[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AIRPORT SECURITY: THE NECESSARY IMPROVEMENTS TO SECURE AMERICA'S
AIRPORTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 19, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-25
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
VACANCY
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas, Chairwoman
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
Columbia GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado Officio)
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Mathew Washington, Director
Erin Daste, Counsel
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Coley O'Brien, Minority Senior Counsel
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 4
The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 20
The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Oregon............................................ 15
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 4
The Honorable Ed Perlmutter, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Colorado.......................................... 19
The Honorable Ginny Brown-Waite, a Representative in congress
From the State of Florida...................................... 17
WITNESSES
Panel I
The Honorable Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary, Transportation
Security Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Panel II
Mr. William E. Holden, Senior vice President of Operations,
Covenant Homeland Security Solutions:
Oral Statement................................................. 30
Prepared Statement............................................. 32
Mr. Greg Principato, President, Airports Council International--
North America:
Oral Statement................................................. 27
Prepared Statement............................................. 29
Ms. Lauren Stover, Assistant Aviation Director for Security and
Communications, Miami-Dade Aviation Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 23
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
For the Record
Material submitted by Hon. Ginnie Brown-Waite.................... 44
AIRPORT SECURITY: THE NECESSARY
IMPROVEMENTS TO SECURE AMERICA'S AIRPORTS
----------
Thursday, April 19, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:37 a.m., in
Room 340, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, DeFazio, Clarke,
Perlmutter, Lowey, Lungren, Brown-Waite, Bilirakis, and
McCarthy.
Ms. Jackson Lee. [Presiding.] Good morning. The
subcommittee will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
the necessary improvements to secure America's airports and
what the Department of Homeland Security is doing to protect
our nation's airports.
However, before I begin, I would like to ask for unanimous
consent that Ms. Lowey, who I know will be joining us, a member
of the full committee, be able to sit and question the panel
during today's hearing.
Hearing no objection, it is so ordered.
Let me, first of all, thank all of you.
Mr. Lungren, come in. We were just mentioning that you were
en route, and we thank the ranking member.
I yield myself 5 minutes for an opening statement.
Let me, first of all, say that we have a bounty of activity
today, and because of that, we are told that there may be votes
in a short while.
I am going to abbreviate my remarks so at least, Mr.
Hawley, we can begin and you may be interrupted during your
testimony.
Let me acknowledge the presence of the ranking member, Mr.
Lungren, the esteemed distinguished member of the committee,
Mr. DeFazio, also subcommittee chair on Transportation and
Infrastructure, Mr. Bilirakis, a member of the committee now,
Ms. Brown-Waite as well, who is present.
I think it is important to note the philosophy of this
committee, and, Congresswoman Lowey, we have already
acknowledged, your presence here today, and we thank you so
very much for your leadership.
It is very clear that the Homeland Security Committee has
one of the most daunting responsibilities in this House.
Without any reflection negatively on any other committee, we
recognize that as we have looked mourningly at the horrific
tragedy of this past Monday, in each of my committees, I have
offered to the community of Virginia Tech, the state of
Virginia our deepest concern and certainly our respect, our
love and recognition of the horror of which they experienced.
But we also know that as time moves on, the questions are
asked, ``What if?'' And this committee would, unfortunately,
hold in their hands that one question, ``What if?'' And so this
committee is looking forward, along with a cooperative effort
with the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, close
working relationships with the full committee chair and
subcommittee chairpersons of a number of subcommittees, to
begin to get in front of these many issues.
Today, we will look at a number of security issues. Mr.
Hawley we hope that you will provide us with insight on a
number of issues. But we certainly are interested in the whole
landscape of airports; certainly that of passenger travel and
the new technology that we have utilized, but we know the
airports are like cities, and, therefore, we are looking at the
comings and goings of so many different people.
We need not recount some of our more horrific stories,
maybe the shoe bomber, something that we had not heard of
before. We knew about airplanes but certainly not passengers
with bombs on their feet.
Similarly, we don't know of the comings and goings of the
many people that come inside of the airport beyond the area of
security. We also know that airplanes and air carriers have to
work and function. We need pilots, we need flight attendants.
We need to make sure that they get to their planes on time.
Probably, we would hear more of an outcry from passengers about
late pilots and flight attendants maybe than their own
security.
So this committee today is making the statement that we are
going forward to take a fine tooth comb, a microscope, if you
will, to look at our airports as we look at our rail systems,
our mass transits, our critical infrastructure to ensure that
we are in fact working together to mitigate, to diminish, to
lower the ``what if'' question.
I think it is important to know that checked baggage is
screened for explosives, that it is more likely that the flight
has air marshals on board, crew members are trained in
defensive measures and some pilots volunteer for the Federal
Flight Deck Officer Program to carry firearms to protect the
cockpit, some of the things that we have agreed or disagreed
on.
We also recognize that it is very clear that TSA has not
lived up to its obligation under the Aviation, Transportation
and Security Act, which mandates in section 106 improved
airport perimeter access security that, ``The undersecretary
shall require as soon as practical after the date of enactment
screening or inspection of all individuals, goods, properties,
vehicles and other equipment before entering a secured area of
an airport.''
In addition, this section also states that, ``The screening
or inspection will, at a minimum, be as rigorous as screening
of passengers and their baggage.''
Certainly, it is unthinkable after 5 years after September
11 a solution as fundamental and simple as this one still has
not been implemented, but it is important to note that a
meeting with the transportation and security administrator, Mr.
Hawley, he has initiated a seven-point initiative that I hope
he will explain, which begins to lay a thoughtful concept of
beginning to find out who in fact are in America's airports.
So I look forward to the testimony today, and I want us to
collectively demonstrate to the nation that we are the
committee not of what ifs but how can we and what can we do
ahead of time, because we value the security of America every
single day that we have the responsibility of that important
challenge.
Prepared Opening Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee,
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you all for joining
us this morning so that we can begin our exploration of the topic of
Airport Security and examine what steps we must take to secure the
Nation's airports.
In the wake of September 11th, aviation security was made a federal
responsibility, and I think everyone here today would agree that
aviation security has improved substantially.
Protecting the Nation and shoring up aviation security requires a
layered approach.
For example, today, checked baggage is screened for explosives, it
is more likely that the flight has air marshals on board, crew members
are trained in defensive measures, and some pilots volunteer for the
Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) program to carry firearms to protect
the cockpit.
However, given the fact that there is an existing threat of liquid
explosives, the fact that all passengers names are not checked against
the full terrorist watch list, and the fact that we do not screen those
who have access to secure areas, it is very clear that TSA has not
lived up to its obligation under the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA, P.L. 107-71) of 2001 mandates in Section 106--
``Improved Airport Perimeter Access Security''. This section states
that the Under Secretary--shall require, as soon as practicable after
the date of enactment, screening or inspection of all individuals,
goods, property, vehicles, and other equipment before entering a
secured area of an airport.
In addition this section also states that the screening or
inspection will, at minimum, be as rigorous as screening of passengers
and their baggage.
It is unthinkable that more than five years after September 11th, a
solution as fundamental and simple as this one still has not been
implemented. At our nation's airports we meticulously screen passengers
and baggage. However, many of the Nation's airport employees and
contractors are currently free to roam wherever they want, even in
``sterile'' areas, without prior screening. Giving workers open access
to a ``sterile'' area is like installing an expensive home security
system but leaving your back door wide open.
This is a huge security gap that already has been exploited for the
purposes of carrying out criminal activities and I believe that if we
continue to use TSA Band-Aid approaches, it is only a matter of time
before terrorists exploit this vulnerability to attack our nation.
As Member of Congress and more specifically, as Members of the
Committee on Homeland Security, we have a responsibility to make sure
our planes and airports are secure. We are at a crossroads--where we
must take action to find out what is the best way to provide a safe,
secure, and functional aviation system. If we do not put effective,
safety measures in place, our Nation may very well be susceptible to
another attack, which in turn will cause a major avoidance of
commercial aviation. This potential avoidance would subject us to grim
economic consequences. We must continually earn the confidence of the
flying public. In order to ensure that the public continues to enjoy
the freedom of mobility that flying provides, we must demonstrate to
them that our Nation's airports are secure.
Ms. Jackson Lee. It is now my honor to recognize the
ranking member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from
California, for an opening statement for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentlelady for the time, I thank
the other members for their attendance, and I thank our
witnesses for being here.
We know that we have done a lot of work in the area of
aviation safety and security, and we know that that has made us
much safer than we were on 9/10 or 9/11, but we also know that
much more remains to be done. And there has been the interest
of members in particular of this committee about the question
of security with respect to those employees who have access to
otherwise secure parts of the airports.
And there has been a debate about a perimeter defense, if
you will. I look forward to hearing from Mr. Hawley about that
approach versus the new initiative that he is announcing, how
they might differ, how they might have aspects of separation
that may make some airports more conducive to one approach and
other airports conducive to another.
I also believe that it is important for us to have pilot
projects to go forward so we can have some comparisons and also
so that we can move forward rather than just talk about it.
And, lastly, I would just like to mention that, as Mr.
Hawley knows, there has been a concerted interest on this
committee for the effective use of canine units, the ability
that they have to supply your department with an agility that
they might otherwise not have and that that may answer some of
the questions with respect to construction concerns that we
have that confront us when we are dealing with machines of
technology.
So I look very much forward to hearing the testimony of our
witnesses today about what they believe is the best approach
for eliminating the threat that may be posed by airline
employees.
Let's say, for the record, most of the airline employees do
an outstanding job, are loyal Americans, but what we are
looking at are potential vulnerabilities and how we avoid those
vulnerabilities.
And with that, Madam Chair, I would yield back the balance
of my time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the distinguished ranking member.
Let me acknowledge the presence of Mr. McCarthy as well.
Welcome.
And let me ask unanimous consent to yield to the gentlelady
from New York 30 seconds.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you very much, and I wanted to thank the
subcommittee chair, Ms. Jackson Lee, and the ranking member,
Mr. Lungren, and Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member King for
allowing me to participate in this critically important
hearing.
I look forward to working with each of you to advance my
legislation to initiative a pilot program for screening airport
workers and to take additional steps toward achieving total 100
percent screening at U.S. airports.
Additionally, I want to thank Assistant Secretary Hawley
for the frank discussion we had yesterday afternoon. I know we
don't agree, we don't see eye to eye on which strategies would
be most effective, but I did appreciate the opportunity to
continue having an open and frank dialogue with you of the
issue.
And I do want to thank Ms. Brown-Waite for being an active
cosponsor of this legislation.
Thank you very much. We look forward to the hearing.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentlelady.
At this time, I would like to welcome Kip Hawley, the
assistant secretary of the Transportation Security
Administration at the Department of Home Security, and I would
correct that and say he is an assistant secretary of Department
of Homeland Security and administrator for the Texas--Texas on
my mind--Transportation Security Administration.
You know what happens when you come from a big state.
I want to say to you, as Congressman Lowey has said,
overall, I think it is a good tension between this committee
and the Department of Homeland Security in terms of oversight.
We don't always agree, but let me acknowledge that you have
been a wonderful breath of fresh air with respect to the
dialogue and the interest that you have had in working with
Congress on this very large challenge that we have. We are
delighted of the new attitude, and we certainly welcome you to
this committee.
Might I say that, without objection, Administrator Hawley's
full statement will be inserted into the record.
And now I ask that you summarize your statement for 5
minutes. And thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF HON. KIP HAWLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Hawley. Thank you. Thank you for those kinds words.
Good morning, Madam Chairman, Mr. Lungren and members of
the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to discuss
security at America's airports, as you prepare to mark up
legislation in this area.
We generally look at aviation one slice at a time. We look
at what do we do for employee screening, for air cargo, for
passenger checkpoint baggage, perimeter security, one by one.
But it is very, very important that we keep in mind that to
terrorists we are one target, and they don't care which
particular place they attack.
So we need balance and flexibility in all of our security
measures. If we jump from concern to concern, mandating
measures for each one, we may tie up critical resources that do
nothing more than make it easy for a terrorist to attack
somewhere else.
If an attack is successful, it does us no good to say that
we were impenetrable at a different spot.
I will outline for you this morning TSA's plan for
effective screening of airport employees. It is, in my view,
the most effective security for this environment.
Passenger screening uses a different model than airport
employee screening, and it makes common sense that we use a
different approach. Passengers come to the airport, and not
much is known about them. We move them through security and
hold them in a sterile area before they board the plane.
It is a completely different thing with airport workers. We
know a lot about them, and they are well-known to each other.
When they come to work, they are gaining access to the
equivalent of a small city, which already contains more than
enough raw materials to commit a terrorist act.
Therefore, keeping track of people and what they are doing
is a better approach to security. It doesn't make sense to dig
in security resources, looking in lunch pails when the real
vulnerability is what happens inside the airport property.
Magnetometers cannot detect suspicious behavior. In fact,
installing fixed checkpoints makes the job easier for
terrorists. Although it may be comforting for us to see
employees in line for screening, a checkpoint provides an
unchanging, predictable barrier that sits in one place every
day. The terrorist can spend all the time he or she needs to
find ways around, over or through that checkpoint.
For this reason, we must use many layers of security, each
one nimble, unpredictable and dynamic. And just as we are
pushing the perimeter of security past the checkpoint for
passengers with behavior observation, document checkers,
canine, things like that, we are using the same strategy when
it comes to employee screening. This leads me to the plan I am
here today to discuss.
With our airport partners, including airport law
enforcement, we have agreed to create a practical, workable
solution to employee screening. It is an evolution on top of
what we do today and adds real risk-based security.
TSA already has a layered approach in place for the
nation's airport workers, and I have outlined that in my
prepared statement; be happy to talk about it.
But here is what we are adding on top of it, a six-point
security plan for employee screening as follows. Number one,
behavior observation. The population of highly skilled officers
will grow beyond TSA to include airport employees trained to
recognize hostile intent and suspicious behavior.
Second, employee training on top of what they receive
already will raise awareness of suspicious behavior and what to
do about it when you find it.
Three, targeted physical inspection. We will now add
airport employee to roving patrols to TSA's random,
unpredictable employee screening. That is on top of everything
we do in the random sector. This adds additional physical
security screening, including at the point when they come to
work.
Fourth, biometric access control. This will add security by
knowing who is where in the airport.
Fifth, certified employees will create a new level of
employee risk assessment that will allow established low-risk
employees easier mobility to do their jobs.
And, finally, the technology component where security
technology will continue to be deployed and developed for
specific use in the airport environment, add things like
cameras and not necessarily new things that have to come out of
R&D but an integrated use of cameras can have tremendous
security effect.
Better overall security is achieved if personnel are not
tied down to checkpoints, checking and rechecking people that
work in the airport every day. We want our security resources
on the move so that terrorists cannot plan an attack knowing
what defenses they will face.
I appreciate the committee's interest in working with us on
a pilot approach to further explore the options, and we will be
good partners in the effort. And I see a lot of common ground
with where we want to go, and the pilots will be a good way for
us to establish further data to move forward.
We don't need, however, to wait to implement what I just
outlined. We have already begun to work to start
implementation.
So thank you for your time and attention. I would be happy
to answer your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Hawley follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary,
Transportation Security Administration
Good morning, Chairwoman Jackson-Lee, Ranking Member Lungren and
members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before you today to
discuss airport security.
At every airport security requires partnerships. TSA, airlines,
airports, law enforcement and passengers must work together. Only
through cooperative partnerships are we able to provide a robust
security system. But airport security is only one layer of security in
a larger security system whose mission is to reduce the risk of
emerging threats to the entire transportation system.
Aviation security begins well before a passenger arrives at the
airport.
1. U.S. government agencies work with others around the globe
to identify and disrupt terrorist activities at their source.
2. Customs and Border Protection activities further identify
potential terrorists and bar their entry into the United
States.
3. Federal, State, and local law enforcement work together with
the FBI in Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the United States
to identify and disrupt terrorist activities within the U.S.
4. A No-Fly system is used to prevent anyone known to an agency
of the U.S. government to be a threat to commit a terrorist act
from flying into or in the United States.
5. Airline flight crews and airport employees who have access
to an aircraft are subject to an even stricter vetting standard
than the No-Fly analysis.
These first five security elements mean that anybody known to
U.S. intelligence or law enforcement agencies as a terrorist or
a close terrorist associate never gets close to an airplane.
But there is much more.
6. An additional, risk-based computer-assisted pre-screening of
passengers is conducted before a boarding pass is issued.
7. Hundreds of canine teams and local law enforcement officers
are working at airports across the country to identify
suspicious articles or people.
8. Surveillance activities take place in and around the airport
environment on a daily basis. In 31 airports today, specially
trained Behavior Detection Officers look for suspicious
behavior.
All of this happens before a passenger even shows up at a TSA
checkpoint.
9. At the checkpoint, a professional, well-trained, experienced
team of Transportation Security Officers (TSO), assisted by
multiple technologies, screens passengers and their carry-on
bags for weapons and explosives.
10. In the baggage area, similarly well-trained, experienced
Transportation Security Officers use a variety of technologies
to screen baggage, and, when necessary, they physically search
baggage to resolve anomalies.
Then, on the aircraft:
11. Thousands of Federal Air Marshals fly undercover on a very
significant number of flights, both domestic and international.
12. Thousands of pilots who undergo special training and become
Federal Flight Deck Officers are authorized and ready to
protect the cockpit with firearms.
13. Other local, State, and Federal law enforcement officers
travel armed as part of their normal duties and are prepared to
intervene.
14. Hardened cockpit doors prevent unauthorized access to the
flight deck.
15. And sitting on every airplane are passengers who remember
the courage and commitment of the men and women on United
Flight 93, and who are prepared to act, if necessary.
Each and every one of these 15 security layers is important.
Relying solely on security at the checkpoint or focusing all of our
resources to defeat one threat is counterproductive and detracts from
our overall mission. The 9/11 Commission recommended a layered security
system saying: ``No single security measure is foolproof. Accordingly,
the TSA must have multiple layers of security in place to defeat the
more plausible and dangerous forms of attack against public
transportation.'' (p.392).
Control of access to sterile and secured areas is just one of the
many aviation security layers we have in place. We recognize that,
despite our efforts to make each layer as strong as possible, a
concerted effort directed at any one layer could be successful. But
there is tremendous power in the reinforced, multiple layers. Truly,
the whole is greater than the sum of the parts--and, together, they are
formidable.
This plan is more rigorous than 100 percent machine screening of
employees at a stationary checkpoint. Because airport employees move
about the facility and are not confined to a sterile area (as are
passengers), they have access to items throughout the airport and to
items introduced at the perimeter. The idea is not to check all
employees at specific, known locations, but to check them throughout
the facility, to discern hostile intent, to track their movement
patterns, and to train employees to detect suspicious behavior. An
added dimension of this plan is to narrow the field of employees that
we need to know more about on a regular basis. We can do this by
creating a level of ``certified employees'' who have been subjected to
a more rigorous, initial level of scrutiny on a voluntary basis and
remove them from the regular, but not random screening regimen.
Employee Background Screening
Today, someone working in a sensitive airport environment undergoes
extensive review before being allowed unescorted access. Airports must
submit fingerprints for each individual who is employed or performs
duties in the Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) or the
sterile area at our Nation's airports. The fingerprints are used to
conduct a criminal history records check to ensure that the airport
does not grant unescorted access to individuals whose background
reveals a disqualifying criminal offense. TSA also conducts name-based
security threat assessments of the name against its terrorism and other
Federal databases of these individuals as well as anyone with an
airport-issued identification medium that allows access to these areas.
Any name that is a possible match to a database is referred to
appropriate law enforcement or intelligence agencies to determine
whether the individual's identity can be verified, and whether the
individual continues to pose a threat. TSA informs airlines or airports
if an individual's access to secure areas must be denied or rescinded.
TSA will soon increase the scope of the Security Threat Assessments to
include any individual who holds or is applying for airport-issued
personnel identification medium. The Security Threat Assessments of all
identification medium holders are conducted on a perpetual basis.
Generally, in order to access sterile or secured areas, anyone who
has not been issued a Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) badge
for a particular airport, including airport and airline personnel,
vendors and contractors, and even TSA employees, must pass through the
TSA security screening checkpoint and submit to the same physical
screening process that passengers must pass through before boarding an
aircraft.
Airport operators are responsible for developing and implementing
TSA-approved airport security programs procedures and processes to
control access to sterile, secure and SIDA areas. These programs must
include badging, a challenge program, and a compliance regime. All
entrances must be secured, and this is generally accomplished by guards
or with electronically controlled locks. Nearly 1,000 TSA Aviation
Security Inspectors ensure that airports and air carriers comply with
the regulatory requirements. In addition, although individuals with a
SIDA badge are not required to pass through a screening checkpoint in
order to access SIDA areas, TSA, for some time now, has been conducting
physical screening of individuals and vehicles entering SIDA areas on
an unpredictable basis at numerous airports.
By building unpredictability into our screening and oversight
operations, deploying new technology as it becomes available, and
utilizing all of our resources more flexibly, we can continue to
improve the formidable system of layered security that now exists.
Aviation Direct Access Screening Program (ADASP)
In July, 2006, TSA implemented the first version of the ADASP that
requires screening of airport employees, their accessible property and
vehicles upon entering a direct access point screening location for
identification, prohibited items and items of interest. Again, while I
cannot discuss all of the operational details of ADASP in this setting,
I can tell you that the program emphasizes the random and unpredictable
aspect of our approach to security. Its scope can take in all or some
components of airport security to include gate screening, SIDA
identification, cargo or the aircraft itself. Its specific focus,
location and duration remain dynamic. It may also include assisting
airport and aircraft operators in the performance of their security
responsibilities. With our current personnel policies, we are able to
surge these activities, as in Orlando, on very little notice.
Recent Incident at Orlando
On March 5, 2007, TSA ordered a Delta flight from Orlando to San
Juan to be reverse-screened upon arrival, based on information that
there were potentially weapons onboard the aircraft. An individual
carrying 14 weapons and eight pounds of marijuana was apprehended upon
deplaning in Puerto Rico. TSA coordinated efforts between Orlando and
San Juan that included local police in both jurisdictions and the FBI.
Because an investigation is still ongoing, there is a limit to what I
can say in this setting.
The incident, however, raised regional and national awareness of
the employee ``insider threat'' at our nation's airports. TSA quickly
deployed more than 160 transportation security officers, aviation
security inspectors, Federal Air Marshals and other personnel to
augment already existing employee and passenger security efforts.
Shared Responsibility
TSA recently expanded its ADASP through Saturation Security Teams
(SST) at airports in the region including Orlando, Miami, Fort
Lauderdale, Tampa and San Juan. In addition to ADASP, the teams
employed behavioral observation techniques, aviation security
inspections and other demonstrations of random-continuous security.
This operation was marked by a sharp increase in random, unpredictable
screening of employees in secure areas. Access to secure areas was
limited during non-business hours and door access during those hours
was audited for suspicious activity. We deployed integrated teams of
Federal Air Marshals, K-9 teams, law enforcement officers and
transportation security officers to areas throughout the airport. We
conducted random screening of employees and passengers at boarding
gates, including using behavior observation techniques, and we randomly
inspected aircraft.
The recent surge illustrated TSA's ability to implement random,
unpredictable security enhancements anywhere in the nation on short
notice. Surges are now a permanent part of our security posture and
could occur anywhere, at any time, as part of our unpredictable
approach.
This mobilization illustrates TSA's ability to quickly and
unpredictably deploy assets based on risk. The agency has developed a
longer-term, sustainable plan with our airport and airline partners not
only for the Florida/Puerto Rico region, but for the entire U.S.
aviation system. TSA will conduct additional operations in other
regions in the coming weeks and months on an unannounced basis.
Finally, with regard to TSA's workforce at Orlando, several new
measures have been established that will further tighten security at
Orlando.
At the request of Greater Orlando Airport Authority (GOAA), TSA has
entered into a 90- day agreement to take over employee screening at the
SIDA access doors in the passenger terminal in exchange for GOAA taking
over non-security functions that TSA previously provided. Additionally,
GOAA has entered into a contract with a private provider to conduct
employee screening at the vehicle checkpoints. While TSA advocates a
multi-layered approach to security, we are willing to assist our
airport partners in Orlando to meet their goal on a short-term basis.
Because of the airport's limited number of employee access doors and
willingness to provide personnel to conduct non-security functions, TSA
is able to come to this agreement without negatively impacting security
in other areas or wait times.
Conclusion
Over committing TSA resources to inflexible, resource-intensive
measures is not consistent with our risk-based approach to aviation
security. TSA moves resources in a flexible, unpredictable fashion to
address both known and unknown threats with a layered security
approach.
Airports have primary responsibility for employee screening, with
TSA acting as a regulatory authority. This operation, as well as the
broader ADASP program, augments airport security already in place.
TSA employs a risk-based approach to security, including roving
transportation security officers that search employees, their packages
and their vehicles. Every employee should have a reasonable expectation
that they could be screened at any time, at any access point within the
footprint of the airport. That applies to all airports, not just where
a surge is occurring.
I am aware of Representative Nita Lowey's introduction of HR 1413
as well as HR 1690 to require pilot programs for physical screening of
airport workers with access to secured and sterile areas of airports. I
look forward to working with Representative Lowey and the Subcommittee
on this very important issue.
By building unpredictability into our screening and oversight
operations, deploying new technology as it becomes available, and
utilizing all of our resources more flexibly, we can continue to
improve the formidable system of layered security that now exists.
Ms. Chairwoman, thank you again for the opportunity to testify
today. I would be happy to respond to questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
At this time, I would like to remind each member that he or
she will have 5 minutes to question Assistant Secretary Hawley.
And I thank him for his insightful testimony.
And I will now yield myself 5 minutes for questions.
I said earlier that many times we have moments of agreement
and many times moments of disagreement. I, frankly, think that
it was important for you to make this announcement. I think
also the committee believes that it is long overdue and,
frankly, should have been done more than a number of years ago.
So in my first question, or a series of questions, I will
ask two together, is for you to give me a sense of urgency to
complete these elements but more importantly then to move to
next steps. And, as you well know, there is underlying
legislation that we will be looking at, as well as a number of
amendments on the question of who is at our nation's airports
and how are they documented.
Then I would like you to answer a more specific question
that I think gives us a sense of the problem, and that, of
course, the issue at Orlando International Airport that
happened with the Comair employees and those who, I think, were
able to game the system. How long did they exploit the breach
and what exactly happened?
Mr. Hawley. I will take them in order of pace.
We agree with you on the urgency of it, and since the
August liquids threat when the airports really were able to
help us--and airlines--stand up a totally new security regime
overnight, we did that in August and have been sustaining at a
very high level of alert, including at the orange level, which
requires significant additional activity by airports.
And as we have been discussing how we can make those
measures sustainable if we have to keep it orange, we have been
developing solutions together to increase the security and be
able to sustain at that high level. So that is really the
genesis of what I am talking about, and it is with a great deal
of urgency that we get after it, because we do recognize the
possibility for someone trying to use employees.
Now, on the Orlando incident, specifically, I can't get
into the exact details of that, because that is an ongoing
active investigation, but it does raise the issue of who are
these people working at our airports, how much do we know about
them, what security is there?
So, in general, without specific to that exact thing, one
of the learnings from that involves--when I said knowing who is
at the airport, we already do know that, because we do all the
background checks, and we keep track of them with their badge,
but knowing where they are at the time, this is an additional
way to get at it.
So if somebody is normally supposed to be in one place and
shows up in another, there is a good opportunity, if we can
capture that and address it at--
Ms. Jackson Lee. Have you discovered how long the breach
was going on?
Mr. Hawley. Well, that is subject to an FBI investigation,
and I think in a non-public setting we or the FBI could give
you the full story.
But mentioning the FBI, it is also important to note that
their joint terrorism task forces are extremely active and
include the airport jurisdiction. So in addition to everything
TSA does, the FBI joint terrorism task forces are all over what
is going on at airports. And if there is the first sniff of
anything involving something with terrorists, that is a red hot
thing that we all get on.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But you can understand our concern,
Assistant Secretary, when--and you are right, we will have a
further classified briefing, but you can understand the public
statement is that there has been a breach. We don't know how
long that breach has occurred. We don't know whether there are
many breaches going across America's airports. And, therefore,
it is more than a sense of urgency that we have standards,
regulations, enforcement.
And so someone might think whether or not the announcement
yesterday would have anything to do with the fact that there
are potential legislative initiatives being acted upon.
Mr. Hawley. I think we are grateful for the public
attention on the issue that this brings, and it is taking an
opportunity to get the public focused on it and to say, ``Yes,
these are things that we are doing on top of the other
measures.''
But we have an ongoing, it is an evolution, we will never
finish adding security to the system and finding better, more
practical ways to get it done.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you are not intending to put an
undermine under the legislative initiative going forward.
Mr. Hawley. No. No. I think, frankly, this is baseline
thing, and it is, I believe, completely compatible with Mrs.
Lowey's bill on the pilots. We can work with the committee to
agree on a series of pilots.
Ms. Jackson Lee. There are so many bells.
Let me thank you for your testimony, and let me now yield 5
minutes to the distinguished ranking member.
Mr. Lungren. I think I know what we are going to be doing
in a few minutes.
Thank you very much for your testimony, Mr. Hawley.
Six-point plan, how soon is that going to be actually
implemented?
Mr. Hawley. The elements regarding training, we are working
on now to define exactly what that training is. We have got the
training for our TSOs and now to package it for use for airport
environment will not be a difficult thing. The airports already
do a lot of training. So I think that is the first one out. I
would be looking in the 3-month range to get that going.
The most longer-term one would be the biometrics. So I
think in this year we will have the standards or a concept of
operations, how that will come into place.
Mr. Lungren. And I know you touched upon this in your
testimony but I wish you had elicited a little bit more on the
challenge that you have for securing the entire airport
environment with respect to employees that may be moving around
and I think, as you mentioned, their ability, once they gain
access to the airport to find things that taken together or
even individually could be used as weapons or cause destruction
of a damaging nature.
And you talked about the multilayered approach, but what I
am trying to get at is how do we as a committee come up with
legislation that directs you to do what I think you know we
want to done but gives you the flexibility so that it can
actually be accomplished with the reality of the different type
of airports we have here? And how do we do that so it doesn't
look like we are giving you a hedge so that you are not doing
what we are actually asking you to do?
Mr. Hawley. Yes. I think the experience we have had working
with air cargo is a good example where we started off in
different places but wanted to get to the same security result.
And I think as we have worked along over the last couple of
months, that figuring a way to make it operationally feasible
to get the very thorough screening for air cargo is a good way
to look at this.
And I think we can do the same thing here through the
pilots. We want to get to the same result that the committee
wants to and Mrs. Lowey wants to do in terms of measurable risk
reduction in that environment.
So by doing these pilots, I think that is a good way to do
it, and then just continue to work together to make things
operational, like the standard of passenger screening doesn't
make sense in the backside of the airport where we have tens of
millions of gallons of jet fuel and blow torches, and so for us
to be confiscating lighters from workers coming in is not
something that I think any of us would say that is a good idea.
So we need to look at the actual specific of what the
measure is and not tie us down and make it operationally
infeasible. But we are willing to try very innovative things to
achieve the result.
Mr. Lungren. And the use of canines in this whole
operation.
Mr. Hawley. Very key part for the whole thing, because
canines can work anywhere in the airport environment. Again, it
is a wide variety of threats. Very good deterrent, very good
effective bomb detection, and we are very enthusiastic about
the canine program.
Mr. Lungren. I mean, you are enthusiastic about it, but
where are we in terms of number of teams necessary to do the
job? Because this is something Mr. Pearce started us looking at
a year or 2 years ago when he was on the committee. And there
was some concern that while we need to pursue the technology
fixes and the new machines and try and get the best technology
in place, we might not be putting enough emphasis and enough
money behind sufficient number of canine teams with the
adaptability that they possess to do the various jobs that are
necessary.
Mr. Hawley. We are somewhere short of 400 dog teams, and we
continue to grow that. This is--
Mr. Lungren. You are not saying you are short 400 dog
teams, you are saying you are just slightly less than 400.
Mr. Hawley. Yes. Yes. I will have to get the exact number
for the record, but it is around 400. It varies because we are
kicking out new teams frequently. We are also putting them in
the transit environment., so we use some of our dogs to go to
transit. But we agree on that strategy of brining in dogs right
now while we develop long-term technology.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
Mrs. Lowey. [Presiding.] Just in case there is a little
confusion, the chair and Mr. DeFazio went to vote, so I am
asking a question. Then we are going to recess, I gather, while
we all vote and then come back. So I will be quick here.
Mr. Lungren. So non-members of the subcommittee can be
chair? Can I be the majority for the day?
[Laughter.]
Mrs. Lowey. I don't know.
Okay. We will move quickly before you check that in the
room.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Lungren. I reserve my objection.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you very much.
If I can get through a couple of questions quickly, and
then we will adjourn and go and vote.
Does TSA have the screener and technology resources
necessary to conduct 100 percent employee screening?
Mr. Hawley. Not at the same level as passenger screening,
no. It would almost double our total number of people screened.
Mrs. Lowey. So at some point, I think it would be helpful
to know specific numbers and what it would take to do it.
Because it is always blown up, and there are all kinds of
rationale, as you know, because you presented the rationale to
me, but we never really get the accurate statistics. So we will
follow up with you on that.
Mr. Hawley. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Lowey. Has TSA revised its screener allocation model
to account for the additional duties required of screeners,
such as randomly screening employees?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, that is incorporated into our staffing
model.
Mrs. Lowey. Now, several airports report that TSA does not
have adequate staffing to efficiently and effectively screen
passengers, baggage employees, aircraft under the Aviation
Direct Access Screening Program. And with the busy summer
schedule fast approaching and the additional duties required of
screeners, how will TSA ensure that passengers and baggage are
processed in a timely manner while preserving a high level of
security?
Mr. Hawley. Every manager I have ever worked with didn't
have enough resources, and I think that is true with our guys.
We have run the numbers, and we are flexible on how we do the
ADASP program. And I believe just like last year we will handle
the passenger load effectively.
Mrs. Lowey. Have you consulted with both airports and
airlines in the development of your employee screening program?
Mr. Hawley. Yes.
Mrs. Lowey. Now, I understand that TSA has proposed a
layered approach to enhancing airline-airport employee
screening that includes targeted physical inspections,
increased training on how to recognize suspicious behavior,
monitoring of employee access points with cameras. Why do you
think--you didn't convince me yesterday--so why do you think
that approach is better than 100 percent physical screening by
magnetometers?
Mr. Hawley. Because if the screening by magnetometers is at
the perimeter, as you mentioned, the resource to get at that
screening would make it harder to do the screening on the
inside of the airport, which is where the action is. And being
unpredictable everywhere on the airport is something that is a
far better security measure than saying once you break through
the checkpoint on the outside, you have free reign of the whole
city.
Mrs. Lowey. Well, had the new policy that was announced
yesterday been in place in Orlando at the beginning of March,
would that have prevented the two individuals from boarding a
plane with a bag full of firearms and narcotics?
Mr. Hawley. I am not going to talk about that specific
event, although I believe history will show there was no threat
of a terrorist event on that particular flight, although it
does raise valid issues about employee access.
Mrs. Lowey. Okay. Now, wouldn't 100 percent physical
screening have prevented the incident?
Mr. Hawley. I can't talk about the actual operational
details of that area. I would point out that guns and drugs are
not unusual in the airport environment, and throwing things
over fences and finding other ways than going through
checkpoints is a possibility.
Mrs. Lowey. However, if those workers had gone through a
metal detector, would it not have detected what they were
carrying?
Mr. Hawley. They would have, I believe, the same result,
because they did go through metal detectors. They just got
their guns in a different way. So I don't dispute that adding
additional screening on the outside can be very good for
security. It just can't be a static measure that ties up all of
your activity. It is a part of the puzzle, not the complete
security.
I would say from a real security point of view, keeping
track of what is going on on the inside of the perimeter is of
higher security value than magnetometers on the outside.
Mrs. Lowey. I am a little confused here. You are talking
about other ways to detect it. If there are guns hanging around
the airport in a drug store or at a food store, we have real
problems here. So you are saying that they could have gotten
the guns in another way, and if we had a system whereby every
worker had to go through a metal detector, they still could
have gotten the guns in? Maybe we have to do a regular search
of all the various booths or stores at the airport.
Mr. Hawley. That is why the key thing is the people,
because there are, in the normal course of business, all of the
things you would use for a terrorist incident, including guns,
in the normal course of business in the airport. So the trick
is, yes, try to keep them out, but also know who those people
are and keep an eye on them when they are inside.
Mrs. Lowey. Well, I agree we have to do everything. The 5
minutes is up. We have to vote. My 5 minutes is up.
I must say, you are a persuasive gentleman, but you haven't
convinced me that it doesn't make absolute sense to have every
worker go through a metal detector. At least you are decreasing
the odds.
So I know we will have further discussion on this, and I
would appreciate any additional information about cost, et
cetera, because I feel when we are spending billions of dollars
on our defense of our country when we are spending billions of
dollars in Iraq, this is essential.
So I thank you very much for appearing before us.
The committee stands in recess.
[Recess.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. [Presiding.] We will re-begin the hearing.
And I would like to yield 5 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Oregon, former subcommittee chair to the
Committee on Aviation for Transportation and Infrastructure,
Mr. DeFazio.
Mr. DeFazio. I thank the gentlelady for the time and for
her leadership on this and other important homeland security
issues.
I guess, Mr. Hawley, I would like to ask what is proposed
in terms of a pilot. Do we have, essentially, an ongoing pilot
in Miami Airport? My understanding is they are screening all
employees there.
Mr. Hawley. I think we have functionally an ongoing pilot,
and I believe in the next panel you will hear from Miami
Airport, but it is a very good program.
And I think one of the significant pieces about it that I
view most effective is the behavioral observation training that
the airport, in conjunction with Miami Police Department, has
gone with for the employees. And that adds very significant
security beyond whatever airport screening they do.
Mr. DeFazio. This is sort of the neighborhood watch aspect
of what you are proposing that TSA would adopt as a nationwide
policy. And that is essentially, sort of, modeled a bit on what
we are doing in GA, right, where we have, essentially, the
Airport Watch Program?
Mr. Hawley. Yes. The way I look at it, in a passenger
environment, just think as if everybody on the plane flew the
same flight every day with the same people. You get to know who
belongs, who doesn't, what they are doing is normal or not. If
we give them an avenue to relay that information, that is a
huge security value.
Mr. DeFazio. Right. Just for a moment, it is not on the
topic, but the GA Program, are we funding that? I mean, it is
very modest cost. Is that in the budget?
Mr. Hawley. Well, the industry has taken that on and
essentially does that themselves.
Mr. DeFazio. I thought there had been some apportionment.
Mr. Hawley. Well, I am sure there is a small amount of
money, but--
Mr. DeFazio. Okay.
Mr. Hawley. --but I think it would not be fair to say that
we fund that.
Mr. DeFazio. No, no, but I thought that there was some
contribution, that is all.
So but as you are anticipating this, sort of, program in
the airports, TSA would perform the training or you would
contract for the training and those sorts of things, you would
have roving security teams, as I understand it. Do you envision
trying to move more people through security also?
Mr. Hawley. I would definitely have the effect of screening
more people. With our own program that we do with our
transportation security officers, it is not trivial. It is on
the order of 4 or 5 or more hours a day at airports across the
country. So that is a significant piece of screening that goes
on in various places around the airport. Adding to that would
be a different program operated, for instance, by the airport
to do the same kind of thing.
Mr. DeFazio. And then just on the issue of if we were to
move toward full screening of all employees and everything
coming in the backside of the airport, do you have a cost
estimate on that?
Mr. Hawley. We have looked at that, and the number of
people--about 800,000 people have SITA badges, and they go
through frequently during the day. So if you just roughly
double it, that is only twice a day, that is equivalent to what
we do today.
I think, in a practical sense, we would not go with
passenger screening, as I mentioned, the lighter thing or take
away tools. You can't take away tools more than 7 inches for
airport workers. So there is some accommodation that will need
to be made for practicality, and that would cut the cost down
somewhat. So that is the detail. How many checkpoints you do,
are you doing a ballpark look in the bag or how much are you
going through the bag and examining each item? That will define
the cost, and I think the pilots give us an opportunity to
really field test what it does cost.
Mr. DeFazio. What size airport would you recommend for a
pilot?
Mr. Hawley. I think, as Mrs. Lowey's bill includes, it
talks about all sizes. Because, as you know, each airport is
different, and each size airport has different things. And as
you also know, at the very small airports, they don't have SITA
badges, so you have to figure out what is the practical way of
doing it. But at a small airport, everybody really does know
everybody else.
Mr. DeFazio. Now, as far as I know from our past
conversations, in fact, I believe in a recent hearing or
meeting, I can't remember, oh, briefing perhaps, we seem to see
you a lot these days, TSA is asking this year that an
additional 1,600 employees be in the budget; is that correct?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir, for document checking purposes.
Mr. DeFazio. Right. So you are, at the moment, if you had
additional staff allowance or funding, your highest priority
would be the document checkers.
Mr. Hawley. That is correct.
Mr. DeFazio. Where would you put--and maybe you don't want
to say this in a public setting--never mind, I won't even ask
that question.
But let me point to the, kind of, obvious, I mean, what
happened at Orlando. Is what you have proposed, I mean, what
likelihood do you think that what you are proposing would have
prevented that kind of penetration and problem?
Mr. Hawley. Well, I am trying to figure out a way to give
you the answer to your question without getting improperly into
to the specifics. But I can say this, that we have looked very,
very, very carefully at that as a learning experience, and we
have taken whatever learnings are appropriate and incorporated
them in our own practices as well as in some of things here. So
I think although the specifics of that one I don't want to talk
about, they do highlight the opportunity for inside employees
to be turned against the system, and it is a serious thing we
have to pay attention to.
Mr. DeFazio. And then you also mentioned--just one last
quick thing--cameras. I just had a recent visit at San
Francisco, and they have an extraordinary system of cameras
throughout and around the airport.
Mr. Hawley. I think that is exactly what we are talking
about.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
Let me remind members that I will recognize members who
were present at the start of the hearing based on the seniority
on the subcommittee, alternating between majority and minority.
Those members coming in later will be recognized in order of
their arrival.
Might I now yield to the distinguished gentlelady from
Florida, Ms. Ginny Brown-Waite, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Brown-Waite. I thank the chairwoman for acknowledging
me.
And thank you, Mr. Hawley for being here.
When I read over your testimony last night, I was
absolutely shocked that you would say that the Orlando incident
raised everyone's awareness.
Sir, with all due respect, Nita Lowey and I and other
members of this committee have been saying, ``There is a
serious problem here at the backdoor of the airport.''
Actually, it was a TSA employee who tipped me off to this.
Let me ask you this: When TSA employees report to work, do
they have to go through the initial metal detector screening
every day?
Mr. Hawley. Yes.
Ms. Brown-Waite. Do you not think that these are people who
have been vetted, who have had their background checks done,
who have certainly a higher level of security than perhaps
someone who is on the cleaning crew or working at a restaurant?
It flies in the face of what Americans believe security should
be to know that the person who is checking them gets checked,
but the backdoor people just come in with a little magnetic
card. And so for you to say that America's awareness and the
agency's awareness--
Mr. Hawley. No, no. I did not say the agency's awareness.
You will note in our ADASP Program was rolled out in June, and
since I came to this agency, we went right after issues that
are beyond the checkpoint, IEDs, we have been all over this,
and I have had conversations, frankly, with Mrs. Lowey right
from the start, and our program is now extremely sophisticated.
As I mentioned, we have hundreds and hundreds of our TSOs
working on these backdoor things, and they have been going on
since last summer.
Ms. Brown-Waite. Have you considered, perhaps, having the
vendors add another nickel to the already unhealthy corndogs
that they are selling to help to pay for this, because if their
employees aren't truly being screened every day, we are asking
for a problem.
And, certainly, Ms. Lowey and I work together on this bill.
It is something that needs to be done, but five airports, it is
a good start and certainly your announcement yesterday, which
was very timely in light of this hearing today, we need to have
a better system there at the airport.
Let me ask you a question: If a person is working for a
vendor at the airport and they are screened, does it also
include checking for the fact that perhaps they are an illegal
immigrant?
Mr. Hawley. Yes.
Ms. Brown-Waite. And illegal immigrant employees do not
pass the test; is that correct?
Mr. Hawley. That is supposed to be the program. There have
been some cases where with false, in the past, social security
numbers, things like that. So there is a criminal history
records check and a watch list check. And to that, the program
that we have added here in the past number of months includes
the immigration check.
Ms. Brown-Waite. Sir, when you talk about random screening,
Orlando already had random screening, and yet this incident
occurred. Do you think that passengers should have random
screening, and do you think TSA workers should have random
screening?
Mr. Hawley. Well, they all do, and I think everybody
should. And perhaps you were not here earlier when I addressed
the Orlando issue. I don't want to get into the specific
details of a live case, but that, as history will show, did not
involve a risk of terrorism on that particular flight. It did,
however, present some interesting learnings about operations of
people who are breaking the law in an airport environment,
which obviously we have paid a lot of attention to.
Ms. Brown-Waite. Sir, I want to work with the agency to
accomplish the goal of making sure that passengers are safe. If
the TSA workers have to go through that line, every member of
Congress has to go through that line, every little old lady in
a wheelchair has to go through that line, then it just is
unfathomable why we are not taking that extra step. Because,
obviously, as proven in the Orlando case, random doesn't work.
Mr. Hawley. Well, it is a very different environment. In
the sterile area that you get screened to go in as a passenger
is a very limited holding tank that is swept for objects and is
kept sterile. The airport work environment where workers work
is a city, and it is not practical to have that be a sterile
environment.
What you want to do is keep track of the people inside.
Know who is there, know where they are and what they are doing,
because everything you need to do a terrorist act is already on
the inside, and to check just what they are bringing in from
the outside is not sufficient security.
Ms. Brown-Waite. I have one more question, Madam Chair, if
you will indulge me.
In light of the fact that you have found illegal aliens who
have the employee cards, are you regularly following up at
doing at that point at least some random checking to see if we
have illegals working at the airports?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, we do. As part of the program I mentioned
back in the back of the airport on these ADASP programs, we
check not only what they have on them, who they are, valid
credentials, all of those things are checked, including
vehicles, vehicle searches. There is nothing on the airport
that is exempt from TSOs out there screening at any time.
Ms. Brown-Waite. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I yield back the time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We yielded the gentlelady, with unanimous
consent, an additional 1 minute.
I thank the distinguished gentlelady for her questions, and
I now yield to Mr. Perlmutter, the distinguished gentleman from
Colorado, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Hawley, it is nice to meet you in person.
And, first, I would like to thank you and TSA for
responding to some questions I had concerning an examination by
the Red Team conducted at the Denver International Airport. I
do want to say that you were very responsive, as were people
within your organization, in getting back to me. So thank you.
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Perlmutter. But I do want to dig a little deeper into
that whole kind of approach. And now I have had an opportunity
to meet with Red Team members, to talk to you about this a
little bit, to go out to the Denver International Airport. And
the issue was that the airport did not do well on an
examination, in effect, by a team of your investigators, your
experts who kind of probed for holes in the system.
After having met with everyone, it seemed to me that the
electronics did a pretty good job. It was more of a personnel
kind of an issue. And in Colorado, if I am not mistaken, we
have gone from about 1,100 screeners 3 or 4 years ago, we are
now down into the neighborhood of about 700 screeners, and we
have many, many, many more passengers going through that
airport. And I am just wondering if we are taxing our personnel
in a way that doesn't enhance our security.
And if you could comment on that, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Hawley. Sure. Thank you, and I think you are raising a
very important issue.
As you know, IED detection is our number one priority at
the passenger checkpoint, and it is, by far, the thing we spend
the most time on. And the Red Team testing you mentioned is
directed at the people, because we already know what the
machines can do. We have taken the labs; we know exactly what
they can do. So what we need to test and probe is what is the
human factor, how do we better train, how do we better test?
So we send inspectors out there who know the entire system,
know the vulnerabilities, and they probe those vulnerabilities
to understand what are the human factors we can add that would
cover for machine vulnerabilities. And that is an ongoing
process, as you know.
As to the number of people, it is always a tough management
job to get the right number of people, and we have been able
with--and, frankly, I have to give credit to our officers for
improving their own effectiveness and efficiency in cutting
down absences, working with us to reduce injuries, and some of
the human resource things have enabled us to generate screening
capacity by fewer people leaving and more training, things like
that.
So we look at flight by flight what the TSO requirement is.
We did build in the ADASP program, I mentioned earlier, and I
think, as we noted last summer, Denver was supposed to be a big
disaster in Memorial Day and over the holidays, Labor Day and
Thanksgiving, frankly. And we stepped up, and when we had the
snow in December, as you know, we flew in people from around
the country to keep Denver fluid.
So my commitment to you and the people of Denver and the
city of Denver is to keep the airport fluid, effective and not
have security be a barrier toward the purpose of the airport.
Mr. Perlmutter. And I appreciate that, and, I guess, I
think, the tension, and you have described the tension, the
tension is between moving people through, getting them on their
plane, but also making sure that we have proper security.
And I understand this tension. And I guess what I am saying
is your organization--there is a point in any organization,
business or otherwise, where you can hit efficiency and then
you cut to the bone, and when you cut to the bone, you screw up
the mission. And my warning to you is that you are at the bone,
and you may not think so, but just my rump opinion, my
observation is you are close, if you are not there.
The other thing I would say, and I have some concern, is
you try to meet the rush hours, the morning rush hour, the
evening rush hour and then it ends up in, kind of, the split
shifts or you are looking at hiring part-time folks. And with
this particular security issue, I am concerned about that,
whether or not you are going to get the kind of people who will
be devoted to the agency, be long-term employees who will do a
good job. That is just my word of advice.
And, Madam Chair, I will yield back.
Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We thank the distinguished gentleman.
And I am now pleased to yield 5 minutes to the
distinguished gentlelady from New York, Ms. Clarke, who has a
few large airports in her area, New York City, Brooklyn.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you so very much, Madam Chair.
After the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., on 9/
11, the American people had the expectation that the government
would ensure that such a situation could never happen again.
Congress reacted by passing a variety of reforms aimed at
preventing airline passengers from carrying anything on board a
plane that can threaten lives. However, recent events that have
occurred at airports all over America have convinced me that
not nearly enough is being done to prevent harm coming from
airport workers.
While the vast majority of airport and airline employees
are honest, hardworking people, there are inevitably a few
individuals that can and may view working at an airport as a
way of getting around screening. This is a major vulnerability,
and I think we have all acknowledged that.
I live in Brooklyn and represent a large district in
Brooklyn, which is under the busiest air corridor in the
country. There are three very large airports within just a few
miles of my district, and there is no reason why we should not
do everything possible to protect those who fly and those on
the ground.
If 100 percent screening of airport workers can be
accomplished, I see no reason why we should not do this.
Secretary Hawley, it is good to see you once again, and I
know that these are really complex issues that you are having
to deal with here, but if Heathrow and Miami International
Airport and other airports have successfully implemented 100
percent worker screening with success, why wouldn't it work
systemwide?
Mr. Hawley. I think the type of screening for passengers is
of a different nature given the purpose of passenger screening
is to make sure that objects that can be used to have a
terrorist attack don't get onto a plane; whereas, it is a very
different thing in the secure area of a working factory,
basically, where you have all the chemicals that you could
imagine, tools, lots of things, not to mention the aircraft
itself.
So I believe from a security perspective, it is more
important to really be sure of who these people are, have the
training--and I know we have talked of this in the mass transit
environment, but it is exactly the same issue of increase the
training and the ability to, as you said to me, once you see
something and say something, who do you tell it to and what do
you do, but to have that worked into the airport environment as
well.
And I think that is an immediate, effective security
measure that is worth more to us in the flying public than
trying to figure out which screwdriver--figuring out what every
duty is for everybody working there. I think there is always a
component of checking physically when they come in, and we are
happy to work with the committee on pilots to achieve that.
Ms. Clarke. Yes, because you mentioned in your testimony
here today about the sterile environment versus the non-sterile
environment. I think the emphasis coming from this subcommittee
is that we focus in on that non-sterile environment and create
as many opportunities in that environment to deal with the
whole issue of who is there, why they are there and what
constructs can come from it.
And I don't know whether there has been an analysis or an
assessment or even a pilot that begins to get at these answers,
but I would suggest to you that it is going to be important
from so many different perspectives.
I mean, we don't know under what circumstances someone
becomes psychotic, we don't know what drives people to do the
things that they do. We look at international terrorism
oftentimes as the major threat, but we are finding more and
more, as we found, unfortunately, this week, that you may have
a troubled individual that shows up to work, recognizes they
have the capability to do something demonstrative in terms of
destruction, and we are unable to catch it, because we haven't
created an environment that would disrupt something like that.
You discuss the possibility of using a biometric card.
Other DHS programs, such as US-VISIT has attempted to make use
of biometric data on a large scale but have found it highly
complicated and difficult, which has often led to failure.
How difficult do you feel it would be to implement such a
program for airport workers compared with using existing
technology to screen them, and how long do you feel it would
take to implement this in comparison with how long it would
take to implement screening technologies similar to what is
used on passengers?
Mr. Hawley. On the issue of observing someone with erratic
behavior, at the checkpoint, if we have got magnetometers, that
is not going to pick it up. But the behavior observation and
the training, that is one thing we have learned this week, is
that there are signs if you are looking for them and prepared
to act. So we are in full subscription with integrating the
behavior observation to pick up both the foreign terrorist as
well as anybody who would do otherwise harm.
And on the biometric, as everybody knows, that is a very
complicated technology, and we are breaking new ground at DHS
with these programs, and the transportation worker identity
credential, which we are doing in the maritime environment, is
breaking new ground that we can use the data from that to use
in the airport environment. And that is what gives me the
optimism to think that we can move forward.
And there have been some standards of interoperability done
in the airport community, already established, like in
Registered Traveler. So we are in the ballpark. I think that is
the one that is the furthest out of the measures that we are
talking about, and what in my calendar is to figure out in the
4-to 6-month period what the parameters are and the specs and
this is what it is and then figure what that costs.
And it is critical--I think you raised an excellent point--
it is critical we not go to gold-plated, that we go to
something that is effective, gets the job done and can be
quickly deployable.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Secretary.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you, Mr. Hawley, for your
attention to these matters. Certainly, I think together we have
a collective commitment to ensuring the safety of all of our
airports. I have mentioned, though, the jurisdiction in this
committee may go even beyond TSA, even questions about general
aviation we must address.
I leave you simply, as I bring forward the second panel,
one, I think you will find a theme in this larger committee and
the subcommittee a great concern for our employees, both in
terms of training, in terms of security, whether it be those
who work in the airports or whether it be our pilots and flight
attendants. We will be looking forthwith on added training
measures for both pilots and flight attendants. And so we are
equally attendant to our, if you will, core of workers. We
thank them for their service, but we know there have been
breaches.
And so I think the concern is, as I ask for a sense of
urgency from the agency as we look at legislation this coming
week, be reminded that during the breaches our airport
employees cut across very serious products, be they weapons, be
they chemicals or other manner that could be used to create
havoc. It is in the breach, it is in the lapse that comes
tragedy and disaster. We don't have those excuses.
So I thank you and would look forward to working with TSA
to ensure that we have a sense of urgency in this committee and
a sense of urgency to be able to create the right mix of
legislation and policy that is moved as quickly as possible in
order for us to leap across the breach and to close the breach.
I think that is an enormously important challenge that we have.
Thank you for your testimony.
The members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for Administrator Hawley. We will ask you to respond
to those questions expeditiously, Administrator, in writing,
and at this time, the committee shall move to the next panel.
Call that a little bit of musical chairs. You did that very
well.
[Laughter.]
At this time, I would like to welcome the second panel of
witnesses.
Our first witness will be Ms. Lauren Stover, assistant
aviation director, Security and Communications for Miami-Dade
Aviation Department. In this capacity, Ms. Stover handles all
communications responsibilities for the department and assumed
a key role in the management of airport security.
A 23-year veteran of Miami-Dade County government, she
returned to the Miami-Dade Aviation Department after a stint in
a leadership role within the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security.
Our second witness is Greg Principato, president of
Airports Council International--we thank you for being here--
North America. Mr. Principato oversees the leading association
of airports and airport-related businesses in North America,
which enplane nearly all of domestic and international airline
passenger and cargo traffic on the continent. And I am always
reminded by my director, Rick Vacar of the importance of ACI. I
think I have been attending with him for a number of years.
So we welcome you again.
The final witness of this panel is Mr. William E. Holden,
senior vice president of operations, Covenant Homeland Security
Solutions. Before joining CHSS, Mr. Holden spent 30 years in
civil aviation, holding management positions of various levels
in Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Newark, Miami, Boston, LaGuardia
and Washington National Airports. He also held director-level
positions in passenger services with Pan American and Northwest
Airlines.
Let me indicate to the witnesses that we will proceed with
this hearing. You may see the distinguished gentlelady from New
York to take the gavel for a moment. We are in several
committees at once, votes on the floor; however, I, as the
chair, will return and be able to engage with you.
So without objection, the witnesses' full statements will
be inserted into the record.
I now ask each witness to summarize his or her statement
for 5 minutes, beginning with Ms. Stover from Miami-Dade
Aviation Department.
And we welcome you to Washington.
STATEMENT OF LAUREN STOVER, ASSISTANT AVIATION DIRECTOR FOR
SECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS, MIAMI-DADE AVIATION DEPARTMENT
Ms. Stover. Thank you very much.
Good morning, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Lungren and
members of the subcommittee. I thank you for having a hearing
on this very important issue of screening airport employees.
As you know, since 1999, we have been performing security
screening of all employees working in secure and restricted
areas of Miami International Airport. This practice grew out of
necessity, resulting from a 2-year undercover drug smuggling
operation, not unlike the one that occurred Orlando
International Airport.
In response, MIA implemented a comprehensive security
enhancement program including, most notably, the screening of
all employees with access to secure areas of the airport. We
began conducting criminal background and warrants checks for
employees working at the airport needing access to these
restricted areas. We hired more security staff and, in short,
dramatically beefed up our overall security program such that
in many ways MIA was ahead of its time in terms of security
measures that now, in the post-9/11 era, are completely
applicable to neutralizing a potential terrorist threat.
The overall issue we had to address in 1999, and what
Congress will be deliberating this year, is how to keep airport
employees from using their access to restricted areas as a
means to conduct illegal activities. At MIA, we have 30,000
people working at the airport, 27,000 of whom have access to
restricted areas.
One hundred percent of the individuals accessing the secure
area through the terminal are screened by the magnetometer, and
their personal items are subject to X-ray inspection. Employees
are also required to log in and log out throughout our access
control system when beginning and ending their shifts.
We contract with a private security firm to operate our
four employee-only screening checkpoints for personnel that
work in the aircraft ramp area. In the terminal area, working
closely with our air carriers and employee unions, we
incrementally reduced the 34 unmanned employee entrance areas
to the four that we have today.
We have implemented security directives that specify the
types of items employees can carry with them into SITA areas.
For instance, many employees carry tools that are necessary for
work but otherwise would not be allowed through a standard
passenger checkpoint. Employees who work in the sterile areas
within the terminal that are beyond the passenger security
screening checkpoint are screened by TSA.
With background checks and comprehensive security measures,
including behavior pattern recognition, which I will discuss
later, we have a layered approach to security, and we
ultimately know who these people are and what they are doing.
We spend about $2.5 million each year on the security guard
services to implement this employee screening program. As I
said before, our security program is a multilayered approach
and we work closely with our local law enforcement and with our
federal partners in the Department of Homeland Security, as
well as the U.S. Department of Justice, such as what we are
doing currently right now in Miami, as I speak to you today.
We regularly need and exchange information. Also conducts
sweeps with these law enforcement partners to ensure that
employees are not engaged in criminal activity.
In addition to conducting comprehensive background checks,
interagency sweeps and screening employees with access to
secure areas, another security layer that we have at MIA that I
am extremely proud of because we are a leader in this area, is
an airport-wide behavioral analysis program.
The behavior pattern recognition, or BPR, as it is termed,
is a security technique originated by Rafi Ron, who is the
former security director for Ben Gurion, an airport in Tel
Aviv, whereby people are trained to detect suspicious
individuals based on behavior rather than ethnic background. To
date, more than 1,500 employees at MIA have received the
training, and sessions will continue with the goal of training
all 30,000 employees.
As you look at ways to improve security at our nation's
airports, specifically through employee screening, I would like
to say that all airports are truly different with respect to
their configuration, their security programs and the threat
analysis. A one-size-fits-all solution is not appropriate.
A federal approach to employee screening must take into
consideration that most airports are financially unable to
dramatically increase expenditures any more than what they have
done since 9/11. In fact, most airports already are dealing
with paying for unfunded federal mandates, such as the inline
explosive detection system that we are currently installing at
MIA. Airport facilities differ and the way employees get to
their jobs differ, but there is common ground. And with input
from airports, we can assist in crafting airport employee
screening legislation to better secure our nation's airports
and passengers.
I would like to leave you with some thoughts from our
perspective on employee screening. First, any national program
that mandates employee screening must be properly resourced and
funded. Second, different standards must be established. The
protocols and standards that are appropriate screening are
different than those appropriate for passenger screening.
Third, we believe the emphasis should be on stopping ill-
intended individuals. And, finally, a layered approach to
security is our best bet from those who would do us harm.
I thank you for the privilege of sharing our experiences
and thoughts, and I look forward to answering your questions.
And thank you for having me here today.
[The statement of Ms. Stover follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lauren Stover
Good morning Madame Chairman, Ranking Member Lungren and Members of
the Subcommittee. I thank you for having a hearing on this very
important issue of screening airport employees. As you know, since
1999, we have been performing security screening of all employees
working in secure and restricted areas of Miami International Airport.
This practice grew out of necessity as we discovered an organized
narcotics smuggling operation not unlike the recent incident that
occurred at Orlando International Airport.
In response to the drug smuggling activities that involved airline
employees, a comprehensive security enhancement program, including most
notably the screening of all employees with access to secure areas of
the airport, was implemented at MIA.
We began conducting criminal background and warrants checks for
employees working at the airport needing access to secure and
restricted areas. We hired more security staff and, in short,
dramatically beefed up our overall security program such that in many
ways, MIA was ahead of its time in terms of security measures that now,
in the post 9-11 era, are completely applicable to neutralizing a
potential terrorist threat.
The overall issue we had to address in 1999, and what Congress will
be deliberating this year, is how to keep airport employees from using
their access to restricted areas as a means to conduct illegal
activities. First, let me say as an airport employee for many years,
most of us are good, hardworking people, but a few, with ill
intentions, can do a lot of damage. In conducting employee screening,
we are reducing the ``insider threat'' which is a critical element of
our security program.
Let me briefly describe who these airport employees are. There are
airport employees such as myself that work for the operator of the
airport, which in most cases is the local government or an airport
authority. The vast majority of people who work at the airport,
however, work for airlines, vendors and tenants, many of whom have
access to restricted areas in order to perform their duties.
At MIA, we have 30,000 people working at the airport. My security
department manages the credentialing of these employees with
identification media/or ID badges. In the secure areas of the airport,
including the SIDA area--or Security Identification Display Area--
employees must always have on visible display the ID media issued by my
security division at the airport. All airport employees are trained to
challenge anyone not displaying a proper ID in the SIDA.
Criminal History Background Checks are conducted on all employees
who have a need to access secure areas. We color-code our ID badges
which helps anyone be able to immediately identify the specific area
where an employee will work, such as on the airfield or inside the
terminal beyond the security checkpoint, etc. At MIA, 100% of the
individuals accessing the secure area through the terminal are screened
by magnetometer (or walk through metal detector) and their personal
items are subjected to x-ray inspection. Employees are also required to
log-in and log-out through our access control system when beginning and
ending their shifts.
We contract with a private security firm to operate our four
employee-only screening checkpoints for personnel that work in the ramp
area where the aircraft are positioned at gates connected to the
terminal. These are the baggage handlers, maintenance personnel and
other employees that work directly on airplanes and around the
airfield. In the terminal area, working closely with our air carrier
and employee unions, we incrementally reduced the 34 unmanned employee
entrance areas to the four we have today. We have implemented security
directives that specify the types of items employees can carry with
them into SIDA areas. For instance, many employees carry tools that are
necessary for work but otherwise would not be allowed through a
standard passenger checkpoint. Employees who work in the secure areas
within the terminal that are beyond the passenger security checkpoint
are screened at the passenger security checkpoint by TSA.
With background checks and comprehensive security measures
including Behavioral Pattern Recognition which I will discuss later, we
have a layered approach to security and we ultimately know who these
people are and what they are doing.
We spend about $2.5 million dollars each year to implement this
employee screening program at MIA. As I said before, our security
program is multi-layered, and we work closely with our local law
enforcement--the Miami-Dade Police Department--as well as with our
federal partners in DHS--TSA, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and
Customs and Border Protection as well as the U.S. Department of
Justice, the FBI and the Joint Terrorist Task Force. We make a point to
regularly meet and exchange information in order to allow
investigations to proceed without interference and to continue to
monitor activity in securing the airport. We also regularly conduct
sweeps with these law enforcement partners and our canine teams to
ensure employees are not engaged in criminal activity.
In addition to conducting comprehensive background checks, inter-
agency sweeps and screening employees with access to secure areas,
another security layer that we have at MIA that I am extremely proud of
because we are a leader in this area is an airport-wide behavioral
analysis program. Behavior Pattern Recognition, or BPR, is a security
technique originated by Rafi Ron, the former security director for Ben
Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv, where people are trained to detect
suspicious individuals based on behavior rather than ethnicity.
To date, more than 1,500 employees at MIA have received the
training, and training sessions will continue over the next two years
with the goal of training all 30,000 employees at MIA. BPR will be
permanently embedded into the fiber of the airport's security program,
and BPR training will be required for employees renewing their airport
ID badges. In March 2007, MIA was the first airport to host a national
BPR training session for airport law enforcement officers.
As you look at ways to improve security at our Nation's airports,
specifically through employee screening, I would like to say that all
airports are truly different with respect to their configuration,
security and threat analysis. A one-size fits all solution is not
appropriate. A federal approach to employee screening must take into
consideration that most airports are financially unable to dramatically
increase security expenditures any more than what they have done since
9/11. In fact, most airports already are dealing with paying for
unfunded federal mandates such as the in-line Explosives Detection
System we are installing at MIA. Given our financial constraints, we
have been forced to defer other capital projects in order to fund our
North Terminal EDS project. To date, TSA has not committed funding.
Airport facilities differ and the way employees get to their jobs
differ, but there is common ground and with input from airports, we can
assist in crafting an airport employee screening legislation to better
secure our Nation's airports and passengers.
I would like to leave you with some thoughts from our perspective
on employee screening. First, any national program that mandates
employee screening must be properly resourced and funded. Second,
different standards must be established. The protocols and standards
that are appropriate for employee screening are different than those
that are appropriate for passenger screening. Third, we believe the
emphasis should be on stopping ill-intended individuals from accessing
the secure area. And, finally, a layered approach to security is our
best defense from those who would do us harm.
I thank you for the privilege of sharing our experiences and
thoughts and look forward to answering your questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much for your testimony.
I now would like to recognize Mr. Holden with Covenant--I
have moved ahead. I would like to recognize Mr. Principato,
with ACI, to summarize his statement for 5 minutes.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF GREG PRINCIPATO, PRESIDENT, AIRPORTS COUNCIL
INTERNATIONAL-NORTH AMERICA
Mr. Principato. Thank you, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking
Member Lungren and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
the invitation to appear today. I am here to offer the views of
America's airport security and on improvements to enhance the
systems currently in place.
As president of Airport Council International-North
America, I am testifying today on behalf of the local, regional
and state authorities that own and operate commercial service
airports. As has already been stated by the chairwoman, our
member airports enplane nearly all of the domestic and
international and passenger cargo traffic in North America.
Nearly 400 aviation-related businesses are also members of
ACI-North America.
Madam Chairwoman, we commend you for holding this hearing
today. Each day, airports work to ensure that our facilities
are safe and secure for our passengers and for our employees.
To this end, airports partner with airlines, tenants, TSA and
federal and state and local law enforcement to maintain and
develop a comprehensive layered security system that can
quickly respond to new and evolving threats.
A critical part of this wide-ranging structure is ensuring
that individuals with access to secure areas are sprained as
part of the risk-based security regime that makes the best use
of TSA and airport resources.
Before additional security measures are mandated, it is
important to understand the multilayered system currently in
place for individuals with access to secured areas at airports.
Airport, airline or other tenant employees seeking unescorted
access privileges in the secured area of airports undergo a
finger-print based FBI criminal history record check. These
individual are continually checked against federal terrorist
watch lists.
In addition, TSA conducts a security threat assessment to
verify the individual's identity, employment eligibility and
citizenship status.
Access control systems are also an important part in
ensuring airport security. These systems range from key or
cipher locks to sophisticated, fully automated systems
utilizing biometric data. Most access control systems are also
supplemented by closed-circuit television to allow monitoring
of the critical areas from a centralized control room, audible
alarms to enunciate breaches and patrols by public safety and
law enforcement personnel.
Vehicles and equipment seeking access to these areas are
inspected by local law enforcement or specially trained public
safety personnel. Some new generation access control systems
within the secure areas.
Airport, airline and tenant employees undergo security
training specifically tailored to the airport. Additionally,
the TSA Aviation Direct Access Screening Program, ADASP,
subjects employees and their property to random screening as
they enter the secured area. Anywhere on the airport, at any
time, employees, including airport directors, know they may
encounter TSA screening.
Now, as was discussed before by Administrator Hawley, ACI-
North America has been working with TSA, with the American
Association of Airport Executives and our airport members to
develop programs for even more robust employee screening. The
program under discussion would not replicate the stationary
process currently in place for passengers and their baggage, as
the work environment for airport workers has already been
discussed, presents far different challenge, security
challenges, and requires measures targeted to meet those
challenges.
It includes the use of behavior recognition techniques,
targeted physical inspections, enhanced employee training to
raise awareness of suspicious behavior, development of a
certified employee program, expansion of the use of biometric
access controls and deployment of additional airport
surveillance technology.
TSA, airports, airlines and employee representatives are
working to refine the specific procedures that would be
incorporated into the pilot program. We believe that work can
be completed in about the next 90 days or so. ACI-North America
is recommending that the pilot program using these techniques
be conducted for at least 180 days to assess the improvement in
aviation security, the impact on airport and airline operations
and the cost of the program.
Assuming Congress appropriates the necessary funds to
implement the plan, further deployment could then occur.
This approach would also incorporate the latest
intelligence information to allow more nimble and effective
security measures, which could be modified quickly to address
new and emerging threats. The pilot would also allow different
combinations of programs and technologies to be evaluated to
determine which provide the greatest security benefits and
which are appropriate for airports of varying sizes and
configurations.
I want to again emphasize that airports are committed to
working with you and with Congress to enhance the already
effective airport security system with risk-based measures. We
believe that a risk-based program, developed collaboratively by
airports, airlines and TSA, will enhance the security of the
traveling public by strengthening employee screening while
appropriately using technologies and resources across the
industry.
The members of ACI-North America thank you for inviting me
to testify and we look forward to working with you, and I look
forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Principato follows:]
Prepared Statement of Greg Principato
Chairwoman Jackson-Lee, Ranking Member Lungren, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to appear before the
subcommittee today to offer the views of America's airports on airport
security and improvements to enhance the systems currently in place. As
the President of Airports Council International--North America (ACI-
NA), I am testifying today on behalf of the local, regional, and state
governing bodies that own and operate commercial service airports in
the United States and Canada. ACI-NA member airports enplane more than
95 percent of the domestic and virtually all the international airline
passenger and cargo traffic in North America. Nearly 400 aviation-
related businesses are also members of ACI-NA.
Madam Chairwoman, we commend you for holding this important
hearing. Each day, airports work to ensure that our facilities are safe
and secure for passengers and employees. To this end, airports partner
with airlines, tenants, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), and Federal, State, and local law enforcement to maintain and
develop a comprehensive, layered security system that can quickly
respond to new and evolving threats. A critical part of this wide-
ranging structure is ensuring that individuals with access to secure
areas are screened as part of a risk-based security regime that makes
the best use of TSA and airport resources.
Before additional security measures are mandated it is important to
understand the multi-layered system currently in place for individuals
with access to the secured areas at airports. First, persons employed
by the airport, airlines or other tenants seeking unescorted access
privileges within the controlled areas of airports must provide the
airport sponsor with two forms of government-issued photo
identification, be authorized to work in the United States of America,
and undergo a fingerprint-based FBI criminal history records check to
ensure that they have not committed any of an explicit list of crimes
designated by Congress during the prior 10 years.
Some airports, with TSA approval, have implemented more rigorous
background check standards, verifying information for the past 20
years. Further, at the time of initial employment and throughout the
period where access privileges are authorized, these individuals are
continually checked against the federal terrorist watch lists developed
by TSA, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the intelligence
agencies. In addition to the criminal history records verification and
terrorist watch list checks, the TSA conducts a security threat
assessment (STA) to verify the individual's identity, employment
eligibility and citizenship status.
Access control systems are also an important component in ensuring
airport security. These systems have been are in place for many years
at airports and range from key or cipher locks to sophisticated, fully
automated systems utilizing biometric data. The components provide
security beginning at the public area through the security
identification display area (SIDA). All certificated airports designate
these zones in their Airport Security Plans (ASPs) and implement
measures to restrict access to those with an operational need to enter
the area. Airports must also immediately report to TSA any change in an
individual's badge status to ensure that individual's access to the
secured areas of airports will be revoked.
Most access control systems are also supplemented by closed circuit
television to allow monitoring of the critical areas from a centralized
control room, audible alarms to annunciate breaches, and patrols by
public safety and law enforcement personnel. Vehicles and equipment
seeking access to these areas are inspected by local law enforcement or
specially trained public safety personnel. Some new generation access
control systems allow for tracking of authorized vehicles within the
secure areas.
Airport, airline and tenant employees undergo initial and recurrent
security training, specifically tailored to the airport. The training
emphasized the individual's responsibilities and duties while working
in the secured area of the airport, including the importance of
challenge procedures and quickly contacting airport authorities of
unusual activities or possible threats.
Additionally, the TSA Aviation Direct Access Screening Program
(ADASP) subjects employees and their property to random screening as
they enter the secured area. It is well established that random
security checks provide an effective deterrent to both criminal and
terrorist activities. Anywhere on the airport at any time, employees
know they may encounter TSA screening. We believe that random checks
under the ADASP make airport security unpredictable, thus making it
difficult for terrorists to ascertain operational patterns that can be
exploited.
ACI-NA has been working with TSA, the American Association of
Airport Executives and our airport members to develop programs for even
more robust employee screening. The program under discussion would not
replicate the stationary process currently in place for passengers and
their baggage, as the work environment for airport workers has
different security issues that must be addressed with measures targeted
to meet those potential vulnerabilities. Instead, it includes the use
of behavioral recognition techniques and interviews before employees
enter the sterile and security areas, targeted physical inspections,
enhanced employee training to raise awareness of suspicious behavior,
development of a certified employee program, expansion of the use of
biometric access controls and deployment of additional airport
surveillance technology. ACI-NA recommends that a pilot program using
these techniques be conducted for at least 180 days, to assess the
improvement in aviation security, the impact on airport and airline
operations and the costs of the program. Assuming Congress appropriates
the necessary funds to implement the plan, a phased deployment of the
program to the 452 commercial U.S. airports could then occur.
Implementation of this six-point program would incorporate the
latest intelligence information to allow more nimble and effective
security measures, which could be modified quickly to address new and
emerging threats. Such a program would also allow different
combinations of programs and technologies to be evaluated to determine
which provide the greatest security benefits and which are appropriate
for airports of varying sizes and configurations.
As you know, Miami International Airport and Orlando International
Airport have already implemented a different approach for employee
screening. We understand the circumstances which lead to these ACI-NA
member airports establishing measures tailored to their unique
environment and security challenges. ACI-NA supports the right of
airports to exceed federal or state regulatory requirements if they
believe the additional security procedures and/or equipment provide a
benefit for their passengers and employees.
I want to again emphasize that airports are committed to working
with Congress to enhance the already effective airport security system
with risk-based measures. We believe that a risk-based program,
developed collaboratively by airports, airlines and TSA, will enhance
the security of the traveling public by strengthening employee
screening while appropriately using resources across the industry.
The members of ACI-NA and I thank you for inviting me to testify
today and we look forward to continuing to work with you on this
important issue. I'll be pleased to address any questions you might
have.
Ms. Clarke. [Presiding.] Thank you for your testimony.
And I now recognize Mr. Holden, with Covenant Homeland
Security Solutions, to summarize his statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM E. HOLDEN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF
OPERATIONS, COVENANT HOMELAND SECURITY SOLUTIONS
Mr. Holden. Thank you. Ms. Clarke, ranking member of the
subcommittee, I would like to thank you each of you for
inviting me to participate in a hearing to discuss airport
security.
By way of background, Covenant Aviation Security was
awarded a contract as part of a Transportation Security
Screening Pilot Program on October 10, 2002. We are currently
providing both passenger and baggage screening at San Francisco
International Airport, a category X airport, and also at Sioux
Falls Regional Airport, a category II airport.
Covenant was the only private contractor to be awarded two
airports during the pilot screening program.
I would like to point out the compressed timelines under
which the award was made on October 10 until staffing the
checkpoints on November 19, 2002 and providing full trained
screeners for checked baggage on January 1, 2003.
Covenant was successful in meeting both of these federally
mandated deadlines. Covenant successfully deployed over 1,100
security screeners to all passenger checkpoints at San
Francisco International Airport and Tupelo Regional Airport
during the very brief 39-day transition period. Additionally,
Covenant staffed all baggage checkpoints by January 1, 2003 for
a total of 1,453 screeners hired, trained and deployed within
the TSA-mandated timelines.
Covenant was awarded screening operations at Sioux Falls in
February 2006. Tupelo Regional Airport was awarded to Trinity
Technology in May of 2006 as a small business set aside.
Covenant provides management services for Trinity.
The Covenant team offers extensive experience in airport
operations, security and personnel management capable of
providing the government cost effective and value added
solutions.
Currently, at both San Francisco International and the
Sioux Falls Regional Airport, Covenant Aviation contract scope
has been increased by the TSA to include Aviation Direct Access
Screening Program, ADASP.
ADASP screening entails the screening of airport personnel
who have access to secure areas of the airport. Airport
personnel having the appropriate credentials and access rights
can enter into the airport sterile area without going through
checkpoint security.
Through the ADASP, airport personnel and their belongings
are subject to rigorous screening standards to prevent the
introduction of prohibited items into an airport's sterile
area. The ADASP represents a significant step forward by the
TSA to ensure the safety of the flying public.
ADASP was implemented by TSA in 2007 and requires
additional procedures to expand screening to include direct
access points into the airport operations area, AOA. It is
important to note that there is an extensive background check
process for all airport community employees.
ADASP is conducted on a random and unpredictable basis to
accomplish the following: Look for improper ID media, ensure
that all checked IDs do not show signs of tampering, look for
non-visible airport ID media, ensure that prohibited items on
the TSA prohibited list do not gain access to the AOA, and,
five, check individuals and their accessible property entering
direct areas other than checkpoint entries, resolving all
alarms.
The majority of all employees that work in the airport
community and possess a badge issued by the security access for
San Francisco International as well as their belongings go
through the same screening process as the traveling public.
They proceed through a walk-through metal detector and their
personal or job-related possessions are screened by an X-ray
machine. If there is an alarm of any kind they are subject to
hand wanding, bag searches or a pat down of their possessions.
They are subjected to the screening process every time they
leave the sterile area and wish to re-enter.
Employees in the airport community are airline employees,
inclusive of management and flight crews, vendors working for
the airlines or city employees. In San Francisco and Sioux
Falls, the certified screeners that work for Covenant must go
through the security check point each time they enter the
sterile area.
Covenant strongly supports the screening of all employees
in accordance with the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
of 2002. I stand for your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Holden follows:]
Prepared Statement of William E. Holden
Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Lungren, Members of the
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection--
I would like to thank you for inviting me to participate in today's
hearing to discuss Airport Security.
BACKGROUND
Covenant Aviation Security was awarded a contract as part of the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Security Screening Pilot
Program on October 10, 2002. We are currently providing both passenger
and baggage screeners at San Francisco International Airport, a
Category X airport, and Sioux Falls Regional Airport, a Category II
airport. Covenant was the only private contractor to be awarded more
than one airport under the Privatization Pilot Program (PP5). I would
like to point out the compressed time frame from contract award on
October 10, 2002, until staffing all checkpoints on November 19, 2002,
and providing fully trained screeners for checked baggage on January 1,
2003. Covenant Aviation was successful in meeting both of these
federally mandated deadlines.
Covenant successfully deployed over 1,100 security screeners to all
passenger checkpoints at San Francisco International Airport (SFO) and
Tupelo Regional Airport (TUP) during the very brief 39-day transition
period (October 10, 2002--November 19, 2002). Additionally, Covenant
staffed all baggage checkpoints by January 1, 2003 for a total of 1,453
screeners hired, trained and deployed within the TSA-mandated
timelines. Covenant was awarded screening operations at Sioux Falls
Regional Airport in February 2006. Tupelo Regional Airport was awarded
to Trinity Technology Group in May 2006 as a small business set aside
contract with the TSA. Covenant provides management services for
Trinity.
The Covenant team offers extensive experience in airport
operations, security and personnel management capable of providing the
Government cost effective and value added solutions. Our company
mission states our commitment to provide dedicated aviation security
services for the safe and efficient movement of people and cargo within
the United States and its territories. One benefit Covenant has
capitalized on is the dedication and support we have received from the
Airport Directors, Mr. John Martin of San Francisco, Mr. Terry Anderson
of Tupelo and Mr. Mike Marnach of Sioux Falls.
In addition, our collaborative relationships with the Federal
Security Directors' in San Francisco, Mr. Ed Gomez and Mr. Mark Heisey
in Sioux Falls, South Dakota have enabled us to provide exceptional
service and is a contributing factor in successfully maintaining the
mission focus. The ``Team SFO'' and ``Team FSD'' concept represents the
joint efforts of Airport Management, the Federal Security Director
including their staffs and Covenant. These relationships were built
over time and a result of Covenant consistently demonstrating the
ability to overcome challenges and supporting the TSA and its mission.
EMPLOYEE SCREENING
At both San Francisco International and the Sioux Falls Regional
Airport, Covenant Aviation Security's contract scope has been increased
by the TSA to include Aviation Direct Access Screening Program (ADASP)
screening. ADASP screening entails the screening of airport personnel
who have access to secure areas of the airport. Airport personnel
having the appropriate credentials and access rights can enter into the
airport sterile area without going through checkpoint security. Through
the ADASP, airport personnel and their belongings are subject to
rigorous screening standards to prevent the introduction of prohibited
items into an airport's sterile area. The ADASP represents a
significant step forward by the TSA to ensure the safety of the flying
public.''
ADASP was implemented by TSA in 2007 and requires additional
procedures to expand screening to include direct access points into the
Air Operations Area (AOA). It is important to note that there is an
extensive background check process for all airport community employees.
ADASP is conducted on a random and unpredictable basis to
accomplish the following:
i. Look for improper ID media
ii. Ensure that all checked ID's do not show signs of tampering
iii. Look for non-visible airport ID media
iv. Ensure that prohibited items on the TSA prohibited list do
not gain access to the AOA
v. Check individuals and their accessible property entering
direct access areas other than check point entries, resolving
all alarms.
The majority of all employees that work in the airport community
and possess a badge issued by the Security Access Office for San
Francisco International Airport (SFO) as well as their belongings go
through the same screening process as the traveling public. They
proceed through a walk through metal detector and their personal or job
related possessions are screened by an x-ray machine. If there is an
alarm of any kind they are subject to Hand Wanding, bag searches or a
pat down of their person. They are subjected to the screening process
every time they leave the sterile area and wish to re-enter.
Employees in the airport community are airline employees (inclusive
of management and flight crews), vendors working for the airlines or
city/airport employees. In SFO and FSD the certified screeners that
work for Covenant must go through the security check point each time
they enter the sterile area.
CHALLENGES AND IMPLEMENTED SOLUTIONS
Due to the fact the two airports we service are distinctly
different (Category X and Category II) they bring individualized
operational issues to the table. I will begin by discussing solutions
we implemented in San Francisco and Sioux Falls.
STAFFING
The current staffing level in San Francisco is 815 full time
employees. The TSA authorized staffing level is 845. Covenant teamed
with the FSD, Mr. Gomez and his staff, determined the required hours of
operation by incorporating information collected on passenger
throughput and passenger waiting time in order to ``right-size'' the
screener workforce. Covenant has been successful in reducing the number
of employees without jeopardizing the level of security, customer
service levels or experiencing an increase in wait times.
We currently have 84 part-time employees which provides Covenant
the flexibility to schedule those individuals where needed in order to
meet the demand. To my knowledge, we were the first airport to
establish a part-time workforce.
Sioux Falls is staffed with 32 full time employees and 4 part time
employees.
SCREENING CONTROL CENTER
The FSD, Airport Director and Covenant recognized the need for a
Command and Control center for the entire airport. Due to the dispersed
locations of the checkpoints and three separate terminals it became
apparent for a communication system that provided a link to the TSA,
airport staff and law enforcement officials.
The Screening Control Center (SCC) concept of Command and Control
was developed with the TSA SFO Executive Team and the SFO Airport
Commission to provide a centralized resource to improve operating
efficiencies of the screening workforce. The SCC is located in the
Airport Communications Center and includes a Closed Circuit Television
system (CCTV). The SCC is manned 24/7 in order to constantly monitor
the operation of SFO's 39 checkpoint lanes and the queuing passengers
at checkpoints.
A major function of the SCC operators is to move screeners to
checkpoint/ baggage workstations during `off-peak' hours to work in
locations where additional screeners are needed. Additionally, the SCC
takes calls reporting out-of-service Government Furnished Equipment
(GFE) and oversees the dispatch of Siemens, Boeing and InVision
technicians decreasing the downtime of essential screening equipment.
Due to the success we had with the Screening Control Center in San
Francisco we implemented it at Sioux Falls at no cost to the TSA or the
airport.
SAFETY, ON-THE-JOB INJURIES (OJI) & WORKERS COMPENSATION CLAIMS
Covenant, along with most airports, was experiencing a high number
of Worker's Compensation Claims that resulted in significant amounts of
money being paid out in claims. Covenant has taken steps to
aggressively manage this issue. In early 2003, Covenant management
initiated both a part-time screener job classification and a return-to-
work program for screeners who have been injured while performing their
screener duties. Although they cannot return to full-time employment,
they are available to work in a restricted duty capacity (jobs assigned
by medical restrictions). Covenant, with FSD approval, has hired a
Workers Compensation Specialist to review claims for cost containment
and who manages the return-to-work program.
ATTENDANCE CONTROL CENTER (ACC)
Covenant's absentee rates were fluctuating on a monthly basis and
at one point went at high as 14.7%. The Covenant management team along
with the guidance of the FSD, Mr. Gomez, knew we needed to get this
issue under control. In May 2003, Covenant opened the Attendance
Control Center and our absentee rate began to decrease almost
immediately. Our absentee rate is 3.6%.
The ACC is an innovation that provides a center of communication on
current staffing levels at all checkpoints. The ACC works in
conjunction with the SCC by reporting actual numbers of personnel at
the start of each shift and compares them to the established schedule.
The SCC in turn can efficiently reassign personnel to ensure that
screening operations are maintained by staffing the areas most critical
to operational continuity.
Of particular note, Absent-Without-Leave (AWOL) has been
significantly reduced due to management actions taken by Covenant in
administering the Attendance and Disciplinary policies. The ACC assists
in reviewing and addressing employee attendance performance through
counseling or disciplining as appropriate. Having one central location
performing this function ensures that applications of discipline for
attendance infractions are consistent across all terminal checkpoint
and baggage operations.
ASSESSMENT
Covenant recognized the staffing deficiency occurring nationwide.
In addition, Covenant could foresee the problems that would occur while
waiting, possibly six months, for TSA's subcontractor, CPS to arrive
and perform the assessments. During those six months, service levels
would be compromised along with rising costs if the usage of overtime
hours increased.
With the assistance of the FSD, Covenant has developed a proven
approach that was first demonstrated with the hiring of Baggage
Handlers. Since then Covenant has conducted several assessments for the
recruitment of part-time and full-time passenger and baggage screeners
for San Francisco International Airport. The method is a phased
approach including three phases (1) recruitment, (2) pre-screening and
(3) assessment. Covenant is responsible for the entire assessment
process. The percentage of candidates who will successfully meet the
full assessment criteria is increased by validating minimum
qualification criteria early in the selection process. Pre-screening
candidates provides cost-efficient methodologies for ensuring expenses
are not incurred for assessing unqualified candidates. Covenant uses
actual screeners to assist in panel interviews with candidates so that
operational experience is brought to bear in assessing potential
employees.
TRAINING
The airport screening environment presents multiple challenges to
any training program due in large part to its 24/7 operation and large
number of screeners who work various shifts, days of the week, and
terminals, yet still must receive the same consistent information and
direction that greatly impact security and passenger safety.
Covenant developed a Training Academy that includes an onsite
computer learning lab that serves as the ``hub'' of all training and
certification activities. The lab consists of 55 stand-alone PC
computers equipped with CD-ROM and headset. Initially, the computers
were used primarily for image recognition training--three hours per
week. Now screeners have a library of CD-ROMs to choose from that
include hidden weapons, screening of footwear, hand-wanding, full body
pat down review, back injury prevention, harassment-free workplace, and
Hazmat guidelines. In addition, operational equipment can be dispatched
to the lab for hands-on training related to operational testing and
weekly/monthly maintenance procedures. The Computer Learning Lab has
become an integral part of the screener's daily activities--right along
side the screening of passengers and checked baggage.
HUMAN RESOURCES
Covenant recognizes the problems federally run airports are
experiencing in terms of human resource functions. At times these
processes are very confusing and time consuming due to the excessive
layers involved in the TSA process.
Covenant realizes the importance of communicating information
regarding benefits, policies, and resources available to our employees
to maintain positive employee morale. By having a local human resource
department Covenant is able to service the employees better. For
example, Covenant has the flexibility to promote individuals based on
performance and on the other hand can remove an individual from a
position if required. Covenant can handle simple matters such as a pay
discrepancy the same day. The flexibility has allowed us to implement
such employee programs as an Employee Assistance Center, Employee
Relations Management system, recognition programs and alternative work
schedules without waiting for approval from TSA headquarters.
Having Covenant provide human resource functions allow the FSD to
focus on his main objective--security, rather than trying to resolve
personnel issues.
BEST PRACTICES (SFO)
Covenant Aviation Security (CAS) is contracted to perform the
Aviation Transportation Security Act screening procedures. While
fulfilling all of the requirements of the contract and the TSA Standard
Operating Procedures (SOP) we have developed some ``best practices''
that have elevated SFO's performance.
CAS runs a test every 30 minutes at every operational
screening lane of randomly chosen prohibited items (IED's-
Improvised Explosive Devices)
CAS exceeds the hours required for all computer based
training, OLC (on-line computer) and TRX (image). CAS has
installed computers close to check points and in break areas so
employees can readily access all computer based programs.
CAS has supplied each check point with ``image
books''. The image books are x-ray pictures of actual bags with
every day items and some IED and prohibited item materials. The
front of the page is the images generated, the back of the page
clearly defines the images.
CAS contracts with companies that covertly try to
breach security by having prohibited items or IED parts in
their bags or on their person. What separates our testing is
CAS makes the testing difficult. The better the score means
that we need to make the tests harder. CAS provides a monetary
incentive when employees ``catch'' prohibited items or IED
related materials.
CAS has a pro-active Dual Function Screener (DFS)
program. DFS' advantages are improved morale (employees are
scheduled for two weeks in baggage and two weeks at check
points), heightened skills (because they must know and test in
both areas) and operational improvements. If there is an
operational problem the DFS program gives CAS flexibility at
reacting to security issues.
Best practices that are applicable will be implemented in Sioux
Falls.
CONCLUSION
The FSD oversight and partnership we've developed has played a
major role in the successful operation at both San Francisco and Sioux
Falls airports. The FSDs, Mr. Gomez and Mr. Mark Heisey and their
staffs require Covenant to justify/explain the following metrics on a
weekly basis: overtime, attendance, OJI's, attrition and wait times for
passengers. Recent statistics show that SFO metrics surpass other
Category X airports in the Western Area in the areas of attendance,
overtime and attrition. The guiding principle for Covenant management
is ``If we cannot measure it, we cannot manage it.''
Covenant strongly supports the screening of all employees in
accordance with the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2002,
Section 44903 of title 49, United States Code.
Ms. Clarke. I thank all the witnesses for their testimony.
I will remind each member that she or he will have 5
minutes to question the second panel.
I now recognize myself for questions.
My question is directed to Ms. Stover.
Have you had the opportunity to demonstrate your operations
and screening techniques for officials at other airports? I got
from your testimony that you really want to practice
specifically for that airport environment; it is not a one-
size-fits-all. But there are certainly some best practices that
you have established that can be adapted to each airport
environment that exists, particularly in the areas--that are
similar.
Has there been any interest from other airports?
Ms. Stover. Yes, Ms. Clarke. We have had Orlando Airport
come visit us recently, we have had TSA come down and see our
operations, and we have had Metropolitan Washington Airports
Authority come.
I have offered to the industry, and I do that through this
forum today, that any airports that are interested in viewing
our operations we would certainly be happy to host them.
Again, we do feel that there needs to be a layered approach
to this, working with access controls. We have the ability to
be able to restrict the access through the encoding of our ID
badges. Recently, I have instituted a call for data on how many
doors are being used and those that are not being used, I am
shutting down and locking down. My fire access doors I am
restricting to those who need access.
So there is a layered approach that we could take to doing
this so that there is not just one impenetrable ring but rings
of security that would help us to deter any potential acts.
Ms. Clarke. You also spoke to the cost.
Ms. Stover. Yes.
Ms. Clarke. and I would like for you to elaborate a little
bit more on that and also state whether you think that there is
something that government can do to support.
Ms. Stover. Certainly. Thank you for the opportunity. Right
now, currently, we are--and I don't have the numbers in front
of me--but we have $2.5 million that we are expending on the
guards. They cost about $23 an hour, we have four checkpoints,
we operate 24/7. So we are spending about $2.5 million,
including the maintenance costs of the equipment. We also are
incurring $300,000 for the recently federal mandated
requirement of vendor inspections to the sterile areas. One
hundred percent of that is costing Miami Airport $300,000.
We are about to open over 1 million square feet of new
terminal in Miami, a whole new south terminal, and in order for
me to maintain the current employee screening program that I
have, I will need to open another three checkpoints at that
cost of $1.3 million, and I am going to look to TSA to provide
us with additional walk-through metal detectors for that new
terminals, because we are closing down a portion of Miami
Airport to develop the whole north terminal. So we are shutting
it down, I will have screening equipment there, and I want to
move it into the south terminal.
And we have the vehicle access gates where employees enter
through the airfield, and we are expending about $1 million
there. So we are expending well over $5 million to $6 million
on trying to raise the level of security.
Ms. Clarke. And how are you paying for it?
Ms. Stover. That is a very good question.
[Laughter.]
That is why we have a leaky roof in Miami Airport. We are
just trying to look for grants and ways that we can make it
happen. And we are thoughtful and mindful of our airports
around the nation that also are in the same financial
predicament. We want to work with the category I, II, III, IVs
and Xs and with ACI and AAAE to come up with a practical
solution.
We do have an operation going on in Miami Airport right
now. Today you may be hearing about it in the press. As a
matter of fact, at 2 o'clock where I should have been at a
press conference, I am up here with you all.
But we had an investigation that is resulting in some
arrests of airport workers. These workers are not physically
screened by us. They have access to our cargo areas, so Mr.
DeFazio would have been probably interested in that. But we are
working with immigration and Customs Enforcement and the U.S.
Department of Justice, and we dismantled an operation today in
our cargo area.
Ms. Clarke. I want to thank you for your response and your
candor here today.
The chair will now recognize other members for questions
they may wish to ask the witnesses. In accordance with our
committee rules and practice, I will recognize members who were
present at the start of the hearing based on seniority on the
subcommittee, alternating between the majority and the
minority. And those members coming in later will be recognized
in the order of their arrival.
The chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman from
Colorado, Mr. Perlmutter.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Since we were talking about money just a second ago, I
would like to ask the panel, any of you, do you think--have you
seen--and I know, Ms. Stover, you are focused on Miami, but all
of you, whether or not the TSA is overstaffed?
Ms. Stover. You want to take that?
Mr. Principato. No, I don't think TSA is overstaffed. I
heard the points you made earlier, Congressman, and, certainly,
several of our members had they been here would be able to tell
you that they feel like they need additional resources at the
airports to take care of the ever-increasing traffic they are
seeing and so forth. So, no, I don't think TSA is overstaffed.
Mr. Perlmutter. Mr. Holden, what do you think?
Mr. Holden. Well, when we start our contract in San
Francisco, we are over 1,100 screeners. The number today is
down to 847, and that includes baggage screening for both
passenger screening and baggage screening in January we were
over 1,400 employees.
So to answer your question directly, sir, no, I do not feel
that they are overstaffed.
Mr. Perlmutter. So your experience is similar to what has
happened over at Denver's airport. Sounds almost similar
numbers, except Denver may be a little bigger cut than you have
suffered.
Ms. Stover, what do you think?
Ms. Stover. Did you want to answer the Denver question?
I can speak to you on behalf of all of the airports. I
participate regularly on the conference calls that they have
with TSA, with AAAE, with ACI. And, really and truly, the
screening allocations across the board, I don't know what the
model is but I don't think it is thoughtful in truth into the
operations of the airports. We are grossly understaffed, and I
can just share that with you.
I used to work for TSA, so I have been on the other side of
the fence, and they have done a wonderful job of trying to
allocate the cap, but that cap needs to raise.
Mr. Principato. If I can just add one point. As Lauren
said, TSA is working hard to deal with the cap and so forth and
the resources. One of the arguments that we have made is that
need over time to move from a labor-intensive to a technology-
intensive security system.
Lauren talked before about inline baggage systems, for
example. That would be one way to do that; there are many
others. Moving from labor-intensive to technology-intensive I
think would go a long way toward making the best use of those
resources.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you.
In Denver, we have a lot of inline baggage systems to
screen the bags, and I was very interested in looking at that,
but there still is the people portion of all this, and my fear
is that we are trying to move people along for purposes of
getting them on their planes, but then there is so much
pressure to move people along, you can make mistakes, and that
is my fear.
Here is my political statement--I am glad you answered my
question the way I thought you would--is in the emergency
supplemental bill that is in conference and will be presented
to the president, there is at least $1.5 billion for technology
and staff for the staff and for airport security. In the media,
there has been a lot of talk about some of the farm pieces or
this or that, calling it all pork, but, obviously, in my
opinion, spending money on transportation security at our
airports or our ports or our borders is not pork.
And I would encourage all three of you to encourage your
members or your friends to tell the president not to veto that
bill. Thank you.
That is my last question, Madam Chair, and I will yield
back.
Ms. Jackson Lee. [Presiding.] Let me thank Congresswoman
Clarke for her dutiful duty.
Mr. Perlmutter. Outstanding job.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And her colleague even adds to that
outstanding, and let me also thank Mr. DeFazio in his absence
for helping us play a little tag here this morning.
Let me provide a little backdrop to my questioning, and I
thank all of you for being here and just to remind us that in
the nation's airports, employees and contractors are currently
free to roam wherever they want, even in sterile areas, and
without prior screening. Giving workers open access to a
sterile area is like installing an expensive home security
system but leaving your backdoor wide open.
This is a huge security gap. It already has been exploited
for the purposes of carrying out criminal activities, and I
believe that if we continue some of our Band-Aid approaches, it
is only a matter of time before those who wish to do us harm
will exploit this vulnerability to attack our nation.
So it is the same thing that I started out with, is that we
must be diligent.
We have now a wonderful combination before us, a
representative of a very, very large airport but one, Ms.
Stover, where we still have the images of airport employees
with their hands in the air or hands behind their back, who
perpetrated this whole drug activity, certainly, maybe right in
our eyesight but, certainly, as legal, if you will, employees
of that airport.
I am reminded every time I land of the appearance of, if
you will, laxness on the apron part of the airport. For the
airlines that I travel on, please note that I keenly look out
the window as we are, if you will, taxiing, and it is literally
a small city. The appearance is that it is clearly laissez-
faire, the goings and comings of individuals, deliveries, those
who are giving direction, trucks driving back and forth. So it
looks like an exposed area.
And I think, Mr. Principato, you would be concerned, as
your directors should be concerned, about that exposure.
So my questions will be to see if we can get this sense of
urgency, and although we want convenience and although we want
to have a legislative initiative, I know the Senate has a bill,
that balances interests, I said once that we cannot opt for
bucks, dollar bills, over security. That goes to the whole wave
of foreign ownership, it is okay because we are getting a buck.
We have to look at how our ports are managed, even if we think
it is in vogue to have foreign ownership or maybe it is not
only in vogue but it is really the norm.
The same thing with our airports. There are reasons to have
convenience, because our traveling public is looking for
fastness, but I would think that we also want security. We have
got Mr. Holden here who has come out of the private sector, his
company is in the private sector, and some airport, thought
enough of the breach to engage Mr. Holden's company.
So let me start with Mr. Principato to talk about TSA's
plan, if you have not answered that. And when I say, talk about
the plan, there are a lot of good elements to it. This week is
dominated by Virginia and I am very sensitive. I think I
mentioned in another committee that members are tempered in
their actions. You will see us probably move swiftly in the
weeks to come, but we are tempered because of the mourning. But
the point is, is that we now know we have another element to
bad acts behavior.
Give me a sense of the urgency of your organization about
moving quickly and whether or not this behavioral concept that
now is glaringly before us in light of the horrific tragedy of
Virginia Tech, where are you all going and what is your
assessment of what TSA has begun to do?
Mr. Principato. We have been working very closely with TSA
on these concepts. ACI, AAAE and other organizations have been
working very closely with TSA on these concepts and developing
them.
Let me say that, as I said earlier in my statement, airport
directors and their staffs feel that sense of urgency every
day. I get calls from our members from airport directors every
day about all matter of things, but three-quarters of them--I
keep track--three-quarters of them are about security and they
are working day after day after day to improve the security at
their airport.
Professionals like Ms. Stover, who is sitting next to me
here, working with her director, you mentioned Rick Vacar
before and Mr. Mancuso down there, working very hard to
increase the security at their airports.
And we believe that you can never stand still, that you can
never say, ``We are done. We have got the most secure system,
we are done. We can't do anything more.''
Which is why I am very excited about working with TSA on
some of these concepts and rolling them out and trying to make
sure that--testing them out, see what works, what doesn't work,
what kind of combinations work and get the best possible system
put in place, knowing that once we do that, we are going to
keep at it, we are going to have to keep adjusting, we are
going to have to keep changing, and we are never going to be
able to go to sleep on this. This is something we have to do
every day, and our members feel that acutely.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you feel that you should move faster on
this and should be moving more quickly now?
Mr. Principato. I will say that that sense of urgency is
there every single day, and, certainly, a discussion like this
helps focus the mind.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I will do to myself what I have done to a
variety of members and yield myself an additional--I ask to
yield myself an additional 3 minutes. Any objection?
Ms. Stover, you do 100 percent screening at Miami. As I
said to you, the images are still very prominent in our minds
about the incident that occurred, one of the first more glaring
incidents, others probably are occurring without
newsworthiness. Orlando represents another one.
You do 100 percent screening. What are your challenges? Why
can't we implement the 100 percent screening and look closely
at the apron of the airport? What a large airport you are
addressing that question. Do you think you have gotten your
hands around the apron aspect by the fact that you are
screening 100 percent of the persons that are there?
Ms. Stover. What we do today, quite frankly, won't be good
enough for me tomorrow. We are getting our handle on this. I
think more so than anything else, it is a deterrent from any
type of illegal activity.
Yes, we can implement 100 percent screening, and I am
encouraged at the discussion. I know some airports are nervous
about it, but, certainly, at Miami, we have intercepted
firearms, we have intercepted stolen computers, large sums of
cash and other items that were stolen. And I am proud of that
program, and it took a lot of pain to get where we are at. And
we got there based on a thoughtful approach of working with the
airlines and the unions to incrementally reduce the access
points.
We didn't do it overnight; we did it in phases. So that
where we are at today, only four access points with workers,
five elevators that the guards there searching your personal
effects. I am still not comfortable. I am still not comfortable
about the insider threat, and a lot of that is because of the
background checks.
I won't get into too many details in a public forum, but
the NCIC is more so the name-based background and fingerprints
are more accurate, and I would like to know these airport
workers that have been in our country for only a year. I don't
know if they are persons of interest in international
locations, and that is a disconnect that I would like to see
the industry and TSA and members of Congress work more toward
getting more expanded background and credentials.
It doesn't necessarily prohibit an act like such happened
at Virginia Tech the other day with a person whose prints came
up clean and they basically went in and committed this
massacre, but it is all a part of the discussion.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, as we are ongoing in our thinking,
remember, we mentioned behavior, and, certainly, that might
have been an element that would have been very, very important
in the assessment of the tragedy of Virginia Tech.
Certainly, not knowing someone is being a person of
interest and fingerprints being clean, but this tragedy of
mental health issues but other behavior issues that may not be
attributable to mental health, still, that may be another
element, which is one of the things TSA has mentioned.
Ms. Stover. Correct. And TSA could possibly think about
rolling out a behavior program for airport security directors
or the airport directors, a train the trainer type of approach.
They are using SPOT, I am using Rafi Ron, who is the originator
of the methodology. He has trained a core group of my police
officers, and then I went to them and said, ``Okay, now you
need to train us.''
So we have a partnership on this and we are doing it, and
we are now instituting a new directive that will require every
airport worker who is going to get a badge or renew their badge
to go through the training. So it will be woven into the fiber
of the security program.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, you heard me say as I started this
hearing that we were going to have a series of hearings on a
large number of airport security issues. Do you think that is a
relevant approach to take?
Ms. Stover. As a representative of the airports, yes, I do.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Holden, thank you so very much and
thank, if I might, the familia, Gerry, for making the
accommodation to us. Tell us what you believe you have
accomplished in Orlando. Again, that was a glaring news-focused
breach, and I indicated that there are so many products that
are provocative that employees have access to, one of which,
which is conspicuous, would be weapons. Tell us how you believe
you have worked your way into the system of airports and
provided a service.
Mr. Holden. Well, I will charge into the airlines and the
airports. Specifically, it started in San Francisco, and we did
that by assembling a team with airline background. We have been
able to work with the TSA, with the airport authorities, with
the FSDs at these airports to ensure that we are following all
the guidelines and mandates that are set forth by the TSA.
This cannot be accomplished by a company or a team alone.
It has to be a team approach. And every airport that we go to
our approach is to become a part of the team, to become a part
of the family. And as we do these things and get lessons
learned, we are able to increase where we stand in security.
We make it a point to educate our employees on the need for
security and the rules of security. We also go another step to
make sure that we do not allow Bill Holden to work the same
location every day. We think the movement of employees is very
important.
You asked about Orlando. We are able to work with the team
in Orlando by, one, we have a history of being able to
assemble, in a short timeframe, a number of employees to do the
job, but we go a step further. It was mentioned earlier about
background checks. In some areas that we have ventured, we are
finding employees who had background checks who we have had to
term, if I can use that, because of false location of
background checks. This is one of the biggest challenges that
we have is to make sure that background checks are thorough.
Not only do we perform a background check using the
standard methods, but we have in place a process wherein that
we meet all employees to question the employees. We have a very
extensive checklist to make sure that we try to capture with
each new hire or each incumbent employee anything in the
background that may be service that would not ordinarily allow
that person to work.
So working with the airports as a team, working with FSD as
a team, working with the airport community as a team helps us
succeed in what we are doing as far as security.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Did you use Miami as a model or did you
create a new model? Is there any enhanced technology that you
have that you are utilizing?
Mr. Holden. We use Miami's history as a model. We use the
information that we have in ADASP, and we also use our past
experience with other security that we have performed outside
of the airport community.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you believe that it is important, as
you look at airports across the country, San Francisco,
Orlando, that continued assessment of the security concerns at
airports is an important responsibility or challenge for this
committee? Should we continue to have oversight over new and
different ways to improve the security of airports and of
course airlines and the traveling public?
Mr. Holden. After the events of 9/11, my concerns with
airport security was as we move further down the road from
airport security that changing face that we apply to airport
security on 9/11 will soon fade away. Without oversight of
airport security, we will be back to the point we were prior to
9/11. We need to dedicate the resources to ensure that we do
not go back to the events prior to 9/11 and changing the face
of security. We have got to continue to build on what we have
and what we have accomplished and not lose sight of the fact
that airport security is and should be strong.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Principato, I am going to let you
answer, but let me yield first to the very patient
distinguished gentleman from Colorado--
Mr. Perlmutter. I have already gotten to speak. I thought
this chairman was--
[Laughter.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. It is good to be able to have
colleagues in the same class salute each other.
Then that means I can yield to Mr. Principato. Thank you.
Mr. Principato. Thank you. Just very quickly, and maybe not
to differ entirely from what Mr. Holden said, of course, I
think there is a proper role for the oversight of this
subcommittee and the Congress, and we welcome that.
I don't think we are ever going to--
Ms. Jackson Lee. Say that again, Mr. Principato.
Mr. Principato. There is certainly a role for the oversight
of the Congress and this committee and this subcommittee, and
we welcome that, but I don't think we are ever going to go back
to the mindset, the pre-September 11, 2001 mindset. I think we
are cured of that. I don't think that is going to happen. You
certainly have the pledge of this organization and our members
that that is not going to happen, but we do certainly welcome
that oversight and the ability to work with you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. As I close this hearing, I am going to
play a game show a little bit and ask each of you to give just
one issue of security that you think we should, going forward,
be cognizant.
Ms. Stover, you had mentioned something toward the end of
your testimony, I don't know if you remember that, and you
might repeat it, but you were saying something needed to be
expanded, and I am sorry that I didn't catch it, but you may
have a new idea as we go to the three of you, as I close the
hearing.
Ms. Stover. Okay. Well, you are asking me to pick one that
I think is the most important.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And you won't be limited to that. We will
have you back.
Ms. Stover. Oh, thank you.
I think the credentialing and the background checks are
critically important to revisit, and, of course, we are a
proponent of the employee screening. We would like to see that
woven into your legislation if it is done with the
thoughtfulness of the configuration of each of the airports.
And then, lastly, behavior pattern recognitions, because we
were the first airport to lead the way on that, so I have to
say that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And you are still going strong.
Ms. Stover. Oh, absolutely. And no one is going to get
their ID back unless they go through my 2-hour course.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Principato?
Mr. Principato. I am going to agree with everything Lauren
just said and add, as I said in my discussion with Congressman
Perlmutter before, the movement from a labor-intensive to a
technology-intensive security system, making greater use of
technology, for example, inline EDS systems, which will make
the security--
Ms. Jackson Lee. Pardon me?
Mr. Principato. Inline EDS, which will make the security
system much more efficient and much more secure and allow us to
better utilize those scarce resources.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Holden?
Mr. Holden. We have benefited greatly from technology. With
everything good sometimes come things bad, so I have to agree
with my distinguished colleague, credentialing and background
checks. Technology has helped the bad boys, if you can call
them that, to breach security with false ID. So credentialing
and background checks is very, very important.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
This Congress is at a crossroads, the committee is at a
crossroads. That is to be able to match the major function of
airports, the traveling public, with the new era in which we
find ourselves, not in this country, but in this world. Having
been to a number of borders, northern border, southern border,
Europe, if you will, and the third border, we find out that
areas that are surrounding the United States are also part of
the story of security.
This committee will look both nationally and
internationally as we look at the traveling public and ways of
providing security. We will need the cooperation of the
Airports Council, we will need the cooperation of major and
small airports around the nation and frankly the world.
And, Mr. Holden, we certainly are hopeful that there will
be transparent contracts rendered by airports and the
Department of Homeland Security and they will be effective
partners, as we know that Orlando believes that you have been,
your company has been, to be able to provide us security. The
only way we can get past the crossroads is that cooperative
spirit and information.
This committee may submit to the members additional
questions. We would ask that you would expeditiously submit
those questions back to us. We expect that will have the
opportunity to have a markup shortly, and as we do so, we will
be cognizant of the work that each and every one of you have
done.
So I thank you for the valuable testimony, and I thank the
members for their questions and their insight. We usually have
a vigorous markup. I know there will be a number of amendments
that will reflect the different viewpoints of members, but we
will cite airports that have 100 percent screening of their
employees, and we will make the point that their doors are
still open.
And so we can find ways to accommodate our friends, pilots,
flight attendants and others, but we will make sure that we
move forward on the challenge that we have of securing America.
Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
For the Record
Prepared Statement of The Honorable Ginnie Brown-Waite, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Florida
I am in complete support of Congresswoman Nita Lowey's bill, H.R.
1413. The bill's purpose, to ``direct the Assistant Secretary of
Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration) to address
vulnerabilities in aviation security by carrying out a pilot program to
screen airport workers with access to secure and sterile areas of
airports,'' is something our nation desperately needs to secure our
airports. I also have a submission I would like to put in to the record
from the Orlando Aviation Authority on this subject.
Recent events that took place at the Orlando International Airport
are a case in point.
The arrest last month of various airline employees attempting to
smuggle 13 handguns and 8 pounds of marijuana aboard a flight from
Orlando International Airport to San Juan, Puerto Rico, is a perfect
example of a striking gap in airline security nationwide.
Specifically, the fact that airline employees are not required to
go through the same security checkpoints as other passengers leaves a
huge gap in our aviation security system. Given that an employee was
willing to take the risk of smuggling illegal weapons and drugs onto a
flight for a few thousand dollars would certainly lead one to believe
it plausible that an employee of an airline could be bribed by well
financed terrorists to obtain access to an airport's infrastructure.
On March 12th I met with TSA officials and Members of the Greater
Orlando Aviation Authority at the Orlando airport. Together, we reached
an agreement that the airport would provide 1005 screening of all
Orlando International Airport employees, baggage and passengers.
Miami International Airport already has a program which screens
every worker, and there is no reason why Orlando, or in fact, all
airports nationwide, should not be conducting the same type of security
measures.
For Florida, tourism and travel form the backbone of Florida's
economy, and obviously, those traveling to the state need to feel safe
during their commute. Similarly, those traveling domestically and
internationally via U.S. airports need to be secure, and increasing and
enforcing security procedures for airline employees serves as an
important step forward towards achieving this goal.
----------
GREATER ORLANDO
AVIATION AUTHORITY
TESTIMONY BY
THE
GREATER ORLANDO AVIATION AUTHORITY
Hearing on
AIRPORT SECURITY: THE NECESSARY IMPROVEMENTS TO
SECURE AMERICA'S AIRPORTS
April 19, 2007
Before The subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection
Committee on Homeland Security
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on HR 1413. Your
leadership in promoting safety and security for the traveling public is
appreciated by airports across the United States.
Our goal is to work in cooperation with the Department of Homeland
Security and State and local law enforcement agencies to ensure the
safety and security of passengers traveling through Orlando
International Airport.
Attached you will find a recent presentation approved by the
Greater Orlando Aviation Authority Board. This presentation lays out in
detail the Authority's plan to screen employees with access to secure
and sterile areas of the airport.
The Authority is funding $1.8 million in additional equipment costs
and an additional $3.2 million in personnel costs for a total of $5
million during the first year of this program. The cost of this program
will place a burden on an already constructed budget.
Attachment:
Enhanced Employee
Screening
The Plan
1. Reduce Access
2. Add Technology
3. Enhance Employee Screening
Enhanced Employee Screening
Baggage Make-Up to Baggage Claim Doors
1. TSA to provide screening
at these doors ( )
under interim agreement
2. GOAA to provide
additional Customer
Service Representatives
on a 1 to 1 basis
Projected additional cost: $1 million
Enhanced Employee Screening
Vehicle Entry Checkpoints
Emergency Purchase Order with
Covenant AviationSecurity
TSA Certified Company
Training to be provided
by Lockheed Martin
Mobile force can be
expanded to other locations
Immediate start up
Projected additional cost: $2.2 million
Enhanced Employee Screening
Add additional security
equipment
Fixed and mobile assets
State and Federal
procurement lists
will be used
Projected additional cost: $1.8 million
Funding for Implementation: 1. Equipment costs from 1997 Revenue $1.8 million
Bonds2. Personnel costs from Operations and $3.2 million
Maintenance Fund Total: $5.0 million 3. Possible federal & pilot program
appropriations Greater Orlando
Aviation Authority Wednesday, March 21, 2007