[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PARTNERSHIPS IN SECURING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 12, 2008
__________
Serial No. 110-100
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
43-965 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts Lamar Smith, Texas
Norman D. Dicks, Washington Christopher Shays, Connecticut
Jane Harman, California Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Tom Davis, Virginia
Nita M. Lowey, New York Daniel E. Lungren, California
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Mike Rogers, Alabama
Columbia David G. Reichert, Washington
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
Islands Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Bob Etheridge, North Carolina David Davis, Tennessee
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Henry Cuellar, Texas Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania
Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Al Green, Texas
Ed Perlmutter, Colorado
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas, Chairwoman
Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts Daniel E. Lungren, California
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Columbia Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Ed Perlmutter, Colorado Officio)
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Erin Daste, Director & Counsel
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Coley O'Brien, Minority Senior Counsel
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 1
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection....... 8
Witnesses
Mr. Douglas B. Arnot, Senior Vice President, Games Operations,
Chicago 2016:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Jeffrey A. Slotnick, President, Setracon, Inc.:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
For the Record
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection:
Letter to Honorable Michael Chertoff........................... 5
Letter to Honorable Rick Larsen................................ 7
PARTNERSHIPS IN SECURING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
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Wednesday, March 12, 2008
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:18 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, Clarke, and Lungren.
Ms. Jackson Lee [presiding.] The subcommittee will come to
order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
partnerships in securing critical infrastructure. Importantly,
this testimony will include insight into the planning that goes
into securing critical infrastructure for a global event like
the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics.
Let me acknowledge the presence of my friend and colleague
from New York, Congresswoman Clarke, and indicate that the
Ranking Member has been detained. However, he will be arriving
shortly. At that time, we will allow him to give his opening
statement.
Importantly, this is a vital hearing, and I welcome the
witnesses. I would like to take this opportunity to thank all
of you for joining us again this afternoon. We are here to
learn about the preparations that are going into securing
critical infrastructure in advance of the 2010 Winter Olympics
in Vancouver. Some might ask why this should be a topic to be
addressed by this subcommittee. The importance to us is that
the Vancouver games will be a mere 30 kilometers from the U.S.
border, and planning, preparation and response measures must be
in place on our side of the border.
We are certainly reminded of the attempt by an alleged
terrorist that walked across the border at the turn of this
century. So this is an important challenge that we have before
us.
Between February 12, 2010 and February 28, 2010, it is
estimated that 1.8 million tickets will be sold for the events
and that 250,000 visitors will attend. Three billion people are
expected to watch or to view this world event on television.
Because the games are being held so close to the United States,
there will be a heavy reliance on U.S. infrastructure.
Washington State will provide key transportation access and
overflow accommodations for the event.
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport will be used
frequently as an alternate airport to direct flights into
Canada. The games will also mean more travel on Washington
State highways, passenger rail lines, airlines and ferries.
Certainly, we welcome this opportunity, but it would be foolish
if we did not focus on how do we secure the homeland. That is
the responsibility of this committee, and I thank Chairman
Thompson for his leadership. I thank my colleague, Ranking
Member Lungren, for working with us for this important hearing.
U.S. resources will be stressed during the games and the
need for these resources will be exacerbated in the event of
some sort of attack. For this reason, essential planning is
necessary to ensure that proper prevention and response
procedures are in place on the U.S. side of the border. The
purpose of this hearing is to begin a discussion about the
efforts underway to secure the 2010 Vancouver Olympics.
This hearing is intended to be fact-finding hearing, where
we learn from people deeply involved in planning for Olympic
events about what needs to be done and what role DHS should
have in securing critical infrastructure. This hearing will
allow members to acquire knowledge from experts about the steps
to be taken and the questions to be asked.
In short, this hearing will not complete the subcommittee's
activities on this important topic. It lays the groundwork for
activity ahead that will attempt to move DHS in the right
direction of better coordinating planning and response
activities prior to this global event. As we all know, the
Olympic Games have been the site of terrorist activity dating
back over 3 decades, most notably the Munich massacre, which
occurred in 1972 at the Summer Olympics in Germany--an
absolutely atrocious and violent event that woke the world up
in a tragic way. Eleven Israeli athletes and one German police
officer lost their lives.
So we know that this is not impossible. This is not a
question of the possibility of the possible. This is a question
of being prepared for what has already happened and what could
happen in the future. During the Atlanta Games in 1996, at a
late-night concert in the town square of the Olympics, Eric
Robert Rudolph placed a green military knapsack containing
nails and three pipe bombs at the crowded event.
Two people were killed and 111 were injured from the pipe
bomb explosion. As Rudolph later said, he acted for political
reasons. This means that this is an open and viable
possibility. We do not encourage terrorist acts, but we
certainly need to be prepared.
This past weekend, Chinese police allegedly thwarted a
planned attack on the Beijing Olympics scheduled for this
summer by a group based in Western China. State-run Xinhua News
Agency quoted government officials as saying----
Although it has not been independently corroborated that
these individuals were in fact terrorists, this event
reinforces that individuals may attempt to make political
statements through violence at the Olympics in Vancouver. In
its role to prevent, protect and coordinate responses to
disasters such as acts of terrorism, DHS has designated a DHS
Federal coordinator whose tasks is coordinating the security
plans of the DHS components in preparation for the games.
However, some have suggested that this coordinator has not
played a prominent role in any planning effort. An over-arching
complaint among stakeholders in the State of Washington is the
lack of involvement of DHS personnel in assisting with the
planning efforts that may be necessary to employ if an event at
Vancouver cascades and negatively affects U.S. infrastructure.
There are several potential problems that have been
identified as causes for concern as we move forward to 2010:
lack of planning efforts ahead of any potential terrorist
activity; lack of procedures in place if Canada shuts down its
border; lack of status review regarding mutual aid agreements
between the United States and Canada--and might I add, if the
borders shut down, what is the viability of ingress and egress
even for escape or some need to provide security to our
homeland?; lack of knowledge about the consequences of a port
being shut down; and lack of understanding of how the
interoperability of radios is functioning between stakeholders.
That is an important challenge that we have to be concerned
about.
The Governor of the State of Washington created the 2010
Winter Olympic Task Force and it includes a Security
Subcommittee Task Force. Most of the planning efforts carried
out within the United States are done by this entity. DHS
published a report required by Congress entitled Report to
Congress on the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games on
June 22, 2007. I would like to introduce that report into the
record.
This report required DHS to report on expected increases in
border flow, necessary enhancements to border security,
estimated border crossing wait times, and any need for
increased border personnel. The report recognizes that
significant progress is necessary for the United States to know
how the United States prepares for a large-scale special event
occurring in the immediate vicinity of its international
borders.
Key issues discussed in the first section of the report
include Washington State's role providing critical
transportation access to the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter
Games. Key issues discussed in the second section of the report
include technical interoperability challenges such as the
significant impact that multi-jurisdictional agencies have on
frequency and band width used and the need for coordination and
interoperability both technical and operational, and the need
to involve Canadian and U.S. frequency licensing agencies early
in the planning process.
So this hearing is about planning and preparedness. In a
letter from members of the Washington State delegation to
Secretary Chertoff dated December 21, 2007, members inquired
about steps taken to implement recommendations in the report,
as well as what sources of funding exist to ensure that
implementation is successful. In a response dated February 4,
2008 and surprisingly signed by the assistant secretary for
legislative affairs, the concerns of members were not
addressed.
The concerns were: the creation of an integrated Federal
support plan; the creation of a multi-year training and
exercise plan and schedule; a plan by CBP to meet anticipated
impact of increased border flow at domestic airports, seaports,
rail stations and bus terminals, including the expected
displacement effect; a plan by CBP to ensure border wait times
at ports of entry do not exceed the current average peak wait
times, including opening of additional lanes and augmentation
of temporary duty officers; an operational and funding plan to
establish a brick-and-mortar multi-agency coordination center
close to the border; an integrated interoperability plan to
support the 2010 Olympic mission using the SAFECOM
interoperability continuum to develop a robust interoperability
solution.
Until these vital issues are addressed by DHS, we cannot
rest assured that the 2010 games will be secure. In fact, we
cannot rest assured that we have a plan that ensures that this
homeland of the United States is secure, working in cooperation
with the Canadian government. As this subcommittee continues to
investigate the efforts in Washington State, we will eagerly be
looking for DHS, including Secretary Chertoff, to show us that
it has the security situation well in hand.
At this time, I would like to ask unanimous consent to
enter into the record the DHS report to Congress on the 2010
Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, and we will do that again
when the Ranking Member is present. We will add that as an
admitted document, but we will repeat that.*
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* The information has been retained in committee files.
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I would also ask unanimous consent to enter into the record
the two letters, the first by members of the Washington State
delegation to Secretary Chertoff, inquiring about
implementation of the previously mentioned report; and the
second is the response to the Washington delegation by DHS.
Again, I am offering to enter this into the record by unanimous
consent, and we will submit that again when Mr. Lungren is
present.
[The information referred to follows:]
Ms. Jackson Lee. Once again, I would like to thank everyone
for their participation today. I look forward to hearing from
our witnesses. As I indicated, Ranking Member Lungren will be
in, but at this time this committee will stand in recess for
the vote, and we will return in a moment. I thank the witnesses
for their indulgence. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. The subcommittee will now come to order.
It will be my pleasure to now recognize the Ranking Member
of the subcommittee, the gentleman from California, Mr.
Lungren, for an opening statement for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
I am glad we were able to finally get here. It takes me a
little bit longer these days. I share your interest and concern
over the challenges the Nation faces securing our critical
infrastructure. Unfortunately, it will be a never-ending
struggle due to our country's many critical infrastructure
assets scattered from coast to coast. As we know the 2010
Winter Olympics will be held in Vancouver, Canada, which
creates terrorist opportunities similar to those which have
been exploited in the past. A world stage, enormous crowds,
multiple venues and close proximity to the U.S. border presents
an attractive target to the twisted terrorist mind.
This is a very serious issue which should be examined in a
bipartisan manner. I am sorry the hearing was only noticed less
than a week ago, and that I did not have warning about it.
Hopefully, we can have future hearings with Republican input.
The Vancouver Olympics certainly deserves more attention than
we are able to provide this afternoon.
I would hope that we could have the Department of Homeland
Security, which has the Federal responsibility of protecting
our critical infrastructure; the Coast Guard, which would play
a key role securing U.S. ferries, waterways and ports for
citizens traveling to and from Vancouver; and I wish we would
have reached out to the 2010 Olympic Committee core group,
which is currently planning for the Vancouver games.
As I understand it, in fact yesterday, a tabletop exercise
was conducted at Camp Murray, Washington for the 2010 Olympic
Security Committee Core Group and liaison agencies from
Federal, State and local security partners. This first tabletop
exercise is attempting to identify gaps in the initial standard
operating procedures, future training goals, communications and
coordination center needs.
As I understand it, DHS Federal Coordinator Mark Beatty
also participated. I hope that the chairwoman would agree we
need to examine the issue in a more comprehensive fashion. The
Vancouver Olympic threat deserves no less than our best
congressional bipartisan oversight efforts. I look forward to
hearing from the witnesses we have here today.
Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We wanted to resubmit documents that we
ask unanimous consent to submit into the record. That would be
the report to Congress on the 2010 Olympic Winter Games by the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. I ask unanimous consent.
With no objection, it will be submitted into the record.* Then
two letters,** one dated December 21, 2007 to Michael Chertoff
by the Washington State delegation, and one dated February 4,
2008, the response of the Department of Homeland Security to
the Washington delegation from the Homeland Security
Department. We ask unanimous consent. Without objection, they
will be submitted.
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* The information has been retained in committee files.
** Previously submitted and included in the hearing record.
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Let me indicate to Mr. Lungren that we look forward to
building on your comments. I think they are important comments
on expanding this research. Of course, we noticed the hearing
in the appropriate time, and we will look forward to the
minority staff in future hearings. Mr. Lungren is correct that
there is a top-off going which I applaud, frankly, because that
will give us an opportunity in our future hearings to ensure
that we have representatives engaged in that top-off, and again
being able to ask them the hard questions about coordination.
So we are grateful to the witnesses that are here today.
That will simply lay the groundwork for our future hearings,
because with the Olympics in 2010, we certainly have our work
cut out for us, and certainly a period of time in which we must
move forward on these issues.
With that in mind, let me remind any other Members of the
subcommittee that under the committee rules, opening statements
may be submitted for the record.
I now welcome our panel of witnesses. Our first witness,
Mr. Doug Arnot, is senior vice president, games operations,
Chicago 2016. Mr. Arnot served as security lead for the Salt
Lake Olympic Games, overseeing all games operations. He is
presently developing the security plan for Chicago's bid for
the 2016 games.
Our second witness, Mr. Jeff Slotnick, is a security
industry consultant with more than 26 years of experience in
providing professional development and training to security,
law enforcement, military personnel, and conducting
comprehensive security risk assessments. Mr. Slotnick is a
member of the Washington State governnor's Homeland Security
Council on the Infrastructure Protection Subcomittee, and the
Security Subcommittee Task Force of the 2010 Winter Olympic
Task Force.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record. I now ask each witness to summarize
his statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Arnot.
Gentlemen, I would offer to say that your testimony is in fact
timely, as we indicated in the backdrop of operational planning
and top-off activities going on in the region. So we thank you
for your presence here today.
Mr. Arnot.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS B. ARNOT, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, GAMES
OPERATIONS, CHICAGO 2016
Mr. Arnot. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman and the
honorable Member from California. I appreciate the opportunity
to address this subcommittee. I genuinely appreciate the study
that each of you has apparently given to this matter. It is
clear that you have a significant understanding of the
challenges that face the securing of an Olympic games, the
infrastructure around it, and the areas around it.
Very briefly, the Department of Homeland Security report
began to capture the magnitude and complexity of the games. Not
to go too deep into all of the statistics, but about 7,000
athletes and officials, 80 countries, 1.8 million tickets, and
there will be about 500,000 general spectators. The media will
be about 10,000. The media sub-center and the main
international broadcast center for the games will be about the
size of CNN and 30 Rock combined.
There are about 25,000 volunteers that will work at the
games. The athletes' village, just for your little statistic of
the day, will probably serve somewhere in the neighborhood of
about 250,000 meals, all for the various varieties of diets for
the athletes during the games.
The games, in short, whether summer or winter, are really
the largest peacetime events in the world. The size and
complexity are matched only by the worldwide attention and
scrutiny. As each of you has noted, the games are an attractive
target and need to be protected as such.
The target is actually growing larger. With each
consecutive games, you not only now have the games venues, but
what is built around the games--the live sites, the
entertainment centers, the sponsor hospitality. So the number
of ticketed spectators ends up being about 25 percent of the
people who will actually participate in games activities.
The security period itself for the games extends well
beyond the period of the 16 days of the games. The security
period is generally around 60 days, and I would urge us all to
recognize that the security period includes not only the
Olympic Winter Games, but the Paralympic Winter Games.
No post-community can handle the security of the games
alone. It needs to be supplemented significantly, and the
public safety forces in the region will need the help obviously
in Canada of significant Federal support, as has been the case
in the United States.
A clear understanding of the event itself is crucial to
being able to protect the event. It needs to be provided by
knowledgeable and experienced games experts and is essential to
the security planning and understanding of what resources each
agency can bring to the games. Yet I would urge also that we
need to understand there needs to be a balance struck between
the spirit and excitement of the games, and the protective
needs of the games, between the image, that is, and the
security needs. Only with a comprehensive understanding of the
games and exhaustive preparation is this possible.
I might point out quickly a couple of things which can
assist in preparation for the games. We can reduce the burden
in Washington and in Oregon with appropriate interaction from
more distant ports of entry and the communication back and
forth between those ports of entry and the organizing
committee, as well as the forces in the United States. We
should also understand that travel profiles can be established
and border demand anticipated. That will help a great deal.
That information can again be developed with the VANOC group.
Public information programs detailing what Olympic
travelers can expect and how they can facilitate their own
cross-border travel must be balanced with the threat
assessments and properly adjusted security policies and
procedures. There are also other concepts--express lanes, off-
hours logistics and freight operations--that will help in the
efficacy of the operation.
Finally, I would like to note that throughout the world,
Olympic athletes and officials and the media that follow them,
and the many national team officials that support them, enjoy a
status at international borders in other countries that is the
near-equivalent of international diplomats. As the United
States of America has responded to terrorist threats, our
reputation as a host for travel for international sport has
deteriorated.
Re-engaging operations like the 24-hour rapid response
effort of the United States State Department and INS that was
developed for the Salt Lake Olympics will help us to monitor
the travel of the athletes and key officials, and ensure them
an appropriate travel and ease of transit from the United
States ports of entry all the way to the Vancouver Games.
Thank you very much. I stand ready for whatever questions
you might have.
[The statement of Mr. Arnot follows:]
Prepared Statement of Douglas B. Arnot
March 12, 2008
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Report to Congress on the
2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games fairly represents some of the
baseline statistics that begin to outline the challenge of securing the
events for 2010. As one of the world's ``super events'' the Olympic
Winter Games are an extraordinary organization and execution challenge.
The number of athletes, officials, media, broadcasters, spectators
listed in the DHS report are part of the picture. The Games will be
spread over a distance of 120 kilometers stretching from Vancouver and
Richmond to Whistler Mountain. There will be four venue clusters and
two Athlete Villages. Some of these areas, particularly the more
remote, are served by limited public safety resources. So, the
capability of calling on existing ``reserves'' or off-duty personnel is
not an option, and the force must be supplemented. As at all Winter
Games the rugged terrain around the mountain venues calls for special
attention and the winter weather can be particularly harsh on
personnel, equipment and infrastructure.
The Olympic Games attract the attention of the world as no other
event. Any incident at an Olympics is felt around the world. The Games
have been attacked twice, and should be protected as an attractive
target. That target grows larger with each consecutive Games as they
evolve beyond the sports venues into many major public celebrations,
attracting an event population that is several multiples of the number
of ticketed spectators and event support personnel.
The security period of the Games, with some waves of increasing and
decreasing activity is about 60 days. The number of places that must be
secured is well beyond the obvious competition and key non-competition
venues. Live sites, medal ceremonies, concerts, sponsor events, and
much more, expand the event and the job of securing the event.
Of course, all of the Games-related activity is added to the normal
activity of the host city/region and so, as noted, the resources needed
to secure the host city/region grows well beyond the local resources
regularly available for public safety. Thus, I am sure that Canada is
planning significant Federal support such as that which was provided
and absolutely necessary for the 2002 Olympic and Paralympic Winter
Games.
Arguably the most critical aspect of securing the Games is adopting
a command and control structure that will serve the Games in planning
and preparation as well as in execution of the plan. In Games prior to
Salt Lake, planning by public safety agencies for Games Security tended
to exclude a major player, the event itself. Yet, a clear understanding
of the event, provided by knowledgeable and experienced Games experts,
is essential to Security planning and an understanding of what
resources each agency and organization can provide to the plan.
Early planning for Salt Lake City was similarly isolated from the
event. Inexperienced local planners worked in an information vacuum.
But, over time, an extraordinary new model was developed. It was a
complex private, public partnership of local, State and Federal
agencies, the United States Military and the Organizing Committee that
structured a plan that was strong enough that it required little
modification after 9/11. It was the seemingly endless integration work
sessions, with key agencies and the Organizing Committee at the table,
that developed the appreciation and understanding of roles,
responsibilities, resources and procedures for the routine, as well as
the exceptional, that made the security operation at the 2002 Olympic
Winter Games a success. A similar approach is suggested for planning
the U.S. operations for 2010.
One apparent challenge for 2010 is to secure the Northwest border
States without unduly disrupting the experience of Olympic visitors or
the lives and commerce of the region. To achieve this, the security
force must develop a comprehensive understanding of the event itself
with which, even at a distance, it will be interacting daily. As
fundamental as it may seem, an understanding and trust must be
developed in order for each agency and organization to develop an
appreciation for the task and challenge of the others so that a
balanced, team plan can be developed.
The DHS report logically focuses on the Washington, Idaho and
Montana borders. But, the burden at those points can be reduced with
appropriate interaction with more distant ports of entry in other parts
of the United States of America. An Olympic Travel plan such as that
developed for Salt Lake should be considered. Working with the
Organizing Committee, information about athletes, media, broadcasters,
and officials was developed and shared with multiple ports of entry
into the United States of America. The same was done for sports and
broadcast equipment that is critical to the Games. There was also the
appointment of intermediate airports for private aircraft inspection,
again reducing the burden on the ``Olympic Zone''. This might be
considered for air traffic in traveling north as well as south.
Working with the Vancouver Olympic Organizing Committee, a detailed
understanding of event schedules and crowds should be developed. Travel
(USA Re-entry) profiles need to be studied and border-demand
anticipated. Public information programs detailing what Olympic
Travelers can expect and how they can facilitate their own cross-border
travel must be balanced with threat assessments and properly adjusted
search policies and procedures. The operation will need well-trained
personnel supported by information and communication. It is suggested
that concepts such as express lanes, and off-hours logistics and
freight operations may reduce the peak hour burdens and add to search
efficacy. The Winter Games present unique challenges posed by terrain,
and weather. This should be accounted for in all planning, especially
for a State-side response to an exceptional incident in Canada that
could prompt an unanticipated early, mass departure from the event.
Throughout the world, Olympic athletes and officials, the media
that follow them and the many national and team officials that support
them enjoy a status at international borders that is the near
equivalent of international diplomats. As the United States of America
has responded to terrorist threats, our reputation as a host or travel
hub for international sport has deteriorated. By re-enaging operations
like the 24-hour Rapid Response effort of the U.S. State Department and
INS (developed for the Salt Lake Olympics) we can monitor the travel of
athletes and key officials and ensure them an appropriate welcome and
ease of transit from a U.S. port of entry all the way to the Vancouver
Games.
These practices helped the United States of America to avoid what
could have been very damaging international press reports of athletes
or officials in holding cells waiting resolution of entry status. To
the contrary, the hard work on entry procedures set the tone for a Salt
Lake Games that many hailed as the best Winter Olympics ever. With
information, communication and cooperation we can facilitate travel to
the 2010 Olympic Winter Games without jeopardizing our national
security. As the United States of America seeks the honor of hosting
the world in 2016 in Chicago, we can enhance our place among sport-
loving nations of the world.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the witness for his testimony.
The next witness, thank you very much. You are recognized
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JEFFREY A. SLOTNICK, PRESIDENT, SETRACON, INC.
Mr. Slotnick. Madam Chairwoman, and the gentleman from
California, I stand here today to inform you of my impression
of security, critical infrastructure, preparedness and response
capabilities in preparation for the 2009 World Fire and Police
Games, 2010 Olympics and 2010 Paralympics. Based on my
experience, I can seriously tell you we are not prepared.
The safety and security of the United States is at risk if
we do not take direct action. There are tasks identified by DHS
in their congressional report, some of which have not been
completed, and 11 additional tasks that must be accomplished to
ensure a safe and successful event.
The DHS report to Congress on the games identifies gaps
which must be addressed prior to the Olympics. It is my
impression that precious little has been accomplished in the
way of Federal preparation and support, although tremendous
strides have been made on a State level with minimal funding.
The World Fire and Police Games commence in 14 short months.
The DHS Special Events Working Group promised a comprehensive
risk, threat and vulnerability assessment. This essential
planning document has not yet been prepared.
The Pacific Northwest has a higher threat of disaster. We
are susceptible to a variety of potential catastrophic
incidents, including earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, flooding,
terrorism, epidemics and fires. These are exacerbated by the
geographic constraints of the population centers, bordered by
the Pacific Ocean on the west and the Cascade Mountain range on
the east.
In its current status, the 2010 Olympics has been federally
designated as a special event. In past year, the Academy
Awards, Superbowls, and 2002 Winter Games were given the higher
designation of national special security events. Many of these
were only 2 to 4 hours in duration. The 2010 Olympics will be
conducted over 14 days and seen by 3 billion viewers, seconded
only by the Summer Olympics.
The Pacific Northwest has significant private sector
assets--Boeing, Microsoft, Starbucks and Washington Mutual are
national or global in nature and possess significant
intelligence assets. In many cases, individuals in these
organizations have higher security clearances than law
enforcement officials. It would be unfortunate not to
capitalize on these assets through the framework established by
the Northwest Warning and Response Network.
These companies and others have significant physical assets
that will be impacted by Olympic traffic. They must move
supplies, materials and personnel in support of business
operations. The impacts will be significant in the case of a
manmade or natural disaster.
A robust information intelligence-sharing process can
prevent an attack by discovery in the early planning stages.
This is best accomplished through a process which includes
vetted public and private professionals in all critical
infrastructure sectors. Additionally, our intelligence-sharing
abilities with our Canadian partners needs to be enhanced and
tested.
Recent flooding in Lewis County closed down all lanes of
Interstate 5 for 4 days. This closure had an estimated economic
impact of $5.8 million per day. From this, we can only
extrapolate what the financial impact might be of a major
event. The best way to limit significant expense is to rapidly
respond, mitigate and recover from an emergency. Costs become
exponential each day an emergency continues. To prevent this,
we must enhance the State's capabilities developed through
General Lowenberg's excellent efforts.
The DHS report does not address border issues for emergency
operations. It is imperative that medical, fire and police
resources have prearranged agreements for expedited border
crossings in both directions. In regards to nurses, doctors,
and medical personnel, there are union issues which must be
considered. Although identified in the congressional report, it
is not apparent what progress has been made at the Federal
level to enhance the interface between the United States and
Canadian Customs authorities.
I have noted 11 areas for improvement. We should upgrade
the 2010 Olympics and associated games to a national security
event; provide Federal support for funding, training and
exercise of NWWARN; permit participation in intelligence and
information process of professionals; fund exercises to support
greater interoperability of intelligence assets between
Washington Fusion Center and Canadian authorities; provide
funding for training of private security officers and police
officers in surveillance detection; fund exercising of the
Pacific Northwest Emergency Mutual Aid agreements; complete the
SEWG threat and vulnerability assessment; fund tabletop
exercises which include participation from all sectors from
both sides of the border; plan for border crossings during
emergency situations; develop prearranged border-crossing
agreements for medical and fire personnel; and develop
protocols for expediting mass transit through the border.
The return on investment for this funding and support is
the development of best practices which will directly impact
the safety and security of the Pacific Northwest and 2010
Olympics. The lessons learned will have national relevance as
other States and event planners can benefit from our
experiences and best practices.
Dealing with future catastrophes is not easy. It requires
time and commitment. Commitment in the Federal Government means
establishing priorities for action through funding. Only when
this is seen, will collaborative plans have a reasonable chance
of successful implementation. PNWER is a unique organization,
statutorily viable in several northwest States and the Canadian
provinces. It has a proven track record through its Center for
Regional Disaster Resilience to expedite these processes and
significantly impact preparedness through its ability to
develop collaborative solutions between the public and private
sectors.
Pending your questions, this concludes my testimony. Thank
you.
[The statement of Mr. Slotnick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeffrey A. Slotnick
March 12, 2008
Ms. Chairwoman and Members of the subcommittee, first and foremost
I want to thank you for this opportunity you have provided me as a
citizen of the United States of America to impact the safety and
security of our great Nation and specifically the Pacific Northwest.
You have seen the biography I provided so I will not take time with
my professional bona fides. I do have a brief story to recount: In 1985
while I was still serving in active military service I was returning
from a 5-year overseas tour in Europe where I experienced terrorism
first-hand through the activities of the Bader Mein Hoff Gang, the
Italian Red Brigade, the 1983 bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut,
and the day I will never forget as I watched in June 1985 the hijacking
of TWA Flight 847 in which a 23-year-old U.S. Navy diver, Robert Dean
Stethem, of Waldorf, MD, was shot and dumped on the tarmac of Beirut
International Airport. These events fundamentally changed my outlook on
the world and put me on a course that has led to me speaking with you
today.
You may ask why do I invoke these memories--well in 1985 as I
returned to the United States through Kennedy International Airport I
looked around and said to myself, We are not ready, doesn't anybody
watch the news? I retired from military service late in 1992 and
watched in horror as the World Trade Center was destroyed in 2001.
I stand here today to inform you of my impression of security,
critical infrastructure preparedness, and the response capabilities of
the Pacific Northwest in preparation for the 2009 World Fire and Police
Games, 2010 Olympics, and 2010 Para-Olympics and based on my experience
I can seriously tell you that we are not prepared.
The safety and security of the 2010 Olympics and the United States
is at risk if we do not take direct action. There are tasks that were
identified by DHS in their congressional report, some of which have not
been completed, and eleven additional tasks I will identify that must
be accomplished to insure a safe and successful event.
I have lived in the Pacific Northwest for almost 22 years and
during that time I have served on numerous Homeland Security-related
committees, personally conducted Risk, Threat, and Vulnerability
Assessments for two counties, Transit Facilities, water and sewer
utilities, private corporate facilities, and educational facilities.
Additionally, I have participated as a planner and evaluator for
several Blue Cascades Critical Infrastructure Interdependency Exercises
held by the Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER). Additionally, I
have been involved in writing initiatives and breaking down barriers in
support of public/private partnerships in information sharing and
intelligence. Most recently I was an active participant in the recent
floods in Lewis County which closed down Interstate 5 for a period of
several days.
I am an industry professional who has a ground-up view and I wish
to share that with you today. I am going to provide information on
several critical areas, they are:
Public/Private Interoperability Issues;
Critical Infrastructure Preparedness and Regional Disaster
Resilience;
Expedited Border Crossing Issues.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Report to Congress on the
2010 Olympic and Para-Olympic Winter Games identifies many gaps and
shortfalls which must be addressed prior to the 2010 Olympics. As I
have experienced in local meetings and read in various Federal
documents precious little has been accomplished in the way of Federal
preparation and support although tremendous strides have been made on a
State level with minimal funding.
The 2009 World Fire and Police Games will be held also in
Vancouver, and provide an opportunity for us to plan and test our
preparedness for the Olympics.
The World Fire and Police Games which commence in 14 short months
and will bring athletes, spectators, and support staff from all over
the world to the Pacific Northwest.
As we speak winter Olympic teams are already arriving in the
Northwest for practice and preparation.
To this end the DHS Special Events Work Group (SEWG) promised to
provide a comprehensive risk, threat and vulnerability assessment. This
is a critical document as security planning and decisions are based in
risk and risk is calculated from threat. This essential planning
document has not yet been prepared.
Different from other Olympic Events the Pacific Northwest has a
considerably higher threat of disaster. We are susceptible to a variety
of potential catastrophic incidents (indeed, these are more than
potential--most have occurred in the recent past): Including
earthquakes; volcanic eruptions with a lahar flow possibility;
flooding; hurricane-force windstorms; domestic and foreign terrorism;
epidemics; tsunamis; fires; hazardous materials disaster; landslides;
and tornadoes. These events--and the problems associated with any
response to them--are exacerbated by the geologic and geographic
constraints of the main population centers (Seattle, Tacoma, Portland,
Vancouver) which are bordered by the Pacific Ocean on the west and the
Cascade Mountain Range on the east. These geographic features create
what has become known as the I-5 corridor.
In its current status the 2010 Olympics has been federally
designated a ``Special Event''. In past years the Academy Awards, Super
Bowls 2002 to 2008, and 2002 Winter Olympics were given the higher
designation of ``National Special Security Events''. Many of these
events were only 2 to 4 hours in duration. The 2010 Olympics will last
for 14 days and be seen by over 3 billion viewers seconded only by the
Summer Olympics.
Given the above information I ask that you consider upgrading the
designation of this event to ``National Special Security Event''.
public/private information sharing
The Pacific Northwest has significant private sector assets.
Companies like Boeing, Microsoft, Starbucks, and Washington Mutual are
national or global in nature and possess significant intelligence
assets for support of their operations. In many cases individuals in
these organizations have higher security clearances than many law
enforcement officials.
It would be unfortunate not to capitalize on these assets in
support of the 2010 Olympics through the framework established by the
Northwest Warning and Response Network NWWARN.
The best way to prevent an attack is by discovering it in the early
planning stages. This can best be accomplished through a robust
Information and Intelligence Sharing process for vetted professionals
in all critical infrastructure sectors, both public and private.
Sharing intelligence and warning information with Canada will be
key in preventing any attack during the 2010 Olympics. In consideration
of our cross-border Canadian partners this ability needs to be enhanced
and tested.
critical infrastructure preparedness and regional disaster resilience
I was recently involved in flooding of Lewis County Washington
which closed all four lanes of Interstate 5 for 4 days, 3 to 7 December
2007 it is estimated this 4-day closure had a regional economic impact
of $5.8 million per day.
In the grand scheme of things this was a relatively minor event.
From this, we can only imagine what impact a major event would have on
the Pacific Northwest Economy.
The best way to prevent significant expense is the ability to
rapidly respond, mitigate, and recover from an emergency event. Costs
rapidly become exponential each day that an emergency event continues.
To prevent this we must enhance the States' capacities developed
through General Lowenbergs' excellent efforts and conduct federally-
supported and -funded cross-border, multi-jurisdictional, disaster
resilience preparedness exercises that consider critical infrastructure
interdependencies which could negatively impact the Games, and the
border.
expedited border crossing
At present there are considerable issues pertaining to cross-border
movement of people and goods related to the various games. The DHS
report prepared for the 2010 Olympics identified numerous significant
issues with border crossing, the report only considers the anticipated
increases in traffic due to the games. The report does not address
Emergency Operations in case of a manmade or natural disaster.
It is imperative that Medical, Fire, and Police resources have pre-
arranged agreements for expedited border crossings in both directions
should their support be required during the response phase of a
critical incident. In regard to nurses, doctors, and medical personnel
there are union issues which must be considered and resolved.
I have several concerns for non-emergency operations during the
Olympics including developing protocols for the movement of people and
goods at the border. To the best of my knowledge not enough effort is
being made at the Federal level to develop this interface between the
Customs and Border Patrol, and the Canadian Border Services Agency
(CBSA).
Ideally, it is important to develop protocols for mass transit
carriers such as buses and high-speed ferries.
To further cut down on Border delays it would be reasonable to
consider a Park-and-Ride type of arrangement with shuttle busses where
the benefit is pre-clearance of passengers to expedite border crossing
during the games.
Reduced passenger car traffic is very important to the Vancouver
Olympic Committee (VANOC) as no private cars will be allowed on the
road to Whistler, not to mention emergency response and potential
congestion issues. Identified gaps need to be federally addressed,
especially on our side of the border, with Critical Infrastructure
owners and operators, Mass Transit carriers, and border officials.
eleven areas for improvement
General
Upgrade the 2010 Olympics and associated games to a National
Special Security Event.
Information Sharing
Provide Federal Support for funding, training, and exercises
for NWWARN.
Permit participation of vetted professionals through NWWARN
in all critical infrastructure sectors both public and private.
Include participation by our Canadian partners in
information and intelligence sharing.
Fund exercises to support greater interoperability of
intelligence assets between the Washington Fusion Center WAJAC
and Canadian Authorities.
Provide training for private security officers and street
level police officers in Surveillance Detection and Indicators
of Deception.
Critical Infrastructure
Fund exercising the mutual aid agreements with (PNEMA) which
have not been tested.
Complete the SEWG Risk, Threat, and Vulnerability
Assessment.
Fund the development of Table Top Exercises which include
participation from impacted sectors specifically owners and
operators of critical infrastructure, emergency managers,
PNEMA, fire, and police from both sides of the border.
Expedited Border Crossing
Consider and plan for Border Crossings during emergency
situations.
Develop pre-arranged border crossing agreements (both ways)
for Medical, Fire, and Police personnel.
Develop protocols for expediting Mass Transit through the
border by expedited manifests of passenger information.
The return on investment for this funding and support is the
development of best practices which will directly impact the safety and
security of the Pacific Northwest and 2010 Olympics. The lessons
learned will have national capacity as other States and event planners
can benefit from our experiences and best practices.
closing
Given the current world situation and based on my experience I feel
the 2010 Olympics has strong potential to be a global target and at a
minimum has a higher-than-normal possibility for natural disaster.
In this light I remind you of the 1972 Olympics where the terrorist
target was not only twelve Israelis, but the millions of innocent
viewers worldwide who had terrorism brought right into their living
rooms as they watched a terrorist event unfold on national television.
The way forward: Dealing with future catastrophes is not easy. It
requires time and commitment. Commitment in Federal Government means
establishing priorities for action through funding. Only when this is
seen will collaborative plans have a reasonable chance of successful
implementation.
The Pacific Northwest Economic Region, of which I am a part, is a
unique organization that is statutorily viable in several Northwest
States and the Canadian Provinces.
PNWER has a proven track record through its Center for Regional
Disaster Resilience to expedite these processes and significantly
impact preparedness through it ability to develop collaborative
solutions between the Public and Private Sectors.
Through the dedicated efforts of General Lowenberg and his staff,
the Pacific Northwest economic region, and an involved community the
framework for successful completion of these actions exists in the
Pacific Northwest.
This concludes my testimony.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank both of the witnesses for
their insightful testimony. I will begin the questioning by
yielding myself 5 minutes.
May I ask both Mr. Arnot and Mr. Slotnick, based upon your
expertise in security, and specifically security for the
Olympics, I want you both to consider these thoughts. In past
Olympics, what has the role of security been in advance of and
during the games' preparation? As part of those Olympics, what
has been the role of the Federal Government? That is, how has
it been involved in the process? What should be the role of the
Department of Homeland Security and the rest of the Federal
Government be doing in preparation for the Vancouver Olympics?
Is DHS and the rest of the Federal Government providing the
necessary support?
I will start with Mr. Arnot. Mr. Slotnick, I do want you to
answer the question in the context of your remarks which say we
are not prepared.
Mr. Slotnick. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Arnot.
Mr. Arnot. Well, Madam Chairwoman, I think the key role of
the Federal Government is important to address. I think
overall, what we are looking at and what was very successful
finally in Salt Lake City was clearly outlining roles and
responsibilities for the specific Federal agencies.
The key lead agency should be the local agency. In the case
of Utah, it was the Utah State Police. In Chicago, should we be
fortunate enough to host the games, it would be the Chicago
Police Department. They need to take the lead in the unified
command structure, but the Federal agencies can all play a very
specific role. Secret Service played a very important role in
terms of developing the infrastructure protection plan,
particularly as it related to the venues themselves. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation played key roles in terms of
intelligence, hostage rescue, and response to terrorist
activities.
I could go on with each one of the elements of the command,
each one of the agencies that was involved. You know well what
the responsibilities are, but clearly what was successful for
us in Salt Lake City was to understand the expertise of each
one of the agencies and apply it appropriately to the command
structure.
In the early stages, in advance of the games, the key role
of the Federal Government actually was to assist in the
development of the training for all of the agencies that were
involved and to support financially the training of the local
agencies. No local agency, as I said in my testimony, is
prepared to handle the games alone. They need to be
supplemented by the Federal agencies, and they need obviously
of course to be able to handle the normal public safety
responsibilities of their jurisdiction during the games time.
To handle both that and the games is simply too much for them.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The Department of Homeland Security did
not exist.
Mr. Arnot. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So, was there a coordinating lead agency
from the U.S. Government.
Mr. Arnot. From the U.S. Government, the lead agency was
the United States Secret Service.
Ms. Jackson Lee. They coordinated with the lead law
enforcement on the ground?
Mr. Arnot. They did. They coordinated directly with the
Utah Public Safety Command, but the Public Safety Command,
importantly, included all of the Federal agencies, as well as
all of the State and local agencies. It compelled everybody,
quite frankly, to sit down in the same room and work through
together what the details of planning would be, what the
communication protocols would be, and all of the myriad of
details for each one of the venues, all of the surrounding
area, and everything, quite frankly, that dealt with it, from
the air above to the ground beneath us. It obviously involved
the U.S. military significantly, too.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What do you think now with the Department
of Homeland Security in place, with all of its resources, and I
imagine tentacles in a lot of emergency preparedness and the
whole question of providing equipment so there is
interoperability, what role would you see for the Department of
Homeland Security?
Mr. Arnot. I would see the Department of Homeland Security
taking a role of coordination of the Federal agencies, and
understanding again what the expertise of each one of those
agencies is, and being able to oversee each of those agencies
in handing their roles and their areas of expertise.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I guess not speaking directly as to what
is going on in Vancouver and Washington State, did you have
enough resources during your time, your tenure for the
Olympics, from the Federal Government? Was there sufficient
support?
Mr. Arnot. We did in Salt Lake City. It was late, perhaps,
in coming, but when it did come, it was adequate.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you for your polite demeanor
in that it was adequate. We thank you for giving us that
assessment.
Thank you, Mr. Arnot.
Mr. Slotnick.
Mr. Slotnick. Yes, Madam Chairwoman.
As far as what should DHS be doing, I think I can summarize
it by saying providing expertise, funding and being a good
community partner. I think those are things that are very
important.
As I stated, we are talking about the 2010 Olympics, but in
reality what we are speaking about is the 2009 World Fire and
Police Games that give us an excellent opportunity to prepare
and exercise in preparation for the games. In many cases, as
far as participants, there is a larger attendance from the 2009
World Fire and Police Games than there are for the Olympics.
So it would be appropriate to have that funding and have
that funding up front so that what we are able to do is involve
the community, get everybody working together so that we have
this adequate response. The other thing that I see is that
since the 2010 Olympics is not on U.S. soil, it has been given
a lesser designation. As Mr. Arnot said, the Utah Olympics was
designated a lead agency of the U.S. Secret Service. The U.S.
Secret Service only takes the lead if it is designated as a
United States special event.
That is why I would encourage that we change that
designation to a special event, because we do have significant
impact within the continental United States as an alternate
hub, an arrival points, teams coming into practice in the
Pacific Northwest before the games, and the impact of the
Americans that will be attending the Olympics. Our
understanding is that 40 percent of the attendees at the 2010
games will be Americans, and most of those are expected to come
through the port of Seatac into Vancouver.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. I will have some follow-up
questions, but my time has expired.
I am now pleased to yield to the distinguished gentleman
for 5 minutes for questioning, Mr. Lungren, the Ranking Member.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Mr. Arnot, you talked about the organizational model
developed for the Salt Lake City Olympics involving the
private-public partnerships, local, State, Federal, U.S.
military, Olympic Organizing Committee. Are you knowledgeable
about whether or not that is the model that is being used by
the Washington State Olympics Security Committee?
Mr. Arnot. I don't have specific knowledge of that, sir.
Mr. Lungren. Do you, Mr. Slotnick?
Mr. Slotnick. I do know that in Washington State, we are
using an ICS-based model. That is the model for all responses
within Washington State, simply because of our hazard profile,
being on the cusp of a 9.0 earthquake, we adhere to ICS very
carefully. I can't imagine that we would use anything but
unified command for that.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Slotnick, you talked about some union
issues involving doctors, nurses and other medical personnel
that might somehow interfere with them rendering assistance.
Can you tell me what you mean by that?
Mr. Slotnick. Yes. There are some union agreements within
Canada that prevent our people from actually going across the
border and responding.
Mr. Lungren. I see. So it is the cross-border, not any----
Mr. Slotnick. Yes, it is not a U.S. union issue, but it is
an issue that needs to be addressed and resolved.
Mr. Lungren. Okay. You mention in your testimony about your
background and how we were all shocked at what happened at the
Olympics in Munich----
Mr. Slotnick. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lungren [continuing]. And that sort of thing.
Obviously, we have a heightened concern for terrorism today,
coming in our own borders.
Mr. Slotnick. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lungren. That has heightened the interest of not only
this committee, but the entire Congress and the government
itself.
What I am trying to find out is the gravamen of your
complaint about what is occurring now. Is it that it is not
happening fast enough? You are afraid it is not going to
happen? Or is it because there has not been a designation of
the 2010 Olympics as a national special security event that is
at the core of your concern?
Mr. Slotnick. I think it is a bit of all of the above, sir.
My personal perception is that things are not moving fast
enough. We are 14 months away from the 2009 World Fire and
Police Games. We have adequate time with the proper Federal
support to be able to respond adequately and properly for the
2010 Olympics. But it just doesn't seem to have the impetus
behind it that it should.
Mr. Lungren. Let me ask this about, when we talk about
risk, we talk about threat, we talk about vulnerability, we
talk about consequence. Threat is primarily, in my judgment, a
function of us gathering, analyzing and disseminating
intelligence, and understanding what the bad guys are looking
at.
Are you satisfied at this point in time with the level of
intelligence sharing from the Federal Government to State and
local authorities with respect to either or both of the 2010
Olympics or the earlier games, the Police and Fire that you
have been referring to?
Mr. Slotnick. At this point, to the best of my knowledge,
sir, the Security Working Group has not produced their risk,
threat and vulnerability assessment that would give that threat
and identify that threat specifically for the Olympics. The
other thing, as I identified, it is very important that we
incorporate private sector in this. Private sector has
significant assets and is going to be directly impacted by any
event that occurs as a result of the Olympics, whether it is
something that is caused by a criminal act, or whether it is
something that happens as a result of natural disaster.
Mr. Lungren. Let me ask you this, it has been my impression
that the Northwest, particularly the State of Washington, from
a standpoint of coordination of local, regional and State law
enforcement and other first responders, are on what I would
call the forefront of coordination and collaboration. Is that
your feeling, that throughout that region there is a real
effort at a regional approach? And that whether we are talking
about the 2009 games or the 2010, that it is one of the better
areas of our country in that regard?
Mr. Slotnick. Definitely, sir. The Northwest Warning and
Alert, NWWARN, is leaning way forward in the trenches in that
regard for coordinating information coming from private sector
and elevating it to the Washington Joint Analytical Center,
WAJAC. WAJAC is a tremendous program and does have coordination
at the upper levels with the Federal intelligence group and the
JTTF, Joint Terrorism Task Force.
But it could be better. Again, funding is an issue. General
Lowenberg has done some significant things with State funding.
It would be exceptional if we could advance that model and get
that model up to speed for the 2010 Olympics.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Lungren.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, Ranking
Member Lungren.
Gentlemen, thank you for your patience and perseverance.
Let me just start by asking Mr. Arnot, in your experience
with Chicago and your previous experience with New York, to
what extent is security and having a plan in place taken into
account when the Olympic Committee decides upon a location? Is
this a significant factor?
Mr. Arnot. The easy answer is yes, it is a significant
factor. When the International Olympic Committee makes the
decision, the security and general public safety of the entire
Olympic environment is definitely a major consideration on
their part.
Ms. Clarke. I wasn't here, unfortunately, for the beginning
of both of your testimonies, but I wanted to ask either of you,
since you both have had the experience with security at large-
scale events going back many years, generally speaking has
security greatly evolved significantly since the 2001 Olympics
and other such events held in North America? If so, in what
ways?
Mr. Arnot. If I could start. The 2002 games established a
new threshold for us. I think that the bar was raised
significantly by 9/11, obviously. I think that the model that
has been established, the work that was done on the 2000 games
was significant. It would be my own personal opinion that we
have not seen significant advancement since 2002.
Ms. Clarke. Mr. Slotnick, did you want to chime in? Is
there anything that you would vary with Mr. Arnot on?
Mr. Slotnick. Yes, ma'am, I would concur with that. I think
since 2001, we have seen considerable growth in security in
general, and security concerns against criminal acts and
terrorism. It has been exponential. Of course, since that time,
the National Incident Management System, the National Response
Plan, the National Intelligence Plan have all evolved since
that time and impact how we conduct ourselves and how we plan
for emergencies and prepare for terrorist acts.
Ms. Clarke. Then, this question is for either of you as
well: In preparing for any Olympics, who takes ultimate
responsibility for security? Is there one organization that has
the final say and ensures that all security organizations work
together in a sensible way? Is it the Olympic Committee, the
government of the host country, the local government? What
would you say is the command structure around security for
events of this magnitude?
Mr. Arnot. I think we would probably both agree that it
needs to be a unified command structure. At the top of that
unified command should be the host city, assuming that the host
city in itself has significant resources. A city like New York
for the 2012 bid, a city like Chicago for the 2016 bid, would
take the lead. The other agencies, including the Federal
agencies, would come in in a designated support role.
In Utah, it was a bit different because the city of Salt
Lake itself did not have a very substantial police department.
So the Utah State Patrol was the lead agency. In each case, it
was the lead government officer. In the case of Salt Lake, it
was the Governor. In the case of New York's bid, it was the
mayor. In the case of Chicago, it would be the mayor who in
fact is the person in charge of that public safety command.
Mr. Slotnick. Ma'am, I think of considerable note is that
this is not an event that is a specific U.S. event. We have the
cross-border issue, so all the more need for unified command
and the ability to exercise those commands prior to any event.
With the actual Olympics being conducted on Canadian soil, but
significant impact to the United States and U.S. businesses and
the I-5 corridor, it is just absolutely huge in what we should
be preparing to do.
Ms. Clarke. So are you saying that in terms of unified
command, is it your assertion that the Federal Government
probably through CPB would also have to be a partner in this?
Then just in closing, because I know my time is running out, I
know that the Chairwoman raised the issue of interoperability
in terms of communication. Have there been any advances to your
knowledge which would facilitate the emergency preparedness for
the environment that you are working with right now?
Mr. Slotnick. We have been working on interoperable
communications within the State. The ability to communicate
with the Federal Government has improved, but again we are
dealing with a cross-border issue. So it is not only our
ability to communicate within ourselves, but it is our ability
to communicate with Canadian law enforcement and Canadian
Federal Government even for normal operations, let alone during
an emergency.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentlelady for her thoughtful
questions. I would like to pursue those questions, so I yield
myself an additional 5 minutes for an abbreviated second round.
Again, let me suggest that this is both instructive and I
think it opens the door for future hearings for those who are
presently in the top-off and presently engaged. But let me
raise this question. As you well know, I gave a list of
concerns when I gave my opening remarks, having to do with the
2010 Vancouver Olympics. I would like to again raise them with
you for your thought and analysis by both witnesses, and Mr.
Arnot first.
I am concerned about expedited border closings during the
games, and what would happen if we would have to close the
borders; intelligence fusion across borders and within
governments, the way of communicating intelligence quickly;
radio interoperability, which my colleague mentioned just a
moment ago; and the need for a multi-agency coordination
center; and what roles should DHS play in support of these
efforts.
Now, I would appreciate as I have looked over the landscape
of large events, Mr. Arnot, the Olympics are not the only large
events that we confront every day here in the United States. I
know that the NASCAR is continuously happy, the throngs of
individuals that they put in a stadium almost on a weekly
basis. Likewise, so is the Superbowl thrilled with their
numbers, whether it is the NBA All Stars or playoffs--these are
large-number venues.
So please incorporate in your answer your thoughts about a
breakdown or a break-out or a segregated--``segregated'' is not
right--but an actual designated assistant secretary or
component of DHS to deal with large events, so that there is a
point person that is collaborative, that is coalescing, that is
working, even thinking, if you will, way ahead of the time when
we have to address these sometimes very thorny questions.
Mr. Arnot, I mentioned the expedited border crossings,
intelligence fusion, radio interoperability. I think you heard
all my points.
Mr. Arnot. Madam Chairwoman, thank you.
I think the notion of expedited border crossings--the
notion that we have the appropriate personnel at the border
crossings now to be handled an expedited border crossing I
would assume from Canada into the United States, especially in
the event that there would be some kind of a significant
incident surrounding the games and what that would do to the
general psyche of the people who were at the games, obviously
being able to have the appropriate number of people at the
border closings I think is, as the distinguished representative
from Washington noted earlier, the idea that that is supported
by appropriate medical personnel and other support personnel is
something absolutely to take a look at.
Intelligence fusion--intelligence is absolutely the first
key to the security of the games or any large event. The
sharing of intelligence back and forth between the United
States and Canada is something that absolutely needs to be
looked at with regard to the event. The development of fusion
centers for this particular event, if it has not already
happened, it something that I would suggest should be
researched.
Radio interoperability--your operation is only as good as
your information. Your information is only as good as your
communication. Your communication is based on your
communications equipment. You can't operate if you don't have
interoperability of your communications equipment.
I was very impressed, Madam Chairwoman, with your
understanding of the spectrum demands on an event like this,
especially when they are crossing borders and we are dealing
with different Federal agencies, and the control of those
spectrums.
The multi-agency coordination center--regardless of the
fact that this event is in Canada, if the United States is
going to be able to address the threats that might be posed by
this event to the United States, it would be suggested that a
multi-agency task force be assembled and that they are in one
place able to communicate and work with each other on a regular
basis.
Your question about the threat assessment to other events I
think is also quite wise. On any given Saturday in the fall, we
have dozens of stadiums across the United States with 50,000,
60,000, 70,000, 100,000 people. Each of the State and local
agencies have done a good job between 2002 and today in terms
of stepping up what they can do individually to protect those
areas. The job is enormous. The risk is significant. The
threat, because of the numbers of people alone, is something
that bears some consideration.
I think that the notion of having someone or an office
within the Department of Homeland Security that is able to
review those events on a regular basis, preview the events on a
regular basis and be able to address Federal support that might
be deemed necessary, I think would be prudent.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me, before I go to Mr. Slotnick, Mr.
Arnot first of all thank you for bringing your vast range of
knowledge and disparate knowledge, different venues that you
have either consulted on or actually been operationally
involved in and in charge. In the games in Atlanta and Salt
Lake, did you have direct contact with security so that as you
are managing whether or not an athlete has gotten on the bus
and has gotten to the venue for his or her particular skill,
did you feel that you had either the walkie-talkies, whether e-
mail was sufficient at that time, but the direct contact with
the principals dealing with security?
Mr. Arnot. Madam Chairwoman, in Atlanta, the answer is no,
we did not. Atlanta was a challenge from a number of different
perspectives. The advancement of the planning from Atlanta to
Salt Lake was very significant. I will tell you that I felt
that during the Salt Lake Games, I could get to the information
in a relatively short period of time. In the case of an
emergency, that short period of time may not have been short
enough. The communications equipment and the varieties of
communications equipment that we were working with at that time
would have allowed us--the protocols were there, the
cooperation was there, the will was there, but the way was not
necessarily there.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me let Mr. Slotnick finish, and I will
then yield very quickly to Ms. Clarke for a question that she
has as well.
Did you remember my questions?
Mr. Slotnick. Yes, ma'am, I did.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Arnot, very much. That was
a very important response. Thank you.
Mr. Slotnick. As to expedited border crossings, I think
this is very important to include private sector. The Pacific
Northwest economic region through their Blue Cascades exercises
has done quite a bit to conduct gap analysis and identify
alternatives for emergencies and for natural disaster.
I think the same model would be applied to looking at
issues with border crossing in a collaborative effort, how we
might expedite certain crossings. For example, having mass
transit set up so that there wasn't a lot of individual
vehicular traffic, but with the carrot being for people to get
pre-cleared if they take mass transit, allowing them to cross
the border rather expeditiously in both directions, would
eliminate a lot of tie-up at the border; would reduce the
amount of personnel needed; and have folks with ability to
travel very rapidly.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Are you suggesting opening up or expanding
mass transit that crosses the border? And are you suggesting
that that would be a manner of evacuation?
Mr. Slotnick. It could be both. It could be both, ma'am.
But yes, I am suggesting that we consider pre-clearing folks,
similar to some other programs like the CLEAR Program that we
use here in the United States for folks that are traveling
between TSA venues from airport to airport. They get pre-
cleared in a biometric fashion, so that they are able to
transit the TSA rapidly--to have something set up like this at
the 2010 Olympics to allow citizens from both sides to be able
to cross rapidly during normal operations, as well as have
expedited crossing in case of an emergency.
As to intelligence fusion, it is absolutely key. It is a
critical component. Again, I would like to reemphasize the need
for private sector involvement in that. We see a lot of
information that comes across that is geared toward Federal
consumption, toward law enforcement consumption.
But not only does private sector need to be aware of what
is going on, but private sector has a tremendous awareness of
what is going on, because they have to deal with it to protect
their enterprises on a daily basis. When you are protecting a
Boeing enterprise or you are protecting a Microsoft enterprise,
you are aware of a lot of the same things that Federal
Government is and law enforcement. The opportunity to share
that in both directions to me is key and critical.
As to an office within DHS, I think instead of having to
reinvent things at each event, the ability to have an office
that would be in charge and have standardized protocols,
lessons learned, the ability to learn from each event and
improve those standard operating procedures and personalize
them for each event would be greatly enhanced by having a
central repository for those type of events.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
I will now yield to the gentlelady from New York for her
question.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Madam Chair.
My question is really a follow-up to the expedited border
crossing. I just wanted to note that the Olympics tend to be
international by nature, so that the processing, the Customs
processing of individuals who may not be either citizens of
Canada or the United States, has that been taken into
consideration? For U.S. citizens, the CLEAR Program is great,
but if you are not a citizen of the United States, it doesn't
really facilitate the transporting of ease through TSA.
Have you looked at the fact that we will have people from
around the world attending this event, and the intricacies of
having to deal with moving them about should something occur at
the venue?
Mr. Slotnick. Ma'am, I would say that it has been
considered. Probably not many solutions have been developed.
Funding is certainly lacking in that area, but the ability to
have funding for collaborative exercises that allow those
things to rise to the top where a gap analysis can be done and
solutions developed, needs to happen. That has not happened
yet.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
Let me add my appreciation on behalf of the committee and
offer to say to you that we selected a day that couldn't have
been more busier, if that is completely correct English, with
members in a variety of hearings. You might hear a lot of
buzzing of emails. These are other staff members asking us why
we are not in the committee meeting that is going on across the
campus, which is why Congresswoman Clarke and Congressman
Lungren is now on the floor dealing with a matter, and a number
of our Members are doing so.
Having said that, we believe this is a very important first
step and hearing. We are grateful to each of you for providing
now the series of questions, and I think a roadmap going
forward, one, not only for Vancouver, but really the question
that we really have been studying over a period of time, large
venues. We have had some staff assessments on a number of large
venues. I don't think that we have reached the final
conclusions that you have now contributed to in terms of what
we need to be addressing.
Mr. Arnot, your very frank and blunt statement, without I
know any attempt to denigrate, but your frank comment on
Atlanta is taken for what it is, as a help to us to realize
that the incidences that we have had, whether or not one would
say it would be totally preventable because terrorists are by
their nature based upon surprise. But we do know that we have
now the wake-up call, and now with more sensitivity after 9/11,
to really be prepared.
We have been very fortunate in all of the large events that
we have engaged in as Americans, from whether it is a faith
meeting with how many hundreds of thousands come to a faith
event for good purposes, versus boxing opportunities and NASCAR
and just plain old Rose Bowl activities where all the parents
and everyone is gathered for a celebratory time.
We need to be more conscious, and I do think we are going
to look very closely at the idea of this designation in DHS
because we need to be consulting with experts like yourself. We
need to build a very tight team within the agency that has
immediate response and activity and operational activity on all
of these events, which frankly I believe certainly have
probably been attended to by a number of law enforcement
agencies.
I can't imagine that some of our important law enforcement
agencies are not engaged in some of these large venues. But
again, how are they engaged? Are they on the day-of and that is
the extent of their work? Then I think that is not enough. This
hearing contributed to moving us forward along those lines.
So let me again on behalf of the full committee, Mr.
Thompson the Chairman, Mr. King the Ranking Member, and myself
as the subcommittee Chair that has a great interest in this
concept called critical infrastructure, thank you very much for
your testimony and your patience today. We appreciate it.
Any additional statements to be offered by our members can
be submitted into the record. Let me do my follow-up so that we
will make sure that everything is in order. The Members of the
subcommittee may have additional questions for the witnesses,
and we will ask you to respond expeditiously in writing to
those questions. You will be assisted by the committee staff in
case you want to know where those submissions can be made.
This subcommittee looks forward to subsequent hearings and
briefings on the security issues surrounding the 2010 Vancouver
Olympics. As I previously indicated, now that you have brought
us quite a bit of information and challenge, we will be looking
at other large-venue events, and we will do so in the coming
weeks and months. This continues to be an ongoing issue and a
very important issue.
Hearing no further business, the subcommittee now stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]