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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 16, 2008

HOUSE RESOLUTION 834—GROUND FORCE READINESS SHORTFALLS

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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. Ortiz. The meeting will come to order, and we are going to see—we don't want to hurry you, gentlemen and ladies, but we are going to have some votes in about the next 10 minutes, and then I think we might be out for at least 40 minutes, and I know that you all have a busy schedule.

So what we are trying to do now is to get one of the delegates who does not vote on the floor votes, and maybe she can continue to run the meeting until we come back.

But we are going to get started.

Today, we meet in a joint session with the Air and Land Forces Subcommittee to discuss and hear testimony on H.R. 834. This resolution identifies ground force readiness shortfalls, acknowledges the strategic risk and resolves that Congress should commit to attempt to restore the health of our ground forces.

The purpose of this resolution and of this hearing today is on improving military readiness, about how we, as Members of Congress, can restore readiness to ensure a well-trained, well-equipped ground force for a safe homeland.

Today, we are here because we are seeking solutions, a way forward.

As we know, the readiness of the ground forces is measured in three categories: Equipment, personnel, and training.

Today, the Army, Marine Corps, National Guard and Reserves are reporting lower levels of readiness in all the three categories than they were in 2001. This is a fact. No matter how you measure it, using Army and Marine Corps current metrics to measure readiness against all requirements, there are significant shortfalls.

In previous hearings, we have learned that our troops are worn out, and their families are stressed from repeated deployments and redeployments. Equipment has been consumed by combat and prepositioned stocks almost depleted. Equipment shortfalls and time
constraints limit the amount and type of training our troops receive as they prepare to protect this country.

While we have the world's best counterinsurgency-trained ground force, we do not have a force that is prepared for many of the tasks that they could need to support other contingencies. This reduced readiness posture has left the United States in a risky strategic position.

At a hearing last week with the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, we heard that neither was confident of their respective service's ability to deploy to meet other contingency requirements to their eyes. This leaves an America more vulnerable than we want to be and, more importantly, than we should be.

What we know is concerning on many levels, but it is the unknown that concerns me the most. How would our ground forces respond if called upon today for another contingency? Will they be trained? Will they have the equipment they need? How long will it take for them to respond? And could we support our troops once they are engaged, the sustainability part of it? And are they prepared for contingencies other than Iraq and Afghanistan?

I commend every one of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines serving today. The sacrifices they make are honorable, but as General Cody said, “The awards our soldiers have earned reflect the accomplishment and bravery on the battlefield, but their valor is not enough to restore balance and readiness to our Army.” He is right. This is our job.

I ask my colleagues to join me in co-sponsoring H.R. 834 to recognize the readiness shortfalls, acknowledge the strategic risk and, most importantly, make a commitment to restoring the health of the ground forces.

I look forward to our witnesses today and their testimony and hearing their recommendations. And this is one of the reasons we are here.

You know, we are all in the same boat, and we need recommendations. We are not here to point fingers at anybody. We are trying to see how we can resolve and restore the strength of the ground forces.

And the chair now recognizes my good friend, the distinguished gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, the ranking member for the Readiness Subcommittee, for any remarks that he would like to make.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, as always, I thank you for your leadership, and thank you for this hearing.

This hearing on H.R. 834 follows a series of hearings this committee has recently held focusing on the readiness of our forces and our strategic posture. There is no doubt that we face an enormous challenge as we work to rebuild, transform and grow our armed forces while they are actively engaged in combat. However, I am
uncertain as to how our soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen will benefit from either this hearing or the proposed resolution.

I do believe, however, that this committee and this Congress can take action for the benefit of our troops and readiness by passing the fiscal year 2008 supplemental. This funding will benefit our troops by growing the force and initiating the process of refitting our five combat brigades returning from Iraq.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has gone on the record stating that they can continue to operate if they have the supplemental by the end of May. However, continuing to operate and having the funds needed to operate and improve readiness are different targets.

While testifying before the full House Armed Services Committee on February 6, 2008, Secretary Gates stressed that funding in the 2008 supplemental request was direct linked to the readiness of our military forces. General Magnus and General Cody delivered the same message last week.

During the hearing, General Cody stated, “This year, we didn’t get all the money for refit. There is still $7.6 billion for the Army sitting out there, and time is not on our side. We now have the most brigades deployed that we have ever had consuming our equipment. Our depots are running at 26 million direct labor hours, and we need that $7.6 billion like in October of last year to start buying long lead items, because we have got the workforce energized, and then as these five brigades come out, be able to rapidly reset so we can start getting into the time factor of building a strategic reserve. And so when I talk about timely and fully funding, that is critical to get back to strategic readiness.”

General Magnus echoed his remarks when he said, “Until we receive these supplemental funds, the Navy and us cannot put under contract for this Nation’s industry to build the aircraft that we need, the ground combat vehicles and equipment that we need, in addition to the personnel and operations and maintenance expenses that are needed. Our systems command is ready to contract with American industry now, and these are all lead time away from delivering some of these systems.”

In addition to the funds for equipment reset, the supplemental also includes $5.4 billion to grow the force. $4.1 billion of that is for Army efforts and $1.3 billion for the Marine Corps. In layman’s terms, this equates to more people. There is no question our men and women have made tremendous sacrifices in defending the Nation since 2001. The resolution before us details extended combat hours, limited time at home to train, multiple deployments, and personnel shortfalls.

All of these challenges are real, and they can be mitigated with more people. We must take responsibility then for the fact that Army and Marine Corps efforts to increase combat forces and decrease dwell time are directly tied to the funds in the 2008 supplemental and the failure of the Congress to act on it for more than a year.

On that note, I met just last week with Major General Thiessen, the Assistant Deputy Commandant for program and resources for the Marine Corps. He commented that readiness is the balance of people, equipment, and time, people with the right skills, rank,
equipment, and training. We must realize we cannot snap our fingers and produce a military that is fully ready, regardless of the funds provided. It takes time, measured in months, not weeks, to recruit, train, and ready soldiers and Marines.

It also takes time, often 18 months or more, to field the equipment our soldiers and Marines need to accomplish their missions. Every day that passes without the readiness funding included in the 2008 supplemental is one more day that we delay gains in strategic readiness.

To be clear, I do not approach today's hearing seeking to minimize the fact that our army is out of balance or that the armed services have presented large unfunded requirements to the Congress this year. It is time we take responsibility for our readiness shortfalls, readiness shortfalls that are grounded in decades of an inadequate defense top line and fund the needs of our troops.

For all these reasons, I testified before the House Budget Committee that we ought to increase the top line for defense spending. As you well know, the budget resolution passed in the House included no such increase. Unless we take action on this matter of funding, then I believe it is premature to consider the resolution before us today.

Mr. Chairman, I welcome our witnesses and look forward to hearing from each of them today, and I yield back the balance of my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 40.]

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much.

Let me just say that the House, our committee, has passed the authorizing supplemental, but it is in the Appropriation Committee's sight, and they are the ones—and I do agree, you know, we do need to get this funding. But it is not that I am passing the buck. We have done our job. Now, the gentlemen on the Appropriations Committee need to do the same, because, he is right, we need to fund it.

Now, let me yield to my good friend, the Chairman of the Air and Land Subcommittee, my good friend from Hawaii, Mr. Abercrombie.

STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

To our witnesses, I hope you don't feel it is unfair that we are making these opening remarks just at the time the bell is going off. The reason for it is, is I think it is important, as we receive your testimony, for you to have the context within which we are operating in our decision-making, because I think it will help you to help us understand where we need to go.

I am especially appreciative of Mr. Forbes' commentary, because I reach a different conclusion from that commentary than he does about whether or not the resolution is premature. We suffer from some very great difficulty here on the committee. People like Mr. Forbes knows what he is talking about. People on the committee, by definition, are consumed with the subject matter that is in front
of us. The sad reality is, is that many of our colleagues, let alone most of the people in the United States, are unaware of the circumstances that we are dealing with here today and unaware of the subject matter that you will be discussing in your various presentations.

One of the reasons, I believe that we do need to have this resolution is not because we don't know it or that we are not aware of what is involved in the regular order budget process, or the supplemental budgets that have become part and parcel of our response where defense is concerned, but that most people don't know.

We want to pass this resolution or get this resolution forward to inform our colleagues, the rest of the Congress and, by extension, the country as to why we are doing what we are doing, what we need to do and, more particularly, from my point of view, get away from these supplemental budgets. The very things that my good friend, Mr. Forbes cited, are what we should be taking up in the regular order of the budget process and the regular order of the authorization.

Think about it, long lead items, building strategic reserves, ground combat vehicles, building the necessary air carriers that we need to have, growing the force. The failure of the Congress to act on the supplemental for over a year now. You can't depend on the supplemental budget, you can't start mixing up the regular budget order, the regular Department of Defense Authorization Act that leads to appropriations and become dependent on a supplemental budget which may or may not get presented.

We don't know when it is going to be presented, we don't know how it is going to be presented, we don't know what other items or elements will come into it in the course of its presentation, we don't know when it is going to pass. And yet we are talking about strategic elements, such as I have just mentioned and such as Mr. Forbes outlined, being dependent on as undependable a process as a supplemental budget.

We need to have a readiness resolution out there that, in my judgment, that can explain to our colleagues and explain to the American people what is at stake and why we are doing what we are doing.

I have a further comment, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to enter into the record, which outlines, essentially, what you have said and what Mr. Forbes has said, reiterating it and possibly adding some detail. But with your permission, I would like to put it in.

Mr. Ortiz. Hearing no objection, so ordered. The rest of your statement will be submitted for the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Abercrombie can be found in the Appendix on page 38.]

Mr. Abercrombie. And I want to echo the chairman's remarks that we did not plan on having this vote take place as it is right now, and it probably will be 40 minutes, and I am not quite sure how we are going to work it now. I would like very much to hear the witnesses.

Mr. Ortiz. I am the same way. And I know that all three of you are very, very busy individuals. And one of the reasons why we are
here is to get your input and to hear from you. I understand we are having how many votes? Okay.
  So we should be back, pray to God, we should be back in about 15 minutes.
  Is that okay with you, witnesses? Thank you.
  The committee will recess for about 15 minutes
  [Recess.]
  Mr. Ortiz. We are going to see if we can really get going now, but since we have a 10-minute debate on a motion to recommit and then we have a 50-minute vote, we really didn't want to waste your time. I think we need to continue to go on.
  And I would like to submit a statement for the record for Mr. Jim Saxton. I hope he comes back in.
  {The prepared statement of Mr. Saxton can be found in the Appendix on page 43.}
  Mr. Ortiz. But today we have a panel of distinguished witnesses, and we are very happy that you are with us today.
  We have Ms. Flournoy, Michele Flournoy, she is the president of the Center for a New American Security; Mr. Lawrence J. Korb, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress; Mr. Thomas Donnelly, Resident Fellow of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute.
  Without objection, all the witnesses' prepared statements will be accepted for the record.
  And, Ms. Flournoy, welcome, and you may proceed with your opening remarks that you might have.

STATEMENT OF MICHELE A. FLOURNOY, PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

Ms. Flournoy. Thank you very much, Chairman Ortiz, Chairman Abercrombie and Ranking Member Forbes, members of the committee. Thank you very much for holding these hearings and for inviting us to speak to you today.

I want to start by saying I applaud your holding these hearings, because I think it is very important that the American people become more aware of the significant strains and stresses on the force, because that is part of building the support that is necessary to fully fund the refit and recovery of the U.S. military, which is going on long beyond the current force levels in Iraq start to come down, long beyond when the supplementals run out.

So I applaud your calling attention to this issue, because I think it is critical to building the political support necessary to fully fund the recovery of the U.S. military, particularly our ground forces.

As you all well know, the high tempo of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has taken a substantial toll on the force, particularly the Army, the Marine Corps and the National Guard and Reserve. Personnel, training, and equipment in these components have been under sustained stress for several years due to multiple deployments with back-to-back times overseas and minimal time in between at home.

Readiness has kept pace with current operations but just barely. And, now, in recent weeks, we have had Army leaders, sort of, raising the red flag and warning that the demand for forces in Iraq
and Afghanistan is actually exceeding what the Army can sustainably supply.

The other key concern I have is that the United States currently lacks an adequate strategic reserve of ground forces that could be ready and available to respond to other potential contingencies that might arise. As a global power with global interests, and at a time when we face daunting challenges around the globe, I think restoring that strategic reserve of ready ground forces is absolutely critical for the United States.

In the interest of time, I am going to pass over some of the detailed analysis I have tried to provide in my written testimony about how multiple back-to-back deployments with little time at home are stressing the force specifically.

I just would note that while I think it is a very positive step that the President has announced that the 15-month tours for the Army are now going to return to 12-month tours with 12 months in between, I just want to note with caution that one-to-one ration, although it is an improvement over what we have had, is not sustainable over time, particularly coming on the wake for units that have already had three and four tours overseas in a short amount of time.

I also talked in my statement how compressed training time has narrowed the focus of our training to be primary for counterinsurgency without enabling units to have the time they need to train on the full spectrum of missions.

I also talk about wear and tear on equipment and how Army equipment, for example, is wearing out at up to nine times the normal rate, and that is starting to really build the cost of refitting the force and recapitalizing the force to quite a substantial level and, again, one that is going to be, kind of, a bad hangover. It is going to go on beyond the time that supplemental funding and be a bill that we have to pay for many years going forward.

Let me just focus on two key areas: recruitment and retention. As you all know, the Army has been making its overall recruiting and retention targets in recent years, but I think there are some very serious challenges that we need to pay attention to.

For the Army, for all of the services, one of the problems is on the supply side. Only three in 10 young Americans actually meet the educational, moral, and health standards required for military service. So that is a very small percentage of the population that we are able to recruit from. The Army has had, particularly as it tries to grow the force and needs to recruit more people, has had a particular challenge meeting its own standards. For example, the percentage of new recruits that has high school diplomas has fallen from the target of being over 90 percent to about 82 percent in this fiscal year.

In addition, the Army has had to grant additional numbers of waivers, some for medical, some for other reasons but particularly so-called moral waivers so that you now have 20 percent of new recruits receiving a waiver of some kind. Now, many of these are for misdemeanors, but I think as the Army begins to track the performance of these troops, the record is mixed. Some are performing better than average, some are performing less. This is a quality issue that we have to pay very close attention to over time.
On retention——
Mr. Ortiz. You can go ahead. We still have about 10 good minutes left.
Ms. Flournoy. Okay. I will try to be very quick.
On retention, again, overall target is being met. I think there is growing concern, within the Army, particularly, also the Marine Corps, about retention of company grade officers. Lots of concern about people coming off their third or even fourth tours and deciding to leave the service. These challenges will grow. As these forces grow, you have to actually achieve higher than historical retention rates.
In my testimony, I tried to, again, underscore the challenge that readiness poses for us and to highlight five specific steps that the Congress can take. One is to continue to support the growth of the force, the growing of the size of the Army and the Marine Corps, but to make sure that the pace of growth does not exceed our ability to maintain quality that really sets our force apart from any other in the world.
Second, begin to drawdown forces in Iraq over time to reduce the level of strains on the force, to increase dwell times between deployments, and to make more time for full spectrum of training and eventually the ability to both send more forces to Afghanistan and reconstitute a ready reserve of ground forces.
Third, reestablish that ready reserve of ground forces, absolutely essential to lowering strategic risk for our Nation.
Fourth, fully fund and continue to fund the reset and force expansion, which will become more challenging as supplementals come down over time.
And, finally, rebalance the force for the 21st century. Pay close attention to how we allocate growth to the different kinds of capability areas and ensure that our forces have the mix of capabilities they need for the full spectrum of warfare, not just conventional war at the high end.
In the interest of time, I will conclude my remarks there and be happy to take any questions when the time comes.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Flournoy can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much.
Mr. Korb, you can begin. Somebody just didn't talk to the Pope today, and that is why we are having all these votes.
But go ahead and you can get started, sir.

STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE J. KORB, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS
Mr. Korb. All right. As you said, my testimony will be entered into the record.
Let me make a few comments.
Mr. Abercrombie. Can you pull the mike a touch closer, Mr. Korb, please?
Mr. Korb. All right. Let me make a few——
Mr. Abercrombie. Even closer.
Mr. KORB. Okay. This is not the first time this has happened, and I think it is important to keep in mind, they say history doesn’t repeat itself, but sometimes it rhymes.

The Army was broken as a result of Vietnam, and the transition to an all-volunteer military when to meet our numbers we lowered our standards. And, basically, it took us a decade to fix it. I had the privilege of working with President Reagan and some of those distinguished gentlemen on the wall, as well as people like Senator Nunn, Senator Warner and Senator Goldwater on the Senate side to get it back to where it needed to be.

In my view, you are there again. People use euphemisms: hollow, out of balance. I mean, the fact of the matter is you have a very, very serious problem.

Now, I want to make a point: How did we get into this? The reason we got into this is that we did not have the courage of our convictions. I did not support this war, but if you wanted to fight it, you had to realize that when we set up the volunteer military, we had four pillars. One, a comparatively small active duty Army, a guard and reserve that would be a bridge to conscription. We did not do that, and because of that, we caused the problems that you have to address here. Multiple tours, not sufficient dwell time, guard and reserve not used as a strategic Reserve but an operational Reserve, getting deployed over and over again and then substituting private contractors to do military functions. And that is the reason we got into it was we didn’t have the courage of our convictions.

General Abizaid, the most distinguished commander of the Central Command we have had in this war, basically put it well when he said, “The Army was not designed for a long war,” and so we didn’t do it.

So the question becomes, now what do you do? You have got two choices, in my view. You want to continue this endless war in Iraq, go back to the draft. If you don’t want to do that, get out of Iraq. Set a responsible deployment plan.

General Maxwell Taylor, former Army Chief of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Ambassador to Saigon said, “We went to Vietnam, we sent the Army to Vietnam to save Vietnam. We took the Army out to save the Army.”

The late Bill Buckley put it even more succinctly. He said, “Had you not gotten out of Vietnam, you wouldn’t have won the Cold War, and if you don’t get out of Iraq, you are not going to win the war on terror,” because as Michele has pointed out, and I have in my testimony, you do not have the capacity to do the things that you need as long as you are bogged down, and you are weakening your military.

The thing most disturbing is, 13 percent of the people coming into the Army in fiscal year 2008 have moral waivers. That is the type that you are getting in. We did that in the 70’s to meet our targets, and we had an absolute disaster on our hands.

Now, what to do as you get out of Iraq, I think there are a couple of things to keep in mind when you expand the force. You should expand the ground forces, because, basically, the Guard needs to stay home to guard the homeland, and if you have other things, you do not want to rely on them as much. Do not lower your qual-
ity standards. If you can't get the people, don't do it. The Commandant of the Marine Corps in the 70's, Lou Wilson, said, "I don't care if I don't meet my numbers, I am not going to take in people I shouldn't," and that turned out to be the correct strategy in the long run.

Number two, don't make the force that you expand a mirror image of what you have got. You need forces that understand peacekeeping and stabilization.

Number three, do it in a fiscally sound manner. We have got too many weapons that deal with threats from a bygone era. Get rid of those to pay for the expansion of the ground forces.

And then, finally, drop these outmoded social restrictions on people who come in. Get rid of, "Don't ask, don't tell," okay? Basically, the uniform code of military justice is enough to deal with it. We are throwing out people who have critical skills that we need, and if you look at all of—for example, General Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff in the 90's basically said that that policy is outmoded.

And then, finally, drop the restrictions on women in combat. You should set specific criteria for every job in the military, and they should not be determined by gender.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Korb can be found in the Appendix on page 57.]

Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much.

We have a couple of votes, and hopefully we will be back in the next 10 minutes. Ms. Bordallo will continue with the hearing, so take your time when you are making your testimony, because we do have some very key members in the audience with us today. So we can go vote, and you can continue with the hearing.

Thank you so much.

Madam Chairwoman.

Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Donnelly, I assure you your testimony has been gone over by us, and when we come back we will pick on you as quick as we can.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS DONNELLY, RESIDENT FELLOW, FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY STUDIES, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Mr. Donnelly. Mr. Abercrombie, I appreciate that attention. [Laughter.]

As a former staff member, it is always an honor to return to this committee room. I look forward to being picked on.

I am also relieved to be excused from the obligation to speed testify, so if we are going to continue, okay.

Much of what I have to say will be informed by my previous service as a committee staff member. When I worked here force readiness was something I spent a lot of time on, but also the condition of American land forces is something I have spent all my career doing.

And if I may be permitted a bit of shameless commerce, the questions that the committee asks are the primary subject of a book that my colleague, Fred Kagan, and I will be publishing in the next
month called, “Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power.” So I appreciate your indulgence, even if the chairmen aren’t here.

I want to supplement the testimony that Michele and Larry gave by trying to give a little bit of a larger context as to how we came to this pass. Because if this is a perfect storm, it is not something that brewed up just in the last couple of years, in fact. There are a number of factors that should be considered when contemplating the condition of U.S. land forces and the challenges they face today.

As Larry suggested in his testimony, even the land force mission of the Cold War years was kind of an economy of force mission. Those units forward stationed in Germany, the five divisions that were permanently garrisoned there, were only intended to hold the line for a very brief period while further active units were deployed. And, as Larry said, the Reserve components then would be mobilized and deployed as necessary.

The Cold War came to an end, and the era of peace then was upon us. Certainly, the first Bush administration took as its first target for defense reductions the land forces of the United States, and Congress went along happily with this. Senator Sam Nunn, in particular, allowed that he couldn’t find any future use or an important future use for large-scale, heavily equipped land forces.

Now, obviously, this drawdown was interrupted by Operation Desert Storm, which tended to remind people of the value of land forces, more generally, but of heavily equipped land forces. But after the war was over and the pace picked up again during the Clinton administration years, the process continued until the U.S. Army’s roles were about 40 percent smaller than they were in 1988.

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review process, which was conducted by this Bush administration, also planned to eliminate two further Army divisions from the active structure, but those plans were shelved in the wake of the September 11 attacks.

Land forces were also disproportionately, in my judgment, targeted during what we came to call the Procurement Holiday of the 1990’s. That was, in some ways, understandable, because a smaller force could live off the accumulated investments of the Reagan administration. And it is true that the so-called big five procurement programs, things like the M1 tank, the Bradley fighting vehicle, Blackhawk and Apache helicopters and so forth, were, and continue to remain, the most lethal and modern land force systems on the planet. But they got older, and they have been used much more rapidly than anticipated, and they have been subject to combat conditions rather than just training conditions.

Also, the Army’s two signal modernization programs of this period, the Comanche helicopter and the Crusader howitzer, fell victim, first of all, to lack of funding and then to what we have come to know as the defense transformation movement.

And, indeed, the current Future Combat Systems Program, which has now started to generate important new capabilities, not only for high technology conventional warfare but the kind of irregular warfare that has become the part and parcel of U.S. land forces over the last four or five years, has just begun to bring those capabilities into the field.
And, in my judgment, this modernization effort remains under-funded, and even if it were more sufficiently funded, it would be years before the full effects of the modernization effort would be felt.

But the transformation movement, as promulgated by former Secretary Rumsfeld, was based on two insights that don’t look very good in retrospect. One was about the state of the world, that we were in an extended period of so-called strategic pause. If that were ever true, it certainly seems to be over now, and, certainly, that is true if you are wearing a green uniform. Land forces are running as fast as they can to do what we ask them to do.

The second insight was that technologies, and particularly information technologies, would reveal a transparent battlefield. Former Admiral Bill Owens, who was the Vice Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman, talked a lot about this transparent battlefield, lifting the fog of war. And we thought that because we would see the battlefield completely, our ability to tailor forces would be more precise and more efficient and more effective.

And, in particular, our land forces might be more valuable as nodes in an information network rather than for conducting close combat with the enemy. As Chinese theorists who have a gift for aphorism came to call it, we thought we had entered an era of no contact warfare, and the war in Kosovo seemed to bear that out in some sense.

This really had a whipsawing effect on the U.S. Army, and to the degree that the U.S. Army really struggled to be relevant to the Kosovo operation, the Army became motivated to emphasize the quality of strategic deployability. It was worried about its simple ability to get to the fight and secondarily about what would happen after they got there. And so the Army has transformed itself into a lighter and more mobile and a modular force.

And this has been supplemented by a Marine-like adoption of a force generation model that is based on rotational deployments, predictable rotational deployments.

And so we have to understand that the force itself has changed the way it measures its own readiness and the kind of deployment that particularly the Army has set for itself. So it has set itself an entire set of benchmarks that might be less relevant today than they were when they were introduced. Today, I would submit that the primary question is not how quickly we can get to a conflict, but how long we can remain engaged in it.

And, obviously, our initial experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the very successful initial invasions, seemed to suggest that faster and lighter were synonymous with better. But if the global war on terror has extended from being a global manhunt, as it was often called, into the long war, which is more often described as a global counterinsurgency, the qualities of sustainability and durability seem much more salient than they did when this war began after September 11.

So I would just say that where we are today is a product of events that go back at least 15 years. And as the committee considers and submits the resolution for the Congress’ consideration, while there are many aspects of the resolution that I find admi-
rable, there are some more enduring questions that need to be an-
swered if we are to dig out of the hold that we are in.

And to conclude very rapidly, I would suggest that whether it is
a matter of passing the immediate supplemental or including the
Grow-the-Army initiatives that are in the supplemental in long-
term regular budget order of planning, it is simply going to be a
question of whether we are willing to, as Larry says, summon the
moral courage to pay the price, and by which I mean primarily the
fiscal price, because there is no way that the full burden of this
commitment can be shared equally across the American people.

This is a war that demands regular forces, highly motivated,
well-trained regular forces, and I would just submit that we really
need to increase the size of the force to meet the demands of the
war and the admirable impulse to reduce the strain on folks cannot
be solved by pretending the war isn’t as large and as long lasting
as it is likely to be. We need to size the force to meet the commit-
ment, rather than reduce the war to meet the size of the force.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Donnelly can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 74.]

Ms. Bordallo [presiding]. Thank you. Thank you very much,
Mr. Donnelly.

I have a couple of questions, and, of course, I do want to thank
Chairman Ortiz and Chairman Abercrombie for calling this hearing
and for their leadership overseeing the readiness of our armed
forces.

Today’s topic about the readiness shortfalls in our ground forces
is extremely important to all of us. I am one of the sponsors of H.R.
834, and I believe that it is important for us, as a Congress, to ac-
knowledge that there are some critical readiness shortfalls and
that we should take the necessary actions to correct this.

And I want to thank all of you, this panel of defense policy ex-
erts. Thank you for your testimony this afternoon.

I am particularly concerned about the current levels of equip-
ment that are available to the governors of the 50 states and the
four territories, including Guam. Lieutenant General Blum puts it
best. He says, “It takes the people, plus equipment, plus training
to equal a capability.”

Nationally, the National Guard only has about 43 percent of its
equipment on hand and available for use by the commanders in
chief of the states and the territories and our governors. On Guam,
we only have a staggering 17 percent of equipment available for
use by the governor. Obviously, this poses a significant challenge
to having a viable operational force. The equation is out of balance,
and we need to fix this problem.

So I pose this question to any one of you who feels that you can
answer it. Each year, the President’s budget request includes a doc-
ument known as the P1R, which provides a breakdown of how
much of the service procurement request is planned for the Na-
tional Guard and the Reserves. The annual National Guard and
Reserve equipment report required under Title 10 does not really
provide the Congress with an effective oversight tool for visibility
on whether or not services are, in actual fact, sending the money
as indicated in the P1R.
So could you answer this: In your opinion, do you think it would be effective if Congress reformatted its Authorization and Appropriations Committee conference report to convey congressional intent for breakdown of each procurement line for active, National Guard and Reserve components? Or would it be more beneficial to have a separate procurement account for the National Guard and Reserves?

I would like to hear your thoughts on such ideas for potential action.

Any one of you?

Mr. KORB. I think given the fact that the Guard has become an operational Reserve rather than a strategic Reserve, and, obviously, nobody wants to go back to conscription, you need to ensure in the appropriation process that the equipment goes right to them. Because if you don’t, and I can tell you from my own days, as they say, in the building, it will go to where the overall service wants it. So you need to do that.

I mean, that is why, for example, Congress created a separate Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, because there was a concern that if you did not do that, that the voice of the Reserves would not be held, and it would get lost in the shuffle. That is why Congress created a special operations force budget so they could do that.

So, yes, if you want to do that, I think you need to do that, and you also might want to consider—I know other people have talked about it—making the head of the National Guard Bureau a four-star officer so that he or she can sit at the table with the other chiefs.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much.

Ms. Flournoy, do you have comments on that?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. I have not looked at the specific alternatives that you have laid out to have a strong opinion over which way is best, but I do agree with the sentiment that now that we are turning to the National Guard and Reserves as more of an operational force, we need to fundamentally reprioritize the equipping of that force. They have been consistently underresourced over a period of years.

The wear and tear that they have experienced in recent situations has only exacerbated that problem. And I think even current plans to withdraw their equipment only brings them up—doesn’t bring them up to 100 percent of their authorized levels. So even the get well plan only gets them about 75 percent of the way.

And now that we have the, sort of, transnational terrorism and very real risks to our homeland security, not only natural disasters like Katrina, but attacks like 9/11, I think the strategic importance of the Guard, not only as an operational Reserve for missions abroad but as a force for response at home, has gone up substantially, and I think we have to adjust the way we equip and fund the Guard, accordingly.

Mr. DONNELLY. If I may, I would——

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes, Mr. Donnelly.

Mr. DONNELLY. Thank you. I would agree with the diagnosis of the problem. I would be very leery of a separate and discrete procurement account, particularly in a time of war, and when we have
essentially a just-in-time readiness model, removing any further flexibility from the Army’s ability to manage its resources is likely to have unintended second order consequences.

And, also, I think it is important to distinguish between the federally organized Army Reserve and the state level National Guard units. So I would agree that the need to modernize the Guard is more pressing than it has ever been, and I would agree with both Michèle and Larry’s characterization of the Guard as an operational Reserve; however, I am not sure that, certainly, a discrete and separate procurement account, or set of accounts, would not create more problems than it solves.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Donnelly.

Well, I can’t quite agree with you. I feel that there has to be some specific language or whatever—whenever you don’t have a specific account of something, it is going to be lost in the general fund, and I do agree that this is what is happening here, and I think this is why the Guard and Reserves are shortchanged.

I have another question here. This, again, is to any one of our panelists. As with all the other services, the National Guard Bureau publishes an unfunded requirements document every year. Every year, it seems the unfunded requirements grow for issues like full-time support and training, which are essential elements to have a ready and operational force.

The service components have acknowledged that the National Guard is an operational force; however, I am skeptical of the financial commitment that is truly needed to make the National Guard a truly operational force.

Short of ending the war in Iraq, what other alternatives or actions should Congress look into in order to provide additional training dollars for the National Guard? Are there any recommendations from the recent National Guard and Reserve commission report that could help with this aspect of funding?

Maybe we will begin with you, Mr. Korb.

Mr. KORB. The job of the Secretary of Defense and the President and the Congress is to set priorities. I don’t care how much money you are willing to spend, you can’t buy perfect security. And it seems to me, as you look at the threats that the United States faces, the immediate threats, that you have got to give priority, as Michele mentioned here, to homeland defense. That is now a new mission. You have also got to give priority to the fact that the Guard, as you pointed out, is going to be used as an operational Reserve.

So I think, therefore, when you look at the unfunded requirements, you have to put them up against things like buying weapons systems for an era that no longer exists. We still buy an awful lot of weapons that were designed primarily for the Cold War and now continue to be justified on the basis of some potential future threat.

So I think that is what you have to do. And as I look at the budget that was submitted to Congress this year by the administration, they made no hard choice; they just kicked the can down the road to the next administration.

For example, both Secretary Gates and Deputy Secretary Gordon England are on record as saying that the production of the F/A–
22 should stop at 182 or 183 planes, whatever it is, but yet they didn't close the production line. So what that means is that the Air Force will come back next year and ask for more, and that is what we will be competing against, these unfunded requirements, which, in my view, should have a higher priority, given the immediate threats that we face.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Ms. FLOURNOY. I guess I would just echo the priorities of, I think, the first task is to restore the Guard's readiness for its homeland defense and security missions, because we have no backup there. I mean, they are it, given how busy the active duty force is, which is usually the backup. So I think that has got to be the first priority.

And the second, I would say, there are parts of the Guard that are more stressed than others. The Army has parked a number of so-called high-demand, low-density assets in the Guard, and those forces are the ones who are seeing the particularly high levels of perstempo and optempo, repeated deployments and so forth. And I would focus on getting that part of the force well, both in terms of time at home for personnel and equipment.

And then I would look to trying to get back to resourcing the kinds of sustainable deployment tempos that are in Army plans, sort of, five to six years between one-year tours for looking at the Guard as an operational reserve, which seem a very far, just very distant vision at this point, but I think that would be the next priority on my list of things to try to get back to.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you.

Mr. DONNELLY. Again, I would just say that the active force and the Reserve components are so deeply intertwined at this point that any solution that targets only a part of the problem is almost sure to have unintended consequences.

So if we want to restore the pace of operations for the Reserve components, that, I would agree, is preferable. I think the first thing that has to be fixed is the active component and particularly the active duty Army. The Marine Corps is now essentially embroiled in what are traditional Army long duration land force missions.

So if we want to fix the system, I would say the place to start is with the active force, and we have to have some patience in order to understand this is going to take a long time to remedy the problems that have accumulated over the past 15 years.

One of the problems is, is that we don’t have a good measure for balancing these various risks, the risks of fighting abroad, versus the lack of preparedness for homeland defense and homeland security.

So I understand that these shortfalls increase the stress on guardsmen and reservists, but I think anything less than a holistic approach to the solution runs a very great risk of making the thing, in an unintended way, just compounding our problems rather than solving them.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Donnelly.
I now have a question, perhaps, Mr. Korb, you would answer this. Do you have any suggestions for actions the Congress can take to improve readiness beyond the supplemental?

Mr. KORB. I think what you have to do, again, is to focus in the budget on the short-term problems. I think that, for example—I will leave personnel aside for a second—you can buy equipment, you know it is being worn out. I think that Congressman Abercrombie and people like Senator McCain have said after more than five years of war in Iraq and six in Afghanistan, we should put this stuff in the regular budget. We know how much this equipment is being burned up as we go. So that should be in the regular budget where it would then have to compete with other programs that don’t deal with the immediate threat.

And I think that is the way you do it. Once you settle on how much money you are going to spend, then I think you can look at the priorities. But what is happening now is you are putting a lot of this into the supplemental, and at some point the supplementals will end, and when the supplementals end, then the question becomes, what happens to these?

After Vietnam, we did not do that. I mean, after the war in Vietnam ended, we did not continue to reset the force, and it took us quite a while to be able to get the readiness back to where we needed.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much for your suggestions, Mr. Korb.

The chair would like to recognize another one of the members of the Readiness Committee, Mr. Saxton, for any questions he may have.

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. SAXTON. Madam Chairlady, I guess I have an observation rather than a question, and I will invite the witnesses to comment if they would like to.

I have taken special interest in the resolution, that is H.R. 834, which is the subject of this hearing, which goes to great lengths to point out the deficiencies, or the perceived deficiencies, by those who wrote the resolution in our deployed forces and in the forces, as noted in the resolution, that are training to deploy.

And I guess my problem is that we have had two hearings previously on this subject, and they were both with representatives from the Pentagon. The first hearing was where there were representatives from the U.S. Army Reserve and the National Guard who concluded that whatever deficiencies there are have been remedied to some extent by appropriations, usually through supplemental appropriations.

I noted, for example, that the Army National Guard in 2001 on equipment had fewer than 290 medium tactical vehicles on hand, which was a huge problem. But by the time we held the hearing, which was several weeks ago, instead of 290 medium tactical vehicles on hand, they had 4,722.

And when General Cody came in a subsequent hearing and talked about the same subject, we asked him how that growth was
possible, and he said the growth in equipment was possible because of the supplemental appropriations bills that we had passed, which brings me to this resolution, which points out many of the deficiencies, perceived deficiencies, which are apparently on their way to being fixed if you believe the Army National Guard and subsequently General Cody.

And that leads me to the question, and I know that the gentleman in the chair can't answer this question, because it is not his decision, but why in the world we haven't passed the proposed supplemental that is languishing in the House is the decision, apparently, of the Democrat leadership to delay it or perhaps not to pass it.

So there is a road to a fix for the equipment readiness issue, which lies, according to General Cody and according to the National Guard representative, General Vaughn, and according to the U.S. Army Reserve representative, General Stultz, that can be fixed with the supplementals, and we have one languishing. And it is beyond me why those who would vote for this resolution, or maybe we should, maybe we shouldn't, why the leadership of that party will not permit us to vote on a supplemental, which is the road to recovery.

So that is just my observation. I was late and didn't get a chance to give an opening statement, so I am venting my feelings, and if you care to comment, you are certainly welcome.

Mr. Korb. Congressman, even when you pass the supplemental with the Guard, you are not going to solve the whole problem, because you need to take a look at the report that Arnold Punaro put out and says, yes, this would be a step in the direction, but it is not because, according to that report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, there is a $48 billion equipment shortfall. The money there will move a little bit toward it. And according to Arnold, 88 percent of all Army National Guard units are not ready. So even this, while it would help some, is not going to solve the problem.

Mr. Saxton. I am delighted that you said it would help some, because it certainly would. As a matter of fact, I am told that in order to fix the entire problem, that is to bring all units up to C1 level, it would cost something in the neighborhood of $1 trillion. Well, we are not going to do that. We never had done it. That condition has never existed.

And so it seems to me that if the old saying holds any water, that if you are getting yourself in trouble by digging a hole, the first thing you ought to do is stop digging and then start to climb out. Well, we stopped digging, and we have started to climb out through the use of supplementals, and yet there is a supplemental which has been proposed, is in a position to be voted on, and the leadership of the House will not permit us to do that.

Mr. Ortiz. One of the reasons, like I stated before I left this hearing, that we are here because we know we have a problem. And going back to the National Guard and the Reserves, we have to be realistic. They serve two masters. They respond to the needs of the state, and they respond to the needs of the Federal Government for deployments whenever they are activated and needed.
The problem that we have now is that some of these National Guard and Reserve people have gone and have been deployed, and you know what, they came back and they did not bring their equipment back. They left it behind, because some of the equipment was being destroyed and was being utilized by the active Army.

So now I am going to ask a question here that I had.

Ms. Flournoy, what is your assessment of the testimony, and I am pretty sure you are familiar with it, given last week by General Magnus and General Cody concerning ground forces readiness, specifically their comments concerning the ground force ability to respond to other contingencies that arise? And you know what I fear is the unknown.

Maybe you can respond to the question that I just asked about the testimony of both generals.

Ms. Flournoy, When I heard and then re-read their testimonies, it was the closest I have ever heard senior leaders in the Marine Corps and the Army come to sounding an alarm. It is not in their culture to sound alarms. I mean, you give them a certain mission, they are going to die trying to do the mission.

But I think when General Cody said, “Our readiness is being consumed as fast as we build it. If unaddressed, the lack of balance poses a significant risk to the all-volunteer force and degrades the Army’s ability to make a timely response to other contingencies.”

They know they are on the hook, not only to supply forces for Iraq and Afghanistan but for any other contingency that might arise and the President might tell them to go to deal with a threat. And they are acutely aware of the fact that there are many possible challenges out there, and we do not have an adequate reserve of ready and available ground forces. And I think that makes them, as force suppliers, deeply uncomfortable and deeply aware of the strategic risk that we are accepting at the moment.

So I think they are very interested in seeing a rebalancing of demand and supply. I think here supporting growth is very, very important to bringing that back into balance. But that is going to take time. In the nearer term, the only way you are going to get closer to that balance is by moderating demand.

Mr. Ortiz. I know we have been gone, so let me just yield to my good friend, Mr. Forbes, for a question that he might have.

Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I have got a number of questions if this is the appropriate time to go ahead and ask some of those.

And I want to begin by stating what we all know up here but make sure that everybody knows it, if there is anybody who is neutral out there, and that is that some of my dearest friends are sitting on this subcommittee, and I have just absolute respect for the chairman and for Neil Abercrombie and Madeleine, who was handling this and who has left now, and, of course, Mr. Saxton and Mr. Jones and Mr. Wilson, who is coming in.

Oh, I am sorry, Madeleine, I didn’t see you sitting back there.

And I also have incredible respect for our witnesses.

But I have stated this before, and I continue to believe it, every time I see you guys, it reminds of the end of the Casablanca movie where we say, “Okay, round up the usual suspects.” We have heard this testimony over and over and over again, you know? And one
of the big concerns I had today was, if we are really serious about talking about readiness, we don't need an interpretation from our witnesses as to what our men and women say; we need them here. Let you say whatever you want and put them behind you and let them answer, and we requested that, but we were denied that ability to have them come in here and answer these readiness questions.

And the concern that I have today is what Mr. Saxton has raised. There is an article in the paper that talks about the fact that over and over again now what we are doing is taking matters that would normally be on the suspension calendar, running them through the Rules Committee and then bringing them up on the floor so we can have a vote to look like we have something to do.

We don't need to have a discussion about having a discussion on readiness. Mr. Saxton said, we need today to pass the supplemental and to get that passed. And my dear friend, the chairman, rightly so, we have passed the supplemental out, but as my other dear friend, Neil Abercrombie said, as a lot of people in this body don't understand the need for readiness, what we really need to be doing, if we could really focus on our readiness concerns, is we need to pass a resolution that says, we want that supplemental coming back without loading it up with all these pork barrel projects and with any other kind of political agendas on it, because that will do more to help our readiness than any discussion we are going to have here today.

Now, Ms. Flournoy, I want to just ask you a question, because I listened to your testimony, read your testimony, listened to Mr. Korb's, read his—Mr. Donnelly, I apologize, I didn't get to hear yours, but I read yours—and, Ms. Flournoy, you talked about 43 percent, I think, of the equipment available to the Guard for their equipment utilization. Is that an accurate statement in your testimony? Am I misinterpreting what you said?

Ms. FLOURNOY. This is from the Commission on the Guard and Reserve, that the Army National Guard currently lacks 43.5 percent of its authorized equipment.

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Can I stop you right there?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes.

Mr. FORBES. Can I ask you this question: Is that an accurate figure today?

Ms. FLOURNOY. It may have changed in recent weeks.

Mr. FORBES. You don't know, do you?

Ms. FLOURNOY. I don't know since the report has come out.

Mr. FORBES. All right. And now let me ask you this: Do you know the date that that number was effective for in that report? I have got a copy of the report here. What date was that date effective for?

Ms. FLOURNOY. I know it was within the last year, but I don't know if it has changed substantially.

Mr. FORBES. Would it have been February of 2007?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Pardon me?

Mr. FORBES. Would it have been February of 2007?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Like I said, I don't have a specific date.

Mr. FORBES. So your testimony today is that the figure that you are testifying to, you got out of a report, a report that you don't know when the effective date was based on——
Ms. Flournoy. Sir, I can tell you that I actually had my testimony reviewed by people for accuracy, not for judgment or opinion but for accuracy, within the Army staff, and they said that is still in the ballpark. There was not a meaningful change.

Mr. Forbes. Ms. Flournoy—

Mr. Ortiz. Why don’t we just go ahead and let her answer your question?

Mr. Forbes. No, please, I want you to.

Ms. Flournoy. No, that was my answer, that there may be some change but not a significant change.

Mr. Forbes. And in all due respect, these are the figures that have been given to us by the Army Chief of Staff in March of 2008 to this committee.

Ms. Flournoy. Okay.

Mr. Forbes. They are enormously different.

Ms. Flournoy. Great. That is a very good news story.

Mr. Forbes. They have figures of 79 percent and 66 percent. Now, the Army chief of staff, I would imagine, would have a greater degree of accuracy, perhaps, than some of the people you had look it over. And my point is not to discredit you, it is to simply say, between that time period and today, we authorized $20 billion in the 2007 budget that is beginning to be implemented in here, and I think you would agree with me, if the Army Chief of Staff is not giving us false information, that 79 percent and 66 percent, the two figures that they gave, is a whole lot different than 43.5 percent and 33.5 percent.

Ms. Flournoy. I have not been given access to that information. I gave you the best information that I had.

Mr. Forbes. And, Ms. Flournoy—

Ms. Flournoy. So I am glad to hear it is a better story. That would make me very happy.

Mr. Forbes. And my point is, if we had had them in here testifying, as we requested, they would have at least been able to give us that accurate picture.

Ms. Flournoy. I think General Cody was here.

Mr. Forbes. The other question I would ask is this, how many members of the Navy do we have currently in ground force supplemental capacities today, as you and I are listening and looking at our overall readiness capacity, do you know?

Ms. Flournoy. Sir, I know that there are a number of not only Navy personnel but also Air Force personnel, but I do not have the exact figure in my head.

Mr. Forbes. Mr. Korb.

Mr. Korb. I do know that they call them ILOs, in lieu of, over there, and the number probably—and it changes, obviously, all of the time. And when we try and get those numbers, we are told they are classified. As I pointed out in my testimony here, when we tried to get information on active duty units, Guard units, they wouldn’t give them to us.

Mr. Forbes. Mr. Korb, first of all, let me just say, I wasn’t with you when you asked, but, again, it comes back to what we had requested. If we had them here testifying, they have to tell us the information or they can tell us it is classified. Just as of yesterday,
they told me it was 14,671 that you don't even know that they have, and that is a huge impact on readiness.

Now, let me ask you this question: If you look at those individuals, what was the largest, most expensive, most powerful platform the Navy had for readiness capability in their arsenal of tricks? What would you say it would be? The largest platform the Navy has.

Mr. Korb. Probably an aircraft carrier.
Mr. Forbes. Aircraft carrier. On September the 11th of 2001, how many did we have that were deployable?
Ms. Flournoy. I believe it was 11.
Mr. Forbes. Eleven deployable?
Mr. Korb? Mr. Korb. Well, when you say fully ready to be deployed?
Mr. Forbes. Absolutely. That is the word, “deployable,” ready to be deployed.

Mr. Korb. Okay. I mean, the Navy—and I remember my own days as a naval flight officer where you would basically be deployed for six months, you would come back for six months to get yourself ready, so I would say two-thirds were fully deployable.

Mr. Forbes. How many would that be?
Ms. Flournoy. With the possibility of surges.
Mr. Korb. At that particular time, I would say, probably eight.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. You would say 8, you said 11. The actual answer was two. Do you know how many we have deployable today? Let me give you the answer, because I don't think if you didn't know what it was on September 11, you probably don't know today. Today, we have three; in 30 days, we could have six; in 90 days, we could have seven. That is a huge readiness benefit that we have, because we don't have to ask permission where we land our planes, we have got those carriers ready. And I would think that would be a discussion that we would want to have and that you would want to know if we were talking about readiness.

Now, the other thing I want to just raise up, and Brian, if you could throw me that first chart, because this is Ms. Flournoy's testimony, and it was good testimony, but she basically made a statement that I think was very accurate, and she said, when you talk about the sky is falling stuff, if we take a step back, because that is what the American people are really looking at, one of the things that she said that she experienced when she looked at our force was that we had the most experienced, the most adaptive, the most professional and the most capable force this country has ever fielded.

And I asked her if that meant more than last year. Last year, the figures that she had on the Guard were from February of last year. “More than last year,” she said, “Yes.” I said, “More than the year before that?” “Yes.” And we went all the way back to 2000.

Now, since that time, I have asked that same question of Secretary Geren. You know what he said? He agreed with you, the most experienced, adaptive, professional and capable force this country has ever fielded, more than in 2000, more than 2001, 2002, 2003, you can do the rest of the math. I asked General Casey, same quote, he agreed; Admiral Fallon, who at that time was commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), he agreed; General
David Petraeus, he agreed; Admiral Eric Olson, he agreed; Admiral Timothy Keating, he agreed.

Mr. Korb, a while ago, said if we got the supplemental, it wouldn’t fix all the problems. We have never fixed all the problems. In fact, in 2000, we had a picture of $56 billion of holes in the yard. Our testimony from all of our men and women in uniform, who know the figures, said that as of next year, it would be $17 billion.

Brian, if you would give me the next chart. This is what Mr. Saxton was just pointing out. Instead of saying we want to educate all the Members of Congress about the need for readiness, instead of having debates on whether we are going to have additional debates, if we pass this supplemental right now, if we focused our energy and our time and said, “Let’s have a resolution that passes that,” this would do more to grow the force, which would deal with the problems you are talking about, because we are talking about 36,000 additional end strength needs that we begin the process of meeting with that supplemental that is tied up today. But we are not talking about that.

We can’t be content to just say we can wash our hands because we passed it. We have got to say, we need to get this money to our troops, because they need it.

And the last one. And that is why Mr. Saxton and I today put in a resolution that, in all due respect, with all of our friendships to everybody, is the resolution we should be debating today, and we should have military folks here to at least have a supplement with accurate facts of our readiness that says this, that Congress should immediately act to pass the supplemental without additional strings attached to it.

That resolution, Mr. Saxton and I are filing today, that is the resolution, I would submit, we need to be talking about if we are really serious about moving forward with readiness.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. KORB. Mr. Chairman, can I make a comment?

Mr. ORTIZ. Sure, go ahead, Mr. Korb.

Mr. KORB. I used to be in charge of readiness in the Reagan administration, and I think you have to be very careful when you use the term, “readiness,” because you go C1, C2, C3, C4. And so when you say ready, are you talking C1 or C2 or C3? And those numbers are classified. So when you ask a question, like to Michele and myself, on this date how many were ready, were you saying, C1, C2, C3, okay? And I think that is important.

Now, let me give you another example from my own experience, okay? When I was a naval flight officer, I had the duty one day, we got a call from the seventh fleet, and they said, “How many of your planes are ready?” So I read the chart, the C1s. My commanding officer almost had me court marshaled. He said, “When the seventh fleet calls, all of our planes are ready.”

In the readiness thing, there is also a commander’s evaluation, so those are not objective, because I used to go over those things. Basically, you have a commander’s evaluation that the commander decides whether he or she is going to put things in there.
So when you talk about this, I think you have to make it very clear exactly what you are talking about when you talk about ready.

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, if I could respond, since Mr. Korb responded with a new question. I never asked you about whether they were ready, I asked if they were deployable. And the second thing is, I would not only agree with your comment about readiness, because readiness is a big picture, and you can’t go in and look at one single category, I agree with that, but the other thing I would suggest to you is we have changed those definitions of readiness, haven’t we, since we moved from a strategic Reserve to an operational Reserve. Would you agree with me on that?

Mr. KORB. For the Guard?

Mr. FORBES. Yes.

Mr. KORB. Again, those numbers are classified, okay, in terms of—now, what you do—

Mr. FORBES. I understand, but going from a strategic Reserve to an operational Reserve—

Mr. KORB. I understand, but what you do is you have criteria. The personnel, do you have the number of personnel, do you have the equipment, and do you have the training, okay? And, basically, when you say deployable, again, it is a misuse of words, because deployable is up to the commanding officer of that unit, and if the commanding officer decides that that unit is deployable, it can deploy. And a commanding officer sometimes—and, again, he or she has to look at that information. So I think we are mixing apples and oranges here, because they have to sign off on it.

I can tell you this: We sent the brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division to Iraq in December of 2006 as part of the surge. There were 43 people in that unit who were assigned that missed the unit training, and they were sent over there, but that unit was certified as ready. If I were the commanding officer of that, I would not have certified it as ready.

Mr. ORTIZ. Let me say something—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, just for point of clarification, so that we stay on track here, prior to September 11, the Navy operated an entirely different deployment cycle.

Mr. Donnelly, you are shaking your head, maybe you would like to comment on it. I don’t want to start, in a sense, arguments about this, but if the argument is going to be that the readiness resolution in front of us is deficient, at least we ought to have our—we ought to be comparing apples to apples is what I am driving at.

Now, what I mean by that, and not so much in response to Mr. Forbes, but to make sure that we are on the same page, apples to apples, you had a different deployment cycle. You had a 2-year cycle and 18-month preparation. Then it has changed now to exactly what Mr. Forbes says it is, which is the three carriers in 30 days, but that wasn’t because the three carriers in 30 days is now what it should have been prior to September 11 and wasn’t, it was an entirely different basis of deployment specifications prior to September 11. I believe that is accurate.

You seem to be knowledgeable, Mr. Donnelly. Am I stating it correctly? I think I am.
Mr. DONNELLY. Mr. Abercrombie, I would agree with you, and as I said in my opening statement, the Army has, likewise, changed its force generation model. So comparing apples to apples through the years is much more difficult than it used to be.

Ultimately, I would say this is an intimately regressive chase that isn’t very helpful, and I would say also that there has always been commanders’ discretion in certifying units to be ready, so we ought to deal with the statistics as they present themselves. That is not an opinion as to whether there should have been DOD witnesses here or not.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I appreciate that. I don’t want to take further time on it. I just want to make sure that we don’t operate across purposes.

Mr. ORTIZ. Let me just say something: You know, if you read the resolution, our main concern is ground forces, Marines and Army. I know that when you talk about the full spectrum, it includes a lot of other things, but we are talking today about ground forces.

And talking about testimony, the most recent testimony that we had was last week, General Cody and General Magnus. This is what General Cody said. He said, “We have got the best soldiers, the best equipment, but we are also unprepared for the full spectrum.” He goes on to say, “to fight and lack the strategic depth that has been our traditional fallback for the uncertainties of this world.”

See, the factor out there is the unknown factor. Now, you hear candidates say that we might be there 30 days and get them out. You hear other candidates say we might be there 100 years. Well, do we know when this war is going to end? Does anybody know? Can anybody tell me when it is going to end? We don’t know. It is the uncertainty factor that is out there.

And all we are trying to do is to get into it from the witnesses today, from members on both sides of the aisle, because we know that we have a problem.

You know, look at the preposition to stop them. And I don’t want to go into a lot of secret briefings that we have had. This is not the place to do that. All I am saying is that we have horrendous problems. I mean, we are having to pay big, big, big-time bonuses for our soldiers who stay there. You know, it is a strain on the families. The recruiters are having problems. They have to reduce some of the criteria that we had before. Young officers are leaving the military, they are getting out. And you remember sometime back that they were getting to the theater without proper training, they were getting the equipment in Kuwait before they went to Iraq.

There are a lot of problems, but the thing is this: We are not here to point fingers at anybody. We want to fix this problem, because we know that we have a serious problem.

Today, Mr. Abercrombie and I are focusing on the problem of the ground troops.

Now, let me yield—I think that my good friend, Mr. Abercrombie——

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman?

Mr. ORTIZ. Sure.
Mr. Wilson. I would like to move unanimous consent to be listed as a co-sponsor of the Forbes-Saxton resolution.

Mr. Ortiz. Hearing no objection, so ordered.

I guess the next gentleman in line is Mr. Abercrombie for questions.

Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you.

I am not quite sure why we are at the stage where we are having an argument about readiness, per se. The question is more, I think, and part of the motivation for the resolution that is in front of us today, is to try to get information out and perspective on it, particularly as a result of this supplemental question.

It is easy to say that one should have a clean supplemental, but, by definition, if it is an emergency supplemental bill, it is going to take whatever comes along. You can’t change the rules of the Congress. And what constitutes something clean, I am not quite sure.

We just passed a resolution over on the floor while we were away that says we can’t do any business with any country that does business with Iran. Iraq does business with Iran, so, presumably, we are not going to do any business with them. So the overall level of—another context might be frivolousness, although something so serious as this, to be taking that kind of an attitude, seems to me, at best, dysfunctional, at worst, it is a mockery of the troops serving in the field.

It leads me back to where I think we should be, which is, can we get across the idea that we have a readiness question that has to be addressed.

So I promised you, Mr. Donnelly, that I would pick on you as soon as I could, as recompense for walking out on you when you were about to talk. I wonder if you could comment—let me go directly to your testimony. If you will forgive me, I had it right here. I lost my page. Yes.

You said, as one of your preferences, “To understand the challenge that our land forces now face just look back to the years of the Cold War period.” And then you cited two insights which you attributed to Secretary Rumsfeld. One is the state of international politics and concluding the early 21st century is a period of strategic pause, and that said, you then went further on, “and the initial post–9/11 operation, most notably the invasion of Afghanistan,” you were talking about special operation forces.

I wonder if you could comment on do you see a connection between readiness, as outlined in the resolution, and the capacity to be able to deal effectively militarily now, setting aside, if you can, the politics, in Afghanistan and what you think that that would entail in order to accomplish readiness, as we understand it by Army standards, which is your C–1, 2, 3, 4?

It is a pretty big order, but it follows—I appreciate the way you put your testimony, because it let us up in a—not a theoretical but a doctrinal basis, if you will, to where we are. Is that a fair summary of what you were saying?

Mr. Donnelly. Yes, sir, I think it is. And I think it is important for us to focus more than we have done on what the actual mission now is in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, too much of our debate about Afghanistan pretends as though that is actually the central front
of the al Qaeda war in terms of tracking down the al Qaeda senior leadership.

In Afghanistan today, there is really actually very little al Qaeda presence, and so it is less a counterterror operation than it is a classic counterinsurgency operation. And so the kinds of forces that are demanded are really kind of at the opposite end of the spectrum of those that were so effective during the initial invasion.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. May I add, parenthetically, while you are at it, you understand why I am asking, because we tend to get focused on Iraq and we are talking about readiness here, as a general proposition for the Army. That is why I value what you had to say.

Mr. DONNELLY. I agree, and, unfortunately, so much of the mission in Afghanistan that is so critical at the moment or in those areas where our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners have the lead, rather than U.S. forces, actually things are going relatively well in the U.S. sector. And as everybody is aware, then deployment of the Marine expeditionary unit to Kandahar is a response to try to cover those areas that aren’t getting adequate attention.

But we shouldn’t mislead ourselves about what the nature of the mission is. It is not really primarily a counterterrorism mission but in broadly similar terms to the mission in Iraq, it is another long duration, at least as I understand it, counterinsurgency mission that is going to tax the general purpose forces, the conventional formations of the U.S. Army. And so, again, to echo something that Michele Flournoy said, even if force levels in Iraq are reduced for whatever reason in the future, my prediction would be that the demand for forces in Afghanistan will remain constant, if not grow. But, again, it is not an al Qaeda mission, it is a counterinsurgency mission.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If I can follow up on that with you then, because that is my concern. I have no problem with the supplemental, but given what we have done, I have a problem of why we are where we are. We shouldn’t have done this in the first place. Just for purposes of the record, I will state, although many of the members of this committee know, I put an amendment one time to actually pay for the war in Iraq, and I was defeated with the idea that, “Well, we will take that up in the supplemental budget.” We have been paying for the war in the supplemental budget. That is why I am opposed to it, and that is why we have got the readiness thing here. I don’t want to get into an argument—I hope I don’t—about what the real resolution should be or not be. Every resolution is as worthy as what it says. The reason this resolution is here is because I am trying to get to the question, the fundamentals behind the question of supplementary budgets having to make up for what we didn’t do. And everybody has got a stain on them with that respect. Every administration and every Congress has done it, no matter who has been in charge.

What we are trying to do is act in a responsible way here to deal with the fundamental readiness questions that transcend where we are at the moment that we have to make up for it. I will be happy to vote for a supplemental budget that takes care—if we want to talk about a clean resolution, then I don’t want anything in it about paying for the war that we should be paying for anyway, but...
if you put in a resolution that deals with the ongoing readiness questions that helps us with reset and so on, I will do it. I will sign on in a second.

But I am not going to keep voting for supplemental budgets or supplemental resolutions, or however the hell we characterize them, that keep on paying for the same mistakes and keep on rewarding people for doing the same thing over and over again.

Now, in that context, you say, my greatest concern is that in an attempt to relieve the stresses and strains on the Army and Marine Corps, we will attempt to fit the war to the size of the force rather than sizing the force to win the war.

Now, in that context then, and in the context of the answer that you just gave, could you comment a little bit further on what you think it would take to enable us to continue in Afghanistan at this present time without getting lost in the weeds of surge policy or whatever the hell else we are talking about in Iraq?

Mr. DONNELL. I will do my best. And based on an exercise that we ran fairly recently at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and based on my understanding of what General McNeill’s requirement is, and based further on the ways in which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command needs to be supplemented in Afghanistan, I think the minimum requirement for Afghanistan is an additional three American brigade combat teams or equivalents, be they Marine RCT, regimental combat units, or Army brigades.

So I think in order to not only sustain the progress in the east sector that we have responsibility for, but to make more rapid progress in Helmond and Kandahar in the south sector, particularly with a view toward securing the elections that are supposed to take place in 2009 and 2010, which are crucial for progress in Afghanistan, that is, I think, a generally agreed estimate of what the minimum requirement is.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. I will conclude because I am afraid we got trapped in another vote. I take your points on the question of fundamental integrity of the military as a whole threatening the broad national security of the United States. I did not think that the resolution had that implication. I am sorry that you felt you had to use the word, “egregious,” with it. I assure you that that certainly is not the intent of Mr. Ortiz or myself to do anything which is egregious in this context. It is too a serious a matter. But if that is an interpretation that could reasonably be drawn, we will take another look at it and try to remove that, I can assure you.

Mr. DONNELL. As a former staffer, I would appreciate your willingness to consider diverse judgment. It was not an assessment of the intent of the resolution, but I think it is an inaccurate description of the state of the force.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Then we will take that into account, because the kind of recommendations that you are making right there is what we are trying to get at. That is the idea behind the resolution.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ. We have another couple of votes, but before we do, let me yield to Mr. Saxton for—

VOICE. Are we coming back, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Ortiz. Well, I was going to ask the witnesses. I know that we have really belabored you this afternoon, and I don’t know how much time you have.

Mr. Abercrombie. I would like to come back if you folks could stay.

Mr. Ortiz. Yes. If you are going to be here, we will take about 10 minutes.

Mr. Saxton. Well, there is actually a motion to recommit pending, I believe, so we will be out for a vote and then a 10-minute debate and then another vote. That is the way I understand it, anyway. So it is going to be more like half hour, 45 minutes.

Mr. Ortiz. It will take another 30 minutes.

Mr. Abercrombie. That long?

Mr. Ortiz. Yes, because he says we have a motion to recommit, 10 minutes of debate and then passage. Is that what it is?

Mr. Abercrombie. Well, no. We wouldn’t be voting on—the debate would have already occurred. What are we voting on?

Mr. Saxton. So we are out of here.

Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make a suggestion. I have studied your resolution in detail, and, frankly, I agree with a lot of the provisions that are in it. And readiness is an issue; however, there is a path to recovery, as pointed out by General Vaughn and General Stultz and General Cody and General Magnus, all four. And Mr. Forbes and I have introduced a resolution which is similar in nature except that the resolve provision provides for a path forward that is the path that is recommended by the military leaders that this committee has invited here for advice.

And so my suggestion is that we take your resolution and try to identify those areas where we can agree in the whereas provisions and then try to rework a resolve provision that would provide for encouragement for the House to go ahead and pass the supplemental, which most people who have studied this issue believe is a path forward to solve the problem that we both agree needs to be solved.

So that is just a suggestion.

Mr. Ortiz. Well, just give us time, because we haven’t had a chance on this side to look at your resolution.

Mr. Saxton. Yes. Well, our resolution is not written in stone. The provisions move in a direction that I think is positive, and I think you are correct in pointing out the problems that you see as existing with regard to readiness.

So why don’t we get together, put the provisions that we can all agree on together in a single resolution and see if we can’t get it passed?

Mr. Ortiz. Well, let’s give your copy, whatever you have, to the staff, and now I know we are running out of time before we get to the vote. But there are a lot of things that we need to talk about readiness. All the focus has been on equipment, manpower going to Iraq and Afghanistan, and I feel that sometimes I fear—that is personally—that we are forgetting that the focus should be on how to defend the homeland. And I don’t think we are putting enough focus there.

But I am going to recess this hearing now.

Voice. Are we going to have a panel?
Mr. Ortiz. I don’t know about the witnesses. How much time do you have?

Mr. Donnelly. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure, absolutely.

Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Chairman, I will tell you, why don’t we—I am sure the witnesses will be available to us individually. I think it is going to be at least half an hour before we are able to get back, given what is—I, for one, think that we have used their time long enough, and I am sure any of you would be available to us individually for consulting, would you not?

Mr. Ortiz. We are getting more information. It might take 45 minutes or longer to get back.

But thank you so much. I think that this has been an eye opener for all of us. And we need to learn from one another, because we want to do what is best for our country, for our troops, our families, and we thank you for joining us today.

And this hearing stands adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

April 16, 2008
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

April 16, 2008
Opening Statement of
Hon. Solomon P. Ortiz
Chairman of Readiness Subcommittee
Hearing on
House Resolution 834, Ground
Force Readiness Shortfalls
April 16, 2008
Ortiz opening statement, April 16, 2008

"The purpose of H Res 834 and of this hearing today is on improving military readiness—about how we, as members of Congress, can restore readiness to ensure a well-trained, well-equipped ground force for a safer homeland. Today we seek solutions—a way forward.

"As we know, the readiness of the ground forces is measured in three categories: equipment, personnel and training. Today, the Army, Marine Corps, National Guard and Reserves are reporting lower levels of readiness in all three categories than they were in 2001.

"This is a fact, no matter how you measure it. Using Army and Marine Corps current metrics to measure readiness against all requirements, there are significant shortfalls. In previous hearings we have learned that our troops are worn out, and their families are stressed from repeated deployments. Equipment has been consumed by combat, and pre-positioned stocks are depleted.

"Equipment shortfalls and time constraints limit the amount and type of training our troops receive as they prepare to protect this country. While we have the world's best counter-insurgency trained ground force, we do not have a force that is prepared for many of the tasks they could need to support other contingencies.

"This reduced readiness posture has left the United States in a risky strategic position. At a hearing last week with Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Richard Cody and Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Robert Magnus, we heard that neither was confident of their respective service's ability to deploy to meet other contingency requirements should they arise. This leaves America more vulnerable than we want to be, and more importantly, than we should be.

"What we do know is concerning on many levels. But it is the unknown that concerns me the most."

"How would our ground forces respond if called upon today for another contingency? Would they be trained?

Would they have the equipment they need?

How long would it take them to respond?

And could we support them once they are engaged?

"And are they prepared for contingencies other than Iraq and Afghanistan?

"I commend every one of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines serving today. The sacrifices they make are honorable.
"But as General Cody said, 'The awards our soldiers have earned reflect their accomplishments and bravery on the battlefield. But their valor is not enough to restore balance and readiness to our Army.'

"He is right; that is our job.

"I ask my colleagues to join me in co-sponsoring House Resolution 834 to recognize readiness shortfalls, acknowledge strategic risk, and most importantly, make a commitment to restoring the health of the ground forces. I look forward to our witnesses' testimony today and hearing their recommendations on restoring strength to the ground forces."
Air and Land Forces Subcommittee Chairman Neil Abercrombie
Joint Readiness and Air & Land Forces Subcommittees Hearing on
H.Res. 834: Ground Force Readiness

April 16, 2008

"The Readiness and Air and Land Forces Subcommittees meet today to receive testimony on H.Res. 834, a resolution regarding the significant readiness decline of the ground forces and the implications for national security.

"The panel includes Michele Flournoy, President of the Center for a New American Security; Mr. Lawrence Korb, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress; and Mr. Thomas Donnelly, Resident Fellow, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute.

"The Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey, has described the Army as 'out of balance.' Balance being defined as having a combat ready force able to meet current and future requirements across a full spectrum of operations.

"The Army and the Marine Corps determine their own standards for whether or not a unit is combat ready, and their standards are objective measures of equipment and personnel available and the amount of training satisfactorily completed.

"This committee regularly receives updates on the readiness levels of the Army and Marine Corps, measured against these standards.

"Compared to these objective standards, the situation today should alarm members of this committee: nearly all non-deployed active-duty units do not meet Army or Marine Corps combat readiness standards, and the readiness of non-deployed Army National Guard and Army Reserve is even worse.

"That is the motivation behind the findings in the resolution and the resolved clause.

"The first step in fixing this readiness crisis is recognizing that it exists.

"While it is reasonable to disagree about the degree of risk to the nation caused by the current readiness state of the Army and Marine Corps, the fact that there is a crisis – based on the Army and Marines own standards – should be beyond question based on the regular briefings this committee receives.

"Congress must inject oversight to restore the balance of the ground services.

"Senior Army leaders as well as the Secretary of Defense recognize the Army's inability to execute a full range of combat missions.

"Marines are being drawn away from their traditional competencies, such as amphibious operations, and becoming another heavy infantry land-based asset.

"While the Army has announced an intention to reduce its 15-month deployments to 12-months, this does not increase the dwell (or at-home) time in between soldiers or the overall endstrength of the forces. This means our troops will simply deploy more frequently.
The Marine Corps is deploying on a one for one basis – seven months in combat followed by seven months at home, leaving little time for training on missions other than those being performed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Army currently has 22 active and reserve brigades deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan and more than 186,000 troops on the ground.

20 to 30 percent of Marine Corps ground equipment and 20 percent of its tactical aviation are currently deployed in theater. Usage rates are as high as seven times greater than peacetime rates.

"General Casey, Army Chief of Staff, has said 'we are consuming readiness as fast as we can build it.'"

"Both services are consuming their pre-positioned stocks in order to outfit deployed units with enough equipment. The Army plans to replenish these stocks are long-term and accepts a certain amount of risk regarding future international response capability.

"Readiness of the Army National Guard is also suffering. While they have traditionally been equipped and manned at a lower level than the active force, they have become an operational reserve that must be capable of conducting operations at the same level and skill as the active duty force.

"The Administration is accepting a serious risk by limiting the Guard's ability to respond to a national emergency at home or abroad due to a lack of available personnel and equipment.

"Some have argued that there is not a readiness crisis because our troops are now combat veterans, as if experience alone can make up for a lack of equipment or time to train as a unit.

"Without the right type and amounts of equipment, even the most dedicated and experienced soldier cannot train for combat, or help when there is a domestic emergency.

"Pointing out that troops don't have what they need is not an attack on the troops' motivation, but instead is a realistic assessment of their level of readiness.

"Another issue raised in response to readiness concerns is a mythical $56 billion dollar 'hole' in the Army's budget back in 2001, as if that fact alone is responsible for today's readiness crisis.

"However, if such a 'hole' ever existed, this committee never heard that from the Army Chief of Staff at the time, General Shinseki. If it had, Chairman Hunter and Congressman Weldon would have acted quickly to fix the problem.

"More important, the key issue is not casting blame on back in 2001, but instead to focus on what the readiness status of the Army and Marine Corps is today and what we do about it now, not who gets the blame.

"Addressing that issue is the purpose of House Resolution 834 and this hearing."
Opening Statement of
Hon. J. Randy Forbes
Readiness Subcommittee
Hearing on
House Resolution 834_Ground
Force Readiness Shortfalls
April 16, 2008
"Forbes Opening Statement for Joint Hearing on Readiness Legislation

"Thank you Mr. Chairman. This hearing on House Resolution 834 follows a series of hearings this committee has recently held focusing on the readiness of our forces and our strategic posture. There is no doubt that we face an enormous challenge as we work to rebuild, transform and grow our armed forces while they are actively engaged in combat. However, I am uncertain as to how our soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen will benefit from either this hearing or the proposed resolution.

"I do believe however, that this committee and this Congress can take action for the benefit of our troops and readiness by passing the Fiscal Year 2008 supplemental. This funding will benefit our troops by growing the force and initiating the process of resetting our five combat brigades returning from Iraq. The Department has gone on the record stating that they can continue to operate if they have the supplement by the end of May. However, continuing to operate and having the funds needed to operate and improve readiness are different targets.

"While testifying before the full House Armed Services Committee on February 6, 2008, Secretary Gates stressed that funding in the 2008 supplemental request was directly linked to the readiness of our military force. General Magnus and General Cody delivered the same message last week. During the hearing, General Cody stated:

"This year we didn't get all the money for reset, there's still $7.6 billion for the Army sitting out there, and time is not on our side. We now have the most brigades deployed that we've ever had consuming our equipment, our depots are running at 26 million direct-labor hours, and we need that $7.6 billion like in October of last year to start buying long-lead items because we've got the workforce energized and then, as these as these five brigades come out, be able to rapidly reset so we can start getting in to the time factor of building a strategic reserve. And so when I talk about timely and fully funding, that is critical to get back to strategic readiness.'

"General Magnus echoed his remarks when he said:

"Until we receive those [supplemental] funds, the Navy and [Marines] cannot put under contract for this nation's industry to build the aircraft that we need, the ground combat vehicles and equipment that we need, in addition to the personnel and operations and maintenance expenses that are needed. Our systems command is ready to contract with American industry now, and these are all lead-time away from delivering some of these systems.'

"In addition to the funds for equipment reset, the supplemental also includes $5.4 billion to Grow the Force—$4.1 billion of that is for Army efforts and $1.3 billion for the Marine Corps. In layman's term, this equates to more people. There is no question our men and women have made tremendous sacrifices in defending the nation since 2001. The resolution before us details extended combat tours, limited time at home to train, multiple deployments, and personnel shortfalls."
“All of these challenges are real and they can be mitigated will reduced with more people. We must take responsibility then, for the fact that Army and Marine Corps efforts to increase combat forces and increase dwell-time are directly tied to the funds in the 2008 supplemental and the failure of the Congress to act on it for more than a year.

“On that note, I met just last week with Major General Thiessen, the Assistant Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources for the Marine Corps. He commented that readiness is the balance of people, equipment and time—people with the right skills, rank, equipment, and training. We must realize we cannot snap our fingers and produce a military that is fully ready—regardless of the funds provided. It takes time measured in months—not weeks—to recruit, train and ready soldiers and Marines. It also takes time, often 18-months or more, to field the equipment our soldiers and Marines need to accomplish their missions. Every day that passes without the readiness funding included in the 2008 supplemental is one more day that we delay gains in strategic readiness.

To be clear, I do not approach today’s hearing seeking to minimize the fact that our Army is out of balance, or that the armed services have presented large unfunded requirements to the Congress this year. It is time we take responsibility for our readiness shortfalls—readiness shortfalls that are grounded in decades of an inadequate defense top line—and fund the needs of our troops. For all of these reasons, I testified before the House Budget Committee that we ought to increase the top-line for defense spending. As you well know, the budget resolution passed in the House included no such increase. Unless we take action on this matter of funding, then I believe it is premature to consider the resolution before us today.
Statement of
Hon. Jim Saxton

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee

Hearing on

House Resolution 834_Ground

Force Readiness Shortfalls

April 16, 2008
Saxton Statement for Joint Hearing on Readiness Legislation

“As in the past and I am sure will continue long into the future, nothing is more important to what we do here on the Armed Services Committee than taking care of our brave men and women who serve in the military.

“And today, we are having a joint hearing with the Readiness and Air Land subcommittees. From an Air Land perspective, Chairman Abercrombie and I have worked very closely looking at the equipment aspect of readiness. In fact we have recently had two equipment-related hearings with the Army reserve component and the Army. What I learned from these hearings is how much progress has been made from an equipment perspective. For example, in 2001, the Army National Guard had a requirement for 4,722 medium tactical vehicles. They had 290 on-hand at that time. Today that requirement has grown to 22,266 and they have over 9,200 on-hand. I realize this is just one example and we still have a ways to go.

“I am often reminded by brave American warfighters whom I have been honored to spend time with that battles are won and lost down in the mud by warriors who are armed with the right equipment and are well trained. This is the core of America’s military success story.

“The resolution we are discussing today concludes that ‘Congress should restore and maintain the ground forces at the highest levels of readiness in the interest of national security and to ensure the integrity of the entire military force.’ I do not know what it would cost to equip and maintain every unit, both active and reserve, at a ‘C-1’, fully ready status. I don’t know that anyone has ever done those calculations, but I expect that it would be well over trillion dollars annually. Maybe one of our witnesses will be able to tell us just what that might cost.

“That aside, I believe that if Congress is really serious about readiness and properly equipping our military, the prudent path forward is to immediately pass the pending 2008 supplemental and work aggressively to increase the defense top line. Today, we are learning hard lessons from decades of inadequate defense funding. It will take full and timely supplemental funding, as well as a commitment to raise the defense top line to truly restore readiness and provide the strategic depth we need in this global environment.”
April 16, 2008
House Armed Services Subcommittees on Readiness, Air and Land Forces

Chairman Ortiz, Chairman Abercrombie, Ranking Member Forbes, Ranking Member Saxton, distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you very much for asking me to speak to you today about the strains on U.S. ground forces and what the Congress can do to reduce those strains and strengthen our armed forces.

As you know, the high tempo of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has taken a substantial toll on the Army, the Marine Corps and the National Guard and Reserves. Personnel, training, and equipment in these components have been under sustained stress for several years due to multiple deployments overseas with minimal time at home in between. Readiness has kept pace with current operations, but just barely. Now, Army leaders are warning that the demand for forces in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds what the Army can sustainably supply.

In addition, today the United States lacks an adequate strategic reserve of ground forces ready and available to respond to possible future contingencies, increasing the level of strategic risk to the nation. At a time when the United States faces an unusually daunting set of national security challenges—from a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, instability in Pakistan, and a turbulent Iran bent on acquiring nuclear weapons, to a rising China, a nuclear-armed North Korea and a host of weak and failing states beset by a revitalized global network of violent extremists—we must give high priority to restoring the readiness of the U.S. military for the full spectrum of possible missions. As a global power with global interests, the United States needs its armed forces to be ready to respond whenever and wherever our vital national interests are threatened.

In addition to these immediate impacts, our ground forces are likely to experience impacts of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for some years to come. The sustained high tempo of operations in these two conflicts has affected a number of factors that are critical to the long-term health and capability of the American military, from the recruitment and retention of high quality personnel for the All Volunteer Force, to the reset and modernization of equipment essential to ensuring the force has the mix of capabilities it needs for the future.

It is, therefore, critical to consider the difficult strategic choices we face in Iraq in this larger

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1. General Richard A. Cody, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, April 1, 2008.
context. Over the coming months and years, we must successfully regain and then maintain a better balance between readiness for current operations and readiness for possible future contingencies -- not only to relieve the strains on the force, but also to free up resources for Afghanistan and to buy the United States critical insurance against emerging threats to our national security.

Multiple Deployments, Limited Dwell Time

Multiple, back-to-back deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, with shorter “dwell” times at home and longer times away, mean that Army and Marine Corps personnel have been spending more time deployed than either they or their respective services planned. The deployment of Army forces on 15 month tours with only 12 months at home in between has been particularly hard on soldiers and their families. That soldiers are not only deploying for longer tours, but doing so repeatedly, has taken a significant toll. Studies show that multiple tours in Iraq increase a soldier’s likelihood of developing post-traumatic stress disorder, and indeed, cases of PTSD have risen dramatically. The rates of suicide, alcohol abuse, divorce, desertion, and AWOLs among Army personnel are all increasing.

According to Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the nation cannot sustain today’s operational tempos at current force levels. The President’s recent announcement that Army units deploying after August 1 will return to 12 month tours is an important step in the right direction. Getting active duty units back to a more sustainable one-to-two ratio in the mid to long-term will require either a substantial increase in troop supply, a decrease in troop demand, or some combination of both. Growing the size of the Army and the Marine Corps will help to reduce the strain, but it will take time to recruit, train and field the additional personnel.


2 Department of the Army


4 At the same time, however, some senior military leaders are also concerned about the “nobody home” phenomenon that can occur during our own political transitions, from election day in early November to inauguration day in late January, and even later on senior administration appointees await confirmation. This concern may cause them to err on the side of recommending that President Bush keep more forces in Iraq after the pause to maintain stability until a new President and his or her team are in place.
Compressed and Narrowed Training

To remain fully ready, the U.S. military must prepare not only for current operations but also for a broad range of future contingencies, from sustained, small-unit irregular warfare missions to military training and advising missions, to high-end warfare against regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction and other asymmetric means. Yet compressed training time between deployments means that many of our enlisted personnel and officers have the time to train only for the missions immediately before them—primarily counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan—and not for the full spectrum of missions that may be over the horizon. These just-in-time training conditions have created a degree of strategic risk.

With a 12-month dwell time that is compounded by personnel turnover, institutional education requirements, and equipment either returning from or deploying to theater, Army units find themselves racing to get certified for their next deployment. While home-station training and exercises at the major training centers are evolving, the ability of units to train for the full spectrum of operations has been severely limited by time. This same compressed timeline has contributed to the overall stresses on the force.

Equipment Shortages, Wear and Tear

Near-continuous equipment use in theater has meant that aircraft, vehicles, and even communications gear have stayed in the fight continuously instead of returning home with their units. For example, 26% of the Marine Corps' equipment is engaged overseas and most does not rotate out of theater with units. Roughly 43% of the National Guard's equipment remains overseas or has worn out. Given the high tempo of operations and harsh operating environments, equipment has been worn out, lost in battle, or damaged almost more quickly than the services can repair or replace it. And near continuous use without depot-level

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See, for example, General James T. Conway, Commandant, United States Marine Corps, Statement on Marine Corps Posture before the House Armed Services Committee, March 1, 2007.


Statement of General James T. Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Posture of the United States Marine Corps, February 28, 2008

Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, "Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force: Final Report to the Congress and the Secretary of Defense," January 31, 2008. pg. 84.
maintenance has substantially decreased the projected lifespan of this equipment and substantially increased expected replacement costs.

The resulting equipment scarcity has lead to the widespread practice of cross-leveling in both the Army and the Marine Corps: taking equipment (and personnel) from returning units to fill out those about to deploy. Both services have also drawn increasingly from pre-positioned stocks around the world. So far, these measures have met readiness needs in theater, but they have also decreased the readiness of non-deployed units and impeded their ability to train on individual and collective tasks. Even those deployed are at increasing risk as the equipment they have becomes unusable: Army equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan is wearing out at up to nine times the normal rate.13

Meanwhile, the Army has told the Government Accountability Office that it will need between $12 and $13 billion per year to replace lost, damaged and worn equipment for the duration of the war in Iraq and at least two years beyond.11 The Marine Corps estimates it will need at least $15.6 billion for repair.12 Bringing the National Guard’s equipment stock up to even 75% of authorized levels will take $22 billion over the next five years.13 In the current budgetary environment, the military services are struggling to balance resources between reconstituting current stocks and modernizing for the future.

The Reserve Component: Unique Challenges

The Reserves comprise 37% of the Total Force and their battle rhythm has accelerated enormously since operations in Afghanistan began in 2001. Each of the National Guard’s 34 combat brigades has been deployed to Operations Enduring Freedom or Iraqi Freedom, and 600,000 selected reservists have been activated.14

Cross-leveling is especially acute for reserve units, which do not possess equipment at authorized levels. The Army National Guard lacks 43.5% of its authorized equipment, while the Army Reserve does not have 33.5% of its authorized levels. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves found that spending on the Reserve Component "has not kept pace with the large increases in operational commitments," making it unlikely that it will be able to eliminate its equipment shortfalls any time soon. Additionally, a dramatic shortage of personnel—including 10,000 company-grade officers—has forced the Reserve Component to borrow people from other units along with equipment.

While the Reserve Component is intended for use in overseas operations and homeland defense, it is not fully manned, trained, or equipped to perform these missions. The gap in reserve readiness creates a significant and under-appreciated vulnerability in both domestic disaster response and readiness for operations abroad.

Recruitment and Retention

At the same time that the force is under such strain, military recruiters are facing a shrinking pool of eligible applicants. While all the services have met or exceeded their active duty recruiting targets in recent years, they are doing so in an increasingly challenging recruiting environment. Attracting the declining number of young Americans (only 3 in 10) who meet the educational, medical and moral standards for military service has compelled the services, and particularly the Army, to take some extraordinary measures.

Of all the services, the Army has faced the greatest recruiting challenges. Since missing its 2005 recruiting target by a margin of 8%, the Army has taken a number of steps to bolster its accessions and meet its annual targets. These steps have included: raising the maximum age for enlistment from 35 to 42, offering a shorter-than-usual 15-month enlistment option, giving a $2,500 bonus to personnel who transfer into the Army from another service, and providing a new accession bonus to those who enter Officer Candidate School. Most notably, the Army has accepted more recruits without a high school diploma (only 82% had a diploma in FY2008 to date vice the goal of 90%) and has increased the number of waivers granted for

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19 Ibid, pg. 74
18 Army Recruiting Command Brief.
16 Ibid
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enlistment. In 2007, for example, some 20% of new recruits required a waiver: 57% for conduct, 36% for medical reasons, and 7% for drug or alcohol use. An Army study assessing the quality and performance of waiver soldiers compared to their overall cohort found that while the waiver population had slightly higher loss rates in six of nine adverse loss categories, they also had slightly higher valorous award and promotion rates in some communities. This mixed record highlights the importance of continuing to monitor the performance of waiver soldiers over time.

The Army is also facing some new retention challenges as it sustains an unusually high operational tempo while simultaneously converting to modularity and growing its force. Remarkably, loss rates for company grade officers (second lieutenant, first lieutenant, and captain) have remained fairly stable in recent years, despite the demands of multiple tours in quick succession. Nevertheless, there is cause for concern. There is ample anecdotal evidence to suggest that the Army may have a difficult time retaining captains coming out of multiple combat tours in OIF and OEF. Given the criticality of retaining the experienced field grade officers, the Army has formed a task force to address this issue.

Retention challenges are also increasing with growth. The number of officers the Army needs has grown by 8,000 between 2002 and 2006, with 58% of this growth in the ranks of captain and major. A particular gap for the Army is at the level of majors, where the services estimates approximately 17% of spots are empty. As the Army expands, it will need to retain a higher percentage of its experienced officers to lead the force. To decrease the historical loss rate of company grade officers, the Army is offering unprecedented incentives to those captains who agree to extend for three years, including choice of one’s post or branch or functional area, the opportunity to transfer or change jobs, assignment at their post of choice, professional military or language training, fully funded graduate education, or receipt of up to $35,000 critical skills retention bonus.

\[1\] The total number of waivers granted by the Army rose from 11/5% in 2004 to 16.9% in 2006, Congressional Budget Office, “The All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance,” July 2007.

\[2\] Department of the Army. Of the more than 10,000 conduct waivers granted, 68% percent were for minor misdemeanors, 18% were for serious misdemeanors, and 14% were for felonies.

\[3\] Department of the Army, G1 Cohort FY03-FY06 study, 2007.


\[5\] “U.S. Army Officer Retention Fact Sheet,” Army G1, May 25, 2007.


\[7\] Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee on Personnel Overview, testimony of the Honorable David S.C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, February 27, 2008.
Conclusion

In sum, the readiness of U.S. ground forces is just barely keeping pace with current operations. As Army Chief of Staff George Casey has said, “We are consumed with meeting the demands of the current fight and are unable to provide ready forces as rapidly as necessary for other potential contingencies.” Indeed, the United States lacks a sizeable ready reserve of ground forces to respond to future crises. In addition, the struggle to recruit and keep personnel combined with the need to repair and modernize equipment means that building and regaining readiness is becoming increasingly costly.

As a nation, we must find a way to better balance operational and strategic risks such that we enable our deployed forces to accomplish their assigned missions while also ensuring our military is fully prepared for future contingencies. The following recommendations would bring us closer to this objective:

Continue to increase the supply of ground forces: Grow the Army, Marine Corps and Special Operations Forces to planned levels to achieve a minimum 1:2 deployment-to-dwell time ratio, but ensure the pace of expansion does not outstrip our ability to recruit and retain the highest quality personnel. Quality should drive the pace of expansion, not the other way around. This will require careful tracking of how new recruits perform in their first years of service. If it appears that taking in less qualified recruits is diminishing performance in key areas, the pace of expansion should be slowed to keep quality standards high.

Draw down U.S. forces in Iraq: As conditions permit, continue to reduce the level of U.S. ground forces in Iraq to increase dwell time between deployments, reduce strain on personnel and their families, allow more full-spectrum training, and make additional forces available for Afghanistan. The next President will have to balance the competing strategic imperatives of safeguarding U.S. interests with regard to Iraq and the broader Middle East and regaining a degree of

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26 General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army, before the House Armed Services Committee, September 2007.
strategic flexibility by reducing the over-commitment of the nation’s ground forces.\textsuperscript{37}

*Reestablish a ready reserve of ground forces*: Over time, seek to build up a reserve of ready ground forces – several Brigade Combat Teams and Marine Expeditionary Units – that are available for rapid response to other contingencies. Ensuring that the United States has not only air and naval forces but also ground forces that are ready to deal with crisis situations is critical to reducing our current level of strategic risk.

*Fully fund “reset” and force expansion*: The next President and Congress should fully fund the costs associated with resetting equipment lost or damaged in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as those associated with growing the force. As supplemental war funding decreases and pressures on the defense budget increase, it is imperative that we continue to fund the recovery and expansion of the Army, Marine Corps and Special Operations Forces.

*Rebalance the force*: As we grow the force, we must also rebalance its mix of capabilities for the future. Thus far, the services have converted more than 100,000 billets from less-stressed career fields to more in-demand specialties, and plan to rebalance nearly 100,000 more over the next four years.\textsuperscript{39} In the Army, this may mean allocating more of the planned growth to high-demand/low-density assets like engineers, military police and civil affairs. In the case of the Air Force, it may mean investing more in unmanned systems like UAVs and UCAVs and critical enablers like tankers, airlift and C4ISR assets. Rebalancing should also include striving to increase the percentage of each service, particularly the Army, that is deployable in order to increase the size of the operational force relative to the institutional force.

Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss these vital issues with you today.


\textsuperscript{39} Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee on Personnel Overview, testimony of the Honorable David S.C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, February 27, 2008
Michèle Flournoy was appointed President of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) in January 2007. Prior to co-founding CNAS, she was a Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where she worked on a broad range of defense policy and international security issues. Previously, she was a distinguished research professor at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU), where she founded and led the university's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) working group, which was chartered by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop intellectual capital in preparation for the Department of Defense's 2001 QDR. Prior to joining NDU, she was dual-hatted as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy. In that capacity, she oversaw three policy offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense: Strategy, Requirements, Plans, and Counterproliferation; and Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasian Affairs. Ms. Flournoy was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service in 1998, the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service in 1998, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Distinguished Civilian Service Award in 2000. She is a member of the Aspen Strategy Group, the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute of Strategic Studies, and the Executive Board of Women in International Security. She is a former member of the Defense Policy Board and the Defense Science Board Task Force on Transformation. In addition to several edited volumes and reports, she has authored dozens of articles on international security issues. Ms. Flournoy holds a B.A. in social studies from Harvard University and an M.Litt. in international relations from Balliol College, Oxford University, where she was a Newton-Tatum scholar.
DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: Michelle A. Floorrey

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

✓ Individual

___ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:

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**Federal Contract Information:** If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

**Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:**

- Current fiscal year (2007):
- Fiscal year 2006:
- Fiscal year 2005:

**Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:**

- Current fiscal year (2007):
- Fiscal year 2006:
- Fiscal year 2005:

**List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):**

- Current fiscal year (2007):
- Fiscal year 2006:
- Fiscal year 2005:

**Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:**

- Current fiscal year (2007):
- Fiscal year 2006:
- Fiscal year 2005:
Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007):
Fiscal year 2006:
Fiscal year 2005:

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2007):
Fiscal year 2006:
Fiscal year 2005:

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007):
Fiscal year 2006:
Fiscal year 2005:

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2007):
Fiscal year 2006:
Fiscal year 2005:
Mr. Lawrence J. Korb  
Center for American Progress  

Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb  
House Committee on Armed Services, April 16, 2008  

Chairman Ortiz, Chairman Abercrombie, Ranking Member Forbes, Ranking Member Saxton, and members of the Subcommittees on Readiness and Air and Land Forces of the House Armed Services Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the current state of the nation’s ground forces. I cannot think of a more critical issue facing the nation at this time.

After more than five years of combat in Iraq and well over six in Afghanistan, America’s ground forces are stretched to their breaking point. Over this time the Army has become severely overstretched and its overall readiness has significantly declined. The Marine Corps is suffering from many of the same strains as the Army and the situation for the Army National Guard is even worse. The deployment of more than 30,000 troops to Iraq in the president’s latest escalation and the dispatch of another 3,200 Marines to Afghanistan have placed an unsustainable level of stress on U.S. ground forces and put their readiness to fight in other conflicts effectively in doubt.

Army and Marine commanders have only been able to provide these additional troops by putting additional stress and strain on those in uniform and by cutting corners on training and equipment. The unprecedented decision by the administration last April—that tours for Army brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan would be extended from 12 months to 15 months—is something that was not even done in Vietnam when we had over 500,000 troops on the ground, or in Korea where we had over 300,000. This only further demonstrates the dire situation that the Army is facing.

Senior military officers have increasingly been warning Congress and the American people about the burden placed on our men and women in uniform. In September of 2007, merely halfway into the administration’s latest escalation, Army Chief of Staff General George Casey made the Army’s situation clear in no uncertain terms: “our Army is out of balance...The current demand for our forces exceeds the sustainable supply. We are consumed with meeting the demands of the current fight and are unable to provide ready forces as rapidly as necessary for other potential contingencies.” This is a polite way of saying that our Army is broken.

Six months after Casey testified and a full 15 months after the administration’s escalation began, General Richard Cody, the outgoing Army Vice Chief of Staff, echoed Casey’s bleak outlook: “I’ve never seen our lack of strategic depth be where it is today. Our readiness is being consumed as fast as we can build it.” Moreover, the Army no longer has any fully ready combat brigades on standby should a crisis occur.
The Bush administration’s open-ended and unconditional military commitment in Iraq coupled with the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan means that there is no end in sight for relieving the stress on our ground forces. Because our readiness is being consumed in Iraq faster than we can build it, the ability of U.S. ground forces to recover is dependent upon the willingness of Iraqi Security Forces to take over the mission of securing their own nation. Prime Minister Maliki’s ill-prepared raid on rival Shi’a gangs in Basra, which had to be aborted due to mass desertions within Maliki’s own ranks among other reasons, demonstrates that these forces still do not have the motivation to fight and die for their nation nor will they have it in the foreseeable future. As a result, the overall security of the United States is in the hands of the Iraqis. This is a position a superpower like the United States should never be in.

In the following four sections I will discuss the current structure of the All-Volunteer Force, the misuse of the all-volunteer military in Iraq, personnel challenges confronting the ground forces, and in the final section I will make some recommendations for rebuilding and expanding the ground forces.

I. The All-Volunteer Force (AVF)

The all-volunteer force, particularly the Army component, as General John Abizaid noted in fall of 2006, was not “built to sustain a long war.” The architects of the U.S. All-Volunteer Army intended it to rest on four pillars:

1. A small active duty force made up of well-equipped and highly trained active duty soldiers.
2. A large ready reserve that could supplement the active duty force during short wars like the first Gulf War, and during smaller scale operations like Bosnia. This larger reserve force would serve as a bridge to re-instating conscription in the event of a protracted war. This is why we make young men register for the draft when they turn 18.
3. In the event of a protracted conflict, the government would reinstitute the draft.
4. Private contractors would provide administrative and support services, freeing up soldiers to fight.

Progress Through Action
Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb
House Committee on Armed Services, April 16, 2008

Because the Bush administration has refused to face up to the manpower implications of its open-ended commitment of forces—particularly in Iraq—by reinstating the draft, it has been forced to take three disastrous steps. Active duty forces have been deployed and redeployed without sufficient dwell time; the Guard and reserves have been transformed from a strategic to an operational reserve, alternating deployments with active forces; and private contractors have taken on combat missions.

The Department of Defense has belatedly approved a plan to increase the size of the ground forces by 52,000 troops. However, it should be noted that these small end strength additions will not be finalized until 2012—a full three years into the next president’s administration—and will not be able to relieve the current stress and strain of our ground forces. If the president or his successor wants to continue this mindless, needless, senseless war in Iraq he or she should call for reinstating the draft. That would be the responsible path.

In my view, however, this would be a mistake on par with the initial invasion of Iraq. Instead, I believe the United States should set a firm timetable for the gradual redeployment of U.S. forces and their equipment. At the Center for American Progress we developed a plan that demonstrated how this could be done safely in 10 to 12 months. During that time the United States should work to train and support Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi government while gradually handing over responsibility for security to the Iraqis. This action should be backed up with a diplomatic surge in which the United States would engage all countries in the region. There is no guarantee that this approach will be effective in stabilizing Iraq or the region. In fact, given the misleading justifications for the initial invasion and the way in which the Bush administration has conducted the war, there are no good options left. But I believe that this course, a strategic redeployment and a diplomatic surge, provides the best chance for stabilizing the region as well as mitigating the impact of Iraq on the ground forces and U.S. national security.

As General Maxwell Taylor, Army Chief of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Ambassador to South Vietnam, noted some three decades ago, “we sent the Army to Vietnam to save Vietnam; we withdrew the Army to save the Army.” Or as the late William F. Buckley noted, “if we had not left Vietnam we would not have won the Cold War. If we do not leave Iraq, we will not win the War on Terror.”

II. Overstretched Ground Forces

Today there is little doubt that the ground forces are overstretched. A recent survey of 3,400 active duty and retired military officers found that 88 percent of respondents believe
that the Iraq war has stretched the U.S. military dangerously thin while 60 percent of the same officers believe that the U.S. military is weaker today than it was five years ago. Since the attacks of September 11, nearly 1.7 million U.S. servicemen and women have been deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan. Of those 1.7 million, nearly 600,000 have been deployed to either theatre more than once. In early March 2007, we at the Center for American Progress released a study chronicling the effects that sustained deployments in Iraq are having on the Army. By analyzing every active Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) we were able to convey the strain and fatigue placed on the force and illustrate its implications for our nation’s national security. The facts that we compiled were troubling but in the subsequent year, these strains have been exacerbated.

Of the Army’s 44 combat brigades, all but the First Brigade of the Second Infantry Division, which is permanently based in South Korea, have served at least one tour. Of the remaining 43:

- Five brigades have had one tour in Iraq or Afghanistan
- Thirteen brigades have had two tours in Iraq or Afghanistan
- Nineteen brigades have had three tours in Iraq or Afghanistan
- Six brigades have had four tours in Iraq or Afghanistan

The task of not only sustaining but increasing troop levels in Iraq has forced the Army to frequently violate its own deployment policy. Army policy holds that after 12 months of deployment in a combat zone, active duty troops should receive 24 months at home for “dwell time”—time at home between deployments to rest, recuperate, reconnect with family, integrate new unit members, train, and prepare to deploy again—before returning to combat. Even before the surge, the Army had reduced dwell time to one year. Since April of 2007, all Army combat brigades have been on a 15-month deployed to 12-month dwell time ratio before deploying again. Similarly, Marines have been on a 7-month deployment cycle for every 6 months at home.

Equally disturbing, both militarily and morally, is the fact that several units have been sent to either Iraq or Afghanistan who are not fully combat ready. Three units that are part of the president’s latest escalation are glaring examples of inadequate dwell time.

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1 Because the Army would not provide this information, the Center for American Progress had to compile this data from an extensive review of available open source information about individual brigade deployments in local news reports and by talking to the headquarters of individual brigades. Although we have high confidence that the information presented is accurate, we openly acknowledge that some pieces of information may be inaccurate or incomplete.
Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb
House Committee on Armed Services, April 16, 2008

- With only nine months at home between its first and second deployments to Iraq, the Third Brigade, First Armored Division from Fort Riley, KS, experienced one of the shortest dwell time periods of any unit in the Army.

- The Fourth BCT, 10th Mountain Division was activated in January 2005. It is currently on its second deployment of its three-year history. There were nine months of dwell time for the new unit, after 15 months deployed, between its first and second tours.

- Some Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division, Second Brigade Combat Team (Fort Drum) had six months dwell time between its second and third post-9/11 deployments.

On April 11, President Bush announced that he would be following U.S. Army General David Petraeus’ recommendations to withdraw 25 percent of American combat forces from Iraq by the end of July. Despite the president’s assertion that the withdrawal of these troops represents a “return on success” for his “surge” policy, the president is merely making a virtue out of necessity.

The fact of the matter is that these five brigades, or about 20,000 combat troops, were scheduled to be withdrawn after their 15-month tours came to an end—whether Iraq witnessed a temporary decline in violence or not. It would have taken extraordinary measures such as an extension of these soldiers’ deployments to 18 months to maintain current levels beyond this time.

Moreover, the 8,000 support personnel that deployed along with the surge’s additional combat brigades will remain in Iraq after the surge draws down. This means that even with the current reduction in force levels, there will be more soldiers and Marines in Iraq after the surge runs its course in July than when it began in January of 2007. The president also announced that Army units would begin a one-to-one deployment-to-dwell-time ratio, or 12 months deployed in combat followed by 12 months of dwell time.

These decisions are inadequate for two reasons. First, this change will have no immediate effect on relieving the stress and strain on our soldiers because it will not reduce the tours of any soldier currently deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan—and will only affect soldiers deploying after August 1, 2008. In fact, tens of thousands of soldiers in Iraq and
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Afghanistan will remain there under the 15-month cycle until their deployment is over.

Second, even with this modest reduction in deployment length, the president will still be forcing the Defense Department to violate its own deployment policy. Department of Defense policy calls for a one-to-two ratio of deployment to dwell time. Dwell time is critically important to maintaining high levels of readiness in our armed forces.

President Bush also made no mention of the Marine Corps in his remarks. Though smaller than the Army, the Marine Corps, too, is feeling the effects of frequent repeated deployments.

Marine Corps

Just like the Army, the Marine Corps has also been under serious strain due to the increased operational tempo required to sustain the engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Marine Corps, our nation’s premier expeditionary force, has over the past few years seen its capacity to quickly respond to contingencies around the world diminish. Currently, the Marine Corps has been able to limit its deployments to seven months. However, the constant cycle of deployments and demand for Marines in Iraq has meant that for all practical purposes, the Marine Corps has had to abandon its role as an expeditionary force, something that Commandant James Conway has said needs to be reversed. In effect, the Marines have become a second land Army. With the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit currently augmenting our forces in Afghanistan, we do not have an expeditionary presence capable of responding in event of contingencies in the Mediterranean and North Africa. This exemplifies the strain on our forces, and how other areas critical to our national security interest have been left vulnerable.

While the majority of Army units comprising the surge in Iraq will return in July, the Marine Corps will remain deployed overseas in large numbers until October, when 3,200 Marines are scheduled to return from their temporary deployment to Afghanistan. The need for more troops to fight in Afghanistan, the true central front against Al Qaeda, is clear. However, the United States does not have the troops to send. The fact that the Pentagon could only muster 3,200 Marines to send to Afghanistan this spring exemplifies the strain the Marine Corps is under. Commandant Conway recently commented, “give us some relief (in Iraq), and we’ll go to Afghanistan in force.” Marines are ready to take the fight to Al Qaeda, but can’t because there aren’t enough of them to go around.
Lack of sufficient dwell time has also hindered Marine units’ ability to effectively train for the “full spectrum” of operations required of the Marine Corps as an expeditionary force. There has been an emphasis on counter-insurgency training, the primary type of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, at the expense of thorough training for other types of contingencies to which the Marine Corps is often the first responder—humanitarian assistance, non-combatant evacuation operations, or other operations of a non-counter-insurgency nature. Additionally, as is the case for the Army, units needing to train here at home are unable to do so as efficiently as is needed. This is in part because of equipment shortages resulting from equipment normally used to train at home having been sent to forward deployed units to use in Iraq and Afghanistan. The importance of dwell time cannot be overstated. Gen. Conway recently commented that sufficient dwell time is “critical to success in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

National Guard

The reserve component is also in tatters. The Pentagon has had to rely increasingly on the Army National Guard and Reserve in order to meet demands on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the Pentagon straining to keep force levels high in Iraq, the Guard and Reserve are being used as an operational reserve, alternating deployments with the active force.

Since 2001, every Army National Guard combat brigade has been deployed overseas at least once and six have already been deployed twice. Moreover, last October, the Defense Department notified eight National Guard brigades to be ready to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan beginning in either fall of 2008 or early 2009. Of the eight Guard units, all have already served at least once in either Iraq or Afghanistan since 2001.

According to the Defense Department’s standard deployment to dwell time ratio, reserve units should receive five years at home for every one year deployed. As with the active force, the DoD has been forced to break its own policies with regard to reserve deployment to dwell time ratio in order to maintain large numbers of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, three of the eight brigades on call returned from deployments in 2005 and two more returned from Iraq in 2006—well short of the recommended five years at home.

The Army Guard began the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq with its units short tens of thousands of soldiers, or about 15 percent to 20 percent of its required wartime needs,
and equipped with only 65 percent to 70 percent of its required wartime needs. Those shortages have deepened as people and equipment are borrowed from units staying home to fill out those about to go overseas—a process known as “cross-leveling.”

Today, the National Guard faces a $48 billion equipment shortfall and 88 percent of all Army National Guard units are rated “not ready” according to a report completed earlier this year by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves.

Equipment

The overall cost of operations in Iraq far exceeds its direct financial cost as well as the burden it has placed on our men and women in uniform. The high pace, long duration, and harsh climate of Iraq have taken a heavy toll on Army equipment in particular. Restructuring and rebuilding Army equipment after Iraq will be an incredibly costly endeavor. While the total cost is uncertain, the Government Accountability Office has released an estimate on the projected cost through 2015. The Army’s plans to equip modular units, expand the force, reset equipment, and replace prepositioned equipment are likely to cost at least $190 billion. The breakdown the GAO has given is as follows:

- Resetting the force: $118.5 billion
- Equipping restructured modular units: $43.6 billion
- Increasing the number of and equipping of new Army units: $18.5 billion
- Reconstituting prepositioned stocks: $10.6 billion

Total $191.2 billion

Lowering Standards

Even more troubling for the long-term readiness of the force is the fact that the Army has had to relax the standards for new recruits. Although the Army has trumpeted the fact that it achieved its 2007 recruitment goals, closer examination demonstrates this self-congratulation is not warranted. In 2006, for example, the Army raised its maximum age for enlistment twice, first from 35 to 40 and then from 40 to 42 while it shortened the
enlistment period for some recruits from four years to as little as 15 months. The proportion of new Army recruits with high school diplomas dropped from over 90 percent in 2003 to 84 percent in 2005 to 71 percent in 2007—the lowest levels in at least 25 years. Further, in the last three years, the amount of recruits who scored in the lowest category, Category 4, has gone up six-fold. In 2006, the Army even recruited an 18 year-old autistic man to be a cavalry scout—one of the Army’s more dangerous assignments.

To further expand its diminishing pool of recruits, the Army has allowed recruits with criminal backgrounds to enlist at an alarming rate. Such offenders have been allowed to enlist after committing crimes such as arson, aggravated assault, robbery, and vehicular homicide—a process which the military terms “moral waivers.” 11 percent of new active-duty and Army Reserve troops in 2007 received a moral waiver, up from 7.9 percent in fiscal year 2006, according to figures from the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. So far this fiscal year, that number has increased to 13 percent, or one in eight soldiers. In fiscal 2003 and 2004, soldiers granted waivers accounted for only 4.6 percent of new recruits.

III. The Consequences of the Last Five Years in Iraq

The frequency and duration of deployments of U.S. servicemen and women to Iraq and Afghanistan have placed an incredible strain on the All-Volunteer Force. This deployment cycle has affected soldiers’ mental health and personal lives as well as enlisted and officer retention rates, all of which will affect the readiness of our ground forces over the long-term.

Among combat troops sent to Iraq for the third or fourth time, more than one in four show signs of anxiety, depression, or acute stress, according to an Army survey of mental health. Twenty-seven percent of noncommissioned officers on their third or fourth tour exhibit post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms. The same study also noted that soldiers on multiple deployments report low morale, more mental health problems, and more stress-related work problems. Today, one in five troops returns from Iraq and Afghanistan with post-traumatic stress disorder.

In 2007, 121 soldiers committed suicide, an increase of more than 20 percent over 2006. An estimated 2,100 troops tried to commit suicide or injure themselves last year—up from 350 in 2002. Family life is also affected by the war, as 20 percent of married troops in Iraq say they are planning a divorce, and 42 percent of all returning service members report “feeling like a guest in their own home.”
The resulting anxiety, depression, and psychological trauma from prolonged and repeated exposure to combat is bound to take a significant toll on service members and their relationships. Over the long-term, these factors are shown to contribute to drinking problems, drug use, and domestic violence, indicating that the effects of prolonged tours in Iraq and Afghanistan will be with us for many years.

Retention Rates

Retention rates are also affected by frequent and prolonged deployments. The Congressional Research Service has noted that Army projections show its officer shortage—which will be approximately 3,000 line officers in FY 2007—will grow to about 3,700 officers in FY 2008, and will continue at an annual level of 3,000 or more through FY 2012. This FY 2008 shortage will include 364 lieutenant colonels, 2,554 majors, and 798 captains who entered in FYs 1991 through 2002. In response, the Army has begun promoting junior officers at record levels by reducing the promotion time to the rank of captain (O-3) from the historical average of 42 months from commissioning to the current average of 38 months. The promotion time from Captain to Major has also been reduced from 11 years to 10 years while 97 percent of eligible Captains have been promoted to Major as compared to the desirable rate of 80 percent. At the same time, 98 percent of First Lieutenants have been promoted to Captain, compared to the normal 90 percent. Meanwhile, the Guard and Reserve confront a corresponding shortfall of 7,500 officers.

Retention rates among the Army’s primary source of future leaders are especially troubling. According to statistics compiled by West Point, of the 903 Army officers commissioned upon graduation in 2001, nearly 46 percent left the service in 2006 (the latest year for which statistics are available), 35 percent at the conclusion of their five years of required service, and another 11 percent over the next six months. And more than 54 percent of the 935 graduates in the class of 2000 had left active duty by this January, the statistics show.

To be sure, high retention rates will be inextricably linked to more predictable deployment schedules—and not only among officers. This conflict, which the administration deems “the long war,” requires that the U.S. deploys knowledgeable, veteran soldiers and Marines to combat increasingly experienced and determined enemies. Without high retention rates, this will be impossible.

Progress Through Action
IV. Recommendations While Expanding and Rebuilding the Ground Forces

The administration’s belated decision to expand the Army and Marines is long overdue. At the Center for American Progress we have been calling for such an expansion for the past five years. However, the difficult situation facing the Army and the Marines requires a long-term approach toward expanding and rebuilding the ground forces. Increasing the size of the Army and Marines will not help the situation on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, growing these forces is about preparing America’s military for the future. I have the following recommendations:

Don’t Lower Standards. The Army and Marines should meet their new end-strength goals without relaxing recruitment standards or retention and promotion criteria. This will not be easy in the current environment. The overall percentage of youth who describe themselves as less willing to even consider military service doubled from 26 percent in 2003 to 52 percent in 2007. In order to ensure the Army and Marines continue to get the best and the brightest, the current target of adding 7,000 soldiers and 5,000 Marines per year is too ambitious in light of current circumstances and should be scaled back. Recruitment and retention standards should return to at least the pre-Iraq standards. Congress must make sure that the quality of U.S. military personnel does not slide as it did in the 1970s. It is worth waiting a few extra years to ensure that the Army and Marines attract the men and women who possess the specialized skill sets needed for an effective 21st-century military.

Expand with a Focus on Peacekeeping and Counterinsurgency Operations. Following the war in Vietnam, instead of building off the experience of fighting an unconventional force, the military adopted the mantra of “no more Vietnams” and shifted its focus back to confronting conventional threats. We cannot make this same mistake today. It is clear going forward that America’s ground forces have to be prepared to engage an entire spectrum of operations, from conventional ground combat to humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that while our ground forces remain conventionally unmatched, there is significant room for improvement in our ability to conduct counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations. The U.S. Army should develop specialized “peacekeeping” or “stabilization and reconstruction” brigades. Such specialized brigades would alter both the type of recruit the Army is seeking and the type of person who might be interested in joining the
Army.

**Grow the Forces in a Fiscally Responsible Manner.** Growing the ground forces is and will be expensive. The average annual cost of maintaining a single service member already exceeds $100,000. Currently the defense budget is severely unbalanced. Despite claims that 9/11 changed everything, during Secretary Rumsfeld’s tenure only two weapons systems were canceled. Many of the current weapons programs are unnecessary relics of Cold War-era thinking. The challenge confronting the Army and Marines in terms of both escalating personnel costs and the deepening equipment crisis requires significant congressional attention and funding. Expanding the ground forces and resetting the equipment from Iraq and Afghanistan should be the overriding priority in the defense budget.

**Open Up the Military to all Americans Who Possess the Desire, Talent and Character to Serve.** The Army and Marine Corps cannot afford to place unnecessary obstacles in the way of qualified men and women who want to serve. To this end, the military should make two major changes to its personnel policy:

- First, repeal the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. The “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy is counterproductive to military readiness. Over the past 10 years more than 10,000 personnel have been discharged as a result of this policy, including 800 with skills deemed “mission critical,” such as pilots, combat engineers, and linguists. These are the very job functions for which the military has experienced personnel shortfalls. General John M. Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1993 when the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy was enacted, no longer supports the policy because he now believes that allowing gay men and women to serve openly in the military would no longer create intolerable tension among personnel and undermine cohesion. A recent Zogby poll supports this view. It found that three-quarters of Afghanistan and Iraq veterans were comfortable interacting with gay people.

- Second, all military occupations should be open to whoever qualifies, regardless of gender. Currently, the Army and Marines prohibit women from serving in infantry, field artillery, and Special Forces units that directly engage the enemy on the ground. The idea that women who possess the requisite mental and physical skills should somehow be “protected” from the dangers of combat fails to acknowledge the reality of the modern battlefield and the role women are already
Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb  
House Committee on Armed Services, April 16, 2008

playing in Iraq and Afghanistan. Approximately a hundred women have been killed in these wars. We only impede our ability to build a 21st-century military by constructing barriers where none need exist.
Lawrence J. Korb
Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress

Lawrence J. Korb is a Senior Fellow at American Progress and a Senior Advisor to the Center for Defense Information. Prior to joining the Center, he was a Senior Fellow and Director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. From July 1998 to October 2002, he was Council Vice President, Director of Studies, and holder of the Maurice Greenberg Chair.

Prior to joining the Council, Mr. Korb served as Director of the Center for Public Policy Education and Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, Dean of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, and Vice President of Corporate Operations at the Raytheon Company.

Dr. Korb served as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Logistics) from 1981 through 1985. In that position, he administered about 70 percent of the Defense budget. For his service in that position, he was awarded the Department of Defense's medal for Distinguished Public Service. Mr. Korb served on active duty for four years as Naval Flight Officer, and retired from the Naval Reserve with the rank of Captain.

Dr. Korb's 20 books and more than 100 articles on national security issues include The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The First Twenty-five Years, The Fall and Rise of the Pentagon, American National Security: Policy and Process, Future Visions for U.S. Defense Policy, Reshaping America's Military, and A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction. His articles have appeared in such journals as Foreign Affairs, Public Administration Review, New York Times Sunday Magazine, Naval Institute Proceedings, and International Security. Over the past decade, Mr. Korb has made over 1,000 appearances as a commentator on such shows as The Today Show, The Early Show, Good Morning America, Face the Nation, This Week with David Brinkley, MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour, News Hour with Jim Lehrer, Nightline, 60 Minutes, Larry King Live, The O'Reilly Factor, and Crossfire. His more than 100 op-ed pieces have appeared in such major newspapers as the Washington Post, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Times, Los Angeles Times, Boston Globe, Baltimore Sun, Philadelphia Inquirer, and Christian Science Monitor.
DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: Lawrence Korb

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

X Individual

Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: 

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**Federal Contract Information:** If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

- **Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:**
  - Current fiscal year (2007): NA
  - Fiscal year 2006: NA
  - Fiscal year 2005: NA

- **Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:**
  - Current fiscal year (2007): NA
  - Fiscal year 2006: NA
  - Fiscal year 2005: NA

- **List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts, manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):**
  - Current fiscal year (2007): NA
  - Fiscal year 2006: NA
  - Fiscal year 2005: NA

- **Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:**
  - Current fiscal year (2007): NA
  - Fiscal year 2006: NA
  - Fiscal year 2005: NA
Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007): ________________________________;
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List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007): ________________________________;
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Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

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STATEMENT OF THOMAS DONNELLY
Resident Fellow in Defense and National Security Studies
American Enterprise Institute

Before the

SUBCOMMITTEES ON READINESS AND AIR AND LAND FORCES
House Armed Services Committee
Hearing on House Resolution 834
April 16, 2008

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Saxton, for the opportunity to address the committee on this important topic. Force readiness was one of my primary duties when I was a member of the committee staff and a good deal of my current research continues to focus on that topic. Further, the state of U.S. land forces is an even more enduring issue for me, from my years as editor of Army Times to today: early next month, the American Enterprise Institute press will release a new work I have co-authored with Frederick Kagan, *Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power*. Much of what I have to say this afternoon will be drawn from that work.

Let me begin with a few general observations and then discuss a number of issues highlighted in House Resolution 834. To begin with, our soldiers and Marines are caught in a perfect storm: they have been asked to fight a war for which they were not perfectly prepared or adequately manned, and which has lasted longer than anticipated or intended. But a storm of such magnitude did not brew up overnight. And it will take, in my judgment, at least a decade to build up U.S. land forces to withstand what promises to be an extended hurricane in the greater Middle East.

To understand the challenges our land forces now face, we must look back to the years of the late Cold War period. From a land-force perspective, the Cold War, and particularly the Cold War on the German central front, was an economy of force mission: the five divisions permanently stationed in Germany were only meant to hold a part of the NATO line while, according to the accepted war plan, 10 divisions in 10 days were to deploy from the continental United States. After that, we hoped, cooler heads would prevail to prevent nuclear Armageddon. My point is this: America had a very small Army.

At the end of the Cold War, the first Bush Administration began to shrink that Army. Nor could Sen. Sam Nunn or any of the defense experts in Congress see a need for large-scale, heavily equipped land units. Operation Desert Storm brought a temporary respite to the land-force reductions, but they began again during the Clinton Administration and did not stop until the U.S. Army’s rolls were roughly 40 percent smaller. In the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review process, the current Bush administration had set its sights on eliminating two further divisions, but shelved those plans in the wake of the September 11 attacks.
Land forces also suffered disproportionately from the so-called “procurement holiday” of the 1990s. While a smaller force could live longer off the accumulated weapons inventories of the Reagan buildup, and the Army’s frontline systems—the M1 Abrams tank, the M2/3 Bradley fighting vehicle, the Black Hawk and Apache helicopters and so on—remain the most lethal and effective in the world, these systems began to age. The Army’s two signal modernization programs of the period, the Comanche helicopter and Crusader howitzer, fell victim to, first, lack of funding (both efforts were stretched out over many more years than originally planned) and then the mania for “defense transformation.” The current Future Combat Systems program has started to generate important new capabilities that address the needs of soldiers in urban, irregular warfare environments, but it, too, is underfunded and will not begin to field a full complement of land combat vehicles for many years.

The defense transformation movement that gained the ascendency under Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was premised on two insights that, in retrospect, appear flawed: one was about the state of international politics, and concluded that the early 21st century was a period of “strategic pause.” Our experience since 9/11 suggests that, if ever there were such a pause, it’s over; certainly it is over for our land forces. The second insight was that advanced technologies, and particular information technologies, were revolutionizing the conduct of warfare, lifting the traditional “fog of war” to reveal a “transparent battlefield.” And since we could see everything, we could strike anything, at any time, from increasingly long range; *ipso facto*, there was even less need for land forces, except perhaps as additional “nodes” in a network of sensors. As Chinese military theorists enthusiastically observed, we had seemed to enter an era of “no-contact warfare.”

The U.S. Army, in particular, was whipsawed by these supposed innovations. The idea of no-contact war was derived from an understanding of the intervention in Kosovo in 1999, an air-only operation that left the Army sputtering to try to deploy itself in a timely way and to serve a useful combat purpose. While many of the constraints were either self-inflicted wounds or a reflection of the peculiar political conditions that surrounded the NATO alliance, the image was of a service that “could not get to the fight.” Thus the Army set about transforming itself into a lighter, more mobile force that worshipped at the altar of strategic mobility. But, recognizing that it budgets and overall resources were declining, the service adopted a so-called “modular” unit design and a rotational or cyclic approach to force generation, not unlike that long employed by the Marines. This model presumed greater predictability in deployments and accepted greater fluctuations in overall readiness.

In initial post-9/11 operations, most notably the invasion of Afghanistan, it appeared to many that this was the right thing to do. Images of Special Operations Forces mounted on small-but-rugged Afghan ponies while calling in precision strikes on Taliban positions from B-52s did seem to capture a transformation in the art of combat. And so, in planning the invasion of Iraq, “faster” and “lighter” became synonymous with “better.” Secretary Rumsfeld famously fretted over the number of truck companies that
were called for in the deployment order. The three-week blitzkrieg to Baghdad again reinforced the transformational vision.

But as the “Global War on Terror” — meant to be a rapid and decisive suppression of al Qaeda and its affiliates — has itself been transformed into the so-called “Long War” — a global counterinsurgency meant to create a more durable and legitimate political order in the greater Middle East and thus a more stable security regime, the stresses on the Army and Marine Corps have risen. The strategic question for our forces is no longer: “How fast can you get there?” It is: “How long can you stay?” The mission for this stronger, lighter, faster force is to be more resilient, hang tougher, remain in place.

House Resolution 834 well captures many of the strains on soldiers, Marines, their families and on the services as institutions. It is undeniable that the nature of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq — long-duration counterinsurgencies — are almost exactly the opposite of the short and decisive campaigns the military had planned and structured itself to conduct and which, naturally, it prefers to conduct. By every traditional measure readiness — personnel, equipment, training and so on — nondeployed units face worrisome shortfalls.

But it is equally clear that traditional readiness measures are of only limited value in a war-time environment. To begin with, we should not forget that deployed units have been “plussed up” beyond their normal strengths in personnel and equipment; standard tables of organization and equipment reflect life in the garrison, not on the streets of Baghdad or Kandahar. Conversely, traditional readiness reporting does not capture the inherent resilience of today’s force, which to me is the most striking quality of today’s Army and Marine Corps. I must admit this is something I did not expect or anticipate. While my published record permits me to claim that I guessed that these would be long wars — certainly longer than the Bush Administration originally thought — my paper trail is also littered with worries about a “broken Army.” I was wrong; neither the Army and Marine Corps are broken. They may near to breaking — often you don’t see the cliff until you go over it — and they need help, but they have stood up to the strains far better than we might have thought.

Therefore I would take issue with several of the over-the-top findings in the resolution. For example, the pressures on the National Guard do not come close, in my judgment, to creating “an unacceptable amount of risk.” The Guard can never be big enough to eliminate the risk of a once-in-a-century disaster or unexpected acts of terrorism. Even more egregious is the assertion that the shortages bedeviling U.S. land forces threaten the fundamental integrity of the military as a whole or the broad national security of the United States.

My greatest concern is that, in an attempt to relieve the stresses and strains on the Army and Marine Corps, we will attempt to fit the war to the size of the force rather than sizing the force to win the war. To do so would inevitably increase the risks to our national security while at the same time foregoing the strategic initiative. As our commanders on the ground frequently but ruefully report, in war, the enemy gets a vote.
The enemy, however, does not get a vote when it comes to raising and supporting our armies — you, the members of this committee and the Congress, cast those votes.

Generally speaking, the resolution does an excellent service in outlining the questions we face about our land forces. It does not, however, give us an answer. I think the answer is clear: increasing the size and improving the quality of our land forces is the only way to sensibly address the risks we face. This is the analysis we undertook and the argument we advance in the forthcoming *Ground Truth*. We recognize that it will take a long time — as long as 10 years — and a lot of money — hundreds of billions of dollars — to build the force we need. But we can afford it, and it seems to me to be the least we can do to share some of the sacrifices of our soldiers and Marines.
Thomas Donnelly  
Resident Fellow  
The American Enterprise Institute

A defense and security policy analyst, Thomas Donnelly is the coeditor, with Gary Schmitt, of Of Men and Materiel: The Crisis in Military Resources (AEI Press, 2007). Among his recent books are The Military We Need (AEI Press, 2005) and Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Strategic Assessment (AEI Press, 2004). From 1995 to 1999, he was policy group director and a professional staff member for the Committee on Armed Services in the U.S. House of Representatives. Donnelly also served as a member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. He is a former editor of Armed Forces Journal, Army Times and Defense News.

Professional Experience
- Member, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2005-2006
- Editor, Armed Forces Journal, 2005-2006
- Director, strategic communications and initiatives, Lockheed Martin Corporation, 2002
- Deputy executive director, Project for the New American Century, 1999-2002
- Director, Policy Group, House Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 1996-1999
- Professional staff member, House Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 1995
- Editor, Army Times, 1987-1993

Education
M.I.T.P.P., SAIS, Johns Hopkins University
B.A., Ithaca College
DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: ________________________________ Thomas M. Donnelly

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

X Individual

Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:

FISCAL YEAR 2007 (N/A)

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**Federal Contract Information:** If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

- Current fiscal year (2007): ____________________________
- Fiscal year 2006: ____________________________
- Fiscal year 2005: ____________________________

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

- Current fiscal year (2007): ____________________________
- Fiscal year 2006: ____________________________
- Fiscal year 2005: ____________________________

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

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- Fiscal year 2006: ____________________________
- Fiscal year 2005: ____________________________

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

- Current fiscal year (2007): ____________________________
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Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007): ________________________________;
Fiscal year 2006: ________________________________;
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Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2007): ________________________________;
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Fiscal year 2005: ________________________________;

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007): ________________________________;
Fiscal year 2006: ________________________________;
Fiscal year 2005: ________________________________;

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2007): ________________________________;
Fiscal year 2006: ________________________________;
Fiscal year 2005: ________________________________.
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 16, 2008
H. RES. 834

Regarding the readiness decline of the Army, Marine Corps, National Guard, and Reserves, and the implications for national security.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NOVEMBER 15, 2007

Mr. ORTIZ (for himself and Mr. ARECIBO) submitted the following resolution, which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services

RESOLUTION

Regarding the readiness decline of the Army, Marine Corps, National Guard, and Reserves, and the implications for national security.

Whereas non-deployed Army and Marine Corps units currently in the United States are reporting lower levels of readiness;

Whereas in order to meet ongoing operational demands, members of the Army and Marine Corps face multiple deployments, extended combat tours, and a limited time at home, which create stress and strain on the service members and their families;

Whereas faced with these demands, the Army and Marine Corps are experiencing retention and recruiting challenges while trying to meet operational demands and “Grow the Force” initiatives,
Whereas to address personnel shortfalls, the Army offers inflated bonuses as incentives, and has lowered service standards, to create a higher number of eligible personnel;

Whereas the inability to offset personnel shortfalls continues to increase the demands and hardship experienced by active-duty military members and members of the Reserve Forces;

Whereas the high operational tempo of combat operations overseas has decreased the useful life of ground and aviation equipment;

Whereas the destruction or damage of equipment in battle results in equipment inventory depletion;

Whereas in order to address equipment shortages, the Army and Marine Corps have drawn from prepositioned war stocks of equipment that are needed to rapidly deploy military units worldwide and are strategically stationed around the world, and plans to restock the equipment drawn are not near-term, thereby hindering the capability of the Army and Marine Corps to rapidly respond to any emerging crisis;

Whereas equipment is often left behind in theater to support the incoming unit, resulting in severe equipment shortages in the United States for non-deployed units;

Whereas due to time constraints, many Army units are skipping vital pre-deployment training;

Whereas due to equipment shortages, Army and Marine Corps units do not train as they fight, instead receiving the necessary force protection and other essential equipment just prior to their deployment or when they arrive in theater;

\*HRES 834 IH
Whereas shortened dwell time has negatively impacted the ability of the Army and Marine Corps to provide soldiers and marines with full-spectrum training, possibly limiting the ability of the ground forces to respond to all types of conflict;

Whereas these training shortfalls increase the personal risk associated with serving in the Army and Marine Corps and limit the ability of service men and women to perform their assigned duties;

Whereas the National Guard and Reserves have mobilized into an operational backstop to meet Army and Marine Corps active-duty shortfalls and thus are experiencing declining readiness shortfalls in personnel, equipment, and training;

Whereas the Army Reserve is experiencing a fundamental personnel shortfall in battlefield leaders and is now deploying training brigades because all deployable brigade-level units have been deployed in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan;

Whereas the Nation is accepting an unacceptable amount of risk because the National Guard equipment inventories in the United States are depleted and the Department of Defense has not measured or tracked the National Guard’s readiness for domestic missions, with the result that the National Guard may not be prepared to respond effectively to unexpected terrorist incidents or large-scale natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina;

Whereas all Army National Guard Brigade Combat Team units have been deployed in support of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and as the Army switches from deploying individual units to whole brigades, at-
home time is decreasing, leaving Guardsmen facing multiple deployments that negatively impact families and communities throughout the United States;

Whereas the Army and Marine Corps are reporting personnel shortfalls;

Whereas the Army and Marine Corps are reporting equipment shortages;

Whereas the Army and Marine Corps are reporting training deficiencies;

Whereas the National Guard and Reserve are experiencing declines in the readiness of personnel, equipment, and training;

Whereas the readiness of the military is critical to the national security interest of the United States, its citizens, and the integrity of the entire military force;

Whereas the readiness shortfalls within the Army and Marine Corps pose an immediate risk to the integrity of the military force and the national security of the United States; and

Whereas section 8, article 1, of the Constitution empowers the Congress “To raise and support Armies” and “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”: Now, therefore, be it;

1    Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep-
2    resentatives that because serious readiness shortfalls exist
3    within the Army, Marine Corps, National Guard, and Re-
4    serves, severely limiting the ability of the ground forces
5    to respond effectively to any contingency or threat, at
6    home or abroad and thus creating a potentially dangerous

*HRES 834 III*
level of risk to the national security of the United States.
Congress should restore and maintain the ground forces
at the highest levels of readiness in the interest of national
security and to ensure the integrity of the entire military
force.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ

Mr. Ortiz. During the hearing, Representative Forbes referred to your prior testimony on February 14 regarding the strengths of the U.S. military—namely, that the force is adaptable, experienced, and professional. Please elaborate for the record how the ground forces, while certainly serving our Nation heroically, are nevertheless experiencing the types of readiness challenges that you described in your testimony for this hearing.

Ms. Flournoy. As you point out in your first question, I have testified previously regarding the impressive performance of the Army and Marine Corps in current military operations despite serious stresses to personnel and equipment. While I believe that the current generation of America's soldiers and Marines is remarkably adaptable and experienced, I also believe that we are fast approaching the physical limits of what the Army and Marine Corps can sustain. Even the world's best military can be pushed beyond the limits of what it was designed to support. Ceaseless high-tempo operations will constrain training time, wear down equipment, and exhaust personnel and their families no matter their quality. To ignore or deny the evident strains on the ground forces puts both the force and the Nation at risk. I therefore urge the Committee, as I did in my testimony, to do everything in its power to reestablish a ready reserve of ground forces, fund reset and expansion, and support a rebalancing of the force to deepen capacity in higher-demand capability areas. Doing so will help our forces to build on the experience they have gained while also restoring readiness.

Mr. Ortiz. Please describe for the committee the scale of investment rebuilding readiness will require. Will we be able to address our readiness concerns with one supplemental, or will recovery be a longer-term challenge?

Ms. Flournoy. In answer to your second question, rebuilding ground force readiness will not be a simple or short-term endeavor. Addressing today's readiness shortfalls involves both recovering from the Nation's two ongoing wars and readjusting to the range of likely future contingencies. Resetting and modernizing equipment, in addition to expanding the force and training for full-spectrum operations, will require at least a decade of continuous, robust investment. For example, the Government Accountability Office estimated this past April that the costs for Army equipment reset alone could reach $118 billion. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps estimated in its 2008 posture statement that it needs almost $5 billion more to repair and replace equipment from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such investment must be made with long-term budgetary management in mind and should, over time, be migrated to the base defense budget from short-term supplemental funding packages.

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to update one of the statements I made during my testimony. In my written and oral remarks, I referred to equipment data taken from the Final Report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. I have since received an updated briefing from the Army, and would like to share the information provided to me with the Committee. Specifically, updated Army data now shows that the Army National Guard (ARNG) had 79 percent of its required equipment at the end of fiscal year 2007, and that 13 percent of that equipment was deployed with units, leaving 66 percent of ARNG equipment available to State Governors.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK

Mr. Loebsack. Last week, General Cody appeared before this Committee and stated that the army is "out of balance," that we are "unprepared for the full-spectrum fight and lack the strategic depth that has been our traditional fallback for the uncertainties of this world."

In Iowa, we have seen how our National Guard has born much of the brunt of the current readiness strain of our ground forces, leaving our Nation's first line of defense against emergencies—of any nature—depleted, and our homeland less secure.
To date, the Iowa National Guard has mobilized 10,000 Soldiers and Airmen in support of operation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Every Iowan is deeply proud of the service and dedication of our National Guard men and women. However, as the Adjutant General of the Iowa National Guard Major General Ron Dardis, has stated, the Iowa Guard and their families are “stressed and strained.”

When the 224th Engineer Battalion, which is based in my District, was deployed to Iraq it was at 100% equipment readiness. When it redeployed, it was forced to leave most of its equipment in theater, leaving it with 30% of its required equipment.

When the 833rd Engineer Company, also based in my District, was recalled to Iraq after only 14 MONTHS at home, they had no equipment on which to train.

To say that this training, equipment, and readiness situation is alarming is a gross understatement. Iowa leans heavily on its National Guard for emergency response. Guard units operating with 30% of their equipment and with only 14 months of dwell time are simply not in a position to respond to an emergency at home—or be called up as an operational force to respond to threats facing our Nation abroad.

1. Last week General Cody told me that, even once the Grow the Force Initiative is complete, our ground forces will be operating at a 1:2 dwell time ratio while the size and pace of our current deployments continue. DOD’s deployment policy currently requires Reserve components to meet a 1 in 5 deployment ratio. This was clearly not the case for the 833rd Engineer Company nor for the many units across the country that are experiencing 1 to 1 deployment ratios.

a. Can you please outline for me what, in your belief, must be achieved in dwell time ratios in order to assure that our ground forces—both active duty and reserve—are properly trained, equipped, and rested?

b. What are the strategic risks associated with continuing deployments at the current rate? What are the risks to our servicemembers and their families?

c. According to Admiral Mullen, “the most likely near term attack on the United States will come from al Qaeda” via the safe havens in the under-governed regions of Pakistan. How would current commitments and readiness levels affect the timeliness and effectiveness of our response to an unforeseen contingency along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border or elsewhere?

Thank you. I believe that it is imperative that Congress acknowledge and address the declining readiness of the ground forces in the interest of our security at home and abroad. I strongly believe that we must commit to restoring the readiness of the military, particularly the ground forces, in order to mitigate the strategic risk of our current readiness shortfalls.

Ms. FLUENNY. Secretary of Defense Gates’ recent efforts to improve deployment-to-dwell ratios are commendable precisely because, as you point out, such compressed dwell times limit training time and increase our level of strategic risk. When the ground forces do not have adequate time to train for the full array of possible missions, the force as a whole becomes imbalanced, increasing the risk that it will not be prepared for future contingencies that may differ from today’s operational challenges. As my colleague, Alice Hunt, and I write in a forthcoming piece on the state of the U.S. military, “readiness means more than having forces ready to deploy to ongoing operations. The U.S. military must also maintain its readiness for possible contingencies such as a conflict in the Middle East, with North Korea or China . . . Maintaining the readiness of the U.S. military writ large is a balancing act between the demands of ongoing operations and the possible requirements of other missions that may arise. As force providers to the combatant commanders, and to support deterrence globally, the services must ensure that their forces train and equip for a broad array of potential missions—something the Army calls ‘readiness for the full-spectrum of operations’”

One such contingency, as you point out, could arise in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. The complexity of operations in Afghanistan, the evolving nature of the relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban, and the precarious political situation in Pakistan make possible contingencies—and the plausible American responses—very difficult to predict. However, many analysts have noted that the strain on our ground forces has precluded a more robust commitment to the conflict in Afghanistan, and a timely and effective response to any wider events in the region could be hampered by the ongoing force demands in Iraq. Beyond possible
events in the Afghanistan area of operations, I am personally concerned that the Army has only one fully ready brigade in the United States that could respond immediately to other contingencies.

Compressed dwell time and repeated deployments also increase the risk to the all-volunteer military. As you also point out, shortened dwell time at home has adverse effects on service members and their families. Studies have shown that repeated tours in Iraq increase a soldier’s likelihood of developing mental distress, including post-traumatic stress disorder. One study conducted by the RAND Corporation, for example, showed that approximately 14% of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans reported symptoms of PTSD. Even for those who do not experience these very real wounds of war, 15-month deployments often mean that soldiers spend two cycles of holidays away from loved ones; children have multiple birthdays without their parents, and spouses juggle the challenges of family and finances on their own for an extended period of time. I personally have spoken to several soldiers who decided to retire from the force simply because their families cannot continue to withstand the stress of these back-to-back deployments.

I therefore applaud the President’s recent decision to return the Army to a 12-month deployment cycle, but I believe the Nation must act as quickly as possible to bring the active Army back to a 1:22 deployment-to-dwell time ratio in order to allow soldiers more time with their families and more time to train to the full spectrum of operations. But even this is not sustainable indefinitely. The Army must continue to move toward a 1:3 ratio once operational demands are reduced and the expansion is completed in order to realize robust and sustainable readiness conditions for the ground forces.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Last week, General Cody appeared before this Committee and stated that the army is “out of balance”, that we are “unprepared for the full-spectrum fight and lack the strategic depth that has been our traditional fallback for the uncertainties of this world.”

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ness of our response to an unforeseen contingency along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border or elsewhere?

Thank you. I believe that it is imperative that Congress acknowledge and address the declining readiness of the ground forces in the interest of our security at home and abroad. I strongly believe that we must commit to restoring the readiness of the military, particularly the ground forces, in order to mitigate the strategic risk of our current readiness shortfalls.

Mr. LOEBSACK. A. Can you please outline for me what, in your belief, must be achieved in dwell time ratios in order to assure that our ground forces—both active duty and reserve—are properly trained, equipped and rested?

Mr. KORB. Readiness requires that a given unit have an adequate number of personnel, the right amount of equipment and that the personnel receive appropriate training on tactics they will use in carrying out their mission.

Personnel: Army policy recommends that after serving 12 months in theater, active duty troops come home to recuperate and retrain for 24 months before being returned to the theater. For every 12 months in a combat zone, reserve soldiers should spend 60 months at home before returning to a war zone.

Training: Readiness also requires that Army troops be adequately trained to perform the duties they will be assigned in theater and learn to operate the equipment they will use in combat. The concept of "combat readiness" is subjective and difficult to measure. By its very nature readiness is only truly determined once the unit is placed into combat. Even the best system to measure readiness can only do so through the use of surrogates or substitutes. At present, the Pentagon places combat units into five categories of readiness:

- C–1: Fully combat-ready.
- C–2: Substantially combat-ready, that is, the unit only has minor combat-deficiencies.
- C–3: Marginally combat-ready, that is, the unit has major deficiencies but can still perform its assigned missions.
- C–4: Not combat-ready because the unit has so many deficiencies that it cannot perform its wartime functions.
- C–5: Not combat-ready because the unit is undergoing a planned period of overhaul or maintenance.

Equipment: Finally, readiness requires that troops have a sufficient supply of appropriate equipment to carry out their mission and that the equipment be in good working order.

Mr. LOEBSACK. B. What are the strategic risks associated with continuing deployments at the current rate? What are the risks to our service members and their families?

Mr. KORB. Continuing deployments to Iraq at current rates poses great strategic risks to overall U.S. national security interests. Below are three most pressing strategic risks.

First, the U.S. incurs a substantial risk to its interests in the greater Middle East and to its own security by allowing the security situation in Afghanistan, the true central front in the War on Terror and the origin of the 9/11 attacks, to deteriorate. As the U.S. intelligence community has pointed out, the failure to consolidate the gains made in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban has allowed the group to reconstitute itself in its safe haven along the Afghan-Pakistan border region while training and inspiring a new generation of Pakistani militants. As long as the U.S. remains so heavily engaged in Iraq, it will not be able to send sufficient troops to Afghanistan.

2007 was the deadliest year for U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan since the 2001 invasion and 2008 is on pace to be even deadlier. Indeed, May 2008 was the most violent month in Afghanistan since the 2001 invasion. May saw 214 violent incidents in more than 100 of the country’s 398 districts, up from April’s count of 199 violent incidents in 86 districts. As a result of the country’s declining security situation, the government of President Hamid Karzai controls less than a third of Afghanistan’s territory.

Second, the continued large-scale deployment of U.S. troops to Iraq also plays into the al Qaeda narrative that the U.S. intends to occupy Muslim lands and exploit its people for their oil. Consequently, as the intelligence community made clear in a 2006 National Intelligence Estimate, a large-scale U.S. presence in Iraq remains a “cause célèbre” for the worldwide jihadist movement and will continue to be a boon for al Qaeda recruitment. A large U.S. presence in Iraq also plays into al
Qaeda’s stated objective to bog the American military down in Iraq and thereby produce economic and strategic exhaustion.

Third, maintaining an average of 130,000 troops in Iraq over the last five years has not only decimated U.S. ground forces, it also has compromised our ability to respond to other threats or conflicts around the globe. According to Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Richard Cody, the Army no longer has any fully ready combat brigades on standby should a conflict occur.

General Cody’s immediate superior, Army Chief of Staff Gen. George W. Casey Jr., told the House Armed Services Committee last fall that, “the Army is out of balance.” That’s a polite way of saying it’s broken. Casey, who is responsible for the Army’s overall health, is rightfully concerned.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Navy Adm. Michael G. Mullen, echoed Casey’s unease. In January, Mullen told the Marine Corps Times that there was reserve capacity in the Navy and Air Force but that ground troops were a different story. “Clearly, if we had to do something with our ground forces, a significant substitute would be a big challenge,” he said. Mullen’s predecessor, Marine Gen. Peter Pace, also expressed his discomfort with our ability to respond to other crises. Before leaving his post last October, Pace, stated that the troop commitment to Iraq would “make a large difference in our ability to be prepared for unforeseen contingencies” in the region and elsewhere.

Unfortunately, our service members and their families have paid a disproportionately high price for our large scale military presence in Iraq. The Pentagon’s decision last year to extend tours in Iraq and Afghanistan to 15 months from 12 months until the fall of 2008 resulted in the longest Army combat tours since World War II. Moreover, dwell time—time in-between deployments—has been shortened to 12 months as many soldiers are on their second, third, or even fourth tour of duty in either theatre. As a result, many soldiers and their families are being pushed beyond their physical and mental breaking points.

The full psychological effect of the war is impossible to estimate, as debilitating conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder and clinical depression can take years to appear and last a lifetime. Warning signs, however, are already appearing that indicate that large numbers of soldiers and Marines returning from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will face lasting psychological effects. A RAND study estimated earlier this year that nearly 20 percent of military service members who have returned from Iraq and Afghanistan—300,000 in all—report symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder or major depression.

An in-depth review of the problems facing our brave men and women in uniform indicates the scope of the challenge ahead.

### Overall Mental Health

- **30 to 40:** The percentage of Iraq veterans who will face a serious psychological wound, including depression, anxiety, or PTSD. Multiple tours and inadequate time between deployments increase rates of combat stress by 50 percent.

### Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

- **One in five:** Number of troops returning from Iraq and Afghanistan who show signs and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.
- **Nearly 20,000:** The increase in the number of Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans seeking treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder from the Department of Veterans Affairs in the 12 months ending June 30, 2007, VA records show. This represents a nearly 70 percent jump since June 30, 2006.
- **30 percent:** The percentage of troops returning from war zones who experience some level of PTSD, according to the Department of Veterans Affairs.

### Substance Abuse

- **40,000:** The number of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans who have been treated at a VA hospital for substance abuse.

### Families

- **20 percent:** The number of married troops in Iraq who say they are planning a divorce.
- **42 percent:** Number of returning soldiers and Marines who said they felt like "a guest in their own home," according to a 2007 poll. The study also found a link between family problems and PTSD, with the two reinforcing each other in a vicious spiral.

### Traumatic Brain Injury
98

- **150,000 to 300,000**: The number of veterans who have suffered a TBI during the war.
- **30 percent**: The percentage of soldiers admitted to Walter Reed Army Medical Center who have suffered TBI.

### Suicide

- **115**: Number of Army suicides in 2007, a nearly 10 percent increase since 2006.
- **2,100**: The number of attempted suicides and self-injuries in 2007, as reported by the Army. There were less than 1,500 in 2006 and less than 500 in 2002.
- **55 percent**: The percentage of suicide cases in 2006 that involved soldiers who were serving or had served at some point over the preceding five years in Iraq or Afghanistan.

### A Strained System

- **Over 100,000 percent**: The number of mental health diagnoses the VA has already given to Iraq and Afghanistan veterans, or 38 percent of new veterans who visited the VA for any reason.
- **150 percent**: The percentage increase in VA disability pay for PTSD among veterans between 1999 and 2004—or $4.2 billion.
- **200:1**: The ratio that patients outnumber primary care managers in some major military facilities. Until recently, the ratio was 1200:1.
- **22 percent**: The percentage decrease of licensed psychologists in the military in recent years.

Mr. LOEBSACK. C. According to Admiral Mullen, “the most likely near term attack on the United States will come from al Qaeda” via the safe havens in the under-governed regions of Pakistan. How would current commitments and readiness levels affect the timelines and effectiveness of our response to an unforeseen contingency along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border or elsewhere?

Mr. KROB. The pace of deployments to Iraq has significantly impacted our ability to send more troops to Afghanistan, as the meager temporary deployment of 3,200 Marines to Afghanistan this spring has demonstrated.

Army Vice Chief of Staff, Gen. Cody testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Army no longer has any fully ready combat brigades on standby should a threat or conflict occur. “I’ve never seen our lack of strategic depth be where it is today,” said Cody, who has been the senior Army official in charge of operations and readiness for the past six years.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Navy Adm. Michael G. Mullen, echoed Cody’s concern. “Clearly, if we had to do something with our ground forces, a significant substitute would be a big challenge,” he acknowledged in January of this year.

The Marine Corps’ ability to train for potential conflicts has also been “significantly degraded,” said Gen. Robert Magnus, assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee this last April. Gen. Magnus went on to state that the current pace of operations is, “unsustainable.”

Mr. LOEBSACK. Last week, General Cody appeared before this Committee and stated that the army is “out of balance”, that we are “unprepared for the full-spectrum fight and lack the strategic depth that has been our traditional fallback for the uncertainties of this world.”

In Iowa, we have seen how our National Guard has born much of the brunt of the current readiness strain of our ground forces, leaving our Nation’s first line of defense against emergencies—of any nature—depleted, and our homeland less secure.

To date, the Iowa National Guard has mobilized 10,000 Soldiers and Airmen in support of operation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Every Iowan is deeply proud of the service and dedication of our National Guard men and women.

However, as the Adjutant General of the Iowa National Guard Major General Ron Dardis, has stated, the Iowa Guard and their families are “stressed and strained.”

When the 224th Engineer Battalion, which is based in my District, was deployed to Iraq it was at 100% equipment readiness. When it redeployed, it was forced to leave most of its equipment in theater, leaving it with 30% of its required equipment.

When the 833rd Engineer company, also based in my District, was recalled to Iraq after only 14 MONTHS at home, they had no equipment on which to train.

To say that this training, equipment, and readiness situation is alarming is a gross understatement. Iowa leans heavily on its National Guard for emergency response. Guard units operating with 30% of their equipment and with only 14
months of dwell time are simply not in a position to respond to an emergency at home—or be called up as an operational force to respond to threats facing our Nation abroad.

1. Last week General Cody told me that, even once the Grow the Force Initiative is complete, our ground forces will be operating at a 1:2 dwell time ratio while the size and pace of our current deployments continue. DOD’s deployment policy currently requires Reserve components to meet a 1 in 5 deployment ratio. This was clearly not the case for the 833rd Engineer Company nor for the many units across the country that are experiencing 1 to 1 deployment ratios.

   a. Can you please outline for me what, in your belief, must be achieved in dwell time ratios in order to assure that our ground forces—both active duty and reserve—are properly trained, equipped, and rested?

   b. What are the strategic risks associated with continuing deployments at the current rate? What are the risks to our servicemembers and their families?

   c. According to Admiral Mullen, “the most likely near term attack on the United States will come from al Qaeda” via the safe havens in the under-governed regions of Pakistan. How would current commitments and readiness levels affect the timeliness and effectiveness of our response to an unforeseen contingency along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border or elsewhere?

Thank you. I believe that it is imperative that Congress acknowledge and address the declining readiness of the ground forces in the interest of our security at home and abroad. I strongly believe that we must commit to restoring the readiness of the military, particularly the ground forces, in order to mitigate the strategic risk of our current readiness shortfalls.

Mr. DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Loebsack, for your important and incisive questions. In our recent book, *Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power*, Fred Kagan and I addressed a number of the issues that you have raised. Our core argument is that the insufficient size of America’s land forces is the most significant constraint on U.S. military strategy. In order to address the dire divergence between American military ends and American military means, Fred and I have argued that the United States requires a million-man active-duty land force, with a proper balance of marines and soldiers, configured in such a way as to win the conflicts that have come to characterize the Long War on terrorism. In order to meet the full spectrum of the nation’s needs, however, we must look beyond the number of active brigades and regiments. We must also restore the role of the National Guard and reserve components as genuine strategic reserve, not simply another pool of resources to meet immediate rotational requirements.

For five years, activated reservists and National Guardsmen have been providing 15 to 20 percent of present U.S. Army active strength. As a result, they no longer represent a strategic reserve, hedging against unforeseen contingencies, but an operational reserve. As such, they are being strained by the rotational demands of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Long War efforts just like the regular force. In sum, the failure to expand, refit, and restructure U.S. land forces in a timely fashion that the 9/11 attacks has left the Army and Marine Corps brittle. The force certainly is not broken, but its institutional basis is cracking.

The growing willingness of the senior military leadership to see Guard units as operational rather than strategic reserves is sure to have implications for their training and their availability for traditional homeland security and disaster relief missions, but the trade-offs are not clear-cut. As long as America faces an urgent need for combat power in ongoing wars, the priority must go to addressing that need, rather than keeping force at home for possible contingencies. Nevertheless, the military remains the only force that can reliably and quickly respond to large scale disasters. This capability, therefore, must continue to be resourced as a core mission, not simply as a lesser included requirement, even as the Guard is takes on additional missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

With regard to the necessary length of dwell times, I would call your attention to a series of observations by Lieutenant General Ray Odierno. Since April 2007, Lieutenant General Odierno has been frequently questioned as to the strains that extended, 15-month tours and the 1:1 dwell time ratio has exacted on his soldiers. In response, he has pointed out that there are two good ways to relieve these strains: first, win the war that we are fighting; second, increase the size of our ground forces. The sooner we accomplish either of these objectives, the sooner our forces can come home. Constraining the number and rate at which forces can be de-
ployed only serves to extend and jeopardize the success of the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

As Fred and I argue in *Ground Truth*, the current strain on America’s ground forces has required the armed services to accept an increasing imbalance among the active and reserve components and their missions. America’s ground forces can mitigate this imbalance, first and foremost, by increasing their numbers dramatically—though that would simply be a starting point. Any effort to grow U.S. ground forces must also be supplemented by an effort to reshape, restructure, and reequip them. Improving this balance and growing the force would ease the burden on soldiers and marines, who would need to be deployed less often, as well as on the National Guard and Reserves, which could pursue their true functions instead of being called upon to make up any shortages in Army manpower.