[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HEARING ON ELECTION CONTINGENCY PLANS: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED AND IS
AMERICA PREPARED?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE
ADMINISTRATION
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MAY 14, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration
Available on the Internet:
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/administration/index.html
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
43-798 PDF WASHINGTON : 2008
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania, Chairman
ZOE LOFGREN, California VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
Vice-Chairwoman Ranking Minority Member
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas KEVIN McCARTHY, California
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama
S. Elizabeth Birnbaum, Staff Director
William Plaster, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Elections
ZOE LOFGREN, California, Chairwoman
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas KEVIN McCARTHY, California
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama
ELECTIONS CONTINGENCY PLANS: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED AND IS AMERICA
PREPARED?
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 14, 2008
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Elections,
Committee on House Administration,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:10 p.m., in
room 1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Zoe Lofgren
(chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Lofgren, Davis of Alabama and
McCarthy.
Staff Present: Thomas Hicks, Senior Election Counsel;
Janelle Hu, Election Counsel; Jennifer Daehn, Election Counsel;
Matt Pinkus, Professional Staff/Parliamentarian; Kyle Anderson,
Press Director; Kristin McCowan, Chief Legislative Clerk;
Daniel Favarulo, Legislative Assistant, Election; Gregory
Abbott, Policy Analyst; Gineen Beach, Minority Election
Counsel; Ashley Stow, Minority Election Counsel; and Bryan T.
Dorsey, Minority Professional Staff.
Ms. Lofgren. Good afternoon and welcome to the Committee on
House Administration's Subcommittee on Elections and the
hearing that we are having on Election Contingency Plans: What
Have We Learned and is America Prepared.
In the past several years, natural and manmade disasters
have resulted in more attention being drawn to the need for
election contingency planning. September 11, 2001, disrupted
the statewide primary in a New York; Hurricane Katrina caused
delays in administering a New Orleans local election; and, more
recently, the February tornados which occurred on Super Tuesday
posed a challenge. All of these events have brought to light
the necessity of taking precautions and making preparations to
manage emergency situations affecting the election system.
There are States that have addressed, to some extent,
Election Day emergencies. Generally, these policies deal with
communications at the State level with the development of
specific plans to be determined by counties and cities. While
the 16 States that have taken these steps should be commended,
it's not enough. What role the Federal Government should play
in assisting States and localities in planning for emergencies
and recovering from these emergencies needs to be defined.
In an attempt to help clarify the role of the Federal
Government in assisting States and localities, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency was invited to testify today, but
they declined, stating that it, ``does not have any statutory
role in preparing for and carrying out elections.'' I disagree.
FEMA does have a role under Section 406 of the Stafford Act to
assist State and local governments for the replacement or
repair of equipment and structures damaged by a major disaster.
406 also includes wages and eligible work which FEMA defines as
work necessary as a result of a disaster within the disaster
area and the legal responsibility of the applicant. This
definition clearly would include election costs. In fact, FEMA
has already acted in this capacity. FEMA approved $7.9 million
to assist the New York Board of Elections to cover expenses
associated with canceling and rescheduling the statewide
primary elections of September 11, 2001. It also provided
reimbursement for election expenses in Florida incurred as a
result of Hurricane Andrew in 1992.
Former Louisiana Secretary of State Ater was invited to
testify about his experiences with elections as a result of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and attempts made by Louisiana and
Mississippi for reimbursement for election expenses and other
issues but, unfortunately, had to cancel his appearance due to
a scheduling conflict. His testimony will be submitted for the
record.
For these hurricanes, FEMA took the position that it was
not required under 406 to provide reimbursement for election
expenses related operating costs provided the minimal
assistance for damaged equipment was the issue. This has been a
complete change of FEMA's past position regarding requests for
election assistance, so I plan on pursuing this matter further
with FEMA to make sure that Federal Emergency Management Agency
does what it needs to do to assist States and localities just
as it has done in the past.
I thank all the witnesses who have accepted the invitation
to testify before the Subcommittee today. I look forward to
their testimony as we explore what State and local governments
have done to prepare for an emergency on Election Day and what
role the Federal Government should play in preparing and
responding to such an emergency.
[The statement of Ms. Lofgren follows. Additionally, a
declination letter from FEMA follows.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Lofgren. Since we will be having another series of
votes in about an hour, in the interest of time I will ask
other members to submit opening statements for the record; and
we will go directly to our witnesses.
I would like to introduce Mr. Thomas Wilkey. He is the
Former Executive Director of the New York Board of Elections
and since 2005 has served as the Executive Director of the
Elections Assistance Commission. Prior to his work with the
EAC, Mr. Wilkey was also a founder and former president of the
National Association of State Election Directors and a member
of the Election Centers Board of Directors.
Next, we have Ms. Laurel Beatty. Ms. Beatty is the Director
of Legislative Affairs for the Office of the Ohio Secretary of
State. In this capacity, Ms. Beatty serves as liaison to Ohio's
legislative process and represents the Secretary of State with
the Ohio General Assembly and 88 County Boards of Election.
Prior to her work with the Secretary of State's Office, Ms.
Beatty worked as a litigation lawyer at Frost, Brown and Todd,
as well as Kegler, Brown, Hill and Ritter. Ms. Beatty received
her BS from Spellman College and her JD at Vanderbilt
University; and we are pleased to have her here because her
Secretary of State is receiving the Profiles in Courage Award
today, which is really quite an achievement.
Finally, we have Ms. Dawn Roberts, who currently serves as
the Assistant Secretary of State of the Florida Department of
State. Ms. Roberts has been with the Department of State for 5
years, where she also served as the Director of the Division of
Elections as well as general counsel. Prior to her work with
the Department of State, Ms. Roberts was also staff director of
the Florida House of Representatives Committee on Election
Reform, as well as Florida's Senate Judiciary Committee. Ms.
Roberts received her BA from Converse College and her JD from
Florida State University.
We welcome all of you, and thank you for your participation
today.
Without objection, your full statements will be made part
of the record; and we would ask that you provide your oral
testimony in about 5 minutes. When there is 1 minute to go, if
the machine is working, there will be a yellow light telling
you that you need to start wrapping up.
STATEMENTS OF THOMAS WILKEY, FORMER EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NEW
YORK BOARD OF ELECTIONS; LAUREL BEATTY, DIRECTOR OF LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE; AND DAWN K.
ROBERTS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Ms. Lofgren. So if we could start with you, Mr. Wilkey.
Thank you so much for being here.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS WILKEY
Mr. Wilkey. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Lofgren, Ranking
Member McCarthy, Congressman Davis. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee today.
In my 40 years administering elections, I never would have
conceived of facing an Election Day disaster as horrific as the
one on September 11, 2001. Early that primary day morning,
before the polls opened at 6:00 a.m., I made my customary
rounds of polling sites in midtown Manhattan. As Executive
Director of the New York State Board of Elections, I knew the
importance of being prepared for anything on Election Day. But
this experience taught me even more about being prepared for
the worst and how Federal, State and local government can act
together to prepare and, if need be, respond to an emergency,
whether it be a terrorist act or a natural disaster on Election
Day.
Even though September 11th was a primary day in New York, I
am proud to say that everyone worked together to hold the
elections just 2 weeks later. This was a magnificent feat,
given the devastation that we had witnessed throughout the
city.
We were able to do this because of emergency planning,
communication and coordination among Federal, State and local
officials. We were able to communicate with polling places
quickly in New York City because, as is customary, a police
officer is on duty in every polling place throughout the city.
Through the officers, we were able to communicate directly all
the needs of the Governor's executive order and the
administrative judge's--11th Judicial District Judge's oral
order that the election be suspended or cancelled and that poll
workers should pack up all supplies and vacate the premises
immediately.
Our poll list printing facility was destroyed in that
attack. Fortunately, our management information systems
department had a backup copy stored at a secure remote
facility. We were quickly able to reduce all the poll books,
some 5,000 of them, and have them ready for the primary that
took place, the rerun primary, less than two weeks later.
The State government also acted quickly. Within two weeks
of the attack--within two days of the attack, the legislature
passed and the Governor signed the Emergency Primary
Rescheduling Act of 2001 which provided legal authority to
reschedule the primary less than two weeks later.
The Board personnel in New York City moved 7,700 voting
machines to their warehouses for reprogramming in time for the
next election, working with local officials of the School Board
and Police Department to have access to cordoned-off areas of
the city. Lower Manhattan was virtually closed in frozen zone
below 14th Street, where the Board's general offices was
located, for at least two weeks.
The Board placed public notices announcing the rescheduled
primary date, times and polling place locations to make sure
voters knew where to go. On Election Day--on election night,
rather, we tallied the votes the old-fashioned way. They were
delivered to the local police precincts and then hand-delivered
to the central tally center at police headquarters.
Lots of things can go wrong on Election Day and often do.
This is why it's so important to anticipate every possible
scenario so voters can participate. Of course, I don't think
anyone could have prepared for September 11th, but the
contingency planning we already had in place was the reason we
were able to reschedule the primary so quickly.
And since I have an extra minute I will add it was the 300
employees in the City Board of Elections and employees
throughout the whole State of New York that really went to work
and rolled up their sleeves. I am so proud to be associated
with those people. They worked hard and got the job done in a
very short period of time.
We know turnout will be huge in November. We know Mother
Nature could disrupt the process. The EAC, I am pleased to
report, has issued tools that provide a framework for
developing and implementing contingency plans; and if we
continue to work together, Federal, State and local, we can be
ready for anything this November.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much, Mr. Wilkey.
[The statement of Mr. Wilkey follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Lofgren. We would be pleased to hear from you, Ms.
Beatty.
STATEMENT OF LAUREL BEATTY
Ms. Beatty. Good afternoon, Chair Lofgren and distinguished
members of the House Subcommittee on Elections. Thank you for
the opportunity to offer testimony on Election Day contingency
plans.
I am Laurel Beatty, Director of Legislative Affairs and
counsel to the Voting Rights Institute for Ohio Secretary of
State Jennifer Brunner.
The advent of electronic voting machines and the passage
and the implementation of the Help America Vote Act drastically
changed the landscape of election administration. How election
administrators plan for emergency situations also changed with
the adjustment to these innovations. Ohio currently uses
optical scan and direct electronic recording voting machine
technology and has found that careful planning and quick
adjustments have enabled our election administrators using the
equipment to protect against potential disasters.
The March, 2008, primary election in Ohio is an example of
prudent planning and quick on-the-spot thinking which helped
our State carry out the election process. Leading up to that
election, Secretary Brunner began making preparations by
removing some of the impediments that plagued Ohio in previous
elections.
In September of 2007, Secretary Brunner commissioned a risk
assessment study of the three voting machine systems used in
Ohio known as Project Everest. The purpose of the study was to
provide a comprehensive, independent, balanced and objective
assessment of the risk to election integrity associated with
Ohio's voting systems. This also encompassed election-related
equipment, testing standards and associated internal controls,
including the extent to which integrity violations are
possible, preventable, detectable and correctable. The results
were crucial to evaluate the integrity of Ohio's election
systems before the March, 2008, primary election and for future
elections.
The Everest study contained scientific and industrial
findings that Ohio's voting system had significant problems.
With these disturbing findings in hand before the March
primary, Secretary Brunner embarked on a campaign to implement
several initiatives that would give boards of elections the
tools necessary to deal with an emergency situation should they
arise and should funding not be available to replace voting
machines.
Secretary Brunner required Ohio county boards of elections
to provide our office with security plans that detailed chain
of custody procedures for electronic voting machines. County
boards of elections used this mandate as an opportunity to
assess the integrity of their processes in handling voting
equipment.
Secretary Brunner also required all county boards of
elections that utilized touch screen voting machines as their
primary voting systems to print back-up paper ballots in the
amount of at least 10 percent of the number of voters who voted
in a similar, previous election. Secretary Brunner's directive
effectively accomplished its intended purpose. When machines
were not working properly in several counties, voters were able
to cast their votes on paper ballots. Voters also used the
paper ballots to vote during power outages in an ice storm in
several Ohio counties.
Secretary Brunner also increased the legal staff, which
paid off, as the office was able to field calls from county
boards of elections continuously throughout the day and address
legal concerns in real-time. All counties were instructed by
directives to notify their assigned attorney in the office of
machine failures or ballot shortages. Communications between
county boards of elections and the Secretary of State's Office
were optimal. We worked with boards of elections developing
contingency plans to use ballot-on-demand machines. We also
established a well-devised partnership with the Attorney
General's Office, where several attorneys from that office were
stationed in the field and were able to seamlessly obtain court
orders when and where they were needed.
The 16 regional liaisons in the office were also on site
throughout the State at boards of elections; and, in one case,
a regional liaison assisted in delivering provisional ballots
to individual precincts when those ballots ran low.
Secretary Brunner also alerted law enforcement throughout
the State of its legal responsibilities in assisting election
officials on Election Day, and county sheriffs in several
counties provided great aid to the local boards of elections in
assisting the transportation of ballots during a Level 3
weather emergency.
The November, 2008, general election is approaching. With
the Everest study in mind, Secretary Brunner will do everything
within her power to ensure that Ohio is ready for the election
in November.
Thank you very much.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Ms. Beatty follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Lofgren. We turn now to our witness, Ms. Roberts.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF DAWN K. ROBERTS
Ms. Roberts. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, distinguished
members of the Subcommittee on Elections.
My name is Dawn Roberts. I am the Assistant Secretary of
State for Florida and the Chief of Staff to Secretary Kurt
Browning.
I have been asked to describe the contingency plans that
were in place for the 2004 Presidential election prior to the
landfall of Hurricane Charlie and what lessons we learned in
Florida. I have also been asked to describe contingency plans
that we have in place for our upcoming fall elections.
We have had an Elections Emergency Act on the books in
Florida since 1992. This Act authorizes the Governor to
suspend, delay or reschedule an election. The goals of this Act
are to maximize participation in the electoral process but at
the same time to ensure the safety and welfare of our voters
and our poll workers. It is to protect the integrity of the
election and to provide for a safe and orderly procedure should
an election have to be rescheduled.
In response to the passage of that Act, the Division of
Elections promulgated by rule in 1994 a comprehensive emergency
suspension plan. This plan covers six broad areas with respect
to election administration: notification procedures through
PSAs; conduct of a rescheduled election with a focus on
assessing polling places; temporary polling sites;
consolidation of precincts; absentee voting, allowing for
temporary absentee voting sites to be established; voting and
tabulating equipment, ensuring that the supervisors of
elections have the flexibility to borrow and lease equipment
should there have been damage during the event; and also,
safety of the existing polling places. Should equipment have
already been deployed or ballot materials, there needs to be
procedures in place to secure those sites to protect the
integrity of the election. And, lastly, what do you do with the
release and certification of results, especially if you've got
races that have crossed jurisdictional boundaries?
In 2004, Florida experienced four storms in 6 weeks. The
first storm, Hurricane Charlie, hit Florida just 2 weeks before
our primary. It could not have been without the extraordinary
efforts at both the State and local level that we were able to
actually keep to our elections schedule and hold an August 31st
primary.
What we learned is really what we summarize as the three
P's: poll workers, polling places and power restoration.
Through our emergency operation center in Tallahassee, we were
able to get together with those supervisors who were impacted
by Hurricane Charlie and develop a contingency plan to go
forward with the election as scheduled.
Some of the lessons we learned: you have to think outside
the box. Your first reaction may be to reschedule an election,
but until you have done an assessment of your polling places,
your poll workers, worked with your supervisors of elections,
you don't know for certain whether or not a rescheduling is
absolutely necessary.
We learned quickly that you have to have communication with
the Department of Justice, especially if you are a pre-
clearance State, as we are in Florida. We have five counties
subject to pre-clearance. So whenever you change polling sites,
consolidate precincts, change any of the rules of the game,
that has to be pre-cleared through the Department of Justice;
and they were very cooperative with us.
Try not to duplicate your efforts, and what works in one
emergency may not work the same in another. For example, in
Hurricane Charlie, what worked did not work with Hurricane Ivan
that hit the Panhandle. With Hurricane Ivan, they had more time
to prepare and so they were actually able to handle a lot of
their issues from the local level. But we--in our zeal to help
them, stepped over some lines with respect to who was doing
what with assessing the polling places.
Having up-to-date phone trees cannot be understated. And if
you don't have a continuity of operations plan at the local
level and you take it off the shelf once in a while and look at
it and update it, there is nothing the State is going to really
be able to do for you.
Since then, we have established a regional response plan
with our supervisors of elections to approach election
contingency from a regional perspective. We also developed, for
the Division of Elections particularly, their own continuity of
operations plans. The supervisors of elections have entered
into memorandums of understanding amongst themselves to
actually put down on paper that they will assist one another in
the event of an emergency.
And, lastly, we have actually started looking at what we
would do if there was a pandemic influenza situation with an
election.
I will be happy to answer any questions.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Ms. Roberts follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Lofgren. I think we will have a few questions. I would
turn first to Mr. Davis for whatever questions he may have.
Mr. Davis of Alabama. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Let me thank you all for being here.
One of the things that the panel--or that the committee,
rather, is obviously trying to assess is the feasibility or the
advisability of any Federal law regarding Election Day
disasters. I want to get some sense from all of you, first of
all, under the statutory provisions in Florida and New York, I
take it Ohio, Ms. Beatty, does not have a provision for
suspending an election, is that right?
Ms. Beatty. No, it does not.
Mr. Davis of Alabama. Florida and New York apparently do.
So, Mr. Wilkey--well, let me just ask you with respect to
New York City. Obviously, the election was postponed in New
York City. Who made the decision to do that and how did that
happen on 9/11?
Mr. Wilkey. Well, for clarification, in the primary
election in New York we have two different polling hours. In
the city of New York, the counties in Long Island and the
immediate counties adjacent to New York--Westchester, Rockland,
Orange, Ulster--the polls are open from 6:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.,
and in Erie County upstate in the Buffalo area. In the
remainder of the State, the polls do not open until noon. They
are open from noon to nine. This has been the way it has been
since I have been in election, which is nearly 40 years.
There was no provision for canceling an election in our
law. There is provisions in the law for rerunning a primary or
an election, or a primary particularly after the fact,
depending on what happened that day.
So two things really happened. In the city of New York, a
judge had already been assigned by the administrative judge of
the court system in New York to oversee any problems that came
up on Election Day. There is a judge in every borough office
who handles Election Day complaints, and the administrative
judge of the 11th District was assigned on that day to handle
problems.
And so we immediately scrambled. I was on my way down to
the general office, which was only three blocks from Ground
Zero. It was virtually unaccessible. And so by phone we, the
Board staff and their counsel, got an oral order from the judge
canceling that election; and that order went out immediately.
Mr. Davis of Alabama. So one judge has authority to cancel
an election of an entire city?
Mr. Wilkey. The order was taken under consideration; and I
think within a couple of minutes, knowing what was going on
then, he immediately suspended that election.
Mr. Davis of Alabama. Ms. Roberts, let me ask you, who has
the statutory authority in Florida to make the actual decision?
Ms. Roberts. The Governor. The Secretary of State can
request an extension or rescheduling, a supervisor of elections
or a city clerk that is in charge of a municipal election. All
of those entities, those individuals, can request that there be
a delay, but only the Governor can make that decision.
Mr. Davis of Alabama. And is the Governor somehow recused
or precluded, if the Governor happens to be on the ballot?
Ms. Roberts. No, sir.
Mr. Davis of Alabama. Is that a problem?
Ms. Roberts. To be honest, I had not thought about that
before. Potentially.
Mr. Davis of Alabama. Let me just try to get some input
from you with respect to what we might do as far as Federal law
goes.
There was some conversation a few years ago about Congress
creating the authority to suspend an election; and, of course,
all the obvious practical problems were raised. No one or at
least a lot of people were not comfortable with the idea of the
President of the United States having that authority. It is not
necessarily feasible for Congress to have it, because there is
the obvious conflict issue if Members of Congress are
themselves on the ballot. Second of all, Congress might not be
in session; and if Congress is not in session you wouldn't have
time to assemble people to make a decision in real-time.
Can the three of you just--first of all, let me just ask
you, do any of the three of you think that there should be a
Federal law that in any way entails a suspension of a Federal
election for President or Congress? Do any of you think that
would be advisable?
Mr. Wilkey. I can only tell you, based upon my past
experience, that, as I indicated, in my State there was not a
provision for anybody to cancel an election, including the
Governor. The Governor used his executive power that day to
basically do what had to be done.
We still do not have a law on the books to do it, because
the legislature and the Governor cannot agree on who would do
it. Should the Governor do it? Should the State Board of
elections do it? Should the courts intervene? And to this day
we still don't have a provision in law to do it.
While I understand some of the statements that were made by
the former chairman of my commission, I think it needs to be
looked at very carefully. Because if an attack or problem
happens on Election Day, as many people have noted elections
are going to continue to go on. And really, you know, there is
a long-held provision in our Constitution that the
administration of elections is reserved to the State level. And
so I think that the debate would have to be very carefully made
in Congress to do that.
But I know that, based on my own experience in New York, it
needs to be addressed. It needs to be looked at. How it is
done, I can't make a suggestion. But I think that it does need
to be addressed. But I do agree.
I think one of the best statements I have read on that
issue was by your Senator, Madam Chair, Senator Feinstein, who
made the comment, you know, we are having elections all over
the country. If we have a situation, it is likely to be only in
one area of the country and why suspend voting for the rest of
the country. And I think that is a very good observation.
But that doesn't mean that we shouldn't have some
discussion about it, and that is why today I continue to be
saddened that we still don't have that provision in our State
law. I think it needs to be done, and somebody needs to be
responsible for it.
Ms. Lofgren. If I may, one possibility--I mean, I am not
necessarily proposing this, but where States have adopted a
statutory scheme, they are ahead of the game. Florida has. Some
other States have. California I don't think has. I remember the
Loma Prieta earthquake. There was an election in San Francisco,
and it was not really possible to have the election.
So it seems to me that one opportunity would be to have
some statutory scheme, but that if a State has adopted its own
that you would not preempt that scheme. So at least there is
some statutory authority not for the whole county but for
Federal elections where it is impossible to actually hold the
election because buildings have fallen down or whatever. So
that if there is an earthquake in southern California it
shouldn't disrupt the election in Alabama. But there needs to
be some ability to respond to the fact that people can't drive
down the road because the freeways have collapsed, for example.
That is just a thought that occurred to me.
The gentleman's time has expired.
I have my 5 minutes, so I will be very--I don't know if I
will use the entire 5 minutes.
But one of the questions I had--and I understand, Mr.
Wilkey, that you had back-up voter registration information in
a different location; and it seems to me that that is a very
smart thing to do, number one, and something that I don't know
whether--I honestly don't know whether my county has done that
or whether my State has done it. I wonder if Florida and Ohio
have back-ups at remote locations, and if so where and how do
you do that.
Ms. Roberts. I can speak for Florida. With the advent of
the Help America Vote Act, a requirement to have a single,
statewide, computerized voter registration database--we call
ours the Florida Voter Registration System. We actually have a
hot site that is our back-up from the State perspective. But we
have also allowed when we designed our system that our 67
counties still were able to maintain their own voter
registration system, and it interfaces with the State system,
so we do have multiple back-ups.
Ms. Beatty. Ohio also has multiple back-ups. The counties
keep the voter registration information on a county level and
transfer it to the Secretary of State's Office, and the
Secretary of State also backs that up through the State of Ohio
computer center.
Ms. Lofgren. The final question I wanted to ask--well,
actually, two. As we saw with Hurricane Katrina and in some
cases these terrible hurricanes and tornados that have
occurred, disasters can result in displacement for residents
that last for a long time. How do you approach displaced
residents that still have an intent to reside--they are still
registered to vote. How do you maintain your contact with your
citizens who have been displaced but intend to rebuild their
lives after a disaster as voters?
Ms. Roberts. In Florida, in 2004, when Hurricane Charlie
hit, it was a concentrated impact. It didn't have large
displacement of our citizens, and we were able to maintain
contact and provide them with information with public service
announcements. We actually chartered a plane and flew a banner
across that region with the 1-800 phone number. We passed out
palm cards in areas where they were passing out ice and water
and so forth, giving the voters information.
But certainly, I mean, you are very correct, that if you
have a large displacement of your population, as with Hurricane
Katrina, then that's going to require a whole different
assessment and set of circumstances.
Ms. Beatty. Congresswoman, I would echo Ms. Roberts'
sentiments. The weather emergencies that took place in Ohio did
not displace anyone. However, it did spur a lot of interest in
the possibility of a vote-by-mail system in Ohio.
Ms. Lofgren. Interesting.
Let me ask just a final question. Because, as you might
have noticed from my opening statement, I am a little bit
miffed at FEMA who no longer thinks that they have a role in
emergency management or reimbursing States and localities. Have
you successfully obtained reimbursement for your emergency
expenses related to elections efforts you have engaged in
because of emergencies?
Ms. Roberts. I can speak for 2004 that indeed we had a
great deal of cooperation with FEMA. And every time we had to
put something in the tracking system we had an accounting
afterwards, and our accounting office worked very closely with
FEMA to get reimbursement.
Ms. Lofgren. That is good.
Ms. Beatty. Thankfully, that was not applicable in Ohio.
Ms. Lofgren. And I know in New York you did get reimbursed.
Mr. Wilkey. Yes, we did get reimbursed; and they were very,
very helpful to us. I mean, we needed to be able to get in our
office building, which was virtually inaccessible in lower
Manhattan; and we were able to get on the list to get the power
that we needed and get up and running. And so we were very--
they were very cooperative in that area, and they did reimburse
us for a large number of the expenses.
Ms. Lofgren. That is good news, and that is what we want to
get them back to.
So, with that, I am going to thank all of you for your
testimony. We will keep the record open for 5 legislative days.
If there are additional questions, we will forward them to you.
And if that happens we ask that you respond as quickly as
possible so answers could be made part of the written record.
And we do thank you very much.
And we will ask our next panel to come forward.
As the next panel is coming forward, I will introduce them,
since I believe we will have votes in about 10 minutes.
Commissioner Rosemary Rodriguez currently serves as Chair
of the Election Assistance Commission. She was appointed in
2007 and served as Vice Chair of the Commission during her
first term. Prior to work with the EAC, Ms. Rodriguez was
President of the Denver City Council, Director of Boards and
Commissions for the Mayor's Office and a Clerk and Recorder of
Denver for 5 years.
And we also have Mr. Kevin Kennedy. He is the Director of
the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, which
administers and enforces State laws relating to elections,
campaign finance, ethics and lobbying. Mr. Kennedy has worked
in election administration for over 25 years, serving as
counsel and executive director of the Wisconsin State Board of
Elections. He is a former president of the National Association
of State Election Directors and a member of the EAC Standards
Board. Mr. Kennedy received his BA and JD from the University
of Wisconsin at Madison.
We welcome you both; and, as you know, your full statements
will be made part of the official record. We ask that you
summarize them in about 5 minutes.
STATEMENTS OF THE HONORABLE ROSEMARY RODRIGUEZ, CHAIRWOMAN,
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; AND KEVIN J. KENNEDY,
DIRECTOR, WISCONSIN GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD
Mr. Lofgren. We will begin with you, Chair Rodriguez.
STATEMENT OF ROSEMARY RODRIGUEZ
Ms. Rodriguez. Thank you, Madam Chairman and Honorable
Davis. Thank you for the opportunity for the Election
Assistance Commission to be here today.
What have we learned in elections in the United States?
That anything can happen on Election Day and that we have to be
prepared.
You also asked, is America prepared? And we at the Election
Assistance Commission are hopeful that they are prepared, and
we have issued guidance, and I will discuss that a little bit
in my testimony.
But what we know already is that contingency planning in
2008 is more important than ever. We have seen record
registration and interest in this election and turnout in the
primaries. In most cases, election officials were ready. When
tornados hit Tennessee and heavy rain came through Ohio,
election officials pivoted quickly. Polls were relocated. Hours
were extended. But these solutions were the result of careful
planning on the part of election officials. I am very glad to
hear Ms. Beatty had an opportunity to discuss that.
In addition to nature's fury, we have to be ready for power
outages, phone system failures and, most likely in November, an
insufficient number of ballots. Another troublesome scenario is
when poll workers fail to show up.
The point is we've already seen each and every one of these
occur, so we know what to expect, and we should plan
accordingly. The EAC has provided election management
materials. We have copies at the door. We advise election
officials to obtain a copy of their State's emergency
operations plan. Who is authorized to act during an emergency
situation? Which Representative Davis got right to. Who is in
charge? Who can extend poll hours? Who can reschedule an
election?
Election officials should implement contingency plans for
emergencies. Involve your county's information technology staff
to assist with developing procedures to create a computer
action plan.
Some of the questions election officials should consider
include are records backed up regularly and stored in secure
off-site locations, which sounds like they are. How do we
educate and inform poll workers of changes? How do we inform
the public when there is an emergency? And how do displaced
voters participate? Hopefully, many have the opportunity to do
absentee ballots, but some States are stricter about that. They
must implement a continuity of operations plan that reflects
their contingency plan, establish a line of succession for
election staff. Who is in charge of the office if something
happens? Coordinate with law enforcement and chief State
election officials and document procedures for Election Day in
case of problems. And develop a complete list of polling place
locations and give them to fire department and police
departments in your jurisdiction.
We have focused on ensuring that States and local
jurisdictions have contingency plans in place. Most disasters,
per Senator Feinstein's observation, are localized. However, we
cannot afford the reality of a disaster that has national
implications. As uncomfortable as this idea makes us, I believe
it deserves our attention. We should begin a dialogue among
voters, Federal and State legislators, election officials and
plan together.
EAC appreciates the opportunity to provide testimony today;
and we are ready to work with you, State and local election
officials and voters. Voters should know that nothing will stop
them from making their voices heard loud and clear on Election
Day.
Thank you.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Ms. Rodriguez follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Kennedy, we would be pleased to hear from
you.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN J. KENNEDY
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you very much Madam Chair, Congressman
Davis. It is truly an honor to be here, and I appreciate that.
It has also been an honor and a privilege to be Wisconsin's
chief election official for 25 years.
I would like to just make a few points, rather than go
through the testimony that's been submitted for the record; and
I think this is a great forum to do this, because it serves a
purpose for the public as well as for you.
Preparedness is not new in election administration. It has
been something that dedicated election officials have been
approaching for years. It has always been more of what are we
going to do under this circumstance. Now I think what's
happened as a result of the 2000 election, the 2001 9/11, the
issues that we've heard, as a community we are talking. And we
take--I think it is now a point of emphasis. It is more than
just what are we going to do.
You know, we had those hot button things that got our
attention, but now I think election officials are taking a very
systemic approach. And you saw that reflected in the testimony
of the individuals before that, you saw that in the commitment
from the U.S. Election Assistance Commission in terms of the
guidance that they've prepared that I referenced in my
testimony. And I think that is important.
I was asked to talk about Wisconsin, and that is why I said
preparedness just isn't a new thing in Wisconsin or other
places. But we've really incorporated into all aspects of our
election administration and, quite frankly, in our
administration of a State government. In our training, we have
detailed information.
We have to certify the chief election inspectors in the
State of Wisconsin. My agency does that, and right away we put
the pressure on them. Do you have--make sure you review the
plan, ask for it, which puts the pressure on our clerks. And in
Wisconsin we are unique in the sense we don't run our elections
at the county level. We run it at the municipal level. There
are about 8,000 local election officials, and 2,000 of them are
in the State of Wisconsin. I have 1,851 town cities and
villages that are on the ground, people running the elections.
And my 72 county clerks are involved, but voter registration
and absentee voting and polling places and poll workers are in
the hands of those dedicated people, many of whom are part
time. But we incorporate that into the training. We try to put
some responsibility on everyone.
Now, I don't have a copy of a plan from 1,851
municipalities in 72 counties, but they have been hearing about
this for a long time from us. As I said, we've moved from the
what are you going to do, to let us see a plan, let us have
that. And that is incorporated in the training. That is
incorporated in our election preparation. I find it ironic that
it has become part of our culture for an election
administration, and as we move into 2008 Wisconsin has been a
battleground State for the last two Presidential elections, and
we don't expect that to change in 2008.
And so the day that I got a call from the staff here I was
actually speaking to the State bar and had been asked to speak
on election disaster. Avoiding Your Worst Nightmare was the
title of the talk that they gave to me. So even the attorneys
that advise my local election officials are there wanting to be
prepared.
And so it is--you know, I think that is the benefit, and I
think this is where this hearing adds to this. Because the fact
that we have made a part of our culture in election
administration the fact that our attorneys are saying we need
to know this as we go into 2008 means that we can then convey
to the public that we are taking this seriously.
The other thing that I want to mention, there was one good
example that we used, and that is in the 2006 election, which
is our statewide election for Governor and Attorney General as
well as our legislative elections and congressional elections,
we had a bomb threat at a polling place at a high school in the
city of Madison; and the handling of that bomb threat was
exactly--showed how well the preparedness had paid off. All the
preaching that we had done and sample plans we had set out, the
city of Madison was well prepared. They called our office and
they said what do we do--or this is what we are doing, is that
okay, do you have any suggestions, was really the approach that
they took. The city attorney was saying, do you have a model
form for going into court to extend voting hours, was it okay
for us to set up across from the building so that voting could
continue.
And it all worked together well. We got a court extension
for an extra hour, but we really never really disrupted the
voting other than moving the equipment out of the polling
place. And we had people in there. And because it was well
communicated to the public, that is why we went to court.
It wasn't because we broke the chain of voting, but the
fact that the media was covering this and knew about it, the
public said, gee, there is a disruption. What's going to
happen? We got that extension so that there was time for them
to be comfortable with the change.
Let me just finish with one comment about Federal roles in
this, and that is I think Wisconsin has a well-developed
emergency planning program. I think the Feds have really
stepped in to beef that up through Homeland Security, and I
think that creates a real synergy where we can use that
information. Clearly, our infrastructure is stronger now than
it was eight years ago; and I think that is a result and I
think that is a role that the Federal Government plays very
well on that.
And what we really need to do is, as I think the Chair
mentioned, get election management as a component. If it is on
the radar screen, then they know. That is part of what we do to
keep our country running.
Thank you very much.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Lofgren. Thanks to both of you.
I will turn now to Mr. Davis for his questions.
We welcome Mr. McCarthy to the hearing.
Mr. Davis of Alabama. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Let me begin, Ms. Rodriguez, with your testimony. I agree
with you at the outset that this is not an implausible Tom
Clancy kind of scenario. One of the things that we believe
regarding 9/11 is that al Qaeda mistakenly thought that hitting
the Pentagon, hitting the Capitol and hitting the World Trade
Center would have a decapitating effect on our government. That
was a misunderstanding of something as basic as the fact that
Members of Congress aren't all sitting around the floor in the
morning on Tuesday, and as fundamental is the fact that our
economic and military command structures are much more
dispersed, and I think they appreciate it.
But the fact that they got it wrong doesn't mean that the
intent was not there. So it is plausible, it is conceivable
that some election in the future, al Qaeda or some version of
al Qaeda around the world could try to do, for example, a
series of multiple attacks. And while it takes Senator
Feinstein's observation about an attack by definition being in
a limited physical location, you could have a run of suicide
bombings, for example, which would have the effect of
paralyzing those communities and causing widespread fear in
other places.
So I don't view this as a Tom Clancy scenario. But what I
struggle with is the question of decision-making power.
Obviously, the one thing the Federal Government lacks is an
election board. We don't have the equivalent, Mr. Kennedy, of
your organization at the Federal level. And, obviously, the EAC
is certainly not the Federal version of a Board of Registrars
that can make or implement these decisions.
Vesting the power to suspend an election on the President
of the United States jars us for all kinds of reasons. There
have been two instances in our history when presidents acted to
suspend the constitutional rights: Mr. Lincoln's suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus, Mr. Roosevelt's actions regarding
Japanese detainees. We don't look approvingly at Mr. Lincoln's
actions in retrospect; and, frankly, Mr. Roosevelt's actions
we're appalled by. So giving the power to the executive worries
us.
Giving the power to the Congress is implausible. Congress
is not in session on Election Day in November. You can't
exactly do a phone-in on something like this. So that would
certainly strain our system. So is there any conceivable
statutory authority that you could suggest, Ms. Rodriguez, or
any conceivable decision-making process that would work?
Ms. Rodriguez. Well, perhaps you could consider some sort
of check and balance system that involved the executive,
congressional leadership perhaps, and the Supreme Court. I
mean, maybe there is some combination of those three. There
would have to be a lot of what-ifs built in.
Mr. Davis of Alabama. Or some of us didn't like it the last
time the Supreme Court went near an election in this country.
Ms. Rodriguez. But with the check of Congress and the
executive, maybe there is something that can be done. It seems
to me that we ought to have a contingency plan at the national
level.
Mr. Davis of Alabama. Mr. Kennedy, would you like to
comment on that?
Mr. Kennedy. I will comment based on the Wisconsin
situation, because we don't have a statute but we do have--that
clearly says it, but our emergency management authority for our
Governor is very strong, and there is a clear requirement for
our agency to work with him. And our position has been that the
Governor does have the authority to act in this. And I think
what could be done at the Federal level is something similar to
the Wisconsin level, recognizing the role of the three branches
of government.
I think that Congress can authorize the President to act
under certain circumstances with a very immediate review by the
Supreme Court that Congress is allowed to set the parameters on
this. And I think the comments that people have made about it
is generally very dispersed. I mean, I think about this in
Wisconsin about snowstorms. If we close a polling place in
Green Bay, how does that affect the southwest corner of the
State?
Mr. Davis of Alabama. What if the President were on the
ballot?
Mr. Kennedy. I think, you know, we elect governors and
presidents to be our leaders; and they are going to be held
accountable. They may be on the ballot, they make that
decision, but ultimately we have courts to keep them in check.
I think that is something to recognize; and that is why when
Congress, if it goes this route, sets the parameters. But I
think our three branch government allows us to set those kind
of standards. And it is a risk, but I would say the same thing
we would be asking of the Governor on the ballot.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
Mr. McCarthy.
Mr. McCarthy. Thank you very much.
I apologize for coming late. I had a couple committees.
But just kind of along that same line, I know Mr. Davis
mentioned about people get concerned when it goes to the
courts. But, first, a little truth in advertising. It was Al
Gore who requested to go to the Supreme Court.
But the checks and balances that we do have set up, much as
this body here, two of us worked on a--if you have a contested
race in Congress, it goes before Congress. And I think
Chairwoman Zoe Lofgren, when we went through ours, showed a
very good example of how to do it right. So there is a way of
getting there, but you do need the checks and balances, and you
do need to be able to look at it both ways.
Before I progress, I do want to ask unanimous consent to
enter these two documents into the record: the written
testimony for Keith Cunningham, Allen County Ohio Elections
Director, and the Milwaukee Police Report.
Ms. Lofgren. Without objection, they will be made a part of
the record.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. McCarthy. I have a couple different questions, one for
Mr. Kennedy. Knowing and hearing the end of your testimony and
reading some of it there, I know you have the back-ups to paper
prepared for it. How often have you used that in Wisconsin?
Mr. Kennedy. Wisconsin has been a paper ballot State for
years. In fact, we had 900 polling places that had hand-counted
paper ballots before HAVA where we either added optical scan or
a touch-screen voting system to that.
Occasionally, with our optical scan we have had to hand
count ballots, because we either ran out of ballots and we had
a provision for substitute ballots since they aren't going to
be read by the machine. It has been part of our culture. It
doesn't happen a significant number of times. But I would say
in any general election we will have a number of hand-counted
ballots where it is primarily an optical scan.
The year 2006 was the first time we had--we have 20
municipalities that have just touch screen plus paper for their
absentee voting or for the back-up. So we haven't had an
experience there, and they are all relatively small
municipalities.
Mr. McCarthy. So you are already prepared. You did that on
your own, your own driven ability.
Is one of the reasons at times you may have to go to back-
up, is it ever caused by same-day registration, where you have
people coming in that you have never been able to gauge that
this was going to happen because they weren't registered prior?
Mr. Kennedy. No. Election Day registration, a lot of it is
address changes. We've peaked at about 18 percent in 2006, and
that is because our small municipalities didn't have voter
registration.
Mr. McCarthy. Clarify 18 percent for me. You have 18
percent new people who come in who voted who weren't registered
before?
Mr. Kennedy. In 2006, of the 2.2 million people who voted
in our gubernatorial election, 18 percent registered at the
polling place. And part of that was because, as part of HAVA,
we put a statewide voter registration system in place. We had
1,500 municipalities that were like North Dakota, no voter
registration.
Mr. McCarthy. So almost one-fifth of everyone who voted you
had no idea was coming.
Mr. Kennedy. Well, actually, if you are doing--an election
official who is doing their job has a very good job they are
coming, because they can gauge the voter turnout. We, quite
frankly, nailed the turnout for 2006 when we did our
predictions right almost to the number in terms of how many
people were going to vote. So if it happens, it is because the
election official hasn't done their work. Because they--we have
had Election Day registration since 1976, and we have a good
sense of how many people register. We know most of them are
really address changes in the municipality because they reflect
people's convenience for this.
Mr. McCarthy. How much of the 18 percent is address change?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, that one we are just starting to get a
handle on now. I couldn't give you an answer now, but I would
say easily half of that.
Mr. McCarthy. What safeguard do you have? Because in the
report I was reading, this Milwaukee Police Department, they
were citing some double voting and some others because of same-
day registration. How do you protect from that?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, with any double voting you protect with
it after the election.
Mr. McCarthy. You protect after the election?
Mr. Kennedy. You always enforce after the election when you
are dealing with double voting, because people are going to
double vote in remote locations.
Mr. McCarthy. Are those ballots already counted, though?
Mr. Kennedy. That is a possibility that they may be
counted.
Mr. McCarthy. But if I voted twice, if I walked in and I
registered to vote, so I did it fraudulently, because one out
of every five people are totally new, so I am registering
putting it in. I vote and then my ballot goes into that box
correct or gets counted.
Mr. Kennedy. That's correct.
Mr. McCarthy. So how do you know which ballot is which if
you are having almost 20 percent of the people registering that
day and they are double voting.
Mr. Kennedy. Well, when people register to vote on Election
Day, they are required to provide identifying information so we
know who the people are who have registered. Anytime you have a
ballot box stuffing situation--and I can tell you that in
Wisconsin the number of people who have double voted is very
small, and we have prosecuted two or three people because we
have been able to identify them through the statewide voter
registration system. They always vote in different locations,
because their name is going to be on the poll as somewhere
else. They bring their identification to vote in a new
location. We have had successful prosecutions. That's how we
stopped that process.
The Milwaukee Police Report is very speculative. It is
actually a political document that has more to do with the
internal politics of the Milwaukee Police Department than it
does with the conduct of the election in 2004.
Mr. McCarthy. So you disagree with the special
investigation unit, you think it is political?
Mr. Kennedy. I think that the generation of that report is
political. The Milwaukee police chief did not even see it
before it was released.
Mr. McCarthy. So the persons doing this just for political
reasons is 1 of 67 pages, I guess. If I just follow one
thought. I ask if it is possible, would you agree that it would
be more helpful to election officials maybe if you cut off
registration two weeks prior, that way you still have the
election going on, the excitement, people can register, but you
would know how many people are there. You wouldn't have one out
of every five persons coming in. And from your words, you are
dealing with it after the election. Then you would make sure
they couldn't double-vote and have that ballot inside the box
already counted.
Mr. Kennedy. I would not agree with that. I think that
Wisconsin and Minnesota have demonstrated very minimal
electoral fraud, and it is probably less than you see in places
that closes 30 days before the election. The Election Day
registration is generally not the source of the problems.
Milwaukee's problems in 2004 were generally poll worker-related
problems for failing to balance the voters against the ballots.
They didn't really----
Mr. McCarthy. How much fraud is acceptable?
Mr. Kennedy. I don't think any fraud is acceptable.
Realistically, you recognize there are always people who will
try to game the system. That is why we have prosecutors and
that is why we build tools into the system to catch those
people and publicly prosecute them, so that that's the best
deterrent.
Ms. Lofgren. The gentleman's time has expired. I will just
ask a couple of questions because I know we are going to be
called away to votes in a few minutes. Chairwoman Rodriguez, it
is my understanding that the former Chairman Suarez sent a
letter in, I think 2004, to the Department of Homeland
Security, expressing his concern about the lack of plans to
deal with disruption of elections due either to a catastrophe
of whatever nature, and that he never got an answer to this
letter.
I guess it is good to know that I am not the only one who
never gets an answer from Department of Homeland Security.
The question is, have they, even though they never answered
the letter, have they provided input to the Commission? Have
they given support for the planning efforts that the Commission
has undertaken?
Ms. Rodriguez. To my knowledge, they have not nor have we
followed up that letter.
Ms. Lofgren. Okay. I just want to follow up a little bit
more on the whole issue of in the case of a disaster that
disrupts voting, how we deal with that, which is really the
purpose of this hearing. I think I agree with Senator Feinstein
that if there is a disruption in one place, you don't cancel
the election. We are America, we hold elections, we choose our
leaders ourselves. That should be our plan.
Having said that, having been through the Loma Prieta
Earthquake and some other disasters, there are some things
where you just can't proceed at the moment in a particular
area. Mr. Davis is right, it is difficult to decide who makes
that decision in a way that is apolitical that is not biased
towards any party or candidate. And it strikes me that if we
were to set some standards, or at least for Federal elections
put a statute in place that would only be viable if the State
didn't have a system in place and the States that do would be
fine. That involved really the Judiciary, which is the least
political of the three branches of government, that that might
be at least a useful thing to do. Do you have a reaction,
either one of you, to that concept?
Ms. Rodriguez. I like the concept because it would go to
the State first, does the State have something in place? But
when in an event that the State didn't, certainly in my
opinion, somebody has to take some action. And it would make
sense that Congress with some input, some check, would be the
person or be the entity.
Mr. Kennedy. I think I responded to Congressman Davis,
Congress is in a good position to set some parameters on how
authorities exercise, and that is one way of approaching it. I
think any time you have an election that involved Federal
candidates, even under Wisconsin's situation, we would be
consulting with our U.S. attorneys, for example.
Ms. Lofgren. Right.
Mr. Kennedy. Our congressional delegation would be in touch
if we had that kind of situation. Even though it would be our
governor making the decision, recognizing it was a
congressional, you would end up having ultimate authority on
judging the outcome of that election after, if it was postponed
or forcing it to be changed.
Ms. Lofgren. Chairwoman Rodriguez, it is my understanding
that only 16 States have a statute or developed plans to deal
with Election Day emergencies. What should Congress or the
Commission do between now and October to help or encourage
States who have not prepared themselves as Wisconsin and
Florida and others have, to do so, because I think the
likelihood is natural disasters can happen anywhere.
And HAVA funds can be used for contingency planning, but it
doesn't look to me from the reporting data that any of the
States have used HAVA funding to put contingency planning in
place. What is your suggestion for us to get States who have
not prepared in a preparation mode?
Ms. Rodriguez. Well, I noticed Leslie from the National
Association of Secretaries of State in the audience.
Ms. Lofgren. Welcome.
Ms. Rodriguez. And I have no doubt that she will report on
this hearing. Mr. Kennedy, thank you for putting visibility on
this issue. I will chime in because this level of interest in
what the States are doing, I think, will prompt legislatures to
address the issue.
Ms. Lofgren. Okay. With that, I am going to thank each of
you for your testimony. Note as I said earlier that we will
keep the legislative record open for 5 legislative days. If
there are additional questions that the members have, we will
forward them to you and ask that you respond as promptly as
possible.
We thank the witnesses, all of you. A lot of people don't
realize that the witnesses are volunteers here to help our
country do the best job possible. So we appreciate the expert
advice we have gotten today. Thank you very much and this
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:22 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]