[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-105]
A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
DECEMBER 13, 2007
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Tenth Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina DUNCAN HUNTER, California
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
ADAM SMITH, Washington California
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California JEFF MILLER, Florida
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia TOM COLE, Oklahoma
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam ROB BISHOP, Utah
MARK E. UDALL, Colorado MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
NANCY BOYDA, Kansas PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
KATHY CASTOR, Florida
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Will Ebbs, Professional Staff Member
Jenness Simler, Professional Staff Member
Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2007
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, December 13, 2007, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower............................................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, December 13, 2007...................................... 43
----------
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 13, 2007
A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Allen, Adm. Thad W., USCG, Commandant of the Coast Guard, U.S.
Coast Guard.................................................... 8
Conway, Gen. James T., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps, U.S.
Marine Corps................................................... 6
Roughead, Adm. Gary, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Allen, Adm. Thad W........................................... 68
Conway, Gen. James T......................................... 58
Roughead, Adm. Gary.......................................... 47
Documents Submitted for the Record:
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower............. 77
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions asked during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mrs. Drake................................................... 97
Mr. Forbes................................................... 95
Ms. Shea-Porter.............................................. 95
. A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, December 13, 2007.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Ladies and gentlemen, the hearing will come
to order. Members will come in shortly. After the vote
yesterday, I am sure that they would think that a hearing today
is--well, it is great to have our panel here.
December 13, 1775, anniversary today, the Continental
Congress authorized the first 13 frigates. And Duncan Hunter
says we have to build them soon. This is the 100th anniversary
of the Great White Fleet. ``a good Navy is not a provocation to
war, it is the surest guarantee of peace,'' President Theodore
Roosevelt, December 2, 1902, in his second annual message to
Congress. And we congratulate the Navy on its celebration of
the Great White Fleet. And as I have told my Navy friends many
times, my father served on the USS Missouri, which was part of
that Great White Fleet. He served on it in 1918, and it was
decommissioned the following year. That was when my father said
that that is when they made men of steel and ships of wood. But
I am sure there was a little facetiousness there.
Well, thank you for being with us. It is a special treat.
Actually, we are making history today. Appearing before us,
Admiral Gary Roughead, the Chief of Naval Operations; General
James Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps; Admiral Thad
Allen, Commandant of the United States Coast Guard. This is
historic because this is the first time the holders of these
three respective positions have ever testified together. And we
are thrilled that you are here to discuss this.
We are fortunate to count Elijah Cummings, a member of this
committee, who chairs the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation of the Transportation Committee, which
has oversight of the Coast Guard. And hopefully, Admiral Allen,
you will feel as comfortable here as you do before that
subcommittee.
We are here today actually at the request of the service
chiefs. You have asked for the opportunity to present to
Congress a published doctrine entitled ``A Cooperative Strategy
for 21st Century Seapower,'' and it should be in front of you
in booklet form. And we welcome this opportunity to discuss
strategic concepts. I think that strategic thought gets lost in
the minutiae of building systems, trying to keep families and
personnel at their highest level of capability. But it is
important that we have a strategic thinking for our country,
particularly in seapower. The seas don't get any smaller. Our
Navy, sadly, gets smaller. And that, of course, is one of the
challenges before us.
I will ask that my statement, so artfully drafted by an
excellent member of the staff--who as of 15 minutes ago is a
new grandfather, Will Ebbs, who sits next to me, and if he
flees the room it is understandable. Congratulations to you.
So with that, and without delving further into the need for
strategic thinking or the military education that goes into it,
and hopefully we will be able to touch on that. It was an area
that I was blessed to study as a panel chair of this committee
a good number of years ago. So we may touch on that as well.
Duncan Hunter.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 77.]
STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for calling
this hearing. And gentlemen, good morning. And especially I
would like to join in Ike's welcome to Admiral Allen, and also
give a special welcome to Admiral Roughead, who appears before
this committee for the first time as Chief of Naval Operations.
Congratulations, Admiral, and best wishes to you in this
assignment.
I understand that the strategy was developed in a
nonresource-constrained environment. And it is not intended to
replace the Navy's 30-year-old shipbuilding plan, or 30-year
shipbuilding plan or budget planning documents, and for that I
applaud you.
For some time I have been concerned that the strategy of
the Department of Defense is driven by the Office of Management
and Budget. As you have heard me say in the past, I believe the
greatest failing of the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review
was the artificial constraint placed upon it by budget caps. I
understand that the availability of resources must shape our
programs, but in order to make educated decisions we have to
start with a baseline understanding of the global security
environment and what capabilities we need to protect the
national security interests of the United States, with minimal
risk. Only after determining requirements can we begin to make
trade-offs based upon resource constraints in such a way that
we understand where we are accepting risk.
And that is why this committee initiated the Armed Services
Committee Defense Review in parallel with the QDR, to establish
a framework for the members to consider the recommendations of
the QDR. The irony is that with all the personnel available to
the Department of Defense, the work that this committee did by
taking a different, nonresource-constrained approach, turns out
to have been more representative of what the services now say
that they need.
And incidentally, I would turn your attention to the
personnel end-strength recommendations that came out of the
Committee Defense Review as compared with the old QDR.
So I look forward to hearing more from you today about how
you intend to translate this strategy into service-specific
requirements which will form the basis of your request for
resources.
However, with that said, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast
Guard don't have a good track record with regard to managing
the resources that you have been provided. You are not alone,
but that does not excuse the situation we find ourselves in. On
one hand, we have a critical need for modernization, and DOD's
planned investment in new systems that has doubled in the last
6 years from around 750 billion to nearly 1.5 trillion. On the
other hand, there has been cost escalation on nearly
everything, from aircraft to ground vehicles to submarines and
shipbuilding.
The GAO has found many times over that acquisition programs
are too often started with immature technologies, and without
stable designs. Every time one of these programs experiences a
Nunn-McCurdy breach, the cost of a ship more than doubles, the
support for additional resources and modernization wanes.
Now Admiral Roughead, when you and I had an opportunity to
meet the other day we discussed this. The Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS) was supposed to be a small, fast craft that we could
build in large numbers to operate in the littorals. Instead,
they are over 400 feet, the size of World War II-era
destroyers, operate at 45 knots, and cost nearly half a billion
dollars apiece. Today we have only been able to partially build
two. And I fear that the Navy's talk of transformation is
nothing more than a speech senior leaders give at the Rotary
Club.
And after coming off that podium and talking about having a
Navy that is going to have fast ships with a low manning level,
multi-mission capability and all the other things, we tend to
stride off that podium and the reporter says, ``Well, what are
you building this year?'' and you tell them, ``We got a carrier
going, and a couple of submarines, and maybe an LCS.''
But the talk about transformation has essentially been
that. It has been talk. You have had the opportunity to embrace
transformation and you have chosen not to. And I want to point
to the Sea Fighter, the X-Craft that was built up in Mr.
Larsen's district. Here was a ship built by the United States
Navy, by the Office of Naval Research, which is the fastest
ship in the history of the world, goes 60 miles an hour, does
it with a crew of 26, can handle and does handle in fact a UAV,
helicopter capability, special operations capability, and has
the ability, if you a use those modules in the right
configuration, you can put over 500 medium-range cruise
missiles on that ship. That gives you multiples in terms of
capital investment versus firepower, manning versus cost,
operations and maintenance versus cost, huge multiples over the
current state of affairs with America's warfighting ships. And
yet the Navy has spent more time trying to kill the Sea Fighter
than, in my estimation, do anything else with respect to
platforms.
So gentlemen, with all due respect, I am pleased that you
have cooperated to develop the strategy that you are going to
talk to us about today. I am supportive of its tenets.
But you are not going to be able to deliver if you can't
afford the force that will make the strategy a reality. What
are you planning to do to get control on requirements and to
enable the acquisition community to more effectively manage
their programs?
Last, I look forward to hearing more about a few specific
elements in the strategy. First, the strategy states, today the
United States and its partners find themselves competing for
global influence in an era where they are unlikely to be fully
at war or fully at peace.
General Conway, I am surprised that the Marine Corps would
agree with such a characterization. Isn't the Marine Corps now
fully at war? Are we being naive to think that we are in an era
without the possibility of full war? And if so, how does this
affect your need for resources in terms of end strength and
weapons systems?
Second, the strategy advocates a concentration of forward-
deployed forces in the Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf, Indian
Ocean. At what expense? Where will we take risk if we pursue
such a strategy? Also, is this consistent with the
recommendation contained in the strategy to establish a
persistent global presence of U.S. forces? How will you
accomplish both?
And finally, I would be interested in learning how the
growing influence of China, with the expanding Chinese
shipbuilding capacity and the increasing capability and numbers
of Chinese submarines and air power, shape the new maritime
strategy. How is this strategy different as a result of these
factors?
And gentlemen, let me just tell you one thing that I am
very concerned about is that China has an increasing domestic
shipbuilding capability, commercial shipbuilding capability. If
that shipbuilding capability, which is presently focused on
commercial construction, is translated or turned into warship
construction, the Chinese Government has the ability to quickly
outstrip the construction of American ships and the fielding of
a large Navy. So I would like you to talk about that a little
bit, whether or not you are looking at America's shipbuilding
plan against the backdrop of a China which is quickly stepping
into the superpower shoes that have been left by the Soviet
Union, and which understands that the naval dimension of that
new superpower status is extremely important to their economic
well-being and also their ability to enforce their foreign
policy, which at times may be contrary to America's foreign
policy. So if you could address that, that is a very important
point I think for us to look at as we come together on this
policy.
With that, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this
hearing. Very important hearing. Gentlemen, thank you for being
with us today.
The Chairman. Before I ask our distinguished witnesses for
their testimony, let me take this opportunity to again thank
the members of this fantastic committee for the work that you
all have done for the bill that passed yesterday
overwhelmingly. And we, of course, all know that we could not
have done it but for such an outstanding staff that we have to
work with. And I just want to add my personal gratitude to
every member and every staff member, because it was yeoman's
work. We finally got there. Now it is in the bosom of the
Senate. And we hope they will pass it momentarily, and, among
other things, pay raises can go to the sailors and the troops.
Mr. Hunter, thank you very much. We will testify in this
order: Admiral Roughead, General Conway, and Admiral Allen. So
without further ado, I thank you very much for this. This is an
all-important hearing to think strategically regarding our
seapower. Admiral.
STATEMENT OF ADM. GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Roughead. Thank you very much, Chairman Skelton,
Mr. Hunter, distinguished members of the committee. On behalf
of our 600,0000 sailors, Navy civilians and families, I am
pleased to be here with General Conway and Admiral Allen to
present the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.
That all three maritime service chiefs are here together and
are signatories to the strategy is a testament of our Nation's
maritime forces to an integrated approach in protecting our
Nation's vital interests.
We are a maritime Nation. Our founders recognized it, our
history has Shown it, and this committee, with its leadership
and interest, continues to reinforce it. Our last maritime
strategy, albeit a Navy-only strategy, was issued in the early
1980's. It contributed to the end of the Cold War. And because
it was a Cold War strategy, its efficacy ended there.
We have been too long without strategic guidance for our
maritime forces. I am pleased to have been part of this
maritime strategy development. It is a strategy that charts the
right course for our maritime services at this point in time.
I am of the fleet. My experiences of the past 5 years as
Commander of U.S. Second Fleet/NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic, as
a Maritime Homeland Defense Commander supporting U.S. Northern
Command (NORTHCOM), as Commander of Joint Task Force 519 in the
Pacific, as the Commander of the Pacific Fleet, and as the
Commander of United States Fleet Forces Command, these
experiences have given me a perspective of our worldwide
operations that convinces me of the relevance of this maritime
strategy.
As recently as the year that preceded its release, I led
robust operations in the Western Pacific, ranging in the full
spectrum of seapower from multi-carrier operations in the
Western Pacific to proactive humanitarian assistance operations
with our hospital ships Mercy, Comfort, and Pelileu. While at
opposite ends of the operational spectrum, these uses of U.S.
seapower demonstrated the need to codify our strategy and build
for a new future.
At the same time, my experiences working with our partners
and allies around the world made it clear to me that
international partnerships and cooperation will underpin global
and, therefore, American prosperity.
Watching the successful Malaysian and Singapore and
Indonesian operation, enhanced maritime security and maritime
domain awareness in a vital strategic strait was incredibly
important. And also seeing our activities under the
Proliferation Security Initiative to dissuade the transfer of
weapons of mass destruction shows that these cooperative
opportunities and similar activities will be important to our
future.
But my experiences and those of my colleagues were only
part of what informed our new strategy. Through our
conversations with the country, I heard firsthand the demand of
the American people to remain strong and to also cooperate
internationally to secure our national interests. This
solidified my conviction that the Navy needed a new strategy
that would address the changing and increasingly integrated
global environment while securing our prosperity through the
seas and protecting our homeland.
At the International Seapower Symposium in Newport, Rhode
Island, the three of us unveiled this maritime strategy that
uniquely met those demands. Before record attendance of 98
nations, 67 Chiefs of Navy, and 27 Chiefs of Coast Guard, the
symposium was the ideal venue to communicate our new vision and
demonstrate our commitment to international cooperation. It was
extremely well received. And while the maritime strategy
reaffirms our unbending commitment to forward presence, to
deterrence, to sea control and power projection, it is unique
for three reasons:
First, all three maritime services participated in the
development and are signatories.
Second, we take the bold step of committing to a higher
level of cooperation with maritime forces around the world, a
commitment that we as seagoing forces are uniquely able to
meet.
And third, while we remain the preeminent warfighting force
this maritime Nation expects, we also intend to pursue
proactive humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and
maritime security operations.
My guidance to the fleet is to execute our strategy. And my
priorities--to build our future Navy, to maintain our current
readiness, and support our people--reflect what is needed to do
so.
The imperative and challenge for the Navy is to remain a
balanced Navy, with the force structure and capability and
capacity that can apply the enduring principles of seapower in
a manner that protects our vital national interests, while
promoting greater collective security, stability, trust, and
prosperity.
I look forward to working with you to ensure that our
maritime services remain preeminent. And on behalf of our
sailors and Navy civilians, I thank you for your continued
support and your commitment to our Navy. And I would like to
submit a copy of my written statement and a copy of the
maritime strategy for the record. Thank you.
The Chairman. Without objection, they will be received.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Roughead can be found in
the Appendix on page 47.]
The Chairman. General Conway.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES T. CONWAY, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
MARINE CORPS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Conway. Thank you, Chairman Skelton, Congressman
Hunter, distinguished members of the committee. I have pledged
to always provide you with forthright and honest assessments,
and I bear that in mind as I report to you today on the future
of the Marine Corps. Your Marine Corps is fully engaged in what
we believe is a generational struggle against fanatical
extremists. This long war is multifaceted, and will not be won
in one battle in one country or by one method. Your Marines are
a tough breed, and will do what it takes to win, not only in
these opening battles of Iraq and Afghanistan, but also in
subsequent conflicts which we endeavor to prepare for today.
Congressionally mandated to be the most ready when the
Nation is least ready, your multicapable Corps is committed to
fulfilling this responsibility.
Some say that today the Marine Corps is closer to the Army
than it has been since World War One. Our new maritime strategy
reaffirms our Naval character, and reemphasizes enduring
relationships with the Navy, and now the Coast Guard.
Current operations limit our ability to aggressively commit
forces to strategy implementation at this time. However, as we
increase our end strength to 202,000 Marines, and as security
conditions continue to improve in Iraq, the Marine Corps will
transition our forces to other battles in the long war.
Ultimately, we will realize a new era of expeditionary
operations called for by this strategy.
The most complex mission in the maritime strategy is the
congressionally mandated mission of amphibious forcible entry.
Such an operation requires a high level of proficiency, and
long-term resourcing, and is not a capability that we can
create on short notice. The sea-basing concept allows us to
maximize forward presence and engagement, while stepping
lightly on host nation responsibilities. In that matter, we
avoid disruptions that can result from a larger U.S. presence
ashore.
A classic example was our recent operation, alongside our
brothers in the Navy, in Bangladesh. Importantly, sea-basing is
not exclusive to the Navy and the Marine Corps. It will be a
national, joint capability. Combat tested in the Middle East,
with historical roots in the Pacific, the Marine Corps seeks to
further enhance its operational capabilities in the Pacific
theater.
That said, some areas like Africa offer unique
opportunities for the operational flexibility afforded by sea-
basing and the extended reach of aircraft like the MV-22 and
the KC-130J. The future bodes well for dispersed units of
Marines with their interagency partners to enhance our
relationships on that very large continent.
As America's Naval forces implement this new maritime
strategy, several factors warrant consideration:
First, based on defense reviews over the last several
years, we have already accepted risk in our Nation's forcible
entry capacity. We have reduced amphibious lift from three to
two brigade-sized assault echelons. On the low end of the
spectrum, Marines embarked aboard amphibious ships must also
meet Phase 0 demands. The ability to transition between those
two strategic goalposts, and to respond to every mission in
between, will rely on a strong Navy and Marine Corps team and
the amphibious ships that cement our bond. The Navy and Marine
Corps have worked together to determine the minimum number of
amphibs necessary to satisfy the Nation's needs, and further
look forward to working with this committee to support the
chief of naval operation's (CNO's) shipbuilding plans.
Second, key to our ability to implement this new strategy
is the flexibility and combat power of Marine aviation. Our
priority has been to replace legacy aircraft, some of which
have been flying since Vietnam. Today and tomorrow, vastly more
capable aircraft, such as the Joint Strike Fighter, will ensure
that the Corps maintains its warfighting advantage for our
Nation in the years to come.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, everything we read
about the future indicates that well-trained, well-led human
beings with the capacity to absorb information and rapidly
react to their environment have a tremendous asymmetric
advantage over an adversary. Ladies and gentlemen, that
advantage goes to us. Our young Marines are courageous, willing
to make sacrifices, and, as evidenced by our progress in al-
Anbar, capable of operating in complex environments. Quiet in
their duty, yet determined in their approach, they are telling
us loud and clear that wherever there is a job to be done they
will shoulder that mission with enthusiasm. Your continued
support remains a vital and appreciated foundation to their
service.
Thank you for your magnificent support thus far, and thank
you for the opportunity to report to you today on behalf of
your Marines. I look forward to answering the committee's
questions, sir.
The Chairman. General, thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Conway can be found in
the Appendix on page 58.]
The Chairman. Admiral Allen, please.
STATEMENT OF ADM. THAD W. ALLEN, USCG, COMMANDANT OF THE COAST
GUARD, U.S. COAST GUARD
Admiral Allen. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hunter,
distinguished members of the committee. I am very pleased to be
here today with my fellow sea service chiefs to discuss the
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.
I would like to begin by recognizing the leadership of
Admiral Roughead and General Conway in spearheading an
integrated strategy for our Nation's sea services. This
approach reflects maritime challenges faced by our Nation and
offers a consensus on the way forward. While the strategy is
new, it takes on greater meaning, having been jointly developed
by all three sea services for the first time in history. It
continues to reflect enduring relationships built on more than
two centuries of working together.
The cooperative strategy reflects our times. It is a
convergence of leadership, ideas, and capabilities. It is also
a platform we can use to talk about how to best move this
Nation forward with confidence into a very uncertain future in
an era of persistent and often irregular conflict, where the
next challenge may be wholly new and unanticipated. It is a
global strategy that reflects the absolute necessity to
integrate, synchronize and act with coalition and international
partners, not only to win wars, but as Admiral Roughead has
said, to prevent them.
Your Coast Guard is not a large organization, but we are
broad in reach. As we meet here this morning, we have Coast
Guard patrol boats working with our Navy, Marine, and coalition
partners in the northern Arabian Gulf, maintaining the security
of the Iraqi oil platforms, sharing best practices with
emerging regional navies and coast guards, as we have done in
Yemen.
We are also working in the eastern Pacific and Caribbean,
with aerial surveillance and surface patrols, extending our
reach in removing drugs from the transit zone before reaching
shore. I am proud to say we reached a milestone in Coast Guard
history this past year, having removed more cocaine at sea than
any year in our history. That is maritime strategy in action.
Closer to home, we are saving lives of mariners in
distress, securing critical infrastructure, inspecting
commercial ships, and protecting the environment. We are at all
times maritime, military, and a multi-mission service. With our
partners, we bring critical capabilities to bear on this
strategy and its future.
The Coast Guard is a unique instrument of national
security. Unlike the other services and other Federal agencies,
we are simultaneously an armed force of the United States and a
Federal law enforcement agency. This dual character allows us
to operate in many venues, domestically and abroad. In
international engagement, we necessarily move beyond
traditional relationships with maritime-related ministries and
military relationships with defense ministries. Over two
centuries we have become agile in building multiple
relationships with our foreign partners.
The Coast Guard's role is also unique because of the
capabilities and the history we have of operating in the
world's polar regions. The Cutter HEALY, one of the Coast
Guard's three icebreakers, returned this fall from a science
mission off the North Slope of Alaska to determine the extent
of the United States Continental Shelf, an appropriately timed
deployment given the changing Arctic environment and associated
challenges. The Coast Guard is the Nation's most visible
presence in isolated waters, and we must continue to be able to
extend our reach, our competencies, our capabilities and our
capacities in high-latitude regions.
Equally important to the execution of the strategy is our
expeditionary force capability that can quickly build and
deploy force packages for environmental protection, disaster
relief, security cooperation and other missions. We are
prepared to tailor and deploy operational teams immediately for
full spectrum operations. We are integrated with our sea
service partners. And given the composition of our fleet, are
able to work very closely with emerging, less developed nations
and coalition partners.
Mr. Chairman, my promise to the committee today, my promise
to Admiral Roughead and General Conway, is that we will work
tirelessly in implementation and execution of this strategy,
not only because it is the best thing for the Coast Guard, or
the best thing for our sea service--which it is--but because it
is the best thing for maritime security of the United States,
as well as peace and stability around the world.
I thank you. I would be glad to take your questions and
submit a full statement for the record.
The Chairman. Admiral, thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Allen can be found in
the Appendix on page 68.]
The Chairman. Again it is a pleasure to have all three of
you before us today. In listening to you and your strategic
outline, I have had the privilege of serving here in the House
for a good number of years, and it just seems like yesterday
when President Ronald Reagan was urging a 600-ship Navy. And if
we count every one today, it is a 280-ship Navy. And I think
you will find this committee understands the challenges.
It also understands that there is a quality with quantity
as well. And we, of course, want your best advice regarding
that.
I have one quick question before I ask Mr. Hunter to lead
off with a question. You are talking about strategy, which is
strategic thought. Strategic thought is taught and discussed at
our war colleges. And I remember back in 1988, when it was only
a secondary thought in some services to receive an intermediate
and senior-level War College degree. Since that time, much has
changed. The Naval War College at that time was the best, but
you didn't have to go there. It was good if it fit into the
career.
The Marine Corps, thanks to General Al Gray, did a complete
180-degree turnaround, which today makes us very, very proud of
the Marine Corps, not just in its graduate staff level, but now
with its War College. I don't know how many Coast Guardsmen go
to either intermediate- or senior-level schools, but I think it
behooves that to take place.
So let me ask one question, and I will just do it of you,
Admiral Roughead, if I may. Are you getting the strategic
thinkers, uniformed strategic thinkers from the various War
Colleges, whether they are other service schools, your service
school, or the national Industrial College of the Armed Forces
(ICAF) or the Joint Forces Staff Colleges? Are you getting
those strategic thinkers that you need today?
Admiral Roughead. We are, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to
say that our Naval War College was instrumental in the
development of this strategy. And as you know, it is not the
brick and mortar that contributes, it is the intellectual
effort of the young men and women who are at the college, who
have gone through the college, who populate our strategic
planning staffs. So we are getting the numbers that we need.
I believe the unveiling of the strategy in Newport that
drew 98 countries to that institution, of which the Navy is
extraordinarily proud, is indicative of the stature of our War
College and the emphasis that we are putting on it. I see the
young men and women out and about in the fleet adding thought,
adding their ideas. And I am satisfied with the product that we
are getting out of there.
The Chairman. I could ask the same question of the other
two gentlemen, but in the spirit of moving along, Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, gentlemen,
thanks for being with us.
Admiral Roughead, in putting together this plan, did you
folks look at where you think China will be with respect to
maritime power, where it is today, and where you think it will
be in 10 years?
Admiral Roughead. Mr. Hunter, we looked at changes in
navies around the world and what the maritime forces around the
world--how they were evolving, the technologies that were
coming into play, their growth.
Mr. Hunter. Specifically did you look at China? Probably
the Bangladesh Navy may not be of too much importance from our
perspective.
Admiral Roughead. We looked at China, yes, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Have you made any changes that you think are
substantive changes as a result of looking at China's emerging
maritime capability?
Admiral Roughead. I believe a point that you highlighted in
your opening statement was the concentration and focus of our
Navy and our strategy in the Western Pacific and in the Indian
Ocean region. And that concentration that we have called out
for is a function of the growth in navies in those parts of the
world, China in particular.
Mr. Hunter. That is an operational change, but have you
done anything with respect to the construct or the makeup of
the U.S. Navy, which as the Chairman has mentioned, is at an
all time low in terms of numbers and the ability to cover
important areas? But have you looked in your shipbuilding
program for the near future and for the long run? Have you made
any analysis with respect to whether we are going to need more
submarines, more missile platforms, the makeup of the U.S.
Navy? Have you looked at that?
Admiral Roughead. Mr. Chairman, we are always looking at
what the appropriate force mix and balance should be based on
evolving Naval trends around the world.
Mr. Hunter. Okay. Here is my question then. You said that
you have looked at the evolving trends of China and you have
looked at the emergence of China with its new maritime power.
Is that accurate?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Okay. Have you made any changes in the long-
range plans for construction of American vessels, whether
undersurface or surface vessels, as a result of looking at
China's evolution of their own maritime capability? Is there
any manifestation of changes that we made as a result of
looking at that?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, I believe if you look at the
capabilities that we are putting in.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Hunter, could we get the Admiral to pull
the microphone a little bit? He is speaking off to one side.
Mr. Hunter. Yeah, get that mike a little bit closer.
Admiral Roughead. All right, sir. We look at the
capabilities that navies have that are evolving, and China
being one of them. And that has driven our advancements in
certain capabilities, whether it be in antisubmarine warfare,
ballistic missile defense, the command-and-control capabilities
that we need on our ships as we operate globally as a global
Navy, the strategy outlines, the overarching principles that we
see. And then----
Mr. Hunter. But in terms, Admiral--I don't want to cut you
off, but those are all aspects of Naval warfare--in terms of
increasing or changing the mix in the construction programs
that will produce the Navy of the future, have you made any
changes there in terms of do we need more submarines? Do we
need more missile platforms? Do we need more aerial platforms?
Have you made any changes there as a result of the evolution of
Chinese maritime strength?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. Our force structure is
examined. And as we build our budgets we look at what the
current situations are around the world and we make adjustments
to that. For example, the Littoral Combat Ship was--even though
it has tremendous application in littorals, it is also capable
of running and providing enhanced anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
capability to our more traditional battle formations, our
expeditionary strike groups and carrier strike groups. So LCS
is a function of the need that we see for anti-submarine
warfare, mine warfare, and anti-surface warfare capability in
areas where we see the threat evolving.
Mr. Hunter. Okay. So you are saying that the LCS to some
degree has been derived from an analysis of where we think
China is going?
Admiral Roughead. We have derived LCS capabilities and
numbers from what we see with naval developments around the
world, to include China, to include the evolution of systems
that are proliferating around the world and can be used by
others. So that is what drives our calculus for our force
structure.
Mr. Hunter. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hunter. Dr. Snyder, please.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for
being here.
I wanted to ask a question that may seem unrelated to the
topic of ships and how many and platforms and all. I know this
is the summary document; we have got the full document, but
this is more colorful, ``A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower,'' and you have the three of your logos on it.
But your document is very clear that it is cooperation you are
asking for not just within the three of your organizations, but
beyond.
And the question I wanted to ask you is this. Secretary
Gates a couple of weeks ago gave his speech on soft power that
I am sure you have read some of the press reports about. He
gave it at Kansas State, and I quoted from it here a couple
days ago when he testified, in which he called for--you know,
here is the Secretary of Defense calling for dramatic increases
in funding for the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the State Department and the kinds of
functions that they have. And I thought we had a pretty good
discussion that day. And he did a very good job in discussing
that.
Ironically, or perhaps coincidentally, as we are coming
here today to do your hearing in which you talk about a
cooperative strategy, you talk about the importance of training
your junior people on cultural sensitivity and language skills,
and that you are not just a bunch of boats floating in the
water off the shore, that you have interaction with all the
places in the maritime community that you go to, and it is the
relationships that you build that allow for your effectiveness
in humanitarian relief and the kinds of things that can flare
up.
But what I want to ask you about, as you put on your broad
hat and looking at the full nature of our national security,
today's paper, in striking contrast with what Secretary Gates
was talking about three weeks ago, has a Karen DeYoung story in
The Washington Post: Diplomatic posts at the State Department
and U.S. Embassies worldwide will be cut by 10 percent next
year because of heavy staffing demands in Iraq and Afghanistan,
Director General Harry Thomas informed the Foreign Service
yesterday.
Now, if I stopped there, we could blame the State
Department; but we can't blame the State Department, we need to
blame ourselves, the Congress for this.
Reading on: The decision to eliminate the positions
reflects the reality that State does not have enough people to
fill them. Nearly one-quarter of all diplomatic posts are
vacant after hundreds of Foreign Service officers were sent to
embassies in Baghdad and Kabul, and Congress has not provided
funding for new hires. Many of the unfilled jobs will no longer
be listed as vacancies.
And that is just part of that story. I would like the three
of you to comment, as you put on your broad strategic hat, how
shortsighted are we as a Congress being if we are going to
allow this kind of cutback to occur in what many of us think is
an already understaffed, underfunded Diplomatic Corps and State
Department?
Start with you, General Conway. I would just like to hear
the three of you comment on that.
General Conway. Yes, sir. Sir, I wouldn't blame the
Congress as much as I would simply agree with what Secretary
Gates has said. My observations on the ground in Iraq and in
visiting Afghanistan is that the interagency is powerful. It
has got to be a partner in Phase 0, Phase 1 operations, and
then in Phase 4 and Phase 5. And it has simply not been
resourced or manned over time in order to allow it to do that.
So I don't know that the blame goes to any one place. I
think there needs to be a better case made in some instances
that there is an expeditionary culture or an ability to put
people forward where they are needed that I think you would
resource if convinced. But there is no question in my mind
about the absolute need now and in this long war.
Admiral Roughead. If I could just add on to that, there is
no question that when we come together with our partners in
State Department, and some of the missions that I talked about,
humanitarian assistance--for example, we are operating one of
our amphibious ships off the west coast of Africa--that when we
work together we can achieve some significant results, bring
increased cooperation into our operations. And it is a very
powerful force.
Admiral Allen. Sir, the Coast Guard lives in both of these
worlds, and so does our Department of Homeland Security. I
would say the challenge goes beyond State Department, and it
has to do with deployable capabilities that can construct civil
societies and do the things that are not kinetic related to the
mission that you are trying to accomplish. The problem is these
departments and agencies don't have people in garrison on a
deployment cycle ready to deploy. And that capacity and
capability is just not presently there, sir.
Dr. Snyder. I think that was one of the concerns that
Secretary Gates has. I talked to Mr. Armitage about it, and he
thinks that the Congress, we need to build in a 10 percent--
throw out a number--redundancy in the State Department, because
when we pull people from places like Afghanistan and Iraq, then
when you all want to go off the coast of West Africa, the
people aren't there because they have been pulled--the State
Department people and the other civilian agencies aren't there
because they have been pulled to do other jobs. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Dr. Gingrey, please.
Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Excuse me, Doctor, just one moment. I just
learned we not only have one vote, but we have, it appears,
four votes. And I will apologize to our distinguished
witnesses, but we will do our best to make your short recess as
short as possible. But it is necessary for us to make the
votes. But we shall return, and we beg your indulgence, and we
hope we have you for a great part of the day.
Doctor.
Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
General Conway, Chief, Admiral Roughead, Admiral Allen, we
thank all three of you for being here and for your service. I
am going to address my question to our new CNO, Admiral
Roughead. In regard to of course pursuing this national
military strategy and the national strategy for maritime
security, the joint pamphlet between the Navy, Marine Corps and
Coast Guard, a large focus, and I think rightly so, is on
securing the United States from direct attack.
And here is the question. What are the major seaborne
threats and what ability do the terrorists have to attack us
from the ocean? And I will address it first to Admiral
Roughead.
Admiral Roughead. Sir, the major seaborne threats, as I see
them, would be brought in largely through commercial
activities, because we do have the buffers of the oceans, a
great benefit that we enjoy. But it is also possible that as we
look to the future, and the strategy tries to take us out
decades, and we have seen proliferation of advanced weapons
systems around the world, whether they are submarines or
missiles, that in time one could see those types of threats
evolving. But in the near term, it really does deal with that
which can be brought in through normal means. And that is why
maritime security, maritime awareness, and our partnership with
the Coast Guard on being able to be aware of that which is
moving on and near our coastlines, that which is coming from
across the ocean, and then to be able to work in this
cooperative way with the Coast Guard is key to our homeland
security and homeland defense.
Dr. Gingrey. Well--and Admiral Allen may want to touch on
this as well, because I think, obviously, back on the attack on
the USS Cole, and the fact that so much of our equipment, our
maritime equipment and, of course, our great seamen and Marines
on that equipment are pulled into these ports all around the
world in some really tough neighborhoods. And it worries me.
So Admiral Allen, if you will comment on that as well, I
would appreciate it.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir, I think our goal should be to
create transparency on what is arguably the last global common.
And we have made great strides since the attacks of 9/11 to do
that; first of all, for mandatory carriage requirements for
transponders for all vessels greater than 300 gross tons that
we negotiated at the International Maritime Organization. And
we will be transitioning to long-range tracking. And that will
give us a view of what is legitimately operating out there. And
while it won't tell you who has got the machine turned off, you
can then sort and understand who is legitimate and who may not
be.
Beyond that, I think the next challenge we have to deal
with is vessels less than 300 gross tons that are not regulated
internationally. And these would be vessels capable of carrying
a weapon of mass destruction or an improvised explosive device
(IED). I am talking about down in the range of commercial
fishing vessels, recreational boats and work boats. And that is
a challenge that we are taking on in the Coast Guard, sir.
Dr. Gingrey. One other question before my time expires, and
our Chairman addressed this, Admiral Roughead, at the outset,
his first question with regard to are we strategically getting
the manpower, the brainpower that we need from the Naval War
College. And then I was sitting here thinking, now, do our
Marines, General Conway, do they go to the Naval War College or
do they primarily attend the Marine War College? I am not even
sure where that is located, if it is located, so you can
educate me on that? My point is is there some jointness in
regard to cross-training with our members of the Coast Guard,
the Navy and the Marines in regard to that educational
experience?
General Conway. The answer is absolutely, sir. All of our
War Colleges, both at the senior level and at the intermediate
level are purposefully joint because there is some real
learning that takes place in the seminars that you cannot have
in the larger classrooms. I would offer to you, sir, that I
think it is critically important that there be a good balance
there, though, with our young officers. They need to have the
operational experiences, they need to understand other
cultures, they need to have seen the world a little bit before
they move to the academic aspect of things, and then continue
to increase their knowledge base. Simply to be an analyst
without benefit of portfolio I think is not the person we are
looking for.
Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you. My time has expired,
and I will yield back, and I think we will probably be going to
vote soon.
The Chairman. Let me add this, Doctor. Let me tell you why
I am so proud of the Marine Corps. Back in 1988, when we did
our investigation of all the War Colleges, the command level
staff college of the Marine Corps did not get a good grade.
That was turned around 180 degrees. In addition thereto, they
established their very own senior War College, not a large one,
but a quality one. And I am just so proud of the fact that they
took professional military education so seriously. And as a
result, we have class--you know, you pick the service, class
intermediate and senior War Colleges today. But the Marine
Corps came a long way. And I really have to give credit to
General Al Gray for initiating that.
We do have these votes. We apologize. We will be back as
quickly as possible. Thank you.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. Our hearing will come back to order. Members
will be returning from the vote, but we should proceed.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just jump in
quickly.
Thank you all for coming today and for helping us
understand the cooperative strategy for 21st century seapower.
The question is really focused right now for Admiral Allen.
If you can talk a little bit about some of the issues that are
a little closer to home for me, but as they relate to the
strategy.
The first thing I want to ask is with regard to the Arctic,
how this particular cooperative strategy aligns with the needed
polar policy end capabilities. If you could speak to that
generally; then I want to get into specifics after that.
Admiral Allen. I would be happy to.
This year, we had the largest amount of receding ice in the
Arctic history, and the implications for traffic over the top
of Russia or potentially through the Northwest Passage raise
the spectrum of the need to have presence up there for any
range of missions that any of our services may have to
accomplish.
For that reason, we have initiated a requirements
development process to take a look at how we would execute our
missions that support the strategy, including search and rescue
operations, environmental response, critical infrastructure
protection and so forth. But I think we really need a reasoned
discussion on the requirements and what it means to operate at
high latitudes.
There is a work group that was established under the
National Security Council to look at the current Arctic policy
that was issued under a Presidential directive in 1994. All of
this is converging.
In the meantime, our commander up there is looking at
proofs of concept for both aviation and surface operations,
navigation issues, communications issues and so forth.
Mr. Larsen. Could you then talk a little bit about your
Deepwater acquisition program specifically? I am on the
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. We have had a lot
of discussions about it on that committee.
Can you talk about how the Deepwater acquisition assets
would fit into the cooperative strategy, as it relates to the
Arctic? Could you talk specifically about any specific assets
that would be supportive of the strategy?
Admiral Allen. I would be happy to do that, particularly as
to the capabilities of the National Security Cutter.
We just finished machinery trials last week. We are very
pleased with the progress there. With that contract, all
current issues have been resolved. We are commencing
construction on number three. We think this thing is being
stabilized in the way that the committee was looking for.
Coast Guard cutters, by their nature, have to be
interoperable with the Navy because, under statute, we can be
transferred to the Navy in times of war, but we also do a lot
of law enforcement work. We do a lot of work with Coalition
international partners on search and rescue and oil spill
response. Because of that, we are kind of a linking pin. We can
go down to low-tech and no-tech partners.
As far as executing the strategy of deploying a Coast Guard
cutter in concert with Navy assets out there in global fleet
station concepts, we have become a force multiplier at the
lower end in dealing with Coalition partners, and it makes a
perfect match.
Mr. Larsen. Can you talk a little bit about the Coast
Guard's polar icebreaking fleet and if it is meeting its
current mission performance requirements? If not, what will it
take to meet its performance requirements?
Admiral Allen. We currently have three icebreakers in the
U.S. inventory: the Polar Sea, the Polar Star, which are heavy-
duty icebreakers, and the Heely, which is an icebreaking
research vessel.
As it stands right now, we need to make some decisions on
the long-term future of the Polar Sea and the Polar Star
because they are approaching the end of their service life.
That needs to follow a very deliberate requirements development
process, which I addressed earlier.
But, quite frankly, those ships are going to have to be
addressed in the next 5 to 10 years. One is laid up in
commission special status. One is operating right now, but it
certainly is something we are going to have to get our arms
around in the future.
Mr. Larsen. We will need to further explore that.
For the three of you, is there a test case country where
you all--the Coast Guard, Marine Corps and the Navy--are
working together with that country, where we can sort of put
our minds around these cooperative strategies, or a country
right now where the three of you are cooperating and are trying
to develop an integrated approach with that particular country?
Can you help us understand?
Admiral Roughead. I think not so much a particular country,
Mr. Larsen, but, rather, the regions where we operate. For
example, we have the USS Fort McHenry, one of our amphibious
ships, that is operating off of the West Coast of Africa, and
it is a cooperative effort with us, with the Coast Guard, with
the other armed services, and with the host nations themselves.
It is this ability to come into an area, do training, work
on maritime security, schemes and thinking with those
countries. So it is more of a regional approach, and we get a
lot of benefit from that.
Admiral Allen. Yes. We have law enforcement attachments and
trainers that are deployed out of Fort McHenry. We just
finished a deployment with the Navy in the Caribbean with
Comfort, a hospital ship that deployed down there. There were
Coast Guard hospital corpsmen on board, as well.
Mr. Larsen. General Conway.
General Conway. I can only think of one instance, and it is
probably off the Philippines, working with the Philippines
Special Operations Forces, where we embarked aboard Navy ships
and were putting forces ashore on an infrequent basis.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. Okay. Thank you.
Maybe I will follow up later, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. LoBiondo.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I thank our panel for being here today and for the fine
work they do.
Admiral Allen, we have been hearing some rumors that there
might be a proposal to transfer the Coast Guard's safety
authorities and capabilities to some new entity or to a
different Federal agency.
Have you given any thought or can you comment on how you
think that would impact your ability to execute the cooperative
strategy?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. There has been some discussion
about whether or not the Marine's safety mission might be
located someplace else. It is our position that it belongs
inside the Coast Guard and that safety and security are
intimately intertwined.
A good example of the most robust international engagement
that the Coast Guard can do on behalf of the strategy is our
engagement with the International Maritime Organization, which
is the international maritime safety regulatory body.
In fact, two weeks ago, I led the U.S. mission to the 25th
Assembly there. This is where we negotiated the agreements on
long-range tracking and things that give better transparency to
the global commons. In my view, it is impossible to separate
safety and security within the Coast Guard's mission section,
and it should be retained there.
Mr. LoBiondo. So that would, in your view, definitely
impact your ability in the cooperative strategy?
Admiral Allen. It would, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. Also, Admiral Allen, how do the Coast Guard's
specific capabilities complement the cooperative strategy? It
is a broad term, and it is big concept, but I am trying to
connect the dots on some basics, on some specifics.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. I noted in my opening statement
that, when we go into a country on a visit, we deal with a lot
of ministries other than the Ministry of Defense by virtue of
the portfolio of the missions that we have. It could be the
interior ministry, public safety or, in the case of China, the
communications ministry. This allows us a broader reach in
doing shaping and international engagement that could preclude
conflicts in the future.
Right now, we have three advisors deployed to South Korea
to assist in oil spill response, and that would be a good
example.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to all of you for being here. Thank you so much
for your service.
I was going to follow up, actually, General Conway, with
the Chairman's question, because I wanted to have you have a
chance to express your concern also about the educational
opportunities that our mid-level servicemembers are having.
As one thing just to throw out there, and perhaps you can
follow up, I am just wondering to what extent we are really
tracking to see whether we have an increasing number of
servicemembers taking advantage of classes, whether they are
getting the time, on ship or dwell time, to enable them to take
advantage of those classes.
Is there any way of really seeing whether there has been a
drop, when there is an increase, how we determine that, and how
we are able to effect that into making sure that our young
people are really getting the kind of educational opportunities
that they need, especially when they are serving on ship or in
country?
General Conway. Ma'am, I would talk, first of all, to the
professional education aspect of this and say that, although
with our operating tempo (OPTEMPO) there have been pressures to
offset the requirement for promotion and selection to command
and those types of things, we have not done so. We have tried
to make it easier for our Marines, both officers and enlisted,
with online courses and seminar courses and that manner of
thing. But before every promotion board, every selection board,
there is the requirement that that Marine be, quote,
``professional military education (PME) complete'' before he or
she receives serious consideration.
So we consider it the strategic thinking that we are going
to have to have, the strong operational thinking we are going
to have to have on down range. And it is just not one of those
standards that we are willing to forego in spite of, again, the
very significant tempo that we are experiencing right now.
Admiral Roughead. If I could add to that, ma'am, our
process is very similar. The path to promotion is through
professional education, professional military education. We
have, in our major fleet concentration, areas and opportunities
for our officers to take advantage of that.
Although, I would say that, while that is very important
and it allows us to increase the numbers that are in that
program, there is much to be said for going to the institution
itself, to the war college. Because it is when you immerse in
that environment and when you are there and in seminars and
your total focus is on joint military education and on
professional military education and you do not have the daily
churn and demands of your job, it is a much richer experience.
You get better cross-pollenization. Therefore, we cannot take
our eye off of that either.
Mrs. Davis of California. I agree. I think it is critically
important. And my concern would be whether or not we are seeing
some diminution of that, partly because we have so many people
who are deployed for longer periods of time. And I would just
hope that we would be watching that and seeing whether there is
a point at which we need to be concerned about it.
The other issue, and I think it has been mentioned, is in
terms of language and to be able to track and to see, you know,
again, the extent to which regional expertise and language
expertise is being developed and people are taking advantage of
that.
We should be, really, having a surge of that kind of
interest, I think, and applicability. And I would think, during
this time, perhaps that is not the case.
Admiral Roughead. Well, our policy, particularly for our
officer accession programs, is that they must take some
regional courses or language courses. That has been worked into
our institutions.
For our enlisted force, we, as our groups deploy, provide
regional expertise information to them. In the last few years,
the step up in our attention on that has been significant.
Mrs. Davis of California. If I could turn for a moment just
to the humanitarian assistance, because that has obviously been
a very important part of the work that you all do and over
which you have, I think, a great deal to offer.
Are we ensuring that we have the right mix of personnel to
conduct these operations in the future while supporting our
other core capabilities? How are we doing that in terms of our
health-care needs and whether or not, in fact, we are training
the physicians who are going to be available for those kinds of
missions in the future? Is that a concern?
Admiral Roughead. The way that we have done the
humanitarian missions--and my experience has been that I was
intimately involved in the tsunami relief and in the deployment
of our hospital ships in the proactive way that our strategy
calls for.
We go through a vetting process as we put the teams
together. One, what are the types of skills that we think we
will need in that particular area? Then we go through a very
formal vetting to make sure that we are not depleting those
skills in our medical treatment facilities that are important
to our sailors and to our families.
Then, of course, we reach out to other services, to the
host nation and to nongovernmental organizations, which
minimizes the demand that is placed on us.
General Conway. Ma'am, I do have a mild concern, and that
is just with the number of Marine expeditionary units, or now
the expeditionary support groups, that we are able to put out
at any one time. We have what we call a ``1-0 presence.'' there
is one at all times in the Central Command region, but we are
not covering Europe like we used to. We are not covering the
Pacific completely.
We have had some very good fortune with ships and with
people being in the right place with some of the catastrophes
that we have had, but we can only hope that we continue to be
lucky, because we are not covering the planet like we used to.
Mrs. Davis of California. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Admiral Roughead, at a Seapower Subcommittee hearing in
October, our subcommittee raised several questions relative to
the adequacy of the 60 Sierra to perform adequately a number of
missions. I would like, with your permission, sir, to submit
some questions for the record relative to these helicopters and
to your future planning.
In your maritime strategy, you mentioned climate change as
a factor in changing the global security environment. There is
another factor which, if the environmental changes loom large,
these changes will be huge, and that is changes that will occur
because of an increasing scarcity of the amount of oil that the
world would like to use.
We have had four Government studies--two of them in 2005,
two of them just this year--that were paid for by your
Government, that were ignored by your Government, that were all
saying essentially the same thing, that the peaking of oil--
that is, the world's ability to produce oil--is maxing out. The
peaking of oil is either present or imminent, with potentially
devastating consequences.
There are two major entities which track oil around the
world and which do prognostications. I would pay little
attention to their prognostications, but they do a very good
job of documenting what has happened. This is the International
Energy Administration and the Energy Information Agency in our
country. Both of them have been tracking the production of
crude oil around the world. If you look at their graphs, both
of them show that the world has reached a maximum and is down a
bit from that maximum that it reached in the production of
crude oil. This reality, of course, is reflected in the fact
that crude oil is now more than $90 a barrel.
China, as you know, is going around the world, buying up
all of the oil it can at the same time that it is aggressively
building a blue-water navy. With 1.3 billion people, the time
may come when China will not be able to share the oil which it
owns with the rest of the world. That will produce some
enormous challenges and dislocations in the world, and I wonder
why this very real potential for future challenge was not
included in your maritime strategy.
Admiral Roughead. Well, I would say, Mr. Bartlett, that the
strategy calls out for where we must be and the types of
capabilities that we must have. As we translate those
requirements into what we buy, I believe that is where we look
at what is the proper source of propulsion, the proper source
of power generation.
And it is in that process that we then take a look at,
given the future that we see, what are the decisions that we
must make to have the robust, capable fleet and fleet in
numbers for the future.
Mr. Bartlett. Of all of the institutions in our country,
our military is more effectively addressing the energy
challenge than any other. I appreciate that.
As a whole, of course, our country is doing a tiny fraction
of what it needs to be doing in this area, but you mentioned
climate change, you know, the melting of the polar ice so that
we now have access to resources there and maybe sea routes
through there and the flooding of low-lying areas, which
require the need for more humanitarian aid. So you are looking
to the future and in how you would structure our maritime
forces to meet these challenges.
Don't you think that the increasing scarcity of crude oil
in the world will potentially create even bigger challenges and
a bigger need to look at our strategy for the future than
global warming? Global warming is probably not going to produce
any big effects for maybe a half a century.
I will tell you, sir, I do not think we will make it
through a decade without some major international dislocations
as a result of competition for energy. I am not sure how this
would impact what your planning for the future is, but I think,
certainly, it needs to be a factor in that planning.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. And I believe that, in our
strategy, we clearly call out for the effects of the
competition for resources. And that played no small part in
where we have focused our attention and have called for a focus
of attention, which is in the Arabian Gulf, in the Indian Ocean
region and in the Western Pacific, where energy will become a
driver of what takes place.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Taylor, please.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our very, very distinguished guests for
being with us and for serving the Nation.
Commandant Allen, I am going to start with you. I want to
first thank you for letting me visit the Baltimore shipyard
last weekend. It gave me a much better appreciation for the
challenges of the 110's, 123s. It also, quite frankly, left me
more angry than I went there, knowing that eight very capable
vessels were turned over to the yard that built them in order
to modify them. That yard was given a performance spec. And I
am told by the very capable Coast Guard captain who walked us
through the yard that, almost immediately after those boats
were delivered, even before they saw any sort of a sea state,
that the engines started being out of alignment because the
hulls started deflecting almost as soon as they engaged the
clutches on the engines.
I would remind the commandant that other Government
agencies--and, as you know, we have been through Hurricane
Katrina--starting with the Corps of Engineers, have the right
to tell contractors who are not living up to their expectations
on one contract that we are not even going to consider you for
the next until you fix the first one. And the Corps, I know,
did that with a number of debris haulers. I would like to know
if you have the legal authority to do that under present law.
I would also like to put you and the contractor in question
on notice that, on the next Coast Guard authorization bill, if
this is not resolved to your satisfaction and to the taxpayers'
satisfaction above all, it is my intention to have those eight
vessels heretofore known as the ``Bollinger class.'' I think
our contractors deserve a big pat on the back when they give us
a good vessel, but when they design something and they build it
and they modify it and they screw it up and they do not assume
responsibility for that, then, again, we are going to help them
assume responsibility for that. So I hope this message is
delivered to your contracting folks.
I am curious. On the contracting, do you have the authority
right now to say, ``Look, until you straighten this out, you
are never getting another contract''?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. Under our current contract award
procedures, we are able to include past performance, and we do.
And that does bear in the decision-making process, moving
forward. We appreciate your continued support, and this is a
difficult situation.
Just to advise you on where we are, we have revoked the
acceptance of those boats. We have made that notification to
the contractor. They have provided us information back in
rebuttal. We are getting very close to what we would call a
contracting officer's determination on our final position on
it. Then that will take us to our next step, whether it is in
the courts or whatever.
We will keep you advised, sir. We thank you for your
interest.
Mr. Taylor. Again, these are assets of the people of the
United States of America. And if someone--again, if he built
it, if he modified it, if there were a performance spec and if
it did not work, as far as I am concerned, Bollinger Shipyard
is responsible, and they need to fix it. Either that or give
their money back to the Nation.
Admiral Roughead, I hope you are aware that this year's
Defense Authorization Bill calls for the next generation of
nuclear cruiser. The next generation of cruiser is to be
nuclear-powered.
You were kind enough to give me a book on Admiral Nimitz
and how his efforts in Hawaii led to a series of events leading
to other books about the war in the Pacific, the most recent
about Howse's typhoon.
Do you know what initiated the series of events that caused
Admiral Howse's fleet to sail into that typhoon, the series of
historical events that led to the sinking of the three
destroyers and of also the 900 sailors?
Admiral Roughead. It dealt with the need to fuel those
ships----
Mr. Taylor. That is correct.
Admiral Roughead [continuing]. And the decisions that were
made to ballast or not ballast. I believe that is what you are
getting at, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. That is exactly what I am getting at, Admiral.
Again, you know, for all of the reasons we outlined earlier
in the year, as far as I am concerned, that was the icing on
the cake. Any potential peer or foe is going to recognize our
Nation's, as the great Congressman from Maryland pointed out,
vulnerability when our fuel supply is cut off.
For that reason--and remember, they had to get far enough
away from the Philippines where they could not be attacked by
land-based aircraft while they were refueling. If another
scenario like that in the Pacific were to take place, I know
that you do not want to see our carriers vulnerable while the
ships that are protecting the carriers are refueling.
So I would encourage you--the Senate has passed this, and
the House has passed this. I fully anticipate the President
will sign it. We have got about seven years to put the plans
together for these vessels.
Quite frankly, it is going to be the one part of the ship
where we have a pretty good idea of how much it is going to
cost. Everything else is up in the air. So let's go ahead and
let's get this going and let's get those ships in the fleet.
General Conway, again, thank you for working with us on the
expeditionary fighting vehicle. I do appreciate the Marine
Corps's willingness to look at options to make the vehicle more
mine-resistant. I think it is fair to say that the ranking
member and I are not yet sold on your solution, but we do want
to continue to work with you, and we do appreciate your looking
at other options to make it more mine-resistant.
We appreciate all three of you in your service to our
Nation.
The Chairman. Mr. Taylor triggered my thought, Admiral
Roughead, of which I will subject you to again, that we in
Congress do our homework. Sometimes we are able to look at the
problems you have that extend beyond today or tomorrow vis-a-
vis the work that we did over four years, which, as you full
well know, we call Goldwater-Nichols.
When Mr. Taylor makes reference to fuel problems, to oil
refueling problems, we take this very seriously. And it is our
baby, because we are the ones who are constitutionally charged
with raising and maintaining the military. And we intend to
work with you.
Then we hope that you will understand the depth with which
we pass the measure regarding our future cruisers. I know I
speak for Mr. Taylor and for Mr. Bartlett. Their subcommittee
will work very, very closely with you on this.
I use as an example Goldwater-Nichols, which is now part of
your culture, which, as I told you recently, every member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff was adamant against, but at the end
of the day, to you all's credit, you made it work. And it has
done a good thing for our Nation and for, hopefully, the other
work that we do, including, the issue of which Mr. Taylor spoke
would befall that category.
Do you have a comment on that, sir?
Admiral Roughead. I do, Mr. Chairman. I am a great
proponent of the work that you did and how it has transformed
our military. We talk about things that are transformational--
it is not always equipment--and I think that that is a case in
point.
I have spoken with Mr. Taylor about this, and we know that,
as we go through our analysis on our designs and force
structure, that the cost of building a nuclear cruiser is going
to be significantly higher than it would not be, as far as
acquisition cost.
The concern I have is how will we then resource the rest of
the shipbuilding program that we need when we have a
significant cost up front, perhaps to be regained as we go
through the life cycle of the ship. But I am concerned about
what the initial ship costs will be and what that will do to
fleet size because of the rate of procurement that we can have.
The Chairman. Admiral, you are looking at the people who
are going to solve that for you.
Admiral Roughead. All right, sir. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Jones, please.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
General Conway, this is a personal issue, that I want to
publicly thank you,on behalf of Congressman Gene Taylor and
myself, for what you did to help the Jerome Lee family in
Mississippi. I think that the services of the Marine Corps, the
Navy, the Coast Guard, the Army and of the Air Force are
special, and too many times we forget that our fighting men and
women have a big heart. So I just want to say thank you, sir.
General, I do have a question regarding the 33 amphibious
ships of which you have been ordered to satisfy the issue
addressed in the maritime strategic document. I ask this
question because we have you and General Roughead here. How is
this program going? Is it working together well to fulfill
these requirements of these 33 amphibious ships?
General Conway. Sir, I will take the first part of it and
say that I am very comfortable that the Navy and the Marine
Corps have worked together closely to identify what the
requirement is to put two brigades in assault across another
enemy shore, the forceable entry capability that we must have
as a Nation.
We have gone to Quantico. We have worked together on a
computer load-out, which is what we would use to put those two
brigades aboard ship. The number, actually, comes to 34 ships
in the total requirement, 17 ships for each brigade. But in
deference to the CNO shipbuilding plan, my predecessor said we
can live with 30. We can do some things on black bottoms that
will augment.
So I have maintained that line of reasoning and have said,
if the requirement is 30 ships, if you apply 85 percent of
availability against that, then we need probably 33 ships in
order to have that capacity ready on short notice.
I have had those conversations with the previous CNO.
Admiral Roughead and I have had those conversations, and I
think we are in general agreement on the requirement. At this
point, I think the determination is, do we extend old ships for
a longer life cycle or do we build new ships to get to that
number? But we are confident that the CNO understands and the
Navy understand the requirement.
Admiral Roughead. If I could, Mr. Jones, the way that I
look at things--and I do not believe that there is a lot of
daylight between General Conway and myself--is that there are
requirements and then there is what we can afford. While I
agree on the requirement, I also have the obligation to you to
be able to produce a shipbuilding plan that is fiscally
possible.
So, as we go through our process in the coming years, the
requirement is there, and we will work very closely together to
realize the capability for our country and for our Navy and
Marine Corps that gives us the capability that is important and
that is called out in the maritime strategy.
Mr. Jones. Admiral, I appreciate that. And that is why I am
pleased that the Chairman is Gene Taylor and that the ranking
member is Roscoe Bartlett, because I know that these two men
will do what is necessary to make sure that our Marine Corps
and our Navy have exactly what they need to defend this country
and the interests of this country.
I have one last question. I think I have a little bit of
time.
General Conway, considering the Marine Corps's end-strength
will increase by 9,000, what is the state of the Marine Corps?
You might have had this question earlier. I was at Walter
Reed, visiting the troops, and I missed votes, and I missed
being here. If you had that question, I apologize. But if you
did not, Camp Lejeune is in my district, and it is a growing
base, and we are happy about that, but can you speak to the
question I asked?
General Conway. First of all, sir, I would say we are going
to go by a total of 27,000 over the next 5 years. And if you
look at those metrics that help our leadership to define the
health of the Corps, they are all pretty good. I mean, we are
working hard, and the first tempo for operational forces is
seven months deployed and seven months home. We consider our
families to be the most brutal part of that whole equation
because Marines are essentially doing what Marines joined our
Corps to do.
Re-enlistment rates are increasing, really, every year
compared to what they were the year before. We recruited not
5,000 in this first year, which was our goal, but actually
7,000 young Americans to be Marines, without reducing our
standards in the slightest.
Our equipment is getting worn-out, admittedly, but that
said, this committee and others have helped us with reset
costs, and we have the expectation that that will continue to
be the case as we posture for the long war and for whatever
might follow in years to come.
So, all in all, I feel pretty good about where we are right
now, sir, to be honest with you.
Mr. Jones. Thank you, General.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman from North Carolina.
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the panel for being with us here today.
Admiral Roughead, I want to just follow up on your comments
about the fiscal challenge that you face. In looking at your
testimony, it states that the 313-ship force represents the
maximum acceptable risk in meeting the security demands of the
21st century.
Given the fact that today we are at 280, it sort of begs
the question about whether or not we are at a point of
unacceptable risk. And I just wonder if you could maybe fill in
that blank.
Admiral Roughead. I would not call it unacceptable risk,
but I do believe that we have moderate risk in our ability to
conduct the range of missions that we have around the world
and, as I found out firsthand when I was in the Pacific, that I
could have used more ships of differing types to be able to
conduct operations that span the spectrum that our Navy is
expected to perform.
Getting to 313 ships is a priority. I believe that is what
we need as a Navy, as a minimum. In my four years that I have
ahead of me, I am going to be working to achieve that
objective.
Mr. Courtney. Again, you have a lot of friends in this
room, but having just sort of gone through this process as a
new Member just this year--and again, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Bartlett,
Mr. Skelton and Mr. Hunter obviously moved heaven and earth to
try and get both the defense bill out of this committee and the
budget bill to a higher level--it seems to me that, as to what
is projected in terms of the $14 billion a year over the next
few years, it almost has to work perfectly to get to that
number, because there just cannot be any cost overruns, given
the strains that that is under.
Admiral Roughead. Well, I believe there are many things
that have to come into play: making sure that, particularly in
my area of responsibility, we accurately define the
requirements; that those requirements are what we need, not
just want; that we then have in place some accurate costing
processes to determine what the cost is; that we then have the
oversight on the programs, as we build those programs, to
ensure that we are staying within those cost controls; and
also, that we have an ongoing process to ensure that, as
classes are being built, that we do not see what I call a
requirements creep, which is often the case.
I have seen it time and time again, and we have to have the
discipline to say, no, we are not going there because it will
cost us out of business.
Mr. Courtney. Okay. Again, it just seems that the
trajectory of what you have to reach or of what you are
shooting to reach and what the budget is that is being
projected is a pretty big challenge for you. Hopefully, as you
go through that, that is something that you will be--I do not
mean this in a negative way. I mean, hopefully, we are going to
get a straight picture, you know, from the Pentagon about
whether these pieces are really falling into place with the
numbers that are being projected.
Admiral Roughead. You will from me, sir.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Sestak,
please.
Mr. Sestak. Thank you for your time.
Admiral, I guess Mr. Hunter had asked the question--I have
come and gone, and I may have missed it--on the LCS. You just
mentioned you were out on the Pacific.
If you had to say what the major areas are of focus that
you might do regarding China--and I do not mean that as an
adversary, but Taiwan is like a dog with two tails, us and
China. If Taiwan shakes, we just have an honest broker's role
to play.
What are your number-one and number-two areas of concern
regarding the maritime capability we want to bring forward? Not
concern--that would probably be your priority out there.
Admiral Roughead. I would say that, for me--and I lump it
into the context of what will it take to keep the sea lanes
open. I have for a long time been someone who has focused on
antisubmarine warfare because of the ability of just one
submarine to cause enough uncertainty and confusion that it
could shut down the flow of commerce, which would be absolutely
critical, or the flow of our supplies should we be in conflict.
So antisubmarine warfare is a very high priority for me.
Mr. Sestak. I am sorry; I did not mean to interrupt. Was
there one more? That is your number one?
Admiral Roughead. That is where my number-one focus has
been.
Mr. Sestak. Before you go on to your next, your answer to
Mr. Hunter mentioned the capabilities of ASW for the LCS and
for the anti-surface warfare (ASUW). But this year, the Navy
cancelled the Advanced Deployable System (ADS), the major ASW
capability that we are supposed to have on the LCS. The
modeling that has been attendant to how good the LCS would be
in ASW in a scenario in the Western Pacific has relied almost
exclusively, not totally--it has the Romeo, but the Romeo has
to stay close on an ADS. So did we make the right decision to
cancel ADS if that is your number-one priority out there?
And, number two, is LCS to be a player in that scenario in
ASW?
Admiral Roughead. I----
Mr. Sestak. Okay. I will follow up--I am sorry--at this
time. I apologize. Go ahead.
Admiral Roughead. No. I would say that, as I come into my
job and as we look to the 2009 budget and 2010 budget, clearly,
looking at our capabilities across a broad spectrum--ASW for
one, air defense for another, ballistic missile defense--we
really have to get away from looking at just the platforms and
look at the systems that give us the capability.
Mr. Sestak. That is not a platform. ADS was meant to be
off-ship----
Admiral Roughead. Right.
Mr. Sestak [continuing]. Which seems to me where the Navy
was headed for a while. It is not platform on platform. If the
Chinese have more submarines than we do today, we just cannot
build enough submarines to go one on one. So the concept, to my
understanding, was to get these with off-board ASW capability,
throw them out there, and they will kind of track them.
So why did we cancel ADS if LCS is the priority?
Admiral Roughead. Well, as you know, as we go through our
budget process, there are priorities that drive cancellations
or additions or sustainment. And my view is that, as we go into
our Palm 10 process, we have to look at what capabilities we
are going to buy. And I fully recognize that it is not a
platform, but what we have to do is look at it holistically and
see where we get the most bang for the buck. ASW is an area
that I am going to be paying particular attention to.
Mr. Sestak. Admiral and General, in your testimony, you
have mentioned seabasing, but I didn't notice seabasing in
yours, sir, or even in this. Has the Navy walked away from the
concept of joint seabasing? I may have missed it, but that
seemed to be, for a number of years, where the naval service
was going, conceptually.
Admiral Roughead. I have not walked away from seabasing. In
fact, the discussions that we have discuss that.
Mr. Sestak. Should it have been in here if it is still a
part of the ethos of the Navy?
Admiral Roughead. What we did is, as we were developing
that strategy, we talked more about the capabilities that we
wanted and that we believe are relevant to the future. Then as
we go into our operating concepts and then into our strategic
plan, that is where I believe we put the fine definition on the
``seabase'' and the types of things that we have to acquire to
be part of that seabasing.
Mr. Sestak. I am out of time. Thank you.
The Chairman. Before I recognize Mr. Cummings, let me
interject.
There was a certain class of Coast Guard cutters--I think
they were called the 110's--that you tried to extend by 13
feet, and it didn't work; am I correct?
Admiral Allen. That is correct, sir.
The Chairman. I don't think the Navy has ever had similar
problems. From this country boy, whose only experience with a
body of water is called the Missouri River, I am having a
little difficult time as to why we didn't have the expertise to
say, ``Hey, these things are going to buckle; something bad is
going to happen,'' but no one did, which raises the thought
with this Missouri River-bound country boy as to why we don't
have, in some instances, common hulls with the United States
Navy.
Is there some problem with it? Do you all speak about these
things and say, ``Hey, let us try this together''?
Do you ever do that, Admiral?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. In fact, those conversations got
started a year and a half ago when I became the commandant
within the CNO.
Admiral Mullen--in fact, Admiral Roughead and I are
scheduled to meet after the first of the year in these ongoing
series of warfighter talks. And the topic for that meeting is
the side-by-side comparison of LCS and the National Security
Cutter (NSC), not just hull forms but systems and subsystems--
the deck gun, the radar and so forth.
As I had told Admiral Mullen before I became the Chairman,
I think you are going to see us up here more often together,
answering these types of questions, because they are the right
questions to be asked, sir.
I will tell you this just in general, and then I will throw
it to Admiral Roughead. The employment and the concept of
operations for the LCS and for the NSC are different, and that
does drive some of the hull considerations. LCS is looking for
speed. They operate with oilers. We look for high endurance,
for the ability to loiter.
We operate independently, and that does take you different
places on the hull design, but it is a perfectly legitimate
question to ask. We need to be talking about it. We need to
provide you answers based on our conversation, sir.
The Chairman. It sounds like a major step in the right
direction.
Admiral.
Admiral Roughead. Clearly, in the environment we are in,
the need to be more cooperative and collaborative on systems
and even on ship types is something that we have to continue to
assess. That is the path that we are on. But as Admiral Allen
pointed out, sometimes our mission requirements are different,
and then that, in turn, drives the ship design. Wherever we can
reach commonality, that is where we are going to go.
The Chairman. That is great. I know you will keep the
Subcommittee on Seapower fully advised on that----
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir.
The Chairman [continuing]. At the beginning of the year.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to also thank you, Mr. Chairman, for raising the
issue that you just raised. As Chairman of the Subcommittee on
the Coast Guard under the Transportation Committee, I can tell
you that Congressman Taylor also sits on that subcommittee, and
we have urged the commandant of the Coast Guard to work closely
with the Navy. We just think that it is a good combination and
that it makes a lot of sense, as the Chairman was just saying.
Let me just address a few questions to you, Admiral Allen.
Does the Coast Guard's involvement in this strategy mean that
any of the Coast Guard's missions will change in any
significant way? Will your relationship with the Navy change?
Or is the strategy more an articulation of the kinds of
relationships and joint activities you already undertake with
the Navy?
Admiral Allen. Sir, you have summarized that absolutely
correctly. What we are actually doing is institutionalizing and
codifying relationships that have been built over 2 centuries.
Quite frankly, even though we are building new classes of
ships, the old ships are still operating and deploying. For
instance, we had a medium-endurance cutter deployed to the Gulf
of Guinea this last year.
We are actually bringing this into our governance in an
integrated synchronization structure that will actually allow
us to be more effective with the resources we have, sir.
Mr. Cummings. As you know, of course, the Subcommittee on
the Coast Guard is very concerned about the need to ensure that
the Coast Guard adequately balances its traditional missions,
particularly Marine safety, with its significant new homeland
security missions and with the missions it is undertaking in
support of the Navy and of our U.S. operations around the
world. While that will be required to implement the full range
of missions and vision in the new cooperative agreement, the
Coast Guard has to also work to fine-tune this balance.
How will the services' participation in this new strategy
affect the services' ability to carry out their traditional
missions, such as ensuring the effective regulation of the
commercial maritime industry?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. It is a great question. In fact,
it allows us an opportunity to integrate at a higher level,
both at safety and security, in furthering the needs of that
other nation and our services.
Specifically, I think the greatest synergy that we bring to
this strategy is our involvement with the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), which is the international safety
regulatory body. The fact that the Coast Guard leads the
mission to the General Assembly is a way that we can deal with
it.
And I will give you a good example. We dealt with both a
Marine safety and a security issue with the last General
Assembly. One was a resolution on how to move forward with
coastal states that are involved with piracy issues, mainly
Somalia. The other issue we dealt with was ballast water
management and the issue of invasive species.
I don't think you are going to find an ability to bring
those types of things together in an international forum to
promote the aims of the strategy, which is to shape and to make
sure that we can avert wars in the future by working
internationally, sir.
Mr. Cummings. One of the things I failed to say, Mr.
Chairman, also, is that one of the proudest moments for the
Coast Guard was during Hurricane Katrina, when they saved over
30,000 people, 20,000 of whom would have perished if it were
not for the Coast Guard. And I think that so often goes
unnoted.
Going back to the strategy document, it says, quote, ``To
successfully implement this strategy, the sea services must
collectively expand core capabilities of U.S. seapower to
achieve a blend of peacetime engagement and major combat
operational capabilities.''
We have core capabilities specifically and, within the
Coast Guard, the need to be expanded as part of the effort to
ensure the effective implementation of the maritime strategy,
particularly given that the Coast Guard has significant
responsibilities for ensuring the maritime security of the
United States, but it is obviously much, much smaller than any
DOD services.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. We are required by title 14,
chapter 2, to be interoperable with the Navy should the
President elect to transfer us to the Navy in times of major
war. The last time that occurred was in World War II, when that
indeed did happen.
That drives the need for all of our core capabilities at
some level to be interoperable with the Navy, should that
happen. That also drives the discussion we just had earlier
about would you look at the NSC and the LCS. Even if the hull
forms are different, they have to be interoperable. We train at
the same standards. We go through the same shake-down and
refresher training that the Navy does, and that is how we
accomplish the ability to integrate.
So, as we grow core capabilities, there is no distinction
or conflict between our core mission set and what we need to do
to operate with the Navy, because it is legally mandated
anyway, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
With that, I yield back.
The Chairman. Duncan Hunter has questions again.
Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Roughead, as the Chief of Naval Operations, I am
sure that you know some of these facts. In terms of commercial
shipbuilding, China is turning out 5,000 commercial ships a
year versus 300 by the United States. They are turning out
three submarines a year versus one by the United States. And
undergirding that production is a production of 480 million
tons of steel versus 99 million tons for the United States, a
five-to-one advantage.
All of that is giving them the industrial base that could
allow the Chinese naval capability to outstrip the United
States if they turn that commercial shipbuilding capability
into a warship-building capability.
Now, I have looked at your plan for construction, and I see
no adjustments in the American plan for construction that
reflects this change and this emergence of Communist China's
naval power as a major security concern for the U.S.
In my estimation, there is something else you should be
doing. We are sending China $200 billion a year more than they
are sending us. They are utilizing American trade dollars to
arm, clearly, and they are complementing the homemade or
country-made naval construction with acquisition from places
like Russia, where they are purchasing the sovereign mini-class
missile destroyers. You are aware of that.
I think you should be weighing in with the Administration
with respect to their trade policy, because that high cash flow
that is going to China from American consumers each year
pursuant to these unfair trade policies is being translated
into military power.
So my first question is, have you engaged with the
Administration on the need to adjust our maritime construction
strategy?
And second, have you engaged with the Administration on the
need to stop China's cheating on trade and this massive trade
imbalance, which is being translated into security problems for
your sailors and Marines?
Admiral Roughead. Well, Mr. Hunter, as you know, our
engagement on our shipbuilding policy is through the
Administration and the programs that we put forth. But I have
not engaged on trade policy with the Administration.
Mr. Hunter. Well, that is a very small answer to a much
bigger question. With respect to the increased production, in
terms of them outstripping us by three to one on submarine
production, and your own figures show that they are going to
eclipse us in submarine numbers in 2011--maybe a little
earlier, maybe a little later, depending which analysis you go
with--clearly that should be a concern to you.
Admiral Roughead. Well, it is.
Mr. Hunter. Clearly, this massive commercial shipbuilding
capability should be a concern to you.
Admiral Roughead. I have had the opportunity to visit their
yards that have built commercial and military ships, and they
are state-of-the-art. They are very competitive on the world
market. And there is no question that their shipbuilding
capability is increasing rapidly, and I believe that not in the
distant future it will likely surpass Korea as the prominent
shipbuilder in the world today.
Mr. Hunter. Does that give you any concern?
Admiral Roughead. As someone who is involved in the
maritime interests of this country, the fact that our
shipbuilding capacity and industry is not as competitive as
other builders around the world is cause for concern.
Mr. Hunter. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Admiral Roughead, did we ever receive any
official explanation from China, to your knowledge, as to why
they refused the harboring of the Kitty Hawk and the two
minesweepers, the two minesweepers that I understand were in
weather distress? Did we ever receive any official explanation
for that?
Admiral Roughead. With respect to the information that I
have received, it is categorized as a misunderstanding. And
then we have moved forward and have moved beyond that and are
continuing to work with the Chinese Government to continue the
program of ship visitations that we have had.
The Chairman. Okay. That was a great surprise to me because
of the cordiality and openness that our delegation received in
China in just this last August. I was very surprised.
Admiral Roughead. The interest that I have in the military-
to-military relationship is to get to the heart of exactly what
you are talking about, Mr. Chairman, to be able to better
understand their process, their decisionmaking process, to
better gauge the intent and where they plan on going with their
navy and how they intend to employ that navy. And I believe
that, through the military-to-military interaction that we
have, we can gain insight into the intent of the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and the People's Republic of China
(PRC).
The Chairman. You may recall--Admiral Ferguson is with us--
you may recall that we had an excellent briefing from their
navy, as well as a visit aboard one of their ships. And I
thought they were very, very open to our delegation at the
time.
Mr. Taylor has additional questions.
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, again, I wanted each of you to know how much I respect
you, how grateful I am for your service to our Nation. And I am
grateful that you are here today.
It is a nice, pretty slick brochure, but at the end of the
day it really didn't do very much for our country.
A couple things I wish I had heard in this brochure--and it
starts first with the Navy and the Marine Corps. In my time in
Congress, I have seen a tendency by the Navy to give second-
class treatment to Marine Corps requests. And that starts with
the big-deck amphibs. It is like, ``Well, the Marines will get
that on their own. We won't make it a priority in our
requests.''
And, Admiral, I know you are new on the job. I know the
Commandant is new on the job. I know this Commandant is fairly
new on the job. I would hope, in addition to slick brochures,
that in the future we see the Navy giving a higher preference
to amphibs. I was deeply disappointed to see the second amphib
that this committee put into the bill, that the House
appropriators funded, did not get similar treatment from the
Senate. And I think, quite frankly, if the Navy had weighed in
and said, yeah, we need it, the fleet is at an all-time low
post-World War I, and it is in the budget, doggone it, we hope
you guys will keep it in there.
Second thing that I would ask of you--and, again, both of
you are fairly new in this job, but I would hope that, between
the Commandant of the Coast Guard and the CNO, that you will
set the standard for, in the future, greater use of common
hulls. Each of you come to me individually and say we are not
buying enough to get any sort of economy of scale. That is why
they are so darn expensive; that is why we need so much money.
But I have never, in 18 years, seen the Coast Guard and the
Navy really sit down and say, what hulls can we use?
Historically, the Coast Guard has used a heck of a lot of
Navy surplus hulls. They worked very well. The ship that saved
the air crew in the movie ``The Perfect Storm,'' which was a
true story, was a Navy hull that had been given to the Coast
Guard that the Coast Guard used for a good 40 years after World
War II, did a great job.
So it can be done. And I would hope that you two set the
precedent for, in the future, greater use of common hulls so
that we can get some economies of scale in our purchases.
And the third thing--again, Commandant Allen, I do
appreciate the visit to the Baltimore yard last week. And I was
very impressed with the captain who walked us around. I was
very impressed with the gentleman, I guess from either Pakistan
or India originally, who is your expertise on the civilian
side.
But I remember asking them, why wasn't a hogging and
sagging calculation run on this boat? And they said, in effect,
``Well, we were counting on Bollinger to do it, and Bollinger
screwed up.'' I said, ``Well, who is your equivalent of Naval
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)''--Navy Shipbuilding Command. And
they said, ``We are.'' Two guys.
And so, I am not going to blame two guys for this fiasco.
Bollinger should have done it right the first time. But what
does trouble me, having been lucky enough to visit the David
Taylor Research Center, having been lucky enough to get to work
extensively with NAVSEA over the years is, why wasn't there a
greater use of that resource?
Okay. And that is water under the bridge. But what kind of
guarantees are we going to get in the future that there will be
greater cooperation? Because, quite frankly, I understand that
a major acquisition of Coast Guard large hulls is a
generational thing. But the Navy is doing it every year. There
is absolutely no reason for the Coast Guard, every generation,
to recreate a ship-buying apparatus when the Navy has got one.
And the vast majority of what you all do is common. I realize
there are some things that are unique to the Coast Guard, some
things unique to the Navy.
And that really is going to start with you two gentlemen,
that this is a cultural thing, that we have to get better as a
Nation. Because we have seen the LCS mistakes, we have seen the
110 mistakes. And, quite frankly, we can't afford as a Nation
to keep repeating these mistakes.
So what, if anything, is going to happen toward any of
those requests?
Admiral Allen. Well, first of all, we are already moving on
several of those fronts, sir. And, again, I thank you for your
interest.
First of all, the solicitation for the new patrol boat that
will succeed the 110-foot fleet is going to be American Bureau
of Shipping (ABS) class. We have Naval Sea Systems Command
involved whenever they are needed.
The current project office down in Pascagoula for the
National Security Cutter is jointly staffed with both
Supervisor of Shipbuildings (SUPSHIP) for Navy personnel and
Coast Guard personnel. And the acceptance trials for the
National Security Cutter will be done by a U.S. Navy Inspection
and Survey (INSURV) board for the first time in the history of
the service, sir.
Admiral Roughead. And, Mr. Taylor, if I could just add on
to the approach that we are taking, Admiral Allen referred to
our warfighter talks. I think that the fact that our two
services have joined over the past year to look at the future
and see what capabilities we believe we, as a maritime nation,
can have or need to have, and doing it jointly, leads us into
the room to have the types of discussions and make the
decisions that get exactly to your point.
So even though the strategy may be an overarching document,
I believe it has set in motion a level of cooperation and
sharing of information systems and commonalities that are going
to be very important to us and, at the end of the day, also be
very economical for both of our services.
Mr. Taylor. How about our request that the Navy give a
greater degree of importance to the need to replenish the
Marine Corps's amphibious fleet?
Admiral Roughead. And as General Conway has mentioned, we
have already met, in the brief time that I have been the CNO,
to talk about and work through our future amphibious lift
requirement, acknowledging the requirement that has been
generated by the Marine Corps, and moving forward to create the
type of capability that we need to have a viable, modern
amphibious force to support the Marine Corps.
So we are already going down that path, as well.
Mr. Taylor. Again, I thank you for your service to the
Nation.
Admiral Roughead. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you for being here.
The Chairman. Mr. Bartlett has a question.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
I would like to return for just a moment to Mr. Hunter's
line of questioning. A bit less than a year ago now, Mr. Larsen
and I and seven other Members of Congress spent several days in
China. We spent New Year's Eve in Shanghai. And we went there
principally to talk about energy. The Chinese began their
discussion of energy by talking about post-oil. We have trouble
in our country thinking beyond the next quarterly report and
beyond the next election. They seem to be able to think in
terms of generations and centuries. And there will, of course,
be a post-oil world.
They have a five-point plan, which everybody in their
Government seemed to know. The first point of that five-point
plan is conservation. They understood that there is now no
surplus oil. To invest in the development of alternative energy
sources, we need to buy some time and free up some oil with an
aggressive conservation program.
Second and third points were get energy from other sources,
and as much of that as you can from your own country.
And the fourth one may surprise you: Be kind to the
environment. They have 1.3 billion people, 900 million of which
are in rural areas, clamoring for the benefits of an
industrialized society. And I think they see the potential of
their empire unraveling, like the Yugoslav and Soviet empires
unraveled, if they can't meet these demands.
As Mr. Hunter noted, this year they will turn out, I think,
six times as many engineers as we. They will graduate more
English-speaking engineers than we graduate. And half of our
English-speaking engineers are Chinese students. They have an
enormous potential. They now are buying up oil all over the
world and building a blue-water navy.
I am really quite surprised that in your document looking
forward that you didn't mention energy. I think it is going to
be the overarching issue, not just for our country but for the
world, in the next decade. And I think that many of the
challenges that you face in the future are going to be a result
of the competition for decreasing amounts of fossil fuels.
Our obsession with corn ethanol has driven up the price of
grain, so that there are children now hungry in India because
we are making corn ethanol for our cars. And one of the people
from The World said that this was a--what was the term he
used?--a crime against humanity.
If we use all of our corn for corn ethanol--these are
numbers from the National Academy of Sciences--if we use all of
our corn for corn ethanol, every bit of it, all 70 million
acres, and discounted it for fossil fuel input, we would
displace 2.4 percent of our gasoline. That is absolutely
trifling.
And by the way, they said also that all of our soybeans
converted into diesel would displace 2.9 percent of our diesel.
Don't you think, gentlemen, that our maritime posture for
the future needs to consider energy in a very large way? And I
am really quite surprised that it wasn't even mentioned. You
mentioned a competition for resources, energy which would be
one of those. But you really don't mention energy as a
challenge for our planning for the future. Shouldn't you have?
Admiral Roughead. Well, Mr. Bartlett, by addressing the
competition for resources, we are addressing the challenges,
the potential strife and even conflict that can come from that
competition for resources. That is the intent of addressing it
in the strategy, because we believe it will drive where we will
have to operate, the types of operations that we will be
involved in, and ultimately will drive the type of fleet that
we must have to operate, live and shape that future world.
So the strategy does address competition for resources. But
it is as we go forward in our operating concepts and in where
we are going to be accepting risk and then building our
programs from that, that is where that will play out in the
future years.
Mr. Bartlett. But you did single out global warming. That
is a challenge. I think it is a fairly trifling one for the
next couple of decades compared to our competition for energy.
Why do you think the Chinese are so aggressively pursuing a
blue-water navy? They don't need one for Taiwan, do they? Won't
a brown-water navy do just fine there?
Admiral Roughead. I believe that what the Chinese Navy, the
PLA Navy is doing is developing a blue-water navy that allows
them to influence and control events in the Western Pacific,
around some of the critical straits and into the Indian Ocean.
That is the navy they are building. They are very unabashed
about the fact they are building a blue-water navy that will
operate out to the first island chain, as they refer.
And as we have seen throughout history, and as we have seen
in own country over the course of our Nation's history, that we
are a maritime nation and our Navy and Marine Corps and Coast
Guard are the maritime forces that can influence events in that
maritime domain. They also see, as do other countries, the
importance of navies to assure their security and their
prosperity. And that is what is going on.
And we, as a Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, must also
value our navy and what it takes to be a global navy, to be
able to influence events in ways that are advantageous to our
country.
Mr. Bartlett. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Ms. Davis.
Mrs. Davis of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We know the Marines are an expeditionary force. And I
wonder if you could speak to the issue of whether, or to what
extent, we have had to sacrifice some of that role.
In your maritime strategic concept, you say, ``Permanent or
prolonged basing of our military forces overseas often has
unintended economic, social or political repercussions.''
Could you speak to some of those? What is that? How far
down that road, I guess, do you think that some of that role
has been sacrificed?
General Conway. Some of it, ma'am, but I think knowingly.
The Nation is engaged in two major fights. And as long as that
is the case, the Marine Corps has to live up to its claim of
being adaptable and flexible to the Nation's needs. And we
consider that we have done that.
When the time comes to disengage from that kind of
activity--and, really, our role in Iraq, in particular, has
been that of a second land Army. When it comes time to be able
to disengage from that service to the Nation and retain our
original expeditionary flavor and our naval roots, I think we
need to be looking at doing that. And that is what the strategy
now seems to me to offer. And it is, I think, a blueprint for
us to be able to do that in a little bit of a new and different
fashion.
The things, the mine resistant ambush protected vehicles
(MRAP) comes immediately to mind, those things that would make
us heavier, that would make us not nearly so expeditionary, the
fact that our battalion tables of equipment are vastly
different today from what they were in 2003--we have people
working on all those things. And so we want to be able to do
both, provide a service to the Nation that it desperately needs
to help the Army with the commitments, but at the same time,
when the time is right, to retain our expeditionary flavor and
be lighter and harder-hitting and more agile.
Mrs. Davis of California. Is there a part of that, though,
that worries you the most?
General Conway. Probably the human dimension. Because,
again, we now have a generation of young Marines who think that
being expeditionary is three squares a day at the forward-
operating base and a bed at night. And we need to get away from
that some and have the Navy deliver us to a moonscape somewhere
where we have to start fending for ourselves and making
something out of nothing. That is expeditionary.
So I think as long as we have great young leaders who can
manage that mindset, we will be okay. But we need to, again,
remember what it was like before 2004, when we probably first
started experiencing those things.
Admiral Roughead. If I could just add on that,
acknowledging what General Conway has just talked about, my
Third Fleet commander and his general out in California have,
given those circumstances, have come into agreement on being
able to do more with what we currently have available and what
the Marines can afford to contribute, so that we keep that tie
that is traditional and that really gives the Navy and Marine
Corps its power.
The systems are important, the ships are important, but it
is when our sailors and our Marines come together, that is the
power of the Navy-Marine Corps team.
Mrs. Davis of California. And I think we would certainly
all agree that they have performed magnificently. I think the
concern is, you know, what are the problems that you see down
the line with that, if any?
And I know, General, you mentioned also the fact that our
families are brittle. That element is an important one to keep
focus on, and I appreciate the fact that you are dedicating
your resources to that.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady from California.
As I understand, we are going to have three votes
momentarily. Mr. Larsen and then Mr. Sestak, as I understand,
have additional questions.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, we are going to play a lightning fill-in-the-
blank here, given the shortness of time.
Perhaps for Admiral Roughead and maybe for Commandant
Allen: Does the Law of the Sea Treaty, does approval and
ratification of that help, hurt, is it neutral on what you want
to accomplish with the cooperative strategy, especially as it
relates to other nations?
Admiral Roughead. I believe especially the Law of the Sea
Treaty is a very positive thing for our Navy and for our
country.
What I saw in the Pacific was that the fact that we had not
acceded to the treaty kept countries from doing things with us
that would have enhanced the maritime security and the
interoperability that are so important across a range of
operations.
Admiral Allen. I couldn't agree more. In fact, sometimes I
think we are inhibited because, two things: Number one, we are
dealing with countries that understand we haven't acceded to
the treaty; and number two, we are not in a position to rebuke
claims that are not consistent with the Law of the Sea Treaty
because we have not ratified it.
I will tell you, just in relation to Arctic issues, moving
north, issues relating to the continental shelf, the potential
for 25 percent of the world's oil and gas resources may be
unexploited in that part of the world, not having a seat at the
table when the claims are made on the continental shelf by
Russia I think robs us of a chance to act where we need to
under the strategy and also is going to inhibit our ability to
make claims on our own continental shelf.
Mr. Larsen. It is ironic that lack of ratification may be
impacting our ability to exercise our sovereignty.
Second, Admiral Roughead, in your testimony, you talked
about vessel tracking system. Perhaps for, again, both Admiral
Roughead and Commandant Allen, can you talk about sort of a
Navy role and Coast Guard role and where that line is in the
vessel tracking service (VTS)? Is there a line, or how does it
overlap?
Admiral Roughead. My view is that we no longer live in a
world of lines.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah.
Admiral Roughead. And the ability to be able to merge the
information we have with the information the Coast Guard has
with information other agencies have and other countries may
have, that is where we have to go.
Admiral Allen. Yeah. Maritime domain awareness has two
major components. One is what we will call global maritime
situational awareness, be able to sense and understand what is
going on there. And then the information associated with it,
which we would call global maritime intelligence integration.
Both of those functions have a place. Global maritime
intelligence integration is part of the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) organizational structure. And that community
of interest is currently being headed by a Coast Guard flag
officer. Global maritime situational awareness is a program
office at Coast Guard headquarters within Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), but is headed by a Navy admiral. There
are no lines.
Mr. Larsen. So, as that applies back home in the Strait of
Juan de Fuca and the Strait of Georgia, and between Washington
State and British Columbia, with the vehicle tracking system,
there is really no--not only are your systems interoperable,
but your people are interoperable.
Admiral Roughead. Exactly.
Do you want to add to that?
Admiral Allen. That is correct. In fact, we just opened a
Joint Harbor Operations Center in Seattle on Pier 36 that has
representation from the Navy and our force protection role
related to the movement of their vessels in and out of Puget
Sound.
And I might add we have international cooperation with the
Canadian Vessel Traffic Services in Tofino that actually
exchange information with our Vessel Traffic Services in Puget
Sound.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah.
Back to China, if I could just weigh in a little bit on
that, Admiral Roughead, you discussed a little bit in response
to some questions. I was going to ask, you know, what is your
judgment of the Chinese military modernization? Do you have a
judgment that is good, bad, indifferent, or how do you----
Admiral Roughead. My judgment is that it is a navy that is
modernizing at a rate that is exceeding what our expectations
have been. There are resources that are flowing into it. It is
a navy that is becoming more capable, more modern, has legs
that can get it into the blue water.
And the most significant change that I have seen in my
observation of it over the last 13 years is in the human
dimension. We can all watch the systems they are buying,
capabilities they are buying----
Mr. Larsen. Right.
Admiral Roughead [continuing]. But what I have seen is the
nature of the leadership. These are now officers in their navy
who have grown up in their areas of specialty, whether it is
submarining or a surface ship or an aviator, and bring that
perspective and that ambition to their leadership positions.
And I think that is one of the major drivers in shaping their
navy of the future.
Mr. Larsen. Does that relate--are you saying that, although
they are all PLA, they are becoming more professionalized as a
military, as opposed to strictly an arm of the party?
Admiral Roughead. Or those who had risen out of the Army,
and they are now--these are now very professional naval
officers. Their desire to constitute a noncommissioned officer
corps is also indicative of the value that they place on the
human resource.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. I will just make one final note. And not
to differ too much with my friend and colleague from San Diego,
California, who is not here now, but I would prefer if the Navy
stuck to the Navy and let the U.S. Trade Representative's
Office stick to trade issues.
Admiral Roughead. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Sestak.
Mr. Sestak. Thank you, sir.
I just had two questions. They both have to do with some
questions asked by the Congressman in the back row on cost and
numbers of platforms.
I mean, you have all had your challenges from Deepwater to
LCS to EFE. I was struck that joint strike fighter (JSF),
however, seemed to consciously go out at the beginning of it,
get about eight nations to be in on the development of it, and
therefore more people are buying, nations are buying this
platform, so the cost goes down. Why haven't we done the same
thing with particularly the LCS?
For the first time, the U.S. Navy is going after a small
ship, which seems so apropos for some other countries. The CNO
of Israel was up to Wisconsin just the other day, I understand,
to look at it, but can't get in on the development of it. And
it is kind of a hull that you just got to change out capability
to some degree with modular.
If we are concerned about costs, shouldn't we make this the
JSF of the Navy?
Admiral Roughead. Mr. Sestak, I am aware of countries that
have shown an interest in LCS, but if I had to characterize
most of them, they are watching us to see will it take flight
or not.
Mr. Sestak. All right. I had dinner with the Ambassador,
and the CNO also stopped by. He said he is ready to sign the
line--I understand it is probably different--sign the line if
he could just be asked to do so. I pass it on. It just sounds
like a great concept. And he seemed, the CNO, yesterday or the
other day, to be very, very interested and said I would sign.
But cost is something.
Could I follow up--and the last question is, again, I think
Mr. Hunter, besides the trade issue, where else he was trying
to go, and that is the number of platforms. I asked that
earlier question on the LCS. And, you know, the concept had
been that it would take this advanced deployable system. And I
was struck by what you said, Admiral, it is just not platforms;
it is systems. And we are supposed to take this underwater
listening system, place it there, and move away, and then
submarines from China might go over it, and you know where they
are because it has a little antenna that sends the signal.
But, as you said in your response, well, you know, you kind
of have some--you have to review things, and some things--you
didn't say these exact words, but some things just don't make
it, you know, because you only have so much resources.
I guess my overarching question would be, do we have the
wrong metric of greatness in our Navy, really in our Army, in
our Marines, Coast Guard or whatever, when we say we have the--
that in this new transformational era that greatness is
measured by the number, 313. Time and again, you hear about
capabilities-based units.
And so my question really comes that, as we have gone from
a Navy of 600 ships 20 to 25 years ago down to 300 or 280
today, no admiral would change today's Navy for one of 25 years
ago, even though it had twice the number of platforms.
Is what is happening with our phobic--and I mean that in a
positive way--on number, that what really gets pushed off in
the resource fight is the capability like ADS? I mean, now we
have an LCS platform that will go out there with no ASW
capability, or very minimal. So we have another platform, just
can't do the mission.
So do we have the wrong metric if we are still sticking
with number as the sign of our greatness?
Admiral Roughead. I would say that we cannot totally
discount numbers, because, as you know, numbers have value,
just in the variety of places around the globe where we can be
doing things.
But I would say that our approach and how we assess our
capabilities, that there is a bias that pulls us to platform.
And we have to get away from that. We have to look at what it
is that we are trying to do, what is the effect that we are
trying to generate, and then what comes together in totality to
be able to deliver that effect.
But we do tend to pull toward platforms, and we have to
stop.
Mr. Sestak. I say that only--I mean, with great respect. We
have gone from Desert Storm, where lots of our Naval aircraft
couldn't even--they just dropped gravity bombs, to today
everyone has a precision-guided munition, to where everybody
shares the common operating picture.
So it just seems as though sometimes, because of
understandable interest everywhere, that--are we building the
right capability for the future if we focus almost exclusively
on numbers?
I am out of time. Thank you.
The Chairman. You will note the votes have come, and we
will close our hearing.
I want to express my gratitude to each of you this morning
for your testimony and for your outstanding service and what
you have and what you are devoting to the Nation.
I will have to tell you sailors that, as being one
interested in history, I am so pleased to see you celebrating
the 100th anniversary of the Great White Fleet. We can all
learn so much from history. And that was a milestone for you,
the Navy; it was a milestone for our country.
And with this strategy that you have testified about today
and the fact that you are together today, the Marines and the
Coast Guard, and the fact that you are helping implement this
strategy could very well be an historic moment in our country,
not just for you but for our country. And, of course, we in
Congress hope and expect to play an important constitutional
part in that.
So we thank you for your excellent testimony, your advice,
and especially for your service. And, with that, we will thank
you and see you again soon. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
December 13, 2007
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
December 13, 2007
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
December 13, 2007
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
December 13, 2007
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER
Ms. Shea-Porter. In what ways do you imagine NetCentric warfare
playing a role both in the future of Naval warfare and also in
coordinating missions and operations across the Navy, Marine Corps and
Coast Guard?
Admiral Roughead. The Department of the Navy (DON) Information
Management & Information Technology (IM/IT) Strategic Plan for Fiscal
Years 2008-2009, is our roadmap to achieve Net-Centric Warfare (NCW)
and Joint transformation by providing robust information sharing and
collaboration capabilities across the Naval/Joint force. The objective
of our Net-Centric Warfare programs is to enable us to integrate
sensors, command/control systems, platforms, and weapons into a
networked, distributed, and sustainable combat force. That will provide
a seamless, interoperable environment to enhance the sharing of time-
critical information. Fulfilling these objectives will enable our
forces; Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard to make better decisions and
employ systems faster. Decision superiority is imperative to realizing
the capabilities called out in our Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. How does the threat to our ships posed by the rapidly
expanding Chinese diesel submarines and new nuclear submarines affect
the Maritime Strategy? It seems logical that the most direct threat to
a sea-base is the threat posed by hostile submarines, what are you
doing to expand anti-submarine warfare capability?
Admiral Roughead. Advanced diesel submarines are proliferating
globally, not only in China. Sea control and power projection are two
of the six capabilities specified in our Maritime Strategy. Advanced
diesel and nuclear submarines challenge those capabilities regardless
of who possesses them.
China's increasingly modern submarine force is optimized for anti-
surface warfare, blockade operations, mining, and reconnaissance. The
Maritime Strategy addresses these challenges posed by advanced diesel-
electric and nuclear submarines. To ensure the core competency of sea
control, our Navy continues to develop improved platform and
distributed sensor systems that provide capability against future
advanced anti-access threats. Improvements in anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) readiness, based on improvements in tactics, training and
technologies, provide a defense in depth that mitigates the threat
posed by advanced submarines.
Research & Development in distributed and networked sensors such as
Reliable Acoustic Path-Vertical Line Array (RAP-VLA) and Deep Water
Active Distributed System (DWADS) will improve wide area search.
Developments in platform sensors such as surface ship sonar (SQQ-
89A(V)15) and P-3/P-8 deployed Advanced Extended Echo Ranging improve
our ability to hold threat submarines at risk and defend the sea base.
Open architecture will provide improved capabilities for submarines,
surface ships, aircraft, and distributed systems.
We are pursuing key technologies such as Surface Ship Torpedo
Defense (SSTD) and Aircraft Carrier Periscope Detection Radar (CVN PDR)
to defend our forces against increasingly capable threats.
Investment continues in the High Altitude ASW Weapon Concept
(HAAWC) and improvements in heavy and lightweight torpedoes to increase
weapons effectiveness.
We continue to respond responsibly to challenges which restrict our
ability to train our ASW forces in a realistic manner.
Mr. Forbes. China recently denied the USS Kitty Hawk porting in
Hong Kong over the Thanksgiving Holiday. Does that action figure into
future planning as to which locations our ship captains can have
confidence they will be welcomed at? What other possible locations in
that area could a ship the size of an aircraft carrier dock, if not in
Hong Kong?
Admiral Roughead. The port visit planning process takes into
consideration many factors. The People's Republic of China's (PRC)
initial refusal, but subsequent granting, of permission for the KITTY
HAWK Carrier Strike Group to enter the Port of Hong Kong will be
included in that calculus. The United States Navy will continue to
request Hong Kong and mainland PRC port visits in support of PACOM's
Theater Security Cooperation efforts. In fact, USS BLUE RIDGE completed
a four-day port visit in Hong Kong this month. I anticipate Hong Kong
port visits will continue at the rate of approximately 35 ship visits
per year, which is consistent with the number of visits over the last
several years.
Locations in Southeast Asia that have hosted carrier port visits
include:
Hong Kong (anchorage only)
Changi, Singapore (pierside berth available)
Pattaya Beach, Thailand (anchorage only)
Phuket, Thailand (anchorage only)
Port Kelang, Malaysia (anchorage only)
Another candidate location is:
Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia (anchorage only)
Mr. Forbes. Do you need top line relief for your acquisition
programs? If so, how much do you need? In other words, Admiral
Roughead, you've mentioned 313 as the absolute floor for the number of
ships--what is a ``mid-level'' number of ships, and what would be the
ceiling figure? How do the cost overruns of LCS create challenges to
achieving the 313 ship Navy?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy continues to analyze operational
requirements, ship designs and costs, acquisition plans and tools, and
industrial base capacity to further improve our shipbuilding plans.
This analysis will underpin any potential budgetary strategies. The
near-term shipbuilding plans have remained relatively stable. A larger
force may reduce risks inherent in the 313 ship minimum force structure
outlined in The Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for
Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2009. However, this plan
represents an acceptable balance between capability, affordability, and
the need to sustain the industrial base. Full funding is supported in
the FY2009 President's Budget and in the Future Years Defense Plan
through 2013.
Full funding and support of this plan is crucial if the Navy is to
maintain the minimum essential battleforce necessary to meet the
maritime needs of the nation.
The 55 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) remain an integral part of
current planned force. The Littoral Combat Ship procurement profile was
adjusted based on a program assessment following significant LCS-1 and
LCS-2 cost increases. Although this assessment resulted in the removal
of 13 ships from the FY 2008 President's Budget FYDP, the plan
continues procurement to reach the objective of 55 ships by FY 2023. I
am committed to continue working with the Congress on this important
program which is needed to fill existing warfighting capability gaps.
Mr. Forbes. Will the new maritime strategy change the Navy's
current requirements for 48 Fast Attack submarines? How will you
fulfill submarine requirements in the years when there will be fewer
than 48 ships?
Admiral Roughead. The new Maritime Strategy will not change the
Navy's current requirement for 48 fast attack submarines (SSNs). The
Maritime Strategy emphasizes prevention of war, containment of
conflict, and security of the seas, and submarines will be integral to
the Navy's core capabilities of forward presence, deterrence, sea
control, power projection, and maritime security.
The requirement for 48 fast attack submarines is indexed to the
Department of Defense threat assessments for 2020, which include
anticipated force levels of potential threats. The shipbuilding plan
detailed in Navy's Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for
Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2009 is the best balance of
anticipated resources to force structure requirements. The Navy is
pursuing a 3-part risk mitigation strategy consisting of:
- a reduction in the construction time of VIRGINIA-class
submarines from 72 to 60 months,
- a service life extension for 16 SSNs, ranging from 3 to 24
months in length, and
- an extension in the length of selected SSN deployments from
six to seven months.
This strategy will reduce the impact of the projected dip in
submarine force structure in the 2020-2033 timeframe and provide for
all current and projected Combatant Commander critical forward presence
requirements.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DRAKE
Mrs. Drake. Admiral Roughead, in January of 2006, the Navy stood up
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command with the understanding that the new
post-9/11 reality that faces our military necessitates a Navy that can
extend its missions of force projection and maintaining the safety and
security of the sea lanes beyond the littorals and into the many inland
waterways that terrorists use to evade U.S. forces. Admiral, are you
committed to the brown-water mission of the U.S. Navy?
Admiral Roughead. Yes. Beginning in 2006 the Navy began to re-
constitute a ``brown water'' capability--a capability in the Navy that
had, outside the Naval Special Warfare community, been dormant since
the early 1970's. Three Riverine Squadrons have been established under
the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command with the responsibility to
conduct and support offensive and defensive operations on inland
waterways They have been organized, trained, and equipped. Two of the
three Riverine Squadrons have deployed in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF); the third Squadron is scheduled to deploy in the spring
of 2008. In addition to responsibilities in support of OIF, elements of
each Riverine Squadron can support future Geographic Combatant
Commander objectives in ``brown water'' environments, to include
training host nations who request our assistance with inland waterway
security. The reconstitution of our Riverine capability, in a short
period of time, is a success.