[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-68]
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND THE
BATTLE OF IDEAS: WINNING THE HEARTS
AND MINDS IN THE GLOBAL WAR
AGAINST TERRORISTS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 11, 2007
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
MARK UDALL, Colorado K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
KATHY CASTOR, Florida
Bill Natter, Professional Staff Member
Alex Kugajevsky, Professional Staff Member
Andrew Tabler, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2007
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, July 11, 2007, Strategic Communications and the Battle
of Ideas: Winning the Hearts and Minds in the Global War
Against Terrorists............................................. 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, July 11, 2007......................................... 25
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 2007
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND THE BATTLE OF IDEAS: WINNING THE HEARTS
AND MINDS IN THE GLOBAL WAR AGAINST TERRORISTS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee 1
Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Ranking
Member, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee................................................... 2
WITNESSES
Kramer, Franklin D., Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy.................................. 5
Wells, Dr. Linton, II, National Defense University............... 9
Zalman, Dr. Amy, Science Applications International Corporation
(SAIC)......................................................... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Kramer, Franklin D........................................... 40
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 29
Thornberry, Hon. Mac......................................... 30
Wells, Dr. Linton, II........................................ 49
Zalman, Dr. Amy.............................................. 32
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Questions submitted.]
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND THE BATTLE OF IDEAS: WINNING THE HEARTS
AND MINDS IN THE GLOBAL WAR AGAINST TERRORISTS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 11, 2007.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:46 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Smith. I think we are going to go ahead and get
started, if we could have everybody take their seats, actually.
Sorry, we should more formally greet the witnesses. I apologize
for that. It is just that we have votes coming up here
imminently. So I wanted to try to hopefully get our opening
statements in and your opening statements in, get as much as we
can in in the short period of time that we have.
Thank you all for joining us. I particularly want to thank
Representative Thornberry for his interest in the subject
matter and our strategic communications efforts on the war on
terror.
And it is something that has been of particular interest to
this subcommittee, which basically is the ideological battle
that is attached to the military battle. And I think that we
really need to focus more on that in our government.
And we cannot possibly win the battle that we are fighting
by simply killing every terrorist that we see. This is a battle
of ideas as much as it is a military battle.
We have to get to the point where people don't want to
follow al Qaida, don't want to sign up for their ideology and
commit those violent acts. If it is a game where we are simply
trying to always stop them before they get to us, it kind of
puts us on a treadmill that is picking up speed constantly.
That is not something we can succeed at.
We need to get our broader message out there. And, without
question, we have the better message. Al Qaida represents a
violent, totalitarian ideology that is simply trying to
subjugate people under the guise of religion, which really has
very little to do with what they are talking about. It has more
to do with control. You know, we have seen what the Taliban did
in Afghanistan--not something that people are signing up for.
We, on the other hand, offer a message of freedom and
opportunity. I think we have the better message in any culture,
be it the West or the Muslim culture or wherever. We have the
ability to deliver a message that offers a better way.
As strongly as I feel that, I also feel that, at this
point, we are by and large losing a public relations (PR) war
to Osama bin Laden in far too many parts of the world, even in
some cases with our allies, who have shown reluctance to jump
on full-bore with our effort. For one thing, they don't even
like the fact that we call it the global war on terror, and I
tend to agree with them. I think there would be a better way to
phrase this, in terms of how we pull people together. And
certainly within the Muslim world, America is not popular. We
are not winning the battle there.
So what we want to find out today and look forward to your
testimony is, you know, what are we doing to improve that
message? What is the message that we are trying to send out?
And of particular interest to me is who is in charge of it.
Because there are a lot of different pieces here: The Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) has a role, the Department of Defense
(DOD) has a role, the State Department has a role, various
different White House agencies, the Counterterrorism Center.
Who is in charge? How are we delineating that message?
Because, to some degree, this is something that all
politicians understand: Develop a message and deliver that
message. That is what we did to get here--on a much smaller,
less dangerous scale, I might add. But it is a basic
communications message, saying that we all understand and we
want it to work better than it does right now.
It is a major, major commitment of this committee. And I
know it is also a major commitment of my ranking member, Mr.
Thornberry, who has worked on this extensively.
And with that, I will yield to Mr. Thornberry for his
opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS,
RANKING MEMBER, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate
your comments. But I agree with everything you said.
One of the reasons I am so interested in this is because I
think it is so critical to our country's security. We obviously
face a determined, ruthless, adaptable enemy who uses terrorism
as a tactic. But we will not defeat that enemy with military
power alone. We have to engage in the battle of ideas, and we
have to engage successfully.
But the reason I am so motivated about this is because I
know of no one who thinks we are doing so successfully, or
maybe even competently, at the current time. And there have
been study after study, report after report, that talk about
how important it is, and yet we seem to be a lumbering
bureaucracy, moving to be slightly better. But as you point
out, in too many parts of the world, I am afraid, we are
losing.
My view is that you have to begin with an understanding of
the enemy, a deep understanding of the enemy, and then develop
specific approaches to then address that understanding, to
delegitimize his view of the world, offer an alternative, and
then have effective methods and perseverance enough to actually
implement what you are trying to do.
And I think that is what brings us to this hearing.
Mr. Chairman, strategic communications--one of those words
that gets slapped around--some people think it means we ought
to hire better PR people. Some people say that it is better
slogans, more effective commercials on television or radio. I
think it is much more and much deeper than that.
I have an article in my written statement from a colonel
who used to be with Central Command (CENTCOM), who describes it
as synchronizing public diplomacy, public affairs, public
relations, outreach, information operations, psychological
operations, so that you get the right message to the right
audience in order to help shape perceptions.
As you mentioned, that does not mean that it is the job of
one department of government--or, in my view, it is even
government alone. I think we have to bring in the considerable
expertise of the private sector to help do it.
But the point is, we have to do it. We can't fight this
battle with bullets alone. And I think we have to do a lot
better.
Defense Science Board study in 2004 said that ``strategic
communications is a vital component of our security. It is in
crisis and must be transformed with a strength of purpose that
matches our commitment to diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law
enforcement and homeland security.'' That is what motivates me,
Mr. Chairman, to try to put more light on it.
I appreciate very much the witnesses and the work they have
done in this area. And I am especially looking forward to their
suggestions on what we can do in Congress to help give it the
same strength of purpose that matches our commitment in those
other areas.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in
the Appendix on page 30.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. I appreciate that.
With that, I will turn to our witnesses. We have three this
morning: Dr. Amy Zalman, the Honorable Franklin D. Kramer and
Dr. Linton Wells.
We will start with Dr. Zalman, who is with SAIC but has
written, taught and done considerable research in the area of
strategic communications, particularly focused on the Muslim
world.
And I look forward to hearing your testimony.
Dr. Zalman. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. You can go ahead and get started. I think we can
get through. There are a few a minutes before we have to go.
STATEMENT OF DR. AMY ZALMAN, SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION (SAIC)
Dr. Zalman. Chairman Smith, Congressman Thornberry, thank
you for the opportunity to present my observations on strategic
communications today.
As Bill Natter pointed out in his introduction to the
session, my written testimony speaks primarily to the question
of strategic communications content.
It has been an American objective to tell our story to the
world. There has been less focus to date on what that story
really is and how to construct it so that others want to listen
and participate in shaping its ending.
The 2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and
Strategic Communications lays out a number of ways in which
American voices are about to be amplified throughout the world.
But what are these voices going to say that makes people want
to keep listening? Is it enough to recite lists of American
good works, no matter how true? Is more necessarily better?
Potentially, but not inevitably. Indeed, new efforts are as
reasonably doomed to failure as some of those of the past five
years if, in my view, the U.S. does not take seriously the need
to reaffirm its understanding of the simple: what it means to
tell a story.
What is a story? A story is a structured way of telling
events and of making sense of what happens to us. It has a
beginning, a middle and an end. Individuals tell stories; so do
collectivities.
When I think of stories, I think, of something that we
tell. But at the collective level, stories also tell us. They
tell us who we are, what we believe and idealize, who is one of
us, who is an outsider, how to behave and how not to behave.
This is their strategic function.
We are not only shaped by the stories we inherit, we also
contribute to them: what we tell our children, how we
celebrate, what we valorize, what we think of as right and
wrong, and how we behave. Through these activities, we
participate in story-telling.
Community stories do not so much have endings as they do
proposed futures. This, I think, is where strategic
communications takes place: at that point between present and
future.
Communications that are designed to influence can be
inserted into that moment, so that we shift one future and
propose an alternative. But we insert into a story that is
ongoing, not into a vacuum and not into an entirely new place.
From this, a few thoughts: One, strategic communications
does not take place in a vacuum. Everyone already has a story.
When people turn away from American messaging efforts, it may
not always be a sign of hostility, but rather, it is a sign
that they don't need someone else's story, they already have
their own.
I think we may better understand past failures and future
possibilities if we simply grasp that there are already other
stories in existence.
Two, a story must be credible. This has, of course, been
said ad infinitum in the past five years. But I would like to
explain what I think ``credibility'' means when we think of
communications in terms of stories.
In this case, ``credibility'' does not mean either
scientific veracity nor necessarily verifiable authority. What
it means is the ability to identify with a story and, in fact,
with characters in a story, to look up and go, ``Wow, I see
something that resembles someone like me doing things that I
think would be good and right to do.''
What this means for strategic communications is it has to
be built out of ingredients and values that people already
have. They cannot come from outside. They must come from inside
an existing community, for people to be spoken to.
And three, listening remains the most important task before
the United States. The opportunity to gain from listening to
others has not yet been as well-exploited as it could be.
Here is one way we may use listening. Take our best ideals,
find out, listen for, go and actively unearth what those terms
already mean to others. What is your idea of progress? Where in
your history are there events or processes that you would cast
as democratic? What is your vision of your future? What is the
meaning of the best universal ideals in your idiom?
I am hopeful that knowing these and having some facility
with using them in the idioms of others is the beginning of
being able to communicate truly well.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Zalman can be found in the
Appendix on page 32.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
Mr. Kramer, I think we will go ahead and give you a chance
to get your testimony in, as well, before we have to go vote.
So I will keep my introduction of you short, so that you can
speak. Go ahead.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANKLIN D. KRAMER, FORMER ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
Mr. Kramer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking
Member. Thanks for the opportunity to be here.
I won't belabor the point that each of you have made, that,
although we are an information superpower, we are not winning
the war of ideas. I think that is the basis for this hearing.
And I won't belabor the point, though I believe it deeply,
that we have a very good, really an excellent, story to tell.
So the question is, why aren't we winning?
And we are not winning despite the fact--and I think the
committee has some hearings planned--that the United States
government does communicate. So what is the problem?
Well, one thing is it is a complex world out there. There
are many other messages. There are multiple cultures; there are
multiple audiences. Actions, especially violent actions, speak
louder than words. And it is a difficult problem to find the
right messengers and the right mechanisms to get our story
across.
More specifically, a lot of what we do in the U.S. is what
I would call mass messaging. And mass messages are good, if the
audience is ready to listen, if they are already tuned into the
channel. But it is not for the people who haven't tuned in yet,
not for the unconverted.
So, for example, if you have a Presidential address on the
Middle East, naturally it goes to the American people. But in
Jakarta or Islamabad, it is heard differently. It is in the
wrong language. It is covered differently. The people come with
different preconceptions.
The U.S. also, because we have multiple interests, has
multiple messages, so it is hard for us to focus. We are the
superpower. We are always going to have multiple messages. So
we have to deal with that problem, because with multiple
messages comes lack of clarity, overlapping. So we have to
think about differentiation, audience segmentation, ways to get
our point to the right people.
And those right people, if you will, the target audience--
although I am not sure that is precisely right, because the
audience participates; it is a two-way street--they do live in
their own context. They already have multiple messages coming
in to them. And so, some of those people really don't want more
information. Some will only take information that is congenial
to their attitudes already.
And there are a lot of, if you will, anti-U.S. channels out
there already. There is a very recent Radio Free Europe study
which points out that both the Sunni insurgency in Iraq and al
Qaida make a great deal of use of communications. They do so
through Web sites. And those are amplified by Arab media.
And the real point that they made--and this is a quote--is
that there is a real demand for this in the Arab world. So
people are listening for those anti-U.S. messages, and we have
to recognize that and overcome that.
Even for those who want to listen when we put out a
message, they may hear it differently than we intend it to be
heard. It is because, again, they come with their own culture,
their own attitude, their own preconceptions. And so, exposure,
if you will, is not enough all by itself.
If you put that in the U.S. context, a Rush Limbaugh
listener is not going to be much persuaded by Michael Moore and
vice versa. So it is not enough just to increase the flow of
information. You have to think about how to make the
information effective.
Well, you also have to recognize that our actions have
consequences. Many people have said--it is a truism--actions
speak louder than words. So our policies, their impact, make a
big difference. And you have to cast the words in light of the
actual policies.
And we have to recognize that opposition entities like al
Qaida will take those policies and use them for their own
purposes. The al Qaida narrative, which, briefly, is that the
West is attacking the Muslim world, they draw heavily on what
is going on in Iraq to support their narrative. It is not true,
but it is how they use the activity.
So what do we do? Well, I have eight suggestions for the
committee.
The first is I think we need a substantially greater focus
on other cultures and other societies. We need to be able to
more clearly differentiate our audiences. We need to figure out
who are, if you will, the influencers in those societies.
In the book, ``The Tipping Point,'' Malcolm Gladwell talked
about what he called mavens who validate messages, connectors
who link messages, the link persons, and salesmen who sell
messages. And whether or not that is the exact right set of
categories, there are influential people in society, and we
need to look to them and talk to them and get them to talk in
their own society.
We also need to think about how to make a message
effective. For example, do you focus on individual values, or
do you focus on group values? It is different in different
societies.
What is the role of religion in messaging? If you look at a
Sunni insurgency message, it is wrapped in religious metaphors.
What should we do? We need to at least think about that.
As implied by that, my second point is we need more
experts--more experts focused on culture, more experts focused
on geography--who are working in the communications world. We
need to be able to build what I would call a societal map for
communications.
And to those experts, we need other disciplines: marketing,
psychology and expertise in the use of T.V. and Internet and
radio. Those are multiple disciplines. They are not taught in
basic training. They aren't taught in advanced training. And
they are not taught in foreign service school. So we need to
think about how to bring those kind of people in.
I would not suggest we don't have any; that would be a
mistake. But we don't have enough. And we need to expand that.
We also need to think about the fact that multiple theaters
require multiple message campaigns. Indonesia, which is part of
the Muslim world, is not the same as Pakistan, which is part of
the Muslim world; is not the same as Egypt, which is part of
the Muslim world. We need to think differently about how to get
our messages across in different places. We need a regional and
focused kind of approach.
As is implied by all that, we need more resources. I would
strongly suggest that we look hard at the Broadcasting Board of
Governors (BBG) and their various T.V. and radio stations,
increase there; the State Department's public diplomacy budget.
We need to do a lot more with respect to the Internet, Web. The
Government Accountability Office has said that our embassies
are very poor at sending out messages. We need to increase
their capacity. We need more regional efforts----
Mr. Smith. I apologize, sir. Unfortunately, we have to go
vote. We are down to a couple of minutes here. So I will stop
you on your fourth point, and we will have four more when we
come back.
It is going to be about 45 minutes before we come back, for
which I apologize. But----
Mr. Kramer. We know where the cafeteria is. [Laughter.]
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Mr. Thornberry and I, certainly I think we will--other
members of the committee who are probably over there voting now
will be back. And we look forward to hearing the rest of your
testimony, and yours as well, and asking questions.
So we will be back as soon as we can.
[Recess.]
Mr. Smith. Well, thank you for your patience. We will go
ahead and get started again. I am pretty sure that Mr.
Thornberry is coming back in just a second. And, you know, I
mentioned it to a few other members. See if we get a few other
folks here.
But, Mr. Kramer, I believe you were in the middle of----
Mr. Kramer. I was working my way through my points, as it
were. I think I had made four, so let me just make four more
and get off the podium here.
The fifth point I would make is that we need to take a
long-term as well as a short-term view. Especially in the DOD,
there is a tendency to be short-term. And it is understandable,
because you have to deal with the consequences of violent
actions. But what we are really talking about is changing
attitudes, and attitudes change over time.
And just, again, to use an example, think of the difference
in attitudes toward cigarette smoking in the U.S. It took 30
years. It takes time. And we need to have information
activities that are long-term.
The department, the DOD, for example, runs something called
the Southeast European Times. It is in nine languages. It is an
information site. Or it runs another one called Magharebia. It
is in three languages. All those are are news sites and
information and analysis. They are not going to solve the
problem today. But they are that background kind of information
that gives you a possibility.
The sixth point I will make is that, although it is true
and I certainly subscribe to the fact that facts speak louder
than words, it is possible to explain facts. And I think we
really need to increase both the training and the resources for
our combat forces to help them in this arena.
It is good, and the committee's work with Special
Operations Command (SOCOM), which runs psychological
operations. It is good what strategic communications (STRATCOM)
does. But when you are in counterinsurgency, you are in
stability operations, it is really the folks on the ground who
are doing it. So that is your brigade, your battalion, your
company, your platoons.
And they need, of course, to get to the center of gravity.
The center of gravity is the people. That means they need to be
able to communicate. And they really don't have sufficient--I
wouldn't say none at all, but they don't have sufficient
training. They don't have sufficient resources. They don't have
sufficient capacities when they go in. So I think that is
awfully important.
The seventh point I would make is that we really need to
use much more greater use of a partnership approach with allies
and partners. If you are a business, you simply would not go
into another country without a local advisor or a local partner
or a joint venture or something like that. You would know you
would be lost.
And we need to have that, what I would call, fingertip feel
for the country. And you get that when you have deep, local
knowledge. Now, Americans can get that of countries, but you
have to live there, work with them and the like.
It is not a Washington approach; it is a in-country
approach. And we actually do it on the military side. And we
even do it on the diplomatic side. We need to do it on the
communications side.
And the last point I would make is that, although I think
this hearing and others I know the committee is holding is
enormously valuable, it would be terrific if the Congress as a
whole could take, what I would call, a comprehensive look at
strategic communications.
I mean, you have the jurisdictional set of issues. But, you
know, by and large, you get along well with one another. And so
you have got what the department is doing. You mentioned in
your opening statement what State is doing and the BBGs.
Putting that all together and figuring out whether we have
enough real resources in the program.
You know, as a benchmark, if you are a beer company in the
U.S., you would probably spend no less than $100 million a year
selling your beer. You know, a car company, the same way. So if
you put that together, you know, with the number of beer
companies, the number of car companies, you are talking real
money.
If you look at the recruiting budget we have for the DOD--I
think this is right--it is about $4 billion a year. Shouldn't
we be thinking about putting real money and resources into
strategic communications?
And with that, let me close. And I appreciate the
opportunity to testify, and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kramer can be found in the
Appendix on page 40.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
Dr. Wells, who is the Force Transformation Chair and
Distinguished Research Professor at the National Defense
University.
Dr. Wells.
STATEMENT OF DR. LINTON WELLS II, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
Dr. Wells. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Congressman Thornberry. I appreciate the chance to be here at
this really important topic. And I want to emphasize I am here
in an individual capacity.
Certainly, effective communications, strategic
communications would be essential to winning the ``Long War''
just as they were in the Cold War. And it has been pointed out,
in this area, facts, which include actions, speak much louder
than words.
I think there are four areas where we ought to focus on
doing a better job. And one is communicating the nation's
commitment to its core values. Second is reaching out to those
who share our ideals. Third is supporting those who struggle
for freedom, and then countering those who espouse hate and
oppression.
An objective of strategic communication, in fact, the
ultimate measure of success, is the way it forced the
advancement of U.S. policies. And this is achieved by
influencing foreign audiences to take action that either
support U.S. interests or to cease action that damage them. And
the point here is that the success of strategic communication
alone does rest with the government actions by themselves.
There is no doubt this is very hard to achieve. You have to
synchronize a whole series of messages. And Mr. Kramer just
talked about messages and delivery mechanisms have to be
aligned within the government. You have to link actions across
organization, nations and cultural lines. You have to
understand the impact on foreign audiences.
And this is compounded by the rapidly changing information
environment that relatively few people actually have experience
in working with.
On the other hand, the Nation does have a number of
enduring advantages which ought to stand us in good stead in
the long-term competition, which is what we have to focus on.
First of all, it is the nation's openness; the opportunity
it is perceived, I think, mostly in the world as providing; and
importantly, the ability to learn from our mistakes. And so, a
core issue, as Dr. Zalman has mentioned, is how to describe
these qualities in ways that are important to people around the
world and in ways that matter in their lives.
The U.S. Government has done a number of things working to
improve its strategic communication performance. And one I
would commend to you is, as soon as the minutes come out, there
is actually, as we speak, a two-day strategic communication
symposium going on at National Defense University.
It was kicked off this morning by Newt Gingrich. Admiral
Giambastiani spoke, Karen Hughes spoke, Deputy Secretary
England is speaking tomorrow. And it is a serious effort of
looking at the way we address it and reflects, I think, the
increasing importance that people are putting on this.
As was cited at the end of May, the National Security
Council issued the National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and
Strategic Communications within DOD last September. Deputy
Secretary signed out a roadmap for the execution of the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). And in the last two months,
actually, there has been a lot of progress on implementing and
executing that roadmap.
That said, we still have a long way to go, and one of the
key areas is definitional. The Defense Department has a
definition of strategic comms, but it is not fully accepted
across the interagency. So I would submit, until we agree on
the definition of what we are doing, we are not necessarily
going to align with the efforts.
On the other hand, there does seem to be agreement that
this is--Congressman Thornberry said that strategic
communication actually is a process. And it is a process that
links together a whole batch of other things, from public
affairs to public diplomacy. Some parts of information
operations, very importantly in the third world, visual
information, and finds that target, and makes it available to
foreign audiences.
The issues are broader than just definitional. We need to
integrate and synchronize our actions, while promoting cultural
and organizational change across at least DOD. And the point is
these are transformational changes; this is not a modest
bureaucratic change. And it needs to be treated with that level
of seriousness.
In addition, though, as you look at these U.S. Government
things, this is a messy business. The information environment
is very complicated. And a lot of this is going to happen from
the bottom up, not from top-down, coordinated actions.
And so, again, as we pointed out, the glut of information
in this new environment means that an information source has to
be perceived by the audience as credible and trustworthy in
order to capture their attention. We need to understand how to
make our information competitive in that environment.
And I think it is critical that decision-makers understand
the impact of these sorts of changes.
One related area where the Defense Department is starting
to make progress is in the sharing of unclassified information
outside the boundaries of the defense enterprise with several
military partners who may or may not have security clearances.
We have typically focused at sharing classified information
within the department. We need to reach out, communicate,
collaborate, translate, engage with these partners.
This is not just a governmental effort. Strategic
communications is much broader than that. There are many, many,
many more messages delivered around the world about our nation
every year through advertising, entertainment, through
government channels.
Unfortunately, those messages are not always positive. We
need to understand how to deal with them. On the other hand,
there have been effective advertising campaigns. There are
people who know how to do this. We need to be able to tap into
them.
Ultimately, it is important that people perceive that U.S.
actions are advancing their interest, not just our own. And the
facts have to be coherent with words and also need to provide
hope to the population in their terms for things like jobs.
So finally, there are no simple ways ahead. We have to
match means to ends with just a few thoughts.
First of all, we have to define the values, the visions,
the metrics, the strategy and the programs clearly and assess
the probability of success honestly.
Second, these processes need to be made more agile,
decentralized and local. Again, a single integrated, top-down
process will not work.
We have to do a better job at understanding the intended
audience, their culture, their language, their history.
We have to be realistic about the cause of anti-Americanism
and realistic about our ability to change this in the near
term.
We have to leverage new technologies in ways that allow
much greater interaction, not just transmission but
interaction, with audiences.
We have to recognize that total control is not possible. I
heard a very good description this morning that we need to
train our people and trust them, rather than trying to manage
and supervise them continuously.
But in this context, then, people need to be allowed to
make mistakes. And if I were to ask for one area from the
Congress, is to allow our people the ability to make those
mistakes without being necessarily hung out to dry when they
make them.
We have to work to align the U.S. with the public in the
areas we seek to reach. Dr. Zalman, I think, made this point
very well. How do we fit into their story and their idiom?
And finally is the question, as Mr. Kramer said, of
resources, especially, I think, in priority for exchange
programs. As Under Secretary Hughes will point out, exchange
programs are life-long commitments. We have actually begun
summer camps for 8- to 14-year-olds recently in order to begin
that bonding as soon as possible.
Language training, cultural awareness, for DOD the
unclassified engagement, and something else to remove the
obstacles to allow our processes to be more nimble.
Just a simple example: The DOD benefited enormously last
year from the conference language in the authorization bill
that allowed information and communications technologies to be
included as part of rudimentary construction and repair when
the department is doing humanitarian civic assistance.
I mean, amazingly, it had been interpreted by a number of
judge advocates general that you could rebuild a hospital
destroyed by an earthquake but could not put any wiring in that
could connect that hospital to the Internet to become a
teaching hospital or something.
The committee's language clarified that. And the removal of
that impediment has been a big help to us.
In terms of resources, what I am told, last year the
funding for public diplomacy was about $800,000 a year, with
another $700,000 for exchange programs.
Two-point-nine million dollars was available for public
opinion research, which, in the standards of the U.S. political
campaign, even is small. So I echo Mr. Kramer's point. If you
look at our advertising budgets, certainly we need to be able
to be serious about this.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Wells can be found in the
Appendix on page 49.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Several questions. There is the first question in terms of
the structure and how we are getting this message out.
Imagine, for the moment, that in this meeting we came up
with some great idea for how we wanted to, you know, do
strategic communications, either the message or how we were
delivering it. Who would you go see in the Federal Government?
Who would be the person or the agency or the area that is
overseeing this, in your view, as you have observed our
efforts?
Dr. Wells. Well, clearly, I think the responsibility in the
government is assigned to Under Secretary Karen Hughes in
several hats. One is as the Under Secretary of State for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs. But she also shares this policy
coordinating committee (PCC) on the National Security Council
(NSC) of Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication.
DOD has stood up something called the Strategic
Communication Integration Group, or SCIG. And this came out of
the roadmap from the Quadrennial Defense Review. There is an
executive committee of that made up of people from public
affairs, from the joint staff, from Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy. And several of those are members of this
interagency PCC.
Mr. Smith. And does Karen Hughes's shop sort of oversee
that, as well? Or is that separate?
Dr. Wells. The DOD SCIG reports to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, but clearly through the PCC, which is the interagency
mechanism that is coordinated with Karen Hughes.
Mr. Smith. Great. And how would you evaluate, at this
point, the performance? How are they doing? What could they be
doing better?
Dr. Wells. So I think--let me see. I think there is
progress being made, and there is particularly progress in the
last of couple of months, and it is a little bit too early to
say.
If you look at our performance since 9/11 candidly, sir, I
would say it has been very poor. If you look at the current
vector, there are at least some hopeful signs.
Again, this morning at this symposium, Under Secretary
Hughes was talking about three main thrusts, and one was the
exchange programs. Another was on communicating better, finding
the mechanisms, how you get our people out to talk on Al
Jazeera in Arabic to Arabic languages, how you get the
embassies more engaged from the, you know, region. And then
what they call the diplomacy of deeds, which is a focus on the
things we are doing with public health and the comfort
deployment, Central America----
Mr. Smith. Disaster relief----
Dr. Wells. Disaster relief. The Pakistan earthquake was a
success, and the tsunami was a success. Again, Defense is
looking at making influence operations sort of a major
operational line of warfare, along with maneuver and
intelligence and logistics. And if you get to that, then you
are assigning it a priority that, you know, it has not
previously had.
So I think the attention and the vectors are right. It
remains to be seen whether we can execute along these vectors.
Mr. Kramer. Could I jump in on that?
Mr. Smith. Certainly.
Mr. Kramer. You know, they just put out the National
Strategy for Public Diplomacy. You have it because Bill was the
one who actually sent it to us. If you look at it, it is hard
to quarrel with the document, but it is a nascent document.
Mr. Smith. Right.
Mr. Kramer. And the whole point here--and Dr. Wells made
this point--is we haven't done well up to now. We are still in
the organizational stage. And actually getting the messages out
is very, very difficult.
I go back to the point that the Government Accountability
Office made about the posts. I mean, they are the people out on
the front line. And if you look at what comes out of the
embassies themselves, it is pretty poor, not because they are
unintelligent people, not because they don't care, but they
don't have the training, they don't have the resources, and
they have other day jobs.
So we really have a long way to go. So I would say, you
know, heart is in the right place, but the execution is pretty
limited.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
I have more questions, but I will yield to Mr. Thornberry
for his questions.
Mr. Thornberry. Dr. Zalman, would you answer the question
that we have been discussing: How well are we doing now?
Dr. Zalman. Yes. Well, I am encouraged by this event. It
seems to me that from the 2004 strategic communications
document that came out to now, there is a leap in
sophistication and in recognition of the thing that I call
``story'' but other people talk about in other ways.
So that two or three years ago, the entire Middle East did
look like a big, kind of, one geographic and one, kind of,
conceptual unit to people looking out. And now, on a regular
basis, it is recognized that people speak different languages,
that they need to be addressed differently, and that, as a
matter of fact, they need to be addressed in different ways.
And I suppose that part of that reflects the experience
that people have now had on the ground and speaks to the need
that you just spoke to, to have processes that come from the
bottom up.
But clearly, American opinion, the opinion of the world of
the United States, remains generally in decline.
Mr. Thornberry. Part of my frustration is we are six years
after 9/11 and we are still grappling with beginning steps to
wage the kind of struggle that we are in--on other than the
military, which I don't mean to diminish.
And part of the difficulty is, as you all have described,
it is a cumbersome process that goes across government
agencies. And so, you may have an NSC coordinating committee,
but that is not exactly the best way to implement
communications at a time when so much of it is over the
Internet and happens in a matter of seconds.
And I think it was you, Dr. Wells, that talked about the
importance of training our people and trusting them to be more
nimble. Because if you have to get a press release approved
through the bureaucratic process, you are way behind already in
a time when things happen so quickly.
Some people have suggested that, in order to kickstart this
issue, that a new organization needs to be created. Now, that
is a typical, you know, suggestion that comes: When in doubt,
rearrange the boxes. But let us see if any of you all have any
opinions about that.
And I guess the argument would be United States Information
Agency (USIA) has been, you know, bandied about. Obviously,
there is not the resources, not the emphasis on training there
needs to be for people in our embassies or others.
So a new organization that can focus better on strategic
communication might not be as threatening as having the
Department of Defense be in charge of strategic
communications--some other agency out there.
Anybody have an opinion about that?
Mr. Kramer. I will take a shot at it, yes.
First of all, I think it is fair to say that the Office of
Public Diplomacy itself is, you know, something of a new
organization, Karen Hughes's office. And it got started with
great difficulty. As you recall, there was a prior Under
Secretary who had a lot of problems.
I think there are a lot of different ways to play it. But I
would say that, wherever you put it, you have to have a lot
more people and a lot more resources.
And one easy way to do it sometimes is to create a, you
know, kind of a joint task force. The NCTC, National
Counterterrorism Center, is an example of a new organization
that was created by melding some capacities from old ones, but
they put them in a separate place, so they can really focus and
so that they would have the responsibility.
And I would think that there is some argument, which is one
of the reasons why I encourage the committee to really look at
this comprehensively, to create, if you will, an NCTC-like
organization to focus on influence.
I don't think the Department of Defense can, in any way,
shape or form, be in charge of strategic communications, but it
will necessarily be involved in that. And so will the State
Department, and so will the posts.
So when you create a new organization, you have to
recognize that you are still going to have people out in the
field who have great involvement. And I guess, you know, that
is the argument, about how do you put this all together.
As Dr. Wells said, you have a lot of players here. If you
try to do it from a top-down point of view only, then it is
going to just kluge up the system. You will get clogged
arteries. So you really do have to trust people below you.
But you could have some greater nimbleness, I think, and
some greater focus, including by this body, you know, by the
Congress, for resources if you had a central point.
Dr. Wells. One of the points that Under Secretary Hughes
made this morning--because this was asked of her. And she said,
``Look, nothing is going to happen in the remainder of this
Administration. So the question is, what to do next?''
But an advantage that her structure has is that it is part
of the policy planning process at State, whereas at least there
was a perception that the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) was a distinct entity that
was communicating a message, but none the--and something that
has been discussed a lot is that strategic communication needs
to be part of the overall campaign plan from the beginning of
the policy planning, not just reacting to events as something
goes on.
And so there is an argument, at least, that whatever entity
you would want to set up, whether it is independent, ought to
have this kind of link back into the planning process.
Mr. Thornberry. Let me touch on another area. The Defense
Science Board study that looked at this recommended creation of
an Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) or
some entity that would facilitate private-sector expertise
being used. I mean, you think about the resources in this
country that are available for people who want to figure out a
message, tell a story and communicate that story. It is
unbelievable.
Part of what got me into this is a person who fits that
description ended up volunteering his efforts in other
countries. And he would like to make a greater contribution. He
doesn't want to be a GS-11, but he is looking for a way to
contribute.
Talk to me a little about your view as to how we can tap
into this expertise that exists in the United States in the
national interest, but in a coordinated way--not everybody
doing their own.
Dr. Zalman. I have a small comment to make about this,
because I actually worked in a very direct way a couple of
years ago on a private-sector effort that was intended to
produce materials for dissemination in the Middle East. And one
of the problems was that, despite very good intentions by all
involved, it ended up being very difficult to have them
informed by necessary cultural expertise.
So, very sophisticated and good materials produced by
people who knew what they were doing were created. But there
was a really complicated disconnect between people who
understood the place and the region into which they were
supposed to be put and the creators.
And clearly, there are solutions to this, but I think that
they can't be spontaneous ones, or they should be considered in
advance of these sorts of projects.
Mr. Kramer. You know, whether it is an FFRDC or not, I
mean, I couldn't agree more with that point. It really is an
interdisciplinary requirement.
I mean, you have got the message-makers, if you will, the
marketeers. And I am not sure who you were speaking about, but
we certainly have fabulous marketers in the U.S. And they are
very sophisticated, take advantage of psychological studies and
the like. But they know the culture, so they don't even have to
think about that. Then you have people who know the culture,
and we have people who, well, do know the culture, but they are
not the marketers.
And then there actually is an expertise on the use of the
medium: T.V. or Internet or radio. And they are all different.
So if you are a radio person and not a T.V. person and you are
not an Internet--I mean, you can be, but they are different. So
I think you really need to have all three put together.
Now, whether you use an FFRDC or not, open question. But I
would make the point that Dr. Wells made before, that you
really also do need to connect into the policy people, because
if it is not connected to the policy, you are just lost out
there.
I mean, one of the difficulties that contractors always
have if they have a, I am going to call, the statement of work.
And, you know, they are in good faith. And they work to the
statement of work. But in the meantime, the policy is changing,
things are happening and the like. And it is hard for them to
be as flexible.
So having the capacity to be inside the government while
you are trying to have this agility is, I think, enormously
important. FFRDCs have that, to some extent.
Dr. Wells. I would think that one would perhaps be better
focusing on the commercial world rather than the entertainment
world. And I say this only because--and I am speaking with
absolutely no personal expertise in the area. But there have
been a number of very successful campaigns for U.S. products
that have been sold in the third world or in foreign markets.
But there have also been a lot of very successful television
shows and cable whatever which are wildly popular but convey
the U.S. in not necessarily the view we would like to see the
U.S. conveyed in.
And so, at least when you have the economic incentive to
wind up with the product being sold and the intent that you are
trying to deliver, there is that feedback mechanism that may
not be the case in a purely entertainment environment.
Mr. Thornberry. Dr. Zalman, I think you make a very good
point about narrative, and particularly in the Muslim world,
the narrative that stretches back centuries, which we are not
used to thinking in those terms.
I am interested to know, in your interactions, have you
found places in the U.S. Government you think that have a good
understanding that there is a narrative stretching back
hundreds of years, and that we have to take that into account
in what we try to do?
Dr. Zalman. I want to understand your question. Do you
mean, are there examples in our own----
Mr. Thornberry. What I am really trying to understand is to
what extent--my view is that there are pockets of deep
understanding in the government but that it is not very
widespread and that often this understanding of a long
historical narrative, which plays a much greater role in other
cultures than it does in our own, that understanding does not
translate always into policy decisions or into communications.
And I am just curious as to your experience, what you have
found in dealing with government entities, positive and
negative.
Dr. Zalman. Instead of addressing length of historical
experience, I might use the concept of stakeholder. Who
understands the concept of what it means to actually be engaged
as a stakeholder?
And I would say, to that end, I would have to think a
little bit more about where there are institutional pockets,
because I think that they exist. And I would like to get back
to you on that. But in terms of individual, I see them
everywhere.
And I will use myself as an example. I am a stakeholder in
an old American story that goes back to the 17th century. I
think of my past as starting at Plymouth Rock. That is not a
reflection of the truth of my family, which arrived much more
recently. But I engage and am a stakeholder in perpetuating
this history.
And I think it is very possible to easily make people
working in the government and these institutions simply self-
conscious holders of their own experience, and that that is
transferable, that that is a kind of portable framing.
And it can be said in a more sophisticated way than I just
did, if necessary.
Does that answer the question?
Mr. Thornberry. Yes. I think it is just a challenge for us,
because there are some differences in culture. And, as you said
earlier, you can't look at everybody who speaks Arabic as one
monolithic thing, or all the Muslim world as one monolithic
thing, and all we need is a glitzy commercial to go out there
and say how great we are, and it is going to translate into any
degree of effectiveness.
Dr. Zalman. Right.
Mr. Smith. Could----
Dr. Zalman. But you----
Mr. Smith. Go ahead.
Dr. Zalman. But you can go out and go, why is this
contemporary community--whether it is a national community or a
segment of a national community--why are they, say,
stakeholders or engaged in a certain historical narrative of
themselves? And then you can speak to that.
Mr. Smith. Okay. I want to follow up and ask a little bit
about exactly what the attitudes are about America out there.
And we all have our answers for it. I mean, there is
widespread agreement that, particularly in the Islamic world
but even more broadly, opinions about America are worse now
than they were pre-9/11 and certainly fading in the last, you
know, 20 or 30 years. And it has been a rather precipitous
drop.
An example I think I have used before this committee before
is I remember reading Thomas Friedman, ``From Beirut to
Jerusalem,'' talking about when the Marines showed up in
Beirut. And I read this book post-9/11 and was just staggered
by the fact that when the Marines showed up in Beirut, the
reaction was very positive in Lebanon amongst the Muslims as
well as the Christians. There was the feeling that if America
is there, things must be getting better. And this is 1983. Hard
for me to imagine too many places, you know, certainly in the
Islamic world, where some Marines could show up at this point
and have that same reaction.
And certainly, you know, day after 9/11, there was a
certain amount of sympathy for us out there that we seem to
have lost in the last five or six years. And I think, you know,
certainly I have my answers for how that came about. But it is
three people who track this stuff.
And, I mean, this is a starting point. If we are going to
change these attitudes, what are the attitudes? How did they
come about?
And I understand that, oh, it is probably different. There
is a full history in Pakistan. I just got back from a trip
there. And I have a much better understanding about their
attitude toward us that go back to stuff that happened in the
1960's and elsewhere. It varies from country to country. I get
that.
But in the broad category, or if you want to take it down
to a specific, you know, why are we having such trouble winning
this PR war? What are we doing? What are the reactions? What
are the feelings that people have toward us? How can you sum up
the reasons for the anti-Americanism that we are talking about?
Dr. Wells. You know, there are two broad arguments. And I
know you know this. They come in the category of ``they hate us
for what we are'' and ``they hate us for what we do.''
In the ``hate us for what we are,'' I think that is limited
to a very, very small group of what I would call militant
radical, you know, al Qaida types. They hate us--and I don't
even know they ``hate'' us is the right word--but not with us
for what we do goes a lot more to policies and a view that our
policies are not advancing their interests.
And there are certain hot-button issues in that world
which, whether we choose to believe it or not, do seem to make
an issue. One, obviously, is the Middle East peace process,
which has stalled for a long time now. Another was not so much
necessarily the invasion of Iraq, but the fact that it has gone
very poorly. So the consequences are difficult.
But, you see, when we go into different parts of that
world--you have been to Pakistan. You know the relief effort
got widespread approbation. The relief effort with respect to
the tsunami got widespread approbation. There are certainly
places where we are able to work very capably.
So I think that, and in my opinion--and I defer to my
colleagues here at the table if they disagree--I do think that
our broad message, which we all talked about--you know,
democracy, freedom, human rights, social openness, economic
opportunity--really still resonates broadly in their world, but
they are not sure that we mean it.
And I think the last thing I would say is I think we have
to do a lot more listening. I think that was mentioned by each
of the other speakers. If you want to understand the Middle
East, it is good to drink a lot of tea. You know, it is a
metaphor, of course. But it is good to sit and talk and listen.
And they have a lot to say.
Mr. Smith. And one specific aspect of that, you mentioned
that, I think the perception is that America impacts the rest
of the world. You know, we just do because of our size and
scope in a variety of different ways. And the perception is
largely that we are impacting it in a way that is negative to
the rest of the world.
And one of the concerns that I have had--you know,
obviously within our foreign policy, within our military
policy, we are supposed to pursue our own interests. This is a
point that Mr. Bolton, amongst others, have made about the
process of the United Nations (UN) and other international
institutions. But in so doing, if that is our message, and we
are more invested in winning over the rest of the world and
most other countries--if that is our message that basically we
are out there trying to pursue our own interests, we
fundamentally undermine ourselves.
There has to be some piece of that message that says we
want to do good for you as well. And I think we have really
lost that; because I think post-9/11 there was that attitude of
we have been wronged. Therefore whatever we do is justified.
And I think that has sort of accelerated some of the trends out
there of people feeling like that U.S. is not particularly
interested in what is in the best interests of Pakistan or Iraq
or any other country out there.
And, you know, if we are serious about winning the hearts
and minds, we have to sometimes put our, you know, short-term
interests--one of you mentioned short-term versus long-term--
put our short-term interests on the back burner and desire to
pursue that long-term interest of how we get the rest of the
world to view us in a more positive way.
Dr. Wells.
Dr. Wells. I think a couple things. First of all, the words
are important. And I was looking about a year ago to co-author
an article with a Jordanian businessman on the use of
information communications technologies for promoting
opportunities in the Arab world for employment. And in the
course of this, democracy came up.
And he basically came back very quickly and said, ``Please
let us not use that term in this article, because it has a
connotation in the Arab world that is not necessarily
advantageous to the image that America wants to promote. If you
want to say participatory government to enhance people's
opportunities or things like that, that would be terrific. But
the phrase democracy in and of itself has a cache associated
with it.''
And the second piece is historically, anytime we have a
dramatic imbalance of power, whether it is Britain's role as a
balancer of continental powers, over there is an inherent
tendency of the others to form coalitions to restore that
balance. And so, whatever our message, all that does is make
our environment more complicated and more difficult to restore
the image. I think that is just a natural consequence of
international relations we need to take into account.
And the third, as somebody pointed out at the symposium
this morning, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union in many
respects was almost an ideal enemy. One could point to the KGB.
One could point to this and say well, them versus us. You know,
clearly this is the way most people would want to go. We don't
have that clear-cut opponent now. Again, it is a much more
difficult environment for us to make the case.
So I think irrespective of what we do versus what we are,
there is an environment there that complicates our ability to
get our positive message across.
Mr. Smith. And, Dr. Zalman, I want to ask you one
additional question. In your prepared remarks, you talked about
not trying to, sort of, create our own narrative to counter
existing narratives in the places we are trying to persuade,
but sort of feed into the narrative, which I think makes a
great deal of sense; because you are then, you know, feeding
into cultural understandings that are already there, instead
of--I mean, there is a limit to what marketing can do. You
can't come in and, you know--you really can't sell iceboxes to
Eskimos, cliche notwithstanding. So I think that is a good
idea.
Can you expand upon that particular idea, an example of how
we could do that to better promote ourselves?
Dr. Zalman. Sure. I am going to borrow one from the paper
that I provided you before.
A couple of years ago, there was a very big flap over an
article that showed up in Newsweek and found its way to
Pakistan about a Koran having been thrown into a toilet at
Guantanamo Bay. This led subsequently, or was structured as we
narrated it, to have led to very big demonstrations across the
Islamic world.
Mr. Smith. Turns out I don't think it actually happened, by
the way. But it was just a side note.
Dr. Zalman. It actually was explained to me by one of the--
anyway----
Mr. Smith. Correct. Yes.
Dr. Zalman. That is not exactly what happened.
Mr. Smith. Right.
Dr. Zalman. But it actually--it doesn't matter.
Mr. Smith. It doesn't matter, no. I agree with you on that
point. But----
Dr. Zalman. So the official response to this was two-fold.
One was the United States respects Islam. We wouldn't do--we
respect other religions. And the other one, hopefully was so
negligent, but that is the reason why I can't remember it right
now. But there was not a very big response.
But if you looked and examined, as I had the opportunity to
do then, to where this started in Afghanistan, there were
actually a number of local responses. For example, a local
sheikh who said, wow, this is in Afghan. We don't behave this
way. We don't protest in this way. There is foreign provocation
here. They were responding to a local set of circumstances
between Afghanistan and Pakistan. There was an official
response from Hamid Karzai, who said wow, look at this
incipient democracy. This is so great. We have protests now.
There was a response among the population to other events,
Abu Ghraib, et cetera. And they weren't really responding to
something that was Islamic per se but to a story about human
rights on a universal human rights and a series of events that
had led up to that.
I think that there were ways probably, if those stories had
been available and had been followed at that time, that more
acute and precise responses coming from the State Department
and perhaps elsewhere could have been made that would get at
what was actually being said and would hook into some of the
ways in which local populations were themselves already
addressing the situation.
Mr. Smith. Instead of trying to go----
Dr. Zalman. Yes.
Mr. Smith [continuing]. No, this is wrong----
Dr. Zalman. Right.
Mr. Smith [continuing]. ``America would never do such a
thing.'' You could sort of feed into it and find narratives
that fit with the need to narrative. That is a great example.
And then one final question in terms of policy. And I am
trying to get an idea for, you know, getting outside the
messaging for the moment. And, again, policy-wise if there were
two or three things that we could change, from a policy
perspective, that would then help us deliver the message,
because I am mindful of the fact that--I have a great example
from my brief career in the legal field. Looking at a case one
time with an attorney who warned me before we started that we
had some bad facts--which, I love that. ``It is not that we are
going to lose. It is not that we are wrong. We just got some
bad facts. We got to work on those.''
Well, we have some bad facts at the moment, you know, in
terms of the U.S. effort, particularly in the Islamic world.
You know, certainly that is what is going on in Iraq.
But there is a whole, you know, phrasing of the ``global
war on terror.'' There is the whole tendency of American
policymakers to use the words ``Islamic terrorist.'' I mean, to
my mind, in this whole battle, you know, we ought to keep the
word ``Islam'' out of how we describe al Qaida. It gives them
credibility in the Islamic world that we shouldn't be doing.
But I also stopped at Great Britain on my trip. And we
talked about the global war on terror, old phraseology. Is that
the right way to do it?
You know, if you had just two or three policy things, if
you are the messenger, we say to you, ``Okay, go out there,
sell America to the Islamic world,'' you come back to us and
say, ``Okay, I can do that, but you have to help me with a
couple of things. Here is a couple policies that I think you
ought to change to help us with that messaging.''
What are the things that you would point toward?
Dr. Wells. I think one of the points Under Secretary Hughes
made this morning was that she is actively working to eliminate
the religious terminology in the U.S. Government
pronouncements--to make them religion-neutral.
And so I think that is very close to what--in fact, she
said she has taken to calling a lot of the suicide bombers and
whoever ``death cult''--the point is their only message is
death--and leaving out the Islamic whatever.
Mr. Smith. I think that is a great idea.
Mr. Kramer, Dr. Zalman.
Mr. Kramer. I think you have to jump into some of the
really difficult issues in a more effective way.
One is, I think that if you want to have good messages, you
have to be thought of as a partner. If you want to be a
partner, you have to have a partnership. And I think we need to
think hard about how to create partnerships with specific
countries and the perception then of the partnership with the
Arab world as a whole.
There is a lot of economic difficulties--not in every
state, because some of them are fairly rich, but in quite a
number. And we might look hard at expanding our capabilities
there in the economic arena. It is not an easy sell, I am sure,
to the American public. Foreign aid has never been an easy
sell. But I think----
Mr. Smith. Well, it should be. I mean, following up with
something Mac said earlier, we talked about how we haven't put
the resources in, except for the Defense Department. We talked
about how, you know, by and large, from a military standpoint,
our military has been successful in Afghanistan and certainly
they were successful in Iraq in toppling Saddam Hussein. We
have targeted a large number of al Qaida members successfully.
You know, but the public diplomacy piece hasn't been so good.
And you can look at, you know, Defense Department budget, State
Department budget over the same period. And it is not hard to
see. So I think that resources point is very well made.
And whether it is an easy argument for the American public
or not, we have to make it. You know, it is just as important,
arguably more important, in keeping this country safe that we
upgrade our public diplomacy and our commitment to the rest of
the world, in terms of the support you are talking about, as it
is that we, you know, better fund our troops to fight the war.
Dr. Wells. Second point I would make is I am fully in
support of what is being done for the expected exchange
programs and various other interactions with other publics. The
difference is I would probably increase it by about 10 times.
And I would certainly look hard at reducing some of the
visa requirements. You know, we have put them on for good
reasons. There are people who are out to harm the United
States, no question about that. But at the same time, we have
reduced some of the flow into this country. And I think we need
both increased flow out and more flow in.
Now, that is a long-term kind of activity. In my government
service, I had the International Military Education and
Training Program, IMET, underneath me both times. And that is
also a long-term activity. And it was dollar-for-dollar,
universally thought of as, essentially, the most valuable thing
we did. I think these exchange programs have the same
potential. And I think they ought to be substantially,
substantially increased.
Mr. Smith. Dr. Zalman.
Dr. Zalman. I want to draw on one of the very good ideas I
heard at a conference recently that I referenced in the written
testimony at the East-West Institute on violent extremism and
stopping it or forestalling it. And that was that U.S.
officials and policymakers are not seen as condemning all forms
of extremism equally. And there is a perception globally or
elsewhere that there is a real selective condemnation of that
violent extremism committed by Muslims and by Islamic actors.
And so, there should be attention to making sure that they
both do and are seen condemning extremism wherever it takes
place and by whichever parties, perhaps especially in the realm
of religious actors or actors saying that they act in the name
of religion.
Mr. Smith. You answered all the questions I had.
Mac, do you have anything further?
Well, thank you.
Dr. Wells. May I respond just to Congressman Thornberry's
question earlier about the source of expertise in the
government?
I think one of the truly spectacularly successful uses of,
really, anthropology in support of government policy was the
World War II set of studies that went on in Germany and Japan
that sort of led to Ruth Benedict's Chrysanthemum and the Sword
and the decisions to retain the emperor and really an
understanding of Japanese culture that wouldn't have been in
place without that.
And that was not something you would find within the
government, even within the foreign service officers who had
served out there, but actually went out to anthropologists and
academics and brought that expertise together.
So this would, sort of, argue either for the, sort of, ad
hoc task force or focused task force that Mr. Kramer talked
about you might bring together for particular purposes. But
that would be my thought on that.
Mr. Smith. Is there anything else? No one else?
Again, thank you very much. It turned into a longer
afternoon than you expected, and I appreciate your patience in
sticking with us.
And last, I would like to stay in touch. We are going to be
working on this for quite a while, and your expertise will be
helpful to us in the future, I am sure.
So thank you for testifying today and for your time.
Mr. Kramer. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
[Whereupon, at 5:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
July 11, 2007
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 11, 2007
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