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A NEW U.S. GRAND STRATEGY (PART 1 OF 2)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

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A NEW U.S. GRAND STRATEGY (PART 1 OF 2)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 15, 2008.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m. in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Dr. SNYDER. Good morning. Why don't we get started here this morning? We have, I think, titled this hearing, instead of hearings, A New U.S. Grand Strategy.

But the term "grand strategy" is one that I think several of us on the committee are still trying to get our hands around, and particularly, do we currently have one? Do we need one? And if so, what should it be? And we appreciate the four of you being here today and getting a start on this.

We began last July and then in January on six hearings on Iraq in terms of what should our strategy and proposals—alternatives be for Iraq. We have had a series of discussions about interagency reform specifically focusing on the provincial reconstruction team. But the whole concept of reform and change and the new policies often comes back to, what is the unifying theme? Should there be a unifying theme? And that is what we hope you will help us with this morning.

Chairman Ike Skelton is here with us this morning, and he is also in the process of elevating this discussion of what should a national strategy look like. And, in fact, he is in the process of giving some speeches about that. In fact, we are going to have a full committee hearing, I believe in September, with—we hope with some former high-ranking officials from both Defense and State.

Henry Kissinger noted in an April opinion piece that the global environment is going through an unprecedented transformation in a discussion he called the three revolutions: one, the transformation of the traditional state system of Europe; number two, the radical Islamic challenge to historic notions of sovereignty; and three, the drift of the center of gravity of international affairs from the Atlantic, to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. And, in fact, his discussion was about the fact that perhaps our Presidential debate, as we head into the fall, ought to be about those kinds of themes rather than the things that have been talked about so far in the national security area.

Before introducing our witnesses, I would like to recognize Chairman Ike Skelton for any comments or an opening statement he would like to make.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

First, let me compliment you, Dr. Snyder, on your interest in calling this hearing. You and I have discussed on any number of occasions the need for a strategy for the United States, and I have had the opportunity over a period of years and more recently months in talking with leading thinkers in this area. And kind of like Mark Twain, the more you explain it to me, the more I don't understand it because this is a very complex world in which we live. And to try to glue together a strategy based upon a solid policy, much less the tactics, both military and diplomatic, that would fit under such a strategy is very, very difficult.

During the Cold War, the Truman Administration glued together what we know as the doctrine of containment, which worked. When President Eisenhower was elected, he did not automatically accept it. He had a series of three teams that studied the issue of policy and strategy; and he ended up deciding that what was in the Truman doctrine was the correct one and swore that the containment theory did work, as we know, culminating in 1989 when the Wall came down and all of the Soviet Union changed in character.

To glue together such a strategy now is more difficult, which we all know, because of the different challenges, threats, interests that are throughout the world. It cannot be centered on the Islamic radicals because that omits a great part of the world.

So where do we go from here? That is where our witnesses come in to give us their best thought. First, you have to have a policy, you have to have a strategy in order to get there; and then, of course, the diplomatic and, when necessary, military techniques under it.

Dr. Snyder and Mr. Akin will have hearings here in the subcommittee, which I compliment them on—Doctor, thank you for your leadership in this role—and in September we hope to have a major culminating hearing.

Whatever the strategy is and comes from the White House, it is going to have to include Congress. It is going to have to include the American people, so that there is a common consensus as to where our Nation should go and what we want it to be like in 10, 15, 25 years and henceforth. And without a strategy, we are treading water or getting washed ashore somewhere else.

So this may be the only place that this is being looked at seriously, and our committee intends to involve you very deeply.

So, again, thank you so much.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We will recognize Mr. Akin now before we introduce our guests.

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Dr. Snyder. And I don't know which one is Mr. Chairman. We have a couple chairmen in here. We have so many chairmen, we don't know what to do with them.

This is a hearing that I have long been looking forward to. Years ago, I was able to sneak through an engineering school and get a degree in engineering. And it seemed to me that one of the problems that we have is Americans who are really good at solving problems, but we are not too good at defining what the problem is. And that is why this hearing is exciting to me, because it seems like we are getting to the basic assumptions behind who we are as a Nation and who we are as a people, and then having to project those in terms of our policy.

I hope that that is the way you are looking at things and can give us some thoughts on that subject. It would, I think, be interesting, too, if you built into your testimonies, gentlemen—and thank you for coming and joining us today.

First of all, President Bush, it seems to me, has maybe extended or applied the old Monroe Doctrine to a certain degree in a preemptive sense against Islamoterrorism. You might include that as part of whether or not you see that as part of where we should be.

It is also clear that the President has made the war on terrorism for the past 8 years his number one priority. Certainly, if you talk to him, that is what he is thinking about all the time. And then it also seems to me that almost before you can come up with a grand strategy, it seems that you almost have to agree to a vision of who we are as a people, what America is.

I have always used largely the basis of what is written in our Declaration of Independence as the basis, the idea that we believe that there is a God—even if you disagree with what his name is—and he gives basic rights to people: life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. And governments are instituted among men to protect those basic rights.

When we have gone to war, in the War of Independence, we fought because we believed that sentence. And if you look at most of the wars that we have fought, they have been fought basically on that idea, that we think that there are fundamental rights that all people should have, and some tyrant was trying to take them away.

Is that still a basis for our Nation and for our grand strategy or not? And does that fit in?

I think those are some interesting questions. I look forward to the witnesses' testimony. I thank you, both Mr. Chairmen, for a very interesting topic for a hearing.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Akin.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

Dr. SNYDER. We are pleased to have with us today our panel of experts: Dr. Andrew Bacevich, Professor of International Relations and History at Boston University; his latest book is The Long War and New History of U.S. National Security Policy Since World War II;

Dr. and Ambassador James Dobbins, Director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND National Security Research Division, who has served as a diplomat in South America, Europe and Afghanistan;

Dr. Barry Posen, the Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of Security Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; his recent article is called The Case for Restraint; and

Dr. Mitchell Reiss, the Vice Provost for International Affairs at the College of William and Mary and Professor at the College's Marshall-Wythe School of Law, who previously directed the policy planning staff at the Department of State.

Gentlemen, we are pleased you are here with us today. I found your written statements to be very thought provoking, and in fact, they will be made a part of this record.

I might also say, any written statement that Chairman Skelton or Mr. Akin or other members of the committee wish to be made part of the record will be done so, without objection.

We are going to have the five-minute clock go on here, so when you see the red light go off, it means five minutes has ended. Feel free to take longer if you need to. But I think we have an energetic group of members that would like to ask some questions, so we will put the light on there as your guideline.

We will begin with you, Dr. Bacevich, and just go right down the line. Dr. Bacevich, you are recognized for as much time as you need.

STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW J. BACEVICH, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BOSTON UNIVERSITY

Dr. BACEVICH. Thank you for the opportunity to present my views to this committee. I am very grateful for that chance.

In American practice, grand strategy almost invariably implies conjuring up a response to emerging threats or prospective challenges beyond our borders. The expectation is that an effective grand strategy will provide a framework for employing American power to shape that external environment.

These days, strategists expend considerable energy and imagination devising concepts intended to enable the United States to win the global war on terror, to transform the greater Middle East or to manage the rise of China. These are honorable, well-intentioned efforts and may, on occasion, actually yield something useful. After all, as Chairman Skelton noted, the grand strategy of containment devised at the end of World War II did serve as an important touchstone for policies that enabled the United States and its allies to prevail in the Cold War.

Yet there is a second way to approach questions of grand strategy. This alternative approach, which I will employ in my very brief prepared remarks, is one that emphasizes internal conditions as much as external threats.

Here is my bottom line: The strategic comparative that we confront in our time demands, first of all, that we would put our own house in order—fixing our problems to take precedence over fixing the world's problems.

The past decade has seen a substantial erosion of U.S. power and influence. This has occurred, in part, as a result of ill-advised and recklessly implemented policy decisions, the Iraq war not the least among them. Yet it has also occurred because of our collective unwillingness to confront serious and persistent domestic dysfunction. The chief expression of this dysfunction takes the form of debt and dependency. In the not-so-very-distant future, they may well pose as great a danger to our well-being as violent Islamic radicalism or a China intent on staking its claim to the status of great power.

To persist in neglecting these internal problems is, in effect, to endorse and perpetuate the further decline of U.S. power. Let me illustrate the point with two examples.

Example number one is energy. I hardly need remind members of this committee of the relevant facts. Once the world's number one producer of oil, the United States today possesses a paltry four percent of known global oil reserves, while Americans consume one out of every four barrels of worldwide oil production. President Bush has bemoaned our addiction to foreign oil. He is right to do so. The United States now imports more than 60 percent of its daily petroleum fix, a figure that will almost certainly continue to rise.

The cost of sustaining that addiction are also rising. Since 9/11 the price of oil per barrel has quadrupled. The Nation's annual oil bill now tops $700 billion, much of that wealth helping to sustain corrupt and repressive regimes, some of it subsequently diverted to support Islamic radicals who plot against us.

Since the 1970's Americans have talked endlessly of the need to address this problem. Talk has not produced effective action. Instead, by tolerating this growing dependence on foreign oil, we have allowed ourselves to be drawn ever more deeply into the Persian Gulf, a tendency that culminated in the ongoing Iraq war. That war, now in its sixth year, is costing us an estimated $3 billion per week, a figure that is effectively a surtax added to the oil bill. Surely this is a matter that future historians will find baffling, how a great power could recognize the danger posed by energy dependence and then do so little to avert that danger.

Example number two of our domestic dysfunction is fiscal. Again, you are familiar with the essential problem, namely, our persistent refusal to live within our means. When President Bush took office in 2001, the national debt stood at less than $6 trillion. Since then it has increased by more than 50 percent to $9.5 trillion. When Ronald Reagan became President back in 1981, total debt equaled 31 percent of GDP. Today, the debt is closing in on 70 percent of GDP.

This is no longer money we owe ourselves. Increasingly, we borrow from abroad, with 25 percent of total debt now in foreign hands. Next to Japan, China has become our leading creditor, a fact that ought to give strategists pause.

Given seemingly permanent trade imbalances, projected increases in entitlement programs and the continuing cost of fighting multiple open-ended wars, this borrowing will continue and will do so at an accelerating and alarming rate. Our insatiable penchant for consumption and our aversion to saving only exacerbate the problem. Any serious attempt to chart a grand strategy for the

United States would need to address this issue, which cannot be done without considerable sacrifice.

Now, there are those who would contend that the Bush Administration has already formulated a grand strategy. The centerpiece of this strategy is the global war on terror. In some corridors, it is referred to as "the long war."

In fact, the long war represents an impediment to sound grand strategy. To persist in the long war will be to exacerbate the existing trends toward ever greater debt and dependency, and it will do so while placing at risk America's overstretched armed forces. To imagine that a reliance on military power can reverse these trends toward ever-increasing debt and dependency would be the height of folly. This is the central lesson that we should take away from the period since 9/11.

Shortly after 9/11, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld framed the strategic problem facing the United States this way: "We have a choice," he said, "either to change the way we live, which is unacceptable, or to change the way they live." And "we," referring to the Bush Administration, chose the latter.

What we have learned since then is that the United States does not possess the capacity to change the way they live, whether they are the people of the Middle East or indeed of the entire Islamic world. To persist in seeing U.S. grand strategy as a project aimed at changing the way they live would be to court bankruptcy and exhaustion.

In fact, the choice facing the United States is this one: We can ignore the imperative to change the way we live, in which case we will drown in an ocean of red ink, or we can choose to mend our ways, curbing our profligate inclinations, regaining our freedom of action, and thereby preserving all that we value most. In the end, how we manage or mismanage our affairs here at home will prove to be far more decisive than our efforts to manage events beyond our shores, whether in the Persian Gulf or East Asia or elsewhere.

Thank you very much.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Dr. Bacevich.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Bacevich can be found in the Appendix on page 50.]

Dr. SNYDER. Ambassador Dobbins.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES DOBBINS, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND CORPORATION

Ambassador DOBBINS. Thank you.

Let me start by saying, I agree with Dr. Bacevich on his main point, which is that the budget deficit currently represents America's greatest vulnerability and correcting it is our greatest national security challenge.

It is very flattering to be asked to comment on the components of a new grand strategy. I have to say, as a long-time practitioner of American diplomacy, I have some skepticism about the utility of grand and somewhat, sometimes, grandiose statements of American purpose in terms of an actual guides for the conduct of policy.

My experience over the last 40 years impresses upon me the enduring interests, friends, and values that the United States has,

and the importance of consistency in our behavior and continuity in our policies. Rather than try to sketch out an entirely new schemata, therefore, let me suggest how our existing grand strategy might be amended in reaction to our experiences of the last year.

I believe that the contemporary schools of foreign policy—realism, Wilsonianism, neoconservative—provide pundits and political scientists with useful instruments for analysis, but afford poor guides to future conduct. Wise Presidents and legislators will pick and choose among these alternative efforts to describe and prescribe for a world that defies easy categorization, worrying less about ideological coherence and more about incremental progress toward long-term national goals which do not and should not in the main change.

In terms of aspects of the current policy, which I think need some amendment, although not complete reversal, I would include the war on terror, preemption, democratization and nation-building, all central elements of the current Administration's approach, all of which have become, as a result of the war in Iraq, somewhat more controversial.

On the first, the war on terror, the Bush Administration's rhetoric since 9/11 has accentuated the martial character of the terrorist threat and the warlike nature of the required response. Treating terrorists as combatants and labeling their activities as jihad or holy wars dignifies their endeavors, bolsters their self-esteem, and enhances their standing throughout the Muslim world.

Most of the tangible success in the war on terror comes as a result of police intelligence and diplomatic activity. Certainly efforts to counter violent extremism and protect the American homeland must continue, but we need to find a vocabulary that secures us broader international support, which denigrates rather than dignifies the terrorists, and which supports a greater allocation of our own resources to diplomatic intelligence and law enforcement instruments.

Preemption is another aspect of the current doctrine which I believe needs to be modified. After all, over more than two centuries the United States has conducted dozens of military campaigns, only two of which were in response to attacks on our homeland. This record should leave no one in doubt that the United States will employ military force when necessary to protect itself and its friends and its interests without necessarily waiting to be struck first. But trying to incorporate this in a declarative doctrine simply makes our military actions more controversial when they take place and diminishes the degree of international support that we are able to get for them.

Democratization is another aspect of the current Administration's approach which I don't think should be jettisoned, but I do think needs to be somewhat modified. Like preemption, democracy promotion has been a component of our foreign policy almost since the country's birth. In the 18th century, all of Latin America adopted the American model, however imperfectly, and in the recent decades all of Latin America, much of East Asia, some of Africa, and all of Eastern and Central Europe have become functioning democracies with American help. It was, as Condoleezza Rice has indi-

cated, probably a mistake to have not applied these kinds of policies in the Middle East over the last 60 years; but it is also unrealistic to expect this deficiency to be remediated over a period of a few years.

Democracy is no panacea for terrorism and no shortcut to a more pro-U.S. or, for that matter, pro-Israeli Middle East. Established democracies may not wage war on one another, but studies have shown that democratizing nations are highly prone to internal and external conflicts.

Furthermore, elections are polarizing events and we have seen the effect of elections in highly divided countries over the last few years. So I do believe that we should continue to pursue democratization, but we should expect this to be a long-term rather than a short-term program; and I think we do need to focus less on dramatic electoral breakthroughs and more on U.S. efforts to advance democracy by building on its foundations, including the rule of law, civil society, larger middle classes, and more effective, less corrupt governments.

Nation building is another aspect of current policy that has also become controversial. And while the Administration has made some commendable efforts to improve its performance after the initial setbacks in Afghanistan and Iraq, and while it has clearly determined to do better next time, many Americans may be more inclined not to do this kind of thing next time.

In fact, both conclusions are valid. The United States should certainly avoid invading any further large hostile countries on the basis of faulty intelligence with the support of narrow, unrepresentative coalitions. But not all conflicts are avoidable. Iraq may have been a war of choice and the choice may have been a poor one, but Afghanistan was neither, and both interventions left the United States with a heavy burden for nation building.

Nation building is tough, slow work. Yet, contrary to popular impression, successes do outnumber failures. Tens of millions of people are living today at peace in places like El Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia, Cambodia, Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, East Timor, Haiti, Sierra Leone, and Liberia because either American or European or NATO or U.N. troops came in, separated the combatants, disarmed the contending factions, helped rebuild the economy, organized elections, and stayed around long enough to make sure that those governments could take effect.

It is the Middle East where our national security strategy has undergone the greatest innovation since 9/11, where it has encountered the least success, and where, consequently, the need for renovation is the greatest. Today, we have some 200,000 troops in the region and yet our influence has never been more absent. At present, the European Union is leading negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program. Turkey is brokering peace talks between Israel and Syria. Qatar has just mediated an end to the political crisis in Lebanon. Egypt has brokered a cease-fire accord between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.

This Administration initially resisted all of these efforts. American leadership is currently manifested only in what appears to be a dead-end negotiation between the Israelis and the Palestinians,

a process that, at best, is going to produce a statement of principles before the end of the current Administration.

There is no controversy about what our country's objectives in this region are. We all want a secure Israel at peace with its neighbors, a denuclearized Iran, a unified and democratic Iraq, and the modernization and democratization of all the societies in the region. What is under debate is not our ends, but how we prioritize them and the best means of approaching them.

The threat from al Qaeda is centered primarily in South and Central Asia, and secondarily, in disaffected Muslim populations in Western societies, not in the Middle East. The attacks of 9/11, therefore, do not justify or require an enduring American presence in the Gulf region. The overall American goal in this region should be to promote the emergence of an equilibrium among local powers that does not require most of our available ground forces to sustain.

This is not an impossible goal. Such a balance existed from when Great Britain left the Persian Gulf in the early 1950's until Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in the early 1990's. During this 40-year period, American interests were preserved with little more than occasional naval visits. A return to this condition may take a while, but it will be worth enunciating this as a national goal.

On the other hand, a precipitous withdrawal from Iraq could easily move us further from that objective. We owe it to the Iraqis, we owe it to the region, and we owe it to ourselves to leave behind a unified country capable of contributing to regional stability. This will not happen overnight nor even, in all likelihood, within the next year or two, although some significant troop draw-downs over this period may well prove feasible if the security situation there holds.

I have not addressed many other areas of our national security strategy on which I think there is a broad consensus and on which I have no great differences with the Administration.

The Bush Administration has moved away from its unilateral approach in its early years and has sought to force better relations with Europe, Russia, China and India, the world's other major power centers; and I would anticipate that the next Administration is likely—whoever is elected—to embrace these policies and continue those approaches.

Having served under eight Presidents through seven changes of Administration, I have come to view these transitions as periods of considerable danger, as new and generally less-experienced people assume positions of power with mandates for change and a predisposition to denigrate the experience and ignore the advice of their predecessors.

America needs a grand strategy that helps it bridge these troubled waters, one that enjoys bipartisan support and is likely to endure. One key criteria for judging any newly announced grand strategy, therefore, is whether it is likely to be embraced by successor Administrations. In this respect, Napoleon's advice with respect to constitutions may prove apt: that they be short and vague.

Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Ambassador.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Dobbins can be found in the Appendix on page 58.]

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Posen. And, Dr. Posen, I note you have the greatest challenge of condensing your thoughts to 5 minutes because you gave us a very comprehensive written statement, which I appreciate.

STATEMENT OF DR. BARRY R. POSEN, DIRECTOR, SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Dr. POSEN. I am an academic scrivener and you have my scrivenings, so I will not read them.

I want to thank you for inviting me. The last time I was before the House Armed Services Committee was in the 1990's. Congressman Dellums was Chair. The subject of the hearing was U.S. grand strategy. At that time I argued that there were roughly four grand strategies competing in the American intellectual discourse, and I believe we are down to two.

I am going to say what the two are. One is, I think, basically the consensus, which I think to some extent Ambassador Dobbins just represented; and the other is a critique that has been around since the 1990's that several of us are making. You have heard a little from my colleague, Andy Bacevich, and that is a grand strategy that many are starting to call restraint and renewal. And I will talk in a second about restraint and renewal.

Before I do, I want to not lay out what I think the grand strategy is, but I do think grand strategies offer a lot of benefits. And I feel like Ambassador Dobbins was critical of that, and I just want to remind people that there are reasons why you want grand strategies to do the things that they do.

One, we live in a world of scarcity. Choices need to be made. We need some sort of metric by which we are going to make those choices.

Second, the U.S. Government is a vast enterprise. We need some general concepts, general theory, to coordinate the activities of that enterprise.

Third, this is a great, big, and rambunctious political system. We need a way to ensure government accountability. The population of this country, its elites, need a way to judge new enterprises when they are offered. Are they consistent with the grand strategy that we understand to be our grand strategy? And why are they consistent?

And finally a grand strategy is needed to communicate America's interests abroad. Much of what we do in the world is either about coercion or deterrence. You can only practice coercion and deterrence if people know what you are up to and why you are up to it. Stated grand strategies help you do that.

The current grand strategy consensus in the United States is centered around the United States being essentially the preeminent power in the world, an extremely active power, a very heavily armed power, a power that is concerned about threats of all kinds—threats to safety, sovereignty, national security, power position. It is concerned about the internal workings of other countries and the power that other countries can mobilize. It is con-

cerned about terror. It is concerned about great powers. It is concerned about energy.

It is a long, long list which almost defies prioritization; and it leads the United States to an extremely activist policy that I think has not served us well in recent years, for some of the reasons that Andy Bacevich talked about.

Now, people who are interested in this grand strategy, I think, are motivated by five big facts that they see as being extremely important in international politics today. One is the fact that the U.S. has great power. The United States is still the preeminent economic power in the world, and it is certainly the preeminent military power in the world.

This is an enormous source of American security, but it is also an enormous source of temptation. Americans always believe they have the capability to do the things that they can imagine. That is extremely tempting.

Second, much of the world we used to talk about, the great regions of the eastern and western ends of Eurasia where the middle and great powers are, these parts of the world are as stable as they have ever been. There are balances of power, regional balances of power, in these parts of the world. And the United States has to do much less to accomplish its basic interests in the world than it once did.

Third, globalization is a powerful force. The people who study it have disagreements about how the force works. The one thing I think we can say it does: It disrupts the lives of hundreds of millions of people in the world. It brings the power of modern capitalism to the developing world. It shakes up societies. It draws people into cities. It interacts with the population explosion in this part of the world, with urbanization in this part of the world; and it makes large numbers of people extremely insecure and ripe for mobilization for all kinds of political action—most of it, we hope, good; but some of it, we have seen, bad.

Another aspect of globalization is the diffusion of power in the world, right? And though the United States is certainly a clear number one, a lot of capability is now out there in the hands of countries that we have formerly thought of as weak. And this capability makes itself felt particularly when the United States military goes ashore.

There are millions and millions of young men of military age in the developing world. There are millions and millions of infantry weapons left over from the Warsaw Pact that have made their way into the developing world. When an American soldier goes to the developing world, he meets many, many adversaries. And this is going to drive up the cost of American intervention to rebuild societies, to wage counter insurgencies. The costs are high and they are going to get higher.

Finally, nuclear proliferation is a sad fact of modern international life. We look at the new proliferators, the countries that are managing to get nuclear weapons. These are not modern, highly capable industrial powers—or they are modern, highly capable industrial powers, but they are small ones. Cracking the nuclear code is just not that difficult anymore. And if the United States has the idea that we can basically control entirely the diffusion of nu-

clear weapons technology to the rest of the world, then we are in for a very, very large and very, very demanding project, all right.

Now, in light of these facts, what does restraint recommend as a U.S. grand strategy? Basically, the United States has to focus first on preserving its own power, which is the ultimate source of American security. And right now, as Andy Bacevich suggested, the sources of that power, the sinews of American power, are in danger.

Second, we have to maintain the capability when we wish, when we need to, to tip the balance of power on the Eurasian landmass. As I said earlier, the Eurasian landmass is quite stable right now, so America does not have to do much. But it does have to maintain the capability to do it if it has to.

We have a problem with terrorism. We should focus on the key source, which is this organization, al Qaeda. And we should deal with terrorism in a way that doesn't create more support for terrorists, which means the United States has to be extremely judicial in the offensive use of military force and depend much more on intelligence and police cooperation to deal with this problem.

Finally, we have to avoid the following four perils of our current grand strategy:

One is overstretch, the tendency of American activism to take us into costly and open-ended engagements.

Second, making the United States a magnet for balancing and targeting, right? Being too imminent in the lives of others cause them to blame us for the problems that they face.

Third, we have a problem with our allies. Our policies encourage free riding and reckless driving. The Europeans spend a very small share of GDP on defense compared to the United States, less than two percent typically. The Japanese spend less than one percent. These are rich allies, with strong currencies these days, all right? They have good industrial bases. They produce good weapons. They have decent and, in many cases, quite good military commanders. They could do more, they should do more; they don't have to do more because the Americans are carrying the load.

The flip side is, we have allies who trust us too much and who drive recklessly. Right now the Iraqi Government continues to drive recklessly, secure in the notion that the Americans will catch them if they fall. For years, the Taiwanese Government drove recklessly. Sometimes the Israeli Government drives recklessly. And the United States needs to do something to discourage this reckless driving.

And, finally, we face a problem of blow-back. Our grand strategy affects American politics at home. When we go to explain a policy to the American people, it seems like we invariably tell them that whatever new initiative, whether it is going to be Bosnia or Iraq or Afghanistan, it is ultimately going to be inexpensive.

It is time we started leveling with the American people about these things. The deployment of military power to rebuild nation-states, to fight counterinsurgencies, to occupy other countries, these are very expensive and long-term projects. And the American people need to be told so that they can participate in this debate in a way that allows them to have some say over whether or not they want to pursue this strategy.

With that, I will stop. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Dr. Posen.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Posen can be found in the Appendix on page 73.]

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Reiss.

STATEMENT OF DR. MITCHELL B. REISS, VICE PROVOST FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, WILLIAM AND MARY MARSHALL-WYTHE SCHOOL OF LAW

Dr. REISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you and the whole committee for inviting me to testify today.

It seems that we have been searching for a new Mr. X or Ms. X, for a decade now, since our ultimate triumph in the Cold War. A number of foreign policy experts have tried to answer the call to become the next Mr. X, yet none has won the Mr. X sweepstakes. Public and elite opinion have not yet coalesced around any of these grand strategic attempts. So it is interesting to ask ourselves why is this so.

There are three possible reasons. The first is that there is no single unifying threat that galvanizes the attention of the United States, our allies and friends and the world. There is currently no "glue" to bind countries together like the glue the Soviet Union provided during the Cold War. The global war on terror, which some would maintain is the unifying force around which a grand strategy can be constructed, simply doesn't provide the same amount of glue.

A second possible reason is that the world today is too complex. In place of a single overarching threat, there are today a wide variety of lesser threats that impact different countries differently, thereby discouraging collective action. These threats fall into two general categories, country-specific threats, like Iran and North Korea, and transnational threats, such as climate change, WMD proliferation, mass migration, terrorism, and infectious diseases.

It is humbling to think that today George Kennan would not only need to have a deep understanding of Russian politics, history, and culture, but would also need a deep understanding of China's military modernization, global economic flows, demographic trends, environmental degradation, WMD proliferation, and the sources of Islamic extremism, to name but a few topics. That is a pretty high bar for anyone to surmount.

The third possible reason has less to do with the supply side than with the demand side. Our political system today is too divided to accept a grand strategy. And it is not just divisions between the Republicans and the Democrats; it is also divisions within the different wings of each party. There is simply not a lot of receptivity to grand, unifying ideas. In particular, there is no consensus over five key concepts, what we might term the building blocks of any new grand strategy.

The first key concept is American primacy. As you recall, the Bush Administration's 2002 national security strategy was a rousing call for extended American primacy. For some, this language was viewed as aspirational, a distant goal on a faraway shore, and certainly unobjectionable. After all, why wouldn't we want the

United States to remain the dominant power for as long as possible?

Others saw this goal as a realistic and achievable objective, assuming we kept our economy strong, made the necessary military hardware and personnel investments, and employed our strength widely. And still others viewed it as arrogant and objectionable, perhaps even horrifying.

Significant differences exist around a second key concept: the use of American military force. Few people disagree that the United States should defend its vital interests. But this begs the larger question of how these vital interests should be defined, a task made more complex by the increasing interconnectedness of the world in which we live.

A further complication is that some would maintain that the prevention of humanitarian disasters, such as genocide, is a vital interest of the United States, consistent with our national character and under an increasingly developing responsibility to protect.

A third key concept where there isn't consensus is in our attitude toward international institutions. The classic reasons for establishing international institutions are well known, they reduce transaction costs, they provide a forum for regularized contact and information exchange, and they institutionalize a cadre of professional expertise. However, critics argue that these institutions often take a lowest common denominator approach and are unable to respond effectively to fast-moving crises.

They point to the inability of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) to thwart the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food scandal, and the gross misbehavior of some of its African peacekeepers. We have just seen in the past few days the inability of the U.N. Security Council to effectively sanction Zimbabwe.

These critics prefer, instead, coalitions of the willing, ad hoc groups of like-minded states that form and reform depending on the contingency.

A fourth key concept where there isn't agreement: democracy promotion. On few Bush Administration policies has there been less agreement over how best to proceed. Is democracy promotion about holding elections, building civic institutions, alleviating poverty, reforming education, promoting women's rights, transparency in the rule of law; or all of the above? Do we promote democracy differently depending on the country or region? Is democracy promotion the same for China, the Congo, Saudi Arabia, and Belarus?

And even assuming we can find the right tools, how do we measure success? What metrics are the most relevant? And how urgently do we push democracy? What time frame do we use?

Needless to say, answers to each of these questions range all over the political spectrum.

The fifth key concept is globalization. The debate over globalization in the United States has largely been reduced to strongly held views on trade. The wide gap between the "free trade" Republicans and the "fair trade" Democrats has been on public display during this Presidential campaign season.

Now, these are serious divisions, and it is unclear whether they will be bridged or reconciled anytime soon. But more importantly,

they mask an even greater shortcoming that threatens America's security.

As in George Kennan's time, America's diplomatic standing, military power, and financial influence are a product of our economic strength. Without a strong economy, our ability to promote our values and defend our interests, to support properly our men and women in uniform, to help our friends and allies overseas, and to safeguard our country will be gravely weakened. Without a strong economy, all talk about a grand strategy is illusory.

As a first step, I strong strongly urge the committee to focus its first hearings on developing a strategy for sustaining and enhancing America's economic power. Such a strategy would include the following issues: reducing the national debt, which now stands at record levels and has placed great stress on the middle and working classes; tackling the coming crisis in entitlement payments, especially health care, U.S. citizens 65 and over will increase by a projected 147 percent between now and 2050; reforming immigration laws to ensure that highly skilled and motivated people can continue to come to the United States to work, create jobs, and receive an education; revitalizing our industrial infrastructure and developing a new national energy strategy to reduce our dependence on foreign oil, including greater investment in alternative energy sources.

These are just a few of the hurdles that we will have to surmount in the coming years if we wish to keep America strong.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Reiss can be found in the Appendix on page 83.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you all for your thoughtful, both written and oral, statements.

Mr. Skelton has asked if he could defer to the end of the subcommittee members, and we will do that. We will go ahead and put on the clock. We will put ourselves on the five-minute clock and go around, and we will probably have time for a second round.

I appreciate you all's comments today. And I also appreciate—I think there is unanimous agreement on—I think every one of you talked about the economy and that here we are a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, and yet you see the economy as being perhaps our number one priority that we ought to look at as a nation. And I certainly can't disagree with that.

The two questions I want to ask I am going to combine into one and let you respond to it. One is, given what you all have presented here today, do you see—would you describe what we are in? The situation right now is—are we in a situation of drifting?

Dr. Reiss, you talked about how there is not really an agreement in—either politically or in the country for a grand strategy. Would you describe this as a period of, we are drifting? Would we describe it as a period in which we have sufficient strategy? Would you describe it as a situation in which we just need to recognize we do need to have a complex—a statement, but it will be a complex statement of where to go in terms of strategy?

And the second question I want to ask, what role for Congress do you see in these discussions that we have asked you to respond to today?

Dr. Bacevich, we will start with you.

Dr. BACEVICH. I think that the Bush Administration seized upon 9/11 as an opportunity to revolutionize U.S. grand strategy. And when we look at a very important—I personally think wrong-headed, but very important document like the National Security Strategy of 2002, we see an authoritative statement of what that new grand strategy was to be.

Fast forward to 2008, and it seems to me that events have shown that that grand strategy, post–9/11 grand strategy, was fundamentally defective and, indeed recently, increasingly we see the Bush Administration implicitly backing away from it toward a more realistic and, I think, more restrained approach to things.

So I think the answer to the question is, we still have a grand strategy on the books, as it were, and it has been discredited. And yet there has been insufficient recognition of the extent to which it has failed and, therefore, insufficient public dialogue about the need to replace it.

I mean, this hearing, in a sense, may be part of an effort to promote that kind of a dialogue. But we don't so much have drift as we have a statement of policy that has failed and has yet to be replaced.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Dobbins.

Ambassador DOBBINS. I agree with that. Looking back throughout the Cold War for 40 years, we essentially had a bipartisan approach to national security policy. There were hawks and doves, but they were in both parties. There were doves in both parties; there were hawks in both parties. There were people for arms control; there were people against arms control. There were people for detente; there were people against detente. But it was Nixon and Kissinger who led the detente move.

So you had a national argument about these things, but it wasn't conducted on clearly partisan lines. And I think that helped very much to keep the dialogue constructive and to keep the country on course.

That began to break down with the end of the Cold War. In the 1990's, the Clinton foreign policy was attacked by the opposition. And that is certainly one of the functions of the opposition, to oppose; so within reason, that is fine. But that, of course, continued with the Bush foreign policy. And I think as long as national security policy is, you know, regarded as a partisan issue—I am tougher than you are, I am more capable of leading the country than you are; and this transcends not just the personalities of Presidential candidates, but the parties—I think you are going to have a virtually impossible time devising a grand strategy that will transcend Administrations.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Posen.

Dr. POSEN. I will not surprise you that I have a different view. We may be drifting, but the feeling of drift, I think, has more to do with where we are in the political cycle.

A colleague of mine did a little drill. She went through all of the national security policy statements of the principal candidates that appeared in the Journal of Foreign Affairs. I sat down last night and looked again at Senator Obama and Senator Clinton and Senator McCain. The amount of consensus is really quite surprising.

And I think it would also be surprising if those documents were actually written by those people. They probably had staffs of foreign policy experts who helped them write those things. So I think there is quite a lot of consensus. I don't really think it is drift.

Where I see the drift is an inability to bring together a sense of the real scarcity that the United States is going to begin to see in terms of resources because of the fiscal condition of the country and because of the expenses that are coming, the real difficulty of bringing that sense of scarcity together with our national security policy and trying to look at these things against each other.

We have a tendency in this country to basically assume that if we identify something as a national security problem, we are going to find the money. But we have gotten into this habit of identifying many, many things as a national security problem, and this has produced a very, very big bill. And we have to do major rethink to try and figure out what our actual national security priorities are.

And if there is one—if you are asking for a role for Congress, and I am no expert on how the Congress works—but I do think we have a problem in bringing together the disparate corners of our revenue raising and our spending in this country right now. We need a way to look at these very big numbers which you can find in any of the Congressional Budget Office documents about the future—these very big numbers about rising health care, about taxes that are insufficient to cover our spending, and about the magnitude of the defense budget today and the apparent preference for both of the current Presidential candidates to keep that defense budget high and maintain a high level of energy.

So something has to give here. My own guess is that everybody is going to have to contribute to paying the bill. The defense budget and defense efforts are going to have to come down. Medical care is going to need to be controlled. And taxes are going to need to go up. And we need to have a discussion in this country about the realities of those trade-offs rather than sort of continue to talk about these things in isolation and end our conversations with a kind of an airy collection of hopes and dreams about how we are going to slice away at these problems at the margins.

These are percents of GDP, which is a lot of resources in this country. So that is the thing I think we need to find a way to focus on it. And if this body and this House can kind a way to focus on it, I think it would be a great contribution.

Dr. SNYDER. My time is up; we will go to Mr. Akin. But, Dr. Reiss, when we come around again, I will call on you first.

I think we are going to have this problem all day, just because of the nature of the topic. I think we will try to follow the 5-minute rule as closely as we can even if it means witnesses don't all get a round.

Mr. Akin for five minutes.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I appreciated your perspectives. It is refreshing to hear. You know, in certain ways you are agreeing and yet the focus and your emphasis is a little bit different and all.

I guess some of the discredited and failed language that I heard in terms of what has gone on, it seems to me to be a little blind to what has happened in the last year in Iraq. I would be a little

surprised if the people in Iraq really feel that in five years from now that they are in the same place they were back when—before we attacked Iraq.

I think there has been progress. Whether the cost was reasonable in terms of return is a very different question. But it seemed to me that the President made a statement that was really a broad vision for what he wanted to do in foreign policy, and that was, he wanted to export freedom.

I guess I would be interested—first of all, I don't know that he knew how to define that. But I am not sure that that wasn't a pretty grand vision for what we should be doing. I am not sure that—his approach to doing that was maybe more muscular than it needed to be and had less sales and more coercion in it. But yet that was still a pretty big idea.

Would you want to respond to the concept of exporting freedom?

Dr. BACEVICH. I will take a stab.

I think you ought to know what it is you are trying to export before you do try to export it. I agree with you that apart from some sort of grandiose language, they really had very little understanding of what the export of freedom in particular to the greater Middle East entailed. And we are oblivious to the possibility that people who lived in that region of the world might define "free" differently than we do.

So, to my mind, it was a fool's errand that we never should have undertaken; that is to say, that the export of freedom to the greater Middle East in the aftermath of 9/11 was a completely wrong-headed objective and has taken us down the path.

Now you alluded to the fact, and it is a fact, that over the past year or so technical conditions on the ground in Iraq have improved, at least in terms of the level of security. But it seems to me, to be fair to the Administration, the Administration didn't invade Iraq simply because of Iraq, but as you suggest, with this expectation that the invasion of Iraq was going to produce all kinds of positive second- and third-order consequences.

From my perspective, that hasn't happened.

Dr. BACEVICH. My perspective is that hasn't happened and that freedom has not been brought to the region. To the extent that democracy has taken hold, it has done things like brought Hamas to power in Gaza; it has enhanced the power of Hezbollah in Lebanon.

So there is something fundamentally flawed with seeing the promotion of freedom as somehow the cornerstone or the fundamental source, the place to begin thinking about the U.S.——

Mr. AKIN. Does anybody else want to agree with that, or do you all disagree with the idea that exporting freedom is a reasonable starting point?

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think it is an important component of American foreign policy and has been for a long time, and I think it is an element of continuity in our approach.

I do think that the emphasis given to this in the Administration's policies from 2003 to 2005, say, was excessive and ultimately counterproductive. I mean, we needed the cooperation of all of Iraq's neighbors if we were going to stabilize it. And none of them were going to cooperate in a project that was designed to undermine their legitimacy and ultimately overthrow their systems.

So to the extent we saw Iraq as a model for the region and as a precursor for democratization of the region as a whole, we simply built up resistance to our overwhelming objective, which was to stabilize the country behind a freely elected government, which we could have done with a lot lower rhetoric.

So I think the goal should continue to be an important element of our policy, but not always the dominant element and not always the element that we lead with rhetorically.

Dr. POSEN. I just think we have to be aware of what other definitions are. For many, many people, peoples, around the world, "freedom" means freedom from outside intrusion into their affairs. It is not their model of our government that is defined as freedom. It is the ability of their people to determine their own governments and their own ways.

So the very idea of exporting freedom, the greatest power in the history of the world, sort of, bringing freedom to you, immediately involves all kinds of dilemmas and runs the risk of causing all kinds of trouble.

I, sort of, look at the problem differently. I don't think freedom is very easy to export. I think others could import it, but I am not sure that we can export it.

Mr. AKIN. Go ahead, Dr. Reiss, or we may never get to you.

Dr. REISS. Thanks very much.

I think President Bush's second inaugural address will go down as perhaps his greatest public speech. And, as Jim said, the promotion of democracy and human rights overseas is a longstanding element of American foreign policy.

But, as the other panelists have also said, we can't reinvent these other countries in our own image. It is not going to be Jeffersonian democracy throughout the rest of the world. And, in fact, we have to pick and choose the means we use, the places we use. What we try to do in Saudi Arabia is not going to be the same as in Iraq or Belarus or China or other places.

But what I would like us to try to adopt is to have a little bit more patience and a lot more confidence that this is a universal value, it is not an American value, that most people want to have dignity in their lives, whether it is expressed as liberty or freedom or democracy or what have you. They want to be able to live safely, with accountable government, with decent schooling and education and health care for themselves and their family. That is something that is, I think, a universal aspiration. And when we try to use a cookie-cutter approach and impose it on other people, I think we run huge risks.

Dr. SNYDER. Ms. Sanchez for five minutes.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being before us today.

I completely agree with you that our number-one national security issue is this whole fiscal responsibility or lack of responsibility in Washington, D.C. And I, as a former investment banker, have been very worried about this issue. I remember in 2000 when we started with President Bush, and the people will remember, I think it was in the February-March-April time frame, we were having discussions in the front page of the Wall Street Journal about what would the Government really look like without Government debt,

without T-bills and T-bonds, and was that really something that we wanted to do. And now we find ourselves in completely the opposite direction. And the war is, of course, just a very, very small piece of that, although it is a bleeding that continues to go on.

So I guess my question to you is, what would be the format or the forum in which we could begin to really address this broader issue with the American people? Because they, I believe, aside from now suffering individually from lack of savings or costs going up with respect to fuel and other issues, I don't really think that they understand just how bad this fiscal foundation is of our United States.

So I guess, as a lot of you are academics, what would you suggest as a forum, or how do we begin—and it is a lot of political risk. I mean, every individual Congressperson goes back to their district and says, "Things are going to get better. Don't worry." But the reality is that they are so broad, the entitlement issue is so broad, the energy independence issue is so long-term, could be, although I believe Californians are much further ahead in solving that issue for us.

But what would you say would be the forum for that?

And then the second question would be, how can we on the defense committee, I mean, what is it that you think we should be doing in the area that we control, i.e., our military and how we use it, to begin to address this larger issue that I believe—I don't know whose testimony I have in front of me, where you talk about the five or six different things that we need to do. And I think the theme is throughout all of your written testimonies.

So the first question, what kind of forum do we use to really talk to the American people about the hole that we are in? And, second, what can we do as members of the military committee? And it is up for grabs to anybody.

Dr. REISS. I think you have a wonderful platform and a wonderful megaphone, and you can hold hearings.

And I spent a long time negotiating with both North Korea and with the political parties in Northern Ireland, and I always saw my first job was to educate and explain, not to negotiate. And I think that you need to educate and you need to explain to the American people exactly what the balance sheet looks like right now.

You know, if this was a business and you were coming in, you would do an audit. You would do a strategic audit of the whole business and find out where is the money coming in, where is it going out, where can you plug holes, where can you get more revenue? Doing a strategic audit for the U.S. Government, for the new Administration coming in, may be one way to do it.

But you need to explain what the balance sheet looks like to the American people, whether it is in the military budget or whether it is in the other accounts. And I think that there has been no coordination in advance among any of us, that I am aware of, and yet I am pretty impressed that there is a large degree of overlap in terms of how we are analyzing the challenge.

And it faces all of us, but you are the public representatives, and it is your responsibility not just to respond to the American people but to lead us. And so I think that there is some political risk involved, but that is why you get paid the big bucks.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Don't worry. I voted against a lot of things, like giving you $600 rebate checks when there is no money in the coffers. So I don't worry about it.

Dr. Bacevich.

Dr. BACEVICH. Well, I don't fully understand the way the Congress works, but, I mean, it seems to me that one of the things you can do is try to break down those compartments. I mean, again, I don't know if this is feasible, but to insist that just because you are on a committee that is concerned with the Armed Forces that these other matters, like debt and dependency, somehow need to belong, to be owned by somebody else, because in terms of the long-term interests of the Nation, they do all come together to shape the problem.

Now, specifically with regard to the matters under this committee's purview, it seems to me that one of the big questions that I don't think has been fully engaged with has to do with the fundamental purpose of the United States military as we try to reshape it and configure it.

To oversimplify, if we look at the pre–9/11 era, the first nine months of the Bush Administration and of Mr. Rumsfeld's tenure, the bumper sticker to describe how we were going to reshape U.S. forces was transformation. It implied a particular emphasis on technology, on long-range strike, probably a bias in favor of air and naval as opposed to ground troops.

Since the invasion of Iraq, since the rise of General Petraeus and the rediscovery of counterinsurgency operations or, as I think they are now called, stability operations, we are, sort of, drifting toward a model of U.S. forces that now places greater emphasis on boots on the ground, on long-term, protracted presence and engagement, on nation-building, not simply warfighting.

I think a fundamental question as we look to—we must look to—the post-Iraq era is, which of those two models really is going to help us think about the future of U.S. forces? Or is there a third model? And we can't do both. Because to do both I think is utterly unaffordable. So what is the shape and purpose of the United States military as we look out 10 years or 20 years?

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Bartlett for five minutes.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

David Walker has resigned as the Comptroller General. He is now the CEO of the Peter Peterson Foundation. Peterson has committed $1 billion of his personal fortune to educate the American people about the imminent financial crisis that we face in our country.

This is a huge challenge, and it may, in fact, be insurmountable if we don't have a proper policy relative to another crisis we face, and that is the energy crisis. The two of you mentioned energy specifically, and the third of you mentioned scarcities in our country, and energy is one of those scarcities.

There is a new mantra now: Drill now, drill more, pay less, to hell with our kids and our grandkids.

Oil is not an infinite resource; it is finite. It will run down, and it will run out. We reached our maximum capability to produce oil in our country in 1970. No matter what we have done since then, we have produced less oil every year, year after year. We have

drilled more wells than all the rest of the world put together, and we now produce half the oil than we did in 1970.

The same man that correctly predicted that 14 years before it happened predicted the world would be reaching its maximum production of oil now. The International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Energy Information Administration (EIA) have oil production in the world flat for the last 36 months, while oil has risen from $52 a barrel to $146 a barrel.

We have no national energy policy. What is going to have to happen before the American people and our leaders recognize that it is a huge, huge challenge? You are not going to drill your way out of this. You are not going to solve it with immediately turning to alternatives. What is going to have to happen before we recognize the magnitude of this challenge?

Dr. POSEN. I have a little pet peeve here about oil, and I don't know that it would help much, but it might help a little bit.

I think, without quite thinking it through, a big part of America's energy security, and particularly oil security, policy is nested in the Department of Defense in the fact of the enormous American military commitment to the Persian Gulf, which, from my point of view, has no other rationale other than oil.

The magnitude of this commitment is not well-understood, and I think it is actually quite hard. I have tried to find decent academic articles that will tell you what exactly it is we are spending in the Persian Gulf.

DOD spends a lot of money every year, and my own guess is that a big, big chunk of it is going in this direction. And we should be asking ourselves, do we want a big chunk of America's energy security policy to be nested in the Pentagon?

And to even begin to offer a rational answer to that question, we need to have a relatively defensible estimate for exactly what we are spending each year. I am not just counting the Iraq war. I am talking about what we have been spending every year, certainly since Saddam Hussein's first defeat at our hands, what we have been spending every year to make ourselves ready for war in the Gulf.

It doesn't mean we shouldn't do it maybe we should. But it would be useful to know what those figures are, because maybe some of that money could be better spent going to some other energy sources and some other way of providing energy security that might have a longer-term payoff.

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, $4-a-gallon oil or gas has already had a quite beneficial effect on conservation, carbon emissions. And one probably impolitic approach is to determine that we should not want the price of gas to go down. That, as the external price goes down, taxes should rise to keep the price at the pump where it is now, which is still lower than most other countries.

And most other countries have had this approach for a long time—that is, very high taxes, which encourage conservation, smaller cars, more efficient cars, et cetera, more efficient homes. And there is no hope for America unless we are prepared to adopt that philosophy.

Dr. REISS. If I can just add quickly to that. To answer your question, I wonder sometimes whether we can mobilize ourselves politi-

cally in the absence of a crisis. And there is a joke in this town that the Government only knows two speeds, complacency and panic. And unless there is another opportunity, short of a crisis, that is hard for me to imagine, it is hard to see how we are going to mobilize the political will, given all the vested interests in things the way they currently are.

And I agree with what Jim was saying. You want to make sure that the revenues from gasoline stay in the United States and don't go to a lot of our adversaries around the world, where they are currently going. But that is not sufficient. You then need a government policy that is going to recycle those dollars into science and technology and research and development with new alternative energy sources.

And I am not the first one to say that we should be aiming to be the world's leader in energy technologies for the 21st century. We have the ability in our universities, in our best companies. We have the brain power. We just don't have the political willpower right now.

But I think that is clearly the way to go. And that is what is going to sustain America's strength, I think, long term.

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Davis for five minutes.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I certainly appreciate this hearing. There aren't too many opportunities, as you well know, for us to have these kinds of discussions, and it is a good one to have.

One of the things that we have done on the committee is talk a lot about interagency coordination. And I wonder if you could perhaps put that in some of the context in which you are speaking.

We know that the tools of government were not used in Iraq or Afghanistan the way they could have been. We came pretty late to the table with that. A little more of that is happening today.

I think that you have certainly touched, Ambassador Dobbins, on the idea that people are probably going to be pretty tired of nation-building. They want, as Tom Friedman has said, they want nation-building, but they want it here at home.

And how can we better talk about the need to use all of these tools better in a way that might, in fact, engage the American public?

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think that the current Administration's performance has significantly improved in this respect. I think you see good civil-military relations and a substantial civilian role in both Afghanistan and Iraq. I think the White House is functioning quite successfully as an integrator of policy. And I think you see the effects of this improvement in the turnaround that we have seen in Iraq.

We have recently completed a study looking at how Presidential leadership and interagency structures and decision-making processes affect outcomes in America's national security efforts abroad. And the conclusion is that some Administrations are better than others, but all of them get better over time. And then that improvement doesn't transfer to their successors, that there are abrupt discontinuities, in terms of expertise and competence, when Administrations change, particularly when they are accompanied by changes in party.

And, therefore, if you are looking at a place to fix the system, fixing it at the transition point is the point at which you are likely to have maximum effect, because they all do get better. And I would suggest that there are several ways of doing that.

First, it would help to have legislation that set out clearer guidelines on what State, AID, Defense and others are supposed to be doing. The Administrations need some flexibility, but completely reinventing the interagency division of labor every 4 or 8 years is very disruptive, because no department is going to invest in the long-term personnel and other capacities that are needed to perform functions that may be taken away from them and given to some other agency. And we have seen repeated shifts between State and Defense, really, since 1989, as to who does what when they are jointly engaged in some constituency.

Second, I think that just as our military are told that if you want to reach general rank, you have to have served in another armed service other than the one you are in, or in a joint position, telling members of the Foreign Service and the Civil Service that they are not going to get to the Senior Foreign Service or the Senior Civil Service unless they have served in another national security agency or in a White House or joint position would be an appropriate way of improving jointness at the interagency level.

And, finally, I think that the number of political appointees that are now transitioned every 4 or 8 years as a new Administration takes office—we are now up to 6,000 or so people change when a new Administration takes office—this is very disruptive. It demoralizes the career service. It creates an ideological layer between the professionals at the bottom and the policymakers who are appropriately political at the top.

And I think setting some limits on that and perhaps establishing that a certain proportion of sub-Cabinet positions and White House staff positions, including particularly national security positions, National Security Council staff positions, should be career would be another way of bridging these abrupt discontinuities that occur at transitions.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. How important is all that to this grand strategy?

And I think my follow-up question was going to be really on the international level, as well, in terms of trying to have a counterpart to that.

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think most people would agree that the major failures of the current Administration were the failures of competence in the early years. You can argue whether it was a good idea or not to have invaded Iraq. But whether or not it was a good idea, there were many multiple failures, which the Army has recently documented and any number of academics have documented, which are purely questions of competence and expertise.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Is there any disagreement with that issue, in terms of interagency, on the panel?

Dr. POSEN. Well, just to, at least a footnote. It matters more to Ambassador Dobbins's grand strategy than it does to mine, the interagency process get itself sorted.

You know, as everyone, including me, agrees, these state-building or nation-building or peace enforcement or counterinsurgency

projects are immensely complex military, political, economic activities, and all kinds of expertise is required.

And I am guessing that one of the reasons it looks better at the end is because of actual craft knowledge that is gained on the ground. I am actually very dubious that this can somehow be structured in before you can get into one of these projects. My own guess is that most of these projects are going to go badly for several years, no matter what, no matter what you do.

Now, I subscribe to a grand strategy that wants to do a less of this. Because I want to do a lot less of it, then I need lots less of it. And if you have doubts about our ability to become real experts at this fine orchestration of multiple talents, then it should make you question the viability of the entire grand strategy that, sort of, drags you into these projects.

Dr. REISS. Just to address very quickly on this point. One thing that would be very useful for whatever grand strategy is adopted would be to revise legislation to allow statutorily the Secretary of the Treasury to become a member of the National Security Council.

Right now, the Secretary of the Treasury is invited to these meetings according to the discretion of the President. But statutorily, I would argue, especially with today's world, the importance of globalization, trade, commerce and finance and that interconnectedness with all these other issues, the Treasury Secretary needs a seat at that table in order to empower him or her going forward and to make sure that Treasury has an input into these deliberations.

Dr. SNYDER. We are now going to the members in the order in which they arrived after the gavel. It will be Mr. Sestak, followed by Mr. Jones, then Mr. Conaway.

Mr. Sestak for five minutes.

Mr. SESTAK. All right. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I heard a couple things today. One was that national security begins at home; we need to address the fiscal issues. The other one I heard is that there is a destructive phenomenon going around globalization; it is somewhat disturbing out there.

And I also heard that we need to reach out every so often, to Dr. Posen's points and others, that we have to do something every so often when people are driving a car the wrong way. In fact, Mr. Ambassador pointed out, however, recently we have let Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, someone else, the European Union handle affairs in the Middle East, they are deciding where the car is to go.

My question is, or I guess my assessment has been, up to now, and I would like a comment, is that I have seen a need for some template, grand strategy, call it what you might, that appears to be less in this grand strategy world now than ever before, particularly as we have walked away, for good or bad, from past templates—the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, CBC protocol, Kyoto treaty, International Court of Justice.

So that U.S. leadership has been absent, not just in these individual cases you point out, Mr. Ambassador, but it has been absent from—what we did after World War II is constructed consciously 63 defense agreements around the world—the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations (U.N.).

My question is not what should that be. I don't think anybody here knows exactly. But in a world that is increasingly destructive, in terms of blurring the lines between what used to be foreign policy and domestic policy, because we can't fix our fiscal house without dealing with globalization, this construction needed, in my opinion, of the right types of international entities, which U.S. should influence for its self-interest.

What has been, in your viewpoint, the impact of not having that upon here in the decision-making? I am not interested in what the construct is; but I am interested, if you Congress should hold up some national mirror to the Nation and say, here is what is attendant to what we need, I think they would be more interested in knowing what happens here at home in decision-making if you don't have it?

One might argue that the Joint Chiefs of Staff didn't have a template in this new genre of how to argue for the right or wrong of Iraq. Some might argue that when the Pentagon sends over here something called a conventional Trident missile to be stuck on a nuclear submarine with 23 other similar-looking missiles that are all nuclear-armed, that there is no arms control template to argue that. We vote for it, but we don't have this deep, thorough discussion that, obviously, Congress probably hasn't had in 10 years until this has come up.

I am interested, if you could quickly, what is the impact if we don't have it upon decision-making policy and decision-makers that don't have such a template to think about this national security strategy that no longer really has borders between us and overseas?

If you could, just each.

Dr. BACEVICH. I am not sure I can answer your question in a satisfactory way. However, it does seem to me that, even if there is no construct, there at least ought to be the opportunity now to try to divine in a nonpartisan way what are the lessons of the Iraq war or the lessons of the global war on terror. And if we can identify those lessons, those lessons at least provide the basis for some kind of a construct. Let me illustrate what I mean with a specific example.

I think in the decade after the end of the Cold War there was a bipartisan—and I mean Republican and Democratic, civilian, military—intoxication with what seemed to be the limitless capacity of American power and especially American military power.

I think the greatest expression of that was this conception conceived in the Pentagon in the 1990's called "full-spectrum dominance," in which the Pentagon claimed that by tapping both the great expertise of U.S. forces and the potential of information technology, the United States was going to be able to be dominant in all forms of warfare, and that this kind of an idea had a certain amount of purchase among national security experts. It was false, it was silly, it was stupid, and it has been demolished by the events on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq.

So what we ought to do, it seems to me, at this juncture, even if we can't agree on the label that will describe our grand strategy going forward, we at least ought to confront the actual lessons and the limitations of our capacity—and, again, I would emphasize, es-

pecially our military capacity. And at least the recognition of those lessons would provide some basis for going forward and trying to think about what the construct ought to be.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Conaway for five minutes.

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, thank you, gentlemen, for coming today. Obviously very bright, articulate folks.

My one contribution would be that we need a better name. "Grand strategy" has a pluralistic, kind of, overarching, kind of, ugly phrase, to me, personally, that, Mr. Chairman, maybe we can figure out something else to call whatever it is we are talking about. Because I am put off, right off the bat, just by the phrase.

Dr. SNYDER. We could have met in a solarium, but that wouldn't have worked out so well.

Mr. CONAWAY. You know, hindsight is wonderful, and I guess you guys get paid for looking backwards. And we are trying to look forward with this, whatever we call this piece.

I was particularly impressed that it is dominated by the fact that our internal threats probably—not probably—do outweigh any external threats to this country. If some nation-state would threaten us, I suspect we would galvanize immediately. World opinion or U.S. opinion, following 9/11, although it was a relatively huge attack, but on the grand scale of the world wars it was a pretty small pop, but, you know, this country rallied quickly. We don't see that same kind of spirit rallying behind cuts in Federal Government spending, raising taxes, whatever your solution. And those of us on our side of the aisle think this Federal Government spends too much money.

I would be interested in where you would cut spending. Dr. Reiss, you might want to start this, because your five points circulated around national debt and government reform and a couple other things. Where would you whack a significant chunk off Federal spending?

Dr. REISS. Well, we are quickly——

Mr. CONAWAY. It is easy to talk about reform——

Dr. REISS. We are quickly going to exceed my competence on the domestic side of the ledger.

I think what I would want to do would be, first of all, to not identify any single thing. I think probably there are going to need to be hits taken across the board.

But rather than be arbitrary, I think that there needs to be a process so that everybody can see transparently what the balance account looks like, and then you are going to have to have a national conversation. And it is going to be messy, and it is going to take a while, but I don't see any alternative, unless we have another crisis again, in which case anything is possible. I don't think any of us want to wait for that to happen. We hope that that never happens.

So I am afraid I can't give you very many specifics. I am kind of like a general practitioner here, rather than—I think you need a specialist to try and examine this patient.

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, I think the defense budget is the largest component of discretionary spending by far, if I understand correctly. And, therefore, to the degree that this committee were to agree with the proposition which all of us here in one form or an-

other have stated, which is that balancing the budget and getting our domestic fiscal house in order is the most important national security challenge we face today, and were to offer to the other committees of Congress who are responsible for other forms of discretionary spending a willingness to join in a broader effort to reduce those deficits, I think that would be a significant contribution.

Dr. BACEVICH. I mean, it seems to me that, again, it depends on your assumptions or your expectations. To go back to the earlier comment about do we need Donald Rumsfeld's high-tech, transformed military, or do we need a military that is configured to do stability operations, how you answer that question suggests where you make the cuts.

If, indeed, the future of the U.S. military is to be more and more stability operations, then the current expansion of the Army and the Marine Corps, which I think is supposed to be 92,000 over 5 years, is inadequate, if we are going to have more Iraqs and Afghanistans in our future. And if that is going to be the case, then we cut the F–22 and we get rid of a couple of carrier battle groups from the Navy, and that is where the budget cuts come from.

If your military is the transformed, high-tech military, it is not going to be, in particular, focused on stability operations, then the expanded expansion of 92,000 more ground troops is probably unnecessary, and we can make cuts there.

Dr. POSEN. I will share the humility expressed by my colleagues. But I think that we are talking about big numbers here, so it is easy to pick on one particular problem in DOD that one or the other of us doesn't like. I think we have to, sort of, begin to confront the fact that defense spending as a share of GDP in this country has to go back under three percent. It is hovering around four now. This is a big and wrenching change for DOD and requires lots of cuts across the board.

Mr. CONAWAY. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the panel adequately expressed what we face every day, that nobody wants to be the first guy to raise their hand to take those cuts in spending.

So thank you, panelists.

Dr. SNYDER. In Arkansas, we look at cutting a lot of projects in Texas. But that doesn't seem to work out so well with the Texas delegation.

Mr. CONAWAY. Big target.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Skelton.

The CHAIRMAN. First, let me thank you for your excellent testimony today. We are very appreciative.

It seems that in recent years we have had two international traumas to our country. One, of course, is 9/11, the other one is Iraq, both in the Middle East. They seem to have dominated international thoughts on where we are as a country. And we seem to be measuring ourselves in relation to the Middle East, when, in truth and fact, there is a lot of world we have not adequately addressed.

What, of course, we all want is a return to our country being not only respected but admired. And as a result of particularly the actions in Iraq, we have lost some friends and standing with longtime allies.

But I have two questions, in listening to your testimony.

Is it even possible to derive a singular American strategy for the days ahead?

And the second question is this. Fast-forward to January the 20th. The phone rings, it is the President of the United States. And he says, "You are the expert. I would like for you to write a two-page paper for me and have it to me in 7 days, because I want to make a speech on national strategy on the 8th day. Would you please get that paper to me?" And being the President of the United States, you would say, "I would be glad to." And then you start struggling with that two-page paper.

Just assume that telephone call has come in to you. Would you outline for us what you would put down on your two-page paper devising a strategy for the United States as will be enunciated in 8 days by the President of the United States?

Dr. Bacevich.

Dr. BACEVICH. I think that my two-page memo would begin by saying that the global war on terror as a construct to frame our post–9/11 policies is deeply flawed, and that this new Administration intends to reject it. That the terror threat, the threat of violent Islamic radicalism is real, it will be persistent, but we have misconstrued it, and we have overstated it. That, in many respects, the catastrophe of 9/11 happened not because the adversary was cunning and strong, but because we had let our guard down; and that we will never do that again.

And, therefore, when it comes to terror, I would subscribe strongly to some of the remarks of my colleagues, that rather than thinking in terms of war, rather than thinking that invading and occupying countries somehow is going to provide an antidote to terror, that we need to revive, revitalize, strengthen the so-called law enforcement approach.

Having said that, it seems to me that, going forward, the essence of our grand strategy will be focused on reconstituting and husbanding American power, primarily economic power but also American military power. And it will be done with a general sense that the nexus of international politics in the 21st century, which in the 20th century tended to be in Europe, is now decisively shifting toward Asia. And that our efforts, in terms of trying to shape the world beyond our borders, will focus primarily not on the greater Middle East, but will focus primarily on East Asia, where stability and openness are absolutely essential to the wellbeing of the United States over the next several decades.

That would be what I would say.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ambassador DOBBINS. I am not sure that we are going to be able to replicate what we had during the Cold War, which was a national strategy that fit conveniently on a bumper sticker. We had "containment and deterrence." And then, for the last 20 years of the Cold War, we had "containment, deterrence and detente." And that pretty much summed up a bipartisan approach to our main national security challenge, which was the Soviet Union.

It is a more complex world today. If you had to put it on a bumper sticker, I would say "inclusion." Our main objective ought to be to gradually include the emerging powers—or re-emerging in the case of Russia—China, India, and of course the European Union in

the international system, which we have done so much to build, in a system based on the rule of law and on institutional arrangements that channel competition among nations in constructive fashions.

And to do that, we need to explain to the American people that we need to play by those rules ourselves, we need to belong to those institutions, we need to shape those institutions in order to bring these emerging powers into this.

Now, if I was looking for a way of explaining this, I would definitely, as I think all of the panelists and many of the committee members have indicated, stress that national security begins at home.

And I would go back and look at some of the rhetoric from President Eisenhower's Administration. You know, it was Eisenhower who ended the Korean War, imposed drastic reductions in the defense budget, talked about the dangers of the military industrial complex, and conducted what historians now regard as one of the most successful American presidencies in history. So I think going back and looking at how Eisenhower handled some of these tradeoffs between strength at home and strength abroad is worth doing.

Dr. POSEN. I am a great admirer of Eisenhower's defense strategy, as well.

I would make only a few points to the President, bearing in mind that my two pages is not the political speech.

One, the facts of the case: The U.S. is already enormously secure. We have spent the last 15 years trying to tell Americans that they are not, but we are. We have a quarter of gross world product. Our nearest competitor has less than half. We spend half of what the entire world spends on defense, and our military is really unchallengeable in normal, conventional, or nuclear war. We have a huge nuclear deterrent. We have big oceans to the east and west and weak, compliant neighbors to the north and south.

So the first thing we have to do is do no harm. Our principle risk today are errors of commission, not errors of omission.

Now, what do matter? What are the obvious threats? One, we have to keep an wary eye on the balance of power in the Eurasian land mass. That is why the United States waged the Cold War. That is why we waged World War II. That is why we waged World War I. The main reason why America goes abroad for big wars or big peacetime military operations is because of the possibility of a great military empire rising in Eurasia. That possibility isn't very great right now, but we always have to maintain the capability to thwart it.

We have two other problems in the world today, new problems, threats to safety: They arise from terror, and they arise from nuclear proliferation, and some people fear the nexus of the two.

We have to figure out a way to work those problems. But one of the things I think we have learned from the last few years is working those problems in a way that is designed to try and achieve 100 percent solutions ends up being extremely costly and probably undoable. This is an uncomfortable fact for Americans.

So we have to do what we can to restrain the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but we have to maintain a strong nuclear deterrence so those that get them know that trying to threaten the

United States is the most dangerous and crazy thing they can ever do.

We have to do what we can to suppress terror, but suppression, not 100 percent victory, has to be the model. And we have to fight that battle in the back alleys and back streets of the world with the assistance of other intelligence agencies, other police forces of other countries who have at least as big an interest in stopping al Qaeda as we do.

Dr. REISS. I think the new American President next January is going to want to start redressing America's image in the world, which we all know is not what we would like it to be. And I think that there are five things that he would need to say, not really a grand strategy, perhaps more a combination of a strategy and shorter-term policy, but nonetheless would send a very positive signal to the world, would be that: The United States is going to take the lead now on climate change. We are not going to be in denial. We are not going to refuse to do this. We are actually going to be the world's leader in acknowledging this problem.

Second, we are going to close Guantanamo and abide by the rule of law.

Third, we are going to elevate the importance of the Middle East peace process, not episodically but on a consistent level, appointing a special envoy who will report directly to the President of the United States.

Fourth, we will aggressively promote free trade agreements, trying to revive the Doha round, and try to pass through Congress the three Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that are currently before it.

And, fifth and finally, that there will be a much greater effort on national investment in research and technology for new energy technologies to make us, not energy-independent, because we are never going to be energy-independent, but rather what I would call energy-secure.

And I think that alone would do wonders for reviving America's image throughout the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. Gentlemen, we are going to go around again, if you have the stamina here. And we will use the 5-minute clock.

I appreciate you all's comments today and thoughts. I don't want you all to have to dwell on this any more than my wife and I do, but we currently have a two-year-old and she is pregnant with triplets. So our thinking about the future has passed the, "Oh, my God, I will never retire," to actually thinking about the future as all of us with children and grandchildren, and care about what America does.

But it seems like what you all have talked about today in terms of, as you look ahead, to what you see as security threats is really a grand opportunity. I mean, the priorities that you are putting on your list, energy, security—and I prefer that term, too. We are always going to be a trading nation, and we shouldn't shy away from being a trading nation. We want security of price and security of supply, and make sure that it is a reasonable percentage of family income that every American pays for whatever kind of energy choices they make.

But when we look at things to do in energy, things that are in conservation, in investments in new technologies, the economy, things that we can do in terms of dealing with our national debt, our long-term challenges of boomers that you all talked about, what you talked about, either Ambassador Dobbins or Dr. Posen, about the competency of government, the transition to new Administrations, dealing with all these kinds of things, in terms of focusing on diplomacy, making sure it is the quality that we want it to be.

All of those things are under our control. These are all things that are under our control. It is a tremendous opportunity for us if we all buy into that these are the priorities that this Nation needs to undertake.

A dramatic contrast with where we were during these periods after the Solarium Project and the strategies were developed where there were things that we could certainly do, and did, in terms of alliances and building up our forces and the tremendous investment in our military. But the reality is, a lot of what the future of the world had to hold was out of our control. And we saw that in Vietnam, and we saw that in North Korea, in the Korean Peninsula.

So it seems to me that there is some tremendous opportunities here as you all describe what you see as the security challenges for this country.

I wanted to talk about one specific issue, if I might, and it is a detail. Let's see, who mentioned it? One of you talked about the absence—oh, I know, it was Dr. Posen. He talked about language. I think it is on page 93.

Yeah, page 93, Dr. Posen, I am quoting from you now, you say, "Despite the great power of the United States, its national security establishment is particularly ill-suited to a strategy that focuses so heavily on intervention in the internal political affairs of others. The U.S. national security establishment, including intelligence agencies and the State Department, remain short on individuals who understand other countries and their cultures and speak their languages."

Now, I think from your perspective you would say what you said to Mrs. Davis: If you have a policy of restraint, perhaps you don't need as many people. I would also argue, though, along with what you all have said about developing the American economy, if we want to compete in this world, our kids and our adults today had better be prepared to understand cultures and understand languages, or otherwise we don't compete.

Would you all respond to the specific niche question of what I see, what a lot of people see, as the lack of foreign language expertise and its accompanying lack of cultural sensitivity?

Dr. Reiss.

Dr. REISS. I am very excited about this question, because I have given it a lot of thought——

Dr. SNYDER. Well, I was excited to ask it, Dr. Reiss. Carry on.

Dr. REISS [continuing]. When I was in the Government and now in academia.

You use as a reference point the launch of Sputnik and how the United States responded after that shock to our American political

system, and you look at the legislation that Congress passed. Not just a bump-up in the military budget, but also a National Education Act that put in the hands of American students grants for them to study the Russian language, Russian history, Russian politics, aspects of Russian society that paid dividends throughout the rest of the Cold War.

You then contrast that with what happened after 9/11. And there were some attempts by the House to try and pass some modest language programs. There was some, again, a modest bump-up in the Boren program. But, again, given the need for us to understand this strategic part of the world, the greater Middle East, the different languages involved, the need for universities to be able to get qualified teachers to teach our students, the response has been wholly inadequate.

And it is not just in the State Department and the military; I think it is throughout our entire society. So that we are not doing a very good job in terms of responding to, I think, a heartfelt strategic need right now.

And even if you don't think that military intervention is going to be the right way to go in these situations, and I think many of us would agree with that, if we are going to win hearts and minds, we have to be able to have conversations with these people. If we don't speak the language, we literally have nothing to say to them.

And we just can't expect people to speak English; and if they don't speak English, they must not have anything worthwhile to say to us. We have to be able to understand not just Arabic but all the different dialects and languages in this part of the world, because we are going to be there for a very long time.

Ambassador DOBBINS. I agree in general, but let me be a little contrarian. I think that the problem, particularly in the early years of this decade, was less a problem of supply than demand. That is to say, the Defense Department, the military, the Administration simply weren't interested in tapping the sources of expertise that was available.

This has changed dramatically. You know, today we are deploying anthropologists with every brigade we send to Afghanistan and Iraq to advise the commander on the human terrain in which he is operating. This is a big change, and it is just one example of the ways that the State Department, the Defense Department and the White House are beginning to look to external sources of expertise and tap them. But back in 2001, 2002, 2003, the Defense Department wasn't even interested in asking the State Department for advice, let alone academics from outside the Government.

So it won't do us any good to up our language training if we don't have the demand side. If you don't have enough foreign service officer positions funded that require language as a prerequisite, It doesn't make any difference matter how many graduates you have. The fact is that, with our immigrant population, we have an advantage over most countries of having native speakers of almost any language in the world in large numbers, including Arabic.

So, you know, I think that we need to fix the demand side as well as the supply side.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin, for five minutes.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate a lot of the different points you are making. And it seems to me that a good foreign policy—in the political world, we go back and tell our constituents, "I am fighting for you in Washington, D.C." We don't do any fighting down here. The things that we accomplish are all based on persuasion and salesmanship. Even if you look at the bills that we pass, there is very little that we accomplish that has not had to have been really agreed to by both political parties. Any time, in the political world, one party tries to shove something down everybody's throat, it usually doesn't get through the system.

So my sense is that the way that we approach a lot of these things is pretty much more—I like the idea of exporting freedom, but I agree with you, you can't really export it; all you can do is encourage people. And it seems to me that the emphasis should be on understanding their cultures and saying, "Boy, we have a lot of problems in our own country too, but here are some things that worked for us when we ran into some similar problems," and that sort of a friendship kind of reaching out a hand and working with foreign cultures, understanding them.

This committee has done a great deal of work, a lot of hearings, years' worth of hearings, on basically projecting the Goldwater-Nichols jointness concept to a much broader kind of context. I think one thing that was very exciting to us on this committee was we have some real left-wingers and right-wingers and conservatives and liberals and Republicans and Democrats, and we all had a good sense that this was a project we all saw the need for. There was a good sense of cooperation that this is a direction that we should be going. Interesting that DOD was saying, "We think the State Department budget should be bigger." Kind of interesting.

My question to you is—and maybe you would reject it, that we can't really know this for sure. But, as we took a look after September 11th at threats, what we realized was the most dangerous thing to us is a nation-state that has the funding mechanism of a nation-state that concentrates in developing weapons of mass destruction and is determined that they are going to use them if they can get a hold of them.

Now, you might argue that we don't have such a nation-state in existence. But what we found was it is very hard to develop nuclear weapons if you are just a bunch of terrorists running around from camp to camp. You need to have a source of oil or something to pay for the amount of research and technology that goes into making a significant threat, particularly asymmetric kinds of threats.

But let's say that you are the President and you are stuck with a situation where you believe there is some country that truly is run by nutcases and that they have enough money to develop nuclear weapons and that they are very close to having them and that they will use them. If you will grant those assumptions. Now we are confronted with a pretty sticky wicket. How do you proceed under those conditions?

Because those of us that voted here, the U.S. Congress, as you know, voted almost unanimously to go into Iraq, because we thought that those conditions were in existence in Iraq when we

made that decision. Let's say that we had been right. What do you do?

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, one of the questions you have to ask yourself is whether the regime that you are concerned about is more irrational than Joe Stalin or Mao Zedong. Where are they on that scale? After all, Mao sent a million troops to confront us in Korea and put his own people through hell with the cultural revolution, and Stalin conducted genocide on a far wider scale than even Adolph Hitler. And yet, we found them sufficiently rational actors. So a combination of containment, deterrence and detente was our response. So you have to go pretty high beyond that threshold before those aren't the right answers.

And if you are beyond that threshold, then coercive diplomacy and declaring preemptive doctrine probably isn't very useful, because if the person is so irrational, those probably aren't going to sufficiently correct his behavior. And so, you know, maybe invasion is the right answer, but that doesn't mean having a doctrine of preemption is a good way of dealing with the generic problem of nuclear proliferation.

Mr. AKIN. Anybody else? Or take the other one, China invades Taiwan. What are you going to do?

Dr. POSEN. On your nuclear question, I couldn't add a single thing to what Ambassador Dobbins said. I mean, I think agree with him, sort of, 110 percent. I mean, one can always define a problem in such a way that the answer is, sort of, inevitable. But we should set a fairly high bar to convince ourselves that we are dealing with undeterrable countries.

Now, we can always imagine a set of facts that will make almost any of us deviate from our standard policy line. So I think buried in your question is some deeper question about how we do these assessments, what would convince us that the particular actor is undeterrable.

Mr. AKIN. I was asking the question, recognizing you are swallowing a very big premise. And that is one of those things. But somewhere along the line, when you are a CEO—and we have to make those decisions when a vote comes on the floor. But I think most of us are pretty sensitive to that. You don't jump into it quickly.

Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Gingrey for five minutes.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I am sorry that I had to leave to go to another committee hearing. And this is, I think, extremely informative. And I commend Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Akin and Chairman Skelton for being with us here earlier. It is a very important discussion.

Dr. GINGREY [continuing]. I guess the one question I would like to ask—and hopefully it has not already been addressed—we talk about the development of our grand strategy, and we have talked about a number of things. Before I left, I heard a number of you comment on internal strategy and the importance of getting our own house in order before we could really have any grand strategy that was applicable to the nations of the world.

I want to know if you can describe for us the grand strategies of some of these other nations, such as China, India, Russia, Brit-

ain, Japan and, indeed, Iran. Are their grand strategies explicitly declared? Or do we understand them implicitly as a result of their actions and what principally influences their strategies?

Maybe you can also touch on how much information we really should be sharing with the general public. I think maybe a grand strategy from the 30,000-foot level, an overarching explanation, but certainly I would be concerned about sharing too much detail on how our grand strategy meshes or, indeed, conflicts with the grand strategy of these other countries, just a few of whom I mentioned by name.

So any one of the four of you who wants to take that on, go ahead.

Dr. POSEN. Well, it is not always true. And in fact it is mostly untrue that states develop clear and coherent grand strategies and state them publicly. Many of us are sort of axiomatical about the grand strategy of the Eisenhower Administration, and a good bit of it could have been divined from public statements. But the guts of it remained in a national security document; I think it was NCS 162, and I believe that document remained classified until many years thereafter.

It was quite common during the Cold War to keep much of it secret, and I think a lot of that secrecy had to do with the competition inherent in international politics. The trade-off between the values and the gains of having a clearly stated grand strategy in public and the possible risks of telling adversaries too much always has to be treated. You have to be self-conscious about that.

Second, sometimes countries have grand strategies, but you know, they are not written down in one place. And you are looking for kind of a main line of advance, you know, a set of basic principles. And I think that would be true right now of most of the countries you are talking about; I am not sure you can find a single written document for one of those countries in public.

You do find them from time to time. Just as an example, when I first started in this business, I tried to figure out what Israeli grand strategy was, and it wasn't written down anywhere. So I collaborated with a fellow one summer at the RAND Corporation, and we managed to assemble what we thought was basic outlines of their grand strategy. The document was very popular in Israel because they had nothing to talk about, so they essentially used ours.

I think you are on to something here. But it is a good idea to start out with the premise there is one and see somehow if you can fill in the blanks. My own view is that most countries' grand strategies, first and foremost, arise from their international situation. And by their international situation, we are talking about, what is their power position relative to others? What big interests, conflicts do they have with others? What is the geography around their country? And in many countries, something that we know less about is the ethnography in their own country because many countries have different ethnic groups living in different parts of their countries, and they have to worry about them together.

So China today, we think of China being a strong and growing country that is interested, in some sense, in challenging American dominance in that part of the world, in the first instance, trying

to develop some regional military capability, maybe some regional denial capabilities.

But we also should understand that China has its own concerns. You know, out at the other end of China, there are many disparate ethnic groups. Keeping those ethnic groups under some kind of control is a big problem for them; and it seems to be a source of conservatism in their grand strategy because when they get too adventurous, they have problems.

But that is just a kind of example of how it works.

Dr. GINGREY. Dr. Posen, I am about to run out of time and maybe one of the others would like to comment.

Dr. BACEVICH. I would want to emphasize, I think it is absolutely imperative for this strategy, whatever it is, to be explained to the American people, because if they haven't bought into it, it is not going to happen.

We have talked about the strategy of containment. Kennan's foreign affairs article, President Truman's speech where he enunciated the Truman Doctrine, Secretary Marshall's speech where he enunciated the Marshall Plan. These speeches were really the effort to explain, to—and if you want to put it crudely—sell the American people on the idea of containment. If they hadn't have bought it, it wouldn't have worked.

In particular, I would say today, if there is going to be a new grand strategy, it is going to have to be explained and sold, because any new grand strategy that focuses on getting our house in order—talk about energy security and the like—is going to require near-term sacrifice by us; and that is going to have to be explained in great detail in order to make it palatable.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Jones for five minutes.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And, again, I want to compliment you for this hearing. I have been looking forward to something like this for a long time.

I sit here in great amazement. Are we at a point in the history of this country that we don't need to have a grand strategy for the world? Is what we need a grand strategy to rebuild America? I think it is amazing.

I regret that I voted to give the President the authority to go into Iraq. It was a failed policy to begin with. I bought what I was sold, I will leave it at that.

What I see happening is that in this country, today, we cannot be seen as a superpower. We are borrowing money from the Chinese to pay our bills; we are borrowing money from Japan. You have all acknowledged this. I am not telling you anything you haven't said. The trade deficit with China is $252 billion. And yet we in Congress are trying to deal with some very difficult issues that there are no easy answers to. And I hope the next President, whoever that is, Mr. Obama or Mr. McCain, will concentrate on America and only do the things that have to be done militarily when we are attacked, or if it is in the national security interests of this country.

But for this country to continue to believe—I will tell you the truth. I don't know how we, our military people, sit down with the Chinese. I ask this question in Armed Services, and I will close and I will get your responses to some of my rambling.

We had Assistant Secretary for Pacific Affairs, we had a four-star Air Force general, very fine gentleman. They are telling us about a sit-down with the Chinese and talk about, we need to do this, we need to do that. I said to them, how in the world can the Chinese look across the table at you with the same respect that they might have if you didn't owe them money?

So are we at a point that—I am not talking about being an isolationist. I am not talking about being a protectionist. But if we don't get this country back on its economic feet—we lost 3.5 million manufacturing jobs in 7 years. I don't know how we can see ourselves as being a world leader when we can't pay our bills.

I conclude my rambling. I think I have put maybe not anything of any depth out for you to respond to. But I wish you would respond back because this frustration I feel—I have felt it for the last six, seven years—is great. And my concern is that I am sitting here and watching not Rome burn, but America crumble.

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think most of us would agree that the international situation has seldom been more benign. We have no peer competitor; we have nobody who could even become a peer competitor within the next two or three decades.

Now, part of the reason the world is on balance, rather more benign than it has been for most of the last 200 years, is because of American leadership and American engagement and building up an international system. And it is frayed around the edges as the result of some of the decisions we made over the last few years. But it has by no means deteriorated.

So I think we do have the luxury of turning back and worrying about our own problems somewhat more—without becoming isolationists, without withdrawing from the system, and without ceasing to strengthen the system when we can, but recognizing that it is in pretty good shape.

Mr. JONES. Would anyone else like to comment?

Dr. BACEVICH. Well, I think you have introduced this term "isolationism" into our discussion, and it is very important to do that because, in essence, that becomes the club that some will employ in order to beat into submission anybody who counsels a strategy of restraint or who advocates spending more time correcting our internal problems. And it is very important to recognize the history of discourse about U.S. foreign policy and the role that this bugaboo of isolationism has played.

The truth is, we have never been an isolationist country. And I would simply want to emphasize that as a strategy of restraint focused on internal rebuilding is articulated, it needs to be articulated in the sense that we are rebuilding ourselves in order to facilitate engagement, in order to make it—make us better able to engage the world in ways that are, first of all, in our interests, but may also actually contribute to building a peaceful and prosperous international order.

Dr. SNYDER. I want to give—about winding down here, gentlemen. Mrs. Davis, did you want a second round?

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman. I am sure you are familiar with Henry Kissinger's article of April 7, 2008, the three revolutions and how—is that familiar to anybody? And he talks about—well, the world order and what is occurring.

I am wondering, and it is partly with regard to some of the other questions, where does our discussion of a grand strategy—and that may be not be the best way to define it at this time—fit in with our allies and our ability to include others in that discussion? Are we doing that?

I guess—what advice would you give to the next President if in the next, you know, first month or three months or so of the Presidency, where would you go first? Where should that be placed initially?

Dr. REISS. Let me try and address that a couple of ways.

First of all, the centerpiece of our strength and the centerpiece of any grand strategy has to be our allies, so the first place you want to go is to Europe to visit our allies in Asia, Japan, South Korea, Australia and others. They are very desirous of American leadership right now. I have been to both Europe and Asia recently; they are waiting for the next Administration. It is not so much that they expect some of the policies to change, although some people do; but I think that they would welcome a change in tone in terms of the face that we show the world.

And it shouldn't be an angry face where everything is reduced to a war on terror, but rather something positive and affirmative which the United States has traditionally stood for. Economic development, human dignity, human rights, these are the values I think resonate globally and that epitomize the best of our country.

But when we are talking about a policy of strategic restraint, if I can just sort of transition to one of the earlier questions, we have to recognize the rest of the world isn't going to take a global timeout while we get our house in order. Things are going to be taking place, many things, around the world that we are not going to be very happy with.

And I think for Congress, especially over the next few years, the two biggest issues you are going to have to grapple with in addition to—well, the three biggest things then—is going to be what is the next phase of our history with Iraq? In particular, what type of American diplomatic and military presence do we want to have in the Persian Gulf 5 to 10 years out? Because that is really what the debate is all about right now.

We are going to be coming home, whether quickly or slowly. But the issue is, what residual force presence do we have? And what residual diplomatic influence do we have in the region in response to a secondary threat, which is a rising Iran, in particular, an Iran with unfettered nuclear ambitions.

And then the third big issue to really focus on—which, again, is not going to await our getting our house in order—is going to be Pakistan. This is ground central for al Qaeda, according to the intelligence estimates. And Pakistan is beset by all sorts of internal difficulties. There are structural problems that have long afflicted that country, and it is not going to await our ability, our timing to engage it. It is going to be demanding the attention of the Congress and the next Administration well before then.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Does anybody else want to comment, in a minute or two, just in terms of those issues that you put front and center, the extent to engage our allies in that? Because I think part of our question is—this goes to Afghanistan as well—this

threat is not perceived in the same way that we perceive it necessarily. So where does that fit into that?

Dr. POSEN. Well, the only thing I would suggest is that it is very interesting the way Dr. Reiss started talking about the traditional allies. When we start talking about problems, the problems were all concentrated in this one little cauldron. And, of course, we have problems with our allies in that cauldron.

I think we need to have a serious engagement with our allies about risks and costs and interests in this part of the world. It is about time we found out what kind of allies we actually have. I don't think what we have discovered is particularly good.

The British and the Australians and the Canadians can't carry all the weight for America's alliances. There are other rich countries out there who put many, many caveats in their participation. And we have to press harder. If we can't get their help for some of the things we are inclined to do, I think we have to think a lot harder about whether we can do them.

The $64 question on Iran is: Are we going to have a war with them? What is everyone else going to say about that war if we decide to have it? These issues have to be thought through very seriously, because if there is one straw left out there that could break the camel's back as far as an American act of commission, it is a prevented war with Iran.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. We will close with Mr. Bartlett for any questions he wants to finish up.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important hearing.

I think it is very clear that we cannot have a defensible grand strategy unless it addresses the energy challenge that the world faces, particularly facing us because we, having only about 2 percent of the world's oil, use 25 percent of the world's oil.

I think, Dr. Reiss, it was you who mentioned in your testimony, we were sent to negotiate. The first thing you did was to educate and explain so that you would then have a basis for negotiation.

Who is responsible for educating relative to energy? There is so much misinformation out there. People come to me talking about schemes for getting energy out of water. Water is the ash you get when you burn hydrogen. Do you think there is energy in water?

You probably think there is energy in the ash in your furnace. I had a Member the other day, with a straight face, tell me that we had 2,500 years of coal, so we didn't need to worry. I hear people saying that by 2050 we will be using twice as much energy as we are using now, and most of it is going to come from fossil fuels, from oil.

Then there are those who worship the market: The market will fix this problem; it fixes other problems. But resources are finite. You will not like the way the market fixes this problem if you wait for the market to fix the problem.

Then there are others that tell me, don't worry at all about the future because we have 1.6 trillion barrels of oil in the oil shales of the West. Two bubbles have already broken and one will shortly break. The first bubble that broke was the hydrogen bubble. People

finally figured out it is not an energy source, I think; it is simply an energy carrier.

The core ethanol bubble broke with disastrous consequences, like world hunger and food shortages around the world. And now the next bubble that is going to break—and remember, you heard it here—it is the cellulosic ethanol bubble. I can't imagine that we are going to get a great deal more energy from our wastelands, not good for growing any crop, that we could get from all of our corn and all of our soybeans.

And the National Academy of Sciences—this isn't Roscoe Bartlett; this is National Academy of Sciences. If we used all of our corn for ethanol and discounted it for fossil fuel input, it would displace 2.4 percent of our gasoline. They noted you would save as much if you tuned up your car and put air in the tires. And if we use all of our soybeans for soy diesel, we would 2.9 percent of our diesel.

There is just a gross amount of misinformation out there. Who has the responsibility to educate? Because until people are educated, we cannot possibly have a rational discussion of energy. Who has that responsibility?

Dr. REISS. Congressman, we all do, as educators, as representatives. But the prime responsibility is the President of the United States; he has the biggest megaphone and the biggest pulpit. That is really what is going to be required, and it is going to take more than one speech. It is going to take a long-term, persistent effort; and there is going to be an awful lot of push-back from vested interests.

And, again, this is why I keep on saying, there has to be an awful lot of education that takes place here because it is going to be a struggle. You are going to be promising people future benefits, but they are going to be taking short-term pain; and that is always a very difficult political bargain to sell.

But I think what you have heard today from all of us, if I can be presumptuous for a minute, is that I think we all see that this is absolutely essential if we are going to keep our country strong for the future.

Dr. POSEN. It is easy for people in the education business to tell others that they should educate, but—I agree.

But people need more authoritative sources of facts. One of the problems with—one of the beauties, really, of the Information Age economy is that there is too much information, and much of it is not vetted, we need more sources of information that are authoritative. People that, you know, we can sort of have a little—you know, give a little credibility to some of the sources.

For years and years and years, you know, I have been indebted to you folks, because in my business, we love the stuff that we get from Government Accountability Office (GAO), we love the stuff we get from Congressional Budget Office (CBO), we love the stuff that we get from Congressional Research Service (CRS). And you guys have a terrific capability to create facts that have a little bit of credibility behind them, rather than factoids or candidate facts or baloney.

And so we welcome your assistance.

Mr. BARTLETT. It is not that the information is not out there. Our government has paid for four studies, all of them saying the

same thing: The peaking of oil is either present or imminent with potentially devastating consequences. The Hirsch report, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) report, was the first one; Corps of Engineers, the second one in 2005. Last year there were two reports; the second one was the National Petroleum Council, the first was the Government Accountability Office. And our government has chosen to ignore all of those.

The Hirsch report says the world has never faced a problem like this, that the mitigation consequences will be unprecedented. And still, it is business as usual. I am just—you know, I am flabbergasted, Mr. Chairman, how we can do that with all of the evidence out there.

Thank you very much.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett, for your questions and for your very eloquent way of expressing what clearly is a national and world challenge.

Gentlemen, I appreciate your being with us today. Let me say that if, either in your minds now or in the near future, you come up with something you wanted to add, feel free to submit that as an answer—as a question for the record, and it will be distributed to the Members and the staff and included as part of the record of this hearing.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Dr. SNYDER. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

JULY 15, 2008

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 15, 2008

Opening Statement of
Chairman Dr. Vic Snyder
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Hearing on "A New U.S. Grand Strategy"

July 15, 2008

Good morning, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations' hearing on a new grand strategy for the United States.

At a number of committee and subcommittee hearings over the past year, the need for a relevant, thorough, and publicly-vetted national strategy has become evident. This subcommittee's six hearing last July and January on alternative strategies for Iraq caused us to reflect on the need for a context with a more comprehensive set of interests beyond that theater of operations. Our look into provincial reconstruction teams, as an example of interagency operations, underscored the need for interagency reform. At the same time, however, it's difficult to address reforms until we know what we want the interagency to do.

The chairman of the full committee, Ike Skelton, has planned to elevate the level of debate on national strategy over the next several months. In his July 9 speech, "The U.S. Needs Comprehensive Strategy to Advance National Interests," Chairman Skelton called on the next president to engage in a process for determining a strategy for today's rapidly changing world. In what he referred to as the "first in a series" of speeches, Chairman Skelton underscored that "Congress should be involved in the process, and to ensure that a new strategy is one that the American people can support, the general outline of the debate should be shared with and involve the American people."

Chairman Skelton has expressed his support for this hearing and its follow-on on July31, where we'll hear from former flag officers and ambassadors. He will chair a full committee hearing in September on this topic with former Secretaries of Defense and State.

Dr. Henry Kissinger noted in his April opinion piece that the global environment is going through an unprecedented transformation. Regional power is shifting; some large nation states, such as China, India, Brazil to name a few, are ascending and verge on global power

status. Russia may already be there, again. Is their rise a challenge to oppose or an opportunity to engage? Some of our traditional security arrangements may fade in importance as others take on new meaning. But nation states are not our only concern. It is clear that a number of trans-national issues will challenge us while others may provide positive potential. Fundamentalist terrorism and the proliferation of dangerous weapons are obvious examples of serious challenges, of course, but what about climate change, the fragility of increasingly connected world financial markets or the outbreak of pandemic disease?

So, the time could not be better for us to hear the views of this distinguished panel of experts joining us today:

- Dr. Andrew Bacevich, Professor of International Relations and History at Boston University. His latest book is "The Long War: A New History of US National Security Policy since World War II."

- Dr. and Ambassador James Dobbins, Director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND National Security Research Division, who has served as a diplomat in South America, Europe, and Afghanistan. He is the author of a new book on nation building.

- Dr. Barry Posen, the Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of Security Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His recent article in *The National Interest* entitled, "The Case for Restraint" has received a lot of attention.

- And, Dr. Mitchell Reiss, the Vice Provost for International Affairs at the College of William and Mary's Marshall-Wythe School of Law, who previously directed the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State and authored a number of scholarly works on nuclear non-proliferation.

Welcome to all of you and thank you for being here. After Mr. Akin's opening remarks, I'll turn to each of you for a brief opening statement. Your prepared statements will be made part of the record.

Opening Statement of Congressman Todd Akin

Subcommittee Hearing on New U.S. Grand National Security Strategy

WASHINGTON, D.C. - Today, Rep. Todd Akin (R-MO), the ranking Republican on the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, released the following opening statement for the subcommittee's hearing on the need for a new grand strategy for United States national security:

"Thank you, Chairman Snyder, and good morning to our witnesses--we appreciate you being here today.

"Today this subcommittee will hold its first public meeting to discuss the topic of U.S. grand strategy. Whether a national security strategy is grand-or-not seems to be a matter for historians and scholars to debate. Determining what the national security priorities should be for the United States for the next four years is vitally important to this Congress and to the people we represent, however.

"In preparing for this hearing, this subcommittee heard convincingly from one expert that a national security strategy which does not take into account resource constraints offers little strategy and less security. With that in mind, I'm interested in hearing from our witnesses what they think the three or four top national security priorities should be for the U.S. going forward.

"Finally, I would like our witnesses to address the war on terrorism. The attacks on 9/11 and our government's response have been at the center of the Bush Administration's national security strategy for almost eight years. I'm curious where our witnesses believe the global war on terrorism belongs in a future grand strategy? How should the threat posed by radical Islam and al Qaeda be managed in concert with other challenges like nuclear proliferation and China military modernization?

"I look forward to hearing our witnesses' thoughts on these questions. Again, thank you to our witnesses for being here today."

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http://Republicans.ArmedServices.House.Gov/

Testimony of Andrew J. Bacevich
House Armed Services Committee
July 15, 2008

Thank you for the opportunity to present my views on the future of U. S. grand strategy to members of this committee.

In American practice, grand strategy almost invariably implies conjuring up a response to emerging threats or prospective challenges beyond our borders. The expectation is that an effective grand strategy will provide a framework for employing American power to "shape" that external environment – "shape" having in recent years become a favorite term among those who inhabit the rarified world of grand strategy.

These days strategists expend considerable energy (and imagination) devising concepts intended to enable the United States to "win" the Global War on Terrorism, "transform" the Greater Middle East, or "manage" the rise of China.

These are honorable, well-intentioned efforts and may, on occasion, actually yield something useful. After all, the grand strategy of Containment, devised in the wake of World War II, did serve as an important touchstone for policies that enabled the United States and its allies to prevail in the Cold War.

Yet there is a second way to approach questions of grand strategy. This alternative approach – which I will employ in my very brief prepared remarks – is one that emphasizes internal conditions as much as external threats.

Here is my bottom line: the strategic imperative that we confront in our time demands first of all that we put our own house in order. Fixing our own problems should take precedence over fixing the world's problems.

The past decade has seen a substantial erosion of U. S. power and influence. This has occurred in part as a result of ill-advised and recklessly implemented policy decisions, the Iraq War not least among them. Yet it has also occurred because of our collective unwillingness to confront serious and persistent domestic dysfunction.

The chief expression of this dysfunction takes the form of debt and dependency. In the not so very distant future these may well pose as great a danger to our well-being as violent Islamic radicalism or a China intent on staking its claim to the status of great power.

To persist in neglecting these internal problems is in effect to endorse and perpetuate the further decline in U. S. power.

Let me illustrate the point with two examples.

Example number one is energy. I hardly need remind members of this committee of the relevant facts. Once the world's number one producer of oil, the United States today possesses a paltry 4% of known global oil reserves while Americans consume one out of every four barrels of worldwide oil production.

President Bush has bemoaned our "addiction" to foreign oil. He is right to do so. The United States now imports more than 60% of its daily petroleum fix, a figure that will almost surely continue to rise.

The costs of sustaining that addiction are also rising. Since 9/11, the price of oil per barrel has quadrupled. The nation's annual oil "bill" now tops $700 billion, much of that wealth helping to sustain corrupt and repressive regimes, some of it subsequently diverted to support Islamic radicals who plot against us.

Since the 1970s, Americans have talked endlessly of the need to address this problem. Talk has not produced effective action.

Instead, by tolerating this growing dependence on foreign oil we have allowed ourselves to be drawn ever more deeply into the Persian Gulf, a tendency that culminated in the ongoing Iraq War. That war, now in its sixth year, is costing us an estimated $3 billion per week – a figure that is effectively a surtax added to the oil bill.

Surely, this is a matter that future historians will find baffling: how a great power could recognize the danger posed by energy dependence and then do so little to avert that danger.

Example number two of our domestic dysfunction is fiscal. Again, you are familiar with the essential problem, namely our persistent refusal to live within our means.

When President Bush took office in 2001, the national debt stood at less than $6 trillion. Since then it has increased by more than 50% to $9.5 trillion. When Ronald Reagan became president back in 1981, total debt equaled 31% of GDP. Today, the debt is closing in on 70% of GDP.

This is no longer money we owe ourselves. Increasingly, we borrow from abroad, with 25% of total debt now in foreign hands. Next to Japan, China has become our leading creditor, a fact that ought to give strategists pause.

Given seemingly permanent trade imbalances, projected increases in entitlement programs, and the continuing costs of fighting multiple, open-ended wars, this borrowing will continue and will do so at an accelerating and alarming rate. Our insatiable penchant for consumption and aversion to saving only exacerbate the problem.

Any serious attempt to chart a grand strategy for the United States will need to address this issue, which cannot be done without considerable sacrifice.

Now there are those who would contend that the Bush administration has already formulated a grand strategy, one that will carry us well into the current century. The centerpiece of this strategy is the Global War on Terrorism, in some quarters referred to as the Long War.

In fact, the Long War represents an impediment to sound grand strategy. To persist in the Long War will be to exacerbate the existing trends toward ever greater debt and dependency and it will do so while placing at risk America's overstretched armed forces.

To imagine that a reliance on military power can reverse these trends toward ever increasing debt and dependency would be the height of folly. This is the central lesson that we should take away from period since September 11, 2001.

Shortly after 9/11 then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld framed the strategic problem facing the United States this way. "We have a choice," he said, "either to change the way we live, which is unacceptable, or to change the way that they live; and we chose the latter."

What we have learned since then is that the United States does not possess the capacity to change the way they live, whether "they" are the people of the Middle East or the entire Islamic world. To persist in seeing U. S. grand strategy as a project aimed at changing the way they live will be to court bankruptcy and exhaustion.

In fact, the choice facing the United States is this one: we can ignore the imperative to change the way we live, in which case we will drown in an ocean of red ink; or we can choose to mend our ways, curbing our profligate inclinations, regaining our freedom of action, and thereby preserving all that we value most.

In the end, how we manage – or mismanage – our affairs here at home will prove to be far more decisive than our efforts to manage events beyond our shores, whether in the Persian Gulf or East Asia or elsewhere.

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: Andrew J. Bacevich

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

X Individual

___Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: _____

FISCAL YEAR 2007

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
None			

FISCAL YEAR 2006

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
None			

FISCAL YEAR 2005

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
none			

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Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007): none;
Fiscal year 2006: ↓;
Fiscal year 2005: ↓.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

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List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

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Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2007): none;
Fiscal year 2006: ~~[illegible]~~;
Fiscal year 2005: ~~[illegible]~~.

TESTIMONY

Does America Need A New Grand Strategy?

JAMES DOBBINS

CT-311

July 2008

Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on July 15, 2008

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The RAND Corporation

Does America Need A New Grand Strategy?[2]

Before the Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
United States House of Representatives

July 15, 2008

Mr. Chairman: It is highly flattering to be offered this opportunity to offer thoughts on a new grand strategy for the United States. I must admit, however, to certain reservations about the utility of such exercises. Having entered public service at the beginning of the Vietnam war and continued through the rest of the Cold War, the short lived New World Order, and the opening campaign of the War on Terror, I have become persuaded that the United States has enduring interests, friends, and values, all of which militate for a high degree of consistency in our behavior and continuity in our policies. Observation of the war in Iraq has only reinforced this view.

The contemporary schools of foreign policy – realism, Wilsonianism and neo-conservatism – provide pundits and political scientists with useful instruments for analysis but afford poor guides for future conduct. Wise presidents and legislators will pick and choose among these alternative efforts to describe and prescribe for a world that defies easy categorization, worrying less about ideological coherence and more about incremental progress toward long-term national goals which do not and should not, in the main, change from one Administration to the next.

Of course we need a national strategy, and of course it must evolve with changing circumstances, but I doubt we need a new strategy every year, or even every four or eight years. Rather than use my brief time here to lay out an entirely new and fully developed strategic construct, therefore, I feel I can better serve the Committee by explaining how our existing national security strategy should be modified in light of recent experience and changing circumstances.

Reordering the War on Terror

The unanticipated costs and uncertain prospects of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the continued resilience of our adversaries in the war on terror certainly call for some adjustments

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in policy. The current Administration has already made some important course corrections. Others, which I will attempt to prescribe, should be introduced by its successor.

The Bush administration's rhetoric since 9/11 has accentuated the martial character of the terrorist threat and the warlike nature of the required response. Treating terrorists as combatants, and labeling their activities as jihad, or holy war, dignifies their endeavors, bolsters their self esteem and enhances their standing throughout the Muslim world. Most of the tangible successes in the "war on terror" have come as a result of police, intelligence, and diplomatic activity. Certainly efforts to counter violent extremism and protect the American homeland must continue to occupy a high priority in our national strategy, but we need to find a vocabulary that secures us broader international support, which denigrates rather than dignifies the terrorists, and which supports a greater allocation of our own resources to the diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement instruments upon which we must rely to battle violent extremism in those places where it is most threatening, that is to say in the homelands of our friends, allies and partners around the world.

In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001 the Bush Administration elaborated and began implementing a national strategy that emphasized preemption, democracy promotion, and nation building. These policies have become increasingly controversial by reason of their association with an unexpectedly costly and arguably unnecessary war in Iraq. All deserve reexamination, but none should be jettisoned entirely.

Preemption

Over more than two centuries, the United States has conducted dozens of military campaigns, only two of which were in response to attacks upon the American homeland. This record should leave few in doubt that the United States will employ force to protect itself, its friends, and its interests without necessarily waiting to be struck first. To enshrine this principle in publicly proclaimed national doctrine, however, only makes any subsequent resort to force more controversial and hinders the process of attracting allies and securing international sanction for such actions. Other nations will never be prepared to exempt the United States from the internationally recognized restraints on the unprovoked use of force. This international resistance to declared U.S. policy was clearly on display when the decision was made to attack Iraq soon after the Bush administration formally adopted preemption as the cornerstone of its new national security strategy. Washington therefore needs to drop "preemption" from the lexicon of its declared national security policy while leaving an appropriate degree of uncertainty in the minds of any potential foes about how the United States might respond to a mounting threat.

A good place to start to deemphasize explicit threats of preemption is with Iran. Insanity, it is said, consists of doing the same thing over and over again while expecting different results. Yet we have in this country today a serious debate about the desirability of launching a preemptive attack upon yet another large hostile Middle Eastern state on the basis of intelligence suggesting that that country may, at some time in the future, become a serious threat.

At least we are debating the proposition, one might say. And this debate does represent some advance, given the lack of serious examination accorded to the Iraq enterprise five years ago.

The debate in the United States is not between one camp that thinks a preemptive attack on Iran may prove necessary, and another opposed, however. Rather, the disagreement is between those who think the U.S. should talk to the Iranian regime first, and bomb them only after they fail to agree to dismantle their nuclear program, and those who believe this preliminary step unnecessary. The debate, in other words, is not about the morality, or even the expediency of preemptive attack, but rather the utility of preventative diplomacy.

Consideration of how best to deal with the challenge posed by Iran logically depends on where one places that country on the spectrum of potential adversaries. Is Iran a country like Grenada or Panama, one that can do America no serious harm, and that the United States can therefore safely afford to ignore, or overrun, at its discretion? Or is Iran more akin to the former Soviet Union or China, an adversary that can do American great harm, and that Washington cannot afford to ignore, or overrun?

If one concludes that Iran is closer to the Soviet Union than Grenada on this spectrum, then the military option is probably not an expedient response to anything the Iranians might do short of overt aggression. After all, the United States never threatened to use force to take out Soviet or Chinese nuclear facilities. It did not bomb China when that country sent a million men to battle American troops in Korea. It did not even attack Soviet or Chinese ships supplying North Vietnam during the war in Indo-China. Washington found a myriad of ways to discipline, punish, contain, contend with and, in the case of the Soviet Union, eventually defeat its Cold War adversaries, but preemptive attack was never one of them.

There are instances of diplomacy backed by force succeeding. There are far more frequent examples of it failing. Saddam, after all, could not even be coerced into demonstrating persuasively that he had no WMD. Taking the military option off the table might come at some cost if there were good reason to believe that Iran could be coerced into giving up its nuclear program. There is, however, better reason to believe that the threat of attack is a prime motivation for the Iranian program.

As long as the United States maintains a military establishment, the military option remains available. Taking this threat off the table, and putting it in a readily available drawer would improve the prospects for negotiation while avoiding the most likely result of the current approach, which is that in the end America either has its bluff called or finds itself launching a war the costs and consequences of which it cannot confidently predict. This does not require abandoning the possibility of preemption, but it does mean retiring the doctrine.

Democratization

Like preemption, democracy promotion has been a component of U.S. foreign policy almost since the country's birth. Beginning in the eighteenth century, most other nations in the Western Hemisphere adopted political systems modeled, however imperfectly, on the United States. After World War II, the United States established strong democracies in Japan and Germany and supported democratization throughout Western Europe, employing a combination of military power, economic assistance, strategic communications (that is, propaganda), and direct, if surreptitious, support to democratic parties. In more recent decades, all of central and most of eastern Europe, nearly all of Latin America, much of East Asia, and some of Africa have become democratic with active U.S. encouragement.

But democratization is no panacea for terrorism and no shortcut to a more pro-U.S. (or pro-Israel) Middle East. Established democracies may not make war on one another, but studies have shown that democratizing nations are highly prone to both internal and external conflicts. Furthermore, democratic governments in Egypt, Jordan, or Saudi Arabia would be more hostile to Israel and less aligned with the United States than the authoritarian regimes they replaced, since public opinion in those countries is more opposed to Israeli and U.S. policy than are their current leaders.

It may well have been a mistake, as Condoleezza Rice has suggested, to exempt the Middle East from over 60 years of largely successful U.S. efforts to promote democracy elsewhere, but it is unrealistic to expect this deficiency to be remedied within a few years. Recent efforts to accelerate political reform in the region have already backfired. Elections, after all, are polarizing events, particularly in societies already marked by sectarian conflict, as has been demonstrated recently in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. Rather than seeking dramatic electoral breakthroughs, let alone imposing reforms, U.S. efforts to advance democracy in the Middle East should focus on building its foundations, including the rule of law, civil society, larger middle classes, and more effective, less corrupt governments.

Nation Building

Nation building also deserves to survive the setbacks encountered in Iraq. The Bush administration, like the U.S. public, now recognizes that the occupation of that country was mismanaged and has put in places many new structures, doctrines and capabilities designed to improve American performance in the area. While the Administration's reaction to its early missteps in Iraq and Afghanistan has been a determination to do better next time, however, Americans may more inclined to avoid any such future enterprises.

In fact, both conclusions are valid. The United States should certainly avoid invading any further large hostile countries on the basis of faulty intelligence with the support of narrow, unrepresentative coalitions. But not all conflicts are avoidable. Iraq may have been a war of choice, and the choice a poor one, but Afghanistan was neither. Both interventions left the United States with a heavy burden of nation building.

Through the 1990s, the Clinton administration slowly learned how costly and time-consuming such missions could be. In Somalia, the United States turned tail at the first sign of opposition. In Haiti, it set an early departure deadline, thereby ensuring that any improvements it introduced would be short-lived. In Bosnia, Clinton set an even shorter timeline, promising to have all American troops out of the country within 12 months. But if Clinton had not learned by then to avoid setting deadlines, he had at least learned to avoid keeping them. Only late in his second term did he finally acknowledged the open-ended nature of U.S. commitments in both Bosnia and Kosovo.

It has taken the Bush administration a similar amount of time to learn that nation building cannot be done on the cheap. The "surge" of troops into Baghdad is a belated acknowledgment that rebuilding a failed state takes an enormous commitment of manpower, money, and time.

Nation building is tough, slow work. Yet, contrary to the popular impression, successes do outnumber failures. Tens of millions of people are living at peace today in places like El Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia, Cambodia, Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, East Timor, Haiti, Sierra Leone and Liberia because American, European, NATO or UN troops came in, separated the combatants, disarmed the contending factions, helped rebuild the economy, organized elections and stayed around long enough to ensure that the resultant government could take hold. Despite the continued fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan and Darfur, the number of conflicts around the world has steadily decreased over the past twenty years, and the number of casualties and refugees resulting from such conflicts has also decreased.

Resizing and Rebalancing Our National Security Establishment

The United States thus needs to decide whether nation building is going to be an enduring part of its repertoire. If so, it will need to rebalance the political and the military elements of national power. For example, the Army and Marine Corps are projected to add about 90,000 in end strength over the next several years. Despite recent and projected future expansion, the total number of personnel in civilian agencies associated with nation building, including USAID, the CIA, and the State Department, is dwarfed by this number. Budgets are similarly weighted toward the military. Absent some effort to redress this imbalance and to create an operational civilian cadre for nation building, the implementation of American policy in this field is likely to remain stunted no matter how sound its strategic vision.

Should increases in the numbers of our diplomats and aid workers be matched by further increases in the size of our armed forces? Certainly there seems considerable support for this proposition. Indeed, even many of those calling for a rapidly reduced U.S. military presence in Iraq are simultaneously urging an increase in the size of the army. Underlying this apparent anomaly is widespread confusion regarding the appropriate role of military force in combating violent extremism.

Where the United States puts the bulk of its national security effort will be heavily influenced by how Americans conceptualize the struggle against violent extremist movements in the Muslim world. If al Qaeda and its ilk are regarded primarily as criminal conspirators, then the United States needs a counterterrorism strategy that emphasizes police, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts. If the threat is deemed to have metastasized to the point where it is regarded as a global insurgency, then a greater reliance on military force may be justified.

Many experts do indeed believe that the threat of Islamist terrorism has grown to the point where its purveyors have the capacity to overturn existing governments and seize control of substantial territory. Others continue to regard al Qaeda and its imitators more as opportunistic parasites that seek to attach themselves to what are essentially nationalist conflicts (much as al Qaeda attached itself to a Sunni resistance movement in Iraq).

In the case of parasitic relationships supporting rather than opposing the insurgency can sometimes be the best way to marginalize the extremists. After all, there are few insurgent movements that would not rather have American support than al Qaeda's if it were available. This is the approach the United States followed in Afghanistan in the 1980s and in the Balkans in the 1990s, where America supported Muslim insurgencies against Soviet and Serbian domination,

respectively. This is the strategy the U.S. has followed in Iraq over the past eighteen months, co-opting the Sunni insurgency and separating it from al Qaeda.

Staying entirely aloof, as the United States did with respect to the Algerian insurgency in the 1990s, is another option where the local state is strong enough to handle the challenge on its own. In those cases where U.S. national interests dictate some level of involvement against the insurgents, limiting the U.S. role to training, equipping, and advising the counterinsurgents is normally preferable to direct military intervention. In rare circumstances, such as in Afghanistan, that option may not be immediately available, and the burden may necessarily fall to U.S. soldiers. U.S. strategy should seek to minimize such requirements, however.

Iraq is a comparatively small country, yet countering the insurgency there has engaged most of the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps. If future terrorist-linked insurgencies are to be similarly confronted directly by U.S. forces, then very large numbers will be needed. Alternately, if the United States chooses in the future to combat insurgencies via local forces, as it did throughout the Cold War (Vietnam being the sole exception), then a renewed emphasis on training, equipping, and advising friendly foreign forces is in order. In that case, the need is less for a larger army than for one reorganized to better handle these new tasks.

It would thus be a mistake to employ Iraq as the yardstick by which to gauge the future necessary size and shape of the U.S. military, given that the war was probably unnecessary and the occupation mishandled from the outset. Afghanistan offers a better and somewhat less demanding guide for future requirements. The U.S. effort there has broad (if diminishing) local support, full international legitimacy, and substantial multinational participation. Yet Afghanistan, for all these advantages, is a test the United States is not currently passing. Improvements in the United States' capacity for nation building and counterinsurgency are thus in order.

The Middle East

It is in the Middle East where our national security strategy has undergone the greatest innovation since 9/11, encountered the least success and is consequently in need of the greatest renovation. Today we have some two hundred thousand troops in the region, and yet our influence has never been more absent. At present the European Union is leading negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program, Turkey is brokering peace talks between Israel and Syria. Qatar has just mediated an end to the political crisis in Lebanon. This Administration initially resisted all three of these efforts. American leadership is currently manifested only in what appears to be dead end negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, a process that can, at best, produce no more than a non-

binding declaration of principals before the next American Administration takes office. There will thus be little to show for eight years effort.

There is no controversy in our country about American objectives in this region. We all want a secure Israel at peace with its neighbors, a denuclearized Iran, a unified and democratic Iraq, and the modernization and democratization of all societies in the region. At issue are not ends but the sequencing among these various goals and the methods best suited to reaching them.

The threat from al Qaeda is centered primarily in South and Central Asia and secondarily in disaffected Muslim populations resident in Western societies, not in the Middle East. The attacks of 9/11 therefore do not justify or require an enduring American military presence in the Gulf region. The overall American goal in this region should be to promote the emergence of an equilibrium among the local powers that does not require most of our available ground forces to sustain. This is not an impossible goal. Such a balance existed from when Great Britain left the Persian Gulf in the early fifties until Saddam invaded Kuwait in the early nineties. During this forty-year period America interests were preserved with little more than occasional naval visits. A return to this condition may take a while, but it would be worth enunciating such a goal and thereby making clear America's long term intentions.

On the other hand, a precipitate withdrawal from Iraq could easily move us further from that objective. We owe it to the Iraqis, we owe it to the region, and we owe to ourselves to leave behind a unified country capable of contributing to regional stability. This will not happen overnight, nor even, in all likelihood, within the next year or two, although some significant troop drawdown over this period may well prove feasible if the security situation continues to improve.

Stabilizing Iraq will be the next President's most urgent problem, while denuclearizing Iran is likely to prove his most difficult challenge. In both cases, the decisive variable is Washington's ability to influence Teheran. Non-communication and the threat of preemptive attack are not the best means to do so. Diplomacy can not always produce agreement, but it does always yield information, and more information will result in better informed choices, more options and wiser policy. We talked to Moscow under Stalin and Beijing under Mao, and we are talking today to Havana under Castro. The Iranian regime is no worse, and in some respects rather better than any of these. Talking is no concession, and self imposed silence no virtue in this situation.

Areas of Continuity

There are a number of elements of our national strategy I have not addressed, as I do not advocate substantial changes. The current Administration has largely abandoned the unilateralism of its early

years, and sought to foster better relations with Europe, Russia, China and India, the world's other major power centers. I would expect its successor, of either party, to continue those efforts. Latin America has been somewhat neglected since 9/11, and I would hope to see a return to the closer and more positive ties of the 1990s. Both candidates have promised a renewed emphasis upon arms control and a reduction in nuclear stockpiles looking toward the long-term goal of a nuclear weapons free world. This is to be applauded, as we can not expect to reverse expansion in the number of nuclear powers as long at those who possess these weapons do nothing to reduce their own reliance upon them.

America's long term interests are to integrate emerging and reemerging powers, like China, India and Russia into the broader, rule based international system our country has done so much to shape over the past sixty years. Close transatlantic collaboration will be needed to ensure that an adequate mix of incentives and conditions are established so that this entry happens, and happens in ways that strengthen the various organizations and arrangements that underpin the existing system.

Talk about American decline, the emergence of new peer competitors, and the end of American hegemony has been somewhat overstated in my view. China will not be a peer competitor of the United States in the area of hard security for several decades, if ever. Nor will India, over this same time span, be able to compete with, or counterbalance, China. Neither will a united Europe emerge, in the security sphere, to compete for influence with the United States. Today America still produces about a quarter of the entire world's goods and services and has a defense budget as large as most of the rest of the world combined. The resultant budget deficits have gotten wildly out of control, and this imbalance is weakening our currency, our economy and our international influence. But we corrected this problem in the 90s and we can do so again. If we do not, it is no one's fault but our own.

America's standing in the world has certainly fallen as a result of some of the tactics the present Administration introduced in its war on terror and some of the unintended abuses that flowed from them. Those abuses have already been curtailed and the most controversial practices largely abandoned. One can expect with some confidence that the next Administration will move America back to full conformity with national and international law. This will be very important, as there is no doubt that America's ability to shape the international environment, influence foreign governments and lead international opinion has been very negatively effected by this loss of prestige and respect.

Conclusion

Having served under eight presidents through seven changes of administration, I have come to view these transitions as periods of considerable danger, as new and generally less experienced people assume positions of power with mandates for change and a predisposition to denigrate the experience and ignore the advice of their predecessors. America needs a grand strategy that helps it bridge these troubled waters, one that enjoys bipartisan support and is likely to endure. One key criteria for judging any newly announced grand strategy, therefore, is whether it is likely to be embraced by successor Administrations. In this respect, Napoleon's advice with respect to constitutions may prove apt: that they be short and vague.

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: James Dobbins

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

___Individual

_x_Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: RAND Corporation

FISCAL YEAR 2007

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
Contract	OSD	7,322,001	FFRDC: Research

FISCAL YEAR 2006

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
Contract	OSD	40,349,413	FFRDC: Research

FISCAL YEAR 2005

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
Contract	OSD	31,713,272	FFRDC: Research

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007):____1____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____1_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____1_____.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2007):____OSD____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____OSD_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____OSD_____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007):____FFRDC Research_____;
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Fiscal year 2005: ____FFRDC Research_____;

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

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Current fiscal year (2007): N/A;
Fiscal year 2006: N/A;
Fiscal year 2005: N/A.

A Grand Strategy of Restraint and Renewal,

Barry R. Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science, Director Security Studies Program, MIT

U.S. House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

July 15, 2008

Today the U.S. grand strategy debate suffers from an excess of accord. In this testimony I will outline current grand strategy, offer a critique, and suggest an alternative, the Grand Strategy of Restraint and Renewal.

The mainstream position is that the U.S. should have a long global agenda of security goals including the struggle with terrorism, rescue and reconstruction of failed states, containment or overthrow of "rogue" states, the spread of democracy, prevention of proliferation, the retention and extension of Cold War alliances, the security of the Persian Gulf, and a very watchful eye on China. These missions are seen to require a military force that is in most respects quantitatively and qualitatively superior to almost any conceivable combination of other states. It is simply assumed that this force will be regularly employed on missions of every kind. It is unquestioned that these forces will regularly be stationed in large numbers across the globe.

Disagreements are few, and mainly tactical. Many policy analysts associated with the Democratic Party believe that international institutions are useful instruments of U.S. foreign policy, and should be nurtured. Many Republicans view them as impediments. Many Democrats are more inclined to give diplomacy a chance; some Republicans have less patience. Until recently, many Democrats hoped for a new set of nuclear arms control agreements to manage the post Cold War world while Republicans wanted the U.S. to have a free hand. This has changed recently, judging from speeches by Senator McCain.

Perhaps the strongest disagreements remain on Iraq; many Republican analysts, and Senator McCain, wish to fight on until Iraq is "a stable, prosperous, and democratic state…that poses no threat to its neighbors and contributes to the defeat of terrorists," with indigenous military forces fully able to protect the country. These are ambitious but amorphous objectives, the achievement of which will not be self evident, but rather

depend heavily on the judgment of U.S. leaders. Senator Obama, and many analysts associated with the Democratic Party think it wise to set a date certain by which most, but not all U.S. troops would leave Iraq. This process would still take nearly two years, and the residual force levels may prove surprisingly high. On the whole, however, these disagreements are dwarfed by the strategic consensus on a forward, activist, omnidirectional, and militarily muscular global strategy.

This strategy has proven costly and self defeating. It saps U.S. power, infantilizes U.S. allies, prompts other states to work against the U.S., and encourages other peoples to blame the U.S. for their troubles. The U.S. has fought five significant military engagements since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Only one of those engagements, the overthrow of the Taliban in Operation Enduring Freedom can reasonably have been considered essential. The two Balkan engagements still have not led to stable political outcomes; U.S. troops remain in Kosovo ten years later. Iraq has consumed vast sums of money and many American lives; despite tactical progress there is still no end in sight. In these engagements the U.S. teaches its adversaries how best to combat its power. This increases the difficulty of future military engagements, which necessitates still greater defense investments to recover U.S. advantages.

U.S. military engagements prove more difficult than expected because the U.S. consistently underestimates the power of nationalism, and the propensity of modern peoples to oppose outsiders who try to manage their politics. The U.S. often overestimates its capacity to reengineer the politics of other countries in any case. Though globalization brings many good things with it, it also brings with it an intensification of nationalism and other forms of identity politics. Traditional societies disrupted by rapid economic and social change are often seduced by leaders who trumpet the safety and predictability offered by old traditions, and the security of group affiliations.

Finally these engagements have a hidden political cost. Policy makers persuade the American people to support these interventions by telling them that the wars, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, or nation building exercise will be cheap and easy. When they turn out otherwise, public confidence is eroded. Overall, policy makers seem unwilling to level with the American people about the costs of U.S. Grand Strategy. The

entire global war on terror has been financed on borrowed money, perhaps because U.S. leaders have been unwilling to risk the questions that would be precipitated by a tax increase.

Others states take advantage of U.S. activism. Some free ride or cheap ride; others drive recklessly. Europeans and Japanese spend a much lower share of GDP on defense than does the U.S., despite their high standard of living, competent military leadership, and effective military industries. (Three quarters of the European members of NATO spend between 1 and 2 % of GDP on defense; Japan spends just under 1%, while the U.S. spends a bit more than 4%.) These allies sometimes participate in U.S. led endeavors, but often with so many caveats that their true assistance turns out to be much less than one would expect. Other states feel so secure in the U.S. embrace that they do as they wish. Iraqi politicians take as long as they like to sort out their political differences, secure in our protection. Israel is so comfortable with the U.S. commitment that it expands settlements in the West Bank in contradiction to U.S. views, sometimes announcing its plans within hours of a visit by the U.S. Secretary of State.

U.S. activism causes some states to balance U.S. power, and tempts peoples to blame the U.S. for their troubles. Though few great states actively oppose U.S. power, some do what they can to increase U.S. diplomatic or military costs. Diplomatic cooperation is slow and grudging. Weapons and military technology are exported to aspiring great powers or putative U.S. adversaries. Across the Arab world, the presence of U.S. forces and bases helps convince the disgruntled that the U.S. is the obstacle to their hopes and dreams. This creates new potential recruits for enemies of the U.S..

The U.S. grand strategy consensus, essentially a strategy of sustained global primacy wedded to liberal ideals, needs a rethink. Some students of U.S. grand strategy are proposing an alternative, which some of us are calling "Restraint and Renewal." "Restraint and Renewal" recognizes that the world is still a hard place; states must rely first on their own resources for their security. In the U.S., these resources must be nurtured. They ought not to be expended profligately. The U.S. should do less abroad. It should use the financial and political resources it saves in that way to renew the foundations of U.S. power, which are here at home. These include fiscal and economic health, social cohesion, and even military readiness. The U.S. would disengage most of

its forces from their fixed bases around the world, but retain the ability to re-engage its military power for its own interests. The U.S. would make clear that others have first to prove that they have done everything they can and should do in their own defense.

What strategic problems does the U.S. face and how should they be addressed? The U.S. is already quite secure, but it does need to keep a watchful eye on the global balance of power, suppress Al Qa'ida, and do what it can to limit the risks posed by nuclear proliferation. At the same time, it must ensure that its efforts to address these threats do not become self defeating.

The U.S. is a rich and capable nation, separated by the oceans from the other great powers in the world. It is impossible to conquer and extremely difficult to coerce. The U.S. fought two world wars and one Cold War to prevent militaristic empires from conquering the richest states in Europe and Asia. We feared that those empires would put their conquests to evil use, assembling enough resources to threaten U.S. security in North America. With the Soviet collapse, there is no such threat at either end of the Eurasian land mass. There is a natural balance of power, reinforced in the west by independent British and French nuclear forces, and in the east by massive geographical barriers that separate China from India and Japan. Nevertheless, the world is undergoing rapid change, and these regional balances could someday erode to the disadvantage of the U.S. Thus, the military requirement is to retain a capability at all times to shift the balance of power in Eurasia in favor of whomever we like. This does not necessitate the current U.S. alliance system, nor the current distribution of ready U.S. forces.

U.S. traditional alliances need reform; they waste scarce resources and encourage free riding. NATO is the best example, but relationships with Japan and Israel also need a rethink. NATO has outlived its usefulness. Europe is safer than it has ever been in modern times. The Soviet Union is no more; Russia is a mere shadow of its former incarnation. Germany, France, and Britain are partners in the European Union—the return of their old enmities is scarcely conceivable. Europeans spend less on defense than does the U.S., which suggests that they feel quite secure. The European Union is the natural focus of European security cooperation, but it develops in fits and starts, perhaps because member states feel no pressure. The continued existence of the NATO military command structure allows the Europeans to remain unworried about their security future;

it may hamper the progress of the European Union. There is no longer any need for U.S. ground or tactical air forces to be stationed in Europe. Thus, NATO should be transformed into a political alliance. The U.S. should exit the military command structure; the Europeans can keep it, or transfer it to the European Union, or dissolve it if they are as unconcerned about threats as they seem.

A second key problem is Al Qa'ida. Its members and sympathizers pose no threat to conquer the U.S. or even to upset the balance of power among the other great powers of the world. Al Qa'ida does threaten U.S. safety, as we tragically learned. The U.S. must act to keep this organization on the run, so that it spends more resources defending itself and fewer plotting against the U.S.. And the U.S. must put as many barriers between Al Qa'ida and the U.S. as can efficiently be arranged. That said, it is critically important not to add strength to this adversary. Excessive U.S. activism, including the use of force, provides tinder for Al Qa'ida propagandists, as they try to blame the problems of the Islamic community, especially the Arab world, on the presence of U.S. power. Instead, the U.S. needs to keep a low profile in the Islamic world. Many regimes there fear Al Qa'ida as much as we do. The U.S. should cooperate in the shadows with their intelligence and police forces to combat Al Qa'ida. Rarely, will the U.S. need to use force directly, but when necessary, it is preferable to rely on short, sharp special operations rather than occupations.

In the Middle East and Persian Gulf the U.S. should rely heavily on naval power to backstop the struggle against terrorism, and to deter local aggressors. The pre-1990 model should be resurrected, in which local states that hope for U.S. assistance would build bare bases, reception facilities, and fuel depots to assist a U.S. return. This would have the twin effect of lowering the salience of U.S. forces in the lives of populations that are predisposed to blame the U.S. for their problems, and endowing rich allies with more responsibility for their own defense.

The U.S. should also undertake some proactive missions to improve its image in the Islamic world. When natural disasters strike, the power projection capability of U.S. forces, especially naval forces, can be of great initial utility. The U.S. should be willing to assist in these relief efforts when its assistance is requested. The U.S. reaped huge political dividends for its assistance after the Asian Tsunami. This is the best kind of

humanitarian operation because it involves no shooting, and has an obvious exit strategy—when the initial damage to transportation infrastructure is repaired, civilian relief organizations can take over.

A third key problem is nuclear weapons in the wrong hands. It is a sad fact that nuclear weapons are no longer mysterious. States of modest economic and technical capacity are able to build them. The U.S. should do what it can to slow the proliferation of nuclear weapons by supporting prudent arms control agreements. But the U.S. should not be tempted into preventive, counter-proliferation wars. They will seldom be as cheap as advertised, nor as effective. The most important antidote to the risks posed by nuclear proliferation is already in the hands of the U.S.—our own nuclear forces. The U.S. would retaliate against any state that used nuclear weapons against the U.S. Moreover, the U.S. should make clear that states that deliberately provide nuclear weapons to non state actors will be held similarly accountable. That said, so long as there are nuclear weapons and the materials to make them in the world, no one can promise that the risks of a nuclear terrorist attack are zero. U.S. intelligence and homeland security efforts must make a sustained effort to prevent such terrible events. The U.S. must also, however, avoid the temptation to assume huge and enduring political and military costs in a futile effort to banish these risks.

The U.S. must also carefully reconsider other purposes to which it military power has been committed. The two most important new purposes are energy security and reconstruction of failed states. The first has mainly to do with prosperity and the second with philanthropy. On the whole these are very difficult projects for military power and for two basic reasons. U.S. military power is wildly expensive to employ and like all military power it is blunt instrument. Including the emergency supplemental appropriation signed into law on June 30, the U.S. has already spent or committed to spending, using the narrowest definition, 650 billion dollars on the Iraq war. If the Iraq war is partly about the security of future energy supplies, it is difficult to see the economic case. For the price of the war, the strategic petroleum reserve could have been filled eight times at present oil prices of 140 dollars a barrel. Since the end of the Cold War, a Persian Gulf contingency was taken to justify half of the U.S. conventional force structure. This represents an enduring expenditure stream of hundreds of billions of

dollars. If the security of energy supplies to protect U.S. prosperity is the purpose of this effort, then other uses of the money could presumably buy equal energy security without the attendant risk of war. Military power is a poor way to ensure prosperity.

A consensus has formed around the need to intervene in "failed states," In the Clinton years, humanitarian concerns motivated military action. In the Bush years, a counter terror argument has been added to the case: failed states are thought to be breeding grounds or base areas for terrorists. Combining the two rationales produces a peculiar coalition of liberals and conservatives in favor of lengthy, complex, and uncertain projects. If a state has failed, it likely suffers tremendous organic political problems, which will resist easy resolution. While much has been learned about the reconstruction of failed states, there is no recipe book for success. If there were, Bosnia and Kosovo would no longer be under the armed tutelage of the E.U. and NATO respectively. Statistics suggest that the Iraq effort is now going better from a security point of view, but the country is still quite dangerous, and political reconciliation has barely begun.

If a state has failed, and descended into internal violence, U.S. military power will be engaged in peace enforcement or counter insurgency operations, or both. These operations typically require large numbers of ground troops; at least 20 soldiers per 1000 of population to be policed is the usual rule of thumb. The numbers mount quickly. Then Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki estimated correctly when he suggested in February of 2003 that the reconstruction of Iraq would require hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops. If there is local resistance, it only takes a few competent insurgents to bring out the ferocious side of the U.S. military. The combination of the facts of occupation and the regular application of U.S. combat power can make a great many local enemies. Young men of military age are plentiful in the developing world, as are simple but effective infantry weapons. The combination quickly raises costs. Resistance movements embedded in perhaps half of Iraq's population of 27 million people consumed all the energies of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps for the last five years. Military leaders admit that U.S. ground forces have sacrificed some of their skills in conventional combat to retool for counter insurgency. Other countries of possible interest such as Iran or Pakistan have much larger populations than Iraq. The U.S.

military is simply not large enough to support the political reconstruction of most other societies, even if we had a good understanding of how to do it, which we do not.

The United States is a powerful country. Nevertheless, it is not as powerful as the foreign policy establishment believes. Political, military, and economic costs are mounting from U.S. actions abroad. At the same time, the U.S. has paid too little attention to problems at home. Over the last decade Americans became accustomed to a standard of living that could only be financed on borrowed money. U.S. foreign policy elites have become accustomed to an activist grand strategy that they have increasingly funded on borrowed money as well. The days of easy money are over. During these years, the U.S. failed to make critical investments in infrastructure and human capital. The U.S. is destined for a period of belt tightening; it must raise taxes and cut spending. The quantities involved seem so massive that it is difficult to see how DOD can escape being at least one of the bill payers. We should seize this opportunity to re-conceptualize U.S. grand strategy from top to bottom.

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: Barry R. Posen

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

✓ Individual

___ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: _____

FISCAL YEAR 2007

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
Cindy Williams	Dept. of Defense	15,085.47	Dept. of Defense National Security
Harvey Sapolsky	Dept. of Defense	185,603.66	Military Innovation under Fairness
Harvey Sapolsky	Navy	39,930.32	The management of large scale Systems

FISCAL YEAR 2006

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
Harvey Sapolsky	Navy	2,994.63	The management of large scale Systems
Owen Cote	Navy	28,644.83	Future of Naval Aviation
Harvey Sapolsky	Dept. of Defense	120,504.10	Military Innovation under Fairness

FISCAL YEAR 2005

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
Owen Cote	Navy	3,116.05	future of Naval Aviation
Harvey Sapolsky	Navy	23,333.34	The Management of Large Scale Systems

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007): 3;
Fiscal year 2006: 3;
Fiscal year 2005: 2.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2007): ;
Fiscal year 2006: ;
Fiscal year 2005: .

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007): please see above info;
Fiscal year 2006: ;
Fiscal year 2005: .

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2007): 238,619.45;
Fiscal year 2006: 152,143.56;
Fiscal year 2005: 26,449.39.

U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Hearing: A New Grand Strategy for the United States

Testimony of Mitchell B. Reiss*
College of William & Mary
Williamsburg, Virginia
July 15, 2008

I would like to thank the Committee Chairman for inviting me to testify today on a new grand strategy for the United States. I can think of few more important topics to discuss, given the number of challenges and opportunities that confront the United States and given that we will soon have a new president and administration.

With your permission, I'd like to submit my written remarks for the record and offer an abbreviated version for my oral testimony.

It seems that we've been searching for a new "Mr. X" -- or "Ms. X" -- for over a decade now, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the demise of the Soviet Union and our ultimate triumph in the Cold War. As we continue to conduct this search, it is important to recall that the grand strategy conceived by George Kennan in his April 1946 "long telegram" and known by its shorthand formula as containment, created more than its share of controversy and criticism over the years. This criticism started with Kennan himself, who believed that subsequent American administrations overemphasized the military aspects of the policy and undervalued its political, diplomatic and economic aspects.

Over the years, containment was also challenged by both the left and the right on the American political spectrum. The left argued that containment encouraged the United States to enter into alliances with unsavory dictators, as long as they were anti-communist, and to fight unnecessary and bloody proxy wars across the Third World as it competed for influence with the Soviet Union. Others argued that it over-militarized and distorted our foreign policy priorities; no less a figure than President Jimmy Carter warned us against having an "inordinate fear of communism."

On the right, critics complained that containment's concept of applying counter-pressure wherever the Soviet Union probed was too passive and reactive; it ceded the initiative to Moscow. Containment's step-child -- détente with the Soviet Union – attracted vocal criticism, most famously by the Committee on the Present Danger, which believed it legitimized a fundamentally illegitimate regime. These critics also developed a counterstrategy to containment designed to "roll back" Soviet gains around the world.

This thumbnail sketch of the history of containment is useful to remind us that any grand strategy is almost certain to have its critics. Consensus will be elusive.

This has not deterred a number of foreign policy experts in the past few years to try to answer the call to become the next Mr. X. Frank Fukuyama, Fareed Zakaria and Phillip Bobbitt have all written excellent and insightful books on different aspects of our world and offered different policy prescriptions to guide us forward. Thomas Barnett has offered his concept about the "core" and the "gap." Parag Khanna has envisioned a future tri-polar world order. The Princeton Project for National Security launched an ambitious, multi-year study that calls for "a world of liberty under law." The first George W. Bush Administration's 2002 National Security Strategy emphasized America's preeminence and military preemption. And in his second inaugural address, President Bush boldly called for "the expansion of freedom in all the world."

Despite the generally high quality of these efforts, none has won the Mr. X sweepstakes. Public and elite opinion has not coalesced around one of these attempts. It is interesting to ask ourselves: Why?

There are three possible reasons as to why we haven't been able to arrive, either individually or collectively, at a new grand strategy. The first possibility is that there's no single, unifying threat that galvanizes the attention of the United States, and its friends and allies around the world. There is currently no "glue" to bind countries together like the glue that the Soviet Union provided during the Cold War. The global war on terror, which some would maintain is the unifying force around which a grand strategy can be constructed, simply doesn't provide the same amount of glue; among other reasons, many countries do not prioritize counter-terrorism as highly as the United States does.

A second possible reason, which is related to the first one above, is that the world is too complex. In place of a single, overarching threat, there are today a wide

variety of lesser threats that impact different countries differently, thereby discouraging collective action. These threats fall into two general categories: country-specific threats, like Iran and North Korea, and transnational threats such as climate change, WMD proliferation, mass migration, terrorism and infectious diseases. It is humbling to think that today George Kennan would not only need to have a deep understanding of Russian politics, history and culture, but would also need a deep understanding of China's military modernization, global economic flows, demographic trends, environmental degradation, WMD proliferation, and the sources of Islamic extremism, among other topics. That's a very high bar for anyone to surmount.

The third possible reason why we are still searching for a new grand strategy has less to do with the supply side than with the demand side. Our political system today is too fractured, too divided, to accept a grand strategy. And it's not just divisions between the Republican and Democratic parties; it is also divisions within the different wings of each party. There is simply not a lot of receptivity to grand, unifying ideas.

In particular, there is no consensus over five key concepts – what might be termed the building blocks of any new grand strategy.

The first key concept is *American primacy*. The 2002 National Security Strategy was a rousing call for extended American primacy, declaring that "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States."

For some, this language about American preeminence was viewed as aspirational, a distant goal on a faraway shore, and certainly unobjectionable. After all, why wouldn't we want the United States to remain the dominant power for as long as possible? Others saw this goal as a realistic and achievable objective, assuming we kept our economy strong, made the necessary military hardware and manpower investments and employed our strength wisely. And still others viewed it as arrogant and objectionable, perhaps even horrifying. If power corrupts, perpetual preeminent power would corrupt absolutely, this thinking went. Perhaps these differences reflect old divisions dating from the Vietnam war or new ones from the Iraq war. But whatever their sources, differing views of American primacy have important implications for the size of our military budget, the mission of our intelligence services, the maintenance of our alliances, the role of international institutions and how we respond to a rising China in the coming decades.

Significant differences exist around a second key concept: *the use of American military force.*

Few people disagree that the United States should defend its vital interests. But this begs the larger question of how these vital interests should be defined and bounded, a task made more complex by the increasing interconnectedness of the world in which we live. George Kennan was concerned about Soviet expansion into Western Europe and East Asia. Today, the Persian Gulf, with its immense oil and natural gas reserves, is widely seen a vital interest as well. But what about the Horn of Africa? The Panama Canal? The straits of Malacca? The Balkans? Different administrations may answer these questions differently.

Some would maintain that the prevention of humanitarian disasters, such as genocide, is a vital interest of the United States, under an inchoate "responsibility to protect." This altruistic argument is sometimes supplemented by a more traditional national security claim that humanitarian disasters can destabilize countries or entire regions, and can lead to the creation of lawless zones where terrorists and criminals flourish.

Even assuming that the challenge of determining where to intervene can be settled, questions over the lawfulness and legitimacy of intervention remain. As the recent National War Powers Commission Report, co-chaired by former Secretaries of State James Baker and Warren Christopher, stated: "The Constitution provides both the President and Congress with explicit grants of war powers, as well as a host of arguments for implied powers."

But what are the sources of international legitimacy? A few would argue that the United States should not use force without the imprimatur of the UN Security Council. Others would argue that the United States does not need the approval of any international or regional organization before it uses armed force. And still others would argue that such prior approval is impractical, given the difficulty of getting the Permanent Five members of the Security Council to reach agreement on issues of war and peace; this approach risks holding America's freedom of action hostage to the preferences of China, Russia, France and Britain.

This leads directly to a third key concept where there isn't consensus: our attitude toward *international institutions*. We know that they can augment U.S. strength, but we also know that they can constrain U.S. options in important ways.

The classic reasons for establishing international institutions are well-known – they reduce transaction costs, they provide a forum for regularized contact and information exchange, and they institutionalize a cadre of professional expertise. However, critics argue that these institutions often take a lowest common denominator approach and are unable to respond nimbly and effectively to fast-moving crises. They point to the inability of the IAEA to thwart the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, the UN's oil-for-food scandal and the gross misbehavior of some of its African peace-keepers. They prefer instead "coalitions of the willing," ad hoc groups of like-minded states that form and reform, amoeba-like, depending on the contingency.

A fourth key concept is *democracy promotion*. On no other Bush Administration policy has there been a greater disconnect between soaring rhetoric and meager budgetary resources than on democracy promotion. And on few Bush Administration policies has there been less agreement over how best to proceed. Is democracy promotion about holding elections? Is it about building civic institutions? Alleviating poverty? Education reform? Women's rights? Transparency and the rule of law? All of the above?

Do we promote democracy differently depending on the country or region? Or is democracy promotion the same for China, the Congo, Saudi Arabia and Belarus? Even assuming we can find the right tools, how do we measure success? What metrics are the most relevant? And how urgently do we push democratic elections? What time-frame do we use?

Even if we learn how to promote democracy, after the war in Iraq, Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, does the United States have the moral authority and international credibility to do so, especially in the Middle East? Or should the United States let other countries find their own way, helping instead by serving only as a positive example as we try to perfect our own great experiment in democracy? Needless to say, answers to each of these questions range all over the political spectrum.

The fifth key concept is *globalization,* which in its various guises (e.g., cultural, economic, financial) is the most powerful and pervasive force in the world today. The globalization debate in the United States has largely been restricted to strongly held views on trade. The gap between the Republicans and Democrats on this issue was highlighted during this election season, when John McCain, a staunch supporter of free trade, told the auto workers in Michigan that some of their jobs simply weren't coming back. In comparison, both Senators Obama and Clinton

refused to endorse the free trade agreements that are currently pending before Congress and called for a do-over on NAFTA.

These are serious divisions, and it is unclear whether they will be bridged or reconciled anytime soon. But more importantly, they mask an even greater shortcoming that threatens America's security.

As in George Kennan's time, America's diplomatic standing, military power and financial influence are a product of its economic strength. Without a strong economy, our ability to promote our values and defend our interests, to support properly our men and women in uniform, to help our friends and allies overseas and to safeguard our country, will be gravely weakened. Without a strong economy, all talk about a grand strategy is illusory.

As a first step, I strongly urge the Committee to hold hearings on developing a strategy for sustaining and enhancing America's economic power. Such a strategy would include the following issues:

- Reducing the national debt, which now stands at record levels, and has placed great stress on the middle and working classes;
- Tackling the coming crisis in entitlement payments (especially health care); driven by the "bow wave" of the boomer generation, U.S. citizens 65 and over will increase by a projected 147% between now and 2050;
- Reforming immigration laws to ensure that highly skilled and motivated people can come to the United States to work, create jobs and receive an education;
- Revitalizing our industrial infrastructure; and
- Developing a new national energy strategy to reduce our dependence on foreign oil, including greater investment in alternative energy sources.

These are just a few of the hurdles that we will have to surmount in the coming years if we wish to keep America strong. Undoubtedly, there are others. None of them will be easy to accomplish. But it is important to remember that small countries do not attempt such things. Only great ones do.

Thank you.

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* Mitchell B. Reiss is Vice Provost for International Affairs at the College of William & Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia. A complete resume is attached.

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Professional Experience:

THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM & MARY, Vice Provost for International Affairs, Williamsburg, Virginia, 2005-present. Responsibilities include:

- Supervising and administering international activities and programs at the College
- Developing major gifts with American and foreign alumni, foundations and other donors
- Teaching courses on International Negotiation and American Foreign Policy

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, President's Special Envoy for the Northern Ireland Peace Process with Rank of Ambassador, 2003-2007. Recipient: Foreign Affairs Award for Public Service. Significant accomplishment:

Worked closely with the British and Irish governments to persuade the political parties representing Northern Ireland's two "traditions" to finally end the "Troubles" and restore local government.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Director of the Office of Policy Planning, 2003-2005. Responsibilities included:

- Providing Secretary of State Colin L. Powell with independent strategic advice and recommendations, with special emphasis on developing U.S. policies towards Iraq, North Korea, China, Iran and the Arab-Israeli conflict
- Leading the Policy Planning staff, which included managing personnel, hiring staff and building a world-class team of foreign policy experts
- Coordinating across the U.S. Government to ensure that short-term operational goals were integrated with longer-term considerations
- Engaging actively with non-governmental organizations, the academic community, think-tanks and others to solicit views and ensure that public and expert opinion informed U.S. policy-making

THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM & MARY, Dean of International Affairs, Director of the Wendy and Emery Reves Center for International Studies, Professor of Law at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, Professor of Government in the Department of Government, 1999-2003. Significant accomplishments:

- Developing new academic programs in Beijing, St. Petersburg, Seoul, Tokyo, Taipei, Amman, Havana, Prague and Cambridge, England

- Securing new funding for faculty research and travel, student-faculty collaborations and student study abroad scholarships
- Managing the Reves Center's multimillion dollar budget, hiring new staff, reviewing for promotion and building a first-rate team committed to internationalization
- Collaborating with faculty colleagues to win a $1.5 million grant for Asian studies from the Freeman Foundation; and helping secure the lease for a new W&M Washington DC Office
- Outreach to important stakeholders and constituencies, such as Board members, alumni, local community and other friends of the College

KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (KEDO), Assistant Executive Director and Senior Policy Advisor, New York City, 1995-1999. Significant accomplishments:

- Helped manage the start-up and operations of a multinational organization designed to deliver $6 billion of energy (500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil/year and 2 1,000 MW nuclear power stations) to North Korea
- Concluded numerous complex and diplomatically sensitive nuclear technology and construction agreements as KEDO's chief negotiator with North Korea
- Served as KEDO's first General Counsel, which included the hiring and supervising of outside counsel
- Served as public spokesman for KEDO with U.S. and foreign media; briefed U.S. officials, Congress and foreign missions on KEDO's activities

WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, Guest Scholar, Washington, D.C., 1992-95. Significant accomplishments:

- Raised program funds from the Ford, Rockefeller, W. Alton Jones, and Spanel Foundations, the U.S. Institute of Peace, and the Rockefeller Brothers and Ploughshares Funds
- Directed the Wilson Center's Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Projects, administered $400,000+ budget, supervised and managed support staff
- Organized international conferences and meetings on current nonproliferation issues
- Commented on television and radio on nuclear matters and regional security issues

COVINGTON & BURLING, Attorney, Washington, D.C., 1989-92.

- Concentrated on general corporate and banking law
- Negotiated directly with appropriate regulatory bodies and advised Firm clients
- Analyzed and synthesized statutory and case law and drafted legal memoranda

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, Special Assistant to National Security Advisors Generals Colin Powell and Brent Scowcroft. Selected in national competition for the one-year White House Fellowship. Washington, D.C., 1988-89.

- Handled WMD proliferation issues and initiated intelligence briefings for NSC staff
- Monitored and reviewed export control matters

Consultancies:

- OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, 2006-present
- LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY, 2002-2003, 2005-06.
- U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, Attorney/Advisor, Office of the Legal Advisor, 1999-2003.
- CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, Senior Associate, International Security Program, Washington, D.C. 2001-2003, 2005-present.
- LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY, 1994-95, 2000-2002.
- U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, Attorney/Advisor, Office of the General Counsel, 1993-96, 1996-97, 1998-99.
- COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Project Director, "Can the NPT Regime Be Saved?," Washington, D.C., 1994-95. Appeared as Nuclear Proliferation: Confronting the New Challenges (January 1995)
- CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Library of Congress, 1994-95.
- THE FORD FOUNDATION, 1991-92

Education:

COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, J.D., 1988. Rockefeller and Bradley Foundation Grants, 1986.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY, D.PHIL. in International Relations, 1985. Overseas Research Student Award, 1981-84; Cyril Foster Fund Grant, 1982. President, Oxford University Strategic Studies Group. Twice Oxford University Tennis "Blue."

ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Certificate, The Hague, Netherlands. 1982.

TUFTS UNIVERSITY, M.A.L.D., Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, 1982. Founder, Amnesty International campus chapter. Assistant Squash Coach.

WILLIAMS COLLEGE, B.A., cum laude, 1979. Honors in Political Science. Founder and President, Amnesty International campus chapter. National Intercollegiate Championships: Tennis and Squash.

Related Experience:

Member, Board of Trustees, Center for a New American Security, Washington, D.C.
Member, Aspen Strategy Group
Member, Editorial Board, *The Washington Quarterly*
Member, International Board of Research Consultants, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
Member, Board of Trustees, Hampton Roads Academy, Newport News, Virginia
Member, Board of Trustees, The Korea Society, New York, New York
Member, Board of Trustees, Korea Economic Institute, Washington, D.C.
Member, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, New York

Editor and Senior Correspondent, "Institute Commentaries on World Change," Cambridge Institute for Applied Research, Washington, D.C.
Member, Advisory Panel, "Countering Proliferated Weapons of Mass Destruction," Office of Technology Assessment, Washington, D.C., 1995
Board of Directors, Lawyers Alliance for World Security, Washington, D.C., 1998-2003
Co-Chair, Steering Group on Nonproliferation, Business Executives for National Security, Washington, D.C., 1993-95
Member, Advisory Committee, American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Law and National Security, 1994-95
Member, Executive Committee, British-American Project for the Successor Generation, 1992-94
Member, Board of Directors, White House Fellows Alumni Association, 1992-94

Speaking Experience:

Appeared on national and international radio and television programs, and delivered over 150 talks before academic, military, and civilian audiences all over the world on U.S. foreign policy, international security, and nonproliferation issues.

Publications:

Authored two major studies and contributed to eleven volumes on nonproliferation and regional security issues. Testified numerous times before the Senate and House of Representatives on U.S. foreign policy. Written over 80 publications on global issues, trade, international security, and arms control matters. A complete bibliography of books and articles is attached.

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: MITCHEL B. REISS

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

✓ Individual

___ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: _____

FISCAL YEAR 2007

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
	NATIONAL COUNTER-PROLIFERATION CENTER	< $5,000	WMD PROLIFERATION

FISCAL YEAR 2006

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
	NATIONAL COUNTER-PROLIFERATION CENTER	< $5,000	WMD PROLIFERATION

FISCAL YEAR 2005

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
U.S. STATE DEPT —		~$2,000	NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS
	NATIONAL COUNTER-PROLIFERATION CENTER	~$7,000	WMD PROLIFERATION

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 15, 2008



A GRAND STRATEGY OF RESTRAINT

By Barry R. Posen


JUNE 2008
Finding Our Way:
Debating American Grand Strategy
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A GRAND STRATEGY OF RESTRAINT[1]

By Barry R. Posen

The foreign policy elites of both parties share a commitment to a grand strategy of international activism, including the regular use of military power, which is serving the United States poorly. Since the early 1990s, the United States has used military force habitually, and at considerable human, material, and political costs. The thrust of much of this military action has been the political transformation of other societies in endeavors to produce stable democracies. However, public opinion in much of the world is now hostile to America. Bosnia remains an ethnically divided society, a protectorate of the European Union. The humanitarian intervention in Kosovo still occupies U.S. troops; Serbia remains highly nationalistic and resentful of the two U.S.-led wars against it. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq show no sign of ending; indeed, Afghanistan is deteriorating. Despite this abysmal record, politicians of both parties publicly flirt with the possibility of yet another war, against Iran, a country stronger and more capable than Afghanistan and Iraq combined. This activism has mainly been paid for with borrowed money; the imminent retirement of the "baby boomers" and their looming health care demands in combination with the generally exploding costs of health care will soon swell demands on the public purse.[2] Meanwhile, the American public has grown weary of the war in Iraq and doubts the foreign policy advice of its leaders. This grand strategy is not sustainable. Below I develop an alternative — the grand strategy of "Restraint."[3]

In this paper, I offer a brief definition of grand strategy, discuss the theoretical premises that underpin my own strategic thinking, assess the state of the world on the basis of those premises, review and critique the current grand strategy

[1] An earlier version of this article is "The Case for Restraint," *The American Interest*, Vol. III, No. 2, (November/December 2007).

[2] Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid funding is projected to grow from 8.4% of GDP in 2007 to 14.2% of GDP in 2030. See Congressional Budget Office, *The Long-Term Budget Outlook*, (December 2007): Table 1–2, 5.

[3] Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," *International Security*, Vol. 21 (Spring, 1997): 5–48.

consensus, and finally offer an outline of an alternative grand strategy, "Restraint," which is gaining traction among a small group of international relations scholars and policy analysts.[4]

What is Grand Strategy and Why Would You Want One?

A grand strategy is a nation-state's theory about how to produce security for itself. Security has traditionally encompassed the preservation of sovereignty, safety, territorial integrity, and power position — the last being the necessary means to the first three. States have traditionally been quite willing to risk the safety of their people to protect national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and power position. A grand strategy enumerates and prioritizes threats and potential political and military remedies to threats. A grand strategy contains explanations for why threats enjoy a certain priority, and why and how the proposed remedies would work. A grand strategy is not a rule book; rather, it is a set of concepts and arguments that need to be revisited regularly. Sometimes nation states write their grand strategies down in one place, sometimes they do not.

A grand strategy is a key component of a state's overall foreign policy, but foreign policy may have many goals beyond security, including the improvement of the prosperity of citizens at home, or the welfare of people abroad. These are appropriate goals for a foreign policy, but great care should be taken not to conflate these goals with security goals as they have historically been understood, lest one fall into the trap of prescribing security means for the solutions to these goals. Grand strategy is ultimately about fighting, a costly and bloody business. Environmental change, the risk of global pandemics, human rights, and free trade may be important and worthy foreign policy problems for the United States. There may be a connection, as cause or consequence, between these problems and the massive U.S. defense budget, the peacetime deployment of large U.S. forces around the world, the U.S. alliance structure, and the employment of U.S. military power in war, but this is to be demonstrated, not assumed. And if a connection is found, the right answer may be to sever rather than accept the linkage.

Though states have often gone without clearly stated grand strategies, they do so at their peril. Grand strategies serve four functions. First, resources are invariably scarce. If a grand strategy includes clearly stated priorities, it provides a guide for the allocation of these scarce resources. Second, in modern great powers, several large and complex organizations must cooperate to achieve a state's security goals. Micro-management of this cooperation is difficult. A clearly stated grand strategy helps these organizations to coordinate their activities. Third, insofar as grand strategies pursue interests abroad, deterrence and persuasion of potential adversaries and reassurance of allies and friends is preferable to the actual use of force. Grand strategies communicate interests. Finally, clearly stated grand strategies assist internal accountability. They permit criticism and correction when they are proposed; they organize public discourse when new projects are suggested; and they allow for evaluation of such policies after the fact. Grand strategies are good for democracy.

The Premises of Restraint

The analysis below is guided by a realist depiction of international politics, an appreciation of the power of identity in domestic and international politics, and a grim respect for the utility and the limits of military power. Together, these premises call for a conservative and cautious grand strategy.

[4] An earlier version of this article is "The Case for Restraint," *The American Interest* (November/December 2007). See also my response to my critics, "Restraining Order," *The American Interest* (January/February 2008).

Realists depict the international political world as anarchy — a realm without a sovereign. In this realm, self-help is the rule. Most states wish to achieve as much autonomy as possible. Any state can resort to armed force, so all will want at least some armed force and the material and human assets that contribute to armed force, to protect themselves against the worst case. States seek power; some pursue what they perceive to be "sufficient" power to defend themselves and some chase all the power that they can. Some chase power recklessly, while others are shrewd and cautious, waiting for opportunities. Ironically, superior relative power is one such opportunity; the strong typically wish to get stronger and their superior capability may allow them to do so.

States wish to survive. They will balance against those who seem too greedy for power, wondering what they intend to do with it. In the face of military build-ups or aggression by others, they will seek to increase their own capabilities, pursue allies, or aim to achieve a combination of the two. States will also "buck pass." To husband their own power, they will encourage others to deal with international problems, until they are forced to deal with these problems themselves. States will "free ride" and "cheap ride" if another state is willing to do the heavy lifting.

Nuclear weapons profoundly affect the relationships among the states that possess them. Nuclear weapons in the hands of an adversary raise the stakes of any great power clash. Because they are quite small relative to their potential destructive power, nuclear weapons are easy to deliver and easy to hide. They are also relatively cheap. Thus, moderately advanced states ought to be capable of developing an assured ability to retaliate against a nuclear attack by its peers, a "secure second strike capability." Even a ragged retaliation puts much of an opposing state's wealth and population at risk. This is not difficult for statesmen to understand and, thus, they will be very cautious in dealing with other nuclear weapons states. Nuclear powers are difficult to coerce and impossible to conquer. Nuclear weapons strategically favor the defense.

Identity politics is a strong feature of the modern world. Though people identified with and battled for their families, tribes, and clans in antiquity, modern nationalism has raised these inclinations to a larger scale. Since the French revolution, we have seen the propensity for very large groups of people without blood ties to connect their fates together on the basis of shared language, culture, and history. These "imagined communities" seek political power to advance their collective interests and to ensure their collective survival and prosperity. Ambitious politicians find that appeals to nationalism are particularly effective in periods of physical and economic insecurity. Thus is born the nation-state. Nationalism has been one of the most powerful political forces of modern times, providing the political energy that sustained the two world wars, the wars of decolonization, and the numerous conflicts that followed the collapse of Soviet power, including the collapse worldwide of multi-ethnic states that had survived largely due to the superpower dole.

Political scientists argue vehemently about the sources of nationalism, and whether or not nationalism *per se* is a source of conflict. That said, intensification of nationalism has traveled with conflict quite often, as cause or consequence. Nationalism is a powerful political tool for military mobilization. And nationalism has been resurgent since the end of the Cold-War ideological competition. It must be acknowledged, however, that other identities have likewise proven powerful. Religious identities are often part and parcel of national identities. Some states are inhabited by multiple ethnic groups struggling to determine the content

of a national identity or striving to secede to establish their own nation-states. Most important, the spread of modern nationalism makes states hard for outsiders to conquer and govern.

Though essential for the achievement of security in international politics, military power is a crude instrument. Students and practitioners of war understand that war is costly and not easily controlled. Carl von Clausewitz asserts that war is an extension of politics, and that every act in war should be connected to the ultimate political end. He also observes, however, that war creates an environment of its own — of fear, fog, and friction. War is an intense competition, subject to strong emotions and random events. The achievement of political purposes is thus quite difficult.

The U.S. weapon of choice since 1991 has been the aircraft-delivered precision guided bomb, and the tactical effectiveness of this weapon has created strategic confusion among political leaders. They have become enamored with the airplane flying above the fray, immune to the obsolescent or nonexistent air defense weapons of far less prosperous adversaries, placing weapons on key targets of high value and either disarming the adversary entirely or eliciting his cooperation. The use of force thus seems cheap; its costs are measured mainly in money. The following question, however, remains: How does one turn the destruction of targets into the achievement of political purposes? Where defense of an independent country is concerned, military power is terrific. The purpose is simple and the destruction of useable military power will do the trick. Where purposes are more complex, such as changing the minds of leaders or peoples, or changing the way they will govern themselves, the organization and employment of military power becomes much more complicated. In a world characterized by nationalism, an outsider, however powerful, will face grave difficulties imposing a particular political order on a mobilized people.

World Politics as We Find It

Five factors constitute the most important drivers of world politics today and in the foreseeable future: unipolarity — the concentration of capabilities in the hands of the United States; regional balances of power — rough equipoise among the consequential powers on the Eurasian land mass; globalization — the intense integration of much of the world into a capitalist economy that crosses borders and the propensity of that intense integration to disrupt societies; diffusion of power — the spread of military capacity to states and non-state actors; and finally, the de-mystification of nuclear weapons technology, which has permitted even poor states to acquire these weapons, albeit slowly and at considerable cost.

Table 1

2005 International Comparison Program Preliminary Results		
Gross domestic product share of global GDP (%)		
Country	PPP-based	Market exchange rates
United States	23	28
China	10	5
Japan	7	10
Germany	5	6
India	4	2
United Kingdom	3	5
France	3	5
Russian Federation	3	2
Italy	3	4
Brazil	3	2
Spain	2	3
Mexico	2	2

Source: World Bank, December 17, 2007

GLOBAL UNIPOLARITY

By almost every reasonable measure, the United States emerged from the Cold War as one of the most powerful states in history. Its gross domestic product (GDP) was and remains two or three times that of its closest economic competitor. Even immediately after post-Cold War reductions, U.S. military spending exceeded the combined defense budgets of most of the rest of the larger powers in the world; today, it exceeds the defense spending of the rest of the world combined. U.S. military technology, conventional and nuclear, sets the world standard. U.S. intercontinental nuclear forces remained large and capable. U.S. population size exceeds that of any other great or middle power with the exception of China and India, and U.S. population continues to grow. The American population, though aging, will remain much younger than that of most other powers. The United States had command of the global commons — sea, air, and space — at the Cold War's end, and retains this command today.[1] U.S. technical capabilities for intelligence collection dominate those of any other state; indeed, the U.S. intelligence budget has roughly equaled the entire defense budgets of Britain or France, two of the world's most capable military powers, and the only ones other than the United States with any global reach. America enjoys a favorable geographical position, with weak and friendly neighbors to the north and south and oceans to the east and west. The Cold-War network of global alliances, coupled with massive investments in strategic lift, gave the United States the ability to put large forces almost anywhere there is a coastline. In 1991, five U.S. divisions reached Saudi Arabia in four months, and nearly ten in six months. It is no wonder Charles Krauthammer called this the unipolar moment; and it is no wonder that the term has stuck.

REGIONAL BALANCES

Although the United States is the preeminent power in global politics, consequential powers are to be found in Eurasia, including Russia, China, and Japan, and the principal Western European powers, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, who can sometimes concert their capacity, and that of other European states, through the European Union (EU). India may soon ascend to the club of consequential powers, but it is not quite there yet. In contrast to the bloody first half of the twentieth century, rough balances of power exist at both ends of the Eurasian land mass. The possibility that a Eurasian hegemon could arise and develop sufficient power through internal mobilization and external conquest to match U.S. capability and significantly threaten U.S. security is remote. In the long term, China seems the most likely candidate to do so, but even before confronting the United States, it will need to overcome many difficult obstacles.

Russia is incapable of conquering Western Europe; it does not have the economic, demographic, or military capacity to do so. Independently, the principal western European states are incapable of conquering Russia, and the EU is insufficiently united to concert their power to do so. Europeans possess, after the United States, the second most capable set of military forces in the world. But these forces are divided among the major and minor European powers and they could not easily be coordinated for positive military action on the scale of an offensive aimed at Russia. Indeed, some wonder whether they can be coordinated effectively for modest humanitarian interventions in Africa. Russia, France, and the UK possess strong nuclear deterrent forces, which would make conventional or nuclear aggression suicidal. Europe may be a strategically stable as it has ever been, with or without the U.S. presence.

[1] Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security* (Summer 2003): 5 – 46.

Much has been made of the rapid growth of China's economic and military potential. If the entire Chinese population can be brought into a modernized industrial economy, the nation's potential power will be truly enormous. That said, Japan, not China, still has the second most potent economy in the world. Japanese science and technology remains ahead of China's. Japan designs and produces more complex, sophisticated consumer and capital goods than does China. It also produces more sophisticated weaponry. Because Japan's population is smaller, its per capita GDP is much higher than China's. Its ability to extract resources from its economy for military purposes is therefore higher. If the two powers shared a land border, China's vastly larger population could permit it to threaten Japan, despite China's relative poverty. Japan and China are separated by water; thus, neither can even hope to invade the other without a massive mobilization and, given the difficulty of large amphibious operations, even that might not work. Further, China is a nuclear power and, therefore, Japan could not challenge it without great risk. Most experts agree that Japan is a "near nuclear" power. A truly hostile China would quickly find itself facing a nuclear Japan, which would then be all but unassailable. Both Japan and China are trading states and are vulnerable to serious economic consequences from a war at sea. Yet, their vulnerability is reciprocal and that vulnerability seems to fall well short of the ability of either truly to strangle the other. Finally, China faces a rapidly growing potential adversary in India. In a competition with Japan, China's rear is not secure. Ultimately, if China is barely competitive with Japan, then it is far from competitive with the United States.

An ambitious China could think of going north into relatively under populated, and resource rich, Pacific Russia. It will not be long before Russia will lose its ability to defend these areas with non-nuclear forces. Whether it would risk nuclear war to hold this land or quietly cede it to Chinese control may turn out to be the most important strategic problem of this century. But it is a problem about which the United States can do little.

GLOBALIZATION

Globalization and the closely associated process of modernity are both important facts of global politics. I define globalization as the spread of capitalism across the globe and the intensification of international trade, manufacturing, and investment. This is enabled by the continuing improvements in all modes of transportation for goods and people. The information technology revolution has made possible on a global scale low-cost, high-bandwidth communications. Globalization has largely been embraced by U.S. business and political elites as a good thing and it certainly offers economic opportunity to many formerly excluded from most of the benefits of modernity.

All of this opportunity and change comes at a cost, however.[8] Specifically, it accelerates modernity. The intensification of industrial capitalism in the late 19th century socially mobilized large numbers of people for politics by disrupting their traditional ways of life, drawing them into cities, subjecting them to the new insecurities of industrial capitalism, and exposing them to regular intense political communication. Globalization is likely to have similar effects in many parts of the world. Those socially mobilized for politics in the late 19th century became vulnerable to the appeals of nationalists, communists, and fascists, who all offered simple and powerful ideologies of solidarity and inclusion, especially in times of economic and political uncertainty. Predictions about the pace of population growth and urbanization over the next

[8] Jonathan Kirshner, "Globalization, Power, and Prospect," in Jonathan Kirshner, ed., *Globalization and National Security* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 321–338.

several decades suggest that the developing world will see a steady supply of urbanized citizens at the lower end of the income scale, experiencing acute economic and personal insecurity, at the same time that modern technology opens them to intense mass communications and simultaneously permits small independent groups to communicate directly with large numbers of people.[7] These individuals will want political protection and participation and they will be vulnerable to political mobilization on the basis of identity politics. Insofar as the governments of many developing countries will have a hard time keeping up with these demands, political entrepreneurs will find fertile ground for appeals based on the resurrection of traditional values. Globalization adds some new complications to these old processes. The intensity of international trade and investment makes it easy for political entrepreneurs to blame foreigners for local problems. The enhanced ability to communicate and travel makes it possible for like-minded groups in different countries to find each other, to organize, and to cooperate.

To the generic problems posed by globalization must be added the peculiar tinder of the Arab world. There, pan-Arab and Islamic identities overlap, and do so in 22 countries with a combined population of more than 320 million. Population growth and urbanization both proceed apace, but economic growth lags, and the political organization of these countries leaves vast numbers bereft of any sense of control over their political destinies. The oil wealth of some Arab countries, compared with the poverty of so many others, fuels resentment. Oil and gas also bring the interests and presence of the great powers to the region, especially the United States. The emergence of an economically and militarily successful, Westernized Jewish liberal democracy — Israel — in their midst serves both as a focus of identity politics and a reminder of the extent of Arab political failures since the end of the Second World War. Macro-level economic and technological forces and specifically regional characteristics thus combine to create fertile ground in the Arab world for extremists hostile to the existing international political and economic systems.

THE DIFFUSION OF POWER

The diffusion of power, especially of military capacity, is a critical development of the last two decades. Although the United States faces few, if any, plausible competitors in the open oceans, or space, or even in the air at medium and high altitudes, nation states and groups have learned how to compete with the Americans on their home turf. In infantry combat, ruthless, committed, and oftentimes skilled Somalis, Iraqis, Afghans, and miscellaneous al Qaeda fighters have directly fought U.S. forces. They seldom "win," but they do make the Americans pay. Somali, Iraqi, and al Qaeda air defense gunners have shot down dozens of U.S. helicopters, mainly with heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. Serb SAM operators, primarily using 1970s technology, shot down few U.S. aircraft, but sufficiently complicated U.S. air operations that most Serb ground forces in Kosovo survived the 1999 air campaign. It is worth noting that all of these opponents profited from the vast arsenals of the former Warsaw Pact — especially its infantry weapons — much of which has since fallen into the wrong hands. At the same time, the ability to manufacture such weapons has spread. Simple long range artillery rockets and more complex anti-ship missiles manufactured in Iran turned up in the hands of Hezbollah in the summer 2006 war with Israel.

[7] United Nations Population Fund, *State of World Population 2007: Unleashing the Potential of Urban Growth* (2007). The urban population of the world is expected to increase by roughly 50 percent, or 1.6 billion people over the next two decades, with most of the growth in the developing world (see page 6). Many of these people will be poor, and young (27). Young people aged 15 – 24 commit the largest number of violent acts (26 – 27). The revival of religion, including radical Islam, has been associated with the recent wave of urbanization (26).

According to the U.S. government, components of the Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP), off-route, anti-armored vehicle mines, discovered in Iraq were manufactured and supplied by Iran, which surely has more sophisticated versions of the same weapons in greater numbers in dumps on the other side of the border. Iran is also one of the world's largest producers of new warheads for the ubiquitous Soviet-designed RPG 7 rocket-propelled grenade launcher. More ominously, Iranian arms exporters now offer night vision devices for sale. If these devices work, an area of presumed significant U.S. tactical superiority in infantry combat will soon wane.

More important than the proliferation of low- and medium-technology conventional weapons is the apparent spread of military expertise. The combination of quality conventional weapons, large numbers of committed young men, proven tactics, and competent training that is cleverly adapted to urban, suburban, and rural environments, which favor infantry, has preserved meaningful costs of combat for high-technology U.S. ground forces. Costs escalate if U.S. or other Western forces intend to settle into other countries to reform their politics and are then forced into long counterinsurgency campaigns.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Just as conventional military technical and tactical capacity has diffused, so has the capacity to design and build nuclear weapons. U.S. policy makers were surprisingly successful in ensuring that only one nuclear successor state would emerge from the wreckage of the Soviet Union — Russia. Three states have, however, found their own ways to nuclear weapons capacity since the end of the Cold War: India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Iran may be next and Israel has long been assumed to have developed a nuclear weapon. Though these states vary in their respective economic and technical capacities, they each developed a nuclear capability on relatively thin resource bases. This tells us that nuclear weapons technology is no longer mysterious or particularly costly. The five original nuclear powers set up a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and regime, which has failed to achieve non-proliferation; it has achieved "slow" proliferation. The lesson of these new nuclear powers, therefore, is that proliferation cannot be prevented; it can only be managed.

The U.S. Response: The Grand Strategy Consensus and its Costs

Since the end of the Cold War, the American foreign policy establishment has gradually converged on a highly activist grand strategy for the United States. There is now little disagreement among Republican and Democratic foreign policy experts about the threats that the United States faces and the remedies it should pursue.* This strategy has produced or will produce an erosion of U.S. power, an increase in U.S. state and non-state opponents, and an epidemic of irresponsible behavior on the part of U.S. allies through acts of omission or commission.

Democratic and Republican strategists alike hold that the most imminent threats are to U.S. safety. Terrorism, basically Islamic in origin, is the key problem. It is caused by something

*The three candidates still in the 2009 Presidential race as of March 2008 all published articles on National Security in Foreign Affairs. There is a striking degree of commonality among the three strategies. See Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Security and Opportunity for the Twenty-First Century," and John McCain, "An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom," both in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86 (November/December 2007): 2 – 34. See also Barack Obama, "Renewing American Leadership," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86 (July/August 2007): 2 – 16. My colleague, Dr. Cindy Williams, reviewed these articles and recorded the following commonalities. All three see terrorism, non-state actors, and weak or failed states as threats to the United States. All are concerned about rising powers. All insist on the need for U.S. leadership. All believe in the use of force to prevent atrocities abroad. All strongly support NATO, though they all want it to do more. Obama and Clinton note that they subscribe to the unilateral use of force; McCain is silent on the matter in the article, but he surely concurs. All rate nuclear proliferation as a very serious problem; all agree Iran must be prevented from getting nuclear weapons; all are open to a military solution to Iran's nuclear programs. Also noting the overlapping positions on Iran is David Kerff, "But Who's Against the Next War?" The New York Times, (25 March 2007).

that is wrong with Arab society in particular but also the societies of other Islamic countries, such as Pakistan. "Rogue" states, with interests and forms of government different from our own, a willingness to use force, and, in the worst case, an inclination to acquire nuclear weapons form a closely related threat because they may assist terrorists. Failed states, and the identity politics that travels with them, are also a serious threat not only because they produce or nurture terrorists, but also because they produce human rights violations, refugees, and crime. The possibility of a loss of U.S. influence is an overarching threat and, thus, the rise of a peer competitor is a real but at this time distant problem.

The consensus therefore supports a U.S. grand strategy of activism. The United States must remain the strongest military power in the world by a very wide margin. It should be willing to use force and preventively, if need be, on a range of issues.* The United States should endeavor to change other societies so that they look more like ours. A world of democracies would be the safest global environment for America, and the United States should be willing to pay considerable costs to produce such a world. Additionally, America should directly manage regional security relationships in any corner of the world that is of strategic importance, which increasingly is every corner of the world. The risk that nuclear weapons could "fall" into the hands of violent non-state actors is so great that the United States should be willing to take extraordinary measures, including preventive war, to keep suspicious countries from acquiring these weapons.

The key difference between the two political parties lies in attitudes toward international institutions: Democrats like and trust them; Republicans do not. Republicans accuse Democrats of a willingness to sacrifice U.S. sovereignty to these organizations. This is not the case. Democrats obscure that they like and trust international institutions because they think that the great power of the United States will permit it to write the rules and dominate the outcomes. The legitimacy of any given outcome achieved in an international institution will rise due to the processes that have been followed, but these processes can be controlled to produce the outcomes that the United States desires. Legitimacy will lower the costs for America to get its way on a range of issues. Democrats expect that international institutions will thus produce a net gain in U.S. influence.

U.S. strategists have responded to the facts of the post-Cold War world with costly national security policies that produce new problems faster than they solve current ones. The great concentration of power in America skews the security policy debate toward activism. If the global distribution of power were more equal, U.S. policy makers would have to be more cautious about the projects they choose. The existence of a peer competitor would inject into the U.S. policy debate a persistent question: Will this project help or hurt our ability to deter or contain country X? Moreover, it is tempting in any case to imagine that with this much power, the United States could organize a safe world, once and for all, where America remains the acknowledged military and ideological leader.

A realist international relations theorist (which I am) predicts that this much power will tempt the United States toward activism and that the combination of activism and power is bound to discomfit other states. At the same time, the great concentration of American power makes

*This position is now associated mainly with President George W. Bush. See The White House, *The National Security Strategy for the United States of America* (November 2002). However, similar views were expressed by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in 1998. On the matter of attacking Iraq she averred, "But if we have to use force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us." See Madeleine Albright, interview on *The Today Show* (19 February 1998).

direct opposition to the United States difficult and dangerous. Nevertheless, other states are doing what they can to protect their own national interests. Some fear U.S. freedom of action and the possibility of being drawn into policies inimical to their interests. They want an ability to distance themselves from the United States if they must, even as they "cheap ride" on the U.S. security umbrella.

The EU has gradually strengthened its ability to run military operations so that they can get along without the United States, if they must. Paradoxically, these same European states, in their NATO guise, under-invest in military power consequently constraining NATO's effort in Afghanistan. Other states fear that U.S. policies will hurt their interests indirectly and look for ways to concert their power. Russia and China have reached out to each other in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Still others expect U.S. attentions to be directed straight at them and they improve their abilities to deter U.S. military action or directly engage the United States in combat. North Korea and Iran pursue nuclear weapons. Iran also has developed a conventional capability to inflict costs on the United States in the Gulf and has been implicated in inflicting such costs in Iraq. To the extent that the United States continues its current policy path, these reactions will continue and they will slowly increase the costs of future U.S. activism as well as reduce the propensity of others to cooperate in order to share these costs.

Other states take advantage of U.S. largesse to improve their own positions, sometimes against U.S. interests. They are not free riders, but rather reckless drivers. The Taiwanese nationalist party in power for the last eight years seemed bent on causing a confrontation with mainland China that the United States wished to avoid. America helped make Israel the preeminent military power of the Middle East to assure its security; it has used that position to increase its hold on lands taken in the 1967 war, which the United States believes must revert to Palestinian control. The occupation has harmed the U.S. position in the Arab world.

American activism also interacts with globalization to provoke negative reactions to the U.S. Insofar as the U.S. economy is the largest and most dynamic in the world, the forces associated with globalization — trade, global supply chains, investment, travel, and communications — will often be associated with America by those experiencing the consequences. Political entrepreneurs in the developing world will find it expedient to attribute the difficulties experienced by their target populations to the actions of the United States. An activist foreign and security policy makes the United States the most obvious unkind face of globalization. When U.S. activism turns to direct military intervention in the affairs of other countries, local political leaders can rely on the most elemental of forces, nationalism. Most people who have formed any collective identity strongly prefer to run their own affairs and can generally be relied upon to resist violently those who try to reorganize their politics at gunpoint. Sometimes such movements are weak, but one ought not to count on it.

Aside from Saddam Hussein's attempted smash-and-grab robbery of Kuwait, the first troublesome conflicts of the post-Cold War world were internal and centered on identity.[10] Given the weakness of the opposition, the United States paid a surprisingly high price to intervene in these disputes. For the U.S. military, this included Desert Storm's

[10] A still unexplained increase in the number of internal conflicts, many of them about identity, began in the late 1970s, peaked in 1991, and then mysteriously declined to the present level, roughly equal to the level of the mid-1970s. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that 118 of the 228 armed conflicts recorded since the end of World War II, occurred after the end of the Cold War. The vast majority of these conflicts were internal. See Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict and its International Dimensions, 1946 – 2004," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 42 (2005): 623 – 635.

unhappy postscript in the rebellions in northern and southern Iraq and civil wars in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. U.S. leadership eschewed military intervention to stop the Rwanda genocide, but those in the Clinton administration who made this decision all regret it deeply and critics of this policy believe that such an intervention would have been easy and successful.

The U.S. approaches to these conflicts have certain similarities, rooted in U.S. liberalism, which exalts the rational calculating individual and thus underestimates the power of loyalty to the group. America was usually surprised by one or more of the following: the outbreak of conflict itself, the extent of group ambitions, the intensity of violence, the intensity of group loyalties, and the cost and duration of any U.S. military effort to intervene. This myopia crossed party lines and persisted: Republican security strategists were as surprised and confounded by the bloody, stubborn, and resilient identity politics of Iraq as the Clinton Administration was in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo. The interventions of the Clinton years should have served as a warning. The United States is facing a half-trillion-dollar bill for the direct costs of its effort in Iraq, an effort that has seriously damaged the U.S. Army and has served as a school for jihadi fighters.

Despite the great power of the United States, its national security establishment is particularly ill suited to a strategy that focuses so heavily on intervention into the internal political affairs of others. The U.S. national security establishment, including the intelligence agencies and the State Department, remains short on individuals who understand other countries and their cultures and speak their languages. The United States seems to lack sufficient numbers of analysts, diplomats, advisors, and intelligence agents for the array of global engagement opportunities in which it is involved. Moreover, it should be admitted that a good many people who are capable find their vocations in non-governmental organizations. They are more interested in representing the problems of the places where they work and study to the U.S. government and public than figuring out what the United States should do in these places from the point of view of its own security interests. Additionally, U.S. politicians are reluctant to provide significant funds for non-military projects overseas. Whether or not foreign economic assistance produces much long term benefit in the recipient countries, it is an important tool of an activist foreign policy. Without it, the center of gravity of U.S. foreign policy efforts shifts to the military.

U.S. active ground forces, which carry the weight of efforts to transform other societies, have been relatively small since conscription was abandoned at the end of the Vietnam War. The all-volunteer U.S. ground forces shrunk quickly from their end of Cold War peak of nearly one million, reaching 470,000 in the Army and just under 170,000 in the Marines in 2001. By comparison, the United States had 440,000 Army soldiers and Marines in Vietnam in 1969 out of a total strength of nearly 2 million. Even with the 100,000-person increase now pledged by Republicans and Democrats, U.S. ground forces will remain small. It is difficult to maintain more than a third of a professional ground force in combat at any one time without suffering retention, recruitment, and training problems. Roughly half of American forces are currently deployed and this is understood to be unsustainable. Half of Iraq's land area and population essentially swallowed the Army and Marines over the last five years and the demands of that fight have turned U.S. ground forces into "Iraq only" capabilities. Other possible U.S. adversaries dwarf Iraq in population — Iran is nearly three times as populous and Pakistan is nearly six times. A prolonged period of peace, vast sums of money,

and a suffering economy might allow a significant expansion of U.S. ground forces without conscription but even a return to the Cold War peak would be insufficient to meet the problems raised by an activist grand strategy. If the attacks of September 11, 2001, coupled with the demands of the war in Iraq, have not produced a political consensus for the reinstatement of conscription, it is hard to see what would.

The United States also seems to lack the domestic political capacity to generate sufficient material resources to support its foreign policy over the long term. The American public has been trained by its politicians to be chary of taxes. As a result, the U.S. government has financed much of its security efforts since September 11 with borrowed money. Even obvious security related taxes, such as a tax on gasoline to discourage consumption to help wean America off imported oil, find no political sponsors. It is difficult to believe that U.S. hegemony can long be financed with borrowed money. Economists seem unworried about the mass of foreign debt the United States has accumulated, noting that debt as a share of U.S. GDP is remarkably low compared to other advanced industrial powers. America, however, will soon add the financing of the retirement and health care of a huge cohort of baby boomer retirees to its foreign policy bills.

The activist grand strategy that is currently preferred by the national security establishment in both parties thus has a tragic quality. Enabled by its great power and fearful of the negative energies and possibilities engendered by globalization, the United States has tried to get its arms around the problem; it has sought more control. But this policy injects negative energy into global politics as quickly as it finds enemies to vanquish. It prompts states to try to balance U.S. power however they can and it prompts peoples to imagine that America is the source of their troubles. Moreover, Iraq should be seen as a harbinger of costs to come. There exists enough capacity and motivation out there in the world to significantly increase the costs of U.S. efforts to directly manage global politics. Public support for this policy may wane before profligacy so diminishes U.S. power that it becomes unsustainable. But it would be unwise to count on this prudent outcome.

A Grand Strategy of Restraint

If security is about deterring or defending against threats to safety, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and power position, what is to be done? The United States should have three overriding objectives: the preservation of its power and power position, the reduction of its political and emotional salience in the eyes of populations suffering the insecurities associated with entry into the modern globalized world, and the weakening of states and non-state actors intent on enacting violence against the United States. It is not easy to pursue these goals simultaneously. An activist solution has been tried and is not working. The United States is getting weaker, albeit slowly; its salience in the eyes of others has increased; and al Qaeda seems no weaker than it was on September 11 and is, in fact, arguably stronger. A less activist strategy would work better.

THE POLITICS OF PRESERVING U.S. POWER

For now, most threats to America are not threats to U.S. sovereignty or territorial integrity. The country is in no danger of conquest or diktats from those more capable. U.S. territorial integrity is secure. The reasons these dangers are small is because the U.S. power position is excellent — any power position that allows a country to think about running the world ought to provide ample capability for defense. Protecting this power position is an important goal, but intense armed international activism is the wrong way to proceed.

First, the United States should lower its participation in regional security schemes. As argued earlier, a rough balance of power now exists in Eurasia. If and as regional powers grow strong enough to threaten their neighbors, and perhaps ultimately threaten U.S. interests, local actors will wish to balance that power. The United States should preserve an ability to help out if necessary but should remain stingy in this regard. Others should get organized and dig into their own pockets before Americans show up, thus saving U.S. resources for other uses until they are really needed; these other uses may increase overall U.S. capabilities if properly invested.[11] A more distant stance to these regions would likely increase U.S. influence. Currently, U.S. interest is taken for granted and local actors do little to earn U.S. support.[12]

The U.S. forward stance pokes and prods other states. If Russia, China, or Iran wishes to make themselves enemies of the United States, it would be better to put the onus on them. As it stands today, U.S. pressure brings these states and others like them together. We should want to keep them divided. They are not all natural allies of one another. Moreover, although these states are not perfect democracies, they must confront their own domestic politics. Why make it easy for them to build domestic coalitions in favor of external assertiveness, masked as resistance to U.S. pressure? As the United States depends excessively on military power to support its diplomacy, others see U.S. efforts as particularly threatening. Americans have no concept of how others view this. Few Americans know about the Unified Command Plan, which puts U.S. forces in hailing distance of all the consequential powers in the world. Few understand that America is the only power in the world that for all intents and purposes is ready to go to war almost anywhere at any time. Theodore Roosevelt said speak softly and carry a big stick — today the United States only follows half that advice.

Finally, the United States has grown too fond of using military power. This instills fear in other states; some may become more cooperative but they also take measures to better defend themselves and, in turn, weaken the U.S. position. Some military operations have been inexpensive; others have been quite costly. If one wages enough wars, eventually one will go poorly. The Iraq War has proven immensely costly in dollars, moderately costly in lives, and very costly to the U.S. reputation. Even if the endgame in Iraq can be portrayed as a success to the public, this war will not have strengthened the United States; it will have weakened it. Vast resources have been expended for little or no security gain. Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist Iraq had almost no capability to attack the U.S. homeland or its interests. U.S. power to deter Iraq was ample. Containment and deterrence worked against the Soviet Union; a heavily armed state with roughly half of the equivalent U.S. GDP, and equal or greater defense spending. Iraq's whole GDP was considerably less than the U.S. defense budget.

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[11] Given politically realistic expectations about tax and spending policy, the United States now risks a rate of deficit spending that is unsustainable, and which could significantly lower U.S. economic output over the next forty years. Tax increases and spending cuts will be necessary to bring revenues and expenditures into a sustainable equilibrium. Though Social Security and health care are the major sources of expenditure growth, it is unlikely that defense can escape the paring knife. See Congressional Budget Office, *The Long-Term Budget Outlook* (December 2007): 14.

[12] Ann Scott Tyson, "U.S. to Bolster Forces in Afghanistan: Pentagon Cites NATO's Failure to Provide Additional Troops," *The Washington Post*, (10 January 2008): A04. See also Data Analysis Section, Force Planning Directorate, Defense Policy and Planning Division, NATO International Staff, *NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence*, (20 December 2007), five data showing that U.S. allies consistently spent a much lower share of GDP on defense than the United States, even before the attacks of September 11, 2001. This NATO report now includes data on Russia, but has eliminated aggregate comparisons of U.S. and NATO European defense spending, burying the relative weight of European and U.S. contributions to the common defense. The reader must now calculate this. The formerly annual U.S. Dept. of Defense "Allied Contributions to the Common Defense" has not been published since 2004. U.S. citizens now have a more difficult time judging the efforts of their allies.

PROTECTING U.S. SAFETY

Today the most imminent U.S. security problem *is* safety. Here, I agree with the consensus view. The main threat is al Qaeda but if the analysis above is right, there are deeper forces feeding that organization than their interpretation of religious texts, and these forces could give rise to future violent organizations. This threat should not be minimized, but neither should it be exaggerated. Al Qaeda is ruthless, persistent, and creative. It will remain possible for such groups to kill tens and hundreds, if not occasionally thousands, with materials ready at hand. This will not bring down the United States of America and it would be wise to stop conveying to these groups that they can. If such groups get their hands on a nuclear weapon and use it, the costs are obviously much worse. It is important, however, to remind others that America would still go on and that it will hunt down the perpetrators and whoever helped them, no matter how long it takes.

The United States needs to do two things to deal with al Qaeda, specifically, reduce its political salience in the populations from which al Qaeda recruits, and keep al Qaeda busy defending itself, so it cannot focus resources on attacking the United States or its friends.

Two strategies have been suggested to take on al Qaeda. The United States has pursued an expansive strategy of direct action. After September 11, I suggested a different strategy, one more defensive than offensive and more precisely directed at al Qaeda, though I did support the overthrow of the Taliban, and still do.[13] The basic orientation of the Bush Administration was offensive, but their priorities were bizarre. They appropriately went after al Qaeda *and* the organization's most immediate friends, but before finishing the job they quickly turned to Saddam Hussein and Iraq, dubious future allies of al Qaeda. The respite allowed al Qaeda to recover, by the U.S. Intelligence Community's own admission.[14] Moreover, the United States has squandered one relatively constant factor that should work in its favor, the fact that the nature of al Qaeda condemns it to theatrical terrorist attacks against innocent people, since such attacks have a way of alienating potential supporters. By over stressing offensive action in Iraq and, by occupying an Arab country in particular the United States has contributed to the al Qaeda story in the Arab world and has done a terrible job of telling the U.S. story. Some think the United States can do a better job debating al Qaeda in the Arab world. I doubt it, but it is worth a try. The scarcity of U.S. expertise about Arab nations and culture suggests that their pitching staff is larger than ours. To weaken al Qaeda, the United States must first stop giving it debating points for its narrative.

An alternative strategy to fight al Qaeda is to draw as many other states as possible into the effort while avoiding adding new facts to the jihadi narrative. America needs to reduce, not increase, its presence in the Arab and Islamic world. The U.S. military should abandon permanent and semi-permanent land bases in Arab states and should generally lower the profile of its military and security cooperation with Arab states. The fight against al Qaeda should continue, but it should be conducted in the world of intelligence. Cooperation with foreign intelligence and police agencies comes first, but the U.S. intelligence community may need to engage in direct action from time to time. To the extent that America has interests in the Arab world that can only be pursued with old fashioned military power, such as the possible need to defend Arab states from Iranian

[13] Barry R. Posen, "The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics," *International Security*, Vol. 26 (Winter 2001/2002): 39–55.
[14] National Intelligence Council, *National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland* (July 2007).

expansionism, the United States should rely on its massive power projection capabilities. The U.S. military should be over the horizon.

To reduce political sympathies for its enemies, the United States needs projects in the developing world that are consistent with U.S. values and permits America to look like the "good guy." Three steps commend themselves to these objectives.

1. The United States should build on the experience of Operation Unified Assistance, which provided prompt relief to victims of the Pacific tsunami of December 26, 2004.[19] The remarkable "power projection" capability of the U.S. military provides an inherent capability to get into many major natural disaster areas "first with the most." Admiral Thomas Fargo, then head of U.S. Pacific Command, quickly saw the potential assistance that could be rendered by the U.S. military in the early and desperate days after the disaster. No other country or organization could have done what was achieved. Political results were seen quickly through shifting opinions of America in the countries in question, including most notably Indonesia. Disasters happen, and the United States can earn a great deal of political respect for coming to the aid of those most impacted. Further, and in contrast to peace-keeping and peace enforcement operations, which for many have the same purposes, natural disaster relief efforts have a clear exit strategy.

2. Instead of focusing on the export of democracy, which we lack sufficient cause-effect knowledge to accomplish in any case, let us recommend practices that will allow others to find their own way to democracy, or at least to more benign forms of government. The United States should make itself a voice for the rule of law and for press freedom.

3. The United States should be willing to assist in humanitarian military interventions, but under reasonable guidelines. The most important guideline is to eschew overselling the mission to the American people. Prior to engaging in armed philanthropy, U.S. leaders should not disguise the effort as the pursuit of a security interest. If the latter is required to sell the policy, then the policy is already in trouble. Once characterized as a security interest, the U.S. Congress and public expect that American forces will lead the fight, that decisive military means will be employed, and that victory will be achieved. This raises U.S. military and political costs. Instead, the United States should only engage in armed philanthropy in large coalitions, operating under some kind of regional or international political mandate. America should not insist on leadership; indeed, it should avoid it. On the whole, the United States should offer logistical, rather than direct combat, assets.

The United States must also develop a more measured view of the risks of nuclear proliferation. It will not be possible, without preventive war, to physically stop all potential new nuclear weapons programs. Nuclear weapons are no longer mysterious, but neither are they easy to get. It is costly and technically difficult to produce fissionable material in quantities sufficient for nuclear weapons and only a few countries have this capability. It has taken a good bit of time for those smaller states who wished to develop nuclear weapons to get them. Though an imperfect regime, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) do provide obstacles to the development of nuclear weapons and some early warning that mischief is afoot. Good intelligence work can provide more warning

[19] Bruce A. Elleman, *Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy's Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia*, Center for Naval Warfare Studies Newport Paper 28, (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2007).

and presumably some intelligence operations could slow the diffusion of nuclear know-how, slowing the progress of national nuclear programs, if need be.

It is worthwhile to keep proliferation relatively costly and slow because other states require time to adapt to such events and extra time would be useful to explain to the new nuclear power the rules of the game they are entering. American policy makers feel compelled to trumpet that all options, including force, are on the table when dealing with "rogue" state proliferators. True enough. The United States is a great military power and on security matters its forces are never off the table. But preventive war ought not to be casually considered. It has serious and probably enduring political costs, which the United States need not incur. Deterrence is a better strategy. America is a great nuclear power, and should remain so. Against possible new nuclear powers such as North Korea, or Iran, U.S. capabilities are superior in every way. In contrast to the Cold-War competition with the Soviet Union, where neither country would have survived a nuclear exchange, it is clear which nation would survive such an exchange between the United States and North Korea or Iran. Indeed, these states should worry that they will be vulnerable to preemptive U.S. nuclear attacks, in the unhappy event that they confront the United States over important issues. In addition, new nuclear states ought not to be encouraged through loose talk to believe that they can give nuclear weapons to others to use against America and somehow free themselves of the risks of U.S. retaliation.

ENCOURAGE RESPONSIBILITY

Finally, U.S. security guarantees and security assistance relieves others of the necessity to do more to ensure their own security and enables others to pursue policies that counter U.S. interests. The United States should stop this; as part of a strategy of restraint there must be a coherent, integrated, long-term effort to encourage long-time wards to look after themselves. If others do more, this will not only save U.S. resources, it increases the salience of other countries in the discourse of political entrepreneurs hostile to globalization. The other consequential powers benefit as much from globalization as does the United States, and they should also share political ownership of the political costs. If others need to pay more for their security, they will think harder about their choices. Virtually all existing U.S. international relationships need a rethink. Below I offer some examples, but there are surely many more relationships and policies that should be reconsidered. These changes must be implemented as a package to produce the desired effect. It would not be prudent to launch these policies overnight; a governing rule should be *not* to so rapidly or decisively alter regional politics that windows of vulnerability or opportunity are opened to tempt or compel military action.

- The effort to preserve and expand NATO, a project aimed at ensuring U.S. power and influence in Eurasia, enabled the excessive drawdown of some European military capabilities, notably those of Germany and Italy, and stood in the way of possible improvements in European military capacity in the EU. This also has had the effect of allowing members of the EU to postpone decisions about how to integrate Turkey into Europe. They can consign this task to NATO and the United States. The United States should develop a ten-year plan to turn NATO into a more traditional political alliance. America should withdraw from military headquarters and commands in Europe, which could migrate to the EU, if Europeans actually find them useful. Most U.S. military forces still in Europe today would return home.

- U.S. military assistance to Israel makes the occupation of the territories inexpensive for Israeli political leaders and implicates America in these efforts. This does not help the U.S. image in the Arab world. Occupation of the West Bank does not seem to be good for Israel either, but Israeli society can decide its security priorities for itself. The United States should develop a ten-year plan to reduce U.S. government direct financial assistance to Israel to zero. Israel is now a prosperous country. It is surrounded by military powers with no capacity to conquer the state. These countries can find no superpower patron to back them with great new supplies of modern conventional offensive weapons sold on credit or offered as gifts, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, fighter aircraft, and attack helicopters. There is no producer in the world today with the capacity that the Soviet Union once had to suddenly alter material military balances. Israel can then decide how much the occupied territories matter to its security and how to allocate security spending accordingly. Israel is not an enemy of the United States and it will not become one; friendly relations should continue. Israel should be permitted to purchase spare parts for existing U.S. military equipment and new military equipment to the extent that these are needed to assure a regional military balance. To ensure that the reduction of military assistance to Israel is perceived as fair in American politics, and to ensure against the creation of any windows of vulnerability or opportunity, U.S. assistance to Egypt should be put on the same diet, with an allowance for Egypt's comparative poverty. The United States should practice restraint in its arms sales to the region, and encourage others to do the same. If other states decide to disrupt the new regional military balance, U.S. leadership can reconsider both decisions and should convey the message that it would do so.

- The United States also needs to reconsider its security relationship with Japan. This relationship allows Japan to avoid the domestic political debates necessary to determine a new role for itself in Asia. In particular, it allows Japan to avoid coming to terms with its own past and relieves it of the necessity to develop diplomatic strategies to make it more "alliance worthy" in Asia. The modalities of a change in the alliance with Japan are trickier than they are in Europe because Asia is a more unsettled place due to China's rapid economic expansion and concomitant military improvements. Nevertheless, some change is in order. U.S. policy in recent years has endeavored to bind Japan ever more closely to U.S. global concerns. America seems to be consolidating its military base structure in Japan and integrating that base structure ever more tightly into its global warfighting capability. Japan cooperates in order to protect the one-way U.S. security guarantee embedded in the U.S.-Japan security treaty. The United States is obliged to come to Japan's defense, but Japan is not obliged to do anything. Japanese military cooperation is doled out by the thimble full, just enough to keep America engaged. Confidence in the U.S. security guarantee limits the necessity for Japan to launch an intensive diplomatic effort to reconcile with its former enemies and persuade them that today's Japan will not repeat the rampages of the last century. Thus, as with its activist grand strategy elsewhere in the world, the United States does more; others do less; and U.S. responsibilities mount.[98] Under a grand strategy of restraint, America would reverse its military orientation in Japan and aim for the minimal military relationship necessary to implement the security treaty. Some U.S. forces would be withdrawn from

[98] Christopher W. Hughes, in *Japan's Emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power*, (London: IISS, 2004): 368 – 9, observes that Japan has significantly improved its military capabilities in recent years but at the same time, "the JSDF force structure is becoming ever more skewed to the point that Japan cannot defend itself without U.S. assistance."

Japan entirely in the near term. Other bases should be slimmed down.[17] Japan must be made to understand that the U.S. commitment is no longer to defend Japan, but to help Japan defend itself, in extremis. The U.S. willingness to do so in the future will rest greatly on the extent and wisdom of Japan's military efforts at home and diplomatic efforts in the region.

MILITARY STRATEGY

A grand strategy of restraint suggests changes in U.S. military strategy. There are things that America should do, and things it should not do. First, the United States must maintain "Command of the Commons," an ability to use sea, air, and space when it needs to do so. This is the essential enabler for the United States to practice balance of power strategies on the Eurasian land mass, to employ military power to keep non-state enemies such as al Qaeda on the run, and to assist in humanitarian military operations in the rare occasions that these are deemed reasonable investments of U.S. power. Command of the Commons also permits "over the horizon" strategies in places where the United States may have interests that it wishes to defend, but where it does not want to incur the possible political costs of having forces ashore. The best example would be the Persian Gulf. Realistically, the United States may, from time to time, require access to land bases in various parts of the world in order to preserve an ability to move its forces globally. The model developed in the Global Posture Review should dominate. The United States should secure quiet agreements for access, and piggy back on existing national facilities that it can improve against the possibility that the capacity would be needed later. The United States should avoid the appearance of permanent presence and permanent bases. Some states will find it in their interests to cooperate with America in this endeavor, and some will not. The United States should avoid the temptation of having visible permanent installations abroad whenever it can.

To ensure that states that might consider the acquisition of nuclear weapons consider carefully the risks they run by doing so, the United States must maintain a viable nuclear deterrent. This includes letting others know that the United States would retaliate if nuclear weapons were used against U.S. soil or U.S. forces. America would also need to let other states know that its intelligence agencies both have and prioritize nuclear forensics, or the determination of "return addresses" after a nuclear attack. Nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are a terrible business. It is improbable that the Treaty-delineated nuclear weapons states will succeed in controlling entirely the technology that permits others to build nuclear weapons. The United States must take the world as it is — which means making crystal clear our willingness and ability to retaliate.

Finally, the United States needs to avoid pitting its weaknesses against others' strengths. This means avoiding protracted ground force engagements. Where U.S. ground forces are needed to help defend important allies from invasion, they should be used. Where they are needed to recover important ground, they should be used. Occasionally, it may be reasonable to "raid" areas that U.S. enemies are using to organize attacks against us. On the other hand, projects that involve long occupations for peace enforcement, nation building, and/or counterinsurgency should be avoided. U.S. ground forces are not large enough for most operations of this type. These operations run the greatest risk of direct collisions with aroused nationalism in populous countries. Moreover, though "doctrine"

[17] Chris Preble, as *Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship* (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, April, 2006), offers a systematic plan for how the United States should proceed in order to transform the U.S.-Japan relationship into a more equitable alliance.

has been written to guide U.S. forces in these contingencies, this is at best a codification of best practices, not a recipe for success. Politics matters more, and we have no political cookbooks to deliver stable, friendly democracies.

RESTRAINT: IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Grand strategy is a set of general principals. Grand strategy provides guidance for specific contingencies, but not detailed plans. Elsewhere, I have explored the reasons for and modalities of an exit strategy from Iraq. Here, I only sketch out an approach to Iraq.[18] The principal U.S. security interests in Iraq are negative: limiting the prospects for a comfortable and well-funded base for al Qaeda, and limiting the prospects for a regional war that could significantly reduce the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. These goals can be achieved at lower U.S. costs in blood, treasure, and reputation by pulling U.S. forces out of Iraq and employing U.S. military power in the region to contain whatever problems Iraq may continue to create. Some also worry about the risks of civil war and intervention by outside powers into such a war. In my judgment, the costs of these two outcomes fall mainly on others. The United States should diplomatically engage all regional powers to explore common interests and concert action in an effort to avoid these unpleasant outcomes.

From offshore with naval power, from informal land bases in the region for special operations forces, from Diego Garcia, and through prepositioning and bare base agreements with local states, the United States can deal with the risks of greatest concern to America and others in the region. It is clear that the nightmare scenario of an al Qaeda takeover of Iraq cannot happen; the Shiites are now too strong. It is possible that a current U.S. exit from Iraq would leave bin Laden sympathizers able to operate in that country, as they can now. From outside, the United States can, with intelligence operations and occasional raids, continue to observe and harass such people. There are plenty of people in Iraq who hate Bin Laden sympathizers and, in exchange for money and weapons, will be willing to pursue them. Neighboring states will have a greater interest in watching their borders with Iraq than they do now, because bin Laden sympathizers are a threat to all the regimes in the neighborhood. They could no longer count on U.S. forces to bear the bulk of the burden of controlling these threats so they would have to do more in their own interests. Many worry about the possibility of civil war in Iraq and the possibility that such a war would not only draw outside powers in, but escalate to a more general regional war. Civil war and outside intervention to support Iraqi clients is possible, but escalation to a general war is improbable, and it is only general war that much threatens the region's energy exports. The Gulf states and Iran both depend on vulnerable oil installations and export routes for the bulk of their national wealth and would have a great deal to lose from escalation. Some mutual deterrence may prevail. From an offshore military position, the United States ought to be able to generate sufficient military power to deter Iran from escalating to general war and reassure Saudi Arabia that its basic security is intact.

The overthrow of the Taliban regime was a necessary response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The Taliban had been warned many times prior to the attacks to sever their relationship with bin Laden. U.S. leaders cannot allow other states to believe that they can host violent conspiracies against it, and could not allow al Qaeda to continue a safe existence in Afghanistan. The war itself was mismanaged; too little military attention was focused on bin Laden and his immediate circle and on key Taliban

[18] Barry R. Posen, "Exit Strategy: How to disengage from Iraq in 18 months," *Boston Review* (January/February 2006).

elements. Because both Taliban and al Qaeda elements survived the war and took refuge across the border in the tribal areas of Pakistan, there is a grave risk that, absent a U.S. presence, these elements could return to Afghanistan and their old ways. Thus, the United States is stuck managing a counterinsurgency and state-building exercise in Afghanistan.

Restraint still has some advice for the Afghan war. First, the United States must resist the temptation to keep adding forces to Afghanistan. Too many forces in country would probably energize nationalist resistance and help turn Afghans against America. Second, the problem of building a competent Afghan state and associated security forces needs to be treated more seriously. The best is the enemy of the good; the purpose is not to build an exemplary democracy but rather to build a state that can deliver some services, and keep some order. One reason not to increase the U.S. troop presence is to remind the Afghans that they do need to assume more responsibility for their security. Third, the United States must resist the temptation to expand the war to Pakistan. Although the Pakistan base areas of the Taliban and al Qaeda are a major problem, the United States must not energize Pakistani nationalism against it. Current discussions of quiet and sustained efforts to improve Pakistan's police forces seem the right way to go. Finally, the United States will need to significantly reduce its forces in the region well short of a decisive victory. The goal should be to help move the Afghan and Pakistani governments to a point where they can contain al Qaeda and Taliban fighters on their own. Staying longer also runs the risk of turning more local forces against the United States.

Conclusion

Presidents William Clinton and George W. Bush have been running an experiment with U.S. grand strategy for nearly sixteen years. The theory to be tested was, "Very good intentions, plus very great power, plus action can transform both international politics and the domestic politics of other states in ways that are highly advantageous to the United States at costs that the United States can afford." The evidence is in; the experiment has failed. Transformation is unachievable and costs are high. America needs to test a different grand strategy: it should conceive its security interests narrowly; it must use its military power stingily; it should pursue its enemies quietly but persistently; it should share responsibilities and costs more equitably; and ultimately, it must patiently watch and wait more.

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