[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
REVELATIONS BY FORMER WHITE HOUSE
PRESS SECRETARY SCOTT McCLELLAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 20, 2008
__________
Serial No. 110-185
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan, Chairman
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California LAMAR SMITH, Texas
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,
JERROLD NADLER, New York Wisconsin
ROBERT C. ``BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ZOE LOFGREN, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
MAXINE WATERS, California DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts CHRIS CANNON, Utah
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida RIC KELLER, Florida
LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California DARRELL ISSA, California
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MIKE PENCE, Indiana
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
BETTY SUTTON, Ohio STEVE KING, Iowa
LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois TOM FEENEY, Florida
BRAD SHERMAN, California TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York JIM JORDAN, Ohio
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama
DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
Perry Apelbaum, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Sean McLaughlin, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
JUNE 20, 2008
Page
OPENING STATEMENT
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress
from the State of Michigan, and Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary...................................................... 1
The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary. 3
WITNESS
Scott McClellan, former White House Press Secretary
Oral Testimony................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Exhibits submitted by the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a
Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, and
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary........................... 64
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and Member,
Committee on the Judiciary..................................... 71
Material submitted by the Honorable Steve King, a Representative
in Congress from the State of Iowa, and Member, Committee on
the Judiciary.................................................. 75
Post-Hearing Questions of the Honorable Lamar Smith, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and Ranking
Member, Committee on the Judiciary, to Scott McClellan, former
White House Press Secretary.................................... 78
Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Scott McClellan, former
White House Press Secretary.................................... 85
REVELATIONS BY FORMER WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY SCOTT McCLELLAN
----------
FRIDAY, JUNE 30, 2008
House of Representatives,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable John
Conyers, Jr. (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Conyers, Nadler, Scott, Jackson
Lee, Delahunt, Wexler, Sanchez, Cohen, Johnson, Sutton,
Sherman, Baldwin, Davis, Wasserman Schultz, Ellison, Smith,
Coble, Lungren, Keller, Issa, Feeney, and Franks.
Staff Present: Robert Reed, Majority Counsel; Brandon
Johns, Majority Clerk; and Crystal Jezierski, Minority Counsel.
Mr. Conyers. Good morning. The Committee will come to
order.
We welcome everyone to the hearing, especially former White
House Press Secretary Scott McClellan and his counsel, Mike and
Jane Tigar.
Many respected commentators have noted that this is the
most important matter Congress could examine in its oversight
of this Administration. As John Nichols wrote in The Nation
magazine, what Scott McClellan wrote in his new book about the
Administration's propaganda campaign to promote and defend the
occupation of Iraq was not a revelation. It was a confirmation
that the White House has played fast and loose with the truth
in a time of war.
Depending upon how one reads the Constitution, that may or
may not be an impeachable offense. But Mr. McClellan's
assertion that top Presidential aides, perhaps with the
cooperation of the Vice President, conspired to obstruct
justice by lying about their role in the plot to destroy the
reputation of former Ambassador Joe Wilson, a critic of the
rush to war, and his wife, former CIA agent Valerie Plame; and
this demands a response from Congress. When White House
insiders leak classified information, manipulate media
coverage, and otherwise employ their immense power to punish
dissenters, Congress does not have any other option, has a
constitutional duty to check and balance an errant executive
branch.
That the former White House spokesman, with his claim that
the President said he authorized the selective release of
classified information to reporters covering the Wilson story,
links the wrongdoing directly to Bush, ups the ante even
further. That is the quote.
I would like to make these three points. First, Mr.
McClellan's revelations highlight acts that may constitute
illegal obstruction of justice beyond that for which Scooter
Libby was convicted. In his book, Mr. McClellan explains that
he stated to Mr. Libby that he did not intend to vouch for and
exonerate him to the press in the way that he had done
concerning Karl Rove since the leak investigation had actually
begun.
Shortly after that conversation, however, White House Chief
of Staff Andrew Card told Mr. McClellan that the President and
Vice President spoke this morning. They want you to give the
press the same assurances for Scooter that you gave for Karl.
It seems clear that Mr. Libby, Mr. Card, the President and Vice
President were involved in directing Mr. McClellan to falsely
vouch for Mr. Libby, despite Mr. McClellan's earlier
reservations.
In fact, handwritten notes from Vice President Cheney
himself confirm this. These notes now on the screen were an
exhibit in the Libby trial, and appear to be notes from Mr.
Cheney's conversation with the President. The notes say, ``Has
to happen today. Call out to key press saying same thing about
Scooter as Karl. Not going to protect one staffer and sacrifice
the guy.''
And then something intelligible--something illegible, but
looks like, ``This press,'' meaning this President, ``that was
asked to stick his neck out in the meat grinder because of the
incompetence of others,'' end of quotation.
That is disturbing enough, but we also have a letter from
two former Federal prosecutors, as we can see on the screen.
The first paragraph, that is all I will read, of that letter
states that ``A substantial predicate exists for investigation
of whether this conduct may constitute the criminal offense of
obstruction of justice.''
To those who would dismiss the significance of today's
hearing, I would say that concerns about possible obstruction
of justice are not trivial and clearly warrant this Committee's
attention. In many respects, today's hearing just offers us a
partial glimpse into apparent deceptions at the White House,
including most notably with regard to the outing of Valerie
Plame.
To truly get to the bottom of this matter we will need far
more cooperation by the Administration and from the Justice
Department. It is vital that we obtain the interview reports of
President Bush and Vice President Cheney and unredacted
interviews, interview reports of other key White House
officials, to determine their involvement not only in the leak,
but also the cover-up.
Yet the Justice Department has been less cooperative with
this Committee, refused even to give us access to redacted
materials that the Oversight Committee of the Congress has
already seen. Such conduct is unacceptable, which is why this
week we sent a letter to Attorney General Mukasey, reiterating
our requests and explaining that we may have to resort to
compulsory process if they continue to deny us the documents.
We look forward to hearing from Mr. McClellan on the role
of the Vice President and the President.
Now the issue of a possible pardon of Mr. Libby still
remains outstanding, in addition to the President's earlier
commutation of Mr. Libby's prison sentence. Following Mr.
Libby's sentence commutation, we held a hearing on the issue;
and we hope to explore with Mr. McClellan his thoughts on a
possible Presidential pardon for Mr. Libby in the context of
the revelations in his book.
And I want to close by acknowledging Mr. McClellan's
suggestion in his book and in today's opening statement that
all of us work on what he mentioned in his book, restoring
civility and bipartisanship and candor to our national
political discourse, and putting our Nation's interests above
our partisan goals.
I want to point out this Committee has been, I think,
superb in working in that spirit. We have very important
issues, wide differences of view, but we have always been able
to conduct our discussions in a very highly appropriate way.
And these goals are shared by Members of this Committee on both
sides of the aisle. As a result, when credible and
troublingallegations are made by an important former
Administration official, although partisan tensions may arise,
we know that we can deal with the facts and not personal or
partisan attacks.
I thank you for your appearance. And I would like to
recognize now the Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee,
the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Lamar Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, everyone, to
the Judiciary Committee's first ``Book of the Month club''
meeting. Today it is Scott McClellan's ``What Happened: Inside
the Bush White House and Washington's Culture of Deception.'' I
propose that next time we consider Ann Coulter's book, ``How to
Talk to a Liberal If You Must.''
It is hard to take Mr. McClellan or this hearing too
seriously. Despite what Mr. McClellan says regarding Iraq,
three different studies, the Senate Intelligence Committee
report of 2004, the Robb-Silverman report of 2005, and
Britain's Butler report, conclude that intelligence reports
were not altered in the lead-up to the Iraq war. And despite
this book's innuendo, a 3-year independent criminal
investigation found that no White House officials leaked
Valerie Plame's name to the media in violation of the law.
Also it should be of no surprise that there was spin in the
White House press office. What White House has not had a
communications operation that advocates for its policies? Any
recent Administration that did not try to promote its
priorities should be cited for dereliction of duty.
Many have asked why Mr. McClellan did not object to what he
saw while he was at the White House. The reason is clear. There
was nothing to object to.
Last Monday, at the Dallas-Fort Worth airport, I had a
conversation with an airline employee who asked me what I was
working on. I mentioned this hearing, and she, a self-
proclaimed Democrat, replied, Why are you having him? All he
did was write a book. It appears many Americans might have
trouble taking this hearing seriously.
Motives are important. And we really don't know Mr.
McClellan's motives. He says he had a revelation which
contradicts everything he said and did for 2\1/2\ years before.
There are some questions we may never get the answer to.
What really explains going from a loyal and trusted staff
member to a person who makes biting accusations? Since Mr.
McClellan has included no footnotes in his book, and few direct
quotes or written memos are cited, is the book just a typical
opinion piece without evidence to support its assertions?
Mr. McClellan was asked to leave his job. Did this color
his views? Did he just want to strike back at those who showed
him to the door?
What role did money play? So far he has not revealed what
he was paid for the book or what he stands to gain by promoting
it. Clearly, Peter Osnos, the editor-at-large for Mr.
McClellan's publisher, Public Affairs, would have known that an
inflammatory book would sell more copies and make more money
for all concerned.
How much influence did a biased editor have on the finished
product? What edits were made to the original manuscript to
make it more critical of the Administration? We do know that
Mr. Osnos and Public Affairs have published six books by George
Soros. Mr. Soros was the largest donor to Democratic 527 groups
during the 2004 Presidential election, giving over $23 million.
And we know that Mr. Osnos himself has been highly and publicly
critical of the Bush administration.
Also, Mr. McClellan's project editor for the book, Karl
Weber, has written venomous statements about the President, for
example, calling him a, quote, ``clearly horrible person.''
So who is the real Scott McClellan? The one who actually
wrote in his book that the Administration did not employ
deception and said, quote, ``Some critics have suggested that
sinister plans were discussed at the White House Iraq Group
meetings to deliberately mislead the public? Not so,'' end
quote. Or the one who elsewhere in the same book leveled self-
serving accusations?
While we may never know the answers, Scott McClellan alone
will have to wrestle with whether it was worth selling out the
President and his friends for a few pieces of silver. He will
have to confront whether he was manipulated by extremely biased
editors with a partisan agenda. And finally, sooner or later he
will have to answer to his own conscience.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will yield back.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you. Before I----
Mr. Tigar. Mr. Chairman? I know Mr. McClellan has a
statement, but as his counsel, I would like to object. The
statement we just heard could have been the basis----
Mr. Issa. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman is out of order. Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Conyers. I am afraid you are out of order. You will
have an opportunity to object in just a moment.
Mr. Tigar. Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Issa. Mr. Chairman, point of order.
Mr. Conyers. Counsel cannot object to the Committee
proceedings.
Mr. Issa. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Conyers. Let me do this, please.
I would like to introduce into the record the following
documents: the statement from former Federal Prosecutor Barry
Coburn and Professor Adam Kurland of Howard Law School; second,
a letter from our colleague, Neil Abercrombie, attaching a
letter he wrote to the United States Attorney Patrick
Fitzgerald; and an exhibit from Mr. Libby's trial that I
referenced in my opening statement.
Mr. Scott McClellan served as the White House Press
Secretary from 2003 to 2006. Prior to that, he was Principal
Deputy White House Press Secretary. And before that, as
Traveling Press Secretary for the Bush-Cheney 2000 Campaign.
Earlier he served as Deputy Communications Director in the
Texas Governor's Office for Governor Bush, as a top legislative
aide, as a campaign manager for three successful statewide
campaigns.
We would appreciate it if you would stand, raise your right
hand, and take the oath before you begin your testimony.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Conyers. Thank you very much. Welcome to the Committee.
Mr. McClellan. Thank you.
Mr. Conyers. You may begin your statement.
Mr. McClellan. Is this on?
Mr. Conyers. You have to press it on.
TESTIMONY OF SCOTT McCLELLAN,
FORMER WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
Mr. McClellan. Okay.
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, and Members
of the Committee. I am here today at your invitation to answer
questions about what I know regarding the Valerie Plame
episode.
Back in 2005, I was prohibited from discussing it by the
White House ostensibly because of the criminal investigation
underway, but I made a commitment to share with the public what
I knew as soon as possible. That commitment was one of the
reasons I wrote my book.
Unfortunately, this matter continues to be investigated by
Congress because of what the White House has chosen to conceal
from the public. Despite assurances that the Administration
would discuss the matter once the Special Counsel had completed
his work, the White House has sought to avoid public scrutiny
and accountability.
The continuing cloud of suspicion over the White House is
not something I can remove because I know only one part of the
story. Only those who know the underlying truth can bring this
to an end. Sadly, they remain silent. The result has been an
increase in suspicion and partisan warfare, and a perpetuation
of Washington's scandal culture, one of three core factors that
have poisoned the atmosphere in Washington for the past two
decades.
The central message in my book is the need to change the
way Washington governs. We need to minimize the negative
influence of the permanent campaign, end the scandal culture,
and move beyond the philosophy of politics as war.
No one has a better opportunity to make that happen than
the President. To do so, he must first fully embrace openness
and candor, and then constantly strive to build trust across
the aisle and seek common ground to unite Americans from all
walks of life and political persuasions.
I believed President Bush could be that kind of leader for
the country when I first went to work for him in Texas. He was
a popular, bipartisan leader who had a record of working with
Democrats. Unfortunately, like many good people who come to
Washington, he ended up playing the game by the existing rules
rather than transforming it.
The larger message of my book is bigger than any person or
party. It is about restoring civility and bipartisanship and
candor to our national political discourse. It is about putting
our Nation's interests above partisan goals. Indeed, all of us,
especially those in elected office, can do more to make this
happen by promoting openness and engaging in civil discourse.
The permanent campaign leads to just the opposite.
Substantive debates over policy give way to a contest over
which side can most effectively manipulate the media narrative
to its advantage. It is about power and electoral victory.
Governing becomes an offshoot of campaigning rather than the
other way around.
Vicious attacks, distortions, political manipulation and
spin become accepted. Complex issues are reduced to black and
white terms and oversimplified in the context of winners and
losers and how they will affect the next election. Too often
the media unwittingly ignores the impact of Government on the
daily lives of Americans, focusing foremost on the Beltway game
and lionizing those who play it most skillfully.
There is no more recent example of this unsavory side of
politics than the initial reaction from some in Washington to
my book. I received plenty of criticism for daring to tell the
story as I knew it. Yet few of my critics tried to refute the
larger themes and perspectives in the book. Instead of engaging
in a reasoned, rational, and honest discussion of the issues
raised, some sought to turn it into a game of ``gotcha,''
misrepresenting what I wrote, and seeking to discredit me
through inaccurate personal attacks on me and my motives.
The American people deserve better.
Governing inevitably has an adversarial element. People and
groups will always differ about the proper use of limited
Government resources. But should Government be a process of
constant campaigning to manipulate public opinion, or should it
be centered as much as possible on rational debate,
deliberation, and compromise?
Writing this book was not easy for me to do. These are my
words, my experiences, and my conclusions. I sought to take a
clear-eyed look at events. To do so, I had to remove my
partisan lens and step back from the White House bubble. Some
of the conclusions I came to were different from those I would
have embraced at the outset.
My book reflects the only idea of loyalty that I believe is
appropriate in a democratic government, and that is loyalty to
the ideals of candor, transparency and integrity, and indeed to
the constitutional system itself. Too often in Washington
people mistakenly think that loyalty to an individual
officeholder should override loyalty to basic ideals. This
false loyalty is not only mistaken, but can exercise a corrupt
influence on Government.
I am here because in my heart I am a public servant who,
like many Americans, wants to improve the way Washington
governs and does not want to see future Administrations repeat
the mistakes this White House made. I do not know whether a
crime was committed by any of the Administration officials who
revealed Valerie Plame's identity to reporters, nor do I know
if there was an attempt by any person or persons to engage in a
cover-up during the investigation. I do know that it was wrong
to reveal her identity, because it compromised the
effectiveness of a covert official for political reasons. I
regret that I played a role, however unintentionally, in
relaying false information to the public about it.
I will do my best to answer any questions on this matter
that Members of the Committee may wish to ask.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McClellan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Scott McClellan
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, and members of the
committee.
I am here today at your invitation to answer questions about what I
know regarding the Valerie Plame episode. Back in 2005, I was
prohibited from discussing it by the White House ostensibly because of
the criminal investigation underway, but I made a commitment to share
with the public what I knew as soon as possible. That commitment was
one of the reasons I wrote my book.
Unfortunately, this matter continues to be investigated by Congress
because of what the White House has chosen to conceal from the public.
Despite assurances that the administration would discuss the matter
once the Special Counsel had completed his work, the White House has
sought to avoid public scrutiny and accountability.
The continuing cloud of suspicion over the White House is not
something I can remove because I know only one part of the story. Only
those who know the underlying truth can bring this to an end. Sadly,
they remain silent.
The result has been an increase in suspicion and partisan warfare,
and a perpetuation of Washington's scandal culture, one of three core
factors that have poisoned the atmosphere in Washington for the past
two decades. The central message in my book is the need to change the
way Washington governs. We need to minimize the negative influence of
the permanent campaign, end the scandal culture, and move beyond the
philosophy of politics as war.
No one has a better opportunity to make that happen than the
president. To do so, he must first fully embrace openness and candor
and then constantly strive to build trust across the aisle and seek
common ground to unite Americans from all walks of life and political
persuasions.
I believed President Bush could be that kind of leader for the
country when I first went to work for him in Texas. He was a popular,
bipartisan leader who had a record of working with Democrats.
Unfortunately, like many good people who come to Washington, he
ended up playing the game by the existing rules rather than
transforming it.
The larger message of my book is bigger than any person or party.
It is about restoring civility and bipartisanship and candor to our
national political discourse. It is about putting our Nation's
interests above partisan goals. Indeed, all of us--especially those in
elected office--can do more to make this happen by promoting openness
and engaging in civil discourse.
The permanent campaign leads to just the opposite. Substantive
debates over policy give way to a contest over which side can most
effectively manipulate the media narrative to its advantage. It is
about power and electoral victory. Governing becomes an offshoot of
campaigning rather than the other way around.
Vicious attacks, distortions, political manipulation and spin
become accepted. Complex issues are reduced to black-and-white terms
and oversimplified in the context of winners and losers and how they
will affect the next election. Too often, the media unwittingly ignores
the impact of government on the daily lives of Americans, focusing
foremost on the Beltway game and lionizing those who play it most
skillfully.
There is no more recent example of this unsavory side of politics
than the initial reaction from some in Washington to my book. I
received plenty of criticism for daring to tell the story as I knew it.
Yet few of my critics tried to refute the larger themes and
perspectives in the book. Instead of engaging in a reasoned, rational,
and honest discussion of the issues raised, some sought to turn it into
a game of ``gotcha,'' misrepresenting what I wrote and seeking to
discredit me through inaccurate personal attacks on me and my motives.
The American people deserve better.
Governing inevitably has an adversarial element. People and groups
will always differ about the proper use of limited government
resources. But should government be a process of constant campaigning
to manipulate public opinion, or should it be centered as much as
possible on rational debate, deliberation, and compromise?
Writing this book was not easy for me to do. These are my words, my
experiences, and my conclusions. I sought to take a clear-eyed look at
events. To do so, I had to remove my partisan lens and step back from
the White House bubble. Some of the conclusions I came to were
different from those I would have embraced at the outset.
My book reflects the only idea of loyalty that I believe is
appropriate in democratic government, and that is loyalty to the ideals
of candor, transparency and integrity, and indeed to the constitutional
system itself. Too often in Washington, people mistakenly think that
loyalty to an individual officeholder should override loyalty to basic
ideals. This false loyalty is not only mistaken, but can exercise a
corrupt influence on government.
I am here because in my heart I am a public servant who, like many
Americans, wants to improve the way Washington governs and does not
want to see future administrations repeat the mistakes this White House
made.
I do not know whether a crime was committed by any of the
Administration officials who revealed Valerie Plame's identity to
reporters. Nor do I know if there was an attempt by any person or
persons to engage in a cover-up during the investigation. I do know
that it was wrong to reveal her identity, because it compromised the
effectiveness of a covert official for political reasons. I regret that
I played a role, however unintentionally, in relaying false information
to the public about it. I'll do my best to answer any questions on this
matter that members of the committee may wish to ask.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you so much.
One of the most disturbing revelations in your book was
that White House officials, including the President and Vice
President, directed you to falsely vouch for Scooter Libby's
not being involved in the Wilson leak. Please explain what
happened and whether you think Mr. Libby was involved in that.
Mr. McClellan. That happened on the Saturday after the
investigation, I guess, was launched, which was on September
29th.
That Saturday morning I received a call from the White
House Chief of Staff, Andy Card, and he said that the President
and Vice President had spoken that morning, and they wanted me
to provide the same assurances for Scooter Libby that I had for
Karl Rove. I was reluctant to do it, but I headed into the
White House that Saturday morning.
I talked with Andy Card, and I said I would provide the
same assurances for Scooter Libby provided he gave me the same
assurances that Karl Rove had. And I got on the phone with
Scooter Libby and asked him point blank, Were you involved in
this in any way? And he assured me in unequivocal terms that he
was not, meaning the leaking of Valerie Plame's identity to any
reporters. And then I contacted reporters to let them know
about that information.
But it was Andy Card that had directed me to do that at the
request of the President and Vice President.
Mr. Conyers. You spoke very frequently with the President
and the Vice President. Do you think either or both of them
knew about the leak and had any role in causing the leak to
happen, or knew that Mr. Libby was involved in the leak when
they helped get you to falsely vouch for him?
Mr. McClellan. I do not think the President in any way had
knowledge about it, based on my conversations with him back at
that time when he said that Karl Rove had not been involved in
it and told him something to that effect.
In terms of the Vice President, I do not know. There is a
lot of suspicion there. As Patrick Fitzgerald said at the trial
of Scooter Libby, there is a cloud that remains over the Vice
President's Office, but it is because Scooter Libby put it
there by lying and obstructing justice.
Mr. Conyers. In the light of your testimony and your
statement that you do not think Mr. Libby's criminal sentence
should have been commuted, do you think that it would be any
more appropriate to give Mr. Libby a full pardon?
Mr. McClellan. No, Congressman. I do not, Mr. Chairman.
I believe that it would signal a special treatment, the
same thing that happened with the commutation. And the
President has always held a certain standard for granting
pardons, even going back to when he was governor; and I worked
for him then. And that is that the person must first repay his
debt to society, and second, must express remorse for the
crimes which he committed. And we have seen neither of that
from Scooter Libby at this point.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Lamar Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McClellan, your title of the book,What Happened: Inside
the Bush White House and Washington's Culture of Deception,
implies that the President himself engaged in some amount of
deception. Yet elsewhere in the book you say he did not engage
in outright deception.
Who was it that suggested the title to your book?
Mr. McClellan. The title to my book, What Happened?
Mr. Smith. No, who suggested----
Mr. McClellan. Or Inside--the subtitle?
Mr. Smith. Right.
Mr. McClellan. This was something I talked about with my
publisher.
Mr. Smith. So Mr. Osnos is----
Mr. McClellan. We came to an agreement on it.
But in terms of the----
Mr. Smith. Since it contradicts what you----
Mr. McClellan. Inside the Bush White House and Washington's
Culture of Deception? That was something we all discussed.
Mr. Smith. And who is the ``we''?
Mr. McClellan. With the publisher.
Mr. Smith. That is Mr. Osnos?
Mr. McClellan. That would include Mr. Osnos.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you.
It has been reported that you received $75,000 as an
advance to your book; is that true?
Mr. McClellan. That is correct.
Mr. Smith. And you are also aware, of course, that every
book that sells means more money to you as well.
Mr. McClellan. I am sorry?
Mr. Smith. You are aware, the more books you sell, the more
money goes to you, I presume?
Mr. McClellan. Yes, a small percentage goes to the author
usually in situations like that.
Mr. Smith. Is it true that Karl Weber was the project
editor?
Mr. McClellan. Yes, he worked with me.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Were you aware before you worked with him
that he had called President Bush a ``clearly horrible person''
and had said, quote, ``He is consciously manipulative and
deceitful''?
Mr. McClellan. No, I was not.
Mr. Smith. Okay. So, in other words, someone who called the
President a ``clearly horrible person'' helped you draft and
edit the book; Is that right?
Mr. McClellan. Actually this is my book. I wrote this book.
And he did provide great help as an editor.
Mr. Smith. Yeah. Did he edit the book?
Mr. McClellan. He was an editor on the book, yes.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
You write that you witnessed Mr. Rove and Mr. Libby meet in
Mr. Rove's office behind closed doors, and you inferred that
they were conspiring to mislead the grand jury looking into the
Valerie Plame investigation at the time.
Did you hear any portion of their conversation?
Mr. McClellan. No, sir, I did not. I say that in the book.
Mr. Smith. And so it is speculation on your part as to what
they were saying?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I thought full disclosure was the only
way I could go. I said I was going to discuss everything I knew
about the episode.
Mr. Smith. But you were still speculating as to what you
thought they were saying?
Mr. McClellan. I said it was suspicious to me. I said--in
the book I said, I do not know what they discussed behind
closed doors.
Mr. Smith. And they could have been talking about, who
knows, the Supreme Court nominations at the time, or anything
else?
Mr. McClellan. They could have been.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
And is it true that Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage has admitted that he was the source of the Valerie
Plame leak?
Mr. McClellan. Well, to Robert Novak, but there were other
reporters that that information was revealed to prior to it
being public. And there was a report in the Washington Post
that he has identified at least six reporters were told about
her identity.
Mr. Smith. And wasn't that the first public leak?
Mr. McClellan. That was the first time it was published,
but her identity was revealed----
Mr. Smith. That is correct. That is correct, that was the
first time her name was published.
Mr. McClellan. I am sorry, I couldn't hear you over the
buzzer.
The first time her name was published. Yes, but I would
like to make the point----
Mr. Smith. Richard Armitage----
Mr. McClellan. Could I finish my answer?
Mr. Smith. Richard Armitage has admitted that he was the
source. Do you agree with that? Or do you question his----
Mr. McClellan. He was the initial source for Robert Novak.
Karl Rove was the confirming source.
Mr. Smith. Right. And that was----
Mr. McClellan. Karl Rove, Scooter Libby, and Ari Fleischer
also--can I finish my response?
Mr. Smith. That was the first time her----
Mr. McClellan. They also revealed her name to other
reporters prior to it being published publicly.
Mr. Smith. Right. But that was--the first time her name was
ever published was when the----
Mr. McClellan. Yes. As I point out in the book, that is
correct.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. McClellan.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you.
That was a call for a Journal vote.
The Chair recognizes----
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Conyers. What is the problem?
Mr. Lungren. The problem is, we are the Committee of
jurisdiction on FISA. As I understand it, FISA----
Mr. Conyers. It is a Journal vote.
Mr. Lungren. I understand, but could you inform the
Committee as to what the process is going to be and whether we
are going to be----
Mr. Conyers. Oh, we are going to cover--we are going to be
on the floor and the hearing will be suspended.
Mr. Lungren. Will we be--will there be an opportunity for
Members to be on the floor for the debate on the rule for FISA
or just for FISA debate itself?
Mr. Conyers. No, no, not the rule, but the debate. You can
use your own option, though.
The Chair recognizes the Chairman of the Constitution
Subcommittee of Judiciary, the gentleman from New York, Jerry
Nadler.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
I am going to ask a series of questions, so try to keep the
answers brief because I only have 5 minutes.
Do you have any knowledge of whether prior to or after the
leak of Ms. Wilson's covert identity either the Vice President
or the President declassified her covert status in order to
have it leaked to reporters?
Mr. McClellan. No, I do not.
Mr. Nadler. And do you have any information of the role, if
any, played by the Vice President in the leaking of Ms.
Wilson's identity?
Mr. McClellan. No, I have no direct knowledge of that.
Mr. Nadler. And do you have any idea why Vice President
Cheney may have knowingly indirectly or directly instructed you
to publicly exonerate Mr. Libby?
Mr. McClellan. No, sir, I do not. I was not a party to that
conversation with the President.
Mr. Nadler. Do you have any idea whether at the time he
knew that Mr. Libby had, in fact, been involved in the leak?
Mr. McClellan. I am sorry?
Mr. Nadler. Do you have any idea whether, when he gave that
instruction, he knew at that time that Mr. Libby had, in fact,
been involved in the leak?
Mr. McClellan. No, I do not know that.
Mr. Nadler. In any event, did you come to learn that Karl
Rove and Scooter Libby had lied to you, and that each of them
was involved in the Plame leak?
Mr. McClellan. Yes, I did. About----
Mr. Nadler. Can you comment on that briefly, how you
learned that.
Mr. McClellan. That was in--well, first in July of 2005,
when it was about to be reported in the media, I learned that
Karl Rove had revealed her identity to Matt Cooper of Time
magazine. And then a short time after that it was Robert Novak.
And then, within the next few months, it was learned that
Scooter Libby had also revealed her identity to reporters.
Mr. Nadler. Okay.
Now, the President had promised the American people and
stated publicly when this first came out that he was going to
investigate internally, find out who had leaked the
information; whoever had leaked would no longer be in the
Administration, et cetera, because this was a terrible thing.
Do you know what steps, if any, were taken by the White
House to conduct an internal investigation into the leak?
Mr. McClellan. As far as I know, the White House Counsel's
Office worked to provide information to the Justice Department
that was gathered during the process of the investigation at
their request, e-mails and things of that nature. But I don't
know of any internal----
Mr. Nadler. You don't know of any internal investigation to
find out for the President so that he could fire or do----
Mr. McClellan. My understanding was, we weren't doing any
of that.
Mr. Nadler. You weren't doing any of that.
Now, the President commuted Mr. Libby--commuted Mr. Libby's
sentence. Now, this would seem--well, do you regard this as, in
any way, a violation of the President's pledge to find out all
the information he could and make it public about this?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I certainly think that the President
should have stuck by his word on the matter. And I certainly
view the commutation as--it was special treatment; it does
undermine our system of justice in my view.
Mr. Nadler. I am not sure what you are saying in the first
part. The President's commutation of Mr. Libby's sentence was
somehow not standing by his word?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I don't know that it is not standing
by his word. I don't know that he said anything specifically
about a commutation. But he did say anyone that was involved in
this--and I said, on his behalf, no one would be employed by
this Administration any longer, so----
Mr. Nadler. And would you regard the President's
commutation as--do you think it is fair to infer from your
knowledge that the President's commutation of Mr. Libby's--of
the conviction, whatever it was--that his commutation was part
of an effort to, in fact, assure that all the facts would not
become public, part of a cover-up, in fact?
Mr. McClellan. I do not know that. I do not make that
claim, and I do not have the information to know whether or not
that was the thinking.
I had already left the White House by the time he commuted
Scooter Libby, but there were a lot of suspicions that were
raised because of that action.
Mr. Nadler. Okay.
Now, in your book--oh, and before I go to this last
question, let me, on behalf of some Members of the Committee,
apologize to you for the aspersions as to your motives instead
of asking you questions about the truth or evidence of what you
wrote that we heard a few minutes ago.
Such character assassination has no business in this
Committee.
Mr. McClellan. Thank you.
Mr. Nadler. In your book, Mr. McClellan, you state that the
Iraq war was sold to the American people with a sophisticated
political propaganda campaign that included overstating
intelligence in Iraq, manipulating sources of public opinion,
downplaying the major reasons for going to war. As the
President's former Deputy and Chief Press Secretary, it is a
very serious charge.
Could you explain why you think that this was a political
propaganda campaign as opposed to simply informing the American
public as to what was going on?
Mr. McClellan. Well, it was a marketing campaign or a
propaganda campaign, however you want to refer to it. What I
talk about in the book is that we took this permanent campaign
mentality that was used on other issues like Social Security or
education reform and used it to take the Nation to war, and
sold the Nation on the premise that Iraq was a grave and
gathering danger.
We now know that it was not, that the case was overstated,
it was overpackaged in the way that the intelligence was used.
That was something that----
Mr. Nadler. And by ``overpackaged in the way the
intelligence was used,'' do you mean they were declassifying
only those portions of intelligence that seemed to indicate the
threat and not those portions of the intelligence that
downplayed the threat or said, we are not sure of this
information?
Mr. McClellan. I think it is public record that they were
ignoring caveats and ignoring contradictory intelligence.
The implication and innuendo that was used to talk about
the connection to al Qaeda, for instance, is one example. The
Senate Intelligence Committee for the first time just released
a report about how the intelligence was used and backed up a
lot of----
Mr. Nadler. And therefore misrepresenting the facts and
misleading the Congress and the American people?
Mr. McClellan. Yes, it was more to make the strongest
possible case. And in doing so, they ignored caveats, they
ignored contradictory----
Mr. Nadler. And mislead and misrepresent, therefore?
Mr. McClellan. It had that effect.
I do not think it was necessarily deliberate on the part of
a group. Whether individuals were doing things intentionally or
deliberately, I do not know. But I don't think there was a
group sitting around trying to conspire to say, let's mislead
the American people. Instead, it was, how do we make the
strongest possible case?
But when you are going to war, it is particularly troubling
when you use that kind of mentality and you don't speak about
the truths of the situation as best you know them, including
the contradictory intelligence, including the caveats and
qualifications, and including the consequences, the risk, and
the cost of going into war. And we did not do that.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you very much.
Mr. Conyers. The Chair recognizes the distinguished
gentleman from North Carolina, senior Member of the Committee,
Howard Coble.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McClellan, let me follow up on the war issue. I voted
to dispatch troops to Iraq, believing that Saddam Hussein was
an international terrorist, which I still believe. I
furthermore believed that there were weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq, or they had the capability of developing
same, which I still believe. I believed that a post-entry
strategy had been formulated. I am not sure I believe that now.
Was there a post-entry strategy?
Mr. McClellan. I am sorry, post-what strategy, sir?
Mr. Coble. Post-entry strategy. After we go in and take him
out, was there any sort of plan whereby A, B, C was to be
followed?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I think that the public record shows,
there were a lot of problems with the post-invasion planning
and preparation. That was not something I was directly involved
in. Certainly from a communications standpoint I was, but not
from the planning standpoint.
Mr. Coble. That has plagued me from Day One, and I am still
uneasy about that.
Now, let's shift gears to Scooter Libby. I know we are on a
short time frame here, Mr. Chairman.
Your book, Mr. McClellan, includes many recollections from
your experiences working in the White House during this time. I
had some problems as to whether or not Scooter Libby should
have been prosecuted. I still have some doubts about that.
But what was your reaction, Mr. McClellan, when you learned
that former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage revealed
the identity of Mrs. Valerie Plame Wilson? And do you think
that more should have been done to hold Mr. Armitage
accountable?
Mr. McClellan. I can't speak directly to whether or not he
should have been held accountable. I don't know the facts of
why he revealed her name, other than what has been reported
during the trial and during the investigation publicly and what
he has stated publicly since that time.
Obviously, I think that all of the information should have
been put out as quickly and as soon as possible about exactly
what occurred and when it occurred. And maybe we wouldn't have
ended up where we did.
But I think that the problem here is that this White House
promised or assured the American people that at some point,
when this was behind us, they would talk publicly about it. And
they have refused to. And that is why I think, more than any
other reason, we are here today and this suspicion still
remains.
Mr. Coble. But as to the post-entry strategy, you are not--
you really don't have your hands around that.
Mr. McClellan. Yeah, I can't speak specifically to all the
planning there because that was done without me being in those
discussions.
Mr. Coble. That has just plagued me, and I have said so
publicly.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you. Members of the Committee, we do
have three votes--on the Journal, ordering the question on the
rule on the Stop Child Abuse law, and then on H. Res. 1276, a
rule providing for consideration of 5876. And then we begin
debate on the FISA bill. And so we will stand in recess until
we have covered all of those matters and then resume
immediately when we return.
Thank you very much. The Committee stands in recess.
[Recess.]
[12:40 p.m.]
Mr. Conyers. The Committee will come to order. I am pleased
now to turn to the distinguished Chairman of the Crime
Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, Bobby Scott of
Virginia.
Mr. Scott. Mr. McClellan, in response to a question from
the Chairman, you were asked about the situation where Scooter
Libby, where Mr. Kurlard called you and asked you to try to get
Scooter Libby also exonerated. Do you have any reason to
believe that Mr. Libby himself was involved in that effort to
get himself exonerated?
Mr. McClellan. Yes, I do. We spoke earlier that week, I
believe it was Wednesday of that week when I told Scooter Libby
that I was not going to go down a list of White House aides and
start trying to exonerate them now that the investigation was
officially under way, and he expressed his appreciation that I
let him know that. But I think that as his name continued to
surface, he certainly was behind that effort to make sure that
I exonerated him. And I later saw public documents with his
handwriting putting down some talking points that I should use.
Now, I never saw those talking points myself until they came
out in the press.
Mr. Scott. You mentioned several people that were leaking
Valerie Plame's name all over town. Do you have reason to
believe this was a coordinated effort?
Mr. McClellan. I don't know for sure. There were certainly
three--at least three White House aides that revealed her
identity to reporters. But I don't know personally whether it
was a concerted effort. I was Deputy Press Secretary at that
time, so I was not involved in any effort, if there was.
Mr. Scott. Now, it seemed to me that in response whether or
not individuals might have been involved with the leaking of
the name, the Administration seemed to leave a clear impression
that Valerie Plame was fair game in the debate over Mr.
Wilson's information. And it seemed to leave the impression
that anyone who in effect told the truth, thereby criticizing
the Administration effort to get us into war, might reasonably
expect problems, including having the lives of their family
members put in jeopardy. Was that an intentional impression?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I certainly think that for at least
some people that she became just another talking point in this
effort to discredit her husband, Joe Wilson. Whether or not I
could characterize it before that, I would hesitate to
characterize it more than that.
Mr. Scott. Well, she was a covert CIA agent. Was she not?
Mr. McClellan. That is right.
Mr. Scott. And revealing her identity could reasonably be
expected to jeopardize her life. Is that not true?
Mr. McClellan. It is a serious matter. And as I said in my
opening statement, it was wrong. Whether or not it was
criminal, it was certainly wrong because of her covert national
security status.
Mr. Scott. And did it not leave the impression with people
that family members' lives may be in jeopardy if you tell the
truth about what is going on?
Mr. McClellan. You mean people that were involved in
revealing her identity?
Mr. Scott. Right?
Mr. McClellan. I can't speak for them. But they should have
been more careful about it, that is for sure.
Mr. Scott. Another piece of information that was involved
in the run-up of the war was what the war would cost. I serve
on the Budget Committee in addition to the Judiciary Committee;
I was serving on the Budget Committee at the time, and we were
told to ignore the cost of the war because it would be so
negligible as not worthy of Budget Committee consideration. Are
you aware of that testimony?
Mr. McClellan. I don't know if I am familiar with that
specific testimony, but I am sure certainly aware that we left
the impression that it would be less costly and for a shorter
duration than what has happened.
Mr. Scott. The present estimates of the total cost of the
war are now $3 trillion. What information did the
Administration have that could have led us to believe, if we
had gotten truthful information, that the cost of the war would
be significant?
Mr. McClellan. Well, certainly I recount in the book a
conversation that Larry Lindsey had making some projections in
September of 2006--or 2002, I believe, informing a reporter
that he thought it might cost somewhere between $100 billion
and $200 billion; which at the time everybody seemed to think
it was high, and now we realize that even that estimate was
considerably low.
Mr. Scott. And what happened to him and his estimates?
Mr. McClellan. Well, he left the Administration a few
months later.
Mr. Scott. Was he fired?
Mr. McClellan. He resigned. But my understanding, that he
was asked to leave as well.
Mr. Scott. So we find that his estimate was truthful,
honest, candid, and turns out to be even optimistic that it
could only cost $100 billion to 150 billion, and he was fired
for telling the truth?
Mr. McClellan. That is correct. It is not something that we
wanted to discuss at the White House.
Mr. Scott. Now, we had a similar situation with a Medicare
estimate, the prescription drug benefit costs. Administration
officials knew that the number we were working with was not the
correct number, that the number was actually higher. Is that
right?
Mr. McClellan. I guess there was a different estimate
between Congressional Budget Office and the Medicare actuaries,
if I remember correctly. My brother might be better to testify
for that.
Mr. Scott. What happened to the Administration official
that had that accurate information? And was he threatened if he
revealed it?
Mr. McClellan. I understand it that the Administrator at
the time, I understand from public records, that something
along those lines did happen, if I remember correctly.
Mr. Scott. Now, is this a pattern, that people who tell the
truth get sanctions?
Mr. McClellan. Well, as I say in the book, I think that we
have not embraced a high level of openness. This is a very
secretive White House that tends to be pretty compartmentalized
and very disciplined in terms of what methods or talking points
they put out there, and there are some things that they would
prefer not to be talked about. I think that is what you are
getting at.
Mr. Scott. Well, I was wondering what you were getting at.
Mr. McClellan. Yes. Both of us. Yes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Conyers. Mr. McClellan, is there a clarification that
you would like to make about a discussion we had earlier?
Mr. McClellan. Yes, Mr. Chairman. There was a comment made
earlier and I would like to clarify the record. There was a
quote attributed to one of my editors, Karl Weber, describing
the President as a clearly horrible person. Actually, that was
a comment that was made by his daughter; and his daughter's
name is on that post, it is on the family blog site.
Irregardless, the views and conclusions in the book are mine,
and they were not affected by any editor.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you very much.
Mr. McClellan. Thank you.
Mr. Conyers. We now turn to Mr. Ric Keller, who is the
gentleman from Florida who serves on the Administrative
Commercial Law Subcommittee. He also serves on the Intellectual
Property Committee. And, in addition, he serves on the
Antitrust Task Force Committee. The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. Keller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for being here, Mr. McClellan.
Mr. McClellan. Thank you.
Mr. Keller. Mr. McClellan, all of us in public life have
probably, myself included, said some things that in retrospect
we wished we would have worded it a little differently or used
a different adjective or phrase. Is there anything in your book
that if you had it to do over again, any phrase or adjective
that you might write differently?
Mr. McClellan. No. I think the book clearly reflects my
views and my conclusions, and I stand by them.
Mr. Keller. Thank you. Some of the adjectives or what some
people consider to be some loaded words that you used in your
book were that the Bush administration shaded the truth, used
innuendo, and engaged in a propaganda campaign. Do you stand by
those words?
Mr. McClellan. I do.
Mr. Keller. Did President Bush ever ask you personally to
shade the truth, use innuendo, or engage in a propaganda
campaign?
Mr. McClellan. Not in those words.
Mr. Keller. Did the President ever knowingly mislead you or
withhold information from you?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I think that one episode I recount in
the book is when I learned that the President had secretly
authorized the Vice President to get out some information of
the--the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq to reporters
and do it anonymously. We had decried the selective leaking of
classified information for years, the President and myself as
the spokesman, and so that was certainly something that caught
me by surprise and was a very disillusioning moment for me, to
say the least.
Mr. Keller. Mr. McClellan, I am referring to page 269 of
your book. You said, quote, ``I never felt the President had
knowingly misled me or withheld relevant information from me.''
Do you wish to change that phrase?
Mr. McClellan. No, I don't wish to change that phrase.
Mr. Keller. So you said in the book you don't think he
misled you knowingly. And just now you said you think there was
an occasion where he did mislead you knowingly?
Mr. McClellan. No, I am not saying that he was trying to do
it consciously or deliberately. But it had that same effect in
terms of the National Intelligence Estimate. So I think there
is a distinction there to be drawn.
Mr. Keller. And I want to talk about your personal
knowledge as opposed to your opinion with respect to this
question. Did you ever witness any meeting or see any document
or overhear any conversation when the President asked someone
else to lie, shade the truth, use innuendo, or engage in
propaganda?
Mr. McClellan. It had the effect by the way we went about
selling the war to the American people, as I outlined in the
book in some detail.
Mr. Keller. And I understand your opinions, and I think you
are entitled to opinions and I am not going to hit you on
having your opinions and I am not even going to hit you on
making money off of those opinions. But do you have any
personal knowledge of hearing the President ask someone else to
lie or shade the truth?
Mr. McClellan. No. It is the whole idea of the permanent
campaign mentality and when you are trying to make the
strongest case. And it is what you leave out that has that same
effect. And that is the point I make in the book. Whether or
not it is deliberate or conscious, it still is very troubling,
particularly when you are talking about making the case for
war.
Mr. Keller. Now, your purpose in writing the book, as you
testified today, is to promote civility and bipartisanship, and
to end the scandal, culture, and the poisonous political
attacks. Correct?
Mr. McClellan. Absolutely.
Mr. Keller. You write in the book about a very personal
issue of the President allegedly using an illegal drug over 30
years ago, and you overhearing his private conversation with a
supporter about that. What about that topic that you decided to
include in your book do you think promotes civility and
bipartisanship?
Mr. McClellan. It is not the issue that you bring up. It is
what the President, how he approached that issue. And I think
it is something that a number of politicians probably do when
he said that ``I can't recall.'' And my concern about that was
that later transferred over into issues of policy. That
particular issue, it didn't bother me whether or not he had
used cocaine previously or not, that wasn't the issue, 30, 40
years ago. The issue was how he approached it and how that
transferred over into other issues. And I think it tells
something about his character. It was important to the book.
Mr. Keller. Something about his character? Because he
allegedly had used drugs over 30 years ago, so that says
something about his character?
Mr. McClellan. That is not the point I am making in
describing that in the book. The point I make is that he said
he couldn't recall it, or at least he said he couldn't recall
it. And I thought, how can that be? And then there were other
times that I later learned that he used that same response for
other issues.
Mr. Keller. Well, since that is such a key character issue,
do you recall if you have ever used illegal drugs?
Mr. McClellan. Yes. And I haven't.
Mr. Keller. Would you agree----
Mr. McClellan. In fact, I write about it in the book in
that same section. I talk about my own experiences.
Mr. Keller. Would you agree with me that nothing about that
little private story of you overhearing serves to end the
scandal, culture, or poisonous political attack culture?
Mr. McClellan. Actually, I do. I think it is a very
important lesson to look at why politicians sometimes take that
approach, this defense of ``do not recall'' when it is
essentially an evasion. And the President, I think we all
remember very well when he was asked about the National
Intelligence Estimate on Iran, and he had been talking about
how Iran was continuing to pursue nuclear weapons and he had
had a National Intelligence Estimate even during that time
telling him that they had suspended their nuclear weapons
program, but he said he couldn't recall in a briefing. I think
it is important for people to understand why a politician might
take that kind of position.
Mr. Keller. I am just saying that some people think that
you are a truth teller and a whistleblower and you are trying
to bring back civility and bipartisanship, and others
characterize you differently with different motives. And I am
just saying, if you assume the best, that you really are here
to promote civility and bipartisanship and do away with the
scandalous information, why include the sensational fact that
even you yourself, there is probably something you yourself
have said is probably something that should be off limits?
Mr. McClellan. I disagree, and that is why you talk about
it in part. But my purpose of this book is about changing the
way Washington governs for the better. And to do that, you have
to restore candor and honesty. And the President was not
approaching this in a very direct and honest way. And that is
why I use that example in the book.
Mr. Keller. But you didn't use that in your original book
proposal that you wrote in December of 2006. You didn't mention
anything about this alleged drug use.
Mr. McClellan. I didn't mention it specific. But I think I
mentioned that period, about the 2000 campaign and going back
and looking at some of those issues. It was a big issue there
in the campaign, one of many issues, and I think it was
relevant to talking about the President's leadership style and
his character.
Mr. Keller. Some would say that you included that
sensational information about the alleged drug use and his
denial not to promote bipartisanship and civility but rather to
promote book sales. Do you disagree with that characterization?
Mr. McClellan. I think if you read it, it is a very
thoughtful look at this issue. It is not looking at whether or
not--you know, the truth behind that. It is looking at a
broader character issue.
Mr. Keller. Okay. Has your initial book proposal from
December of 2006 been reflective of the book that you
ultimately wrote, or is it fair to say, as Ari Fleischer did,
that you have essentially changed over the course of the past
year and that your version of events have changed?
Mr. McClellan. Well, it is fair to say that the initial
book proposal included one of the key themes that I developed
in my book, which was, how did this popular bipartisan Governor
of Texas become one of the most controversial and polarizing
Presidents in modern history? And I said that was one of the
issues I wanted to look at, and I answered the question why.
Now, yes, I started with some preconceived notions and
wanted to put responsibility a lot of different places. But as
I went through the book and reflected and researched things, I
came to the conclusions that I did. It was a constant search
for the truth as I was going through this book. I put a lot of
thought into it. This book was not something that was easy to
write. The words did not come easily to me. But it is what I
believed happened, and it is my views and my conclusions and my
perspective on things.
Mr. Keller. And, Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, so if
you will indulge me, let me leave this one final question. And
I just want to be fair to you, Mr. McClellan, and get your side
out. That is why I am asking you these questions.
I know you have a concern about the President engaged in a
permanent campaign, and I think you have made similar concerns
about the Clinton White House as well and that you hoped it
would be different. And I can understand your cynicism from
time to time. But isn't it also true that this is the same
President who worked very closely with Democrats on No Child
Left Behind, and to the chagrin of some conservative
Republicans he worked side by side with Ted Kennedy to allow
illegal immigrants to have a path to citizenship?
Mr. McClellan. I write about those early days in the book
and I actually talk about that. But you can't separate some of
the other more consequential decisions that were made that
overshadow some of those more positive aspects.
Mr. Keller. Thank you, Mr. McClellan, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman. My time has expired.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you.
I would like to recognize Robert Wexler of Florida, who
serves the Judiciary Committee on the Intellectual Property
Committee.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
McClellan, for appearing before this Committee today.
Your book raises many questions about an Administration
that is incapable of telling the truth and, in your words,
avoids accountability.
I want to focus on how and why Scooter Libby came to reveal
the identity of covert CIA Agent Valerie Plame Wilson. From
everything we know about this Administration, it is
inconceivable that Mr. Libby would have acted alone. It is
essential we learn who ordered or gave permission to Mr. Libby
to expose the identity of this covert agent. The President and
Vice President have denied ordering this illegal leak, but
logic and the chain of command dictates that it must have been
one of them.
Mr. McClellan, in your book you state that you cannot
believe President Bush authorized the leak of Valerie Plame
Wilson's status as a covert agent. It is unimaginable to you
that the President, one of only two people with the authority
to give Libby the go-ahead to make this leak, actually did it.
So who does that leave us? The Vice President.
You do not defend Mr. Cheney in your book. In fact, the
lack of faith you express in the Vice President in your book is
striking. Why?
Mr. McClellan. Well, he is someone that keeps things pretty
close to the vest, to say the least. I do not know what his
thinking is or what his involvement was in this whole episode.
I think that Patrick Fitzgerald stated it well when he talked
about the cloud that was remaining over the Vice President's
office because of Scooter Libby's actions that led to his
conviction on four counts, I guess. But there is a lot of
suspicion there, because there are questions that have never
been answered despite the fact that we said at some point we
would address these issues.
Mr. Wexler. So this suspicion leads you to believe that
Vice President Cheney could have authorized Mr. Libby's leak?
Mr. McClellan. I can't rule it out. And I think that
Scooter Libby in some testimony that was released talked about
it is possible that he could have first learned about her or
that the Vice President could have even asked him to get that
information out.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you for your candor, Mr. McClellan. And
your suspicion or the doubts that you raised fit in very nicely
to what it is we do know. We do know Mr. Cheney has been deeply
involved in the efforts to cover up the leak and exonerate Mr.
Libby. We know Mr. Cheney called you to have you unknowingly
lie to the American people about Libby's involvement. We know
that the Vice President wrote a note where he starts to write
and then crosses out the fact that the President himself asked
Libby to stick his neck into a meat grinder to protect the
Administration. It is clear to me that Mr. Cheney is the only
one left, the only likely suspect to have ordered the leak.
If Mr. Cheney really thought Libby was innocent, then his
note would have likely said something like, we need to protect
this man who has done nothing wrong. But that is not what Mr.
Cheney's note said. The Vice President's own hand betrays him
and Libby and implicates the President of the United States.
These facts and your testimony, Mr. McClellan, are more
than enough, in my view, to open up impeachment hearings.
Furthermore, the President's use of the pardon power to
deflect an investigation into his own wrongdoing by granting a
commutation to the man who may have lied for him would
constitute an abuse and crime of the highest order, and we must
determine on this Committee conclusively whether or not this
happened.
Thank you, Mr. McClellan, for exposing some of the lies
that were propagated by this White House. But, unfortunately,
as you have said I believe as well, others in this White House
have been blocking access to the truth.
It is time we sweep away the bogus claims of executive
privilege and get Karl Rove, Andy Card and others before this
Judiciary Committee. We have the power of inherent contempt,
and, if need be, we should use it.
Mr. McClellan, what you have provided today to the American
people is enormously important. You are the first high official
in this Administration to come before this Congress and offer
us a glimpse into the truth. I commend you for being here
today.
Mr. McClellan. Thank you, Congressman. I do believe it is
important for the American people to have the truth.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you. I now turn to the gentleman from
Virginia, former Chairman of the Agriculture Committee, but for
many years a Member of Judiciary Committee that served on the
Intellectual Property Subcommittee and the Immigration
Subcommittee. You are recognized at this time, sir.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. McClellan, welcome. I would like to talk about the
nature of the termination of your employment at the White
House. Were you fired?
Mr. McClellan. I actually describe it in detail in the
book. Josh Bolten had decided to make a change in the White
House Press Secretary position. I was also ready to leave at
the time.
Mr. Goodlatte. And you were upset about this, were you not?
Mr. McClellan. I am not the kind of person who gets angry
or upset really. I think most people that know me know that. I
was certainly someone that was disillusioned at that moment,
anyway, as I talk about in the book. So I was looking to leave
at some point in that time frame, anyway.
Mr. Goodlatte. You say in the book on page 299: My
emotional response was strong and immediate. I thought to
myself, he is ready to throw me to the wolves. I thought how
long I had worked for the President and about how loyal I had
been to him.
I know that in your book you immediately follow this
passage with the recognition that you understood why they felt
they needed to take the Press Secretary position in a new
direction. But those are pretty strong feelings you had.
Mr. McClellan. I think they are natural initial reactions.
But as I say in book, I went on to describe that I understood
where he was coming from.
Mr. Goodlatte. Let me ask you about that. Were you happy in
your job before this conversation?
Mr. McClellan. No. I was disillusioned at that moment. As I
say, I had just learned about a week or two before that about
the President's National Intelligence Estimate being secretly
declassified by the President himself.
Mr. Goodlatte. Well, today, over 2 years after that
conversation, are you still angry with Josh Bolten?
Mr. McClellan. No. Not at all.
Mr. Goodlatte. You then moved on to prepare to write this
book. And the Associated Press has quoted Steve Ross, who is
the publisher of the Collins division of HarperCollins, as
saying: Books by spokespeople rarely contain anything
newsworthy and have generally not proven particularly
compelling to consumers, and that your proposal was, quote,
shopped around, but like others who publish in the category, we
didn't even take a meeting based upon past history.
Now we move forward to your current publisher.
Mr. McClellan. I believe I met with some part of
HarperCollins, actually.
Mr. Goodlatte. Let me move forward to the folks who
actually did decide to publish, and I would like to read you
some more quotes from your publisher. Mr. Osnos has stated of
you, quote: A lot of people were skeptical about how far Scott
would go in shaping his criticism he's delivered in every
respect.
Were you asked to be aggressive with your criticism in the
book by anyone that causes it be published by this publishing
entity and turned down by others prior?
Mr. McClellan. No. Actually, there were at least three
proposals, I believe, on the book. And, no, I was not. In fact,
I told each of the publishers I met with that I was going to be
candid, that I was going to search for the truth. And I think
Peter Osnos understood that was where I was coming from and he
appreciated that. He actually called some people, some
reporters that he knew to find out: If he said something like
that, could I take him at his word. And those reporters told
him, yes, you can take him at his word. He is a straight
shooter.
Mr. Goodlatte. Now, where else have you appeared to discuss
your book?
Mr. McClellan. I have been on a book tour. I've been doing
a number.
Mr. Goodlatte. Can you give me a rough number of the number
of TV shows that you have appeared on?
Mr. McClellan. No. I think that is probably all out there
in the public realm. But there have been a number of national
shows.
Mr. Goodlatte. Dozens?
Mr. McClellan. I'm sorry?
Mr. Goodlatte. Dozens?
Mr. McClellan. I don't know if it is dozens, but it's
certainly a lot.
Mr. Goodlatte. Did this particular publisher offer you the
most money?
Mr. McClellan. Out of the ones that were the book
proposals? I would have to go back and look. I think there was
one that was within the same range, and then the other one was
a little bit less.
Mr. Goodlatte. But basically the most.
Mr. McClellan. At $75,000----
Mr. Goodlatte. And you acknowledge in your testimony today
and on some of those other shows that you appeared on and in
response to Mr. Keller that the shape of this book evolved over
the original prospectus that you prepared and submitted to some
publishers. Is that not correct?
Mr. McClellan. Yeah. I say that in the book. Some of the
conclusions that I came to were different from what I would
have embraced at the beginning, because it was a constant
search to try to understand the truth by taking off my partisan
lens, stepping back from the White House, and then trying to
give something to the American people or the readers what they
could learn from my experiences and what we can take away from
it. I think that is an important thing to give back.
Mr. Goodlatte. Well, I have to say that I don't believe
that there is any enlightening information to be gained from
your testimony here today, because as many people who know you
have pointed out, many of the statements that you have made in
your book directly contradict statements that you made during
your tenure in the White House, and have even questioned how
this book was put together because it sounds so drastically
different from the Scott McClellan they knew. I know Ari
Fleischer for one has made that statement.
This puts in doubt, I think, the credibility of everything
recounted.
Mr. McClellan. No one is challenging--Ari Fleischer or no
one else is challenging the themes or perspectives in the book.
They are trying to attack me personally, as I say at the
beginning. And I stand by everything in this book. I was a
spokesman for the President, not for myself. This book reflects
my personal views, and my own views, some of which I had to be
able to step back and reflect on those experiences to
understand exactly where things were going.
Mr. Goodlatte. Mr. Chairman, if I just might add one thing.
Whatever your motivations were for writing this book, I
can't help but think that either the allegations you make were
serious enough that you should have raised these concerns while
you were at the White House, or they have been hyped to sell
the book.
Mr. McClellan. I would say, which specific allegations?
Mr. Goodlatte. Well, there are many allegations in this
book about things that could have been raised at the White
House.
Mr. McClellan. Well.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McClellan. Yeah.
Mr. Conyers. The Chair is pleased now to recognize the
Chairwoman of the Commercial and Administrative Law Committee,
the gentlelady from California, Linda Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McClellan, according to press accounts, the plan to
fire all 93 U.S. Attorneys originated with Karl Rove, and it
was seen as a way to get political cover for firing the small
number of U.S. Attorneys the White House actually wanted to get
rid of. Many have speculated that Mr. Rove's goal in proposing
the U.S. Attorney firing was to pressure and intimidate U.S.
Attorney and Special Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald. When Mr. Rove
made the suggestion to fire the U.S. Attorneys, he had already
been before the grand jury several times in the Scooter Libby
case.
To your knowledge, is that account correct?
Mr. McClellan. I did not--I am sorry, could you repeat the
question again?
Ms. Sanchez. Sure. When Mr. Rove made the suggestion to
fire the U.S. Attorney, he had already been before the grand
jury several times in the Scooter Libby matter?
Mr. McClellan. I don't know the exact time. I did not have
direct involvement in terms of those personnel matters in
regard to the U.S. Attorneys. It was not something that boiled
up while I was Press Secretary. It happened after I had already
left.
Ms. Sanchez. So are you aware of any conversations
involving Karl Rove or anyone else at the White House during
the leak investigation in which Mr. Rove or anyone else at the
White House discussed having Mr. Fitzgerald removed as U.S.
Attorney?
Mr. McClellan. No. I am not familiar with those
conversations.
Ms. Sanchez. So to the best of your knowledge, those
matters were not discussed during the leak investigation?
Mr. McClellan. I just don't know. It was not something I
was involved in.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. In 2003, President Bush said that anyone
who leaked classified information in the Plame case would be
dismissed. And in June 2004, when President Bush was asked
whether he stood by his promise to fire whoever was found to
have leaked Valerie Plame's name, Mr. Bush reiterated his
promise and said ``yes.'' However, in July 2005, President Bush
said: If someone committed a crime, they will no longer work in
my Administration.
Do you know what prompted President Bush to raise the bar
in July of 2005?
Mr. McClellan. Well, it was revelations regarding Karl
Rove's involvement and revealing her identity to Matt Cooper as
well as being a confirming source for Robert Novak as well. And
I think that is why the President changed the threshold there.
Ms. Sanchez. Who do you think in the Administration should
have been fired if Bush had adhered to his initial promise?
Mr. McClellan. Well, if he would have adhered to his word,
then Karl Rove wouldn't have longer been in the Administration.
I think he should have stood by his word.
Ms. Sanchez. Do you believe that Mr. Libby was involved in
getting you to vouch for him in the press?
Mr. McClellan. Yes, I do.
Ms. Sanchez. Can you please explain why?
Mr. McClellan. Well, as I recount in the book as well, I
talk about the conversation I had with Scooter Libby midweek
where I told him that I wasn't going to go down a list of White
House names now that a formal investigation had been launched
and we were aware with it. He expressed his appreciation but
didn't say much else. Then it was that Saturday, just a few
days later when Andy Card contacted me saying that the Vice
President and President had talked and wanted me to basically
exonerate Scooter Libby, give the same assurances I had for him
that I did for Karl Rove. And so I am sure that Scooter Libby
was involved in talking to the Vice President about that. It
also later became revealed in public documents that he had
written out some talking points for me to use to that effect
prior to that. Now, I never saw those talking points until it
came out in the media.
Ms. Sanchez. The last topic of inquiry for me. You write in
the book: The campaign to sell the war didn't begin in earnest
until the fall of 2002. But as I would later come to learn,
President Bush decided to confront the Iraqi regime several
months earlier. Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz all saw September
11th as an opportunity to go after Saddam Hussein, take out his
regime, eliminate a threat, make the Middle East more secure,
and Bush agreed.
When exactly did President Bush decide that the U.S. would
wage a preemptive war in Iraq.
Mr. McClellan. Well, he is someone that tends to govern
from the gut or instinctive decisions, and he confirmed to Bob
Woodward that he had asked Secretary Rumsfeld to update the war
plans for Iraq in late November. He had conversations with
General Tommy Franks in December about Iraq. And so it was in
that November, December, January period when he had essentially
set the course that either we were going to go in with military
action, or Saddam Hussein will have to come clean. There was no
flexibility in that approach. So he had essentially set the
policy in place at that period of time.
The President is someone I know very well, and he tends to
make the policy decision and then expect everybody to work on
implementing that decision. And the market into the campaign
was part of that effort.
Ms. Sanchez. And why do you believe that President Bush was
fixated specifically on invading Iraq?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I think his driving motivation--and
this is something I would come to learn more when I became
Press Secretary, that the driving motivation was this
idealistic and ambitious vision that he could transform the
Middle East by coercively going into Iraq, and that Iraq would
be the linchpin for transforming the rest of the Middle East
into a democratic region.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. I have no further questions. I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Conyers. Darrell Issa of California serves with great
distinction on three Subcommittees of the Judiciary Committee,
plus the Intelligence Committee; but the Constitution
Subcommittee, the Antitrust Task Force, and the Intellectual
Property Subcommittee. And we recognize the gentleman from
California at this time.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to live up to
that introduction. It will be difficult.
Mr. McClellan, I am not going to be easy on you, I am not
going to be hard on you. I wasn't pleased to see this book, and
let me go through why. By the way, it is good read. My reason
for not being pleased may become more evident, though.
You said you reflected for a period of time before you were
able to properly write the book. I might propose that that
reflection period was a period of time in which, had you
reacted sooner, I think even you would admit that you could
have affected the outcome of this Administration. Had you,
let's say, published this book a year earlier, you would have
had some effect on an Administration before its waning hours.
Would that be fair to say?
Mr. McClellan. I am not sure. You are talking about
changing their policies?
Mr. Issa. Well, let's just say that if you don't say
anything about what you now have said in this book, you are not
going to have an effect on the Administration.
The fact that you are now saying it is what troubled me.
Had you reflected until November 5th of this year and then
published, had the book come out, would you have had
essentially a great effect on an Administration on the eve of
one or the other coming into office without affecting the
actual election in process? And I don't know if you have given
much thought to the fact that your book, quite frankly, is a
political book launched in the most political time, disparaging
a past Administration but in a sense that makes the war a
focus, and many of the comments here today really focused on
the war.
Mr. McClellan. And I don't want to repeat the same mistakes
that we made when you talk about war. The other aspect of this
is that this larger message, as I said, is bigger than any
person or party, and it is about improving governance in
Washington. And that is why it is very important to today's
national political conversation more than anything else. But I
wasn't finished with the book in November 2006--or 2007. This
was a process. I began writing it in earnest probably in July
of 2007, and it took until mid-April really to finish it. I had
to push a couple of deadlines back because I wanted to make
sure that the book reflected my views and that it was right.
And that is why I pushed the deadline back a couple times. I
was still working through some of these issues myself.
Mr. Issa. And I have to agree that it takes a while to
write a book. But did you consider writing any articles that
would have essentially--very often the George Wills of the
world will write a series of articles that in fact are preludes
to books, but they do in fact allow him to affect policy and
decisions and public debate in a more real-time. Did you
consider doing that?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I think this is affecting policy
debate in a positive way.
Mr. Issa. But a year and a half ago before writing a book
of this length, did you consider writing 400 words----
Mr. McClellan. I think from my perspective people needed
the full context of how I looked at these events. And that is
why I talk about my upbringing and being raised in a political
family, my belief in speaking up, what I was taught as a young
kid.
Mr. Issa. I guess I will go on to another one, because, I
mean, this is not out here in a timely fashion--through no
fault of yours, but not a timely fashion to affect this
Administration. So we are clearly affecting one of two----
Mr. McClellan. Well, I disagree. It could affect this
Administration.
Mr. Issa. Well, in this case my statement will stand. This
is not going to affect this Administration in the waning days.
Both its friends and its foes alike I think believe that. And
by the way, I agree with you that Iraq is not going to be the
linchpin of democracy in the Middle East; and that in fact
anyone who believed that, believes that because they were naive
about what it was going to take to move that area of the world
toward a Government that serves its people better. I have spent
a lot of time in that area. I respect that the President has
tried to learn about it. So I don't disagree with some of your
premises in this book.
Let me move on, though. The next Administration is going to
put a spokesperson in the White House to stand in that newly
remodeled room that I understand used to be a swimming pool or
something in the basement, and some have said it should be made
that again. What guidance would you give to the next
spokesperson? For example, should they not do on camera? Should
they in fact not be part of the spin in that sense but rather
report only in a prepared statement the official statement of
the White House, rather than taking questions and giving
assurances as you did? Because in your book, I think you laid
out pretty fairly, you gave assurances based on assurances.
This Committee could potentially have the jurisdiction to
create a situation in which the next press secretary, or press
spokesperson would, if they took those assurances, be called
before this Committee. And if they swore that, we could refer
it for criminal prosecution that the person who gave that
official statement that was then relayed committed a crime.
That isn't currently the case. If Karl Rove were to give you an
assurance, or some other person, and that assurance turned out
to be untrue, that doesn't create an action that the Attorney
General by definition would go after just because you said it
based on their assurance.
Do you believe we should change the law so that when you
speak on behalf of the President or you speak on behalf of
somebody else who has given you assurances, that if that false
assurance constitutes a crime that would be punishable by the
Justice Department?
Mr. McClellan. It is not something that I have considered
or thought about.
Mr. Issa. Well, Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. But
hopefully you have considered it or begun considering whether
or not a spokesperson on behalf of somebody, if they are
relying on assurances as this book seems to say, either should,
A, not be taken seriously since the assurances don't mean
anything; or, B, those assurances should constitute something
that we codify in law.
I thank you for your presence here today. I thank you for a
good book, even if I disagree about the release of time. And I
thank the Chairman for his kind introduction.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you for your observations.
The gentlelady from Houston, Texas, Sheila Jackson Lee, is
first of all a senior Member of the Committee serving on four
Subcommittees, Intellectual Property, Immigration, Crime, and
Antitrust, and additionally chairs the Subcommittee on Border
Security in the Homeland Security Committee. And we recognize
her now.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McClellan, let me indicate to you that I am very proud
of you as an American, and I imagine that there are many
Americans who are likewise proud of you today. It fits right
into the constitutional scheme of three branches of Government
and the responsibility that we have for oversight and the
responsibility that we have for integrity as relates to the
American people. Not only am I proud of you as an American, but
I am certainly proud of you as a fellow Texan.
I want to give sort of a rapid fire series of questions.
And I know that in some instances in your capacity in the
Public Affairs Communications Office, rightly so, you would not
be in meetings. But obviously in discussions with the Chief of
Staff and staff meetings you could get the flavor of the tone
of the White House. So first my question is, have you been paid
to come to this hearing?
Mr. McClellan. No, I have not.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I saw you stand and take an oath of
office, or an oath rather. Do you take that oath seriously?
Mr. McClellan. Very seriously.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And are you committed to telling us the
truth?
Mr. McClellan. Absolutely.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And do you distinguish and do you think we
should distinguish payments made for a book from your
willingness to come forward here today, take an oath, and
commit to the American people that you are telling the truth?
Mr. McClellan. Sure.
Ms. Jackson Lee. With that premise, I would ask you these
questions.
Mr. McClellan. I would hope that it would encourage others
to do the same from this White House, but unfortunately I don't
think that will happen.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think certainly it will add to the
oversight responsibilities that are taken seriously by this
Committee and I think the American people.
Do you believe that the President, in instances of
sincerity or belief, misrepresented to the American people,
told, made statements that were misrepresenting facts to the
American people?
Mr. McClellan. In terms of the build-up to the Iraq war?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Build-up to the Iraq war. I am going to
get into a series of other incidents that you might have had in
your book.
Mr. McClellan. As I say, it was less than candid and less
than honest by the way we went about marketing that war to the
American people. That's the way I would describe it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you describe it as telling an
untruth?
Mr. McClellan. It was not completely truthful. That is the
way I would describe it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And do you believe, having sat in this
room on occasion dealing with the questions of impeachment, do
you believe that hearings that would discuss--well, hearings
that would be in the context of impeachment proceedings would
be warranted on the basis of untruths or that? You are not a
lawyer?
Mr. McClellan. Right.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But do you believe that issues could be
raised?
Mr. McClellan. Congresswoman, I do not support impeachment
based on what I know.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you believe that, however, that there
were instances of the untruth being spoken?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I talked about the permanent campaign
culture and how that got transferred into the war-making
process. And so the American people didn't get the real truth
of the situation as best we knew it. And they should have had
that. They should have had all the facts before them, and they
didn't. Instead, they had a partial case that was being made,
or a case that was being made that only included part of the
information that this Administration knew.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And you have just made your comments as a
personal citizen relating to your thoughts on any kind of
constitutional proceeding?
Mr. McClellan. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Your personal assessment?
Mr. McClellan. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask you about your efforts with
Ambassador Joseph Wilson, any lingering understanding of that.
Prior to the leak of Valerie Plame Wilson's covert status in
July 2003, did you participate in any discussion with the White
House officials or officials or other Government agencies about
Joseph Wilson and charges he had made behind the scenes about
the misuse of Niger intelligence?
Mr. McClellan. I was not directly involved in any of that.
Certainly there were talking points that would have been passed
around the Administration. But I was not involved in the
overall strategy, if that is what you are getting at, in terms
of trying to discredit him.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But what did you represent to the public
based upon discussions that might have had?
Mr. McClellan. In that initial period, I was still Deputy
Press Secretary. I became Press Secretary right after or during
all that period when it was happening, the 16 words controversy
over the State of the Union, and literally July 15th was my
first day. And I think it was the week before that when it was
really bubbling up.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So what was your sense, however, being on
the inside, of what they were trying to do to Joseph Wilson?
Was he treated fairly by the actions of the White House
inasmuch as he was an official of Government, he was a standing
ambassador. It would not be thought that he would misrepresent
what he had found.
Mr. McClellan. I think it was wrong to start with an
anonymous effort to discredit him, which I talk about in the
book, which is now public knowledge. And I think it was wrong
to go about it that way instead of addressing these issues
openly and directly.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And do you believe that the issue with Mr.
Libby and his involvement with the issue of leaking was an
intentional action inside the White House?
Mr. McClellan. I do not know for sure. As I said, I have
spoken to the President. I don't think he in any way was
involved in that, to the best of my knowledge. In terms of
whether or not it was an intentional effort by himself, Scooter
Libby, or other persons, I do not know for sure. But there is a
lot of suspicion that has been left.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But you believe that the leak did generate
out of the White House?
Mr. McClellan. Well.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Individuals involved in the White House?
Mr. McClellan. There were at least three White House
officials that revealed Valerie Plame's identity to reporters
before it was publicly known.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And certainly any impeachment proceedings
not only point to the actual actor that would be impeached, in
this instance a President, but it would also draw the
opportunity to engage, investigate all of the occurrences that
might be attributable to either the misuse or the abuse of
Government. I know you are not a lawyer, but you understand
that all this would be laid out. Do you think the American
people need to have an airing or a clearing of some of the
elements that you have spoken about in your book?
Mr. McClellan. I think it is always better that they have
the facts and that they have the truth, and then that way we
wouldn't be in this position in the first place. We wouldn't be
continuing to investigate this matter, asking questions. The
suspicion wouldn't be there. The partisan squabbling that goes
on on both sides because of issues like this would be
diminished. I think it is a bad strategy to keep information
from the public when they have the right to know it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. My last point, the weapons of mass
destruction was a key element.
Mr. Conyers. The gentlelady's time has almost expired.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, you are kind for your
indulgence. I will end on this. The weapons of mass destruction
became the singular cry for the American people to be
frightened into conceding to the necessity of a war against
Iraq. How much goings on, how much interaction, from your book,
from your exposure, went on to characterize the dastardly
condition that we are in because weapons of mass destruction
were about to destroy America? How much misrepresentation was
engaged in that?
Mr. McClellan. To characterize?
Ms. Jackson Lee. The weapons of mass destruction as a
dastardly act.
Mr. McClellan. There was a massive marketing effort to make
WMD as well as the connections to al Qaeda a central part of
that effort to sell war to the American people and package it
as a grave and gathering danger, when the reality is that it
was not as urgent or serious or as grave as it was portrayed.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So untruth prevailed there?
Mr. McClellan. Well, certainly less than truthful.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Conyers. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
California, Dan Lungren, a former statewide enforcement officer
for California.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McClellan, could you just succinctly say what your
purpose is being here?
Mr. McClellan. I was invited by the Chairman, received a
letter from him on the Valerie Plame episode.
Mr. Lungren. You were not subpoenaed. Correct?
Mr. McClellan. That is correct.
Mr. Lungren. So what is your purpose in voluntarily coming
here?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I think to shed light on this whole
episode.
Mr. Lungren. You are not coming here as part of an
impeachment proceeding, are you?
Mr. McClellan. No.
Mr. Lungren. Because I have listened to my colleagues now I
think refer to impeachment four different times. And yet we
have been told by the leadership on the Democratic side that
impeachment is off the table. So my question, I guess maybe
rhetorically, is whether what we are doing here is Kucinich-
light: We would not dare to bring up an impeachment resolution,
but we are here asking you questions and then trying to
extrapolate from what you say statements that then Members can
infer lead to impeachment of the President or others. But I
just wanted to make sure, you are not here for that purpose.
Correct?
Mr. McClellan. I am not here for that purpose. I don't
think we would be here for this purpose if this White House had
been more open.
Mr. Lungren. No. But my question is, you didn't come here
believing that someone should be impeached. Did you?
Mr. McClellan. No. As I said, I do not support that.
Mr. Lungren. And I was not here in 2002, when the
authorization for the United States Armed Forces, the use of
United States Armed Forces against Iraq, but I just went in to
get a copy of it and it goes on for three and a half pages for
the basis for the resolution, one of which was weapons of mass
destruction.
Did the Administration, to your knowledge, support this
resolution in its entirety?
Mr. McClellan. I believe so.
Mr. Lungren. Was the Administration talking at that time
about the other grounds for going against Saddam Hussein as
well?
Mr. McClellan. There were other grounds that were talked
about, but the chief rationale was the WMD connection and
terrorism.
Mr. Lungren. I understand that. Well, I was going to ask
you if you have an opinion whether Congress ever wastes time or
wastes money or wastes space, but that sort of answer itself.
We've got two and a half pages talking about whereas clauses,
going back to the violation of the sovereignty of Kuwait by
Iraq, Iraq entering into the United Nations-sponsored ceasefire
agreement, the United States intelligence agencies, and--
despite the efforts of United States intelligence agencies,
international weapons inspectors, et cetera. Iraq was not
cooperating. Iraq was in direct and flagrant violation of the
ceasefire, attempted to thwart the effort of weapons inspectors
to identify and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. A
1998 law passed by the Congress concluding Iraq's continuing
weapons of mass destruction programs threatening the United
States.
In other words, the Administration supported all of those
points. Is that correct?
Mr. McClellan. It wasn't just those points that were
emphasized. The larger point that was emphasized as the chief
rationale was the WMD and connections potentially to al Qaeda.
Mr. Lungren. So the Administration spokespeople, when they
were presented with these others, rejected them, or said that
they supported the overall judgments?
Mr. McClellan. No. And I am saying it was where the
emphasis was in selling this to the American people that made
it a grave and gathering danger and an urgent danger that
needed to be addressed now was how it was packaged together and
what the emphasis was. And I think I said the Senate
Intelligence Committee also reflected that in their recent
report.
Mr. Lungren. Hindsight is pretty good, isn't it?
Mr. McClellan. Well, there is certainly things that I--I
didn't have access to the intelligence at that point in time.
Mr. Lungren. Neither did I.
Mr. McClellan. I trusted the Administration, I trusted the
President, and part of that trust I think was misplaced.
Mr. Lungren. And I not being in Congress at the time not
only put some trust in the Administration, but I was looking at
the judgments made by both Democrats and Republicans in the
House and the Senate, and I went through repeated judgments, at
least as reflected in their comments by leading Democrats on
the Senate side who were, at least as they said at the time,
reflecting on their review of the intelligence that was then
available. And they were saying the same thing that the
President was saying.
But let me ask you this about, you have used the word
``propaganda'' a few times. On the American Heritage Dictionary
definition of propaganda, it says: The systematic propagation
of a doctrine or cause, or of information reflecting the views
and interests of those advocating such a doctrine or cause.
I guess that is what you were talking about. Right? I mean,
you were part of the machinery that was presenting a cause, and
you were trying to make the best case at the time to the best
of your knowledge and ability. Right?
Mr. McClellan. That is my what--best of my knowledge of
what?
Mr. Lungren. Best of your knowledge and ability at the
time.
Mr. McClellan. I am sorry, I missed the last part.
Mr. Lungren. Knowledge and ability at the time.
Mr. McClellan. Yes. I was part of that effort to some
extent. Now, I was the Deputy Press Secretary at the time, so I
wasn't intricately involved in that effort during that period.
Mr. Lungren. And I have gone through your book in some
detail. And would it be fair to say that there are--much of it
is your reflections and your opinions based on what you were
exposed to at the time you worked at the White House?
Mr. McClellan. It is certainly my perspective based on the
way the White House operates, knowing the President as well as
being involved in these efforts, too.
Mr. Lungren. And some of it was opinion. Correct? When you
give us an idea of what you thought people were doing when you
were not in the room listening to what they were saying, you
were forming an opinion based on your knowledge but not the
knowledge of the precise facts.
Mr. McClellan. Well, based on my knowledge of working
closely with the President. Based on my knowledge--there were a
number of meetings I was involved in. There were some--this
White House tends to be compartmentalized, so sometimes
decisions were made in a small group of two or three people.
Mr. Lungren. So you can understand how some of us might
have some difference of opinion with your opinions.
Mr. McClellan. Well, I was on the inside. I was intimately
knowledgeable of what was going on.
Mr. Lungren. I know. But I read through your book and you
called Jimmy Carter a centrist, you called Ronald Reagan a
centrist. Now, I dealt with both of them and I would describe
them in many different ways, but I would describe neither one
as a centrist.
Mr. McClellan. But in many ways that they governed toward
the center is what I was talking about in that part of the
book.
Mr. Lungren. Well, a centrist. The only point I am making
is a lot of what is in your book is the----
Mr. McClellan. Moderate or conservative in their views.
Mr. Lungren. And you wouldn't think that we ought to
proceed on something like impeachment on opinion. Would you?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I have already stated my opinion on
impeachment.
Mr. Lungren. You are not here for that purpose?
Mr. McClellan. No.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
Mr. McClellan. Thank you.
Mr. Conyers. The Chair recognizes Steve Cohen, Memphis,
Tennessee, Member of the Administrative Law Subcommittee, the
Constitutional Law Subcommittee, and the Antitrust Task Force.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McClellan, you said that President Bush came to
Washington, you believe, with great potential having worked
with Democrats as he did in Austin as Governor and in the
beginning. What events or what people do you think led him
astray from the potential that he had to be a uniter and not a
divider?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I think part of this was he came into
this and was going to make an effort to an extent. But that he
saw this as the way the Washington game is played, and decided
to play it just like it is played by many other people instead
of trying to transform it like he pledged to do when he was
running for President. I think part of that was based on
experience of seeing what happened to his father in his time in
office.
Mr. Cohen. So you think he had the potential to come in
based on the experience he had in Texas where he worked with
the Lieutenant Governor and all?
Mr. McClellan. Right.
Mr. Cohen. And the system changed him, what was in
Washington. Is that right?
Mr. McClellan. I think that is part of it, yes.
Mr. Cohen. And the Vice President was put on the team
because he had knowledge of the system and experience in
Washington. Is that not correct?
Mr. McClellan. And his foreign policy experience and
experience in other ways.
Mr. Cohen. Do you believe that Vice President Cheney was
most responsible from deterring President Bush from being the
great President and uniter that you think he could have been?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I think the President has to bear
responsibility for his presidency veering off track like it did
more than anyone else. But there were certainly some influences
on him that I think were negative influences in that regard,
and I would include the Vice President in that.
Mr. Cohen. Who was the greater influence, the Vice
President or Karl Rove?
Mr. McClellan. I don't think that I could make a specific
judgment on that. But both of them had enormous influence in
terms of the direction of this White House. And the way this
White House operated is--of course, with the Vice President it
was more on certain foreign policy elements and economic policy
issues, and with Karl Rove it was the massive political
operation that exists in this White House. And it existed in
other White Houses as well, but when you transfer that over
into the war-making process it becomes a problem.
Mr. Cohen. Did you ever hear of any decisions for people
that used BlackBerries that were RNC BlackBerries or RNC e-
mails for political purposes so as to not place those on----
Mr. McClellan. Well, I certainly knew that people had RNC
e-mails. I didn't have an RNC e-mail account myself, but I
certainly knew that people used them. I believe that I probably
would have sent e-mails to both of Karl Rove's accounts, his
White House account and probably that account as well just to
make sure it got to him.
Mr. Cohen. Are you aware of any particular policy that said
to use those to avoid Government oversight?
Mr. McClellan. Not directly. No.
Mr. Cohen. How about indirectly?
Mr. McClellan. No. I wouldn't say indirectly either.
Mr. Cohen. You say you heard talk about Iraq and the build-
up for war there. Did you ever hear any talk about Iran and a
build-up for war with Iran in the White House?
Mr. McClellan. Well, there is certainly a focus on Iran.
And I sat in world leader meetings with the President where he
would discuss Iran. It was a high foreign policy for him and
remains a high foreign policy for him as well. And I think the
views of people within the Administration are pretty well known
in terms of what we ought to be doing to confront Iran.
Mr. Cohen. The President didn't attend and hasn't attended
funerals of soldiers who were killed in the war. Were you privy
to any of the discussions of why it was determined that he
would not attend those funerals as previous Presidents?
Mr. McClellan. Including discussions from him personally
that he didn't want to view it as picking or choosing one
funeral over another. I did attend often with him when he would
visit families of the fallen and wounded soldiers as well.
Those were certainly moving moments, and I saw the President's
care and concern for those troops and for those families as
well.
Mr. Cohen. Previous Presidents attended funerals, did they
not.
Mr. McClellan. I believe so, yes.
Mr. Cohen. They didn't worry about choosing one over
another. They tried to make as many as possible. So there was a
decision to make none because you couldn't make them all; is
that correct?
Mr. Cohen. Well, I think part of it was, where do you draw
the line? And if you do one, then you can't do the other. If
you're not doing the others, does that show disrespect to
others? But the President, as I said, often visits with the
troops, the wounded and visits with the families as well. And
that's the way he decided to approach it.
Mr. Cohen. Do you remember when he gave up golf?
Mr. McClellan. No, I don't.
Mr. Cohen. Does he----
Mr. McClellan. I saw his comments about that, but I don't
remember any discussion personally about, this is his time to
give up golf.
Mr. Cohen. During the campaign of 2004, were you familiar
with any discussion about swift-boating Senator Kerry?
Mr. McClellan. No, I was not involved in that. That was
more of a campaign side of things, if anything, and I wouldn't
have been involved in that.
Mr. Cohen. Did you ever overhear any conversations about
firing of U.S. attorneys, at all?
Mr. McClellan. That was something that boiled up after I
was there. So I don't--I don't--it was never something that was
high on my plate in terms of press issues that I was dealing
with, so it's not something I ever focused on.
Mr. Cohen. Several people edited your book. It's been
elicited that different people edited it.
What did they edit out of the book that we should know
about?
Mr. McClellan. I don't think there's anything that would be
of interest to this Committee that was--if you say edited out
of the book, I think I've given a pretty clear view of the big-
picture things in this book.
That was what I was trying to focus on is, how did this
Administration go so badly off course, and what can we learn in
it.
Mr. Cohen. You said in an interview by Amy Goodman on
Democracy Now that you mentioned the number of civilian
casualties in Iraq as one of several issues you should have
spoken up on while you were at the White House, one of several
you should have spoken up on.
What were the other issues you should have spoken up on?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I mean, in retrospect, there were a
number of times I think I should have spoken up more. But as I
say in the book, too, in this Administration, once the policy
is decided, the President expects everyone to march in lockstep
to that policy and not question it. You can question how it's
being implemented, but once that decision's made, you're not
encouraged to speak up about it.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. McClellan.
Mr. Conyers. The Chair recognizes Tom Feeney of Florida,
who is a Member of the Administrative Law Subcommittee and the
Intellectual Property Subcommittee as well.
Mr. Feeney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
Congressman King who ceded his time so I can make an early
flight and see my son play some Little League tonight maybe, if
it's not raining in Orlando.
You know, Mr. McClellan, regardless of the motives or who
edited your book, there are things that are fairly well-known
facts. You at length, you know, cite speeches and other news
reports; and then there is a lot of inference and speculation
and, in some cases, some innuendo based on people you know or
people you assume to be true, what may have been happening in
meetings that you were in or not. And I appreciate that.
But in terms of speculation and opinion, do you have a
brief opinion, given your position as secretary? Regardless of
the merits of your book or why you did it, do you think in the
future, at a time of war or there's sensitive intelligence
being discussed, that when a press secretary goes out shortly
after he leaves the White House, that this book is likely to
set the precedent for press secretaries or deputy press
secretaries to have more or less access to what is actually
behind the decision-making system in the White House?
Mr. McClellan. It depends on what lessons future Presidents
take away from this book or future Administrations. If they
take the right lessons, that person is going to have even more
access.
Mr. Feeney. Well, for example, as the allies were deciding
whether D-Day would occur in Normandy or the southern shores of
Europe, should the press secretary have had access to those
meetings and been available to the press, the worldwide press,
to explain what the thinking and the rationale for the effort
was?
Mr. McClellan. No, I don't think a press secretary should
ever be talking about potential war movements that are not yet
publicly known.
Mr. Feeney. Well, but you've speculated a lot about the
motives of people, including the President, but especially with
respect to the reason for war, including why Rumsfeld would
want to go to war, why Cheney would want to go to war, why
Wolfowitz would want to go to war.
By the way, there's nothing new. Wolfowitz had said--you
know, as you write in your book--to Vanity Fair that one of the
primary reasons that they were going to go to war, and tell
people, was because of weapons of mass destruction.
Hindsight is 20/20. We all know what we know now, which we
may have known at the time had Saddam Hussein complied with
some--more than one dozen resolutions by the United Nations
Security Council asking him to let the world know whether he
did or did not.
Why would every nation in the U.N. Security Council demand
to know the status of a weapons of mass destruction program if
we all knew or should have known it didn't exist? That's sort
of a rhetorical question.
But let me ask you this question because you do do a lot of
speculation. Secretary Rumsfeld has a lot of experience, in
Administrations, in defense. Same thing with Vice President
Cheney. They also know that history has a lot more perfect
vision than contemporary rationales for war.
Can you speculate on the motives of two men that have
served in numerous Administrations and know that they will be
judged by history, why they would deliberately go out and lie
about a primary justification for war, knowing full well that
every history book would prove that their motivation for war
was a big lie?
I just can't fathom why people that experienced and that
sophisticated about the way Administrations are subsequently
judged would deliberately tell a lie, knowing that they would
be outed. I can't find the motivation.
Mr. McClellan. Actually, I think, in the book I say that I
don't believe it was a deliberate attempt. It was a cultural
problem that exists in this city where spin and manipulation
become part of the accepted culture. And then, when you
transfer that over from domestic policy issues to war-making
decisions, the American people aren't getting the full truth;
and they need to have the full truth so that they know exactly
what we're getting into.
Mr. Feeney. If Saddam Hussein had complied with what the
world demanded of him, they would have had access to the truth
about weapons of mass destruction.
Finally, I want to--did the President know or have any
knowledge about either Mr. Libby or Mr. Rove or anyone else
disclosing Plame's identity to reporters?
Mr. McClellan. I do not believe so, based on my
conversations with the President.
Mr. Feeney. In fact, you say, you're confident, you're
convinced?
Mr. McClellan. Yes. That's right.
Mr. Feeney. I think that's important.
I understand--look, you know that in the heat of battle and
a run-up to a war there's a lot of emotions and there's a lot
of lack of knowledge. I remember after 9/11 Air Force One
didn't know what direction to take off in.
Mr. McClellan. Right.
Mr. Feeney. And it's the job of an Administration to try to
tell America what they need to know. But the notion that we are
going to share everything that we know with our enemies I find
very disturbing.
Mr. McClellan. I don't make that suggestion.
Mr. Feeney. Well, anyway, thank you for your testimony.
Mr. McClellan. Thank you.
Mr. Conyers. Bill Delahunt of Massachusetts----
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Conyers [continuing]. On the Administrative Law
Subcommittee, on the Foreign--he chairs a Subcommittee on the
Foreign Affairs Committee. And he is on the Immigration and
Crime Subcommittees of Judiciary.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I don't think in
any way that Mr. McClellan is suggesting that we share
information with the enemy. I think it's important, however,
that we share information with the American people.
Let me applaud you for this book. I think you've made an
excellent contribution to public discourse. I think there is
much for all of us to learn, not just simply the next
Administration, but Congress on both sides of the aisle. This
is not a partisan issue.
Mr. McClellan. Right.
Mr. Delahunt. What struck me the most in reading portions
of your book was your statement that the Bush administration
lacked real accountability, in large part because Bush himself
did not embrace openness or sunshine in Government. I concur
with that. This Committee and my own Committee have had
constant problems dealing with this Administration.
Currently, there is a very significant international
agreement that's being discussed between Iraq and the United
States that has significant implications for the American
people and for the region. And despite their own rules, the
Department of State, the so-called Circular 175 proceedings,
there has been zero--well, maybe 1 on a scale of 100
consultation with Congress.
It was embarrassing to meet with the Foreign Minister of
Iraq who gave us a better briefing in terms of what was under
discussion than this Administration.
And today in one of the local papers here, The Hill, the
headline is, ``Cheney Gets Last Laugh, Records Stay Secret.''
He has managed to stonewall Waxman, stonewall Cheney. You know,
it can be funny, it can be humorous, but these decisions are
absolutely too important.
So I think you made a real contribution by opening up the
debate as to what is the quality of public discourse among the
institutions that this democracy relies on. And at its core we
have to have an informed citizenry.
And I agree with you. I voted against the war, as did 133
of my colleagues, 125 of which, by the way, were Democrats. It
was a majority of Democrats that voted against the war simply
because of information in the public domain. There were heroes,
like a great field man. Nobody here would know who he is. But I
had him to my office. He's from the Department of State.
He said, I've read everything, Congressman Delahunt. There
is no nuclear weapons program. They just simply isn't. It was a
hard sell, and a tragic one at that. But I think we have to
look forward.
I'll tell you what I found very disturbing--and I would be
interested in your comments--was the secret declassification
that no one else knew about except President Bush and Vice
President Cheney. You didn't know about it. None of us knew
about it. Is this how we operate a democracy?
Mr. McClellan. It's one of the problems with this White
House, how compartmentalized it is. That is a prime example of
how problematic it is, too. The Chief of Staff didn't know, the
National Security Adviser didn't know, the Director of Central
Intelligence didn't know. We were going through a formal
declassification process shortly after that, unaware that it
had been----
Mr. Delahunt. This is not a democracy where you classify
and then declassify and then reclassify and keep everything
secret. This is not openness in Government.
And I applaud you for this book.
Mr. McClellan. Thank you.
Mr. Delahunt. And it was earlier stated that your book--
others have been saying this. You have plenty of company. I can
remember reading the memoir of Paul O'Neill, The Price of
Loyalty. He was stunned because at the first National Security
Council, he was in the room, he was a principal, and a
discussion about Iraq and the instruction by the President to
Rumsfeld and then-Joint Chief Shelton to prepare military
operations. That was 10 days after the inauguration of the
President, prior to 9/11.
There was a proclivity--and we heard weapons of mass
destruction and Mohammed Atta and, yeah, the dog wagging the
tail about his overarching vision for the Middle East.
And we all share that vision, but how do you impose it?
Is my time up, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Conyers. There is a red light on the desk.
Mr. Delahunt. Okay. Well could I have another 10 seconds?
Mr. Conyers. Of course.
Mr. Delahunt. I would--I chair, as the Chairman indicated,
the Oversight Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs. And I would like
to have you and Paul O'Neill come before that Committee after
the election, so there won't be any impugning of anyone's
integrity, and give us a view of the process or lack thereof.
Because that was Paul O'Neill's problem as well as yours. There
was no process; it was all gut and intuition. And now we've got
ourselves in a mess.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Conyers. Steve King of Iowa is the Ranking Member on
Immigration and a valuable Member of the Constitution
Subcommittee as well.
Mr. King. I thank the gentleman Chairman. And I'd like to
start out by agreeing with the gentleman from Massachusetts. He
said, this is not a democracy. I couldn't agree more. And I
pray it never will be, that it remains a constitutional
republic where we actually have a chance to move this society
forward with a representative form of Government.
Mr. McClellan, there were impeachment hearings in this very
room back in 1998. And although I wasn't a member of this
Committee, I spent some days here witnessing that. I remember
around that period of time Charlton Heston made a statement.
And his statement was to President Clinton and he said, Mr.
President, when you say something that's wrong and you don't
know that it's wrong, that's called a mistake. But if you say
something that's wrong and you know that it's wrong, that's a
lie. He drew the distinction, and I think it's important for us
to look at this.
And you've made reference to the 15 words in the
President's State of the Union address, and I believe you're
referring to his January 28, 2003, address, which I happen to
have the copy I had in my hand when he gave that address. I'll
read these words to you and I think these are the ones that you
referred to.
The President, speaking in that State of the Union address,
quote, ``The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein
recently sought significant quantities of uranium from
Africa,'' closed quote. That's the reference, I believe.
Do you believe that's a mistake or a lie when the President
said it?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I actually talk about it in the book
at length. And I think the President thought it was credible to
be saying that at the time that it had some substantiation. I
don't know what every individual knew about that or was passing
along. I think some questions remain there.
Mr. King. Let me submit that I don't believe it was either
a mistake or a lie. I believe that the language in here
sustains itself as the accurate and factual truth even today.
Mr. McClellan. Well, but our CIA disagree with that at this
point.
Mr. King. I have in my hand a CIA report. This is a
debriefing report from Ambassador Joseph Wilson within 2 hours
of the time that he arrived back home after his 2 weeks in
Niger.
He's been before this Committee. I didn't have this report
in my hand on that day; I wish I had.
It's, though, the debriefing date, 8 March 2002. Are you
familiar with this report?
Mr. McClellan. I may have seen it before. I'm not sure.
Mr. King. Just for your edification and for that of the
Committee, let me just read from this report: ``Debriefing on
the return''--and I'm going to submit that this report directly
contradicts Joseph C. Wilson 180 degrees, where he testified--
or in his report to the CIA, they say he referenced this former
Prime Minister Ibrahim Mayaki. He says, ``However, Mayaki did
relate that in June 1999 a Nigerien-Algerian businessman
approached him and insisted that Mayaki meet with an Iraqi
delegation to discuss `expanding commercial relations' ''--and
that's in quotes--``between Niger and Iraq.
``Although the meeting took place, Mayaki let the matter
drop due to the United Nations' sanctions against Iraq and the
fact that Mayaki opposed doing business with Iraq. Mayaki, the
former Prime Minister, said that he interpreted the phrase
`expanding commercial relations' to mean that Iraq wanted to
discuss uranium yellow cake sales.
``Mayaki said, he understood the rogue states would like to
exploit Niger's resources, specifically uranium, but he
believes the Nigerien Government's regard for the United
States, as a close ally, would prevent sales to these states
from taking place despite Niger's economic woes.''
This is verbatim from the CIA report that was secret and
now been released, redrafted. I would ask unanimous consent to
introduce this into the record, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Conyers. Without objection.
Mr. King. And I recognize that it catches you a little bit
unaware. I trust you have not seen this report nor the language
in it.
Mr. McClellan. Not recently. I don't know if I've seen it
before. I would have to look at it.
But certainly October of 2002 for the speech the President
gave in Cincinnati, the CIA director had said, Take this
information out that relates to Niger. Steve Hadley recounted
that in conversations I was participating in at the White House
later, when the 16 words became--or that----
Mr. King. I'm sorry. But recognizing there was a
backpedaling on the part of the White House, I'm going to
submit that the State of the Union address remains factual
today.
They did learn from the British--whether it turned out to
be upheld in later statements or not, they did learn from the
British. This statement of Joseph C. Wilson contradicts his 4
years of calling President Bush a liar.
And I would submit also that--let me pose this question. If
you had to choose, if your life depended on it and you had to
choose between putting your trust in Ambassador Joseph Wilson's
veracity or that of the President of the United States, where
would you put your----
Mr. McClellan. I don't know that I'd jump into that
hypothetical kind of question.
Mr. King. Okay. I'm going to take that as an answer to that
question. I'll pose another one then.
What is your advice to your successor secretaries, White
House press secretaries, as to how they should handle
themselves and how a President might want to handle them?
There's two parts to this question. What would you say to the
succeeding secretaries on at what point they should step up and
tell the world--in the middle of their job, perhaps?
And how will the President handle this from this point?
Does he have to then put the next press secretary into a
cubicle and slide press releases to him under the door for fear
that he will either write a book or come before the Judiciary
Committee and divulge information that I believe was, at least
from a national security--not national security, but from the
integrity standpoint, could you not have taken some of this to
the grave with you and done this country a favor?
Mr. McClellan. I think that by speaking up about these
issues that the country can learn much from what went wrong and
what we can learn from that. And that's why I wrote this book,
because I want to see things change here.
Mr. King. That may well be true--thank you for your
testimony. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Conyers. Hank Johnson is a lawyer/magistrate from
Atlanta, Georgia, serving on the Administrative Law
Subcommittee, the Intellectual Property Subcommittee and the
Crime Subcommittee.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McClellan, I appreciate your attendance today. During
the course of President Bush's administration, there have
been--there were 5,626 petitions for commutation, which were
received and processed by the Office of Pardon Attorney, which
is a part of the Justice Department. And of those, prior to Mr.
Libby's commutation, President Bush had granted just three
petitions for commutation. And you----
So in other words he actually denied 4,108 of those
petitions, and the other ones were closed without Presidential
action, presumably by the Office of Pardon Attorney. And this
reluctance to grant mercy on these commutation petitions is
consistent with President Bush's conduct with respect to death
penalty cases when he was Governor of Georgia--excuse me--
Governor of Texas; isn't that correct?
Mr. McClellan. Yes. I think--I believe so, yes.
Mr. Johnson. He presided--he had the distinct opportunity
to preside over a record number of men and women--in fact, 150
men and 2 women--a record unmatched by any Governor in modern
American history. He presided over 150 executions as the
Governor of Texas and commuted only one sentence. Is that
correct?
Mr. McClellan. That's correct.
Mr. Johnson. And then all of a sudden----
Mr. McClellan. I mean, I say I trust your numbers. I
haven't looked back at it recently.
Mr. Johnson. Then all of a sudden we've got White House
confidant Scooter Libby, and many Americans believe that there
was an attempt to silence Mr. Libby. Many Americans believe
that there was a misleading of the American public in this
Administration's march to war, there was an intentional lying
to the American public.
And many Americans feel that when Ambassador Joseph Wilson
had the gall to reveal the deception to the American public,
that he was punished by the Administration, which ordered the
revealing of his wife's identity as a covert agent, Valerie
Plame.
And many people feel that the Vice President is responsible
for Scooter Libby putting his head in the meat grinder, if you
will; and that in return for Scooter Libby putting his head in
the meat grinder, going through a jury trial--an extensive jury
trial, after which he was convicted of obstructing justice,
making false statements and two counts of perjury--and having
been sentenced to 30 months in prison, and his motion for bond
pending appeal having been denied by the trial judge; and then
also denied by the court of appeals in affirming the trial
judge's denial of the appeal bar, and Scooter Libby was headed
to jail, to prison, imminently.
And on the same day that Scooter Libby found out that the
court of appeals would not reverse the judge's decision to deny
the appeal bond, that's when President Bush issued a
commutation, which is inconsistent with his previous history as
Governor of Texas and President of this country. And without
consultation of his own Justice Department, which was
responsible for prosecuting Mr. Libby, without consultation
with that Department or its Office of Pardon Attorney, he
decided to issue a commutation of that prison sentence.
And there's some who believe that he did that so that he
could make sure that Scooter Libby would not at some point
spill the beans on the Vice President or someone else.
Do you believe that is the case.
Mr. McClellan. I don't know. Again, it's one of those
questions where I can understand why people you know view it
that way.
Mr. Johnson. Even in the situation where Mr. Bush--well,
strike that. And I'll move forward.
Do you have any reason to think that that would not be a
reasonable scenario that I just--that I just gave?
Mr. McClellan. Well, we haven't had any real answers to
these questions that you're raising. There's a lot of suspicion
there about that, and I understand why people would reasonably
come to that conclusion.
Mr. Johnson. It is a reasonable suspicion?
Mr. McClellan. It sends a terrible message. It was special
treatment, in my view, that Scooter Libby received; and I think
that the President should not have made that decision. But
that's his right, to do it.
Mr. Johnson. In your opening statement, you lament the
permanent campaign culture and constant spin that has corrupted
Washington. Stripping away all of the spin, please tell us
candidly and directly, what do you believe were the
Administration's real strategic motives in misleading this
country and the American people into a war in Iraq?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I think the driving motivation--and I
think I talked a little bit about this earlier--was, in the
President's view--I can't speak to every individual, but in the
President's view was this idea that we could transform the
Middle East by coercively going into Iraq, that Iraq would be
the linchpin to change Iran into a democratic state; when
you've got Afghanistan and Iraq on each side of it, democratic
nations on each side of Iran. And then it would go from there.
That was the thinking. The President has spoken
passionately about it in numerous settings where I was with
him.
Mr. Conyers. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I could just
conclude that one question.
Did you ever hear of any discussion during the run-up to
war about the possibilities of gaining control over Iraq's vast
oil reserves as a reason for going to war?
Mr. McClellan. I personally did not.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. McClellan. Thank you.
Mr. Conyers. The Chair recognizes Attorney Betty Sutton of
Ohio, who serves on the Intellectual Property Subcommittee, the
Crime Subcommittee and the Antitrust Task Force.
Ms. Sutton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McClellan, one of your conclusions from this experience
is that, quote, ``War should only be waged when necessary and
the Iraq war was not necessary,'' end quote.
But in discussing the mood of the country in the fall of
2002 in your book, you state that, quote, ``conditions were
favorable for the Bush team as it launched its campaign to
convince the--convince Americans that war with Iraq was
inevitable and necessary.''
We know you have come to a conclusion that the war was not
necessary. Did the war become inevitable under this
Administration? And if so, when?
Mr. McClellan. I believe so, because the President left
himself no wiggle room. I don't think it was reasonable to
conclude that Saddam Hussein was ever going to come fully
clean. Then the only other option the President left him was we
were going to use military power to remove his regime from
power. And, you know, certainly the whole laying out of the
marketing campaign was aimed in moving it in that direction as
well.
Ms. Sutton. Okay. And I want to talk to you more about that
marketing campaign and sort of this momentum that was gaining.
In reacting to Larry Lindsey stating in The Wall Street
Journal that the cost of the war would be somewhere between
$100 and $200 billion, you state in your book, quote, ``None of
the possible unpleasant consequences of war--casualties,
economic effects, geopolitical risks, diplomatic
repercussions--were part of the message. We were in campaign
mode now.''
And I guess--if you could just share with us, are you aware
of any discussions about the costs and lost life and money that
would be unacceptable once this campaign to war began?
Mr. McClellan. Well, any direct knowledge of some of those
suggestions? Well, certainly Larry Lindsey's comments are one
in terms of looking at--trying to calculate the potential cost.
And I think he was basing it on a 1- or 2-year time frame.
So, I mean, there were discussions that maybe were going
on. But certainly that was not part of the way to take--you
know, sell the war to the American people.
Ms. Sutton. What I'm asking about is, were there internal
conversations that you're aware of, was it contemplated what
would be unacceptable loss of life, or what would be
unacceptable as the cost of war in a monetary sense? Did you
hear those discussions? Was that part of----
Mr. McClellan. No. At the time of the build-up, remember, I
was Deputy Press Secretary. So, yeah, I filled in from time to
time and participated in some meetings, but in terms of the war
discussions, that would have been in the National Security
Council meetings that I did not participate in at that time.
Ms. Sutton. Did you ever become aware of any of those
discussions along the way, throughout the course of the war?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I mean, I've referenced Larry
Lindsey's comments. But, you know, it was not something that
was emphasized or stressed around the White House or that I
ever remember coming up in terms of some of the discussions
about how to take the Nation--or how to make the case to the
Nation.
Ms. Sutton. Okay. Not about making the case to the Nation,
but did you ever hear any concern expressed about what would be
an unacceptable loss of life as----
Mr. McClellan. No. I can't say that I had any direct
conversations on that.
Ms. Sutton. Okay. And you also state that Vice President
Cheney, quote, ``might well have viewed the removal of Saddam
Hussein as an opportunity to give America more influence over
Iraq's oil reserves, thereby, benefiting our national and
economic security.''
Now, of course, today in The Washington Post we see an
article that's entitled Big Oil Firms Ready to Sign Agreements
With Iraq; and in part, ``June 19--Iraq is preparing to award
contracts to several Western energy companies to help develop
its vast oil resources.'' The article goes on and states,
``U.S.-based Exxon Mobil and Chevron, Royal Dutch Shell,
France's Total and British Oil Company, BP, will secure the
biggest contracts.''
In light of that and this comment in your book about Vice
President Cheney perhaps might well have viewed the removal of
Saddam Hussein as an opportunity to give more America more
influence over Iraq's oil reserves, could you just expand upon
what that statement--what that statement means?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I said it's hard to know what the Vice
President's thinking is in terms of what his real rationale was
for pushing forward on going into Iraq or encouraging the
President to move forward on going into Iraq.
But certainly if Iraq didn't have its large oil reserves,
it wouldn't have been a national security interest and it
wouldn't have been something on the radar screen like it was
from the beginning of this Administration.
Ms. Sutton. Okay.
Was there anything specific? Or what would make you make
that statement, though? That's sort of a general answer. Is
there anything more specific----
Mr. McClellan. Based my knowledge of the people at the
White House and the workings within the White House, that would
be how I would make that statement--and the Vice President's
involvement, certainly, in energy issues.
Ms. Sutton. Is the White House still in campaign mode?
Mr. McClellan. I don't think they've ever gone out of
campaign mode, if that's what you're asking.
Ms. Sutton. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Conyers. Brad Sherman of California, Intellectual
Property Subcommittee. And I'm pleased to recognize you now.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to focus not
on how Valerie Plame's name was exposed but rather why.
One theory is that the goal was to discredit Ambassador
Wilson by questioning the legitimacy of how he was selected to
go and investigate things in Niger. Another theory is that it
was to punish Ambassador Wilson by imperiling his wife's career
or even her safety.
Did anyone in the White House make the statement that
Valerie Plame was revealed in order to teach Ambassador Wilson
or anyone else a lesson? Or do you think that Valerie Plame's
name was revealed just to undermine the report, the credibility
of Ambassador Wilson?
Mr. McClellan. My belief is that it was to undermine his
credibility, by the people who revealed her name, as part of
the effort to discredit Ambassador Wilson.
Mr. Sherman. Moving to a different issue, in November,
2004, you said that, what, Guantanamo detainees were being
treated humanely. When did you learn that there was
waterboarding being used at Guantanamo?
Mr. McClellan. I think that that became public in the
media--it may have been at some point even after I left. But, I
mean, there was certainly discussion about it before that that
this might be going on.
In terms of my knowledge of it, you know, essentially I was
using the Administration talking points that I was given by
others from the national security staff.
Mr. Sherman. So, so long as you were press secretary, you
thought that they were being treated humanely and that there
was no need to correct----
Mr. McClellan. Well, I was getting assurances from people
with--inside the White House, as well as probably the Pentagon,
in conversations with them that that was the case.
Mr. Sherman. Now, your book brings to light a few occasions
where the information you gave the public as press secretary
turned out to be false; and I wonder whether there are any
occasions, not revealed in your book, where the statements you
made to the press, to the public, were false or misleading?
Mr. McClellan. You know, I couldn't say that without
bringing up a specific statement. I think I included everything
that I'm aware of in the book.
Now, I mean, some of what I said, I thought it was sincere
at the time. I think some of it, in retrospect, was misguided.
Mr. Sherman. Do you have any advice for us on what to do to
reduce the partisan nature of Washington, D.C.?
Mr. McClellan. Well, the first thing that has to happen is
the embrace of openness and forthrightness with the American
people. And I think the President, more than anyone else, has
the ability to set that kind of constructive tone, to establish
the trust. That's first and foremost.
But then I go into some other ideas actually in the book,
as well, from the White House perspective: what the White House
can do to change the partisan tone and transcend that, the
bitter partisanship in D.C.
Mr. Sherman. I think you have some good ideas in your book.
I would point out, though, that Washington is not so much a
matter of personalities as structure. We have moved over the
last 40 years to ideological parties. And if we really wanted
more moderation here in Congress and in Washington, we'd go to
an open primary system, that we'd be looking at how we
structure who gets elected and what it takes to get reelected
rather than just counting on the next President or the
President after that to be a more angelic person than the
occupant of the White House.
Mr. McClellan. There are certainly other issues that I have
proposed or that need to be addressed; I think you get into
some of those. I was focusing on it from the executive branch;
and I think that the President can go a long way toward
changing the atmosphere here in Washington, D.C.
Mr. Sherman. I think we have a structure of electing
elected officials that won't get you there.
But I yield back.
Mr. McClellan. Part of that as well.
Mr. Conyers. The gentleman from Alabama, Artur Davis,
himself a former assistant United States attorney who serves on
the Immigration, Constitution and Crime Subcommittees.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Chair, thank you. And, Ms. Baldwin, thank
you for letting me slip ahead because I have a plane to catch.
So thank you for that.
Mr. McClellan, let me circle around a person whose name has
come up a great deal today, and that's Karl Rove. You stated in
your book and you have reiterated to the Committee several
times that Mr. Rove encouraged you, allowed you, encouraged you
to repeat a lie. You've said a number of things about Mr. Rove,
and you've indicated you've known him for some period of time.
So I want you to kind of give the Committee some advice on how
to deal with a little situation that we have with Mr. Rove
right now.
The Committee has extended an invitation to Mr. Rove to do
what you've done, to come and appear under oath, to allow
anyone who wants to ask you questions to do so. Mr. Rove has--
not surprisingly, to you, I suspect--declined the invitation.
Mr. Rove has come back, and he said to the Committee, Well,
I'm willing to talk, but only if there is no oath, only if
there are no cameras present, only if there are no notes made
of what I have to say.
And let me just ask you, based on what you know of Mr.
Rove, Mr. McClellan, does it first of all surprise you that Mr.
Rove is seeking limitations on the manner and the circumstances
in which he would appear before this Committee?
Mr. McClellan. No, it does not surprise me. And I think
it's probably part of an effort to stonewall the whole process.
Mr. Davis. I'm going to ask you two pointed questions.
Would you trust Mr. Rove if he were not under oath to tell the
truth?
Mr. McClellan. Well, based on my own experience, I could
not say that I would.
Mr. Davis. And, in fact, if Mr. Rove were under oath, would
you have complete confidence that he would tell the truth?
Mr. McClellan. I would hope that he would be willing to do
that. And as you point out, it doesn't seem that he is willing
to do that. But based on my own experiences, I have some
concerns about that.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Rove did testify under oath before the grand
jury investigating the leak a number of times, did he not?
You have to answer orally.
Mr. McClellan. Yes.
I'm sorry. Yes.
Mr. Davis. You don't believe he told the complete truth to
the grand jury under oath when he did testify?
Mr. McClellan. I don't know since I haven't seen his
testimony. I do not know.
Mr. Davis. You state--at one point, there was a very
pointed sentence. You say that Karl was only concerned about
protecting himself from possible legal action and preventing
his many critics from bringing him down.
Do you believe, based on what you know of Mr. Rove, that he
is capable of lying to protect himself from legal jeopardy,
sir?
Mr. McClellan. Well, he certainly passed on false--or lied
to me. That's the only conclusion I can draw.
So, based on my own experience, you can appreciate where
I'm coming from.
Mr. Davis. Do you believe, based on what you know of this
gentleman, your experiences with him, that he is capable of
lying to protect himself from political embarrassment?
Mr. McClellan. I would have to say that he did in my
situation. So the answer is yes.
Mr. Davis. You talk about an Administration that, in
effect, came up with a strategy to go to war in Iraq and was
not candid with the American people about the reasons. You
suggest that an Administration that was so conscious of spin,
so conscious of protecting itself politically, that it would
shave facts and shave off elements of the truth.
You know that this Committee has been investigating for
about a year allegations around the firing of the U.S.
attorneys. I know that happened after you left. I want to ask
you again about the state of mind of this Administration.
Is the Bush administration that you know, Mr. McClellan,
capable of coming up with a false cover story as to why the
U.S. attorneys were fired?
Mr. McClellan. I would hesitate to try to characterize that
because I have no direct knowledge of that situation.
Mr. Davis. What about capability from what you know?
Mr. McClellan. I don't have any direct knowledge of that I,
so would not want to make any broad, sweeping statement on the
Administration itself.
Mr. Davis. If it were suggested that the Administration had
come up with a cover story to conceal its true motives, would
you say that you had seen the Bush administration do that kind
of thing before?
Mr. McClellan. Again, I don't want to try to speculate
about that since I don't have any direct knowledge about of it.
Mr. Davis. Have you seen them do that before?
Mr. McClellan. Have I seen them do--I'm sorry, repeat.
Mr. Davis. Come up with a cover story that conceals the
true motive.
Mr. McClellan. Well, I certainly think that in the Valerie
Plame leak episode that it's clear today, instead of hiding
behind the cover of an investigation or legal proceedings, that
the Administration was more interested in simply stonewalling
on this issue and not getting involved publicly.
We said that we would----
Mr. Davis. My time is running out. I have two more points.
With respect to Mr. Rove, as you may know from reading news
reports, there have been allegations that Mr. Rove may have
attempted to influence the prosecution of at least one
individual, a fellow named Siegelman who was the Governor of a
State of Alabama.
I suspect you have no factual knowledge of that, but let me
ask you this: How long have you known Karl Rove?
Mr. McClellan. I think it's going back to the early '90's--
'91-92.
Mr. Davis. Do you have a sense of how he thinks about
politics and how he thinks about people on the other side of
him?
Mr. McClellan. Well, he views the other side as the enemy,
I think. He's the one that plays bare-knuckle politics.
Mr. Davis. Is the Karl Rove that you've known for 15 or 16
years, Mr. McClellan, capable of attempting to influence the
prosecution if he had the opportunity to do that?
Mr. McClellan. I don't have direct knowledge of that.
Mr. Davis. That's not what I asked you.
Mr. McClellan. I know. I would hate to try to speculate on
that question as well.
Mr. Davis. Let me just add if I can close out, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Delahunt, my friend from Massachusetts, gave me a
document. There's a particular quote here that I think is
particularly appropriate, given some comments by Mr. King,
quote, ``To announce that there must be no criticism of the
President or that we are to stand by the President, right or
wrong, is not only unpatriotic and servile but is morally
treasonable to the American people.''
That quote comes from a noted Republican who held the
Office of Presidency named Teddy Roosevelt. And I end with
that, Mr. McClellan, because I suspect there's some in your
party who will tell you that you've somehow read yourself out
of the party by coming here today and writing this book in the
candor in which you have.
I would suggest that you may want to point out to them that
there is another tradition in the Republican Party other than
the cut-throat ideological warfare that your former
Administration has practiced for 8 years. Teddy Roosevelt
represented it, and I think that you represent it as well, sir.
Mr. McClellan. Thank you.
Mr. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Conyers. The gentlelady from Wisconsin, Attorney Tammy
Baldwin who serves on the Crime Subcommittee of Judiciary.
Ms. Baldwin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McClellan, I want to appreciate your taking the time to
come and testify here today; and before I begin with my
questions, I want to address one point that you made in your
testimony this morning.
You state that President Bush came to Washington and ended
up playing by the game--or ended up playing the game by the
existing rules rather than transforming them. And I could not
disagree more.
To the contrary, I believe that our President intentionally
and repeatedly has broken the rules of the game. And by that, I
mean the laws and Constitution of this country. I know you were
referring to it in a different context.
I believe his conduct and that of the Vice President raises
serious questions in relation to some of the most--some of the
principal elements of our democracy, including transparency and
basic respect for the rule of law.
The more we learn about why Valerie Plame Wilson's identity
as a covert CIA agent was leaked, the more serious the breaches
of accountability appear and the more interconnected the lies
and violations of the American public trust grow. For many
Americans, myself included, it is difficult to comprehend that
the Bush administration manipulated, exaggerated intelligence
on Iraq's nuclear capabilities to begin an unjustified war and
then instructed Mr. Libby's perjury to protect themselves from
further scrutiny brought about by Ambassador Wilson's
statements.
It's a horrifying display of political retaliation, abusive
authority and political quid pro quo. And I think, for me, the
only thing worse than knowing that the world will live with the
consequences of this Administration's actions for generations
to come is knowing how many have already suffered or died as a
result of these transgressions.
On that note, I would thank you for your contribution to
our ongoing congressional investigations and would like to ask
you a few questions as my time allows. And I'd like to actually
start with a very, very basic question about how you were
prepped and how you got your information for briefings with the
press.
Before you met with reporters, with whom did you speak, who
gave you information, for example, on the status of the war,
the events at Abu Ghraib? Did you speak with President Bush and
Vice President Cheney directly to prepare or did you get that
information from others for your press briefings? And please
just give us a brief----
Mr. McClellan. It depends on the situation. Sometimes
directly with the President. Sometimes it was the National
Security Adviser or someone--or Deputy National Security
Adviser. So it depends on the situation.
Sometimes it was just getting information from a policy
person on the staff, if I didn't need to go to the President or
someone else.
Ms. Baldwin. Okay.
Mr. McClellan. Or participate in meetings, even.
Ms. Baldwin. In hindsight do you believe you were used by
the White House to intentionally mislead the American public?
Mr. McClellan. In terms of the Valerie Plame episode? Or
are you talking about----
Ms. Baldwin. Well, in any episode.
Mr. McClellan. Well, again, I don't think that there was a
deliberate effort necessarily, saying, Let's go out and mislead
the American people. I think it was part of this permanent
campaign mentality, which to some extent Washington accepts a
little bit of the spin and manipulation that goes on. And I
think that's a problem that needs to be addressed; and that's
one of the reasons I wrote the book, it's one of the key themes
in the book.
Ms. Baldwin. You were just asked by Mr. Sherman some
questions. But during your tenure at the White House you stated
on more than one occasion that the President does not condone
torture and that he never would. Yet you were at the White
House when the accounts of abuse and torture of prisoners held
at Abu Ghraib surfaced. And we now know you were also there
during the time when secret legal opinions endorsing the use of
torture on terrorism suspects were written.
Given that we are revisiting the statements you made
defending the Administration's reasons to go to war in Iraq, as
well as the Administration's official role in leaking of a
covert CIA agent's identity, would you care to comment on any
statements you made over the years regarding this
Administration's stance on torture or----
Mr. McClellan. Those are not comments I would make today,
knowing what I know today. There is information I did not know
at that time, when I was making those comments. And I was
relying on the assurances from others within the White House
staff.
Ms. Baldwin. So during your time working for this
Administration, I ask again, do you believe that you were
intentionally used by the White House to mislead the American
public?
Mr. McClellan. Well, again, I think there's certain
individuals there that actually believe that those words are
the case, and they sincerely believe that.
I think most people take a very different view, though.
Ms. Baldwin. During your time working for this
Administration, did you ever observe any Constitution--sorry--
any conversations or actions at the White House that you
believe were in violation of Federal law?
Mr. McClellan. No.
Ms. Baldwin. And I would include in that, obstruction of
justice or perjury.
Mr. McClellan. Right.
No, nothing; nothing that I would have had direct knowledge
about.
Ms. Baldwin. Mr. Chairman, I'd yield back.
Mr. Conyers. Debbie Wasserman Schultz of Florida.
Oh, I'm sorry. Excuse me.
Mr. Trent Franks is a distinguished Member of at least two
Subcommittees on the Judiciary Committee. And I'm happy that
he's here to join us at this time. I am happy to recognize him
now.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I can hardly
wait to hear what I have to say. I appreciate it.
Mr. McClellan, thank you for joining us today. I want to be
very candid with you and very up front with you. There is a
feeling in my heart that if you felt that you were doing
something wrong at the White House, or misleading people, that
you should have spoken up at that time.
And then for you to do so afterwards, it seems like at some
point--I'm having a real struggle with that. So I want to be
open with you about that when I begin my questions here.
The comments in your book, Ari Fleisher has had some
commentary about them. He said there's something about this
book that just doesn't make any sense. And these are his
quotes. He said, ``For 2\1/2\ years Scott and I worked shoulder
to shoulder at the White House. Scott was always my reliable
solid deputy. Not once did Scott approach me privately or
publicly to discuss any misgivings he had about the war in Iraq
or the manner in which the White House made a case for the war.
Scott himself repeatedly made the case for the war from the
podium and even after he left the White House. And I remember
watching him on Bill Maher's show about 1 year ago making the
case for the war.''
Now, I understand that people can change their minds about
things. But if you really thought you were doing something that
was wrong before the public, I just am so convinced that that
would have been the same time to say it.
In your book you made mention of a couple of things. You
said--and I'm going to quote it--``the obfuscation, dissembling
and lack of intellectual honesty that helped take our country
to war in Iraq''--that's a quote.
You also said, ``When candor could have helped minimize the
political fallout from the unraveling of the chief rationale
for the war, spin and evasion were also instead of what we
employed.''
You also said in your book, ``We engaged in spin,
stonewalling, hedging, evasion, denial, noncommunication and
deceit by omission.''
You also said in a White House briefing, though--and this
is in contrast to the book; you said, ``If you look at the
National Intelligence Estimate, it showed the collective
judgment of the Intelligence Community.'' And then you go back
and look at the bipartisan Robb-Silverman Commission and they
said, ``There is no evidence of political pressure on the
intelligence analysts.''
You go back and look at the Butler Report. The Butler
Report said there was no evidence of deliberate distortion. You
go back and look at the Senate Intelligence Committee report,
and they said they did not find any evidence that the
Administration officials attempted to coerce influence or
pressure analysts to change their judgment.
Now I've got to ask you the obvious question here. It's
hard to ask. But were you obfuscating, dissembling, being
dishonest, hedging, evading or being deceitful when you said
those things?
Mr. McClellan. I think we need to unpack everything that
you rolled together.
First of all, in the buildup to the war, as I say in the
book, like a lot of Americans I was giving the Administration
the benefit of the doubt. I thought we were rushing into it,
but I didn't have access to the intelligence. The foreign
policy team was highly regarded at the time so I gave the
benefit of the doubt to the Administration, just like a lot of
Americans.
In terms of my role, my role was to speak for the President
and his decisions and his policies, not for myself.
In regards to the intelligence, I actually say in the book,
yes, it's not a question of whether or not intelligence
analysts were pressured. It's how that intelligence was used,
how it was packaged, how it was overstated and sold to the
American people.
And that was the problem. We weren't open and candid about
what was known in terms of caveats and qualifications, in terms
of the way we implied certain things with the language that we
used. So the case was greatly overstated, in my view.
Mr. Franks. Mr. McClellan, in your original book proposal,
you've said the following: Fairness is defined by the
establishment media within the left-of-center boundaries that
they set. They defend their reporting as fair because both
sides are covered. But how fair be can it be when it is within
the context of the liberal slant of the reporting. But then in
the final draft of your book--this is a follow-up; a little bit
later you say, ``I am inclined to believe that the liberal-
oriented media in the United States should be viewed as a good
thing.''
I'm just wondering, did the publisher have an effect on
this epiphany?
Mr. McClellan. No, Congressman. As a matter of fact, I
stated earlier that if you look at that original proposal that
was written in December of 2006, I talk about these issues and
the bipartisanship and how that--how the President became such
a divisive figure. And that was what I really wanted to look
at. And initially, I think I was looking to put responsibility
everywhere else but where it really belongs. That's a long
process. But I put a lot of thought into it and drew those
conclusions.
Mr. Franks. Let me ask you one last question, Scott--Mr.
McClellan. It's kind of a big one.
Do you believe in your heart that President Bush is or is
not an honorable and decent man.
Mr. McClellan. I think he is a decent man; and I say so in
the book, I believe.
Mr. Franks. Thank you very much.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you.
The Chair is pleased to recognize Debbie Wasserman Schultz,
who serves on both the Constitution Subcommittee and the
Antitrust Task Force.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McClellan, it's a pleasure to finally be able to ask
you some questions down here at the very end of seniority on
this Committee. And it's a privilege to serve on this
Committee.
You know, they said after the Watergate scandal that it
wasn't the crime, it was the cover-up. And I can't help but
think about that when listening to your testimony here today,
because what happened to Valerie Plame and to Joe Wilson was
unconscionable. But that was the cover-up. The real crime was
the way the war was packaged and sold to a frightened nation
after 9/11 and under false pretenses. And that's what I want to
discuss and focus on with you here today.
You make a reference in your book to President Bush's
philosophy of coercive democracy; and you've talked about that
here today, and I'll quote you, ``a belief that Iraq was ripe
for conversion from a dictatorship into a beacon of liberty
through the use of force and a conviction that this could be
achieved at nominal cost.''
And in that vein, do you think that there was a conclusion
in the Administration on going to war with Iraq at the outset
and a subsequent effort to fit the facts and emphasize points
that would convince the American people, Members of Congress
and the press that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass
destruction and was an imminent threat?
Mr. McClellan. I'm sorry. Do I think that----
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Do you think basically that the
Administration, from the President through Vice President and
the upper tier of the leadership of the White House----
Mr. McClellan. Right.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz [continuing]. Fit the facts based on
this coercive democracy philosophy to--what they ultimately
wanted to be the end, which was for Congress to support the war
and the public to support the war?
Mr. McClellan. Well, the facts were certainly packaged in a
way to make the most compelling case to the American people
with the caveats and qualifications and contradictions pretty
much left out of that.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. You do emphasize in your book that
you don't think there was deliberate out-and-out deception.
Mr. McClellan. Right. And that's not speaking to every
individual, but as a whole; that I don't think Colin Powell and
others that were sitting in a meeting--``Let's go out and
deliberately mislead American people.''
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Where do you make the distinction?
Who do you think was engaged in out-and-out deception? And who
do you think maybe was more involved in distortion?
Mr. McClellan. I can't speak to that because of my role at
the time in the buildup to the war and I can't get in the head
of every individual and what they were thinking and what they
might have been promoting within the Administration or trying
to push.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Okay. Do you believe the President
was more focused on distortion as opposed to deception? I mean,
he was more willing to distort and emphasize facts.
Mr. McClellan. Well, it was this whole idea that you can
run a war-making campaign like a political campaign and use the
same kind of spin and manipulation that you do in a political
campaign or in a campaign to push forward on education reforms
or Social Security reform. And I think that that is the
mistake, a big mistake, that was made by this Administration.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. I want to bring out something you
just said, you just implied a minute ago. A minute ago, you
implied that there were some that did not intentionally deceive
the American people. But that left the impression that perhaps
you think there are some that did intentionally deceive the
American people.
Mr. McClellan. I can't rule that out, whether or not some
were or were not. We don't have a lot of answers to some of
those questions today.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. So who can you indicate that you
believe engaged in deception?
Mr. McClellan. Well, again, I don't have direct knowledge,
in terms of the buildup to the war, of who might have been
trying to do that.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. But it is an opinion that you hold.
You must have an idea within that opinion who it is.
Mr. McClellan. No, I don't have direct knowledge of that.
What I say in the book is that we were less than open and we
were less than candid, but it wasn't some, in my view, some
sinister attempt where everybody was sitting around, ``let's go
out and mislead the American people.'' Whether or not an
individual held certain views and was engaging in that, I can't
speak to that.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Even though they might not have
publicly or stated in meetings that they intended to mislead
the American people, do you basically think that that is what
it evolved into?
Mr. McClellan. Well, it certainly had a result of being
misleading. I think that is what I make clear.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Do you think that President Bush,
Andy Card, and Vice President Cheney or others knew that there
was no imminent threat from Iraq to the U.S. when it comes to--
when it came to weapons of mass destruction and that they
distorted the facts in order to convince Congress to support
the war?
Mr. McClellan. Do I think that any of those individuals
did? The President, the chief of staff----
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. The President, the Vice President
and Andrew Card.
Mr. McClellan. Again, I can't speak to every individual. I
don't think, from my experience, that the President was viewing
it that way or that Andy Card was, and, you know, but I am not
going to try to speak to every individual.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Do you think that any of those three
individuals knew that there were not weapons--that there was no
imminent threat from Saddam Hussein with weapons of mass
destruction?
Mr. McClellan. Well, the way we portrayed it was that, it
may not be imminent, but it was a grave and gathering threat.
And whether or not some of those individuals knew that it
wasn't that serious or that urgent of a threat that needed
addressing, I don't know.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. But you emphasize in the book, and I
want to clarify that now, that that was not necessarily the
primary reason for going to war, of course democracy was, but
that they thought that was the argument that would be the most
convincing to the American people.
Mr. McClellan. Right. And I think that has been made in
statements made in the public record.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. As my time expires, Mr. Chairman, I
wanted to ask one other question.
Do you think Karl Rove lied to the President of the United
States about his involvement in the Plame scandal?
Mr. McClellan. Based on what the President told me, I
believe that, because the President told me that Karl had told
him he was not involved in the revealing of her identity.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Do you think Vice President Cheney
lied at any point in this process?
Mr. McClellan. I don't know, because I have not had
conversations with him about it.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Do you think there are any instances
in which Karl Rove lied to the President on other policy
matters?
Mr. McClellan. I don't know specifically. We would have to
try to address each specific issue, but I don't know
specifically off the top of my head of anything I can think of.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Just let me ask, if you don't mind,
Mr. Chairman, one more thing, if you can indulge me.
Whom in the White House are the relevant people, if anyone,
that you believe should be brought before this Committee or any
other congressional Committees to get more specific answers to
these questions that might have more specific knowledge?
Mr. McClellan. Well, certainly on the Plame episode, the
Vice President has information that has not been shared
publicly. You could go on down the list, from Scooter Libby to
Karl Rove, Ari Fleischer. There are others that have probably
not--that have not shared everything that they know about this.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. So you think each of those people
should be brought in front of a congressional Committee?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I think that it would be a benefit if
they shared--if everything was known, and if they shared what
they knew, and it would be a benefit if they did it under oath.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Conyers. Keith Ellison of Minnesota is a former State
Senator, a trial lawyer of more than a decade, and serves on
the Immigration Subcommittee, and the Constitution
Subcommittee.
Mr. Ellison. Mr. McClellan, since you have made these
revelations, has it damaged some of your personal friendships
that you had in the White House?
Mr. McClellan. Well, you find out who your true friends are
during a time like this. So that's the way I would describe it.
But, yes.
Mr. Ellison. And people who you got to know pretty well now
may not be talking to you? Is that right?
Mr. McClellan. That is correct.
There are also a number that are still good friends, and
they understand me, and they understand where I am coming from.
They know who I am.
Mr. Ellison. But also, too, you know, I mean, I know that
you are probably going to make some money off your book, but
the truth is, you are a pretty capable guy and could have done
pretty well and will, I guess, do well in your professional
capacity aside from a book; right?
Mr. McClellan. Well, yeah, there are certainly other
opportunities I could have pursued separate from this book.
Mr. Ellison. And they would be pretty lucrative?
Mr. McClellan. I think that--yes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ellison. And so this is not about money. This is not
about grudges. You are just trying help your country. Is that
right?
Mr. McClellan. Trying to make a difference.
Mr. Ellison. And I think what you are doing is courageous,
and I just want to let you know that I hope you continue to be
open and have candor.
What are the lessons here? I mean, the fact is, you know,
you worked in that White House. I imagine there was a
tremendous--when things began to occur to you that really were
not right, you must have just felt, man, I don't know what to
do, I am just going to shut up and do my job. Is that right?
Mr. McClellan. Well, there is--I think there is maybe a
little bit of that. But those last 10 months certainly became a
disillusioning period----
Mr. Ellison. Right.
Mr. McClellan [continuing]. When I learned from the media,
or just as the media was about to report it, that I had been
knowingly misled by Karl Rove and Scooter Libby. Then when the
NIE revelation came out. But even things in-between that, from
the terrorist surveillance program or the warrantless
wiretapping program to the Vice President's hunting accident,
you can go down a list of other events.
Mr. Ellison. We certainly could. I want to touch on a few
of those. But I just want to say that, you know, I want to
talk--ask you about what do you think the lessons are? How do
we keep our Government transparent, open? How do we stop this
sort of culture of secrecy, silence, and obfuscation that, in
your opinion--what do we do to make sure that doesn't happen in
the next Administration?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I mean, certainly you are exercising
your oversight role and trying to get to some of these answers.
Mr. Ellison. So is part of the solution that we have got to
have an active Congress that does its part?
Mr. McClellan. Oversight is very important. And the other
aspect of this is a White House that is committed to embracing
openness and Government in the sunshine, and willing to be
candid with the American people.
Mr. Ellison. How do you think that we got into this frame
of mind in the White House where, you know, they sort of like
circle the wagons? And you used the term ``permanent
campaign,'' but was there a tolerance for alternative and
dissident points of view, for example on the war?
Mr. McClellan. Well, once the policy was set, there was not
tolerance for different views. Before the policy was set, the
President would welcome differing views. But I think this Iraq
policy, as I state, was set early on.
Mr. Ellison. Like Dan Levy, for example. Do you know him?
Mr. McClellan. No, I don't.
Mr. Ellison. You don't know Daniel Levy?
Mr. McClellan. I am sorry?
Mr. Ellison. Maybe I have got the name wrong.
Daniel Levin, sorry. Do you know him? He was an Acting
Assistant Attorney General for a while.
Mr. McClellan. Okay.
Mr. Ellison. He rewrote the memo that was originally
written by Addington and you.
Mr. McClellan. No, I would have dealt with the Counsel's
Office on that or maybe Addington.
Mr. Ellison. Okay. Did you deal with Addington?
Mr. McClellan. I dealt with the Counsel's Office primarily
on that, when Al Gonzales was still the White House Counsel,
and David Leach I believe was still there at that time. We did
some press briefings on those issues.
Mr. Ellison. Now, let me tell you, Addington and you came
up with a memo that sort of gave license to these enhanced
interrogation techniques that have gotten a lot of press. Did
you--were you privy to any conversations that took place before
the actual drafting of those memos? Do you understand what I am
asking you?
Mr. McClellan. In terms of the detainee policy?
Mr. Ellison. Yes.
Mr. McClellan. No, I was not involved in those meetings
where that was discussed. Now, I certainly had to go out and
defend the Administration on some of those policies, and so
information was shared with me in terms of Counsel's Office,
whoever else it might have been.
Mr. Ellison. How did they tell you--how do they equip you
to go out there and face the press given those policies that
they----
Mr. McClellan. Well, part of it was also getting them out
there to talk about it. We did a detailed briefing. I don't
remember what year it was. Maybe August of 2004 or 2003, we did
a pretty detailed--or maybe it was later than that--detailed
briefing with reporters, with Al Gonzales, with I think the
counsel at the Pentagon, Haynes, Jim Haynes, and some others as
well.
Mr. Ellison. Now, when you got them out there to talk about
it, after, for example, they talked about--I am talking about
that December 2002 memo that Addington-Bybee-you memo. Did you
ever sort of wonder about what they were going out to ask you
to defend and ask them questions about it?
Mr. McClellan. Well, I trusted their assurances they were
giving me on those issues. That was one time when the press
secretary is relying on others within the Administration to get
his information.
Mr. Ellison. Did you ever in your own mind ever think, wow,
you know, they are giving me a tough thing to defend here?
Mr. McClellan. I, certainly looking back on it, I have some
reservations about some of the things that were said during
that time.
Mr. Ellison. Let's talk about the Abu Ghraib issue. I mean,
the fact is, is that you were at the White House during that
time.
Mr. McClellan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ellison. And the world knows that people like Lynndie
England and others were put on trial for those things. Did you
ever get the impression that that incident started higher up?
Mr. McClellan. Well, the sentiment within the White House
was that this was something that was not higher up, that it was
always to put the focus on those individuals that had been
responsible for doing this without authority. And that was the
attitude within the White House.
Mr. Ellison. Was there any dialogue around that you heard
that, you know, where people were saying, well, we know we may
have sort of given them license to do this, get that
intelligence however----
Mr. McClellan. I know the President never personally
thought that or expressed that to me in conversations. I mean,
he certainly felt that it was the responsibility of those
individuals going beyond their authority. And certainly----
Mr. Ellison. What about Donald Rumsfeld?
Mr. McClellan. I am sorry?
Mr. Ellison. What about Donald Rumsfeld?
Mr. McClellan. I didn't have direct conversations with him
on that.
Mr. Ellison. What about Jim Haynes?
Mr. McClellan. I did not have direct conversations with Mr.
Haynes either.
Mr. Ellison. Did you talk with anybody about that during
that time?
Mr. McClellan. Well, certainly, yeah, we were talking about
it internally, but, you know, the information I received was
pretty much what I was saying publicly.
Mr. Ellison. Did you--were you ever told--was there any
discussion about, we are going to honestly try to get to the
bottom of this to prevent it from happening?
Mr. McClellan. I did not hear that or a focus that it may
have been higher up. I mean, certainly it was investigated and
looked into. I can't add anything to that record.
Mr. Ellison. Okay. What about Guantanamo and the detainee
policy there? Were you privy to much discussion around that?
Mr. McClellan. Well, not direct discussions in terms of
meetings where those policies were set in place. Again, that
was part of some of the briefings that we did for the press
with Al Gonzales and the others that I mentioned.
Mr. Ellison. Yeah, but I know that before you go out there
and look at those cameras, I am sure you get yourself ready.
Mr. McClellan. Yes. And I talk to individuals inside the
White House who would have knowledge of those of issues.
Mr. Ellison. Yeah. And so what you are telling me is that
when it comes to addressing, for example, those torture memos,
the Addington-you torture memo, you never had any private--you
never had any conversation before you had to go out and defend
that policy?
Mr. McClellan. No, I would have had conversations with
people about what the message is here and what we can share
with the public.
Mr. Ellison. Right. Did you ever have any discussion about
how that might be--about how people--are we there? Okay.
Mr. Conyers. Very close.
Mr. Ellison. Last question.
You know, of course--are you familiar with a guy named
Maher Arar.
Mr. McClellan. Doesn't ring a bell.
Mr. Ellison. He is a Canadian of Syrian ancestry who was
rendered to----
Mr. McClellan. Right.
Mr. Ellison [continuing]. Syria.
Mr. McClellan. Okay, now I know who you are talking about.
Mr. Ellison. Yeah. Did the Administration ever talk about
what you were to do to defend that policy?
Mr. McClellan. I don't remember if I commented on that
publicly or not. I would have to go back and look at that time
period to see.
Mr. Ellison. Did they ever talk about rendition at all?
Mr. McClellan. What we talked about, I know we talked
publicly about rendition, yes.
Mr. Ellison. What were you told to say about that?
Mr. McClellan. Without looking back at my notes, it is hard
for me to talk about it other than what I said publicly is
probably what I knew about that issue.
Mr. Ellison. Thanks a lot, Mr. McClellan.
Mr. McClellan. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Conyers. I want to thank my colleagues, Steve King and
Bill Delahunt and Mr. Ellison for staying with me.
Counsel Mike Tigar and Jane Tigar, we appreciate your
endurance.
But I am very impressed, Mr. McClellan, with your ability
to recall with such precision the many incidents and issues and
names in the course of this very unusually long hearing. I
compliment you on what you are doing, what you have done, and
probably the further contributions that you will be able to
make to our trying to make this a better Federal system of
Government.
And so without objection, the record will remain open for 5
legislative days for the submission of other materials that you
or the Committee might want to submit for the record.
And with that, the Committee stands adjourned.
Mr. McClellan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 2:52 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Exhibits submitted by the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative
in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and Member,
Committee on the Judiciary
Material submitted by the Honorable Steve King, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Iowa, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary
Post-Hearing Questions of the Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative
in Congress from the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Committee on
the Judiciary, to Scott McClellan, former White House Press Secretary
Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Scott McClellan,
former White House Press Secretary