DEFENSE LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL AWARENESS TRANSFORMATION: TO WHAT END? AT WHAT COST?

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DEFENSE LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL AWARENESS TRANSFORMATION: TO WHAT END? AT WHAT COST?

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 9, 2008.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:34 p.m. in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Dr. SNYDER. Why don’t we go ahead and get started.
We have got votes coming up sometime in a half hour, 45 minutes or somewhere in that range, and I don’t think it will be a terribly long break. I don’t think we have a very complicated day. So whenever that occurs, we will leave and hope that you will stay with us.

Welcome to all of you today to our witnesses and folks in attendance and to the members. Our topic today is Defense Language and Cultural Awareness Transformation: To what end? At what cost?

And the witnesses may not know it, but our staff puts together a hearing memo before each of these events. And I liked the one so much for today, I am going to lift it. I am going to read from a couple of paragraphs from it as my opening statement.

Many experts say as there will be a continuous need for the Department of Defense (DOD) to focus on irregular warfare, building partnerships with foreign countries and the sustained effort required by the long war, all spotlighting a need for greater foreign language proficiency and cultural competency in U.S. forces. If this is indeed the environment in which we expect our forces to operate, then that forms the fundamental basis for looking at the range of these capabilities. Deciding on the optimal level and extent of proficiency, given resource limitations is the difficult part.

Today’s hearing will focus, I hope, on the following questions:
What should be the military’s overarching goal in terms of the distribution and level of language skills and cultural awareness capabilities to support national security requirements? And given that acquiring these capabilities comes at a cost in terms of money, time and readiness in other areas, what price should the Nation be willing to pay? As a result, what is the vision of the future?

And to put it another way, for every time or hour or month spent in language school, a person in the military is not learning some-
thing else, and so the question becomes language capability at what risk.

And I would say the other question is, also, if we don’t do the language training, at what risk? And I think that is the core of what we are trying to get at today.

Most seem to agree that more language and cultural awareness is a necessary and desirable trait for the 21st century U.S. military in its role supporting national security. But how much is appropriate for the military and what career fields and in what ranks should it be concentrated? How widely should it be dispersed among military and civilian personnel? How much can be gained through a reserve corps or contractors? What should the needed training aim to emphasize? And no matter how worthy an objective, what will not get done as a result? Will other aspects of readiness be sacrificed?

And, Mr. Akin, I think I will let you do your opening statement now, and then I will show my film clip, and then I will go to our witnesses. So Mr. Akin for any comments he would like to make.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is a topic that I think continuously is generated more and more from other work that we have done and other witnesses that we have had. And certainly, I think that Vic put it in a very good light, the kind of question, I think if you are taking a look at what is it that we are going to train our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and all, there are all kinds of things competing for resources. The question is, where does—not just the language but the language combined with the cultural awareness kind of training, where does that fit in and what form does it take?

My own experience came more from watching years ago the Green Berets training in specific to go into Czechoslovakia and how they were trained. It was very, very effective training but probably very costly training.

What is the model? What are the career paths? How does that priority stack against basic infantry skills? All those kinds of questions, those are all here on the table.

I thank you for coming. We are looking forward to your testimony.

And, Vic, as far as—I yield back, and you can roll the film.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

Dr. S NYDER. What we are going to show now is just about a 2- or 3-minute clip, very brief, about a couple of folks. The first is from a film, and then some audio called “The Untold True Story of Guy Gabaldon,” which depicts Marine PFC Gabaldon’s single-handed success in persuading over 1,500 Japanese soldiers on Saipan in 1944 to surrender, including—this is all by himself, solitary. He stumbled into a Japanese regimental headquarters and at one time had 800 surrender at one time.
There will be a brief film clip. It will then go blank, but you will hear an audio that we lifted from a National Public Radio (NPR) story a few months ago. And then you will see a clip probably more familiar to you from the Ken Burns film about World War II, the War of Senator Inouye.

Let’s go ahead and roll that now. And for those of you who can’t see any screen, you are welcome to get up and move around.

[Video played.]

Dr. SNYDER. Well, both of those stories are from times many years ago, decades ago in our history.

Today, we are joined by Dr. Richard Brecht, Executive Director at the University of Maryland’s Center for Advanced Study of Language, who has extensive experience in the best ways to acquire and sustain language skills; Dr. Amy Zalman, who is an expert in how cultural awareness factors into successful strategic communications; Dr. Montgomery McFate, who has worked to develop a framework for fielding anthropologists and other social scientists to support combat brigades and other deployed forces; and Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, the President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, who will discuss the capabilities our future military force will require in the area of language skills and cultural awareness.

And shall we begin over here, Dr. Brecht? And what we will do, Dr. Brecht, is we are going to put this little light on; and it will flash on red at five minutes. I don’t want you to feel like you are automatically cut off, but I would encourage you all to stay as close to that five minutes as we can so that members can ask questions and learn from you as the day goes.

Dr. SNYDER. So Dr. Brecht.

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD D. BRECHT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDY OF LANGUAGE, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

Dr. BRECHT. Thank you very much for the opportunity. I appreciate that quite a bit.

I guess my role here is to suggest to you in the very broadest terms that the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, which I have studied quite a bit, is on its way to building the first U.S.-based globalized workforce in the history of this country. It has a long way to go, and there are many things to do and to complete, and it has to be sustained. But I would say that, basically, we are set out on the right path. The question is, what still remains?

And, in my view, this building of this workforce—if you look at my testimony, I spend a long time on a scenario in North Africa, in Niger, suggesting that, in 10 or 12 years, what a workforce, a military globalized workforce would look like, and that workforce basically comprises three strong components.

The first one—and this is the thing that is missing, from my point of view, in all the things I have read and studied about what the military and the Defense Department is doing—is that every member of this globalized civilian and military workforce has to be trained in communications competence. The first thing people have to know is do they have a language task they are facing or a cultural understanding task that they are facing? And if they do, do
they have the capability to deal with it? And if they don’t, do they know where to get the resources that are actually positioned to be brought to bear? And if they get those resources, have they worked in that particular task? That is basically the overall global workforce capability that is needed.

After that, you have an inherent and in-house capability of people with languages and skills from very low level to very high level, and we can talk about which languages those could be.

And the third thing that this workforce has at its advantage, it has the ability to outsource, the ability to localize, and the ability to reach back.

Those are the capabilities that are here so that the Department of Defense and the military and the Army and the Marines and the people on the ground don’t have to have the full capabilities that a workforce deployed in 130 countries basically dealing with probably something on the order of 5,000 languages and maybe 50,000 dialects has to deal with. And so it is this picture that I am trying to present to you.

How do you build this workforce? If you look at my statement to you, it is basically we have to have much better recruitment. The emphasis can’t only be on training. The emphasis has to be a much stronger emphasis on recruitment, and that is being dramatically assisted by the roadmap’s emphasis on reaching out to the K–12 and university system. Because if you have a better education system you will have a more effective recruitment system.

The training is, obviously, the DL—Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center will still lead the way with the command language programs. But, basically, this training has to also, besides language at all levels, include the communication skills and the cultural knowledge as well.

We have also had a lot to do with lifelong training which has been made available to a lot of online resources which are now available as well.

The point I guess I am making—and I would love to go into details on this—is that you have started down the path and I think the path is the right one. This workforce, though, that you are building has a lot of capabilities inherent in it and it has a lot of capabilities waiting to be deployed if you build a system to bring those reach-back capabilities, outsourcing and localization capabilities to bear. That is the real trick.

And if you build a system, a database, a net-centric operation that will allow them in the field to reach back to those capabilities and if you skill the people in the right languages and that is based on, if you will, language futures, what are the languages you need to put in the right place at the right time, we are capable projecting that. You tell us what areas you are interested in, and linguists and sociolinguists can start talking about what languages you need.

I will end with the simple fact that, in Africa now, because Africans are basically multilingual and everyone, most of them, speak 2 or 3 languages, there are 15 core languages in Africa which 85 percent of the population speaks. If you divide Africa into five zones the way the African Union does, then each one of those U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM) components can only have to deal with two or three languages as part of its in-house capabilities.

These things are possible; and my message to you, again, it is possible to build that workforce. And I have talked to people and they say it is too big a task to do. It is not too big a task to do. It takes a much more strategic, collaborative, cohesive approach, which I think the academic ministry and the military together can build.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Dr. Brecht.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Brecht can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Zalman.

STATEMENT OF DR. AMY ZALMAN, POLICY ANALYST, SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION (SAIC)

Dr. ZALMAN. I hope you will forgive me if I read my remarks. They are directed primarily toward the long term and to the training and education component of cultural awareness.

Chairman Snyder and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the future direction of language and cultural awareness in the U.S. military. My remarks are divided into three parts: the challenge, the issue of transformation, and a few potential action routes.

The U.S. military confronts particular challenges with respect to cross-cultural awareness. The majority of deployed forces rotate from one distinct linguistic and cultural arena to another with relative frequency. It would be implausible for all regular forces to become area or linguistic experts in one region, let alone several.

Second, warfighters lack the luxury of time to reflect on or learn organically from their surroundings. They may find themselves thrust into situations in which they must make decisions rapidly.

To make matters more complex, members of the 21st century military are likely to find themselves in situations other than war and engaged with civilians. These conditions suggest a paradox. The military at all levels has a vital need for cultural awareness, yet these same conditions constrain the practical ability of many military members to acquire it.

Moreover, the current turn of events arguably has distorted the path the DOD may take to forge a long-term cultural awareness strategy. I might suggest that a preoccupation with the September 11, 2001, attacks as a point of historic departure and the subsequent focus on Islamic societies has led to a habit of confusing knowledge of particular cultures, such as Afghan cultures, with cultural awareness in a more comprehensive sense. This habit can be found within and beyond the military.

The military has tended to define cultural awareness as facts about other cultures, especially those that appear on their face to be least familiar. That is, of course, a simplification. However, because regular forces cannot be expected to accumulate nor process nearly enough information to make this definition useful, another framework is required.

Force transformation suggests itself. This subcommittee has already revised the existing paradigm by incorporating cultural and linguistic awareness into the broader concept of force trans-
formation. The transformation framework offers a productive conceptual vehicle for the defense community to elaborate what it means to have a culturally aware military.

The absence of cultural and linguistic awareness from even recent statements on transformation indicates there is work to be done. The 2003 document, Military Transformation, calls for processes to enable innovation and adaptability, arguing that if we do not transform, our enemies will surely find new ways to attack us. Despite the claim that no aspect of defense should be left untouched if we are to maintain a competitive advantage in the information age, the cultural aspect of defense is left untouched.

Transformation’s key concepts align well with those of cultural awareness. The DOD defines transformation as a process that changes—pardon me—that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations. This umbrella concept could easily comprehend a parallel process to shape the changing role of cultural interaction and cultural competence in military endeavors and to prepare for that role through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations.

The directive to enable innovation and adaptability is perfectly or at least well attuned with the 21st century cultural awareness paradigm. In this case however, it is people, members of the military, from regular forces to their top leadership, who must be enabled to innovate and adapt. To that end, a new paradigm will correspond to the operational landscape where human communities, cultures, are also innovating and adapting to new technological, social, material and other realities of this millennium. Culture, in a new paradigm, will be seen as an element of human interaction and perhaps not only as something out there.

In the transformation paradigm, although a member of the military may be called on to deploy in three different areas in as many years, they will recognize in all three that they must be watchful for their own and their interlocutor’s habits of interaction. They will have enough elementary knowledge and language to enter into interactions, and they will have training that gives them the cognitive tools to innovate, adapt, and learn more or perhaps reach back as that interaction deepens. They will not be allowed by responsible leadership to deploy culturally unarmed.

I have three suggestions, which I won’t elaborate here, that may be followed immediately. One is to develop a cultural and linguistic awareness transformation strategy, a top-level document. Another is to conduct a cultural awareness training and education audit to assess capabilities now against a transformation set of goals. And the third is to design and test a requisite first layer of cultural awareness learning that would be required of all military members, although perhaps in slightly different ways in the future.

Thank you again for this opportunity.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Dr. Zalman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Zalman can be found in the Appendix on page 86.]

Dr. Snyder. Dr. McFate.
STATEMENT OF DR. MONTGOMERY MCFATE, SENIOR SOCIAL SCIENCE ADVISOR, JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING DIVISION, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

Dr. McFate. Mr. Chairman and ranking members of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, thank you very much for this opportunity to testify on the importance of sociocultural knowledge to U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq.

I am appearing today in my personal capacity vice my official capacity. As such, my comments should not be construed as official Department of Defense or U.S. Army policy.

Sociocultural knowledge is a critical enabler for stability operations in irregular warfare. Stability and reconstruction operations pose a tremendous challenge to the U.S. Government because they require different skills, knowledge, training and coordination than those tasks commonly required by major combat operations.

Unlike major combat operations, stability and reconstruction operations must be conducted among and with the support of the indigenous civilian population. Working effectively with local civilians in order to rebuild a country requires knowledge of how the society is organized, who has power, what their values and beliefs are, and how they interpret their own history, among other things.

Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past few years have demonstrated the benefits of having this knowledge and the drawbacks of not having it in terms of lives, money and mission success.

A critical question is how U.S. military personnel should acquire this knowledge. There are multiple possible means, to include education, training, advisors and databases.

An additional question concerns the optimal amount of sociocultural knowledge that U.S. military personnel should have and the trade-offs in terms of time, money and manpower that acquiring this knowledge entails. After all, making every soldier and Marine into a social scientist is neither feasible nor desirable.

Professional military education is a long-term solution to ensuring that the U.S. military has the requisite level of knowledge about foreign cultures and societies. Lessons learned, insight gained and skills acquired in a classroom influence how problems are conceived, solutions are developed and decisions made in subsequent professional positions.

Most professional military education institutions in the United States face a number of challenges right now:

First, a lack of qualitative social scientists within the curricula, inadequate attention to developing intercultural and cognitive skills, et cetera.

Second, recognizing that sociocultural knowledge has improved the effectiveness of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, all branches of the military have now began cultural pre-deployment training programs. Creating training programs was initially a "bottom-up" movement in response to lessons learned, rather than a "top-down" push resulting from official Department of Defense requirements. As a result of this process, cultural training varies widely in content, structure and time allotted. However, the DOD,
Army and other military services are now developing comprehensive cultural and language strategies.

Third, collecting sociocultural information in a computerized database is another means to provide U.S. forces with information about the local population in their area of operations. When Operation Iraqi Freedom began, there was no ready-made repository for the collective knowledge about a given local area. Because brigades had no system to store, sort, organize or effectively transfer this information, much of it was lost during transfer of authority between units. Recognizing this issue, the DOD made an effort to develop such a database in 2004.

Subsequently, in field testing this database, we discovered that commanders and their staffs had little time available to use such a tool and little inclination to do so. What commanders actually wanted was an advisory staff element that would be attached 24/7 to the brigade who could develop, use and maintain such a database.

Fourth, operating forces can also acquire the requisite knowledge about the local population through the use of cultural advisors. At the present time, the U.S. Army’s human terrain system is probably the best-known example of such an advisor program, although it is not the first and it is not the only one. Colonel Schweitzer testified on April 24 to another House subcommittee on the same issue.

To recap, the Human Terrain System (HTS) mission is to provide commanders in the field with relevant sociocultural understanding in order to assist them in developing courses of action that are better harmonized with the interests of the local population and which entail less lethal force. This mission is achieved through five- to eight-person teams of military and reservist personnel who are attached on orders to the military unit that they support.

The team does not rotate out with the brigade at the end of their tour but remains in place. For example, the human terrain team in Taji will remain in Taji as long as U.S. forces do. Individual team members are rotated out on a staggered basis, ensuring the continuity of sociocultural knowledge and enabling each brigade to start their tour at a higher place on the learning curve.

In addition, HTS supports these teams through a research reach-back center and a network of subject matter experts who are able to conduct research and analysis to meet the brigade commander and staff’s requirements.

In conclusion, solutions to the military’s immediate sociocultural knowledge requirement have been ad hoc, bottom up and developed by the respective military services in response to their own perceived needs. For any of these solutions to be sustainable beyond the immediate conflicts, they should be rationalized, coordinated and institutionalized. Otherwise, the capabilities will be lost, as happened after the Vietnam war, and will have to be rebuilt yet again.

Thank you for this opportunity to comment, and I look forward to your questions.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Dr. McFate.

[The prepared statement of Dr. McFate can be found in the Appendix on page 95.]
Dr. Snyder. Dr. Krepinevich.

STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW F. KREPINICH, JR., PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The need for cultural awareness and language competence is really greatest in the area of irregular warfare, whether we call it counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense or the latest buzz phrase: stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations.

In these kind of conflicts, the population is really the center of gravity. Hence, the phrase, trying to win the hearts and minds to mobilize the population to your side. Very difficult to do that if you can't operate on what some people in the military call complex cultural terrain.

So one of the critical questions is, is irregular warfare going to be an important staple of the future in terms of what kind of challenges our military has to confront?

I have talked to one general in particular who told me, look, the Army's had its hand on the stove here for about five years. Once we finally leave Iraq and Afghanistan, we are not going to do this for another 30 years. The American people won't stand for it.

That may be the case, but I think there are powerful trends arguing the opposite. And there is also an old Army saying that the enemy gets a vote in terms of what kind of conflict, what kind of challenge he presents.

If you look at trends, it is hard to see how we are not going to be challenged by an increasingly what I would call disordered world. If you look at demographic trends throughout Africa, the Middle East, Central and South Asia, also Central America, parts of northwest Latin America, there is a huge bulge, a huge percentage of the population under the age of 15. In places like Nigeria, that percentage is over 40 percent of the entire population.

What we are going to see in the coming years is this rising youth bulge reach the age of maturity where they have to be absorbed into that particular country or region's economy. Yet, in many of these areas, you have this rising large number of young people who generally are undereducated and uneducated, who are going to be expected to compete not in the local economy but in a global economy, not just against Nigerians or Colombians but also Indonesians, Indians, South Koreans and so on, that are unfortunate enough for the most part to live in countries where the governments are corrupt or incompetent or, typically, both. And this, again, presents a situation where you are going to have a rising number of highly frustrated people.

There is scholarship that indicates in these kinds of situations you are looking at raised levels of internal instability. And so there is motive here. There is motive to create higher levels of disruption.

When you look at the communications revolution, you will add to this the fact that more and more people, even in the developing parts of the world, understand just how badly off they are relative to the rest of the world. The fact that they could be more easily proselytized, organized, recruited, organized and trained and even equipped.
If you look at financial transfers, if you look at the kinds of means that are falling into the hands of these groups, over a decade ago, Aum Shinrikyo in Japan developing nerve agents and chemical weapons, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) looking for radiological bombs, al Qaeda looking for nuclear weapons, and Hezbollah practicing in 2006 a kind of hybrid war using rockets, artillery, mortars, munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles. And not only the means but a track record of forcing the U.S. out of Lebanon in 1983; Somalia, 1993; the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1989; and the Israelis losing the second Lebanon war in 2006.

So means, motive and a track record of success.

If you look at what that means in terms of a requirement coming out of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), you see in terms of the way the Army, for example, is structuring its brigade formations with the need for a surge capability, the ability to surge brigades forward and keep them on station for a protracted period of time, for advisors, for trainers as part the QDR’s admonition that the military needs to begin to think of building partner capacity on an enduring basis as a key part of our defense strategy.

And not just that but also the need for U.S. forces and capabilities in terms of humanitarian relief operations and what the military calls phase zero operations, trying to engage in prophylactic effects like we have in places like the Philippines to keep nasty situations from turning worse.

So, again, a strong need. And I would say if we are talking about trade-offs, I would be happy to discuss this in detail.

But I think, in the area of conventional war capabilities, nobody wants to build the next tank Army to take on the Americans. Nobody wants to build the next combined arms Republican Guard to take on the American military. They are gravitating toward weapons of mass destruction and, as I said, irregular warfare.

So, in summary, I think irregular warfare, whether we look it or not, is here is stay. I don’t think it’s a fad or a run-off. I think it is a trend. I think it’s going to increase in importance. I think the challenges are going to become more difficult. And the key to executing this well, the key to operating well on complex human terrain—one of the keys at least—is going to be cultural awareness and language proficiency.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Krepinevich can be found in the Appendix on page 104.]

Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Dr. Krepinevich.

We will go ahead and start the five-minute clock.

I want to ask my first question. It is just very, I guess, straightforward and not very subtle.

But it is my understanding that the foreign language proficiency bonus is paid to a little over 17,000 service members. So that is about 1.2 percent of DOD personnel, which totals about $1.3 million.

Now, of that number, probably a significant number of those are senior folks that are in intelligence, so they’re not going to be the people that are out doing street patrols and, you know, training foreign militaries. My question is, what should that percentage look
like? Should we have 20 percent of our folks getting the foreign language proficiency bonus? Should it be 10 percent? Now, I suspect every one of you are going to hedge on that, but I want to hear the hedges. What should our specific goal be? How do we measure it? How are we going to arrive what that specific goal would be?

Andy, why don’t we start with you this time and let’s go back the other way.

Dr. KREPINICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think a lot of it has to do—as long as we are hedging—to do with how you see your forces being employed. So, for example, if you look at the Marines right now, they are trying to organize themselves around units that can really break down from the regimental level down to battalion and even company and platoon level. And one of the examples they give is that a battalion could have multiple deployments in different parts of Africa performing different kinds of missions in different locales. If that is the case, the more you break these units down—and a lot of this kind of conflict environment or operational environment is a series of microclimates—then that is going to drive up the needs for language proficiency and certainly cultural awareness.

If you are taking more of an outsourcing approach—and I am not an expert this, but my understanding is the Army is looking at these kinds of human terrain teams and operating in larger units. Then, if that is the case, you might be able to get away with a lower level of language proficiency. But, again, I think the trade space here isn’t between necessarily how you organize. The trade space here really is the ability to conduct this mission and be very flexible and adaptable. So the Marines could scale up to perform Army-like operations and the Army could break down to conduct Marine-style operations or small unit operations. The trade space really is between that and what I think is some of the high-density, low-demand capability, which I think has to do more with conventional or traditional kinds of military operations.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. McFate.

Dr. McFATE. I once had a trip down to Fort Bragg which was very interesting. I went to go visit with Army Special Forces, and someone down there explained to me that, in terms of how they assign people to learn languages and what languages they choose to learn, that to some degree it’s always best guess and it always requires a little bit of crystal ball gazing. Because you are trying to make an assessment about what’s going to be needed by the military in the future, and it is hard to know exactly what that is going to be.

Even if you had 25 or 30 percent of general purpose forces collecting the language incentive bonus, you still would not end up with a comprehensive coverage of all the languages in the world that might need to be spoken, given contingency operations, et cetera.

So I think what’s important for the committee to consider is what are the other resources out there that can be brought to bear to allow the military to work effectively in environments where you may find that you don’t have anybody or you have very few people
who do speak the local languages. And I believe that Dr. Brecht could probably speak better to that than I can.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Zalman.

Dr. ZALMAN. I would also work backwards from needs. I would hope that everybody who—I can't speak to the military levels—but that everybody who is to deploy to a particular area has minimal language competence and the ability to discern when they need some greater competence. They need to be able to enter into an interaction in a local scenario, but I don't think that they need to have—that everybody needs to be a linguist.

Dr. SNYDER. And I agree with that. The issue is I don't think we are satisfied where we are today, but we don't know what the end point is.

Dr. Brecht.

Dr. BRECHT. That is a really tough question. Because, basically, as I see it from my—I mean, the last time I was in the military was in 1963, so my perspective may be a little off. But the mission has changed dramatically, and what the military language requirements were in the 1980's were very high-level skills of a pretty elite cadre, mostly for intel purposes and so on. And in the last 20 years, because of irregular warfare and everything we have done, that base has spread immensely.

Now, we still—so trying to get a percentage on that is extremely difficult. It is still difficult to acquire those three level on a scale of zero to five takes an immense investment, and so rewarding the people who stay with that—basically, it takes years and years of intense language study and exposure in the country to reach that level. So incentivizing those people is really important.

As we go down to the lower levels, where you have a much broader population and having to do many more jobs which we have never calibrated on that scale basically of pay, that is a real different kind of task.

And if I were sending people over—and I am a language person, so my language colleagues are going to be offended at this—but the first thing people need is what I talk about, is they have to recognize when they are in a communications dilemma or a cultural awareness issue. They have to be culturally sensitive and aware of the communication task they are facing and where to get the resources. That is the first thing they need.

The second thing they need is some experience in that culture so that they don't do some things that are really damaging. But, in that problem, it's always sometimes a little culture that can be a dangerous thing.

And then the third thing they need is the language capability. So we are tying everything to do with language at this stage. We are tying—kind of an older system that was based on fairly high-level, narrow cadres and very high-level skills. And what it appears to me you are doing is changing the paradigm and asking a question that is extremely hard to get at. Because you can't separate the culture and the language at those levels, and you can't separate those tasks at those levels.

So is that enough hedging?

Dr. SNYDER. That is pretty good hedging. We don't want to separate it at all.
Mr. Akin for five minutes.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, Dr. Krepinevich, most civilian organizations or big companies, there is a promotion path. Sometimes you have to be an accounting kind of guy, a bean counter to get to be president. Other times, you are a line operating person or maybe you are a lawyer or whatever. I used to work for IBM. It was marketing. In the military, is there a certain pattern for promotion for people who want to move up the line? Are there certain places that you have to touch base?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I will speak to the Army in particular, because that is the service I am most familiar with. Certainly there are a series of hoops you have to jump through, say, if you want to become a brigade commander, a colonel.

Recently, I received a briefing from the Army. They took a look at 20 people who had recently been selected for brigade command. And the Army has this phrase, officers should be pentathletes. They should be capable in many different skills. Well, in looking at this matrix of assignments of these 15 different officers, overwhelmingly I think out of the matrix only 3 slots weren't directly related to line troop assignments, field assignments. And of course, you want to be proficient in combat. That is what these assignments were oriented on. But it certainly didn’t lead to brigade commanders who were pentathletes.

If you look at the Army’s foreign area officer program, typically not an area to get into if you want to get promoted. You are not going to be the future Chief of Staff of the Army. You probably won’t even make general if you pursue that path.

Mr. Akin. Are you saying that the people who were being promoted were not really people who were on the front lines or line officers? They tended to be more staff kinds of people?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. No. What I am saying is people who are promoted are people who spend most—as much time as possible out with the field Army. That means either in troop assignments as a commander, platoon leader, company commander, battalion commander or in troop, staff assignments such as a battalion operations officer. Those are the ones that get you the greatest credit in terms of future advancement. And you can go all the way back to the Vietnam war, and I can tell you stories if you are interested.

But that has been the theme and the trend for a very long time now in the Army, and whether the Army can change that culture I don’t know. There is a lot of institutional credibility built up in terms of the field Army career path.

One of the things that I think is very interesting for the Army in particular at this point in time is I think as an institution it really is at a crossroads. Because if you asked the Army in the 20th century what kind of an Army do we need, the first half of the century is we need an Army to beat the Germans. The Germans fought us like we fought them. The second half is we need an army to beat the Soviets. They fought us like we fought them.

Nobody wants to fight us that way anymore. And so when you ask the question, what kind of an Army and you look at where the trend lines are going, it really is an Army more and more focused on irregular warfare.
Mr. Akin. I appreciate your setting the background and the tone as to how that works.

So now, taking what you are saying where the Army is going, does that mean that the higher-level leaders should be very effective in terms of communications in cultural and language? Or does that say those people maybe should be operating at a lower level, and you have the people who are what the military calls the pointy end of the spear, they are the ones that don’t necessarily have to have language. Or do you think it should be spread up and down the chain of command?

Dr. Krepinevich. Let me give you an alternative career path for an Army general.

You come in. You are assigned to an Army brigade that has a high capability to deal with irregular warfare operations. You are engaged in a lot of phase zero operations. You may be in sub-Saharan Africa under General Ward, and you are doing sort of reconstruction operations, security assistance these sorts of things.

Eventually, you go off to graduate school. You go off to graduate school in an area studies program. Your duty assignment or your utilization tour after that is you go to sub-Saharan Africa for a couple of years in civilian clothes, and you wander around. And you come back in two years, and your performance is what you wrote up of what you learned being Lawrence of Arabia for two years.

Then maybe you go on to command that brigade that you were in that had units operating in terms of security assistance, training, advising in sub-Saharan Africa. Eventually, you might command a military assistance group that is responsible for several brigades as a general officer operating and supporting sub-Saharan African militaries and societies and so on. And eventually you might be the next General Kip Ward, a four-star who is head of AFRICOM.

And so you have built that competence over time. It is a mix of what I would call field and warfighting competence but also that other competence that becomes critical when the population becomes the center of gravity.

And again, if you look at the officers who have been quite successful in Iraq and Afghanistan, people like Barno and Corelli and Petraeus and so on, they were sent off to serious graduate schools to get serious grad school educations and developed an understanding for the fact that warfare can be a lot more than just kinetics, as General Corelli says. There are these other aspects.

Mr. Akin. What you painted is a very geocentric kind of career path, though, to a certain degree.

Dr. Krepinevich. That is right. You would have to—and, again, you would have to take into account the fact that you could pick the wrong geographic area. And then you might have to consider what I think the Army sometimes calls cross-leveling. So if I had two brigades operating in sub-Saharan Africa and all of a sudden I need eight, I may have to transfer some of the staff and elements of those two brigades to sort of even things out among the eight so that I don’t have great competence in two brigades and no competence in the six others.

And, again, there is no perfect answer, but you can position yourself so that when you are surprised you could adapt more critically.
Mr. AKIN. Thank you.
Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Bartlett for five minutes.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.
Following up on the question Mr. Akin asked about promotion, I guess it was 56 years ago I left government service as a GS–15, which was the highest grade, unless you were at that time PL–313, which was super grade. I guess they have changed that since.
And nobody reported to me. Nobody. I was all alone. And that is because I was a scientist and I didn’t need to have 49 or 450 people reporting to me to be a GS–15.
Do we have a similar thing in the military to reward people who are really, really good at something? And what we are talking about today could be an absolutely invaluable asset, somebody who is really, really good at knowing the language and knowing the culture? Can we reward them the way I was rewarded, without having a whole Army report to me?
Dr. KREPINEVICH. Is that a question for me, Congressman?
Mr. BARTLETT. Or whoever, yeah. Or do they remain buck private forever because they don’t have anybody to report to?
Dr. KREPINEVICH. My understanding—and I am not an expert on the promotion system—but it has been quite centralized over the years and so there is limited opportunity for sort of spot promotions, as they used to call it, as you had in World War II or even back in the 1950’s. There are still stories about General LeMay, when he commanded the Strategic Air Command, promoting people on the spot and also firing people on the spot. So that is much more, I think, limited today.
And, also, I think there is limited ability for sort of horizontal accession into the military. In other words, in the medical field, medical doctors, I believe still come in at a higher rank reflective of their expertise and skill. But if you are talking about, you know, somebody who comes in off the street and enlists and has expert knowledge of Farsi, I don’t think they start out anywhere ahead of anybody else that comes in off the street and enlists in the military.
Mr. BARTLETT. Recognizing how valuable those skills could be, shouldn’t we have a way of rewarding them like we do doctors?
Dr. KREPINEVICH. Well, yeah. I think there is a number of opportunities here. One is, we are blessed more than the other great powers of the world by the fact that we have a very diverse population. Just going around Washington you can find people who speak Spanish, Persian, Afghan, Pakistani, Vietnamese. I mean, just get in a taxi cab. And we do make a priority of recruiting these kind of people. We certainly set certain—we want people with these kinds of education backgrounds and these kinds of physical characteristics and so on. We have to begin to orient our recruitment efforts on trying to recruit people who maybe have English as a second language who live in this country.
We have allies. I was at a conference last year, a conference of European armies, and I found myself sitting next to the French Army Chief of Staff. And he says to me, I want to meet General Casey. Do you know General Casey? I said, I know General Casey, but General Casey doesn’t know me. But he wanted to talk to General Casey about AFRICOM and start to say, look, we have cul-
tural competence in certain parts of Africa. We know Morocco. We
know West Africa. We have cultural terrain competence in those
areas, language competence, so let’s sit down and work together as
allies.

The Turks, you know, another long-standing ally of the United
States. I see us having to rely a lot more on allies. And if you look
at allies that we have in the developing world and if you look at
our allies who were colonial powers at one time, they may not be
able to send 200,000 troops someplace, but they do have an advan-
tage over us in terms of understanding cultural terrain and having
language facility in certain important parts of the world that we
don’t.

Dr. Brecht. Can I just say, there was a study of corporate—Fortu-
tune 500 companies about 8 years ago about what qualifications
they want in their managers. And the first qualification that the
survey did—the University of Washington also did it. They wanted,
first, core competency in their skill, in their specialty. The second
is they wanted good English. The third is they wanted experience
living abroad. The fourth one was language capabilities, for the
simple reason they didn’t want to pay for language capabilities in
Japanese at a high level when they are moving someone to
Santiago, Chile, in the next—after two years. And so even cor-
porate America does not have what you are asking for, a focus on
a specialty in that language.

The high-level managers in the Officer Corps, they want people
who adapt to any circumstance in any part of the world; and that
is what we are seeing from the corporate sector.

Dr. Zalman. May I add two brief comments?

One is that, over the long term, as the paradigm of the current
military shifts so that cultural awareness and language ability to
some extent are not seen as exceptional or as needed in this situa-
tion or only in that situation, the issue of reward for most would
become more of a moot one, I would think.

The second is that I would suggest that, at the lower levels, peo-
ple from heritage language communities, non-native, non-English
speakers aren’t necessarily more culturally aware. They will bring
their biases, whatever they are, just as anybody else will, to their
perception of the situation and they will enact them or commu-
nicate them. So they are in as much need as anyone else, I would
think, of a sense of awareness that they are in a cultural situation.

Dr. Snyder. Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I guess this mike is on.

You know, it seems that everybody agrees that we need more of
this type training that is cultural awareness and language train-
ing. But the big question in my mind is how much is appropriate
for the military and in what career fields and in what rank should
it be concentrated. We had touched on that a little bit. Or should
we rely on civilians and contractors? Would this be an area maybe
where a civilian reserve corps could be an asset?

Dr. Brecht, you just mentioned about corporate America and
multinational companies that don’t seem to reward language expert-
tise because, you know, they may be in one area for two years and
then go to another one and they’re not expert in this particular lan-
language. And the same thing I think Dr. Zalman maybe referenced in regard to the military.

But to my way of thinking, that possibly it is time for a change in that way of thinking and that concept, that maybe the multinational corporations would do very well to recruit and reward individuals that have the cultural awareness and language expertise and send them to China if that is the appropriate language and keep them there for a while and not move them in two years and get the full bang for the buck out of these people. And the same thing with the military.

I know, back in my home State, North Georgia College and State University trains their cadets in Chinese language to better prepare them for their military careers, and they are trying to and will with our help be starting an Arabic language curriculum, too.

So, in the future, I guess my question is, do you believe—this is a specific question—that in order to be promoted in the military, knowledge of a foreign language will ultimately be a prerequisite? And how is the Defense Department partnering with universities to help develop these skills and how can we improve in this area?

Dr. Gingrey. Any of you, of course.

Dr. Brecht. I think your point is exactly right. Corporate America uses workarounds. They basically use localized talent, and they outsource and they do everything else except bring in an in-house capability in language and culture. That is characteristic of corporate America. And that is because they can. You can't localize warfighting, you can't localize intel, and you can't outsource that kind of thing the way corporate America does. So corporate America is a very bad example.

And, in this case, I think the Department of Defense is leading the way—and I will come back to the term I have used—toward a truly globalized workforce, because you can't localize, you can't outsource. And how to build in that capability is—and one of the things that I am particularly admiring of the road map is that basically it has incentives, it has requirements, it has management structure, and it sets the tone in leadership, that you can't get promoted presumably—officers have to have this language capability. They have to have the experience of engaging other cultures. And I believe any military that we have in the future, the leadership has to have that capability. And they are not looking at global America for that.

Dr. Gingrey. Dr. Zalman or Dr. Krepinevich, any of the panel, I would be glad to have you respond.

Dr. Krepinevich. Just a couple of quick observations.

One is I don't think certainly 100 percent of the officer corps has to be cultural and language experts, but I do think it is possible. And I defer to my colleagues here. My understanding is it is not terribly difficult to get a certain level of cultural familiarity and some basic language training. And if you have time, these units, on a rotation basis, they are supposed to have at least about a year to train up before they go on their next deployment. They typically are supposed to know where they are going. That certainly provides an opportunity to do those sorts of things.

I would say in terms of outsourcing language support as opposed to cultural support, if the military is doing what is called for, at
least in terms of the QDR and some of the other public statements, which is building partner capacity and engaging in phase-zero prophylactic kinds of operations—and this is a steady state. This isn’t a surge capability. This is a capability you need because the military, particularly the Army and to a lesser extent the Marine Corps, the Navy and to some extent the Air Force engage in this all the time.

And then finally you say knowledge of a foreign language. I am not quite sure what level of capacity you are talking about.

Dr. GINGREY. Well, I am talking about speaking ability.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. The familiarity with a foreign language, again, it has been a long time since I was in high school or even college, but you used to have to take four years of a foreign language in high school and at least a few years in college. And I think there is a lot to criticize about our K-to-12 education system and some other aspects of even our college.

Dr. GINGREY. Well, we don’t have time to get into all of that, and I have already expended my five minutes, but let me just say that I believe—and maybe you alluded to this or one of the other panelists—in regard to rewarding these skills of all this time that it takes to require an ability to speak and understand a language, maybe it should be rewarded, just like a higher ranking given to a physician who is coming in and has a skill to provide for health care.

Thank you.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am sorry I missed your testimony, but I wanted to maybe just ask a few general questions, and you can certainly let me know whether you have already answered them.

But also share just very briefly, my community is San Diego, and San Diego State University has embarked on a program with the ROTC, and they are training young people in that program in three major languages.

The beauty of that—and I met with them just the other day—is that, instead of taking other courses in the summer, that is all they are doing. So they are not immersed in the same way that—I will mention another program that the Marines from Camp Pendleton are involved in, but at least that is all that is on their plate. And I think that has made a tremendous difference. In fact, several people mentioned that in two weeks they basically finished a semester, and they could really benefit from that experience. And so that is something to think about.

And I certainly want to follow up on that and see where, within the ROTC programs, we can do more of that. The young people are being paid to be part of that program; that is an incentive. But they also feel that they are getting valuable skills, and there may be a role there.

The other piece of that with Camp Pendleton is we are fortunate that we have Iraqis in San Diego, and so they are immersing these young people in the Iraqi community. They are not living with families, which I think should be a good next step actually, but they
are going to meals, they are in the community, they are really trying to get a better feel. And I think that is critical.

And when I have asked them, well, what should we be giving up? You know, when we are preparing people for deployment, obviously there are a lot of things that need to be learned in addition to all the basic training and the other skills that people have. And they basically said, you know, there are plenty of people who can be identified who don't need to be doing everything that is going on. So pick the skills that you need, and relieve those people of their obligations to be there with their unit through that entire period and give them this kind of an experience.

So I just throw that out. You know, is that the kind of advice you might give someone if they are thinking about these kinds of programs? Or is there something else that is critical in doing that? Can we find the time, really, to give people? I think it is really the—having that kind of time to study is remarkable, if we can do that.

Dr. ZALMAN. Well, as you were speaking, and I was remembering the question that was just asked previously, I mean, this seems to me a very good idea, because he raised for me the reminder that any language training to a certain depth, let's say three years, every day—I mean, languages differ, but from a serious endeavor, people tend to come out knowing about language learning in general and about the culture that they have been immersed in and about its history, because it is embedded in the language.

And that, even if you go somewhere else where you need to speak a different language, is a portable kind of knowledge, in a sense, a portable skill. So you can go from one linguistic environment to another but with a greater sense of self-awareness of what people are doing when they are speaking a language.

So if that opportunity were made available, I would think people would want to take advantage of it for that reason. It compounds the benefit.

Dr. McFATE. Just to follow up on this, it is sometimes said that General Petraeus is the best social scientist in Iraq. And I think that there is actually a lot of truth in that. And that can be said about a number of other senior leaders, as well.

And I think if you look at the life experience and at the professional experience of people like General Corelli and General Petraeus, they didn't have time in their otherwise very busy military careers to engage in higher education at civilian institutions. And I think that that opportunity is particularly important.

To follow up on what Dr. Zalman was just saying, I think it is very important to look at the ability of the military to acquire general cross-cultural communication skills and general cultural competency, specific regional knowledge and specific language competency. These are two different approaches to the same goal.

And I think that there is a definite benefit in terms of thinking about this in general skills terms, because this is transferrable and it is portable, so you don't get a whole bunch of people who have been trained to go to China and they all speak beautiful Cantonese or Mandarin but we are going to actually send them instead to Bosnia. If they have general skills and they have general knowl-
Dr. BRECHT. Could I underline your question about the ROTC? As I understand, these grants now are going to ROTC programs around the country. One of the critical things they should do is send them abroad for an immersion in country. That is what they should do in the summer. It would be a terrific thing to get them in the country that is not a lot of money. And these young future officers would profit immensely simply by exposure to that other culture, but real exposure and immersion in that authentic environment.

Dr. SNYDER. We need to break for votes. And if you need anything, the staff will be glad to help you. And we will come back after the votes, two votes.

[Recess.]

Dr. SNYDER. I resisted the temptation, Dr. Krepinevich, to call you to the table just to show off that I could pronounce your name. See, I went ahead and did it anyway.

We are going to go ahead and start. Mr. Akin will not be able to return, which gives me free rein here until we have another member come.

I wanted to ask, so far, probably justifiably so, we have been pretty squishy. But I think that is an okay thing. I don’t fault you for it. I think we are just squishy as a Nation on what we think our goals are to be, with regard to foreign language skills and cultural awareness. So, I want to kind of poke at it a bit around the edges.

Maybe the first thing I would get at is the video that we showed of Mr. Gabaldon and Senator Inouye, with the contrast between a person who had not only foreign language skills, Dr. Zalman, but getting to your point in your thing, I think it didn’t come out in that video, but how Mr. Gabaldon learned his skills was he had Japanese friends as a teenager, and he traveled with them. I don’t know if it was, like, right after the Depression, or if they traveled in work; I think agricultural work.

He had Japanese friends, so it wasn’t just his language skill in some classroom. It was, I think, he liked the Japanese people. I think he didn’t want to kill any more Japanese than he had to. And he risked his life to keep 1,500 of them from getting killed in a very dramatic way. And you think about, how many U.S. soldiers would we have lost if we had to kill another 1,500 Japanese?

And the point I am getting at, Dr. Krepinevich, is these are skills not just in irregular warfare. I mean, that is a dramatic example of potentially the value of language skills and I say cultural awareness in a very conventional war setting. What if we had another 10 of the Gabaldons on that island? What if we had 15,000 less Japanese that would have had to have been killed before that battle would have been over? What that would have meant for those families and to our Marines that would have died in it.

So I think this issue of cultural awareness goes hand in hand with language skills, but it gets right, I think, down to the level of different kinds of combat. It has value in a lot of different areas of combat.
I want to give you some specific scenarios, maybe get away from some of the squishiness of it. I know a young Marine in town here. He is one of our fellows who did a couple of tours in Iraq. And because of some civilian life experiences, his Arabic skills are good enough he could go on street patrols with Iraqi troops without an interpreter, and the value that comes from that.

Now, what does that tell us about—you know, anybody who wants to comment; don’t feel like you have to comment—but you are talking about somebody right down at the street level. One-point-seven percent of a lot of intelligence officers doesn’t get to that level unless we greatly enhance the number of folks.

Now, is that an important goal or not? Do you have any immediate reaction? Or is the expense of it too great?

I think in your statement, Andy, you talk a lot about it is the Marines and Army that needs to benefit from this the most because of their proximity to being on the ground. But that is a street patrol situation, not just a—

Dr. Krepinevich. Well, again, if the Pentagon is serious about its determination to help build partner capacity, building partner capacity is going to involve training indigenous forces, it is going to involve advising them once they are trained. And language skills here, obviously, among the trainers is going to be important, and certainly the cultural aspect of it, and certainly advisors.

Typically, there may be a handful of advisors in, say, an Iraqi battalion. And so, unless you are counting on the Iraqis to have a high degree of English proficiency or you are going to outsource translators and bring them in, it can make a significant difference in terms of having American advisors and trainers who do speak the language who can go out on patrols as advisors.

Dr. Snyder. The question, then, is significant difference; that it is significant to such an extent that it is worth the investment in doing things differently and enhancing the road map and setting as a national priority for this country that we have to do better at kindergarten level up.

Dr. Krepinevich. You know, there is the interesting debate that you raised in the questions leading up to the hearings about, well, what do you give up? And there are certain people in the Pentagon who are willing to give up things to accomplish this, certain people who aren’t.

Two years ago, I sat on a Marine Corps professional military education review board with a number of retired Marine generals. And they certainly thought that this was an important skill-set.

Now, one thing we got into was the need, for example, to send American officers overseas to the staff colleges of foreign countries, the Indian Staff College, the Pakistani Staff College and so on, not only for the purpose of language and cultural awareness, but also for the purpose of building relationships among our mid-career officers with theirs so that someday 5, 8, 10 years down the road our generals know their generals.

I had a Brit talk to me, it was a couple years ago, had worked with the Pakistani military for quite some time, said that he went back to Pakistan not too long ago and was greeted very warmly in the officer club by a lot of the senior officers and was treated very frostily by a lot of the junior officers. And he was very much con-
cerned that the British military was losing that kind of relationship with the Pakistanis that had always helped them to, sort of, deal with difficult times in the past.

So I think this works on a number of different levels, all the way from that street patrol in Baghdad, all the way up to the senior officer level.

Dr. Snyder. I think it is well-accepted at the senior level. I don't think that is an issue.

Dr. Brecht, you wanted to comment?

Dr. Brecht. I would like to direct your attention to the written statement that I gave, which basically sets a future scenario in Niger, in northern Africa. And the argument is that presumably AFRICOM is divided into five regions, like the Africa Union does. And so these troops now, they are facing crowd control insecurity in food distribution because of a drought, say. And so the idea is that every one of these people has some idea, they are trained, basically they are aware of the cultural issues in this area. Many of them have basic phrases in the principal languages in Niger. Others can perform at the 2-2-plus level in 2 of the 15 core languages which are spoken there, Hausa and Fulfulda, okay. And so some officers, they know French, because they are communicating with the leadership there.

And then if you take this notion that there is your internal capacity, but when you have someone, you are in an interrogation and this person is speaking in Arabic that we don't recognize, we can pull down this tool online which identifies Arabic dialects, and we find out that this is, you know, Shuwa Arabic, but nobody knows what that is, and so now we draw back and we reach back for that capability. We don't have to build it in there. And then we have a telephonic, online telephonic interpretation ability and things like that.

What I try to demonstrate in this is that, if every unit, every person in that battalion had some idea of what the language and culture requirements are, they had a really good idea of what the capabilities, whether they had them themselves or whether they could draw them out, where they could reach back, outsource, or even rely on localized populations, but they will know in that area you can't localize the Arabic because we have insurrections.

So I would agree with you very clearly that, if you want to build something new, we have to build this total force that everyone in the force is aware of the language and cultural requirements. They know where to get the expertise; they don't all have to have it. That is, I think, the lesson in this.

Dr. Snyder. Of course, what I thought your scenario was—it is on page four and five of your written statement, of course, but it was at the very beginning, I noticed, when you said in the year 2021, which may be——

Dr. Brecht. A little off.

Dr. Snyder [continuing]. May be a realistic analysis of when we would have those skills.

The other thing, Dr. Brecht, that you talked about is K through 12. And I forget when our next hearing is on this, but it is going to be hearing from the Administration, the Pentagon, about what
they are doing on the defense language roadmap, which I look forward to.

But Dr. Chu has been very candid about, for some years now, this is a national problem. And we have actually got defense dollars going to States. I think we are funding a language roadmap kind of scenario in three States. And then we have money going to K-through-12 programs, because you just can’t keep recruiting people who don’t speak any language at all and think that you can train your way somehow through a military career and language training to the levels you want to get. I mean, it is a national issue.

You refer to, “The DOD should continue to support and serve as the bully pulpit for improvement in the Nation’s schools, colleges and universities,” which I think is a really interesting statement. I mean, what you are saying is this is a national security challenge for us that is so great that it has to be solved in our schools. I mean, it has to start in kindergarten through all the schools, secondary, elementary, colleges, universities. And the Pentagon has to lead the charge in this, which I think is an interesting statement.

By the way, we are hoping to have a hearing with these States that are getting Pentagon money to do the language programs, defense dollars, and see what they are doing. And George Miller, who is the chairman of our Education Committee, is going to plan to sit in with us on that, because he is very interested in that too.

My time is up, but does anybody have any other comments?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I would just say there is a great historical analogy. I am old enough to remember when Sputnik went up. And right thereafter, my schoolteacher was wondering why little Krepinevich couldn’t do his sums better. There was this huge sense that we were falling behind in science and technology against the Soviets. And there was a great deal of emphasis, resources, emphasis in the curriculum on science and mathematics to make sure that we either caught up or didn’t fall further behind.

And, again, the sense was that that was a national security problem for the United States, that the way to solve it was by increasing the competence of the American people writ large in terms of science and technology and engineering. Sadly, we have, kind of, fallen back in that hole again, if you look at a lot of the recent trends in science and technology.

But, certainly, language and global economy, where when things go wrong it can affect our security, our economic well-being because, you know, there is this kind of environment, certainly I think there is a legitimate case to be made that this needs to be a priority.

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Davis for five minutes.

Mrs. Davis of California. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, again, I am afraid I might repeat a question. But if we could go back for a second to the ROTC issue that we talked about. And you made the suggestion that, instead of training people here in the States, even if they have good instructors, it would be better off to send them to a foreign country and have them learn in a better immersion program.

Is that discussion being held? I mean, where should that discussion be held?
I think with a lot of the issues that you have talked about, the roadmap, I think, and also the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center——

Dr. Brecht. It is being held——

Mrs. Davis of California. Who is driving that train, I guess? How do we really develop that conversation more to really identify the best programs?

Dr. Brecht. It is my understanding that this program resides in the National Security Education Program Office, and Dr. Robert Slater is driving this. And I do believe that the Senior Language Authority in the Pentagon and Dr. Slater are talking about this issue and particularly maybe directing some of these funds more toward immersion. But I don't know anything more than that.

Dr. Snyder. Susan, I am meeting with him tomorrow, and you are welcome to join us in my office.

Mrs. Davis of California. Okay, that would be great.

Do you think that the Defense Language Institute is doing what needs to be done today? Is there something that we should be speaking to that would push them in an expanded role here?

Dr. Brecht. I think the Defense Language Institute is doing a remarkable job taking 19-year-olds and giving them language. The challenge they face is that the requirements have expanded so much that the Special Forces have requirements at the 0-plus, 1-1-plus. And the Marines have different requirements and so on. Across the board the requirements are so broad, and no one institution can do it all.

What they are doing I think they are doing very well, but they also have the mandate to reach out to the command language programs and so on. And I just think that the task they have taken on is huge. Raising, going to the 2-plus-2-plus-2 level is a huge challenge, to take a 19-year-old who may not want to be studying Pashto and take that person, where you can't even define standard Pashto, and take that person to a 2-plus is an incredible challenge.

And so I think that, basically, I have seen a lot of language programs. And for full disclosure, I am on their board of visitors, so I don't want to seem like an advocate too much. But what I have seen, they are doing a remarkable job. It is just a very tough, uphill climb for them, for anybody trying to get those skills.

And they can't satisfy the broad requirements of the whole military. Special Forces have different requirements. And the soldiers on the ground and the Marines, it is so broad, the new requirements of the day.

Mrs. Davis of California. Yeah. Yeah.

Does anybody else want to comment on that, the best way to get there?

Obviously, earlier in elementary and secondary, having been on a school board at a time that we were trying to expand some languages, many, many years ago—and, you know, when you have budget problems, what goes first? You are just not able to follow through with that.

I am pleased that there are some programs in the country that are doing a lot, a lot more than we were doing at that time. But part of it is the training of teachers. It is training them in a way that they weren't trained. Because even if you have language
teachers, they were trained in a way that doesn't expand a student's ability to be fluent in a language, only to read and write. And that has to change, as well.

I guess I would be interested in just hearing from you—and, again, I am sorry I missed a lot of the earlier testimony—you know, what message would you really like to leave with us? What hasn't been asked that you want to be sure that we are aware of, that we are thinking about?

Dr. Brecht. In K–12, I don't think there is any question, if you took $30 million and seeded dual language immersion programs across the United States, one in each State, where for half a day they are learning English and the other half of the day they are learning Hindi or Telugu or whatever. And those programs, those dual language programs are spreading across the country. They are one of the most successful K–12 experiments. And they get adult support, because the heritage communities are supporting them. And they fit No Child Left Behind, because they are doing English as well as the other languages, and so on.

If I had one magic wand wave, it would be that, because the K–12 system has to be demonstrated that they can learn language and the education system can succeed. And I think that is the base of everything else.

Mrs. Davis of California. With DOD funding?

Dr. Brecht. No, that has to be Department of Education funding.

Dr. Krepinevich. Well, a lot of the funding is local.

There are some interesting studies out recently. One is called "Falling Off the Flat Earth." It was done, I think, by the National Academy of Sciences. You can Google it. It talks about the terrible condition our science and engineering education is, in terms of K–12.

I think the system is in crisis across the board; it is not just in science and engineering. And, again, there is precedent. I was just in a session with the chairman of Intel last week. You know, Intel is pouring tens of millions of dollars into the public education system, trying to encourage science, the study of science and so on. And one of the big problems they are finding is you can't get qualified public school teachers in those fields because they are in demand elsewhere because there is a growing shortage. The ones you can get in may know the field, but they may not necessarily be good teachers. And he said he had data that showed a lot of people who are teaching in these disciplines aren't qualified. So that turns the students off even further who might have originally had an interest in it.

So you are in this downward spiral. And I don't know if it is the same in the language disciplines, but certainly, as I said, there is precedence. Fifty years ago, almost exactly 50 years ago, there was this push that said you can't be competitive as a Nation, you can't have the underlying foundation for a strong economy that can produce a strong military that produces qualified, capable, literate soldiers if you don't have a good education system.

Dr. Brecht. You said is there one thing, one message. The message is, and to answer the chairman's question: The Pentagon led racial integration. The Pentagon led gender equity issues, not out
of altruism, but out of strictly pragmatic approaches to solving major problems that were endemic to the Pentagon's needs and to society. Language is another one.

And that is what the bully pulpit means. You can't pay for it, but you can lead it. And that is what I think your mission could be.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. If I might, Mr. Chairman?

Dr. SNYDER. Sure.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Because you raised an issue that, obviously, is an emotional and difficult issue. But the don't-ask-don't-tell policy has been looked to as one area in which we had members of the services learning languages, being quite competent at them, who were separated from the service.

Do you have anything you would like to say about that, in terms of how we use policy to, I guess, make a strong point that we really need people in the services that can speak languages? Does it impact on that at all?

Don't want to touch it. Okay. That is all right.

Dr. SNYDER. Well, you will get another chance here.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Okay.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Brecht, I want to read a couple lines that you had here. On page six of your testimony, you say, quote, “Particularly challenging is the fact that the language needs of the Department of Defense are real and critical, but at the same time they appear to be so daunting that immediate and practical workarounds seem more attractive than anything that is proposed under the guise of a long-term solution. With troops moving around the world on short-term, 1- or 2-year deployments with hundreds, if not thousands, of languages in play and with many funding priorities competing, a comprehensive end-state of a language-competent and culturally aware total workforce simply looks out of reach.”

And I think the reason I have been prying at this—well, what percent? And I knew you weren't going to be able to answer that; it is unfair. The Pentagon can't answer that. But we need to at least say, we have it in reach. We need to at least get to the point through all this that we can see, okay, we have a sense of where we are going. I think the Pentagon has a sense that they are moving in the right direction. I just don't think they have a sense yet of what that end point is, if everything is going as well as they want.

But I think that is a pretty good statement, it just looks out of reach. It looks so daunting, it looks so daunting, what we are talking about. How can we get it—it doesn't even look in—well, we need to get it so it is in reach.

Dr. Zalman, I think you have been trying to get a word in. Go ahead.

Dr. ZALMAN. Well, I am a little slow. Well, but this actually is the right question to say it to.

I actually don't think that it is out of reach. The idea of full competence, that is to say full fluency, in a difficult language does seem out of reach. But, for example, the example you gave before of the guy on the street who knows something, there is a generalizable skill, a portable skill that he had. In this case, he didn't view his interlocutor as exotic; he could get up close. Somebody else can
learn those skills with a general cultural awareness training, something more elementary without full-on language skills.

So I would divide, in order to make this not so daunting and not so hard to swallow expense-wise and labor-wise, would start to look at what kinds of elementary, portable skills and capabilities can everyone be trained in. And then you have a more, sort of, elite cadre.

And might add that there may be more places to look for that. You alluded, the way that I read it, when you opened to the fact that the topic today, cultural awareness in the military, actually is a function of strategic communication or whatever we are going to call it next. So there are other places like the State Department, not that they are so well-funded, but like Fulbrights, and there are so many places where this is important, that the military is only one of them, which is training a citizen to be a citizen in a globalized world.

Dr. Snyder. That would be the Senator William Fulbright from Arkansas, is that correct, Dr. Zalman?

Dr. Zalman. I benefitted from——

Dr. Snyder. You were a Fulbright Scholar in Jordan, yes.

I want to ask maybe Dr. Brecht, do you have any comment or did you form any opinion about the State roadmaps that the Pentagon is funding? I understand there are three States with pilots, and do you have a sense of how does it work? Are they called State language roadmaps?

Dr. Brecht. Yes. They are a little uneven. But, frankly, I think we need 48 more, including the District. Because I have not seen business, local government and State government and academe collaborate more and hold a better dialogue on language and cultural understanding than in those. We have brought it down to actually real people with real local problems and dealing with the schools. And so, frankly, I think it was a wonderful experiment, and I just need 48 more.

Dr. Snyder. Yeah.

I have a couple more questions, I think. I have to throw out my off-the-wall idea. I have mentioned this off and on for the last several years. I actually did it initially almost as a kind of throwaway question, but I am not so sure that it is not a good idea, which is that this ought to start in boot camp.

I was enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1967, Platoon 2059. And you ought to have some choice over it. But then you get assigned to the Farsi platoon. And for those 13 weeks that you are in boot camp or whatever boot camp is now, perhaps during meals—you would have to do it in a way that you wouldn't take away from learning to shoot a rifle or, God forbid, learning the march, but perhaps during meals you would have a native speaker in that language, not in that confrontational boot camp way, but your one break of the day, only you had to do it—all of you would converse, but it had to be in Farsi. And at the end of the 13 weeks, you would have probably some very basic exposure. Some would do well. Some would have chosen that language because they already had some background in it. And then see where that would lead.

And maybe that would be—maybe they do that in that sense, Dr. Zalman, of cultural awareness. That that goes for some people that really hadn't had much foreign language training, hadn't traveled
much, exposure to somebody from another country. For some it would perhaps be an early initiation to a language that they really didn’t realize they had an aptitude for.

But do you all have any comment about starting doing that kind of a thing?

Dr. ZALMAN. Someone who was in the military once suggested to me that existing diversity training programs actually offer a platform for, within the military, offer a platform for learning about people who are beyond the military and in other countries.

Dr. BRECHT. Those of us who were in boot camp know that is mostly the first time anyone has left western Pennsylvania. They are already seeing cultures now, and being jammed up against a major culture, the military, and also subcultures for people from all over, and exploiting that would be a really good idea. Because we just jam them in there and make do, but no one has ever tried to make that first exposure to people from really different backgrounds a cultural experience that they could build on, leaving language aside, just on the cultural.

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Earlier, just to go back a little bit, do we have the rewards in place to provide the kind of incentives for someone to go into a program, the ROTC one I mentioned, whether when they go on—are they there? Is it in terms of their ability to advance? Obviously, financial rewards.

And what do you think it would take to really reward people for taking the time to learn a language in some depth? Any thoughts? The incentives aren’t there now.

Dr. BRECHT. The foreign language proficiency pay incentive is significant that they put in place, but it is a very high level. It is a 3-3 in two languages, and, you know, that is huge, it is very high. And there are very few, if any, real incentives lower down.

I think the ROTC issue is, if you said you have two months abroad, even if it is Kyrgyzstan, at least there is something that is there.

And the simple answer is I don’t think we have nearly enough in place to get people to stay long enough to reach those higher levels, let alone just deal with the lower levels that they need.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. That is something that we need to work on.

I might just tell a quick story. The captain who was working with the ROTC students who was in Iraq walked into a meeting that he said was so tense one day, you could just cut it in the tent, essentially. And he kind of walked in and was able to say in Arabic, you know, “Where’s the party?” And it just relieved all the tension in the room, and people kind of decided to get down and try and work together.

And I think that that says something about the ability to convey a message very strongly and to do it in the proper way. And that is what we need, people that are interested in wanting to do that.

Dr. BRECHT. We have another really good experiment: the National Language Service Corps, which is being put in place as we speak. You asked, what are the incentives for people joining that? There is patriotism. People will do it because it is good for the country, I believe. But one of the things that would be useful is,
I don't think it is part of the program as yet, but their skills are assessed. But they also should be given some money to go take more language. And it may be a way, also, to support the academic programs in little languages in kind of a backdoor way.

But this is another vital experiment done in the Department of Defense that could be very, very useful in building this cadre where you don't have to have everybody in every language but you have people in the warehouse waiting to be used.

Mrs. Davis of California. Right. Thank you.

Dr. Snyder. I have one final question, Dr. Brecht, and then I am going to tell a foreign language story, Susan.

Very briefly, Dr. Brecht, you have one recommendation about that there should be somebody in the White House that oversees this. How did you come up with that idea? Just looking for ways to get it as a higher priority?

Dr. Brecht. Senator Akaka, as you know, has a bill which hasn't gone anywhere at this moment, but there have been recommendations. We need somewhere high enough in the Government that says language, like science and technology, is a critical aspect of our society for the future. We don't have that. The fact you have the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the White House, that is the model; that at least there is someone, the bully pulpit.

But it is not only defense. Defense shouldn't have to carry the whole language ball, obviously. And it crosses all the departments, and it also crosses into education, and getting someone high enough to bring the sectors of education, industry and Government and the heritage communities, and to get that position at least visible. That was where it comes from.

Dr. Snyder. Let me extend to you the offer, I will ask it as a question for the record, if any of you come up with any written material you would like to provide or add on to any answers, feel free to do that, and it will be added as a question for the record.

Let me close. I will tell you my one story about foreign language skills. I was working as a doctor in the Cambodian refugee relief effort along the Thai-Cambodian border in 1981. And we would go out in these Thai villages and hold clinics. And the hospital that I admitted sick patients to was run by Italians. And one day I went to a village, and there was a lovely young 19-year-old woman with a sky-high fever, a terrible dull pain, right-upper quadrant pain, and I knew she was sick and probably was going to need to have her belly opened up to see what was going on. I took her to the Italian hospital.

Well, I was here, and then my interpreter who spoke English and Thai was here. And then he spoke to the woman who spoke Thai and Italian, and then the Italian doctor was down there. So there were four of us. And I would say something and boom, boom, boom, boom. I think it was old Danny Thomas event, with Uncle Tonoose, if you remember that show.

So, anyway, in the course of this conversation, going back and forth, I said, "It is possible this is an atypical presentation of appendicitis," a retrocecal appendix I think is what it was called back when I actually practiced medicine, meaning it can cause right-upper-quadrant pain rather than right-lower-quadrant pain. So I leave it there.
I come back, like, three days later, I want to see how she is and what happened. And I go to her bed, and she is not there. And they say, well, she is outside getting water. I go out there, and she is carrying a bucket of water, walking around. I get her to come in and lay down. She doesn’t speak any English. And she has this very neat, healing, short, small, right-lower-quadrant appendix scar. And I thought, how does an Italian doctor know that he just had to go in like that and not have to just open her up to see what is going on?

So I get them lined up again; you know, the doctor down here. So I said, how did you know that was a retrocecal appendix? And he turns to the Italian doctor, and his eyes get big, and he says, “I thought that was your diagnosis.” [Laughter.]

So that is all. We are adjourned. Thank you all.
[Whereupon, at 4:43 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Opening Statement of  
Chairman Dr. Vic Snyder  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations  

Hearing on “Defense Language and Cultural Awareness Transformation:  
To what end? At what cost?”  

July 9, 2008  

Good afternoon, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations’ hearing on Department of Defense efforts to improve its language and cultural awareness capabilities.  

Not only is this a historic challenge, but this is an area with profound implications for our success at adapting to the new realities of war in the 21st Century, with the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as prime exhibits. But our goal here is not to hash over what has or has not been done in those theaters, or what steps DOD has or has not taken. Instead, my expectation is that we can look ahead and consider the larger question of what capabilities our military needs to have and to sustain for its role in national security – to take advantage of opportunities and to respond to threats.  

Before I turn to our witnesses, I have two examples of the enduring need for this capability – both from World War II.  

The first is from a film called the Untold True Story of Guy Gabaldon, which depicts Marine PFC Gabaldon’s single-handed success in persuading over 1,500 Japanese soldiers to surrender on Saipan in 1944. This is followed by an audio-only excerpt from a from a news report originally broadcast on NPR’s Morning Edition on April 25, 2008.  

The second segment is from Ken Burns’ film The War and an interview with Senator Daniel Inouye about his wartime experiences in Europe.  

We are joined today by:  

- Dr. Richard Brecht, Executive Director at the University of Maryland’s Center for Advanced Study of Language, who has extensive experience in the best ways to acquire and sustain language skills.
• Dr. Amy Zalman, who is an expert in how cultural awareness factors into successful strategic communications.

• Dr. Montgomery McFate, who has worked to develop a framework for employing anthropologists and other social scientists to support deployed forces.

• And, Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, the President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments who will discuss the capabilities our future military force will require.

Welcome to all of you and thank you for being here. After Mr. Akin’s opening remarks, I’ll turn to each of you for a brief opening statement. Your prepared statements will be made part of the record.

With that, let me turn it over to our ranking member, Mr. Akin, for any statement he would like to make.
Statement of Ranking Member Todd Akin
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
House Armed Services Committee

Hearing on Defense Language and Cultural Awareness Transformation

July 9, 2008

Thank you, Chairman Snyder, and good afternoon to our witnesses — we appreciate you being here today.

Today’s hearing raises a new subject for this subcommittee — the Department of Defense language and cultural awareness transformation initiatives. This is a topic of increasing importance for the military. As we most certainly will hear from our witnesses today, warfare in the era of failed states and terrorism requires a military that is conversant not only in the conventional techniques of warfare, but also familiar with the languages and culture of the places in which they operate.

As we see in Iraq and Afghanistan, defeating the enemy is often more a matter of perception than meeting objective military metrics. We are learning that winning hearts and minds will probably not occur unless those fighting have some understanding of the hearts and minds they seek to win.
This is why this subcommittee is focusing on the Department’s efforts to improve the language proficiency of our military and why we’re looking at how we train our servicemen and servicewomen to be “culturally aware” when operating in foreign lands.

So before we begin investigating how best to generate a military with these “soft” skills – an inquiry that will require this subcommittee to delve into the weeds and discuss the minutiae – we ought to keep in mind that this critical capability will likely be a contributing factor in our success or failure in defeating an insurgency. Moreover, language training and cultural awareness provides our military with a virtual layer of armor that can save lives.

With this perspective in mind, I’d like thank Chairman Snyder for focusing the subcommittee on this topic. Anything we can do to advance and improve this initiative is worthwhile.

I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ thoughts on how best to build this capability in our military. Again, thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
“The End State of Language Capability for the U.S. Department of Defense:
The Country’s First ‘Globalized’ Workforce”

Prepared Statement before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
July 9, 2008

Richard D. Brecht
Executive Director
University of Maryland
Center for Advanced Study of Language
Executive Summary

The “end state” of language and culture capability in the DoD is a “globalized total workforce” built and maintained by enhanced recruitment, more targeted training, rigorous warehousing, and effective management. This organic capacity is buttressed by force multipliers consisting of outsourced, localized, and reach-back resources accessed anywhere and anytime through a networked resource access system.

Such an end state must be comprehensive, cohesive and collaborative, as it cannot depend on DoD efforts and resources alone. The programmed support of other government departments as well as the academic, business, and heritage sectors must be brought to bear in an efficient and effective manner.

Summary Conclusions and Recommendations

- The end state is a “globalized total force,” with defined organic capabilities supported by force multipliers based on outsourcing, localization, and reach-back.

- The core to this capability, the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (DLTR), must be completed and its funding and programs maintained or enhanced.

- Successful recruitment depends ultimately on vastly improved language education at the K-12 level, and the DoD should continue to support and serve as the “bully pulpit” for improvement in the nation’s schools, colleges, and universities.

- A national coordination point for language, similar to the Office for Science and Technology Policy, should be created in the White House and charged to provide guidance in integrating the national architecture upon which this end state depends.

- A network-based language and culture resource access system should be developed that is capable of locating and providing needed language and cultural resources anytime and
anywhere, leveraging the extensive USG investments in language and culture as well the resources of academe, industry, and the nation’s heritage communities.

- A concentrated effort should be made in the areas of African and Asian languages and cultures.

- Finally, a short term solution should be a priority, specifically the creation of the network-based language and culture resource access system.
Introduction

In the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (DLTR), the Department of Defense (DoD) has laid out an unprecedented, comprehensive plan to meet the language needs of the nation’s military and has made impressive progress in implementing that plan. Two questions, however, remain: What is the appropriate “end state” for a DoD language and cultural awareness capability? What are the next steps after the DLTR to get us there?

An End State Scenario

In 2021, a severe draught in northern Niger is taking the lives of thousands of men, women, and children. The United Nations and the African Union have agreed to provide humanitarian assistance. The U.S., through AFRICOM, has contributed, among other resources, an infantry battalion, which is responsible for crowd control at food distribution centers in an area where a radical insurgent element operates. Tempers flare, and troops and local populations are endangered. Language tasks arise and are met with the following capabilities:

- Organic language capabilities: As part of their training, all troops of assigned to the Northern Region of the AFRICOM mission area are aware of the language and culture issues they will face in the field. Many have basic phrases in the principal languages of Niger, while others can perform at the 2-level in the two African “core” languages (out of the fifteen “core” languages of Africa) spoken in the Northern Region: Fulfulde and Hausa, as well as in French (the official language of Niger) and in Arabic. Thus, there is successful communication between American and community leaders, while people on the street are addressed using Voice Response Translators (VRTs) programmed on-site via satellite in the above languages for crowd control.

- Outsourced capabilities: Operating in conjunction with the African Union’s African Standby Force, Northern Region, U.S. commanders can assume that villages, whose populations speak the other principal languages of Niger, Djerma, Kanuri, and Tamajaq, will be handled by the ASF. The battalion’s communications management specialist, by the way, has been assigned to provide on-going training to units at the battalion, company, and platoon levels.
• Reach-back: Given the history of past ethnic conflict in the area, the commander reaches back in the pre-deployment stage into the African Title VI center at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign for the latest information on tribal and cultural issues pertaining to Niger and surrounding countries. Meanwhile, on site a prisoner is speaking an unrecognizable dialect of Arabic, and the interrogator goes on-line to access the Arabic Variation Identification Aid (AVIA) developed by the University of Maryland Center for Advanced Study of Language. Having identified the Arabic variant as Shuwa Arabic and aware that this capability is not organic and localization is unreliable, the interrogator accesses the Army Language Line Services, which provides telephonic interpretation during questioning. Also, many local populace interviews must be conducted in Hausa, and so assistance is sought from National Language Service Corps, which has dispatched a set of fluent speakers for the mission. The text for the battery of information and rescues leaflets in all 12 of Niger’s languages has been provided by the African Languages National Resource Center at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.

• Localization: Intelligence units of the Niger military provide valuable information to company and platoon leaders. French and Arabic are vital to this channel of information. Officers in these units are skilled in communications management and feel comfortable that they are getting the information they need.

This combination of appropriate organic language capabilities together with the force multipliers, provide the capabilities needed in future scenarios like this.
The Problem

The problem of defining and reaching an appropriate end state is particularly “wicked,” given the fact that the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report envisions a future dominated by “uncertainty” and “unpredictability” and focuses on “capabilities and agility” more than specific threats from specific countries.” Particularly challenging is the fact that the language needs of the Department are real and critical, but at the same time they appear to be so daunting that immediate and practical work-arounds seem more attractive than anything that is proposed under the guise of a long-term solution. With troops moving around the world on short-term (1 or 2-year) deployments, with hundreds (if not thousands) of languages in play, and with many funding priorities competing, a comprehensive end state of a language competent and culturally aware total workforce simply looks out of reach.

That having been said, the focus of this testimony is to attempt to lay out an attainable end state of required language and cultural awareness capabilities, along with the challenges that threaten it and the opportunities that it promises. My underlying assumptions are:

- First, that the existing Defense Language Transformation Roadmap is the most sophisticated language plan this nation has ever seen and lays the foundation for building the first ever language and culture-competent “globalized work force” based in the United States.
- Second, the investment this roadmap has required must be protected and the job must be finished, in spite of some significant challenges that can impede progress and threaten attainment of the end state.
- Third, in spite of the magnitude of the problem, a practical end state can be reached. However, this task will not be accomplished simply, easily and quickly, as it will depend on a comprehensive, cohesive, and collaborative total language system.
- Fourth, short term practical steps can be taken that offer immediate return on investment and, perhaps more importantly, demonstrate that the language problem is not intractable and that long-term solutions are possible.
The End State: A “Globalized DoD Workforce”

The lessons learned over the past two decades have made clear that language and cultural knowledge must be a force-wide capability. Accordingly, the end state we seek is a “globalized workforce” in which every unit and every individual will have the ability to deal on an appropriate level with allies as well as enemies anywhere in the world. This globalized workforce comprises: all military and civilian personnel with adequate communications management skills; a sub-set of this total force with language skills at all levels and in all relevant occupations; a cadre of language specialists capable of performing at the highest levels; and, a set of force multipliers available on demand. Targeting “capabilities and agility” to meet “uncertainty” and “unpredictability” assumes that all levels of the workforce have the globalized mindset, the prerequisite knowledge of what this means, and a language and culture resource arsenal available on demand.

A. Communications Management Skills. The Defense Language Transformation Roadmap has as one of its goals that “…the total force understands and values the tactical, operational, and strategic asset inherent in regional expertise and language.” Not only must “…the total force understand and value…,” but it must be able to use the “…tactical, operational, and strategic asset…” Whether or not the personnel on the ground themselves have language skills or adequate cultural knowledge, training must ensure that all personnel have basic “communications management,” which means that they have some basic knowledge of when human and/or technology-based language capabilities are needed and what value they bring, what resources are available and where they can be obtained, and whether the language and culture resources put against the problem are sufficient. Essentially, members of a globalized workforce are armed with the ability to pose and answer the questions: Do we need language skills and culture capabilities? What specifically do we need? Will technology suffice, or do we need human resources? Where and how soon can we get the necessary resources? Are they working?

The communications management training that is called for here, to the best of my knowledge, is not available. Cultural briefings, sensitivity training, and short, intensive language courses and
programs, while certainly required, are not sufficient to equip the total force to deal with the range of language and culture issues they will face in the field. However, before such training can be developed and implemented, a picture of all language capabilities available to a unit must be drawn and an access network must be developed that is capable of deploying the appropriate resources on demand.

B. Organic Language and Culture Skills

Strategic planning of the Department of Defense as well as the White House, Intelligence Community, the Department of Homeland Security, and other relevant entities, will determine the language readiness map defining: the languages, the levels of proficiency and performance (from basic to sophisticated), the skills and tasks required, the number of language and culturally-competent personnel; and, the mix of human and technological assets.

Given the global involvement of U.S. military, the inevitable first question that arises is: Which languages and dialects are to be included in the organic capabilities of the Department, given the fact that there are approximately 7,000 languages in the world, with tens of thousands of dialects? The current approach of identifying and projecting “Immediate Investment Languages” and future “Stronghold” languages needs is very reasonable, given the enormity of the task. The question, however, is: How can or should more languages, even dialects, be included in the end state? Clearly, building a workforce competent in hundreds, not to say, thousands of languages is not feasible.

The solution lies in a system with strategically planned, organic language capabilities augmented with outsourcing, localization, and reach-back capabilities. These organic language capabilities have to be carefully constructed against what might be called “language futures,” that is, an analysis of which languages and dialects will be in use by which populations in twenty years in regions of the world of inevitable interest. Which are lingua franca languages in those regions? Which languages are widespread among relevant sub-populations and sub-regions in the future? If, then, combatant commands can be configured to minimize inter-regional deployments, units assigned to specific areas should have lingua franca capabilities, perhaps even down to sub-regions. For example, a recent Cape Town study asserted that, since Africans as a rule are
multilingual and speak two or three languages, there are 15 languages that are spoken by 85% of Africans. If the continent were divided into 5 regions, as the African Union has done, then the number of languages each AFRICOM unit assigned to those regions would have as its organic capability would be manageable.

And how do we build this carefully expanded organic capability? Clearly, the DoD language training programs will remain the primary provider, with the DLIFLC in the lead. However, it is possible that, in the long term, DLIFLC will be able to hone its on-campus mission to higher levels skills in critical languages by drawing from a recruitment pool enriched by better language programs in schools, community colleges and universities as well as in heritage community language schools. (See Appendix B, where a map of the national pipelines in language education and training is sketched out.) In the meantime, the transformation of the DLIFLC to higher level outputs in critical languages, now underway, must be supported to completion. In addition, across the Department language training would be more targeted on job performance with life-cycle training available across the workforce, most likely largely through mobile training teams and on-line courses like those of the SOCOM, with support from technology-enabled learning systems like GLOSS & LangNet. Life-cycle training means that language learning would be an ever-present, career-long endeavor, and management would focus on employing these skills to keep them from atrophying. And finally, once the language skills and professional experience are acquired, they would be “warehoused” in data bases, reserve elements, and the National Language Service Corps, to be available in time of need. All this represents the organic capability of the DoD.

*Force Multipliers*

However, such an organic capacity has to be supplemented by force multipliers, like the following:

*Outsourcing.* Clearly, some reliance on contractors for language services across the board will continue, although more organic capabilities are needed. The language abilities of our coalition partners are another important source of rare linguistic and cultural expertise. However, the
quality of these end state outsourced capabilities requires standards and evaluation processes to be developed that ensure the quality of their performance. These standards, at some level, would become part of the communications management training described above.

Localization. The necessity and disadvantages of hiring local populace translators and interpreters are well known to the military. Here again, standards must be brought to bear, as part of the communications management of all personnel deployed abroad. Industry understands localization very well, and the military can learn from firms forced into markets on which they have little experience, not to say expertise. The importance of standards in localization efforts cannot be overestimated. (It is particularly noteworthy that one of the principal industry organizations in this area is the Localization Industry Standards Association (LISA).)

Reach-back: There are USG-sponsored capabilities that cannot be deployed in the field but, given global information transfer in today’s world, can be accessed on demand, but only if their availability and usability are known. Such language resources include: the National Language Service Corps (NLSC), the National Virtual Translation Center (NVTC), The Language Flagship (TLF), and, presumably, a government contracted telephonic interpretation services like industry’s Language Line Services.

In sum, while outsourced and localized resources can be valuable, the weaknesses are clear. War fighting cannot be outsourced or localized, although large elements of stabilization and reconstruction can. Once again, though, leaving aside cost, the value of such non-organic resources depends upon their quality, which ultimately depends upon standards against which to judge performance.

A word about technology: Human Language Technology (HLT) came into its own when it acknowledged its limitations and targeted its strengths. To this observer, the ability of Human Language Technology (HLT) to match human expertise in processing complex texts is a long way off. Nevertheless, HLT has a definite role to play in the end state; in fact it is critical to it. Processing large volumes of information at relatively low levels sophistication is its strength. In the field it has a role in low level tasks, like traffic control and the like. However, the future
globalized workforce must be armed with the knowledge of what the task is, what the capabilities of the technology are, and how the delta, if it exists, can be filled by human expertise. As mentioned above, this kind of training is a critical component of the universal communications management training called for above.

In sum, the end state envisioned in the Roadmap, with some elaboration here, can be represented by the chart in Appendix A.

**National Capacity Architecture**

The construction and maintenance of this end state capability in the DoD depends upon a national architecture that is comprehensive, cohesive, and collaborative. The charts in Appendices A & B represent such an architecture, which presumes collaboration among the sectors constituting the nation’s language capacity: academic, federal, heritage, industry, and overseas. They are meant to indicate that any solution to a language need as broad as that faced by the DoD is complex and cannot realistically depend on a total workforce trained in the languages spoken in the approximately 130 countries in which we have troops. Moreover, the basic premise here is that the DoD cannot reach the appropriate end state on its own, as department leadership has frequently asserted and the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap clearly implies. However, I would argue that the end state is indeed reachable, provided that the proposed broad collaboration is integrated into a system and supported as a whole.

Whereas industry in the form of private contractors is recognized as a vital part of the DoD’s total workforce, close ties particularly with the academe sector are not yet a generally acknowledged and accepted part of the DoD strategic plan for language. That being said, there is no question that academe is envisioned as an integral part of the most recent QDR, and that vision can be broadened. Putting DoD end state functions of Appendix A against the national human resource pipelines reflected in Appendix B gives the following picture of how the end state might work:
First, the Language Flagship of the NSEP was launched in order to dramatically enhance the pool from which language expertise could be recruited into the government. This program directly provides to government entities skilled professionals with certified high level language ability in critical languages. In addition, the intent of this program is to strengthen language education across the country by involving leading language programs that demonstrate how language instruction in the education system can become more effective and by disseminating the model to other institutions. This unprecedented program, along with recruitment from heritage communities, ultimately will enable the DoD’s principal language school, the DLIFLC, to focus more of its mission on higher levels and on critical languages and missions.

Second, in the area of training, federal funding has enabled the academic sector to collaborate in providing long-term career language enhancement through on-line systems like LangNet and DLI-developed GLOSS, critical language learning materials catalogued in UCLA’s Language Materials Project (LMP), and broad access to authentic materials from across the globe through SCOLA.

Third, with regard to warehousing, the National Language Service Corps (NSLC), along with reserve elements, can become the nation’s primary vehicle for preserving hard-won language skills and making them available on demand in time of need. The NSLC can and should draw upon the best academic language programs in the United States, as documented in CASL’s LinguaVista system, to maintain and enhance its members’ language and culture skills. This same service is available to DoD personnel wishing to enhance language skills on their own or through USG-sponsored programs.

Fourth, in the area of outsourcing, various accrediting organizations can be of assistance in establishing standards for selection and performance assessment of contracted interpreters, translators, interrogators, and the like. (See, for example, The Commission on English Language Program Accreditation (CEA) and American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)).
Fifth, reach-back may be seen to comprise a number of services, including translation, interpretation, cultural behavior advising and training, as well as research on immediate and long-term problems in language training, performance, and assessment. The NLSC, the NVTC, and a military telephonic interpretation service—all staffed by many professors and graduate students—can provide just-in-time on translation and interpretation services. The reach-back capabilities of Human Terrain Teams in the field might be extended to include experts in regions and areas of the world from Title VI National Resource Centers. In research and development, the Title VI National Language Resources and the University of Maryland Center for Advanced Study of Language can be called upon.

Sixth, localization can be effective, provided that managers of such efforts are themselves trained in what we are calling communications management so that they can know what skills they are looking for, what options are available, and how well the localized efforts are performing.

**Academe as a Core Asset**

It should be clear that many of these capabilities depend on the academic sector maintaining expertise, programs, and teachers in languages of all regions of the world. In fact, academe, as opposed to government and industry, is best positioned to extend and maintain expertise in all areas of the world without having to justify its practical application. Indeed, the strength of academe lies in its “knowledge for knowledge sake” approach. However, there are a number of critical considerations that arise here.

The core of this capability to develop and maintain expertise is the language field, which can be analyzed as comprising, for any given language or language area, foundational elements (expertise base, research, national organization, strategic planning, national resource centers), infrastructure (teacher training programs, in-country immersion programs, publications outlets, assessment instruments, etc.), as well as exemplary national programs. This field architecture, supported principally on the federal side by Title VI/Fulbright-Hays of the Higher Education Act, is critical to all aspects of the federal language enterprise. This is particularly true given the
fact that language fields as a rule pay attention to a broad range of languages in their area, devoting graduate and undergraduate education to critical linguistic and cultural aspects of the discipline unavailable anywhere else. This field structure is critical to much of the end state architecture described here.

Now that culture is receiving its due in the Department, academic researchers can be very helpful in laying out the parameters that have to be considered and the theory that can guide any practical training, whether it be in the area of cultural sensitivity or on specific cultures. This is particularly important when attempting to consider culture separate from language. Furthermore, regional or area studies, as opposed to culture research, is a major strength of universities, and the National Resource Centers funded by Title VI are the major repositories of this knowledge in the world.

Another consideration is that the integration and collaboration called for here among government and academe depend on a clear vision and a strong will across federal agencies responsible for national security. Language is a national problem, and ultimately the globalized workforce called for here will be reached most easily if and when this country’s education system produces “globalized citizens.” It is a fact that K-12 language education is a DoD issue in that its globalized workforce ultimate depends on it. To the extent that the DoD can continue to advocate for the broader, strategic, language education needs of the nation, the more its direct requirements will be met most efficiently and effectively.

Summary Conclusions and Recommendations

- The “end state” for the DoD of a “globalized total force” is attainable, but only if viewed as comprising a workforce universally informed about the value of language and culture capabilities and about how to bring appropriate language and culture resources to bear when needed. This basic communications capability is the foundation upon which will be built cadres of personnel skilled in languages at all levels, all supported by a full array of force multipliers including outsourcing, localization, and reach-back.
• Hard won ground must not be lost; the significant investment made by the Department in language and culture must be protected. The DLTR must be fully implemented, and its funding and programs must be maintained as the core to this capability.

• A language and culture resource provider system should be devised that is accessible anytime and anywhere. This system must incorporate all aspects of in-house resources (human or technology), as well as outsourced, localized, and reach back capabilities; and it should include resources across government, academe, and industry. This approach is in line with the “Net-Centricity” vision of the 2006 QDR Report, which is intended to harness “the power of information connectivity” to enable “critical relationships between organizations and people.” (p. 58)

• Along with adequate assessment processes and instruments, standards should be developed that would apply across all outsourcing, localization, and reach-back capabilities. Such an effort could leverage the 15 billion dollar language services industry, if these businesses would participate with academe in the development process.

• A concentrated effort should be made in the area of African languages. Just because the task is formidable does not mean that it should not be attacked. An initial step would be a major effort to compile language corpora for targeted areas of the continent, which would enable training and research and development of critical technology tools. Also, being a Russian specialist, I would be remiss not to point out the graying of the field both inside and outside our government. A capacity built over decades is in danger of being seriously weakened, just when Russia is emerging once again as a very important player in the world. Finally, the languages of our friends in Europe and Japan are critical to our security, yet they do not garner the support that currently more pressing languages do.

• Efforts should continue and be strengthened to instill appropriate cultural behaviors and understanding in the DoD workforce. Cultural sensitivity is critical as a basis for all cultural training, as there is a danger that very short term training on specific cultures can
cause more harm than good. Communications management entails awareness of the value of cultural knowledge along with the ability to find resources and expertise when needed.

- The comprehensive architecture proposed here requires cohesion and collaboration across agencies and sectors. Ideally, a coordination point for language established in the White House, similar to the Office for Science and Technology Policy, would provide guidance in this direction. Equally importantly, such an office would argue for a national language education policy for the schools, colleges, and universities in this country, thereby providing a longer term solution to what is clearly not just a military problem.

- Finally, a short term result should be a priority. While the end state envisioned here does not involve a total workforce able to speak the languages encountered in global deployments, it does propose a workforce capable of dealing with the communication requirements of their job through access to a range of language capabilities that include human and technological, on- and off-site, and owned and leased, made and bought. A shorter term solution is to build the data base of resources and the delivery system as well as the communications management training components required across the services.
Appendix A: DoD Language Supply Architecture

More Efficient Recruitment
- Base language ability in critical languages (TLF)
- More language experience in commonly taught languages
- ROTC programs

More Focused Training on:
- Critical languages
- Job performance
- All levels including higher level skills

Warehouse:
- NLSC
- Reserves
- DLVP

DoD Globalized Workforce
Organic Capability:
- Universal Communications Management Capability
- Personnel with usable Language & Regional Expertise
- Language Professionals at 3/3/3 and above

Surge Capability
- Warehousing
- Cross-Training
- Reach-back

Localization
Outsourcing
- Allies
- Contractors

Reach-back:
NLSC, NVTC, TLF, NRCs, LRCs, CASL

Language & Culture-focused Management
Appendix B: DoD National Language Capacity Architecture/Pipelines

Abbreviations:
Curriculum Vitae

RICHARD D. BRECHT
Executive Director
Center for Advanced Study of Language
University of Maryland
7005 52nd Avenue
College Park, MD 20742

Telephone: (301) 226-8801
E-mail: rbrecht@casl.umd.edu
Social Security: 190-30-9733

EDUCATION

1969-1972 Harvard University (Slavic Languages and Literatures) Ph.D. 1972
Dissertation: Problems of Deixis and Hypotaxis in Russian: Towards a Theory of
Complementation

1965-1969 Harvard University (Slavic Languages and Literatures) M.A., 1969

1963-1965 Pennsylvania State University (Russian) B.A., Summa Cum Laude, 1965
Phi Beta Kappa

PRINCIPAL ACADEMIC ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS HELD

2003-present Executive Director, University of Maryland Center for Advanced Study of
Language

1999-2003 Director, National Foreign Language Center, Johns Hopkins University and the
University of Maryland

1992-1999 Deputy Director, National Foreign Language Center, University of Maryland

1985-1987 Dean (Acting), College of Arts and Humanities, University of Maryland (chief
academic and administrative officer for College of 462 FTE, with $23 million
budget)

1980-1985 Chair, Department of Germanic and Slavic Languages and Literatures, University
of Maryland (20 FTE faculty)

ACADEMIC FACULTY POSITIONS HELD

1994-present Professor, Department of Asian & East European Languages & Cultures,
University of Maryland
1981-present  Visiting Professor, Department of Russian, Bryn Mawr College

1994-2000  Adjunct Professor, National Foreign Language Center, Johns Hopkins University

1985-1994  Professor, Department of Germanic and Slavic Languages and Literatures, University of Maryland

1980-1985  Associate Professor, Department of Germanic and Slavic Languages and Literatures, University of Maryland

1976-1980  Associate Professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures, Harvard University

1973-1976, 1971-1972  Assistant Professor Slavic Languages and Literatures, Harvard University

1971-1972  Assistant Professor of Modern Languages and Linguistics, Cornell University

PUBLICATIONS

Books & Edited Volumes


  Russian Language: Stage Two: An Intermediate Level Russian Course, with N.M.


Manuals and Reports


Articles


"Ctoby or Cto and by," in *Folia Slavica* 1, 1977, 33-40. (Reviewed in *Sapostavitelnoezikoznanie* 2 (1983), 112-16 by Waclaw Osadnik (Katowice, Poland).


"Deixis in Embedded Structures," Foundation of Language 9, 1974, 489-513. (Reviewed in Foundations of Language 14 (1976), 549-60; by George Cummins.)

Congressional Testimony


Major Newspaper/Magazine Citations

“U.S. Patriots From Mideast Want to Pursue Bin Laden,” Blaine Harden, New York


Reviews and Abstracts


Scholarly Papers Delivered

A list of several hundred refereed or invited scholarly and professional lectures delivered between 1972 and 2007 available upon request.

Sample of Recent Presentations

2007

“A Dialogue on the Passover Question: Why is this time different from all others? Or, Have we reached the “tipping point” for Language in the US” 2007 NCOLECTL Conference, with J. David Edwards (JNCL).


“From the Perspective of Language and Culture,” a presentation to Creative Enablers, April, 2007.

2006


“The Emerging Language Landscape in the US: Old and New Landmarks & the LCTLs” NCOLECTL 2006.

“A Policy Perspective on Standards for Oversees Japanese Language Education” Japan
Foundation Tokyo 2006.


2005


"Meeting the Language Needs of the Nation: We Can and We Will!" National Museum of Language, June 2005.


“Integrating Education, Heritage Communities, and Government Programs in Preparing a New
68

Generation for Government Service in Language and Culture” Department of State, 3/7/2005.


2004


“Back to the Future,” paper read at the National Council of Less Commonly Taught Languages 8th International Conference (2004), Madison, Wisconsin.


2003

“Роль педагогического дизайна учебного объекта в овладении иностранным языком,” International Association of Teachers of Russian Language and Literature, St. Petersburg, July 2003.

2002


“Key Note Speaker – IT without ID is not PC: Instructional/Instructional Technology without Instructional Design is Not professional Correct,” Using Technology in the Teaching of Russian, East European and Eurasian Languages, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, April 5-6, 2002.


“Key Note Speaker,” Symposium on Foreign Language in the Elementary Schools, Southern Illinois University-Carbondale, the Public Policy Institute, March 3-4, 2002.


2001


“Panel and Key Note Speaker - The National Languages Across of Curriculum Movement,”


2000


“Keynote Speech,” Union Latina Conference at the University of Maryland, College Park, MD, October 2000.


PROFESSIONAL SERVICE (Selected Positions)

Principal in Founding and Development of National Organizations/Programs

2003  University of Maryland Center for Advanced Study of Language, a UARC (University Affiliated Research Center).

2002  National Flagship Language Program, under the National Security Education Program.

1998  American Councils for International Education, umbrella organization of ACCELS and ACTR.

1998  LangNet (the National Language Network), a unique collaboration between the federal and education sector for language learning support, funded by USED (FIPSE), NSEP, and DoD.

1990  National Council of Organizations of Less Commonly Taught Languages, co-founder, Co-Executive Director 1990-1996, Executive Director 1996-1999, funded by the Ford Foundation, the first national organization representing all the languages taught in the United States except French, German, and Spanish.

1987  American Council for Collaboration in Education and Language Study, concerned with bi-lateral exchanges and language programs with East Europe and the former Soviet Union, for languages other than Russian.

1985  National Foreign Language Center.

1984  Project ICONS (International Communication and Negotiation Simulations), a national and international educational program on foreign policy and foreign language, for colleges/universities and schools.
1974 American Council of Teachers of Russian, presently the principal organization in the United States concerned with the Russian language (student and teacher exchanges, publications, research, field development).

Principal Elected and Appointed Positions

2007-present Board of Visitors, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center
2005-present Editorial Board, Russian Language Journal
2004-present Editorial Board: Language Policy
2002-present Advisory Board, University of Washington, Language Learning Center
2002-present Board of Visitors, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) University
2000-present Advisory Board, National African Language Resource Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison
1998-present Chair, Board of Trustees, American Councils for International Education
1998-present Chair, National Advisory Board, American Council for Collaboration in Education and Language Study
1987-present Chair, National Advisory Board, American Council for Collaboration in Education and Language Study
1985-present Director of Research and Development, American Council of Teachers of Russian
1975-present Board of Directors, American Council of Teachers of Russian
2001-2004 Academic Advisory Board, Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center
2002 – 2003 External Consultant, Spanish Project Meeting, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh PA
1999-2003 Director, National Foreign Language Center
1999-2003 Member of the Executive Advisory Group for the Law Enforcement Interagency Language Access (LEILA)
2001-2002 Professional Development Education Board, University of Wisconsin, Madison
2001-2002 Project Consultant, Monterey Regional Educational Initiative, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center
1999-2002 Member, National Policy Committee, Center for Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies (SEELRC)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001-2001</td>
<td>External Review Committee, Phillips Academy, Andover, MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 – 2001</td>
<td>Project Consultant, US Department of Education Title VI Grant, Emory University, Center for Arabic Study Abroad, Atlanta, GA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>Board of Directors, National Museum of Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-2000</td>
<td>Board of Directors, The Center for Quality Assurance in International Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1999</td>
<td>Deputy Director, National Foreign Language Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991-1999</td>
<td>Director, National Council of Organizations of Less Commonly Taught Languages</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996-1998</td>
<td>Institutional Representative, Coalition for Reauthorization of Title VI of the HEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1996, 1985-1992</td>
<td>Member, Executive Board of the Joint National Committee on Languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1996</td>
<td>Member, Executive Committee, Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-1995</td>
<td>Senior Research Associate, National Foreign Language Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-1992</td>
<td>Secretary, Joint National Committee on Languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1989</td>
<td>Associate Board of Editors, <em>Folia Slavica</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>1984-1988</td>
<td>President, American Council of Teachers of Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-1987</td>
<td>Member, Inter-organizational Coordinating Committee, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-1987</td>
<td>Board of Editors, <em>Studies in Language</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-1986</td>
<td>Member, Committee on College and Pre-College Russian, AAASS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-1986</td>
<td>Member, Committee on Language Training, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-80</td>
<td>Associate, Russian Research Center, Harvard University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1975-79 Vice-President, Massachusetts and Northern New England branch of American Association of Teachers of Slavic and East European Languages

1975-77 Board of Editors, Foundations of Language

Selected Conference Administration


Invited Contributor, “Heritage Language Education Research Conference,” Sponsors: Victoria University of Technology, Melbourne and University of California, Los Angeles, held at Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia.


Graduate Curriculum Group, MLA Commission on Foreign Languages, Literatures, and Linguistics, Charlottesville, VA, Co-sponsored by National Endowment for the Humanities and the University of Virginia, November 1985.


Co-organizer of Soviet-American Conference on the Russian Language I, held at MIT and Amherst College, with the sponsorship of IREX and the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education of the USSR, October 1974.
Consultancies and Program Reviews

1999- present  Member, Board of Visitors, University of Pittsburgh, PA.

2002-2002  Member, Board of Visitors, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) University.

2001-2002  Project Consultant, Emory University, GA.


1996-2000  Member, Board of Visitors, College of Humanities Ohio State University.


1996-1996  California State University, Monterey Bay, CA.


Program Reviews

Organized Research Units in International and Area Studies, University of California - Berkeley, February 2000.

University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, September 1999.
Russian Department, University of Arizona, March 1999.

Slavic Department, Ohio State University, January 1999.


Russian Language Program, University of Iowa, November 1994.

"Exchange: Japan" Teacher Training Institute, Bryn Mawr College, 1993.


Foreign Language Departments, Lehigh University, October 1990.

Graduate Work in the Foreign Languages, Literatures, and Linguistics at Rutgers University, December 1986.

Russian language program of the National Cryptological School, Fort Meade, MD, January 1985.

AWARDS

2008-2008 Elected member of Omicron Delta Kappa, the National Leadership Honor Society.

2005-2005 American Council of Teachers of Russian Distinguished Service Award.


1998-1998 The American Association of Teachers of Slavic and East European Languages, for Distinguished Contribution to the Profession.


1986-1986  A.S. Pushkin Medal, International Association of Teachers of Russian Language and Literature, Budapest Congress.
1968-1972  Danforth Fellowship.
1965-1968  NDLF Fellowship.

Funded Projects

2003-present  Executive Director, UARC contract from the DoD for the University of Maryland Center for Advanced Study of Language.

2000-present  Original Principal Investigator, LangNet, a multiyear contract to the National Foreign Language Center, from the DoD.

1998-2003  Principal Investigator, Project EELIAS: An On line System for the Evaluation of Title VI and Fulbright - Hays, $1,393,000.00, a U.S. Department of Education grant for five years.


1996-1999  Principal Investigator, Strategic Alliances for Preservation and Enhancement of the Less Commonly Taught Languages in the United States, awarded by the Ford Foundation $300,000.00 a grant for 3 years.

1996-1998  Principal Investigator, Base-line Studies of the Match Between National Language Needs and the Capacity of Title VI: Planning for the 21st Century, $270,000.00, awarded by the U.S. Department of Education, a Grant for two years.

1996-1997  Co-Director, (Two grants for Chinese Heritage School System) 1) Professional Development Program for Chinese Heritage Language School Teachers, 2) Development of a Framework for the Improvement of Heritage Language Education, $300,000.00 awarded by the Freeman Foundation Grant, for two years.

1990-1996 Co-Director, project for the organization of the Less Commonly Taught Languages, $270,000 awarded by the Ford Foundation.


1993-1995 Principal Investigator, The Language of the Former Soviet Union, Project at the University of Maryland funded by the National Security Agency $293,000.00.

1993-1994 Co-Principal Investigator, project to develop a national architecture and strategic planning process for the less commonly taught languages, $119,988 awarded by the National Security Agency.

1988-1991 Co-authored proposal to establish the US-USSR High School Academic Partnership Program: A Presidential Initiative, $1,000,000 grant awarded to ACTR (American Council of Teachers of Russian) and NASSP (National Association of Secondary School Principals).

1988-1990 Co-Principal Investigator, project to study second language acquisition in a study-abroad environment, $360,000 awarded by Ford Foundation.


1983-1989 Co-Director, Project ICONS (International Communication and Negotiation Simulations) for University of Maryland, College Park, award-winning educational program, funded continuously since 1983 by USED, IBM, FIPSE, and others.

1983-1985 Program for Access to National Resources in Russian/Soviet and East European Studies, grants written with Karen E. Rawling, the Director of International Affairs at the University of Maryland, College Park, provided fellowship monies totaling approximately $40,000 for 2 years.


1975-1980 Deputy Director, Slavic and East European Language and Area Center, Harvard University, 1975-80: prepared (with E. Mead) grant proposal for NDEA Center funding for 1975-78; awarded for three years at approximately $90,000 per year;
prepared (with J. Valliant) grant proposal for NDEA Center funding for 1978-80, awarded for two years at approximately $90,000 per year.

1975-1980
Director, NDFL Fellowship program for the East European Area, Harvard University, 1975-80; prepared (with E. Mead) grant proposal for NDFL Fellowship funding for 1975-77, awarded, number of fellowships increased from seven to twelve per year; prepared grant proposal for NDFL Fellowship funding for 1977-80, awarded at approximately $70,000 per year.

Personal Grants

1982-1982  General Research Board, University of Maryland, Faculty Research Grant for spring semester.

1978-1979  American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) Fellowship to research and write a book-length manuscript on grammatical meaning.

1979, 1977, 1976  Clark Fund and Graduate Society, Harvard University grants (3) for research Assistance.

1976, 1975  International Research and Exchange Board (IREX) and Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education of the USSR for work on second year Russian textbook at the Pushkin Institute of the Russian Language, Moscow.

1974-1974  President's Innovation Fund and the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences grant, Harvard University for the preparation of materials for second year Russian.

Professional Memberships

American Society for Testing and Materials
American Association for Applied Linguistics
American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies
American Council of Teachers of Russian
American Association of Teachers of Slavic and East European Languages
American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages
Linguistic Society of America

Courses Taught

At Harvard University, Amherst College, Cornell University, Bryn Mawr College, University of Maryland
Linguistic courses on the history and structure of the Russian language

Old Church Slavonic

Beginning and Intermediate Russian language courses

Translation courses in the ICONS Project

Second Language Acquisition
DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: Dr. Richard D. Brecht

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

___ Individual

X__ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: University of Maryland, Center for Advanced Study of Language (CASL)

FISCAL YEAR 2008

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Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2008):
Fiscal year 2007:
Fiscal year 2006:

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2008):
Fiscal year 2007:
Fiscal year 2006:

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2008):
- Foreign language and dialects
- Linguistics
- Disciplines relevant to analysis and critical thinking
- Disciplines relevant to the use, and sharing of information of varying quantities and diverse forms;

Fiscal year 2007:
- Foreign language and dialects
- Linguistics
- Disciplines relevant to analysis and critical thinking
- Disciplines relevant to the use, and sharing of information of varying quantities and diverse forms;

Fiscal year 2006:
- Foreign language and dialects
- Linguistics
- Disciplines relevant to analysis and critical thinking
- Disciplines relevant to the use, and sharing of information of varying quantities and diverse forms;
Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

- Current fiscal year (2008): $12,714,224
- Fiscal year 2007: $13,654,214
- Fiscal year 2006: $14,052,014
Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2008): ______ None________________________;
Fiscal year 2007: _________ None________________________;
Fiscal year 2006: ___________ None________________________.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2008): _________ None________________________;
Fiscal year 2007: ____________ None________________________;
Fiscal year 2006: ____________ None________________________.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2008): _________ None________________________;
Fiscal year 2007: ____________ None________________________;
Fiscal year 2006: ____________ None________________________.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2008): _________ None________________________;
Fiscal year 2007: ____________ None________________________;
Fiscal year 2006: ____________ None________________________.
Statement of
Dr. Amy Zalman
Senior strategist
Science Applications International Corporation

before the
Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation
United States House of Representatives
July 9, 2008

on the topic of
Department of Defense Language and Cultural Awareness Transformation

Chairman Snyder, Congressman Akin and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the future direction of language and cultural awareness in the United States’ military. It is a privilege to be able to contribute. This statement reflects my own assessment and independently conducted research, and not that of my employer.

**The Current Challenge**
The U.S. military confronts particular challenges with respect to cross-cultural awareness. The majority of deployed forces rotate from one distinct linguistic and cultural arena to another with relative frequency. It would be implausible for all regular forces to become area or linguistic experts in one region, let alone several.

Second, warfighters lack the luxury of time to reflect on, or learn organically from, their surroundings. They may find themselves thrust into situations in which they must make decisions rapidly, with life-and-death impact.

To make matters more complex, members of the 21st century military are likely to find themselves in situations other than war, and engaged with civilians. Humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism or counterinsurgency support, peacekeeping and other operations will be successfully achieved by way of negotiation, suasion and collaboration more than they will sheer force.
These conditions suggest a paradox. The military at all levels has a vital need for cultural awareness. Yet these same conditions constrain the practical ability of many military members to acquire it.

Moreover, the current turn of events arguably has distorted the path the DoD may take to forge a long-term cultural awareness strategy. I would suggest that a preoccupation with the September 11, 2001 attacks as a point of historic departure and the subsequent focus on Islamic societies has led to a habit of confusing knowledge of particular cultures (e.g., Afghan and Iraqi) with cultural awareness in a more comprehensive sense. This habit can be found within and beyond the military.

The 2001 Al Qaeda attacks did not compel the need for a culturally aware military. Rather, they reflected trends in evidence since the end of the Cold War, including globalization and the revolution in communications technology.

The Soviet collapse permitted deferred ethnic-nationalist agendas and regional conflicts to emerge. The globalization of markets and media promoted new, hybrid forms of culture and community, both transnational and local. And a communications revolution ensured rapid, dynamic shifts within cultures. Transcultural networked communities with fluid boundaries emerged. These are the conditions that in combination have created the need for a more culturally aware military. In such circumstances, the warfighter armed solely with demographic facts or customary behaviors is at best minimally prepared to evaluate his surroundings.

It is worth briefly emphasizing that globalization impacts every society. This is so even if to the American eye a community appears to be barely on the brink of modernity, and even if its own inhabitants proclaim their pure traditionalism.

The U.S. expectation that the globe's inhabitants live in two separate worlds dominates the military mindset, and affects its approach to cultural awareness. In the 'two worlds' mindset, Western democracies are modern, high-tech, secularized, and rational. Adversaries in the Middle East, as well as friends, come from and have access to a more slowly modernizing, religious, traditional and potentially less rational world. We use bank transfers; they use hawalas, for example. To accommodate this worldview, the military has often approached cultural awareness as consisting of knowledge about that second world, or of traditional societies.

This 'two worlds' model has led to substantial cultural miscalculation, however. By way of example, consider the extended confusion over how Usama bin Laden could appropriate both modern and anachronistic symbols and strategies to suit his purposes. Substantial time and energy could have been saved by understanding at the outset that these appropriations do not present bin Laden, nor his adherents, nor the societies they function in, with much of a paradox.
For the purposes of cultural awareness, it would be more effective to understand that we all live in the same world. At the strategic level, we will grasp that our predisposition to divide the world into two reflects our own cultural habit of mind.

At the ground level, these mindsets matter. A soldier seeking to make sense of an unfamiliar situation will rely on her own cultural habits. A soldier looking over a village landscape, whose inhabitants wear what she views as old-fashioned or traditional clothing, may make many other assumptions about what these inhabitants know and don't know, and how they function. The same can be said of a soldier looking out over a London street.

The military has tended to define "cultural awareness" as 'facts about other cultures, especially those that appear on their face to be least familiar.' However, because regular forces cannot be expected to accumulate nor process nearly enough information to make this definition useful, another framework is required.

Resolving the Challenge: Cultural Awareness an Element of Force Transformation
This Subcommittee has already revised the dominant paradigm by incorporating cultural and linguistic awareness into the broader concept of Force Transformation. The Transformation framework offers a productive conceptual vehicle for the defense community to elaborate what it means to have a culturally aware military. This strategic elaboration may then flow into practical steps in the education and training of the military.

The absence of cultural and linguistic awareness from even recent statements on transformation indicates that there is work to be done. The 2003 document, *Military Transformation*, calls for "processes to enable innovation and adaptability," arguing that, "if we do not transform, our enemies will surely find new ways to attack us." Despite the claim that "no aspect of defense should be left untouched if we are to maintain a competitive advantage in the information age," the cultural aspect of defense is left untouched.1

As a result, existing cultural training processes and products, whatever their specific uses, reflect an increasingly obsolete understanding of the nature and role of the military. The use of wireless technology, voice recognition software, gaming technology, or other information age technologies does not indicate a transformed notion of cultural awareness. They simply transport information about specific cultures to their audiences more speedily and potentially more effectively. Recruiting native speakers from heritage communities, while it also has uses, also does not indicate a military moving toward what the Army calls Cultural Proficiency.2 (Multilingual military members do not come with

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2 United States Department of the Army, *2008 Army Posture Statement Information Papers: Cultural and Foreign Language Capabilities*. Available online at:
fewer biases, or with less need to be trained in cultural awareness, than English speaking members).

Transformation's key concepts align well with those of cultural awareness. The DoD's definition of transformation as "a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations . . ." will easily incorporate a parallel process to situate the changing role of cultural interaction in military endeavors, and to prepare for it through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations.

The directive to "enable innovation and adaptability" is perfectly attuned with a 21st century cultural awareness paradigm. In this case, however, it is people—members of the military, from regular forces to their top leadership—who must be enabled to innovate and adapt. To that end, a new paradigm will correspond to the operational landscape, where human communities—cultures—are also innovating and adapting to new technological, social, material and other realities of this millennium. Culture, in a new paradigm, will be seen as an element of human interaction, and less so as only inert terrain to be observed from afar.

Finally, transformation will also offer a framework for strategizing relevant changes in the organizational culture within the U.S. military. Indeed, cultural awareness cannot be conceived without engaging its key ingredient, human individuals and communities. The military community is the starting point for cultural awareness.

In the transformation paradigm, although a Marine may be called on to deploy in three different arenas in as many years, he will recognize in all three that he must be watchful for his own and his interlocutors' habits of interaction. He will have enough elementary knowledge and language to enter into interactions, and he will have had training that gives him the cognitive tools to innovate, adapt and learn more as his interactions deepen. He will not be allowed by a responsible leadership to deploy culturally unarmed.

**Action Items en Route to a Culturally and Linguistically Aware Military**

Circumstances do not permit the luxury of working out a cultural and linguistic transformation strategy, and then implementing it. However, it is likely to be counterproductive and costly in terms of opportunity to begin to plan next steps without any governing framework. A well-constructed roadmap for next steps could condense and combine strategy and implementation to good effect.

Very loosely, here are some of the practical steps toward cultural and linguistic transformation. Although I have primarily folded foreign language learning into the broader cultural awareness rubric today, it is probable that there are supporting activities related only to the special activity of language acquisition that should be undertaken.


• **Develop a cultural and linguistic awareness transformation strategy.** This document will elaborate what is meant by cultural awareness, develop the relationship between cultural awareness and force transformation, and develop a high level strategy for its achievement, in a coordinated way, across the defense community.

• **Conduct a Cultural Awareness Training and Education Audit for Congress.** Resource planning requires a clear picture of the current state of cultural awareness. Cultural and language training and education take place in a variety of settings, through a variety of means. The programs at TRADOC, the USMC Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), in the military academies, and elsewhere; the products such as games and informational material produced by or on behalf of the military; and the processes in and outside of the United States should be catalogued and evaluated in order to get a clear picture of the state of cultural awareness training. Courses, products and materials may be scored against the goals of a cultural awareness transformation paradigm; they may also be evaluated on their own terms.

• **Find a home base for cultural awareness and linguistic transformation planning, or create room for one within existing organizational structures.** If an existing organization is selected to house and direct next steps, it should be open to the idea of cultural awareness as an element of Force Transformation. It may be useful to develop a network or academic partnership to contribute to planning and programs. A team from a range of disciplines may be useful to consult. At the minimum, the social sciences and the humanities, various disciplines engaging pedagogy, including psychology, and cross-cultural management and organizational behavior will prove useful.

• **Design and test a requisite first "layer" of cultural awareness learning that will be required of all military members in the future.** In the near future, all military members should be trained in cultural awareness as a portable skill as a prerequisite for learning about any particular culture. It will be useful to plan when and where in the larger cycle of education and training this layer will be inserted, and whether and how it will differ for different career tracks within the military. It may also be useful to contemplate a similar course for civilians who will be working alongside the military.

Finally, it may be kept in mind that the creation of a culturally aware military is a function of a broader strategic communication strategy for the U.S. government as a whole. Culturally aware forces will both reflect and model the kind of engagement, in speech and action, that the U.S. intends to have with the rest of the world through its diplomatic, economic and cultural engagements. Thank you again for this opportunity.
Amy Zalman, Ph.D.

2221 Beacon Lane  •  Falls Church, VA 22043  •  646.327.5683 (mobile)  •  amyzalman@gmail.com

PROFESSIONAL PROFILE

Amy Zalman has combined strategic vision, skilled management and an expert knowledge of the Middle East to support culturally appropriate tools to improve communications between American and foreign communities, in commercial and national security contexts, since 2003. Dr. Zalman writes and speaks regularly on violent extremism and transcultural communication, and has briefed senior decision makers in the United States and abroad. She is highly proficient in Arabic.

PROJECT STRATEGY & MANAGEMENT

Senior Strategist, Science Applications International Corporation, Vienna, VA. 2007 - present

Provides methodologies, original research and policy recommendations for government clients on U.S. strategic communications projects. In first year, captured and managed contract in new business area, was tasked to organize and manage company-wide organization to leverage internal capabilities.

Founding Partner, Orx Communications, New York, NY. 2004 - 2006

Provided executive education, research products and advisory services to organizations expanding in the Middle East. In first year teaming with second organization on global media campaign development; paired with international law firm to develop joint marketing products; initiated joint venture with Kuwaiti investor for workforce training program in Arabian Gulf region; Executive Editor, Orx Culture Monitor.


Provided qualitative and quantitative evaluations of daily Kuwaiti press for Department of Defense clients; recommended communications strategies; contributed to product development.

ISSUES RESEARCH Middle East, Violent Extremism, U.S. Strategic Communications

Writer, Terrorism Issues Website, About.com (http://terrorism.about.com) 2006 - present

Researcher and writer of reference site on terrorism and related issues for New York Times online division About.com. Topics include history, trends, causes, cultural representations of political violence, counterterrorism, and politics of terrorism/counterterrorism in international community.

Honorary Research Fellow, East-West Institute, New York, NY. 2007 - 2008

Conducts independent research on the role and potential of language and framing in resolving global terrorism and extremism challenges.

Fulbright Fellow, Jordan 1999 - 2000

Conducted original study on social violence with National Institute of Forensic Medicine; promoted public discussion in print and presentations.

TEACHING & CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

Adjunct Professor, New School University, Department of Social Sciences: Modern Middle Eastern history. 2006

Instructor, New York University, College of Arts & Science 2001 - 2002

Created original syllabi and activities for courses on Middle Eastern, Islamic and African History (in two, non-consecutive time periods).

Administrator, National Endowment for the Humanities Institute, New York. 2000

Administrator and faculty member for innovative program on Islam for high school instructors.

Lecturer, Cornell University, Department of English 1993 - 1995

Writing Instructor, introduced and fully enrolled new course based on Middle East politics and literature.
Amy Zalman, Ph.D.

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS and PRESENTATIONS


"In Pursuit of Legitimacy the Muslim Brothers and Mubarak 1982-2005" (review), American Journal of Islamic Social Science, Winter 2006.

"Gender and the Palestinian Narrative of Return in Two Novels by Gaussan Kanafani," in Literature and Nation in the Middle East, (Edinburgh University Press), 2006.

"In Support of a Narrative Theory Approach to Strategic Communications," Presentation to Office of the Secretary of Defense/Highlands Forum XXVII: Strategic Listening, Carmel, CA, November 2005.


Amy Zalman, Ph.D.

EDUCATION
New York University, Ph.D., Middle Eastern Studies 2003
Cornell University, M.F.A., Poetry 1995
Columbia University, B.A., English literature, quasi-fade 1990

LANGUAGES
Highly proficient Arabic; Conversant in Hebrew; Elementary French and Spanish.

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES & MEMBERSHIPS
Invited participant, Hunt Alternatives Fund Initiative for Inclusive Security Ninth Annual Colloquium 2008
Member, Women in International Security (WIS) 2057 - present
Judge, annual NYU Reynolds Graduate Fellowship in Social Entrepreneurship 2056 - present
Young Leadership Board, Children of Abraham organization 2055 - present
Columbia College Alumni Association Reunion Planning Committee 2004 - 2005
DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
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Witness name: Amy Zalman

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

- Individual
- Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:

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STATEMENT OF:

DR. MONTGOMERY MCFATE, JD, PhD

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEE

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

110TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION

HEARINGS ON

THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIO-CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE TO THE US MILITARY

9 July 2008

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL

RELEASED BY THE HOUSE

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
Introduction

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Members of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify on the importance of socio-cultural knowledge to US military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. I am appearing today in my personal capacity as a cultural anthropologist vice my official capacity as the senior social science adviser to the US Army's Human Terrain System (HTS). As such, my comments should be construed only as my own conclusions and not official Department of Defense or US Army policy.

Socio-cultural knowledge is a critical enabler for Stability Operations and irregular warfare. Stability and reconstruction operations pose a tremendous challenge to US Government personnel because they require different skills, knowledge, training, and coordination than those tasks commonly required by major combat operations. At a minimum, the short-term tasks include providing security to a local population, restoring essential services, and addressing immediate humanitarian needs. The long-term tasks include encouraging a viable economy, developing the rule of law, promoting democratic institutions, and assisting in the creation of a robust civil society.

Unlike major combat operations, stability and reconstruction operations must be conducted among, and with the support of, the indigenous civilian population. Working effectively with local civilians in order to rebuild a country requires knowledge of how the society is organized, who has power, what their values and beliefs are, and how they interpret their own history, among other things.
Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past few years have demonstrated the benefits of having this knowledge, and the drawbacks of not having it in terms of lives, money and mission success. I want to provide you with a short, simple example from one of our Human Terrain Teams (HTT) in Iraq that shows what a difference a little cultural knowledge makes:

In October 2007, two members of an HTT provided support to a maneuver company conducting an operation in a small rural village, known to be an area in which al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) operates. During the operation, an elderly Muslim man was wrongly detained. The HTT facilitated his release and coached the company commander on how to remedy the insult by offering a public apology in front of witnesses from his village. On the day following the release of the elderly man, a sheikh from a local tribe came to the patrol base and said that the “respectful” nature of the current operation (and the release of the elderly man who turned out to be his uncle) had prompted him to seek Coalition assistance in securing his village from AQI. He offered to provide over 100 local fighters to oppose AQI, and requested air to ground recognition to prevent fratricide. At the conclusion of the meeting as a gesture of good will, the sheikh told the company commander and the HTT the specific location of a deeply buried IED in front of the mosque and the location of five other IEDs. In the words of the company commander: “The combination of cultural sensitivity and the assistance of the HTT on the mission to ... was the reason for our success. If I had the opportunity I’d definitely use them again.”

A critical question is how US forces should acquire or access this knowledge. There are multiple possible means, to include: education, training,
advisers, and databases. An additional question concerns the optimal amount of socio-cultural knowledge that US military personnel should have, and the trade-offs in terms of time, money, and manpower that acquiring this knowledge entails. After all, making every soldier and marine into a social scientist is neither feasible nor desirable.

First, professional military education (PME) is a long-term solution to ensuring that the US military has the requisite level of knowledge about foreign cultures and societies. Lessons learned, insight gained, and skills acquired in a classroom influence how problems are conceived, solutions are developed, and decisions made in subsequent professional positions. Most professional military education institutions in the US face a number of challenges in meeting this need, to include: lack of qualitative social sciences within curricula; inadequate attention to developing inter-cultural and cognitive skills; limited opportunity for civilian graduate education; few social scientists on staff and limited research opportunities for students.

Second, recognizing that socio-cultural knowledge has improved the effectiveness of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, all branches of the US military have begun cultural pre-deployment training programs. In addition, the Combat Training Centers have developed scenario-based role-player training simulating operational conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Creating training programs was initially a “bottom-up” movement in response to lessons learned, rather than a “top down” push resulting from official DoD requirements. As a result of this process, cultural training varies widely in content, structure, and time allotted. However, the DOD, the Army and other military services are now developing comprehensive cultural and language strategies.
Third, collecting socio-cultural information in a computerized database is another means to provide US forces with information about the local population in their area of operations. This is not a new idea: such a cross-cultural database was designed and built in the 1940s by the US military to prepare for war in the Pacific. However, when the Operation Iraqi Freedom began, there was no such ready-made repository for the collective knowledge about a given local area: each brigade stored information differently in its own local files, and transferred that information haphazardly to successor units. Because brigades had no system to store, sort, organize, or effectively transfer this information, much of it was lost during transfer of authority between units.

Recognizing this issue, the DoD made an effort to develop such a database in 2004, known as the Cultural Preparation of the Environment. Subsequently, in field-testing this database, we discovered that data needed to be geospatially referenced, and that commanders and their staffs had little time available to use such a tool and little inclination to do so. What commanders actually wanted was an advisory staff element that would be attached 24/7 to the brigade, who could develop, use, and maintain such a database. Thus, the Army’s HTS includes both a database, called the Mapping Human Terrain Tool Kit (MAP HT), and teams of advisers.

Fourth, operating forces can also acquire the requisite knowledge about the local population through the use of cultural advisers. At the present time, the US Army’s HTS is probably the best-known example of such an adviser program. The HTS mission is to provide commanders in the field with relevant socio-cultural understanding in order to assist them in developing courses of action that are better harmonized with the interests of the local population, and which entail less kinetic force. This mission is achieved
through 5-8 person teams of mixed military reservist and civilian personnel who are attached on orders to the military unit they support. The team does not rotate out with the brigade at the end of their tour, but remains in place. For example, the HTT in Taji will remain in Taji as long as US forces do. Individual team members are rotated out on a staggered basis, ensuring the continuity of socio-cultural knowledge and enabling each brigade to start their tour at a higher place on the learning curve. In addition, HTS supports the teams through a Reach-back Research Center and a network of subject matter experts, who are able to conduct complex research and analysis in support of a commander’s requirements.

Currently, there are eight HTTs attached to brigade combat teams in Iraq and three in Afghanistan. By the end of September 2008, there will be a total of 24 teams deployed. In FY09, two additional teams will also be deployed.

Solutions to the military’s immediate socio-cultural knowledge requirements have been ad hoc, bottom up, and developed by the respective military services in response to their own perceived needs.

For any of these solutions to be sustainable beyond the immediate conflicts, they should be rationalized, coordinated, and institutionalized. Otherwise, the capabilities will be lost and will have to be rebuilt yet again. After WWII, for example, much of the foreign governance and administration capacity within the US military was dismantled. Similarly, after the Vietnam War, the institutional capacity of the US government to conduct stability operations was lost, leaving the US with little institutional memory about how to meet cultural knowledge requirements at the present time.
**DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION**

**INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES:** Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

**Witness name:** Montgomery McFate

**Capacity in which appearing:** (check one)

- [X] Individual
- [ ] Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:

**FISCAL YEAR 2007**

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**Federal Contract Information:** If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

- Current fiscal year (2007): 1
- Fiscal year 2006: 1
- Fiscal year 2005: 1

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

- Current fiscal year (2007): US Army
- Fiscal year 2006: OSD Personnel & Readiness
- Fiscal year 2005: US Army

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

- Current fiscal year (2007): Cultural expertise
- Fiscal year 2006: Cultural expertise
- Fiscal year 2005: Cultural expertise

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

- Current fiscal year (2007): 132,700
- Fiscal year 2006: 350,000
- Fiscal year 2005: 72,000
Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007): ______________________________;  
Fiscal year 2006: ______________________________;  
Fiscal year 2005: ______________________________.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

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Fiscal year 2006: ______________________________;  
Fiscal year 2005: ______________________________.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

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Fiscal year 2006: ______________________________;  
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Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

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Fiscal year 2006: ______________________________;  
Fiscal year 2005: ______________________________.
July 9, 2008

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL AWARENESS TRANSFORMATION
Testimony of Andrew F. Krepinevich, President

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before you today, and to share my views on the value of cultural awareness and language training for the United States armed forces. My remarks are intended to place this issue in a broader strategic context, in the hope that this will allow the subcommittee to evaluate its significance better. I will discuss the likely shape of the future security environment, the types of challenges the U.S. military should be prepared to confront, how it might respond to these challenges, and what all of this says about the importance of cultural awareness and language training. In addition, I will address the issue of possible tradeoffs that might be required if the Services expand their focus on these types of training.

INTRODUCTION

Asymmetric warfare will remain a mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time.

Arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous armies and police—once the province of Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military as a whole. The same is true for mastering a foreign language...and building expertise in foreign areas.

Army soldiers can expect to be tasked with rendering public services, rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting good governance. All of these so-called “nontraditional” capabilities have moved into the mainstream of military thinking, planning, and strategy—where they must stay.

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates
Remarks to the Association of the United States Army,
October 10, 2007

1 Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Armed Services, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee.
In order to assess the value of any particular piece of equipment or form of training, it is necessary to have a sense of what tasks the armed forces will be asked to perform, and where they will be operating in the years to come. During the 45 year-long Cold War the U.S. military focused primarily on structuring, training and equipping itself for conventional combat against the Soviet Union and its allies on the European continent and at sea. Following the Cold War, our armed forces have found themselves conducting operations, often irregular and protracted in character, in places such as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq that to some would have seemed highly implausible only months before they were undertaken. If the experience of the last seventeen years tells us anything, it is that we are likely to continue to find our armed forces deployed, often for protracted periods of time, and typically in operations among the indigenous populations, rather than around them. As I will discuss presently, it is not only past experience, but strong current trends that argue for this conclusion.

Consequently, as we look ahead, the U.S. military should be prepared to confront a more diverse array of opponents, including third-tier rogue powers, transnational terrorist organizations, indigenous insurgent groups, as well as potential great power rivals. Rather than focusing on one particular geographic area, U.S. forces will likely be required to prepare for contingencies in widely dispersed locales. Moreover, U.S. soldiers, marines, sailors and airmen will increasingly be asked to perform a range of tasks quite different from those associated with conventional combat operations.

The Future Security Environment: A Disordered World?

What will the future security environment look like? Although it is impossible to say for certain, a number of trends suggest that the United States may be on the verge of confronting a “disordered world” in which the principal threats to U.S. security are more likely to emanate from irregular forces and ungoverned spaces than they are from the great power rivals that posed the gravest threats during the last century. These trends include the continuing use of irregular tactics and strategies by state and non-state adversaries alike; the empowerment of non-state opponents due to a revolution in communications and the proliferation of increasingly advanced weapons; and the growing prospects of internal instability, state failure, and even state collapse in a number of fragile nations due, in part, to worrisome demographic trends.

The Rise of Irregular Warfare

The current trend toward irregular warfare did not begin with the counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns that the United States has undertaken in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, the entire post-Cold War era has been dominated by irregular warfare contingencies. To be sure, the First Gulf War in 1991 and the conventional combat operations phase of the Second Gulf War in 2003 involved major, combined-arms air and ground operations. However, both of these conflicts vividly demonstrated the enormous overmatch that exists between the United States military and those that might choose to
challenge it by waging conventional warfare, as Saddam Hussein's military did not once, but twice.

The U.S. military's performance in irregular warfare campaigns has not met with the same success as it has enjoyed in conventional combat. The difficulties encountered should not have been a surprise. Following the Vietnam War ground our armed forces were optimized for conventional warfare. The catchphrase "No More Vietnams" reflected the military's desire to avoid protracted, ill-defined conflicts. General William DePuy, one of the Army's leading thinkers, viewed the 1973 Middle East War as a godsend of sorts, as it enabled the Army to reorient itself back toward a more familiar, almost comfortable threat to U.S. security: the Soviet Army in Central Europe. The "No More Vietnams" attitude was heartily seconded by the American people and civilian leadership. It spawned the Weinberger and Powell doctrines of the 1980s and the "Exit Strategies" discussions that preoccupied political and military leaders during the deployment of U.S. ground forces in the 1990s. The U.S. military became increasingly structured, trained and equipped to fight short, conventional wars. When this proved unworkable, the intent became to set clear limits on the duration of U.S. force deployments to avoid "another Vietnam."

Unfortunately, as our generals are fond of reminding us, "The enemy gets a vote," and many of our enemies—especially those espousing a violent radical Islamist creed—have "voted" against taking on the United States with conventional forces, opting instead for irregular warfare.

There are three primary reasons for this:

• First, as noted above, the U.S. military has overwhelming dominance in conventional warfare;

• Second, and consequently, even if they wanted to confront the United States conventionally, most of our enemies simply lack the human and material resources to build conventional forces on anything like the scale and level of sophistication required to pose a serious challenge to our military; and

• Third, and perhaps most important, the U.S. military, and other first-rate militaries like Israel's, have proven far less effective in combating enemies waging irregular warfare than those engaged in conventional war.

To buttress their line of thinking, our enemies can cite from an impressive run of successes by non-conventional forces, including the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, and the withdrawals from Lebanon in the 1980s and Somalia in the 1990s; Soviet losses in Afghanistan; and Israel's inability to prevail over the Iranian-backed irregular forces of Hezbollah in the Second Lebanon War. Given these factors, it seems likely that the U.S. military is destined to face adversaries waging irregular conflicts unless these adversaries gain an advantage in conventional warfare (an unlikely occurrence in the
foreseeable future), acquire nuclear weapons, or the U.S. military demonstrates an ability to deal effectively with the irregular warfare challenge.

The Diffusion of Information and Military Technology

Not only should we expect that many existing and prospective opponents will resort to irregular warfare well into the foreseeable future, but we should also assume that they will be able to do so more effectively than in the past. This is due in large part to a revolution in communications that has diffused to the lowest levels of society, as well as the growing availability of advanced weapons and military technologies.

Terrorist groups and insurgent forces have already demonstrated their ability to use mass media and information technology skillfully to communicate, recruit and organize new members, create and disseminate propaganda, and share "lessons learned" from their efforts. Moreover, the diffusion of advanced military technology (such as rockets and missiles, precision-guided munitions, advanced explosive charges, etc.) is significantly enhancing the capabilities of irregular forces, a trend that is likely to continue for some time. Perhaps most worrisome are the efforts of groups such as al Qaeda and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

Demographic Trends and Instability in the Developing World

While the proximate causes of disorder are likely to be the deliberate actions of terrorist groups, insurgent forces or rogue nations, the underlying causes of instability can often be found elsewhere, for example in demographics. At present, many nations in the developing world are at risk of experiencing increased instability due in part to one or more demographic trends.

One such trend has been termed the "youth bulge." The fertility rates in developed states, to include the United States and its traditional allies in Australia, Canada, Europe, Japan, and South Korea, have been declining for some time and are now quite low. Along with the increased longevity characteristic of most developed nations, these low birth rates have led to rapidly aging populations. By contrast, many nations in the developing world have high fertility rates that have only recently begun to decline. As a result, young adults make up an unusually large portion of these populations. Youth bulges are heavily concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East—an area stretching from Morocco to India. The other main high concentration of youth population runs from Mexico, through Central America, and along South America's northwest coast.

What is the strategic significance of these youth bulges? A disproportionately youthful population, especially when combined with high levels of unemployment and increased urbanization, tends to give rise to higher levels of instability in comparison with societies not experiencing youth bulges. In fact, a number of studies have demonstrated that nations
experiencing youth bulges are far more likely to suffer civil conflict than those that are not. The reasons for this are relatively straightforward. In societies where the economy cannot absorb large numbers of new workers, frustration often ensues. Unable to find work or life stability, young men in particular often feel alienated from society. In countries with urban populations, the incidence of these men forming associations based on their common hostility toward society increases. Furthermore, their generally low level of education contributes to making them easy prey for radical elements looking to exploit their anger.

Consider, for example, the case of Nigeria. Despite its potential wealth from its rich oil resources, Nigeria’s demographic profile remains in a classical pyramid shape with an enormous youth base narrowing to a small percentage of elderly at the top. Specifically, an astonishing 44 percent of Nigeria’s population is under the age of 15. When combined with rampant poverty, little to no public infrastructure in many parts of the country, an uneducated population, and endemic government incompetence and corruption, Nigeria is a prime candidate for state failure.

Sex ratios present another demographic trend of concern. Worldwide, the ratio between boys and girls has historically stood at roughly 103-105:100. That is, for every 100 girl births, between 103-105 boys are born. In parts of Asia and the Middle East this balance has been disrupted for a number of years. In China, for example, the male-female birth ratios have climbed from 109 males per 100 females in 1982, to 116 in 1995, to roughly 120 in 2000. The reasons for this deviation include the enduring cultural preference for sons, low or sub-replacement fertility (due in part to Beijing’s “one child” policy), and the general availability of gender-based abortion.

How much does this surplus of males matter? Some argue that as the male demographic increases, and as males enter the 15-34 age range, they have the potential to cause considerable internal instability. This age group is known to be responsible for the preponderance of violence in societies; moreover, the majority of this group’s acts of violence are perpetrated by unattached males. If this is true, then parts of Asia and the Arab world could be entering a particularly long and tense period.

A third demographic factor likely to contribute to disorder and instability is the HIV/AIDS epidemic. At present, this epidemic is largely concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, where over two-thirds of the planet’s estimated 30.6 million infected adults (aged 15-49) reside. Correspondingly, this region


accounted for 1.6 million of the estimated 1.9–2.4 million adult and child
deaths worldwide from the disease in 2007. The most severe outbreaks are in
Botswana, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho, Namibia, Zambia and South Africa.
Over 20 percent of these countries’ populations are infected with HIV, and
each country is losing between 10 and 18 percent of its working-age population
every five years. The result is a downward spiral in which economic growth is
difficult to sustain and pressures on the government purse—to generate new
skilled labor, treat those suffering from the disease, and care for children left
 orphaned—threaten to destabilize the already fragile regimes that characterize
the region. Should this eventually be realized, the international community
may be faced with a humanitarian crisis on a scale never before seen.

Because of the prevalence of these three worrisome trends and the high
probability that they will continue to escalate in the foreseeable future, they
must be considered significant contributing factors to an increasingly
disordered world. In other words, these demographic trends have the potential
to cause a great deal of instability in the years to come, possibly in regions (like
the Middle East) or nations (like Nigeria) where the United States has
significant strategic and economic interests. Moreover, the possibility of state
failure or state collapse—whether due to demographic trends alone or in
concert with other factors—magnifies the problems discussed above, as
irregular forces could benefit from these developments by gaining new
sanctuaries and recruits to augment their strength.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES MILITARY**

Given this partial assessment of the future security environment, what
implications can be drawn for the U.S. military on the value of cultural
awareness and language training? Perhaps the most important, overarching
observation is that, as noted by Secretary Gates, irregular conflicts stand to be
far more common in the years ahead than conventional wars; this being the
case, the need for cultural knowledge and language skills within the U. S.
armed forces becomes increasingly clear.

Before discussing recommendations to this effect, however, it is
important to note that the rising prevalence of irregular warfare is likely to
affect the ground forces—the Army and the Marine Corps—disproportionately,
as they will be the Services that are most involved in conducting
counterinsurgency and stability operations, and advising and training
indigenous forces. The Navy certainly has a significant, albeit limited, role to
play, both in terms of building partner capacity and conducting operations in
littoral areas. Of the four Services, the role of the Air Force, while still
important, is likely to be comparatively modest. That being the case, efforts to
increase cultural awareness and language training should focus primarily, but
not exclusively, on the ground forces and to a lesser extent the Navy.

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on April 17, 2008.

7 Richard P. Cincotta, Robert Engelman, and Daniele Anastasion, *The Security
Retain and Improve the Military’s Ability to Conduct COIN Operations

Given the experience of the past six-plus years, in addition to the previously-discussed trends that are likely to shape the future security environment, it seems only prudent to make sure that the U.S. military remains capable of successfully executing counterinsurgency operations and other forms of irregular warfare. The need to do so provides one of the most important reasons for the Services to emphasize cultural awareness and language training. As the authors of the Army’s recently published counterinsurgency field manual argue:

Successful conduct of COIN operations depends on thoroughly understanding the society and culture within which they are being conducted. Thus, effective COIN operations require a greater emphasis on certain skills, such as language and cultural understanding, than does conventional warfare. The interconnected, politico-military nature of insurgency and COIN requires immersion in the people and their lives to achieve victory.

Emphasize Building Partner Capacity as a Core Military Mission

Counterinsurgency operations are manpower-intensive and often take a decade or more to achieve their intended goals. The American public, however, prefers wars to be short, decisive, and successful, while it tends to tolerate protracted engagements only if the perceived stakes are high and sufficient progress toward victory is being made. The prospects of an increasingly disordered world suggest that the number of terrorist groups, insurgent forces, and similar threats could multiply in the years to come. These factors, when taken together, and in conjunction with the size limitations associated with a volunteer military, provide a strong argument in favor of a U.S. strategy that emphasizes “building partner capacity”—training and equipping indigenous military forces in countries threatened by radical elements, and the forces of our allies and partners. This line of thought acknowledges America’s finite resources, manpower limitations, and political constraints, and promotes cooperation with allies and partners to supply the forces required for sustained irregular operations. Because building partner capacity requires U.S. forces to work closely with host nation forces or other indigenous groups, cultural awareness and language skills will be increasingly valuable in the years to come.

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8 Irregular warfare comprises insurgency; counterinsurgency (COIN); unconventional warfare (UW); terrorism; counterterrorism (CT); foreign internal defense (FID); stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations; strategic communications; psychological operations (PSYOP); information operations (IO); civil-military operations (CMO); intelligence and counterintelligence activities; transnational criminal activities, including narco-trafficking, illicit arms dealing, and illegal financial transactions, that support or sustain IW; and law enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries. Briefing, US Special Operations Command, SOF-30 Futures Directorate, “Irregular Warfare JOC,” January 2007. Accessed at www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/strategic/cedays_30joc.ppt on July 5, 2008.

Nontraditional Tasks Will Become "Conventional"

To the extent that the U.S. military will increasingly be expected to engage in irregular warfare operations, U.S. service men and women will also be expected to perform tasks that have traditionally been considered outside the domain of conventional combat operations, but which are vital in these types of environments. As Secretary Gates noted, this may include reviving essential services, rebuilding public infrastructure, promoting good governance, and all of the various tasks that fall within those broad categories. This in turn suggests that the military must be prepared to operate "among the people" much more than in the past. Language training and cultural awareness will therefore be critical enabling capabilities.

General Purpose Forces Must Become More "SOF-Like"

Insofar as special operations forces are distinguished in part by their linguistic skills and knowledge of specific regions or nations, the need to increase the language skills and cultural awareness of the rest of the military suggest that they must, in a sense, become more "SOF-like."

This will especially be the case if general purpose forces increasingly take on the mission of building partner capacity—training and advising indigenous forces—so that SOF can focus more of their time and effort on direct action missions, which remain a significant aspect of counterinsurgency operations and the broader war on terrorism.

To summarize, as the security environment changes, the U.S. military must adapt as well. Many of the changes the Army and Marine Corps are undertaking, and should continue to pursue, highlight the importance of language training and cultural awareness. Moreover, because the trends that are now shaping the security environment are likely to persist for some time, the value of increased instruction in these areas will likely only grow over time.

Tradeoffs

If the military is to expand its focus on cultural awareness and language training, what tradeoffs will it have to make, both in terms of time and resources? While specific recommendations are beyond the scope of my testimony today, I would like to suggest that the military's continuing relatively high emphasis on conventional operations is to some extent misplaced, and thus provides an area where resources and personnel might be divested, with relatively minimal risk to the nation's security, in order to support language and cultural training, as well as other "soft" skills that are particularly useful in irregular warfare.

At present, the ground forces are increasing their active end-strength by 92,000 troops—with 65,000 going to the Army and the remainder to the Marines. The Army plans to utilize the additional soldiers to create six brigade combat teams (and associated combat support and combat service support elements) in addition to the 42 currently planned, for a total of 48. The Marine Corps plans to use their end strength increase to stand up a regimental combat
team to round out their three division-wing teams. Although these forces are advertised as being “full-spectrum” capable, both moves suggest that the additional U.S. ground forces will be trained and equipped primarily for conventional, high-intensity ground combat operations. Is this the best use of these additional forces? If experience since the end of the Cold War is any indication, the answer is: not likely.

In response to proposals that ground forces specialize to a greater degree in irregular warfare, the Army and Marine Corps are quick to note that, given the potential stakes and effects of major combat operations (MCOs), they cannot ignore conventional war contingencies. However, this argument, while valid, carries far less weight than it did during the period following Vietnam, when Soviet armies posed a threat that far exceeded that of any rivals pursuing irregular warfare. The evidence strongly suggests that no one wants to play the role of Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard, either now or in the foreseeable future. One searches in vain through the pages of military journals to find stories of countries assembling tank armies to oppose us. Truth be told, the two countries most often cited by our military leaders as opposing the United States in major combat operations involving large-scale conventional forces—North Korea and Iran—lack even a Republican Guard mechanized force, let alone a Soviet tank army.

As members of this subcommittee well know, the threat from North Korea stems from its budding nuclear arsenal, ballistic missiles, special operations forces and artillery (perhaps armed with chemical or biological agents) positioned in caves and mountains near the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Moreover, the mountainous DMZ itself is perhaps the most heavily fortified territory in the world, with both flanks anchored on the ocean. The South Koreans have both the incentive and the resources (a population twice that of the North and an economy dozens of times greater) to field ground forces capable of blocking any attempt by North Korean forces to advance south—a concept Pyongyang seems ill-disposed to execute in any event.

Iran, having witnessed first-hand the American military’s quick victory over Saddam Hussein’s conventionally armed and organized militaries, and the subsequent difficulties that same military faced when confronted with irregular operations, would not likely be attracted to Saddam’s method of challenging the U.S. Moreover, it is the Iranians who have armed and trained groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, and who are providing support for Iraqi irregular forces like the Mahdi Army. Discussions of Iranian military power center on Tehran’s quest for weapons of mass destruction, its terrorist networks, and its ability to close the Strait of Hormuz to shipping traffic by developing anti-access/area-denial capabilities. Were the U.S. military to confront Iran in a major combat operation—now or a decade from now—

Tehran's conventional forces would almost certainly be a secondary consideration.

Put another way, given the overwhelming success of our ground forces in conventional warfare operations, and the shift of rival militaries and nonstate entities toward irregular warfare, orienting 48 active Army brigades, 28 National Guard brigades, and three Marine Corps divisions primarily on conventional warfare operations would appear to reflect a desire to prepare for the kinds of challenges we would prefer to confront, rather than those we will most likely encounter.

To be sure, our ground forces must remain dominant in conventional (or what the 2006 QDR calls "traditional") operations. However, it does not follow that the Army and Marine Corps must be principally, or even primarily, devoted to this task. Consider that, thanks to the gains in effectiveness realized by our armed forces, improvements in their ability to fight as a joint force, and the U.S. military's enormous advantages in advanced capabilities (e.g., precision munitions; C4ISR), only one heavy Army division was needed to defeat the Iraqi army in the Second Gulf War.13

Simply stated, while the Army and Marine Corps have clearly placed an increased emphasis on irregular warfare capabilities, to include language and cultural training, they nevertheless remain predominantly focused on conventional combat operations. Should it be necessary to make tradeoffs in order to support enhanced cultural awareness, language training, or other skills that are particularly crucial to winning an irregular warfare campaign, drawing resources away from conventional capabilities is an option that should be seriously considered.

**SUMMARY**

In an era dominated by irregular warfare challenges, the United States military is more likely to undertake missions requiring irregular warfare capabilities rather than traditional large-scale ground combat operations. A key component of military readiness will be the ability to understand the cultures of, and communicate with, people from many regions of the world. Increased language and culture training will ultimately prove to be a powerful weapon in the American military's arsenal. As the development of institutional language and cultural expertise requires significant time as well as resources, I commend the committee for raising awareness on this important issue and encourage it to continue exercising its oversight responsibilities by supporting the military's efforts to create sufficient language and cultural awareness capacity to meet both existing contingencies and those that are likely to emerge in the coming years.

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13 One Marine division was also involved in the major combat operation, as was the Army's 10th Airborne Division (Air Assault) along with some brigade-sized maneuver elements.
DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: Andrew Krepsienevich, President, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

X Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)

FISCAL YEAR 2007

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Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007): 2
Fiscal year 2006: 3
Fiscal year 2005: 2

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2007): 1
Fiscal year 2006: 2
Fiscal year 2005: 2

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure analysis, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007): Research and Analysis;
Fiscal year 2006: Research and Analysis;
Fiscal year 2005: Research and Analysis.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2007): $5,657,653
Fiscal year 2006: $3,698,000
Fiscal year 2005: $5,195,000

Federal Grant Information:

CSBA has no grants with the federal government in 2007, 2006, or 2005.
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 9, 2008
Outlines of a National Language Education Policy

in the Nation’s Interest:

Why? How? Who is Responsible for What?

Richard D. Brecht
University of Maryland
Center for Advanced Study of Language

The Foreign Language Education Policy Colloquium,
“Language Education and the National Interest” Panel
University of California at Berkeley
October 2005

Preface

This is a unique time in the history of language education in the United States. My intent here is to propose policies and programs that take advantage of the times and are based on a recipe for effective change, the source of which I cannot find but which goes something like this: “Build on your base, go with the wind, and shoot for the moon.” The proposals here are intended to do just that. They build on what is there, take advantage of existing energy supporting language in this country, and are aimed at a shift in paradigm for language education. In my view, they are all doable in these times, in fact, if not now, perhaps never.
Goals of a National Language Education Strategy

In today’s world, every nation needs a “plurilingual” citizenry, defined by the Council of Europe to be citizens capable of interacting with speakers of many languages, one or a few of which they know and many of which they do not. This reflects the communication needs of most nations with multilingual citizens and constant and intense international dealings. Even an English speaking country like Australia, in the 1980s, arrived at a national language policy, the explicit goal of which was a bilingual citizenry.¹ For its own sake and for the improved wellbeing of nations around the world, the United States should pursue this same goal of a plurilingual citizenry. However, given how far this country has to go to transform the language competence of its citizens, it will be necessary to launch a national language education effort which takes an explicit, long term, and pragmatic approach to the task. First, instead of an immediate goal of a plurilingual citizenry, a national language education policy for the United States should target the development of three distinct constituents: (1) an educated citizenry aware of the role of language and culture in the world and in human cognition; (2) a broad base of school graduates with some functional language skills; and (3) a cadre of advanced language specialists capable of the highest level of linguistic performance.² Secondly, such a national language education approach should be broken into an explicit set of language education strategies aimed at each component of the education system. Thirdly, a long term and practical plan for implementation is required.

¹ A compatible, and perhaps the most visionary of models is that plan articulated in Australia in the mid 1980s and briefly summarized here as: 1. English for everyone; 2. If you have a language other than English, you have a right to keep it; 3. If you do not have a language other than English, you have an obligation to acquire one; and, 4. language services to be provided where deficits occur.¹
Rationale for the Three Targeted Goals

Linguistically and Culturally Educated Citizenry: As residents of an English-speaking country in this latest era of “globalization,” there is a real danger that the American public will not understand the world around us, the role of language in communication, or the influence of culture on conceptual understandings and behavior. In general, the American public will not appreciate the advantages of linguistic and cultural diversity, put so well by Joshua Fishman:

The joys of one’s own language and ethnicity are subsequently expressed over and over again, from every corner of Europe and in every period. In modern times this feeling has been raised to a general principle, a general esthetic, a celebration of ethnic and linguistic diversity per se, as part of the very multisplendored glory of God, a value, beauty, and source of creative inspiration and inspiring creativity—indeed, as the basic human good. It is claimed that it is ethnic and linguistic diversity that makes life worth living. It is creativity and beauty based upon ethnic and linguistic diversity that make man human. Absence of this diversity would lead to the dehumanization, mechanization, and utter impoverishment of man.

The weakening of this diversity is a cause for alarm, a tendency to be resisted and combated. (Fishman (1989:15), originally published in Roundtable on Languages and Linguistics, 1977, pp. 297-309.

In addition to this philosophical justification, there is a very practical motivation here: such understanding and appreciation underlie the goal of having a sizable portion of the
society studying language and reaching some level of competence. Finally, a general appreciation of the value of language and cultural understanding is critical to broad voter support for funding language programs in education and in government.

Language Competence: The need for foreign language competence has become broadly accepted, the excuse that “the whole world speaks English” is carrying less and less weight.¹ Hardly a day goes by without an article in a major news outlet concerning the need for language in the United States. Whether motivated by “globalization” or Freedman’s “flat world,”² or by adherence to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, the need for people capable in languages other than English is more and more prevalent and emergent in the consciousness of Americans and of their policy makers.³

Language Expertise: The need for professionals capable of operating in a foreign language and culture is perhaps most obvious in the federal government, particularly in those agencies responsible for national security. (By expertise here is meant a working proficiency of Superior and Distinguished in ACTFL terms, 3- and 4-level on the Interagency Language Roundtable scale). Since 2001, the National Security Agency has announced that a 3-level is required for employment as a language analyst. The DoD has launched its “Defense Language Transformation” initiative, one goal of which is 3-level and higher linguistic expertise.⁴

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¹ Robinson et al.
² Freedman
³ Robinson et al.
⁴ The Defense Language Institute has launched its “Proficiency Enhancement Project” to raise the level of graduates of its basic language program from 2/1+ in listening, reading, and speaking, to 2+/2+/2, with a strong focus on 3-level and higher in its intermediate and advanced courses.
Responsibility for National Language Education

Government

Any proposed national policy and improved education system able to achieve these goals will have to reflect the realities of U.S. history and traditions. Policy is set and implemented by government as well as by the educational systems. With regard to the role of government, traditionally state and local authorities share overall responsibility for education in the United States, while the federal government enters this domain primarily when national security—its primary responsibility—is at stake. (Examples of government intervention into language education include the Army Special Training Program of 1942, the National Defense Education Act of 1958, and the National Security Education Act of 1991). Since the mid-1990s, and particularly since September 11, 2001, the federal government has made significant investments in its own language capabilities in the name of national security. At the same time, it has taken a very strong hand in language education and research more broadly with the increases in Title VI/F-H and NSEP and the establishment of the University of Maryland Center for Advanced Study of Language. Additionally, in June 2004, the Department of Defense, in collaboration with UM CASL, sponsored the “National Language Conference,” the avowed purpose of which was the exploration of a partnership among government, academe, and business sectors in developing a national language education strategy and plan. The White Paper that resulted from the conference is a call to action towards collaboration to this end. (The present Colloquium, as well as the January 2005 ACTFL policy conference and the upcoming ACTFL panel in November are follow-ups and
reactions to the proposals in this White Paper as well as to the government efforts on behalf of language in general). Thus, the Departments of Defense, Education, Labor, and State are on record advocating a national language education initiative in the United States. Various committees in Congress have spoken out on the need for more language competence in the U.S. While there is a growing general belief that the nation would be stronger with a linguistically much more sophisticated citizenry, the primary motivation for this government activity is to enable all agencies and offices to be able to recruit linguistically competent future employees, thereby enabling the U.S. government to concentrate its own educational programs on higher levels of proficiency and language for special purposes.7

Education Sector

While these and other government efforts are going forward, the ultimate responsibility for improved language education rests with the schools, colleges, and universities that constitute the language education system of this country. In general, a national educational design required to achieve the three goals listed above must be comprehensive and cohesive. It must include all levels of education, kindergarten through graduate and professional school, and it must guarantee that these levels be fully

articulated and integrated with each other. More specifically, each subsystem must design its language programming in accordance with its specific role in meeting one or all of the goals proposed above and in congruence with the other parts of the system.

*K-8 Level.* The K-8 level has two principal responsibilities: First, to provide universal language exposure in order to, at a minimum, guarantee that all students receive an appreciation of the role of language and culture in society and an understanding of language use as well as learning. One can argue that any general understanding of language can only be effectively conveyed if it is accompanied with acquisition of some real language ability; however, language proficiency *per se* is not included under this goal. Second, the K-8 system must begin the language learning career of those learners desirous of acquiring functional ability. This is particularly important for those aspiring to advanced level proficiency, as the required “time on task” to reach such a level is greatly facilitated by an early start in the student’s educational career.

*Secondary Level:* At the secondary level, the primary task will be to build upon what is accomplished at the K-8 level either supporting the student’s language from middle school or by providing mechanisms for adding a new, less commonly taught language to the student’s native language. This, of course, will only be possible once the elementary and middle schools are fully involved in the language teaching enterprise. However, for the immediate future, secondary schools will have to spend resources in beginning language courses as well as a basic orientation to language and culture in the social studies curriculum. Thus, when students finish their formal education at this level, they all must graduate with a basic understanding of language, culture, and cognition as well
as a minimal working ability in at least one language other than English. For students continuing on to the university, the language programming should be designed to integrate smoothly with courses in higher education in order to enable students to build working competence in a language other than English and even to advance to high level language proficiency.

**Higher Education:** The duty of language programs at this level is to guarantee that all three goals have been met through programming focusing on the four “missions” for which students enroll, faculty teach, and curricula are designed at the university level.\(^8\) These include the *General Education Mission* (part of general distribution requirements) as well as three other missions focused on functional language ability as well as advanced language and cultural expertise: the *Heritage Mission* (development of further skills in a language acquired at home or in one's community); the *Applied Mission* (aimed at the practical use of a language in personal or professional endeavors, e.g., German for Engineering); and the *Professional Mission* (preparation as a language professional: professor/teacher, researcher, interpreter, translator). The problem is that these four goals are usually served by one program and program design, with most resources inadvertently devoted to the General Education mission and most design oriented to the Professional Mission.

**Language Education Reform**

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\(^8\) Cf. Brecht, & Walton with Caemmerer, and Brecht & Walton 2000.
In order to meet these laudable goals, the programming and educational design must be appropriate. In the U.S., much will have to change at all levels of education, starting with kindergarten and ending with graduate or professional school.

**K-8:** Traditionally, discussion about the strategy of language instruction and learning at the K-8 level has focused on FLEX vs. FLES and whether and how well they provide the basis for functional language ability later on in the system. Nevertheless, with so few resources available, particularly with the enactment of the *No Child Left Behind Act* (*NCLB*), there is little talk of universal exposure to language, let alone universal language education. While universal language exposure or education is realistically beyond most policy makers’ imagination at the present time, the recent efforts at the federal level on behalf of language have caused a refocusing on language at the elementary school level. The reference here is to the presumption by policy makers in the Administration and the Congress that “early start” is the key to developing the broad and deep expertise that conditions in today’s world demand. This need and focus is most explicitly articulated in the “White Paper” resulting from the National Language Conference.\(^9\)

However, the immense energy created by the events of 9/11 in the federal government notwithstanding,\(^10\) there is still little overall investment in language education at the K-12 level, and so the goal of universal language exposure—let alone competence—remains a very distant one. It is undeniable that America’s schools currently are able to make significant contributions to providing a cadre of Americans with language proficiency

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\(^9\)“A Call to Action”

\(^10\)Brecht 2004.
and even high-level language expertise. However, this ability varies by language.

Spanish and French programs in the schools, where they exist, are able to provide a firm basis for functional language ability reached at the secondary and higher education levels. However, when it comes to the so-called Less Commonly taught Languages (LCTLs), the only significant educational assets available at the K-8 level are the immersion programs (both total and “dual language”) and the heritage community school networks. This situation can only be improved with a major USED initiative on behalf of language learning in elementary and secondary education, ideally coordinated by a separate office dedicated to language education at this level. (See below.)

Secondary Schools: While enrollments and attained proficiency here are basically far short of the desired level, the adoption of national language standards oriented toward proficiency has been a great boon to the nation’s capacity to produce students with some functional proficiency in a world language. In particular, the standards offer a basis to connect the secondary schools to the elementary and middle school language programs as well as to the university programs. This K-16 articulation is critical to the development of language expertise among America’s professionals. In addition, one of the most important developments in this regard at the secondary level is the new emphasis on Advanced Placement courses and testing in the LCTLs. A new generation of Advanced Placement Test oriented to language proficiency is being developed, which offers
significant hope for coordination with university programming and the attainment of high level expertise in the language and its culture and literature.\footnote{New AP tests are being developed in Chinese, Japanese, Italian, and Russian. Cf. http://apcentral.collegeboard.com/article/20045148-6-0-20157206.html}

In addition to articulation, the secondary schools must find a way to expand the range of languages they offer to build on the heritage and other immersion K-8 programs and to offer a second foreign language to those coming out of middle school with Spanish and French. This kind of expansion will require a major focus on language in the USED, one that is not seen as conflicting with the NCLB act.

**Higher Education:** For better or for worse, language education in this country is led by the higher education segment of the education community, if for no other reason that no other level has made any comparable investment in the endeavor. However, policy and programming at the higher education level has far to go if it is to meet its responsibility in guaranteeing the attainment of the three national goals articulated above. First, it must vary its programming to respond to all four missions described above. Given the fact that attrition between first year and second year courses stands on average at 59%, this means that 75% of resources are devoted to students who will finish no more than 2 years of regular college-level language programming and thus not attain any real functional ability. This means that these students should be understood as basically involved in the "general education" mission, and so the courses should reflect this and focus much more on the role of language in culture and cognition and on the actual

\footnote{New AP tests are being developed in Chinese, Japanese, Italian, and Russian. Cf. http://apcentral.collegeboard.com/article/20045148-6-0-20157206.html}
process of language use and learning. The education these students receive in these
courses should be aimed to stand them in good stead throughout their career, particularly
when they feel the need to return to language learning at an appropriate moment in their
personal or professional lives.\textsuperscript{12}

In addition, higher education should honor its leading role in language education by
taking courageous and dramatic steps to signal the importance of language learning and
the role of K-12 education. First, unpopular as it may be, the question of requirements
should be revisited both for entry and exist from the university system. Second, first and
second year Spanish and French should be credit bearing only when they are the student’s
second or third foreign language. Finally, university programs should be full participants
in the new generation of Advanced Placement language programs and exams.

This presupposes a full dialogue on language standards, like those already developed for
Chinese, Japanese, and Russian for K-16. These strategies, if broadly adopted, can send
a very clear message that language is vital to education and that schools are critical to
language education process, and it will as well provide abundant motivation for
articulation between the two levels. While there are significant differences in opinion
here, there is a vital need to engage on this topic to ensure articulation among all levels of
education and to enable long and effective language learning careers for the system’s
graduates.

\textsuperscript{12} In Brecht & Ingold (2000), we proposed a new configuration of the language and culture
component of general education under the term linguacy, which we use to designate the ability TO
INTERACT WITH SPEAKERS OF LANGUAGES OTHER THAN ONE’S OWN AS WELL AS WITH
TEXTS EMANATING FROM CULTURES FROM AROUND THE WORLD. Linguacy stresses
understanding of the nature of ‘language in culture’, in particular its role and function in human society; the
cognitive aspects of language, including how it is learned, as well as the ability to apply that understanding
in a lifetime of civic, professional, and personal contexts.
A Plan for Implementation: Universal & Selective Language Education Systems

In an earlier paper, Brecht & Met 2002 suggest that a national language education policy for the United States should proceed from the assumption that everyone should learn a second language, akin to the national bilingual model of Australia described in footnote 1. However, as an immediate and interim solution on the path to universal language education, they propose a Selective Language Education Policy, which would build a national, but limited, system of pipelines from kindergarten through the university system for a set of languages deemed critical to the nation in today’s world (e.g. Arabic, Chinese, Hindi, Japanese, Korean, Russian, Swahili, Turkic languages, etc). According to this plan, the components of this pipeline system would include:

- a set of strengthened K-8 schools capable of producing real language ability that can be passed on to the secondary level, including; schools of choice (majgnate) devoted to language, schools with collaborative arrangements with heritage community schools, schools with dual language and total immersion language programs, and schools with superior FLES programs.
- “Regional flagship schools”-12 level that would exist to build on the functional language competence acquired in the K-8 network of schools;\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{13} The National Flagship Language Initiative of the National Security Education Program has just established a K-16 Chinese language project.
• A fully implemented university level flagship language program system, the basis of which is already established in the National Flagship Language Program of the National Security Education Program.\(^\text{14}\)

The proposed K-12 system would be based on school districts, where the “flow” of students from kindergarten through grade 12 is managed, provided there is a local high school with a secondary flagship program capable of taking in highly qualified language students from the elementary and middle schools. At the university level, a broad network of flagship universities, each specializing in the language(s) most appropriate to the state in which they are located, would recruit students to its regular major programs who could also feel confident that their language learning careers would be supported.

Binding these systems together, vertically and horizontally, would be a set of supporting elements, presumably comprising the following:

• An Advanced Distributed Learning system permitting the sharing of teaching and learning resources among these schools (see Appendix A)
• Intensive summer programs for student acceleration, remediation, and specialization
• A network of both domestic and in-country immersion programs dedicated to this system, immersion being a vital ingredient for proficiency attainment
• Articulation mechanisms like the new AP Test, faculty development programs, and a clear set of standards based on the National Language Standards

\(^{14}\) [http://www.ndu.edu/nsep/](http://www.ndu.edu/nsep/)
• Agreed upon proficiency outcomes for each level of education (e.g. Higher education: Superior; Secondary: Intermediate High/Advanced; Elementary: Novice High/Intermediate)

Such a selective, as opposed to a universal, approach to language education would have certain distinct advantages. First, instead of undertaking an expensive system-wide reform (particularly in a time when K-12 resources are dedicated first and foremost to math and English through the NCLB Act), this very focused effort would be cost-effective and therefore more liable to funding. Second, the selective system would demonstrate the viability of a national language education system. Third, the selective language education effort would focus on high level language expertise in critical languages, which is what government agencies desperately need and Congress is currently willing to support.

Without question, the obstacles to even a Selective Language Education System—let alone a universal one—are many, including resources (incentives and rewards), mindset, and leadership. Strategies required to overcome such obstacles for an immediate Selective System leading to a Universal system would include a major collaborative effort, along the lines of the previous Holmes Group effort in education that would consist of member K-16 institutions that agree to constitute a national system of language pipelines that cross district and possibly even state boarders. This consortium of institutions would mutually commit to:

• High level language proficiency as the goal of programming
Specific proficiency outputs at each educational level, accumulating to the Superior/3-level upon graduation from college

Integration of heritage learners into the system and accreditation of heritage programming

Accountable outputs through rigorous and regular testing

Full articulation, vertical (among levels) as well as horizontal (geographic) through the acceptance of common standards.

National Language Policy

Without question, federal support—the administration and the Congress—is critical for a major comprehensive, collaborative, and cohesive national language education plan. Financial support will be required to provide incentives (program/teacher subsidies for low enrollment languages (language choice); faculty development, both pre- and in-service; seed funding to establish programs; immersions, both in heritage communities and abroad; and rewards for meeting proficiency goals in the form of percentage of students graduated and levels attained).

This support will have to be provided through legislative vehicles, which could take the shape of a broad and comprehensive act along the lines of the National Defense Education Act of 1958.13 Another, perhaps more practical approach would be to build on existing legislation and programs by strengthening those where necessary and filling in the gaps where appropriate. For example, such gaps would include new legislation in the

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13 To this end, Representative Rush Holt of New Jersey introduced the “National Security Language Act” in December 2003.
next reauthorization of Elementary and Secondary Act that would fund a dedicated office as home for language at K-12 level.

**Leadership**

Experience shows that even adequate funding of a set of individual programs alone will not guarantee that the targeted improvement will match the investment, i.e. that the whole exceeds the sum of its parts. Another critical step is required, one that ensures that the efforts made on behalf of language by government and education will be effective, and I would like to focus the remainder of this paper on that step.

While many initiatives are being proposed for improving language in the U.S., both in the federal and academic sectors, there is no one authority responsible for coordinating these efforts across the five language capacity sectors: academic, federal, private, heritage, and overseas. In essence, the language community lacks a focal point with real authority to guarantee that these and future efforts on behalf of language constitute a comprehensive, cohesive, and collaborative solution to the language problem in United States. Such a force, I submit, can be in the form of an Office of Language Policy, akin to the Office of Science and Technology Policy, which encompasses elements like the Science Division, the Technology Division, the Homeland and National Security Division, and the National Science and Technology Council and the President’s Council of Advisors and Science and Technology. A parallel effort on behalf of language in the United States could ensure the vital status of language for the country.

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16 Reference to Brecht & Walton
Among the principal responsibilities of such an office would be the preparation of the administration’s budget proposal for language and national well being, and working with education and national security committees to ensure its passage. Such responsibilities would include an integrated needs assessment process and a degree of influence on funding to guarantee integration of language initiatives. Presumably, this could be facilitated through collaboration with the Senior Language Authority office in the various government agencies as well as by reliance on academic think tanks concerned with such issues.

It must be stressed that the Office of Language Policy, apart from being directly responsible for the integration of the requirements and preparedness of agencies and offices responsible for the nation’s security and well being, would also be expected to coordinate collaborative efforts with academe as well as to serve as the bully pulpit for improvement of the situation of language in education and in the private sector. In the long term, the most cost-effective way of meeting the language expertise needs of the nation is to build a very broad base of American citizens who receive a strong education in one or more languages. Language should be an integral part of K-12 education, leaving universities to concentrate on high level language instruction, second and third foreign language, and on Less Commonly Taught Languages. Such innovation in
education must be led, and the Office of Language Policy can play an important role here.\textsuperscript{17}

In my opinion, the design of a federal architecture for language and national security and well being is close at hand, but its effective implementation depends on a renewed dedication to adequate funding for all the components as well as a strong integrating mechanism insuring that they function as a comprehensive, collaborative, and cohesive force for the good of the whole nation. The federal government has taken dramatic steps in this direction, including the National Language Conference and its resulting White Paper. It is continuing the initiative through a dialogue among the Secretaries of the Departments of Education, Defense, and State. It is time, however, for educators from all levels to step forward and form a functional leadership cadre dedicated to the implementation of a national language education policy. It is hoped that the present conference is a step in that direction.

Friday, September 16, 2005

\textsuperscript{17} The National Language Conference and its subsequent White Paper called for a National Language Advisor and Council. The proposal here for an Office of Language Policy refines that made in Brecht 2004 and is intended to support the White Paper.


Appendix A: “System III”\textsuperscript{18}

It is clear that the adequate availability of resources will be a major obstacle to implementing any language education policy and system. For decades, technology has been considered the “magic bullet” for cost-effective learning; but it clearly still lags behind its promise, although there are clear models emerging that suggest that there is help on the way. In an earlier paper, Brecht & Walton (2000) described a new language education system, which they called System III. Their intent was to show how all languages and all levels of education could benefit from an “advanced distributed learning” system, which could enable the shift from System I (which provides Commonly Taught Languages to many) and System II (providing LCTLs to a few) to System III, where any and all languages can be made available to any and all learners.

\textit{The Magic Bullet: Advanced Distributed Learning}

The IT revolution can be seen to comprise both “Instructional” as well as “Informational” Technology. With regard to the as yet relatively modest contributions of Instructional Technology to teaching and learning, the problem does not reside principally with the technology—although the “human centered computing call for by Michael Dertouzos remains a distant reality.\textsuperscript{19} The problem with Instructional Technology is that we really do not know enough about the cognitive processes of learning to take full advantage of what technology even now has to offer.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18} Cf. Brecht & Walton 2000.
\textsuperscript{19} Dertouzos 2002.
\textsuperscript{20} cf. \textit{How People Learn})
On the other hand, the application of Information Technology in education has recently moved to the fore, as “Advanced Distributed Learning” is rapidly establishing itself as the “new new thing” in learning. The ADL initiative is firmly established in a network of centers and collaborating universities in the U.S. and around the world.

The initial focus of ADL has been on the development of technical standards for the electronic sharing of learning objects. Thus, ADL, ARIADNE, IEEE, IMS have all been working hard on this issue, with now the ADL Co-Labs taking the lead in unifying the effort. In addition to the technological issues involved, ADL includes some very substantive educational concepts that in fact give meaning to the entire effort. Among these are:

- Learning Objects. The term “learning object” is comprehensive, ranging from the very broadest interpretation of “anything in the learning system” to a much more specified and helpful. The principal questions that arise in the design of LOs are scope (granularity) and sequence (combination). 

- LO Instructional Design: The glue to the educational application of ADL, as with any other educational innovation, is instructional design. Given the capabilities of LO-oriented design, there is a genuine possibility of incorporating a constructivist approach in the system, which itself serves as the theoretical basis of scope and sequencing as well as meta-tagging.

- Learning Management Systems. Any distributed learning system will have, by definition, learners and teachers widely dispersed, joined synchronously as well as asynchronously, and all proceeding at different rates and engaged in different...
learning activities. This potential chaotic situation requires a learner tracking
system to record learners characteristics, participation, and success in learning.

- Learner Management: Any system that revolves around the customization of
learning, ideally, should seek to empower the user to manage as much as possible
the learning process, thus removing management from the exclusive purview of
the system itself. Any such system software aims to emulate this management
and so should have some capability to provide this capacity to the learner. So
empowered, the learner may have something to teach the system, provided the
system's tracking system is able to take the lesson. This function is particularly
important for life-long and experiential learning, which inevitably situates
learning in context and on tasks that the system has yet to anticipate.

While we are far from full and effective implementation of such a system, the research is
growing and rudimentary systems are being developed that promise to provide the
breadth of language access that the nation requires in order to meet the goals stated
above.24

24 Examples of the “Learning Object” approach to language are the LangNet project of the National Foreign
Language Center and the Gloss project of the Defense Language Institute. The AED Initiative is the
primary organizing entity in this effort in the United States: http://www.aednet.org/
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

JULY 9, 2008
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER

Dr. Snyder. While the current focus is properly on Iraq and Afghanistan, do you feel DOD is doing enough to build up a resident capability in other languages and regions that might present opportunities for engagement in the future or become security risks?

Dr. Brecht. In my view, the DOD could do more especially with the languages of Africa. As I indicated in my testimony, there is a sense among some leaders hard pressed for resources that the problem is simply too large to address. However, I believe there are practical steps that can be taken to begin to build an African language capability in the DOD. Indeed, while in many parts of Africa a colonial and official language are sufficient for official communication, the requirements of the department clearly extend well beyond communications within official channels as well as into areas of the continent where so-called official channels may not even exist. This requires a significant investment in regional languages as well as in many of the languages and dialects in critical areas of the continent.

More generally, the Department has identified “investment languages” that reflect current and projected requirements. The problem is that, for any given geographical area, national and regional language policy, social conditions, and local linguistic habits are constantly evolving, and future DOD capabilities projections must take these factors into consideration. For example, will Russian be the lingua franca for Central Asian countries in twenty years as it is now? Will the trilingual habits of Africans change with the growing influence of national languages and global English? Which Arabic dialects will be most commonly used for insiders’ speech in North Africa in the next ten years? Clearly, strategic planning and future projections in national security should be augmented by sociolinguistic research on future language usage in targeted areas.

Finally, in order to be able to bring to bear the appropriate linguistic and cultural expertise for unanticipated developments around the world, the less-commonly-taught language expertise in the nation’s colleges, universities, and heritage communities must be maintained and enhanced. Title VI/Fulbright Hays of the Higher Education Act is the nation’s major asset in this regard, the major priority of which is to guarantee our nation’s access to expertise, programs, and resources in world area, languages and cultures.

In all respects, the DOD’s shift to capabilities-based requirements in place of needs-based requirements is a critical step in the right direction. This focus on capabilities, enhanced with a “language futures” approach to strategic planning, could help address the problem inherent in the current requirements driven process that makes it difficult to invest in languages that may not be important today but could be critical to national security tomorrow.

Dr. Snyder. What are your views about the success of the Defense Language Institute’s Foreign Language Center in guiding the process and identifying the principal needs of DOD’s language requirements? What about the Service centers for Language and Cultural Excellence? Can you give us an evaluation of them?

Dr. Brecht. As far as I know, the DLIFLC is not responsible for identifying the DOD’s language requirements, but it must respond to requirements formulated and passed on by the services. Unfortunately, these requirements seem to be focused on short term real needs and therefore changeable according to the latest crisis. This situation creates a significant challenge for the DLIFLC, given the fact that hiring and firing language faculty cannot be accomplished as rapidly as language requirements change in a system driven by immediate needs.

In general, I believe the services’ efforts at identify requirements have improved significantly; however, this is an area that needs constant attention. Overall, as stated above, the department’s moving from threats to capabilities in the specification of language needs is a major improvement, and there are efforts at the highest levels to get the requirements right. Again, we still need to consider a “language futures” approach to determine which languages and dialects will be relevant in regions identified as critical in the future.

Unfortunately, I am not in a position to evaluate the Service centers for Language and Cultural Excellence. I know that they are working very hard to address their
specific service's needs, but I have not worked with them sufficiently to offer an opinion on their effectiveness.

Dr. Snyder. How much can existing and likely technological improvements offset the need for actual language training?

Dr. Brecht. Technology, together with advances in cognitive, cognitive neuroscience and language research, will greatly facilitate language learning in the future. (In fact, one of CASL's strategic goals is to dramatically reduce the time it takes to learn a language and measurably improve the effectiveness of the process.) If effectively deployed, this combination of tools and science can dramatically improve classroom learning. More importantly, in the future, language learning will be available on-demand on the job, thus enabling life-long language learning needed by DOD career professionals. While this will greatly relieve the classroom burden, there is always a need for good classroom teaching in initial stages of instruction as well as in on-line courses delivered to the field.

Dr. Snyder. In your testimony, you stated that the Department of Defense “should continue to support and serve as the bully pulpit for improvement in the Nation’s schools, colleges and universities” and suggested that, for foreign language proficiency, as was the case for racial integration and gender equality, the Pentagon should lead the way with a pragmatic solution. You also argued for the drafting of state language roadmaps in the remaining 47 states and the District of Columbia and suggested that by using seed-money for dual language schools, the K–12 system could demonstrate that foreign language could be taught successfully in the education system.

We’d like to hear more about your perspectives on the state language roadmaps.

Dr. Brecht. The DOD-funded state roadmaps were an attempt to reenergize language education at the state and local levels, where education policy and funding have traditionally resided in the U.S. While national security concerns since 9/11 have focused federal efforts on language, the strategic view requires states and local jurisdictions to support language education as never before. The state roadmaps can create the first dialog and necessary synergy among government agencies, industry, not-for-profit organizations, foundations, and the language teaching professions.

At this stage, we have seen three state roadmap efforts take place, and we have learned a lot about how to make them more effective and how to keep them moving forward. However, being limited to these three states, this initiative has not benefited the rest of the states, and thus the nation as a whole, by establishing models to be emulated and creating synergies among states. The state roadmap initiative could be made into an unprecedented national effort on behalf of language in the United States. We know from recent polls that the parents of our children are ready for action in this area; we just have not been able to come up with a practical strategy that limited state and local budgets and time constraints can support. No one school, district, or state education agency can do enough alone, but a combined effort of the constituents listed above might just “tip” the system towards “plurilingual” America (to use a European Union term). Without this, the DOD will continue to expend huge amounts of resources to accomplish what the education system should have already done.

Dr. Snyder. Can you provide more detail on what actions should be taken to improve the K–12 education system’s ability to meet the Department of Defense’s foreign language proficiency needs?

Dr. Brecht. The underlying assumption of this question is, in my view, absolutely appropriate: The education system should assume more of the burden of language education, thus enabling the DOD to focus on rarely taught languages, high levels, and language for specific tasks and purposes. The Department has made this point of view clear in the last several years, and it must now continue its financial support of NSSEP efforts as well as its advocacy of the role of the education system in meeting the language needs of the country.

For the immediate future, I believe there are three distinct steps to be taken: First, State Language Roadmap efforts should be undertaken in all fifty states and District of Columbia. Second, the USED K–12 component of the NSLI should be funded and implemented. Third, the Department of Education should launch a new dual language immersion program aimed at funding start-up dual language programs across the country, presumably under the NSLI mandate.

Finally, in September 2005 I delivered a paper at a conference at the University of California Berkeley that lays out the broader, national perspective of the role of schools and universities in language education in the United States: “Outlines of a National Language Education Policy in the Nation’s Interest: Why? How? Who is Responsible for What?” With some hesitancy, I attach it here in the belief that it provides the broader perspective on language education that you are seeking here. (See attachment.) This paper makes the case that a comprehensive plan is required,
one that is cohesive and collaborative, and that its components are not beyond current budgetary and political realities.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 119.]

Dr. BRECHT. The DOD should continue the implementation of the Language Transformation Roadmap, moving on to a next phase of planning and development that continues to support the Flagship programs of the NSEP. The Department should also continue to be a major voice and bully pulpit in support of language education in the United States, given the fact that the DOD has influence among the American people and their elected representatives that no other constituency in this country has. The Department of Education, for its part, should add language to its English and mathematics priorities and put in place structures and funding to dramatically improve language education in this country. This USED effort should focus on coordinating state and local jurisdictions as they implement state roadmaps that create the partnerships and synergies that will make language education change possible.

It has been particularly damaging to the nation’s language capacity that Congress has not funded the USED component of NSLI, and so the department should make this one of its priorities.

Finally, dual language immersion programs should be launched across the country. These programs are composed of children, half of whom speak English as a native language and half speak a language other than English with their parents at home. In the morning the language of instruction is in the foreign language, say Mandarin, and the afternoon sessions are conducted in English. This kind of program has proven effective in giving English speaking children very impressive foreign language skills, while on the other hand it supports NCLB by strengthening the English skills of members of our heritage communities.

In sum, there is no question that a significant investment at the K–12 level would raise the bar at every level of language education in this country, both in numbers of students and levels of proficiency, thus buttressing every other element of the NSLI.

Dr. SNAIDER. While the current focus is properly on Iraq and Afghanistan, do you feel the DOD is doing enough to build up a resident capability in other languages and regions that might present opportunities for engagement in the future or become security risks?

Dr. ZALMAN. As the outbreak of violence between Georgia and Russia and the subsequent aid shipments by US Navy and Air Force suggest, the U.S. has entered an era in which estimating potential military engagement is difficult, at best. The U.S. must be prepared for engagement anywhere, in a variety of modalities (military force, humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, nation-building, etc.). This recognition is evident in the DOD’s vigorous emphasis on creating a global force capable of leveraging capabilities across regions.

Given this reality, the DOD will be well served by committing resources to building up a generic resident cultural competence capability, in addition to building regional/linguistic capabilities in currently foreseeable areas of potential engagement, such as Southeast Asia, and Africa’s northern tier.

Cultural competence is a composite skill set that enables people to enter into an unfamiliar situation with enough cognitive agility to interact, observe and learn from their interactions with others. Cultural competence is something people “do” in interactive situations, as opposed to a kind of knowledge that they “have” about others. Cultural awareness manifests itself when soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines can mobilize information about their own and others’ cultural predispositions in order to influence adversaries or communicate collaboratively with partners.

This capability can be created through training in basic skills such as: how to work in culturally diverse environments, cross-cultural management, negotiation and conflict mediation, and training in the tools of self-reflection. While Special Forces routinely train in these skills, the approach among regular forces is more haphazard.

The experiences of those deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan have amply demonstrated the need to cultivate these skills among officers and senior enlisted members. Knowing etiquette or even basic demographic facts about their surroundings is not enough. Many require the ability to negotiate, distribute resources or manage competing demands in cross-cultural contexts.

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1 The term cultural competence is used widely in health, mental health and educational contexts. It usefully denotes not only awareness, but also a skill; the ability to do something.
Training that helps military members practice and transport such skills across regional and linguistic lines will indicate a deepened commitment to preparing forces for the potential engagements of the future.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON

Mr. Johnson. The Department of Defense established the National Language Services Corps pilot program in 2007. This effort will identify Americans with skills in critical languages and develop the capacity to mobilize them during times of national need or emergency. The National Language Services Corps represents the first organized national attempt to capitalize on our rich national diversity in language and culture. This organization has a goal of creating a cadre of 1,000 highly proficient people, in 10 languages, by 2010. What do you see as its potential to support broader national security objectives of increasing cultural awareness and foreign language capabilities?

Dr. Brecht. In my view, the National Language Service Corps has the potential to play a critical role in our strategic approach to language, culture and national security in the United States. As I indicated in my testimony, no single element in the USG can house all the linguistic and cultural capabilities needed for the indefinite future. All agencies must find a way to recruit, train, and maintain an in-house language and culture capability, but they must also be ready to localize, outsource, and warehouse resources against unexpected requirements. The NLSC demonstrates the warehousing capability, serving as a pilot and model for the future.

In addition, if as part of its design the NLSC would support the maintenance and enhancement of critical language abilities of its members, less commonly taught language programs around the country would have access to a broader clientele, thereby justifying their existence and traditionally low enrollments to managers in academia and industry.

Mr. Johnson. How important do you believe it is to use a program like the National Language Services Corps to access Americans with diverse language and cultural skills to support our agencies during national emergencies in the near-term?

Dr. Brecht. A major advantage of the NLSC is the potential to recruit heavily from our almost 50 million member heritage communities across the country. While there is a range of challenges involved in recruiting from many of these communities, these citizens can provide a level of language competence that is difficult to acquire for native English speakers. In addition, such a recruitment effort will also send an important message to speakers of other languages in this country: that their language abilities are critical to our common well-being and that, in addition to learning English, their duty as citizens is to maintain their native language as a service to this country.