[House Hearing, 110 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office] RADICALIZATION, INFORMATION SHARING AND COMMUNITY OUTREACH: PROTECTING THE HOMELAND FROM HOMEGROWN TERROR ======================================================================= HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT of the COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ APRIL 5, 2007 __________ Serial No. 110-22 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/ index.html __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 43-558 PDF WASHINGTON : 2009 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York AL GREEN, Texas ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado VACANCY Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director ______ SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT JANE HARMAN, California, Chair NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado PETER T. KING, New York (Ex BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) Officio) Thomas M. Finan, Director and Counsel Brandon Declet, Counsel Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk Deron McElroy, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member (II) C O N T E N T S ---------- Page STATEMENTS The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment............. 1 The Honorable David G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment..................................................... 3 The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress from the State of Washington........................................ 27 The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress from the State of California................................... 4 The Honorable Ed Perlmutter, a Representative in Congress from the State of Colorado.......................................... 30 Witnesses Panel I Mr. William J. Bratton, Chief of Police, Los Angeles Police Department: Oral Statement................................................. 10 Prepared Statementq............................................ 12 Ms. Janice K. Fedarcyk, Special Agent in-Charge (SAC), Counterterrorism Division, FBI's Los Angeles Field Office: Oral Statement................................................. 15 Prepared Statement............................................. 17 Sgt. Larry Mead, Deputy Sheriff, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department: Oral Statement................................................. 21 Prepared Statement............................................. 23 Mr. John J. Neu, Chief of Police, Torrance Police Department: Oral Statement................................................. 6 Prepared statement............................................. 7 Panel II Mr. David Gersten, Director, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Programs, Department of Homeland Security: Oral Statement................................................. 46 Prepared Statement............................................. 48 Mr. Brian Jenkins, Senior Advisor, RAND Corporation: Oral Statement................................................. 39 Prepared Statement............................................. 41 Ms. Sireen Sawaf, Director, Southern California Government Relations, Muslim Public Affairs Council: Oral Statement................................................. 33 Prepared Statement............................................. 35 Appendix For the Record Prepared Statement: Mr. John M. Vanyur, Assistant Director, Correctional Programs Division, Federal Bureau of Prisons.......................... 63 RADICALIZATION, INFORMATION SHARING AND COMMUNITY OUTREACH: PROTECTING THE HOMELAND FROM HOMEGROWN TERROR ---------- Thursday, April 5, 2007 U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Committee on Homeland Security, Washington, DC. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9 a.m., in the Torrance City Council Chambers, 3031 Torrance Boulevard, Torrance, California, Hon. Jane Harman [Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives Harman, Dicks, Perlmutter, and Reichert. Also Present: Representative Lungren Ms. Harman. The Subcommittee will come to order. The Subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on Radicalization, Information Sharing and Community Outreach: Protecting the Homeland from Homegrown Terror. Twenty months ago, police in this city, Torrance, disrupted the first known prison-based terrorist cell in the United States. Those arrested were Americans and one permanent resident. The allegations against them, if true, present a chilling account of the threat we face from homegrown terrorism. Among other things, they are charged with having planned attacks on synagogues on Jewish holidays in order to maximize the number of deaths and on U.S. military bases and recruitment centers. To fund their terror campaign, the defendants allegedly robbed eleven gas stations in and around Torrance. That is where the Torrance Police Department came in. But for the hard work of some local officers whose efforts led to the discovery of maps and other evidence that unraveled the plot many, many lives could have been lost. Those Torrance Police Department officers worked with LAPD and FBI partners to share information and build a case in a way that would have been almost unimaginable before 9/11. All of us on this dais want to commend them for their great service to Torrance, to California, and to our country. Thank you on behalf of a grateful nation. We are holding this field hearing on radicalization to learn more about the homegrown terror threat to our nation. Let me be clear: when we talk about radicalization and homegrown terrorists, we are not talking about people from any particular ethnic, political, or religious group. On the contrary, we are talking about ideologically-driven violence, whether by a white, U.S. Bronze Star honoree named Timothy McVeigh; or in Belgium, a female Catholic convert to Islam who traveled to Iraq and blew herself up; or in the UK, third generation Britons of Pakistani descent who killed their countrymen on buses and trains and were plotting to blow up U.S. airliners en route from Britain to America. Last fall, Dame Eliza Manningham Buller, the Director of Britain's MI5, revealed for the first time the seriousness of the home grown terrorism threat in her country. She stated that MI5 and local police in the UK are currently investigating some 200 separate terrorist networks that include over 1,600 individuals who are actively planning attacks both domestically and overseas. And those are just the ones she knows about. When I met with her in my Washington office in February, I reminded her that what happened here in Torrance shows that the threat is also emerging on this side of the Atlantic. She agrees. But focusing our efforts against any particular group of people would be futile. The Washington Post recently reported that police in Western Europe are arresting``significant numbers of women, teenagers, white- skinned suspects and people baptized as Christians'' people who until now were not on the radar screen as radicals prone to violence. In fact, the demographics of those being arrested are so diverse that many European officials say that they have given up trying to predict who is most likely to become a terrorist. Age, sex, ethnicity, education and economic status simply have become more and more irrelevant. The same is true here. How do we explain why Adam Gadahn, a 17-year-old Jewish kid from Santa Ana became a radical, moved to Pakistan, now works as Osama Bin Laden's spokesman, and is under indictment here for treason? I am very pleased to be joined by the distinguished witnesses, and obviously my distinguished colleagues, on two panels this morning. On the first panel, we will hear from Torrance Police Chief John Neu, LAPD Chief Bill Bratton and Special Agent in-Charge Janice Fedarcyk from the FBI's Los Angeles office, and Sergeant Mead of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. They will be talking with us about the Torrance arrests, what homegrown terrorism is, and what we might do about it. We will then hear from a second panel including Sireen Sawaf from the Muslim Public Affairs Council who serves as a representative on the FBI's Multi-Cultural Advisory Committee called MCAC, and David Gersten from DHS. Both will share their own thoughts about home grown terrorism and how engagement with minority communities can help prevent it. And finally, an old friend, author, and consultant on terrorism, Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation, who will put our subjects in perspective. I am joined today by some very valued House colleagues. Let me start on my right by introducing the Ranking Member Dave Reichert of Washington State, a former sheriff. On my left Norm Dicks of Washington. On my right Dan Lungren of Northern California, formerly of Long Beach, California. On my left a new member of Congress, Ed Perlmutter of Colorado, I would also like to acknowledge in the audience Charles Allen, the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security who has come out here to join us yesterday at meetings at the JRIC, Joint Regional Intelligence Center, and today to be part of this hearing. As I mentioned, one of his DHS associates will be a witness on the second panel. Charlie, you obviously are a very valued partner in this effort to make certain that we understand radicalization and that we provide those first preventers with the tools and the information they need to find out what the plots are and stop them before they happen. Let me just say finally that this is a success story and it is a very important success story. We are telling that story where it happened, in Torrance, California. Now let me recognize the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, the gentleman from Washington, for an opening statement. Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair. It is a pleasure to be here in the Los Angeles area. It reminds me of some old days in the 1980's when I was a homicide detective, the lead investigator on a serial murder case, and I spent a long time in this area working and following leads, working with the various police departments here in the Los Angeles area and with the sheriff's office and with the FBI, all great partners. I think it really points to the success of that case the team work that came together and what we see here today and the different uniforms representing different law enforcement agencies and those of you in suits and ties also coming together in civilian clothes all here to protect our country and to keep our citizenry safe. Charlie Allen, thank you, too, for your efforts and leadership and understanding the necessity of sharing information with locals and working hard to bring that about. Again, thank you Madam Chair. I am really honored to be here. You and I both agree that radicalization is a very important topic and I want to commend you for holding this hearing. Given the recent pattern of homegrown terrorist that have been discovered in the UK, Canada, and the United States it is important that the Subcommittee spend some time understanding this issue and its implications for the security of our homeland. Identifying the patterns of radicalization, where they exist, and isolating the contributing factors can help us mitigate problems before they begin. The topic of this hearing today, Radicalization, Information Sharing, and Community Outreach: Protecting the Homeland from Homegrown Terror, builds upon the work of this Subcommittee from last Congress and will be part of the continuing record we are developing on this topic. Last July members of this Subcommittee traveled to Toronto, Canada to learn more about the so-called Toronto 17, a group of radicalized individuals in the Toronto area. The Subcommittee was concerned with radicalization of individuals traveling to the United States across our northern border and how to stop them. But when radicalization is happening within our own borders, it becomes increasingly difficult to detect. While the global fight against terrorism focuses our attention on Islamic radicalism, other forms of radicalization also endanger our homeland. We saw this in Oklahoma City in 1995. Radicalization can happen in many different ways and in many different places. Since the late 1970s, the Aryan Nations has been engaged in radicalizing and recruiting in prisons. Others including al- Qa'ida sympathizers are doing the same. Prisons can quickly become fertile recruiting ground for those who wish to radicalize susceptible inmates. We have seen this occur right here in California and it will be discussed today. I would like to yield the balance of my time, Madam Chair, to the gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren, whose district includes New Folsom State Prison where a recent case of radicalization and alleged terrorist plotting occurred. Ms. Harman. Without objection. Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentleman for yielding and I very much thank the Chairwoman for having this hearing and for the work that she is doing in this area and the bipartisan way in which she is approaching this. I used to represent this area some 20 years ago and I represent an area 450 miles away and it is always great to be able to come down here but it saddens me that I come down here as we look at a problem that had its genesis in my district at Folsom State Prison and yet was carried out down here. The idea of homegrown terrorists is something that ought not to surprise us but ought to make us ready to take action and ensure that we do all this is necessary. One of the things that is crucial to this is the cooperation of all elements of law enforcement, local, state, and Federal. I look forward to hearing the case study to the extent that we can talk about it since the case is still going on of cooperation among all of these elements of law enforcement. When I was Attorney General one of the concerns I had was making sure that information flowed both from the feds down to us as well as from us to the feds. It will be interesting to see in this particular instance how well that worked. But I would also like to just say this. It is the great work done by police officers doing their regular work that really gives us the key to solving these problems. If we didn't have a very, very good police officer from Torrance understand the importance of this, if we didn't have some people in the state prison system understand this, if we didn't have the cooperation with LAPD and the other law enforcement agencies, we never would be where we are with the case that is uppermost in many minds. I thank the gentlelady for having this hearing. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I just want to thank all law enforcement for the work they are doing. Ms. Harman. Thank you. This Subcommittee rules provide that other members under our rules can submit opening statements for the record. It is now my pleasure to welcome our first panel and I will introduce all of you briefly and then each of you will be recognized for five minutes or less. Your complete statement will be accepted in the record so please summarize. That will give us all a chance to ask you questions which I think will make this hearing a more interesting event. I know you are aware of this request. Let me say that I had hoped to recognize the individual Torrance police officers who were so capable and were able to first understand this terror plot, but I am told they are operating under cover so the best I can do is recognize the big boss who actually had a role in this and that is Chief John Neu who himself has had a distinguished career at the Torrance PD for almost 22 years. Prior to his appointment as police chief he served in a variety of capacities including Special Operations and Patrol Bureau Commander. Among his numerous accomplishments was his establishment of the supervisory development course that is used for training new supervisors at the Torrance Police Department. Chief Neu has been cited by the U.S. Department of Justice Organized Crime Bureau, the FBI, and the U.S. Attorney's Office for his effective police work and exemplary leadership skills. Our second witness, Bill Bratton, has been on the cover of Time magazine and has had a very quiet career so far. How many cops with a strong boss in action who have been head of the NYPD have come on over to LA where now he is just unanimously supported for a second five-year term. It sounds like a movie plot but it is actually happening in our midst. He is the only person ever to have served as chief executive of these two huge police departments. Throughout Bill Bratton's 37 years in law enforcement he has been a strong advocate of community policing and has worked extremely hard in LA to strengthen local commands, increase responsiveness to community concerns, develop strategies to counter gang-related crimes and the threat of terrorism. Under Chief Bratton's leadership the LAPD has developed one of the most comprehensive and effective counterterrorism operations in the country if not the world. Our third witness, Janice Fedarcyk, is the newly appointed Special Agent in-Chart of the Counterterrorism Division at the FBI's Los Angeles Field Office. A 19-year FBI veteran, Ms. Fedarcyk previously served as the FBI's representative to the National Counterterrorism Center's Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning where she led the development of a classified national strategic operational plan in the war on terror. She has also served as an inspector at FBI headquarters where she led inspection teams in assessments of FBI offices and entities. Among other things Ms. Fedarcyk will be speaking to us today about the FBI's Multi-Cultural Advisory Committee, MCAC, we will then hear from someone involved in MCAC, which is designed to share information, ideas, and concerns between the FBI's Los Angeles Field Office and Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and Coptic communities. Our forth witness, who I will not overlook, is Sergeant Larry Mead who has 24 years of experience with the LA County Sheriff's Department. Sergeant Mead serves as the jail investigations gang intelligent sergeant where he has worked to improve the dissemination of declassified information to line deputies thereby increasing their awareness of ongoing gang trends and communications with the LAPD, FBI, ICE, and the California Department of Corrections among other local, state, and Federal agencies regarding the street gang subculture and present radicalization. As I said, without objection, the witness' full statements will be inserted in the record and we will enthusiastically receive very concise summaries of your testimony beginning with Chief Neu. STATEMENT JOHN J. NEU, CHIEF OF POLICE, TORRANCE POLICE DEPARTMENT Mr. Neu. Chairwoman Harman, Honorable Committee Members, good morning. I want to thank you for holding this hearing this morning. Needless to say, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the role and responsibility of local law enforcement as first responders to terrorist activity have changed. Our mission demands that we make every effort possible to detect and prevent terrorist activity right here in our own communities. The new paradigm for local law enforcement is prevention, but the awareness, knowledge, skills and abilities of these officers must be enhanced in order to effectively thwart terrorist plots before they manifest as attacks. The most significant trend that has been identified over the past several years is the rise of the homegrown threat, which has been publicized extensively in the media. The possibility of a homegrown terrorist attack against Los Angeles, New York, Chicago or any other American city is real and is worsening with time as the radicalization process unfolds. The fuel that ignites this inside threat is a significant challenge for law enforcement agencies across the United States. In July of 2005, officers from my department arrested two suspects for robbing a local gas station. As the investigation continued to unfold, the officers came face-to-face with a direct act of domestic terrorism. An Islamic extremist group based here in California and known as``Assembly of Authentic Islam'' (JIS) was uncovered. This group, operating primarily in state prisons without apparent connections or direction from outside the United States, committed several armed robberies throughout Southern California, including the one in Torrance. The robberies were committed with the goal of financing attacks against the enemies of Islam, including the United States government and supporters of Israel. The chilling evidence that was recovered during the investigation showed us the capabilities of this terror group. The JIS case is a prime example of the powerful radical influence which poses a serious threat from within. Our greatest weapon against terrorism is unity. That unity is built upon information sharing and coordination of law enforcement at every level and the intelligence communities. The JIS case involved approximately 500 law enforcement officers from the Federal, state and local levels. It has been described by some in our community as a model case of information sharing and investigation. The Los Angeles Police Department provided over 100 officers to this investigation alone. Local law enforcement is, in fact, uniquely positioned to identify terrorist activity right here in our own communities. As displayed in the JIS case, local law enforcement's relationship with Federal law enforcement has improved immensely. A major portion of this success is directly related to the training of our line level officers in regards to domestic terrorism. A specific focus on threat identification training paid dividends across the board during the JIS investigation. The vertical sharing of intelligence information, coupled with communication and coordination throughout the investigation, proved to be invaluable to all of the agencies involved. Local law enforcement plays a critical role in the identification and disruption of radicalized Islamic groups. Our personnel are on the streets of our community everyday interacting, observing, and maintaining the public safety. Our Community Based Policing model, Focus Based Policing, has proven to be successful mainly because of our steadfast relationships with the people we protect. Since the attacks of 9/11 local law enforcement has utilized these policing models to address our homeland security needs and specifically the radicalized Islamic extremist threat. Our professional relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been well established for over twenty years. Our investigators from the Crimes Persons, Narcotics, and Crime Impact Sections of our organization work hand in hand with FBI personnel on very successful regional investigations. Our organizations have synergized and we have gained from each others strengths. We consistently enjoy a seamless commingling of resources, training, and expertise with our FBI partners. Our participation in the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force was a natural progression of our professional relationship. We, as an organization, recognize the regional challenge to security and we meet the challenge without hesitation. The success of the JTTF initiative weighs heavily on local law enforcement participation. We understand our role and are prepared to endure the challenge. We recognize the value of the ``Task Force'' approach to investigations, and our National Security is paramount in our thoughts during this trying time in our history. In closing, the Torrance Police Department has experienced homegrown terrorism firsthand. Our Federal, state, and local partners were invaluable in uncovering and dismantling a very real threat to our region. I would like to thank the committee for allowing me to participate in this hearing. Thank you. [The statement of Mr. Neu follows:] Prepared Statement of John J. Neu Needless to say, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the role and responsibility of local law enforcement as first responders to terrorist activity have changed. Our mission demands that we make every effort possible to detect and prevent terrorist activity right here in our own communities. The new paradigm for local law enforcement is prevention, but the awareness, knowledge, skills and abilities of these officers must be enhanced in order to effectively thwart terrorist plots before they manifest as attacks. The most significant trend that has been identified over the past several years is the rise of the ``homegrown'' threat, which has been publicized extensively in the media. The possibility of a ``homegrown'' terrorist attack against Los Angeles, New York, Chicago or any other American city is real and is worsening with time as the radicalization process unfolds. The fuel that ignites this inside threat is a significant challenge for law enforcement agencies across the United States. In July of 2005, officers from my department arrested two suspects for robbing a local gas station. As the investigation continued to unfold, the officers came face-to-face with a direct act of domestic terrorism. An Islamic extremist group based here in California and known as ``Assembly of Authentic Islam'' (JIS) was uncovered. This group, operating primarily in state prisons without apparent connections or direction from outside the United States, committed several armed robberies throughout Southern California, including the one in Torrance. The robberies were committed with the goal of financing attacks against the enemies of Islam, including the United States government and supporters of Israel. The investigation brought charges against Kevin James, Lavar Washington, Gregory Patterson, and Hammad Samana. The indictment alleges that James, while in prison in Sacramento, recruited fellow prison inmates to join JIS and preached the duty of members was to target for violent attack any enemies of Islam, or ``infidels,'' including the United States government and Jewish and non-Jewish supporters of Israel. James allegedly distributed a document in prison that justified the killing of ``infidels,'' and made members take an oath not to talk about the existence of JIS. He also allegedly sought to establish groups or ``cells'' of JIS members outside of prison to carry out violent attacks against ``perceived infidels,'' including the United States government, the government of Israel and Jewish people. Washington, also an inmate at the Sacramento prison, joined JIS in November 2004 and was paroled at the end of the month. In December 2004, James allegedly instructed Washington to recruit five people to train in covert operations, acquire firearms with silencers, and find contacts with explosives expertise or learn to make bombs that could be activated from a distance. The indictment alleges that beginning in December 2004, Washington, Patterson and Samana targeted and conducted Internet research on and surveillance of United States military facilities, which included recruitment centers and military bases in the Los Angeles area, as part of their plot to kill United States military personnel. In July 2005, Patterson and Samana allegedly used computers to research military targets in the Los Angeles area, while Samana drafted a document listing Israeli and United States targets in Los Angeles. In addition to the United States military targets, the coconspirators specifically targeted Israeli and Jewish facilities in the Los Angeles area, including the Israeli Consulate, El Al (the national airline of Israel) and synagogues. They also allegedly engaged in firearms and physical training in preparation for attacks. According to the indictment, the defendants purchased weapons or otherwise tried to acquire weapons in furtherance of their terrorist conspiracy, and made efforts to raise money by robbing gas stations. The indictment alleges that eleven times beginning May 30, 2005, the defendants, armed with shotguns, robbed or attempted to rob gas stations in several cities and towns in Southern California, including Los Angeles, Torrance, Playa del Ray, Bellflower, Pico Rivera, Walnut, Orange, Playa Vista and Fullerton. The indictment alleges that during the gas station robbery spree, Patterson updated James on the progress of the planned war of terrorism against the United States government. The JIS case is a prime example of the powerful radical influence which poses a serious threat from within. Our greatest weapon against terrorism is unity. That unity is built upon information sharing and coordination of law enforcement at every level and the intelligence communities. The JIS case involved approximately 500 law enforcement officers from the federal, state and local levels. It has been described by some in our community as a model case of information sharing and investigation. The Los Angeles Police Department provided over 100 officers to this investigation alone. The criminal investigation into the alleged terrorist conspiracy was lead by the FBI's Long Beach Joint Terrorism Task Force, whose participating agencies include the Los Angeles Police Department; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; the Torrance Police Department; the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department; the Long Beach Police Department; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; the Los Angeles Port Police; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; the U.S. Coast Guard Investigative Service; the Defense Criminal Investigative Service; and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The JIS case is a prime example of how far local law enforcement has come in our collaborative efforts in fighting domestic terrorism that involved radical homegrown terrorists. Local law enforcement is, in fact, uniquely positioned to identify terrorist activity right here in our own communities. As displayed in the JIS case, local law enforcement's relationship with federal law enforcement has improved immensely. A major portion of this success is directly related to the training of our line level officers in regards to domestic terrorism. A specific focus on threat identification training paid dividends across the board during the JIS investigation. The vertical sharing of intelligence information, coupled with communication and coordination throughout the investigation, proved to be invaluable to all of the agencies involved. Information Needs of Local Law Enforcement Relating to Islamic Radicalization Local law enforcement plays a critical role in the identification and disruption of radicalized Islamic groups. Our personnel are on the streets of our community everyday interacting, observing, and maintaining the public safety. Our Community Based Policing model, Focus Based Policing, has proven to be successful mainly because of our steadfast relationships with the people we protect. Since the attacks of nine-eleven, local law enforcement has utilized these policing models to address our homeland security needs and specifically the radicalized Islamic extremist threat. We do, however, require better awareness in some critical areas such as:
Understanding the threat of terrorism to our community and infrastructure Homegrown terror (JIS) Cultural awareness of the Muslim community we serve and equal knowledge of the very small percentage of Muslims that would be vulnerable to the radical ideologies What factors lead to radicalized beliefs and what are the trip wires or clues in the community that local law enforcement would encounter? Where could recruitment and radicalization occur in our community? Identification of material support efforts for terror and criminal organizations Gaining a better understanding of combating Fourth Generation Warfare Terrorism is a tactic of Fourth Generation Warfare Our partners in the FBI and the region are facilitating the training and awareness through unprecedented lateral networking. Our Well Established Relationship with the FBI Our professional relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been well established for over twenty years. Our investigators from the Crimes Persons, Narcotics, and Crime Impact Sections of our organization work hand in hand with FBI personnel on very successful regional investigations. Our organizations have synergized and we have gained from each others strengths. We consistently enjoy a seamless commingling of resources, training, and expertise with our FBI partners. Our participation in the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force was a natural progression of our professional relationship. We, as an organization, recognize the regional challenge to security and we meet the challenge without hesitation. Our investigators are contributors and team players within the task force initiative. The success of the JTTF initiative weighs heavily on local law enforcement participation. We understand our role and are prepared to endure the challenge. We recognize the value of the ``Task Force'' approach to investigations, and our National Security is paramount in our thoughts during this trying time in our history. Our FBI partners, the Los Angeles Police Department, the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, and other law enforcement agencies have embraced this spirit of cooperation. We truly witnessed this selfless commitment during the JIS investigation. This investigation tasked over 500 personnel and the Los Angeles Police Department alone contributed over 100 officers. This ability to force multiply was critical to the rapid dismantling of this dangerous threat and we are very appreciative to ``our big brothers'' in the region. With the creation of the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center (LA JRIC), the ``fusion'' of information sharing has really evolved. The centralized facility has truly encouraged both vertical and, more importantly, lateral information sharing. The initiative has spurred the growth of other Terror Early Warning Groups (TEW) and Terror Liaison Officer working groups within the region. These groups apply proven networking techniques; mentor one another, track crime trends, and train on terror related topics. The LA JRIC also provides terror reporting fusion procedures, predictive analysis relating to crime and terrorism, investigative support and training. All are critical components to enhancing line level officers' awareness. Our Community Outreach Efforts To address our community's safety, we have followed our successful Focus Based Policing model to reach out to the public and business sectors. We have modified the ``focus'' to include trip wires for terror related activities. We have identified areas within our jurisdiction such as the Del Amo Fashion Center, our many public and private schools, petrochemical facilities, Exxon Mobil Refinery, and secured our relationships and resources to maximize security efforts. This, too, has been a collaborated effort involving DHS, FBI, and local law enforcement. We are constantly reinforcing our methods and training to equal the threat and maintain the safety our community. Focus Based Policing for Counterterrorism Building ties and relationships with the community Understanding socio-cultural, political, and religious issues Understanding terrorist indicators and behaviors Empowering the community Engage the Community Town hall meeting and outreach programs School awareness programs and counter terror trained School Resource Officers Business contacts and critical infrastructure monitoring Deployment of Terror Liaison Officers In closing, the Torrance Police Department has experienced ``homegrown'' terrorism firsthand. Our federal, state, and local partners were invaluable in uncovering and dismantling a very real threat to our region from JIS. Our success in this case was due to a professional, established, aggressive approach to investigating criminal activity, and the established partnership with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. I would like to thank the committee for allowing me to participate in this hearing. Thank you Ms. Harman. Thank you, Chief, and thank you for respecting the time limits. Chief Bratton, you are now recognized for up to five minutes. STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. BRATTON, CHIEF OF POLICE, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT Mr. Bratton. Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert and members of the Committee, thank you for holding this hearing on the pressing issue of Radicalization. The Los Angeles Police Department and the City of Los Angeles have forged successful relationships with our local, state, and Federal partners to begin examining and responding to the growing threat posed by radicalization. However, we need continued support for our efforts across a number of areas of concern. Today, I will address three issues of interest to this committee: First, the growing threat of Muslim radicalization in the United States. Second, the connection between prison radicalization and the potential of homegrown Islamist terrorism. Third, the role that a congressionally-funded National Counter Terrorism Academy serving state and local law enforcement would have in countering the these threats. As you are aware, beginning in May of 2005, four radical Muslim suspects, armed with shotguns, went on a significant crime spree that by itself would have been noteworthy. Eleven times they robbed or attempted to rob gas stations in the cities. In investigating the crimes, the experienced detectives of the Torrance Police Department focused on the basics of any investigation: evidence, witnesses, and modus operandi. A lucky break occurred when a cell phone belonging to one of the suspects was recovered. When a search was conducted of the suspect's apartment the detective also observed disturbing evidence. This evidence included body armor, knives, and other evidence of the crime. However, when the detective noticed jihad-related literature and the addresses of potential ``targets'' the detective fell back on his previous training as a Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO), and yesterday you heard about TLOs, and recognized this as a pre-incident indicator to a terrorist attack. As a TLO, this detective had received minimal formalized terrorism training in comparison to the routine training received by bona fide counter-terrorism professionals. Yet this training was sufficient enough to arm the Torrance detective with usable information. To most detectives this``disturbing evidence'' would have appeared as inconsequential to the robbery charge. Some of it, political or philosophical in nature, would have appeared as mere ramblings during a routine search. Directions, maps, and other non-overtly criminal articles would usually be brushed aside as miscellaneous. To the trained observer, however, the evidence clearly pointed to only one possibility, homegrown terrorism. It was at the Los Angeles Joint Terrorism Task Force(JTTF), which you are familiar with, where LAPD task force officers, tenured detectives, and FBI special agents worked together diligently and tirelessly with the Torrance detectives' information. As a result of this extraordinary teamwork, not only were the suspects apprehended but a larger and greater conspiracy was uncovered. Further investigation revealed that this group was aligned with a California prison group known as Jamiyyat Ul Islam Is Saheeh (JIS), which translates to ``Assembly of Authentic Islam.'' JIS practiced a radical form of Islam that was neither authentic nor peaceful. An inmate, Kevin Lamar James, founded this radical group in 1997 at California's notorious Folsom Prison. James, a Los Angeles-based gang member serving time for robbery, directed his followers ``to target for violent attack any enemies of Islam or `infidels,' including the United States government and Jewish and non-Jewish supporters of Israel.'' Hiding behind the guise of religious freedom, James' JIS used assumed protections such as the freedom of religion to advance its beliefs and pressure new recruits and converts into a hate-based cult. It affiliated itself with al-Qa'ida's philosophies and targeting array. James has much in common with many other radicals that have been identified in the United States. All were street thugs radicalized while behind bars. All were first encountered by local law enforcement before they were radicalized. And all plotted to kill Americans. The tentacles of JIS reached beyond the prison's walls. A released member was able to recruit two otherwise law-abiding residents into a terrorist cell. He convinced them to rob and eventually commit terrorist acts for JIS. He also indoctrinated them into the radical philosophy of hate. The successful approach taken by all participating agencies involved in the Torrance case is no accident. Rather, it was the result of the dedication, training, and expertise of the officers involved. More, however, can be done to locate and stop other attacks. We need to educate all of local law enforcement about counter-terrorism techniques and investigations. In this respect, as a region, as a state, and as a nation, in the Torrance Case we dodged a bullet. Whether the motivation is religious fundamentalism, anti-government sentiment, or the disaffected loner, radicalized groups or individuals are increasingly perpetrating terrorism. A substantial attack upon U.S. soil is increasingly likely. The answer rests with prevention. The nation's 12,000 FBI Special Agents clearly cannot do it alone with their new mission of dealing with terrorism. However, over 700,000 local law enforcement officers in the U.S. are already on the front lines, fighting crime and gathering critical information on a daily basis. Providing these 700,000 front-line officers standardized counterterrorism training will transform these first responders into a coordinated collection and prevention asset. Such an approach can be a true force multiplier. We must cultivate a working relationship with all religious groups in our region, and gain their trust. The colleague from the FBI will speak to that. It is essential that this, in fact, be done. Here in Los Angeles we have initiated a partnership with the Center for Policing terrorism (CPT), which is part of the Manhattan Institute, a think tank in New York City. My working relationship with the Institute goes back to my days as the Commissioner of New York City Police Department. CPT leverages world-class experts to help the LAPD and other departments tackle our most pressing counterterrorism challenges smarter, faster, and cheaper. As a result, it is the recommendation of the CPT that the LAPD partner with an existing school of higher education and our Federal partners to create a National Counter Terrorism Academy (NCTA) in Los Angeles. The purpose of the NCTA would be to lead the way in ushering in a new era of policing strategy: Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP). Recognized as a national way forward, ILP is an all-crimes approach to enforcement that will revolutionize law enforcement. ILP richly integrates existing strategies and technologies into a coherent ``game-plan'' approach in allocating resources efficiently. Currently, without a national strategy, or a place where police executives can learn how to implement ILP, it is sitting on the shelf unused. We must set national standards. We must provide training at all levels. It is essential. The Torrance case reinforces that. Public-private partnerships such as that exemplified by the LAPD and the Manhattan Institute build tangible results. Public-private partnerships and partnerships among various agencies at all levels of government are essential. Madam Chairwoman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to speak today on this important subject. I am happy to answer any questions you may have. [The statement of Mr. Bratton follows:] Prepared Statement of William J. Bratton Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert and members of the committee, thank you for holding this hearing on the pressing issue of Radicalization. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the City of Los Angeles have forged successful relationships with our local, state, and federal partners to begin examining and responding to the growing threat posed by radicalization. However, we need continued support for our efforts across a number of areas of concern. Today, I will address three issues of interest to this committee: First, the growing threat of Muslim radicalization in the United States, specifically here in the Los Angeles area, and the challenges posed to local, state, and federal authorities. Second, the connection between prison radicalization and the potential of homegrown Islamist terrorism. Third, the role that a congressionally-funded National Counter Terrorism Academy (NCTA) serving state and local law enforcement would have in countering the these threats. Beginning in May of 2005, four radical Muslim suspects--armed with shotguns)--went on a significant crime spree that by itself would have been noteworthy. Eleven times they robbed or attempted to rob gas stations in the cities of Los Angeles, Torrance, Playa Del Rey, Bellflower, Pico Rivera, Walnut, Orange, Playa Vista, and Fullerton. In investigating the crimes, the experienced detectives of the Torrance Police Department focused on the basics of any investigation: evidence, witnesses, and modus operandi. A lucky break occurred when a cell phone belonging to one of the suspects was recovered. When a search was conducted of the suspect's apartment the detective also observed disturbing evidence. This evidence included body armor, knives, and other evidence of the crime. However, when the detective noticed jihad-related literature and the addresses of potential ``targets'' the detective fell back on his previous training as a Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) and recognized this as a pre-incident indicator to a terrorist attack. As a TLO, this detective had received minimal formalized terrorism training--in comparison to the routine training received by bona fide counter- terrorism professionals. Yet this training was sufficient enough to arm the Torrance detective with usable information. To most detectives this ``disturbing evidence'' would have appeared as inconsequential to the robbery charge. Some of it, political or philosophical in nature, would have appeared as mere ramblings during a routine search. Directions, maps, and other non-overtly criminal articles would usually be brushed aside as miscellaneous. To the trained observer, however, the evidence clearly pointed to only one possibility--homegrown terrorism. It was at the Los Angeles Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) where LAPD task force officers--tenured detectives--and FBI special agents worked together diligently and tirelessly. As a result of this extraordinary teamwork, not only were the suspects apprehended but a larger and greater conspiracy was uncovered. Experienced local detectives and federal agents conducted textbook interrogations of the suspects revealing a surprising fact. The cell of robbers and alleged terrorists were further along in their conspiracy than anyone knew or expected. These homegrown terrorists had already conducted surveillance of military recruitment stations, the Israeli consulate, El-Al airlines, and prominent synagogues. According to the federal indictment against the JIS members, they had selected attack periods ``to maximize the number of casualties.'' Further investigation revealed that this group was aligned with a California prison group known as Jamiyyat Ul Islam Is Saheeh (JIS), which translates to ``Assembly of Authentic Islam.'' JIS practiced a radical form of Islam that was neither authentic nor peaceful. An inmate, Kevin Lamar James, founded this radical group in 1997 at California's notorious Folsom Prison. James, a Los Angeles-based gang member serving time for robbery, directed his followers ``to target for violent attack any enemies of Islam or `infidels,' including the United States government and Jewish and non-Jewish supporters of Israel.'' \1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Kevin Lamar James --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hiding behind the guise of religious freedom, James' JIS used assumed protections such as the freedom of religion to advance its beliefs and pressure new recruits and converts into a hate-based cult. It affiliated itself with al-Qa'ida's philosophies and targeting array (``The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies--civilians and military--is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.'' \2\). James has much in common with Ahmed Ressam, Richard Reid, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, and Jose Padilla. All were street thugs radicalized while behind bars. All were first encountered by local law enforcement before they were radicalized. And all plotted to kill Americans. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, World Islamic Front Statement, 23 February 1998 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The tentacles of JIS reached beyond the prison's walls. A released member was able to recruit two otherwise law-abiding residents into a terrorist cell. He convinced them to rob and eventually commit terrorist acts for JIS. He also indoctrinated them into the radical philosophy of hate. In this case, ``Islamist'' radicals were taken into custody, preventing terrorism at home. It was demonstrated that formal education in the subject matter of terrorist tradecraft, together with modern intelligence-led policing strategies and proven investigative techniques, could be used successfully to counter and prevent terrorism. The successful approach taken by all participating agencies involved in the Torrance case is no accident. Rather, it was the result of the dedication, training, and expertise of the officers involved. More, however, can be done to locate and stop other attacks. We need to educate all of local law enforcement about counter-terrorism techniques and investigations. In this respect, as a region, as a state, and as a nation, in the Torrance Case we dodged a bullet. Whether the motivation is religious fundamentalism, anti-government sentiment, or the disaffected loner, radicalized groups or individuals are increasingly perpetrating terrorism. A substantial attack upon U.S. soil is increasingly likely. The answer rests with prevention. The nation's 12,000 FBI Special Agents are indeed some of the best investigators in the world, and the training they receive sets the benchmark for law enforcement. Despite their talents and abilities, the workload of most special agents is overwhelming and their enforcement scope is limited. However, over 700,000 local law enforcement officers in the U.S. are already on the front lines, fighting crime and gathering critical information on a daily basis. Providing these 700,000 front-line officers standardized counter- terrorism training will transform these first responders into a coordinated collection and prevention asset. Such an approach can be a true force multiplier. The only way to prevent radicalization is to end the conditions that foster it. When efforts at prevention are unsuccessful or impractical, a fully trained and seamlessly integrated public safety force is required to recognize pre-incident indicators and develop interdiction, disruption, or arrest strategies. Furthermore, we must cultivate a working relationship with all religious groups in our region, and gain their trust. It is these congregations that will provide the needed intelligence of disaffected membership. However, a suspicious and frightened religious community will react to knee-jerk outreach efforts as dubious or disingenuous. We have initiated a partnership with the Center for Policing Terrorism (CPT), which is part of the Manhattan Institute, a think tank in New York City. My working relationship with the Institute dates back to my days as the Commissioner of New York Police Department, where the Institute provided some of the intellectual force behind our crime reduction strategies and assisted in their dissemination. Similarly, the CPT leverages world-class intellectuals to help the LAPD and other departments tackle our most pressing counter-terrorism challenges smarter, faster, and cheaper. As a result, it is the recommendation of the CPT that the LAPD partner with an existing school of higher education and our federal partners to create a National Counter Terrorism Academy (NCTA) in Los Angeles. The purpose of the NCTA would be to lead the way in ushering in a new era of policing strategy: Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP). Recognized as a national way forward, ILP is an all-crimes approach to enforcement that will revolutionize law enforcement. ILP richly integrates existing strategies and technologies into a coherent ``game- plan'' approach in allocating resources efficiently. Currently, without a national strategy, or a place where police executives can learn how to implement ILP, it is sitting on the shelf unused. Setting national standards for training in the field of counter- terrorism would be the first step in pursuing a coordinated approach to intelligence gathering and analysis. Currently, unlike intelligence training, information technology systems and first responder training courses must be certified and approved as interoperable. As proposed by the LEAP Strategy report,\3\ such an effort would be needed to train police officers at every level in a unified, scientific, and constitutionally-responsible manner. The NCTA would both seek out current and professional programs and curriculum and develop its own where gaps exist. By establishing a professional academic approach, the NCTA would be a first of its kind to forward ILP strategies for local police agencies and their partners who are going to be essential in transitioning national and international homeland security efforts into homeland security initiatives. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ Law Enforcement Assistance and Partnership Strategy - Improving Information Sharing Between the Intelligence Community and State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Public-private partnerships such as that exemplified by the Los Angeles Police Department and the Manhattan Institute build tangible results. For example, we have sought the advice of CPT and other private and public partners in developing our fundamental approach to building good community relations with faith-based groups in our City. I am proud to report that LAPD works extraordinarily hard at developing strong ties with the people of Los Angeles. In building effective relationships with those groups that the current terrorist operative is likely to exploit, we are learning that it is best to concentrate on shared goals such as public safety and quality of life issues. With the trust and mutual respect between police and citizen that such collaboration fosters, we are erecting the strongest of defenses against terrorism. As with any new educational effort the basics are needed--a brick and mortar facility, and educational infrastructure, computers, networks, and other information technology. A core curriculum aimed at every level of law enforcement, one that is tailored to the students' needs, must be developed and quickly implemented. Madam Chairwoman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to speak today on this important subject. I am happy to answer any questions you may have. Ms. Harman. Thank you, Chief. Ms. Fedarcyk. STATEMENT OF JANICE K. FEDARCYK, SPECIAL AGENT IN-CHARGE (SAC) COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION, FBI'S LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE Ms. Fedarcyk. Chairman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank you for this opportunity to speak to you on the topic of Islamic radicalization in the U.S., and the FBI's efforts to address this emerging threat with our other Federal, state, and local partners. FBI does not investigate members of any religion for their religious beliefs, but rather focuses on investigating activities that may harm the United States. Although the most dangerous instances of radicalization have so far been overseas, the Islamic radicalization of U.S. persons, whether foreign-born or native, is of increasing concern. Key to the success of stopping the spread of radicalization is identifying patterns and trends in the early stages. The FBI characterizes homegrown Islamic extremists as U.S. persons who may appear to be assimilated, but reject the cultural values, beliefs, and environment of the United States. They identify themselves as Muslim on some level and on some level become radicalized in the United States. They could provide support for or directly commit a terrorist act inside the United States. The FBI has identified certain venues, such as prisons and the internet, that present opportunities for the proselytizing of radical Islam. The European and American experience shows that prisons are venues where extremists can be radicalized and recruited among the inmate population. Prison radicalization primarily occurs through anti-U.S. sermons provided by contract, volunteer, or staff imams, radicalized inmates who gain religious influence, and extremist media. Most cases of prison radicalization appear to be carried out by domestic Islamic extremist groups with few or no direct foreign connections, like the Sunni Islamic extremist group in California that you have just heard about, the JIS. Although the Committee is familiar with this case, it is theFBI's responsibility to ensure the defendants in this case receive a fair and impartial trial so I will limit my comments relative to that concern. I would like to emphasize, however, that not all prison radicalization is Islamic in nature. Domestic groups such as white supremacists also recruit in prisons. In response to this possible threat, the FBI and the Bureau of Prisons have been actively engaged in efforts to detect, deter, and interdict efforts by terrorist and extremist groups to radicalize or recruit in U.S. prisons. This effort has been underway since February 2003. As a result of the JIS case, the FBI organized a Prison Radicalization Working Group which is comprised of more than 15 Federal, state, and local agencies, and over 30 task force officers. As part of these efforts, we have identified ``best practices'' for correctional institutions to combat the spread of radicalization. In addition to our investigative efforts, the FBI realizes that community involvement is critical to the success of our mission in combating radicalization within our homeland. In September 2003, the Los Angeles Field Office did initiate the formation of the Muslim, Arab, Armenian, Sikh, and Coptic Ombudsman Program, which actually has evolved into the Multi-Cultural Advisory Committee. This committee allows information, ideas, and concerns to be shared between the FBI and said communities. The inaugural meeting of the Committee was hosted by the Los Angeles Field Office on May 27, 2004. Since that date, the Committee has met on the third Monday of each month to address issues and concerns ranging from the FBI's Counter Terrorism and Counter Intelligence missions, the Patriot Act, and interviews of individuals within these communities, as well as guest presentations by other agencies. As a result the Los Angeles Field Office has also participated in a number of town hall meetings and community functions at which an FBI presence is requested among their communities. In the spirit of partnership and sharing information, Committee members have hosted a number of events for FBI personnel to broaden their cultural and religious understanding of the various aspects of the Arab, Armenian, Muslim, Sikh, and Coptic communities in the greater Los Angeles area. With respect to our collaborations that have been forged among law enforcement and other public safety sectors, the FBI and its law enforcement partners have been working together for a number of years to address terrorism related matters. In 1984, in order to coordinate counterterrorism threats and responses associated with the Summer Olympics the FBI initiated a working group which led to the formation of the Los Angeles Joint Terrorism Task Force. The combined resources of the various formalized and ad-hoc JTTF groups in the greater Los Angeles territory includes more than 260 full-time task force investigators, consisting of approximately 150 FBI Special Agents, and 110 other Federal, state, and local task force agents/officers. Among the fundamental post-September 11th changes, sharing intelligence is now the paramount objective. Among a number of other programs and initiatives one that we are most proud of and excited is the Joint Regional Intelligence Center which you had the opportunity to visit yesterday in which Federal, state, and local resources are commingled in order to produce an integrated multi-agency intelligence processing center. We believe the LA JRIC is a ground-breaking cooperative which fully integrates intelligence intake, vetting, analysis/ fusion, and synthesis from a multitude of law enforcement and public safety agencies. JRIC's services are available to all law enforcement agencies throughout our seven county region and that it allow for a smoother flow of leads and intelligence to prevent duplication, fragmentation, and circular reporting. Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and members of the Subcommittee, there has been a lot of discussion and speculation about the effectiveness of the FBI and its partners to combat terrorism, and the manner in which information is processed and shared. The FBI has made significant improvements in the past six years to ensure we are pooling our Federal, state, and local resources accordingly, and working as one team to address potential threats to our homeland. In my 25 plus years working as a law enforcement officer, I have never experienced the level of collegial partnerships between law enforcement and public safety agencies as I have here in Los Angeles. We fully appreciate and understand the tasking that the American people expect of us, and we are standing shoulder to shoulder with our partners to accomplish this mission. Thank you. [The statement of Ms. Fedarcyk follows:] Prepared Statement of Janice Fedarcyk Chairman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank you for this opportunity to speak to you on the topic of Islamic radicalization in the United States, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) efforts to address this emerging threat with our other federal, state, and local partners. I would like to emphasize before I begin that the issue is not Islam itself, but how the religious ideology is used by violent extremists to inspire and justify their actions. The FBI does not investigate members of any religion for their religious beliefs, but rather focuses on investigating activities that may harm the United States. Successes in the war on terrorism and the arrests of many key al- Qa'ida leaders have diminished the ability of the group to attack the United States (US) Homeland. At the same time, a broader Sunni extremist movement has evolved from being run entirely by al-Qa'ida central, to a broader movement. This is demonstrated by the 2004 Madrid bombings, the July 2005 London bombings, and recent disruptions in the US, United Kingdom, Canada, Bosnia, Denmark and elsewhere. That said, al-Qa'ida's core remains committed to attacking the United States and continues to demonstrate its ability to adapt its tactics to circumvent security measures and reconstitute its ranks. Al- Qa'ida is also attempting to broaden its appeal to English-speaking Western Muslims by disseminating violent Islamic extremist propaganda via media outlets and the Internet. Although the most dangerous instances of radicalization have so far been overseas, the Islamic radicalization of US persons, whether foreign-born or native, is of increasing concern. Key to the success of stopping the spread of radicalization is identifying patterns and trends in the early stages. The FBI characterizes homegrown Islamic extremists as US persons who may appear to be assimilated, but, to some degree, have become radicalized in their support for Islamic jihad. They often see themselves as devout Muslims and reject the cultural values, beliefs, and environment of the United States. Let me make it clear that the FBI is not interested in these people because they have rejected American culture and adopted a strict, devout view of Islam. We are interested in them when and where there are reasonable indications that they may provide support for, or directly commit, a terrorist attack inside the United States because of their radicalized view of Islam. The threat from homegrown Islamic extremists is likely smaller in scale than that posed by overseas terrorist groups such as al-Qa'ida, but is potentially larger in psychological impact. Several recent cases illustrate the nature of the issue. Since August 2005 the FBI, other federal agencies, and our foreign partners have dismantled a global network of extremists who are operating independently of any known terrorist organization. Several individuals affiliated with this network were arrested for providing material support in connection with the plotting of a terrorist attack in the United States. The apparent increase of cases involving homegrown Islamic extremists may represent an increased sensitivity of law enforcement to activities not previously regarded as terrorism, but we cannot rule out the possibility that the homegrown phenomenon could be growing. The FBI has identified certain venues, such as prisons and the internet, that present opportunities for the proselytizing of radical Islam. The European and American experience shows that prisons are venues where extremists can be radicalized and recruited among the inmate population. Prison radicalization primarily occurs through anti-US sermons provided by contract, volunteer, or staff imams, radicalized inmates who gain religious influence, and extremist media. Ideologies that radicalized inmates appear most often to embrace include the Salafi form of Sunni Islam (including revisionist versions commonly known as ``prison Islam'') and an extremist view of Shia Islam similar to that of the Government of Iran and Lebanese Hizballah. Most cases of prison radicalization appear to be carried out by domestic Islamic extremist groups with few or no direct foreign connections, like the Sunni Islamic extremist group in California, the Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS), identified in July 2005. Although the Committee is familiar with this case, I regret that I am unable to elaborate publicly on it at this time due to pending legal proceedings, and the FBI's responsibility to ensure the defendants in this case receive a fair and impartial trial. I would like to emphasize, however, that not all prison radicalization is Islamic in nature. Domestic groups such as white supremacists also recruit in prisons. In response to this possible threat, the FBI and the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) have been actively engaged in efforts to detect, deter, and interdict efforts by terrorist and extremist groups to radicalize or recruit in US prisons since February 2003. As a result of the JIS case here in Los Angeles, the FBI organized a Prison Radicalization Working Group which is comprised of more than 15 federal, state, and local agencies, and over 30 task force officers. As part of these efforts, we have identified ``best practices'' for correctional institutions to combat the spread of radicalization. The Internet is also a venue for the radicalization of young, computer-savvy Westerners--both male and female--who identify with an Islamic extremist ideology. An older generation of supporters and sympathizers of violent Islamic extremism, in the post-9/11 environment of increased law enforcement scrutiny, has migrated their radicalization, recruitment, and material support activities online. Radicalization via the Internet is participatory, and individuals are actively engaged in exchanging extremist propaganda and rhetoric online which may facilitate the violent Islamic extremist cause. These online activities further their indoctrination, create links between extremists located around the world, and may serve as a springboard for future terrorist activities. Overseas experience can also be a significant element in facilitating the transition from one who has a proclivity to be radicalized, and who may espouse radicalized rhetoric, to one who is willing and ready to act on those radicalized beliefs. Although radicalization can occur without overseas travel, the foreign experience appears to provide the networking that makes it possible for interested individuals to train for and participate in operational activity. The experience may vary from religious or language instruction, to basic paramilitary training. We assess that the overseas experiences of John Walker Lindh \1\ played a pivotal role in his involvement with the Taliban. Once overseas, he was directed by radicalized individuals to attend extremist universities, and ultimately training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ John Walker Lindh, after pleading guilty in the Eastern District of Virginia to supporting the Taliban, in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) (50) U.S.C. Sec. 1705(b)0, and carrying an explosive during the commission of a felony (18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(h)(2)), was given a 20-year sentence. The FBI approaches the radicalization issue on two levels: We are attempting to understand the dynamics of individual and organizational radicalization to identify early indicators as to whether individuals or groups are demonstrating the potential for violence. We are engaged in extensive outreach to Muslim communities to dispel misconceptions that may foster extremism. With respect to the latter point, I would like to spend some time discussing the Los Angeles Field Office's efforts over the years to develop and foster a positive working relationship with our Muslim, Arab, Armenian, Sikh, and Coptic communities. In September 2003, the Los Angeles Field Office (LAFO) initiated the formation of the Muslim, Arab, Armenian, Sikh, and Coptic Ombudsman Program per a directive by Director Mueller. It was decided that a council should be formed through which information, ideas, and concerns could be shared between the FBI and said communities. The inaugural meeting of the Committee was hosted by LAFO on May 17, 2004. Since that date, the Committee has met on the third Monday of each month to address issues and concerns ranging from the FBI's Counter Terrorism and Counter Intelligence missions, the Patriot Act, and interviews of individuals within Arab, Armenian, Muslim, and Sikh communities, as well as guest presentations by other agencies. The Committee has grown to 35 members, and is continuing to grow to include, among others, four members from college Muslim student organizations. As a result of the interactions between the FBI and the Committee members, LAFO has participated in a number of town hall meetings and community functions at which an FBI presence is requested, as well as media events hosted by Muslim community organizations. Members of the Multi-Cultural Advisory Committee have also provided information to the FBI which has resulted in investigations of potential radical extremists living among their communities. In the spirit of partnership and sharing information, Committee members have hosted a number of events for FBI personnel to broaden their cultural and religious understanding of the various aspects of the Arab, Armenian, Muslim, Sikh, and Coptic communities in the greater Los Angeles area. LAFO maintains daily contact with the Committee members via telephone, e-mail, and in person meetings. With respect to collaborations that have been forged among law enforcement and other public safety sectors, the FBI and its law enforcement partners have been working together for a number of years to address terrorism related matters. In 1984, in order to coordinate counterterrorism threats and responses associated with the Summer Olympic Games event which took place in Los Angeles, the FBI initiated a working group with the Los Angeles Police Department and Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department. This led to the formation of the Los Angeles Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in 1986. Today, the Los Angeles JTTF program has expanded to include the Long Beach JTTF, the Orange County JTTF, and the Inland Empire JTTF, which coordinate their investigations through the Los Angeles JTTF, and ultimately with the National JTTF. The combined resources of the various formalized and ad-hoc JTTF groups in the greater Los Angeles territory includes more than 260 full-time task force investigators, consisting of approximately 150 FBI Special Agents, and 110 other federal, state, and local task force agents/officers. The following is a listing of the various local, state, and federal agencies who participate on the JTTF's in LAFO's territory: Local Agencies: Los Angeles Police Department Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department Beverly Hills Police Department Long Beach Police Department Los Angeles International Airport Police Department Los Angeles City Fire Department Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, Bureau of Investigations Torrance Police Department Los Angeles Port Police Redondo Beach Police Department Orange County Sheriff's Department Orange County District Attorney's Office Ventura County Sheriff's Department Santa Ana Police Department Anaheim Police Department Cypress Police Department Garden Grove Police Department Irvine Police Department San Bernardino Police Department San Bernardino Sheriff's Department Riverside Sheriff's Department Banning Police Department Barstow Police Department Beaumont Police Department BNSF Railroad Police Department Chino Police Department Colton Police Department Corona Police Department Fontana Police Department Hemet Police Department Indio Police Department Montclair Police Department Murrieta Police Department Ontario Police Department Ontario Airport Police Department Palm Springs Police Department Redlands Police Department Riverside Police Department UC Riverside Police Department Upland Police Department Buena Park Police Department State Agencies: California Highway Patrol California Department of Justice (CATIC) California Army National Guard California Department of Motor Vehicles Federal Agencies: United States Secret Service U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Department of State Diplomatic Security Service United States Army Air Force Office of Special Investigations Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives U.S. Postal Inspection Service Naval Criminal Investigative Service Defense Criminal Investigative Service Central Intelligence Agency Drug Enforcement Administration Federal Air Marshals U.S. Coast Guard Environmental Protection Agency U.S. Customs and Border Protection Transportation Security Administration Department of Defense U.S. Bureau of Prisons Amtrak Rail Police In addition to the long standing JTTF program, the Los Angeles FBI has also developed a number of information sharing programs and initiatives to ensure that our partners are fully aware of intelligence and threat information developed by the FBI and other agencies. As part of the transformation undertaken by the FBI since September 11, 2001, we have developed and directed the implementation of the Field Intelligence Group (FIG) program, which serves as the mechanism by which the Field Divisions evaluate threats. The FIG is utilized by the FBI to evaluate regional and local perspectives on a variety of issues, to include the receipt of and action on integrated investigative and intelligence requirements. FIGs further provide the intelligence link to the JTTFs, Fusion Centers, FBIHQ and the Intelligence Community at large. FIGs, which have been established in all 56 Field Offices since October 2003, consist of Intelligence Analysts, Special Agents, Language Analysts, and Special Surveillance Groups. FIG personnel have been embedded in more than twenty-five Fusion Centers and/or Multi-Agency Intelligence Centers (MAICs) around the country. Among the fundamental post September 11th changes, sharing intelligence is now the paramount objective. We have developed an FBI intelligence presence within the intelligence and law enforcement communities by sharing Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs), Intelligence Assessments (IAs), Intelligence Bulletins (IBs), and related intelligence information on platforms routinely used by our law enforcement and Intelligence Community partners, including JWICS, SIPRNet and Law Enforcement Online (LEO), as well as on the FBI Intranet. This effort has resulted in more than 7,400 IIRs, 150 IBs, and 100 IAs that have been posted on all listed platforms; in addition, over 400 Current Intelligence Reports have also been produced, of which over 50 have been shared with the intelligence community through NCTC Online. We are also using our internal, closed network to provide FBI employees with access to raw, current and finished intelligence products. Additionally, we utilize unclassified, but law enforcement sensitive portals, such as Law Enforcement Online (LEO) and The Intelligence and Terrorism Alert Network (TITAN), to disseminate products to officers on the street relative to both terrorism and criminal matters on which we have developed analysis. Regarding the Fusion Centers and/or Multi-Agency Intelligence Centers, Los Angeles established a Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) in which federal, state, and local resources were commingled in order to produce an integrated multi-agency intelligence processing center. The Los Angeles JRIC is a groundbreaking cooperative which fully integrates intelligence intake, vetting, analysis/fusion, and synthesis from a multitude of law enforcement and public safety agencies. The JRIC also disseminates developed intelligence, provides analytical case support, analyzes trends, and provides tailored analytical products to end users. The JRIC was founded by the FBI, the United States Attorney's Office for the Central District of California, the California Governor's Office of Homeland Security, the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD), and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). Other agencies who participate in the JRIC provide analysts to staff the facility, and the JRIC's services are available to all law enforcement agencies throughout our seven county region. The partnerships formed in the JRIC allow the facility to be a central contact point for law enforcement and public safety intelligence, and provides for a smoother flow of leads and intelligence to prevent duplication, fragmentation, and circular reporting. Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and members of the Subcommittee, there has been a lot of discussion and speculation about the effectiveness of the FBI and its partners to combat terrorism, and the manner in which information is processed and shared to ensure the prevention of terrorist attacks on American soil. The FBI has made significant improvements in the past six years to ensure we are pooling our federal, state, and local resources accordingly, and working as one team to address potential threats to our homeland. In my 25 years working as a law enforcement officer, I have never experienced the level of collegial partnerships between law enforcement and public safety agencies as I have here in Los Angeles. We fully appreciate and understand the tasking that the American people expect of us, and we are standing shoulder to shoulder with our partners to accomplish this mission. Thank you for the opportunity to come before you today and share the work the FBI and our federal, state, and local partners are doing to address terror threats to our country. I am happy to answer any questions. Ms. Harman. Thank you, Ms. Fedarcyk. Sergeant Mead. STATEMENT OF SERGEANT LARRY MEAD, DEPUTY SHERIFF, LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT Sgt. Mead. Madam Chairman, ranking member and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you on the issue of ``Prison Radicalization.'' The subject of ``Prison Radicalization'' reaches far beyond the walls of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, county jails and juvenile facilities throughout the State of California. It has local, national and international implications. The effort to impact homegrown terrorism in prisons, jails and society is a monumental task which requires the cooperation of local, state and Federal agencies and the community at large. My testimony will focus on the local gang culture and it's effects on the Los Angeles County Jail regarding radicalization and our Department's cooperation with Federal, state and local agencies to share information thereby preventing, disrupting, or mitigating a terrorist attack. Within our custody operations division, our gang intelligence unit, Operation Safe Jails (OSJ), which originated in 1985, analyzes gang trends, conduct gang interviews, classifies and maintains gang files in an ongoing effort to prevent attacks on both staff and our inmate population. Over the years OSJ has evolved into an extremely critical asset for unit commanders and executives such as my Chief Sammy Jones of Custody Operations Division. In addition, the unit assists local, state and Federal agencies with ongoing investigations. In an effort to improve communications, a sergeant attends briefings and meetings with the Los Angeles area Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), Terrorism Early Warning group (TEW), the Joint Regional Information Center (JRIC), the California Department of Corrections Gang Task Force and other regional gang meetings. These relationships have resulted in high quality products that are provided to decision makers covering a variety of terror-related subjects. With an average daily population of 19,000 plus inmates, the Los Angeles County jail system is seen as a possible location where prison radicalization can sew it roots. Since late 1995, several OSJ gang intelligence deputies were designated Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO's) who report on radical activities to the Department's Terrorism Early Warning group. This has expanded to other local state and Federal agencies. Their activities were heightened by the July, 2005, discovery of the radical prison group, Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is- Sheeh (JIS), that Chief Bratton and Chief Neu have talked about in length. Since then, analysis shows that radicalization and recruitment in U.S. prisons is still an ongoing concern. Prison radicalization primarily occurs through anti-U.S. sermons provided by contract, volunteer's, staff imams, radicalized inmates, etc. Ideologies that radicalized inmates appear most often to embrace, include or are influenced by the Salafi form of Sunni Islam (including revisionist versions commonly known as ``prison Islam'') and an extremist view of Shia Islam similar to that of the government of Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah. Some of the initiatives that we have taken in Los Angeles County is we have two deputies from our Terrorism and Early Warning Group who are working full time on the radicalization issue within the Los Angeles County Jail System. Our department participates on the Jail Radicalization Working group with FBI, LAPD, CDC, and other agencies. There is an ongoing integration effort with Jail Investigations Unit, Operation Safe Jails, Classification Unit and the Joint Regional Intelligence Center. Ongoing interaction with religious leaders (more than 100) who conduct services at all Los Angeles County jail facilities. And we have a continued outreach for better communication between local, state and Federal custodial facilities regarding the transfer and travel of ``problem inmates.'' Finally, we participated with George Washington University on the study of issues related to radicalization. In the LA County Jail our religious leaders go through a verification process. We do an application. There is a copy of ordination. We do background checks and we monitor their services as well. Sheriff Baca has taken the lead in this effort to impact radicalization and homegrown terrorism in mainstream society is an inherently difficult task, especially without the cooperation and partnership of the local Muslim community. Muslim-American organizations have been working on various ways of supporting and participating in the security needs of America, as well as people of all nations. Sheriff Baca has taken the lead to formalize this endeavor by forming a national organization known as the Muslim-American Homeland Security Congress (MAHSC). This is a non-political, non-governmental, nonreligious, and non-profit organization. Through partnerships, cooperation and assistance with national and local elected officials, law enforcement, civic and inter-faith groups, the Muslim-American Homeland Security Congress will educate, reach out to the disenfranchised, and communicate to all Americans. Operation Safe Jails gang intelligence deputies are continuously monitoring our inmate population. We have identified several inmates who had radical correspondence, drawings of airplanes flying into the World Trade Center, e- mail addresses to radical websites, and we are working with local, state, and Federal agencies. I want to thank you for the time this morning. [The statement of Sgt. Mead follows:] Prepared Statement of Larry A. Mead Madam Chairman, ranking member and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you on the issue of ``Prison Radicalization.'' The subject of ``Prison Radicalization'' reaches far beyond the walls of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), county jails and juvenile facilities throughout the State of California. It has local, national and international implications. The effort to impact ``homegrown'' terrorism in prisons, jails and society is a monumental task which requires the cooperation of local, state and federal agencies and the community at large. My testimony will focus on the local gang culture and it(s effects on the Los Angeles County Jail regarding radicalization and our Department(s cooperation with federal, state and local agencies to share information thereby preventing, disrupting or mitigating a terrorist attack. Within our custody operations division, our gang intelligence unit, Operation Safe Jails (OSJ), which originated in 1985, analyzes gang trends, conduct gang interviews, classifies and maintains gang files in an ongoing effort to prevent attacks on both staff and our inmate population. Over the years OSJ has evolved into an extremely critical asset for unit commanders and executives throughout the Department. OSJ's primary responsibility is gang intelligence. In addition, the unit assists local, state and federal agencies with ongoing investigations. In an effort to improve communications, a sergeant attends briefings and meetings with the Los Angeles area Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), Terrorism Early Warning group (TEW), the Joint Regional Information Center (JRIC), the California Department of Corrections Gang Task Force and other regional gang meetings. These relationships have resulted in high quality products that are provided to decision makers covering a variety of terror-related subjects. With an average daily population of 19,000 plus inmates, the Los Angeles County jail system is seen as a possible location where prison radicalization can sew it roots. Since late 1995, several OSJ gang intelligence deputies were designated Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO's) who report on radical activities to the Department's Terrorism Early Warning group. This has expanded to other local state and federal agencies. Their activities were heightened by the July, 2005, discovery of the radical prison group, Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Sheeh (JIS) or the ``Authentic Assembly of Islam,'' at Folsom State Prison, near Sacramento, California. Since then, analysis shows that radicalization and recruitment in U.S. prisons is still an ongoing concern. Prison radicalization primarily occurs through anti-U.S. sermons provided by contract, volunteer's, staff imams, radicalized inmates who gain religious influence, or extremist media. Ideologies that radicalized inmates appear most often to embrace, include or are influenced by the Salafi form of Sunni Islam (including revisionist versions commonly known as ``prison Islam'') and an extremist view of Shia Islam similar to that of the government of Iran and Lebanese Hizballah. JAIL RADICALIZATION INITIATIVES IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY Two deputies working full time on the radicalization issue within the Los Angeles County Jail System LASD participates on the Jail Radicalization Working group with FBI, LAPD, CDC Ongoing integration effort with Jail Investigations Unit, Operation Safe Jails, Classification Unit and the Joint Regional Intelligence Center Ongoing interaction with religious leaders (more than 100) who conduct services at all Los Angeles County jail facilities Continued outreach for better communication between local, state and federal custodial facilities regarding the transfer and travel of ``problem inmates'' Participation with George Washington University on the study of issues related to radicalization Religious Leader Verification Process Application Copy of Ordination Support Letter from sponsoring church Background by Inmate Services Unit Orientation program Random monitoring by Inmate Services Unit Random monitoring by Chapel Deputies Sheriff Baca's Statement: The effort to impact radicalization and ``homegrown'' terrorism in mainstream society is an inherently difficult task, especially without the cooperation and partnership of the local Muslim community. Muslim- American organizations have been working on various ways of supporting and participating in the security needs of America, as well as people of all nations. Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, of the Los Angeles County Sheriff(s Department, has taken the lead to formalize this endeavor by forming a national organization known as the Muslim-American Homeland Security Congress (MAHSC). This is a non-political, non-governmental, non-religious, and non-profit organization. Through partnerships, cooperation and assistance with national and local elected officials, law enforcement, civic and inter-faith groups, the Muslim-American Homeland Security Congress will educate, reach out to the disenfranchised, and communicate to all Americans the goals and purpose of the organization. MISSION The Muslim-American Homeland Security Congress shall foster education & understanding, organization & empowerment, along with Communication & Cooperation with the American public to protect and defend the United States of America and all people through the prevention of terrorism and any acts of prejudice. Operation Safe Jails gang intelligence deputies are continuously monitoring our inmate population for radical activity. The Imams who conduct religious service go through a thorough background check and their teachings are not associated with the radicalized form of Islam. Inmates who attempt to spread radical Islam are monitored and reported to the appropriate agencies. We have identified several inmates who had radical correspondence, drawings of airplanes flying into the World Trade Center, e-mail addresses to radical websites, and in one disturbing instance, we interviewed a foreign national who provided information regarding a safe house radical mosque where large sums of U.S. Currency is counted and forwarded to a Middle Eastern country for dissemination. There is no doubt that ``Prison Radicalization,'' is an ongoing problem. We all need to continue our focus on this growing phenomena and add additional resources to combat this growing trend or run the risk of another similar situation such as the JIS incident which occurred at Folsom State Prison in July, 2005. Ms. Harman. Thank you, Sergeant. I thank all the witnesses for putting up with my tapping but the goal was to give us enough time to ask questions which will bring out even more good information. Now I will remind each member that the same rules apply to us. Each of us has five minutes to question the panel and I will now recognize myself and adhere strictly to my time. Chief Bratton, you are the one who called training a true force multiplier. You pointed out, I think it was you, that there are 700,000 local law enforcement agents and, as far as I remember, about 40,000 FBI agents, something like that. Think about it. If they are well trained, we obviously have many more resources to prevent harm to our citizens. This Torrance case, which still has to go to trial, but the allegations in this Torrance case are surely evidence that alert policing can prevent harm to our citizens. My first question of both chiefs, and others chime in if you would like to, is what exactly is this training? I think the public would be interested in this because the public, too, can be part of the first preventer force. After all, we all live in these neighborhoods and we can observe strange activities in our neighborhood so could you give us some more information about what the training includes. Chief Bratton, please add a plug for your academy which would be based here but would train nationally as I understand it. Mr. Bratton. Well, the plug actually supports the need. There is no generic training overall in the sense that each agency is effectively attempting to train their own TLOs, if you will. I now have one in each of my area police stations. This is a new area for local policing. It took us many hundreds of years to develop expertise and traditional crime fighting. We need to expedite trying to get basic information into the hands of patrol officers, investigating detectives, supervisors, managers, and chiefs so there's different needs at each of those levels. My suggestion and my belief is that we need to have a degree of generic training for each of those levels that does not currently exist. Oftentimes it's as a result of an individual chief or investigator or supervisor's interest in the topic area, or in the case of Los Angeles, New York, Washington, Chicago, the level of perceived threat in terms of generating focus on this issue. The idea of a national police terrorism academy is to develop a curriculum on what chiefs need, what managers need, what supervisors need, and what does a frontline cop need so those 700,000 personnel are effectively working cohesively to support the 40,000 Federal agents, FBI, DEA, all of those who engage in a similar effort. We are really only at the beginning of this process. We are not really down the road at all. Well, speaking on my own behalf, and I think the Subcommittee would agree, we are very interested in your idea and we will be looking at it closely. Chief Neu, I mentioned in introducing you that you have been commended for the training activity that you have engaged in for your police department. Can you give us some detail just as to that one police department and how do you think it helped the undercover cops, who figured out at least the beginning of this plot, do their work? Mr. Neu. The key to our training as been consistency. It's not just a one day of training or a two-day course. The way that we approach this is we have actually created an intelligence section within out department which has really given us an upper hand, so to speak, in the training of our officers. We have two detectives who train not only the entire department but also open up avenues in the community with our critical facilities, the Del Amo Fashion Center, Exxon/Mobile refinery to name two. All of their security personnel have been through our training because, as Chief Bratton talked about, the force multiplier. It's not just within the walls of the Torrance Police Department. It expands into the community. To expand on that a little bit more, a perfect example would be an incident that we dealt with yesterday which was a threat that came through the internet to the mall. The security director instead of calling for a black and white field officer called our terrorism liaison officer directly who then called the Long Beach FBI office and spoke to a JTTF member who then passed the information on to the LA JRIC. That's the continuity. That's the unity that I talked about. That is common place now but we can't sit still. We have to build upon that and that is exactly what the efforts of Chief Bratton, Sheriff Baca continue to do in this region. Keep in mind we have 43 local law enforcement agencies and it's going to take time for all of us to get there. But I must stress that local law enforcement has a responsibility here. Police chiefs have a responsibility here and that's where we're moving. Ms. Harman. Thank you. My time has expired and I now recognize the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, the gentleman from Washington, for five minutes of questions. Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair. Would anyone want to take a shot at defining what radicalization is? Ms. Fedarcyk. I think we would define it as the movement from beyond a moderate posture, if you will, into a more extremist viewpoint wherein perfectly regular, if you will, beliefs are taken to the extreme to insight violence, if you will in furtherance of a stated religious belief where we see it taken from, if you will, a middle-of-the-road approach or religious belief. It has basically taken the more radical form and the more extremist form with calls to actually insight violence in a call of religion, if you will. Mr. Reichert. Chief. Mr. Bratton. I think in the simplest form is from dormancy to action. Somebody who is looking at it thinking about it, fantasizing about it now moving overtly to do something about it. I guess that is about as simple an explanation that I can provide. Mr. Reichert. There is a lot of discussion about Islamic radicalism. What non-Muslim radicalism is taking place that you can describe probably in the presence that you would see it. Sergeant Mead. I just got off the phone yesterday with one of my counterparts at the California Department of Corrections. In addition to Islamic radicalism they have, as you know, several white supremacist groups that are prison gang members. Some of the recruitment that is ongoing occurs in prisons throughout the United States, not just California. What happens is traditionally you'll have the lone wolf individual who matches the description given here who goes out and pushes it beyond the limit some place in the midwest and elsewhere. They are tracking an individual in addition to all of the other radical issues that are happening in CDC. It is not just the Muslim problem. It is a problem where anyone, whatever their beliefs are, whether it is industrial or radicalism, whatever, they are pushing the limits and they want to take action to destroy infrastructure and our way of life. Mr. Reichert. As you see this problem start to develop, and it sounds like it is increasing across the country, and we are looking at all of these entities that we just rattle off, the local PD intelligence units, the JRICs, the JTTFs and the Fusion Centers. Now we have the prison radicalization group and Operation Safe Jails and we can go on with lots of other groups coming together. You have talked a little bit about how they work together and they share information, but how does the problem of over- classification play into this? I know that is a complicated question but it is something that I think all of you are working on in order to share this information that is developing. Can you describe that problem just a little bit? I know we don't have a whole lot of time for that. Ms. Fedarcyk. I know that the issue of over-classification has been surfaced and is currently being reviewed. I think we have been very successful from what I have seen so far in my short time here in LA in taking information and being able to translate that from the classified version, if you will, into a more actionable intelligence for our partners. We have been very aggressive in obtaining clearances for our partners so that we are in a position to share classified information at all levels. I do think that we are through all of the efforts you have heard about with the JRIC, the JTTF, and many of the other working associations have the ability to pass that information down to where it needs. The issue of over-classification I know is a topic of concern. Mr. Reichert. Yes. Thank you, Madam Chair. My time has expired. Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Reichert. I now recognize Mr. Dicks of Washington State for five minutes of questions. Mr. Dicks. Thank you. Chief, tell us a little bit more in detail about the terrorism liaison officers. What kind of people do you pick? How are they trained? Give us a little more specificity if you could. Mr. Neu. Within our agency we like to have experienced investigators in those positions. In other words, folks within our agency that can actually train immediately because it's not just the singular position of a TLO that we are looking at to work directly with the FBI. It is also to get out in the community and to educate our officers so we are looking for experience. Mr. Dicks. The chief has been talking about a training center which I think is a great idea. Did you just do this on your own? Did you just come up with your own curriculum to train these people or did you get any help from the Department of Homeland Security or the FBI? Mr. Neu. It is actually joint. It is with the Department of Homeland Security and our working relationship with the FBI as I mentioned earlier. Mr. Dicks. Does it go into the training of these people? Mr. Neu. Absolutely. What is important to note through the FBI is there are a number of subject matter experts that they have at our disposal in local law enforcement. It is important for us to utilize that. Instead of, again, waiting for them to come to us we have to go to them and that is what we do not only through our TLOs but also through our intelligence section which is a sergeant and a detective, and also our member who works with the JTTF. Mr. Dicks. It sounds like a good program. Chief, you are saying more training and different kinds of training depending on what level you are in the Department? Is that basically what I heard? Mr. Neu. By way of example the question about radicalization, what is it? The need to educate that we are all speaking with the same understanding of a term or a definition, Hamas, Hezbollah. What is it? What's the history? What's the importance of understanding the differences? Something as basic as that, that we are speaking from the same language and definition base. Again, in this area TLO is a new concept and some agencies are doing it on their own and others are doing it in conjunction with FBI, the JTTFs, Homeland Security. The idea of trying to develop some basic training guidelines. In California, for example, all of our police officers have to be post-certified. That's the California State system to ensure that all of our officers have basic understanding and skills to put a badge on and go into the streets. We need similar types of levels of training familiarization at the various ranks in local policing to better aid the Federal Government agencies, as well as to inform the 2.5 million private security officers that are out there. The chief referenced that he gets a call from the private security director at a local mall because that person has been educated and informed to work with the Torrance Police Department. What he just described was the seamlessness of the effort that we are trying to create throughout the country. Mr. Dicks. Thank you. Sergeant, tell us a little bit about your prison program. Obviously these people, the Torrance group, the four people, were in prison and they were recruited. What are we trying to do to better understand this and to stop this from happening in the future? You mentioned the gangs as part of this. Sergeant Mead. I think traditionally over the many, many years in the history of law enforcement when a police officer makes an arrest and the person goes to a county jail or prison they basically forget about them and that is something they hadn't looked at until the JIS incident. Since then the California Department of Corrections, my sources, they are actively involved in keeping an eye on what is going on over there, gathering intelligence. They are working with JTTFs throughout the state. In many cases, my case for example, the FBI is the one who invited me to come down to the prison working group. Since then I have been sharing that information with everyone. Inside a prison you have young men who are sitting around for long periods of time, when they go especially to the penal, and they go through what I call graduate school. Graduate school has taken a new twist in the form of radicalization that can affect the community on the outside and that is what we see. Mr. Dicks. So this Torrance thing wasn't a one-time incident? Can you tell us are there other things being investigated? Sergeant Mead. Sir, all I can tell you is I have a lot of information that cannot be shared in a public setting but there is a great deal of investigations ongoing. My source yesterday said there is also a paper where an individual is being looked at for radical writings with locations, etc., and I can't say anymore. Mr. Dicks. Thank you. Maybe, Madam Chairman, we will have to have a classified meeting at some point. I think that might not be a bad idea. Ms. Harman. I think that is a great suggestion. Obviously we don't want to compromise an ongoing investigation. Mr. Dicks. We can also talk to Federal officials as well. Ms. Harman. Yes, we can. Yes, we can, the FBI being one of that group. I appreciate the suggestion and I do think we should do that. The gentleman's time has expired and now Mr. Lungren of California is recognized for five minutes. Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Chief Bratton and Chief Neu, as a former Commissioner of Post I am intrigued by your statements that we need to have training in the area of terrorism, liaison, or terrorism. Is there a training component approved by Post right now for terrorism training? Mr. Neu. I checked into that in dealing with actually the academies. I know in the academy there is a small block of training as Chief Bratton referred to. Mr. Lungren. Is that Post approved? Mr. Neu. I believe so. Mr. Lungren. Do you think we need more? What I'm trying to find out is you are talking about we need more training. Has Post done enough here in California? Is that block enough? Do they need more elements? Do you believe that it is of the quality that is necessary for the officers you are talking about? Mr. Neu. My opinion is that the training needs to mirror what we are dealing with right now. The JIS case is a perfect example of, again, the knowledge, the awareness, the education that is needed for the line level officers that are dealing with this in the streets. My answer to your question would be that it needs to be formalized, needs to be enhanced, and it needs to be consistent. Mr. Lungren. For all four of you, if it were not a question of additional money, let us say, for whatever reason, we can't get additional money, what single most important thing would you suggest that we need to do from a policy standpoint to improve the situation dealing with radicalization, dealing with terrorism from a law enforcement standpoint from each of your vantage points? Mr. Bratton. Let me speak briefly to that. The Los Angeles region, I think, is a clear example of what can be done. The ability to share information is not something that has a cost to it, if you will, in the sense of a financial cost. It starts with the willingness to be inclusive to understand that we all need to work together. I think we have tried to emphasize over the last two days with your Committee that we believe that we have crossed over that barrier that still exist unfortunately in many areas of the country. In this area we are attempting to develop seamless lines of communication locally with our colleagues at Homeland Security. Charlie Allen has been out here quite frequently trying to move some of those issues forward. That is really a no cost, just getting people to make nice with each other. Mr. Neu. To echo those statements also, I think it is extremely important to understand, getting back to local law enforcement, that at the TLO level the TLO officer needs to be active. In other words, we can't sit back and wait for something to happen. When I mean active, I am talking about out in the community building and forging that relationship with DHS, with the FBI similar to what we have done. We have done this for years and it has paid dividends for us not just in the JIS case but other cases that we have been involved with. I am answering that question that way because there is no cost to that. In other words, every agency has a TLO identified. It is just a matter of the involvement, the activity of that TLO at this point in time and that TLO needs to be active. Mr. Lungren. Let me ask this on the issue of radicalization. It is more than just moving from thought to action. It is moving from thought to a particular action inspired by, in this case, the case we are basically talking about, a distortion of religious belief. We have had gangs. We have had different organizations who wished to do crime, even crime on an extended level. We are dealing here with a phenomenon of radicalization to the extent of attempting to destroy the very essence of the society we live in. That is different than many of the white skinheads we had. Klu Klux Klan was a terrorist group but they thought they were promoting their crazy idea of American ideals which was a radicalization of a different type. Here we are dealing with a question of an etiologically based radicalization which goes beyond just committing crimes. It goes to committing crimes for the purpose of destroying the structures of our society. That is different in form and substance than what we have done before. That being the case, how do we try and deter that from your stand? Well-- Ms. Harman. Let's let the witnesses offer brief answers to that question. It's a very hard and good question. Ms. Fedarcyk. If I may, I think the outreach efforts that we have engaged in go to a large part of being able to share, exchange and hopefully influence those beliefs as they may exist. I think that is an important component anytime you are trying to persuade another that perhaps an extremist viewpoint they wish to take is perhaps not the one that they should be following. Ms. Harman. The gentleman's time as expired. Before turning to Mr. Perlmutter for questions, I would just note that when Mr. Reichert pushed the wrong button and he said he just called the mayor, the mayor arrived. Frank Scott, the mayor of Torrance, is waving from the audience. I do want to thank him and his city for letting us use this marvelous facility. Let me just note further that early in my Congressional career I actually had my office in the city hall complex in Torrance except the then-mayor Katy Geissert didn't let me occupy this lovely building. She put me in a trailer with no indoor plumbing and then the trailer was demolished. I guess that was the notice to me that I had to move on. Mr. Dicks. Madam Chair, you would think in Washington, D.C. we could get a button that said, ``Call the President?'' Ms. Harman. I think Mr. Perlmutter will answer that as part of his five minutes. I now yield five minutes to the gentleman from Colorado. Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you, Madam Chair. I guess the thing that is bothering me is within our prison system, both state and Federal system, groups break down into sort of protective gangs. Some guys will join the Aryan Nation bunch as a way to protect themselves. Others will join some other kind of organization just as a way to protect themselves from the violence that is ongoing within our prisons. I am just curious if any of you see something different now. I mean, this experience that you've had in Torrance, and I don't want to screw up your case and talk about it in any detail, but there seems to have been something different that occurred here because in Colorado we have the gangs develop within the system and then they seem to disperse generally later. Here in this instance something else happened and I'm just concerned and curious if you see this becoming a more regular kind of phenomenon. Sergeant Mead, I would start with you on that question. Sargeant Mead. Within the prison system you have prison gangs and basically when you go to prison you have to align yourself with someone or else you will probably end up becoming the victim of some sort of assault or dying. As far as your question goes, I think the catalyst for all of this was the September 11th attacks. It is sort of like a spark on a dormant issue. These people have been radicalized for a long period of time. However, since the September 11th attacks and our actions in response to it I think there is a spark that created something and it is ongoing. We have information that certain groups such as the Black Gorilla Family, which is a prison group, have aligned themselves with People's Nation and they are trying to get together and create problems for us out here on the street. The bottom line is we are in different times. These gangs members no longer just want to go out and commit crimes just for profit. They are embracing Islam in many cases and the type of Islam that they are embracing is radicalized. Therefore, we will see problems in the future. Mr. Perlmutter. This goes with Representative Lungren's questions and Reichert's. Do you see that same thing coalescing around white supremacist kind of gangs that develop in prison and do you see them staying together outside of prison to do political harm or kind of terrorist or are you seeing it more just with the JIS type of gang? Sergeant Mead. It is on both sides, more on one side than the other side. What you would find in the white supremacist group apart from how they go about doing their illegal activities, remember these people are the Aryan Nation and, ``It should be a white world and America should be all white and we should be in control of everything.'' You have these lone wolves every once in a while that break away from the group and they become problematic. They make two or three or four with them. It doesn't take much for them to get together and create a weapon of some kind to get a message across whatever their ideologies are so, yes, it does occur. Mr. Perlmutter. In Colorado we have what is called Super Max which is the most maximum security prison we have at the Federal level. We had the Unibomber and the shoe bomber and the cosa nostra and some very bad guys in that prison. We determined that there was a lot of information, particularly the man who was involved with the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 was able to get a lot of communications out to his friends and there actually was some additional activity going on that hopefully we put a stop to. Is there any action being taken on the Federal side? I know this is probably more for the Bureau of Prisons than for this panel but to try to put a lid on that kind of thing so that there isn't some guidance given by some of these folks that we captured or imprisoned that they are leading radical elements outside. Ms. Fedarcyk. I think that is part of the national initiative that has been underway since 2003. Obviously the working group that has been developed to try and address some of those concerns about whether the groups that form inside the prison walls continue after either the release or through communications as you have referenced. I think that is part of our ongoing effort to fully identify exactly whether these groups are prone to stay together once they exit the prison walls or if it is strictly a function of needing that association inside the prison walls. Ms. Harman. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has expired. While we could continue this for a long time I want to thank this panel for very helpful testimony and for hosting our visit to the Joint Regional Intelligence Center, the JRIC, yesterday. Of course, I am totally unbiased but this is the biggest and best fusion center in the country and hopefully will be a model for best practices around California including in the Sacramento area and elsewhere. The circumstances are not identical but both the way this is put together, the training exercises, and the collaboration is just I think an excellent start. I know that our friend Charlie Allen is watching these developments closely, has his own person attached to this JRIC and this fusion center and some others. This Subcommittee will follow the progress here closely and try to support the effort to build out these fusion centers. This panel is excused. Thank you again. The second panel should be making its way up to the table. Thank you. I welcome the second panel of witnesses. Our first witness, Ms. Sireen Sawaf, is the Southern California Government Relations Director for the Muslim Public Affairs Council and someone I have met on several occasions and find enormously impressive. As a leading voice of the American Muslim Community, Ms. Sawaf has strategized with coalition and lobbied for legislation that affects Muslims in the United States. She has spoken extensively on the misconceptions of Islam and Muslims, bias in the media and hate crimes prevention. Ms. Sawaf has also coordinated activities with the Department of Homeland Security and local law enforcement and is an active member of the FBI initiated Multi-Cultural Advisory Committee, MCAC, which was described by our prior FBI witness. Our second witness, Brian Jenkins, is a Senior Advisor to the President of the RAND Corporation and is one of the world's leading authorities on terrorism. Mr. Jenkins founded the RAND Corporation's Terrorism Research Program in 1972--get this, 1972--and has written frequently on terrorism and as an advisor to the Federal Government and the private sector on the subject. In 1996 Mr. Jenkins was appointed by President Clinton to the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. He also served as an adviser to the National Commission on Terrorism, a Commission on which I served which is when I met him which predicted a major attack on U.S. soil prior to the 9/ 11 tragic events of 2001. And he is a member of the U.S. Comptroller General's Advisory Board. He is a former army captain who served with special forces in Vietnam and also a former deputy chairman of Crowell Associates. He has authored many books, most recently ``Unconquerable Nation--Knowing our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves.'' Our third witness, David Gersten, is the Director of the Department of Homeland Security Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Programs. Mr. Gersten manages several efforts underway at the Department including engagement in outreach to the American Arab and Muslim Communities, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Training for DHS personnel and partners, appraisal of immigration and assimilation policy, Department fulfillment of international civil rights and human rights treaties, and review of how the Department's use of technology and its approach to information sharing impacts civil liberties. Mr. Gersten also leads the Department's Los Angeles community roundtable for engagement with American Arab Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities. Without objection the witnesses' full statements will be inserted in the record. The little timer is here. I think you can see it. I would urge you to summarize in five minutes or you will hear my clicking sound. Then we will be interested in asking you questions. Let's begin with you, Ms. Sawaf, for five minutes. STATEMENT OF SIREEN SAWAF, DIRECTOR, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, MUSLIM PUBLIC AFFAIRS COUNCIL. Ms. Sawaf. Thank you. First and foremost, I would like to talk about radicalization. It must be seen as a socio-political set of behaviors and is not simply a law enforcement problem per se. If not understood, mishandled, or even exacerbated, the emotions and political persuasions of the people we are trying to help, in this case Muslim American youth, will be further alienated and marginalized from the mainstream, and hence a sense of ghettoization will further alienate and marginalize the community. We cannot afford to continue with language that imposes suspicion on Muslim American youth, whereby they are guilty before proven innocent, and then spend millions of dollars on studies and programs to engage them. The key to countering extremism and radicalization, therefore, is understanding and partnering with the mainstream moderate authentic constituent- based Muslim American community, as we are one of the most under-utilized but irreplaceable assets in the war on terror. When extremists use Islam to justify actions, the only group that can counter bad theology with good theology are the authentic experienced leadership in the Muslim American leadership. We are best equipped to win the hearts of minds of Muslims worldwide and we are best equipped to detect suspicious behavior when we partner with law enforcement as opposed to cultural or what is the norm. It takes leadership and insight to recognize the critical role American Muslims play in protecting this country; hence I commend this Subcommittee for including our perspective today in seeking solutions. As we collectively strive to analyze the reality and possibility of ``homegrown terrorism'' we must understand the roots of extremism. MPAC has just developed a youth paper entitled ``Countering Extremism and Supporting Muslim American Youth.'' The paper does two things. 1) Frame issues related to the phenomenon of radicalization of Muslim youth while considering the realities on the ground. And 2) providing recommendations to specifically Muslim American institutions, government and the media, and universities that engage in a healthy partnership of respect and understanding. While on the minds of many, radicalization is void of thoughtful analyses that explain core dynamics within Western societies and how they affect youth. We must look into key factors and particularly the key factors of identity, social and political alienation, the definition of moderation versus extremism, and Islamophobia. Only then can we begin to identify the problem and learn to prevent it from being further exacerbated. MPAC is ready to provide a detailed briefing to this honorable Subcommittee and its staff and I would be happy to coordinate that with you. Now, to talk about partnership, I think one of the key things that the Muslim community has been doing post-9/11 and pre-9/11, as a matter of fact, is partnering with local and Federal law enforcement. There is a long history of partnership and since the 1990's MPAC enjoyed a very strong and fruitful relationship with the FBI. I have to say that the FBI must be commended for being the first agency to identify the importance of partnering with Muslim Americans. Specifically, I would like to highlight key partnership models two of which were talked about earlier today. One of the them is the Muslim American Homeland Security Congress that was initiated by Sheriff Leroy Baca of LA County and Senior Advisor of the Muslim Public Affairs Council Dr. Maher Hathout in response to the 7/7 bombings in London. This is a community initiated, community constructed model that includes universities, academics, businesses, social and political institutions, mosques, and other Muslim entities to participate in Homeland Security efforts. The second is the Department of Homeland Security's recent efforts in building bridges and initiating consistent dialogues in the local community. That followed, of course, previous dialogues held in Washington in an interagency meeting. The third is the LAPD's recent outreach to us. We recently hosted Chief Bratton and the command staff at the Islamic Center in Southern California in January. The final thing I would like to share with you is the Multi-Cultural Advisory Committee with the FBI. There are certainly challenges in these partnerships, some of which being the distrust between community members and law enforcement due to past experiences or cultural baggage. There are misunderstandings, misperceptions and often times the perception of politicization of cases. There is further a lack of systematic and organized approaches to these partnerships where you have each agency independently operating and constructing some form of partnership lacking the backing of Washington support. You further have often times bureaucracy in some of the agencies that get in the way rather than the lack of interest from the community. That said, I would like to simply close with a quote from former FBI Director Edgar Hoover that is etched on the wall of the FBI's headquarters in Washington that says, ``The most effective weapon against crime is cooperation, the efforts of all law enforcement agencies with the support and understanding of the American people. We as Muslim Americans are ready and willing to partner with law enforcement but we need the support from Washington and we need the systematic approach that is necessary to effectively counter extremism, radicalization, and protect the country. Thank you. [The statement of Ms. Sawaf follows:] Prepared Statement of Sireen Sawaf Chairwoman Harman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. It is a privilege to testify before you today on behalf of the Muslim Public Affairs Council to discuss the phenomenon of radicalization and some of the work the Muslim American community has done alongside law enforcement to counter this threat and enhance our nations security. First and foremost, radicalization must be seen as a socio- political set of behaviors and is not simply a law enforcement problem. If not understood, mishandled, or even exacerbated, the emotions and political persuasions of the people we are trying to help, in this case Muslim American youth, will be further alienated and marginalized from the mainstream, and hence a sense of ghettoization will take place in various communities. We cannot afford to continue with language that imposes suspicion on Muslim American youth, whereby they are guilty before proven innocent, and then spend millions of dollars on studies and programs to engage them. The key to countering extremism and radicalization, therefore, is understanding and partnering with the Muslim American community, as we are one of the most underutilized but irreplaceable assets in protecting the homeland. When extremists use Islam to justify acts of terrorism, the only group that can counter bad theology with accurate theology is the Muslim American leadership. We are best equipped to detect criminal activity and distinguish it from cultural norms (such as prayer in airport terminals), and we are most qualified to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim world. It takes leadership and insight to recognize the critical role American Muslims play in protecting this country; hence I commend this Subcommittee for including our much-needed perspective in this solution-seeking effort. It is important to note that one of the key factors in preventing another 9/11 from happening is the patriotism of the Muslim American community in openly rejecting al-Qaeda as a legitimate group within Islamic discourse. Through counter-terrorism policy papers and public pronouncements against terrorism, such as the Fatwa (legal opinion) of Muslim American scholars, Muslim Americans have separated legitimate Islamic discourse and activity from violent radicalism using religion as a vehicle for mobilization. We recommend that policy-makers and opinion-shapers should apply the same practice. Otherwise, we afford al-Qaeda the only source of legitimacy, the veneer of Islam. As we collectively strive to analyze the reality and possibility of ``homegrown terrorism'' in the West, the bombings in London, Madrid and the recently foiled plots in Canada have fueled public anxiety and the concerns of public officials. In order to effectively counter homegrown terrorism in the U.S., particularly the potential for radicalization of Muslim youth, it is necessary to understand the roots of that extremism and the key factors that may cause one to cross the line from rhetoric to violence. The Muslim Public Affairs Council has just completed the first substantive American Muslim position paper addressing radicalization that contributes to preventing this phenomenon from taking root in U.S. soil by 1) framing the issues related to the radicalization of Muslim youth in the West while considering the realities on the ground, and 2) providing recommendations to Muslim American institutions, government and the media to engage young Muslims in a healthy partnership of respect and equality and subsequently reduce the possibility of radicalization by enhancing integration. For the purpose of today's hearing, I will highlight key parts of this paper entitled, ``Effectively Countering Extremism and Supporting Muslim American Youth.'' The Muslim Public Affairs Council is offering an opportunity to all staff and members of this distinguished committee a briefing on this Muslim Youth paper in Washington, DC, at a time of your convenience. Radicalization and Key Factors The radicalization of young Western Muslims, while on the minds of many, is void of thoughtful analyses that explain core dynamics within Western societies and how they uniquely affect youth within extremely diverse Muslim communities. Only when we delve into the key issues of identity, social and political alienation, the definition of a moderate, and Islamophobia as a root cause of radicalization can we understand and prevent radicalization from taking root in the U.S. First and foremost, when defining radicalization, government agencies across the board must articulate a clear distinction between healthy challenging of the status quo in current affairs with the expression of radical rhetoric, and the willingness to use, support or facilitate violence as a means for change. Until today, the public officials striving to understand and prevent violence have yet to effectively articulate this distinction to the public, particularly the Muslim American community, which has increased the gap of community distrust and suspicion of government officials. Moreover, when law enforcement or anti-academic freedom groups (e.g. Campus Watch) engage in what some have called ``thought policing'', many young Muslim Americans feel alienated. To criticize the lack of free expression in the Muslim world while discouraging the same in the U.S. is perceived to be hypocritical or at least incongruent. As a result Muslim American youth can end up resisting or distrusting mainstream political and civic participation leaving them vulnerable to fringe radical groups. Identity We at MPAC believe that an accurate evaluation of the state of the Muslim American community must be built upon an assessment of the health and vibrancy of the Muslim American Identity. Since the early 1980's, MPAC and its affiliate institutions have focused resources and efforts on building a community of Muslims in America that are forward- looking and contributing components of American pluralism. This and similar Muslim American experiences across the nation aim to build communities that are organic to the global community of Muslims and also at ``home'' in the American project. A recent Gallup poll discussed in our position paper on youth that accounted statistically for the opinions of 1 billion Muslims and their opinions of the West presented data challenging those who argue a ``clash of civilizations'' analysis to explain present concerns around extremism and terrorism. The study's findings further challenge the notion that religiosity and radicalism are two sides of the same coin of terrorism. The inability to realize that religion is an answer to radicalization, that only a good and authentic theology can overcome a zealous and fraudulent one, has led us down a slippery slope of conflating religious conservatism for radicalism or extremism. While rejecting the simplistic ``clash of civilizations'' theory, as realities on the ground including the adoption of the Muslim American Identity have proven false, it is important to recognize the sense of marginalization many youth feel and the importance of reaffirming the contributory role Muslim American youth play in our nations pluralism. Social and Political Alienation It is important to note that the factors that increase the wedge of identity, such as alienation and marginalization of Muslims, vary in the United States and in Europe. MPAC's position paper on youth brings to light the different factors contributing to the more successful integration of Muslim Americans into American pluralism, such as the demographic and structural differences between the U.S. and Europe. As of today, we have not seen a terrorist group forming amongst youth here in the U.S. In fact, the Muslim American community at large has rejected any militancy within the mainstream community and there is no indication that any Al-Qaeda-like movement has gained traction in America. In recent decades, however, some Muslim groups drew young people into communities that attempted to live self-sufficiently from the broader society surrounding them with the intent of living a Puritan life. Throughout the course of American history, the idea of ``separating'' as a race or a religion from the larger society has been viewed repeatedly as an option for the disenfranchised or a desire by immigrant communities to maintain ones identity. It is important to emphasize that in the U.S. experience, none of these social manifestations represented a terrorist threat but were an expression of marginalization, even frustration with current foreign and domestic policies of the U.S. government. Moderates vs. Extremists Much of the global conversation about Islam and Muslims is focused on labeling the different camps of Muslims from a perspective completely out of touch with the realities on the ground. Since our inception in 1988, MPAC has proposed that moderation, particularly of Muslims, cannot be gauged by the political ideas and ideologies that one holds, but rather by ones understanding of moderation as defined by the Qur'an and the tradition of the Prophet. If acquiescence to or active support of American global interest were the test, then characters such as Saddam Hussein and Usama bin Laden would each have qualified at different junctures in their careers. MPAC's position paper details the distinction between a moderate and a radical, the problems that arise when we invoke rhetoric and terminology, such as Islamic Radicalization, and the key to marginalizing the extremists. Suffice it to say, the litmus tests for moderation, rather, revolve around topics such as the role of women in the public square and in leadership roles within Muslim institutions, the impermissibility of the use of violence as a means for political change, the acceptance of disparate segments of the Muslim American community, the rights of non-Muslims in Muslim-majority societies and the role of critical thinking in building the character of a Muslim. When it comes to the topic of reform, it is the sole role of Muslim Americans to lead this discourse within arenas of authentic and well- grounded sources of Islam. Islamophobia: A Root Cause of Radicalization We at MPAC have consistently argued through publications such as our Counterproductive Counterterrorism policy paper and other avenues that much of the hate disguised in counterterrorism is counterproductive, and the anti-Islamic rhetoric will eventually result in impeding our national security and ability to defend the homeland. Too frequently, communities that are excluded from conversations tend to use that exclusion as an excuse to withdraw from any discussion on religious reform and civic engagement. Since the 1980's, MPAC has advocated for civic and political engagement as the key tools for the inclusion of Muslim Americans and the consequent prevention of extremism. Our position paper on youth lists recommendations for Universities, American Muslim institutions, the media, and government to quell the potential for radicalization in the U.S. Here, it is important to highlight some of the relationships MPAC has built with government officials, particularly law enforcement. Muslim Community-Law Enforcement Relations MPAC has been heavily involved in counter-terrorism and outreach efforts in cooperation with national and local law enforcement agencies as well as the equally important efforts of counter-extremism in the Muslim American community with a focus on youth. We have also been engaged with European Muslim communities and governments in numerous arenas on both sides of the Atlantic as well as in Muslim-majority countries in an effort to assess the environments that produce such extremism. Recognizing the importance of engaging young people in planning for the future as a central theme to constructive religious, social and political work, MPAC is committed to building a future generation of leaders. Since the early 1990's, MPAC has worked closely with federal agencies such as the FBI, and has contributed to enhancing our nations security by providing analysis and a unique perspective through direct communication with key officials and thoughtful mediums, such as MPAC's 1999 Counterterrorism Policy Paper. Following 911, many of these relationships have become institutionalized and formalized to some degree, and have expanded to include leadership from other 911-impacted communities on the local and national levels. MPAC currently participates in regular meetings with state and local law enforcement, and on a local and national level, the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigations. The partnership model in Los Angeles I wish to elaborate on is the FBI-initiated Multi-Cultural Advisory Committee (MCAC). As the Government Relations Director of Southern California for the Muslim Public Affairs Council, it is my responsibility to enhance civic engagement amongst the Muslim American community and to ensure that the concerns of the community are being addressed by the appropriate government agencies responsible for those concerns, which is what lead to my participation in MCAC since it's inception. I must start by commending the FBI for being among the first government agencies to recognize the importance of engaging with and outreaching to the community following the horrific attacks of 911. In response to the increasing concerns of American Muslim, Arab, Sikh, South Asian, Coptic Christian, Bahai and Iranian communities in the post-911 era, the FBI initiated the creation of the Multi-Cultural Advisory Committee in 2004. MCAC's mission of creating ``an environment to facilitate dialogue and enhance the relationship between the FBI and the Community, which is based upon mutual respect, understanding, and the protection of Constitutional rights and civil liberties'' is necessary in ensuring communities become part of the solution. Creating and strengthening a two-way line of communication with the government has provided the opportunity for community leaders to raise concerns about policies and procedures and regain confidence in the government when concerns are resolved given their due attention, encouraging the use of community expertise towards problem-solving. While most of what I will share will apply to other communities, I will be addressing the concerns of the Muslim American community. Upon its inception, establishing a strong relationship with the FBI and the grassroots Muslim American community was burdened with external factors such as cultural baggage, particularly cultural distrust due to previous experiences within the indigenous African American Muslim community, and suspicion of law enforcement by first and second- generation Muslims due to experiences in ones country of origin, where police were an extension of an oppressive regime. Muslim leadership and the FBI have continued to jointly craft solutions to these challenges such as providing constructive feedback on watch lists for the purpose of enhancing efficacy and avoiding wrongful inclusion of innocent people; increasing direct communication between the FBI and community members to ensure the sharing of accurate information and citizens have direct access to their public servants; and providing cultural sensitivity trainings to law enforcement designed to increase sensitivity toward the community. These efforts have been successful in breaking down the communication barrier, and they must continue, as the road ahead is a long one. Unfortunately, several internal factors have and continue to inhibit the relationship to some degree, much of which are due to the bureaucracy in the FBI rather than the lack of desire for engagement by the community. The names of innocent citizens landing on watchlists, controversy around high profile cases, the use of informants, the use of foreign intelligence in the prosecution of domestic cases, and the conflation of every criminal activity by Muslims that makes it's way to public media as terrorism are just a few issues that drive a wedge between the FBI and the Muslim American community. The perception of the community has become one where they believe they are viewed as suspect rather than partner in the War on Terror, and that their civil liberties are ``justifiably'' sacrificed upon the decisions of federal agents. So the task of building the level of communication, trust and confidence with the Muslim American community has become much more challenging. It is the responsibility of the FBI to provide clarity in the midst of confusion, and of the community to ensure accurate information surpasses the rumors that can cause fear and alienation. Here, I'd like to highlight an example of a success. Following a series of politically controversial events held by Muslim students at the University of California, Irvine, Pat Rose, the head of the FBI's Orange County al-Qaida squad was quoted as saying her agency was looking for and electronically monitoring potential terrorists in Orange County. Rose also said that the FBI is aware of large numbers of Muslims at UCI and USC, and was ``quite surprised'' that ``there are a lot of individuals of interest right here in Orange County.'' The publication and timing of this quote caused an uproar in Muslim youth and the Orange County Muslim community, as they understood these comments to suggest that the FBI was monitoring student groups, possibly due to organizing unpopular but nevertheless legal political events on campus. In efforts to nip this rumor in the bud, FBI Assistant Director in Charge of the Los Angeles field office, Stephen Tidwell, clarified these remarks at an emergency town hall meeting of youth, parents and other community members in Irvine in June 2006, and in a written statement in July 2006. While some were skeptical of Tidwell's clarification, this swift response by the FBI should serve as an example to the importance of disseminating accurate information about FBI operations and answering to the legitimate grievances of community members. Many challenges remain ahead, and despite the deficiencies in partnerships that currently exist, the MCAC model is an example of how to create and maintain partnership, understanding, information sharing, and bridge building between government officials and community members. The responsibility to maintain a successful partnership falls on both parties. For instance, government public pronouncements about criminal activity should avoid the conflated use of terrorism terminology that implicates Islam and motivations sourced in Muslim culture and Islamic tradition. Moreover, when cases that are championed as terrorism- related are resolved with no relation to issues related to Islam or the American Muslim community, law enforcement should clearly and loudly inform the public. In tandem, community members should continue to engage their public officials, and ensure decision-makers and public servants are addressing their concerns, while we continue to collectively think of innovative ways to participate in the protection of the country and the principles upon which it was founded. Tensions that will challenge the partnership will certainly arise, but we must patiently persevere to create and maintain positive, constructive relations as we find each other on the frontlines of protecting this nation. Sincere partnership based on accurate and responsible communication sharing, the recognition of the critical role the community plays in enhancing our nations security, and collective problem solving is a key tool in preventing radicalization from taking root in our soil. I thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I welcome your questions. Ms. Harman. Thank you very much. J. Edgar Hoover was not a former President. He was Director of the FBI. I just think the record should show that, editorial comments from my colleagues notwithstanding. Mr. Jenkins, you are now recognized for five minutes. STATEMENT OF BRIAN JENKINS, SENIOR ADVISOR, RAND CORPORATION Mr. Jenkins. Madam Chair, members of the Committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to talk to you about the subject today. I'm not going to try to summarize my testimony but let me simply highlight a couple of points and in doing so underscore some of the remarks that were made earlier. First of all, we do have a problem. Although we have achieved undeniable success in degrading the operational capabilities of our jihadist terrorist foes, we have had far less success in reducing the radicalization and recruitment that supports the jihadist campaign. This is going to be a long-term problem. You have to understand that the campaign is above all a missionary enterprise, much more than a military contest. Terrorist operations are intended above all to insight and attract recruits. Recruiting is not meant merely to fill operational needs. It is an end in itself. Despite the importance of recruiting, however, to the jihadist foe, we are not dealing with a centralized recruiting structure. That would be too easy. Recruiting has always been defused, localized, informal and, indeed, self-radicalization was often the norm even before the worldwide crackdown on al- Qa'ida and its jihadist allies forced them to decentralize. The message from the global jihad is aimed directly at the individual. It argues that the Islamic community is under assault. It is threatened, in their view, by military attack, by cultural corruption, by social disintegration, by substandard zeal. The antidote to all of these threats is jihad. Jihad not as a spiritual quest but as a violent action. Don't underestimate the appeal of this narrative, especially to angry young men. It offers a possibility of adventure, the lure of clandestinity, a sense of direction, a seemingly nobel cause, and the eventual promise of paradise. Personal problems do play a role unquestionably. Recruits often come from dysfunctional families. They have experience in some cases disruptive relocations. They suffer identity crisis. They feel alienation. In some cases they are in trouble with the law. Some of these problems come with immigration. Some of them are typical of the age group. The bottom line here is there is no single psychological profile and no obvious indicator that is going to permit targeted intervention. We talked about the problem earlier here that Europe faces. Fortunately the United States does not face the same problem as Europe. Europe is confronted with large numbers of poor immigrants entering legally and illegally from the Middle East and the Maghreb. American by contrast is a distant destination. American's recent Muslim immigrants tend to be better educated, better off, more easily integrated moreover. We know how to do this in a certain sense. As a nation of immigrants we don't demand cultural assimilation as a prerequisite to citizenship. Certainly accented English is no barrier to achievement in this country. These are some inherent strengths we have as a nation of immigrants. At the same time, however, since 9/11 a number of arrests, discoveries of terrorist plots indicate that radicalization and recruitment are taking place here in this country. What can we do? We can try to block the message. Of course, that raises issues of free speech. But, in fact, I think we can do a lot better than we have here. This is a nation that invented marketing, invented the internet, and yet when it comes to our response here we are pretty flatfooted. We can try to remove the inciters. We can try to focus instead on identifying and monitoring recruiting venues. That has some promise. The recruiting process seems to not be very efficient. In reducing the number of retail outlets, in fact, would seriously impede recruiting. We can try to dissuade potential recruits. We can try to enlist the broader community. Whatever we do should be guided by some basic principles that reflect our values and preserve our strengths. We have talked about moving in the direction of a more preventive posture, protecting vulnerable members of society from recruitment down destructive paths, protecting society against destruction. A more preventive or more preemptive posture is going to mean in some cases changing the rules. But although we can change the rules, rules must prevail. Extra judicial measures I always think are unacceptable and dangerous. As a nation of immigrants we have been successful at integrating new arrivals without specific policies beyond guaranteeing equal opportunity and fairness to all so long as they obey our laws. This success makes one wary of government programs aimed at specific ethnic or immigration groups. Faith alone should never be the basis for suspicion but religion should provide no shield for subversion. We don't have to be shy about going after hatred and exhortation to violence even when they are cloaked as religious belief. Final couple of points here is we do need good intelligence at the local level. That has been said time and time again. Finally, whatever we do with regard to intelligence or our response has to be done with strict oversight and a sense of proportion to the threat. We should not by our very efforts to protect society against terrorism destroy what may be our best defense, a free and tolerant society. [The statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:] Prepared Statement of Brian Michael Jenkins \1\ Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment \2\ Madame Chair: I appreciate the opportunity to be here today where you have experienced homegrown terror firsthand to discuss the issues of radicalization and how to protect the homeland. Although the United States and its allies have achieved undeniable success in degrading the operational capabilities of jihadist terrorists worldwide, they have had less success in reducing the radicalization and recruitment that support the jihadist enterprise. Nearly five years after 9/11, a 2006 National Intelligence Estimate concluded that ``activists identifying themselves as jihadists. . . are increasing in both number and geographic dispersion.'' As a consequence, ``the operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow in importance to U.S. counterterrorism efforts, particularly abroad, but also in the Homeland.'' \3\ In testimony before the Senate, FBI Director Robert Mueller indicated concern about extremist recruitment in prisons, schools, and universities ``inside the United States.'' \4\ In March of this year, Charles Allen, Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security, concurred that ``radicalization will continue to expand within the United States over the long term.'' \5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. \2\ This testimony is available for free download at http:// www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT278. \3\ U.S. Government, Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate ``Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States.'' April 2006. \4\ Testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Before the Senate Committee on Intelligence, February 16, 2005. \5\ Testimony of Charles E. Allen, Assistant Secretary, Intelligence and Analysis, Chief Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland Security Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, March 7, 2007. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Recently, we have begun to focus more attention on what I refer to in my book as the ``front end'' of the jihadist cycle.\6\ Growing concern has produced a growing volume of literature on the topic.\7\ My testimony today will simply highlight a few areas for further discussion: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ Brian Michael Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006. See specifically pp. 123-132. \7\ Edwin Bakker, Jihadists in Europe--Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in which They Joined the Jihad: An Exploratory Study, Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2006. Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component of the War --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Building an army of believers--how the jihadists recruit Radicalization and recruitment in the United States How we might impede radicalization and recruitment, and Guiding principles for any actions we might consider. These comments derive from my own study of terrorism over the years, and from a large body of research done by my colleagues at the RAND Corporation.\8\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ See for example, Scott Gerwehr and Sara Daly, ``Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment,'' in David G. Kamien (ed.), The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005, pp. 73--89; William Rosenau, ``Al Qaeda Recruitment in the United States: A Preliminary Assessment,'' MIPT Yearbook 2004. Oklahoma City: Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2004, pp.23--31. See also Kim Cragin and Sara Daly, The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World, Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, MG-246-AF, and Angel Rabasa, et al, The Muslim World After 9/11, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004. Building An Army Of Believers More than a military contest, the jihadist campaign is above all a missionary enterprise. Jihadist terrorist operations are intended to attract attention, demonstrate capability, and harm the jihadists' enemies, but they are also aimed at galvanizing the Muslim community and, above all, inciting and attracting recruits to the cause. Recruiting is not merely meant to fill operational needs. It is an end in itself: It aims at creating a new mindset. At one time, al Qaeda dispatched recruiters, but the jihadists never created a central recruiting organization. Instead, they relied upon a loose network of like-minded extremists who constantly proselytized on behalf of jihad. Recruiting was always diffused, localized, and informal. Self-radicalization was often the norm, even before the worldwide crackdown on al Qaeda and its jihadist allies forced them to decentralize and disperse. Those who arrived at jihadist training camps were already radicalized. At the camps, they bonded through shared beliefs and hardships, underwent advanced training, gained combat experience, and were selected by al-Qaeda's planners for specific terrorist operations. There is a distinction between radicalization and recruitment. Radicalization comprises internalizing a set of beliefs, a militant mindset that embraces violent jihad as the paramount test of one's conviction. It is the mental prerequisite to recruitment. Recruitment is turning others or transforming oneself into a weapon of jihad. It means joining a terrorist organization or bonding with like-minded individuals to form an autonomous terrorist cell. It means going operational, seeking out the means and preparing for an actual terrorist operation--the ultimate step in jihad. Worldwide, radicalization and recruiting vary from country to country. In some places, such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Chechnya, potential recruits are already members of a locally dominant culture and may be involved in an on-going conflict that seeks independence, autonomy, or nationwide adherence to a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. They draw on local tradition and, in some cases, family histories of resistance. The local population is sympathetic to their cause, although it may not always support their actions.\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ For an informative discussion of the different routes to radicalization, see Matenia Sirseloudi and Peter Waldman, ``Where Does the Radicalization Lead? Radical Community, Radical Networks and Radical Subcultures,'' forthcoming. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the core Arab countries, where potential jihadists may share the basic beliefs of the dominant national culture or a fundamentalist subculture, they confront hostility and oppression from the central political authorities and therefore must go abroad or operate underground. The situation in the West is still different, and there are further differences between recruiting in Europe, where there are large and largely unassimilated Muslim immigrant populations, and recruiting in the United States, a nation with a long tradition of assimilating immigrants. Potential jihadist recruits in Western countries are part of a marginalized immigrant subculture or are themselves cut off even from family and friends within that community. The more vulnerable are those who are at a stage of life where they are seeking an identity, while looking for approval and validation. They are searching for causes that can be religiously and culturally justified, that provide them a way to identify who they are, and that provide a clear call for action. The jihadist agenda is action-oriented, claims to be religiously justified, and appeals to this relatively young, action-oriented population. Self-radicalization begins the day that an individual seeks out jihadist websites. In the real world they seek support among local jihadist mentors and like-minded fanatics. This is the group that currently poses the biggest danger to the West. Jihadists recruit one person at a time. The message from the global jihad is aimed directly at the individual. It argues that the Islamic community faces assault from aggressive infidels and their apostate allies; it is threatened by military attack, cultural corruption, social disintegration, and substandard zeal. The antidote to these threats is jihad, not as a spiritual quest, but as an armed defense. This is a religious obligation incumbent upon all true believers. Al Qaeda's brand of jihad offers a comprehensive and uncomplicated solution--the possibility of adventure, a ``legitimate'' outlet for aggression, the lure of clandestinity, pride, camaraderie, an elixir to cure all ills, an antidote to anxiety, an achievable goal, a seemingly noble cause, a sense of direction and meaning in life, and the eventual promise of earthly pleasures in the hereafter. It is a message that is especially attractive to angry young men and frustrated, compliant individuals. Becoming a jihadist is a gradual, multi-step process that can take months, even years, although since 9/11 the pace has accelerated. The journey may begin in a mosque where a radical Imam preaches, in informal congregations and prayer groups--some of which are clandestine--in schools, in prisons, on the Internet. The process starts with incitement--a message that commands and legitimizes violent jihad--and it combines self-selection and persuasion by jihadist recruiters. Volunteers are recruited into a universe of belief, not a single destination. Eager acolytes may coalesce into an autonomous cell, as did the original Hamburg group that later carried out the 9/11 attack, or they may join an existing local group. Individuals may be moved along to training camps or be persuaded by jihadist exhortation to act on their own. Becoming a jihadist may involve a series of invitations and proofs of commitment; it may also involve training abroad. Proceeding to the next step, ultimately to act, is always an individual decision. Volunteers move on by self-selection. There may be powerful peer pressure, but there is no coercion. Submission is voluntary. Not all recruits complete the journey. Commitment is constantly calibrated and re-recalibrated. Some drop out along the way. A component of our counter-recruiting strategy must be to always offer a safe way back from the edge. Jihadist recruiting emphasizes various themes: Honor, dignity, and duty versus humiliation, shame, and guilt. Fighting is God's mandate, a religious duty--paradise is guaranteed to those who join jihad. Jihad provides an opportunity to demonstrate commitment, courage, prowess as a warrior, and although it is not explicit in the recruiting, jihad is a license for violence. At the very least, it provides vicarious participation in war through martial arts, paintball battles, reconnaissance of potential targets, and endless discussion of fantasy terrorist plans. Short of preparing for a specific attack, it is hard to define the exact point at which one becomes a jihadist: Internalization of jihadist ideology? Bonding with brothers at a jihadist retreat? Downloading jihadist literature or bomb-making instructions from the Internet? Fantasizing about terrorist operations? Reconnoitering potential targets? Going to Pakistan? Signing a contract to pray for the jihadists, collect money, or support operations? Taking an oath of loyalty to Osama bin Laden? The legal definition is broad. Personal problems also play a role. Recruits often come from dysfunctional families, have experienced disruptive relocations, suffer identity crises, face uncertain futures, feel alienation; many are in trouble with authorities. Some of the problems are typical of the age group, and some come with immigration. Many recruits in the West are second- or third-generation immigrants. Others display the zeal typical of new converts. But jihadists also include sons of well-off families, people with promising careers, and individuals who are seemingly well- adjusted. There is no ingle psychological profile and no obvious indicator to permit targeted intervention. While the jihadist message is widely and increasingly disseminated, the actual connection with the jihadist enterprise, outside of Middle Eastern and Asian madrassahs, appears random, depending on personal acquaintance, finding a radical mosque, or being spotted by a recruiter. That, in turn, suggests that the numbers are driven not merely by the appeal of the jihadist narrative, but also by the number of ``retail outlets'' where recruiters can meet potential recruits. The recruiting process, therefore, seems to be not very efficient-- the yield is low. However, only a few converts suffice to carry out terrorist operations. Nevertheless, this suggests that reducing the number of suspected recruiting venues would seriously impede jihadist recruiting. Radicalization And Recruiting In The United States Neither imported nor homegrown terrorism is new in the United States. Many immigrant groups have brought the quarrels of their homeland with them. Anti-Castro Cubans, Croatian separatists, Puerto Rican separatists, Armenian extremists, Taiwanese separatists, earlier cohorts of Islamist extremists have all carried on terrorist campaigns on U.S. soil, along with domestic ethnic groups, right-wing extremists, and ideologically driven fanatics. A homegrown conspiracy (albeit with foreign assistance) was responsible for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. Another homegrown conspiracy carried out the devastating 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City. The United States, over the years, has successfully suppressed these groups through domestic intelligence collection and law enforcement. However, Europe faces different problems. With a population of 350 million, Europe is home to between 30 and 50 million Muslims--estimates vary. By 2025, one-third of all children born in Europe will be of the Muslim faith. In contrast, the United States, with a population of 300 million, has approximately 4.7 million Muslims, most of them native Americans. Of the 3.5 million Arab-Americans in the United States, fewer than 25 percent are Muslim. Large numbers of poor immigrants enter Europe legally and illegally from the Maghreb and Middle East, and assimilation is a problem. America, in contrast, is a distant destination for the Arab and Muslim masses; its recent Muslim immigrants tend to be better educated, better off, and more easily integrated. As a nation of immigrants, America does not demand cultural assimilation as a prerequisite to citizenship, and accented English is no barrier to achievement. These are inherent national strengths. Since 9/11, U.S. authorities have uncovered a number of alleged individual terrorists and terrorist rings, including clusters in Lackawanna, Northern Virginia, Portland, New York City, and Lodi and Torrance, California. In all, several dozen persons have been convicted of providing material support to a terrorist organization, a crime that U.S. courts have interpreted broadly, or related crimes. Others, without demonstrable connections to terrorism, have been expelled for immigration offenses. Most of those arrested have been young men of Middle Eastern or South Asian descent. They include both native and naturalized citizens, although almost all are citizens. Most were Muslims by birth, although some are converts. Most of them have been middle-class, with educations ranging from less than high school to postgraduate degrees. They represent diverse professions, and some are veterans of military service. The Lackawanna, Northern Virginia, and Portland groups began to radicalize before 9/11, while the individuals in New York City, Lodi, and Torrance were more recent arrivals in the jihadist universe. The Northern Virginia and Portland groups planned to join jihadist groups abroad; those in New York City, Lodi, and Torrance contemplated action in the United States; the Lackawanna group had no apparent operational plans. These arrests, along with intelligence operations, indicate that radicalization and recruiting are taking place in the United States, but there is no evidence of a significant cohort of terrorist operatives. We therefore worry most about terrorist attacks by very small conspiracies or individuals, which nonetheless could be equivalent to the London subway bombings or the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. This suggests that efforts should be made to enhance the intelligence capabilities of local police, who through community policing, routine criminal investigations, or dedicated intelligence operations may be best positioned to uncover future terrorist plots. Of these, continued intelligence operations are the most important. Radicalization makes little noise. It occurs in an area protected by the First and Fourth Amendments. It takes place over a long period of time. It therefore does not lend itself to a traditional criminal investigations approach. Impeding Radicalization And Recruitment How might we best impede radicalization and recruiting? Let me suggest several possible angles of approach. These are not recommendations; they are options aimed at provoking further discussion, and each raises a number of questions. Blocking The Message. Is exhortation to violence free speech protected by the First Amendment, or does it fall into the category of conduct that can be legally prohibited? Can Internet content be controlled? European governments argue that it can be. Clearly, the Internet is a new battlefield in the jihadist campaign, and the U.S. Army is reportedly preparing an assault on jihadist websites.\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ Jim Michaels, ``Military Readies Internet Assault: Terrorist Activity Expands on Web,'' USA Today, March 28, 2007. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- But does the United States need a new information service to wage an information war? A new United States Information Agency? If so, where should it be located within our government? How can anti-jihadist messages be facilitated? Would distributing such messages violate rules against domestic propaganda? Current law does allow messages against drugs, drunk driving, smoking, domestic abuse, dropping out of school, and publicizing the identity of wanted gang leaders. Can we do the same with jihad? Removing The Inciters. Should the United States, like the United Kingdom, seek to expel foreign-born clerics who incite hatred and violence? Should institutions that host those exhorting violence lose their tax-free status and face other restrictions? Can foreign contributions be blocked when they clearly support radicalization? Are inciters legitimate targets of intelligence efforts? Should messages of hate and their authors be publicly exposed? How can alternative role models be publicized? Focusing On Recruiting Venues. Recruiting for jihad takes place both inside and outside of identified radical mosques and other known venues. These ``retail outlets'' can be identified and monitored. Surveillance, real and imagined, of recruiting venues can inform authorities of possible terrorist plots and may discourage recruiting. The 2004 Herald Square Case in New York City is a good example of the methods, patience, and persistence that are needed to identify, understand, and thwart a jihadist recruitment that would have resulted in a terrorist attack. In fact, the New York Police Department has developed a very sophisticated understanding of the radicalization process and, in my view, has made some of the greatest strides in addressing it.\11\ Prisons are another recruiting venue that could be better controlled. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ An insightful analysis of radicalization and recruitment is provided by Arvin Bhatt and Mitchell Silber in ``Radicalization in the West and the Homegrown Threat,'' forthcoming. Dissuading Potential Recruits. Can the community offer attractive alternatives to potential recruits--national and community service, education and technical training, sports, etc.? Can at least some imprisoned jihadists be rehabilitated to counter the recruiting message? Imprisoned terrorists in Italy were offered reduced sentences in return for renunciations of violence and cooperation with the authorities. Current programs to rehabilitate imprisoned jihadists in Singapore and Yemen may also provide valuable experience. Enlisting The Broader Community. Can we implement educational programs at mosques and community centers, as Singapore is also doing, to expose the nature of jihadist ideology? The absence of significant terrorist attacks or even advanced terrorist plots in the United States since 9/11 is good news that cannot be entirely explained by increased intelligence and heightened security. It suggests that America's Muslim population may be less susceptible than the Muslim population in Europe, if not entirely immune to jihadist ideology; indeed, there appear to be countervailing voices within the American Muslim community. Conversely it may merely indicate that the American Muslim population has not yet been exposed to the degree, variety, of radicalization as that of its European counterparts. This ``success,'' or temporary reprieve, whatever its explanation, suggests in turn that we move cautiously to fix what may not be broken while realizing that the threat from radicalization continues to grow. Some Guiding Principles Society's purpose in this area is twofold: to deter vulnerable individuals from recruitment into destructive paths and to protect society itself against destruction--this may require preemptive intervention before manifest criminal behavior occurs. However, the first principle must be to do no greater harm, to avoid misguided policies, needless hassles that only create enemies. A more permissive intelligence environment, society's demand to intervene before terrorist attacks occur will inevitably result in occasional errors. These should not be the basis for dismantling intelligence efforts or imposing unreasonable controls: Errors should produce prompt apologies. Systematic abuse should be punished. Rules may be altered, but rules must prevail--assertions of extraordinary wartime authority or extrajudicial measures are unacceptable and dangerous. Domestic intelligence, surveillance, the rendering safe of dangerous ideologies are delicate undertakings that, as we already have seen, can slide into despotic behavior. A nation of immigrants, America has been successful at integrating new arrivals without specific policies beyond guaranteeing equal opportunity and fairness to all, so long as they obey its laws. This success makes one wary of government programs aimed at specific ethic or emigre communities. We owe immigrants nothing more than freedom, freedom from exploitation, freedom for prejudice, tolerance of different cultures and customs, and fair access to opportunity. In return, immigrants are not asked to abandon their faith or customs. They are required only to abide by the same laws and rules that govern our behavior. Proposed measures must fit the magnitude of the threat. Isolated terrorist attacks can always occur, as they have in the past and almost certainly will in the future, but at present there is no significant jihadist underground in this country. Good domestic intelligence can discourage overreaction as well as contribute to deterrence. Faith alone should cast no shadow of suspicion, but religion should provide no shield for subversion--society need not be shy about attacking hatred and exhortation to violence even when they are cloaked as religious belief. Protecting the freedom of religion may require enforced tolerance--that is, attacking exhortations to violence--in order to protect the freedom of all. Incitement to violence, especially when there is an expectation that it will lead to action, is not protected by the First Amendment. A sensible response requires a broad understanding of community structure and dynamics--innocent enterprises may at times be the subjects of official inquiry, if only to dismiss them from further scrutiny; intelligence activities should not imply suspicion. Intervention measures should not isolate, alienate, stigmatize, or antagonize the communities in which recruiters look for quarry. It is important to keep lines of communication open at all levels of government. This is community policing in its broadest sense, but the collection of intelligence and initiatives aimed at maintaining dialogue among communities and faiths are best handled at the local community level. Whatever we do must be done with strict oversight and a sense of proportion to the threat. We should not, by our very efforts to protect society against terrorism, destroy what may be our best defense--a free and tolerant society. Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Gersten. STATEMENT OF DAVID GERSTEN, DIRECTOR, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Mr. Gersten. Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for providing me with the opportunity to testify today. It is a privilege to testify alongside other dedicated public servants and community leaders. In seeking to counter the phenomenon of radicalization, it is critical that our country better understand and engage Muslim communities, both in America and around the world. We believe that engaging key communities can help prevent the isolation and alienation that many believe are necessary precursors for radicalization. I look forward to working with this Committee to tackle this complex issue. Today, I want to specifically address the Department's work with American Arab and Muslim communities. Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Daniel Sutherland, launched the work of our Office in April 2003, he quickly realized that many of the issues facing us would be those affecting Americans of Arab descent and those of the Muslim faith. Therefore, the Department has embarked on a project to develop, cultivate, and maintain dialogue with key leaders of the American Arab and Muslim communities. We believe that we will be a much safer country if we learn to improve our work through listening to their concerns and ideas and if we receive help from key leaders in explaining our security mission to their constituents. We will have a greater impact in all of these efforts if we share best practices and experiences in community engagement and invite our non-Federal Government partners to participate in our dialogue with these communities. When appropriate, we should offer materials and facilitate training for our local partners to empower and advise them. Likewise, we should always be open to learning from them. We have invested a great deal of time in developing an infrastructure for success in this area. We have cemented positive relationships and we now know many of the concerns of these communities including aviation watch lists, encounters at the border and, of course, foreign policy. While most of their concerns are recent and related to post-9/11 security efforts, we in government are now better able to appreciate and welcome faith-based viewpoints as a result of our investment of time engaging on these immediate concerns. We also have some understanding of the level of trust and cooperation between community leaders and state and local authorities. Finally, we now have a better understanding of what the government wants and needs from these communities and what these communities want from government. Based on this infrastructure, we have been very active in trying to engage with these communities. As with all outreach efforts, the government must be careful to choose constructive partners. By the same token, community members are careful to meet with government officials who they believe will be reliable partners. Much of our Office's work has involved bringing leadership to the interagency engagement effort. Recently national community leaders have had substantive meetings with the Secretary Chertoff, the Director of the FBI, and others. Our Office has arranged for local officials to participate with us in engaging these communities, most recently hosting Los Angeles Deputy Mayor Hari Falicon at our Los Angeles roundtable. The Assistant Attorney General at the Justice Department hosts regular meetings between government agencies and national civil rights organizations. This type of engagement also takes place across the country under our sponsorship at CRCL in regularly scheduled meetings in cities such as Houston, Chicago, and Buffalo. Since October I have led the meeting here in Los Angeles. In Detroit, the U.S. Attorney has asked Daniel Sutherland to chair the regular meeting there. These meetings typically begin with a substantive presentation by the government on an issue of concern such as redress for travel screening and misidentifications. Then we provide an opportunity for the communities to specify issues of concern. In addition to this engagement through a project we call ``Civil Liberties University,'' we have developed training that provides new skills and competencies for our front-line officers and their State and local partners. For example, we have just released an intensive training DVD for personnel who interact with Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, and people from the broader Arab and Muslim world. We have also produced educational materials on how to screen individuals who wear common Muslim and Sikh head coverings, training on how to screen those of the Sikh faith who carry a kirpan, and a tutorial on the Department's policy prohibiting racial profiling. In addition to producing training and building bridges with community leaders, we have also developed strong relationships across the Federal Government and with many state and local authorities and with allied governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. Again, our goal is to develop, cultivate and maintain dialogue with key leaders of the American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities. Let me finally highlight a few steps that we believe need to be taken at this time: First, we must deepen the engagement; we must take all of this activity to the next level including connecting more with young people from these communities. Second, we must institutionalize these efforts for success over the long term. The work we are trying to do is also taking place at our sister agencies and at the vital level by state and local authorities who interact with members of these communities where they live. We need to ensure that state and local governments are equipped with resources to reach out and connect with these communities all the while helping them comply with civil rights and civil liberties. Finally, we must challenge the communities to get involved. We need to challenge them to help us increase the integration and assimilation of new immigrants. This, too, is a job that local communities are best posed to accomplish. We need to challenge community leaders to spread understanding of our security mission. In conclusion, we must recognize that this work will not be easy. We have to make sure that those who believe in cementing positive relationships are voices that shape opinions. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I welcome your questions. [The statement of Mr. Gersten follows:] Prepared Statement of David D. Gersten Introduction Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for providing me the opportunity to testify today. It is a privilege to testify alongside other dedicated public servants and community leaders. I hope that our testimonies today will demonstrate how closely our offices are working together to tackle the issues you are considering. In seeking to counter the phenomenon of radicalization, it is critical that our country better understand and engage Muslim communities, both in America and around the world. Though there is no magic formula, we believe that engaging key communities and promoting civic participation can help prevent the isolation and alienation that many believe are necessary precursors for radicalization. I look forward to working with this Committee to tackle this complex issue. Mission of the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties In accordance with 6 U.S.C. Sec. 345, the mission of the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties is to assist the dedicated men and women of the Department of Homeland Security to enhance the security of our country while also preserving our freedoms and our way of life. In essence, we provide advice to our colleagues on issues at the intersection of homeland security and civil rights and civil liberties. We work on issues as wide ranging as: developing redress mechanisms related to watch lists; integrating people with disabilities into the emergency management system; ensuring appropriate conditions of detention for immigrant detainees; reviewing how the Department’s use of technology and its approach to information sharing impacts civil liberties; adopting equal employment opportunities policies to create a model federal agency; and, ensuring that information technology is accessible to people with disabilities. Since its inception, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties has worked to help the Department establish and cement positive relationships with a variety of ethnic and religious communities, and the organizations that represent them. We have worked with Catholic and Protestant organizations concerned with immigration law and policy, with Sikh Americans concerned about various screening policies, with the leaders of the Amish community regarding identification issues, and with Jewish community groups on a wide variety of issues. Today, I want to specifically address the Department’s work with American Arab and Muslim communities, but it is important to remember that the work I describe is part of a broader effort to ensure that all communities in this country are active participants in the homeland security effort. Engagement with American Arab and Muslim Communities When the Department of Homeland Security'S Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Daniel Sutherland, launched the work of our Office in April 2003, he quickly realized that many of the issues facing us would be those affecting Americans of Arab descent and those of the Muslim faith. There was an opportunity to do much more than solve specific isolated problems. These communities want to have two-way communication with the government--certainly they want to be able to raise complaints about various situations or policies, but they also want to be invited to roll up their sleeves and help find solutions. Therefore, the Department has embarked on a project to develop, cultivate, and maintain partnerships with key leaders of the American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities. We believe that a critical element of our strategy for securing this country is to build a level of communication, trust, and confidence that is unprecedented in our nation's history. We believe that we will be a much safer country if we better connect the government to these strong communities; if we learn to improve our work through listening to their concerns and ideas; if we convince more young people from these communities to join public service; if we receive their help in educating us about the challenges we face; and, if we receive help from key leaders in explaining our security mission to their constituents. We will have a greater impact in all of these efforts if our State and local authorities create similar models of engagement on their own accord. Just as the Federal government shares information and intelligence needed to save lives and protect our communities, we must also share best practices and experiences in community engagement and invite our non-federal government partners to participate in our dialogue with these communities. When appropriate, we should offer materials and facilitate training for our local partners to empower and advise them. Likewise, we should always be open to learning from them. Infrastructure We have invested a great deal of time in developing an infrastructure for success. For example, we now know many key leaders of the American Arab and Muslim communities. We have solid lines of communication with community activists, renowned scholars, and business leaders; we have established good links with professional and social organizations; and we have constructive and frank interactions with many of the leading civil rights organizations. In short, we have cemented positive relationships with key figures and civil society institutions in these communities. We now know many of the concerns of these communities. We know that these include: aviation watch lists; immigration processing; encounters at the border; investigative methods; detention and removal; and, of course, foreign policy. We know that government works best when it is not intrusive and it is encouraging to note that socio-economic indicators point to widespread achievement and assimilation among American Arab and Muslim communities. While most of their concerns are recent and related to post-9-11 security efforts, we in government are now better able to appreciate and welcome faith-based viewpoints as a result of our investment of time engaging on immediate concerns. We also have some understanding of the level of trust and cooperation between representatives of these communities and State and local authorities. Finally, we now have a better understanding of what the government wants and needs from American Arab and Muslim communities, and what these communities want from the government. Engagement Based on this infrastructure, we have been very active in trying to engage with these communities. This applies, as well, to our colleagues at the Department of Justice, FBI, Treasury, and others, who have all made concerted efforts in this regard. Of course, as with all outreach efforts, the government must be careful to choose constructive people to partner with, and, by the same token, community members are careful to meet with government officials who they believe will be reliable partners. Much of our Office's work has involved bringing leadership to the interagency engagement effort. Together with our partners in other agencies, we have worked hard to ensure that national organizations have access to leaders here in Washington. Within the past several months, national community leaders have had substantive meetings with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, the Secretary of Treasury and others. Our Office has arranged for local officials to participate with us in engaging these communities, most recently hosting Los Angeles Deputy Mayor for Homeland Security & Public Safety Arif Alikhan at our regular L.A. roundtable which I will describe further in a moment. These are not simply occasional meetings, but are becoming part of the structure of our work. For example, several senior leaders of our Department have met with community leaders in both formal and informal settings over the past several months. Moreover, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights at the Justice Department hosts regular meetings between government agencies, including the Departments of Homeland Security, State, Treasury, Education and Transportation, and national civil rights organizations. This engagement takes place across the country. The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties now actively leads or participates in regularly scheduled meetings with leaders from these communities in cities such as Houston, Chicago, and Buffalo. Since October, I have led the meeting here in Los Angeles. In Detroit, the U.S. Attorney has asked Daniel Sutherland to chair the regular meeting there, referred to as ``BRIDGES.'' In all of these venues, the local leaders of the DHS component agencies participate, usually along with the U.S. Attorneys' offices and the FBI. These meetings typically include two to three dozen people around a table in a conference room, at either a government agency or a community center. The meetings typically begin with a substantive presentation by the government on an issue of concern, such as redress for watch list misidentifications. Then, old business is discussed – government agencies are asked to provide updated information on issues that have been raised in previous meetings. Finally, the communities present new issues to discuss with the agencies. As you can see, the meetings provide an opportunity for the communities to learn information about significant new government projects, as well as to raise specific issues of concern in a format that emphasizes accountability for answers. Building capacity Our Office is also working hard to build the capacity of our workforce to address the new challenges that face us. Through a project we call “Civil Liberties University,” we have developed training that provides new skills and competencies for our front-line officers and their State and local partners. For example, we have just released an intensive training DVD for Department personnel who interact with Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, and people from the broader Arab and Muslim world. The training includes insights from four national and international experts--an Assistant U.S. Attorney who is Muslim, a member of the National Security Council who is Muslim, an internationally renowned scholar of Islamic studies, and a civil rights attorney who advocates on issues of concern to Arab American and Muslim American communities. As with many of the materials we produce, our Federal and non-Federal partners have also found this training module on Arab and Muslim cultures useful. Last month our Office made available this DVD to nearly 600 fusion center directors and local, State, tribal, and Federal law enforcement officers within intelligence units attending the National Fusion Center Conference in Florida. This training program has been applauded by the communities who believe that they will be treated with more dignity and professionalism if front-line officers understand their cultures, traditions, and values; and, by our colleagues in the Department who believe that such training will help them do their jobs more efficiently and effectively. We have also produced educational materials with guidance to Department personnel on how to screen and, if necessary, search individuals who wear common Muslim and Sikh head coverings; training on how to screen those of the Sikh faith who carry a kirpan, or ceremonial religious dagger; and a tutorial on the Department's policy prohibiting racial profiling. This type of training is truly a win-win situation: our workforce and state and local partners win by acquiring new skills that they need to better carry out their jobs; and, we all win because American Arab and Muslim communities gain confidence that their insights and contributions are welcomed in the homeland security effort. Incident Management Team If there is another terrorist attack on the United States, American Arab, Muslim, and South Asian communities would likely be at center stage. These communities may be a focus of investigative activity, rightly or wrongly, and quite possibly could be victims of racist retaliation. These communities could also be important keys to calming tensions throughout the Nation, assisting law enforcement in locating the perpetrators and serving as public spokespersons in the media. Therefore, it is critical that the U.S. Government be in contact with leaders from these communities in the hours and days after an incident. As a result, we have established an ``Incident Management Team'' that will connect government officials with key leaders of these communities in the event of another attack on our country. This Incident Management Team is made up of key government agencies, as well as approximately two dozen community leaders that we have come to know well. Government participants include several components within the Department, including the Office of Public Affairs, Office of Strategic Planning, and the Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A). We are joined by the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, the FBI, the State Department, and the Department of the Treasury. Daniel Sutherland serves as the chair and activates the team and reaches out to incident specific participants. Community participants include scholars, community activists from several cities, and representatives of national organizations. Depending on the incident, State and local authorities responsible for community outreach may also be contacted and asked to participate. These meetings are meant to afford both Federal and non-Federal participants with real-time sharing of information and common messages needed in the aftermath of an attack. On the morning of the announcement of the London arrests this past August, our office convened this Incident Management Team. Representatives from Transportation Security Administration, I&A, and the British embassy all provided briefings to the community leaders on the events from the last several hours. While no classified or sensitive material was provided, the briefings were very substantive and gave these leaders concrete information they could share with their communities. There was a question and answer session for the briefers, and then the community leaders shared reactions to the events. The call was valuable for the community leaders, because they received key and timely information, and it led to tangible results. Several organizations issued press releases, which assured their communities that the government was engaging actively with them, again illustrating that there is no need to feel isolated from the homeland security effort. In addition to building bridges with community leaders, we have also developed strong relationships across the government. The working relationships among Federal agencies on these issues are extremely strong. We work on a daily basis with colleagues from State, Justice, FBI, Treasury, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the National Security Council. We have also developed strong relationships with allied governments. We work particularly closely with our colleagues in the United Kingdom, but also regularly meet with representatives of the Canadian and Australian governments, and others as well--such as colleagues from Denmark and the Netherlands. Next Steps Again, our goal is to develop, cultivate and maintain partnerships with key leaders of the American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities. We have laid a strong infrastructure, and we have taken a number of important steps in the early phases of this project. We have seen enough progress to know that we can reach this goal, in the relatively near future, if there is a continuing strong and sustained commitment from all. Let me highlight four steps that we believe need to be taken at this time: First, we must deepen the engagement; we must take all of this activity to the next level. Leaders from all branches of government need to take steps to engage with these communities; meet them, learn about them, and open lines of communication. Government leaders also need to make public statements that impact opinion and drive current debates in ways that increase our citizens’ desire to get involved in public life and public policy, and that decrease the natural tendency toward isolation from government. For example, in the days after the August 2006 arrests of the bomb plotters in London, Secretary Chertoff made the following remarks to an audience here in Los Angeles: ``Given recent events, I think it's good to reinforce the message that America values its rich diversity. Muslims in America have long been part of the fabric of our nation. The actions of a few extremists cannot serve as a reflection on the many people who have made valuable contributions to our society. Right here in Los Angeles we work with several Muslim American leaders who are helping us to better secure our country. Muslim Americans, like all Americans are united in our resolve to live in safety and security.'' We need to ensure that a wide range of senior government leaders make statements such as these. We also need to connect with young people from these communities. We need to find innovative new strategies to improve communication with young people from these ethnic and religious communities. Second, we must institutionalize the engagement effort for success over the long term. At the Department of Homeland Security, we have established the Department's Radicalization and Engagement Working Group. We have also established the Incident Management Team and our colleagues at I&A have established a unit focused on radicalization issues. But we need to redouble our efforts to ensure that all of the component agencies are equipped to play a significant role in reducing isolation and therefore radicalization. The work that we are trying to do is also taking place at our sister agencies--Justice, State, Treasury, NCTC, and others--and, at a vital level, by the State and local authorities who interact where members of these communities live. We need to ensure that State and local governments are equipped with resources to reach out and connect with these communities, all the while, helping them comply with civil rights and civil liberties protections. Third, we must continue to address policy issues of concern. In preparing for our community meetings, we remind ourselves that the meetings will be seen as useless if concrete results are not visible. We have found that these communities have provided a great deal of constructive criticism--that is, they have identified problems we need to address and, in some cases, made excellent recommendations for solutions as well. To be credible, the government must continue to address issues of concern and report back to the communities when progress is made. Finally, we must challenge the communities to get involved. To achieve our mission, we need help from every part of America. We know that these communities are anxious to roll up their sleeves and get involved. It is important at this time that we say loudly and clearly: ``We need your help and we welcome you to the table.'' Specifically, we need community leaders to convince more of their young people to consider public service as a career. One of our priorities as a government has to be to get young people from American Arab and Muslim families to join government service. We desperately need their language skills, but we also need their cultural insights. We need to challenge community leaders to extol the virtues of public service, whether it is as a candidate for political office, as an FBI agent, a soldier, an accountant, a lawyer, or an IT specialist--we need more people from this community to see government service as a place they can build a successful career. We also need to challenge these communities to help us increase the integration and assimilation of new immigrants, particularly those from the Arab and Muslim worlds. We need to ensure that these new immigrants become comfortable with their children's schools, get plugged into places of worship where they can build friendships, learn to speak English, and become familiar with their local government. This is a job that local communities are best poised to accomplish. We need to challenge community leaders to spread understanding of our security mission. There are times when we must deport someone who has come to our country illegally; we need community leaders to calm community tensions and explain the role that Homeland Security officers must play. There are times when someone is questioned at an airport or border port of entry; we need community leaders to explain that in many cases, these are important features of the landscape we have post 9/11. We do not need community leaders to become our spokespeople; but we do need them to help build a level of understanding regarding these issues, which will help people respond to the latest headlines most successfully. We also need to challenge community leaders to influence Muslim perspectives in other parts of the world. For example, Muslim communities in Europe are much less integrated, successful, and prosperous than American Arab and Muslim communities. We need to challenge community leaders here to communicate with communities in Europe, to convince them Muslims can successfully integrate into secular democracies while maintaining their religion, and fully participate in those countries. From decades of experience, Muslims in America know that the environments created by democracies such as ours give them freedom to choose the way they want to worship, raise their families, get an education, relate to their government, start a business, and become prosperous in their professions. Muslims in Europe need to be convinced of these principles, and American Arab and Muslim leaders can play a significant role. In all of these areas, community leaders are already stepping up to the plate. For example, many Arab and Muslim community leaders have traveled internationally and talked about the issues of the day. As a government, we simply need to recognize the efforts that have already been made, and then step up our support and encouragement for even more significant efforts in all of these areas. Conclusion In conclusion, we recognize that this will not be an easy task. This will be a path with many peaks and valleys. There are constant pressures that seek to pull us apart; we must resist those. We have to make sure that those who believe in cementing positive relationships are the voices that shape opinions, and that these are the people who are influencing the debate. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I welcome your questions. Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Gersten. I yield myself five minutes for questions and we will make a few comments at the beginning, and that is to thank all three of you for excellent testimony. In Washington we have heard recently from civil liberties groups that they are afraid of these fusion centers and they are worried that the activities at the local level will infringe on civil liberties. Obviously this panel was put together in part to communicate a message that at the local level people are paying close attention and groups are being enlisted to be good citizens, as the Muslim American community is, and help law enforcement get it right. And also that there is training going on in privacy and civil liberties for personnel at these fusion centers and involved in local law enforcement. I just want to say to you, Mr. Jenkins, that your comments about how we have to get this right but we also have to do this within the rule of law surely resonate with me. I have often said that protection of security and liberty is not a zero sum game. We don't get more of one and less of the other. We either get more of both or less of both. That actually was not my idea. That was Ben Franklin's idea. He has a marvelous quote about that. I see you nodding. I wasn't going to ask you about that. I do want to ask this panel about the Adam Gadahn case. I raised it in my opening remarks. I assume you are familiar with it. Here was a kid in Orange County who grew up in modest circumstances white, of Jewish ancestry, who became quite aimless. My understanding is that he on the web, found a religious site that led him to a local mosque, became radicalized and now lives in Waziristan, Pakistan. It is alleged he is the head of PR for Osama Bin Laden and he has been indicted for treason in this country. My question is how could this happen and if it happened to this kid, how likely is it to happen to another kid? Let's start with Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Jenkins. You know, you indicated a number of the attributes there. First of all, aimless. He's looking for meaning in life. There are lots of young men in our communities whatever their faith or social status who are in that same position. He went to the web. The web has become an increasingly important source of information. He found something that resonated with him personally. The next step, however, really is very much a random step and that is he found a retail outlet. Now, whether that is a mosque, whether it is a group of chums or whatever, he found a connection that then took him the next step. That contact led him along the way. This is a process that we see taking place probably tens of thousands of times at the front end as we go through it up each individual step which is an individual decision. There is a lot of peer pressure but there is no coercion in this so this is very much self-selection. Then that figure would get smaller and smaller and smaller and smaller until we have finally a young man that starts off in suburbia, United States, and ends up in Waziristan. Ms. Harman. Well, Ms. Sawaf, I am sure you are familiar with this case, too. What can the Muslim American community help law enforcement do to prevent the Adam Gadahns from taking that last step? The wandering around and searching the web are things that we permit in a democratic society but it is when that kid goes wrong and becomes a violent actor that we want to prevent. What can you contribute to solving this problem? Ms. Sawaf. Thank you. I think there are a few things we have to take into consideration. Number 1, the trust between law enforcement and that community that took in the suspect, Adam Gadahn. If there was trust built in between the two, law enforcement may have received a phone call, may have received comments or possible information about what they identified as suspicious. Number 2, are we actually listening to Muslim youth? Whether they are new converts or whether they are born into Islam, from my perspective I don't think we collectively are listening enough to Muslim youth. It is important to bring them to the table, to have them interact with decision makers and the opinion shapers to ensure that they know that they are part of America's fabric and they can, in fact, play a contributory role in protecting the country. That, in fact, engagement on that level can encourage and facilitate civic engagement as the avenue for change rather than extremism or radicalization. Ms. Harman. Thank you for that answer. You did mention earlier that you prepared a paper on Muslim youth. Mr. Dicks has suggested, and I concur, that we request a copy for the Subcommittee. Are you able to provide it to us? Ms. Sawaf. Absolutely. Ms. Harman. Thank you very much. Mr. Gersten, on the same subject, what do you have to contribute to preventing the next Adam Gadahn? Mr. Gersten. Well, let me first begin by giving you the Department's definition of radicalization. The Department defines radicalization as the process of adopting an extremist belief system including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence as a method to effect societal change. The fact is that we don't know enough. I think there needs to be a lot more research in this area, and there is ongoing research within our Department on the process of radicalization. So far we have discovered and identified many of the nodes that are exercised by those who are attempting to radicalize others, the venues that forge the radicalization process venues such as universities, prisons, religious institutions, the internet, propaganda, leaders, and even rights of passage such as going to a training camp of some sort. These all have transformative effects. It certainly is the case that Adam Gadahn did, in fact, use some of those venues and we are aware of that. From our perspective at the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, we believe that engagement empowers Muslims to rest control of the debate over reconciling Islamic law with pluralistic western societies from the radicals who interpret Sharia law to justify terror. By demonstrable engagement and influence in the democratic process and civic engagement American Muslims are a testament and an example that directly counters the violent claims-- Ms. Harman. Thank you. My time has expired. Mr. Reichert has asked to yield his first round or his time now to Mr. Lungren. He will ask questions in the subsequent sequence because Mr. Lungren has to leave for an airplane. Mr. Lungren. Thank you. Ms. Harman. I recognize the gentleman from California for five minutes. Mr. Lungren. I appreciate it. Ms. Sawaf, it is very encouraging the work that you are doing in concert with law enforcement in what is occurring here in Southern California. Let me ask you something that I hear from constituents who don't have the opportunity to be involved in those sorts of circles but are the recipients of what they see in the news. They say to me, ``If, as you say, this is radical Islam and it is just a very, very small part of Islam and a distortion of Islam, how come we don't hear that from more people in the moderate or regular Muslim community?'' Could you tell me where I can direct them? Where is there an outlet to find those comments, those condemnations of this misuse of Islam in a violent way? It would be very helpful. Ms. Sawaf. Absolutely. Thank you for asking. I think if you direct them to our website or you direct them to contact me directly, I would be happy to share that information. There is a long line of condemnations beginning from the day of 9/11 when our executive director along with other Muslim leaders were in the White House prepared to meet with the President. Obviously that meeting was canceled but we issued a condemnation within hours of the attacks. Mr. Lungren. You do realize that perception is out there? Ms. Sawaf. Absolutely. I think that the question we have to ask is where are we going to find and where are people seeking to find the answers and the condemnations. Mr. Lungren. The problem is mostly they are looking at television, radio, you have it. Maybe that is a criticism of the media but maybe there aren't the number of condemnations. I don't know. I will be happy to look at your website and examine that. Ms. Sawaf. I think it is a matter of what makes news, right? Mr. Lungren. Oh, absolutely. Ms. Sawaf. Does it make news for Muslims to participate in attacking the country? Mr. Lungren. If it bleeds, it leads. That's what they say. Ms. Sawaf. Exactly. Mr. Lungren. Particularly in television in Southern California. Ms. Sawaf. There is certainly a long list that I would be happy to share. Mr. Lungren. Mr. Jenkins, you really did put your finger on the problem we have here. Look, those who want to destroy our way of life succeed if either they destroy us or they cause us to destroy our own way of life. Give up our civil liberties in an undue fear of being able to control our own destiny in response to them. But you talked about the internet having a tremendous recruiting capability for young people. We have the First Amendment. We don't restrict. In some cases where you would look at a conventional criminal question you would say we can prevent and we can deter. Prevent, you say you can't do that. We can't do that in terms of the web but is there an element of deterrence? I mean, how do we handle this where people are incited to violence in what are First Amendment protected sites? Is there nothing we can do or is there a strategy of deterrence that helps us and also is that in conjunction with other things? Mr. Jenkins. A couple of thoughts here. By the way, first of all, let me just add a comment to that of Ms. Sawaf and that is public condemnations by members of the Muslim community of terrorism are useful but they are also the equivalent of public condemnations of terrorism by anybody. They make you feel good but they really don't really get you there. What we really have-- Mr. Lungren. Let me interrupt on that point which is in response to the question of Islamophobia in response to Americans who were benign in their concerns or attitude towards Islam. You know, live and let live. Now because they don't see those condemnations, it changes their attitude was my point. Mr. Jenkins. Yeah. No, I understand that. It has that political utility but the more effective form of deterrence and dissuasion coming from the Muslim community may be the part that is invisible to the rest of us. It is good news that we have not had a major terrorist attack in the United States since 9/11. I would like to credit that all to superior intelligence and heightened security. I don't believe that for one minute. It does suggest that the Muslim community in the United States is far less receptive to this ideology of jihad. Mr. Lungren. That is an excellent point. Mr. Jenkins. And, moreover, that there are countervailing voices within the community that without public denunciations are, in fact, counseling against this type of behavior. I just want to make that point. Mr. Lungren. That is a good point. To your question about the First Amendment, free speech. There is no question that it does raise First Amendment rights. We do put restrictions on things now. We put various kinds of restrictions on the internet with issues of pornography. We do put limitations on issues pertaining to violence. At a certain point speech becomes conduct. Free speech is guaranteed. Conduct can be addressed, especially when it is an exhortation to violence where there is the expectation on the part of the communicators that it will be acted upon. I think that is something that without altering the constitution we do want to take a look at that. Ms. Harman. Thank you. Safe travel. The Chair now yields five minutes to Mr. Dicks of Washington State. Mr. Dicks. Ms. Sawaf, in terms of radicalization what recommendations would you have in terms of what should be done to address Muslim youth? What would you recommend? Ms. Sawaf. Well, if I can just quickly tailgate on the comments of Mr. Jenkins, it is important to recognize the internet and these other avenues are simply means. We have to prevent radicalization from the root of the problem. That route is when Muslim youth or Muslim prisoners or others, non-Muslims or whatnot, feel as though they are disenfranchised and marginalized and cannot, in fact, make any sort of change and cannot contribute to the political process. When they feel that it is hopeless, we have seen it resort to radicalization and criminal activity. We have to make sure that we engaging at all levels. Engagement in terms of roundtables and in terms-- Mr. Dicks. Are there any examples of a person who has been radicalized having this kind of effort made and they change their views? Do you have any examples of that? Ms. Sawaf. I don't personally have examples off hand in the United States and I don't think we have seen many pop up. I think, though, when you look at the profile of the people, the suspects, we have seen that many of them are disenfranchised. You look at Europe and the landscape of Europe and the cases are very familiar amongst us. Mr. Dicks. That isn't always the case. Osama Bin Laden himself came from a very wealthy family. Ms. Sawaf. Of course, but Bin Laden preached that the way to make a difference, the only way to make a difference, was through attacking our country and our civilization so we need to counter that message. There are other avenues to make change. We know as a country based off of the successes of immigrants that we have a very strong message and we have assets in and of ourselves that we can show to the community that they have not seen. It becomes overwhelming when people are constantly bombarded with negative images of Islam and Muslims in the media and when they hear about their neighbors being placed on a watchlist and when we read about the evidence possibly corrupted for intelligence being used in the prosecution of domestic charities. All of that creates a climate of fear and distrust towards government. What we need to do is better our communication strains with the community and communicate the reasons behind these policies and programs and also open our minds to the community rolling up their sleeves and participating. Mr. Dicks. Do you agree with Mr. Jenkins that in the United States this message is less receptive than it is in other countries? Ms. Sawaf. Absolutely. Absolutely. By the nature of our country we look at our constitution when we talk about the separation of church and state, it is not one that completely denies religion or is anti-religion but it accommodates all religion and all community groups so absolutely. Mr. Dicks. Mr. Gersten, do you have a comment? Mr. Gersten. I do. At a conference in November I represented the U.S. Government in a discussion of engaging Muslim youth and what I heard there from leaders of Muslim youth organizations including the founder of Muslim Space was that one of the tools in counteracting radicalism is being shut off by the very First Amendment concerns that we heard from Congressman Lungren. The founder of Muslim Space mentioned that, indeed, many of those that have a zeal for action simply want to be able to debate these issues so we do need to actually empower Muslim youth to be able to discuss the issues of radicalization without necessary fear of reprisal. In fact, this debate if we were to shut it off by being overly wary of what is mentioned in these discussions among Muslim youth could, in fact, lead to further radicalization. Mr. Dicks. Is there any website that gets into why a youth should use the existing constitutional system to express themselves, to provide questions about the whole situation? Mr. Gersten. There are many. In fact, most of the organizations that we engage with have a long history of civic engagement and cooperation with government using the democratic process and meeting with the representatives from the public sector and affecting change. They do chronicle on their websites their success in that area. Mr. Dicks. Good. Thank you. Ms. Sawaf. We would be happy to host some hearings with you and your staffers, of course, with Muslim American youth to talk about issues that are important. We are doing that this month with the Senate Committee. Ms. Harman. Thank you very much. Mr. Reichert is now recognized for five minutes. Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair. I also want to add my thanks to the three of you and the first panel for the work that you are doing. It is important, very important work. Both panels really have highlighted, at least for me, two issues. One, how important the local law enforcement role is in protecting our communities and rooting out radicalization. And, two, how important it is to address the issue of youth and at the root of the problem. I think for me this goes back to the early 1990's when community policing was first talked about. It was that connection between police and the local community that made a huge difference as we saw through the 1990's crime rates tumble. Now today we have to enhance those efforts even more so to address this issue of radicalization. I want to follow up from Mr. Dicks' line of questioning around youth because you have both hit on, Mr. Gersten and Ms. Sawaf, talked about the youth and the importance of building a closer relationship, giving them opportunities to speak and deepen this relationship. How do you propose to do that? You have talked about roundtables but in the community policing world and law enforcement there actually are things that are in place, tools to be used to bring people together, community block watches, etc. What are you working on together to really capture the youth and educate them? Mr. Gersten. It is interesting you mention that because it is one of the constraints we have from the Federal level. Most of the engagement that we do is with civil rights and advocacy organizations around the country, lawyer associations, those who have been engaged with Government from times dating back many, many years. There is a certain level of wariness beyond the civil rights organizations within the Muslim community and engaging with Federal authorities. Therefore, I think that part of the answer is to empower state and local authorities who are in the communities on the ground level to do some of this engagement. They will be better trusted in some ways and they are there on a day-to-day level. As Ms. Sawaf mentioned earlier, there is a bureaucracy that does get in the way of some of the coordination of our engagement efforts and we would certainly acknowledge that and think that part of the solution for reaching out to Muslim youth is to empower state and local authorities. Mr. Reichert. I am glad you mentioned that. Doing a lot of great things but there is that Federal bureaucratic red tape that we have to go through. Ms. Sawaf. Ms. Sawaf. I think to add to that, it is important that when there are high-profile cases that are announced in mainstream media on the frontlines in the news, it is important that if those cases turn out not to be national security related cases that is, in fact, announced by the officials that were involved in investigating and prosecuting the case. Otherwise, what happens and what has happened is a lack of trust and confidence in the authorities and the investigations and it becomes perceived as politicized. In order to ensure that there is transparency and we can then build trust off of that transparency, that is one thing that local and Federal officials can do. Of course, another one is to provide funding. There was an amazing program called Partnering for Prevention that was proposed by Northeastern University with a $1 million budget. Lo and behold, it was decided by the FBI that it was no longer a program that they would fund because they had to fund computers. There is tons of money going into homeland security efforts and very little to nothing going into cooperation and partnership. We are an asset in this fight against terror and it has to come from within the community because we are the ones that can connect with our community and can bring them to the table. I think those are two things that can be done. A third one, like I mentioned earlier, is organizing roundtable and hearings that include Muslim youth and their perspectives. We often talk about them. We rarely listen to them or talk to them. I think that is critical if we really want to understand what is going on in the hearts and the minds of the youth. Mr. Reichert. Thank you. Madam Chair, I yield. Ms. Harman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has almost expired and I yield to Mr. Perlmutter of Colorado for the final five minutes. Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you, Madam Chair. This panel has really stimulated a lot of thoughts for me. I would just appreciate your testimony. Ms. Sawaf, some of the things that you were saying it is a little different, and Mr. Jenkins may be the guy who remembers all this, but it reminds me of the things that created the Weather Underground or the Black Panthers or things like that, sort of this feeling of hopelessness, of disenfranchisement, of inequality, disparity which then led to radicalization of some middle class white youth, African Americans, and then ultimately led to violence in a very small sliver, but violence nonetheless. What ultimately I think helped in those situations was engagement and a belief that you really could make a difference through the system and not just through violent acts. The difference here that worries me a little bit is the religious overtone of this, that God is on my side and he is not on your side. We have had that too much in our history on this planet that ultimately results in violence so just my thoughts and the words that you said, Mr. Jenkins, about a sense of proportion in how we react to all of this I thought really struck a chord with me. I am just sort of spilling all that and you all can react to it as you choose. Mr. Gersten. I was just going to say that we in government our hands are some ways tied in terms of debating the issue of Islamic law and attempting to convince Salafi, for instance, that Islamic law does not support terror. If we were to engage directly in debates like that, we would, of course, violate the establishment clause. We do have to be concerned of that. Rather I think what we need to do is continue to engage with constructive partners in the Muslim community and encourage them and empower them through their dialogue with us to do that in a sense as a proxy. Mr. Jenkins. I think it is important that we really take the jihadist, and I use that term deliberately, by the way, as opposed to Islamist extremists or anything connected with Islam because I think it is important that we take this threat that we face out of the context of Islam. This is an ideology. It is an ideology that certainly extracts portions of a religion to support its own ideological point of view that is certainly not unique to Islam. We have had extremist groups in this country that extract portions of the Bible to support their views as well. As I say, we take this out of the realm of religion. Religion is not going to provide any cloak for that. We look at it in that sense. In so doing I think where the issue of religion comes into it, or faith, is that certainly our first governing principle should be do no greater harm. That is, we should not by our actions alienate or antagonize or stigmatize members of any ethnic or religious community. I say that for ferociously pragmatic reasons. Good intelligence depends ultimately on good relations. Our ability to deal with that handful that you mentioned and all of these great movements in American history whether it was the labor movement at the turn of the century, whether it was the civil rights movement, whether it was the anti-war movement have all spawned out under extremist fringe, a handful of bombers and shooters. We want to as a society, and we are pretty good at as a society co-opting and absorbing the larger movement, the legitimate components of that. At the same time because of the increasing destructive power that is coming into the hands of gangs, whether the grievances are real or imaginary, we have to work very hard on going after those small groups. That is going to take intelligence, intelligent intelligence if I can say that, primarily done at the local level and that is the challenge, to deal with the reservoir, not antagonize it, not do anything to alienate it. At the same time we vigorously go after that handful with that ideology. Ms. Harman. Ms. Sawaf, please complete your answer as briefly as possible. Ms. Sawaf. Briefly, we as Muslim Americans shoulder the responsibility to fight the theological battle. It is our role and only our role to really get into the domain of the fact that the American identity does not at all clash with the Muslim identity. Therefore, we propose an American Muslim identity that gels together due to the principles of the Sharia and the constitution of the United States. They go hand in hand. It is our role and we take that upon ourselves. We also take community initiatives upon ourselves. We also take community initiatives upon ourselves like our anti-terrorism campaign that I would be happy to share with you. It was endorsed by over 600 mosques. But I must include that you, too, share a responsibility. You as well as media as well as political analysts and so on and so forth. That responsibility is to include our perspective and furthermore not to use the language that will divide you from the Muslim American community. With all due respect, jihadist is wrong terminology because it is a very noble concept that all Muslims believe in. However, it is used and it simply strengthens the arguments of the extremists. We have to be thoughtful with the language we use. We have to be thoughtful with the voices we include. Thank you. Mr. Dicks. What would you say instead of that? Ms. Sawaf. I would say extremists. Mr. Neu. All time for questions has expired. I think this Subcommittee will be much more thoughtful having heard this excellent testimony. I want to thank the witnesses, the members for their questions, and our excellent staff for preparing this hearing. If members have additional questions, I would hope witnesses would respond to them in writing. Hearing no further business, this Subcommittee standards adjourned. [Whereupon, the Subcommittee was adjourned.] APPENDIX ---------- For the Record Prepared Statement of John M. Vanyur, Assistant Director, Correctional Programs Division, Federal Bureau of Prisons The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is pleased to submit this statement for the record regarding the efforts our agency is taking to ensure we are preventing the recruitment of terrorists and extremists in Federal prisons. The BOP is responsible for the custody and care of approximately 195,500 inmates confined in 114 Federal prisons and facilities operated by private companies, State and local governments. Our mission is to protect society by confining offenders in the controlled environments of prisons and community-based facilities that are safe, humane, cost- efficient, and appropriately secure; and to provide work and other self-improvement opportunities to assist offenders in becoming law- abiding citizens. The BOP is committed to ensuring that Federal prisoners are not radicalized or recruited for terrorist causes. The support that has been provided by the FBI, the agencies represented on the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), other components of the Department of Justice, and many other members of the law enforcement and intelligence communities has been invaluable to our efforts in this area. We understand the importance of controlling and preventing the recruitment of inmates into terrorist activities and organizations. We also acknowledge that this is an evolving issue, especially as it relates to the relationships between terrorism, certain radical or extremist ideologies, and the penchant of those who adhere to these ideologies to recruit others to their positions. The BOP's efforts at preventing radicalization focus on: (1) managing and monitoring inmates who could attempt to radicalize other inmates (2) screening religious service providers to avoid hiring or contracting with anyone who could radicalize inmates, and (3) providing programs to help inmates become less vulnerable to attempts at radicalization. We know that some inmates may be particularly vulnerable to radical recruitment and we must guard against the spread of terrorism and extremist ideologies. Our practices in institution security and inmate management are geared toward the prevention of any violence, criminal behavior, disruptive behavior, or other threats to institution security or public safety, which includes the radicalization of inmates. Over the last several years, our agency has taken a number of significant measures, and we are actively engaged in several ongoing initiatives to ensure that inmates in Federal prison are not recruited to support radical organizations or terrorist groups. For example, we have eliminated most institution-based inmate organizations with community ties to control the influence that outside entities have on Federal inmates. We also have enhanced our information and monitoring systems, intelligence gathering and sharing capabilities, and identification and management of disruptive inmates. For over a decade, we have been managing inmates with ties to terrorism by confining them in more secure conditions and closely monitoring their communications. We have established a strategy that focuses on the appropriate levels of containment to ensure that inmates with terrorist ties do not have the opportunity to radicalize or recruit other inmates. We define terrorist inmates as those having been convicted of, charged with, associated with, or linked to terrorist activities or belonging to organizations that planned and/or executed violent and destructive acts against the U.S. Government and/or privately owned American corporations. All inmates determined to have terrorist ties are clearly identified and tracked in our information systems. The most dangerous terrorists are confined under the most restrictive conditions allowed in our most secure facility, the Administrative Maximum United States Penitentiary (ADX) in Florence, Colorado. We have also transferred a number of terrorist inmates to the Federal Correctional Complex in Terre Haute, Indiana, to consolidate them at one facility and increase the monitoring and management of these inmates. We monitor, record, and translate if necessary, all telephone communications (except attorney-client conversations) involving inmates with terrorist ties. We then share any relevant information with the FBI, the NJTTF, and other agencies. We also monitor all of the general mail delivered to or sent from terrorist inmates. Mail is not delivered to or sent from terrorist inmates until it is read, and if necessary, translated and/or analyzed for intelligence purposes. If suspicious content is found, the correspondence is referred to the FBI for analysis before being processed any further. In addition, we have eliminated outgoing ``special mail'' drop boxes.\1\ Inmates must deliver outgoing special mail directly to a staff member for further processing. All outgoing special mail is subject to scanning by electronic means such as x-ray, metal detector, or ion spectrometry equipment. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Special mail is privileged communication between an inmate and his or her attorney or government officials. Federal regulations prohibit the BOP from monitoring the content of special mail (28 CFR 540.18). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- We recently established a Counter-terrorism Unit in Martinsburg, West Virginia. One of the responsibilities of that Unit is to process inmate correspondence that requires language translation and content analysis. The Unit will improve our ability to monitor correspondence and analyze it for potential terrorism-related intelligence. The Unit also oversees telephone monitoring systemwide and has implemented mechanisms to ensure phone calls by terrorist inmates are being monitored. In addition, an FBI special agent and an FBI intelligence analyst are assigned to assist ADX Florence with communication and intelligence matters. We have worked diligently, particularly since 9/11, to enhance our intelligence gathering and sharing capabilities in order to ensure a seamless flow of intelligence information between our agency and other law enforcement and counter-terrorism agencies. We have two individuals (one employee and one contractor) detailed to the NJTTF to facilitate our involvement on this task force and to coordinate the exchange of intelligence related to corrections. These two members of the NJTTF manage the Correctional Intelligence Initiative (CII), a nationwide NJTTF special project involving correctional agencies at the Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and local levels, designed to detect, deter, and disrupt the radicalization and recruiting of inmates. This initiative involves training of correctional administrators by each local JTTF; exchanging of intelligence; communicating best practices to local JTTFs in order to detect, deter, and disrupt radicalization; and coordinating of liaison and intelligence-sharing activities between local JTTFs and corrections agencies. Most importantly, through the CII, intelligence regarding any attempts by inmates, religious providers, or others to radicalize any segment of the population is gathered and shared, and interdiction action is taken by the appropriate correctional authority. In addition, we have established intelligence officers at the majority of our metropolitan detention centers under a Joint Intelligence Sharing Initiative. These intelligence staff members gather and share intelligence information with the FBI and with our Central Office intelligence operations. This staff also coordinate with the local JTTF and act as full JTTF members in some cases. All BOP facilities are required to coordinate with their local JTTFs on matters with a connection to terrorism. In addition to managing and monitoring inmates who could attempt to radicalize other inmates, we help inmates become less vulnerable to any such attempts. Experts have identified the societal marginalization of inmates as a key factor in their becoming radicalized. Our agency provides inmates with a broad variety of programs that are proven to assist in the development of key skills, thereby minimizing the likelihood of the inmates being marginalized. The programs we provide include work in prison industries and other institution jobs, vocational training, education, substance abuse treatment, religious programs, and other skills-building and pro-social values programs. Moreover, we are very aware of the important role religious programs play in preparing inmates to reintegrate successfully into society following release from prison. Religious programs and chaplaincy services are provided to the approximately 30 faiths represented within the Federal prison population. Within the constraints of security, we provide worship services, study of scripture and sacred writings, and religious workshops; and we make accommodations to facilitate observances of holy days. Full-time civil service chaplains in the BOP lead worship services and provide pastoral care and spiritual guidance to inmates, and chaplains oversee the breadth of religious programs and monitor the accommodations provided by contract spiritual leaders and community volunteers. The overwhelming majority of inmates participate in religious programs in a positive, healthy, and productive way. We screen all of our civil service staff, volunteers, and contractors to avoid hiring or contracting with anyone who would pose a threat to institution security. Every BOP civil service chaplain must meet all the requirements for employment as a Federal law enforcement officer, including a field investigation, criminal background check, reference check, drug screening, and pre-employment suitability interviews and screenings. In addition, chaplains must meet requirements unique to their employment and the scope of their duties. Like all BOP employees, chaplains are strictly prohibited from using their position to condone, support, or encourage violence or other inappropriate behavior. Our religious contractors and volunteers are also subject to a variety of security requirements prior to being granted access to an institution, including criminal background checks, law enforcement agency checks to verify places of residence and employment, a fingerprint check, information from employment over the previous 5 years, and drug testing. The BOP continues to work closely with the FBI and the NJTTF with regard to the screening of contract service providers. Information on contractors and volunteers (whether the contractor or volunteer is being considered to help provide religious services or not) is checked against databases supported by the FBI. Moreover, over the last 4 years, we have enhanced supervision of programs and activities in our chapels. We also have increased the training of our staff in the areas of counter-terrorism and recognition of potential radicalization. All BOP staff receive basic correctional skills training at the beginning of their career, and on an annual basis, BOP employees receive additional training that addresses current security and inmate management issues. Since 2004, our agency has included a training segment titled ``Terrorism Management and Response'' in Annual Training for all BOP staff. In addition, Religious Services personnel present a segment during Annual Training that emphasizes an awareness of discriminatory language, behaviors, rhetoric, and speech that could indicate the presence of radical ideology in the inmate population. In 2003, we distributed a Terrorism Training for Law Enforcement CD, developed by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, to all of our facilities. We are in the process of distributing the updated 2006 version of the Terrorism Training for Law Enforcement CD to all institutions. Among the activities of our Martinsburg Counter-terrorism Unit are the production and distribution of intelligence-related documents to BOP staff and the development and provision of counter- terrorism training programs for BOP staff. Every BOP facility has one or more Special Investigative Supervisors/Special Investigative Agents who serve as the focal point in our agency's efforts to manage all security threat groups, including terrorists. This staff helps identify and track members and associates, monitor mail and telephone communications, provide enhanced supervision of identified security threat group members, and share intelligence on the activities of any security threat group. Special Investigative Agents serve as a liaison to the FBI, the U.S. Marshals Service, and the U.S. Secret Service regarding the activities of security threat group members and the investigation of criminal activity in BOP facilities. In 2004 and 2005, Special Investigative Supervisors and Special Investigative Agents from every BOP institution received specialized training in the control and management of terrorist inmates. In December 2006, twenty BOP intelligence staff participated in a 32-hour intelligence gathering and analysis training course provided by the FBI. Two additional classes are planned for over 45 special investigative supervisors and special investigative agents in June and August of this year. BOP chaplains receive specialized training to ensure they have the necessary information about each religion to oversee and manage religious services and programs effectively. Our agency has prepared a comprehensive technical reference manual that describes appropriate religious services procedures and behaviors. The manual is available for use by any staff member overseeing a religious service or activity. Thirty chaplains recently participated in mandatory training designed to enhance their awareness and knowledge about identifiers of radical religious groups. The training will be repeated each year until all BOP chaplains have attended. I hope the information provided in this statement will be beneficial to the Subcommittee in its investigation of efforts underway to prevent radicalization in America's prisons.