of the Hofstad group who intentionally went to work for AIVD in order to funnel information to the group. He was likely working for AIVD when he became a sympathetic ally to the budding terrorist network. Still, this raises questions about our own security screening processes as we recruit people from the Arab and Muslim world in our struggle against terrorist organizations.

This question becomes even more pressing in the case of Nadia Nadim Prouty, aka Nadia Nadim Al Aouar, the sister-in-law of Hizballah-linked fugitive Talal Chahine, who pled guilty in November 2007 to fraudulently obtaining her citizenship and using her illegally acquired status to attain employment with both the FBI and CIA. According to prosecutors in the Eastern District of Michigan, Prouty used FBI computers – absent authorization – to run searches on herself, her sister and her brother in law, Elfat Al Aouar and Talal Chahine, owners of the popular Michigan-based restaurant chain, La Shish.

In May 2006, Chahine and Al Aouar were charged with tax evasion, with some of the proceeds allegedly funneled to Hizballah. As part of that case, the government asserted, in a written proffer of evidence, that Chahine and his wife attended a fundraising event in Lebanon in August 2002 with Hizballah Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, a Specially Designated Terrorist, where the two men were the keynote speakers.¹⁸

¹⁸ U.S.A. v. Elfat El Aouar, Cr. No. 06-20248, EDMJ, 5/22/2006

The Propaganda of Al Qaeda

The arena in which al Qaeda has been most active is in the production and distribution of propaganda. This is an enormous subject that can only be briefly addressed in this testimony. It is a subject that deserves congressional hearings of its own. It can be argued that al Qaeda has exploited the capabilities of the Internet better than any organization in the world. As-Sahab, al Qaeda's media production center, released 58 videos in 2006. In 2007, they released 83. The tempo of these releases is clearly increasing as al Qaeda leadership seeks to influence Muslims around the world and intimidate the United States, Europe, Israel, and secular Arab governments. There is also a steady stream of videotaped attacks against military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The video releases are far from the only propaganda produced by al Qaeda. Al Qaeda also produces audio speeches, instructional pieces and a number of online magazines.

Ayman al Zawahiri

Al Zawahiri is perhaps al Qaeda's most effective public propagandist and ideologue. In a recent video release, al Zawahiri answered a number of questions submitted over the Internet. Most of the questions actually challenged al Qaeda's tactics and choices and al Zawahiri gave full and complete answers to most of them. Several questions addressed the December 2007 suicide attack in Algiers, asking why al Qaeda was killing innocents in Baghdad, Morocco and Algeria. The questioner challenged al Qaeda to order attacks in Tel Aviv. Al Zawahiri answered that al Qaeda has not killed innocents anywhere, but any innocents that were killed, died mistakenly or out of necessity under the doctrine of al Tatarus, which allows mujahideen to take human shields. Al Zawahiri's answers often reference his writings, particularly a book he wrote called *The Exoneration* and a book by emerging al Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al-Libi (mentioned earlier in this testimony) entitled, *Al Tatarus in Contemporary Jihad*. As to the challenge to launch attacks in Tel Aviv, al Zawahiri defended the terrorist group, saying they had attacked Jews in Tunisia and Israeli tourists in Kenya. He reiterated bin Laden's claim that after the United States withdraws from Iraq, they would turn their attention to Jerusalem. He countered that the questioner should ask jihadist organizations in Palestine why they have not come to the aid of Muslims in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Al Zawahiri reiterated his criticisms of Hamas throughout the video. Aside from scolding Hamas for taking part in a democratic election, al Zawahiri criticized Hamas for firing Qassam rockets into "Israeli colonies" because the rockets "don't differentiate between a child and an adult."¹⁹ This is hypocritical as al Qaeda is infamous for indiscriminate mass casualty attacks, particularly the 9/11 attacks, which killed children.

Interestingly, al Zawahiri dodged questions about Iran, referring people to a past interview in which he dealt with that subject.

¹⁹ "The Open Meeting with Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri, Part One," As-Sahab Media, 2008.

Al Qaeda's propaganda should be considered a national security threat for a few reasons. It can motivate Muslims to join and/or support al Qaeda. It can inspire Muslims living in the West to launch attacks against their host countries. It can also inspire Muslims to support ongoing jihads in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Algeria, Israel/Palestine and Kashmir. Perhaps what is most troubling about al Qaeda's propaganda capability is it is far superior to any strategic communications program run by the United States.

Border and Immigration Security

There are several key gaps in our immigration policy and border security that demand congressional attentions. From an immigration and border security point-of-view al Qaeda's efforts to recruit western/European operatives (confirmed recently by CIA Director Michael Hayden) are troubling. These operatives can be used for the purpose of infiltrating not only Europe but ultimately the United States via the utilization of European passports and the exploitation of the US Visa Waiver Program. That, combined with the virtual non-existence of the departure control half of the US VISIT system, causes significant problems in what is supposed to be our border and immigration control and security processes.

The current Visa Waiver program allows foreign nationals who are citizens of 27 countries, mostly western and northern European nations as well as Japan and Australia, to enter the US as a temporary visitor for up to 90 days without applying for or receiving a US visa abroad. The program is being strongly considered for expansion to numerous other countries, primarily East European nations from the former Soviet Union. Visa Waiver entrants generally have their names screened in US security databases shortly before they depart from foreign airports, but that is the extent of pre-entry screening. If the name/passport of such an entrant is "clean" in those databases, most likely the entrant will be admitted into the country. Visa Waiver precludes any other significant pre-admission screening by the U.S. Government. There is no face-to-face interview with U.S. consular or security officers that would allow for an in-person evaluation of the applicant's demeanor and credibility. There is no filing of a visa application that would produce potential self-provided intelligence, biometric evidence, handwriting/printing exemplars, or evidence for potential fraud prosecution utilization post-admission in what could otherwise be a sterile visa fraud prosecution against a terrorism suspect. These law enforcement and intelligence benefits are lost to the Visa Waiver program, a program begun in the 1980s to facilitate international tourism.

US VISIT was created shortly after the 9/11 attacks and is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) immigration-border entry and departure information "control" system for foreign nationals. Most non-immigrant entrants, including Visa Waiver entrants, are subject to the US VISIT system. After significant "fine tuning," the entry half of US VISIT finally works essentially the way it should: capturing required identity, biometric and documentary information and comparing it to numerous existing U.S. intelligence and security databases. The departure-control half of the system, however, is virtually non-existent and non-functioning. Sadly, Congress first legislatively initiated a departure-control requirement in 1996. Yet, now 12 years later and nearly 7 years after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Government is nowhere close to implementing this critically important segment of its border and immigration security apparatus. A March 31, 2008 Government Accountability (GAO) report cites that not only has DHS made no meaningful progress in implementing the departure control segment of US VISIT, but DHS is not even close to completing such implementation plans. Essentially, per GAO, DHS done little with departure-control after 12 years of Congress telling it (and the DHS predecessor DOJ/INS) to get it done.

Departure control under US VISIT could potentially provide the US Government with a treasure trove of intelligence related to possible security threats, if properly processed and analyzed. But

how is that to be done? What agencies should be involved? What systems to query? Should allied foreign services be included? How do commercial carriers (airlines and cruise ships) fit into the process? What to do with what will be huge numbers of identified violators? Over 40% of the illegal alien population entered the U.S. originally with a “legal” temporary visa status and eventually overstayed their status or otherwise violated that status. This included a plethora of foreign terrorists and terrorist support operatives who entered the U.S. with ostensibly legitimate documents and visas (some later were determined to be fraudulent) and were ultimately arrested and prosecuted, or otherwise dealt with. These included Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives and leader Mazen al Najjar, Bashir Nafi and Ramadan Shallah. They included several of the first World Trade Center bombing operatives, including Ramzi Yousef and the murderer of CIA employees Mir Aimal Kasi. They included, of course, the 19 al-Qaeda terrorist hijackers who committed the 9/11 attacks.

US VISIT’s departure control system, when implemented, would certainly identify very many such violators in short order. How will those leads be processed and disposed of? The system, since it has been collecting entry information and presumably interfacing with systems identifying those obtaining legal extensions and legal changes of status would already possess a huge backlog of known violators within the database. What to do with that existing stockpile of known violators? Again, this is potentially a gold mine of intelligence – if properly utilized and analyzed – but the US Government hasn’t yet figured out how to do that or even if it wants to do that.

There have been a number of cases of foreign national terror suspects who have surreptitiously crossed US borders who have subsequently been captured, prosecuted and/or deported. Several of these were cited in an article by Todd Bensman.²⁰ Among these men were: Mahmoud Yousef Kourani, a Hizballah operative snuck across the US/Mexican border; Nabil al-Marabh, one of the most wanted terrorist in the world who was mistakenly deported never to be seen again; Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, who snuck across the northern border and plotted to bomb a New York City subway; Ahmed Ressam, mentioned earlier in this testimony as plotting to bomb Los Angeles International Airport; and Abdelghani Meskini and Abdelhakim Tizegha, Ressams coconspirators.

These are vital flaws in our immigration and border security systems that are being specifically targeted and exploited by terrorists and their organizations. This is something that has been occurring for decades. It should come as no surprise that al-Qaeda is recruiting and utilizing western/European operatives in an attempt to defeat an already weak US border control and immigration system. There is also really no difference between terrorists defeating our border defenses in the hinterlands via surreptitious entry or at a port-of-entry with fraudulent or illegitimately used “clean” identity and travel documents. The result is the same: terrorists succeed in entering the United States. The fact such flaws still exist so many years after Congress identified a need for a fix, and years after the 9/11 attacks, is what is so incredible.

²⁰ Todd Besman, “Have Terrorists Crossed?” ToddBesman.com, March 25, 2008.

The Bigger Picture

Islamist Ideology and its Modern Origin

Al Qaeda is clearly the most significant operational terrorist threat to this country and the issues examined above deserve a great deal of attention by decision-makers, but al Qaeda must be seen in the context of what drives it – an extremist ideology based on a puritanical interpretation of Islam. The biggest flaw in this nation’s national security policy is that it is focused specifically on countering acts of terrorism and not countering the Islamist worldwide ideology that has spawned al Qaeda. This ideology is intrinsically hostile to secular democracies that value pluralism, separation of church and state, free speech, minority rights, and freedom of religion. One need only look back at the history behind the formation of al Qaeda and nearly all Sunni terrorist groups that exist today to find a common parent to their ideology: the Muslim Brotherhood.

Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun)²¹ was founded as an Islamic revivalist movement in the Egyptian town of Isma’iliyaa in March 1928 by school teacher Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949).²² The Brotherhood’s goal has been to promote the implementation of traditional Islamic sharia law.²³ Early in its history, the Brotherhood focused on education and charity. It soon became heavily involved in politics and remains a major player on the Egyptian political scene, despite the fact that it is an illegal organization. It has grown exponentially, from only 800 members in 1936, to over 2 million in 1948, to its current place as a pervasive Sunni Islamist movement, with covert and overt branches in over 70 different countries.

“I did not want to enter into competition with the other orders,” al-Banna once said. “And I did not want it to be confined to one group of Muslims or one aspect of Islamic reform; rather I sought that it be a general message based on learning, education, and *jihad*.”²⁴ According to al-Banna, “It is the nature of Islam to dominate, not to be dominated, to impose its law on all nations and to extend its power to the entire planet.”²⁵

²¹ They are also known as the Muslim Brothers, The Brothers (*al-Ikhwan*), or the Society of Muslim Brothers (*Jama’at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*).

²² Born in Mahmoudiyya, Egypt, Hassan al-Banna was the son of the prominent Imam Sheikh Ahmad al-Banna. He studied at Al-Ahzar University and joined a Sufi order there. He then moved to Cairo as a school teacher in 1932 establishing the Muslim Brotherhood branch there. Al-Banna was assassinated by the Egyptian government on February 12th, 1949 as part of an Egyptian government crackdown on the Brotherhood.

²³ *Sharia’h* is the dynamic body of Islamic religious law. It primarily based on the Koran and the *Sunnah* (the Muslim way of life based on the life of the Prophet Muhammad), developed by the *hadith* (the oral traditions relating the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad).

²⁴ Hassan al Banna, quoted in, Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers* (New York City: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 207.

²⁵ Compare this to the words of Osama bin Laden, who, in a letter to Saudi intellectuals, wrote “In fact, Muslims are obligated to raid the lands of the infidels, occupy them, and exchange their systems of governance for an Islamic system, barring any practice that contradicts the sharia from being publicly voiced among the people, as was the case at the dawn of Islam... Thus they make claims and speak about Allah without understanding. They say our

That helps explain the Muslim Brotherhood's motto: "God is our objective, the Quran is our Constitution, the Prophet is our leader, jihad is our way, and death for the sake of God is the highest of our aspirations."

The Brotherhood has reached global status, wielding power and influence in every state with a Muslim population. Additionally, the Brotherhood maintains political parties in many Middle-Eastern and African countries, including Jordan, Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and even Israel. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood attempted to overthrow the Syrian government in the 1980s, but the revolt was crushed. Aside from the Muslim Brotherhood in Israel proper, the terrorist organization Hamas was founded as the Palestinian chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Since its founding, the Muslim Brotherhood has openly sought to reestablish puritanical Islam as the primary endeavor of human civilization through the establishment of Sunni Islamic governments that rule according to the strict and specific tenets of shariah (Islamic law drawn from the Quran and the Sunnah) and the unification of these regimes under the banner of the Caliphate.

According to al-Banna, the Caliphate must govern all lands that were at one time under the control of Muslims. He stated:

For we want the flag of Islam to fly over those lands again, who were lucky enough, to be ruled by Islam for a time, and hear the call of the muezzin praise God. Then the light of Islam died out and they returned to disbelief. Andalusia, Sicily, the Balkans, Southern Italy and the Greek islands are all Islamic colonies which have to return to Islam's lap. The Mediterranean and the Red Sea have to become internal seas of Islam, as they used to be.²⁶

Once that is accomplished, the Caliphate is to be expanded to cover the entire globe, erasing national boundaries under the flag of Islam. This concept was elucidated by the Brotherhood luminary, Sayyid Qutb, who wrote in his seminal work, *Milestones*, that Muslims are not merely obliged to wage jihad in defense of Islamic lands, but must wage offensive jihad in order to liberate the world from the servitude of man-made law and governance.

The Muslim Brotherhood has provided the ideological model for almost all modern Sunni Islamic terrorist groups. Richard Clarke - the chief counterterrorism adviser on the U.S. National Security Council under Presidents Clinton and Bush - stated before the Senate in 2003 that "...the issue of terrorist financing in the United States is a fundamental example of the shared infrastructure levered by Hamas, Islamic Jihad and al Qaeda, all of which enjoy a significant degree of cooperation and coordination within our borders. The common link here is the extremist Muslim Brotherhood - all these organizations are descendants of the membership and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood"²⁷

sharia does not impose our particular beliefs upon others; this is a false assertion. For it is, in fact, part of our religion to impose our particular beliefs upon others."

²⁶ Hassan al Banna, quoted in: Egon Flaig, *Der Islam will die Welteroberung*.

²⁷ Statement of Richard Clarke. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, October, 22, 2003.

To ensure that the sharia would be the “the basis controlling the affairs of state and society,”²⁸ al-Banna laid out a seven-step hierarchy of goals to be implemented by the Brotherhood for the Islamization of society. The first step is to educate and “form” the Muslim person. From there the Muslim person would spread Islam and help “form” a Muslim family. Muslim families would group together to form a Muslim society that would establish a Muslim government. The government would then transform the state into an Islamic one governed by sharia law, as voted by the Muslim society. This Islamic state would then work to free “occupied” Muslim lands and unify them together under one banner, from which Islam could be spread all over the world.²⁹

As the late Robert P. Mitchell, professor of Near Eastern History at the University of Michigan, explained in his seminal work on the Brotherhood, quoting original Brotherhood sources, these goals would be carried out in three stages. Starting with “the first stage through which all movements must pass, the stage of ‘propaganda, communication, and information.’”³⁰ In this stage, the Brotherhood would recruit and indoctrinate core activists. The next stage consisted of “formation, selection, and preparation.”³¹ In this stage, they would endear themselves to the population by creating charities, clinics, schools, and other services. More importantly, they would prepare for the third and final stage: the stage of “execution.”³² Of this stage, al-Banna stated:

At the time that there will be ready, Oh ye Muslim Brothers, three hundred battalions, each one equipped spiritually with faith and belief, intellectually with science and learning, and physically with training and athletics, at that time you can demand of me to plunge with you through the turbulent oceans and to rend the skies with you and to conquer with you every obstinate tyrant. God willing, I will do it.³³

In addition to al-Banna’s founding philosophy, the works of Sayyid Qutb (1909-1966) also had a major impact on the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Beyond that, his books sent shockwaves throughout the entire Islamic world. His most influential works were *Fi zilal al-Qur’an* (“In Shades of the Koran”)³⁴ and *Ma’alim fi al-Tariq* (“Milestones” or “Signposts”). *Milestones* has come to be Qutb’s most popular work and has influenced Islamic extremists such as former Brotherhood member Ayman al-Zawahiri,³⁵ Abdullah Azzam, Osama Bin Laden, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and Abdullah Azzam.

²⁸ IkhwanWeb. “The Principles of the Muslim Brotherhood”. June 13, 2007, <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=813&LevelID=2&SectionID=116> (accessed October 2, 2007).

²⁹ IkhwanWeb. “Muslim Brotherhood Initiatives for Reform in Egypt”. June 13, 2007. <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=797&SectionID=116> (accessed October 9, 2007).

³⁰ Mitchell, *Society of Muslim Brothers*, p. 13.

³¹ Risalat Al-Mu’tamar al-khamis (Message of the Fifth Congress), quoted in Mitchell, *Society of Muslim Brothers*, p. 14.

³² *Ibid.*, 15.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ This work, written while Qutb was languishing in an Egyptian jail cell (1954-1964), is a 30 volume commentary (*tafsir*) on the Koran. A highly popular work, Qutb in his commentary advocates for *sharia* to be implemented in all Muslim societies. It also contains significant amounts of vitriol directed primarily at Jews.

³⁵ Zawahiri, also a member of the Brotherhood since the age of fourteen (1965) became familiar with Qutb’s writings while he was in Saudi Arabia. There he came under the tutelage of Sayyid’s brother Muhammad Qutb, who fled Egypt in 1972 and began teaching his brother’s philosophy while a professor at King Abdel-Aziz University in Jeddah and the Umm al-Qura University in Mecca. Osama Bin Laden also reportedly attended Muhammad Qutb’s lectures.

Written while Qutb was in prison in Egypt,³⁶ *Milestones*' central thesis was that the world had degraded into a state of "ignorance" (as existed before the advent of Islam) or jahiliyyah and Islam was the solution. In addition to Hassan al-Banna's ideas, Qutb was influenced by the writings of Indian Islamist Sayyid Mawlana Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979)³⁷ and the medieval scholar Taqi ad-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328). However, Qutb radically expanded on their ideas of jahiliyyah and jihad.

While both Mawdudi and Ibn Taymiyyah used jahiliyyah to describe their contemporaries, Qutb described the whole of the Muslim community to be in jahiliyyah, as "the Muslim community has long ago vanished from existence."³⁸ Since Arab secular leaders did not follow the sharia, they were considered to be in "apostasy" (takfir) for violating God's sovereignty (al-hakimiyya) on earth. In fact, "any place where the Islamic Shari'ah is not enforced and where Islam is not dominant becomes the Abode of War (Dar-ul-Harb)."³⁹ Jahiliyyah now included all non-Islamic states, whether ruled by Muslims or not.

To achieve his vision, Qutb advocated for the creation of a vanguard (tali'a), its members modeling themselves after the Prophet Muhammad's companions (sahaba). This vanguard would then fight jahiliyyah and its influences through "methods of preaching (daw'a) and persuasion for reforming ideas and beliefs; and it uses physical power and Jihad for abolishing the organizations and authorities of the jahili system which prevents people from reforming their ideas."⁴⁰ The vanguard would not "compromise with the practices of jahili society, nor can we be loyal to it," Qutb wrote. "Jahili society, because of its jahili characteristics (described as evil and corrupt), is not worthy to be compromised with."⁴¹

These ideas radically expanded the scope of jihad, especially that of jihad bis-said (jihad by the sword). Qutb argued for a more aggressive and offensive definition of jihad as a means to combat the dar al-Harb (Abode of War),⁴² synonymous with the jahiliyyah. This was in order to not only protect the dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam) but also to enhance it and spread it "throughout the earth to whole of mankind."⁴³ Adherence to the sharia would free mankind from the jahiliyyah influences. This struggle would not be a temporary phase "but an eternal state, as

³⁶ Qutb spent ten years in prison from 1954 to 1964 after being arrested for being a member of the Brotherhood (he joined in 1953) when Nasser outlawed the organization in 1954. *Milestones* was published when Qutb emerged from prison in 1965, even though Qutb was arrested and jailed again for preaching for an Islamic state in Egypt. He was executed on August 29th, 1966 with excerpts from *Milestones* used against him during his trial. After his execution he became a "Martyr" (*Shaheed*) to his followers.

³⁷ Also written as Mawdudi or Maudoodi. He founded the Pakistani Islamist party *Jamaat-e-Islami* in 1941 with the goal of establishing an Islamic state in Pakistan. He headed the party until 1973 and was well known for his writings on Islam.

³⁸ Qutb, Sayyid. *Milestones*. (Syria: Damascus, Dar al-Ilm), 9.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 124.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁴² The *Dar al-Harb* (Abode of Conflict) traditionally is considered to be countries and places where Islam is not predominant or areas not ruled by Muslims. Traditional views of physical jihad or jihad by the sword explain it as primarily a call to defend Muslim lands, Muslims, and Islam from military aggression and oppression. The "abode" of non-Muslims, except in matters dealing with Muslims or Islam, is largely ignored primarily to focus on internal matters.

⁴³ *Milestones*, 72.

truth and falsehood cannot co-exist on this earth.”⁴⁴ Qutb, in addition to his strongly anti-secular and anti-Western ideas,⁴⁵ was particularly venomous in his denunciation of Jews. He accused them of conspiracies and stated that “the Jews are behind materialism, animal sexuality, the destruction of the family and the dissolution of society.”⁴⁶

The Brotherhood Today

Many Muslim Brotherhood branches around the world claimed to have renounced the use of violence, but the reality is quite different. The Brotherhood continues to be driven by al-Banna’s belief that Islam is destined “to impose its law on all nations and to extend its power to the entire planet.”⁴⁷ The Brotherhood’s declared principles remain “the introduction of the Islamic sharia as the basis controlling the affairs of state and society” and “unification among the Islamic countries and states ... liberating them from foreign imperialism.”⁴⁸ This includes “spreading Islamic concepts that reject submission to humiliation, and incite to fighting it” while “reviving the will of liberation and independence in the people, and sowing the spirit of resistance.”⁴⁹

In the Fall of 2007, the Brotherhood wrote its first official platform in decades. The platform explains, in plain terms, the agenda of the Brotherhood in Egypt and the Islamic world. It maintains that its fundamental principle is the imposition of Islamic law. It calls for: “Spreading and deepening the true concepts of Islam as a complete methodology that regulates all aspects of life.”

The Brotherhood in the United States

In the United States, the Brotherhood has had an active presence since the 1960s. An internal Brotherhood memorandum, released during the terror-support trial of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) trial in July 2007 shows that the Brotherhood’s jihad can take more subtle and long range approaches. Dated to May 22, 1991, the memo, entitled, “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America,” states, under the heading, “Understanding the role of the Muslim Brother in North America”:

The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and ‘sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands and the

⁴⁴ Ibid., 66.

⁴⁵ Qutb studied in the United States from 1948-1950 at the Colorado State College of Education in Greeley, Colorado. He despised his experience in America, railing against American culture and history in his book, *Amrika allati Ra’aytu*, (“America that I Saw”).

⁴⁶ Milestones., 18.

⁴⁷ Neil MacFarquhar, “Egyptian Group Patiently Pursues Dream of Islamic State.” *New York Times*, January 20, 2002.

⁴⁸ IkhwanWeb. “The Principles of the Muslim Brotherhood”. June 13, 2007. <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=813&LevelID=2&SectionID=116> (accessed October 2, 2007).

⁴⁹ Ikhwanweb. “Reading into the Muslim Brotherhood’s Documents”. June 13, 2007. <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=818&LevelID=2&SectionID=116> (accessed October 2, 2007).

hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God's religion is made victorious over all other religions.⁵⁰

Appended to this memo is a list of all Brotherhood affiliated organizations in North America (See appendix). Included on the list are, the Muslim Students' Association, North American Islamic Trust, Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Islamic Association for Palestine (which was succeeded by the Council on American Islamic Relations [CAIR]), the Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA), the International Institute of Islamic Thought, the Islamic Circle of North America, and other prominent American Muslim organizations.

The theme in this Muslim Brotherhood strategy memo was picked up four years later by Yusuf al Qaradawi, a Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader attending a conference in Toledo, Ohio. Al Qaradawi has been offered the post of General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood twice, but has turned it down in favor of building and managing several Islamist organizations in the West and the Middle East associated with the Brotherhood. At the Ohio conference hosted by MAYA, he said, "Our brothers in Hamas, in Palestine, the Islamic resistance, the Islamic Jihad, after all the rest have given up and despaired, the movement of the Jihad brings us back to our faith."⁵¹

He later added:

What remains, then, is to conquer Rome. The second part of the omen. "The city of Hiraq [once emperor of Constantinople] will be conquered first," so what remains is to conquer Rome. This means that Islam will come back to Europe for the third time, after it was expelled from it twice... Conquest through Da'wa [proselytizing], that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da'wa.

...
But the balance of power will change, and this is what is told in the Hadith of Ibn-Omar and the Hadith of Abu-Hurairah: "You shall continue to fight the Jews and they will fight you, until the Muslims will kill them. And the Jew will hide behind the stone and the tree, and the stone and the tree will say: 'Oh servant of Allah, Oh Muslim, this is a Jew behind me. Come and kill him!' The resurrection will not come before this happens." This is a text from the good omens in which we believe.⁵²

The Brotherhood plays an active role today in promoting terrorism against American interests. The Brotherhood actively supports Hamas to "face the U.S. and Zionist strategy" in the Occupied Territories and supports their "legitimate resistance."⁵³ In August 2004, the Brotherhood issued a public appeal of support for those fighting coalition forces in Iraq,⁵⁴ and the following month, Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader Yusuf al-Qaradawi issued a fatwa deeming it a religious duty for Muslims to fight America in Iraq.⁵⁵ While the Brotherhood claims to have renounced violence to achieve political goals, the Islamist strands inherited from Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb endure and stand in direct contradiction to their non-violent public pronouncements.

⁵⁰ U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation, 04-CR-240 Government exhibit 3-85.

⁵¹ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, MAYA Conference, 1995, Toledo, Ohio.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ IkhwanWeb. "The Principles of the Muslim Brotherhood". June 13, 2007. <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=813&LevelID=2&SectionID=116> (accessed October 2, 2007).

⁵⁴ "The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Support of Fighting Americans Forces in Iraq," MEMRI Special Dispatch Series, September 3, 2004.

⁵⁵ Cleric Says It's Right to Fight U.S. Civilians in Iraq," Reuters, September 2, 2004.

Failures of U.S. Outreach Efforts

American efforts at rapprochement with the Arab and Muslim world after 9/11, largely led by former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes, has been nothing short of a disaster, often choosing to embrace the very people who foment and foster high levels of anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world.

During her tenure, Hughes and her staff held meetings with the very people who should be avoided and denounced for their public, anti-American and pro-terrorist stances; embraced individuals and groups with long histories of support for terrorists and sought advice from individuals who are on the record as being supportive and friendly with terrorists and terrorist causes.

The recent decision to appoint an American observer to the Organization on the Islamic Conference (OIC), a group with a history of support for terrorist organizations and the causes championed by terrorists, rather than denounce the OIC for what it is, is extremely troubling.

Under Karen Hughes, the State Department has met with leaders of various Muslim Brotherhood-front organizations in the United States, including ISNA, currently an unindicted co-conspirator in a major Hamas fundraising case in Dallas HLF. ISNA publications have consistently supported Hamas and specifically top Hamas official Mousa Abu Marzook. Hughes has also worked with the Muslim Students' Association, an organization founded by the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960's.




Figure 2: DHS booth at an ISNA Convention next to a Hizb ut-Tahrir booth⁵⁶

⁵⁶ "ISNA Conference: Hizb ut-Tahrir rubs shoulders with Homeland Security," JihadChat.com, September 6, 2007, <http://www.jihadchat.com/index.php?showtopic=6188>

But the problem goes beyond the State Department, and is systemic in almost all government outreach programs. The Department of Justice has partnered with ISNA, despite another branch of the same organization labeling ISNA as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and an unindicted co-conspirator in the HLF trial. The Department of Homeland Security has also attended ISNA conventions, recently having a booth right next to the radical Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, which seeks to reestablish the Caliphate.

Despite the fact that the DOJ has labeled CAIR as a member of the Palestine Committee of the Muslim Brotherhood and, in addition to ISNA, as unindicted co-conspirators in the HLF trial, and has stated that CAIR has “conspired with other affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood to support terrorists,”⁵⁷ various FBI field offices still insist on partnering with CAIR, allowing the Islamist group to instruct FBI agents and analysts on “sensitivity training.” FBI Headquarters has also refused to issue directives preventing its field offices and agents from attending CAIR events, hosting town hall meetings with CAIR and seeking alternative voices to administer “sensitivity training.”

The U.S. government generally, and the State Department in particular, needs to seek out genuine moderates throughout the Arab and Muslim world, rather than just embrace and promote those who claim to speak for all Muslims, but instead parrot the themes of anti-Americanism, victimology and grievances that seek to place the blame for all the world’s ills on U.S. foreign policy.

Arab and Muslim voices which promote accountability, democracy, human rights and freedoms must be elevated and embraced. Short of that, organizations, individuals and institutions in the Muslim world that are knee-jerk anti-American, and pro-terrorist, or, at a minimum, apologists for terrorism, should be denounced and avoided. The U.S. should not seek to embrace or promote the “least worst option” for lack of a better solution. All organizations with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood need to be treated for what they are: fascistic, paternalistic organizations that seek the return of the Caliphate, and organizations that are apologists for radical Islam and terrorism, and are not prepared to be responsible actors in democratic systems, and will not support the future pluralistic liberal institutions which much be built throughout the Muslim world in order to strengthen the promotion of democracy.

Rather than countering the ideology promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood and the terrorist groups that it has spawned, the U.S. has empowered the Muslim Brotherhood and, by extension, its uncompromising message by reaching out to the group itself in a poorly targeted effort to find allies in the Muslim world. Domestically, government agencies, departments, and officials at the federal, state, and local levels have unwittingly empowered front groups of the Muslim Brotherhood by making them the dominant focus of their outreach to the Muslim community and thus anointing groups with an extremist bent and a documented ulterior agenda as the gatekeepers to the Muslim-American community. This policy, which continues to this day despite the criminal connections of many of these organizations, can only end in disaster for the interest of the United States both domestically and abroad.

⁵⁷ U.S. v. Benkahla, 07-cr- 4778, “Brief for the United States,” pg. 58, 4th Cir., December 2007, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/542.pdf.

Current and future U.S. outreach efforts need to be viewed through this lens, as the promotion and legitimacy of dangerous elements needs to be avoided at all costs, lest we allow short term and short sighted efforts of outreach, that mostly serve our goals only for the sake of appearances, yet do much damage to legitimate and genuine moderates by promoting elements which seek to exclude moderate voices, trump the more important long term needs and goals of the region, and U.S. national security.

A Case Study in Infiltration: Alamoudi

The evidence of Islamists operating on U.S. soil – exploiting American freedoms while expanding the global jihad movement from within our borders – is not fear-mongering, as some may suggest, but a clear and present threat. Extremist groups threaten the U.S. beyond any outright attack in that they have used the United States to fundraise, to train, and to build public support, all the while flying beneath the radar of law enforcement and intelligence officials. This fact is made all too clear when examining the case of Abdulrahman Alamoudi – president of the American Muslim Council (AMC) from 1990 until 2003, and held out to be the moderate face of Islam in the U.S.

Throughout the 1990s, Alamoudi was invited routinely to the White House, was sent abroad by the Department of State on numerous occasions, was honored in Congress, and had access to the FBI and the CIA. A spokesman for FBI Director Robert Mueller is on record as referring to Alamoudi's AMC as the “most mainstream Muslim group in the United States”.⁵⁸ Seen by many as the model American Muslim leader, Alamoudi came off as a true Muslim partner who had significant political access, including meetings with President Clinton and then-candidate for President, George W. Bush.⁵⁹

All of this came crashing down in 2004, when Alamoudi pleaded guilty to “three felony offenses: one count of violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by traveling and engaging in dealing with Libya; one count of false statements made in his application for naturalization; and a tax offense involving a long-term scheme to conceal from the IRS his financial transactions with Libya and his foreign bank accounts and to omit material information from the tax returns filed by his charities”.⁶⁰ He also acknowledged that he was involved with two al Qaeda-linked agents in a colorful plot manufactured by Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi to assassinate then-Saudi Prince Abdullah.⁶¹

Long before any of this came to light, Alamoudi got his start in the public sphere as acting president of the Muslim Students Association (MSA) National (1982-1983),⁶² Founder and

⁵⁸ Shawn Macomber, “Eyes Wide Shut.” *The American Spectator*. December 17, 2003.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*

⁶⁰ U.S. Announces Plea in Terrorism Financing Case,” Dept. of Justice Press Release, July 30, 2004, <http://www.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel04/alamoudi073004.htm> (accessed April 7, 2008).

⁶¹ Glenn Frankel, “Exiled Saudi Is Dissident to Some, Terrorist to Others,” *Washington Post*, July 7, 2004.

⁶² Resume of Abdurahman M. Alamoudi, 2.

President of the American Muslim Foundation (AMF) (1990),⁶³ Regional Representative for the Washington DC-area for the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) (1986-1990),⁶⁴ and Member of the Executive Committee of the Islamic Society of Boston.⁶⁵ However, his true rise to prominence came with the founding of his greatest legacy, the American Muslim Council (AMC), in 1990,⁶⁶ which, ostensibly, was to lobby politicians on behalf of Muslims in the United States. In addition to its other work, the AMC and AMF, and more specifically, Alamoudi, became involved with the selection of Muslim chaplains for the U.S. military through the American Muslim Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs Council (AMAFVAC), which Alamoudi co-founded in 1991.⁶⁷

Alamoudi's work did not end there. Though serving as an Islamic advisor and "roving 'Goodwill Ambassador' to the United Nations"⁶⁸ for the Clinton Administration, Alamoudi also had a long history of links to terrorist organizations. From 1994 to 1999 he served as Director for the United Association for Studies and Research (UASR), based in Springfield, Virginia.⁶⁹ UASR has numerous links to Hamas and was co-founded by Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzook.⁷⁰ Hamas operative Mohammed Salah referred to UASR as "the political command" of Hamas in the United States.⁷¹

As the moderate guise that he had so carefully crafted began to fall apart, the pieces of the Alamoudi puzzle began to come together. Alamoudi's résumé indicated that he served simultaneously as an executive assistant to the president of SAAR⁷² and as an officer⁷³ of the Success Foundation, a sister organization of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) in Virginia.⁷⁴ IIRO's Virginia office has contributed to other charities suspected or convicted of financing terror, including contributions to the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF),⁷⁵ and the Taibah International Aid Association.⁷⁶ The Bosnian Branch of Taibah International was named a specially designated global terrorist on May 6, 2004, for

⁶³ Abdurahman Alamoudi, Guest CV, IslamOnline.net, <http://www.islamonline.net/livedialogue/english/Guestcv.asp?hGuestID=7he3eT> (accessed August 13, 2007).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*; Resume of Abdurahman M. Alamoudi, 1.

⁶⁵ Islamic Society of Boston, Form 1023, 1983.

⁶⁶ American Muslim Council, Form 1024, 1990.; Abdurahman Alamoudi, Guest CV, IslamOnline.net, <http://www.islamonline.net/livedialogue/english/Guestcv.asp?hGuestID=7he3eT> (accessed August 13, 2007).

⁶⁷ Testimony of Dr. Michael Waller before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, October 14, 2003, http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:1RGzzN-9jc8J:judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm%3Fid%3D960%26wit_id%3D2719+%E2%80%9C Hamas+is+not+a+terrorist+group%22+and+%22i+have+followed+the+good+work+of+hamas%22&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=3&gl=us (accessed April 6, 2008).

⁶⁸ Shawn Macomber, "Eyes Wide Shut." *The American Spectator*. December 17, 2003.

⁶⁹ United Association for Studies and Research, Form 990, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998.

⁷⁰ Articles of Incorporation, United Association for Studies and Research, Secretary of State for the State of Illinois, September 18, 1989.

⁷¹ Judith Miller, "Israel Says That Prisoner's Tale Links Arabs in US to Terrorism," *The New York Times*, February 17, 1993, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CEFD133FF934A25751C0A965958260> (accessed April 6, 2008).

⁷² Abdurahman M. Alamoudi curriculum vitae: Freedom of Information request.

⁷³ Success Foundation Forms 990, 1999 and 2000. (showing Alamoudi as secretary)

⁷⁴ Success Foundation Form 990, 2000, line item 80. (showing IRO as related organization)

⁷⁵ International Relief Organization, Inc., Form 990, 1996, 1997.

⁷⁶ International Relief Organization, Inc., Form 990, 1995, 1996.

financing al Qaeda.⁷⁷ Alamoudi served as Vice President of Taibah International in 1999.⁷⁸ German police files also show that Alamoudi had meetings in the fall of 2000 with Mohammed Belfas, an elder from the Islamic community in Hamburg who had ties to many of the 9/11 hijackers and who had shared an apartment with the suspected “20th hijacker,” Ramzi bin al Shibh.⁷⁹

The Alamoudi tale also took on an added dimension once the U.S. Treasury Department found that Alamoudi had raised money for the al-Qaeda-tied Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA) Foundation in the United Kingdom. Authorities at the Treasury noted that his arrest “was a severe blow to al Qaida, as Alamoudi had a close relationship with al Qaida and had raised money for al Qaida in the United States”.⁸⁰

Once thought by many in the highest echelons of government to be the moderate Muslim partner they had long sought, Alamoudi proved in the end to be something very different. Operating not in Baghdad or Kandahar, but in Northern Virginia, Alamoudi subverted and deceived from within and funded those intent on bringing harm upon us and our interests abroad. A supporter of violent jihad and financier of al Qaeda, all the while enjoying the ear of the President of the United States and members of Congress – the story of Abdurahman Alamoudi’s infiltration cannot be forgotten because this infiltration is, indeed, clear and present. This can, and will, continue to occur unless those in power begin to look more closely at just who they are partnering with in the U.S.

Overlooked Victims of Islamism

As noted above, it is imperative that we realize that we cannot defeat al Qaeda without acknowledging that the terrorist organization cannot be decoupled from the Islamist ideology that has spawned it. When considering this matter, it is important and instructive to consider the Danish Cartoons Crisis. In reaction to the Danish Cartoons Crisis, the West abdicated the tenet of free speech, no matter how offensive, in an effort to appease the Muslim world. Free speech, the bedrock of western civilization, was suddenly thrown out the window at the first sign that many in the Muslim world were offended and retaliatory violence was possible. With the exception of a handful of courageous news outlets, the American media refused to republish the cartoons, claiming that “respect for religious values” overrode the principle of free speech. The truth was much more different: journalists simply did not want to have to look at the rear view mirror when they went home at night. Ironically, more publications and media outlets in the Arab and Muslim world ended up publishing the cartoons than in the United States. The U.S. State Department denounced the publication of the cartoons as “unacceptable.”

⁷⁷ “Treasury Designates Bosnian Charities Funneling Dollars to Al Qaida.” US Department of the Treasury press release, May 6, 2004, <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1527.htm> (accessed January 24, 2006).

⁷⁸ Taibah International IRS Form 990, 1999.

⁷⁹ “Who, and What, Does He Know? New evidence suggests that a leading Muslim spokesman in the U.S. associated with terror suspects.” *Newsweek*, October 1, 2003.

⁸⁰ “Treasury Designates MIRA for Support to Al Qaida.” US Treasury Department Press Release, July 14, 2005 <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js2632.htm> (accessed May 8, 2006).

If such “respect” for religious values was such a prominent principle of our society, why have we tolerated U.S. museum exhibits showing Jesus Christ painted with feces? Why has the West been largely silent about the near constant, and incredibly hypocritical, stream anti-Christian and anti-Semitic dogma and propaganda emanating from many segments of the Muslim world? The truth is, religious respect is not the issue.

Moreover, critics of Islamism and extremism who have written books, spoken out, or published cartoons deemed “offensive” to Islam, have had their lives permanently changed – facing death threats and being forced underground or behind the protection of 24-hour security details. Ayan Hirsi Ali, the former Dutch parliamentarian and a friend of Theo Van Gogh (the Dutch filmmaker murdered for producing a film deemed “offensive” to Islam) has been forced to live under 24 hour a day protection and in hiding in her homeland and in the United States where she stayed for a year. Geert Wilders, another Dutch parliamentarian, produced a short film called “Fitna” that included images of the Quran being burned and has called for the banning of the Quran. For this admittedly offensive to some, but protected, transgression, Mr. Wilders has had to live in hiding under protection around the clock. His film was blocked by various websites, although anti-Christian and anti-Semitic films can be seen on YouTube and thousands of other sites routed through servers in the United States and Europe.

Congressman Peter Hoekstra, ranking Republican of this committee, has put it best when he wrote in an op-ed of the Wall Street Journal (March 26, 2008):

Reasonable men in free societies regard Geert Wilders's anti-Muslim rhetoric, and films like 'Fitna,' as disrespectful of the religious sensitivities of members of the Islamic faith. But free societies also hold freedom of speech to be a fundamental human right. We don't silence, jail or kill people with whom we disagree just because their ideas are offensive or disturbing. We believe that when such ideas are openly debated, they sink of their own weight and attract few followers.

In Canada, Irshad Manji, a courageous female Muslim writer has received death threats for daring to speak out against Islamic extremism. And here in the United States, Ms. Wafa Sultan who has debated Islamist clerics on Al Jazeera and courageously condemned violence tolerated and sanctioned by Islamic scholars, has recently been forced to go into hiding in the United States. Ms. Sultan, a Syrian born Muslim, who emigrated to America years ago, has been condemned by Yusuf al Qaradawi, the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood mentioned earlier in this testimony, as someone who “has insulted Islam.” An Arabic newspaper recently published an advertisement sponsored by a group called “The Messenger of Allah Unites Us.” The advertisement shows faces of nine people, including Wafa Sultan (deemed a “villifier of the Divine Being, the Holy Religion and the True Religion”) and Fleming Rose (cultural editor of the Danish newspaper that published the Danish cartoons) under the banner “Wanted for Justice.” Though the ad did not say “Dead or Alive,” the implication was clear: These are “enemies of Islam” who are marked for death. A copy of the ad is attached to this testimony.

All too often, our own policymakers try to appease Islamism by treating their “grievances” as “legitimate.” For example, State Department policy enunciated by Ambassador Dell C. Dailey of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, has stated as follows: “Al-Qaida exploits many Muslims around the world whose grievances are legitimate. The international community, governments and international organizations, politicians, academics, religious and community

leaders, in general, needs to do better at disputing terrorist propaganda and misinformation. We need to tackle head on the false narrative that the West is at war with Islam with both our words and our deeds.”

The truth of the matter is that Islamist grievances are not legitimate. These “grievances” include the very existence of Israel, the separation of church and state, secularism, pluralism, the absence of Islamic hegemony, the classification of Hamas and Hizballah as terrorist groups, and any perceived “insult” against Islam. It is true that the Islamist narrative states that there has been a war against Islam since the Crusades, but the responsibility for changing the false narrative falls only on the heads of the Islamist groups in the Muslim world and the West, including those here in the United States that routinely portray the U.S. at war with Islam. Unless we are prepared to accept severe restrictions on free speech, legitimize terrorist groups, allow the introduction of Islamic law in the U.S., prohibit any criticism of Islam, and propose the destruction of Israel, nothing we do will satisfy the “grievances” of the radical Islamic believers. And unless recognize that the threat of Al Qaeda cannot be decoupled from the larger radical Islamic threat, a counter-terrorist focus on Al Qaeda only is destined to fail.

Recommendations

- Congress should encourage close cooperation between the United States and the new Pakistani regime – particularly on the intelligence and military fronts. The new government will likely pursue a policy toward FATA and NWFP that is detrimental to U.S. security concerns, Pakistan’s internal security, and regional stability, but this will change once the Taliban, al Qaeda, and their tribal allies prove themselves, again, to be unreliable, irrational, and irrepressibly violent. The U.S. must maintain friendly relations and use soft power to influence and modify Pakistan’s frontier policies over time in order to seek to deny FATA and NWFP as sanctuaries for al Qaeda and various Taliban groups.
- According to my sources, the CIA has become risk averse in carrying out HUMINT operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Congress should encourage the CIA and other agencies in the Intelligence Community to take more active and aggressive measures to gather intelligence and act against al Qaeda and Taliban militias in FATA and NWFP. These measures will likely entail higher risk, but also have the potential of higher reward. Al Qaeda and its allies have been able to act with impunity in these regions and our Intelligence Community should be doing more to challenge them with covert action and aggressive information campaigns.
- Pressure must continue on our NATO allies to take a larger role in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.
- Congress should require the lead agencies and departments in the Global War on Terrorism (most notably the FBI, CIA, and DHS) to fully and formally educate all counterterrorism personnel in the proclaimed Islamist ideology of al Qaeda the global Islamist movement. This ideology is easily accessible in Islamic religious texts and treatises such as Sayyid Qutb’s *Milestones*. This has not been instituted at any agency. More than six years after 9/11, this is inexcusable.
- In a related matter, the Muslim Brotherhood movement should be considered a strategic enemy of the United States. It should be designated as a foreign power and a threat, from a counterintelligence point-of-view, to the national security of the United States. The Muslim Brotherhood has stated clearly that it considers the United States to be its enemy, despite claims by some commentators that there exists a moderate wing of the movement that somehow does not support the movement’s core goals and ideology.
- The United States government should fully exploit internal Muslim Brotherhood documents released in the course of the 2007 Holy Land Foundation trial as evidence as a widespread and sophisticated Islamist subversive movement in the United States.
- As noted in this testimony, procedures for the US Visa Waiver Program and US VISIT’s departure control need to be reviewed, updated and enhanced to remove any remaining loopholes that might be exploited by terrorists, including a reassessment of how adding new countries into the fold will increase the chances of terrorist elements infiltrating the United States, as well as implementing safeguards which take into account al Qaeda’s

stated approach of recruiting and Western converts to radical Islam who may have European and non-traditionally Muslim identities to more easily slip through the system.

إنا كفيناك المستهزئين
"Surely we will suffice you against the scoffers"

جملة «رسول الله يوحنا»
"The Messenger of Allah Unites Us" Campaign

Muhammad
The Messenger of Allah
Unites Us

WANTED FOR JUSTICE
مطلوبون للعدالة
Wanted for Justice

 Isbeth Kustøen	 Carsten Juste	 Arne Tjønn
 Waleed Saleh مذيع قناة الجزيرة Villifier of the Divine Being, the Holy Messenger, and the True Religion on the screen of Al Jazeera	 Erik Ringmar كاتب السيناريو The first who dared to draw the evil pictures of the Greatest Messenger	 Esmerine Bone الصحفية Culture editor of the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten
 Faisal Al-qasbi	 Paul Brindley	 Tager Sæderjahn

Bate #ISE-SW/ 1B10/ 0000413

In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful
Thanks be to God, Lord of the Two Worlds,
Prayers and peace be upon the master of the Messengers

An Explanatory Memorandum
On the General Strategic Goal for the Group
In North America
5/22/1991

Contents:

- 1- An introduction in explanation
- 2- The Concept of Settlement
- 3- The Process of Settlement
- 4- Comprehensive Settlement Organizations

Bate #ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000427

Attachment number (1)

A list of our organizations and the organizations of our friends
[Imagine if t they all march according to one plan!!!]

- 1- ISNA = ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA
- 2- MSA = MUSLIM STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION
- 3- MCA = THE MUSLIM COMMUNITIES ASSOCIATION
- 4- AMSS = THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
- 5- AMSE = THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
- 6- IMA = ISLAMIC MEDICAL ASSOCIATION

- 7- ITC = ISLAMIC TEACHING CENTER
- 8- NAIT = NORTH AMERICAN ISLAMIC TRUST
- 9- FID = FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
- 10- IHC = ISLAMIC HOUSING COOPERATIVE
- 11- ICD = ISLAMIC CENTERS DIVISION
- 12- ATP = AMERICAN TRUST PUBLICATIONS
- 13- AVC = AUDIO-VISUAL CENTER
- 14- IBS = ISLAMIC BOOK SERVICE
- 15- MBA = MUSLIM BUSINESSMEN ASSOCIATION
- 16- MYNA = MUSLIM YOUTH OF NORTH AMERICA
- 17- IFC = ISNA FIQH COMMITTEE
- 18- IPAC = ISNA POLITICAL AWARENESS COMMITTEE
- 19- IED = ISLAMIC EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

- 20- MAYA = MUSLIM ARAB YOUTH ASSOCIATION
- 21- MISG = MALASIAN [sic] ISLAMIC STUDY GROUP
- 22- IAP = ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION FOR PALESTINE
- 23- UASR = UNITED ASSOCIATION FOR STUDIES AND RESEARCH
- 24- OLF = OCCUPIED LAND FUND
- 25- MIA = MERCY INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION

- 26- ISNA = ISLAMIC CIRCLE OF NORTH AMERICA
- 27- BMI = BAITUL MAL INC
- 28- IIIT = INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ISLAMIC THOUGHT
- 29- IIC = ISLAMIC INFORMATION CENTER

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, all of your statements in their entirety will be part of the record. We really appreciate your being here.

Let me start the questioning.

First, we know that al Qaeda attacked us on 9/11. As some of you have indicated, we know we have made some significant progress, but Osama bin Laden in particular and al Qaeda in general continue to be an issue for us. Whether it is al Qaeda-specific or al Qaeda as the cause that other organizations or other groups choose to align themselves with in order to carry out terrorist action globally against Western countries, nonetheless, 7 years later, al Qaeda is still able to recruit; they are still able to train; and in particular, Osama bin Laden is still able to send out his messages, as well as al-Zawahiri. Whether or not they are coded messages or just messages of encouragement, they are still problematic to all of us.

My first question is: How is it that al Qaeda has been able to regain strength? With Osama bin Laden still at large, what does this specifically mean for al Qaeda? I will ask each of you to comment.

Mr. BERGEN. How is it that al Qaeda has regained strength?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. How is it that he has been able to regain strength? Secondly, what is the role that Osama bin Laden plays to that end?

Mr. BERGEN. We know in 2002, Mr. Chairman, that the documents that were picked up on the battlefield after the fall of the Taliban revealed that al Qaeda internally felt under great pressure, and there was a fair amount of criticism for months within al Qaeda for attacking the United States. These documents say we have got an 800-pound gorilla coming after us, the United States. The attack was a dumb idea.

In 2002, al Qaeda, by its own account, not by our account, was on the ropes. A critical component in al Qaeda's resurgence was the Iraq war, because, A, it confirmed bin Laden's large narrative about the United States; B, it increased radicalization around the Muslim world; and it increased anti-Americanism. So al Qaeda was able to take the Iraq war and basically use it as a life raft, and of course they kept their safe haven on the Afghan-Pakistan border.

Safe havens are very important because without safe havens, you cannot train. Without training, you cannot be an effective terrorist. We do not train the American Army on the Internet. It turns out that you do not train effective terrorists on the Internet; you train them in training camps. So they kept their safe haven on the Afghan-Pakistan border, and they have this important new development in Iraq. Both the Democrats and the Republicans tend to say that the central front is either in Iraq or in Pakistan. The problem is the central fronts are in both countries right now. So those are, I think, some of the factors of the resurgence.

How important is bin Laden to the movement? I believe that if von Stauffenberg had killed Hitler with a bomb under the conference room table in 1944, World War II would have finished much quicker. Bin Laden and Hitler are very different people, but certain people influence history very directly. As for Ayman al-

Zawahiri and bin Laden, it was their idea for 9/11 largely. Al Qaeda is their creature. If you took them away from the scene, the organization itself would be very wounded. We weren't attacked by a set of ideas on 9/11, we weren't attacked by an ideological movement. We were attacked by an organization. Organizations have leaders. Bin Laden is the most important leader. If we capture or kill Ayman al-Zawahiri, that would be useful, but it would not be as important as capturing bin Laden. Ayman al-Zawahiri is somebody who, even within the organization, is not regarded with great love. People love bin Laden. That is a very strong word.

Mr. GRENIER. Well, I would support what most people have just said. I think when we talk about al Qaeda as narrowly defined, that organization that was responsible for the attacks on 9/11, it has been able to reconstitute itself in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas. I was there in Pakistan when members of al Qaeda were fleeing out of Afghanistan. At that point they were intent on making their way through Pakistan to Iran and to the gulf. It was as a result of that, their sort of moving through these ratlines, if you will, through Pakistan, that we were able with our Pakistani allies to wrap up a very large number not only of senior al Qaeda cadres, but also of simple fighters who were coming out of Afghanistan.

At a certain point they realized that there was an opportunity for them to gain safe haven in the tribal areas. The first great concentration of them we saw was in South Waziristan. We really sort of tumbled into that in the spring of 2004. I will not recount all of the agonized history, but there were effective actions that were taken by ourselves and by the Pakistanis there. There was a migration up into North Waziristan and into the Bajor Agency, and that is really still where the center, if you will, of safe haven activity on the part of al Qaeda still exists.

Because of some of the history that Steve just mentioned, particularly the agreement that was reached by General Musharraf with the extremists in North Waziristan in September of 2006, unfortunately they have been able to establish themselves quite firmly in that area, and that is the situation as it still persists here today.

With regard to al Qaeda in Iraq, that is a very significant phenomenon. It is somewhat different, however, I think, from the narrative that I have just described. Al Qaeda in Iraq was a creature, a creation, of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi was sort of, roughly, affiliated with al Qaeda. He was not sort of a bayat-swearing member of al Qaeda, but he was able, if you will, to establish a franchise.

And he saw a great benefit to himself and his organization in assuming, if you will, the al Qaeda brand. And as Peter has pointed out, we see the same thing replicating itself elsewhere, organizations which heretofore have seen themselves as part of a national struggle, whether in Morocco particularly, in Algeria, in Libya, and elsewhere. Now as they have been stymied in their efforts to take over their native countries they have, if you will, rebranded themselves as al Qaeda, in this case al Qaeda in the Arab Maghreb, and also are beginning to think of themselves and their mission in very different terms. The former GSPC, now a major part of al Qaeda

in the Arab Maghreb, whereas before saw its mission as Islamizing, liberating their country Algeria, now they see themselves quite self-consciously as part of a global jihad. And I think that is significant. We are seeing the same thing now with hitherto independent movements in Pakistan and Afghanistan. We now see members of the Taliban who before, although they were providing assistance and safe haven to al Qaeda, now they see themselves much more so than before as part of the same global movement.

The same is true of the collection of the extremist groups within Pakistan, the rise of Pakistanis who now refer to themselves loosely as Tehrik-e-Taliban. They now again see themselves, rather than people who were locked in the highly particular goals and aspirations, they now see themselves as part of a much wider movement.

So, on the one hand, al Qaeda as narrowly defined I think is a phenomenon largely of the Pakistan-Afghanistan tribal areas, but the influence of bin Laden has been one to spread the brand around the world.

I disagree a little bit with Peter in that my belief is that if bin Laden were to die tomorrow it would not mean the end of al Qaeda. I think that he is a great symbol for the movement. I think the fact that he is still alive and remains at large is greatly encouraging to those within al Qaeda and to members of that much broader movement. But I think that they would find a way to carry on both as a movement and as an organization if he were to meet his demise.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Emerson.

Mr. EMERSON. You raise a great question. How is it that al Qaeda could reconstitute itself in such an incredible way 6½ years later after all of the efforts we have gone through, cutting the money, arresting, killing, targeting people, killing top leaders, interrogating, getting our intelligence? How could they still do this.

I think my response would be, one, there was almost a perfect storm that developed right after 9/11, and one was the incredible fast-paced developments of information technology that allowed al Qaeda to transmit propaganda as well as communicate internally without being detected by U.S. technology. We were not fast enough to figure out how they were getting their tapes, how they were communicating among themselves. In the 1990s we picked up their cell phones and we picked up their satellite cell phones, but they have gone beyond that, way beyond that. So they figured out a way to communicate without us detecting what they were saying. We used to hear the word “chatter.” Well, you know what the word “chatter” means; it is disparate words and doesn’t mean anything to us. It is nonstructured data.

Number two, there are a lot of demobilized Jihadists from after the Afghanistan invasion.

Number three, there was the liberation of territory essentially established by the Taliban and al Qaeda supporters in Waziristan and parts of Afghanistan and certainly in the FATA and the North-West Frontier Province.

Four is European laws had not come to grips yet with the fact that a lot of the extremist Muslim immigrants had an easy—there were no laws restricting the flow back and forth between Europe and Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other countries who had supported

terrorism. So there was a large migration, I shouldn't say massive, but a large flow of people who went into Pakistan, got training, then came out and went back to Europe. So bases in Europe got established.

And then, of course, you had self-anointed franchises.

So al Qaeda sort of grew again by virtue of its children in the Maghreb, in Algeria, in Lebanon, in Gaza.

You know, when you asked the question of the reconstitution of al Qaeda, you could ask the same question of Hamas, which was on its legs when it was blockaded entirely and it is still surviving very well. You could have asked the question about Islamic jihad, you could have asked it about GSPS.

All of these groups show one thing in common: The transcendence of radical Islamic theology over self-interest, over civil interests, over any national interests, over any economic interests. 15 of the 9/11 hijackers came from families that had wealth considered to be evaluated more than \$10 million in value. So it shows that wealthy families produced kids who carried out the 9/11 attacks.

So that transcendence of radical Islamic theology is what we were dealing with, and I think we have failed, honestly, as a government to come to terms with this.

And I give you one great example. When Karen Hughes, who was Under Secretary of State, was in charge of this outreach program, and to use the market of ideas, she thought that 60-second commercials and radio stations were going to basically convert people who believed in jihad and suicide bombings into rational, democratic, secular, pluralist folks. It didn't work. It wouldn't work. She ended up meeting with the Muslim Brotherhood thinking that, if we are rational, they are rational. We view others the same way we view ourselves. Well, it wasn't the case. They lied to her. In fact, we ended up empowering the Muslim Brotherhood and empowering radical Islamic groups around the world, including groups in the United States, into believing somehow that we are a weak tiger and very weak and naive in believing that somehow talking to people was the only way we were going to convince them that the free market would produce a rational response.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Emerson.

Mr. Hoekstra.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to the witnesses. I appreciate your time and your knowledge on this background. And with all that we have studied on the committee over the last number of years, I think we start and have an appreciation for how complex that issue is and how difficult it is to get your hands around it. And I think in this last question, in your opening testimony, you talked about one thing that I agree with you on, is their ability to use new technology, use the Information Age, and use it to their benefit to drive their message to perhaps provide some direction to where they want these disparate organizations to move and to get things done.

I think the other thing that I believe about al Qaeda is that it is a learning organization. It adapts as its reality changes, it adapts very, very quickly. They have used various things to pro-

mote their brand identity, whether it was the occupation of the two holy places or the holy cities.

A while back the popular line was to say, well, you know you need to deal with the Palestinian issue, because that is what is fueling al Qaeda and radical jihadism. Then it is Iraq. Then it is the Danish cartoons. Now it may be builders sometime over the next couple months as that evolves and takes on a life of its own. Then it was 9/11. But they have been very, very effective in driving their message through technology.

I was in Libya last week, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco. I have been to Algeria. And it is interesting, as they have evolved, it is very interesting to be able to go and meet with Muammar Khadafi, and find out that Khadafi is now an ally with us in a certain context against radical Jihadists, as are the governments in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. So as radical Jihadists morph, so do we. And I think we can make a very good argument that we need to do more, but we need to do more of it quicker.

The thing that I would be interested in is your perception of the ability of al Qaeda, al Qaeda Central as we have referred to it out of Pakistan, the Pak-Afghan border, to extend its reach and influence into Western Europe, into the United States, to coordinate, direct, plan, train attacks against these. How good is it?

During the break I think we were talking about the book, there was a book that came out, Leadership Jihad. And in that book, he makes the argument that al Qaeda Central isn't that important anymore, that radical Islam has taken a life of its own, and that eliminating bin Laden, taking care of Zawahiri, it is not that big of a deal anymore. I think the panel here may disagree with it. But I would be interested in your ability or your perception of al Qaeda to be able, from al Qaeda Central, to project into Western Europe and into the United States through homegrown terrorism. And we will go through the list.

Mr. BERGEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Hoekstra. Al Qaeda's ability to expand influence into Western Europe is obviously pretty high. I mean, the statement by John Evans, the head of MI5, that there were 2,000 people that they consider serious security risks sort of speaks for itself. Britain of course is particularly problematic because so many British Muslims visit Pakistan every year; 70 percent of British Muslims are Pakistani, and a disproportionate number of those are Kashmiri.

The problem is also true in many European countries, but we are somewhat insulated by several factors in the United States. First of all, there is something called the American Dream. I grew up in Britain; I am not aware of a British dream or an EU dream certainly. And a country built on immigration like the United States is able to integrate its American Muslims much better. American Muslims are better educated than the average American, they have higher incomes, et cetera, et cetera.

It is very hard to prove negatives, but I don't think al Qaeda sleeper cells exist in this country. If they exist, they are either comatose or dead. They have done nothing in the last several years. We have seen people particularly with al Qaeda living in the United States, but they are very small in number compared to the

numbers we are seeing in Europe. And I can give you the names, but the names, you can count them on a few hands.

So I think al Qaeda's ability to extend its influence into the United States is very small. But that has never been a problem anyway. When being attacked by jihadi terrorists, they are people coming from outside: Ramzi Yousef, Ahmad Ressaam, the 9/11 hijackers. So luckily we are somewhat insulated. In terms of Europe it is a very different picture.

Now, of course you could have a mass casualty attack on a group of Americans in Europe quite easily. If the plane bomb plot in the summer of 2006 had succeeded, that is six American airliners, do the math; it is what, almost 2,000 people. It would have been a 9/11 style event. So that is really where the problem is, and that problem is going to get worse rather than better because for demographic reasons Europeans are not having children anymore. When you visit Florence in the future, it will be like the neutron bomb has gone off, where there are buildings but no Italians because Italians are simply not having kids. These countries face existential choices, which is we are either going to have a country without people or we are going to have to import a lot of people from somewhere else. And where will those people come from? In most European countries, the Middle East or North Africa. And, through a combination of European racism, a certain amount of alienation, a certain amount of homesickness, a number of those immigrants will turn to the al Qaeda ideology. Think about 9/11. 9/11 wasn't incubated really in Afghanistan; it was as much incubated in Hamburg as it was in Afghanistan.

So that is the problem going forward. And in some ways there is some optimism there, because it is harder to get in the United States. European countries also are realizing belatedly that they have this domestic problem.

Mr. GRENIER. I would very much agree with what Peter has just said. One of the things that I would point to as we look at the number of actual terrorist attacks, such as what occurred in London in July of 2005 and a number of others, to include some potentially catastrophic attacks that have been hatched in Western Europe and fortunately have not come to fruition. For the most part, if I am not mistaken, the would-be perpetrators and/or perpetrators of those acts have been self-motivated and self-organized. These were not individuals who were recruited out of the tribal areas in Pakistan and then dispatched into Western Europe in order to mount these attacks. For the most part, these are people who came together sort of self-consciously, if you will, as part of a community nursing resentments and deciding to do something about it locally.

Where the link with al Qaeda has occurred is they have reached back from a place where they could get support, either it is ideological support, religious instruction, technical support, financial support, back into the Afghan-Pakistan tribal areas. And I think that is significant; where the impetus, where the initiative has come from is significant. And the fact that the impetus came from areas far removed from the safe haven is very significant.

As Peter has pointed out, the chances of that sort of a plot being hatched in a place like Western Europe are far greater than a similar thing taking place in the United States. Number one, there is

a much larger Muslim population in many of the Western European countries, much less integration, much more perceived cause for resentment and hatred of the West than, fortunately, is the case here in the United States. It doesn't mean that it couldn't happen here in the United States, but I think that the chances for it are much greater in Western Europe.

One of the great concerns that I have is the relative ease of transport between Western Europe and the United States; the fact that we have a very permissive visa regime between Western European countries and the United States which would enable those who would do us harm who are not indigenous to the United States to travel into the United States. That is not an argument for somehow raising much higher visa barriers, but it is a fact that, given the nature of our society, given the open society that we want to foster and maintain, it necessarily carries with it a much greater risk and vulnerability.

Mr. EMERSON. I would say that, first of all, there is a common narrative in al Qaeda's mantra with all of the defendants arrested in every single plot since 9/11. That mantra is that there is a war against Islam, it has been carried out by the West or the U.S. or—by the West since the crusade in 1095 and therefore we have to avenge it. And that was the mantra of the Danish suspects arrested in September, that was the mantra of the German suspects arrested earlier this year, that was the mantra of the British suspects arrested in the second plot and in the videos released in the first attack in July of 2005. And, by the way, that is also the mantra of the averted attacks in the United States. And I guess I would disagree with Peter, who I, by the way, used to work with very closely many years ago, and I would disagree with him on one point: That I think that the radicalism in the United States has not manifested itself because we have done a much better job of intelligence gathering in terms of preventing attacks. But I think the radicalism is pervasive here because of the groups that exist here. One can see they all were derived—not all of them, but some of the mainstream, quote, groups were derived from the Muslim Brotherhood as revealed in the Holy Land documents. And their mantra is, and you can hear it and we hear it all the time when we attend their conferences, is that there is a war against Islam. And a Canadian intelligence official testified last year that that is the one single motivating factor in inducing young Muslim men to carry out attacks, that type of anger.

And so we averted an attack at Fort Dix, only because of a Circuit City clerk who saw—he was copying videos and he saw something suspicious. We averted an attack in Ohio in Peoria. We averted an attack in Lodi. And people make fun of these arrests because people are arrested at a very early stage of the plots, and the FBI becomes a victim of becoming too aggressive. Had these plots matured more and the public had seen much more of the evidence, then I think the public would be convinced that we have a serious radical Islamic danger in the United States. It doesn't mean that the vast majority of Muslims support it. They don't. But there is a radicalization process going on here largely induced by some of the mainstream groups that, unfortunately, have been considered

to be partners with the FBI when they should be considered outcasts.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hoekstra.

Mr. Holt.

Mr. HOLT. I yield to Ms. Eshoo.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Eshoo.

Ms. ESHOO. Thank you. I appreciate it. Thank you for your testimony today. I have four questions.

My first question is, what do you estimate the number of al Qaeda in Iraq today, and what did you estimate al Qaeda to be when we invaded? That is my first question.

My second question is on training. Can you describe where al Qaeda's training is today, the quality of it, the number of graduates, so to speak, that they produce? Give us some indication of what you know about that. And to what extent do you think al Qaeda is responsible for the acts of murder, kidnapping, terror against Iraqi Christians?

Mr. BERGEN. Thank you for those very excellent questions. The first one, al Qaeda in Iraq today, the size. Al Qaeda in Iraq is 80 to 90 percent an Iraqi organization. That has changed over time. When it started of course it was largely foreigners. Al Qaeda in Iraq, even though it is a relatively small part of the insurgency, perhaps 3,000 would be the minimal number, maybe 5,000 would be the maximal, who is conducting 80 to 90 percent of the suicide attacks and therefore has had a disproportionate effect on the course of the war.

The size of al Qaeda in Iraq when we invaded was zero. There was no—Zarqawi was in Kurdish Iraq, northern Iraq, which of course was an area more under our control than under Saddam. So there was no al Qaeda presence in Iraq. Unfortunately, as a result of our invasion, there is now.

The second question, training al Qaeda today, where is it happening, how good are the graduates, what are they getting. Let's look at the London attack of July 7, 2005 as a sort of model of this training. Two of the guides, two of the leaders trained in an al Qaeda training camp on the North-West Frontier Province.

What are they learning? They are learning how to make a bomb with hydrogen peroxide. And one of my proposals is we need to be very careful henceforth about the way we control industrial strength hydrogen peroxide in this country. A bomb made out of hydrogen peroxide, and I have seen this being demonstrated in Britain, a relatively small amount would basically blow out the entire—everybody in this room would be dead. This is not the sort of thing you get at your hairdresser, industrial strength hydrogen peroxide.

That is what is being taught. That was also the material that was going to be used in the summer plot to bring down the American airliners, that was also the material that was going to be used in the Ramstein Air Force Base. The numbers of people who are being trained are relatively small, but they are, unfortunately, enough to create these plots.

Under the Taliban in Afghanistan, you are talking about hundreds of people going through training camps at any given moment.

Here, you are talking about 10, 20 guys, all guys of course, in a small compound not amenable to overhead imagery, not amenable to bombing, disguised, able to get the bomb-making, how to run a cell, enough to basically be an effective terrorist. So I hope that answers that question.

And then the final question, al Qaeda's attacks on Iraqi Christians, I really don't know the answer to.

Ms. ESHOO. Thank you. Does anyone want to add to what was just said in answering these questions?

Mr. GRENIER. I think I would add a little bit with regard to the situation in Iraq. As Peter has pointed out, al Qaeda in Iraq is primarily an Iraqi phenomenon. Perhaps 90 percent of its numbers have been Iraqis. And so, yes, while I would agree that there really was no al Qaeda in Iraq before the invasion, part of the reason that we suddenly had this flowering, if you will, of al Qaeda in Iraq was that although there was very little visible sign of an Islamic radicalization among some elements of the Iraqi population that we saw elsewhere in the Arab and Islamic world, we didn't see it in Iraq largely because of the climate of repression that existed there. Once a vacuum was created, the Ba'ath Party was removed, the Iraqi Army was removed, it suddenly became possible for this broad cultural phenomenon to manifest itself inside Iraq. It was precipitated I think by outsiders, foreigners who came into Iraq. But very quickly, again, in the absence of the further discrediting of the Ba'ath Party, radical Islamism became the primary ideology through which Iraqi nationalism expressed itself.

Mr. ESHOO. It is a tragedy is what it is. That is just one word to describe it.

Let me ask this. In moving forward, in January of 2009 we are going to have new leadership in the White House. And if two—either one of the Democrats are elected, they are promising a change of policy in Iraq. Can you fast forward and tell us what you think Iraq would look like with a drawdown of American troops and what it would look like, what Iraq would look like and al Qaeda?

The CHAIRMAN. And if you can do it briefly, because we want to get all members to ask their questions.

Mr. BERGEN. Briefly. Al Qaeda has a narrative about the United States as a paper tiger narrative. Any drawdown from Iraq will inform that narrative. Vietnam, Beirut, Mogadishu.

We are on the horns of a dilemma. We are going to confirm their narrative and we will help their strategy the less we are there. On the other hand, the fact we are there increases radicalization and gives energy to the jihadi movement around the world.

So my short answer is, it is a very difficult problem, because you have got to balance the fact that you are increasing radicalization by us being there, and yet at the same time if we simply abandon the field to al Qaeda they have a strategy as well, which is to regroup, get a place for a safe haven in Iraq. Right now they are not doing well, but we know that the Iraqi Army is not going to do better than the U.S. military against this group. And as it is more of an Iraqi problem, we can guarantee that al Qaeda—if it is more of an Iraqi military approach to al Qaeda, that is less strong than a U.S. military approach.

Mr. GRENIER. I guess my short answer to the question is that it very much would depend on how a drawdown occurred. Right now al Qaeda in Iraq has been knocked back on its heels. It is on the run. And the reason for it is because they were able to show themselves for who and what they are to the mass of the Sunni population in western Iraq. Living under al Qaeda in a place where they actually hold sway is not a pleasant experience, and that is the reason why we have had the Sunni Awakening, why the Sons of Iraq have organized themselves, and why they have accepted support from the United States.

So I guess I would say that in the context of any sort of drawdown from Iraq, it would be very important for us to maintain the U.S. connection with the Sunni Awakening and to continue to support that. I think that we could do that with far fewer troops in Iraq. Quite frankly, as someone who spent 2½ years devoted to Iraq since just before the invasion, why we are enmeshing ourselves in intra-Sunni fighting in Iraq is somewhat of a mystery to me. But I think that we could maintain what we need to do in the terrorism fight against al Qaeda with much smaller numbers of troops in Iraq.

Mr. EMERSON. I would just say, I agree with Bob's comments that essentially it is how you withdraw. And if it is a precipitous withdrawal, I think that al Qaeda would fill that void. I mean, al Qaeda had its ebbs and flows, and it is really now at its nadir because of the opposition that it instilled and the resentment that is so popular in the Sunni areas.

The issue of al Qaeda seeing the United States on the run, vacating, running away, like bin Laden has said we ran from Beirut, we ran from Somalia, we ran from Vietnam, this would fuel their sense of emboldenment and I think empower them further. So it is how we draw down, and it is how you conduct the policies, as Bob just said, of continuing certain policies that have been very successful in terms of fueling a popular resentment against al Qaeda in Iraq, which really has resulted in a dramatic reduction of support for al Qaeda in Iraq in the last 2 years.

You had asked a question before about to what extent is al Qaeda responsible for killing Iraqi Christians. We have worked with some Christians in certain Muslim countries, including Iraq. At least I have been in contact with them. And in Iraq, as you know, the Christian community has been decimated. A large exodus, about 50 percent have actually left the country, and the other 50 percent have had to almost relocate themselves because of being forced out of areas. They have been forced out of areas because of a coalition. First it started off by al Qaeda, but now it has been picked up by radical Shiites who essentially had joined forces with the Sunnis at one point but now they have picked up the radicalized movement to push the Christians out of Iraq and to deny them. As you know, a major church leader was just assassinated just the other day, and that has been a regular occurrence almost every month now.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Following up on that, Mr. Emerson. If we leave, will the Chaldeans be better off in Iraq? Any chance at all that they would be better off?

Mr. EMERSON. You know, it is a good question, Mr. Issa. I don't know. The Chaldeans have been particularly oppressed.

Mr. ISSA. But likely—just, you know, limited time here. But likely, if we were to leave today, they would be worse off?

Mr. EMERSON. They would not be protected as much. Right.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Grenier, if we were to leave Iraq today, with the current Shia government and their mixed history on how they treat the Sunni, would it be reasonable to assume that al Qaeda would have an advantage by simply playing the Shia government and any failures of their fairness in order to gain a foothold of support back in the Sunni community?

In other words—all my questions are very straightforward. A lot of people would have you believe a whole bunch of things about Iraq. The only thing that I am concerned about today with Iraq is if we leave are we better off? Some people have tried to say that if we get out of Iraq now things will be better. Specifically, the current government, as you see it, and that has been a public thing, today is not a government that Sunnis trust or that Sunnis believe they get fairness from. Realistically, the strides we have made in the Sunni community to get Sunni to fight this Sunni insurgency of al Qaeda, wouldn't that take a tremendous step backwards if we were to precipitously leave or if we were simply not there today, so to speak?

Mr. GRENIER. If there was a total U.S. withdrawal? Is that what you—

Mr. ISSA. That is what I am saying.

Mr. GRENIER. I think that the short answer to your question is, yes, the situation I think would be far worse. The Sunni dominated government does not now nor do I think in the near term they are likely—

Mr. ISSA. The Shia dominated government.

Mr. GRENIER. The Shia dominated government, is not likely to provide institutional support to the Sunni Awakening. Quite frankly, they see it as a threat to themselves.

Mr. ISSA. And I can understand that with the historic past it is going to take time to heal those wounds.

Mr. BERGEN, when we look at the rest of the areas in which there has been radical jihadist activity over the years, the Hamas, funded by Iran, are Sunni; they in fact have conducted with Shia money for a long time a war, an insurgency against Israel. Isn't that correct?

Mr. BERGEN. Yes.

Mr. ISSA. The United States hasn't been there, and we failed, all of us have failed to stop it, as I see it, because in fact the United States has not been able to get the buy-in and the actual combating of Hamas by the Palestinians. No matter how we look at good efforts, bad efforts, the bottom line is the Palestinian Authority has never been able to effectively attack Hamas and Israel has been effective only in attacking them, but in fact ultimately not eliminating the radicalism.

Is that a fair assessment of what we deal with in the Palestinian territories today, in Gaza particularly?

Mr. BERGEN. I am not an expert in this area, but it seems so.

Mr. ISSA. Okay. In Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood had its roots and continues to this day, would you say that the Egyptian Government, whether we approve or don't approve of their tactics, have for the most part been able to contain the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, their growth, their exports, and their terrorist activities, recognizing there have been some stellar attacks over the years? But would you generally say that Egypt has, at its own expense in its own way, with limited help from the outside world, been able to contain the Muslim Brotherhood?

Mr. BERGEN. Well, yes and no. Because you can make the argument that much of al Qaeda's violence stems from the treatment of people like Ayman al-Zawahiri in Egyptian prisons. That is where he got more radicalized. And of course, the Muslim Brotherhood has done quite well in the elections; I would disagree with Steve on this point. I mean, al Qaeda hates the Muslim Brotherhood precisely because it participates in elections. So these are apples and oranges in many ways.

Mr. ISSA. The reason that I am going through this line of questioning, recognizing that each one of these has a pitfall in some way, is as we as the intelligence community in a public hearing versus our often private, we are here to talk in a term of policy. Realistically, when we look at all the countries, and I only went through a smattering of them, I could have gotten into Lebanon and Hezbollah. Isn't our only choice, whether it is in Iraq or anywhere else in the Muslim world, our only choice to find a government that will work with us, arm them, equip them, assist them in not radicalizing further, and fight jihadism in each and every one of those countries? And we could obviously go to Germany and other countries that are not Muslim countries and deal with theirs. But isn't that ultimately our only choice, that whether we have troops in Iraq or not, we are going to have to be side-by-side with some Iraqi Government stopping this and stemming the flow of jihadism from that country? Isn't that ultimately the only choice America has in not one or two but in dozens of countries?

Mr. BERGEN. Not really. Because it depends on what form of government you are talking about. It is not an accident that so many members of al Qaeda develop in countries with authoritarian regimes.

Mr. ISSA. Like Germany?

Mr. BERGEN. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen. I mean, look at the vast disproportionate numbers within al Qaeda are these kinds of—emerge out of these kinds of societies.

Mr. ISSA. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, I might just note that what the American President and this Congress have been attempting to do in Iraq is to make sure that Iraq is not an oppressive, totalitarian government such as the ones cited by the gentleman.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Issa.

Mr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, witnesses, for being here. I was out at another hearing; I don't know if this has been said already, but I don't think you can say it enough. With the discussion today about how the al Qaeda has become stronger over the recent time and in light of the hearings yesterday in the Senate and probably what is happening today in the House, where General Petraeus has stated that there is no light at the end of the tunnel, we haven't turned the corner, and we have moved the champagne to the back of the refrigerator, I think it is important to note that none of these problems are the fault of the very brave and heroic U.S. military people who are serving abroad. They are doing an outstanding job, and I just don't want anybody to come away with the feeling that they have let us down.

Al Qaeda has used the situation with the Palestinians to generate a lot of anti-Western outrage throughout the Muslim community, and the administration has just recently—this administration has just recently engaged in trying to figure out a peace process for that situation. Has the administration's reluctance to encourage a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict heightened al Qaeda's ability to build popular support and recruit new members?

Mr. EMERSON. If I could respond and just add something to what Mr. Issa—

Mr. THOMPSON. No. You can do that later. This is my time.

Mr. EMERSON. Okay. I won't take your time away. I think that the bottom line is you can't make peace unless somebody will make peace with you. And Israel faces a problem that it lives in a bad neighborhood and it can't move. And Mr. Abbas may have good intentions, but he can't basically even tie his shoelaces without getting permission.

Mr. THOMPSON. So you don't think that waiting 7 years to engage has been a problem?

Mr. EMERSON. I think in fact engagement is not the answer. I think that the notion even that an Arab-Israeli solution is going to tamp down al Qaeda is absolutely erroneous. And I think that if Israel was eradicated tomorrow you would still have the same degree of Islamic radicalism.

Mr. THOMPSON. I understand. Thank you.

Mr. BERGEN. We are interested in swing voters in the Muslim world. We are not going to influence bin Laden. He is irreconcilable. What we are interested in is basically getting the Muslim world to change its opinion about the United States. And there is no single issue that is more important than the Israeli-Palestinian process. And I would add to that that the Kashmiri peace process is something the United States hasn't really engaged in, but that is something the United States should take a much stronger role in because there are some good movements there. We have done very little to help that process. And that is how al Qaeda often recruits people, through the Kashmiri militant process.

Mr. GRENIER. If I could just add to that. I strongly disagree with Mr. Emerson. I think that our failure to use our influence in a way that would ameliorate the situation in Israel and Palestine has very much helped to improve the climate in which al Qaeda is able to recruit elements to its cause. But, as I think Peter is pointing out, even more so I think that it affects the climate within which

terrorists operate. The vast majority of the Islamic world are moderate, they are not inclined or not susceptible themselves to becoming terrorists. However, I think that many of them are ambivalent. Many who don't have to live under the deprivations of al Qaeda themselves feel fundamentally ambivalent about the fact that al Qaeda is among the few elements in the Islamic world who are confronting what they perceive broadly in the Islamic world as an enemy.

The only way that we are going to eliminate al Qaeda is to isolate them and to turn the mass of the Islamic population actively against them. I don't think you do that in the context of a much broader narrative in which Muslims are being seen as oppressed.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. There are about 500,000 Pakistanis living in the United Kingdom, and the planners of Britain's most serious terrorist plots, the 2005 London underground bombings and the 2006 plot to bomb British airliners en route to the United States came about because of folks who are trained, terrorists who are trained in al Qaeda camps in Pakistan before they return to Britain. Do you think that the connection between Britain's Pakistani population and al Qaeda safe havens in the FATA is a problem? Is there a connection there, and is that a problem for us?

Mr. BERGEN. The short answer is yes.

Mr. THOMPSON. In light of what the CIA Director said the other day about training Westerners, we would have a hard time distinguishing if they tried to come into this country?

Mr. EMERSON. In fact, he was referring to the German plot, where the two Westerners had gone to Pakistan together with a Pakistani immigrant to Germany, and who subsequently just blew himself up in a suicide attack. But the two Germans had been to Pakistan to train.

Mr. THOMPSON. Are they training any Americans there? Do you have any knowledge?

Mr. EMERSON. I do not know of any specific knowledge of Americans being trained. I have talked to people in the intelligence community who say that there are Americans of—American immigrants here who have gone back to Pakistan, as we saw in the Lodi connection, to carry out attacks back here when they come back here.

Mr. THOMPSON. Anybody else?

Mr. BERGEN. The only American I can think of is Adam Gadahn. He is an exception that proves the rule. This is quite unusual.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, sometimes the difficulty of these kinds of hearing is that in a short time people are trying to make their points about where we are and either what we did wrong or right. But one thing I found that is completely missing today is putting in context. I am going read a couple things, if I can, quickly.

One, Mr. Emerson, you talked about the fact that they talk often about Beirut, and then we left; the USS Cole, and how we left Yemen. All of those things, not only they talk about, but they use them in recruiting materials. We have recruiting materials where

they recruited people around the world. So we need to put all of this in—that all happened before 9/11, that they were actively recruiting based on their successes and the fact that they chased us out of places I think is unbelievable. They also use the African embassy bombings. Somalia. They list them all. The 1993 World Trade Center, they consider that a successful attack. And they use them in recruiting materials.

So this notion that all of a sudden now they are recruiting based on Iraq does not put it in the proper context, I don't think. And I think that if we are going to make a knowledgeable assessment here we need to set all the facts on the table. And I just want to—a couple of things. This notion, or at least the image that has been given out today is that, gee, there is no terrorism existed in Iraq before we got there. That is clearly not true. It is clearly not true. And it wasn't al Qaeda sponsored, but it was very interesting the parallels. I am just going to read a few that we know since the invasion.

According to correspondence between two Iraqi entities, 79 regime directed attacks were successful against “saboteurs, Kurdish factions, U.N. Operations, and various international NGOs. A routine example is found in a Fedayeen staff officer responding to Uday Hussein's authorization of a series of bomb attacks against foreigners staying in hotels in the northern region. Documents indicate that the regime's use of terrorism was standard practice, although not always successful. From 1991 through 2003, the Saddam regime regarded inspiring, sponsoring, directing, and executing acts of terrorism as an element of state power. Under Saddam, the Iraqi regime used its paramilitary Fedayeen-Saddam training camps to train terrorists for use inside and outside of Iraq.

These are things that we know and are factual.

In 1999, the top 10 graduates of each class Fedayeen-Saddam class were specifically chosen for assignment to London, where they were to be ready to conduct operations anywhere in Europe. A memo specifically states that these trainees are designated for suicide operations.

One more memo from Saddam to the Revolutionary Council in the Iraqi Intelligence Service directed Saddam's decision to form a group to start, quote, hunting Americans present on Arab soil, especially Somalia. A separate memo indicates Saddam ordering the Iraqi Intelligence Service Director to set up operations inside Somalia. The overlap between bin Laden's and Saddam's interests in Somalia provides a tactical example of the parallel between Iraq and radical Islam.

Obviously, they weren't working in cahoots, but their mission was identical. At the same time Saddam was ordering action in Somalia aimed at the American presence, Osama bin Laden was doing exactly the same.

And I guess my point being, and I hope you can flush this out a little bit, that not only at the time I think, Mr. Bergen, you mentioned that they were saying they are down and out and, gee, we shouldn't have done it, there are also many who argue in al Qaeda at the time they weren't doing enough. They needed to be more aggressive. They needed to get more successes like the ones that they

had had where they had the great successes, Beirut, Somalia. And the list goes on. They were trying to promote more of that.

So I don't think it is fair to say, well, they were down on the ropes and they weren't doing any recruiting, and this breathes new life and taught them how to recruit. None of that is really true. There is a long history of these relationships. I mean, Abu Abbas of the PLF was found giving safe haven, who was the chief sponsor of the Achille Lauro event, in Baghdad in 2003. There is a long connection, and this guy was a Stalinist to the hilt. I think he had the largest collection of Stalinist works because he believed in the Stalinist method of cutouts and operatives to do his dirty work around the world. That is where he learned it. At least that is what he said he did, he learned it from those folks.

So I think we have to be careful about this. Iraq can't be handled from an intelligence perspective in isolation. It cannot. When you loaded up 130,000 troops in Afghanistan, to expect that he wasn't going to do the same kind of things that he was already doing against us in other places around the world is ludicrous. The fact that Iran wouldn't do it because somehow it was a nice war in Afghanistan and not a nice war in Iraq really doesn't make any intelligence sense. And the notion that you said, well, gee, if we were to put 130,000 troops on the Afghan border, I would be really curious to know how you believe that would have in any way impacted operations in the tribal areas.

And, Mr. Grenier, I would like you to respond to that as well, knowing the Pakistani Constitution clearly separated those areas out of their own country, which has added to their own difficulty there. And I would appreciate any response. Again, I am just looking for—it has been very focused today. We should put this in the proper context so we understand that terrorism didn't just reinvent itself and automatically appear in Iraq the day we set foot on their soil.

Mr. BERGEN. Of course that is correct. But the Iraq war amplified the energy in the jihadi movement. And without detaining you with the details, that is simply an objective fact. There is a great deal of evidence for this.

The documents you quoted from are—the overall assessment of those documents is there is no operational link between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's Iraq. That is the document you were quoting from earlier. We are presumably talking about al Qaeda; we are not talking about Abu Abbas or others in this hearing; we are talking about people who can actually attack the United States. Abu Abbas killed of course Leon Klinghoffer, but that is one person, that is not a national security problem. So you asked about Pakistan.

Mr. ROGERS. Would Italy agree with your assessment? How do you take terrorism in isolation and say the only group capable of attacking the United States is al Qaeda? I would be curious to your answer to that. Is the only group we should be worried about al Qaeda?

Mr. BERGEN. I am not worried about radical vegetarians attacking the United States right now, but maybe at some point in the future. But al Qaeda—

Mr. ROGERS. Your cynicism is a bit offensive when you list the organizations, and the al Qaeda in the Maghreb is a great example. They migrated there for the financing, but they were still a threat, killed 150,000 people. I don't know how you would dismiss that with a glib comment. That is a serious terrorist organization, took the lives of 150,000 people in the 1990s in Algeria. That is just to be dismissed?

Mr. BERGEN. As to your question on Pakistan, there is a tremendous opportunity on Pakistan.

Mr. ROGERS. I would understand why you wouldn't answer the question, sir.

Mr. BERGEN. As to your question on Pakistan, support for suicide bombing has dropped from 33 percent to 9 percent in the last several years. Support for bin Laden personally has dropped from 70 percent to 4 percent in the last 9 months in the Northwest Frontier Province where he lives.

There is a tremendous opportunity in Pakistan, but also a tremendous potential trap. Nothing has discredited Pakistani officials more than the claim that they are stooges of the United States, one of the reasons Musharraf is such an unpopular guy. So we have to be very careful in our responses in Pakistan.

I think Pakistanis are beginning to dimly realize that this is a problem that is blowing back on themselves. Benazir Bhutto after all was the most popular politician in the country. She was killed by a Taliban cell. So I think that this year, if the Pakistanis don't do what is required politically, the stars are aligning perfectly both in terms of the public opinion and also the politics at the higher level.

So, just to strike a note of optimism, this year could be the year that Pakistan finally gets its act together, because previously it has not been clear whether it is a lack of willingness or a lack of capability or both that they haven't gotten rid of the Taliban and the al Qaeda on their territory. So, looking forward, this might be a moment of opportunity.

Mr. EMERSON. If I could associate myself with your comments. I think you are 100 percent correct that we can't look at this in a vacuum. And the fact is that Saddam—I wrote a book in 1991 about an Iraqi terrorist defector, and he detailed all of the terrorist operations that he was involved with or he was aware of that were supported by Saddam. And they were massive. They were against the United States in terms of planning or even carrying out operations.

And so I think you are 100 percent right that we overthrew a regime that was a terrorist regime, that was carrying out \$25,000 bounties for suicide bombers in Israel, that was carrying out operations in Europe against American embassies, that was a haven for hoards of terrorists from the Palestinian groups, secular Palestinian groups and the Marxist groups, and also some of the jihadist groups. Even though there was no linkage between 9/11 and Saddam, he still had linkages with Hezbollah, and Hezbollah had trained with him and he had provided weapons to Hezbollah. So you would think, how could this be, a secular—a Sunni providing weapons to a Shiite religious group. Well, this is the strange bed-fellows that they produced.

So I think you are 100 percent right to note that that is the context in which we are dealing. And terrorism suddenly didn't arise in Iraq just because we stepped in there in 2003; it had long been there.

Mr. GRENIER. Clearly, Saddam has attempted to use terrorism for his own ends in the past and/or was supportive of terrorist efforts elsewhere, as Steve has just pointed out. In 1991, I have direct knowledge of the efforts on the part of Saddam Hussein and regime to employ Iraqi operatives as terrorists to attack American targets in the context of the first Gulf War. Fortunately, their tradecraft was very bad and we and our allies were able to wrap most of them up. I think probably the most notable example of those attempts occurred in Manila, as I recall.

With regard to efforts on the part of Saddam's operatives to get engaged in Somalia, I am not personally aware of that. I think, as Peter has pointed out, I am not aware of the compelling body of evidence of Saddam's active support to Islamically inspired terrorists. There has been some dabbling on the margins, but I don't think there was a link that was ever firmly made. But with regard to the fact that obviously he played host to Abu Abbas, that is a matter of historical record.

Mr. ROGERS. But don't you think it is very clear by the evidence and even what was uncovered since, that ideologically he wasn't a radical Islam supporter, but for his own aims and ends he certainly did use, operate, and attempt, like you said, some successful, some not so successful, but he was certainly engaged in the activity. The evidence proves it.

Mr. GRENIER. He tends to employ terrorist methodologies.

Mr. ROGERS. My point is, if you commit a crime, I am not sure the motive of doing it for ideological reasons or for personal reasons, you have still committed the crime.

The CHAIRMAN. But let's stop the spinning. And by the rationale expressed here, then the ends justifies the means, and we ought to be prepared to invade other areas of the world that have similar conditions. And clearly that has not been the policy of our government, and we need to recognize that we are——

Mr. ROGERS. I don't know where you are suggesting the spinning necessarily. Presenting the facts as you know them, you can take them for what you want. You can like the war or not. But the problem is if you only hear one set of facts you can't make a conclusion. I am offended that you would say that.

The CHAIRMAN. No. What I am trying to say is that we are where we are today because decisions were made to abandon the effort against al Qaeda in Afghanistan and make a hard charge into Iraq.

Mr. ROGERS. There has been no abandonment of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we certainly have not—we did not put the resources in there when we had bin Laden in Tora Bora. We left, and in fact Mr. Bergen in an article that he wrote said we pulled out the Fifth Special Forces which were the specialists for the——

Mr. ROGERS. And I would remind the chairman that the surge happened there after the Taliban regrouped itself near Quetta, not the al Qaeda. And then they have subsequently come in through the strength of people like Mehsud and others who have fostered

that. That is a big difference than blaming the forces on the ground—

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody is blaming the forces. What we are saying is that policy decisions have brought us where we are today, and that brings us back to the mess that we are in that is going to be passed on to the next administration.

And, which brings me to a question that I want to ask you three gentlemen: Do you have a recommendation for the policymakers? Based on where we are today, based on the fact that we are going to elect a new President with a new administration that is going to have to I think refocus our foreign policy, do each of you, because you are experts in your respective fields that we want to hear from, do you have a recommendation for policymakers? And we will start with Mr. Bergen.

Mr. BERGEN. Thank you. Let me just quickly say, Afghanistan and Pakistan are part of the same problem. They are not two distinct problems. Just as it would be completely absurd to have a discussion about Palestine without a discussion of Israel or vice versa, we have to consider both of these. So these are regional problems.

We also have to say, as policymakers, that we are going to be in Afghanistan for a very long time. Afghans remember we closed our embassy there in 1989. They think we have a narrative that we are going to leave. We are going to be there for 15, 20 years. Let's just say that we are going to be there for 15 to 20 years and effect the hedging strategies of the Pakistani government and all the regional players.

We also need to help the Pakistanis with their counterinsurgency. They have a counterinsurgency problem, but they are set up to fight a land war with India. And some of our military aid should be conditioned on the idea that they bring people over here for counterinsurgency training; perhaps, with their permission very importantly, we help them set up some sort of counterinsurgency training in Pakistan.

I mentioned the universal database for insurgents, terrorists, people joining the jihad, the clerics. I think this is an important thing that should be shared across all intelligence agencies. We need to redouble our efforts to find bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Mullah Omar, but we need to do it without any public fanfare so they don't derive a propaganda victory.

We also need to create an office of metrics where we can determine how are we doing. Because right now we have these discussions without really saying, well, are jihadi Web sites—are they declining in importance? Is support for suicide bombing going down in the Muslim world? These sorts of questions, which would indicate—we are never going to have a surrender ceremony, but there are certain metrics we can have which I detail in my testimony which would be helpful.

And, finally, just a small tactical thing. Industrial strength hydrogen peroxide is a weapon of choice. We need to make sure that people buying that kind of material in this country are not doing so without the government being aware of it if it is for nefarious purposes.

Mr. GRENIER. I would say I would agree with Peter that we need to have, to maintain, and to communicate a long-term commitment

to the Pakistan-Afghanistan region. I think that the government in Pakistan, and Pakistani people in particular, as well as the Afghans, are fully expecting that we are going to leave. I think that they need to know that we are there for the long term. I think that on the Pakistani side of the border what we need to have is a long-term, sustained, committed counterinsurgency effort, of which economic development is a very important part. I think that the Federally Administered Tribal Areas are a wonderful and romantic entity of the 19th century that we can no longer afford. I think those areas have to be incorporated into Pakistan proper. There needs to be a commitment on the part of the government of Pakistan to do that, and we need to be there for the long term to help them to do that so they can fully incorporate those areas into Pakistan and establish centralized government control over those areas in the same way that they do in Karachi and Lahore.

With regard to Afghanistan, there too I think we need to have a long-term commitment, but there is a big caution there. I think that the major part of the fight against a resurgent Taliban is being led by U.S. and NATO forces. I think that so long as the effort is being led by foreign forces we may win a series of tactical victories but we will not succeed strategically.

The long-term answer in Afghanistan has to be Afghan led. If that means building up and supporting local militias in southern Afghanistan in the way that the U.S. has been reluctant to do up until now, I would say so be it. But it has to be an Afghan-led solution there.

Finally, with regard to Iraq, I think there are a lot of different ways of skinning the cat, and the broader context of the U.S. commitment to Iraq I think can be calibrated in different ways, but I think that a necessary component of that must be a continued commitment on the part of the United States to support the Sunni Awakening in a way that a Shia led government simply will not.

Mr. EMERSON. I am just going to briefly add a couple of points. One is, according to some people I have spoken to in the intelligence community, the CIA has become risk averse in HUMINT collection and covert operations in Afghanistan. And I think Congress should encourage the CIA to be much more active and aggressive in carrying out collection and covert operations from disinformation to actual paramilitary operations in Afghanistan.

Number two, I think that in Pakistan the U.S. really has to apply the full pursuit of all of its means of pressure on the new regime to cooperate with the U.S. and to give us latitude to go after the high targets, high value targets, as well as for them internally to understand that they cannot keep those areas, the FATA and the North-West Frontier Province, a liberation zone for the Taliban, because it is going to come back to bite them.

Number three, I really do believe that overall we don't teach our counterterrorism—there is no counterterrorism doctrine that teaches what the fundamentals of the enemy is all about. And that I think is essential. And unless we teach them about the Muslim Brotherhood and teach them about radical Islamic theology that envelops all of these regimes and has implanted itself in Europe and in the United States, after all, we are here to talk primarily about protecting the U.S., then we want to protect Europe, and

then we want to protect our interests overseas. Unless—and the thrust of the reported and aborted attacks in the United States have not come from al Qaeda, but from franchises or from self-activated cells mobilized by just the radical Islamic theology that had initially been propagated by the Muslim Brotherhood as early as 1928.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Hoekstra.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There has been a lot of discussion about this administration, the mess, and these kinds of things. I think where we need to move to, and I really appreciate the testimony of this panel today because I think what you have identified for us one more time is how complex this problem is and potentially how deadly it is, how dangerous it is, and how complicated it is going to be to develop the right strategies and the right tactics to confront this threat and ultimately defeat the threat.

You know, there were some of us who were very critical of what we would say is the mess that President Bush inherited when we looked back at 9/11 and at, you know, what happened to the Intelligence Community in the 1990s, how al Qaeda and radical Jihadists were treated, and that problem was dealt with in the 1990s.

Obviously, there are strong views about how this administration has dealt with the threat, the things that they have done perhaps correctly, the things that maybe they could have improved on.

I think the lesson that we need to walk away with from your testimony, your identification of what the problem is, this country needs to develop a long-term, bipartisan consensus on how to defeat this threat. You know, we need Republicans and Democrats, Congress and the administration to come together and do that.

You know, there are all kinds of components to this. There is a military component. There is a political component. There is an economic component. Then, at the end of this whole process, you recognize that if you are going to be successful in Iraq or in Afghanistan or in Pakistan, it is going to have to be very much driven by people in those countries.

You know, the U.S. cannot impose a solution in Iraq. We cannot impose a solution in Afghanistan or in Pakistan or in Northern Africa. You know, the only thing that we can do is to help create conditions that will enable those governments to be more successful against this threat.

I hope that what we learn through this process, where we go through this year and where we end up in January is that we embark on that process of getting a bipartisan, long-term strategy, recognizing that we will continue to try more tactics to confront and to defeat this threat. Some of them will be successful. Some of them will be moderately successful. Others may be just dismal failures. Because, as much as we know, there is still a lot that we do not know about how to contain and to defeat this kind of threat.

There is not a question in there. I just very much appreciate your helping to enlighten this committee and to give us your perspectives on where we are and where we need to go. So thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hoekstra.

Mr. Rogers, do you have any closing?

Mr. ROGERS. No, other than you look handsome today.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I want to echo Mr. Hoekstra's comments.

First of all, we very much appreciate your willingness to come in and to share your thoughts on this issue, and we hope we can count on you again in the not-too-distant future. Because we do have to work our way through these challenges, and it has got to be done on a bipartisan basis, and it has got to be done with the next administration in concert, I believe, by making a case to our allies that it is in everyone's best interests to help us in the region with the challenges that we all face collectively there.

NATO has stepped up somewhat, not in the way that, perhaps, a lot of us have discussed that they could be the most helpful with the limitations that they have imposed. Certainly, as we look at the long-term strategy and at the threat that al Qaeda and that all of these types of organizations pose, including the free-lancers—because I think all of you made reference to the fact that bin Laden and al Qaeda have given an inspiration to some of these people who are, for their own reasons, stuck in a situation that foments that kind of resentment in whatever country, whether it is in Europe, whether it is here or whether it is in other parts of the world, and that is a very dangerous situation.

So, collectively, we need to find a way to work together, to understand that it is going to be a costly endeavor and costly not just in the traditional sense of money but also in resources and in effort that keeps the main focus on the goal, which is to try to eliminate these very dangerous actors out there. Because the threat has really dramatically changed from the Cold War days.

So, again, thank you all for your testimony. There were some members who wanted to be here, but they are in markups, and they asked me if it would be possible for them to have some questions for the record. If you will agree to indulge that, we would very much appreciate it.

Again, thank you for your time and for sharing your expertise.

With that, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:52 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]