[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-118]
IRREGULAR WARFARE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS: APPROACHES TO INTERAGENCY
INTEGRATION
__________
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
MEETING JOINTLY WITH
TERRORISM AND UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 26, 2008
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey JEFF MILLER, Florida
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
JIM COOPER, Tennessee K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania
Suzanne McKenna, Professional Staff Member
Thomas Hawley, Professional Staff Member
Roger Zakheim, Professional Staff Member
Sasha Rogers, Research Assistant
------
TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee KEN CALVERT, California
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
MARK UDALL, Colorado THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
KATHY CASTOR, Florida
Eryn Robinson, Professional Staff Member
Alex Kugajevsky, Professional Staff Member
Andrew Tabler, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2008
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, February 26, 2008, Irregular Warfare and Stability
Operations: Approaches to Interagency Integration.............. 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, February 26, 2008....................................... 37
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2008
IRREGULAR WARFARE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS: APPROACHES TO INTERAGENCY
INTEGRATION
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking
Member, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee.............. 3
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee................................................... 2
Snyder, Hon. Vic, Representative from Arkansas, Chairman,
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee...................... 1
Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Ranking
Member, Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee................................................... 2
WITNESSES
Davenport, Rear Adm. Dan, U.S. Navy, Director, Joint Concept
Development and Experimentation Directorate (J-9), U.S. Joint
Forces Command................................................. 19
Herbst, Ambassador John, Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization, U.S. Department of State........................ 5
Holmes, Brig. Gen. Robert H., U.S. Air Force, Deputy Director of
Operations, U.S. Central Command............................... 21
Kearney, Lt. Gen. Frank, U.S. Army, Deputy Commander, U.S.
Special Operations Command..................................... 22
Osborne, Col. Joseph E., U.S. Army, Director, Irregular Warfare
Directorate (J-10), U.S. Special Operations Command............ 24
Vickers, Michael, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent
Capabilities, U.S. Department of Defense....................... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Akin, Hon. W. Todd........................................... 45
Davenport, Rear Adm. Dan..................................... 61
Herbst, Ambassador John...................................... 54
Holmes, Brig. Gen. Robert H.................................. 72
Osborne, Col. Joseph E....................................... 79
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 44
Snyder, Hon. Vic............................................. 41
Thornberry, Hon. Mac......................................... 47
Vickers, Michael............................................. 48
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Mrs. Davis of California..................................... 103
Mrs. Drake................................................... 104
Mr. Marshall................................................. 100
Dr. Snyder................................................... 91
IRREGULAR WARFARE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS: APPROACHES TO INTERAGENCY
INTEGRATION
----------
House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Oversight and Investigations
Subcommittee, Meeting Jointly with Terrorism
and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee, Washington, DC, Tuesday, February
26, 2008.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:06 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations)
presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
Dr. Snyder. The hearing will come to order.
As you know, this is a joint hearing that we are having
this afternoon between the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations of which I am the subcommittee Chair and Mr.
Akin is the ranking member and the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities of which Mr. Adam
Smith is the chairman and Mr. Thornberry is the ranking.
If you have any curiosity about why I am sitting here and
Mr. Smith is sitting there, it is because, at some point about
12 years ago, there was a flip of the coin that determined I
had overwhelmingly more senior status compared to him, even
though the election was the same exact date. But, actually, it
is because he is in the West Coast time zone, and the election
in Arkansas closed in 1996 slightly before the one in
Washington State.
You know, we have a big Presidential campaign going on
right now, and all of us have followed this with some interest.
I have not heard the phrases ``Joint Interagency Coordination
Group,'' ``Effects Synchronization Committee,'' or ``Irregular
Warfare Fusion Center'' come up at any of the debates or any of
the speeches of any of our candidates, and yet we are all here
today because we think this stuff is pretty important. We think
it has a lot to do on some of the good things that have
happened in our national security in the past and some of the
better things we hope to happen in the future as we get better
and better at these interagency relationships, and I, frankly,
think we have quite a ways to go. So that is why we are here
today.
And we wanted to welcome you, and I think that is all I
will say at this point, other than I want to give you fair
warning we do have votes coming up probably in the 3:00-3:30
range. I would encourage all our witnesses to summarize your
opening statements. You need to tell us whatever you think you
need to tell us, but I would err on the side of brevity, and I
personally also would appreciate it if you avoided acronyms.
There was a fairly impressive display of acronyms in the
written statements. I considered putting up a jar that you
would have to throw a dollar in the pot every time you used an
acronym. Now this is risky for some of you because I suspect
some of you have an acronym that you do not know what it stands
for, but that will be fun, too.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
So Mr. Smith.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM AND UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Snyder.
I agree with all the statements of Mr. Snyder and will be
brief myself in respect to time and look forward to hearing
from our witnesses and hearing the interaction.
Obviously, these issues are very important. I have spoken
to Mr. Vickers about it before. We are very interested in this
committee on counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, and what we
can do to get better at it, and I guess the one piece that I am
interested in most is the interagency cooperation piece, which
is why, of course, we have the State Department and the Defense
Department here, but there are many other agencies as well who
have a piece of this.
And I think one of the challenges in getting this right is
figuring out what all of those pieces are and bringing them
together, and the model that is, you know, stuck in my mind is
what they have done over at Joint Special Operations Command
(JSOC) on the direct action piece. They do briefings, and they
have everybody under the sun from all over the world from a
whole bunch of different agencies. They get together--I think
they get together once a day--to talk about it, so everybody is
on the same page, everybody is playing, everyone has some idea
who the other guys are.
I think one of the challenges on the low-intensity conflict
irregular warfare piece is, first of all, figuring out who
those players are in the various different places, but then
getting them together. So I am very interested in your ideas on
how we could pull that together because that is my vision, is
that we have, you know, that sort of hearing every day the same
way they do at JSOC on the irregular warfare counterinsurgency
side.
So I look forward to the testimony, and I thank Chairman
Snyder for doing this joint hearing.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 44.]
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Thornberry.
STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS,
RANKING MEMBER, TERRORISM AND UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You also will not hear in the Presidential debates that
this is an issue that Republicans and Democrats, at least on
these two subcommittees, strongly agree upon, that this is a
very important matter with a sense of urgency, and I think all
of us, who have talked to folks coming back from Iraq and
Afghanistan as well as a fair number of people within the
beltway, share that sense of urgency that something has to be
done to help this government be more effective at the kinds of
things that we are talking about today.
So I appreciate you all being here and look forward to your
statements.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in
the Appendix on page 47.]
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Akin.
STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI,
RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just to pretty much echo what the others have said, this is
an issue--the idea of extending jointness beyond just
Department of Defense--that is attractive for a couple of
different reasons. One, the potential for improving how we
operate with foreign countries is tremendous, and the second is
that, unlike most issues that we deal with--you have the
liberals, conservatives, Republicans, Democrats--everybody is
interested and has the sense that this is a very high payback
kind of project to be working on. So just a whole lot of
interest.
And if I could submit my opening statement for the record,
Mr. Chairman?
Dr. Snyder. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the
Appendix on page 45.]
Dr. Snyder. Any opening statements of committee members
will be made part of the record.
Your all's opening statements, without objection, will be
made part of the record.
I also wanted to mention in the spirit of both Mr.
Thornberry and Mr. Akin that Bill Delahunt, who is one of the
subcommittee Chairs on Foreign Affairs, is very interested in
this topic. He and I have talked about doing joint committee
hearings on it. Mr. Tierney from the Government Reform and
Oversight Committee--he is one of the subcommittee Chairs
there--he is also very interested in this topic and would have
been here today but for a conflict. And Sam Farr from the
Appropriations Committee is very interested in this topic and
has attended several of our hearings here.
That is by way of saying this is of bigger interest than
just one small or two small subcommittees. I think there is a
lot of interest. I know Mr. Skelton is very interested in this
topic, too.
With that, Mr. Vickers, we are going to put on the five-
minute clock. When the red light goes off, you feel free to
keep talking if you have something to tell us, it is just to
give you an idea of where your time is at.
Mr. Vickers.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL VICKERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND
INTERDEPENDENT CAPABILITIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Vickers. Thank you.
Chairman Snyder, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Akin,
Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished members of the
subcommittees, I am pleased to be here with you today to
discuss the Department's progress in developing capabilities
and capacities for irregular warfare and stability operations
and in integrating these capabilities with those of other U.S.
Government departments and agencies.
Today and for decades to come, the United States and our
international partners must contend with terrorists with global
reach, with rogue regimes that support terrorists and seek to
acquire weapons of mass destruction, with threats emerging in
and emanating from ungoverned areas and weak or failing states,
and with new manifestations of ethnic and sectarian and tribal
conflict. Most importantly, many of these threats emanate from
countries with which the United States is not at war and thus
placing a premium on interagency cooperation and integration.
The responses to these many threats extend well beyond the
traditional domain of any single government agency or
department.
It is my responsibility as Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and
Interdependent Capabilities to implement the vision provided in
the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) across all of the
Department's warfighting capabilities, while providing policy
oversight over their employment.
The QDR importantly established that irregular warfare,
with stability operations as an important subset, is as
strategically important to the United States and the Department
of Defense as traditional warfare. As a result, it was
incorporated into the Department's force planning construct,
influencing not only the size of our force, but the shape of
our force and its capabilities as well.
Irregular warfare includes counterterrorism, unconventional
warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and
stability operations, although stability operations also can be
outside of irregular warfare. Many of the capabilities required
to execute these missions are resident in some parts of our
force, but not with sufficient capacity to meet expected
demand. In other cases, we need to develop new capabilities to
address emerging challenges.
Rebalancing the overall defense portfolio to ensure that
the Joint Force is as effective in irregular warfare as it is
in traditional warfare requires focused efforts in three areas:
growing Special Operations Forces capacity while ensuring
continued quality, rebalancing general purpose force capability
toward irregular warfare while maintaining their capability for
a conventional campaign, and then promoting increased
integration between SOF, Special Operations Forces, and our
general purpose forces, between the Department of Defense and
our interagency partners, and between the U.S. Government and
our international partners.
We are exploring several transformational ways to enhance
our irregular warfare capabilities. Very recently, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Gordon England initiated a departmentwide
review of the capabilities required to train, advise, and
assist foreign security forces. The results from this study
will soon be reflected in the Department's strategic planning
and resource priorities.
The Department's strategic plan will direct further
examination of irregular warfare capabilities across a wide
range of scenarios, and it will identify areas where we can
accept some risk to increase investment in areas where we are
less proficient, including irregular warfare. We are in the
early stages of developing a Department of Defense (DOD)
directive that takes a comprehensive view of irregular warfare
concepts and requirements, and we believe this approach will
facilitate more efficient use of our resources.
We strongly support interagency planning efforts in
irregular warfare ranging from the Counterterrorism Center to
the Interagency Management System, and we have made significant
progress across the interagency.
In a separate venue, I would be happy to provide additional
detail regarding the progress we have seen in our partnerships
with the intelligence community.
DOD strongly supports the Civilian Stabilization
Initiative, a $249 million program in the State Department's
fiscal year 2009 budget request, which answers the President's
call to improve the United States' ability to respond to
instability in conflict.
In sum, the Department recognizes that winning the war on
terror requires synergistic effort from the entire U.S.
Government working by, with, and through our international
partners. With your continued support, we will continue to
exercise the agility needed to strengthen these partnerships in
ways that preserve and protect the values and interests of our
Nation.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Vickers can be found in the
Appendix on page 48.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Vickers.
Mr. Herbst. Ambassador Herbst.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JOHN HERBST, COORDINATOR FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Herbst. Chairman Snyder, Chairman Smith, Ranking
Members Akin and Thornberry, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify.
As Secretary Vickers pointed out, we face unusual dangers
today in the world from failed states. These unusual dangers
require a new response, a response which takes count of all the
assets of the U.S. Government and, for that matter, of U.S.
society.
The steps to successfully meet this challenge require doing
something that is done by the military, which is building the
necessary human capacity to develop planning and management
systems, to train experts with the necessary skills in the
situations they are likely encounter, and to repeatedly
exercise with partners until our people are ready.
At the center of this preparation is the effort to
strengthen the partnership within the United States Government
between civilians and the military, so that as new threats
evolve and possibly rise to the level of military engagement,
we have relationships that will serve our Nation effectively.
My office operates under National Security Presidential
Directive 44, which calls on both civilian and military
elements of the federal government to promote our national
security through improved coordination, planning, and
implementation. Our job is to support the Secretary of State in
her lead role in integrating U.S. efforts to prepare for, plan,
and conduct reconstruction and stabilization activities. A core
part of this job is harmonizing civilian and military efforts
so that civilians are planning and working with the military
before the start of any operation.
Over the last year, we have been working together across 15
civilian and military agencies to significantly improve the
management of U.S. Government reconstruction and stabilization
operations. This unprecedented process has brought together a
tremendous range of experts to determine the civilian capacity
of the U.S. Government, what it needs in stabilization
operations. It has required an extraordinary commitment to
staff and has required expertise that has also benefited from
the impressive support from Members of Congress, outside
experts, including the academic community.
The examination has identified three required levels of
deployable civilian efforts for use in failed states: an Active
Response Corps of up to 250 first responders from civilian
federal agencies. This Active Response Corps will be comprised
of people who are able to deploy within 48 to 72 hours of a
decision. They would be able to deploy with the 82nd Airborne,
if that was considered necessary.
Backing them up will be a Standby Response Corps of over
2,000 government officials who have full-time day jobs, but who
train several weeks a year and who will be able to deploy
within 45 to 60 days of a decision. We should be able to deploy
anywhere from 200 to 500 of the Standby Response Corps in a
crisis.
Backing them up will be a Civilian Reserve Corps, modeled
after our military reserve system, comprised of private
citizens from across the country who would sign up for four
years, who would train for several weeks a year, and who would
deploy for up to one year in that four-year period. We are
talking about having 2,000 people in the Civilian Reserve Corps
of whom we could deploy up to 25 percent at any one time.
The Civilian Stabilization Initiative would create these
three corps of people. It was embraced by the President and
presented to the Congress in the fiscal year 2009 budget. The
cost for this is $248.6 million. The Civilian Stabilization
Initiative, as outlined in the President's budget request, will
provide a full complement of U.S. civilian personnel that can
respond quickly and flexibly to stabilization challenges. It
provides for new positions within the U.S. State Department,
the Agency for International Development (AID), and other
partner agencies devoted to increasing civilian reconstruction
and stabilization expertise.
This initiative is a critical first step to ensure that we
have the right people with the right skills ready to deploy
quickly. However, making sure that these experts are doing the
right things on the ground according to one strategic plan,
with full synchronization between military and civilian
operations, continues to be the most complex and challenging
task under National Presidential Security Directive 44. In
response to the challenge, we have created the Interagency
Management System. This system fully links efforts of the State
Department, the other civilian agencies, and the Department of
Defense to ensure a single plan of operations in a
stabilization crisis.
We have already been partnering with our other civilian
agencies and the military and, for that matter, with
international partners to test the Interagency Management
System. We have worked out planning systems and potential
challenges in the training and exercise environment so we will
be ready to respond effectively when the next crisis occurs.
There is no question that failed states represent a
premier, if not the premier, security challenge of the next
generation. Building a U.S. civilian planning and response
capability as embodied in the Civilian Stabilization Initiative
will ensure that we are able to partner with the military,
providing the necessary skills to deal with our national
security challenges.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Herbst can be found
in the Appendix on page 54.]
Dr. Snyder. Gentlemen, we were wrong in our estimation of
our times. The beepers went off. There will be a series of
votes. We are going to try to get in a question or two or
three. I am going to ask one question and go to--who is next
then? Mr. Smith?
I wanted to ask, in your written statement, Ambassador
Herbst, on page three, you state, ``Just as the military
underwent tremendous reform in the 1980's following the passage
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, we are proposing shifts across
our civilian agencies that will bring all elements of national
power to bear in the defense of America's vital interests.''
A lot of us have talked about the Goldwater-Nichols, I
guess, more as a metaphor or example of proposed change. What
do you see that is on the scene right now that rises to the
level of the Goldwater-Nichols Reform Act in terms of what is
going on? I mean, I do not see that level. I do not see that
level of mandate, that level of incentive in personal policies,
that level of transparency, that level of drive from the
highest levels of government, but what do you see that compares
what you all are doing right now to that level of mandate?
Ambassador Herbst. I think that the Interagency Management
System under National Security Presidential Directive 44 is
roughly analogous to Goldwater-Nichols. This National Security
Presidential Directive and our agreement as we implement it
have established interagency coordination which did not exist
in the past.
We will have an Assistant Secretary level group called the
Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group overseeing
policy. Every civilian agency which has assets to bear in a
stabilization crisis will sit on this policy group. Under this
group, there will be a secretariat which will write a plan of
stabilization operations.
If the Civilian Stabilization Initiative is approved, if it
is funded, we will create standing bodies of 250 Active
Response Corps members who will sit in all civilian agencies,
who will train extensively as a team, who will be represented
in my office which will function as an interagency office, to
produce an interagency plan with interagency teams to deal with
the crisis of stabilization operations.
This will give us an effective interagency tool using each
asset of the interagency linked up entirely with our military
to deal with stabilization crises.
Now there are some things that could still be done. The
Interagency Management System has to be utilized. We have to
adjust not just training procedures--that is underway--but also
employment practices. But these are things which are right now
being considered for addition in, for example, the State
Department's personnel system to insist that people get
involved in interagency activities, to make that part of the
standards for advancement in the Foreign Service.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Smith for five minutes for questions.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. I will try to be quick.
Just sort of following up on what Dr. Snyder said, I think
our real concern on--certainly on my subcommittee that Mr.
Thornberry and I have talked about and I think Dr. Snyder
shares that concern as well--is the level of commitment to
these types of changes, and there are, you know, a lot of
things we are worried about that have not happened.
I mean, you look at the Defense Department budget, you
know, post-9/11, it has gone up. You can look at that, and you
see everything that has happened post-9/11 and really get a
good gauge of our commitment to sort of the shooting side of
the war, if you will.
On this side of it, on the counterinsurgency, irregular
warfare, you know, development aid has not really gone up. The
United States Information Agency has been, you know, gotten rid
of, not really focused on very much. USAID declassified within
the State Department. None of that has been replaced. The
budgets across the board for you at State anywhere have not
gone up.
And the other question is--when you look at what you are
talking about putting together here, the question of sort of
who is running it--you know, back to my JSOC analogy, without
getting too much into that because a lot of it is classified, I
know who is in charge of that, and you can look at that and you
can see how they have structured it to make sure it gets done.
On this side of it, it seems like, number one, we were
painfully slow to react. We were into 2006 and 2007 before we
started doing some of these things, and even now there is a lot
of activity, but there is not a lot more money. So where are we
pumping the money in? How are we, you know, raising the focus,
getting someone who is in charge, really making those shifts?
And I ask that as a friendly question because we on this
committee want to help. You know, we want to help direct money.
We want to help place greater emphasis there. We just want to
get sort of a feeling on the Administration side, what are they
truly doing to bring this about, if there are not those changes
that I have just talked about in some of the key areas,
particularly when you talk about the bottom line, money,
getting the money in to really beef these things up.
Ambassador Herbst. Mr. Chairman, I think that there is no
question that the fiscal year 2009 budget presented by the
Administration reflects the same concerns that you have just
expressed. It reflects the recognition that to enhance our
national security, we have to beef up not just the personnel
and the budget at the State Department and USAID, but also
create this fast response capability, the Civilian
Stabilization Initiative, for which I am responsible.
Now, given your concerns, I would hope that there would be
support for the budget request we have put forward, but we
understand that the budget is an important part--but not the
only part--of it. To deal with the type of crises that we are
facing and are going to face for the next generation or two, we
need to have the interoperability within the U.S. Government on
the civilian side which we have not seen in the past.
A very smart guy in my office posted a sign on his door
quoting Machiavelli saying, ``There is nothing more difficult
than to create a new system in government.'' I can appreciate
the insight of Machiavelli, having done this job for the last
20 months, but point of fact, we have made a breakthrough in
the Administration.
Over a year ago at an Assistant Secretary level group that
I chaired in January of 2007, we reached agreement on the
civilian capabilities we need. We reached agreement on
Interagency Management System. And this was then approved at
higher levels in the Administration.
What we need now is to get the approval and support of the
Congress to do this, and with that, we could have this
capability up and running within 15 to 18 months, once we have
the approval.
And then we will be able to put these civilians into the
field, and we will need a vast improvement over how we have
been doing things to date, although I am certain we will find
new problems that we will have to fix.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. I appreciate that.
Dr. Snyder. We will give Mr. Thornberry a quick bite at the
apple before we have to run.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Vickers, let me play devil's advocate for just a
second. I would argue perhaps that there are elements of
irregular warfare that are fundamentally incompatible with big
bureaucracies.
You mentioned in your statement strategic communications,
for example. So, whether you are talking about within the
Department of Defense or on an interagency basis, if you are
not moving in real time with communications and making
decisions and getting messages out, you are not a player in the
game. If you have to run up the chain of command and get this
approval and that sign-off, you are irrelevant to the
communications that are going on at that point.
And so the skeptic in me would say adding layers of new
coordinating committees is not going to solve this problem. It
requires deeper change than that.
Now do you think I am wrong?
Mr. Vickers. No, I think you are absolutely right. As a
veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency, a lot of things
that we were able to do in the 1980's depended on just those
kinds of shortcuts.
Strategic communications is probably an area where not just
the interagency system, but our strategy and, to some extent,
our capabilities, but fundamentally our strategic approach has
the furthest to go, and I will be quite candid about that.
I think the important point that you were making, which I
would underscore, is interagency integration is not enough. You
really need interagency capabilities, and you need appropriate
strategies. All the integration in the world is not going to
work if we do not have the right tools to work with, and that
is why things like the Civilian Stabilization Initiative or--as
my own Secretary has said, we have done a lot to improve our
intelligence since 9/11, we have expanded the Department of
Defense, we have done correspondingly less in the Department of
the State, and we need to shore up capabilities in that area.
And then I agree strategic communications is an area where
there is much to be done.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Akin, when we come back, you will begin.
You will get your full five minutes.
I think we are in for several votes. The staff will work
with any of you here, both our first and second panel, if you
need phones or a private room or whatever it is that we can
help you with. I apologize for this, but we will be back.
[Recess.]
Dr. Snyder. We appreciate your all's patience. The House
floor business is done for the day, so unless lightning
strikes, we are in good shape here. We appreciate you being
here. I know some of you have had to move schedules around.
What we will do is finish with the questions of you, Mr.
Vickers and Mr. Herbst, and then have you all slide down, bring
our other witnesses, hear their opening statements, and then go
another round, and we certainly understand if anybody needs to
leave. We appreciate your patience.
Mr. Akin for five minutes.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We were pretty much, as I recall, on the subject of trying
to develop this concept of jointness, and I understand,
Ambassador, your concept that, first of all, if you start where
you are all agreeing to what the plan is, that that is a very
good first step.
When we looked at jointness some years ago, I am afraid
before my time even, there were several things that were felt
were important. One of them was basically to force people to
interoperate so you are mixing your management up with people
from all sides.
The first question is: Is that necessary?
The second question: I have heard it said the State
Department just the way it is organized as an agency does not
fit into this kind of concept very well anyway, just because of
the structure of the way that they think and organize. I do not
know if that is excessive pessimism or realism. I am not sure.
And then the third thing would be: As you take a look at
putting things together on the side of the administration, do
you have a problem with the fact that--military people, you
say, ``Go there'' or ``Do that.'' The State Department people
say, ``I do not think I want that assignment. I will take
something else.'' How do you deal with that question?
So I think that is just a start.
Ambassador Herbst. Well, first of all, it is certainly true
that in order to develop effective civilian interagency
operations, we need to plan, train, and deploy together, and
all of this is envisaged under the Civilian Stabilization
Initiative. Even before we had put this initiative forward, we
had been planning and training together. There have been
various exercises, civilian and civilian-military, which have
participation from USAID, Treasury, Justice, State and so on.
This is the future, and we understand that, and approval by
Congress for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative will give us
an enormous amount of momentum.
Regarding the State organization, I am not here to address
the past. I am here to address what we are doing and what we
expect to be doing in the future. We understand--the Office of
the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)
and the Secretary of State operating under S/CRS understand--
that interoperability, working with our interagency partners,
is absolutely essential to meet our national security
interests, and that is what we are developing, and that is what
we intend to do.
Finally, the notion of assignments and how people get to go
to the world's more interesting and less benign places. The
force that we are developing is meant to be used in all
circumstances, including hostile circumstances. The Active
Response Corps will be deploying people to places where bullets
are flying, perhaps along with, at the same time as, our
military.
S/CRS has already pioneered this concept in miniature. I
have a 10-person Active Response Corps, and my folks have been
to Lebanon, to Darfur, to Eastern Chad, to Nepal, to Sri Lanka,
to Haiti, to Kosovo. We have been to the places where the chips
are on the table.
And when people sign up for the Active Response Corps, they
understand that they will be going at times in harm's way, this
is part of the pitch, and if people choose not to go, then
there are penalties. The penalties are being fired. Penalties
are being forced to pay for any training that they may have
received. So we believe that this system will work at putting
State Department and other civilians into the world's wild
places to our advantage.
Mr. Akin. It seems to me to be odd to hear you say it is
the same team that could go to all those different places. I
would think you would have people that are sort of both
language-wise, but also culturally very attuned to a more
specialized block of countries, instead of having somebody that
is supposed to speak 100 different kinds of languages. Am I
missing something?
Ambassador Herbst. Well, right now, you would say that I
have a boutique capability. Ten people are interesting, but not
much more than that. With 10 people, there are limits to what
you can do.
But if we create a corps of 250 of the Active Response
Corps, and then the standby and the Civilian Reserve Corps,
first, we will find a number of people have many of the
languages that we will need. Second, but more importantly, we
will be training, besides the experts to go out, people who
have functional skills that we need, police skills, lawyering
skills, engineering skills.
We will couple them with area experts, with language
experts. So, when we send a team to Haiti, they will include
French, and not just French speakers. If we send someone to
Afghanistan, they will speak Dari as well as having functional
skills, and we will be training people to operate in different
environments.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Saxton for five minutes.
Mr. Saxton. First, let me congratulate you on endeavoring
to fix a problem that, as you have heard us all say, we think
is quite important.
When we went to Iraq, the first few days of the experience
were quite successful, and then we got into a situation that
perhaps none of us could have anticipated or did anticipate at
least, and during that time, it became obvious that there were
a number of issues in Iraq that needed attention. Perhaps as
well-intended as we were, we sent a team of folks who did not
have all those skills. They were trained to do other things,
and they did them very well, frankly. The Special Operations
Command did well. The various divisions that were deployed to
Iraq did well in doing what they were trained to do. However,
they were not trained to stabilize the country.
I have here a little chart that came from a joint
publication from Joint Operations on September 17, 2006, and it
is a model that depicts various stages of conflict, and we did
fine. We seized the initiative, we dominated the military
fight, and then we got to the stabilization stage and ran into
trouble, and so the stabilization stage, I think, is what we
are endeavoring to fix.
Congressman Sam Farr has introduced legislation, which I
think you are familiar with, which, frankly, I am a co-sponsor
of, and so I think that we owe you a debt of gratitude for
endeavoring to put together a program to plug a hole that we
see in that phase that this chart calls stabilization because
the real aim for us is to get Iraq back up on its feet and
other countries that we may be involved in, like Afghanistan,
which is also a problem, same kind of problem--different
issues, same kind of problem.
So I guess my question is, in a couple of minutes, which is
all I have left really in my five-minute time, can you just
say, in the case of Iraq, which you are all intimately and
painfully familiar with, if your program were in place, how do
you visualize it would be dealing with stabilization in Iraq in
a way that would better enable us to come to Phase 5, which is
turning it over to a civilian authority, the Iraqis?
Ambassador Herbst. Well, it is always a little dangerous to
address hypotheticals, Mr. Congressman.
And thank you for your kind remarks.
But let me just make a few general points. If we had at the
time of our operation in Iraq the capability that we want to
create in this Civilian Stabilization Initiative, we would have
been able, one, through the Interagency Management System to
draw up a plan of civilian operations that were completely
linked with the military plans so that from the moment the
military engaged, civilians would have either been alongside of
them or ready to move shortly after they had won the military
battle.
We would have a single command-and-control structure for
civilian operations overseeing all aspects of civilian
activities so they would be responsible, for example, for all
civilians on the ground, the contractors as well as the members
of the U.S. Government. They would be overseeing those
contracts that the contractors are performing. There would have
been a single address for all civilian activities ensuring that
there was no duplication of activities and no operations at
cross-purposes.
We also would have, if we had in place the people we are
asking for in the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, been able
to put into the field, into Iraq, within 60 days of a decision
anywhere from 900 to 1,200 people to man this command-and-
control structure. They would have been able to begin
operations immediately alongside, if it seemed prudent at the
time, their military partners.
What that would have done for the outcome is difficult to
say, but that is what we would have had, and this is the
capability that we are offering you or asking for your support
to help us build, and I do not have any doubt this will make
our future endeavors, if we find ourselves in similar
situations, more successful.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Chairman, if I could have just one follow
up?
You have talked a lot about partnerships, and I think that
is a good concept. But somebody has to be in charge. Who is in
charge of the partnerships?
Ambassador Herbst. Well, the way we have structured this in
the Interagency Management System, you would have an
interagency group at the lower policy level co-chaired by the
regional assistant Secretary of State, his or her counterpart
at the NSC, and the head of my office.
But point of fact, any serious decisions regarding a major
operation would be made at much more senior levels. This group
would then have responsibility for overseeing the
implementation of that, and chances are that oversight would
fall to my office as an implementer. We would not be running
policy. We would be overseeing implementation, and you would,
therefore, have one-stop shopping when it comes to getting
questions asked about how implementation is proceeding.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Kline for five minutes.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
I just came back from Afghanistan a week ago today, and
what I heard is being echoed all over this place from
tremendous American leaders, military personnel saying, ``We
need civilians.'' We need farmers for one thing, people who
understand agriculture, understand processing, shipping,
marketing, and all those sorts of things. So the need is
urgent, and the cry is loud, and it is way past time to start
doing something about it. So I applaud the efforts being made
here.
But I also remember 20 years or so ago when I was still in
uniform and we had Goldwater-Nichols, and we decided to do
joint and be able to operate, have Joint Operations and
``interoperability'' was a big word. Frankly, that was a very
painful exercise for those of us in uniform. If it had not been
for statute, we probably would not have done many of those
things. It included orders to places we had not wanted to go to
before, going to schools, making the schools joint, all sorts
of things, getting to be Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs) and
all of that.
One of those things, clearly, that I think has made a
difference and where the Department of Defense and the military
services have been able to do as well as they have in meeting
responsibilities besides warfighting, besides shooting has come
because of the terrific education system that we have. The war
colleges, all of them, have done a fabulous job. There has even
been sort of token representation from some people in civilian
attire, very small numbers, but we are always glad to have them
there, and with some of the faculty, you have some expertise in
areas besides the uniformed services.
My point is I think that has been an important part of the
interoperability and the success that the uniformed military is
having, and if we are going to have this sort of success in
this interagency operation, I just wonder are there discussions
between the departments, within the departments, within State,
within other agencies about such an education system that would
bring others up to that same level of understanding, either one
or both of you?
Ambassador Herbst. There is no question that one of the
reasons why the Pentagon produces outstanding leaders is that
they have the personnel that can take time off from doing jobs
to go into training, and they have excellent courses at the war
colleges.
Mr. Kline. Excuse me. If I can interrupt for just a minute,
I would just throw out here that during those early days,
particularly in the late 1980's and early 1990's, there were
members of the services--I would just pick on the Navy in
particular--who said, ``We do not have time to do that. We
cannot take time off from our regular job. We have to run
ships, and we have to do other things.'' So I do not know if I
am detecting a resistance, ``We do not have the time to do
that,'' in civilian attire, but I will just tell you that the
military services felt like they did not have time to do it
either.
So I am sorry. Back to you.
Ambassador Herbst. You detected something that was not
there.
Mr. Kline. Oh, good. I am glad to hear it.
Ambassador Herbst. The point that I started to make was
that the Pentagon is sufficiently staffed with people so that
they can take time off from their jobs and go to the war
colleges, and they have someone else to do their jobs while
they are away, and, in fact, going to the war college is an
important part of their professional advancement, something
they have to do in order to rise in the ranks.
Mr. Kline. Exactly.
Ambassador Herbst. In the State Department, we do not have
the number of people we need in order to take that time off,
and, in fact, that is one of the reasons why in this year's
budget request we have asked for an increase in State
Department personnel to give them time so that they could take
time off to do the war college and, for that matter, to do
language training.
By the way, this is not my area of responsibility, but I
happen to know a little bit about it.
So we get the concept. We need the resources in order to do
it the right way. That is point one.
Point two: In the little area that I am responsible for, we
get the notion that training is critical. It is critical in
part but not only because we are teaching skills which people
who join the State Department have not necessarily acquired
before they signed up.
But one thing my office does well by State Department
standards is planning. We still have a way to go to match our
military planners, but we are getting stronger by the week.
That is a skill that we are teaching our fellow officers at
State. We have created training courses which include planning,
which include interoperability with other agencies, including
with the military, and anyone who signs up to work at my office
takes those courses. For that matter, some staff members in
Congress have taken those courses--they can vouch for their
utility--as have many soldiers--people going off to Iraq and
Afghanistan have taken them and have welcomed these courses--as
have foreigners, part of our reach-out.
The point is we get this. We get this.
In order to do it right, though, we will need more
resources. The Civilian Stabilization Initiative includes
several million dollars--I can give you the exact figure, but I
do not have it off the top of my head--for training. If we
approve the initiative, we are going to need to train within a
few months 44,250 people.
We will do that by using the Foreign Service Institute, by
using our friends in the military, the Army War College, Joint
Forces Command (JFCOM), and so on in order to give these
thousands of people the necessary training they need to be able
to go into a difficult unstable environment.
Mr. Kline. Okay. Thank you.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Hayes.
Mr. Kline. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder. We will go to Mr. Hayes and then to Mrs. Davis
and then to Mrs. Gillibrand.
Mr. Hayes for five minutes.
Mr. Hayes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Vickers, I enjoyed being with you Friday.
What guidance has been given to the combatant commanders on
pinpointing and prioritizing our stabilizing stability
operations and what sort of list has the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) developed that relates to these
priorities?
Mr. Vickers. Well, we started in this area in 2005 with DOD
Directive 3000-05, which is military support for stability,
security, reconstruction, operations, and then the Quadrennial
Defense Review provided additional strategic guidance. That
guidance in turn has been implemented in an irregular warfare
road map and most recently in the department's strategic plan
in the guidance for the development of the force, which lays
out investment priorities for fiscal years 2010 through 2015
and then looks out 15 years beyond that.
The combatant commands, as part of this process, sent in
their integrated priority lists for capability shortfalls, a
number of which now reflect stability operations or irregular
warfare capabilities, with Central Command (CENTCOM) being the
prime example of that since they have the most business right
now. But all the combatant commands basically are stepping up
in this area.
One final point, to shape our capabilities in this area, we
are completely revamping our defense planning scenarios. Three
years ago--this gets into a classified area, but I will talk
about it in general terms--we had three scenarios. None of them
involved irregular warfare or stability operations.
We are developing a family now, I believe, of about 15 of
them. They span homeland defense to irregular war and stability
ops to a broader range. There are probably six or seven or so
that deal with irregular warfare and stability ops that then
ought to shape the future military and, of course, how we
interact with our interagency international partners.
Mr. Hayes. Thank you, sir. That was not quite as specific
as I wanted to get, but----
Ambassador Herbst, have you talked to your folks in the
field about the critical importance of interagency
communications and how vital that is to the process and how
that is being improved? Can you comment on that?
Ambassador Herbst. Certainly it is critical. We understand
it. Before the 82nd Airborne deployed to Afghanistan last year
to take control of American operations in Afghanistan as
opposed to NATO operations, we were asked by the commander to
send a team out to improve communications among his staff, the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and our embassies, and
we did that.
The Interagency Management System calls for use of
something called an integration planning cell, which would be
deployed to the regional combatant commander in an operation
led by American troops, by that regional combatant commander
where there are also civilian operations, to ensure that
civilian and military operations are completely linked up.
So we understand that this is critical, and we have built
this into our operations.
Mr. Hayes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Dr. Snyder. Mrs. Davis for five minutes.
Mrs. Davis of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for being here.
Perhaps this actually just follows, Mr. Ambassador, on what
you said and particularly the emphasis on planning, training,
and deploying together.
We happened to be at Camp Lejeune yesterday, and they spoke
of the training that the Marines will be getting before they
deploy to Afghanistan, and I think it is the bulk of the
Marines who will be going. I understand that Fort Bragg is
perhaps doing some interagency work.
When I asked the general what is going to be different
about their training, he spoke about the cultural training and
he spoke about the linguistic training. He did not mention, but
perhaps it is there, that there would be this kind of
interagency coordination going on, and if you talk to anybody
who has been out in the field with PRTs, they will say how
valuable it would have been had they been able to plan and
train together.
Are you working on this with the training of the Marines at
Camp Lejeune specifically?
Ambassador Herbst. Okay. We understand the importance of
this. We have engaged in training at Fort Bragg. We and USAID
have engaged along with the military at Fort Bragg, but we have
not been engaged at Camp Lejeune. It is something we will look
into, and if we can make a contribution, we would be happy to.
Mrs. Davis of California. I hope you would consider that
because----
Ambassador Herbst. Okay. I will definitely look into it.
Mrs. Davis of California. It seems like it works, and into
everything that you have been saying, and if there is something
that Congress can do to be helpful, if there is authority that
you need, whatever it is, it sounds like you already have it
basically because you are doing it in other settings.
Ambassador Herbst. We have the authority right now to help
with training. I have a staff which can do this, but is
actually rather small. If the Civilian Stabilization Initiative
is approved, our staff will grow much larger and we will have
the capability to do a great deal more.
Mrs. Davis of California. Okay. Great. Thank you. I hope
you will follow up on that.
Ambassador Herbst. I will definitely follow up.
Mrs. Davis of California. I yield back my time. Thank you.
Dr. Snyder. Mrs. Gillibrand for five minutes.
Mrs. Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your testimony.
Ambassador, the fiscal year 2009 budget request supports
the recruitment, development, and training of 250 interagency
Active Response Corps and about a 2,000-member Standby Response
Corps. Based on last year's personnel problems and the
Department of State requirement to fill jobs in Iraq, do you
see this concept as viable, given that these individuals will
likely to deploy to hostile environments?
Ambassador Herbst. This is concept is extremely viable. The
250 members of the Active Response Corps will be newly
recruited from outside the government or maybe from within the
government. We can create 250 positions, and we will be seeking
people who have the skills necessary for use in a destabilized
country.
People will be hired: A, with those skills; B, with the
understanding that they will be going into dangerous places at
times; and, C, with the understanding that they will be able to
make an enormous difference, including for our national
security.
I have done a great deal of public speaking over the past
18 months, and I can tell you there are a lot of Americans who
have done well in life in all the skill areas we need who are
looking for the opportunity to make a contribution and who
would be willing to do something, which is both very
adventurous and maybe a little bit dangerous. So I do not have
any doubt we will be able to find the people to fill these
positions.
The Standby Response Corps will be made up of people who
are currently in the government. We will need 2,000 of those.
That will, frankly, be a little bit more difficult than finding
250 among the whole American public, but I believe there, too,
we have done a great deal of work interagency, reaching
agreement on those numbers. We will be using as part of this
corps our Foreign Service nationals in the State Department and
USAID, people who are actually doing very good work right now
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and I think we will be able to come up
with 2,000 members of this. And also we have to find 2,000
members of the Civilian Reserve Corps. Drawing upon 300 million
Americans, it is eminently doable.
So there will be some glitches in the system, but the
people are out there with the skills, with the enthusiasm, with
the patriotism. This is an eminently doable project.
Mrs. Gillibrand. But why do you have such confidence
because, obviously, we have been trying to staff these PRTs for
a while, particularly in Afghanistan, and what we have heard
from the military is that they are largely staffed by military
personnel still. In your memo that is attached to your
testimony, it says, ``This strategy works to ensure that the
United States is ready to meet the next crisis, bringing all
necessary expertise to bear.'' Is it your intention that this
will actually take time and not be useful for Afghanistan or
Iraq?
Ambassador Herbst. If our budget request is approved, say,
in January of next year, then by May or June of 2010, the
capability I have described or my testimony describes would be
up and running.
Mrs. Gillibrand. By 2010?
Ambassador Herbst. It will take us 15 months, 18 months to
do that. Far be it from me to play prophet. So, if you think
that we will be in Afghanistan or in Iraq in a major way at
that time, we will have a capability that could be used for
those operations in 2010.
Mrs. Gillibrand. And what would your intention be for long-
term sustainability of these two new organizations? I mean, is
your goal to integrate this into both the State Department and
military portfolio? How would they work together?
And, obviously, if you are going to be sending these folks
to war zones, they are going to have to have some kind of
protective training, unless you intend to staff all of these
teams with military personnel to protect their work?
Ambassador Herbst. People who sign up for this will
certainly be trained to operate in hostile environments, and
there will need to be some form of security for them. They will
also be trained to operate as an interagency team. It will be
under the Secretary of State because that is what National
Presidential Security Directive 44 says, but my office already
has a sharp interagency flavor, and that flavor will only grow,
and people will be used to operating as an interagency team
because that is the only way we can be effective in these
environments.
We will find these folks. It will be a sustainable
capability. For example, in the Active Response Corps, we
believe, we can keep 80 percent in the field at any one time.
Then we will see that 20 percent as people coming in and coming
out of the corps.
The Standby Response Corps is a little bit more difficult
to put out in the field because these are people who have full-
time jobs, so we are only counting on right now being able to
deploy 10 percent of them at any one time, but we feel we
should be able to work up to 25 percent, but no more.
Mrs. Gillibrand. That seems like a relatively small number.
For example, if we just look at the work that is needed done in
Iraq and Afghanistan today, that seems very small, and one of
the things this committee has looked at under the chairmanship
of Ike Skelton is renewed view of roles and missions and what
could we be doing to think outside the box about how we grow
our military to be more effective.
And one of the discussion points that we have talked about
is doing exactly what you are doing here, but on a much larger
scale and actually training National Guard and Reserve to do
some of these stability missions so that we have an ongoing
force that is significant to handle not only issues in Iraq,
Afghanistan, or elsewhere, but also in the U.S. if we have a
terrorist attack here in the U.S., should we have national
disasters in the U.S., where you actually need the complement
of ability and training to do stability and reconstruction.
And so I see this as a wonderful idea, but it sounds like
it is going to take a very long time to put in place, and it is
going to be quite small. My concern is it is not enough of what
really needs to happen to keep America safe.
Dr. Snyder. Ambassador Herbst, if I might, why don't we
move to the next panel since that time period is up, and I
think there will be opportunities to amplify on this.
Ambassador Herbst. So I should or should not answer the
question?
Dr. Snyder. Let's not answer that one right now. I think,
given the late hour, what I would like you to do, Secretary
Vickers, Ambassador Herbst, if you can kind of slide on down to
your all's right--and I also realize that I had neglected to
formally introduce you.
Honorable Michael Vickers, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and
Interdependent Capabilities in the U.S. Department of Defense.
Ambassador John Herbst, coordinator for reconstruction and
stabilization, U.S. Department of State.
You will now be joined by Rear Admiral Dan Davenport,
director of the joint concept development and experimentation,
U.S. Joint Forces Command; Brigadier General Robert Holmes,
deputy director of operations, U.S. Central Command; Lieutenant
General Frank Kearney, deputy commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command; and Colonel Joseph Osborne, director of
irregular warfare directorate, U.S. Special Operations Command.
What we will do is have--I think we have three opening
statements--you all come on forward to your assigned pew there,
if you would please.
It is my understanding that we have three formal statements
here. As I said before, your written statements will be made
part of the record. As I said before, feel free to share with
us anything you think we need to hear. You may want to err on
the side of brevity. And then we will go to members for
questions.
Admiral Davenport, we will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. DAN DAVENPORT, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR,
JOINT CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT AND EXPERIMENTATION DIRECTORATE (J-
9), U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND
Admiral Davenport. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon.
Chairman Snyder, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Akin,
Ranking Member Thornberry, and members of the subcommittees, on
behalf of General Mattis, the commander of the U.S. Joint
Forces Command, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you today.
My testimony will address the role of Joint Forces Command
in developing irregular warfare and stability operations
concepts and doctrine as well as our ongoing efforts to improve
interagency integration at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels.
As described in my written testimony, Joint Forces Command
is actively contributing to the development of concepts,
capabilities, and doctrine to improve U.S. forces' ability to
conduct irregular warfare and stability operations and to
integrate those operations effectively with interagency and
international partners.
Informed by operational analysis, lessons learned, and best
practices from current operations, Joint Forces Command
provides solutions and practical tools for the Joint Force
commander in the form of doctrine, concepts, experimentation,
capabilities, exercises, and training. These products reflect
the evolution and maturation of military and interagency
thought and practice.
The intellectual underpinning of Joint Force Command's
(JFCOM's) pursuit of irregular warfare and stability operation
solutions and interagency advocacy resides in our joint concept
work. Developed in coordination with the Joint Staff, combatant
commands, and services, our Joint Operating Concepts address
gaps in current capabilities and provide the base for
developing solutions for the challenges we face in the future
operating environment.
The comprehensive approach to interagency integration is
foundational to our concept work. JFCOM's experimentation
program examines and validates concepts and capabilities that
span the range of doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
logistics, planning, and policy activity necessary to provide
the Joint Force commander and his interagency partners the
capabilities required.
Irregular warfare, stability operations, and interagency
integration are major focus areas for JFCOM's Concept
Development Experimentation Portfolio. In fact, the largest and
most complex projects in my Joint Experimentation Portfolio are
focused on these important areas.
Joint Forces Command is committed to provide the concepts,
doctrine, and capabilities needed by our Joint Force to
integrate effectively with interagency partners in the
execution of irregular warfare and stability operations. The
continued support of the Congress and these subcommittees for
this important work is essential to getting this right.
My written testimony provides a detailed accounting of our
efforts, and I ask that it be placed into the record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I stand by for questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Davenport can be found
in the Appendix on page 61.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Admiral.
General Holmes.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. ROBERT H. HOLMES, U.S. AIR FORCE,
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
General Holmes. Thank you.
Chairman Snyder and Ranking Member Akin, members, today, I
will provide a brief description of Central Command's
organizations and activities that partner across the
interagency as we plan to conduct lines of operation associated
with irregular warfare and stability operations.
You have my written testimony, and I ask that it be
submitted for the record, but if I may take just a few minutes
to hit some high points from that----
In three headquarters organizations--first, the Joint
Interagency Coordination Group and then the Effects
Synchronization Committee and then an emerging Irregular
Warfare Fusion Center--Central Command fosters horizontal and
vertical integration of not only our component warfighters'
activities but with other interagency instruments of power.
Now this includes the kinetic combative effects that you
would expect with traditional military operations, but very
importantly goes beyond that, as it includes governance,
information, economic development, law enforcement, threat
finance, as well as societal and cultural development, all of
the elements of irregular warfare, as they are outlined in the
Department's Joint Operating Concept for irregular warfare, and
I intend to make these injects, these lines of operation, as
they are described in that, as part of CENTCOM's review to
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) Vickers and his team as
they draft a new irregular warfare directive.
In all of this, the overarching importance of strategic
communications cannot be overstated. In addition to these three
organizations that I have named, we have three tactical level
activities, some of which have been mentioned here particularly
by Chairman Smith earlier. They are classified within our
component organizations, and I would be glad to discuss those
in a classified forum.
The battlefield lessons of the last five years demonstrate
that conventional military operations are but a single
component in a vast array of capabilities that are available to
the United States Government to defend our national security
interests. The threats that we face in Central Command, as we
see them, present themselves as networks of violent extreme
actors which are linked and networked beyond CENTCOM's regional
boundaries and authorities, thus making us look to the
interagency for solutions.
These threat networks are agile and adept, utilizing
asymmetric means to attack our strengths. To counter these
threats and asymmetric attacks, we envision, if you will, an
effective blue force network to achieve unity of effort and
purpose across the entire United States interagency and that of
our allies, with an aim to foster a blue force network, if you
will, to prosecute rapid cross-functional integration across
the array of interagency capabilities and thus maximize the
effects of an irregular warfare campaign.
The hostile threats that we see went to school in the
teachings of Tsun Szu and Mao, and it is clear in those
teachings that the key to learning is hearts and minds. So it
is clear to secure this terrain, the hearts and minds of the
military instrument of power in and of itself would not be
sufficient.
We have achieved success in the security line of operation
against mid- and senior-level al Qaeda, Taliban members, in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, but to secure these kinds of
gains, we must sustain and refine Central Command's interagency
relationships and capabilities.
The Joint Interagency Coordination Group formed in 2001 as
a multifunctional advisory and coordinating element works
across all directorate lines at the headquarters and that of
our components and with our interagency partners to access
capabilities and resources to carry out CENTCOM's operations
and plans.
The Effects Synchronization Committee is our means to
operationalize these interagency activities. So we have
coordination, but we must operationalize into our planning and
campaign structure. Recent successes of this committee include
executive orders to prosecute action with regard to threat
finance, and I can go into a number of those, if you would
choose, later.
Other Effects Synchronization Committee actions include the
criminalization of former regime elements in Iraq and high-
valued individuals across our theater in operations combating
terrorism. Additionally, this committee has been able to bring
about special actions against the violent extreme media
outlets.
So, in conclusion, the interagency collaboration of the
past five years has matured to a point where we now need to
establish an Irregular Warfare Fusion Center. It is our next
logical step so that we can focus our interagency integration
to current and future needs. This Fusion Center, this Irregular
Warfare Fusion Center, will, in fact, be an engine room for
developing concepts of operation for irregular warfare and
become a focal point for persistent, coordinated, and
synchronized efforts to prosecute irregular warfare, but more
importantly to identify the measures of effectiveness so that
we can gauge our success.
In all of this, we energetically support ASD Vickers in
developing a new policy for the department in irregular
warfare.
Thank you for this opportunity today to share these views.
[The prepared statement of General Holmes can be found in
the Appendix on page 72.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, General Holmes.
General Kearney.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. FRANK KEARNEY, U.S. ARMY, DEPUTY
COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
General Kearney. Chairman Snyder, Chairman Smith,
Representative Akin, and distinguished members of the
committee, thanks for the opportunity to discuss U.S. Special
Operations Command's (USSOCOM's) role in irregular warfare as
well as interagency coordination and strategic communications.
USSOCOM's mission, as you well know, is to provide fully
capable Special Operations Forces to defend the United States
and its interests and to synchronize the Department of Defense
operations against terrorist networks. Our implementation of a
global synchronization process is a continuous systematic
program that fuses the efforts of the combatant commanders, the
Department of Defense, the interagency, and our key allies.
We have established a standing interagency task force with
USSOCOM members and representatives of 12 interagency partners,
linking knowledge with decision makers. Many recognize that the
ongoing struggle against extreme terrorist organizations cannot
be won strictly through military means. Our Nation's success is
dependent on the efforts of the interagency team.
Today's threat is complex and patient. To overcome our
enemies, we pursue two mutually supporting and often
intertwined approaches: direct and indirect. These approaches
integrate the requirement to immediately disrupt violent
extremist organizations while positively impacting the
environment in which they operate.
The indirect approach addresses the underlying causes of
terrorism and the environments in which terrorism activities
occur. The indirect approach requires more time to achieve
effects, but ultimately will be the decisive effort. This is
where irregular warfare actions become crucial.
Irregular warfare encompasses many of the activities
normally associated with those found at the low end of the
warfare spectrum. It requires getting out and influencing
people by engagement and building relations. It is both
offensive and defensive in nature. It necessitates a whole-of-
government awareness that everyone is a participant, that no
one is a spectator. That type of strategic engagement is
protracted and must be conducted using regional and global
campaigns designed to subvert, disrupt, attrit, and exhaust an
adversary and prevent instability from occurring.
While opportunities to push critical United States
Government messages abound, many challenges make these efforts
more difficult than they initially appear. Additionally, the
network asymmetric enemy we face transcends geographical
boundaries so commonly used by the U.S. Government to assign
communication responsibilities and deconflict the same.
Effective strategic communications represents a defining
characteristic in the direct approach that is critical to
irregular warfare. Deeds in synchronization with words are at
the core of this approach. This is the mindset that has
historically allowed Special Operations Forces to gain access,
build relationships, foster influence, and legitimize our
partners by us being true partners.
This is also the same mindset that is taking hold in the
rest of the Department of Defense. Indirect activities, such as
foreign counterpart training, civil military operations,
information distribution, infrastructure development, and the
establishment of medical, dental, and veterinary clinics, are
now commonplace in our conventional forces operating in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
The need for a unified U.S. Government message which is
synchronized across the enterprise is clear. The role of the
Department of State as the lead strategic communicator with DOD
support is clear. Despite the absence of any compelling
structure for integration, there is positive movement in this
direction.
I thank the distinguished members of the committee for your
role in helping us achieve continued success and enabling us to
protect our Nation, and I appreciate the opportunity to be here
with you today.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, General.
Is Colonel Osborne going to make a statement or----
STATEMENT OF COL. JOSEPH E. OSBORNE, U.S. ARMY, DIRECTOR,
IRREGULAR WARFARE DIRECTORATE (J-10), U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND
Colonel Osborne. Chairman Smith, Chairman Snyder, Ranking
Member Akin, distinguished members of the committees, I am
honored to be here today to report to you on the continuing
efforts of the U.S. Special Operations Command to move the
irregular warfare concept to a full-scale capability for our
command, the department, and our Nation.
I have submitted a statement for the record, but I would
like to forego reading the bulk of that to the committees and
instead provide some brief opening remarks on the broader
context of irregular warfare.
For USSOCOM, irregular warfare is deeply ingrained in our
history, culture, and collective experience. For this reason,
we assumed the leading role in the development and publication
of the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept following the
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Key in understanding this
concept is the recognition that the center of gravity has
shifted from targeting an adversary's military forces or
government to influencing populations. While the term ``winning
hearts and minds'' seems trite, in the case of irregular
warfare, it is not far off the mark.
In order to maintain the momentum in irregular warfare
planning and policy development, the commander of USSOCOM,
Admiral Eric Olson, established an irregular warfare
directorate designated at the J-10 in June, 2007. We reached
our initial operating capability in October of last year, and
we continue to expand our capabilities. We work closely with
and through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and
Interdependent Capabilities to support DOD's efforts to develop
and integrate the concepts, capabilities, and capacity
necessary to wage protracted irregular warfare on a global
scale.
I would like to thank the distinguished members of the
subcommittees for the opportunity to be with you here today and
discuss this very important topic. This concludes my remarks. I
am prepared to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Osborne can be found in
the Appendix on page 79.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
I will now ask questions under our five-minute rule.
I think I will take it off specifically the written
statement that you, General Kearney and Colonel Osborne,
provided in which you state--I am reading on page six--``Much
of the cooperation is initially based on personal
relationships,'' and then it goes on to say, ``In short, our
success in interagency integration requires constant monitoring
and attention.''
My question is, if I am a combatant commander today and I
decide that I need a brigade combat team with a full complement
of skills, not just military, but all the kind of necessary
civilian expertise that we have been talking about here today,
what structure is in place today to ensure that when that
brigade combat team arrives, the civilian personnel are there,
that I, in fact, have the skill sets that I think are required?
And then I would like you to contrast that today with what you
think it ought to be and any comments that any of you have
about that.
General Kearney. Thank you for the question, Chairman
Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. My point of that is if I am the combatant
commander and I decide I need something, I do not have time to
develop personal relationships. We need a structure that
ensures that I have the skill sets I need.
Go ahead.
General Kearney. Right. The structure in the brigade combat
team, as you well know, does not have those additional adjunct
capabilities that are required. The combatant commander would
then go back through the Secretary of Defense, and he would ask
for those capabilities from our interagency partners and
identify the skill sets and the capability gaps that he needs
to work those.
If the situation was a crisis situation, we would take the
assistance that we have, we would work with the country team
that is there, and we would begin to move forward based on what
relationships the combatant command has and has historically
executed. If we have time to train--and we have become very,
very effective in this in our pretraining operations to bring a
unit forward--we normally bring them in at our pre-readiness
exercise before deploying, and we can do that. But there is not
currently a structure that partners interagency folks with U.S.
brigade combat teams in order to rapidly give you that fused
team that we do through relationships now.
Now, in many of our commands, we have had a long-term
historical relationship with interagency partners. In
particular in some of our Special Operations organizations, and
the history that we have today with seven years of combat, we
have begun to build those relationships. So very much so folks
know who to go and ask for by name that they have worked with
over time.
I think that General McCrystal would tell you from Task
Force 714 that one of his major efforts underway is to
professionalize the force, and that is exactly what he is
trying to do, is build those long-term relationships through
habitual assignments.
Dr. Snyder. My follow up would be going back to when I cut
off Mrs. Gillibrand in discussion with Ambassador Herbst, and
Ambassador Herbst and I have had this discussion at previous
hearings. The structural changes that you all are talking about
are for future crises, and you are not satisfied. You just went
through a series of things. We will begin moving forward. Well,
you know, we have already gone through that, and we had a very
unhappy Secretary Gates testifying here, sitting right there,
about how dissatisfied he was with the responsiveness of the
current system.
This is like five years after we were in Afghanistan. So we
do not have a system. We are not talking about something for
future conflict, when we have been at least in Afghanistan
since 2001. So you are not satisfied with what you describe? Is
that a fair statement?
General Kearney. Absolutely not, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder. Secretary Vickers, Ambassador Herbst, do you
have any comments on the issue? I am talking about the person
on the ground who thinks they needs skill sets and what system
do we have today versus what we think we ought to have for
getting them.
Mr. Vickers. We have a ways to go, Chairman Snyder. We are
making some steps. For instance, we have shifted our civil
affairs, which is military analog in terms of capabilities, of
some of the civilian capabilities we need to build in other
government departments and agencies. We are partnering one
reserve civil affairs brigade with each BCT, brigade combat
team, and the Marine Corps and Navy are expanding their civil
affairs capabilities as well.
As you know, in Afghanistan, on an ad hoc basis, we now
have embedded PRTs with the BCTs as well, forming
relationships, but we need to institutionalize these
capabilities and develop more habitual relationships, as
Ambassador Herbst's capabilities come on stream.
Dr. Snyder. Ambassador Herbst, I do not have much time. If
you would err on the side of brevity here, but respond to me
and to Mrs. Gillibrand's comments before.
Ambassador Herbst. Respond to you?
Dr. Snyder. Yes. And Mrs. Gillibrand was on the same thing
about future.
Ambassador Herbst. The point is very simple. Our office
would not exist if we did not realize there were inadequacies
in the way we are responding, and we represent a way to solve
the problems we have been identifying.
Thank you.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Smith for five minutes.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I actually think I have
probably more than five minutes worth of questions and answers,
but I will live with the five minutes and I may have a follow
up at the end if we do not have too many members here.
I think from what we have heard from all of you, the Joint
Operating Concept and Directive 44 and what is going on with
that, sounds promising, but seems more of a crisis response
setup, and it seems sort of focused on Afghanistan and Iraq.
You know, we were not ready when we had to go in there and do
that. You know, how can we get ready for those two and be ready
for the next one? I think that is fine. I think it is
definitely something that we will need to beef up as many
members and all of you have pointed out as well in terms of
resources and so forth.
But what I am really looking for is a more comprehensive
strategy that does not wait for the crisis, and I would
recommend to you something the Brookings Institution put out
this morning. We did a little conference on the release of the
report on failed states, which is an incredibly comprehensive
analysis of, I think, over 100 countries and their various
level of failure in four different areas--economic, political,
security, and also social welfare--that gives sort of a
blueprint of where our problems might crop up and how we might
get in front of them.
And if you can dovetail that over, you know, where is al
Qaeda operating, where are they spreading their message, then
that feeds back into the strategic communications piece of, you
know, how are we countering that message, what is the message,
how are we countering it. That, I think, is the kind of
comprehensive approach we need.
I mean, once you get to the state where you are at in Iraq
and Afghanistan--it has to be done, no question. We have to
dive in there and work at it--I think you would all agree,
having been there, it gets real difficult, you know, once the
existing structure has been blown up and conflict reaches that
level.
And we have to do it, but if we do it in a more
preventative manner, I think we can be far, far more
successful, and toward that end, I guess the first question I
have is--there are a lot of resources involved in that sort of
development effort, and I am wondering about the possibility of
leveraging non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and public-
private partnerships. I have talked to some of you about this
before.
Obviously, on the strategic communications piece, you know,
we have to do that with the government. We cannot be
envisioning some NGO that we try to enlist as our propaganda
tool. That would undermine their mission. It would not
successfully deliver ours.
But if you are looking at a failed state, if you are
looking at the type of reconstruction we are talking about--and
there are organizations out there that are building schools,
that are providing health care--leveraging those dollars would
make an enormous amount of sense. Now that is difficult in
Afghanistan and Iraq because a lot of those people have been,
you know, kidnapped or killed and they have been a little
discouraged. It is going on, certainty in Afghanistan, less so
in Iraq.
I am curious what your experiences have been in those two
places and what you might think about better leveraging those.
And, Mr. Vickers, I do not know if you want to start out
and then anyone else who wants to dive in.
Mr. Vickers. To the general point about strategy, you are
absolutely right that the way we believe we will win the war on
terror is through steady-state continuous operations that
prevent crises from developing by shoring up our partners,
through a full range of national instruments, rather than
responding to acute crises when they develop.
Now we need to have these response capabilities, no
question, but we believe most of our successes around the world
will come from prevention and, accordingly, we are shifting
resources in the Department from responsive capabilities to
more proactive, and that cuts across irregular warfare and
stability operations, from counterterrorism to train, advise,
and assist versus large-scale counterinsurgency, a number of
efforts I could go into in more detail.
But you are absolutely right about the strategic
comparative of doing so.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Does somebody else wish to take a crack at it, jump in?
General Kearney. Chairman Smith, one comment: We work right
now at SOCOM in a nascent relationship with the business
executives for national security who have actually come to us
and talked to us, a wide group of businessmen that have
interests in the security of the United States, but would like
to take their access and their abilities for many reasons, not
just as good patriots, but also because there is a market,
there is opportunity out there for them, and so we are bringing
them in and taking a look inside of SOCOM now at how we can
work with that group in particular and then others like it to
help them come in and help us do our job better.
Mr. Smith. All right.
General Holmes. Chairman Smith, if I may just for a moment,
as we look forward into the future and work past Iraq, past
Afghanistan, in Central Command, we are seeing the need for a
comprehensive theater campaign across the framework of Theater
Security Cooperation that uses the interagency. One thing that
we are doing with our Effects Synchronization Process is to
bring those irregular elements, non-traditional elements, of
the instruments of power into our traditional planning process
to do just that for the long haul.
Mr. Smith. And I will follow up just quickly and sneak my
last question in here. It is a more specific question. It
follows up a little bit on this, and this has to do with the
deployment of the Special Ops Forces, and I am interested in
Mr. Vickers' standpoint and also General Kearney's, and that is
the idea of forward deployed versus being deployed back closer
to home.
Now, obviously, there are several levels to this, and the
biggest point here is most of the SOCOM guys I talk to, you
know, they want to be closer to the populations they are trying
to work with because they are a key piece of the irregular
warfare that we are talking about here, work that is going on
in the Philippines and Africa and a bunch of other places that
are developing relationships with the population.
Now, obviously, this means more than just, you know, where
they are currently deployed overseas, which are not necessarily
the hotspots. What are your thoughts in terms of the forward
deployed versus being back here and then sending them out?
Mr. Vickers. The broad strategic shift we are trying to
make for the war on terror with our SOF posture is to go from
episodic presence around the world to persistent presence.
Doing that, of course, requires more capacity, ability to
integrate better with the existing structure the U.S.
Government has overseas, and then a balance between forward
station forces, which, again, may not be forward based in just
a region, but specifically in 59 some plus Global War on Terror
(GWOT) priority countries while supplementing that with
rotational forces, and that mix is something under study.
If we went all the way to rotational forces, it would be
more expensive and hard to get the persistent presence that you
get from, say, as our State Department colleagues and agency
colleagues do, living in a country for a period of time and
developing those relationships and language skills. On the
other hand, the rotational capability gives the combatant
commanders flexibility to move quickly across a GWOT area.
So there is a balance that is needed there, and it is
something that we are continuing----
Mr. Smith. And you do not have a set plan right now? That
is still something you are----
Mr. Vickers. We are developing a plan and, of course, as
you know, 80-some percent of our forces are currently engaged
in Iraq and Afghanistan----
Mr. Smith [continuing]. Which makes it difficult.
Mr. Vickers [continuing]. Which is why we need to grow the
force, growing various parts of the U.S. Government, to meet
what we see as the future demand.
Mr. Smith. Great. Thank you.
General, do you have anything to add to that?
General Kearney. Yes, Chairman Smith. We are right now
finalizing what we call the global SOF posture, which is
exactly what you are referring to, our deployments worldwide
and where we would sit permanently, and, as Secretary Vickers
has said, where we would have a rotational presence.
We are due to present that back to the Joint Staff in
March, and we continue to come back, and the key principles are
exactly as you have said, persistent forward presence with the
right people at the right place to build those relationships,
and I think what you will find is that in each geographic
combatant commander's Area of Responsibility (AOR), we will
probably have a different approach based on the ability to be
there, our access, and our ability to get to where to where we
need to go and overcome the tyranny of distance, yet balance
the deployment of the force away from their families and where
they need to be.
But we have that on the plate. Admiral Olson is digesting
that now, and we are making the final fine tunes before we come
back to the Joint Staff and the Secretary of Defense on what
that will look like.
Mr. Smith. Great. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a quick question along the same lines as a couple of
my previous colleagues were asking, and that is, obviously, it
is a lot cheaper if you can work on a more preventive side, and
I assume that special operators have been doing that for some
long period of time. What is the shift? Is it more from a
continuous presence to just go in and take out-one particular
problem? Is that how the new system is supposed to operate?
And, also, what is the change particularly with Directive
44 in terms of the decision of when you make preemptive kinds
of moves within a country. Is that mostly done in a joint
context with the leadership of that country? If you could just
develop that little bit.
Mr. Vickers. Well, I will start, and then I think
Ambassador Herbst will want to talk about National Security
Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44), but the shift to more of a
preventive or proactive posture has to do more with having
persistent presence in more places than we have had before and
trying to be proactive, for example, about counterterrorism,
rather than being reactive. Rather than waiting for terrorists
to do something and then responding to it, we are out trying to
deal with them.
A large part of this preventive posture is really building
the capacity of our international partners. The war on terror
absolutely requires that. It requires the U.S. Government
harnessing its instruments with our other partners to support
the security of a number of countries around the world, and
that is really how prevention would take place, by bringing
these various instruments, development aid, political
development, security assistance, focused on trying to prevent
insurgencies from ever starting in the first place or keeping
them at very low levels.
Ambassador Herbst. I would endorse what Secretary Vickers
said. You might say there is a military and a civilian
component to preventive measures, and most of the measures
would be on the civilian side, and there you are talking about
most effectively doing this work with a civilian capacity, and
the capacity we are trying to grow would enable us to put
dozens or even hundreds of people on the ground, civilians on
the ground, to do preventive work, and we have devoted a great
deal of attention to prevention.
Mr. Akin. I just got back from a visit to Japan and South
Korea, had a chance to talk to that shy and retiring General
Bell, and he had his ideas about the importance of having
basing on the continent there and an overall perspective. It
seemed to me that just as dealing with little problems,
prevention is a good thing and working jointly with other
countries is a good thing.
It appeared that he was advocating the same thing to deal
with big problems, and that was, again, that when you develop
allies like Japan with the missile-defense destroyers that they
are building that that also is a very good strategy, both
financially, economically, but also in developing those
partnerships in other countries that can have a different
perspective in terms of dealing with things politically. They
represent a different interest and, therefore, can sometimes
prevail on someone to think in a certain way that we could not.
Anybody want to comment on that?
Mr. Vickers. I will be talking tomorrow to the Strategic
Forces Subcommittee just about cooperative missile defense, so
I agree fully.
Ambassador Herbst. An important part of what my office is
trying to do is to grow the international capability to respond
in stabilization crises. Like you, I took a trip to East Asia--
this was last spring--to talk about cooperation with the
Japanese, with the South Koreans, as well as with the Chinese.
We see a great many potential areas of involvement around the
world, and the United States is not going to do all of them or
even most of them. We are looking for as many partners as we
can find, and we are getting a positive response.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Marshall for five minutes.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. It works now.
In an ideal world, we would not even have these hearings,
threats would not be there, and we would not have to spend any
money trying to address those threats, reorganize ourselves, et
cetera. We accept that the threats that are most pressing and
likely to be so for the next few decades for the foreseeable
future that we are not able to address well are unconventional.
We are not well set up to deal with world pandemics. We are
not set up to deal with angry young men forming cells that get
access to growingly lethal things and wanting to damage, many
of them motivated by religion, but motivated by other things as
well, scattered around the globe.
We accept that climate change is going on, at least most of
us do at this point, and that there is going to be substantial
economic disruption as a result of that, and all of us
recognize that, what, a third of the world maybe is living on
less than $2 a day, and they know how we live. So there are
huge challenges here, and they are scattered around the globe,
and it would be nice if they would all go away, but they are
not.
And we also recognize that we cannot meet all those
challenges. We need the leverage, we need to build partner
capacity, et cetera, and ideally other states would keep those
challenges from ever becoming a challenge to us. And this is
what you guys think about all the time. You think about it from
the perspective of the specific roles that you have. So it is
DOD, it is State, it is SOCOM, it is the specific things that I
need to do, how I need to adjust, how my group needs to adjust
in order to better address the situation.
I would like each of you to think about what you have read
lately, you know, authors, articles, books, critics,
commentators, the people you think have been particularly
perceptive about the threats and how we as a country need to
try to reorganize ourselves, as a country, not just your
individual bailiwicks, how we need to reorganize ourselves so
that we maximize our effectiveness in the long run in
addressing those threats.
I would like each of you to think about that for just a
second and independently just tell me who out there you think
is quite thoughtful about this, has written some good stuff,
has some good views, and I would like you to be open-minded
enough to say, frankly, they are kind of critical of what we
are doing, you know, they do not agree with me, but they are
pretty thoughtful.
And then the second thing I would like you to offer me is
where you think we are falling short, we are clearly going to
fall short, we do not have it right now, we have not quite
figured it out.
And if you would just run through, I have only five minutes
here. So if each of you could take 30 seconds or so and quickly
give me answers to that, it would be helpful.
I guess, Mr. Vickers, we will start with you since you
started off the whole hearing.
Mr. Vickers. Sure. A couple of good things I have read
recently. David Ignatius had a good column, I think, a couple
of weeks ago. He just came back from a trip in Iraq and
Afghanistan and talked about the combination of soft power and
hard power through PRTs and Special Operations Forces.
I think there is a lot more going on there than that, but
he captured the essence of a couple of important instruments
that we have and how in some cases we are leveraging small
amounts of capability to really achieve outsized effects. You
know, things have gotten worse in Afghanistan, but they could
have gotten much worse. The much feared 2007----
Mr. Marshall. We are not going to get through the whole
list before the chairman cuts us off, if you editorialize----
Mr. Vickers. All right. The second thing is Bob Kaplan,
stealth supremacy, an article in The Atlantic recently about
how to do a global posture. Recently. It is probably two years
old or so.
Shortfalls--I talked earlier about strategic
communications. I think the war on terror requires a different
approach than the approach we have had in the past, and I think
that is still the hardest problem that we are facing.
Ambassador Herbst. There was testimony given a few weeks
ago by among others Carlos Pascual and Michele Flournoy about
developing a civilian responsible capability, which I would
recommend.
If you talk about something a little bit broader focused, I
forget the author's name, but the book, The Pentagon's New Map,
is very, very interesting and worthwhile reading. There is a
book by Frank Fukuyama on nation-building which is a cautionary
book which I think is worth reading, as well as the RAND guide
to nation building.
Thank you.
Admiral Davenport. At Joint Forces Command, we developed a
product called the Joint Operating Environment, which is a
future look at what the operating environment might be, and it
gets to many of the threats that you just talked about, and so
we see that there is a wide expanse of possibilities out there,
but what is foremost on our scope right now is irregular
warfare.
Colin Gray has written some recent articles and books on
irregular warfare and the challenges we face there that we are
looking at real hard right now, and Joint Forces Command
overall has an increasing emphasis on trying to ensure we are
addressing that irregular warfare threat and the challenge we
face in the future.
General Holmes. I would say Dr. Joseph Nye at the JFK
School of Government, a lot of writing about soft power that I
have read recently, and then the occasion about eight or nine
months ago to hear Newt Gingrich as he went through changes
that he felt like had to be made across our structures.
Where we are falling short--I think being able to
articulate exactly what strategic communications is or is not
and then being willing to do it, and then also to articulate
what irregular warfare is and what it means to us.
General Kearney. I think the two authors that I have read
certainly that best describe the threat are George Weigel--it
was a book given to me by former CIA Director Woolsey, and I
forget the title, and I will get it to you, sir--and then Walid
Phares' Future Jihad. Both get right at the core of why jihadis
are what they are.
And then I would tell you the thing that keeps me awake at
night is that we have failed to educate American on the threat.
We knew more about the Soviet formation that moved across the
Fulda Gap than we know about the threat facing us today, and we
have failed to provide them that narrative is our strategic
communications.
Colonel Osborne. Yes, sir. I do not recall the author. A
retired British general published a book called Utility of
Force, an exploration of how force applies in the broader
context of irregular scenarios, and he cited many instances in
his career spanning his early days in Northern Ireland through
Desert Storm, Desert Shield.
The other one is a book called Infidel by Miriam Ali. It is
a compelling personal narrative of a woman's journey from
Somalia to actually living in the United States, and while her
story is compelling, her street-level observations on the
changes that were taking place in a society in the 1980's,
early 1990's are indicative of the sort of awareness that we
need to be able to develop to understand culture, societies,
and secondary and tertiary effects of what is happening in our
strategic global enterprise.
I think, sir, the most frustrating thing that we see right
now, almost everybody has hit on it, is the strategic agility
side of how we deal in this 21st century. We tend to move in a
cumbersome, lethargic way, particularly compared against our
current adversaries, and plowing through that is one of the
greatest challenges that we face.
Dr. Snyder. Are you done, Mr. Marshall?
Mr. Marshall. Thank you for the time.
Dr. Snyder. That list of readings makes my reading a couple
of nights ago, Llama, Llama Red Pajama to my son seem kind of
lightweight, but----
[Laughter.]
Dr. Snyder. Mrs. Gillibrand for five minutes.
Mrs. Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your testimony.
I want to follow up on the issue of the primacy of
strategic communication.
Colonel Osborne, in your testimony, you say, ``While
opportunities to push critical United States Government (USG)
messages abound, many challenges make these efforts more
difficult than they initially appear. For example, the ability
to communicate in the most appropriate medium is not
necessarily aligned with the authority to do so.''
Can you expand upon that and tell me what authority you are
lacking and what you are referring to?
Colonel Osborne. Yes, ma'am, and I will try to answer that,
and then I will defer. I am not by career field a strategic
communicator.
I think most important when we talk about strategic
communications from the soft perspective, and I think the
irregular warfare perspective, it is important to note that we
are talking about deeds. That is the most compelling message
that we send, and it is lining up all of the other
communication mediums to support that.
And I think that that, in many cases, has been that
struggle where we are capable fully of planning operations and
doing so in a way from the tactical to the strategic continuum
that are achieving good effects and clearly articulating our
desires and eliciting the behaviors that we want, but on the
flip side, not being able to at the same time recognize that
primacy of the communications side to attach to those deeds,
and be able to push that through, as I said a moment ago, a
somewhat cumbersome bureaucracy that allows us to link those
two elements most effectively.
Mrs. Gillibrand. I think in your testimony you said that
you thought the State Department would take the lead with
support from the DOD. I would like comments from the State
Department on what you think that would mean and whether there
are barriers for you to do that now.
Ambassador Herbst. If we set up the Interagency Management
System, there will be an interagency group which develops the
concept as to how we would deploy in a stabilization operation.
There will be irregular warfare circumstances where the State
Department would not be engaged or there may be somewhere that
we might be engaged in a strictly supportive role. It will
depend upon the circumstances. There is no single answer or
single template to deal with the problems we are facing. There
needs to be flexibility.
Mrs. Gillibrand. Thank you.
I would also like to turn a little bit more to the
challenges of recruitment. Obviously, you have all created an
idea and a plan about how to restructure to handle stability
and reconstruction operations better, but my concern is that we
have not put in place a plan to really achieve what your goals
are in terms of the recruitment to have the diversity of
manpower.
And I would certainly like some thoughts from Special
Operations forces because if our goal was to double the size of
Special Ops within the next two or three years, I do not think
that is physically possible based on earlier testimony I have
asked from various generals who have come before this
committee. So I would like you to talk a little bit about your
plans for recruitment and retention, how you can diversify and
have these skill sets that you are looking for.
Again, I would like you to also talk a little bit about
National Guard and Reserve because one thing the National Guard
is doing is they have deployed the agribusiness development
team to Afghanistan, which I think is fantastic because what
these teams will be able to do is help address the issue of
whether you can have replacement crops, whether you can create
economic development through agriculture that is beyond opium,
and I think that is a very important step for the future of
Afghanistan.
Can you envision a National Guard in particular where you
do have these individual skill sets already developed within
the population because of the nature of the Guard and the
Reserve as part of this solution, even though the testimony we
heard earlier is not going to draw from our current forces? So
I would like you to comment on that.
And then last, just because I want to get all my questions
in, I am very concerned about cyberterrorism, and as part of
the process of reforming our abilities, what kind of
recruitment are you doing to get our best engineers and
technology experts from the best engineering schools in the
world to want to serve in this capacity so that we have the
strength that we need to make sure we keep this country safe?
And I only raise the question because in the news this
morning, in Pakistan, you know, they were able to shut down
YouTube. A country shutting down a Web site, very unusual. It
has been done before in a number of countries, but the capacity
of cyberterrorism is growing, and I want to make sure we are
prepared.
General Kearney. Yes, ma'am. I will try to quickly move
through those and then leave time for others to comment.
First off, recruiting-wise, I think we are doing very, very
well right now. We are moving through in our five-year plan to
expand five Special Forces battalions. We are adding the five
psychological operations (PSYOPs) companies, and we are
expanding from a battalion to a full civil affairs brigade in
the active component.
Those are moving at the right pace. We have accelerated the
amount of people we can put through the school, and, of course,
humans being more important than hardware and quality being
more important than quantity are principles we live by, and we
are pacing ourselves to do that. To double the size of Special
Operations Forces, as you have stated, would not be possible in
a three- to five-year period, and I think we are moving at a
rate that we can sustain for a period of time for those forces.
In the National Guard and the Reserve, we have a great
breadth of skill sets that come and work for both our special
forces, our civil affairs brigades, which are 90 percent in the
Reserve component, and our PSYOPs groups, and we have recruited
those specialists into those forces and they do day to day in
their civilian jobs exactly what we would like them to do.
We have become through the long war prisoners of our
mobilization policy. When you put those skill sets alone in the
Reserve component, then as you achieve mobilization horizons,
you now are without them for a period of time unless you grow
the capacity in the Reserves as well as the active component.
So, right now, we are a prisoner of the pace at which we are
operating.
From a cyberterror point of view, one of the things that
Admiral Olson is trying very, very hard to do is have more
influence with the services on recruiting, retention, and how
we go after and target that soldier that will become the
Special Forces cyberterror operator of the future, and that is
one of the things that we are working with the services right
now.
But to get that caliber of individual, it is often very,
very difficult to recruit that person in at pay levels that are
not commensurate with what his skills or her skills would draw
on the outside without tremendous bonuses and other things, and
I think we are trying to explore that. We have built some
capability inside of our Special Operations Forces and some of
our special mission units to do just what you are talking about
and partner with our interagency partners in the intelligence
community who are doing this.
But we are all competing for the same pool and so, again,
as the ambassador has stated, very often we need to work to how
are we going to gain this capability, who is best suited to
bring that on board to work.
But I think your questions are all spot on, ma'am.
Mrs. Gillibrand. Will you follow up with me on what your
plan is, particularly for recruiting with cyberterrorism,
because you may well have to create a different kind of formula
to get these best and brightest in technology to want to,
number one, serve in the military and, number two, it may
require higher pay. But I just think it is such a vital
component that we have not developed yet, that it may require
thinking outside the box because a typical individual who may
be willing to serve this country may not be that engineering
graduate who could go work at some dot-com for an extraordinary
amount of money to bring them in to public service.
General Kearney. Exactly. And I would tell you that we are
nascent, and what I would need to do is come back to you with a
more detailed strategy to answer your question, but what I can
tell you is what we have done successfully in other special
missions units is to profile the person who has a propensity to
do that, to do it well and will stay, and I think our first
approach will be to take a look at the folks we have who are
doing that very, very well, analyze their psychological,
physical, and mental profiles, and then go, ``How do we get at
them?'' and then ``What are the incentives it will take to make
them join our force?'' or another agency's force to do that.
But I would be glad to come back to you, ma'am.
Mr. Vickers. If I could add to that, in my interdependent
capabilities hat, I have oversight of our cyberwarfare
capabilities across the Department of Defense. Some of this we
would have to discuss in classified session, but cyberwarriors,
while very different people than Special Operations warriors,
are attracted by a similar motivation in some cases to work on
problems you simply cannot work on anywhere else.
I just spent the day out at the National Security Agency
(NSA) a couple of days ago, and that challenge of dealing with
growing threats to our Nation, whether they come from states or
non-state actors is something some Americans thankfully take on
as a very serious responsibility, and we are making good
progress, but I would have to talk to you about in another
session.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
Mr. Smith, anything further?
Mr. Smith. Nothing from me, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Akin?
Mr. Marshall, anything further? You need any more books
listed there for you? [Laughter.]
Dr. Snyder. Yes. Mr. Marshall would like to have all that
listed down and passed out to all the committee. Yes.
I was struck, in closing, Colonel Osborne, by your phrase
``strategic agility,'' and we hear a lot of terms.
One of them is ``soft power'' that we use, I think, as an
important phrase. It implies no sense of urgency about it, and
soft power kind of, I think, implies that you could just spend
days and weeks and months trying to get the process together to
get everything together that you need. If that included
veterinarians or whatever, you would have time to do it.
``Strategic agility,'' I think, is more of the goal, I
think, of the interest of these subcommittees and others, which
is that needs to be available on day one, that if you decided
you need to have a combat team plus two ag officials or three
State Department trainers in local government that they would
be available, too, and I do not think that any of us think that
we are anywhere near that right now as far as we are into these
wars that we are fighting.
We appreciate your time. I apologize again for the
interruptions. Both your written statements and your
conversation today have been very helpful.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 26, 2008
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 26, 2008
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 26, 2008
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER
Dr. Snyder. Assistant Secretary Vickers, the Irregular Warfare
Joint Operating Concept identifies eight key risks and associated
mitigation strategies. One is that the United States Government might
not develop the interagency integration mechanisms necessary to achieve
unity of effort at every level. The JOC directs DOD to conduct concept
development and experimentation focused on improving interagency
integration. What actions has the Department of Defense taken to
address the need for interagency integration mechanisms? The same unity
of effort considerations apply with respect to stability operations.
Are the efforts to improve interagency integration for irregular
warfare and stability operations occurring on parallel tracks that
create new stovepipes?
Mr. Vickers. The Department supports efforts to establish
interagency integration mechanisms across the USG, recognizing that
irregular challenges manifest themselves in ways that cannot be
overcome solely by military means. The responses those challenges
demand extend well beyond the traditional domain of any single
government agency or department.
The Department supports recent efforts to institutionalize
interagency integration, two of which are particularly focused on
irregular warfare and stability operations:
- The establishment of the Department of State Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to lead the
implementation of NSPD-44 ``Management of Interagency Efforts
for Reconstruction and Stabilization'' to include the
development of civilian capabilities and the integration of
those capabilities with the U.S. military for contingencies.
Several aspects of USJFCOM's Unified Action experimentation
series has focused on the integration of civilian and military
capabilities in support of NSPD-44.
- The establishment of the National Counter Terrorism Center
(NCTC), which reports to the NSC staff, to lead interagency
steady-state and surge, or contingency, planning for the War on
Terrorism. Through the NCTC's Directorate for Strategic
Operational Planning, DOD participates in an interagency
dialogue to improve collaboration on a wide range of
initiatives and objectives, such as the National Implementation
Plan for the War on Terror, the National Action Plan for
Combating Foreign Fighters, and the National Action Plan for
Countering Terrorist Finance.
- The implementation of a semi-annual War on Terrorism Global
Synchronization Conference, sponsored by the United States
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). This conference brings
together senior strategists, planners, and operators from all
of the Combatant Commands, a broad majority of the Defense
Agencies, and several of our interagency partners. Through this
venue DOD has improved collaboration, promoted
interoperability, maximized effects, and shared lessons
learned. Each iteration of the conference draws a wider
interagency audience, reinforcing the importance of working
across traditional stovepipes to fully leverage all elements of
national power in the War on Terrorism.
DOD has also developed interagency planning and coordination
mechanisms to support operational-level integration in the field. DOD
is integrating the interagency through Joint Interagency Coordination
Groups (JIACGs) established at Combatant Commands (COCOM), the
structures of which are adjusted according to COCOM priorities and
available interagency personnel. In addition, DOD participates as a
member of the Department of State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism's
Regional Security Initiative that takes a regional approach to prevail
against al Qaeda and its affiliates.
Efforts to improve interagency integration do not create
stovepipes. From a DOD perspective, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy leads the development of all guidance regarding interagency
integration. This guidance is developed in close coordination with the
Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, the Services, and civilian agency
partners.
Dr. Snyder. Assistant Secretary Vickers, what impact will Secretary
England's direction to you to combine the Irregular Warfare Roadmap
with DOD Directive 3000.05 have on the effort to put stability
operations on par with combat operations?
Mr. Vickers. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review identified the
need to rebalance capabilities across the Department to improve joint
force proficiency in countering irregular challenges. To implement the
vision of the QDR, the Department developed implementation roadmaps for
building partnership capacity, irregular warfare, and supporting DOD
processes. DODD 3000.05, which pre-dates the 2006 QDR, provided
influential foundational concepts for Departmental programs to counter
irregular challenges.
Last summer, the Department reported on the progress of DODD
3000.05 initiatives to give stability operations a priority comparable
to combat operations. These initiatives informed Department-wide
concepts for defeating irregular challenges by working with and through
the indigenous population and legitimate government to isolate and
defeat irregular adversaries. As DOD worked to enhance relevant
capabilities, significant synergies across capabilities became evident.
The Department is now developing a directive to capitalize on these
synergies, establish capstone policy for irregular warfare
capabilities, and describe the relationship among key activities,
including stability operations. In so doing, the directive will
integrate the key lessons learned from the QDR Execution Roadmaps, DODD
3000.05, and best practices from current operations. It will
synchronize capability development across a wider range of operational
environments--permissive, contested, and denied. This approach will
help DOD maintain readiness for more contingencies--and provide the
Nation with more strategic alternatives.
Recognizing that stability operations are essential to traditional
warfare, irregular warfare, and a range of activities that are not
characterized as warfare per se, the Department continues to develop
initiatives under the auspices of NSPD-44 and other interagency
authorities. Our strategic guidance reflects this view, and recognizes
that in many cases unified action across multiple government agencies
is crucial to enduring success. DOD remains engaged with our
interagency and international partners to create synergies among our
capabilities and synchronize their application in pursuing national
security objectives.
Dr. Snyder. Assistant Secretary Vickers, can you comment on how the
President's FY 2009 budget reflects implementation of the policy to
make stability operations as important as combat operations in terms of
doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education,
personnel and facilities (or the so-called ``DOT-MIL-P-F'')?
Mr. Vickers. DOD will not be creating separate stability operations
budget lines, but rather driving a shift in capability development
priorities. DOD is working through existing capabilities development
processes to determine future needs. A critical element of that process
will be determining those adaptations made in response to Operations
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom and funded through supplemental
appropriations that need to be institutionalized for this new
environment.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense is working with the Services
and Combatant Commands to identify and prioritize the `full range' of
capabilities required for Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations to
include their DOTMLPF implications.
In his recent testimony regarding the FY09 budget, the Secretary of
Defense highlighted a theme running throughout the FY09 budget request:
ensuring the Department is prepared to address the international
landscape characterized by new threats and instability. Specific budget
requests highlight this change:
- Increased End Strength: increasing Army size by 7,000 over
and Marine Corps by 5,000 over FY08 levels enabling the
Department to relieve stress on the force caused by the Long
War and ensuring it is able to excel at conventional warfare
and counterinsurgency operations. (Personnel)
- Global Train and Equip: providing commanders a means to fill
longstanding gaps in our ability to build the capacity and
capabilities of partner nations. (Authorities)
- Security & Stabilization Assistance: allowing the Department
to transfer up to $200 million to the State Department to
facilitate whole-of-government responses to stability and
security missions. (Authorities)
- AFRICOM: funding to launch the new Africa Command, allowing
the Department to have a more integrated approach.
(Organization)
- Foreign Languages: providing for increased language training
for all forces to improve preparation for irregular warfare,
training and advising missions, humanitarian efforts, and
security and stabilization operations. (Training)
Dr. Snyder. Assistant Secretary Vickers, GAO reported that DOD has
not fully established mechanisms that would help it obtain interagency
participation in the military planning process at the combatant
commands. What mechanisms currently exist to facilitate interagency
coordination at the combatant commands and how effective are they? What
mechanisms are planned for the future? JFCOM reports that OSD declined
to take further action on its concept of operations for the role and
placement of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) at the
combatant commands. Can you explain the rationale behind that decision?
Mr. Vickers. DOD is developing mechanisms to increase interagency
participation in the military planning process here in DC, at the
combatant commands, and in the field. In many ways, the most important
integration points are here in DC and in the field, at U.S. Embassies;
because those are the places where our interagency partners make
decisions and operate. Other Departments and Agencies do not have
organizational corollaries to Combatant Commands (COCOM), making COCOMs
a difficult integration point for our interagency partners.
What mechanisms currently exist to facilitate interagency
coordination at the combatant commands and how effective are they?
Each of the Geographic Combatant Commands (COCOM) has established a
Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) to assist with liaison and
planning at the operational level. The structure of the JIACGs varies
based on the COCOM's priorities and the participation of interagency
personnel. All COCOMs have noted that other Federal Agencies have
difficulty providing qualified liaisons to JIACGs on a permanent basis.
Each COCOM has tailored their JIACG to fit its mission. Some
examples are illustrative:
- USSOUTHCOM has established a J9 staff section that includes
the JIACG liaisons as well as military staff to coordinate
interagency efforts. In the context of USSOUTHCOM's operational
environment and focus, this approach works well.
- USNORTHCOM's mission and location uses a different approach--
using direct liaison with Federal agencies as well as a JIACG.
- USEUCOM and USPACOM both employ JIACGs for interagency
planning, and participation is tailored to their respective
missions.
It is important to note that DOD is currently funding interagency
participation in JIACG organizations. It may be more effective for
other Federal Agencies to program and fund JIACG personnel, creating a
more stable personnel management method and expanding the pool of
qualified interagency planners and operators.
What mechanisms are planned for the future?
Recent changes to DOD planning guidance encourage interagency
cooperation in the development of military plans. DOD is working with
interagency partners on selected plans already. As these efforts
progress, DOD will identify best practices and incorporate lessons
learned into future guidance. We are grateful to the State Department
for the input it has provided on selected plans.
In addition, the development and use of whole-of-government
planning frameworks will facilitate civilian agency integration into
military planning and vice versa. Recent interagency involvement in
global war on terror planning through U.S. Special Operations Command's
(USSOCOM) Global Synch Conference is a good model upon which the
Department will look to build for the future. In addition, DOD has
collaborated on the development of the Integration Planning Cell
concept, a team of civilian agency planners and experts who would
deploy to the CoCom under the Interagency Management System, to
facilitate the harmonization of military and civilian planning for
reconstruction and stabilization.
JFCOM reports that OSD declined to take further action on its
concept of operations for the role and placement of Joint Interagency
Coordination Groups (JIACGs) at the combatant commands. Can you explain
the rationale behind that decision?
DOD does not want to impose a one-size-fits all approach. Rather,
we recommended that the COCOMs tailor their JIACGs for regional
missions.
Dr. Snyder. Assistant Secretary Vickers, GAO reported that DOD's
policies and practices inhibit sharing of planning information and
limit interagency participation in the development of combatant command
plans. Specifically, DOD does not have a process in place to facilitate
information sharing with non-DOD agencies early in the process without
the specific approval of the Secretary of Defense. What steps is DOD
taking to amend its policies and practices to improve information
sharing with interagency partners in the planning process?
Mr. Vickers. Currently, we share aspects of many of our plans with
elements of other agencies, while not necessarily sharing the entire
plan itself. When DOD considers sharing its campaign and contingency
plans, the Department must balance the benefits with the need for force
protection, operational security, and timely plan development.
Combatant Commands can work in coordination with OUSD(P) and Joint
Staff to integrate other agencies into plan development with the
approval of the Secretary of Defense. In the execution of current
operations, DOD encourages field coordination between Combatant
Commanders and the Chiefs of Missions as well as with liaison officers.
Recent changes to DOD planning guidance task the COCOMs to develop
campaign plans, moving the Department away from an exclusive focus on
contingency-driven planning. Campaign plans will provide an opportunity
for greater coordination and synchronization of USG activities to shape
the current security environment in order to prevent potential threats
to our national security interests from developing.
However, to ensure the maximum effectiveness of input from
interagency partners, the USG must build the capabilities of other
agencies to understand military planning, review military plans, and
engage in national-level planning processes.
Regarding information sharing, DOD's Chief Information Office (CIO)
established an Information Sharing Steering Group to serve as the focal
point for guidance, direction, and oversight of DOD information-sharing
initiatives. This effort builds upon the most effective practices in
cooperative venues like the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC).
The CIO has a number of ongoing initiatives to improve information
sharing across agencies, e.g.:
- An Information Sharing Action Plan for Civil-Military support
to stability operations that enhances unclassified components
of civil-military planning in a collaborative environment.
- An Information Sharing Task Force with other Federal
Departments to establish an information sharing environment
that spans agency boundaries.
These efforts, along with the provision of required authorities and
funding to procure the necessary information technologies across the
Federal Government, will enhance whole-of government collaboration
under the process envisioned by applicable NSPDs.
Note: In a separate venue, the Department can provide an overview
of the progress we have seen in our partnerships with the intelligence
community to increase our effectiveness in supporting international
partners in eliminating the most dangerous threats to security.
Dr. Snyder. How does S/CRS currently view its role in leading or
otherwise supporting the NSPD-44 process?
Ambassador Herbst. Under NSPD-44, the President has vested in the
Secretary of State the responsibility to coordinate and lead integrated
U.S. Government efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct
reconstruction and stabilization operations. S/CRS has been charged by
the Secretary with implementing this directive. S/CRS has led and will
continue to lead the interagency effort in Washington to implement the
President's vision to develop the systems and procedures to provide
comprehensive, whole-of-government planning for and management of
reconstruction and stabilization policy and operations.
Dr. Snyder. What are the roles and responsibilities of the regional
bureaus and the new Foreign Assistance Bureau? For example, in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the regional bureaus, not S/CRS, have the lead.
Ambassador Herbst. In carrying out its responsibilities under NSPD-
44, S/CRS works closely with the regional bureaus, with other State
Department bureaus, and with other Departments and Agencies as
appropriate. Should a decision be made to activate the Interagency
Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization (IMS) to address
a particular crisis, the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group
(the Washington-based interagency policy coordination body for the
situation) would be co-chaired by the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization, the Assistant Secretary of the relevant regional
bureau, and an appropriate regional senior director from the National
Security Council staff. The CRSG works within the context of the State
Department regional bureau's foreign policy lead and the Secretary's
foreign assistance structure.
Dr. Snyder. How would you describe the current status of
interagency planning for stabilization and reconstruction activities?
Ambassador Herbst. S/CRS has developed processes and mechanisms for
enabling and supported whole-of-government planning for reconstruction
and stabilization operations, based on NSPD-44. These planning
processes can be applied with or without the Interagency Management
System (IMS).
The Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordination Committee
coordinates interagency efforts to develop a planning framework for
U.S. reconstruction and stabilization operations. This framework has
been tested and exercised in a number of civilian-military exercises,
experiments, and table top events. The planning framework has been
taught to U.S. Government personnel (both civilian and military)
through the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute and at
numerous military education and training institutions. Allied nations
have also participated in S/CRS training.
S/CRS has facilitated and/or assisted interagency planning for
specific country engagements in support of U.S. national security
interests. S/CRS country-planning efforts drawing on the whole-of-
government approach have been applied to Sudan, Haiti, Cuba (in support
of CAFC II), Kosovo, and Afghanistan (at the PRT level). These planning
efforts involved significant participation from across the civilian
agencies and DOD.
Dr. Snyder. What specific actions is State taking to facilitate a
greater understanding of the planning processes and capabilities
between DOD and non-DOD organizations for stabilization and
reconstruction activities?
Ambassador Herbst. S/CRS is undertaking many actions to facilitate
greater reciprocal understanding in both civilian and military planning
processes and capabilities. Specifically, we are engaged in joint
planning activities, development and application of an interagency
planning framework, outreach to DOD, joint education endeavors, and
interagency exercises.
For example, in close coordination with DOD, S/CRS is heavily
engaged in interagency planning for a range of country stabilization
and reconstruction efforts, such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Haiti.
These real-world engagements are perhaps the best way to involve our
civilian agency and military counterparts and expose them to the
relatively new interagency planning process.
S/CRS is also leading an interagency process at the Policy
Coordination Committee level to finalize the development and testing of
a planning framework for stabilization and reconstruction activities--a
process that will be reviewed and approved by the NSC.
In addition, S/CRS has led two separate interagency exercises over
the past year with robust participation from various levels of DOD and
two separate combatant commands. S/CRS has also participated in a range
of military exercises, especially those where exposure to interagency
planning tools and response mechanisms builds civil-military capacity.
Also, S/CRS has successfully encouraged DOD and civilian agency
participation in numerous reconstruction and stabilization courses at
the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute that give students
an in-depth exposure to planning tools and new interagency capabilities
provided by NSPD-44. S/CRS officers have participated and shaped the
curriculum of numerous military planning courses offered by DOD as
well.
S/CRS has also established relationships with OSD, Joint Staff, and
every major Geographic Combatant Command and service component, in an
effort to further their understanding of the interagency planning
framework, the Interagency Management System (IMS), and civilian active
and reserve expeditionary capabilities.
Dr. Snyder. In your view, would the Joint Interagency Coordination
Groups at the combatant command be an appropriate interagency planning
mechanism to engage in deliberate planning?
Ambassador Herbst. It is my understanding that the Joint
Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) largely serve in an advisory
role to the Commander and were not set up to perform deliberate
planning. However, I would refer you to the DOD for further information
on the role and capabilities of the JIACG.
Dr. Snyder. How would the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups
interact with the NSPD-44 framework's Interagency Planning Cells when
stood up for crisis planning?
Ambassador Herbst. The Interagency Management System establishes a
civilian planning cell that deploys to the Geographic Combatant Command
(GCC) to harmonize civilian and military planning in support of U.S.
reconstruction and stabilization strategic objectives. This cell would
focus specifically on the planning for the reconstruction and
stabilization operation, while the Joint Interagency Coordination
Groups (JIACG) would provide the Commander with advice on issues and
topics related to the entire GCC Area of Responsibility.
Individual agencies (such as USAID or Justice) in consultation with
the Combatant Commander, would determine if their personnel at the
JIACG would support the Integration Planning Cell (IPC) or if
additional personnel would need to be deployed to fulfill the IPC
requirements.
Dr. Snyder. How, if at all, does NSC-approved Interagency
Management System (IMS) developed under NSPD-44 differ from the NSPD-1
structures and processes used for operation in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Ambassador Herbst. NSPD-1 establishes the interagency bodies for
consideration of policy issues affecting national security, including
the Principals Committee (PC), Deputies Committee (DC), and Policy
Coordination Committees (PCCs). NSPD-44 directs the Secretary of State
to coordinate and lead interagency efforts to prepare, plan for, and
conduct reconstruction and stabilization efforts.
As a part of the specific coordination function articulated in
NSPD-44, the Secretary of State is directed to provide decision makers
with detailed options for an integrated U.S. Government response to
specific reconstruction and stabilization operations including
recommending when to establish a limited-time PCC-level group called
the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG).
In accordance with NSPD-44 and NSPD-1, the CRSG have the role and
responsibilities provided to a PCC. The CRSG is responsible for
coordinating interagency crisis response and providing recommendations
on strategic guidance on all policy and resource issues related to the
specific country or crisis, including recommendations on lead roles
between all elements of the interagency. It is chaired by the State
Department Regional Assistant Secretary and/or Special Envoy, the
National Security Council Staff Senior Regional Director, and S/CRS and
includes Assistant Secretary-level membership from all relevant
agencies and offices. Interagency representation on a CRSG makes this
body the focal point for overall planning and program integration.
Dr. Snyder. In what specific ways would the IMS and other elements
of the framework improve the U.S. management of those operations?
Ambassador Herbst. The Interagency Management System (IMS) is
fundamentally about ensuring integrated, whole-of-government planning
and operational integration for future stabilization and reconstruction
missions. This happens through facilitated real-time information
sharing that can provide the interagency process in Washington, the
Combatant Command, the Embassy, and agencies in the field with one
shared operating picture and a mechanism for improved communication and
decision-making. This shared picture will allow us to engage in more
effective joint planning, to better leverage resources across U.S.
agencies and among international partners, and would allow for more
coherent mobilization of civilian and military resources to the field.
Dr. Snyder. If the IMS would, in fact, help improve the U.S.
response in Iraq and Afghanistan, why is the Administration not using
the system for those operations?
Ambassador Herbst. The IMS was approved by the NSC in March 2007,
well after the U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were already
underway. S/CRS and other departments and agencies that were actively
involved in developing the IMS have worked with the Afghanistan
Interagency Operations Group (AIOG) and the Iraq Policy and Operations
Group (IPOG) to facilitate the sharing of stabilization and
reconstruction lessons learned to help improve the U.S. response. Given
the wealth of operational experience and lessons learned already
resident in the existing interagency structures for Afghanistan and
Iraq, it would not be advantageous to implement the IMS for those
engagements at this time.
Dr. Snyder. How will DOD's new direction to issue a comprehensive
irregular warfare directive impact the NSPD-44 efforts? Will NSPD-44 be
rewritten?
Ambassador Herbst. NSPD-44 provides a whole of government planning
and operating framework for operations that require similar supporting
DOD capabilities.
Within the context of NSPD-44, the Pentagon has the responsibility
to develop its own departmental doctrine for contributing to the U.S.
Government response to national security challenges such as failed and
failing states.
Dr. Snyder. How will your office be involved in irregular warfare
planning?
Ambassador Herbst. In the context of NSPD-44, we are working with
the Pentagon and Combatant Commands on stabilization and reconstruction
issues and expect this cooperation to continue as DOD works out its
doctrine.
Dr. Snyder. Representative Marshall asked you to name any authors
or writings that struck you as especially perceptive insights on how
our country should best confront the unconventional threats it faces.
Would you please name any authors or works that have influenced your
thinking, whether in agreement or disagreement, on this subject?
Ambassador Herbst. The following works have been particularly
useful to me in my work:
State-Building: Governance and World Order in the
21st Century, by Frank Fukuyama;
The Pentagon's New Map, by Thomas Barnett;
The Beginner's Guide to Nation Building, by James
Dobbins, Seth Jones, Keith Crane, and Beth Cole DeGrasse; and
Political Order in Changing Societies, by Samuel
Huntington.
Dr. Snyder. General Holmes, please describe CENTCOM's Joint
Interagency Coordination Group including who is on it and what they do.
General Holmes. USCENTCOM Joint Interagency Coordination Group's
(JIACG) mission is to facilitate planning by the Commander, USCENTCOM,
and his staff; coordinate information sharing between U.S. military and
U.S. government agencies; and advise Commander, USCENTCOM and staff on
interagency issues in the execution of U.S. Central Command's mission.
However, as directed by the acting Commander, the Joint Interagency
Coordination Group merged into an Interagency Task Force (IATF) to
continue this mission and better incorporate other Central Command
elements by combining the offices of JIACG, Counter-Improvised
Explosive Device (Counter-IED) Group, Strategic Communications and
Information Operations into one division within the Operations (J3)
Directorate.
IATF provides: 1) a whole of government approach to USCENTCOM
engagements, 2) multi-agency and multi-lateral coordination across
Areas of Responsibility (AOR) and Combatant Command (COCOM) objectives,
and 3) regional influence/venue coordination.
Focus areas supported by IATF are:
1) Set conditions for stability in Iraq through:
a. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
b. Training Programs for Border Security, Threat Finance, and
Rule of Law
c. Iraq Threat Finance Cell
2) Expand governance and security in Afghanistan through:
a. PRTs
b. Counter Narcotics Efforts
c. Counter Threat Finance
d. Training Programs
3) Degrade violent extremist networks and operations, with
defeating al Qaeda the priority through:
a. Detainee interrogations support
b. High Value Individual
c. Iraq Threat Finance Cell
d. Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) support
4) Strengthen relationships and influence states and organizations
to contribute to regional stability and the free flow of commerce
through the Alternative Development Program.
5) Posture the force to build and sustain joint and combined
warfighting capabilities and readiness in Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Major Regional Exercises.
Issues requiring an interagency approach include:
1) Strategic Effects, 2) Weapons of Mass Destruction, 3) Regional
War on Terror, 4) Transnational Crime, 5) Maritime, Port & Border
Security, 6) Disaster Relief, 7) Counter-Terrorism, 8) Counter Threat
Finance, 9) Long-Term Posture, 10) Security Assistance, 11) Non-
Combatant Evacuation Operations, 12) Counter-IED, 13) Counter-
Narcotics, 14) Pandemic Influenza, 15) Exercise Support to OIF/OEF, 16)
Strategic Communication, 17) Partner Security Forces, 18) Foreign
Humanitarian Assistance and 19) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.
The IATF participates in planning efforts with the following
organizations:
1) Effects Synchronization Committee--CENTCOM's committee to
synchronize collection and strategic targeting against those who
significantly influence the operations, direction or funding of
terrorists and terrorist insurgencies throughout the region
2) National Counter Terrorism Center.
To achieve the interagency approach, IATF integrates, coordinates,
and synchronizes the following personnel to meet non-traditional
security threats and challenges:
1) Director (SES, with 0-7 oversight)
2) Deputy Director (0-6)
3) Three Branch Chiefs (2 x 0-6, 1 x GS-15)
4) Admin Support (1 officer, 3 enlisted)
5) Action Officers (Mix of officer, enlisted, civilian)
6) Representatives from other Federal agencies including:
Department of State, Federal Bureau of Investigations, Drug Enforcement
Agency, Department of Homeland Security, Treasury Department, and
United States Agency for International Development.
Dr. Snyder. General Holmes, CENTCOM's Combined Joint Task Force--
Horn of Africa conducts many of the core missions inherent in stability
operations. What interagency participation is there at the CJTF
headquarters and what part does your Joint Interagency Coordination
Group play in organizing the efforts of the other departments and
agencies in support of the task force?
General Holmes. Interagency participation in the Combined Joint
Task Force--Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is largely coordinated in the
Embassy Djibouti Country Team. The CENTCOM IATF coordinates several
classified interagency operations among the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and Department of State (DOS).
The IATF serves as a coordinator between the interagency
organizations in Washington, DC and the CJTF-HOA. Specifically, our
Department of State Liaison facilitates host nation permission for
military entry into territorial waters of a HOA nation to effect a
counternarcotics operation. Further, Department of State supports
embassies or consulates in every HOA country except for Somalia. Our
FBI Liaison facilitates investigations and coordinates U.S. law
enforcement actions in the HOA nations as requested by the U.S. or
local governments.
Dr. Snyder. General Holmes, CENTCOM appears to have exercised only
a monitoring role of its Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and
Afghanistan. While there are differences between the composition and
mission emphasis of the teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, shouldn't
CENTCOM be playing a greater role in developing the joint and even
interagency doctrine that guides them? How is CENTCOM assessing the
progress the PRTs are making?
General Holmes. At the combatant command level, CENTCOM conducts
and oversees its components with instructions for policy guidance,
promulgates Department of Defense directives and other documents such
as handbooks and assists in the implementation of operating concepts
and memos of agreement from Joint Staff, Office of Secretary of Defense
and the interagency. CENTCOM provides doctrine review and recommends
Tactics, Training and Procedures (TTP) to Joint Forces Command
regarding Stability Operations.
Primarily, CENTCOM exercises a monitoring role over PRTs, focusing
mainly on stability and security progress/status in our area of
responsibility. Numerous DOD and USG agencies assess (to varying levels
of degrees) the progress and success of the PRTs. PRTs are managed in
two diverse manners in Iraq and Afghanistan; Iraq PRTs are led by the
Department of State and Afghanistan PRTs are led by the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Both concepts achieve the overarching
goals of promoting the expansion of the Central government into the
provinces and mentor and coach the provincial leadership in being good
stewards on behalf of the provincial population.
In Iraq PRTs have been led by the Department of State, since
inception. Originally, called Provincial Support Teams (PST) they have
limited military involvement. After Ambassador Khalilizad moved from
Afghanistan to Iraq at the end of 2004, the PRT program stepped forward
because he saw this as the way ahead and supported its development.
When they were reconfigured into the PRTs of today, Civil Affairs was
tasked to be the lead military element within the PRT, directed by the
Department of State.
The current military/civilian relationship in Iraq is effective and
progressive. MNF-I forces continually incorporate non-kinetic options
into their operational missions with success. PRT staffs work with
Brigade Combat Teams as well as the interagency and other non-
governmental agencies to effect positive change in the communities they
serve. As security improves, PRT effects will increase as all personnel
are able to interact more freely. The project development and monies
for Iraq PRTs are actually not at issue, since Iraqi budgets fund their
projects and Iraq Provincial Councils are developing construction plans
in accordance with the Iraq Development Strategy.
ISAF administers PRT activities in Afghanistan. ISAF, with help
from its many member nations is achieving coherence among all 26 PRTs
by solidifying personnel from over 20 different nations into an
organized command quite capable of assisting the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan (IRoA). In demonstration, ISAF published its PRT Handbook;
endorsed by the ambassadorial-level PRT Executive Steering Committee
(ESC) in Kabul as the standard for PRT operation. This document focuses
in on the various pillars that need shaping in order to have a
functioning society. This culminates more than four years of inputs
from the GOA, ISAF, Combined Forces Command--Afghanistan (CFC-A),
United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) and international
development agencies. The handbook outlines basic guiding principles
and proven best practices each PRT should draw upon when designing and
implementing strategy to meet the challenges of its particular area of
operations. ISAF also orchestrates the efforts each government's
financial efforts, ensuring all accomplishments are nested and vetted
against the Afghanistan National Development Plan (ANDP). ISAF also
works with USAID and other major contributors to manage projects across
the country with funds provided by sources in addition to each PRT's
lead government.
Dr. Snyder. General Holmes, a new irregular warfare document will
replace DODD 3000.05. Is CENTCOM taking a proactive role in assessing
and recording its counterinsurgency experience from Iraq and
Afghanistan for inclusion in this directive?
General Holmes. USCENTCOM has conducted active collection through
other agents, including USSOCOM and USJFCOM, and established a
classified lessons learned program which receives information,
recommendations and suggestions from all sources. This data is
collected, assessed and validated against findings and observations
collected while forces are engaged in Irregular Warfare/Counter-
Insurgency (COIN) operations. These findings (or lessons learned) cover
the full spectrum of COIN operations from non-kinetic activities to
full kinetic actions. The information is contained in a database to
archive these lessons learned and will eventually be resident on our
command's Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JILLS) database and
in USJFCOM's Joint Lessons Learned Repository (JLLR), (both systems are
currently under development and implementation). A number of Joint
Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) and Immediate Warfighter Needs (IWNs)
statements of requirement have been initiated by USCENTCOM that will
enhance on-going and future COIN operations.
Dr. Snyder. Colonel Osborne, according to the Irregular Warfare
Joint Operating Concept, in the future, Irregular Warfare campaigns
will increasingly require military general purpose forces to perform
missions that in the last few decades have been viewed primarily as
Special Operation Forces (SOF) activities. How might this change the
future mission of SOF?
Colonel Osborne. In my opinion, SOF will not change its core tasks
or mission focus. However, an increased use of general purpose forces
in select scenarios will increase our capacity to conduct engagement
activities and allow SOF to focus on the most appropriate missions.
Dr. Snyder. Colonel Osborne, the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating
Concept proposes three alternatives for further development and
experimentation that would provide models to coordinate interagency
command and control: (1) extending the Joint Interagency Task Force
(JIATF) to irregular warfare; (2) establishing interagency Advisory
Assistance Teams at sub-national levels of government; and (3)
expanding the use of U.S. Military Groups (MILGRPs) to conduct and
support irregular warfare. Can you explain the pros and cons of each
approach?
Colonel Osborne. The potential approaches identified in the
Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) are being explored
as part of the concept development and experimentation currently
underway by the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Joint Forces
Command and a number of other agencies. Some thoughts are expressed
below however a thorough analysis has yet to be completed.
The Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) Model has proved to be a
valuable command and control mechanism for integrating civil-military
operations in operational areas, but have been historically a short
term military led organization. JIATF's operate under the operational
control of the Geographic Combatant Commander and are by definition not
part of the U.S. Mission (Embassy), therefore not part of the Country
team which could lead to sub-optimization and over-militarization of
the ``whole-of-government'' approach to solving or managing the
political problem in question.
The IA Advisory Assistance Teams at the sub-national levels of
government have proven to be successful, but more recent Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq have been challenged because of
insufficient numbers of them, being asked to do too much, inadequate
civilian manning, inadequate efforts to integrate them, and a
relatively lower priority than combat units.
The expanded MILGRP Model could be a long term solution and organic
to the U.S. Mission, fully integrated into the Country Team, and much
more likely to subordinate its military activities to the broader
``whole-of-government'' approach led by the Chief of Mission. Although
a permanent organization would solidify relationships and allow for
continuous oversight more effectively, it would require more
infrastructure and manning to execute. This model will also likely have
to function under constraints imposed by both the host nation and our
own Country Team.
Dr. Snyder. Colonel Osborne, please describe SOCOM's Interagency
Task Force. How does it relate to the J-10, which you direct? How does
the J-10 interact with SOCOM's Global Synchronization Division, which
works with the National Counterterrorism Center in the War on Terror?
Colonel Osborne. The USSOCOM Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) serves
as a coordinating activity within the Department of Defense (DOD) and
across the Inter-Agency (IA). The goal is to be a reliable and
connected entity that is able to integrate IA efforts while solving
discrete problem sets that support the global war on terror (GWOT). The
IATF is functionally organized along two major focus areas and several
enduring tasks. Major focus area efforts are combating the foreign
terrorist network (FTN) and expanding United States Government document
and media exploitation (DOMEX) capacity. The IATF's enduring tasks
include counter narcoterrorism, threat finance, persistent surveillance
requirements, counterterrorism research and analysis, information
operations, support to the inter-agency partnership program (IAPP), and
time-sensitive planning.
Dr. Snyder. Colonel Osborne, what role has SOCOM played in
implementation of NSPD-44, given its proponency for the civil affairs
mission?
Colonel Osborne. Civil Affairs (CA) is outside my area of expertise
but I believe the USSOCOM role is primarily as a force provider for the
Geographic Combatant Commanders. In that capacity we provide trained
and equipped Civil Affairs forces to support theater specific plans and
operations. Additionally, as the DOD proponent, we are responsible for
individual, unit, and institutional training of CA core tasks which are
fundamental to stability operations. The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is the
principle vehicle through which this training is developed and
conducted.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MARSHALL
Mr. Marshall. Assistant Secretary Vickers, could you name any
authors or writings that struck you as especially perceptive insights
on how our country should best confront the unconventional global
threats it faces?
Mr. Vickers. I recommend Vali Nasr, Bernard Lewis, Fawas Gerges,
and Walid Phares as scholars who offer important insights on the
challenges our Nation faces.
Mr. Marshall. Admiral Davenport, could you name any authors or
writings that struck you as especially perceptive insights on how our
country should best confront the unconventional global threat it faces?
Admiral Davenport. We draw ideas from a wide range of academic
writings, think-tank monographs, and other informed authors to help
understand our problem sets and their potential solutions. Colin Gray
is an author that has strongly influenced my thinking as Joint Forces
Command (JFCOM) examines ways to deal with the global threat
environment. Some of his most significant works include:
- Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy (Apr
07)
- War, Peace, and International Relations: An Introduction to
Strategic History (Jul 07)
- ``Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters'' Strategic
Studies Quarterly (Winter 2007).
Additionally, we develop ideas from a wide range of academic white
papers, think-tank monographs, and other outside agency sources to help
understand our problem sets and their potential solutions. Important
source documents that influence our thinking as we examine ways to deal
with the global threat environment include:
- More Than Humanitarianism; A Strategic U.S. Approach Toward
Africa (January 2006) is a Council on Foreign Relations study
chaired by Mr. Anthony Lake and Ms. Christine Todd Whitman. The
document views Africa as more than just a charity case and
advocates for a strong mix of policies, programs and
organizational reforms that will address the broader range of
African issues that influence U.S. national interests.
- The Quest For Viable Peace: International Intervention And
Strategies For Conflict Transformation (May 2005) was co-
authored by Mr. Len Hawley, who has worked with us in JFCOM as
a Senior Mentor on numerous projects, and Mr. Jock Covey and
Mr. Michael J. Dziedzic. The book reviews the issues involved
with nation-building and makes concrete recommendations on
rebuilding shattered societies based on the principles of
defeating militant extremism, inculcating rule of law, and
establishing a political economy that reduces rather than
ignites conflict.
- The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building (2007) is a 330-page
RAND monograph done by James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith
Crane, and Beth Cole DeGrasse. As described by RAND, the guide
is a ``. . . practical `how-to' manual on the conduct of
effective nation-building. It is organized around the
constituent elements that make up any nation-building mission:
military, police, rule of law, humanitarian relief, governance,
economic stabilization, democratization, and development . . .
The lessons are drawn principally from 16 U.S.- and UN-led
nation-building operations since World War II and from a
forthcoming study on European-led missions. In short, this
guidebook presents a comprehensive history of best practices in
nation-building . . .''
Finally, Joint Forces Command has a very robust professional
reading list that I frequently use and regularly refer to. This list
contains a wide range of books and articles that provide background and
thought provoking analysis on many topics of interest. I have included
the list below for your convenience and hope you find it useful:
1. GEN (Ret) Rupert Smith (British Army), The Utility of Force.
Former deputy SACEUR, commanded the British armored division in the
1991 Gulf War, commanded the U.N. peacekeeping force in Bosnia in 1995
and spent many years in Northern Ireland. In this book he describes the
new model of war: ``The ends for which we fight are changing from the
hard objectives that decide a political outcome to those of
establishing conditions in which the outcome may be decided.'' (2007)
2. Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War. Van Creveld
argues that Clausewitz, whose tenets form the basis for Western
strategic thought, is largely irrelevant to nonpolitical wars such as
the Islamic jihad and wars for existence such as Israel's Six-Day War.
Wars in the future will be waged by terrorists, guerrillas and bandits
motivated by fanatical, ideologically-based loyalties; conventional
battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres. (1991)
Recommend whole book.
3. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5. Manual takes a general approach to
counterinsurgency operations. The Army and Marine Corps recognize that
every insurgency is contextual and presents its own set of challenges.
Nonetheless, all use variations of standard themes and adhere to
elements of a recognizable revolutionary campaign plan. This manual
addresses common characteristics of insurgencies to provide those
conducting counterinsurgency campaigns with a solid foundation for
understanding and addressing specific insurgencies. (2006) Recommend
whole book.
4. MG Robert Scales (Ret), Yellow Smoke. MG Scales argues that,
given Iraq, Afghanistan, and the ongoing war against terrorism, the
importance of land warfare seems certain to grow. Despite superiority
on almost every front, the U.S. armed forces have been effectively
challenged on battlefields near and far. War remains as much art as
science and MG Scales offers on example of what to expect if we
substitute science and technology wholesale for the understanding of
history and humanity. (2003) Recommend whole book, but could scale to
Chapters 1, 2, 7, and 9.
5. Colin Gray, Fighting Talk--Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and
Strategy. Gray discusses the nature of strategy, war, and peace,
organized around forty maxims. This collection of mini-essays will
forearm politicians, soldiers, and the attentive general public against
many fallacies that abound in contemporary debates about war, peace,
and security. The maxims are grouped into five clusters: War and Peace;
Strategy; Military Power and Warfare; Security and Insecurity; and
History and the Future. (2007)
6. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.
Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf
The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.
Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2005/
d20050408strategy.pdf
The Unified Command Plan (UCP). Available at http://j5.js.smil.mil/
sp/Organization/links/2006%20UCP.pdf (SIPRNET)
7. GEN (Ret) Gary Luck, ``Insights on Joint Operations: The Art and
Science'' A Common Perspective (November 2006). GEN Luck argues that
the United States and its allies are engaged in a protracted global war
within a very complex security environment. Our enemies are not only
foreign states, but also non-state entities, loosely organized networks
with no discernible hierarchical structure. These adversaries can not
be defined only in terms of their military capabilities. They must be
defined, visualized, and ``attacked'' more comprehensively, in terms of
their interconnected political, military, economic, social,
informational, and infrastructure systems. http://www.dtic.mil/
doctrine/jel/comm_per/acp14_2.pdf
8. Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, ``Countering Global
Insurgency'' Small Wars Journal (NOV 2004). The paper proposes a new
strategic approach to the global War on Terrorism, arguing that the War
is best understood as a global insurgency. Therefore counterinsurgency
rather than traditional counterterrorism may offer the best approach to
defeating global jihad. But classical counterinsurgency is designed to
defeat insurgency in a single country. Therefore a fundamental
reappraisal of counterinsurgency is needed, to develop methods
effective against global insurgency. http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/
documents/kilcullen.pdf
9. George Packer, ``Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientists
Redefine the ``War on Terror'' The New Yorker (18 December 2006).
Packer's populist summary of David Kilcullen's thesis (above) ``There
are elements in human psychological and social makeup that drive what's
happening. The Islamic bit is secondary. This is human behavior in an
Islamic setting. This is not `Islamic behavior. . . . People don't get
pushed into rebellion by their ideology. They get pulled in by their
social networks.''
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/12/18/061218fa_fact2
10. Montgomery McFate, ``The Military Utility of Understanding
Adversary Culture'' Joint Force Quarterly (JUL 2005). Cultural
knowledge and warfare are inextricably bound. Knowledge of one's
adversary has been sought since Herodotus studied his opponents'
conduct during the Persian Wars (490-479 BC). Although ``know thy
enemy'' is one of the first principles of warfare, our military
operations and national security decision-making have consistently
suffered due to lack of knowledge of foreign cultures.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1038.pdf
11. Advising Foreign Forces: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures--
Center for Army Lessons Learned Special Edition No. 06-01 dated January
2006 (requires AKO account). A practical guide for individuals and
units to use in preparation for missions as trainers and advisors to
foreign military units.
Mr. Marshall. General Holmes, could you name any authors or
writings that struck you as especially perceptive insights on how our
country should best confront the unconventional global threats it
faces?
General Holmes. The following authors and their works influenced my
thinking and understanding on Irregular Warfare:
1) All works by Dr. Joseph Nye, Director of JFK School of
Government
2) The works, briefings and general writings of Newt Gingrich
3) ``Fighting the War of Ideas Like a Real War'' by J. Michael
Waller
4) The current writings of LTG (ret) David Barno
5) ``Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare'' by Gen John
Mattis, USMC and ADM Eric Olsen, USN
Mr. Marshall. General Kearney, could you name any authors or
writings that struck you as especially perceptive insights on how our
country should best confront the unconventional global threats it
faces?
General Kearney. The two publications mentioned were ``Future
Jihad'' by Walid Phares and ``Faith, Reason, and the War Against
Jihadism: A Call to Action'' by George Weigel. As noted during the
hearing, I think these publications best describe the threat we are
facing.
Mr. Marshall. Colonel Osborne, could you name any authors or
writings that struck you as especially perceptive insights on how our
country should best confront the unconventional global threats it
faces?
Colonel Osborne. During testimony I mentioned two books that I've
recently read, ``The Utility of Force'' by General Sir Rupert Smith and
``Infidel'' by Ayaan Hirsi Ali. In addition to these two books, I
recommend the following books that have contributed to the irregular
warfare dialogue: ``Information Strategy and Warfare'' edited by John
Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer, ``Warrant for Terror'' by Shmuel Bar,
``Counterinsurgency in Africa'' by John P. Cann, ``Counterinsurgency
Warfare'' by David Galula, ``The I.R.A. & Its Enemies'' by Peter Hart,
and ``To Our Great Detriment: Ignoring What Extremists Say About
Jihad'', a thesis by Stephen Coughlin. The last book on my list is
``The Savage Wars of Peace'' by Max Boot. This list is not all
inclusive but does represent a good cross section of the current
literature.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA
Mrs. Davis of California. Our O&I subcommittee has investigated
training operations currently underway between State Department/USAID
and the individual services prior to PRT deployments. Is there any
other interagency training going on or planned? Are copies of the
curriculum available to Congress?
Ambassador Herbst. The State, USAID, and DOD courses represent the
formal training for PRT members at present. In addition, some deploying
PRT members have also taken other courses offered at the Department of
State's Foreign Service Institute (FSI). S/CRS has worked with FSI
since late 2005 in the design and delivery of a reconstruction and
stabilization (R&S) training curriculum that currently includes seven
courses. These courses cover a range of issues important to
reconstruction and stabilization missions (to include the work of PRTs)
including R&S assessment and planning and the Interagency Management
System for R&S, as well as integration issues among rule of law,
infrastructure, transitional security, and governance in an R&S
environment. They are all interagency in design and participation.
Copies of the course outlines are available.
We are currently working closely with a number of other
institutions that are developing courses on R&S including the National
Defense University, the Naval Post-Graduate School, and the U.S.
Institute of Peace, among others. Their courses will be included in a
study on training on complex operations conducted by USIP for the
Consortium for Complex Operations that will be published within the
next few months and will help guide future training expansion.
Mrs. Davis of California. How did this non-PRT type of interagency
training develop?
Ambassador Herbst. The State Department's courses on reconstruction
and stabilization (R&S) were developed in 2005 by S/CRS and the Foreign
Service Institute with an interagency team that included
representatives from the U.S. Institute of Peace, USAID, and National
Defense University, based on an interagency R&S training strategy. The
courses have been continually revised to reflect the latest
developments in interagency planning and R&S operations, integrating
lessons from experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, and Sudan among
others.
This strategy is currently being updated through the NSPD-44
implementation process in a broad interagency effort--the Training,
Education, Exercises, and Experimentation Sub-PCC--co-chaired by S/CRS,
USAID, and DOD.
Mrs. Davis of California. Does the Department of State or the
Department of Defense need additional authorities to carry out
interagency training for Stability and/or Reconstruction Operations?
Are there other barriers in law or policy?
Ambassador Herbst. The authorities of the Department of State and
those of our partner agencies are currently adequate to allow us to
train together. Funding is the immediate barrier to increasing our
training cooperation. The FY 2009 budget request for the Civilian
Stabilization Initiative would cover our requirements for cooperative
course design and delivery, administration, staffing, as well as
tuition, travel, and per diem for training participants.
Mrs. Davis of California. Is it feasible to extend interagency
training to the 3,200 Marines scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan later
this year?
Ambassador Herbst. Presently this level of unit training is being
supported by civilian role players at the National Training Center at
Fort Irwin and the Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft Polk. S/CRS is
working with the interagency to improve civil-military integration
training at the Brigade Task Force level in these venues including
Marine mobilization and readiness exercises at Twenty Nine Palms,
California.
Mrs. Davis of California. Has S/CRS examined the Ft. Bragg model
for Afghanistan PRT training?
Ambassador Herbst. S/CRS has been a partner and actively involved
with the creation and evolution of the Fort Bragg training, from
initial efforts to the interagency field assessment conducted this
month to inform training planned for fall 2008. This past year, S/CRS
briefed PRT military staff, delivered a day-long training on
interagency assessment and planning at the Fort Bragg series to the
full PRT teams, played a key role in developing the scenarios for the
week-long capstone training event, and provided mentors during the
exercise itself. In these activities, S/CRS is in support of State's
Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs and USAID's Office of
Military Affairs.
Mrs. Davis of California. What about for future deployments?
Ambassador Herbst. S/CRS continues to be involved in the Fort Bragg
Afghanistan PRT training and is currently participating in development
of the next iteration. The lessons from Afghanistan training will be
collected through an upcoming interagency PRT Lessons Learned Workshop
and during an April training assessment in Kabul. These lessons will be
integrated into current planning for pre-deployment training in future
deployments.
Mrs. Davis of California. Can S/CRS extend Ft. Bragg's model of
interagency training for Afghan PRTs to Iraq PRT training, which is now
limited to a five day optional course at the Foreign Service Institute
and does not train teams together nor does it connect to the BCT that
it will work within theater for its Mission Rehearsal exercise?
Ambassador Herbst. Following announcement of the New Way Forward in
January 2007, the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International
Development, Department of Defense, and other agencies created an
interagency PRT training course at the Department of State's Foreign
Service Institute in order to provide specialized training for the
hundreds of State, DOD, and other agency personnel deploying to Iraq.
The State-led Iraq interagency constantly re-evaluates and makes
adjustments to PRT training. It is important to note that aside from
the name, PRT operations in Iraq and Afghanistan profoundly differ in
leadership, structure, staffing, and focus. Because Iraq PRT's do not
rotate as a unit, and because not all Iraq PRT's are paired with a
Brigade, it is not feasible to replicate the training structure used
for Afghanistan. However, we recognize the value of joint civilian-
military training and are exploring ways to increase those
opportunities. For example, the Iraq PRT inter-agency working group, in
which S/CRS regularly participates, recently expanded interagency
attendance at the regular Iraq PRT training meeting to, among other
objectives, discuss opportunities for military and civilian elements of
the PRTs to train together and to support each others' training
efforts. S/CRS will continue to support such efforts to share best
practices and lessons learned across agencies and across theaters.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DRAKE
Mrs. Drake. I enjoyed visiting Joint Forces Command on many
occasions. On one such trip I was given the opportunity to observe the
Noble Resolve experiment and I am pleased this work is being down in
the Hampton Roads Region. I believe it will help to contribute to the
overall preparedness, security and safety of Virginia and our nations.
As I understand it, this experiment is heavily focused on interagency
cooperation, particularly Homeland Security, and the involvement of the
National Guard and FEMA. In your written statement, you state ``JFCOM
is engaged in a broad array of efforts to improve DOD and interagency
integration and capabilities, and is rapidly inserting these
improvements into the operating force.'' Can you explain how Noble
Resolve experiments will lead to improved interagency collaboration and
coordination? Can you explain what your future plans are for Noble
Resolve? Will this experiment expand beyond the Tidewater area?
Admiral Davenport. One of our major focal points for Noble Resolve
is information sharing between all elements of national response to
threats to and crisis within the homeland--including defense, federal,
state and local responders. This line of effort identifies, evaluates,
and socializes new technologies, processes, and organizational
constructs that overcome barriers to information sharing within DOD as
well as between DOD elements and interagency, NGO, and multinational
partners. We continue to work closely with USNORTHCOM on establishing a
common operational picture that can be shared between all participants
in our experimentation events. We're also looking at solutions to the
problem of sharing information across security domains, from secret to
unclassified systems, etc. We expect information sharing to remain a
priority for Joint Experimentation for the foreseeable future.
Our Noble Resolve effort, which is being conducted in direct
support of USNORTHCOM, has been focused well beyond the Tidewater area.
In 2007, in addition to our work with Virginia, we conducted
experimentation with military and civilian organizations in the state
of Oregon. In this year's campaign (Noble Resolve 08), we are
attempting to raise our level of engagement to better address regional
issues. While Noble Resolve 08 work will focus on issues with regional
impact, we still engage a limited number of individual states as our
actual experiment partners. In 2008, we are working with Virginia,
Indiana, Texas, and Oregon. In future work, we will partner with states
that are capable and interested in helping address those critical areas
of Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities that have
been identified for joint experimentation.
Mrs. Drake. How much will AFRICOM's efforts toward a ``whole of
government'' target inform your progress toward interagency
coordination first envisioned in the joint interagency coordination
group (JIACG) concept? Should we expect most of these gains to be
material, organizational, or doctrinal in nature?
Admiral Davenport. Joint Forces Command's (JFCOM) efforts at
establishing Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) at the
combatant commands should be seen as an important first step at
institutionalizing the concept of ``whole of government'' into the
military planning processes. The interagency groundwork laid by the
JIACG program provides a baseline from which both AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM
are organizing to exploit the powerful synergy of USG agencies working
in alignment toward larger national goals. The proposed AFRICOM
structure is another important step in placing ``whole of government''
thinking into military operations and the larger government as a whole.
JFCOM is supporting the development of AFRICOM by facilitating an
Interagency Mission Analysis to be completed in a series of workshops/
process that illuminate the direction our work is taking:
- Several portions of the Interagency Mission Analysis are
being led by the appropriate USG civilian agencies, supported
by JFCOM;
- Workshops focus on delineating the roles and responsibilities
of AFRICOM and civilian agencies and analyze the challenges
that AFRICOM will confront in taking a comprehensive approach
to USG planning, programming and implementation and management
of activities in Africa.
- The workshops are examining the ways which representatives
from various USG Departments and Agencies are assigned to and
integrated into the staff in functional roles (as opposed to
liaison officers) in the proposed AFRICOM structure.
We expect most of the expected gains in interagency coordination to
be seen, first organizationally and then doctrinally, as the new
command organizes its staff to develop the structures, processes and
procedures to execute its mission in Africa.