[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RADICALIZATION, INFORMATION SHARING
AND COMMUNITY OUTREACH: PROTECTING
THE HOMELAND FROM HOMEGROWN TERROR
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
INFORMATION SHARING, AND
TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 5, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-22
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
43-558 PDF WASHINGTON : 2009
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
VACANCY
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK
ASSESSMENT
JANE HARMAN, California, Chair
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Thomas M. Finan, Director and Counsel
Brandon Declet, Counsel
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Deron McElroy, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Intelligence,
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment............. 1
The Honorable David G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment..................................................... 3
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Washington........................................ 27
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
from the State of California................................... 4
The Honorable Ed Perlmutter, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Colorado.......................................... 30
Witnesses
Panel I
Mr. William J. Bratton, Chief of Police, Los Angeles Police
Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statementq............................................ 12
Ms. Janice K. Fedarcyk, Special Agent in-Charge (SAC),
Counterterrorism Division, FBI's Los Angeles Field Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Sgt. Larry Mead, Deputy Sheriff, Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
Mr. John J. Neu, Chief of Police, Torrance Police Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared statement............................................. 7
Panel II
Mr. David Gersten, Director, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Programs, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 46
Prepared Statement............................................. 48
Mr. Brian Jenkins, Senior Advisor, RAND Corporation:
Oral Statement................................................. 39
Prepared Statement............................................. 41
Ms. Sireen Sawaf, Director, Southern California Government
Relations, Muslim Public Affairs Council:
Oral Statement................................................. 33
Prepared Statement............................................. 35
Appendix
For the Record
Prepared Statement:
Mr. John M. Vanyur, Assistant Director, Correctional Programs
Division, Federal Bureau of Prisons.......................... 63
RADICALIZATION, INFORMATION SHARING AND COMMUNITY OUTREACH: PROTECTING
THE HOMELAND FROM HOMEGROWN TERROR
----------
Thursday, April 5, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing,
and Terrorism Risk Assessment,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9 a.m., in the
Torrance City Council Chambers, 3031 Torrance Boulevard,
Torrance, California, Hon. Jane Harman [Chair of the
Subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Harman, Dicks, Perlmutter, and
Reichert.
Also Present: Representative Lungren
Ms. Harman. The Subcommittee will come to order. The
Subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
Radicalization, Information Sharing and Community Outreach:
Protecting the Homeland from Homegrown Terror.
Twenty months ago, police in this city, Torrance, disrupted
the first known prison-based terrorist cell in the United
States. Those arrested were Americans and one permanent
resident. The allegations against them, if true, present a
chilling account of the threat we face from homegrown
terrorism.
Among other things, they are charged with having planned
attacks on synagogues on Jewish holidays in order to maximize
the number of deaths and on U.S. military bases and recruitment
centers. To fund their terror campaign, the defendants
allegedly robbed eleven gas stations in and around Torrance.
That is where the Torrance Police Department came in.
But for the hard work of some local officers whose efforts
led to the discovery of maps and other evidence that unraveled
the plot many, many lives could have been lost. Those Torrance
Police Department officers worked with LAPD and FBI partners to
share information and build a case in a way that would have
been almost unimaginable before 9/11. All of us on this dais
want to commend them for their great service to Torrance, to
California, and to our country. Thank you on behalf of a
grateful nation.
We are holding this field hearing on radicalization to
learn more about the homegrown terror threat to our nation. Let
me be clear: when we talk about radicalization and homegrown
terrorists, we are not talking about people from any particular
ethnic, political, or religious group.
On the contrary, we are talking about ideologically-driven
violence, whether by a white, U.S. Bronze Star honoree named
Timothy McVeigh; or in Belgium, a female Catholic convert to
Islam who traveled to Iraq and blew herself up; or in the UK,
third generation Britons of Pakistani descent who killed their
countrymen on buses and trains and were plotting to blow up
U.S. airliners en route from Britain to America.
Last fall, Dame Eliza Manningham Buller, the Director of
Britain's MI5, revealed for the first time the seriousness of
the home grown terrorism threat in her country. She stated that
MI5 and local police in the UK are currently investigating some
200 separate terrorist networks that include over 1,600
individuals who are actively planning attacks both domestically
and overseas. And those are just the ones she knows about.
When I met with her in my Washington office in February, I
reminded her that what happened here in Torrance shows that the
threat is also emerging on this side of the Atlantic. She
agrees. But focusing our efforts against any particular group
of people would be futile. The Washington Post recently
reported that police in Western Europe are
arresting``significant numbers of women, teenagers, white-
skinned suspects and people baptized as Christians'' people who
until now were not on the radar screen as radicals prone to
violence.
In fact, the demographics of those being arrested are so
diverse that many European officials say that they have given
up trying to predict who is most likely to become a terrorist.
Age, sex, ethnicity, education and economic status simply have
become more and more irrelevant. The same is true here. How do
we explain why Adam Gadahn, a 17-year-old Jewish kid from Santa
Ana became a radical, moved to Pakistan, now works as Osama Bin
Laden's spokesman, and is under indictment here for treason?
I am very pleased to be joined by the distinguished
witnesses, and obviously my distinguished colleagues, on two
panels this morning. On the first panel, we will hear from
Torrance Police Chief John Neu, LAPD Chief Bill Bratton and
Special Agent in-Charge Janice Fedarcyk from the FBI's Los
Angeles office, and Sergeant Mead of the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department. They will be talking with us about the
Torrance arrests, what homegrown terrorism is, and what we
might do about it.
We will then hear from a second panel including Sireen
Sawaf from the Muslim Public Affairs Council who serves as a
representative on the FBI's Multi-Cultural Advisory Committee
called MCAC, and David Gersten from DHS. Both will share their
own thoughts about home grown terrorism and how engagement with
minority communities can help prevent it. And finally, an old
friend, author, and consultant on terrorism, Brian Jenkins of
the RAND Corporation, who will put our subjects in perspective.
I am joined today by some very valued House colleagues. Let
me start on my right by introducing the Ranking Member Dave
Reichert of Washington State, a former sheriff. On my left Norm
Dicks of Washington. On my right Dan Lungren of Northern
California, formerly of Long Beach, California.
On my left a new member of Congress, Ed Perlmutter of
Colorado, I would also like to acknowledge in the audience
Charles Allen, the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security who has come
out here to join us yesterday at meetings at the JRIC, Joint
Regional Intelligence Center, and today to be part of this
hearing. As I mentioned, one of his DHS associates will be a
witness on the second panel.
Charlie, you obviously are a very valued partner in this
effort to make certain that we understand radicalization and
that we provide those first preventers with the tools and the
information they need to find out what the plots are and stop
them before they happen. Let me just say finally that this is a
success story and it is a very important success story. We are
telling that story where it happened, in Torrance, California.
Now let me recognize the Ranking Member of the
Subcommittee, the gentleman from Washington, for an opening
statement.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair. It is a pleasure to
be here in the Los Angeles area. It reminds me of some old days
in the 1980's when I was a homicide detective, the lead
investigator on a serial murder case, and I spent a long time
in this area working and following leads, working with the
various police departments here in the Los Angeles area and
with the sheriff's office and with the FBI, all great partners.
I think it really points to the success of that case the
team work that came together and what we see here today and the
different uniforms representing different law enforcement
agencies and those of you in suits and ties also coming
together in civilian clothes all here to protect our country
and to keep our citizenry safe.
Charlie Allen, thank you, too, for your efforts and
leadership and understanding the necessity of sharing
information with locals and working hard to bring that about.
Again, thank you Madam Chair. I am really honored to be
here. You and I both agree that radicalization is a very
important topic and I want to commend you for holding this
hearing. Given the recent pattern of homegrown terrorist that
have been discovered in the UK, Canada, and the United States
it is important that the Subcommittee spend some time
understanding this issue and its implications for the security
of our homeland. Identifying the patterns of radicalization,
where they exist, and isolating the contributing factors can
help us mitigate problems before they begin.
The topic of this hearing today, Radicalization,
Information Sharing, and Community Outreach: Protecting the
Homeland from Homegrown Terror, builds upon the work of this
Subcommittee from last Congress and will be part of the
continuing record we are developing on this topic.
Last July members of this Subcommittee traveled to Toronto,
Canada to learn more about the so-called Toronto 17, a group of
radicalized individuals in the Toronto area. The Subcommittee
was concerned with radicalization of individuals traveling to
the United States across our northern border and how to stop
them.
But when radicalization is happening within our own
borders, it becomes increasingly difficult to detect. While the
global fight against terrorism focuses our attention on Islamic
radicalism, other forms of radicalization also endanger our
homeland. We saw this in Oklahoma City in 1995. Radicalization
can happen in many different ways and in many different places.
Since the late 1970s, the Aryan Nations has been engaged in
radicalizing and recruiting in prisons. Others including al-
Qa'ida sympathizers are doing the same. Prisons can quickly
become fertile recruiting ground for those who wish to
radicalize susceptible inmates. We have seen this occur right
here in California and it will be discussed today.
I would like to yield the balance of my time, Madam Chair,
to the gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren, whose district
includes New Folsom State Prison where a recent case of
radicalization and alleged terrorist plotting occurred.
Ms. Harman. Without objection.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentleman for yielding and I very
much thank the Chairwoman for having this hearing and for the
work that she is doing in this area and the bipartisan way in
which she is approaching this.
I used to represent this area some 20 years ago and I
represent an area 450 miles away and it is always great to be
able to come down here but it saddens me that I come down here
as we look at a problem that had its genesis in my district at
Folsom State Prison and yet was carried out down here.
The idea of homegrown terrorists is something that ought
not to surprise us but ought to make us ready to take action
and ensure that we do all this is necessary. One of the things
that is crucial to this is the cooperation of all elements of
law enforcement, local, state, and Federal. I look forward to
hearing the case study to the extent that we can talk about it
since the case is still going on of cooperation among all of
these elements of law enforcement.
When I was Attorney General one of the concerns I had was
making sure that information flowed both from the feds down to
us as well as from us to the feds. It will be interesting to
see in this particular instance how well that worked. But I
would also like to just say this. It is the great work done by
police officers doing their regular work that really gives us
the key to solving these problems.
If we didn't have a very, very good police officer from
Torrance understand the importance of this, if we didn't
have some people in the state prison system understand this, if
we didn't have the cooperation with LAPD and the other law
enforcement agencies, we never would be where we are with the
case that is uppermost in many minds.
I thank the gentlelady for having this hearing. I thank the
gentleman for yielding. I just want to thank all law
enforcement for the work they are doing.
Ms. Harman. Thank you. This Subcommittee rules provide that
other members under our rules can submit opening statements for
the record.
It is now my pleasure to welcome our first panel and I will
introduce all of you briefly and then each of you will be
recognized for five minutes or less. Your complete statement
will be accepted in the record so please summarize. That will
give us all a chance to ask you questions which I think will
make this hearing a more interesting event. I know you are
aware of this request.
Let me say that I had hoped to recognize the individual
Torrance police officers who were so capable and were able to
first understand this terror plot, but I am told they are
operating under cover so the best I can do is recognize the big
boss who actually had a role in this and that is Chief John Neu
who himself has had a distinguished career at the Torrance PD
for almost 22 years.
Prior to his appointment as police chief he served in a
variety of capacities including Special Operations and Patrol
Bureau Commander. Among his numerous accomplishments was his
establishment of the supervisory development course that is
used for training new supervisors at the Torrance Police
Department. Chief Neu has been cited by the U.S. Department of
Justice Organized Crime Bureau, the FBI, and the U.S.
Attorney's Office for his effective police work and exemplary
leadership skills.
Our second witness, Bill Bratton, has been on the cover of
Time magazine and has had a very quiet career so far. How many
cops with a strong boss in action who have been head of the
NYPD have come on over to LA where now he is just unanimously
supported for a second five-year term. It sounds like a movie
plot but it is actually happening in our midst. He is the only
person ever to have served as chief executive of these two huge
police departments.
Throughout Bill Bratton's 37 years in law enforcement he
has been a strong advocate of community policing and has worked
extremely hard in LA to strengthen local commands, increase
responsiveness to community concerns, develop strategies to
counter gang-related crimes and the threat of terrorism.
Under Chief Bratton's leadership the LAPD has developed one
of the most comprehensive and effective counterterrorism
operations in the country if not the world.
Our third witness, Janice Fedarcyk, is the newly appointed
Special Agent in-Chart of the Counterterrorism Division at the
FBI's Los Angeles Field Office. A 19-year FBI veteran, Ms.
Fedarcyk previously served as the FBI's representative to the
National Counterterrorism Center's Directorate of Strategic
Operational Planning where she led the development of a
classified national strategic operational plan in the war on
terror.
She has also served as an inspector at FBI headquarters
where she led inspection teams in assessments of FBI offices
and entities. Among other things Ms. Fedarcyk will be speaking
to us today about the FBI's Multi-Cultural Advisory Committee,
MCAC, we will then hear from someone involved in MCAC, which is
designed to share information, ideas, and concerns between the
FBI's Los Angeles Field Office and Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and
Coptic communities.
Our forth witness, who I will not overlook, is Sergeant
Larry Mead who has 24 years of experience with the LA County
Sheriff's Department. Sergeant Mead serves as the jail
investigations gang intelligent sergeant where he has worked to
improve the dissemination of declassified information to line
deputies thereby increasing their awareness of ongoing gang
trends and communications with the LAPD, FBI, ICE, and the
California Department of Corrections among other local, state,
and Federal agencies regarding the street gang subculture and
present radicalization.
As I said, without objection, the witness' full statements
will be inserted in the record and we will enthusiastically
receive very concise summaries of your testimony beginning with
Chief Neu.
STATEMENT JOHN J. NEU, CHIEF OF POLICE, TORRANCE POLICE
DEPARTMENT
Mr. Neu. Chairwoman Harman, Honorable Committee Members,
good morning. I want to thank you for holding this hearing this
morning.
Needless to say, since the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, the role and responsibility of local law enforcement
as first responders to terrorist activity have changed. Our
mission demands that we make every effort possible to detect
and prevent terrorist activity right here in our own
communities. The new paradigm for local law enforcement is
prevention, but the awareness, knowledge, skills and abilities
of these officers must be enhanced in order to effectively
thwart terrorist plots before they manifest as attacks.
The most significant trend that has been identified over
the past several years is the rise of the homegrown threat,
which has been publicized extensively in the media. The
possibility of a homegrown terrorist attack against Los
Angeles, New York, Chicago or any other American city is real
and is worsening with time as the radicalization process
unfolds. The fuel that ignites this inside threat is a
significant challenge for law enforcement agencies across the
United States.
In July of 2005, officers from my department arrested two
suspects for robbing a local gas station. As the investigation
continued to unfold, the officers came face-to-face with a
direct act of domestic terrorism. An Islamic extremist group
based here in California and known as``Assembly of Authentic
Islam'' (JIS) was uncovered.
This group, operating primarily in state prisons without
apparent connections or direction from outside the United
States, committed several armed robberies throughout Southern
California, including the one in Torrance. The robberies were
committed with the goal of financing attacks against the
enemies of Islam, including the United States government and
supporters of Israel. The chilling evidence that was recovered
during the investigation showed us the capabilities of this
terror group.
The JIS case is a prime example of the powerful radical
influence which poses a serious threat from within. Our
greatest weapon against terrorism is unity. That unity is built
upon information sharing and coordination of law enforcement at
every level and the intelligence communities. The JIS case
involved approximately 500 law enforcement officers from the
Federal, state and local levels. It has been described by some
in our community as a model case of information sharing and
investigation. The Los Angeles Police Department provided over
100 officers to this investigation alone.
Local law enforcement is, in fact, uniquely positioned to
identify terrorist activity right here in our own communities.
As displayed in the JIS case, local law enforcement's
relationship with Federal law enforcement has improved
immensely. A major portion of this success is directly related
to the training of our line level officers in regards to
domestic terrorism. A specific focus on threat identification
training paid dividends across the board during the JIS
investigation. The vertical sharing of intelligence
information, coupled with communication and coordination
throughout the investigation, proved to be invaluable to all of
the agencies involved.
Local law enforcement plays a critical role in the
identification and disruption of radicalized Islamic groups.
Our personnel are on the streets of our community everyday
interacting, observing, and maintaining the public safety. Our
Community Based Policing model, Focus Based Policing, has
proven to be successful mainly because of our steadfast
relationships with the people we protect. Since the attacks of
9/11 local law enforcement has utilized these policing models
to address our homeland security needs and specifically the
radicalized Islamic extremist threat.
Our professional relationship with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has been well established for over twenty years.
Our investigators from the Crimes Persons, Narcotics, and Crime
Impact Sections of our organization work hand in hand with FBI
personnel on very successful regional investigations. Our
organizations have synergized and we have gained from each
others strengths. We consistently enjoy a seamless commingling
of resources, training, and expertise with our FBI partners.
Our participation in the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force was
a natural progression of our professional relationship. We, as
an organization, recognize the regional challenge to security
and we meet the challenge without hesitation. The success of
the JTTF initiative weighs heavily on local law enforcement
participation. We understand our role and are prepared to
endure the challenge. We recognize the value of the ``Task
Force'' approach to investigations, and our National Security
is paramount in our thoughts during this trying time in our
history.
In closing, the Torrance Police Department has experienced
homegrown terrorism firsthand. Our Federal, state, and local
partners were invaluable in uncovering and dismantling a very
real threat to our region. I would like to thank the committee
for allowing me to participate in this hearing. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Neu follows:]
Prepared Statement of John J. Neu
Needless to say, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
the role and responsibility of local law enforcement as first
responders to terrorist activity have changed. Our mission demands that
we make every effort possible to detect and prevent terrorist activity
right here in our own communities. The new paradigm for local law
enforcement is prevention, but the awareness, knowledge, skills and
abilities of these officers must be enhanced in order to effectively
thwart terrorist plots before they manifest as attacks.
The most significant trend that has been identified over the past
several years is the rise of the ``homegrown'' threat, which has been
publicized extensively in the media. The possibility of a ``homegrown''
terrorist attack against Los Angeles, New York, Chicago or any other
American city is real and is worsening with time as the radicalization
process unfolds. The fuel that ignites this inside threat is a
significant challenge for law enforcement agencies across the United
States.
In July of 2005, officers from my department arrested two suspects
for robbing a local gas station. As the investigation continued to
unfold, the officers came face-to-face with a direct act of domestic
terrorism. An Islamic extremist group based here in California and
known as ``Assembly of Authentic Islam'' (JIS) was uncovered. This
group, operating primarily in state prisons without apparent
connections or direction from outside the United States, committed
several armed robberies throughout Southern California, including the
one in Torrance. The robberies were committed with the goal of
financing attacks against the enemies of Islam, including the United
States government and supporters of Israel.
The investigation brought charges against Kevin James, Lavar
Washington, Gregory Patterson, and Hammad Samana. The indictment
alleges that James, while in prison in Sacramento, recruited fellow
prison inmates to join JIS and preached the duty of members was to
target for violent attack any enemies of Islam, or ``infidels,''
including the United States government and Jewish and non-Jewish
supporters of Israel. James allegedly distributed a document in prison
that justified the killing of ``infidels,'' and made members take an
oath not to talk about the existence of JIS. He also allegedly sought
to establish groups or ``cells'' of JIS members outside of prison to
carry out violent attacks against ``perceived infidels,'' including the
United States government, the government of Israel and Jewish people.
Washington, also an inmate at the Sacramento prison, joined JIS in
November 2004 and was paroled at the end of the month. In December
2004, James allegedly instructed Washington to recruit five people to
train in covert operations, acquire firearms with silencers, and find
contacts with explosives expertise or learn to make bombs that could be
activated from a distance.
The indictment alleges that beginning in December 2004, Washington,
Patterson and Samana targeted and conducted Internet research on and
surveillance of United States military facilities, which included
recruitment centers and military bases in the Los Angeles area, as part
of their plot to kill United States military personnel. In July 2005,
Patterson and Samana allegedly used computers to research military
targets in the Los Angeles area, while Samana drafted a document
listing Israeli and United States targets in Los Angeles. In addition
to the United States military targets, the coconspirators specifically
targeted Israeli and Jewish facilities in the Los Angeles area,
including the Israeli Consulate, El Al (the national airline of Israel)
and synagogues. They also allegedly engaged in firearms and physical
training in preparation for attacks.
According to the indictment, the defendants purchased weapons or
otherwise tried to acquire weapons in furtherance of their terrorist
conspiracy, and made efforts to raise money by robbing gas stations.
The indictment alleges that eleven times beginning May 30, 2005, the
defendants, armed with shotguns, robbed or attempted to rob gas
stations in several cities and towns in Southern California, including
Los Angeles, Torrance, Playa del Ray, Bellflower, Pico Rivera, Walnut,
Orange, Playa Vista and Fullerton. The indictment alleges that during
the gas station robbery spree, Patterson updated James on the progress
of the planned war of terrorism against the United States government.
The JIS case is a prime example of the powerful radical influence
which poses a serious threat from within. Our greatest weapon against
terrorism is unity. That unity is built upon information sharing and
coordination of law enforcement at every level and the intelligence
communities. The JIS case involved approximately 500 law enforcement
officers from the federal, state and local levels. It has been
described by some in our community as a model case of information
sharing and investigation. The Los Angeles Police Department provided
over 100 officers to this investigation alone.
The criminal investigation into the alleged terrorist conspiracy
was lead by the FBI's Long Beach Joint Terrorism Task Force, whose
participating agencies include the Los Angeles Police Department; U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; the Torrance Police Department;
the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department; the Long Beach Police
Department; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives;
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; the Los Angeles Port Police;
U.S. Customs and Border Protection; the U.S. Coast Guard Investigative
Service; the Defense Criminal Investigative Service; and the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency. The JIS case is a prime example of how
far local law enforcement has come in our collaborative efforts in
fighting domestic terrorism that involved radical homegrown terrorists.
Local law enforcement is, in fact, uniquely positioned to identify
terrorist activity right here in our own communities. As displayed in
the JIS case, local law enforcement's relationship with federal law
enforcement has improved immensely. A major portion of this success is
directly related to the training of our line level officers in regards
to domestic terrorism. A specific focus on threat identification
training paid dividends across the board during the JIS investigation.
The vertical sharing of intelligence information, coupled with
communication and coordination throughout the investigation, proved to
be invaluable to all of the agencies involved.
Information Needs of Local Law Enforcement Relating to Islamic
Radicalization
Local law enforcement plays a critical role in the identification
and disruption of radicalized Islamic groups. Our personnel are on the
streets of our community everyday interacting, observing, and
maintaining the public safety. Our Community Based Policing model,
Focus Based Policing, has proven to be successful mainly because of our
steadfast relationships with the people we protect. Since the attacks
of nine-eleven, local law enforcement has utilized these policing
models to address our homeland security needs and specifically the
radicalized Islamic extremist threat. We do, however, require better
awareness in some critical areas such as:
Understanding the threat of terrorism to our community
and infrastructure
Homegrown terror (JIS)
Cultural awareness of the Muslim community we serve
and equal knowledge of the very small percentage of Muslims
that would be vulnerable to the radical ideologies
What factors lead to radicalized beliefs and what are
the trip wires or clues in the community that local law
enforcement would encounter?
Where could recruitment and radicalization occur in
our community?
Identification of material support efforts for terror
and criminal organizations
Gaining a better understanding of combating Fourth
Generation Warfare
Terrorism is a tactic of Fourth Generation
Warfare
Our partners in the FBI and the region are facilitating the
training and awareness through unprecedented lateral networking.
Our Well Established Relationship with the FBI
Our professional relationship with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has been well established for over twenty years. Our
investigators from the Crimes Persons, Narcotics, and Crime Impact
Sections of our organization work hand in hand with FBI personnel on
very successful regional investigations. Our organizations have
synergized and we have gained from each others strengths. We
consistently enjoy a seamless commingling of resources, training, and
expertise with our FBI partners.
Our participation in the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force was a
natural progression of our professional relationship. We, as an
organization, recognize the regional challenge to security and we meet
the challenge without hesitation. Our investigators are contributors
and team players within the task force initiative. The success of the
JTTF initiative weighs heavily on local law enforcement participation.
We understand our role and are prepared to endure the challenge. We
recognize the value of the ``Task Force'' approach to investigations,
and our National Security is paramount in our thoughts during this
trying time in our history.
Our FBI partners, the Los Angeles Police Department, the Los
Angeles Sheriff's Department, and other law enforcement agencies have
embraced this spirit of cooperation. We truly witnessed this selfless
commitment during the JIS investigation. This investigation tasked over
500 personnel and the Los Angeles Police Department alone contributed
over 100 officers. This ability to force multiply was critical to the
rapid dismantling of this dangerous threat and we are very appreciative
to ``our big brothers'' in the region.
With the creation of the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence
Center (LA JRIC), the ``fusion'' of information sharing has really
evolved. The centralized facility has truly encouraged both vertical
and, more importantly, lateral information sharing. The initiative has
spurred the growth of other Terror Early Warning Groups (TEW) and
Terror Liaison Officer working groups within the region. These groups
apply proven networking techniques; mentor one another, track crime
trends, and train on terror related topics. The LA JRIC also provides
terror reporting fusion procedures, predictive analysis relating to
crime and terrorism, investigative support and training. All are
critical components to enhancing line level officers' awareness.
Our Community Outreach Efforts
To address our community's safety, we have followed our successful
Focus Based Policing model to reach out to the public and business
sectors. We have modified the ``focus'' to include trip wires for
terror related activities. We have identified areas within our
jurisdiction such as the Del Amo Fashion Center, our many public and
private schools, petrochemical facilities, Exxon Mobil Refinery, and
secured our relationships and resources to maximize security efforts.
This, too, has been a collaborated effort involving DHS, FBI, and local
law enforcement. We are constantly reinforcing our methods and training
to equal the threat and maintain the safety our community.
Focus Based Policing for Counterterrorism
Building ties and relationships with the
community
Understanding socio-cultural, political, and
religious issues
Understanding terrorist indicators and
behaviors
Empowering the community
Engage the Community
Town hall meeting and outreach programs
School awareness programs and counter terror
trained School Resource Officers
Business contacts and critical infrastructure
monitoring
Deployment of Terror Liaison Officers
In closing, the Torrance Police Department has experienced
``homegrown'' terrorism firsthand. Our federal, state, and local
partners were invaluable in uncovering and dismantling a very real
threat to our region from JIS. Our success in this case was due to a
professional, established, aggressive approach to investigating
criminal activity, and the established partnership with the FBI Joint
Terrorism Task Force. I would like to thank the committee for allowing
me to participate in this hearing.
Thank you
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Chief, and thank you for respecting
the time limits.
Chief Bratton, you are now recognized for up to five
minutes.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. BRATTON, CHIEF OF POLICE, LOS ANGELES
POLICE DEPARTMENT
Mr. Bratton. Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert and
members of the Committee, thank you for holding this hearing on
the pressing issue of Radicalization.
The Los Angeles Police Department and the City of Los
Angeles have forged successful relationships with our local,
state, and Federal partners to begin examining and responding
to the growing threat posed by radicalization. However, we need
continued support for our efforts across a number of areas of
concern. Today, I will address three issues of interest to this
committee:
First, the growing threat of Muslim radicalization in the
United States. Second, the connection between prison
radicalization and the potential of homegrown Islamist
terrorism. Third, the role that a congressionally-funded
National Counter Terrorism Academy serving state and local law
enforcement would have in countering the these threats.
As you are aware, beginning in May of 2005, four radical
Muslim suspects, armed with shotguns, went on a significant
crime spree that by itself would have been noteworthy. Eleven
times they robbed or attempted to rob gas stations in the
cities. In investigating the crimes, the experienced detectives
of the Torrance Police Department focused on the basics of any
investigation: evidence, witnesses, and modus operandi.
A lucky break occurred when a cell phone belonging to one
of the suspects was recovered. When a search was conducted of
the suspect's apartment the detective also observed disturbing
evidence. This evidence included body armor, knives, and other
evidence of the crime. However, when the detective noticed
jihad-related literature and the addresses of potential
``targets'' the detective fell back on his previous training as
a Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO), and yesterday you heard
about TLOs, and recognized this as a pre-incident indicator to
a terrorist attack.
As a TLO, this detective had received minimal formalized
terrorism training in comparison to the routine training
received by bona fide counter-terrorism professionals. Yet this
training was sufficient enough to arm the Torrance detective
with usable information. To most detectives this``disturbing
evidence'' would have appeared as inconsequential to the
robbery charge.
Some of it, political or philosophical in nature, would
have appeared as mere ramblings during a routine search.
Directions, maps, and other non-overtly criminal articles
would usually be brushed aside as miscellaneous. To the trained
observer, however, the evidence clearly pointed to only one
possibility, homegrown terrorism.
It was at the Los Angeles Joint Terrorism Task Force(JTTF),
which you are familiar with, where LAPD task force officers,
tenured detectives, and FBI special agents worked together
diligently and tirelessly with the Torrance detectives'
information. As a result of this extraordinary teamwork, not
only were the suspects apprehended but a larger and greater
conspiracy was uncovered.
Further investigation revealed that this group was aligned
with a California prison group known as Jamiyyat Ul Islam Is
Saheeh (JIS), which translates to ``Assembly of Authentic
Islam.'' JIS practiced a radical form of Islam that was neither
authentic nor peaceful. An inmate, Kevin Lamar James, founded
this radical group in 1997 at California's notorious Folsom
Prison. James, a Los Angeles-based gang member serving time for
robbery, directed his followers ``to target for violent attack
any enemies of Islam or `infidels,' including the United States
government and Jewish and non-Jewish supporters of Israel.''
Hiding behind the guise of religious freedom, James' JIS
used assumed protections such as the freedom of religion to
advance its beliefs and pressure new recruits and converts into
a hate-based cult. It affiliated itself with al-Qa'ida's
philosophies and targeting array. James has much in common with
many other radicals that have been identified in the United
States. All were street thugs radicalized while behind bars.
All were first encountered by local law enforcement before they
were radicalized. And all plotted to kill Americans.
The tentacles of JIS reached beyond the prison's walls. A
released member was able to recruit two otherwise law-abiding
residents into a terrorist cell. He convinced them to rob and
eventually commit terrorist acts for JIS. He also indoctrinated
them into the radical philosophy of hate.
The successful approach taken by all participating agencies
involved in the Torrance case is no accident. Rather, it was
the result of the dedication, training, and expertise of the
officers involved. More, however, can be done to locate and
stop other attacks. We need to educate all of local law
enforcement about counter-terrorism techniques and
investigations.
In this respect, as a region, as a state, and as a nation,
in the Torrance Case we dodged a bullet. Whether the motivation
is religious fundamentalism, anti-government sentiment, or the
disaffected loner, radicalized groups or individuals are
increasingly perpetrating terrorism. A substantial attack upon
U.S. soil is increasingly likely. The answer rests with
prevention. The nation's 12,000 FBI Special Agents clearly
cannot do it alone with their new mission of dealing with
terrorism.
However, over 700,000 local law enforcement officers in the
U.S. are already on the front lines, fighting crime and
gathering critical information on a daily basis. Providing
these 700,000 front-line officers standardized counterterrorism
training will transform these first responders into a
coordinated collection and prevention asset.
Such an approach can be a true force multiplier. We must
cultivate a working relationship with all religious groups in
our region, and gain their trust. The colleague from the FBI
will speak to that. It is essential that this, in fact, be
done.
Here in Los Angeles we have initiated a partnership with
the Center for Policing terrorism (CPT), which is part of the
Manhattan Institute, a think tank in New York City. My working
relationship with the Institute goes back to my days as the
Commissioner of New York City Police Department. CPT leverages
world-class experts to help the LAPD and other departments
tackle our most pressing counterterrorism challenges smarter,
faster, and cheaper.
As a result, it is the recommendation of the CPT that the
LAPD partner with an existing school of higher education and
our Federal partners to create a National Counter Terrorism
Academy (NCTA) in Los Angeles. The purpose of the NCTA would be
to lead the way in ushering in a new era of policing strategy:
Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP).
Recognized as a national way forward, ILP is an all-crimes
approach to enforcement that will revolutionize law
enforcement. ILP richly integrates existing strategies and
technologies into a coherent ``game-plan'' approach in
allocating resources efficiently.
Currently, without a national strategy, or a place where
police executives can learn how to implement ILP, it is sitting
on the shelf unused. We must set national standards. We must
provide training at all levels. It is essential. The Torrance
case reinforces that.
Public-private partnerships such as that exemplified by the
LAPD and the Manhattan Institute build tangible results.
Public-private partnerships and partnerships among various
agencies at all levels of government are essential.
Madam Chairwoman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you
for inviting me to speak today on this important subject. I am
happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Bratton follows:]
Prepared Statement of William J. Bratton
Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert and members of the
committee, thank you for holding this hearing on the pressing issue of
Radicalization.
The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the City of Los
Angeles have forged successful relationships with our local, state, and
federal partners to begin examining and responding to the growing
threat posed by radicalization. However, we need continued support for
our efforts across a number of areas of concern. Today, I will address
three issues of interest to this committee:
First, the growing threat of Muslim radicalization in
the United States, specifically here in the Los Angeles area,
and the challenges posed to local, state, and federal
authorities.
Second, the connection between prison radicalization
and the potential of homegrown Islamist terrorism.
Third, the role that a congressionally-funded National
Counter Terrorism Academy (NCTA) serving state and local law
enforcement would have in countering the these threats.
Beginning in May of 2005, four radical Muslim suspects--armed with
shotguns)--went on a significant crime spree that by itself would have
been noteworthy. Eleven times they robbed or attempted to rob gas
stations in the cities of Los Angeles, Torrance, Playa Del Rey,
Bellflower, Pico Rivera, Walnut, Orange, Playa Vista, and Fullerton.
In investigating the crimes, the experienced detectives of the
Torrance Police Department focused on the basics of any investigation:
evidence, witnesses, and modus operandi. A lucky break occurred when a
cell phone belonging to one of the suspects was recovered. When a
search was conducted of the suspect's apartment the detective also
observed disturbing evidence. This evidence included body armor,
knives, and other evidence of the crime.
However, when the detective noticed jihad-related literature and
the addresses of potential ``targets'' the detective fell back on his
previous training as a Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) and recognized
this as a pre-incident indicator to a terrorist attack. As a TLO, this
detective had received minimal formalized terrorism training--in
comparison to the routine training received by bona fide counter-
terrorism professionals. Yet this training was sufficient enough to arm
the Torrance detective with usable information.
To most detectives this ``disturbing evidence'' would have appeared
as inconsequential to the robbery charge. Some of it, political or
philosophical in nature, would have appeared as mere ramblings during a
routine search. Directions, maps, and other non-overtly criminal
articles would usually be brushed aside as miscellaneous. To the
trained observer, however, the evidence clearly pointed to only one
possibility--homegrown terrorism.
It was at the Los Angeles Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) where
LAPD task force officers--tenured detectives--and FBI special agents
worked together diligently and tirelessly. As a result of this
extraordinary teamwork, not only were the suspects apprehended but a
larger and greater conspiracy was uncovered.
Experienced local detectives and federal agents conducted textbook
interrogations of the suspects revealing a surprising fact. The cell of
robbers and alleged terrorists were further along in their conspiracy
than anyone knew or expected. These homegrown terrorists had already
conducted surveillance of military recruitment stations, the Israeli
consulate, El-Al airlines, and prominent synagogues. According to the
federal indictment against the JIS members, they had selected attack
periods ``to maximize the number of casualties.''
Further investigation revealed that this group was aligned with a
California prison group known as Jamiyyat Ul Islam Is Saheeh (JIS),
which translates to ``Assembly of Authentic Islam.'' JIS practiced a
radical form of Islam that was neither authentic nor peaceful. An
inmate, Kevin Lamar James, founded this radical group in 1997 at
California's notorious Folsom Prison. James, a Los Angeles-based gang
member serving time for robbery, directed his followers ``to target for
violent attack any enemies of Islam or `infidels,' including the United
States government and Jewish and non-Jewish supporters of Israel.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Kevin Lamar James
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hiding behind the guise of religious freedom, James' JIS used
assumed protections such as the freedom of religion to advance its
beliefs and pressure new recruits and converts into a hate-based cult.
It affiliated itself with al-Qa'ida's philosophies and targeting array
(``The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies--civilians and
military--is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any
country in which it is possible to do it.'' \2\). James has much in
common with Ahmed Ressam, Richard Reid, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, and Jose
Padilla. All were street thugs radicalized while behind bars. All were
first encountered by local law enforcement before they were
radicalized. And all plotted to kill Americans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, World Islamic Front
Statement, 23 February 1998
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The tentacles of JIS reached beyond the prison's walls. A released
member was able to recruit two otherwise law-abiding residents into a
terrorist cell. He convinced them to rob and eventually commit
terrorist acts for JIS. He also indoctrinated them into the radical
philosophy of hate.
In this case, ``Islamist'' radicals were taken into custody,
preventing terrorism at home. It was demonstrated that formal education
in the subject matter of terrorist tradecraft, together with modern
intelligence-led policing strategies and proven investigative
techniques, could be used successfully to counter and prevent
terrorism.
The successful approach taken by all participating agencies
involved in the Torrance case is no accident. Rather, it was the result
of the dedication, training, and expertise of the officers involved.
More, however, can be done to locate and stop other attacks. We need to
educate all of local law enforcement about counter-terrorism techniques
and investigations. In this respect, as a region, as a state, and as a
nation, in the Torrance Case we dodged a bullet.
Whether the motivation is religious fundamentalism, anti-government
sentiment, or the disaffected loner, radicalized groups or individuals
are increasingly perpetrating terrorism. A substantial attack upon U.S.
soil is increasingly likely. The answer rests with prevention.
The nation's 12,000 FBI Special Agents are indeed some of the best
investigators in the world, and the training they receive sets the
benchmark for law enforcement. Despite their talents and abilities, the
workload of most special agents is overwhelming and their enforcement
scope is limited. However, over 700,000 local law enforcement officers
in the U.S. are already on the front lines, fighting crime and
gathering critical information on a daily basis.
Providing these 700,000 front-line officers standardized counter-
terrorism training will transform these first responders into a
coordinated collection and prevention asset. Such an approach can be a
true force multiplier.
The only way to prevent radicalization is to end the conditions
that foster it. When efforts at prevention are unsuccessful or
impractical, a fully trained and seamlessly integrated public safety
force is required to recognize pre-incident indicators and develop
interdiction, disruption, or arrest strategies.
Furthermore, we must cultivate a working relationship with all
religious groups in our region, and gain their trust. It is these
congregations that will provide the needed intelligence of disaffected
membership. However, a suspicious and frightened religious community
will react to knee-jerk outreach efforts as dubious or disingenuous.
We have initiated a partnership with the Center for Policing
Terrorism (CPT), which is part of the Manhattan Institute, a think tank
in New York City. My working relationship with the Institute dates back
to my days as the Commissioner of New York Police Department, where the
Institute provided some of the intellectual force behind our crime
reduction strategies and assisted in their dissemination. Similarly,
the CPT leverages world-class intellectuals to help the LAPD and other
departments tackle our most pressing counter-terrorism challenges
smarter, faster, and cheaper.
As a result, it is the recommendation of the CPT that the LAPD
partner with an existing school of higher education and our federal
partners to create a National Counter Terrorism Academy (NCTA) in Los
Angeles. The purpose of the NCTA would be to lead the way in ushering
in a new era of policing strategy: Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP).
Recognized as a national way forward, ILP is an all-crimes approach to
enforcement that will revolutionize law enforcement. ILP richly
integrates existing strategies and technologies into a coherent ``game-
plan'' approach in allocating resources efficiently. Currently, without
a national strategy, or a place where police executives can learn how
to implement ILP, it is sitting on the shelf unused.
Setting national standards for training in the field of counter-
terrorism would be the first step in pursuing a coordinated approach to
intelligence gathering and analysis. Currently, unlike intelligence
training, information technology systems and first responder training
courses must be certified and approved as interoperable. As proposed by
the LEAP Strategy report,\3\ such an effort would be needed to train
police officers at every level in a unified, scientific, and
constitutionally-responsible manner. The NCTA would both seek out
current and professional programs and curriculum and develop its own
where gaps exist. By establishing a professional academic approach, the
NCTA would be a first of its kind to forward ILP strategies for local
police agencies and their partners who are going to be essential in
transitioning national and international homeland security efforts into
homeland security initiatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Law Enforcement Assistance and Partnership Strategy - Improving
Information Sharing Between the Intelligence Community and State,
Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Public-private partnerships such as that exemplified by the Los
Angeles Police Department and the Manhattan Institute build tangible
results. For example, we have sought the advice of CPT and other
private and public partners in developing our fundamental approach to
building good community relations with faith-based groups in our City.
I am proud to report that LAPD works extraordinarily hard at developing
strong ties with the people of Los Angeles. In building effective
relationships with those groups that the current terrorist operative is
likely to exploit, we are learning that it is best to concentrate on
shared goals such as public safety and quality of life issues. With the
trust and mutual respect between police and citizen that such
collaboration fosters, we are erecting the strongest of defenses
against terrorism.
As with any new educational effort the basics are needed--a brick
and mortar facility, and educational infrastructure, computers,
networks, and other information technology. A core curriculum aimed at
every level of law enforcement, one that is tailored to the students'
needs, must be developed and quickly implemented.
Madam Chairwoman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to speak today on this important subject. I am happy to
answer any questions you may have.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Chief.
Ms. Fedarcyk.
STATEMENT OF JANICE K. FEDARCYK, SPECIAL AGENT IN-CHARGE (SAC)
COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION, FBI'S LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE
Ms. Fedarcyk. Chairman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and
members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank you for this
opportunity to speak to you on the topic of Islamic
radicalization in the U.S., and the FBI's efforts to address
this emerging threat with our other Federal, state, and local
partners. FBI does not investigate members of any religion for
their religious beliefs, but rather focuses on investigating
activities that may harm the United States.
Although the most dangerous instances of radicalization
have so far been overseas, the Islamic radicalization of U.S.
persons, whether foreign-born or native, is of increasing
concern. Key to the success of stopping the spread of
radicalization is identifying patterns and trends in the early
stages.
The FBI characterizes homegrown Islamic extremists as U.S.
persons who may appear to be assimilated, but reject the
cultural values, beliefs, and environment of the United States.
They identify themselves as Muslim on some level and on some
level become radicalized in the United States. They could
provide support for or directly commit a terrorist act inside
the United States.
The FBI has identified certain venues, such as prisons and
the internet, that present opportunities for the proselytizing
of radical Islam. The European and American experience shows
that prisons are venues where extremists can be radicalized and
recruited among the inmate population. Prison radicalization
primarily occurs through anti-U.S. sermons provided by
contract, volunteer, or staff imams, radicalized inmates who
gain religious influence, and extremist media.
Most cases of prison radicalization appear to be carried
out by domestic Islamic extremist groups with few or no direct
foreign connections, like the Sunni Islamic extremist group in
California that you have just heard about, the JIS. Although
the Committee is familiar with this case, it is theFBI's
responsibility to ensure the defendants in this case receive a
fair and impartial trial so I will limit my comments relative
to that concern.
I would like to emphasize, however, that not all prison
radicalization is Islamic in nature. Domestic groups such as
white supremacists also recruit in prisons. In response to this
possible threat, the FBI and the Bureau of Prisons have been
actively engaged in efforts to detect, deter, and interdict
efforts by terrorist and extremist groups to radicalize or
recruit in U.S. prisons. This effort has been underway since
February 2003.
As a result of the JIS case, the FBI organized a Prison
Radicalization Working Group which is comprised of more than 15
Federal, state, and local agencies, and over 30 task force
officers. As part of these efforts, we have identified ``best
practices'' for correctional institutions to combat the spread
of radicalization.
In addition to our investigative efforts, the FBI realizes
that community involvement is critical to the success of our
mission in combating radicalization within our homeland.
In September 2003, the Los Angeles Field Office did
initiate the formation of the Muslim, Arab, Armenian, Sikh, and
Coptic Ombudsman Program, which actually has evolved into the
Multi-Cultural Advisory Committee. This committee allows
information, ideas, and concerns to be shared between the FBI
and said communities. The inaugural meeting of the Committee
was hosted by the Los Angeles Field Office on May 27, 2004.
Since that date, the Committee has met on the third Monday
of each month to address issues and concerns ranging from the
FBI's Counter Terrorism and Counter Intelligence missions, the
Patriot Act, and interviews of individuals within these
communities, as well as guest presentations by other agencies.
As a result the Los Angeles Field Office has also
participated in a number of town hall meetings and community
functions at which an FBI presence is requested among their
communities.
In the spirit of partnership and sharing information,
Committee members have hosted a number of events for FBI
personnel to broaden their cultural and religious understanding
of the various aspects of the Arab, Armenian, Muslim, Sikh, and
Coptic communities in the greater Los Angeles area.
With respect to our collaborations that have been forged
among law enforcement and other public safety sectors, the FBI
and its law enforcement partners have been working together for
a number of years to address terrorism related matters. In
1984, in order to coordinate counterterrorism threats and
responses associated with the Summer Olympics the FBI initiated
a working group which led to the formation of the Los Angeles
Joint Terrorism Task Force.
The combined resources of the various formalized and ad-hoc
JTTF groups in the greater Los Angeles territory includes more
than 260 full-time task force investigators, consisting of
approximately 150 FBI Special Agents, and 110 other Federal,
state, and local task force agents/officers.
Among the fundamental post-September 11th changes, sharing
intelligence is now the paramount objective. Among a number of
other programs and initiatives one that we are most proud of
and excited is the Joint Regional Intelligence Center which you
had the opportunity to visit yesterday in which Federal, state,
and local resources are commingled in order to produce an
integrated multi-agency intelligence processing center.
We believe the LA JRIC is a ground-breaking cooperative
which fully integrates intelligence intake, vetting, analysis/
fusion, and synthesis from a multitude of law enforcement and
public safety agencies. JRIC's services are available to all
law enforcement agencies throughout our seven county region and
that it allow for a smoother flow of leads and intelligence to
prevent duplication, fragmentation, and circular reporting.
Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and members of
the Subcommittee, there has been a lot of discussion and
speculation about the effectiveness of the FBI and its partners
to combat terrorism, and the manner in which information is
processed and shared. The FBI has made significant improvements
in the past six years to ensure we are pooling our Federal,
state, and local resources accordingly, and working as one team
to address potential threats to our homeland.
In my 25 plus years working as a law enforcement officer, I
have never experienced the level of collegial partnerships
between law enforcement and public safety agencies as I have
here in Los Angeles. We fully appreciate and understand the
tasking that the American people expect of us, and we are
standing shoulder to shoulder with our partners to accomplish
this mission. Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Fedarcyk follows:]
Prepared Statement of Janice Fedarcyk
Chairman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and members of the
Subcommittee, I want to thank you for this opportunity to speak to you
on the topic of Islamic radicalization in the United States, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) efforts to address this
emerging threat with our other federal, state, and local partners. I
would like to emphasize before I begin that the issue is not Islam
itself, but how the religious ideology is used by violent extremists to
inspire and justify their actions. The FBI does not investigate members
of any religion for their religious beliefs, but rather focuses on
investigating activities that may harm the United States.
Successes in the war on terrorism and the arrests of many key al-
Qa'ida leaders have diminished the ability of the group to attack the
United States (US) Homeland. At the same time, a broader Sunni
extremist movement has evolved from being run entirely by al-Qa'ida
central, to a broader movement. This is demonstrated by the 2004 Madrid
bombings, the July 2005 London bombings, and recent disruptions in the
US, United Kingdom, Canada, Bosnia, Denmark and elsewhere.
That said, al-Qa'ida's core remains committed to attacking the
United States and continues to demonstrate its ability to adapt its
tactics to circumvent security measures and reconstitute its ranks. Al-
Qa'ida is also attempting to broaden its appeal to English-speaking
Western Muslims by disseminating violent Islamic extremist propaganda
via media outlets and the Internet.
Although the most dangerous instances of radicalization have so far
been overseas, the Islamic radicalization of US persons, whether
foreign-born or native, is of increasing concern. Key to the success of
stopping the spread of radicalization is identifying patterns and
trends in the early stages.
The FBI characterizes homegrown Islamic extremists as US persons
who may appear to be assimilated, but, to some degree, have become
radicalized in their support for Islamic jihad. They often see
themselves as devout Muslims and reject the cultural values, beliefs,
and environment of the United States. Let me make it clear that the FBI
is not interested in these people because they have rejected American
culture and adopted a strict, devout view of Islam. We are interested
in them when and where there are reasonable indications that they may
provide support for, or directly commit, a terrorist attack inside the
United States because of their radicalized view of Islam. The threat
from homegrown Islamic extremists is likely smaller in scale than that
posed by overseas terrorist groups such as al-Qa'ida, but is
potentially larger in psychological impact. Several recent cases
illustrate the nature of the issue.
Since August 2005 the FBI, other federal agencies, and
our foreign partners have dismantled a global network of
extremists who are operating independently of any known
terrorist organization. Several individuals affiliated with
this network were arrested for providing material support in
connection with the plotting of a terrorist attack in the
United States.
The apparent increase of cases involving homegrown
Islamic extremists may represent an increased sensitivity of
law enforcement to activities not previously regarded as
terrorism, but we cannot rule out the possibility that the
homegrown phenomenon could be growing.
The FBI has identified certain venues, such as prisons and the
internet, that present opportunities for the proselytizing of radical
Islam.
The European and American experience shows that prisons are venues
where extremists can be radicalized and recruited among the inmate
population. Prison radicalization primarily occurs through anti-US
sermons provided by contract, volunteer, or staff imams, radicalized
inmates who gain religious influence, and extremist media. Ideologies
that radicalized inmates appear most often to embrace include the
Salafi form of Sunni Islam (including revisionist versions commonly
known as ``prison Islam'') and an extremist view of Shia Islam similar
to that of the Government of Iran and Lebanese Hizballah.
Most cases of prison radicalization appear to be carried out by
domestic Islamic extremist groups with few or no direct foreign
connections, like the Sunni Islamic extremist group in California, the
Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS), identified in July 2005. Although
the Committee is familiar with this case, I regret that I am unable to
elaborate publicly on it at this time due to pending legal proceedings,
and the FBI's responsibility to ensure the defendants in this case
receive a fair and impartial trial. I would like to emphasize, however,
that not all prison radicalization is Islamic in nature. Domestic
groups such as white supremacists also recruit in prisons.
In response to this possible threat, the FBI and the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) have been actively engaged in efforts to detect, deter,
and interdict efforts by terrorist and extremist groups to radicalize
or recruit in US prisons since February 2003. As a result of the JIS
case here in Los Angeles, the FBI organized a Prison Radicalization
Working Group which is comprised of more than 15 federal, state, and
local agencies, and over 30 task force officers. As part of these
efforts, we have identified ``best practices'' for correctional
institutions to combat the spread of radicalization.
The Internet is also a venue for the radicalization of young,
computer-savvy Westerners--both male and female--who identify with an
Islamic extremist ideology. An older generation of supporters and
sympathizers of violent Islamic extremism, in the post-9/11 environment
of increased law enforcement scrutiny, has migrated their
radicalization, recruitment, and material support activities online.
Radicalization via the Internet is participatory, and individuals are
actively engaged in exchanging extremist propaganda and rhetoric online
which may facilitate the violent Islamic extremist cause. These online
activities further their indoctrination, create links between
extremists located around the world, and may serve as a springboard for
future terrorist activities.
Overseas experience can also be a significant element in
facilitating the transition from one who has a proclivity to be
radicalized, and who may espouse radicalized rhetoric, to one who is
willing and ready to act on those radicalized beliefs. Although
radicalization can occur without overseas travel, the foreign
experience appears to provide the networking that makes it possible for
interested individuals to train for and participate in operational
activity. The experience may vary from religious or language
instruction, to basic paramilitary training.
We assess that the overseas experiences of John Walker
Lindh \1\ played a pivotal role in his involvement with the
Taliban. Once overseas, he was directed by radicalized
individuals to attend extremist universities, and ultimately
training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ John Walker Lindh, after pleading guilty in the Eastern
District of Virginia to supporting the Taliban, in violation of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) (50) U.S.C.
Sec. 1705(b)0, and carrying an explosive during the commission of a
felony (18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(h)(2)), was given a 20-year sentence.
The FBI approaches the radicalization issue on two levels:
We are attempting to understand the dynamics of
individual and organizational radicalization to identify early
indicators as to whether individuals or groups are
demonstrating the potential for violence.
We are engaged in extensive outreach to Muslim
communities to dispel misconceptions that may foster extremism.
With respect to the latter point, I would like to spend some time
discussing the Los Angeles Field Office's efforts over the years to
develop and foster a positive working relationship with our Muslim,
Arab, Armenian, Sikh, and Coptic communities.
In September 2003, the Los Angeles Field Office (LAFO) initiated
the formation of the Muslim, Arab, Armenian, Sikh, and Coptic Ombudsman
Program per a directive by Director Mueller. It was decided that a
council should be formed through which information, ideas, and concerns
could be shared between the FBI and said communities. The inaugural
meeting of the Committee was hosted by LAFO on May 17, 2004. Since that
date, the Committee has met on the third Monday of each month to
address issues and concerns ranging from the FBI's Counter Terrorism
and Counter Intelligence missions, the Patriot Act, and interviews of
individuals within Arab, Armenian, Muslim, and Sikh communities, as
well as guest presentations by other agencies. The Committee has grown
to 35 members, and is continuing to grow to include, among others, four
members from college Muslim student organizations. As a result of the
interactions between the FBI and the Committee members, LAFO has
participated in a number of town hall meetings and community functions
at which an FBI presence is requested, as well as media events hosted
by Muslim community organizations. Members of the Multi-Cultural
Advisory Committee have also provided information to the FBI which has
resulted in investigations of potential radical extremists living among
their communities. In the spirit of partnership and sharing
information, Committee members have hosted a number of events for FBI
personnel to broaden their cultural and religious understanding of the
various aspects of the Arab, Armenian, Muslim, Sikh, and Coptic
communities in the greater Los Angeles area. LAFO maintains daily
contact with the Committee members via telephone, e-mail, and in person
meetings.
With respect to collaborations that have been forged among law
enforcement and other public safety sectors, the FBI and its law
enforcement partners have been working together for a number of years
to address terrorism related matters. In 1984, in order to coordinate
counterterrorism threats and responses associated with the Summer
Olympic Games event which took place in Los Angeles, the FBI initiated
a working group with the Los Angeles Police Department and Los Angeles
County Sheriffs Department. This led to the formation of the Los
Angeles Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in 1986.
Today, the Los Angeles JTTF program has expanded to include the
Long Beach JTTF, the Orange County JTTF, and the Inland Empire JTTF,
which coordinate their investigations through the Los Angeles JTTF, and
ultimately with the National JTTF. The combined resources of the
various formalized and ad-hoc JTTF groups in the greater Los Angeles
territory includes more than 260 full-time task force investigators,
consisting of approximately 150 FBI Special Agents, and 110 other
federal, state, and local task force agents/officers. The following is
a listing of the various local, state, and federal agencies who
participate on the JTTF's in LAFO's territory:
Local Agencies:
Los Angeles Police Department
Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department
Beverly Hills Police Department
Long Beach Police Department
Los Angeles International Airport Police Department
Los Angeles City Fire Department
Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, Bureau
of Investigations
Torrance Police Department
Los Angeles Port Police
Redondo Beach Police Department
Orange County Sheriff's Department
Orange County District Attorney's Office
Ventura County Sheriff's Department
Santa Ana Police Department
Anaheim Police Department
Cypress Police Department
Garden Grove Police Department
Irvine Police Department
San Bernardino Police Department
San Bernardino Sheriff's Department
Riverside Sheriff's Department
Banning Police Department
Barstow Police Department
Beaumont Police Department
BNSF Railroad Police Department
Chino Police Department
Colton Police Department
Corona Police Department
Fontana Police Department
Hemet Police Department
Indio Police Department
Montclair Police Department
Murrieta Police Department
Ontario Police Department
Ontario Airport Police Department
Palm Springs Police Department
Redlands Police Department
Riverside Police Department
UC Riverside Police Department
Upland Police Department
Buena Park Police Department
State Agencies:
California Highway Patrol
California Department of Justice (CATIC)
California Army National Guard
California Department of Motor Vehicles
Federal Agencies:
United States Secret Service
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Department of State Diplomatic Security Service
United States Army
Air Force Office of Special Investigations
Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
U.S. Postal Inspection Service
Naval Criminal Investigative Service
Defense Criminal Investigative Service
Central Intelligence Agency
Drug Enforcement Administration
Federal Air Marshals
U.S. Coast Guard
Environmental Protection Agency
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Transportation Security Administration
Department of Defense
U.S. Bureau of Prisons
Amtrak Rail Police
In addition to the long standing JTTF program, the Los Angeles FBI
has also developed a number of information sharing programs and
initiatives to ensure that our partners are fully aware of intelligence
and threat information developed by the FBI and other agencies.
As part of the transformation undertaken by the FBI since September
11, 2001, we have developed and directed the implementation of the
Field Intelligence Group (FIG) program, which serves as the mechanism
by which the Field Divisions evaluate threats. The FIG is utilized by
the FBI to evaluate regional and local perspectives on a variety of
issues, to include the receipt of and action on integrated
investigative and intelligence requirements. FIGs further provide the
intelligence link to the JTTFs, Fusion Centers, FBIHQ and the
Intelligence Community at large. FIGs, which have been established in
all 56 Field Offices since October 2003, consist of Intelligence
Analysts, Special Agents, Language Analysts, and Special Surveillance
Groups. FIG personnel have been embedded in more than twenty-five
Fusion Centers and/or Multi-Agency Intelligence Centers (MAICs) around
the country.
Among the fundamental post September 11th changes, sharing
intelligence is now the paramount objective. We have developed an FBI
intelligence presence within the intelligence and law enforcement
communities by sharing Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs),
Intelligence Assessments (IAs), Intelligence Bulletins (IBs), and
related intelligence information on platforms routinely used by our law
enforcement and Intelligence Community partners, including JWICS,
SIPRNet and Law Enforcement Online (LEO), as well as on the FBI
Intranet. This effort has resulted in more than 7,400 IIRs, 150 IBs,
and 100 IAs that have been posted on all listed platforms; in addition,
over 400 Current Intelligence Reports have also been produced, of which
over 50 have been shared with the intelligence community through NCTC
Online. We are also using our internal, closed network to provide FBI
employees with access to raw, current and finished intelligence
products. Additionally, we utilize unclassified, but law enforcement
sensitive portals, such as Law Enforcement Online (LEO) and The
Intelligence and Terrorism Alert Network (TITAN), to disseminate
products to officers on the street relative to both terrorism and
criminal matters on which we have developed analysis.
Regarding the Fusion Centers and/or Multi-Agency Intelligence
Centers, Los Angeles established a Joint Regional Intelligence Center
(JRIC) in which federal, state, and local resources were commingled in
order to produce an integrated multi-agency intelligence processing
center. The Los Angeles JRIC is a groundbreaking cooperative which
fully integrates intelligence intake, vetting, analysis/fusion, and
synthesis from a multitude of law enforcement and public safety
agencies. The JRIC also disseminates developed intelligence, provides
analytical case support, analyzes trends, and provides tailored
analytical products to end users. The JRIC was founded by the FBI, the
United States Attorney's Office for the Central District of California,
the California Governor's Office of Homeland Security, the Los Angeles
Sheriff's Department (LASD), and the Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD). Other agencies who participate in the JRIC provide analysts to
staff the facility, and the JRIC's services are available to all law
enforcement agencies throughout our seven county region. The
partnerships formed in the JRIC allow the facility to be a central
contact point for law enforcement and public safety intelligence, and
provides for a smoother flow of leads and intelligence to prevent
duplication, fragmentation, and circular reporting.
Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and members of the
Subcommittee, there has been a lot of discussion and speculation about
the effectiveness of the FBI and its partners to combat terrorism, and
the manner in which information is processed and shared to ensure the
prevention of terrorist attacks on American soil. The FBI has made
significant improvements in the past six years to ensure we are pooling
our federal, state, and local resources accordingly, and working as one
team to address potential threats to our homeland. In my 25 years
working as a law enforcement officer, I have never experienced the
level of collegial partnerships between law enforcement and public
safety agencies as I have here in Los Angeles. We fully appreciate and
understand the tasking that the American people expect of us, and we
are standing shoulder to shoulder with our partners to accomplish this
mission.
Thank you for the opportunity to come before you today and share
the work the FBI and our federal, state, and local partners are doing
to address terror threats to our country. I am happy to answer any
questions.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Ms. Fedarcyk.
Sergeant Mead.
STATEMENT OF SERGEANT LARRY MEAD, DEPUTY SHERIFF, LOS ANGELES
COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT
Sgt. Mead. Madam Chairman, ranking member and members of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you on
the issue of ``Prison Radicalization.'' The subject of ``Prison
Radicalization'' reaches far beyond the walls of the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, county jails and
juvenile facilities throughout the State of California. It has
local, national and international implications. The effort to
impact homegrown terrorism in prisons, jails and society is a
monumental task which requires the cooperation of local, state
and Federal agencies and the community at large.
My testimony will focus on the local gang culture and it's
effects on the Los Angeles County Jail regarding radicalization
and our Department's cooperation with Federal, state and local
agencies to share information thereby preventing, disrupting,
or mitigating a terrorist attack. Within our custody operations
division, our gang intelligence unit, Operation Safe Jails
(OSJ), which originated in 1985, analyzes gang trends, conduct
gang interviews, classifies and maintains gang files in an
ongoing effort to prevent attacks on both staff and our inmate
population.
Over the years OSJ has evolved into an extremely critical
asset for unit commanders and executives such as my Chief Sammy
Jones of Custody Operations Division. In addition, the unit
assists local, state and Federal agencies with ongoing
investigations.
In an effort to improve communications, a sergeant attends
briefings and meetings with the Los Angeles area Joint
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), Terrorism Early Warning group
(TEW), the Joint Regional Information Center (JRIC), the
California Department of Corrections Gang Task Force and other
regional gang meetings. These relationships have resulted in
high quality products that are provided to decision makers
covering a variety of terror-related subjects.
With an average daily population of 19,000 plus inmates,
the Los Angeles County jail system is seen as a possible
location where prison radicalization can sew it roots. Since
late 1995, several OSJ gang intelligence deputies were
designated Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO's) who report on
radical activities to the Department's Terrorism Early Warning
group. This has expanded to other local state and Federal
agencies. Their activities were heightened by the July, 2005,
discovery of the radical prison group, Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-
Sheeh (JIS), that Chief Bratton and Chief Neu have talked about
in length.
Since then, analysis shows that radicalization and
recruitment in U.S. prisons is still an ongoing concern. Prison
radicalization primarily occurs through anti-U.S. sermons
provided by contract, volunteer's, staff imams, radicalized
inmates, etc. Ideologies that radicalized inmates appear most
often to embrace, include or are influenced by the Salafi form
of Sunni Islam (including revisionist versions commonly known
as ``prison Islam'') and an extremist view of Shia Islam
similar to that of the government of Iran and Lebanese
Hezbollah.
Some of the initiatives that we have taken in Los Angeles
County is we have two deputies from our Terrorism and Early
Warning Group who are working full time on the radicalization
issue within the Los Angeles County Jail System. Our department
participates on the Jail Radicalization Working group with FBI,
LAPD, CDC, and other agencies.
There is an ongoing integration effort with Jail
Investigations Unit, Operation Safe Jails, Classification Unit
and the Joint Regional Intelligence Center. Ongoing interaction
with religious leaders (more than 100) who conduct services at
all Los Angeles County jail facilities. And we have a continued
outreach for better communication between local, state and
Federal custodial facilities regarding the transfer and travel
of ``problem inmates.''
Finally, we participated with George Washington University
on the study of issues related to radicalization. In the LA
County Jail our religious leaders go through a verification
process. We do an application. There is a copy of ordination.
We do background checks and we monitor their services as well.
Sheriff Baca has taken the lead in this effort to impact
radicalization and homegrown terrorism in mainstream society is
an inherently difficult task, especially without the
cooperation and partnership of the local Muslim community.
Muslim-American organizations have been working on various ways
of supporting and participating in the security needs of
America, as well as people of all nations. Sheriff Baca has
taken the lead to formalize this endeavor by forming a national
organization known as the Muslim-American Homeland Security
Congress (MAHSC). This is a non-political, non-governmental,
nonreligious, and non-profit organization.
Through partnerships, cooperation and assistance with
national and local elected officials, law enforcement, civic
and inter-faith groups, the Muslim-American Homeland Security
Congress will educate, reach out to the disenfranchised, and
communicate to all Americans.
Operation Safe Jails gang intelligence deputies are
continuously monitoring our inmate population. We have
identified several inmates who had radical correspondence,
drawings of airplanes flying into the World Trade Center, e-
mail addresses to radical websites, and we are working with
local, state, and Federal agencies.
I want to thank you for the time this morning.
[The statement of Sgt. Mead follows:]
Prepared Statement of Larry A. Mead
Madam Chairman, ranking member and members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to speak to you on the issue of ``Prison
Radicalization.''
The subject of ``Prison Radicalization'' reaches far beyond the
walls of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR), county jails and juvenile facilities throughout the State of
California. It has local, national and international implications. The
effort to impact ``homegrown'' terrorism in prisons, jails and society
is a monumental task which requires the cooperation of local, state and
federal agencies and the community at large. My testimony will focus on
the local gang culture and it(s effects on the Los Angeles County Jail
regarding radicalization and our Department(s cooperation with federal,
state and local agencies to share information thereby preventing,
disrupting or mitigating a terrorist attack.
Within our custody operations division, our gang intelligence unit,
Operation Safe Jails (OSJ), which originated in 1985, analyzes gang
trends, conduct gang interviews, classifies and maintains gang files in
an ongoing effort to prevent attacks on both staff and our inmate
population. Over the years OSJ has evolved into an extremely critical
asset for unit commanders and executives throughout the Department.
OSJ's primary responsibility is gang intelligence. In addition, the
unit assists local, state and federal agencies with ongoing
investigations. In an effort to improve communications, a sergeant
attends briefings and meetings with the Los Angeles area Joint
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), Terrorism Early Warning group (TEW), the
Joint Regional Information Center (JRIC), the California Department of
Corrections Gang Task Force and other regional gang meetings. These
relationships have resulted in high quality products that are provided
to decision makers covering a variety of terror-related subjects.
With an average daily population of 19,000 plus inmates, the Los
Angeles County jail system is seen as a possible location where prison
radicalization can sew it roots. Since late 1995, several OSJ gang
intelligence deputies were designated Terrorism Liaison Officers
(TLO's) who report on radical activities to the Department's Terrorism
Early Warning group. This has expanded to other local state and federal
agencies. Their activities were heightened by the July, 2005, discovery
of the radical prison group, Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Sheeh (JIS) or the
``Authentic Assembly of Islam,'' at Folsom State Prison, near
Sacramento, California. Since then, analysis shows that radicalization
and recruitment in U.S. prisons is still an ongoing concern. Prison
radicalization primarily occurs through anti-U.S. sermons provided by
contract, volunteer's, staff imams, radicalized inmates who gain
religious influence, or extremist media. Ideologies that radicalized
inmates appear most often to embrace, include or are influenced by the
Salafi form of Sunni Islam (including revisionist versions commonly
known as ``prison Islam'') and an extremist view of Shia Islam similar
to that of the government of Iran and Lebanese Hizballah.
JAIL RADICALIZATION INITIATIVES IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY
Two deputies working full time on the radicalization
issue within the Los Angeles County Jail System
LASD participates on the Jail Radicalization Working
group with FBI, LAPD, CDC
Ongoing integration effort with Jail Investigations
Unit, Operation Safe Jails, Classification Unit and the Joint
Regional Intelligence Center
Ongoing interaction with religious leaders (more than
100) who conduct services at all Los Angeles County jail
facilities
Continued outreach for better communication between
local, state and federal custodial facilities regarding the
transfer and travel of ``problem inmates''
Participation with George Washington University on the
study of issues related to radicalization
Religious Leader Verification Process
Application
Copy of Ordination
Support Letter from sponsoring church
Background by Inmate Services Unit
Orientation program
Random monitoring by Inmate Services Unit
Random monitoring by Chapel Deputies
Sheriff Baca's Statement:
The effort to impact radicalization and ``homegrown'' terrorism in
mainstream society is an inherently difficult task, especially without
the cooperation and partnership of the local Muslim community. Muslim-
American organizations have been working on various ways of supporting
and participating in the security needs of America, as well as people
of all nations. Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, of the Los Angeles County
Sheriff(s Department, has taken the lead to formalize this endeavor by
forming a national organization known as the Muslim-American Homeland
Security Congress (MAHSC). This is a non-political, non-governmental,
non-religious, and non-profit organization. Through partnerships,
cooperation and assistance with national and local elected officials,
law enforcement, civic and inter-faith groups, the Muslim-American
Homeland Security Congress will educate, reach out to the
disenfranchised, and communicate to all Americans the goals and purpose
of the organization.
MISSION
The Muslim-American Homeland Security Congress shall foster
education & understanding, organization & empowerment, along with
Communication & Cooperation with the American public to protect and
defend the United States of America and all people through the
prevention of terrorism and any acts of prejudice.
Operation Safe Jails gang intelligence deputies are continuously
monitoring our inmate population for radical activity. The Imams who
conduct religious service go through a thorough background check and
their teachings are not associated with the radicalized form of Islam.
Inmates who attempt to spread radical Islam are monitored and reported
to the appropriate agencies. We have identified several inmates who had
radical correspondence, drawings of airplanes flying into the World
Trade Center, e-mail addresses to radical websites, and in one
disturbing instance, we interviewed a foreign national who provided
information regarding a safe house radical mosque where large sums of
U.S. Currency is counted and forwarded to a Middle Eastern country for
dissemination. There is no doubt that ``Prison Radicalization,'' is an
ongoing problem. We all need to continue our focus on this growing
phenomena and add additional resources to combat this growing trend or
run the risk of another similar situation such as the JIS incident
which occurred at Folsom State Prison in July, 2005.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Sergeant.
I thank all the witnesses for putting up with my tapping
but the goal was to give us enough time to ask questions which
will bring out even more good information. Now I will remind
each member that the same rules apply to us. Each of us has
five minutes to question the panel and I will now recognize
myself and adhere strictly to my time.
Chief Bratton, you are the one who called training a true
force multiplier. You pointed out, I think it was you, that
there are 700,000 local law enforcement agents and, as far as I
remember, about 40,000 FBI agents, something like that. Think
about it. If they are well trained, we obviously have many more
resources to prevent harm to our citizens. This Torrance case,
which still has to go to trial, but the allegations in this
Torrance case are surely evidence that alert policing can
prevent harm to our citizens.
My first question of both chiefs, and others chime in if
you would like to, is what exactly is this training? I think
the public would be interested in this because the public, too,
can be part of the first preventer force. After all, we all
live in these neighborhoods and we can observe strange
activities in our neighborhood so could you give us some more
information about what the training includes.
Chief Bratton, please add a plug for your academy which
would be based here but would train nationally as I understand
it.
Mr. Bratton. Well, the plug actually supports the need.
There is no generic training overall in the sense that each
agency is effectively attempting to train their own TLOs, if
you will. I now have one in each of my area police stations.
This is a new area for local policing. It took us many hundreds
of years to develop expertise and traditional crime fighting.
We need to expedite trying to get basic information into
the hands of patrol officers, investigating detectives,
supervisors, managers, and chiefs so there's different needs at
each of those levels. My suggestion and my belief is that we
need to have a degree of generic training for each of those
levels that does not currently exist. Oftentimes it's as a
result of an individual chief or investigator or supervisor's
interest in the topic area, or in the case of Los Angeles, New
York, Washington, Chicago, the level of perceived threat in
terms of generating focus on this issue.
The idea of a national police terrorism academy is to
develop a curriculum on what chiefs need, what managers need,
what supervisors need, and what does a frontline cop need so
those 700,000 personnel are effectively working cohesively to
support the 40,000 Federal agents, FBI, DEA, all of those who
engage in a similar effort.
We are really only at the beginning of this process. We are
not really down the road at all.
Well, speaking on my own behalf, and I think the
Subcommittee would agree, we are very interested in your idea
and we will be looking at it closely.
Chief Neu, I mentioned in introducing you that you have
been commended for the training activity that you have engaged
in for your police department. Can you give us some detail just
as to that one police department and how do you think it helped
the undercover cops, who figured out at least the beginning of
this plot, do their work?
Mr. Neu. The key to our training as been consistency. It's
not just a one day of training or a two-day course. The way
that we approach this is we have actually created an
intelligence section within out department which has really
given us an upper hand, so to speak, in the training of our
officers.
We have two detectives who train not only the entire
department but also open up avenues in the community with our
critical facilities, the Del Amo Fashion Center, Exxon/Mobile
refinery to name two. All of their security personnel have been
through our training because, as Chief Bratton talked about,
the force multiplier. It's not just within the walls of the
Torrance Police Department. It expands into the community.
To expand on that a little bit more, a perfect example
would be an incident that we dealt with yesterday which was a
threat that came through the internet to the mall. The security
director instead of calling for a black and white field officer
called our terrorism liaison officer directly who then called
the Long Beach FBI office and spoke to a JTTF member who then
passed the information on to the LA JRIC.
That's the continuity. That's the unity that I talked
about. That is common place now but we can't sit still. We have
to build upon that and that is exactly what the efforts of
Chief Bratton, Sheriff Baca continue to do in this region. Keep
in mind we have 43 local law enforcement agencies and it's
going to take time for all of us to get there. But I must
stress that local law enforcement has a responsibility here.
Police chiefs have a responsibility here and that's where we're
moving.
Ms. Harman. Thank you. My time has expired and I now
recognize the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, the gentleman
from Washington, for five minutes of questions.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair. Would anyone want to
take a shot at defining what radicalization is?
Ms. Fedarcyk. I think we would define it as the movement
from beyond a moderate posture, if you will, into a more
extremist viewpoint wherein perfectly regular, if you will,
beliefs are taken to the extreme to insight violence, if you
will in furtherance of a stated religious belief where we see
it taken from, if you will, a middle-of-the-road approach or
religious belief. It has basically taken the more radical form
and the more extremist form with calls to actually insight
violence in a call of religion, if you will.
Mr. Reichert. Chief.
Mr. Bratton. I think in the simplest form is from dormancy
to action. Somebody who is looking at it thinking about it,
fantasizing about it now moving overtly to do something about
it. I guess that is about as simple an explanation that I can
provide.
Mr. Reichert. There is a lot of discussion about Islamic
radicalism. What non-Muslim radicalism is taking place that you
can describe probably in the presence that you would see it.
Sergeant Mead. I just got off the phone yesterday with one
of my counterparts at the California Department of Corrections.
In addition to Islamic radicalism they have, as you know,
several white supremacist groups that are prison gang members.
Some of the recruitment that is ongoing occurs in prisons
throughout the United States, not just California. What happens
is traditionally you'll have the lone wolf individual who
matches the description given here who goes out and pushes it
beyond the limit some place in the midwest and elsewhere.
They are tracking an individual in addition to all of the
other radical issues that are happening in CDC. It is not just
the Muslim problem. It is a problem where anyone, whatever
their beliefs are, whether it is industrial or radicalism,
whatever, they are pushing the limits and they want to take
action to destroy infrastructure and our way of life.
Mr. Reichert. As you see this problem start to develop, and
it sounds like it is increasing across the country, and we are
looking at all of these entities that we just rattle off, the
local PD intelligence units, the JRICs, the JTTFs and the
Fusion Centers. Now we have the prison radicalization group and
Operation Safe Jails and we can go on with lots of other groups
coming together.
You have talked a little bit about how they work together
and they share information, but how does the problem of over-
classification play into this? I know that is a complicated
question but it is something that I think all of you are
working on in order to share this information that is
developing. Can you describe that problem just a little bit? I
know we don't have a whole lot of time for that.
Ms. Fedarcyk. I know that the issue of over-classification
has been surfaced and is currently being reviewed. I think we
have been very successful from what I have seen so far in my
short time here in LA in taking information and being able to
translate that from the classified version, if you will, into a
more actionable intelligence for our partners.
We have been very aggressive in obtaining clearances for
our partners so that we are in a position to share classified
information at all levels. I do think that we are through all
of the efforts you have heard about with the JRIC, the JTTF,
and many of the other working associations have the ability to
pass that information down to where it needs. The issue of
over-classification I know is a topic of concern.
Mr. Reichert. Yes. Thank you, Madam Chair. My time has
expired.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Reichert.
I now recognize Mr. Dicks of Washington State for five
minutes of questions.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you. Chief, tell us a little bit more in
detail about the terrorism liaison officers. What kind of
people do you pick? How are they trained? Give us a little more
specificity if you could.
Mr. Neu. Within our agency we like to have experienced
investigators in those positions. In other words, folks within
our agency that can actually train immediately because it's not
just the singular position of a TLO that we are looking at to
work directly with the FBI. It is also to get out in the
community and to educate our officers so we are looking for
experience.
Mr. Dicks. The chief has been talking about a training
center which I think is a great idea. Did you just do this on
your own? Did you just come up with your own curriculum to
train these people or did you get any help from the Department
of Homeland Security or the FBI?
Mr. Neu. It is actually joint. It is with the Department of
Homeland Security and our working relationship with the FBI as
I mentioned earlier.
Mr. Dicks. Does it go into the training of these people?
Mr. Neu. Absolutely. What is important to note through the
FBI is there are a number of subject matter experts that they
have at our disposal in local law enforcement. It is important
for us to utilize that. Instead of, again, waiting for them to
come to us we have to go to them and that is what we do not
only through our TLOs but also through our intelligence section
which is a sergeant and a detective, and also our member who
works with the JTTF.
Mr. Dicks. It sounds like a good program. Chief, you are
saying more training and different kinds of training depending
on what level you are in the Department? Is that basically what
I heard?
Mr. Neu. By way of example the question about
radicalization, what is it? The need to educate that we are all
speaking with the same understanding of a term or a definition,
Hamas, Hezbollah. What is it? What's the history? What's the
importance of understanding the differences? Something as basic
as that, that we are speaking from the same language and
definition base. Again, in this area TLO is a new concept and
some agencies are doing it on their own and others are doing it
in conjunction with FBI, the JTTFs, Homeland Security.
The idea of trying to develop some basic training
guidelines. In California, for example, all of our police
officers have to be post-certified. That's the California State
system to ensure that all of our officers have basic
understanding and skills to put a badge on and go into the
streets. We need similar types of levels of training
familiarization at the various ranks in local policing to
better aid the Federal Government agencies, as well as to
inform the 2.5 million private security officers that are out
there.
The chief referenced that he gets a call from the private
security director at a local mall because that person has been
educated and informed to work with the Torrance Police
Department. What he just described was the seamlessness of the
effort that we are trying to create throughout the country.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Sergeant, tell us a little bit about your prison program.
Obviously these people, the Torrance group, the four people,
were in prison and they were recruited. What are we trying to
do to better understand this and to stop this from happening in
the future? You mentioned the gangs as part of this.
Sergeant Mead. I think traditionally over the many, many
years in the history of law enforcement when a police officer
makes an arrest and the person goes to a county jail or prison
they basically forget about them and that is something they
hadn't looked at until the JIS incident. Since then the
California Department of Corrections, my sources, they are
actively involved in keeping an eye on what is going on over
there, gathering intelligence.
They are working with JTTFs throughout the state. In many
cases, my case for example, the FBI is the one who invited me
to come down to the prison working group. Since then I have
been sharing that information with everyone. Inside a prison
you have young men who are sitting around for long periods of
time, when they go especially to the penal, and they go through
what I call graduate school. Graduate school has taken a new
twist in the form of radicalization that can affect the
community on the outside and that is what we see.
Mr. Dicks. So this Torrance thing wasn't a one-time
incident? Can you tell us are there other things being
investigated?
Sergeant Mead. Sir, all I can tell you is I have a lot of
information that cannot be shared in a public setting but there
is a great deal of investigations ongoing. My source yesterday
said there is also a paper where an individual is being looked
at for radical writings with locations, etc., and I can't say
anymore.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you. Maybe, Madam Chairman, we will have
to have a classified meeting at some point. I think that might
not be a bad idea.
Ms. Harman. I think that is a great suggestion. Obviously
we don't want to compromise an ongoing investigation.
Mr. Dicks. We can also talk to Federal officials as well.
Ms. Harman. Yes, we can. Yes, we can, the FBI being one of
that group. I appreciate the suggestion and I do think we
should do that.
The gentleman's time has expired and now Mr. Lungren of
California is recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Chief Bratton and Chief Neu, as a former Commissioner of
Post I am intrigued by your statements that we need to have
training in the area of terrorism, liaison, or terrorism. Is
there a training component approved by Post right now for
terrorism training?
Mr. Neu. I checked into that in dealing with actually the
academies. I know in the academy there is a small block of
training as Chief Bratton referred to.
Mr. Lungren. Is that Post approved?
Mr. Neu. I believe so.
Mr. Lungren. Do you think we need more? What I'm trying to
find out is you are talking about we need more training. Has
Post done enough here in California? Is that block enough? Do
they need more elements? Do you believe that it is of the
quality that is necessary for the officers you are talking
about?
Mr. Neu. My opinion is that the training needs to mirror
what we are dealing with right now. The JIS case is a perfect
example of, again, the knowledge, the awareness, the education
that is needed for the line level officers that are dealing
with this in the streets. My answer to your question would be
that it needs to be formalized, needs to be enhanced, and it
needs to be consistent.
Mr. Lungren. For all four of you, if it were not a question
of additional money, let us say, for whatever reason, we can't
get additional money, what single most important thing would
you suggest that we need to do from a policy standpoint to
improve the situation dealing with radicalization, dealing with
terrorism from a law enforcement standpoint from each of your
vantage points?
Mr. Bratton. Let me speak briefly to that. The Los Angeles
region, I think, is a clear example of what can be done. The
ability to share information is not something that has a cost
to it, if you will, in the sense of a financial cost. It starts
with the willingness to be inclusive to understand that we all
need to work together.
I think we have tried to emphasize over the last two days
with your Committee that we believe that we have crossed over
that barrier that still exist unfortunately in many areas of
the country. In this area we are attempting to develop seamless
lines of communication locally with our colleagues at Homeland
Security. Charlie Allen has been out here quite frequently
trying to move some of those issues forward. That is really a
no cost, just getting people to make nice with each other.
Mr. Neu. To echo those statements also, I think it is
extremely important to understand, getting back to local law
enforcement, that at the TLO level the TLO officer needs to be
active. In other words, we can't sit back and wait for
something to happen. When I mean active, I am talking about out
in the community building and forging that relationship with
DHS, with the FBI similar to what we have done.
We have done this for years and it has paid dividends for
us not just in the JIS case but other cases that we have been
involved with. I am answering that question that way because
there is no cost to that. In other words, every agency has a
TLO identified. It is just a matter of the involvement, the
activity of that TLO at this point in time and that TLO needs
to be active.
Mr. Lungren. Let me ask this on the issue of
radicalization. It is more than just moving from thought to
action. It is moving from thought to a particular action
inspired by, in this case, the case we are basically talking
about, a distortion of religious belief. We have had gangs. We
have had different organizations who wished to do crime, even
crime on an extended level.
We are dealing here with a phenomenon of radicalization to
the extent of attempting to destroy the very essence of the
society we live in. That is different than many of the white
skinheads we had. Klu Klux Klan was a terrorist group but they
thought they were promoting their crazy idea of American ideals
which was a radicalization of a different type.
Here we are dealing with a question of an etiologically
based radicalization which goes beyond just committing crimes.
It goes to committing crimes for the purpose of destroying the
structures of our society. That is different in form and
substance than what we have done before. That being the case,
how do we try and deter that from your stand?
Well--
Ms. Harman. Let's let the witnesses offer brief answers to
that question. It's a very hard and good question.
Ms. Fedarcyk. If I may, I think the outreach efforts that
we have engaged in go to a large part of being able to share,
exchange and hopefully influence those beliefs as they may
exist. I think that is an important component anytime you are
trying to persuade another that perhaps an extremist viewpoint
they wish to take is perhaps not the one that they should be
following.
Ms. Harman. The gentleman's time as expired. Before turning
to Mr. Perlmutter for questions, I would just note that when
Mr. Reichert pushed the wrong button and he said he just called
the mayor, the mayor arrived. Frank Scott, the mayor of
Torrance, is waving from the audience. I do want to thank him
and his city for letting us use this marvelous facility.
Let me just note further that early in my Congressional
career I actually had my office in the city hall complex in
Torrance except the then-mayor Katy Geissert didn't let me
occupy this lovely building. She put me in a trailer with no
indoor plumbing and then the trailer was demolished. I guess
that was the notice to me that I had to move on.
Mr. Dicks. Madam Chair, you would think in Washington, D.C.
we could get a button that said, ``Call the President?''
Ms. Harman. I think Mr. Perlmutter will answer that as part
of his five minutes. I now yield five minutes to the gentleman
from Colorado.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you, Madam Chair. I guess the thing
that is bothering me is within our prison system, both state
and Federal system, groups break down into sort of protective
gangs. Some guys will join the Aryan Nation bunch as a way to
protect themselves. Others will join some other kind of
organization just as a way to protect themselves from the
violence that is ongoing within our prisons.
I am just curious if any of you see something different
now. I mean, this experience that you've had in Torrance, and I
don't want to screw up your case and talk about it in any
detail, but there seems to have been something different that
occurred here because in Colorado we have the gangs develop
within the system and then they seem to disperse generally
later. Here in this instance something else happened and I'm
just concerned and curious if you see this becoming a more
regular kind of phenomenon.
Sergeant Mead, I would start with you on that question.
Sargeant Mead. Within the prison system you have prison
gangs and basically when you go to prison you have to align
yourself with someone or else you will probably end up becoming
the victim of some sort of assault or dying.
As far as your question goes, I think the catalyst for all
of this was the September 11th attacks. It is sort of like a
spark on a dormant issue. These people have been radicalized
for a long period of time. However, since the September 11th
attacks and our actions in response to it I think there is a
spark that created something and it is ongoing.
We have information that certain groups such as the Black
Gorilla Family, which is a prison group, have aligned
themselves with People's Nation and they are trying to get
together and create problems for us out here on the street. The
bottom line is we are in different times. These gangs members
no longer just want to go out and commit crimes just for
profit. They are embracing Islam in many cases and the type of
Islam that they are embracing is radicalized. Therefore, we
will see problems in the future.
Mr. Perlmutter. This goes with Representative Lungren's
questions and Reichert's. Do you see that same thing coalescing
around white supremacist kind of gangs that develop in prison
and do you see them staying together outside of prison to do
political harm or kind of terrorist or are you seeing it more
just with the JIS type of gang?
Sergeant Mead. It is on both sides, more on one side than
the other side. What you would find in the white supremacist
group apart from how they go about doing their illegal
activities, remember these people are the Aryan Nation and,
``It should be a white world and America should be all white
and we should be in control of everything.''
You have these lone wolves every once in a while that break
away from the group and they become problematic. They make two
or three or four with them. It doesn't take much for them to
get together and create a weapon of some kind to get a message
across whatever their ideologies are so, yes, it does occur.
Mr. Perlmutter. In Colorado we have what is called Super
Max which is the most maximum security prison we have at the
Federal level. We had the Unibomber and the shoe bomber and the
cosa nostra and some very bad guys in that prison. We
determined that there was a lot of information, particularly
the man who was involved with the World Trade Center bombing in
1993 was able to get a lot of communications out to his friends
and there actually was some additional activity going on that
hopefully we put a stop to.
Is there any action being taken on the Federal side? I know
this is probably more for the Bureau of Prisons than for this
panel but to try to put a lid on that kind of thing so that
there isn't some guidance given by some of these folks that we
captured or imprisoned that they are leading radical elements
outside.
Ms. Fedarcyk. I think that is part of the national
initiative that has been underway since 2003. Obviously the
working group that has been developed to try and address some
of those concerns about whether the groups that form inside the
prison walls continue after either the release or through
communications as you have referenced. I think that is part of
our ongoing effort to fully identify exactly whether these
groups are prone to stay together once they exit the prison
walls or if it is strictly a function of needing that
association inside the prison walls.
Ms. Harman. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has
expired. While we could continue this for a long time I want to
thank this panel for very helpful testimony and for hosting our
visit to the Joint Regional Intelligence Center, the JRIC,
yesterday. Of course, I am totally unbiased but this is the
biggest and best fusion center in the country and hopefully
will be a model for best practices around California including
in the Sacramento area and elsewhere.
The circumstances are not identical but both the way this
is put together, the training exercises, and the collaboration
is just I think an excellent start. I know that our friend
Charlie Allen is watching these developments closely, has his
own person attached to this JRIC and this fusion center and
some others. This Subcommittee will follow the progress here
closely and try to support the effort to build out these fusion
centers.
This panel is excused. Thank you again.
The second panel should be making its way up to the table.
Thank you. I welcome the second panel of witnesses. Our first
witness, Ms. Sireen Sawaf, is the Southern California
Government Relations Director for the Muslim Public Affairs
Council and someone I have met on several occasions and find
enormously impressive.
As a leading voice of the American Muslim Community, Ms.
Sawaf has strategized with coalition and lobbied for
legislation that affects Muslims in the United States. She has
spoken extensively on the misconceptions of Islam and Muslims,
bias in the media and hate crimes prevention. Ms. Sawaf has
also coordinated activities with the Department of Homeland
Security and local law enforcement and is an active member of
the FBI initiated Multi-Cultural Advisory Committee, MCAC,
which was described by our prior FBI witness.
Our second witness, Brian Jenkins, is a Senior Advisor to
the President of the RAND Corporation and is one of the world's
leading authorities on terrorism. Mr. Jenkins founded the RAND
Corporation's Terrorism Research Program in 1972--get this,
1972--and has written frequently on terrorism and as an advisor
to the Federal Government and the private sector on the
subject.
In 1996 Mr. Jenkins was appointed by President Clinton to
the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. He
also served as an adviser to the National Commission on
Terrorism, a Commission on which I served which is when I met
him which predicted a major attack on U.S. soil prior to the 9/
11 tragic events of 2001. And he is a member of the U.S.
Comptroller General's Advisory Board.
He is a former army captain who served with special forces
in Vietnam and also a former deputy chairman of Crowell
Associates. He has authored many books, most recently
``Unconquerable Nation--Knowing our Enemy, Strengthening
Ourselves.''
Our third witness, David Gersten, is the Director of the
Department of Homeland Security Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties Programs. Mr. Gersten manages several efforts
underway at the Department including engagement in outreach to
the American Arab and Muslim Communities, Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties Training for DHS personnel and partners,
appraisal of immigration and assimilation policy, Department
fulfillment of international civil rights and human rights
treaties, and review of how the Department's use of technology
and its approach to information sharing impacts civil
liberties.
Mr. Gersten also leads the Department's Los Angeles
community roundtable for engagement with American Arab Muslim,
Sikh, and South Asian communities.
Without objection the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record. The little timer is here. I think you
can see it. I would urge you to summarize in five minutes or
you will hear my clicking sound. Then we will be interested in
asking you questions.
Let's begin with you, Ms. Sawaf, for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF SIREEN SAWAF, DIRECTOR, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, MUSLIM PUBLIC AFFAIRS COUNCIL.
Ms. Sawaf. Thank you. First and foremost, I would like to
talk about radicalization. It must be seen as a socio-political
set of behaviors and is not simply a law enforcement problem
per se. If not understood, mishandled, or even exacerbated, the
emotions and political persuasions of the people we are trying
to help, in this case Muslim American youth, will be further
alienated and marginalized from the mainstream, and hence a
sense of ghettoization will further alienate and marginalize
the community.
We cannot afford to continue with language that imposes
suspicion on Muslim American youth, whereby they are guilty
before proven innocent, and then spend millions of dollars on
studies and programs to engage them. The key to countering
extremism and radicalization, therefore, is understanding and
partnering with the mainstream moderate authentic constituent-
based Muslim American community, as we are one of the most
under-utilized but irreplaceable assets in the war on terror.
When extremists use Islam to justify actions, the only
group that can counter bad theology with good theology are the
authentic experienced leadership in the Muslim American
leadership. We are best equipped to win the hearts of minds of
Muslims worldwide and we are best equipped to detect suspicious
behavior when we partner with law enforcement as opposed to
cultural or what is the norm.
It takes leadership and insight to recognize the critical
role American Muslims play in protecting this country; hence I
commend this Subcommittee for including our perspective today
in seeking solutions. As we collectively strive to analyze the
reality and possibility of ``homegrown terrorism'' we must
understand the roots of extremism. MPAC has just developed a
youth paper entitled ``Countering Extremism and Supporting
Muslim American Youth.'' The paper does two things.
1) Frame issues related to the phenomenon of radicalization
of Muslim youth while considering the realities on the ground.
And
2) providing recommendations to specifically Muslim
American institutions, government and the media, and
universities that engage in a healthy partnership of respect
and understanding.
While on the minds of many, radicalization is void of
thoughtful analyses that explain core dynamics within Western
societies and how they affect youth. We must look into key
factors and particularly the key factors of identity, social
and political alienation, the definition of moderation versus
extremism, and Islamophobia. Only then can we begin to identify
the problem and learn to prevent it from being further
exacerbated. MPAC is ready to provide a detailed briefing to
this honorable Subcommittee and its staff and I would be happy
to coordinate that with you.
Now, to talk about partnership, I think one of the key
things that the Muslim community has been doing post-9/11 and
pre-9/11, as a matter of fact, is partnering with local and
Federal law enforcement. There is a long history of partnership
and since the 1990's MPAC enjoyed a very strong and fruitful
relationship with the FBI. I have to say that the FBI must be
commended for being the first agency to identify the importance
of partnering with Muslim Americans.
Specifically, I would like to highlight key partnership
models two of which were talked about earlier today. One of the
them is the Muslim American Homeland Security Congress that was
initiated by Sheriff Leroy Baca of LA County and
Senior Advisor of the Muslim Public Affairs Council Dr.
Maher
Hathout in response to the 7/7 bombings in London. This is
a community initiated, community constructed model that
includes universities, academics, businesses, social and
political institutions, mosques, and other Muslim entities to
participate in Homeland Security efforts.
The second is the Department of Homeland Security's recent
efforts in building bridges and initiating consistent dialogues
in the local community. That followed, of course, previous
dialogues held in Washington in an interagency meeting.
The third is the LAPD's recent outreach to us. We recently
hosted Chief Bratton and the command staff at the Islamic
Center in Southern California in January.
The final thing I would like to share with you is the
Multi-Cultural Advisory Committee with the FBI. There are
certainly challenges in these partnerships, some of which being
the distrust between community members and law enforcement due
to past experiences or cultural baggage. There are
misunderstandings, misperceptions and often times the
perception of politicization of cases.
There is further a lack of systematic and organized
approaches to these partnerships where you have each agency
independently operating and constructing some form of
partnership lacking the backing of Washington support. You
further have often times bureaucracy in some of the agencies
that get in the way rather than the lack of interest from the
community.
That said, I would like to simply close with a quote from
former FBI Director Edgar Hoover that is etched on the wall of
the FBI's headquarters in Washington that says, ``The most
effective weapon against crime is cooperation, the efforts of
all law enforcement agencies with the support and understanding
of the American people. We as Muslim Americans are ready and
willing to partner with law enforcement but we need the support
from Washington and we need the systematic approach that is
necessary to effectively counter extremism, radicalization, and
protect the country.
Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Sawaf follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sireen Sawaf
Chairwoman Harman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. It is a
privilege to testify before you today on behalf of the Muslim Public
Affairs Council to discuss the phenomenon of radicalization and some of
the work the Muslim American community has done alongside law
enforcement to counter this threat and enhance our nations security.
First and foremost, radicalization must be seen as a socio-
political set of behaviors and is not simply a law enforcement problem.
If not understood, mishandled, or even exacerbated, the emotions and
political persuasions of the people we are trying to help, in this case
Muslim American youth, will be further alienated and marginalized from
the mainstream, and hence a sense of ghettoization will take place in
various communities. We cannot afford to continue with language that
imposes suspicion on Muslim American youth, whereby they are guilty
before proven innocent, and then spend millions of dollars on studies
and programs to engage them. The key to countering extremism and
radicalization, therefore, is understanding and partnering with the
Muslim American community, as we are one of the most underutilized but
irreplaceable assets in protecting the homeland. When extremists use
Islam to justify acts of terrorism, the only group that can counter bad
theology with accurate theology is the Muslim American leadership. We
are best equipped to detect criminal activity and distinguish it from
cultural norms (such as prayer in airport terminals), and we are most
qualified to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim world. It takes
leadership and insight to recognize the critical role American Muslims
play in protecting this country; hence I commend this Subcommittee for
including our much-needed perspective in this solution-seeking effort.
It is important to note that one of the key factors in preventing
another 9/11 from happening is the patriotism of the Muslim American
community in openly rejecting al-Qaeda as a legitimate group within
Islamic discourse. Through counter-terrorism policy papers and public
pronouncements against terrorism, such as the Fatwa (legal opinion) of
Muslim American scholars, Muslim Americans have separated legitimate
Islamic discourse and activity from violent radicalism using religion
as a vehicle for mobilization. We recommend that policy-makers and
opinion-shapers should apply the same practice. Otherwise, we afford
al-Qaeda the only source of legitimacy, the veneer of Islam.
As we collectively strive to analyze the reality and possibility of
``homegrown terrorism'' in the West, the bombings in London, Madrid and
the recently foiled plots in Canada have fueled public anxiety and the
concerns of public officials. In order to effectively counter homegrown
terrorism in the U.S., particularly the potential for radicalization of
Muslim youth, it is necessary to understand the roots of that extremism
and the key factors that may cause one to cross the line from rhetoric
to violence.
The Muslim Public Affairs Council has just completed the first
substantive American Muslim position paper addressing radicalization
that contributes to preventing this phenomenon from taking root in U.S.
soil by 1) framing the issues related to the radicalization of Muslim
youth in the West while considering the realities on the ground, and 2)
providing recommendations to Muslim American institutions, government
and the media to engage young Muslims in a healthy partnership of
respect and equality and subsequently reduce the possibility of
radicalization by enhancing integration. For the purpose of today's
hearing, I will highlight key parts of this paper entitled,
``Effectively Countering Extremism and Supporting Muslim American
Youth.'' The Muslim Public Affairs Council is offering an opportunity
to all staff and members of this distinguished committee a briefing on
this Muslim Youth paper in Washington, DC, at a time of your
convenience.
Radicalization and Key Factors
The radicalization of young Western Muslims, while on the minds of
many, is void of thoughtful analyses that explain core dynamics within
Western societies and how they uniquely affect youth within extremely
diverse Muslim communities. Only when we delve into the key issues of
identity, social and political alienation, the definition of a
moderate, and Islamophobia as a root cause of radicalization can we
understand and prevent radicalization from taking root in the U.S.
First and foremost, when defining radicalization, government
agencies across the board must articulate a clear distinction between
healthy challenging of the status quo in current affairs with the
expression of radical rhetoric, and the willingness to use, support or
facilitate violence as a means for change. Until today, the public
officials striving to understand and prevent violence have yet to
effectively articulate this distinction to the public, particularly the
Muslim American community, which has increased the gap of community
distrust and suspicion of government officials.
Moreover, when law enforcement or anti-academic freedom groups
(e.g. Campus Watch) engage in what some have called ``thought
policing'', many young Muslim Americans feel alienated. To criticize
the lack of free expression in the Muslim world while discouraging the
same in the U.S. is perceived to be hypocritical or at least
incongruent. As a result Muslim American youth can end up resisting or
distrusting mainstream political and civic participation leaving them
vulnerable to fringe radical groups.
Identity
We at MPAC believe that an accurate evaluation of the state of the
Muslim American community must be built upon an assessment of the
health and vibrancy of the Muslim American Identity. Since the early
1980's, MPAC and its affiliate institutions have focused resources and
efforts on building a community of Muslims in America that are forward-
looking and contributing components of American pluralism. This and
similar Muslim American experiences across the nation aim to build
communities that are organic to the global community of Muslims and
also at ``home'' in the American project.
A recent Gallup poll discussed in our position paper on youth that
accounted statistically for the opinions of 1 billion Muslims and their
opinions of the West presented data challenging those who argue a
``clash of civilizations'' analysis to explain present concerns around
extremism and terrorism. The study's findings further challenge the
notion that religiosity and radicalism are two sides of the same coin
of terrorism. The inability to realize that religion is an answer to
radicalization, that only a good and authentic theology can overcome a
zealous and fraudulent one, has led us down a slippery slope of
conflating religious conservatism for radicalism or extremism.
While rejecting the simplistic ``clash of civilizations'' theory,
as realities on the ground including the adoption of the Muslim
American Identity have proven false, it is important to recognize the
sense of marginalization many youth feel and the importance of
reaffirming the contributory role Muslim American youth play in our
nations pluralism.
Social and Political Alienation
It is important to note that the factors that increase the wedge of
identity, such as alienation and marginalization of Muslims, vary in
the United States and in Europe. MPAC's position paper on youth brings
to light the different factors contributing to the more successful
integration of Muslim Americans into American pluralism, such as the
demographic and structural differences between the U.S. and Europe.
As of today, we have not seen a terrorist group forming amongst
youth here in the U.S. In fact, the Muslim American community at large
has rejected any militancy within the mainstream community and there is
no indication that any Al-Qaeda-like movement has gained traction in
America.
In recent decades, however, some Muslim groups drew young people
into communities that attempted to live self-sufficiently from the
broader society surrounding them with the intent of living a Puritan
life. Throughout the course of American history, the idea of
``separating'' as a race or a religion from the larger society has been
viewed repeatedly as an option for the disenfranchised or a desire by
immigrant communities to maintain ones identity. It is important to
emphasize that in the U.S. experience, none of these social
manifestations represented a terrorist threat but were an expression of
marginalization, even frustration with current foreign and domestic
policies of the U.S. government.
Moderates vs. Extremists
Much of the global conversation about Islam and Muslims is focused
on labeling the different camps of Muslims from a perspective
completely out of touch with the realities on the ground. Since our
inception in 1988, MPAC has proposed that moderation, particularly of
Muslims, cannot be gauged by the political ideas and ideologies that
one holds, but rather by ones understanding of moderation as defined by
the Qur'an and the tradition of the Prophet. If acquiescence to or
active support of American global interest were the test, then
characters such as Saddam Hussein and Usama bin Laden would each have
qualified at different junctures in their careers.
MPAC's position paper details the distinction between a moderate
and a radical, the problems that arise when we invoke rhetoric and
terminology, such as Islamic Radicalization, and the key to
marginalizing the extremists. Suffice it to say, the litmus tests for
moderation, rather, revolve around topics such as the role of women in
the public square and in leadership roles within Muslim institutions,
the impermissibility of the use of violence as a means for political
change, the acceptance of disparate segments of the Muslim American
community, the rights of non-Muslims in Muslim-majority societies and
the role of critical thinking in building the character of a Muslim.
When it comes to the topic of reform, it is the sole role of Muslim
Americans to lead this discourse within arenas of authentic and well-
grounded sources of Islam.
Islamophobia: A Root Cause of Radicalization
We at MPAC have consistently argued through publications such as
our Counterproductive Counterterrorism policy paper and other avenues
that much of the hate disguised in counterterrorism is
counterproductive, and the anti-Islamic rhetoric will eventually result
in impeding our national security and ability to defend the homeland.
Too frequently, communities that are excluded from conversations
tend to use that exclusion as an excuse to withdraw from any discussion
on religious reform and civic engagement. Since the 1980's, MPAC has
advocated for civic and political engagement as the key tools for the
inclusion of Muslim Americans and the consequent prevention of
extremism. Our position paper on youth lists recommendations for
Universities, American Muslim institutions, the media, and government
to quell the potential for radicalization in the U.S. Here, it is
important to highlight some of the relationships MPAC has built with
government officials, particularly law enforcement.
Muslim Community-Law Enforcement Relations
MPAC has been heavily involved in counter-terrorism and outreach
efforts in cooperation with national and local law enforcement agencies
as well as the equally important efforts of counter-extremism in the
Muslim American community with a focus on youth. We have also been
engaged with European Muslim communities and governments in numerous
arenas on both sides of the Atlantic as well as in Muslim-majority
countries in an effort to assess the environments that produce such
extremism. Recognizing the importance of engaging young people in
planning for the future as a central theme to constructive religious,
social and political work, MPAC is committed to building a future
generation of leaders.
Since the early 1990's, MPAC has worked closely with federal
agencies such as the FBI, and has contributed to enhancing our nations
security by providing analysis and a unique perspective through direct
communication with key officials and thoughtful mediums, such as MPAC's
1999 Counterterrorism Policy Paper. Following 911, many of these
relationships have become institutionalized and formalized to some
degree, and have expanded to include leadership from other 911-impacted
communities on the local and national levels. MPAC currently
participates in regular meetings with state and local law enforcement,
and on a local and national level, the Department of Homeland Security
and the Federal Bureau of Investigations. The partnership model in Los
Angeles I wish to elaborate on is the FBI-initiated Multi-Cultural
Advisory Committee (MCAC).
As the Government Relations Director of Southern California for the
Muslim Public Affairs Council, it is my responsibility to enhance civic
engagement amongst the Muslim American community and to ensure that the
concerns of the community are being addressed by the appropriate
government agencies responsible for those concerns, which is what lead
to my participation in MCAC since it's inception.
I must start by commending the FBI for being among the first
government agencies to recognize the importance of engaging with and
outreaching to the community following the horrific attacks of 911. In
response to the increasing concerns of American Muslim, Arab, Sikh,
South Asian, Coptic Christian, Bahai and Iranian communities in the
post-911 era, the FBI initiated the creation of the Multi-Cultural
Advisory Committee in 2004. MCAC's mission of creating ``an environment
to facilitate dialogue and enhance the relationship between the FBI and
the Community, which is based upon mutual respect, understanding, and
the protection of Constitutional rights and civil liberties'' is
necessary in ensuring communities become part of the solution. Creating
and strengthening a two-way line of communication with the government
has provided the opportunity for community leaders to raise concerns
about policies and procedures and regain confidence in the government
when concerns are resolved given their due attention, encouraging the
use of community expertise towards problem-solving.
While most of what I will share will apply to other communities, I
will be addressing the concerns of the Muslim American community. Upon
its inception, establishing a strong relationship with the FBI and the
grassroots Muslim American community was burdened with external factors
such as cultural baggage, particularly cultural distrust due to
previous experiences within the indigenous African American Muslim
community, and suspicion of law enforcement by first and second-
generation Muslims due to experiences in ones country of origin, where
police were an extension of an oppressive regime. Muslim leadership and
the FBI have continued to jointly craft solutions to these challenges
such as providing constructive feedback on watch lists for the purpose
of enhancing efficacy and avoiding wrongful inclusion of innocent
people; increasing direct communication between the FBI and community
members to ensure the sharing of accurate information and citizens have
direct access to their public servants; and providing cultural
sensitivity trainings to law enforcement designed to increase
sensitivity toward the community. These efforts have been successful
in breaking down the communication barrier, and they must continue, as
the road ahead is a long one.
Unfortunately, several internal factors have and continue to
inhibit the relationship to some degree, much of which are due to the
bureaucracy in the FBI rather than the lack of desire for engagement by
the community. The names of innocent citizens landing on watchlists,
controversy around high profile cases, the use of informants, the use
of foreign intelligence in the prosecution of domestic cases, and the
conflation of every criminal activity by Muslims that makes it's way to
public media as terrorism are just a few issues that drive a wedge
between the FBI and the Muslim American community. The perception of
the community has become one where they believe they are viewed as
suspect rather than partner in the War on Terror, and that their civil
liberties are ``justifiably'' sacrificed upon the decisions of federal
agents. So the task of building the level of communication, trust and
confidence with the Muslim American community has become much more
challenging. It is the responsibility of the FBI to provide clarity in
the midst of confusion, and of the community to ensure accurate
information surpasses the rumors that can cause fear and alienation.
Here, I'd like to highlight an example of a success.
Following a series of politically controversial events held by
Muslim students at the University of California, Irvine, Pat Rose, the
head of the FBI's Orange County al-Qaida squad was quoted as saying her
agency was looking for and electronically monitoring potential
terrorists in Orange County. Rose also said that the FBI is aware of
large numbers of Muslims at UCI and USC, and was ``quite surprised''
that ``there are a lot of individuals of interest right here in Orange
County.'' The publication and timing of this quote caused an uproar in
Muslim youth and the Orange County Muslim community, as they understood
these comments to suggest that the FBI was monitoring student groups,
possibly due to organizing unpopular but nevertheless legal political
events on campus. In efforts to nip this rumor in the bud, FBI
Assistant Director in Charge of the Los Angeles field office, Stephen
Tidwell, clarified these remarks at an emergency town hall meeting of
youth, parents and other community members in Irvine in June 2006, and
in a written statement in July 2006. While some were skeptical of
Tidwell's clarification, this swift response by the FBI should serve as
an example to the importance of disseminating accurate information
about FBI operations and answering to the legitimate grievances of
community members.
Many challenges remain ahead, and despite the deficiencies in
partnerships that currently exist, the MCAC model is an example of how
to create and maintain partnership, understanding, information sharing,
and bridge building between government officials and community members.
The responsibility to maintain a successful partnership falls on both
parties. For instance, government public pronouncements about criminal
activity should avoid the conflated use of terrorism terminology that
implicates Islam and motivations sourced in Muslim culture and Islamic
tradition. Moreover, when cases that are championed as terrorism-
related are resolved with no relation to issues related to Islam or the
American Muslim community, law enforcement should clearly and loudly
inform the public. In tandem, community members should continue to
engage their public officials, and ensure decision-makers and public
servants are addressing their concerns, while we continue to
collectively think of innovative ways to participate in the protection
of the country and the principles upon which it was founded. Tensions
that will challenge the partnership will certainly arise, but we must
patiently persevere to create and maintain positive, constructive
relations as we find each other on the frontlines of protecting this
nation. Sincere partnership based on accurate and responsible
communication sharing, the recognition of the critical role the
community plays in enhancing our nations security, and collective
problem solving is a key tool in preventing radicalization from taking
root in our soil. I thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and
I welcome your questions.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much. J. Edgar Hoover was not a
former President. He was Director of the FBI. I just think the
record should show that, editorial comments from my colleagues
notwithstanding.
Mr. Jenkins, you are now recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN JENKINS, SENIOR ADVISOR, RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Jenkins. Madam Chair, members of the Committee, thank
you very much for the opportunity to talk to you about the
subject today. I'm not going to try to summarize my testimony
but let me simply highlight a couple of points and in doing so
underscore some of the remarks that were made earlier.
First of all, we do have a problem. Although we have
achieved undeniable success in degrading the operational
capabilities of our jihadist terrorist foes, we have had far
less success in reducing the radicalization and recruitment
that supports the jihadist campaign. This is going to be a
long-term problem.
You have to understand that the campaign is above all a
missionary enterprise, much more than a military contest.
Terrorist operations are intended above all to insight and
attract recruits. Recruiting is not meant merely to fill
operational needs. It is an end in itself.
Despite the importance of recruiting, however, to the
jihadist foe, we are not dealing with a centralized recruiting
structure. That would be too easy. Recruiting has always been
defused, localized, informal and, indeed, self-radicalization
was often the norm even before the worldwide crackdown on al-
Qa'ida and its jihadist allies forced them to decentralize.
The message from the global jihad is aimed directly at the
individual. It argues that the Islamic community is under
assault. It is threatened, in their view, by military attack,
by cultural corruption, by social disintegration, by
substandard zeal. The antidote to all of these threats is
jihad. Jihad not as a spiritual quest but as a violent action.
Don't underestimate the appeal of this narrative,
especially to angry young men. It offers a possibility of
adventure, the lure of clandestinity, a sense of direction, a
seemingly nobel cause, and the eventual promise of paradise.
Personal problems do play a role unquestionably. Recruits
often come from dysfunctional families. They have experience in
some cases disruptive relocations. They suffer identity crisis.
They feel alienation. In some cases they are in trouble with
the law. Some of these problems come with immigration. Some of
them are typical of the age group. The bottom line here is
there is no single psychological profile and no obvious
indicator that is going to permit targeted intervention.
We talked about the problem earlier here that Europe faces.
Fortunately the United States does not face the same problem as
Europe. Europe is confronted with large numbers of poor
immigrants entering legally and illegally from the Middle East
and the Maghreb. American by contrast is a distant destination.
American's recent Muslim immigrants tend to be better
educated, better off, more easily integrated moreover. We know
how to do this in a certain sense. As a nation of immigrants we
don't demand cultural assimilation as a prerequisite to
citizenship. Certainly accented English is no barrier to
achievement in this country. These are some inherent strengths
we have as a nation of immigrants.
At the same time, however, since 9/11 a number of arrests,
discoveries of terrorist plots indicate that radicalization and
recruitment are taking place here in this country. What can we
do? We can try to block the message. Of course, that raises
issues of free speech. But, in fact, I think we can do a lot
better than we have here. This is a nation that invented
marketing, invented the internet, and yet when it comes to our
response here we are pretty flatfooted.
We can try to remove the inciters. We can try to focus
instead on identifying and monitoring recruiting venues. That
has some promise. The recruiting process seems to not be very
efficient. In reducing the number of retail outlets, in fact,
would seriously impede recruiting.
We can try to dissuade potential recruits. We can try to
enlist the broader community. Whatever we do should be guided
by some basic principles that reflect our values and preserve
our strengths.
We have talked about moving in the direction of a more
preventive posture, protecting vulnerable members of society
from recruitment down destructive paths, protecting society
against destruction. A more preventive or more preemptive
posture is going to mean in some cases changing the rules. But
although we can change the rules, rules must prevail. Extra
judicial measures I always think are unacceptable and
dangerous.
As a nation of immigrants we have been successful at
integrating new arrivals without specific policies beyond
guaranteeing equal opportunity and fairness to all so long as
they obey our laws. This success makes one wary of government
programs aimed at specific ethnic or immigration groups.
Faith alone should never be the basis for suspicion but
religion should provide no shield for subversion. We don't have
to be shy about going after hatred and exhortation to violence
even when they are cloaked as religious belief.
Final couple of points here is we do need good intelligence
at the local level. That has been said time and time again.
Finally, whatever we do with regard to intelligence or our
response has to be done with strict oversight and a sense of
proportion to the threat. We should not by our very efforts to
protect society against terrorism destroy what may be our best
defense, a free and tolerant society.
[The statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian Michael Jenkins \1\
Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment
\2\
Madame Chair: I appreciate the opportunity to be here today where
you have experienced homegrown terror firsthand to discuss the issues
of radicalization and how to protect the homeland. Although the United
States and its allies have achieved undeniable success in degrading the
operational capabilities of jihadist terrorists worldwide, they have
had less success in reducing the radicalization and recruitment that
support the jihadist enterprise.
Nearly five years after 9/11, a 2006 National Intelligence Estimate
concluded that ``activists identifying themselves as jihadists. . . are
increasing in both number and geographic dispersion.'' As a
consequence, ``the operational threat from self-radicalized cells will
grow in importance to U.S. counterterrorism efforts, particularly
abroad, but also in the Homeland.'' \3\ In testimony before the Senate,
FBI Director Robert Mueller indicated concern about extremist
recruitment in prisons, schools, and universities ``inside the United
States.'' \4\ In March of this year, Charles Allen, Assistant Secretary
of Homeland Security, concurred that ``radicalization will continue to
expand within the United States over the long term.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local
legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a
nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and
effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and
private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
\2\ This testimony is available for free download at http://
www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT278.
\3\ U.S. Government, Declassified Key Judgments of the National
Intelligence Estimate ``Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for
the United States.'' April 2006.
\4\ Testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation Before the Senate Committee on Intelligence, February
16, 2005.
\5\ Testimony of Charles E. Allen, Assistant Secretary,
Intelligence and Analysis, Chief Intelligence Officer, Department of
Homeland Security Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, March 7, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recently, we have begun to focus more attention on what I refer to
in my book as the ``front end'' of the jihadist cycle.\6\ Growing
concern has produced a growing volume of literature on the topic.\7\ My
testimony today will simply highlight a few areas for further
discussion:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Brian Michael Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy,
Strengthening Ourselves, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006. See
specifically pp. 123-132.
\7\ Edwin Bakker, Jihadists in Europe--Their Characteristics and
the Circumstances in which They Joined the Jihad: An Exploratory Study,
Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2006.
Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in
Counterterrorism: A Component of the War
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Building an army of believers--how the jihadists
recruit
Radicalization and recruitment in the United States
How we might impede radicalization and recruitment,
and
Guiding principles for any actions we might consider.
These comments derive from my own study of terrorism over the
years, and from a large body of research done by my colleagues at the
RAND Corporation.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See for example, Scott Gerwehr and Sara Daly, ``Al-Qaida:
Terrorist Selection and Recruitment,'' in David G. Kamien (ed.), The
McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005,
pp. 73--89; William Rosenau, ``Al Qaeda Recruitment in the United
States: A Preliminary Assessment,'' MIPT Yearbook 2004. Oklahoma City:
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2004, pp.23--31.
See also Kim Cragin and Sara Daly, The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An
Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World,
Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, MG-246-AF, and Angel
Rabasa, et al, The Muslim World After 9/11, Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2004.
Building An Army Of Believers
More than a military contest, the jihadist campaign is above all a
missionary enterprise. Jihadist terrorist operations are intended to
attract attention, demonstrate capability, and harm the jihadists'
enemies, but they are also aimed at galvanizing the Muslim community
and, above all, inciting and attracting recruits to the cause.
Recruiting is not merely meant to fill operational needs. It is an end
in itself: It aims at creating a new mindset.
At one time, al Qaeda dispatched recruiters, but the jihadists
never created a central recruiting organization. Instead, they relied
upon a loose network of like-minded extremists who constantly
proselytized on behalf of jihad. Recruiting was always diffused,
localized, and informal.
Self-radicalization was often the norm, even before the worldwide
crackdown on al Qaeda and its jihadist allies forced them to
decentralize and disperse. Those who arrived at jihadist training camps
were already radicalized. At the camps, they bonded through shared
beliefs and hardships, underwent advanced training, gained combat
experience, and were selected by al-Qaeda's planners for specific
terrorist operations.
There is a distinction between radicalization and recruitment.
Radicalization comprises internalizing a set of beliefs, a militant
mindset that embraces violent jihad as the paramount test of one's
conviction. It is the mental prerequisite to recruitment. Recruitment
is turning others or transforming oneself into a weapon of jihad. It
means joining a terrorist organization or bonding with like-minded
individuals to form an autonomous terrorist cell. It means going
operational, seeking out the means and preparing for an actual
terrorist operation--the ultimate step in jihad.
Worldwide, radicalization and recruiting vary from country to
country. In some places, such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan,
and Chechnya, potential recruits are already members of a locally
dominant culture and may be involved in an on-going conflict that seeks
independence, autonomy, or nationwide adherence to a fundamentalist
interpretation of Islam. They draw on local tradition and, in some
cases, family histories of resistance. The local population is
sympathetic to their cause, although it may not always support their
actions.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ For an informative discussion of the different routes to
radicalization, see Matenia Sirseloudi and Peter Waldman, ``Where Does
the Radicalization Lead? Radical Community, Radical Networks and
Radical Subcultures,'' forthcoming.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the core Arab countries, where potential jihadists may share the
basic beliefs of the dominant national culture or a fundamentalist
subculture, they confront hostility and oppression from the central
political authorities and therefore must go abroad or operate
underground.
The situation in the West is still different, and there are further
differences between recruiting in Europe, where there are large and
largely unassimilated Muslim immigrant populations, and recruiting in
the United States, a nation with a long tradition of assimilating
immigrants. Potential jihadist recruits in Western countries are part
of a marginalized immigrant subculture or are themselves cut off even
from family and friends within that community. The more vulnerable are
those who are at a stage of life where they are seeking an identity,
while looking for approval and validation. They are searching for
causes that can be religiously and culturally justified, that provide
them a way to identify who they are, and that provide a clear call for
action.
The jihadist agenda is action-oriented, claims to be religiously
justified, and appeals to this relatively young, action-oriented
population. Self-radicalization begins the day that an individual seeks
out jihadist websites. In the real world they seek support among local
jihadist mentors and like-minded fanatics. This is the group that
currently poses the biggest danger to the West.
Jihadists recruit one person at a time. The message from the global
jihad is aimed directly at the individual. It argues that the Islamic
community faces assault from aggressive infidels and their apostate
allies; it is threatened by military attack, cultural corruption,
social disintegration, and substandard zeal. The antidote to these
threats is jihad, not as a spiritual quest, but as an armed defense.
This is a religious obligation incumbent upon all true believers.
Al Qaeda's brand of jihad offers a comprehensive and uncomplicated
solution--the possibility of adventure, a ``legitimate'' outlet for
aggression, the lure of clandestinity, pride, camaraderie, an elixir to
cure all ills, an antidote to anxiety, an achievable goal, a seemingly
noble cause, a sense of direction and meaning in life, and the eventual
promise of earthly pleasures in the hereafter. It is a message that is
especially attractive to angry young men and frustrated, compliant
individuals.
Becoming a jihadist is a gradual, multi-step process that can take
months, even years, although since 9/11 the pace has accelerated. The
journey may begin in a mosque where a radical Imam preaches, in
informal congregations and prayer groups--some of which are
clandestine--in schools, in prisons, on the Internet.
The process starts with incitement--a message that commands and
legitimizes violent jihad--and it combines self-selection and
persuasion by jihadist recruiters. Volunteers are recruited into a
universe of belief, not a single destination. Eager acolytes may
coalesce into an autonomous cell, as did the original Hamburg group
that later carried out the 9/11 attack, or they may join an existing
local group. Individuals may be moved along to training camps or be
persuaded by jihadist exhortation to act on their own.
Becoming a jihadist may involve a series of invitations and proofs
of commitment; it may also involve training abroad. Proceeding to the
next step, ultimately to act, is always an individual decision.
Volunteers move on by self-selection. There may be powerful peer
pressure, but there is no coercion. Submission is voluntary. Not all
recruits complete the journey. Commitment is constantly calibrated and
re-recalibrated. Some drop out along the way. A component of our
counter-recruiting strategy must be to always offer a safe way back
from the edge.
Jihadist recruiting emphasizes various themes: Honor, dignity, and
duty versus humiliation, shame, and guilt. Fighting is God's mandate, a
religious duty--paradise is guaranteed to those who join jihad. Jihad
provides an opportunity to demonstrate commitment, courage, prowess as
a warrior, and although it is not explicit in the recruiting, jihad is
a license for violence. At the very least, it provides vicarious
participation in war through martial arts, paintball battles,
reconnaissance of potential targets, and endless discussion of fantasy
terrorist plans.
Short of preparing for a specific attack, it is hard to define the
exact point at which one becomes a jihadist: Internalization of
jihadist ideology? Bonding with brothers at a jihadist retreat?
Downloading jihadist literature or bomb-making instructions from the
Internet? Fantasizing about terrorist operations? Reconnoitering
potential targets? Going to Pakistan? Signing a contract to pray for
the jihadists, collect money, or support operations? Taking an oath of
loyalty to Osama bin Laden? The legal definition is broad.
Personal problems also play a role. Recruits often come from
dysfunctional families, have experienced disruptive relocations, suffer
identity crises, face uncertain futures, feel alienation; many are in
trouble with authorities. Some of the problems are typical of the age
group, and some come with immigration. Many recruits in the West are
second- or third-generation immigrants. Others display the zeal typical
of new converts. But jihadists also include sons of well-off families,
people with promising careers, and individuals who are seemingly well-
adjusted. There is no ingle psychological profile and no obvious
indicator to permit targeted intervention.
While the jihadist message is widely and increasingly disseminated,
the actual connection with the jihadist enterprise, outside of Middle
Eastern and Asian madrassahs, appears random, depending on personal
acquaintance, finding a radical mosque, or being spotted by a
recruiter. That, in turn, suggests that the numbers are driven not
merely by the appeal of the jihadist narrative, but also by the number
of ``retail outlets'' where recruiters can meet potential recruits.
The recruiting process, therefore, seems to be not very efficient--
the yield is low. However, only a few converts suffice to carry out
terrorist operations. Nevertheless, this suggests that reducing the
number of suspected recruiting venues would seriously impede jihadist
recruiting.
Radicalization And Recruiting In The United States
Neither imported nor homegrown terrorism is new in the United
States. Many immigrant groups have brought the quarrels of their
homeland with them. Anti-Castro Cubans, Croatian separatists, Puerto
Rican separatists, Armenian extremists, Taiwanese separatists, earlier
cohorts of Islamist extremists have all carried on terrorist campaigns
on U.S. soil, along with domestic ethnic groups, right-wing extremists,
and ideologically driven fanatics.
A homegrown conspiracy (albeit with foreign assistance) was
responsible for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. Another
homegrown conspiracy carried out the devastating 1995 bombing in
Oklahoma City. The United States, over the years, has successfully
suppressed these groups through domestic intelligence collection and
law enforcement.
However, Europe faces different problems. With a population of 350
million, Europe is home to between 30 and 50 million Muslims--estimates
vary. By 2025, one-third of all children born in Europe will be of the
Muslim faith. In contrast, the United States, with a population of 300
million, has approximately 4.7 million Muslims, most of them native
Americans. Of the 3.5 million Arab-Americans in the United States,
fewer than 25 percent are Muslim.
Large numbers of poor immigrants enter Europe legally and illegally
from the Maghreb and Middle East, and assimilation is a problem.
America, in contrast, is a distant destination for the Arab and Muslim
masses; its recent Muslim immigrants tend to be better educated, better
off, and more easily integrated. As a nation of immigrants, America
does not demand cultural assimilation as a prerequisite to citizenship,
and accented English is no barrier to achievement. These are inherent
national strengths.
Since 9/11, U.S. authorities have uncovered a number of alleged
individual terrorists and terrorist rings, including clusters in
Lackawanna, Northern Virginia, Portland, New York City, and Lodi and
Torrance, California. In all, several dozen persons have been convicted
of providing material support to a terrorist organization, a crime that
U.S. courts have interpreted broadly, or related crimes. Others,
without demonstrable connections to terrorism, have been expelled for
immigration offenses.
Most of those arrested have been young men of Middle Eastern or
South Asian descent. They include both native and naturalized citizens,
although almost all are citizens. Most were Muslims by birth, although
some are converts. Most of them have been middle-class, with educations
ranging from less than high school to postgraduate degrees. They
represent diverse professions, and some are veterans of military
service.
The Lackawanna, Northern Virginia, and Portland groups began to
radicalize before 9/11, while the individuals in New York City, Lodi,
and Torrance were more recent arrivals in the jihadist universe. The
Northern Virginia and Portland groups planned to join jihadist groups
abroad; those in New York City, Lodi, and Torrance contemplated action
in the United States; the Lackawanna group had no apparent operational
plans.
These arrests, along with intelligence operations, indicate that
radicalization and recruiting are taking place in the United States,
but there is no evidence of a significant cohort of terrorist
operatives. We therefore worry most about terrorist attacks by very
small conspiracies or individuals, which nonetheless could be
equivalent to the London subway bombings or the 1995 Oklahoma City
bombing.
This suggests that efforts should be made to enhance the
intelligence capabilities of local police, who through community
policing, routine criminal investigations, or dedicated intelligence
operations may be best positioned to uncover future terrorist plots.
Of these, continued intelligence operations are the most important.
Radicalization makes little noise. It occurs in an area protected by
the First and Fourth Amendments. It takes place over a long period of
time. It therefore does not lend itself to a traditional criminal
investigations approach.
Impeding Radicalization And Recruitment
How might we best impede radicalization and recruiting? Let me
suggest several possible angles of approach. These are not
recommendations; they are options aimed at provoking further
discussion, and each raises a number of questions.
Blocking The Message. Is exhortation to violence free speech
protected by the First Amendment, or does it fall into the category of
conduct that can be legally prohibited? Can Internet content be
controlled? European governments argue that it can be. Clearly, the
Internet is a new battlefield in the jihadist campaign, and the U.S.
Army is reportedly preparing an assault on jihadist websites.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Jim Michaels, ``Military Readies Internet Assault: Terrorist
Activity Expands on Web,'' USA Today, March 28, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But does the United States need a new information service to wage
an information war? A new United States Information Agency? If so,
where should it be located within our government?
How can anti-jihadist messages be facilitated? Would distributing
such messages violate rules against domestic propaganda? Current law
does allow messages against drugs, drunk driving, smoking, domestic
abuse, dropping out of school, and publicizing the identity of wanted
gang leaders. Can we do the same with jihad?
Removing The Inciters. Should the United States, like the United
Kingdom, seek to expel foreign-born clerics who incite hatred and
violence? Should institutions that host those exhorting violence lose
their tax-free status and face other restrictions? Can foreign
contributions be blocked when they clearly support radicalization?
Are inciters legitimate targets of intelligence efforts? Should
messages of hate and their authors be publicly exposed? How can
alternative role models be publicized?
Focusing On Recruiting Venues. Recruiting for jihad takes place
both inside and outside of identified radical mosques and other known
venues. These ``retail outlets'' can be identified and monitored.
Surveillance, real and imagined, of recruiting venues can inform
authorities of possible terrorist plots and may discourage recruiting.
The 2004 Herald Square Case in New York City is a good example of
the methods, patience, and persistence that are needed to identify,
understand, and thwart a jihadist recruitment that would have resulted
in a terrorist attack. In fact, the New York Police Department has
developed a very sophisticated understanding of the radicalization
process and, in my view, has made some of the greatest strides in
addressing it.\11\ Prisons are another recruiting venue that could be
better controlled.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ An insightful analysis of radicalization and recruitment is
provided by Arvin Bhatt and Mitchell Silber in ``Radicalization in the
West and the Homegrown Threat,'' forthcoming.
Dissuading Potential Recruits. Can the community offer attractive
alternatives to potential recruits--national and community service,
education and technical training, sports, etc.? Can at least some
imprisoned jihadists be rehabilitated to counter the recruiting
message? Imprisoned terrorists in Italy were offered reduced sentences
in return for renunciations of violence and cooperation with the
authorities. Current programs to rehabilitate imprisoned jihadists in
Singapore and Yemen may also provide valuable experience.
Enlisting The Broader Community. Can we implement educational
programs at mosques and community centers, as Singapore is also doing,
to expose the nature of jihadist ideology?
The absence of significant terrorist attacks or even advanced
terrorist plots in the United States since 9/11 is good news that
cannot be entirely explained by increased intelligence and heightened
security. It suggests that America's Muslim population may be less
susceptible than the Muslim population in Europe, if not entirely
immune to jihadist ideology; indeed, there appear to be countervailing
voices within the American Muslim community. Conversely it may merely
indicate that the American Muslim population has not yet been exposed
to the degree, variety, of radicalization as that of its European
counterparts. This ``success,'' or temporary reprieve, whatever its
explanation, suggests in turn that we move cautiously to fix what may
not be broken while realizing that the threat from radicalization
continues to grow.
Some Guiding Principles
Society's purpose in this area is twofold: to deter vulnerable
individuals from recruitment into destructive paths and to protect
society itself against destruction--this may require preemptive
intervention before manifest criminal behavior occurs.
However, the first principle must be to do no greater harm, to
avoid misguided policies, needless hassles that only create enemies. A
more permissive intelligence environment, society's demand to intervene
before terrorist attacks occur will inevitably result in occasional
errors. These should not be the basis for dismantling intelligence
efforts or imposing unreasonable controls: Errors should produce prompt
apologies. Systematic abuse should be punished.
Rules may be altered, but rules must prevail--assertions of
extraordinary wartime authority or extrajudicial measures are
unacceptable and dangerous. Domestic intelligence, surveillance, the
rendering safe of dangerous ideologies are delicate undertakings that,
as we already have seen, can slide into despotic behavior.
A nation of immigrants, America has been successful at integrating
new arrivals without specific policies beyond guaranteeing equal
opportunity and fairness to all, so long as they obey its laws. This
success makes one wary of government programs aimed at specific ethic
or emigre communities.
We owe immigrants nothing more than freedom, freedom from
exploitation, freedom for prejudice, tolerance of different cultures
and customs, and fair access to opportunity. In return, immigrants are
not asked to abandon their faith or customs. They are required only to
abide by the same laws and rules that govern our behavior.
Proposed measures must fit the magnitude of the threat. Isolated
terrorist attacks can always occur, as they have in the past and almost
certainly will in the future, but at present there is no significant
jihadist underground in this country. Good domestic intelligence can
discourage overreaction as well as contribute to deterrence.
Faith alone should cast no shadow of suspicion, but religion should
provide no shield for subversion--society need not be shy about
attacking hatred and exhortation to violence even when they are cloaked
as religious belief. Protecting the freedom of religion may require
enforced tolerance--that is, attacking exhortations to violence--in
order to protect the freedom of all.
Incitement to violence, especially when there is an expectation
that it will lead to action, is not protected by the First Amendment.
A sensible response requires a broad understanding of community
structure and dynamics--innocent enterprises may at times be the
subjects of official inquiry, if only to dismiss them from further
scrutiny; intelligence activities should not imply suspicion.
Intervention measures should not isolate, alienate, stigmatize, or
antagonize the communities in which recruiters look for quarry.
It is important to keep lines of communication open at all levels
of government. This is community policing in its broadest sense, but
the collection of intelligence and initiatives aimed at maintaining
dialogue among communities and faiths are best handled at the local
community level.
Whatever we do must be done with strict oversight and a sense of
proportion to the threat. We should not, by our very efforts to protect
society against terrorism, destroy what may be our best defense--a free
and tolerant society.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Gersten.
STATEMENT OF DAVID GERSTEN, DIRECTOR, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Gersten. Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert,
and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
providing me with the opportunity to testify today. It is a
privilege to testify alongside other dedicated public servants
and community leaders.
In seeking to counter the phenomenon of radicalization, it
is critical that our country better understand and engage
Muslim communities, both in America and around the world. We
believe that engaging key communities can help prevent the
isolation and alienation that many believe are necessary
precursors for radicalization. I look forward to working with
this Committee to tackle this complex issue.
Today, I want to specifically address the Department's work
with American Arab and Muslim communities. Officer for Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties, Daniel Sutherland, launched the
work of our Office in April 2003, he quickly realized that many
of the issues facing us would be those affecting Americans of
Arab descent and those of the Muslim faith. Therefore, the
Department has embarked on a project to develop, cultivate, and
maintain dialogue with key leaders of the American Arab and
Muslim communities.
We believe that we will be a much safer country if we learn
to improve our work through listening to their concerns and
ideas and if we receive help from key leaders in explaining our
security mission to their constituents.
We will have a greater impact in all of these efforts if we
share best practices and experiences in community engagement
and invite our non-Federal Government partners to participate
in our dialogue with these communities.
When appropriate, we should offer materials and facilitate
training for our local partners to empower and advise them.
Likewise, we should always be open to learning from them.
We have invested a great deal of time in developing an
infrastructure for success in this area. We have cemented
positive relationships and we now know many of the concerns of
these communities including aviation watch lists, encounters at
the border and, of course, foreign policy.
While most of their concerns are recent and related to
post-9/11 security efforts, we in government are now better
able to appreciate and welcome faith-based viewpoints as a
result of our investment of time engaging on these immediate
concerns. We also have some understanding of the level of trust
and cooperation between community leaders and state and local
authorities. Finally, we now have a better understanding of
what the government wants and needs from these communities and
what these communities want from government.
Based on this infrastructure, we have been very active in
trying to engage with these communities. As with all outreach
efforts, the government must be careful to choose constructive
partners. By the same token, community members are careful to
meet with government officials who they believe will be
reliable partners.
Much of our Office's work has involved bringing leadership
to the interagency engagement effort. Recently national
community leaders have had substantive meetings with the
Secretary Chertoff, the Director of the FBI, and others. Our
Office has arranged for local officials to participate with us
in engaging these communities, most recently hosting Los
Angeles Deputy Mayor Hari Falicon at our Los Angeles
roundtable.
The Assistant Attorney General at the Justice Department
hosts regular meetings between government agencies and national
civil rights organizations. This type of engagement also takes
place across the country under our sponsorship at CRCL in
regularly scheduled meetings in cities such as Houston,
Chicago, and Buffalo.
Since October I have led the meeting here in Los Angeles.
In Detroit, the U.S. Attorney has asked Daniel Sutherland to
chair the regular meeting there. These meetings typically begin
with a substantive presentation by the government on an issue
of concern such as redress for travel screening and
misidentifications. Then we provide an opportunity for the
communities to specify issues of concern.
In addition to this engagement through a project we call
``Civil Liberties University,'' we have developed training that
provides new skills and competencies for our front-line
officers and their State and local partners. For example, we
have just released an intensive training DVD for personnel who
interact with Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, and people from
the broader Arab and Muslim world.
We have also produced educational materials on how to
screen individuals who wear common Muslim and Sikh head
coverings, training on how to screen those of the Sikh faith
who carry a kirpan, and a tutorial on the Department's policy
prohibiting racial profiling.
In addition to producing training and building bridges with
community leaders, we have also developed strong relationships
across the Federal Government and with many state and local
authorities and with allied governments in the United Kingdom,
Canada, and Australia.
Again, our goal is to develop, cultivate and maintain
dialogue with key leaders of the American Arab, Muslim, Sikh,
and South Asian communities. Let me finally highlight a few
steps that we believe need to be taken at this time:
First, we must deepen the engagement; we must take all of
this activity to the next level including connecting more with
young people from these communities. Second, we must
institutionalize these efforts for success over the long term.
The work we are trying to do is also taking place at our sister
agencies and at the vital level by state and local authorities
who interact with members of these communities where they live.
We need to ensure that state and local governments are
equipped with resources to reach out and connect with these
communities all the while helping them comply with civil rights
and civil liberties. Finally, we must challenge the communities
to get involved. We need to challenge them to help us increase
the integration and assimilation of new immigrants. This, too,
is a job that local communities are best posed to accomplish.
We need to challenge community leaders to spread understanding
of our security mission.
In conclusion, we must recognize that this work will not be
easy. We have to make sure that those who believe in cementing
positive relationships are voices that shape opinions. Thank
you for the opportunity to testify today and I welcome your
questions.
[The statement of Mr. Gersten follows:]
Prepared Statement of David D. Gersten
Introduction
Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for providing me the opportunity
to testify today. It is a privilege to testify alongside other
dedicated public servants and community leaders. I hope that our
testimonies today will demonstrate how closely our offices are working
together to tackle the issues you are considering.
In seeking to counter the phenomenon of radicalization, it is
critical that our country better understand and engage Muslim
communities, both in America and around the world. Though there is no
magic formula, we believe that engaging key communities and promoting
civic participation can help prevent the isolation and alienation that
many believe are necessary precursors for radicalization. I look
forward to working with this Committee to tackle this complex issue.
Mission of the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
In accordance with 6 U.S.C. Sec. 345, the mission of the Office for
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties is to assist the dedicated men and
women of the Department of Homeland Security to enhance the security of
our country while also preserving our freedoms and our way of life. In
essence, we provide advice to our colleagues on issues at the
intersection of homeland security and civil rights and civil liberties.
We work on issues as wide ranging as: developing redress mechanisms
related to watch lists; integrating people with disabilities into the
emergency management system; ensuring appropriate conditions of
detention for immigrant detainees; reviewing how the Department’s
use of technology and its approach to information sharing impacts civil
liberties; adopting equal employment opportunities policies to create a
model federal agency; and, ensuring that information technology is
accessible to people with disabilities.
Since its inception, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties has worked to help the Department establish and cement
positive relationships with a variety of ethnic and religious
communities, and the organizations that represent them. We have worked
with Catholic and Protestant organizations concerned with immigration
law and policy, with Sikh Americans concerned about various screening
policies, with the leaders of the Amish community regarding
identification issues, and with Jewish community groups on a wide
variety of issues.
Today, I want to specifically address the Department’s work
with American Arab and Muslim communities, but it is important to
remember that the work I describe is part of a broader effort to ensure
that all communities in this country are active participants in the
homeland security effort.
Engagement with American Arab and Muslim Communities
When the Department of Homeland Security'S Officer for Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties, Daniel Sutherland, launched the work of our Office
in April 2003, he quickly realized that many of the issues facing us
would be those affecting Americans of Arab descent and those of the
Muslim faith. There was an opportunity to do much more than solve
specific isolated problems. These communities want to have two-way
communication with the government--certainly they want to be able to
raise complaints about various situations or policies, but they also
want to be invited to roll up their sleeves and help find solutions.
Therefore, the Department has embarked on a project to develop,
cultivate, and maintain partnerships with key leaders of the American
Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities. We believe that a
critical element of our strategy for securing this country is to build
a level of communication, trust, and confidence that is unprecedented
in our nation's history. We believe that we will be a much safer
country if we better connect the government to these strong
communities; if we learn to improve our work through listening to their
concerns and ideas; if we convince more young people from these
communities to join public service; if we receive their help in
educating us about the challenges we face; and, if we receive help from
key leaders in explaining our security mission to their constituents.
We will have a greater impact in all of these efforts if our State
and local authorities create similar models of engagement on their own
accord. Just as the Federal government shares information and
intelligence needed to save lives and protect our communities, we must
also share best practices and experiences in community engagement and
invite our non-federal government partners to participate in our
dialogue with these communities. When appropriate, we should offer
materials and facilitate training for our local partners to empower and
advise them. Likewise, we should always be open to learning from them.
Infrastructure
We have invested a great deal of time in developing an
infrastructure for success. For example, we now know many key leaders
of the American Arab and Muslim communities. We have solid lines of
communication with community activists, renowned scholars, and business
leaders; we have established good links with professional and social
organizations; and we have constructive and frank interactions with
many of the leading civil rights organizations. In short, we have
cemented positive relationships with key figures and civil society
institutions in these communities.
We now know many of the concerns of these communities. We know that
these include: aviation watch lists; immigration processing; encounters
at the border; investigative methods; detention and removal; and, of
course, foreign policy. We know that government works best when it is
not intrusive and it is encouraging to note that socio-economic
indicators point to widespread achievement and assimilation among
American Arab and Muslim communities. While most of their concerns are
recent and related to post-9-11 security efforts, we in government are
now better able to appreciate and welcome faith-based viewpoints as a
result of our investment of time engaging on immediate concerns.
We also have some understanding of the level of trust and
cooperation between representatives of these communities and State and
local authorities.
Finally, we now have a better understanding of what the government
wants and needs from American Arab and Muslim communities, and what
these communities want from the government.
Engagement
Based on this infrastructure, we have been very active in trying to
engage with these communities. This applies, as well, to our colleagues
at the Department of Justice, FBI, Treasury, and others, who have all
made concerted efforts in this regard. Of course, as with all outreach
efforts, the government must be careful to choose constructive people
to partner with, and, by the same token, community members are careful
to meet with government officials who they believe will be reliable
partners.
Much of our Office's work has involved bringing leadership to the
interagency engagement effort. Together with our partners in other
agencies, we have worked hard to ensure that national organizations
have access to leaders here in Washington. Within the past several
months, national community leaders have had substantive meetings with
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Director
of the FBI, the Secretary of Treasury and others. Our Office has
arranged for local officials to participate with us in engaging these
communities, most recently hosting Los Angeles Deputy Mayor for
Homeland Security & Public Safety Arif Alikhan at our regular L.A.
roundtable which I will describe further in a moment. These are not
simply occasional meetings, but are becoming part of the structure of
our work. For example, several senior leaders of our Department have
met with community leaders in both formal and informal settings over
the past several months. Moreover, the Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights at the Justice Department hosts regular meetings between
government agencies, including the Departments of Homeland Security,
State, Treasury, Education and Transportation, and national civil
rights organizations.
This engagement takes place across the country. The Office for
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties now actively leads or participates in
regularly scheduled meetings with leaders from these communities in
cities such as Houston, Chicago, and Buffalo. Since October, I have led
the meeting here in Los Angeles. In Detroit, the U.S. Attorney has
asked Daniel Sutherland to chair the regular meeting there, referred to
as ``BRIDGES.'' In all of these venues, the local leaders of the DHS
component agencies participate, usually along with the U.S. Attorneys'
offices and the FBI. These meetings typically include two to three
dozen people around a table in a conference room, at either a
government agency or a community center. The meetings typically begin
with a substantive presentation by the government on an issue of
concern, such as redress for watch list misidentifications. Then, old
business is discussed – government agencies are asked to provide
updated information on issues that have been raised in previous
meetings. Finally, the communities present new issues to discuss with
the agencies. As you can see, the meetings provide an opportunity for
the communities to learn information about significant new government
projects, as well as to raise specific issues of concern in a format
that emphasizes accountability for answers.
Building capacity
Our Office is also working hard to build the capacity of our
workforce to address the new challenges that face us. Through a project
we call “Civil Liberties University,” we have developed
training that provides new skills and competencies for our front-line
officers and their State and local partners.
For example, we have just released an intensive training DVD for
Department personnel who interact with Arab Americans, Muslim
Americans, and people from the broader Arab and Muslim world. The
training includes insights from four national and international
experts--an Assistant U.S. Attorney who is Muslim, a member of the
National Security Council who is Muslim, an internationally renowned
scholar of Islamic studies, and a civil rights attorney who advocates
on issues of concern to Arab American and Muslim American communities.
As with many of the materials we produce, our Federal and non-Federal
partners have also found this training module on Arab and Muslim
cultures useful. Last month our Office made available this DVD to
nearly 600 fusion center directors and local, State, tribal, and
Federal law enforcement officers within intelligence units attending
the National Fusion Center Conference in Florida. This training program
has been applauded by the communities who believe that they will be
treated with more dignity and professionalism if front-line officers
understand their cultures, traditions, and values; and, by our
colleagues in the Department who believe that such training will help
them do their jobs more efficiently and effectively.
We have also produced educational materials with guidance to
Department personnel on how to screen and, if necessary, search
individuals who wear common Muslim and Sikh head coverings; training on
how to screen those of the Sikh faith who carry a kirpan, or ceremonial
religious dagger; and a tutorial on the Department's policy prohibiting
racial profiling.
This type of training is truly a win-win situation: our workforce
and state and local partners win by acquiring new skills that they need
to better carry out their jobs; and, we all win because American Arab
and Muslim communities gain confidence that their insights and
contributions are welcomed in the homeland security effort.
Incident Management Team
If there is another terrorist attack on the United States, American
Arab, Muslim, and South Asian communities would likely be at center
stage. These communities may be a focus of investigative activity,
rightly or wrongly, and quite possibly could be victims of racist
retaliation. These communities could also be important keys to calming
tensions throughout the Nation, assisting law enforcement in locating
the perpetrators and serving as public spokespersons in the media.
Therefore, it is critical that the U.S. Government be in contact with
leaders from these communities in the hours and days after an incident.
As a result, we have established an ``Incident Management Team''
that will connect government officials with key leaders of these
communities in the event of another attack on our country.
This Incident Management Team is made up of key government
agencies, as well as approximately two dozen community leaders that we
have come to know well. Government participants include several
components within the Department, including the Office of Public
Affairs, Office of Strategic Planning, and the Office of Intelligence &
Analysis (I&A). We are joined by the Justice Department's Civil Rights
Division, the FBI, the State Department, and the Department of the
Treasury. Daniel Sutherland serves as the chair and activates the team
and reaches out to incident specific participants. Community
participants include scholars, community activists from several cities,
and representatives of national organizations. Depending on the
incident, State and local authorities responsible for community
outreach may also be contacted and asked to participate. These meetings
are meant to afford both Federal and non-Federal participants with
real-time sharing of information and common messages needed in the
aftermath of an attack.
On the morning of the announcement of the London arrests this past
August, our office convened this Incident Management Team.
Representatives from Transportation Security Administration, I&A, and
the British embassy all provided briefings to the community leaders on
the events from the last several hours. While no classified or
sensitive material was provided, the briefings were very substantive
and gave these leaders concrete information they could share with their
communities. There was a question and answer session for the briefers,
and then the community leaders shared reactions to the events. The call
was valuable for the community leaders, because they received key and
timely information, and it led to tangible results. Several
organizations issued press releases, which assured their communities
that the government was engaging actively with them, again illustrating
that there is no need to feel isolated from the homeland security
effort.
In addition to building bridges with community leaders, we have
also developed strong relationships across the government. The working
relationships among Federal agencies on these issues are extremely
strong. We work on a daily basis with colleagues from State, Justice,
FBI, Treasury, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the
National Security Council.
We have also developed strong relationships with allied
governments. We work particularly closely with our colleagues in the
United Kingdom, but also regularly meet with representatives of the
Canadian and Australian governments, and others as well--such as
colleagues from Denmark and the Netherlands.
Next Steps
Again, our goal is to develop, cultivate and maintain partnerships
with key leaders of the American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian
communities. We have laid a strong infrastructure, and we have taken a
number of important steps in the early phases of this project. We have
seen enough progress to know that we can reach this goal, in the
relatively near future, if there is a continuing strong and sustained
commitment from all.
Let me highlight four steps that we believe need to be taken at
this time:
First, we must deepen the engagement; we must take all of this
activity to the next level. Leaders from all branches of government
need to take steps to engage with these communities; meet them, learn
about them, and open lines of communication. Government leaders also
need to make public statements that impact opinion and drive current
debates in ways that increase our citizens’ desire to get
involved in public life and public policy, and that decrease the
natural tendency toward isolation from government. For example, in the
days after the August 2006 arrests of the bomb plotters in London,
Secretary Chertoff made the following remarks to an audience here in
Los Angeles:
``Given recent events, I think it's good to reinforce the message
that America values its rich diversity. Muslims in America have long
been part of the fabric of our nation. The actions of a few extremists
cannot serve as a reflection on the many people who have made valuable
contributions to our society. Right here in Los Angeles we work with
several Muslim American leaders who are helping us to better secure our
country. Muslim Americans, like all Americans are united in our resolve
to live in safety and security.''
We need to ensure that a wide range of senior government leaders
make statements such as these.
We also need to connect with young people from these communities.
We need to find innovative new strategies to improve communication with
young people from these ethnic and religious communities.
Second, we must institutionalize the engagement effort for success
over the long term. At the Department of Homeland Security, we have
established the Department's Radicalization and Engagement Working
Group. We have also established the Incident Management Team and our
colleagues at I&A have established a unit focused on radicalization
issues. But we need to redouble our efforts to ensure that all of the
component agencies are equipped to play a significant role in reducing
isolation and therefore radicalization.
The work that we are trying to do is also taking place at our
sister agencies--Justice, State, Treasury, NCTC, and others--and, at a
vital level, by the State and local authorities who interact where
members of these communities live. We need to ensure that State and
local governments are equipped with resources to reach out and connect
with these communities, all the while, helping them comply with civil
rights and civil liberties protections.
Third, we must continue to address policy issues of concern. In
preparing for our community meetings, we remind ourselves that the
meetings will be seen as useless if concrete results are not visible.
We have found that these communities have provided a great deal of
constructive criticism--that is, they have identified problems we need
to address and, in some cases, made excellent recommendations for
solutions as well. To be credible, the government must continue to
address issues of concern and report back to the communities when
progress is made.
Finally, we must challenge the communities to get involved. To
achieve our mission, we need help from every part of America. We know
that these communities are anxious to roll up their sleeves and get
involved. It is important at this time that we say loudly and clearly:
``We need your help and we welcome you to the table.''
Specifically, we need community leaders to convince more of their
young people to consider public service as a career. One of our
priorities as a government has to be to get young people from American
Arab and Muslim families to join government service. We desperately
need their language skills, but we also need their cultural insights.
We need to challenge community leaders to extol the virtues of public
service, whether it is as a candidate for political office, as an FBI
agent, a soldier, an accountant, a lawyer, or an IT specialist--we need
more people from this community to see government service as a place
they can build a successful career.
We also need to challenge these communities to help us increase the
integration and assimilation of new immigrants, particularly those from
the Arab and Muslim worlds. We need to ensure that these new immigrants
become comfortable with their children's schools, get plugged into
places of worship where they can build friendships, learn to speak
English, and become familiar with their local government. This is a job
that local communities are best poised to accomplish.
We need to challenge community leaders to spread understanding of
our security mission. There are times when we must deport someone who
has come to our country illegally; we need community leaders to calm
community tensions and explain the role that Homeland Security officers
must play. There are times when someone is questioned at an airport or
border port of entry; we need community leaders to explain that in many
cases, these are important features of the landscape we have post 9/11.
We do not need community leaders to become our spokespeople; but we do
need them to help build a level of understanding regarding these
issues, which will help people respond to the latest headlines most
successfully.
We also need to challenge community leaders to influence Muslim
perspectives in other parts of the world. For example, Muslim
communities in Europe are much less integrated, successful, and
prosperous than American Arab and Muslim communities. We need to
challenge community leaders here to communicate with communities in
Europe, to convince them Muslims can successfully integrate into
secular democracies while maintaining their religion, and fully
participate in those countries. From decades of experience, Muslims in
America know that the environments created by democracies such as ours
give them freedom to choose the way they want to worship, raise their
families, get an education, relate to their government, start a
business, and become prosperous in their professions. Muslims in Europe
need to be convinced of these principles, and American Arab and Muslim
leaders can play a significant role.
In all of these areas, community leaders are already stepping up to
the plate. For example, many Arab and Muslim community leaders have
traveled internationally and talked about the issues of the day. As a
government, we simply need to recognize the efforts that have already
been made, and then step up our support and encouragement for even more
significant efforts in all of these areas.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we recognize that this will not be an easy task.
This will be a path with many peaks and valleys. There are constant
pressures that seek to pull us apart; we must resist those. We have to
make sure that those who believe in cementing positive relationships
are the voices that shape opinions, and that these are the people who
are influencing the debate. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
today, and I welcome your questions.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Gersten.
I yield myself five minutes for questions and we will make
a few comments at the beginning, and that is to thank all three
of you for excellent testimony. In Washington we have heard
recently from civil liberties groups that they are afraid of
these fusion centers and they are worried that the activities
at the local level will infringe on civil liberties.
Obviously this panel was put together in part to
communicate a message that at the local level people are paying
close attention and groups are being enlisted to be good
citizens, as the Muslim American community is, and help law
enforcement get it right. And also that there is training going
on in privacy and civil liberties for personnel at these fusion
centers and involved in local law enforcement.
I just want to say to you, Mr. Jenkins, that your comments
about how we have to get this right but we also have to do this
within the rule of law surely resonate with me. I have often
said that protection of security and liberty is not a zero sum
game. We don't get more of one and less of the other. We either
get more of both or less of both. That actually was not my
idea. That was Ben Franklin's idea. He has a marvelous quote
about that.
I see you nodding. I wasn't going to ask you about that. I
do want to ask this panel about the Adam Gadahn case. I raised
it in my opening remarks. I assume you are familiar with it.
Here was a kid in Orange County who grew up in modest
circumstances white, of Jewish ancestry, who became quite
aimless.
My understanding is that he on the web, found a religious
site that led him to a local mosque, became radicalized and now
lives in Waziristan, Pakistan. It is alleged he is the head of
PR for Osama Bin Laden and he has been indicted for treason in
this country. My question is how could this happen and if it
happened to this kid, how likely is it to happen to another
kid? Let's start with Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. You know, you indicated a number of the
attributes there. First of all, aimless. He's looking for
meaning in life. There are lots of young men in our communities
whatever their faith or social status who are in that same
position. He went to the web. The web has become an
increasingly important source of information. He found
something that resonated with him personally.
The next step, however, really is very much a random step
and that is he found a retail outlet. Now, whether that is a
mosque, whether it is a group of chums or whatever, he found a
connection that then took him the next step. That contact led
him along the way.
This is a process that we see taking place probably tens of
thousands of times at the front end as we go through it up each
individual step which is an individual decision. There is a lot
of peer pressure but there is no coercion in this so this is
very much self-selection. Then that figure would get smaller
and smaller and smaller and smaller until we have finally a
young man that starts off in suburbia, United States, and ends
up in Waziristan.
Ms. Harman. Well, Ms. Sawaf, I am sure you are familiar
with this case, too. What can the Muslim American community
help law enforcement do to prevent the Adam Gadahns from taking
that last step? The wandering around and searching the web are
things that we permit in a democratic society but it is when
that kid goes wrong and becomes a violent actor that we want to
prevent. What can you contribute to solving this problem?
Ms. Sawaf. Thank you. I think there are a few things we
have to take into consideration. Number 1, the trust between
law enforcement and that community that took in the suspect,
Adam Gadahn. If there was trust built in between the two, law
enforcement may have received a phone call, may have received
comments or possible information about what they identified as
suspicious.
Number 2, are we actually listening to Muslim youth?
Whether they are new converts or whether they are born into
Islam, from my perspective I don't think we collectively are
listening enough to Muslim youth. It is important to bring them
to the table, to have them interact with decision makers and
the opinion shapers to ensure that they know that they are part
of America's fabric and they can, in fact, play a contributory
role in protecting the country. That, in fact, engagement on
that level can encourage and facilitate civic engagement as the
avenue for change rather than extremism or radicalization.
Ms. Harman. Thank you for that answer. You did mention
earlier that you prepared a paper on Muslim youth. Mr. Dicks
has suggested, and I concur, that we request a copy for the
Subcommittee. Are you able to provide it to us?
Ms. Sawaf. Absolutely.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Gersten, on the same subject, what do you have to
contribute to preventing the next Adam Gadahn?
Mr. Gersten. Well, let me first begin by giving you the
Department's definition of radicalization. The Department
defines radicalization as the process of adopting an extremist
belief system including the willingness to use, support, or
facilitate violence as a method to effect societal change. The
fact is that we don't know enough. I think there needs to be a
lot more research in this area, and there is ongoing research
within our Department on the process of radicalization.
So far we have discovered and identified many of the nodes
that are exercised by those who are attempting to radicalize
others, the venues that forge the radicalization process venues
such as universities, prisons, religious institutions, the
internet, propaganda, leaders, and even rights of passage such
as going to a training camp of some sort. These all have
transformative effects. It certainly is the case that Adam
Gadahn did, in fact, use some of those venues and we are aware
of that.
From our perspective at the Office of Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties, we believe that engagement empowers Muslims to
rest control of the debate over reconciling Islamic law with
pluralistic western societies from the radicals who interpret
Sharia law to justify terror. By demonstrable engagement and
influence in the democratic process and civic engagement
American Muslims are a testament and an example that directly
counters the violent claims--
Ms. Harman. Thank you. My time has expired.
Mr. Reichert has asked to yield his first round or his time
now to Mr. Lungren. He will ask questions in the subsequent
sequence because Mr. Lungren has to leave for an airplane.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. I recognize the gentleman from California for
five minutes.
Mr. Lungren. I appreciate it. Ms. Sawaf, it is very
encouraging the work that you are doing in concert with law
enforcement in what is occurring here in Southern California.
Let me ask you something that I hear from constituents who
don't have the opportunity to be involved in those sorts of
circles but are the recipients of what they see in the news.
They say to me, ``If, as you say, this is radical Islam and
it is just a very, very small part of Islam and a distortion of
Islam, how come we don't hear that from more people in the
moderate or regular Muslim community?'' Could you tell me where
I can direct them? Where is there an outlet to find those
comments, those condemnations of this misuse of Islam in a
violent way? It would be very helpful.
Ms. Sawaf. Absolutely. Thank you for asking. I think if you
direct them to our website or you direct them to contact me
directly, I would be happy to share that information. There is
a long line of condemnations beginning from the day of 9/11
when our executive director along with other Muslim leaders
were in the White House prepared to meet with the President.
Obviously that meeting was canceled but we issued a
condemnation within hours of the attacks.
Mr. Lungren. You do realize that perception is out there?
Ms. Sawaf. Absolutely. I think that the question we have to
ask is where are we going to find and where are people seeking
to find the answers and the condemnations.
Mr. Lungren. The problem is mostly they are looking at
television, radio, you have it. Maybe that is a criticism of
the media but maybe there aren't the number of condemnations. I
don't know. I will be happy to look at your website and examine
that.
Ms. Sawaf. I think it is a matter of what makes news,
right?
Mr. Lungren. Oh, absolutely.
Ms. Sawaf. Does it make news for Muslims to participate in
attacking the country?
Mr. Lungren. If it bleeds, it leads. That's what they say.
Ms. Sawaf. Exactly.
Mr. Lungren. Particularly in television in Southern
California.
Ms. Sawaf. There is certainly a long list that I would be
happy to share.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Jenkins, you really did put your finger on
the problem we have here. Look, those who want to destroy our
way of life succeed if either they destroy us or they cause us
to destroy our own way of life. Give up our civil liberties in
an undue fear of being able to control our own destiny in
response to them. But you talked about the internet having a
tremendous recruiting capability for young people.
We have the First Amendment. We don't restrict. In some
cases where you would look at a conventional criminal question
you would say we can prevent and we can deter. Prevent, you say
you can't do that. We can't do that in terms of the web but is
there an element of deterrence? I mean, how do we handle this
where people are incited to violence in what are First
Amendment protected sites? Is there nothing we can do or is
there a strategy of deterrence that helps us and also is that
in conjunction with other things?
Mr. Jenkins. A couple of thoughts here. By the way, first
of all, let me just add a comment to that of Ms. Sawaf and that
is public condemnations by members of the Muslim community of
terrorism are useful but they are also the equivalent of public
condemnations of terrorism by anybody. They make you feel good
but they really don't really get you there. What we really
have--
Mr. Lungren. Let me interrupt on that point which is in
response to the question of Islamophobia in response to
Americans who were benign in their concerns or attitude towards
Islam. You know, live and let live. Now because they don't see
those condemnations, it changes their attitude was my point.
Mr. Jenkins. Yeah. No, I understand that. It has that
political utility but the more effective form of deterrence and
dissuasion coming from the Muslim community may be the part
that is invisible to the rest of us. It is good news that we
have not had a major terrorist attack in the United States
since 9/11. I would like to credit that all to superior
intelligence and heightened security. I don't believe that for
one minute. It does suggest that the Muslim community in the
United States is far less receptive to this ideology of jihad.
Mr. Lungren. That is an excellent point.
Mr. Jenkins. And, moreover, that there are countervailing
voices within the community that without public denunciations
are, in fact, counseling against this type of behavior. I just
want to make that point.
Mr. Lungren. That is a good point. To your question about
the First Amendment, free speech. There is no question that it
does raise First Amendment rights. We do put restrictions on
things now. We put various kinds of restrictions on the
internet with issues of pornography. We do put limitations on
issues pertaining to violence. At a certain point speech
becomes conduct.
Free speech is guaranteed. Conduct can be addressed,
especially when it is an exhortation to violence where there is
the expectation on the part of the communicators that it will
be acted upon. I think that is something that without altering
the constitution we do want to take a look at that.
Ms. Harman. Thank you. Safe travel.
The Chair now yields five minutes to Mr. Dicks of
Washington State.
Mr. Dicks. Ms. Sawaf, in terms of radicalization what
recommendations would you have in terms of what should be done
to address Muslim youth? What would you recommend?
Ms. Sawaf. Well, if I can just quickly tailgate on the
comments of Mr. Jenkins, it is important to recognize the
internet and these other avenues are simply means. We have to
prevent radicalization from the root of the problem.
That route is when Muslim youth or Muslim prisoners or
others, non-Muslims or whatnot, feel as though they are
disenfranchised and marginalized and cannot, in fact, make any
sort of change and cannot contribute to the political process.
When they feel that it is hopeless, we have seen it resort to
radicalization and criminal activity. We have to make sure that
we engaging at all levels. Engagement in terms of roundtables
and in terms--
Mr. Dicks. Are there any examples of a person who has been
radicalized having this kind of effort made and they change
their views? Do you have any examples of that?
Ms. Sawaf. I don't personally have examples off hand in the
United States and I don't think we have seen many pop up. I
think, though, when you look at the profile of the people, the
suspects, we have seen that many of them are disenfranchised.
You look at Europe and the landscape of Europe and the cases
are very familiar amongst us.
Mr. Dicks. That isn't always the case. Osama Bin Laden
himself came from a very wealthy family.
Ms. Sawaf. Of course, but Bin Laden preached that the way
to make a difference, the only way to make a difference, was
through attacking our country and our civilization so we need
to counter that message. There are other avenues to make
change. We know as a country based off of the successes of
immigrants that we have a very strong message and we have
assets in and of ourselves that we can show to the community
that they have not seen.
It becomes overwhelming when people are constantly
bombarded with negative images of Islam and Muslims in the
media and when they hear about their neighbors being placed on
a watchlist and when we read about the evidence possibly
corrupted for intelligence being used in the prosecution of
domestic charities. All of that creates a climate of fear and
distrust towards government. What we need to do is better our
communication strains with the community and communicate the
reasons behind these policies and programs and also open our
minds to the community rolling up their sleeves and
participating.
Mr. Dicks. Do you agree with Mr. Jenkins that in the United
States this message is less receptive than it is in other
countries?
Ms. Sawaf. Absolutely. Absolutely. By the nature of our
country we look at our constitution when we talk about the
separation of church and state, it is not one that completely
denies religion or is anti-religion but it accommodates all
religion and all community groups so absolutely.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Gersten, do you have a comment?
Mr. Gersten. I do. At a conference in November I
represented the U.S. Government in a discussion of engaging
Muslim youth and what I heard there from leaders of Muslim
youth organizations including the founder of Muslim Space was
that one of the tools in counteracting radicalism is being shut
off by the very First Amendment concerns that we heard from
Congressman Lungren.
The founder of Muslim Space mentioned that, indeed, many of
those that have a zeal for action simply want to be able to
debate these issues so we do need to actually empower Muslim
youth to be able to discuss the issues of radicalization
without necessary fear of reprisal. In fact, this debate if we
were to shut it off by being overly wary of what is mentioned
in these discussions among Muslim youth could, in fact, lead to
further radicalization.
Mr. Dicks. Is there any website that gets into why a youth
should use the existing constitutional system to express
themselves, to provide questions about the whole situation?
Mr. Gersten. There are many. In fact, most of the
organizations that we engage with have a long history of civic
engagement and cooperation with government using the democratic
process and meeting with the representatives from the public
sector and affecting change. They do chronicle on their
websites their success in that area.
Mr. Dicks. Good. Thank you.
Ms. Sawaf. We would be happy to host some hearings with you
and your staffers, of course, with Muslim American youth to
talk about issues that are important. We are doing that this
month with the Senate Committee.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Reichert is now recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair. I also want to add my
thanks to the three of you and the first panel for the work
that you are doing. It is important, very important work. Both
panels really have highlighted, at least for me, two issues.
One, how important the local law enforcement role is in
protecting our communities and rooting out radicalization.
And, two, how important it is to address the issue of youth
and at the root of the problem. I think for me this goes back
to the early 1990's when community policing was first talked
about. It was that connection between police and the local
community that made a huge difference as we saw through the
1990's crime rates tumble. Now today we have to enhance those
efforts even more so to address this issue of radicalization.
I want to follow up from Mr. Dicks' line of questioning
around youth because you have both hit on, Mr. Gersten and Ms.
Sawaf, talked about the youth and the importance of building a
closer relationship, giving them opportunities to speak and
deepen this relationship. How do you propose to do that? You
have talked about roundtables but in the community policing
world and law enforcement there actually are things that are in
place, tools to be used to bring people together, community
block watches, etc. What are you working on together to really
capture the youth and educate them?
Mr. Gersten. It is interesting you mention that because it
is one of the constraints we have from the Federal level. Most
of the engagement that we do is with civil rights and advocacy
organizations around the country, lawyer associations, those
who have been engaged with Government from times dating back
many, many years.
There is a certain level of wariness beyond the civil
rights organizations within the Muslim community and engaging
with Federal authorities. Therefore, I think that part of the
answer is to empower state and local authorities who are in the
communities on the ground level to do some of this engagement.
They will be better trusted in some ways and they are there on
a day-to-day level.
As Ms. Sawaf mentioned earlier, there is a bureaucracy that
does get in the way of some of the coordination of our
engagement efforts and we would certainly acknowledge that and
think that part of the solution for reaching out to Muslim
youth is to empower state and local authorities.
Mr. Reichert. I am glad you mentioned that. Doing a lot of
great things but there is that Federal bureaucratic red tape
that we have to go through.
Ms. Sawaf.
Ms. Sawaf. I think to add to that, it is important that
when there are high-profile cases that are announced in
mainstream media on the frontlines in the news, it is important
that if those cases turn out not to be national security
related cases that is, in fact, announced by the officials that
were involved in investigating and prosecuting the case.
Otherwise, what happens and what has happened is a lack of
trust and confidence in the authorities and the investigations
and it becomes perceived as politicized. In order to ensure
that there is transparency and we can then build trust off of
that transparency, that is one thing that local and Federal
officials can do. Of course, another one is to provide funding.
There was an amazing program called Partnering for
Prevention that was proposed by Northeastern University with a
$1 million budget. Lo and behold, it was decided by the FBI
that it was no longer a program that they would fund because
they had to fund computers. There is tons of money going into
homeland security efforts and very little to nothing going into
cooperation and partnership. We are an asset in this fight
against terror and it has to come from within the community
because we are the ones that can connect with our community and
can bring them to the table. I think those are two things that
can be done.
A third one, like I mentioned earlier, is organizing
roundtable and hearings that include Muslim youth and their
perspectives. We often talk about them. We rarely listen to
them or talk to them. I think that is critical if we really
want to understand what is going on in the hearts and the minds
of the youth.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
Madam Chair, I yield.
Ms. Harman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has almost
expired and I yield to Mr. Perlmutter of Colorado for the final
five minutes.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you, Madam Chair. This panel has
really stimulated a lot of thoughts for me. I would just
appreciate your testimony.
Ms. Sawaf, some of the things that you were saying it is a
little different, and Mr. Jenkins may be the guy who remembers
all this, but it reminds me of the things that created the
Weather Underground or the Black Panthers or things like that,
sort of this feeling of hopelessness, of disenfranchisement, of
inequality, disparity which then led to radicalization of some
middle class white youth, African Americans, and then
ultimately led to violence in a very small sliver, but violence
nonetheless.
What ultimately I think helped in those situations was
engagement and a belief that you really could make a difference
through the system and not just through violent acts. The
difference here that worries me a little bit is the religious
overtone of this, that God is on my side and he is not on your
side. We have had that too much in our history on this planet
that ultimately results in violence so just my thoughts and the
words that you said, Mr. Jenkins, about a sense of proportion
in how we react to all of this I thought really struck a chord
with me. I am just sort of spilling all that and you all can
react to it as you choose.
Mr. Gersten. I was just going to say that we in government
our hands are some ways tied in terms of debating the issue of
Islamic law and attempting to convince Salafi, for instance,
that Islamic law does not support terror. If we were to engage
directly in debates like that, we would, of course, violate the
establishment clause. We do have to be concerned of that.
Rather I think what we need to do is continue to engage with
constructive partners in the Muslim community and encourage
them and empower them through their dialogue with us to do that
in a sense as a proxy.
Mr. Jenkins. I think it is important that we really take
the jihadist, and I use that term deliberately, by the way, as
opposed to Islamist extremists or anything connected with Islam
because I think it is important that we take this threat that
we face out of the context of Islam. This is an ideology. It is
an ideology that certainly extracts portions of a religion to
support its own ideological point of view that is certainly not
unique to Islam.
We have had extremist groups in this country that extract
portions of the Bible to support their views as well. As I say,
we take this out of the realm of religion. Religion is not
going to provide any cloak for that. We look at it in that
sense. In so doing I think where the issue of religion comes
into it, or faith, is that certainly our first governing
principle should be do no greater harm. That is, we should not
by our actions alienate or antagonize or stigmatize members of
any ethnic or religious community.
I say that for ferociously pragmatic reasons. Good
intelligence depends ultimately on good relations. Our ability
to deal with that handful that you mentioned and all of these
great movements in American history whether it was the labor
movement at the turn of the century, whether it was the civil
rights movement, whether it was the anti-war movement have all
spawned out under extremist fringe, a handful of bombers and
shooters.
We want to as a society, and we are pretty good at as a
society co-opting and absorbing the larger movement, the
legitimate components of that. At the same time because of the
increasing destructive power that is coming into the hands of
gangs, whether the grievances are real or imaginary, we have to
work very hard on going after those small groups.
That is going to take intelligence, intelligent
intelligence if I can say that, primarily done at the local
level and that is the challenge, to deal with the reservoir,
not antagonize it, not do anything to alienate it. At the same
time we vigorously go after that handful with that ideology.
Ms. Harman. Ms. Sawaf, please complete your answer as
briefly as possible.
Ms. Sawaf. Briefly, we as Muslim Americans shoulder the
responsibility to fight the theological battle. It is our role
and only our role to really get into the domain of the fact
that the American identity does not at all clash with the
Muslim identity. Therefore, we propose an American Muslim
identity that gels together due to the principles of the Sharia
and the constitution of the United States.
They go hand in hand. It is our role and we take that upon
ourselves. We also take community initiatives upon ourselves.
We also take community initiatives upon ourselves like our
anti-terrorism campaign that I would be happy to share with
you. It was endorsed by over 600 mosques. But I must include
that you, too, share a responsibility. You as well as media as
well as political analysts and so on and so forth. That
responsibility is to include our perspective and furthermore
not to use the language that will divide you from the Muslim
American community.
With all due respect, jihadist is wrong terminology because
it is a very noble concept that all Muslims believe in.
However, it is used and it simply strengthens the arguments of
the extremists. We have to be thoughtful with the language we
use. We have to be thoughtful with the voices we include. Thank
you.
Mr. Dicks. What would you say instead of that?
Ms. Sawaf. I would say extremists.
Mr. Neu. All time for questions has expired. I think this
Subcommittee will be much more thoughtful having heard this
excellent testimony. I want to thank the witnesses, the members
for their questions, and our excellent staff for preparing this
hearing.
If members have additional questions, I would hope
witnesses would respond to them in writing. Hearing no further
business, this Subcommittee standards adjourned.
[Whereupon, the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
----------
For the Record
Prepared Statement of John M. Vanyur, Assistant Director, Correctional
Programs Division, Federal Bureau of Prisons
The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is pleased to submit this statement for
the record regarding the efforts our agency is taking to ensure we are
preventing the recruitment of terrorists and extremists in Federal
prisons.
The BOP is responsible for the custody and care of approximately
195,500 inmates confined in 114 Federal prisons and facilities operated
by private companies, State and local governments. Our mission is to
protect society by confining offenders in the controlled environments
of prisons and community-based facilities that are safe, humane, cost-
efficient, and appropriately secure; and to provide work and other
self-improvement opportunities to assist offenders in becoming law-
abiding citizens.
The BOP is committed to ensuring that Federal prisoners are not
radicalized or recruited for terrorist causes. The support that has
been provided by the FBI, the agencies represented on the National
Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), other components of the Department
of Justice, and many other members of the law enforcement and
intelligence communities has been invaluable to our efforts in this
area.
We understand the importance of controlling and preventing the
recruitment of inmates into terrorist activities and organizations. We
also acknowledge that this is an evolving issue, especially as it
relates to the relationships between terrorism, certain radical or
extremist ideologies, and the penchant of those who adhere to these
ideologies to recruit others to their positions. The BOP's efforts at
preventing radicalization focus on:
(1) managing and monitoring inmates who could attempt to
radicalize other inmates
(2) screening religious service providers to avoid hiring or
contracting with anyone who could radicalize inmates, and
(3) providing programs to help inmates become less vulnerable
to attempts at radicalization.
We know that some inmates may be particularly vulnerable to radical
recruitment and we must guard against the spread of terrorism and
extremist ideologies. Our practices in institution security and inmate
management are geared toward the prevention of any violence, criminal
behavior, disruptive behavior, or other threats to institution security
or public safety, which includes the radicalization of inmates.
Over the last several years, our agency has taken a number of
significant measures, and we are actively engaged in several ongoing
initiatives to ensure that inmates in Federal prison are not recruited
to support radical organizations or terrorist groups. For example, we
have eliminated most institution-based inmate organizations with
community ties to control the influence that outside entities have on
Federal inmates. We also have enhanced our information and monitoring
systems, intelligence gathering and sharing capabilities, and
identification and management of disruptive inmates.
For over a decade, we have been managing inmates with ties to
terrorism by confining them in more secure conditions and closely
monitoring their communications. We have established a strategy that
focuses on the appropriate levels of containment to ensure that inmates
with terrorist ties do not have the opportunity to radicalize or
recruit other inmates.
We define terrorist inmates as those having been convicted of,
charged with, associated with, or linked to terrorist activities or
belonging to organizations that planned and/or executed violent and
destructive acts against the U.S. Government and/or privately owned
American corporations.
All inmates determined to have terrorist ties are clearly
identified and tracked in our information systems. The most dangerous
terrorists are confined under the most restrictive conditions allowed
in our most secure facility, the Administrative Maximum United States
Penitentiary (ADX) in Florence, Colorado. We have also transferred a
number of terrorist inmates to the Federal Correctional Complex in
Terre Haute, Indiana, to consolidate them at one facility and increase
the monitoring and management of these inmates.
We monitor, record, and translate if necessary, all telephone
communications (except attorney-client conversations) involving inmates
with terrorist ties. We then share any relevant information with the
FBI, the NJTTF, and other agencies.
We also monitor all of the general mail delivered to or sent from
terrorist inmates. Mail is not delivered to or sent from terrorist
inmates until it is read, and if necessary, translated and/or analyzed
for intelligence purposes. If suspicious content is found, the
correspondence is referred to the FBI for analysis before being
processed any further. In addition, we have eliminated outgoing
``special mail'' drop boxes.\1\ Inmates must deliver outgoing special
mail directly to a staff member for further processing. All outgoing
special mail is subject to scanning by electronic means such as x-ray,
metal detector, or ion spectrometry equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Special mail is privileged communication between an inmate and
his or her attorney or government officials. Federal regulations
prohibit the BOP from monitoring the content of special mail (28 CFR
540.18).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We recently established a Counter-terrorism Unit in Martinsburg,
West Virginia. One of the responsibilities of that Unit is to process
inmate correspondence that requires language translation and content
analysis. The Unit will improve our ability to monitor correspondence
and analyze it for potential terrorism-related intelligence. The Unit
also oversees telephone monitoring systemwide and has implemented
mechanisms to ensure phone calls by terrorist inmates are being
monitored.
In addition, an FBI special agent and an FBI intelligence analyst
are assigned to assist ADX Florence with communication and intelligence
matters.
We have worked diligently, particularly since 9/11, to enhance our
intelligence gathering and sharing capabilities in order to ensure a
seamless flow of intelligence information between our agency and other
law enforcement and counter-terrorism agencies.
We have two individuals (one employee and one contractor) detailed
to the NJTTF to facilitate our involvement on this task force and to
coordinate the exchange of intelligence related to corrections. These
two members of the NJTTF manage the Correctional Intelligence
Initiative (CII), a nationwide NJTTF special project involving
correctional agencies at the Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and
local levels, designed to detect, deter, and disrupt the radicalization
and recruiting of inmates. This initiative involves training of
correctional administrators by each local JTTF; exchanging of
intelligence; communicating best practices to local JTTFs in order to
detect, deter, and disrupt radicalization; and coordinating of liaison
and intelligence-sharing activities between local JTTFs and corrections
agencies.
Most importantly, through the CII, intelligence regarding any
attempts by inmates, religious providers, or others to radicalize any
segment of the population is gathered and shared, and interdiction
action is taken by the appropriate correctional authority.
In addition, we have established intelligence officers at the
majority of our metropolitan detention centers under a Joint
Intelligence Sharing Initiative. These intelligence staff members
gather and share intelligence information with the FBI and with our
Central Office intelligence operations. This staff also coordinate with
the local JTTF and act as full JTTF members in some cases. All BOP
facilities are required to coordinate with their local JTTFs on matters
with a connection to terrorism.
In addition to managing and monitoring inmates who could attempt to
radicalize other inmates, we help inmates become less vulnerable to any
such attempts.
Experts have identified the societal marginalization of inmates as
a key factor in their becoming radicalized. Our agency provides inmates
with a broad variety of programs that are proven to assist in the
development of key skills, thereby minimizing the likelihood of the
inmates being marginalized.
The programs we provide include work in prison industries and other
institution jobs, vocational training, education, substance abuse
treatment, religious programs, and other skills-building and pro-social
values programs.
Moreover, we are very aware of the important role religious
programs play in preparing inmates to reintegrate successfully into
society following release from prison. Religious programs and
chaplaincy services are provided to the approximately 30 faiths
represented within the Federal prison population. Within the
constraints of security, we provide worship services, study of
scripture and sacred writings, and religious workshops; and we make
accommodations to facilitate observances of holy days. Full-time civil
service chaplains in the BOP lead worship services and provide pastoral
care and spiritual guidance to inmates, and chaplains oversee the
breadth of religious programs and monitor the accommodations provided
by contract spiritual leaders and community volunteers. The
overwhelming majority of inmates participate in religious programs in a
positive, healthy, and productive way.
We screen all of our civil service staff, volunteers, and
contractors to avoid hiring or contracting with anyone who would pose a
threat to institution security. Every BOP civil service chaplain must
meet all the requirements for employment as a Federal law enforcement
officer, including a field investigation, criminal background check,
reference check, drug screening, and pre-employment suitability
interviews and screenings. In addition, chaplains must meet
requirements unique to their employment and the scope of their duties.
Like all BOP employees, chaplains are strictly prohibited from using
their position to condone, support, or encourage violence or other
inappropriate behavior.
Our religious contractors and volunteers are also subject to a
variety of security requirements prior to being granted access to an
institution, including criminal background checks, law enforcement
agency checks to verify places of residence and employment, a
fingerprint check, information from employment over the previous 5
years, and drug testing.
The BOP continues to work closely with the FBI and the NJTTF with
regard to the screening of contract service providers. Information on
contractors and volunteers (whether the contractor or volunteer is
being considered to help provide religious services or not) is checked
against databases supported by the FBI. Moreover, over the last 4
years, we have enhanced supervision of programs and activities in our
chapels.
We also have increased the training of our staff in the areas of
counter-terrorism and recognition of potential radicalization. All BOP
staff receive basic correctional skills training at the beginning of
their career, and on an annual basis, BOP employees receive additional
training that addresses current security and inmate management issues.
Since 2004, our agency has included a training segment titled
``Terrorism Management and Response'' in Annual Training for all BOP
staff. In addition, Religious Services personnel present a segment
during Annual Training that emphasizes an awareness of discriminatory
language, behaviors, rhetoric, and speech that could indicate the
presence of radical ideology in the inmate population.
In 2003, we distributed a Terrorism Training for Law Enforcement
CD, developed by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, to all of our
facilities. We are in the process of distributing the updated 2006
version of the Terrorism Training for Law Enforcement CD to all
institutions. Among the activities of our Martinsburg Counter-terrorism
Unit are the production and distribution of intelligence-related
documents to BOP staff and the development and provision of counter-
terrorism training programs for BOP staff.
Every BOP facility has one or more Special Investigative
Supervisors/Special Investigative Agents who serve as the focal point
in our agency's efforts to manage all security threat groups, including
terrorists. This staff helps identify and track members and associates,
monitor mail and telephone communications, provide enhanced supervision
of identified security threat group members, and share intelligence on
the activities of any security threat group. Special Investigative
Agents serve as a liaison to the FBI, the U.S. Marshals Service, and
the U.S. Secret Service regarding the activities of security threat
group members and the investigation of criminal activity in BOP
facilities.
In 2004 and 2005, Special Investigative Supervisors and Special
Investigative Agents from every BOP institution received specialized
training in the control and management of terrorist inmates. In
December 2006, twenty BOP intelligence staff participated in a 32-hour
intelligence gathering and analysis training course provided by the
FBI. Two additional classes are planned for over 45 special
investigative supervisors and special investigative agents in June and
August of this year.
BOP chaplains receive specialized training to ensure they have the
necessary information about each religion to oversee and manage
religious services and programs effectively. Our agency has prepared a
comprehensive technical reference manual that describes appropriate
religious services procedures and behaviors. The manual is available
for use by any staff member overseeing a religious service or activity.
Thirty chaplains recently participated in mandatory training designed
to enhance their awareness and knowledge about identifiers of radical
religious groups. The training will be repeated each year until all BOP
chaplains have attended.
I hope the information provided in this statement will be
beneficial to the Subcommittee in its investigation of efforts underway
to prevent radicalization in America's prisons.