INTERAGENCY REFORM: CAN THE PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT) CASE STUDY ILLUMINATE THE FUTURE OF RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS

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INTERAGENCY REFORM: CAN THE PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT) CASE STUDY ILLUMINATE THE FUTURE OF RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS

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INTERAGENCY REFORM: CAN THE PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT) CASE STUDY ILLUMINATE THE FUTURE OF RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Dr. Snyder. Good morning. We are going to go ahead and get started.

Mr. Akin, we are told, is on the way, but he said it is okay for us to go ahead. Mr. Bartlett is here this morning.

We appreciate you all being with us this morning.

This is the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations hearing on the implications for interagency reform, derived from the specific example of the establishment and operation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

We are part of the Armed Services Committee, and yet we have spent the bulk of our time the last six months looking at really the interaction between the civilian side of our government with the military side and what it means for our national security.

And I would ask unanimous consent that my written statement be made a part of the record; the same with Mr. Akin, if he has a written statement, I am sure he does, be made part of the record; as all your opening written statements will be made part of the record.

I just want to make several comments. This effort to look at the PRTs, we think, has been very worthwhile. Perhaps it is the first formal way that this Congress has really looked at this issue of interagency reform, other than the buzz that has been going on in town here for some time.

Good morning, Mr. Akin.

It was brought home probably most forcefully to me with one of my constituents who is currently in Iraq and works on the civilian side. And in an e-mail that she sent several months ago, which I have shared with this subcommittee before, she stated that in her experience that it sometimes seems to her like the conflicts between her agency and other U.S. Government civilian agencies is
more severe than between her agency and the Iraqis. And that is what you all, in a perhaps more academic and concrete way, are talking about here this morning.

I was also struck—I forget which one it was, maybe it was you, Ms. Flournoy, that was talking about in your first page of your statement that while we have had some spectacular military and national security successes, we have had some failures. And the failures may be ones that we can lay at the feet, not on our military, but at its failure of us to mobilize—on all of us, I include us here—to mobilize all aspects of our national security strengths so we can have the kind of successes we want.

And of course we are all familiar with, I thought, the excellent speech that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave November 26 of last year at Kansas State.

And I am going to ask, Mr. Akin, that this Secretary Gates speech be made part of our record today too, in which here is the Secretary of Defense at a time when they really would like to have additional funding for resetting the force and all kinds of things.

And I will just read one of his quotes, “What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on civilian instruments of national security, diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action and economic reconstruction and development.” That is Secretary Gates, our secretary of defense, talking about this.

Then very specifically, Mr. Wilkerson—last week, the topic of interagency processes came up, as this subcommittee, led by Mr. Davis and Ms. Davis and others, this topic comes up quite frequently in our hearings, and Mr. Wilkerson, a former close associate of Secretary of State Powell, stated he thought that while we could look at this broad issue of interagency stuff across the spectrum of civilian government, that if the Department of State and the Department of Defense if they can come, either because of imposition from the Congress or the President, but if those relationships get worked out, that the rest would fall in line fairly readily, which I thought was an interesting point.

So we come here today to hear from you all following the evaluation that we have had over the last several months of the PRTs. We appreciate your presence here this morning.

And before introducing you, I will recognize Mr. Akin for any comments he wants to make, and his opening statement will be made part of the record also.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of our witnesses for joining us here this morning.

After studying the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the subject of interagency stability operations for over four months, the subcommittee is nearing the close of that investigation.
Today’s hearing offers an opportunity to hear from experts on what lessons we should learn from the PRT Program and processes for planning and executing stability operations.

One of the challenges this subcommittee faces as we close our work on the PRTs and interagency stability operations is to try to figure out how, if at all, the Congress can move legislation that will ensure that the agencies, like the Department of Defense and State, will work seamlessly and apply the tools of national power.

Much of what needs to be done are matters that are within the constitutional prerogative of the executive branch. Other initiatives that the Congress could appropriately address would still face hurdles because much of what needs to be done can only emerge outside the various congressional committee systems.

I thought the concrete proposals you have recommended in your prepared testimony are helpful and consistent with what the subcommittee has learned over the course of this investigation.

As we discuss your suggestions today, I would like our witnesses to delineate which proposals could be done in the short term and how Congress can advance such an initiative.

I would also just mention that some years ago there when Harvard MBA programs came out with a thing, a case study approach, one of the things that they always asked witnesses would be, “If you just had only one thing you could do, what is the most important change that you would make?” So if in your testimonies you could address that, say, “If there were just one thing to change, this is what it would be.”

Mr. Chairman, thank you. I look forward to the testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Akin.

Our witnesses today are Ambassador Carlos Pascual, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution and the first coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department; Ambassador Barbara Bodine—am I saying that right, Bodine?

Ambassador BODINE. Yes.

Dr. SNYDER. Diplomat in residence at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University and a former Foreign Service officer with over 30 years of experience concentrated in the Arabian Peninsula and the greater Persian Gulf, including as ambassador to Yemen; Ms. Michele Flournoy, President of the Center for a New American Security, formerly of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), did work on the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols project, and before that principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction and deputy assistant secretary of defense for Strategy; and Ms. Nora Bensahel, senior political scientist, The RAND Corporation and author of numerous studies on post-conflict reconstruction and the related policy challenges.

Ambassador Pascual, we will begin with you. We will put on this five-minute clock with its very attractive green light that seems to rapidly turn to red. It is a signal to you that five minutes is up, but you feel free to ignore it if you have things you want us to hear
about. We just put that up there so you will have a sense of the passage of time. And then we will just go right down the line.

Ambassador Pascual.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR CARLOS PASCUAL, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, FOREIGN POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

Ambassador PASCUAL. Very good.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Akin, other members, thank you very much for this opportunity to testify before you. Thank you for accepting our written testimony for the record.

Dr. SNYDER. Pull that microphone a little closer, if you would, please.

Ambassador PASCUAL. I very much want to commend the committee for the focus that it is giving on the integration of civilian and military capacity to support our national security. One of the things that I have learned in working with our military is that in today's world the military will tell you that kinetic force is not enough to achieve our national security objectives, and Chairman Snyder, you stated that very well at the beginning.

These comments are based on the work that we did in setting up the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization meetings with virtually every combatant command, meetings with the joint staff, joint planning exercises that we undertook with them, as well as experiences that I had at different times in my career working on the National Security Council staff, the Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department.

So I have at least had the benefit of some experiences that allow me to bring together some of these different perspectives from different agencies in some, I hope, useful ways for you.

Let me just underscore a couple of key findings from the work that we have done and things that we have learned from stabilization and reconstruction.

First is that it takes at least five to ten years until it is possible to get local partners to really take the lead in the stabilization and reconstruction effort. To imagine that you can build capacity and help them build capacity any faster is a fantasy, and it just simply hasn't been done. Look at small states like Bosnia and Kosovo.

The easiest part is up front in the most destabilized period because the international community is actually coming in and doing something to a country. The hardest part becomes as you start to build that capacity over time, and it slows down that process of transition, and we haven't understood that. In fact, in a place like Iraq 2003 and 2004, those were the easy years.

The other thing that we have to understand is that we need multilateral engagement to succeed, in order to have the depth and the range and the time commitment that is necessary to undertake these missions.

Afghanistan is a good example where we have the U.N. and NATO and the United States and 30 nations, and here we are still struggling to succeed. To imagine that we can do this alone is just simply a fantasy. If we even look at tiny Kosovo and the effort that it has taken multilaterally, we have to remember that the capacity
that we build as the United States to be successful has to be leveraged with multilateral engagement.

And, finally, I would underscore that security is a prerequisite. There is a certain irony here that on one hand you need security as an enabling environment. If you don’t get progress on stabilization and reconstruction and begin to normalize life, you can’t actually sustain that security. But we shouldn’t fool ourselves, and until there is some basic environment of security, it is very hard to have a sustainable stabilization and reconstruction effort.

In order to address some of these issues, I have tried to underscore in the testimony that there are three levels of capacity that we have to look at building. And let me try to draw, since this is the House Armed Services Committee, an analogy with the military.

The first is the functional equivalent of a joint staff, and this is what the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, S/CRS, was intended to do. The joint staff and the military tries to create a common strategy in a given theater where there is interoperability across the forces. It does not mean that you don’t need the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marines and the Coast Guard. It means that they actually understand how to work together toward a common goal.

And, similarly, the Office of S/CRS was to play that function of creating a joint staff capacity across civilian agencies and between civilian agencies and the military. That process has started. It has been given some foundation in National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD–44), but it is a very, very fragile foundation that has been created thus far.

The second capacity that you need is the ability to establish an operational headquarters on the ground in a theater of action. In the military, you have this with a combatant command actually establishing a field headquarters. You have tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of individuals who constantly work together, train together, plan together and are able to deploy together.

In civilian parts of our government, we essentially send a cable around the world and ask for volunteers of who might be able to come to establish that headquarters. Not surprisingly, it takes months to find the individuals. They have never worked together on these kinds of issues, they usually don’t know anything about the country that they are going to, and so, not surprisingly, we are not the most terribly effective in the deployment of those individual in establishing the headquarters.

The PRTs are one form of establishing that nature of the headquarters, and one of the things that we have learned is that if you don’t have the staff capabilities to put on the ground quickly, the PRT is a theoretical exercise.

And, finally, the third level of capacity that we need are the foot soldiers. If in the second level we have a headquarters where we have the individuals who are developing, designing and managing our programs on the ground, you need those who can actually deliver them—the police, the police trainers, the rule of law experts and so forth. And here we have essentially depended on contractors in the past.
I would think that if the U.S. military were asked to be deployed with comparable resources and training, they would tell us that it would be irresponsible. And yet at the same time, we continue to deploy civilian missions which fundamentally affect the success of military missions without the necessary type of planning capabilities and implementation capabilities.

Let me come back then to bring forward a few recommendations and, Congressman Akin, on your question of what that one specific intervention would be.

I would ask you a question first, and that question would be, what do you want? Do you want a better planning agency in Washington or do you want the capacity to deploy on the ground? If you want the capacity to deploy on the ground and you do it without planning, then you are going to have a haphazard process.

So I am going to take a mild deviation on your question and say that you actually need two things: The capacity to plan effectively and the capacity to deploy effectively. And in order to be able to do that, there are a few things that I think are critical.

The first is establishment of a budget authority that creates an account for stabilization and reconstruction. This may seem an arcane recommendation, but if you look at the foreign affairs budget, there are at least 20 different accounts. The experience that I went through when we were developing a strategic plan on Sudan, for example, was to get individual agencies, offices and bureaus that manage those accounts as fiefdoms to direct them to a particular goal.

In one case when I asked an individual, “What is the U.S. Government goal that you are trying to achieve and how do you contribute to it,” the response I got was, “I have done this job for ten years and nobody has ever asked me that. Why should I begin to do that now?”

Unless there is a way to break across those account structures and be able to identify, for example, $100 million, $200 million that are necessary for a particular initiative, and then ask the question, “How do we use those resources to most effectively achieve the U.S. government’s objectives on the ground,” you can’t come to an effective strategic plan.

The environmental that we have right now—and I have been in it in the field—is that you look across these 20 accounts and you ask the question, “How can I get money from any of these accounts to bring those resources here to the problem that I have in the field?” And so you end up making choices that are not always the most strategic, you don’t get resources for the things that are necessarily the most important on the ground.

And a way to deal with this would be to allow the President to make a determination on the creation of a stabilization and reconstruction account for a particular country when the circumstances warrant it, to reach agreement on that with the Congress and within that account to allow transfers from anywhere else in the foreign affairs budget so that it goes into a common account where you can basically say that the resources there can be used for any purpose in the foreign affairs budget.

This is not terribly complicated to do, it doesn’t cost additional money, it has been written up in the Lugar-Biden bill since 2004,
and it has gone absolutely nowhere, and it is the kind of action that can be done immediately at very little cost.

The second recommendation is on the creation of what the State Department has called an active response corps. It is 250 people in the State Department and other civilian agencies. The purpose of this is to have individuals who take as their assignment the capacity to train for fast deployments on the ground, individuals who work together, so that when you have a situation where you need to establish that headquarters on the ground, you are not going worldwide trying to find who are the individuals that are available, but you have 250 people who are immediately identified.

And if those people go into a standby corps, you can imagine that over years you can build a cadre of 750 people or so who have gone through this training and are your immediate pool for that kind of response capacity. This is a relatively low-cost way in order to be able to move quickly in establishing our capabilities on the ground and to be able to draw the personnel that are necessary for deployments to a Provincial Reconstruction Team.

The third recommendation would be the creation of a civilian reserve corps. I would propose a civilian reserve of about 3,000 people. I would recommend that it focus initially on police, police trainers and rule of law experts, because this generally has been the long pole in the tent in being able to establish stability on the ground and to transfer functions from the military to indigenous police.

Right now, we have contractors that we draw from all over the United States with no common doctrine, deploy them on the ground. In a place like Afghanistan, it was actually two years before we actually even began to put together a strategy that effectively started to address issues related to the rule of law, and we still don't have the capacity to implement it on the ground.

In the 2007 supplemental, a $50 million appropriation was provided in order to begin to establish a civilian reserve. It is absolutely frozen because there is no authorization. H.R. 1084, sponsored by Congressman Farr, is available. Moving that forward and getting that passed is the first way to create that civilian reserve capability.

The fourth recommendation is the creation of a conflict respond fund with about $200 million. We know that this will not fully fund any major mission, but what it can do is begin to create the capability of getting your teams on the ground for the first two to three months of implementation. Because what we do know is if you have to wait for a reprogramming of funds or a supplemental appropriation, it will be months before that money is available. If you can get your teams on the ground in that dynamic moment where you can influence the course of change, it can have an impact that can influence the overall success of the mission.

And, finally, I would just underscore the importance of this subcommittee's support for section 1207 of the defense authorization bill that allows for a transfer authority from the Defense Department to State, because even with a conflict response fund, that is a tiny down payment on the requirements necessary for quick deployments in the field.
I will just conclude by underscoring that creating these capabilities, I think, is truly a bargain. In effect, the total cost of the active response corps, the staff in S/CRS, the conflict response fund is about $350 million. The defense authorization capability in section 1207 creates an authorization against existing appropriated funds. It is a relatively small cost when we look at how much we are spending on the defense side.

But look at it from this perspective: If by creating this capacity we would create or would have created the capacity to withdraw one division from Iraq one month early, we would have saved $1.2 billion, not to mention the lives that would have been involved.

And so I just underscore again the importance of the work that this committee is doing and the way that you are reaching across defense and civilian lines, because the only way that we can really address these issues is if we think about a national security budget and not a defense budget and a foreign affairs budget. Until we integrate these to understand what is necessary for the national security needs of the United States, we will not succeed in our objectives.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pascual can be found in the Appendix on page 62.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Ambassador Pascual.

By the way, Mr. Farr, that you mentioned, that has the bill you referred to, has participated in subcommittee hearings and has a conflict today.

Ambassador Bodine.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR BARBARA K. BODINE (RET.), DIPLOMAT-IN-RESIDENCE, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Ambassador BODINE. Thank you for the opportunity to meet with the subcommittee today. I am very grateful that this subcommittee is taking—for its interest and the time that it is taking to explore very thoroughly, very critically and very constructively what can be done by the interagency with the full support and oversight of Congress to encourage and repair and rebuild the interagency in this process and player so that we can much more effectively and consistently support and defend the interests of this country.

A couple of weeks ago, I had met with about 20 cadets from West Point, and I started my meeting with them by asking them what the difference was between national security policy and foreign policy. And then I watched them spend about 15 minutes getting themselves twisted into pretzels and finally broke it by saying that there really isn’t a difference. National security policy and foreign policy are the same and they have to be addressed jointly, constructively, and it has to be done with all the tools.

I also asked them, since they were West Point cadets, “Would you have an army that was made up entirely of armor?” Well, obviously not. There were two midshipmen among the group, and I said, “Well, would you have an armed services that was solely Army?” Well, no, you wouldn’t do that either.

Well, then why should we be trying to do national security strategy and foreign policy with really almost one element, one tool and that it has to be a civilian-military effort as much as it has to be
joint services and as much as the services have to have a range of tools.

In the 21st century, the greatest threats that we are going to be facing are not going to be from standing armies from strong competitor states like the Soviet Union, but they are going to come from instability within the very weakest states. It is not going to come from powerful adversaries but from failed and failing states that are imploding from a perverse lack of legitimacy, their inability or their unwillingness to provide services and structures and from a lack of a basic social compact with their own citizens. And this is going to spawn domestic violence and humanitarian misery that is going to be unacceptable to both us and the international community.

This is also going to create a vacuum where transnational players will be able to come in and exploit this to either spread violence within these imploding countries or to spread the threat outwards, and we are going to be facing civil wars, secessionist movements, insurgencies and, yes, even terrorism. And this is not a prediction for the future, but this is an assessment of what the current reality is.

We don't have a consensus yet on when and exactly how to intervene with these imploding states, but I think that we can recognize that these reflect political and economic and social dislocations and that we have to have all of the tools available to respond.

The two corollaries of this new threat is that, first of all, the continuum between threat and actual violence interstate is going to be much longer and far more ambiguous than it was with conventional threats and conventional interstate violence, and there is going to be greater opportunities for crisis prevention and mitigation. And the second is going to be that the concept of a clear post-conflict break, the shift from the military to civilian, is going to be equally ambiguous. And what for too long the military considered unconventional warfare is simply going to become the new conventional warfare.

I think the Army and the Marines have recognized this shift with their new counterinsurgency manual, and yet despite the acknowledgement within that manual of the primacy of the political and the need for a civilian agency partner, the net conclusion remained one of the military lead.

Now, this is natural and appropriate. For one thing, the Army and the Marine Corps can't write the doctrine for the civilian agencies, but I think that it also reflected a feeling that the civilian agencies either could not or would not be full partners. It reflected the imbalance in the resourcing, and it was a need on their part for some prudent planning if you were going to accept that those two imbalances were going to maintain.

The lack of coordination and collaboration, is that inevitable and irreversible? No, it is not, and I think that, again, this committee is looking at. “How do we reverse this breakdown in the system?” There has been a fundamental structural change, but I don’t believe that the system itself is broken or antiquated, but proactive corrective action is needed.

The interagency process and how you make it work has long been a debate between the legislative and the executive branches,
and it goes back to the 1947 creation of the Department of Defense (DOD) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the first place and the National Security Council (NSC). And it is very curious if you look at the original legislation on the NSC, which was to coordinate and collaborate, one of its goals was to provide a level playing field so that the new agency, DOD, could have a voice up against the far more established and very prestigious Department of State. We may have overcorrected on that a little.

The tensions that we have within the interagency are not in and of themselves necessarily bad. They present the President, the interagency, Congress with a range of views, a range of options and a whole range of skill sets, and this is not necessarily bad so long as it is done within an understanding of a process and, I would say, a sense of mutual respect.

I have spent over 30 years of my—I have spent my entire adult life in the foreign service, and almost all of it was working interagency, and almost all of that was working with the Department of Defense and the uniformed military. And I won’t go through my history, but what I found in working on these issues, be they arms sales or counterterrorism or what do we do in East Africa, is that there was always a fundamental understanding of shared goals and objectives. And we might very much disagree on how to get there, but we did understand on where we were trying to get to. And we worked within at least understood parameters on how to do it and, as I said, with a mutual respect.

There were times when I might very well doubt the wattage of some of the people I was dealing with, but I never ever doubted their loyalty or their commitment to the national security. And was it ever ideal? No, it never was, and I remember in the mid–90’s that Michele and I worked on a project on complex contingency planning, along with Tony Zinni following the intervention in Somalia. The fact that we are here over ten years later talking about the same thing is perhaps a little depressing, but I do think that some movement has taken place.

But whatever happened interagency there was great debate, and at the end of the day, when a decision was made, you saluted smartly and you did it, you carried it out.

What I was not prepared for when I came back to Washington in 2003 was how bad the process had become; in fact, it was virtually dysfunctional or almost afunctional. A wall had been put up between the military and the civilians on working on both the planning for Iraq prior to National Security Presidential Directive-24 (NSPD–24) and after NSPD–24.

A colonel friend of mine was told that when he suggested it was time to do a political military plan that if he brought it up again, he would be fired. Efforts by the Department of State to bring uniform military into the Future of Iraq Project was met by a directive from DOD to the uniform military that they could not participate in this, and this was simply not the way that we had functioned for over 50 years at that point.

So the issue is not so much one that we had a system that was antiquated or incapable of handling interagency collaboration. We had one where there was actually walls put up and made that we could not do this.
And there is a wonderful quote in David Rothkopf’s book, called “Running the World,” where he quotes a former senior Administration official in looking at the decision-making process in 2002, 2003, 2004, and said that he had never seen more high-level insubordination within the U.S. Government within 30 years.

My point in recounting some of this history, and in my statement, is to make the point that we don’t have a systemic failure of an antiquated mechanism but we do have a system that was undermined, in some cases consciously, that cascaded down and rippled out, and this is what we are now trying to fix. It is a very important distinction between, is the system broken or was the system subverted.

As the nature of the threat has shifted from the most powerful to the weakest and the root causes have shifted to political, economic and social with this complex continuum of civilian and non-kinetic tools, we have also had this counterintuitive reorientation of our foreign policy toward a lead with force, and other national security tools have become subordinated or absorbed. To put this in military parlance, the military has become the supported command, and the civilian agencies have become the supporting command.

The reorientation of our foreign policy has been compounded by this crippling and chronic imbalance in resourcing. And to borrow a phrase that I heard from someone at a conference, we now have one agency on steroids and the rest of the national security apparatus on life support.

It has now gotten to the point where that what we have, our missions are following resources rather than resources following missions. And I think if there is one critical area that Congress can and should be looking at is, how do we write this balance so that we sit down and we critically look at what are the missions and which agencies are best able to fulfill those missions and have the resources following them? We need to just turn this over.

The military will take on the roles and the missions of the civilian partners if they are unable to do so, and they often end up both reinventing wheels that have been already up and running and often not as well, and then if we have, as my colleague pointed out, instead of them actually being able to take them on, it then ends up being outsourced to contractors. And the contractors you have a problem of standup, you have a problem of accountability, as we have seen, and it is not just with the security contractors.

And so we privatize a number of the non-warfighting functions. We then add to the military a whole host of non-kinetic functions, and we end up with having to contract this out. And it simply, to me, does not make any sense if you are trying to have what the military likes to call it, a unity of command or a whole government approach.

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams, I think, are a very creative, very useful, still imperfect and evolving response to these kinds of problems, and they present a good laboratory. They do raise a number of questions at this point: Should the PRTs be counterinsurgency (COIN)-centric, and, again, should they be in the service of the military mission or not? Are we looking for quick
fixes to further security or are we looking for longer term solutions to build stability—and security and stability are not the same.

To what degree can and should we be looking to bring in local stakeholders, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multilateral partners and international organizations? And does the primary mission and who has either de facto or de jure leadership, how does that affect our ability to bring in these other partners? And the answer on that is it has an enormous impact.

And then most finally, can there be any kind of effective interagency coordination and collaboration in the field if you don’t have something comparable back here at home?

Drawing from the lessons of the PRTs, they are a very good transitional mechanism, they should be in support of COIN operations, but they shouldn’t be an extension of them. It has to have a political strategy, and they should be focused on sustainability development.

One problem that we have to look at is that we don’t delegitimize local stakeholders by doing things too much ourselves, and I saw this as ambassador in Yemen where the military would come in and do things for as opposed to with. And while it was very good to come in and vaccinate every single goat in Yemen and all the little two-legged kids as well as the four-legged kids, it did nothing to build any kind of capacity for the local government, and in some ways if done incorrectly underscores to the local population that actually the local government is not able to do this. So we have to think about not just what we are doing but how we are doing it.

This is not a recommendation that there be a strict division between security, but there has to be a better balance of missions.

The counterinsurgency manual is revolutionary and radical, but it draws very heavily on the lessons of the past, and it goes back to basics, but then it tries to get them right for the 21st century. And I think this is what we need to do on the interagency process is go back to basics and then try to make it right.

What do we need to do? Very quickly, the basic decision-making and policymaking process needs to be reaffirmed. There needs to be clarity on who are the supported and the supporting agencies. I would say there needs to be a reaffirmation of the authority of the chief of mission. The National Security Council needs to serve the President by serving the interagency and also supporting effective congressional oversight.

To echo what my colleague has said, there has to be formalized civilian-military coordination in anticipation of crises, not just in response to them, and this would include mandating. And I think this is something Congress can do quickly and easily is to support the Biden-Lugar and formalize what is contained in NSPD–44 and the structure of S/CRS.

Very importantly, there has to be sufficient, regular and predictable funding. Parity with the military is not the goal but equity is. We have to have the funds, the staff, the resources commensurate with the challenges and the threats that we are facing. We need the staff and the resources in the State Department particularly, and I would certainly agree with Secretary Gates. We need what the military calls a training cushion so that we can train to languages, to area studies, to the new skill sets and expertise that we
need. The State Department does not have a training cushion at all; in fact, we are short.

We need to have enough of a training cushion so that we can send our people for advanced education opportunities. I have now taught at four different universities. I have been very much impressed by the number of captains and majors and sometimes lieutenant colonels who are at Harvard and MIT and Princeton and UC getting one-year MPAs studying these issues. And it has been very sad to see that there is almost never an a Foreign Service Officer (FSO) among this group. We need the training cushion and the resources to take advantage of these opportunities.

The Foreign Service Institute—I was dean there for a while—needs to be an institution that is capable to fulfill these kinds of missions, these training missions, area studies, language. Also to be the center for this interagency training that has to take place. If we are going to do it, I think that this is the place it should be done, but it cannot be done without the proper support.

There does need to be long-term interagency training. We need to know who we are, who the other person is. I had the opportunity to do the one-year senior seminar at the State Department, which was half State, half other agencies. And what we learned from each other in being on a bus for almost a year driving around the country was probably more important than what we actually learned when we got to wherever the bus was going.

We need to be able to staff our embassies fully and completely. Admiral Gehman who came out to Yemen following the Cole was appalled to find out that the country the size of France, I had one political officer, one economic officer and one Public Affairs Officer (PAO), that was it. We need to staff embassies, we need to reopen consulates, and we need the money for our public diplomacy program that is real.

We need to staff so that we can respond to crises without stripping our embassies. I had a colonel once ask me why the State Department simply didn't send everybody to Iraq. Even if we sent everybody to Iraq—there are only 7,000 of us, I don’t think it would make a big difference—but it would also mean that we had no one in our embassies to work with our coalition partners. We would have no one in our embassies to work with those who do not support our efforts. We would have no ability to do any of the other work that we need to do. We can't manage crises by stripping Peter to pay Paul. We need the people.

We need a staff and the resources to go with that to do outreach to other agencies. We once had people in almost every agency, all over town. We need more Political Advisors (POLAD). We need the staff to do this.

And then, again, S/CRS needs to be given the staffing and the funding to do its job as a joint office.

If the Administration, either a Republican or a Democrat, does not request sufficient funding, Congress does have within its prerogative to set levels, and I do think that this is something that Congress needs to take a look at.

Interagency coordination and collaboration is not an alien concept within the interagency. We do know how to play nicely together, but we need to be given the ability to do that. It would help
to have the mandate to do that and the resources. It is prudent and wise to ask the question whether we have the structure, the process and the people. Do we want to respond quickly, effectively and well? Do we want to anticipate, respond early and wisely? And that is a different kind of structure.

I have seen the tremendous good that comes when this is done in spirit. I have seen the damage and the frustration and anger when it is done poorly, and I certainly do commend and support this committee’s efforts to try to help the civilian agencies and the interagency to get back to where they were so that we can serve this country properly.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Bodine can be found in the Appendix on page 51.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

Ms. Flournoy.

STATEMENT OF MICHELE A. FLOURNOY, PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

Ms. FLOURNOY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Akin, Ms. Davis of my home state of California, Mr. Davis and other members, thank you very much for the opportunity to speak to you today.

And I wanted to commend your focus on this issue of improving U.S. Government performance and interagency operations, because since the end of the Cold War, from Somalia through the 1990’s to present-day Iraq, we have experienced repeated operational failures at the interagency level.

And I think there is no more important area for you to focus when you have Americans of all stripes—military, civilian—on the ground, putting themselves in harm’s way, trying to reach our strategic objectives as a nation and yet being thwarted because of some of these interagency problems. So I really want to commend you and thank you for focusing on this effort. And I hope that the committee’s efforts in this regard will actually produce some important results.

I want to just take a moment to describe what I think the problem is. The various failures that we have experienced in interagency operations some certainly stem from misguided policy or judgment, but many have stemmed from just poor execution. The U.S. Government time and time again has had trouble bringing to bear all of the elements of its national power in a cohesive and effective way, and I think that the problem stems from several sources—and Carlos and Barbara have also touched on this.

We lack a standard approach, an interagency doctrine, if you will, for planning and preparing and conducting these operations. So we tend to go into each operation reinventing the wheel, and this ad hoc approach has kept us from learning as a nation. It keeps us from learning lessons from past mistakes and then improving the performance next time.

We also lack adequate interagency mechanisms to coordinate and integrate our efforts at all levels: strategic in Washington, operational at the, sort of, planning within regions and then practically in the field.
And then, finally, we lack capacity, particularly on the civilian side. And coming from a DOD background, what I observe is this has very—this is not only bad for mission success, it has very detrimental effects on the uniformed military. Because what lack of civilian capacity means in their experience is, number one, huge mission creep. So they get stuck holding the bag, doing all kinds of tasks for which they really weren’t trained or designed. And they do it and in most cases they do it very well, but it is no way to run a railroad.

The second is even more disturbing, that inability to bring the capacity to bear to meet our objectives in the field means we don’t meet milestones, which means we don’t have a viable exit strategy, and we get stuck. And the longer we are stuck, the more vulnerable we are to increased costs, not only financial costs but also, most importantly, human costs.

So, again, I just want to underscore and applaud your efforts of trying to wrestle with this.

I said more about the problem in my written statement. I want to just jump to highlighting some of the most—and try to answer Mr. Akin’s question, what are the most important things that can be done and what can be done near term.

The first set of things I want to highlight are changes that a new Administration, or this Administration but I think it is unlikely in the final year, but any Administration, any President could change and get very near-term results from.

The first is using the National Security Council as a means of providing clear Presidential guidance, commander’s intent, for what the President wants to achieve in an operation before we ever go in and to create some capacity in the NSC—a senior director and a small office—that is really expert in doing strategic-level planning for operations.

I am not talking about an operational NSC or running operations out of the NSC a la Ollie North, we don’t want to do that. What I am talking about is an NSC that is able to identify clear objectives, agency roles and responsibilities, who is lead, who is support in a particular area, red lines not to cross, policy guidance that planners can then take and then translate into viable plans.

Coupled with this, a second piece, is investing in the planning capacity of the different agencies who need to participate in the process. You have got it in spades in the DOD because DOD has a planning culture and a whole cadre of military planners. You don’t have it at State, you don’t have it in a sufficient capacity at AID, at Treasury, at Commerce, at Justice. That is an investment that Congress and the executive need to make. It is not a whole lot of people, but it is a core planning capacity in each of those agencies, which is critical.

The last piece that is sort of an easy good government thing to do is to standardize an approach, how we are going to do this. When I was in the Clinton Administration, we had Presidential Decision Directive-56 (PDD–56), and that kind of gave us an integrated approach to doing pol-mil planning.

In the Bush Administration, they came up with a PDD that was never signed, NSPD-XX, which was excellent. It was actually an improvement on PDD–56. It was never implemented. NSPD–44
came along, we have got other approaches. Pick one. Use it again and again, refine it, train people to it and stick to it, as opposed to reinventing the wheel every time we have a new Administration or every time we have a new operation.

At the operational level, create rapidly deployable interagency crisis planning teams. The military does this exact thing. They basically—you know, a flag goes up, we have a warning order for an operation, put together a team, start planning for it.

Given the nature of these complex operations, they are not military operations alone; they are whole of government operations. You need to have an interagency approach to that campaign planning. Again, not that resource intensive but something that I think the kinds of initiatives that Carlos was talking about funding at S/CRS would populate some of these planning teams and make that very easy to achieve in the near term.

And then at the field level, I think we need to look at how we organize. Right now, we have two parallel structures. For example, in Iraq, we have a very robust country team and embassy, and we have a very robust Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) staff headquarters, and they do coordinate with mixed degree of success, very well at the top, mixed down below.

I would submit to you that in the future we need to move toward a model where we have an integrated interagency task force where you have got the ambassador and the military commander working hand in glove at the top but their staffs are completely integrated, so there is a civil-military J1, a civil-military J2, a civil-military J3 and on down the line—you can translate that into civilian terms of admin operations, intelligence, et cetera. But that is really what we have to do for the future.

Now, turning to what can Congress do and what are the most important things for Congress, I think the real role of Congress and the most important thing you can do is invest in the capacity on the civilian side. This is something a President cannot do. It requires leadership and legislation to create the civilian capacity, not to match the military person for person but to partner with the military in effective ways.

And I will give you an example. The opening days of Somalia you had one diplomat, Ambassador Bob Oakley, paired with an entire military force, and that one diplomat negotiated the permissive entry of tens of thousands of American Marines without a shot fired. One experienced diplomat made a huge difference. So, again, the right people, in the right place, at the right time can make an enormous contribution.

I think the first step in creating that deployable civilian capacity is to fully fund the S/CRS initiatives that Ambassador Pascual described. I think longer term we need to also be building that capacity in other places like AID and other departments. Longer term we have to determine whether we need to establish a separate field operating agency.

It is still an open question in my mind whether you can build highly operational, deployable cadres inside agencies who have a fundamentally non-operational culture. I am willing to give it a chance, but I think if the experiment of what we are trying to do with S/CRS does not make it, I think at that point you move to cre-
ating a new field operating agency where civilian operators are recruited, promoted, trained and rewarded for being operators.

Very important to go with this is the personnel float that Ambassador Bodine highlighted—5 to 10 percent. This committee, others routinely grants the military 10 percent, 15 percent personnel float to do professional military education, training, interagency joint experience, because you expect the highest professionalism from your military, and that is what enables it.

We don’t do that on the civilian side. If I am a manager in the State Department and you are asking me to send my best and brightest to training, I have to be down my best and brightest. I have to lose that person with no backfill for a year or two—very hard decision. And the incentive structure is exactly wrong.

Third aspect of the investing in capacity, and I think we can take some inspiration from the Goldwater-Nichols legislation that really has become the foundation for jointness on the military side. One of the most important elements of that legislation was changing the incentive structure.

So joint service went from being, sort of, something that people didn’t like to do because it took them away from the service that was their home and where they would get promoted, et cetera, to being joint service then became something that you have to punch this ticket if you are going to make general officer, if you are going to make flag officer. So it completely changed the incentive structure 180 degrees.

I would submit that if we made promotion to SES, Senior Executive Service, on the civilian side among key policy jobs in the various national security agencies, we made that promotion contingent on interagency education and experience, rotations in other agencies, you would fundamentally change the culture, and you would have the best and brightest running to the door to get that experience.

And over time, as we see in the military, over 20 years, over a generation, you would have a fundamentally more joint capacity, interagency joint capacity, because you would have people with experience after experience of working cross-agency, living in other agency cultures, et cetera.

And the last piece of this, I think, is also endorsing something that has come up, which is creating a center of excellence for training people who are going to be interagency planners, who are deploying, participate in PRTs, who are going to go staff the planning team, staff the task forces, et cetera, a training center where you can capture lessons learned and then ensure those lessons learned from the past operation inform the planning for the next operation. It is something that could be easily put together between the National Defense University (NDU), the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) and other appropriate training centers. Not a lot of money, huge potential impact.

So I would just, again, highlight, I think there is a lot that the executive branch can do to better use the instruments it already has to get more integrated approaches, but there are areas where it is imperative that Congress make some additional investment to build the capacity, to do better in these operations over time.
And, again, I would just say that the payoffs really cannot be overstated, both in terms of achieving our strategic objectives but in doing so at far less cost in terms of both blood and treasure.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Flournoy can be found in the Appendix on page 74.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

Dr. Bensahel.

STATEMENT OF DR. NORA BENSAHEL, SENIOR POLITICAL SCIENTIST, RAND CORPORATION

Dr. BENSAHEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me here today.

You asked me to talk about the ways in which other countries have reformed their interagency processes for improved capacity for stability operations in order to perhaps identify some lessons that the United States could apply. Unfortunately, there are very few good lessons to be learned.

The problems of interagency coordination are not limited to the United States. None of these international reform efforts have been successful enough to date to achieve their mandates anywhere in the world. Most of them continue to suffer from the same problems of bureaucratic competition and lack of capacity that the United States does.

In my written testimony, I describe the specific reforms that have been undertaken in the United States with the formation of the coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization, the United Kingdom with the formation of the stabilization unit, Canada with the formation of the stabilization and reconstruction task force, Germany with efforts to improve civilian crisis prevention and the European Union, which is struggling to determine which of its institutions should take the lead in crisis management and stability operations.

I would be happy to discuss the details of any of these efforts during the question period if you are interested.

These efforts have improved capacity in some areas, so the story is not entirely bleak, but despite significant differences in both their substance and their national context, they all suffer from the following four problems.

First, bureaucratic turf wars. The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Germany all created new offices that are supposed to either lead or coordinate interagency coordination. All of these offices have, not surprisingly, faced very stiff resistance from the agencies whose efforts they are supposed to coordinate. The greater their mandate, the more likely they are to provoke resistance from agencies that view them as intruding on their turf and interfering with their mission.

Second, poor organizational placement. These offices tend to be too low in their government hierarchies to compel other agencies to work with them.

Third, lack of financial resources. Most lack the budgets that they need to achieve their missions. This contributes to the problem of turf wars since money and bureaucratic power are often linked.
Fourth, lack of qualified personnel. These offices often rely heavily on secondments from other agencies to include needed expertise and to augment their small staff. But other agencies are often reluctant to provide people for these secondments and also prevent their best people from serving in them.

Why is interagency reform so difficult, not just in the United States but in other countries as well? Simply put, our governments aren’t structured for it. Our political systems are very decentralized. That is a deliberate political choice and one that isn’t going to change. But what that means is that there is always going to be some amount of stovepiping, turf wars and competition for resources.

That said, there are some ways to minimize the negative effects of interagency competition and to increase U.S. capacity for stability operations. The first is to create incentives for interagency secondments. This is a step short of what Michele suggested about a field operational agency but I think is something that could be done in the short term and is an important step to enable civilian personnel who want to operate in the field, on deployments, in order to get them there.

Right now, there are several strong disincentives that prevent even willing agencies from cooperating, particularly in these personnel areas. Congress should establish mechanisms to reimburse home agencies for the costs involved in seconding personnel for these operations, including salary costs and temporary hires to compensate for their absence.

Second, increase the capacity of USAID. USAID is the government repository of knowledge on promoting stability and development in post-conflict situations, but it is hindered by its small size and its lack of resources. While this committee does not have jurisdiction over the USAID budget, it does oversee issues that are directly affected by its lack of capacity since U.S. military forces are regularly required to fill its gap.

To take but one example from Iraq, military forces are actively involved in setting up city councils. No one thinks that military forces are best suited to be establishing local governance structures, especially not the military personnel who are on the ground doing it. But they often have no choice, because USAID and other civilian agencies simply lack the capacity to get into the field and to do everything that needs to be done in these important operations, and military forces are stuck filling that gap.

Third, establish flexible funding mechanisms. Those of us on the panel here seem to be in violent agreement on this point about the need to establish flexible funding mechanisms and to adequately resource these types of operations.

Stability operations require funds to be quickly allocated in order to respond to rapidly changing environments, particularly at the outset of an operation.

In particular, Congress has consistently failed to fund the Administration’s request for the conflict respond fund, which was mentioned earlier. There are legitimate concerns which have prevented it from being funded, including those about the role of congressional oversight, but those legitimate concerns can be addressed through some sort of reporting requirement once funds
have been disbursed. But requiring the State Department to specify in advance the ways in which that fund would be used defeats the entire purpose of a contingency fund.

Fourth, and finally, there is no substitute for an involved President and an involved Congress. Only the President has the political power to break through the bureaucratic conflict that inevitably arises as part of the interagency process. And I would suggest that in the cases where the interagency has worked well, which Ambassador Bodine mentioned, very often one of the key reasons why is that the President has been involved and made sure that this is one of this top priorities.

And only Congress has the power to provide the funds necessary to improve the country’s ability to effectively conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Bensahel can be found in the Appendix on page 88.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Dr. Bensahel. Appreciate both your all’s comments today, and all of your written statements, as I mentioned, will be made part of the record.

What we will do now is begin the question and answer period, and we will follow what we call our five-minute rule. And in this situation, I would ask that when you see the red light go on, we will give you time to finish your sentence or finish your thought, but if you would wrap that up when you see the red light on because that means that we are then taking time away from the next member on the list.

We will begin with Mrs. Davis for five minutes.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of you for being here.

I think it is one of the first times maybe that we have even suggested that it is systemic, but it also depends on the kind of vision that people have about how this can be accomplished, and so you have been able to lay that out and I appreciate it.

I wanted to just hit on one area. There are many questions and Congress member Davis and I, the Davis and Davis team here, we are trying to work with this, as are many of the other members, and that is why I especially appreciate it.

If we think about this response corps, we have so many individuals who have been involved already, have been involved in the PRTs, most of them from the military, bringing their skills, whether it is engineering, whatever that might be. I wonder if that is a way to try and capture them and to have them in some ways, where it is appropriate and, obviously, by their decision, to come down the line to be part of a response corps.

It is maybe kind of premature in terms of where we are with this discussion, but I am just wondering how you might see talking about this in a way that you are developing a career ladder out of all these incredible people who have done this job, who didn’t anticipate doing it. That wasn’t what they signed up for, but that is what they ended up doing.

And I think one of the things that has really impressed us in speaking to especially the men and women who have served in the
military, who have been part of this, it is the most important thing they ever did.

How can we do that? Is that appropriate? Do you see a mechanism for doing that? And how would it fit within the discussion that we are having? Is it too far down the line to even try and get out there with it or is that something worth facing right now?

Ambassador PASCUAL. I am happy to start on this. The response corps capabilities are some of the things that we have been debating for some time.

There are two types of responses to consider. One is the U.S. Government capacity to actually get the teams on the ground that lead and direct our efforts, and I think that that is absolutely necessary now, and it is absolutely appropriate to think about how these individuals who have had these experiences can be integrated into the government functions in those capacities.

And then there is a separate response corps capability of how you get the actual assistance providers—the police, the police trainers, the humanitarians and so forth—which requires a separate kind of mechanism of drawing individuals from civil society more broadly as the military draws in individuals with civil affairs.

One point I would just note, in work that we have done with the civil affairs groups, they have underscored that their role right now is like applying a tourniquet. They can avoid somebody dying, but they don’t have the capacity the set of strategic skills to actually save the life in the way that you wanted to.

And so that is what we are trying to create is the individuals within the government who have the strategic planning capacity overall, the individuals who can be brought in that provide the skills that are necessary across a very broad range of areas and complementing that still with a very extensive capability and military civil affairs, which addresses an immediate humanitarian need.

Ambassador BODINE. I think what I would add to that, the military has done a very good job of trying to capture lessons learned from an ongoing conflict, and rewriting doctrine in the middle of a war is quite an undertaking. The civilian agencies don’t have the numbers of people coming back, but I was at FSI last week talking to the area studies class—it was about 100 people—and I asked how many in the room had either served in Afghanistan, Iraq, PRTs or were going out to them, and it was easily two-thirds of the class.

And so one of the things that the military did that was right, good and proper was they started trying to capture what the captains and the majors and the lieutenant colonels were learning on the ground and bring that back and we have ended up with a new counterinsurgency (CI) manual.

What we haven’t had the opportunity to do, the mandate, the time, the resources—I do think that S/CRS is the place to do it but it isn’t funded—would be to sit down and try to do a comparable process on the civilian side, and it would mean bringing in the military who have been part of the PRTs but also bringing in the civilians who have been part of the PRTs, the NGOs who have worked on it and, in a sense, almost trying to write a companion volume
to the CI manual. And as I said, I don’t think that we should limit ourselves to just CI operations, but it should be pre and post.

Mrs. Davis of California. What would it take to do that?

Ambassador Bodine. First, money. Second, I think a mandate. This is something that perhaps Congress could mandate is, “S/CRS is hereby mandated to organize this.” And I think that would be the one thing you could do—mandate it, fund it and give it to S/CRS.

Mrs. Davis of California. Thank you.

Ms. Flournoy. I would just add a couple of other ideas. One is to make sure that we capture in a database a description of who has had what experience.

And then the second piece is to create some incentive structures for those people as they go into the next step in their careers to consider further operational experiences down the line, whether it is higher pay, better retirement points, earlier promotion opportunities, but to sort of capture who we have got out there, capture the experience base and then incentivize it for people to offer that experience again.

And then the third thing, as Barbara said, is I think some greater mechanism for capturing lessons learned from all of this experience that has been had.

Dr. Bensaheil. I agree with all of that. I would just add that the military has great difficulty doing this, even on its own, even though it has a formidable personnel system identifying people who have been participating in these kinds of civil military operations. And so while I certainly think the need is there to track the civilian expertise and line up incentives to continue cooperation, identifying people on the military side who have this expertise is a problem as well.

Mrs. Davis of California. Thank you.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mrs. Davis.

Mr. Davis for five minutes.

Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One thing I would like to recognize, I really appreciate what Chairman Snyder has done in continuing to bring this effort to light. We have got a little triumvirate going here to try to force the dialogue. Many times in Congress, it might surprise you, it is sometimes difficult to get things done. I think we are working in the epitome of the founders’ vision the last few years here.

But one analogy that comes to mind for me on this whole issue was making pinewood derby cars with my cub scout children, with the boys—I went through the equivalent with our military experience for the last few years—making the car last year with a coping saw, a knife, a block of wood and a piece of sandpaper and was ready for physical therapy when that was over and a little counseling.

Finally broke down and bought myself one of these fancy grinding and cutting tools with literally dozens of different attachments, which was great fun for all of us, and we didn’t destroy any furniture this time either, which was somewhat pleasing to my wife.

But in that vein, one of the things I look at, just having been a process consultant for years, is having the ability to have a real strategy, which I think we are lacking and have lacked for many,
many years with the end of the Cold War. But having the inherent planning capacity, I think, is so important that the agencies have this. The military had to go through a huge adaptation after moving from operational combat to kind of make it up as they went along.

And I think the real question, first of all, for an organization, we see four State Department bureaus and one Central Command (CENTCOM), which is immediately a recipe for disconnect, and you have got many, many dedicated people in all of these agencies who are, in effect, having to work around the system.

Funding, I think, is certainly an issue. One of my friends in J5 predicted the President would—when they announced the additional folks for PRTs, that, effectively, the State Department would say, “yes,” publicly and quietly say, “no,” and it would become a military mission, which it did in many ways with many officers from the Air Force and the Navy having to come and backfill literally empty buildings because of a capacity issue, not a lack of resolve on the part of foreign service professionals to do that.

I guess my feeling there is I would almost like to see us go to a toolbox where we certainly increase the capacity of the other agencies where necessary to have expeditionary capability, have funding more along the lines of a block grant so you can allocate that practically by the team that comes together. Around that, organizationally, a toolbox, sometimes it might be better to lead with an NGO, with people who don’t have the same face that become so typical of our deployments. And it is no denigration of the great work our young people have done but a challenge, nonetheless, to take people into unfamiliar terrain.

And then, finally, the issue of Congress could be very troublesome in this, and I mean it more from an organizational and a committee structure.

And, I guess, throwing all those things out on the table, I would like your comments on any one of those pieces and specifically, perhaps, if one of you might comment on the end, on that role of Congress. Is our structure, committee-wise, an impediment to this? And what would you recommend we take some steps internally to begin to address this interagency issue in such a way that we don’t become a stumbling block to a necessary reform?

And we will just throw it open to whoever would like to start.

Ambassador Bodine. Go down the table again?

Ambassador Pascual. On the toolbox, one of the things that has been created and is not really extensively recognized is that there is actually an agreed interagency planning framework that was developed. S/CRS led the process, it was done together with Joint Forces Command. It was actually circulated to all of the combatant commands. It was tested for over a year. It has been tested on the civilian agency side, on countries like Sudan and Haiti, and it works fairly well, and it is not fully recognized that it even exists. So, actually, in fact, elevating that would be a starting point.

Second set of tools that exists is an essential task matrix, which basically goes through and identifies in five critical areas the best lessons from the interagency about the kinds of actions that need to be taken immediately, what needs to be done to build local capacity, what needs to be done to build sustainability over time.
It is not a cookbook, but it is a pretty good checklist of questions that you need to ask. If we had simply gone through that checklist before the operation in Iraq, we would not have deployed, because the answer to most of the initial questions would have been, “I don’t know——

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. I think that is my point; in fact, probably should qualify and say, preventing deployment is an issue in this case as well.

Ambassador PASCUAL. Right.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Because many voices I know quite well, with extensive Middle East experience from my other life, were not allowed at the table effectively, and I just see the structure being a real problem on getting those other respective services.

Ambassador PASCUAL. And let me just say one thing on the structure. I think that if there is a way to deal with setting budget resolutions on these issues of national security that cuts across the foreign affairs and the defense budget, that that is absolutely critical to do.

The 1207 versus S/CRS conflict response fund side-by-side allocation is a proxy for getting at that, but the reality is that you are talking about questions of budget resolutions where those who are dealing with the 150 account are looking at the constraints that they face and they are saying, “We can’t accommodate them.” And so, in effect, these kinds of capabilities just aren’t going to get funded in the foreign affairs budget.

Ambassador BODINE. Just to make a couple of comments, I think that there are two elements, but the most important one, from your point of view, is I think you bring up a very interesting point on congressional structure, and the doctor mentioned the issue that turf wars, when you try to do these in other places, has been a problem and with funding being an element of the turf war.

The fact that you all are looking at this issue and grappling with it as seriously as you are is great, but where is our Foreign Affairs Committee, where is the intel? I mean, until there is some coordination and collaboration, if you like, on the congressional side, we end up getting stuck in turf wars here.

There are a lot of things that we have talked about in terms of staffing and funding and incentives that don’t necessarily come out of this committee, and so some way of building some of those bridges on the congressional side so that we can get to a single funding mechanism, so that we can really get the economies of effort from this side as well.

And I think to the extent that you could get some of that at this end of Pennsylvania Avenue, it would, again, help drive—when we are talking about, for example, legislating NSPD–44 and S/CRS and all the other initiatives that we have brought up, if even those kinds of things were coming out of Congress as a joint armed services-foreign affairs initiative, to make it very clear that this is what you all wanted. I think that would send a powerful signal.

The issue of Presidential will and what comes from the top, you don’t have a lot of control over that, but that is very important. What kind of signals are being sent as to who should have the lead, who should be playing well together, what is the NSC role as a planning and staffing mechanism? Those things have to be done,
and that is where you get at the toolbox. I think Congress can help guide that. Some of it is going to be probably reflected in whoever comes in in the new Administration.

Ms. FlOurnoy. Two quick comments, sir. On the funding issue, I think that the block grant idea is very interesting, something that gives more flexibility and more responsive funding, time-urgent funding flexibility to the people in the field.

The good news here is there some precedent. ERMA, for example, small account, Emergency Refugee Migration Assistance, has all the right authorities. It is a great example where Congress realized that if you wait until people come ask you in the midst of a refugee crisis for the money they need and go through that process, it is going to be too late by the time it shows up. So there was an agreement to give a little bit in terms of—give a lot more flexibility and then impose some pretty substantial reporting requirements. I think that that is a great model for this, sort of, conflict response fund and is urgently needed.

On the committee question, I think there are two ways to go at this. One is, sort of, a higher level of regular cooperation between the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committee, but I think you could also consider a standing committee for oversight of interagency operations. And I think given that we are going to be doing these things not necessarily on the scale of Iraq but a lot of preventive things, a lot of complex operations of various colors and types over the coming years, these issues come up again and again and again. And so some kind of structure that would bring together the leadership or selected members from the key committees to regularly engage and iron out these issues, I think, would be extremely helpful and very important to success.

By the way, this was a recommendation in our first goal beyond Goldwater-Nichols report, and I think it was the one that was received with the most deafening silence up here on the Hill. [Laughter.]

Dr. BensaHel. I agree with what was just said about the importance of creating new committee structures and oversight, because I think that the committee structure of Congress is one of the most detrimental aspects of being able to fund these kinds of operations across the civil-military gap the way that they need.

And while it really is a pleasure to see this committee take such interest in civil-military cooperation, I would have been happier, for one, if this invitation had come from the Foreign Affairs Committee, because I think they are the ones that have the job of appropriating the funds for these types of things as well. And so increased coordination, to the extent possible, between this committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee, to make sure that the budgets for these kinds of operations can be increased, I think, is extraordinarily important.

I once had a Canadian colleague ask me, in complete confusion, why we didn’t just transfer $10 billion or so from the defense budget to the State Department budget and wouldn’t that solve all of our problems? And in a parliamentary system you can do that. In a system that we have in this country you can’t do that so easily, but we need to get closer to that in terms of being able to allocate funds rapidly and effectively where they need to be.
Mr. DAVIS of Kentucky. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Davis, would you like another bite at the apple before you have to leave?

Mrs. DAVIS of California. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much. I appreciate that, but I was going to go to another meeting that Secretary Gates was at. I think he has left by now. You were all so compelling I had to stay.

Dr. SNYDER. Well, if you are not to leave, then you are going to wait your turn. [Laughter.]

Mrs. DAVIS of California. Please, Mr. Chairman, go ahead.

Dr. SNYDER. I wanted to ask, the NSC has come up several times, and we have talked a lot about congressional role and—I always forget the name of the one—Ms. Hicks, Kathleen Hicks and their report that Mr. Andrews was involved in and Mark Kirk and some others. NSC was a prominent part of their state.

Several of you have mentioned NSC and the role they should play. Would you discuss—of course, we talk about congressional oversight and the job that this body, the Congress, should play in making sure that we are achieving the national security objectives through the systems that we set up.

The more that we put in the NSC, the less congressional oversight there will be. That is the nature of it. NSC folks don’t come up here and testify. They won’t come testify. They will maybe come if we say, “Please, oh, please,” for a private breakfast, but that is about as far as we get.

Discuss that, if you would, please.

Dr. Bensahel, why don’t we start with you and go this way, for a change?

Dr. BENSAHEL. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. We will let Ambassador Pascual get a chance to get his thoughts together.

Dr. BENSAHEL. The NSC plays a crucial role in interagency coordination for these, and, frankly, much of that is done at the NSC despite the fact——

Dr. SNYDER. No, I want to get to the issue—that may be true, but how do I know that? How is Congress going to provide the kind of oversight—the word, “failure,” has come out here several times when you look back at the past in your interagency stuff. How do we provide the kind of oversight because of putting things in the NSC, the Presidential advisors?

Dr. BENSAHEL. Well, I think part of the way that you do that is through the usual mechanisms of oversight with the various agencies themselves directly. Even though you can’t get oversight into what is going on in the NSC, you can find out a great deal from those who the NSC is supposed to coordinate, the extent to which they are doing that and how that process is unfolding.

But, ultimately, I think that despite the fact that it is not easily acceptable to congressional oversight, the NSC plays a very critical role in setting up some of the planning parameters and issuing some of the policy guidance that is essential for this process to work properly. If it is doing its job right, you should be able to see that manifesting itself throughout the rest of the government process, and, likewise, if it is not doing its job well.
Ms. Flournoy. I think when you were talking about planning and integrating effort, you really can't expect agencies to direct one another. I think the NSC plays a critical role, but I understand your concern.

I think one of the ways you can work around that is, in some cases, to have a dual chair, and I know that Ambassador Pascual, this is probably what came out of NSPD–44 in some cases, where you have an NSC and departmental co-chair of, for example, a planning process of a particular interagency team.

And so the President maintains the prerogative to have his staff serving him in privacy and in confidentiality, et cetera, but you also have a way to tap into people who are very well-informed about that process who you can call and ask to testify, et cetera.

I underscore the point that Nora made, which is I think one of the problems we have run into recently is that this Administration, among others in our history, has chosen a lead agency model where you put DOD in charge of Iraq and they are going to run the show and bring everybody else to the table.

Well, that typically doesn't work very well in our system, because agencies don't take direction, particularly with regard to resource allocation, very well from one another. You need the honest broker of the NSC, with the President—the imprimatur and the power and the backing up of the President—to do that integration piece effectively.

But if there is an agency that has a lead role or a predominant role, you can make that agency co-chair with the NSC to try to, sort of, bridge the gap.

Ambassador Bodine. I want to take a slightly different position. We have been, as you said, agreeing so furiously. I agree that if too much is vested in the NSC, you run the risk of not just the oversight issue that you brought up but the NSC morphing into an operational organization. And the few times that the NSC has gotten into operational issues, they have generally not been a good thing.

And part of that is because not only does Congress not have oversight over the NSC but to some extent even sometimes the agencies don't necessarily know what they are doing. So I would be hesitant to put too much of this into the NSC formally. The NSC’s role is to coordinate, to collaborate, to be the honest broker, but I was involved in the Office of Counterterrorism for about four years, and we had a co-chair, at least we did have a co-chair for a while, and it was clear that State had the lead role as the coordinator—and that was the name that was used—and that the other agencies were expected to provide staff and resources. And for awhile it worked extremely well. And I think that this is what S/CRS can do.

Other agencies don't like to give money to someone else, but I think, again, if we are talking about a mandate, if we are talking about legislation, if we can get it from Biden-Lugar to Biden-Lugar and several others, that is doable.

NSC should set policy. You need an agency that is responsible for the implementation of that and for the day-to-day coordination of that. That should not really be at the NSC. I think you do need supported agency and then supporting agencies. We have had
times when that has worked and it has worked very well, and I would suggest that model.

Ambassador PASCUAL. Let me go back and try to draw on the analogy that I created between S/CRS and the joint staff of the military. I think everybody here would recognize that the joint staff in the military is absolutely necessary. It should be in the Pentagon. I think everyone would recognize that there is a necessity for a director for defense in the NSC, and they have a relationship with one another, which is also linked, the relationship to the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as to the civilian agencies.

On stabilization and reconstruction issues, if indeed this model of S/CRS as a joint staff on issues related to conflict is the one that we want to pursue, their a link back to the NSC is one director who is within the directorate that is responsible for humanitarian affairs that reports to the deputy national security advisor who is responsible for the G8 process and trade issues, who then passes on information to the principal deputy national security advisor, who then reports to the principal national security advisor.

In other words, there is no effective linkage here. The individuals who are involved in the NSC are tremendously dedicated—or the individual—but there is no structure here.

And the reason that we come back to the importance of an NSC function and role is that let us say you had a reshaped interagency committee that would be brought together on, let us pick Lebanon—not to put it in the context of Iraq or Afghanistan—and there is a particular issue that needed White House attention and resolution and we wanted to bring it back to the deputy's process and the principal's process. There is no immediate and obvious link back to the NSC process.

The individual who is responsible for stabilization and reconstruction is constantly struggling for a voice internally within the NSC and other regional bureaus. You don't get the same thing on defense issues, you don't get the same thing on intelligence issues, because there is an established office there that has greater weight. What we are talking about here is a senior director and maybe three directors, not a huge structure.

Ambassador BODINE. Yes. And I would agree with that.

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Davis for five minutes.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I think more of a comment.

I am really interested, Doctor, in what you were saying about the fact that there really aren't any good examples to look at, any good models of many of our friends elsewhere. And I was struck when we happened to visit the Royal College of Defence studies and they were talking about how they pull in the military people international to be part of that effort, and I asked them, “Well, what about the diplomatic corps, is anybody over there,” and he said, “We can't get anybody from anywhere, not just the U.S., I mean, anywhere, to do that.” And it is partly because their bench is really tight, and they are not able to draw upon people to take that kind of time out.

The other thing that struck me on our trip to Afghanistan last week was that one of the military liaisons happened to be an intel officer, and I thought, “Wow, what are you doing here? I would rather have you working on intel.” He said, “Well, you know, it is
part of the career ladder, and we have to check off this box, basically.”

That is striking that that is the case, and so I think, you know, it is really clear that we don't have that capacity, and trying to develop that capacity is a major task.

You have addressed lots of ways of trying to do that, and I think part of our task is trying to figure out, “Okay, where can the Congress really push in that so we don't have the situation that we certainly found ourselves in Iraq?”

I think the one book that struck me, “Imperial Life in the Emerald City,” and I think by my second or third time it was really apparent to me that that was a problem. And that is partly where I think a lot of us have come from in trying to figure out, “Okay, how do we get there?” Because there are a lot of wonderful people in this country who would like to be part of that effort, but we have to try to find a way to do that.

Ambassador BODINE. As somebody who was in the Emerald City and did not feel that she was living an imperial life at all——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. No, hardly. I agree with that.

Ambassador BODINE. I know, and I know the regime, that some of that was ironic.

I think one of the lessons from that was there was an active exclusion of career professionals throughout the civilian agencies, particularly in the early days in Iraq, and I think that comes through very much in that book.

By and large, State and, you say, people will step up to the plate, but to kind of beat the poor sports metaphor to death, the bench is very, very shallow. And once you have gone through about 2,000 of us, that is it. But some of that, I think, also was a reflection of a political decision on who do we want to staff these. Again, I think how we vest this and congressional oversight as to who is going out to do this is important.

I think another point that is very important is that we not think of this solely in terms of crisis response, but we need to back this up a little bit as to what kind of structures, interagency, funding, staffing, training that we need to get into crises, to get into imploding states early enough so that the military will be there as providing the security and providing some capability and assets that no one else has but that we don't have ourselves in the position that the only thing we can do is respond to a crisis after the implosion, that we can get in there a little bit earlier.

Ms. FLOURNOY. Could I just add, I would agree that while there is no good model out there that we can replicate in terms of somebody who has really got it right, other countries, I do think that there is an emerging consensus of at least an 80 percent solution. I mean, I think most of the things that have been said today there is a lot more agreement than there is disagreement on at least some of the major elements of reform.

I just want to make a comment about timing of reform. When you have looked historically at major congressional reform, whether it was the creation of Special Operations Command, whether it was Goldwater-Nichols, there tends to be a pattern of acknowledged operational failure at some level.
A period of serious investigation, which is what you are doing right now, and internal dialogue within the Congress brought sometimes broader national dialogue on the issue. And then reform. And I think we are in that period of we are acknowledging, not capital “F” failure but recurring failures at the operational level that are not exclusive to any Administration or any operation. This is a pattern over the last 15 years.

And we are now trying to wrestle with, what do we do about it. I think once we are through the, sort of, silly season of Presidential campaigns where any mention of anything becomes a political football, once we can get back to sort of a rational bipartisan discourse, which I applaud this committee for hosting, even in the midst of a silly season, I think that in the new year there is going to be a real window for action, at least to begin down the road of the reforms where there is very broad and deep consensus on these are some of the right things to do.

And I would hope that you would, sort of, seize the initiative in that timeframe. And I think you are likely to get support on the executive side, no matter who comes in as our next President.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin, for five minutes.

Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share your optimism about this as a project, in a way, because, first of all, this committee being a subcommittee we operate pretty much not at a very political level; we are more into solving problems. And there does seem to be, although the committee is not full of the members, but the members that are on this committee, liberal, conservative, there is the consensus that you need decent organization in this area and that things are not right.

And so that is something that gives us room for optimism that in a political world we can put solutions together when there is a common understanding of a problem. And that is where we do well.

Of course, the biggest thing working against this is somebody has been here for 35 years and they are on life support and they are drinking formaldehyde to stay alive and they are head of a committee finally and they don't want to give up any jurisdiction. That is the surprisingly rigid structure that Congress has, politically.

There are a couple of different things I need some help on. The first is, I am just trying to think of America as it relates to foreign countries. I am trying to get up at the 50,000-foot kind of level. And, in general, I think of the point person for America in a foreign country as being the ambassador, and yet we also have different locations around the globe where the 7th fleet has a command vessel and that is the center of military, sort of, organization for a geographic area.

Then we have these—you know, we now just made Africa, and we have Europe and all this. So you have this, sort of, DOD piece of it as well.

I am trying to picture from an organizational point of view—I would think, first of all, it would be logical that if I am some government person in a foreign country, it would be nice to know who is the point man for America. I mean, I would think that would—you need to have, sort of, a single person who is the top. And then it would seem like to me how that then—I am trying to figure in
my own mind if you were the executive, how would you set that structure up? That was my first question.

My second question is, Goldwater-Nichols we did jointness.

I think it was, Ms. Flournoy, you mentioned something about incentives. You get promoted. Promoted? Now, you have got my attention. You create incentives so that people need certain spots in their careers.

It seemed to me that we had jointness between Navy and Army and those other kinds of things. Does it make sense to have that same jointness so that State Department literally trains with the military and the military trains with State, to a certain degree, so that there is, sort of, at least awareness of the structure that the other people are coming from?

Does it make sense that in State Department that you have at least a section of State where people are told, “Something has just happened in this country and you are going over there,” not asking if you are going over there. This is one of those things, “America needs you,” just the same as the military.

Do we need to have at least certain people that volunteer for that type of service? I am not saying everybody in State would want to do that but that there would be at least teams or groups of people that would say, “This is what I signed up for.”

So that is my question.

What is the interface with a foreign country and the U.S. government? What does that look like, and then how do you build that jointness?

Thank you.

Ambassador PASCUAL. Maybe if I might pick up on the first point, a little bit on both points. On the point person in another country, Barbara is—since both of us have ambassador at the start of our titles from previous incarnations, I mean there is one place in U.S. legislation where there is one individual who is the President’s representative and is responsible for representing the United States, and overseas that is the ambassador.

There are tensions with that. I will tell you, when the head of European Command flies into your country and has an aircraft and comes in with about 15, 20 military along with him, they look at the ambassador and they, sort of, look at, “Where is your army?” And it does create a striking difference. And so there is an issue there with resources.

But I think that one of the things that we stand for as a country is civilian control of the military, and if we want other countries to abide by that, we have to practice what we preach. And if we put the military in control of an interagency process that is looking at the future construction of a country, then we are simply violating something that we don’t stand for, and we are setting an example that many countries are all too happy to follow. And so I think reinforcing the civilian capacity is absolutely critical.

On the issue of how you create that jointness, this is one of the reasons why all of us have talked about some reserve capability, and I think that the creation of what the State Department has proposed as the active response corps is so key. Because it basically puts people in the jobs where their responsibility for two years in that job is to engage in training and operations where they are
ready to move and deploy immediately when they are necessary. And in the meantime, they have a regular day job, so if they are not being deployed, they would work on conflict prevention in Africa, for example.

And you are not then looking at where those teams are going to come from in order to do it. These are the individuals who also can be engaged in more effective joint exercises with the military.

When I was the head of S/CRS, one of the things that we tried to do was a lot of exercises with the military. We had some great exercises. In Southern Command, the experience that we had, in some cases, was they were saying by the extent of interagency engagement that they had, it became the most realistic planning process that they had actually ever gone through.

But the problem is that we just don't have the numbers of people to keep up with the military and these kinds of planning processes, and so I think if there can be the resources made available to in fact actually create this active corps, then that is what is necessary to in fact also create jointness and make it a much more viable concept.

Ambassador Bodine. As the other person sitting up here with A-M-B as her first name, I would very much support what Carlos just said. There is a big difference, on the civilian lead and all of that, between ambassadors and Commanders in Chief (CINCs), having served and worked out in the region.

The CINC flies in with his own airplane and all of his staff and everything else, and there is a great big ship off your coast. And that is nice. His idea of engagement is 24 hours on the ground and me taking him around and a dinner party.

My job is to be there for four years, on the ground, every day. My staff is there, on the ground, every day. And so when the government is thinking about who they should be dealing with, who is representing the President's representative but also interagency, and even a very small embassy is interagency.

That is where they look and that is where they should look, and that is where we should encourage them to look. And to the extent that we start projecting that there is an alternative to the ambassador, we start breaking this down very badly. It was a discussion that I had with a number of CINCs is, “We are here every single day and meeting with the minister of defense is not engagement.”

Mr. Akin. Could I stop you just a second, because I just came back from over in Japan and South Korea——

Ambassador Bodine. Yes, right.

Mr. Akin [continuing]. Two different countries but in a way there are some similarities here. I am picturing part of the value of our relations with those countries, as they add a tremendous level of stability to a region that might not be so stable, particularly with China there, but, certainly, North Korea.

Now, from a geopolitical point of view, if we have joint military operations with Japan and we have joint military operations with South Korea, that provides not only additional capability militarily——

Ambassador Bodine. Right.
Mr. Akin [continuing]. But it helps bring those countries, kind of, up to speed in their military capability.

So I am thinking, okay, now I am the commander in chief and I have got these military things going, and that can overshadow what is happening over at State.

So how do you see those kinds of—because that is a very valuable type of outreach to build contact with——

Ambassador Bodine. Oh, it is a critical outreach, and in very poor countries where I have served, for example, the military’s ability to come in and do Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAPs) and Dental Civic Action Programs (DENTCAPs) and Veterinary Civic Action Programs (VETCAPs), and all of this other kind of thing, was critically important. This was very useful training. But it is an element of a relationship——

Mr. Akin. Right.

Ambassador Bodine [continuing]. And one of the jobs that we have to do as ambassadors and as State is also to get those kinds of assets and resources coordinated with what we are doing more broadly and not think that they are a substitute. As I said earlier, it is nice to come in and vaccinate the goats, but I need an AID presence that is large enough, flexible enough and funded enough that I can help the Yemenis develop a veterinary service. The joint exercises are great but they are not a substitute; they are a part.

Mr. Akin. Sure.

Ambassador Bodine. I found in my career in the Middle East that the relationships with the CINCs was a very close one, very supportive, very constructive, very mutually reinforcing. I did not see him as a competitor, largely because I assumed my position. And in most cases, they didn’t really see it as an either/or. We don’t want to do something that starts setting it up as a parallel.

And this gets back to what I was talking about as supported and supporting commands. This is a concept the military is very comfortable with.

On the incentives——

Mr. Akin. Well, so that is helpful for me to know that, that the CINCs understand the need to have you there and for you to coach them in the culture and——

Ambassador Bodine. Absolutely. I mean, you know, we are sending out briefing memos before they arrive, they get off the plane, we are talking to them in a car, “This is who you need to talk about, this is what you need to do, this is what I need from you, this is what I can do for you.” And I have probably worked with ten different central command CINCs, and in almost all cases, it was a very good supportive relationship where we worked closely and came up with some great things.

I want to say, the incentives are a great idea but not melding, not the idea that we are going to homogenize these. I would say from, again, my personal experience is that people in the State Department want to do this training, want to do these exercises, would like to do the outreach. We just simply don’t have the personnel to do it. There is not an institutional aversion to it, it is just there are only 7,000.
Ms. FLOURNOY. I hesitate to comment on the first issue, because I am not an ambassador, but through my observation I think where there is room for improvement is in some of the, sort of, strategic planning or absence thereof that goes on on an interagency basis for what is it the U.S. is trying to do, in a given country, over a given period of time and to try to strengthen the interagency dialogue on those issues at the country level and then at the regional level.

You see a lot of ad hoc activity where the combatant command (COCOM) because it is the entity that is in the region at that level will invite ambassadors of the region to a conference to talk for what it is we are trying to achieve. I would love to see that kind of thing hosted by a civilian entity.

But I think there is room for improvement in more, sort of—beyond crisis response, more strategic planning at the regional level.

I also think that you are seeing here, too, pretty exceptional ambassadors who understood that their job was to lead interagency country teams, lead interagency teams to get jobs done. I don’t think that is universally true. The best ambassadors understand that. I don’t know that we always prepare everyone who takes the position of ambassador to understand you are not just the State Department representative, you are not just a political representative for the President, but you are the interagency integrator for this country.

On the incentives piece, I mean, we have talked about how to incentivize the civilian side, whether it is pay incentives or promotion incentives, other type of things. There is lots that can be done there.

I just wanted for this committee to also highlight something on the military side. Right now—and this is probably a larger discussion to be had with Chairman Skelton—right now, we define very narrowly the particular positions for which a military officer can get joint credit. So there are lots of seriously joint and interagency experiences that people are having on Joint Task Force (JTF) staffs, on COCOM staffs, on interagency staffs where you have officers spending two and three years doing these highly interagency things but not getting joint credit for it.

I think given the increasing number of demands we are putting on officers to collect all these brass rings and then make it to general officer, increasingly packed in a short amount of time, one of the things we should look at is opening up the list of things that count as joint credit, to include, I would argue, more interagency experiences so that you would also incentivize more participation on the military side to come over to civilian agencies, to come over to predominantly civilian staffs and interagency staffs.

Dr. BENSAHEL. Just quickly, on your second question, the issue of establishing the right incentives, in my mind, is the only way to effectively address the interagency problems, because you can’t legislate cooperation, you can’t change an agency’s culture. The only thing that you can do is make it in their interest to do what you want them to do. And that applies at all levels.

There need to be incentives created for agencies to cooperate with each other bilaterally, not just through the direction of the NSC, but through some bilateral—lateral, I should say, mecha-
nism. There need to be incentives for agencies to let their personnel participate, particularly in field deployments, as I described before. But then also there needs to be the right incentives, as Michele has addressed, for individuals to volunteer and for them to have the right career progress ahead of them so that undertaking these kinds of operations and experiences is not detrimental to them. You need the incentives to be lined up at all levels in order to mitigate some of the worst aspects of interagency competition.

Mr. Akin. Thank you.

Dr. Snyder. If you can hang on for about ten more minutes, I will take five minutes and we will go to Mr. Davis for five minutes, and then we will be right about lunchtime.

I wanted to share a quick anecdote, as we are talking about the ambassador on the ground. I think what your phrase was—Ms. Flournoy, you referred to the ambassador as being the interagency facilitator or someone like that.

Some years ago, I visited Sierra Leone right as the U.N. troops were going out at the end of that war to be peacekeepers, and Joe Melrose was our ambassador there. And there was, I think, a 200-Brit military force that was providing training for the new Sierra Leone army, and there were three U.S. troops there so that it was a joint training force.

And one of them was a Marine—I have two marines on my staff sitting in the back, so probably why I am telling this story. This young marine was a tough guy and literally when he arrived by helicopter into Sierra Leone he was with a woman in her 60's who was working for an American NGO, she was an American citizen, who was wearing a neck brace. They got off the helicopter, she got into a private car and went to her place outside of Freetown where she was going to live and work some time.

That marine, because of the Marine Corps rules, could not leave Freetown overnight, and it just frustrated—and Ambassador Melrose did not have the authority to make that decision. It was fine with him that that marine go outside of the area. And I don't want to take my time for a comment on that, but it really brought home the intricacies of some of these relationships that can mess up the ability to fulfill a mission. We got that corrected, but it shouldn't have been corrected by a Member of Congress.

I wanted to make one comment, Ms. Flournoy, and then ask a question. You referred to the Presidential campaign as a the silly season.

Ms. Flournoy. I am sorry.

Dr. Snyder. I want to pick on you about that.

Ms. Flournoy. In a moment of too much candor, I am afraid.

Dr. Snyder. It is the most vital part of this country's democracy. It has its moments of silliness, but it is not the silly season. And if we think that we can come back in January or February or March of next year as Members of Congress and do some kind of dramatic first change in 50 years in how national security policy is made and conducted and not one Presidential candidate talk about these issues between now and November, or November and swearing in, or no mention or reference in the inaugural speech, I think that is going to be tough.
I was struck last night, and disappointed last night. In fact, I, publicly, at our last full committee hearing when Secretary Gates testified, I pulled out his Kansas State speech and said, “Mr. Secretary, this is a great basis for an inaugural speech,” which is a wonderful way to flatter people, right. He got all flustered because he doesn’t want to have anything to do with that. But it is. It is talking about a vision for the future of American national security.

Last night, we got a mention of the PRTs by the President, but there was no mention about, “let us pull together and set this up for our next President. We have got some problems, institutional problems that the Clinton Administration had, that this Administration has had. Why not spend this year—we have got Mr. Davis and Mrs. Davis working together, we have got others working together. Why not spend the next 10 or 12 months and work on that issue together in a non-partisan, bipartisan way?”

It didn’t get a mention.

So I am not coming down on you hard, Ms. Flournoy, but I think part of our job, and I would hope part of your job, is to make this issue part of this Presidential campaign in some capacity, in some way, because, otherwise, to think that we can somehow hatch an egg out with the limited resources we have come January of next year that has not been—what is the word for keeping the egg warm—incubated, that is going to be a tough——

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, I apologize for my moment of sarcasm, but in terms of actions speaking louder than words, these recommendations came out of Beyond Goldwater-Nichols work that I have done. And I have personally briefed three, and hoping to get to at least four, of the major candidates, two on each side, on exactly these issues.

So I am, my comment aside, taking it very seriously.

We don’t want this to become a partisan issue was my point, a political football, but we want every candidate to agree that this is good governance for the United States.

Dr. SNYDER. I would love to see the candidates fight over what they think is the best way to bring about interagency reform.

Ms. FLOURNOY. Right.

Dr. SNYDER. I think that would be a wonderful discussion and debate to have. And it may have its moments of silliness, but I think it is—I appreciate you doing that, because if we think this issue is important, then we ought to have people standing up at these town meetings and saying, “What about interagency reform?”

Now, that is probably not going to happen, but there will be moments of serious foreign policy discussions, and I would hope that these would come up.

I want to ask Dr. Bensahel, in just the remaining few seconds I have, you said you can’t change culture. I think you can change culture. I mean, culture is set by leadership. Bad culture is bad habit, and I think there are a variety of ways that you can change the culture of an institution if you decide that is important to change that culture and that culture is hurting. And part of it is just educating people that that culture is hurting.

I think that is the strength of Secretary Gates’ speech. What it said is that there is this sense going on within the Pentagon that says, “Something ain’t right, and it may not all be us.” And there
is a changing culture. Who would have thought that we would have a secretary of defense making the most eloquent statement we have had in the last several years about why we need to do something for State Department funding. So I think that is a change of culture.

Mr. Davis, for five minutes, and then we would better let you all go to lunch.

Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Just taking from Chairman Snyder’s comments, I have talked to several of the Presidential candidates, and I began this effort a year ago. I know there are other fellow travelers in this that are raising the issue as well. And in the early discussions, it was very clear that they, in many cases, did not have a clue that this was a critical issue. Some have been successful executives and they think, “Oh, my personality will do this,” not understanding the process.

To Dr. Bensahel’s comment on not having incentives to change, in the corporate sector, the incentive is continued employment, and I think that the models to look to for radical institutional change to adapt to the marketplace is to go out into the commercial world. If you look at what Motorola did, if you look at how Toyota, this young, provocative upstart came in and forced the transformation of American manufacturing because of an entirely different paradigm.

What they were able to do, from a conceptual or a spatial standpoint, is accomplish exactly what we are talking about today. Is it perfect? By no means. There are always the challenges that you face.

I think what drove that, having seen part of that from the inside in the manufacturing world, it is the old statement, “The greatest source of inspiration is desperation,” when you realize there is a need to change.

Speaking of silly season as an aside, there is one. Come visit my primary in the spring with the person who rides on UFOs and the indicted felon. I think I can win in a three-way, but it is going to be a very interesting few months. [Laughter.]

But back to the—I just wanted to salve your wound there for a moment. [Laughter.]

But coming back to this issue, I traveled to the Middle East with some of the marines sitting in the back of the room, and for an Army guy that is a tough thing anyway, but I have to tell you, talking to every one of them, this issue, interagency reform is the issue, every service group that I have been with it is being talked about here in the Armed Services Committee based on that old desperation to address the ultimate root cause. Foreign Affairs hasn’t had an authorization in, what, 12 years?

Ambassador Bodine. Yes.

Mr. Davis of Kentucky, Fourteen years?

Ambassador Bodine. And when we get it it is——

Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Yes, I mean, because they are giving—and I think it is just a misguided priority, frankly, of just talking about resolutions of things that probably create things for you all to do on crisis messaging and things like that in different parts of the world.
At the end of the day, there are a lot of members on that committee in a wide number that want to see these types of changes that we have seen in the interagency reform caucus group that has been recruited on both sides—some folks who can't even be in a room together on any other issue but at least they will agree on this.

And the issue of the NSC—and this is really where I would like folks to comment for a moment—the one area of objection that we had from the Project for National Security Reform study, which I think some of you are participating in that great collection of talents to direct it—a stumbling block to getting that done last January and February when we were in hearings in the full committee, it was very clear it was the National Security Council staff with the objection points to preventing that study from going forward when we were going to talk about probably 23 different case studies that showed this process problem that is very embedded.

We finally got around that, but I think the agency itself is its own kind of shadow for—the organization is its own kind of shadow agency. I have even seen visa problems fixed going through the NSC. I don't want to even know how that happened. But got the problem fixed.

But, nonetheless, there is a process unto itself. And this integration, I think, is going to be critical at the end of the day.

I would highly encourage the folks in the corporate world who have done this to come into the dialogue, specifically since 50 of the largest 100 economies in the world are companies. Wal-Mart, if it were a nation, is the eighth largest trading partner of China. And I am not advocating copying all their marketing practices and things like this, but it is this constant adaptation and integration to change that would be of value.

One thing that I would ask you to comment on, and this might be the radical question, what about moving to a point to have the integration change in the commands themselves, to go to something very hybrid and different, to, for example, in an Africa command, we have an integrated, diplomatic and military response, to have the first or second person, depending on what has to be the more lead focus, to be a civilian working hand in hand with the military?

And if it switches to the other way, then, obviously, some adaptation, but maintaining maybe a tighter integration so you don't have, kind of, a pro-consul on one side with his patrolling guard and centurions all around him and then the poor diplomat in the toga hitching a ride on the chariot as he is coming by, going off to the crisis. [Laughter.]

Ambassador Bodine. I do applaud that with African Command (AFRICOM) that a State Department person is the number two, and I think that that is, in many ways, an improvement over the political advisor position, which is what we normally have, which was extremely personality dependent. If the commander chose to listen to the POLAD, it was great, and if they didn't, there really wasn't anything to do.

I would certainly not want this to be seen as a substitute or, to go back, an infringement on the ambassador's prerogatives. They have a regional focus; they don't have a day-to-day, on-the-ground capability. I think that that is an improvement but we have to be
very careful that we avoid what Carlos so eloquently talked about is both the perception and, in some cases, the reality that we are leading with our military in too many aspects of our foreign policy abroad. There are a lot of reasons that we shouldn't be doing that.

And, again, sort of, getting into this supported-supporting command issue is an important one on how we conduct ourselves, how we manage the resources, what kind of a message that we are giving. I think it is an improvement.

I would like just very quickly on your deployment story from Sierra Leone, that is one issue that I did have with regional commanders is that they were making decisions on who could come into my country and do what, in many cases, overrode my own judgments and my own—and they were defining deployed forces not as something like the photograph behind you, which anybody would understand that what goes on in Afghanistan and Iraq is deployed forces, but two guys from the Coast Guard in polo shirt and Dockers who were going to come in, work out of my embassy and work on a Coast Guard for the Yemenis was suddenly declared to be a deployed force. And I lost control over when and how these people could come in. And at that point, it started to become—we were not working as well together.

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, If I might just add, one of the things I have recommended in past work is thinking about the notion of regional security councils where you would have an interagency entity—might be physical, might be virtual—but with an original ambassador appointed, whose job is not to usurp the authorities of the country ambassadors but really to have a full-time job of coordination. There are so many of these, whether terrorists, weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—I mean, pick your issue, it is very difficult to work these country by country. The things flow across borders very quickly in terms of what we need to contend with.

And I know that, actually, Ambassador Pascual has played a regional ambassador role before, so maybe he will comment on this, but I think having an interagency entity that is not just ad hoc but meets on a regular basis to try to work the regional integration issues would be very useful. The key would be, can you do it without it just becoming another layer of bureaucracy, which would not be helpful.

Ambassador PASCUAL. I think one of the strengths that we have had as a country is our embassy presence and at one time our USAID presence around the world, and a lot of that has shrunk, particularly USAID has shrunk.

And one of the things, I think, that was driving Secretary Gates’ statement is a recognition that in a world that is becoming increasingly complex, we need individuals who are posted on the ground with historical and language and cultural knowledge to be able to understand what the problems are to design solutions and to oversee their implementation. And you only get that with a deployed capacity.

One of the things I would just underscore is that strengthening the capacity to have that country-specific understanding and knowledge is still key and is still a central part of our national security requirement and it is a role that I think an ambassador heads up, but it requires a whole interagency involvement.
I think that there is a strong rationale for having a stronger and better integrated regional function, because, as Michele just said, many of the problems that you are dealing with are transnational, whether it is transnational terrorism or risk of proliferation or the role that insurgents play across country, the inner linkages you have between drug trades and insurgency. You need to look at these across countries.

And so having a capacity to have a strategic vision in that way I think makes a lot of sense. How you organize it and whether you put it into a combatant command is worth debating, and it gets at this question of who is leading and who is driving U.S. policy. But I think that the question needs to be asked.

A point that I would underscore, Mr. Chairman, in changing culture is the importance of leadership. And as you just said, Secretary Gates, in his leadership, has played a fundamental role in changing the way that people think about the interagency and the integration of civilian and military functions.

And if we bring this back to the NSC, you know, we have had NSCs of Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft and Sandy Berger and Tony Lake and Condi Rice, and those are fundamentally different entities and structures, and what it reflects is that depending on the leadership that you have at the top, you can get very different results.

And so the kind of oversight that you provide of the interagency process—and here I understand your frustration, you can’t call a national security advisor in to testify—but it is absolutely necessary to continue to have that check and balance.

The final point I would just make is that weak as some of the international experiments might be—and Nora did a great job of laying out what some of the problems are—you still have in the EU a reserve mechanism that has 200 monitors, 200 judges, 200 administrators, 5,000 police. The Germans have a reserve mechanism that they run through an NGO called ZIF. The Canadians have a $140 million conflict response fund. Even the U.N. has a $250 million respond fund for peace-building, which we, by the way, do not contribute a penny to right now.

Others are getting out there and doing this, and we are falling behind in the kind of experimentation that we are doing, because we are not putting forward the resources.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Bensahel, would you like the last word?
Dr. BENSAHEL. Yes, please.
Dr. SNYDER. Go ahead.
Dr. BENSAHEL. A final note on the changing of organizational cultures. Of course, it is possible to change them. What I meant to emphasize is, it is almost impossible to do from the outside. It really comes from the leadership of those organizations and has to filter down from the top to people throughout the agency.

It is also very important for people within an organization to believe that something fundamentally wrong is happening, whether it is failure or desperation, that the current way of conducting business is not succeeding and something needs to be changed.

And I think that now you are seeing that within the Department of Defense, not just within the leadership but among the soldiers who are on the ground and conducting U.S. operations.
I think in 2004–2005, the early-ish days of deployments in Iraq, what you heard from a lot of soldiers who had on-the-ground experience was that the military could solve these problems. “If the State Department isn’t coming, if civilian authorities aren’t coming, we are just going to have to do it ourselves.”

And I think we have seen a very profound shift in the last year or two to statements from people from the very top, from Secretary Gates on down to privates who are coming back from deployment, saying, “That is not the solution. We can’t do it, we need help to do it. The only solution is to build up civilian capacity.”

That is a very powerful message being sent from the people that we are asking to go serve the country and conduct these operations. And I think that because that culture is changing within that organization from a perceived failure to succeed, as much as perhaps could be the case, we may get some impetus for reform.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you all for being here. I will give you the opportunity as a question from me for the record, if you all have any additional written comments you would like to make, you have, I don’t know, some time to submit those to staff, and we will include those as part of the record and distribute them to the committee staff.

Thank you all again for being here. This committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

January 29, 2008
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JANUARY 29, 2008
Opening Statement of  
Chairman Dr. Vic Snyder  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Hearing on “Interagency Reform: Can the PRT Case Study Illuminate the Future of Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations?”

January 29, 2008

The hearing will come to order.

Good morning, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations’ hearing on the implications for Interagency Reform derived from the specific example of the establishment and operation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

There has been significant buzz in the policy community about interagency failings in national security. We have looked at PRTs in past hearings and heard about their “tactical” successes and shortcomings. Many of the PRT’s shortcomings seem to stem from weakness in the interagency process at the operational and strategic levels. As we broadened our inquiry to the larger Security, Stabilization, Transition and Reconstruction operational capacity development context these weaknesses have become more evident. We hope our witnesses today will be able to provide us with some depth and initial conclusions on this topic.

We are joined today by:

- Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Diplomat in residence at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University and a former Foreign Service officer with over 30 years of experience concentrated in the Arabian Peninsula and greater Persian Gulf, including as Ambassador to Yemen.

- Ambassador Carlos Pascual, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution and the first Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department

- Ms. Michele Flournoy, President, Center for a New American Security, formerly of CSIS (Beyond Goldwater-Nichols project lead) and before that Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy.

- Ms. Nora Bensahel, Senior Political Scientist, The RAND Corporation and author of numerous studies on post-conflict reconstruction and the related policy challenges
Welcome to all of you and thank you for being here. After Mr. Akin’s opening remarks, I’ll turn to each of you for a brief opening statement. Your prepared statements will be made part of the record.

With that, let me turn it over to our ranking member, Mr. Akin, for any statement he would like to make.
Statement of Ranking Member Todd Akin  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations  
House Armed Services Committee  

Interagency Reform: PRTs As A Case Study  

January 29, 2008  

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning to our witnesses, we appreciate you being here today.

After studying Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the subject of interagency stability operations for over four months, the subcommittee is nearing the close of this investigation. Today’s hearing offers an opportunity to hear from experts on what lessons we should learn from the PRT program and processes for planning and executing stability operations.

One of the challenges this subcommittee faces as we close out our work on the PRTs and interagency stability operations is figuring out how – if at all – the Congress can move legislation that will ensure that agencies like the Departments of Defense and State will work in lockstep, seamlessly
applying the tools of national power. Much of what needs to be done are matters that are within the constitutional prerogative of the Executive Branch. Other initiatives that the Congress could appropriately address would still face hurdles, because much of what needs to be done can only emerge outside the stove piped Congressional committee system.

I thought the concrete proposals you’ve recommended in your prepared testimony are helpful and are consistent with what the subcommittee has learned over the course of this investigation. As we discuss these suggestions today, I’d like our witnesses to delineate which proposals should be done in the short term and how Congress can advance such an initiative.

Again, thank you to our witnesses for being here today. I look forward to your testimony.

[Yield to Chairman Snyder]
In the 21st century the greatest threats to the United States, to our security and prosperity at home and our security interests and national values abroad, will come not from standing armed forces of strong competitor states such as the former Soviet Union or China but from instability within and between weakest. The new violence we will face is not from powerful adversaries so much as failed and failing states imploding from a perverse lack of legitimacy, an inability or unwillingness to provide basic services, basic structures and a basic social compact for their own citizens. These imploding states will be marked by domestic violence and humanitarian misery at a level unacceptable, sometimes unimaginable to the international community, will constitute a threat to the peace and stability of their neighbors, and will spawn non-state actors who, in opposition to the misery or as a root cause of the failure, can exploit the vacuum for pernicious transnational purposes, spreading the violence and the threat further outward. These will be civil wars, secessionist movements, insurgencies.

This is not a prediction of the future but an assessment of current realities. There is not yet a consensus within this country or within the international community on whether, at what stage or how to respond, whether it is a pre-crisis or early crisis “responsibility to protect” or a mid-crisis “right to defend,” but there is a recognition that the threat from imploding states cannot safely be ignored. If the threats to the United States and our interests and values come from and within the weakest and reflect political, economic and social dislocation then the tools at our disposal must address the roots of these threats.
Two corollaries to this threat from weakness rather than strength, is that, first, the continuum of threat and violence, intra-state and external, will be longer and more ambiguous than with conventional threats and conventional inter-state violence, which allows for greater opportunities for conflict and crisis prevention and mitigation prior to the requirement for military intervention, and, second, that the concept of a clear “post-conflict” break point for a shift from military to civilian will be equally ambiguous.

The response, whether unilateral or multilateral to intra-state violence, at one end of the continuum may require military force – stability creation, peace-making, peace-enforcing or peace-maintenance. What for too long in the military considered unconventional warfare will become, has become the new conventional.

The US Army and Marine Corps have recognized this shift in the recent Counterinsurgency Manual. Yet despite the acknowledgment of the primacy of the political and the need for civilian agency partners during the stabilization phase, especially in Chapter Two, the net conclusion remained one of a military lead.

Some of this is understandable and appropriate. The Army and the Marine Corps cannot - should not - write the manual, set the doctrine for the civilian agencies. The default to military lead is also a reflection of a perception that civilian agencies cannot or will not be full partners. It is a reflection of the imbalances, particularly resourcing, that have grown over the past few years and the need to prudently plan for a future of enduring and compounding imbalances.

The question becomes whether the imbalances, the lack of coordination, collaboration is inevitable and irreversible, whether the shift in lead, implicit if not explicit, is necessary in the current context and foreseeable future, and whether the fundamental interagency process is either so broken or so antiquated as to be irrelevant.

My answer to these questions would be that the imbalance was not inevitable, is not appropriate, and is reversible. The fundamental structure and process is neither irredeemably broken nor antiquated, but has been sufficiently subverted that pro-active corrective action is needed. I would also say at the outset that while Step One is one of political will and policy direction – within both the executive and legislative branches – there is a price tag. In the broad scheme of things, not a large one, but it isn’t going to be free.

It Wasn’t Always So

Legislative and Executive branch efforts at creating, fixing or overhauling interagency effectiveness in collaboration on national security date, at minimum, to the very creation of the modern interagency structure – the 1947 legislation proposed by President Truman and passed by Congress that established, inter alia, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and, critical to today’s discussion, the National Security Council (NSC). The fundamental function of the NSC was to provide
coordination and collaboration between these new agencies and existing structures, most notably the Department of State. Ironically, an objective of the framers was to provide a forum and structure, a level playing field, for the new DOD up against the established and then pre-eminent State Department. The State Department and the Secretary were the President’s senior advisors and principle agents on the formulation and implementation of foreign policy writ large. One function of the NSC was to ensure that the DOD voice was heard.

The tension between the oldest federal department and the newest was virtually hardwired into the new system. In many respects, this tension served successive presidents well, as did successive National Security Advisors and their staffs, each a reflection of style and priorities of the president they served. While debates and disagreements could be intense, and not without their personal dimensions, on the whole and over time, the system worked, sometimes well.

I spent the majority of my more than 30 years in the Foreign Service working interagency, primarily with DOD and the uniform military. My second tour was as a political-military officer in Bangkok during the last days of the Vietnam War. My last assignment was as Senior Advisor in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. In the intervening years, I was involved in the drafting of the Lower Gulf Arms Policy and the first sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia in the late 70s; served as number two at our mission in Baghdad during the open years of the Iran-Iraq War; coordinated the Tanker Protection Regime in the last years of that conflict; Associate Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department of State, charged with oversight and management of counterterrorism operations, primarily a Special Operations function; subsequently acting overall Coordinator for Counterterrorism; as well as the interagency oversight and coordination that comes from a directorship for East Africa and as Deputy Chief of Mission and Chief of Mission at several posts in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at State. In many of those assignments, my work was as much interagency as traditional bilateral work.

While the organizational cultures, bureaucratic dynamics and resources were always issues, there was a fundamental understanding of shared goals and missions, of support for the President’s national security strategy, and of division of labor. As I explained to the Special Ops guys I worked with on counterterrorism – I don’t do guns; you don’t do policy. I will figure out when and why; you figure out how. We were all comfortable with that division.

Coordination and collaboration was never ideal. In the late 1990s, as the number of humanitarian interventions increased, there was at least one major effort between DOD, State and Central Command to better work complex contingencies. Ms. Flournoy and I, in fact, participated in one such effort in the mid-90s, along with US Marine Corps General Tony Zinni, following our intervention in Somalia but prior to his assuming command of Central Command.

While the machinery did not always work as desired, while there could be major bureaucratic battles with the outcome determined as much by the force of personalities at
the top as the merits of the arguments, there was an agreed, understood and largely adhered to process. Most disputes were resolved at the working level. As needed, disputes would be sent up the chain and, often referred by the NSC, at some level resolved. Once a decision was made, you saluted smartly and carried on. If the disagreement was fundamental, you had the option to resign, as Secretary Vance chose to do over Desert One and a few career officers have felt compelled to do over time.

That was the system, the process, the principles I came to understand and, even in frustration and exasperation, respect.

The Year 2003 – Presages and Practices – A Systemic Failure?

I was not prepared for what I found in Washington in early 2003 when called back by the Department of State for secondment to DOD’s reconstruction efforts in Iraq. I had, of course, read about the interagency struggles in the media, but wrote them off as the settling in process of any new administration, the sorting out of strong personalities at the top, and a press looking for a good story. I figured it was no worse than the legendary relationship between Defense Secretary Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz during President Reagan’s administration. Having been intimately involved in State-DOD joint efforts throughout that administration, I assumed that at the working level, and even at the level of principals, it continued to function.

The reality in 2003 was that it did not function, at any level. The decision to vest the reconstruction at DOD was not as a mandate to coordinate a broad interagency effort, not simply to subordinate the Department of State and others, but as license to exclude them. The extensive interagency work done on the Future of Iraq Project, along many of its key participants, was dismissed. A decision from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to bar uniform military from participation in the work of the project presaged the dismissal of the project and its drafters that was to come. Prior to NSPD 24, there was an explicit OSD decision to bar direct State, and interagency, collaboration with the uniformed military elements directly concerned with its work.

This subversion of the longstanding collaboration predated Iraq. A very senior officer within Central Command visited Sana’a in my last month at post, in August 2001. The senior leadership at DOD was now in place. This senior officer recounted that a directive had come down severing the direct coordination – collaboration – between Central Command and its counterpart bureaus at State. This senior officer fumed that he and his command simply could not do their job if everything – everything – had to be filtered through OSD. It was unnecessary, impractical and, if I read his tone correctly, insulting.

This extended beyond Iraq. In my last assignment, as Senior Advisor in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, I headed a negotiating team with one of our key NATO allies, a close and supportive friend, on a key national security issue. The outcome of the negotiations would not only affect a major defense initiative, but the interests of one of the services and a functional, rather than regional, command. At one stage of the negotiations, often more difficult between State and OSD than bilaterally, a position was
staked out by OSD that seemed at odds with what I understood to be the long term planning assumptions of this service and this command. Greatly at odds. By agreement with DOD, State has Political Advisors (POLADs) assigned to service headquarters and a number of commands. I did a reality check. I called the POLAD. Had they been consulted and was this an agreed position? I was more than surprised to learn they had not been consulted by OSD, were adamantly opposed and gravely concerned. I left it to them to sort it out and get back to me with an agreed position. I was even more surprised by the reaction within and from OSD. The service, the command and we were told in no uncertain terms that the conversation itself was unauthorized. The fact that OSD had not only misrepresented the position of the service and the command but had not either coordinated or informed them of their decision was incomprehensible to me.

What I observed as Senior Advisor mirrored what I had seen in Iraq in 2003 – a consistent pattern of ignoring, overriding the judgments and interests of the professional services and of decisions taken interagency. Minutes of NSC Principal and Deputy Principal meeting were rewritten to accord not with the discussions and decisions taken, but with the preferred position going in, or those decisions were simply ignored.

In looking at the policy-making process on Iraq, one former senior administration official is quoted in David Rothkopf’s Running the World as saying “I have never seen more high-level insubordination in the U.S. Government in almost thirty years.”

My point in recounting this history is that what happened in Iraq, and is at the heart of the Subcommittee’s interest here today, was not isolated or accidental. It was not so much a systemic failure of an antiquated mechanism as a subversion of the system that cascaded down and rippled out.

**Going Forward**

This is an important distinction. If we are faced with a fundamental systemic failure, with an apparatus that simply cannot deal with 21st century national security issues, then we need to fundamentally reform the system. If we are dealing with insubordination, as one administration official chose to characterize it, or subversion... or simply one agency’s consistent, deft and, short-term at least, ability to bend the system to its policy preferences, then we have another set of problems, and entirely different set of remedies.

As the nature of the threat has shifted from the powerful to the weakest, the root causes have shifted to political, economic and social failures and the nature of the response has shifted from traditional kinetic force to a more complex continuum of civilian and non-kinetic tools, there has over the recent past a counterintuitive reorientation of our foreign policy approach toward leading with force. Other national security tools have subordinated or absorbed. In military parlance, the military has become the supported command; all other agencies supporting commands. Much has been written and discussed about righting the balance between “hard power” and “soft power” to what some now prefer to call “smart power” and I will not repeat that here. The need for a
realignment, for swing back to a new middle norm is already underway, but will remain frustrated by the third reality.

This manipulation of the policy-making process and reorientation of the nature of our foreign policy approach has been compounded by a crippling and chronic imbalance in resourcing – people and money. As it has evolved, it has, as has been said elsewhere, resulted in one agency on steroids, and the rest of the national security structure on life support. We have now reached the stage were missions follow resources rather than resources follow missions. As this has spiraled over recent years, many of these agencies increasingly simply don’t have the wherewithal to play their role effectively, with their roles being taken up, by default if not by design, by the military. A vacuum was created and the military has been obliged to fill it. The “Washington Post” on January 24, 2008, reported an initiative by DOD to hire 1,000 language specialists, with a DOD spokesperson graciously noting that this talent pool would be available to other agencies on an as-needed basis. This will, as has become the pattern, be outsourced to a private contractor.

The recent US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency (CI) Field Manual, especially Chapter Two, makes clear an understanding that a civilian partner is needed, but that the military will take on the roles and missions of the civilian partners if they are unable to do so, in too many cases reinventing wheels others have already invented, field-tested and used.

Let me state clearly that I do not believe it is the intent or in the interest of the military to become a one-stop shop for all national security missions – language, development, governance, intelligence etc. This committee understands better than most in Washington the strain on the military. The US military is under strength for its missions. One result, and a most unfortunate and potentially dangerous one, is to outsource these expanding non-kinetic missions, as seen in the language specialist contract noted above, DIA’s $1 billion intelligence support contract as another. It makes no sense to me, and to many friends within the military and in other agencies to privatize a number of non-warfighting functions, and then to add responsibility for post-conflict operations at an unprecedented scale and duration. It is difficult enough to maintain unity of command, a ‘whole government’ approach or interagency coordination and collaboration if you all working for the same government. Add contractors at this level and for this duration – for these needs will not go away soon – and we lose control, accountability, flexibility…..and money.

PRTs as Laboratory

This leads directly to the question of the Provincial Reconstructions Teams (PRTs) as both a legacy of the issues outlined above, and as a possible guide for correction, with some caveats. The establishment of the PRTs reflects many of the concepts and lessons learned reflected in the CI Manual. As we build experience with PRTs, along with our allies and friends in Iraq and Afghanistan, new questions arise.
Should they be COIN-centric, i.e., are they in support of military operations and objectives, or is the primary mission governance and development?

Are we looking for quick fixes to further security, or long term solutions to build stability?

Should their field of vision be local, provincial or should the aperture be widened to a broader country-level strategy?

To what degree can and should local stakeholders, local and international NGOs, multilateral partners and/or international organizations be part of the strategy, the planning and/or the implementation? Does primary mission and de jure or de facto leadership affect the degree to which others can or will want to be part of the effort? If it does, to what degree should that inform our decisions on how we structure ourselves?

Which agency should have de jure lead? Which agency has de facto lead? What determines the difference?

Can there be effective interagency coordination and collaboration in the field absent similar coordination and collaboration at home?

**What Can We Learn from the PRTs?**

Drawing from our experience to date with the PRTs, recognizing the dynamics behind the revolutionary recasting of the Army and the Marine Corps approach to CI, and in light of the reality of the nature of the new threats and the new violence we confront,

PRTs are a useful and appropriate response to the realities of Iraq and Afghanistan, a transitional response mechanism that bears close monitoring and examination for use in other contexts. This would include not only the experiences and lessons learned from U.S. PRTs, as structured and managed differently in Iraq and Afghanistan, but lessons to be learned from our allies’ efforts as well.

PRTs should support COIN operations but not be an extension of them. The primary mission should be building local/provincial capacity in governance, support of the national level political strategy, as well as the local/provincial long-term sustainable development, as opposed to quick impact projects of questionable value as either a security tool or a development tool.

- *Building schools has limited value if there are no teachers, no curriculum development, and no education system. Doing too much ourselves, especially if military-led, can delegitimize fragile local and national political and social leaderships. It devalues the civilization of emerging*
power structures, and reinforces in local minds the ineffectiveness of local and national political structures.

- A civilian-focused as well as led PRT program has a greater chance of building local/provincial political networks, and coordinating if not directing, supervising and managing the work of NGOs and IOs.

  - NGOs are going to have to come to terms with working with if not within these structures, but their sense of humanitarian space, and of perceived non-combatalant status will be enhanced if the structure is not perceived by them, and by the locals, as military. Some allied agencies as well as international organizations and NGOs cannot, by law, work with military-led entities, but can and will work alongside military efforts.

- This is not a recommendation that there be a division between security on the one hand and diplomacy/governance/development on the other, but of the balance of missions, with security the supporting function and diplomacy (governance) and development the supported mission.

- PRTs must reflect a comparable level of interagency coordination at home, including clearly defined lead agency.

Fixing the Interagency – Getting Back to Basics

PRTs or some other comparable mechanism in the field – pre or post conflict - cannot be successful without functioning interagency guidance and back-up. This does not require a fundamental restructuring of the national security apparatus, a Goldwater-Nickels for the national security agencies or the civilian agencies, any more than repair of what Norm Ornstein called “The Broken Branch” demands a rewriting of the constitution on separation of powers, checks and balances and oversight.

While the Counterinsurgency Manual has rightly been called radical and revolutionary, and if adopted would be a tectonic shift in military doctrine, it draws heavily on lessons from the past, lessons that were ignored not simply forgotten. The manual is a call to go back to basics, but getting it right for the 21st century.

For the interagency, this will mean:

(a) Reaffirm the basic decision-making and policy making process as mandated and created in 1947, taking into account evolutions and adjustments the accrued over successive administrations. This would include clarity on supported vs. supporting agencies in policy-making, agenda setting and implementation; reaffirmation of Chief of Mission authorities; a National Security Council that serves the President by serving the interagency; and effective Congressional oversight.
(b) Formalize civilian-military coordination in anticipation of crisis, not just in response to crisis, through legislation that endorses the mandates of State and S/CRS outlined in NSPD 44.

(c) Provide sufficient, regular and predictable funding to all national security civilian agencies. Parity with the military is not the goal; equity is. A State/USAID apparatus the size of even the Marine Corps is not called for. A diplomacy and development apparatus that is commensurate with the new challenges and threats is.

The State Department has fewer than 10,000 FSOs. It is grotesquely understaffed, under funded and under resourced. USAID is perhaps in worse shape on staffing and funding, and hamstrung by an accretion of procedural regulations that severely impair its response capacity.

It will take time to build the diplomacy and development structure we must have but it is unconscionable that we face cuts at a time when the challenges and threats we face demand that we do more with more, not less with less. (We are well beyond the “doing more with less” stage).

- We need sufficient staff and resources for a “training cushion” – for languages, for area studies commensurate with a rigorous academic institution, for the host of new skill sets and expertise we expect of an evolving service dedicated to protecting and advancing our interests and values abroad, for advanced education opportunities such as I have seen the military take full advantage of at some of our finest universities. While I was at the Kennedy School of Government and subsequently at MIT’s Center for International Studies, I was impressed with the high number of mid-level uniformed officers on one-year advanced degree programs, and dismayed by the paucity of FSOs, and this during major military operations in two theaters.

- We need sufficient funds, resources and mandate to turn the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) into an institution as capable in mission and academic integrity as service war college. A Marine major who worked for me in Baghdad in 2003 spent a year at the Naval Post-graduate School in Monterey, CA, working with some of the most notable scholars today on questions of Iran, Islam, democratization, nation-building. Those opportunities must be made available to our foreign service and related civilian agency personnel.

- Studies on PRTs, and personal experience, teach that interagency coordination and collaboration cannot simply be mandated from above – although “command culture” and political will are critical – but must be built from the bottom up. Long-term interagency training is critical and FSI should be given the tools to do this.
We need sufficient staff for embassies, to reopen consulates, to reinvigorate our public diplomacy at the grass roots level, to be able to reach beyond the ministries and the mandated reports which can tie our best officers to their desks, the last place they should be. We need the staff, resources and training to be able to respond to crises such as Iraq without stripping our embassies and offices whose work in those embassies and in those offices is often in direct support of the crisis.

One army officer asked me why State did not send all of the Foreign Service to Iraq, conveniently forgetting that not all of the Army was in Iraq. We need fully staffed embassies in each of our coalition partner’s capitals, and those who do not support the coalition, in all regional capitals, and in countries that may become the next imploding failed state. We cannot be in a “rob Peter to pay Paul” staffing dilemma.

We need sufficient staff to expand our outreach to other agencies, to work interagency not just talk interagency. We need the military need political advisors at every command, to take on positions such as Deputy at the new AFRICOM.

With the formalization of NSPD 44, S/CRS, which my colleague Carlos Pasqual here today did such a magnificent job establishing, must be given the resources to go with the mandate.

If an Administration, Republican or Democratic, does not request sufficient funding, Congress has the authority and the prerogative to set its own levels, as it has done in the past on military spending.

Conclusion

Interagency coordination and collaboration is not an alien concept within professional cadre in the executive branch, or one that the players are inherently hostile to, or incapable of. There are bureaucratic cultures, as there are among the four uniformed services (and the Coast Guard) still despite Goldwater-Nickels. The differences can be healthy and ensure that the President, and Congress, get open debate on a range of options, and the variety of talents, skill sets and experience to implement policies as made. The ability to “play well together” between civilian and military, between State and DOD has been evident in the most recent past, and Secretary Gates’ support for a revitalized civilian partner, and the establishment of the PRTs are evidence that challenges that have confronted us are not inevitable or irreversible. Political will is important, but not sufficient.

It is prudent and wise to ask the question whether we have the structure, processes and people to meet our immediate needs, and our longer term challenges. Do we want to be able to respond quickly, effectively and well? Yes. Do we also need to be able to anticipate, respond early, wisely, with all of the tools available and well….and then be able to see it through? Yes, we do.
I served this country for over 30 years. My entire adult life was spent in the Foreign Service. I had days where I wished I was someplace else. I never had a day when I wished I had done something else. I have seen the tremendous good that can be accomplished through the effective coming together of all of the players — when the “whole government” or “unity of command” approach is not just followed to the letter, but in spirit. I have seen the creativity and innovation that comes from bringing together a range of players. And, I have seen the waste, frustration and, yes, anger, and yes, the damage to our security and our interests, immediate and long term, when the whole thing just breaks down.

I applaud and am grateful to this Subcommittee for its interest and its time to explore thoroughly, critically and constructively what can realistically be done by the interagency, with the full support and oversight of Congress, to support, encourage, repair and rebuild the interagency, its processes and its players so we can all more effectively and consistently support and defend the interests and security of this country.

Thank you,

(end)

Thank you.
CARLOS PASCUAL
BUILDING CAPACITY FOR STABILIZATION & RECONSTRUCTION
TESTIMONY FOR HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS
1/29/2008

WHY IT MATTERS
In the absence of effective governing, states are hollow vessels, providing opportunities for transnational terrorism, organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Such states cannot act decisively to control the spread of deadly diseases, let alone regulate conflict and provide an environment conducive to economic growth and development. Such voids in governance are perhaps most common after conflicts, when it takes time to establish trust and capacity in state structures and between previously warring factions.

An effective stabilization and reconstruction capacity requires the integration of traditional military peacekeeping and peace enforcement capabilities with civilian initiatives to address humanitarian needs, build capacity to administer the rule of law, promote reconciliation among previously warring parties, and help build the physical, human and institutional infrastructure necessary to create a positive peace that is self-sustaining long after peacekeepers leave a conflict. It seeks to create effective public institutions that, through negotiation with civil society, can establish a consensual framework for governing within the rule of law. To succeed, stabilization and reconstruction initiatives require multilateral cooperation to bring together the necessary range and depth of skills, and the capacity to sustain them over at least a 5-10 year period. This has been true even in tiny Kosovo, much less Afghanistan and Iraq.

In the United States, peacebuilding assumed a new place in national priorities after 9/11. Afghanistan, at the time the second poorest country in the world, served as the base for the most significant strike on U.S. territory in the history of the republic. The Bush Administration subsequently elevated the threat of state failure to a top national security objective. The U.S. National Security Strategy affirmed that: “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.” Since then, Canada, the UK, Germany, Australia, the United Nations, the European Union, and the African Union have all created some form of institutionalized, cross-agency capacity for “peacebuilding.” Many countries have incorporated stabilization and reconstruction capabilities into their foreign aid programs or foreign ministries.

The chances for state failure rise dramatically in the void between war and peace. This fragility is most often linked with civil wars—19 of them in 2004, for example. The U.S. invasion of Iraq demonstrated yet another form of state failure linked to international interventions. While concern over the mismanagement of the Iraq War and its aftermath has perpetuated skepticism about what the Bush Administration intends from peacebuilding, the absence of stabilization and reconstruction planning and capacity in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 was a driving cause in the biggest political and international security issue affecting the United States – as well as all the countries of the Middle East and oil-importing countries around the world.

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3 Carlos Pascual is Vice President & Director for Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. He served as the first Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction in the State Department from 2004-2005.
For most of the world, civil wars and regional conflicts have been an affliction in search of attention. Sub-Saharan Africa alone has suffered from 168 conflicts between 1990 and 2003.\textsuperscript{3} The Great Lakes conflict claimed more than 3.8 million lives in the Democratic Republic of the Congo alone.\textsuperscript{4} Historically, neighboring states have suffered a significant share of the cost of another country’s civil war due to refugees and the disruptions from wider instability.\textsuperscript{5} To underscore further the need for peacebuilding, 44% of countries recovering from civil war face the risk of renewed conflict within the first five years of reaching a peace agreement.\textsuperscript{6} The need for capacity to rebuild from conflict is not just a phenomenon associated with American military intervention. It is a reality of the international security environment that affects American interests even when U.S. troops are not involved.

That said, state failure amidst cycles of violence need not be an inevitable result from civil war and interstate conflict. A RAND study of eight UN-led peace operations found that seven of these countries are still at peace.\textsuperscript{7} While the results would have been grimmer if the RAND study had included UN operations in Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Angola, and Rwanda, lessons have been learned. In second chances in both Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo, UN missions are making progress despite massive underfunding and huge political complications. This testimony addresses both lessons learned and what is required to achieve institutional capacities in stabilization and reconstruction given the frequency and scale of conflicts that exacerbate the risk of state failure.

**UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGE**

Stabilization and reconstruction, or what the international community calls peacebuilding, is not a precise science. Local circumstances will dictate factors critical to success. Yet we have also learned enough about peacebuilding to describe its complexity and understand practices and capabilities that will increase the chances for sustainable peace.

As a starting point, peacebuilding is a process that demands time. To understand the nature of the process, the types of international skills required, and the local capabilities that must be developed, consider four stages of peace building. All four may move concurrently, but progress in one may coincide with backsliding in another. For peace to become sustainable, some degree of progress is needed at all four levels.\textsuperscript{8}


\textsuperscript{6} For a fuller explanation of these stages see Carlos Pascual and Stephen Krasner, "Addressing State Failure," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2005.
1. Stabilization. This is the first requirement after conflict. It is incumbent on the international community to guarantee peace and impose law and order in the absence of a widely accepted rule of law. In addition to provision of basic security, there is a “window of necessity” to meet humanitarian needs and give people confidence in the future. Key factors are restarting basic social services, getting kids back to school, and stimulating local jobs that give people an alternative to taking up arms. The process must start to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR) warring opponents. Some form of political activity must begin, often locally, that will lead to credible governance. Elections, when conducted too soon, can be detrimental, forcing competition among previously warring factions before wounds have healed and potentially entrenching criminals or warlords in political office.

2. Unraveling the Past. Eventually, societies recovering from conflict must address the factors that drove them to conflict in the first place. If they do not, these issues will at some stage resurface as spoilers to stable peace. Conflict drivers might include: exclusion from politics, persecution of ethnic or religious groups, lack of trust in formal systems of justice, massive poverty, corruption, failing state enterprises, land and water disputes, and income inequality. However, addressing these drivers of conflict can in themselves be destabilizing. Privatization of state industry can lead to more unemployment and political unrest. Going after corruption can drive former elites to use their money and influence to sabotage political transition. Part of the challenge is to gauge when and how to tackle these issues when achieving stability also is an imperative.

3. Building the Infrastructure, Laws, and Institutions of a Democracy and Market Economy. The process of helping countries build the future foundations of their society is generally the most time-consuming and complicated stage of transition. Laws and regulations must be written and adopted, people must be trained in new forms of governance, investments must be made in appropriate infrastructure, and governance theory and training must be turned into practice. The challenges extend from economic capacity (creation of markets, banking systems, tax systems, fiscal viability), to political institutions (political parties, functioning parliaments, accountable executives), to administering the rule of law (constitutions, implementing legislation, judges, lawyers and penitentiary systems), to civilian control of security structures (civilian police, civilian control of the military, new defense and interior ministries). Societies are seeking to transform from “imposed order” to order based on freedom, openness and competition, with laws to regulate clashing interests, legal systems to mediate disputes and political processes to check executive behavior. Such transitions require time and local ownership.

4. Nurturing Civil Society. Outsiders cannot build civil society, but they can offer training to media, civic organizations, business groups, environmental activists and others who can advance community interests and guard against abuses of power. The role of women is especially important in rebuilding from conflict as women often take a practical stance on health care, education, and water and land issues that can contribute to an environment of trust.

There are two causal paths to peacebuilding failure: failure from a security perspective to contain opposition in the form of spoilers; and failure from a state-building perspective to build the

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necessary local capacity, legitimacy, and effectiveness to sustain peace. Across the four stages of transition described above, certain practices can increase the chances for success.

- All things being equal, peace agreements should be written, clear about expectations, with achievable mandates for the international community.10
- Physical security is a prerequisite for economic and political progress. Adequate forces are needed to enforce the peace, but the use of force without a peace agreement is not sustainable.
- Resource-rich countries have a greater chance of falling back into conflict because they can divert funds to finance war. Accountability for wealth must be started from the outset; and stabilization and reconstruction missions must have a plan for how to deal with resource management issues.11
- Sustainability requires local ownership. Peacebuilding entails the redefinition of the state and its relationship with its citizens. If citizens do not believe in the “new state”, it cannot succeed. Hence, international institutions must involve locals from the outset and seek their empowerment.
- Significant and sustained investment is needed in the physical, human, and institutional infrastructure of a new state. International development banks, development agencies, the UN, NGOs and increasingly private financial institutions all play essential roles during this stage. If the U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts are not integrated with a wider network of capabilities and resources, unilateral U.S. initiatives will fail.
- Building local capacity takes time, often more time than the international community is willing to sustain financing and troops. Moreover, the faster the evolution from stabilization to other stages of transition, the greater role that locals must play, which often creates constraints in absorptive capacity.12

**ASSESSING PERFORMANCE: THE HARD CASES**

Iraq and Afghanistan represent exceptionally hard cases in which the United States has been the lead country and the United Nations has played a secondary role, especially in Iraq. Iraq is particularly hard because it now entails both a civil war and a failed state, and because the U.S. presence there is so widely contested. To build peace in the context of a civil war, experience in Bosnia, Haiti, Mozambique, El Salvador, Guatemala, Northern Ireland, and South Africa has shown that peace agreements are essential requirements, though alone not necessarily sufficient, to guarantee peace.14

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14 The misalignment of donor and host nation agendas often arises most poignantly in the security areas. International actors are generally under pressure to withdraw troops, and there is a massive shortage in internationally-deployable police. Yet it will take a good five years to build a viable local military and police force, and even longer to revamp the justice system.
Because Iraq is a failed state in the midst of war, the parties themselves cannot be expected to reach a political settlement without an outside broker. Even then, there is a need for external forces to create an environment of stability that allows local entities to make progress across the four stages of peacebuilding described earlier.

Even if Iraq and Afghanistan are not typical of international stabilization and reconstruction requirements, they have so tested the limits of U.S.—and in Afghanistan also the UN and NATO—capabilities, that we should learn from the weaknesses and the stress points in order to build more effective capacity in both the United States and the international community. Tough as these two cases might be, they do not even approach the complexity that would accompany comparable conflicts in states such as Pakistan or Nigeria. Some key lessons:

- Adequate international security forces are needed to uphold the peace and enforce law and order immediately after conflict. In Bosnia and Kosovo the troop to population ratios were, respectively, 19 and 20 to 1,000.\(^5\) In Iraq and Afghanistan the ratios were, respectively, 7 and 1 to 1,000.\(^6\) The subsequent insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan should not be a surprise.

- Once a mission loses control over the use of force and criminal activity, it creates the space for insurgency. Understaffing the security component could undermine an entire peace operation.\(^7\)

- Indigenous security forces must assume responsibility for law and order, but building their capacity takes time. In Afghanistan this has required creating new defense and interior ministries, and failure to address such comprehensive restructuring, especially of the police, delayed the creation of effective local capabilities by three or more years.

- While international actors must turn over responsibilities to local actors, precipitous elections when there is a weak legal foundation and few checks and balances in government can create rather than solve problems, such as bringing war lords and criminals into power, or passing flawed legislation such as the Iraqi constitution that favors majority groups and becomes its own driving force for insurgency.

- Creating jobs and building infrastructure are essential to establishing a tangible sense of progress, but these require the capacity for large numbers of civilians to move and act freely. Progress in these areas is unrealistic without security. Yet failure to mobilize civilian capabilities to make progress in these areas will also undermine initial inroads to establish security.

- The scale of American and NATO involvement in Afghanistan, large as they have been, has not been adequate to achieve success. The combination of scale, time, and complexity underscores the need for multilateral engagement to sustain an effective international role over years. Yet to be effective, that role cannot be ad hoc. U.S. and NATO forces at least had the benefit of coordinated planning and training, which the UN has no capacity to do through its ad hoc missions.


\(^{6}\) Ibid., pp. 184-185.

The cooperation of neighboring states, or at a minimum their willingness to refrain from supporting insurgent groups, is needed to build peace.

The Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction
The Bush Administration decided at a Principals meeting of the National Security Council in April 2004 to create a Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the State Department to lead interagency civilian efforts and coordination between civilian agencies and the military in order to help countries emerging from conflict build a sustainable peace. S/CRS was established officially in August 2004. An interagency strategy for stabilization and reconstruction was approved at Deputies and Principals meetings in, respectively, November and December 2004. Extensive consultations were held with most regional U.S. Combatant Commands, including a briefing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, and the Pentagon’s civilian leadership in January 2005. In 2005 the President signed National Security Presidential Directive 44 on Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization. This directive governs internal USG operations and civilian-military interface. Importantly, also in 2005, a companion directive for the Department of Defense was also issued (DoD Directive 3000.08) that elevated stability operations to the level of importance of military operations and directed interaction with civilian elements as the lead of any post-conflict reconstruction operation.

The precepts underpinning S/CRS were agreed upon rapidly. The key constraints to developing a more effective stabilization and reconstruction capacity have been bureaucratic competition, and a lack of political support and resources to translate organizational and operational concepts into capacity. Given the huge demands on the Foreign Affairs budget, even the modest annual increase needed to sustain a strong stabilization and reconstruction capacity – on the order of $350 million a year – will not occur unless the President makes clear that sustaining such a capacity is a priority, and invests the political capital needed to secure the resources and authorities. Administration efforts to date have been well intentioned, but without the necessary vitality at senior levels.

As with any new bureaucratic arrangement, S/CRS has stirred controversy across civilian agencies and within the State Department. Strongest support for the office and its functions has come from the uniformed military. Many agencies and offices have feared that S/CRS would usurp their functions. Rather, the role of S/CRS is to perform a function comparable to that of the Joint Staff in the U.S. military. The Joint Staff ensures that there is a common strategy for a given theater, and that all services function inter-operably within that strategy. The Joint Staff oversees planning and doctrine, something that has no comparable place in civilian agencies due to inadequate resources. The Joint Staff does not replace the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and Coast Guard. Similarly, the role that was enacted for S/CRS was to lead the design of a common U.S. strategy in a given theater for civilian agencies, and between civilian agencies and the U.S. military, to support countries emerging from conflict. The office does not replace USAID, different parts of State, other relevant USG offices. It should, however, ensure that USG civilian capabilities are used more effectively to achieve a common U.S. goal, and that these capabilities are coordinated with the military when there is a U.S. military component, or in other cases with international peacekeeping forces.

Some have argued that S/CRS should be located in the White House. That would be a mistake comparable to taking the Joint Staff out of the Pentagon and placing it in the National Security Council. A strong core team, drawing on staff from across civilian and defense agencies, should be located as it is now in the agency responsible for U.S. foreign policy, the Stated Department. At least 100 people will be needed to carry out the central functions of S/CRS – a moderate staff that
would also increase the size of the NSC by at least 75%. That said, the NSC has to take a leadership role in stabilization and reconstruction to support State-led operation and to show the Executive Branch and Congress it take the function seriously. Since the creation of S/CRS, the NSC has devoted just one director-level position to these functions. Currently that Director reports to a Senior Director responsible for foreign aid and humanitarian crises and then to a Deputy National Security Advisor whose principal role is trade and the G8. Hardly the staffing structure one might expect for an administration that declared in its 2002 National Security Strategy that “weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.”

Two other core functional capabilities are needed to create an effective stabilization and reconstruction capacity. One is to deploy quickly a competent field team that can spearhead civilian stabilization and reconstruction efforts, including the design and management of program strategies and individual projects. The comparable function in the military is the capacity to establish a theater headquarters that draws from the forces within a combatant command. Such field leadership teams may include a mix of political, economic, development, communications and administrative specialists. These are the functional equivalent of field generals that plan for and lead a mission; they are not the foot soldiers. Presently, such teams are put together in crises by calling for volunteers from diplomatic posts around the world, forcing them to break current assignments. Deployments are slow, individuals may have little or no knowledge of local circumstances, rarely have expertise in stabilization and reconstruction issues, and teams have not prepared to deploy together. The U.S. military would never deploy under these conditions.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are one way in which field leadership teams can be deployed. The concept behind PRTs is that they can embed and deploy with the military in insecure environments when a large civilian presence may not be possible. Their initial roles would be to advise the military on initial actions that can help normalize relations with communities and help those communities restore a sense of normalcy after conflict, and to inject field-based insights into stabilization and reconstruction plans coordinated out of Washington. They would also begin to look for potential partners to implement programs.

As security begins to normalize, civilians in the PRTs would begin to mobilize other assistance providers (for example, a civilian reserve, contractors, and NGOs) to undertake specific projects and support rebuilding local capacity. Over time, the balance between civilian and military personnel would shift in the PRTs. Civilians would take the lead in working with local officials to formulate provincial development strategies that reinforce national goals. But to even contemplate the prospect for such provincial-level engagement, State, USAID and perhaps other civilian agencies must have the capacity to deploy trained personnel in a timely fashion. In Afghanistan, close to five years after the first PRTs, civilian agencies still have not mobilized adequate personnel to shift PRTs from military to civilian leadership. In Iraq, the effectiveness of the PRTs will be constrained as long as civilian personnel cannot move freely, allowing for a wider and deeper range of technical specialists to be deployed. In short, the capacity of the USG to deploy capable and trained civilians in PRTs will determine whether, first, they can help strengthen the direction and utility of military-led stabilization efforts while conflict still persists and, second, whether, civilians can help direct short-term stabilization toward sustainable reconstruction efforts.

The other core functional requirement for stabilization and reconstruction is to mobilize and deploy specialists in key skill areas: police, police trainers, rule of law experts, humanitarian and relief efforts, job creation, infrastructure, political reconciliation and effective governance. Not all
communities will have the same needs, but the task of peace building can involve every aspect of national security and political and economic life. If the United States has a stake in helping countries achieve sustainable peace, the United States also has a stake in investing directly and working with international partners to ensure that support in these areas – material and financial – can be delivered in a timely way and sustained.

A civilian reserve corps would fall into this later category of, in effect, mobilizing civilian foot soldiers. Given the resistance to any significant civilian stabilization and reconstruction funding, a civilian reserve could at best be modest – on the order of 3,000 specialists who would train together. If deployed, they would enter into active government service. Reservists would phase out to civilian contractors who could sustain efforts over a longer period and add far more significant resources. The skill focus should initially be police, police trainers and rule of law experts, as they generally are the critical missing link to establishing stability, allow peacekeepers to phase down, and to tapping other civilian contractual capabilities. But beyond a civilian reserve, contracting mechanisms need to be made faster, and personnel need to be better prepared.

About three and a half years after S/CRS was created, there is definitely a record of progress, but the administration’s lack of political will to get fully behind the capacity it set out to create, and the Congress’ consistent rejection of the Administration’s meager requests have left the United States still sorely lacking in an effective stabilization and reconstruction capacity. That is not to say that there have not been accomplishments. S/CRS has led the interagency community to get consensus on a planning framework that creates a common approach and vocabulary between civilians and the military. The S/CRS Essential Task Framework is the best compiled checklist in the field of lessons learned, yet is arguably not even well utilized within S/CRS. Organizational models have been developed for coordinating interagency and civilian military teams in the field, at Combatant Commands, and in Washington. Military and civilian personnel have jointly participated in and learned from simulations and exercise. Planning and interagency strategy development tools have been applied to Sudan and Haiti, and S/CRS has played at least a limited role in planning or short-term responses in Lebanon, Congo, Nepal, Bangladesh, Central African Republic, Chad, Zimbabwe and Afghanistan. A recent mission to Afghanistan focused on strengthening the role of PRTs is promising, although it is unclear where the civilian resources will come from to make the PRTs a vital force to reinforce Afghan provincial governance.

The important lesson to draw is that the challenge of organizing for stabilization and reconstruction is not so much conceptual, but one of realizing the potential of the concepts, models and tools that have been developed. Certainly there will be a need to adapt and adjust the basic models based on experience. The emphasis within the administration, Congress and nongovernmental community at this stage, however, should not be to continue to indulge in architectural fantasy. There is a need to invest in, exercise, test and use the sound foundations already in place. The following section outlines priorities to act on the promise of what has been created.

10 Priorities for U.S. Action

Building a more effective U.S. stabilization and reconstruction capacity has three aims: to ensure that U.S. civilian capabilities are able to contribute as effectively as possible to helping states emerging from conflict become viable and sustainable so that they do not present a threat to their own people and the international community, to ensure that the civilian side of the government has skills that complement our military capacity, and to contribute to and leverage multilateral efforts that are inevitably needed to sustain a stabilization and reconstruction for the time needed and the
resources necessary to make a sustainable difference. Given the capabilities that have been
developed to date, the following are 10 key actions needed to create more effective U.S. stabilization
and reconstruction efforts.

1. **Civilian Leaders Must Use the Capacity They Create.** The President, the National Security
Advisor and the Secretary of State must call on S/CRS to lead civilian stabilization and
reconstruction efforts if the office is to be taken seriously. There will always be bureaucratic
tensions across functional and regional parts of government. At present, the White House and
State use S/CRS for relatively secondary functions when convenient. When tensions arise
between regional bureaus and S/CRS, the bureaucratic answer has generally been to say that all
offices are relevant and important. There is a relatively simple way to address these issues. A
major stabilization and reconstruction mission will require one person to serve as its head.
S/CRS must put in place a roster of senior, trained and experienced personnel who can lead the
policy and planning exercises for stabilization and reconstruction missions. A person from this
roster should be assigned to lead planning and policy processes in Washington. This individual
should be supported by a secretariat drawn from the interagency community, including S/CRS
and relevant regional bureaus. The Secretary of State must use this person as the lead senior
advisor on the situation in question. If the demand does not come from the top, and if there is
not a dedicated leader trained by S/CRS as the point person, the efforts to institutionalize
capacity will flounder.

2. **Establish and Maintain a 25-50 Person Senior Roster to Lead Interagency Planning and
Responses.** At any given time, there will be 3-4 major stabilization and reconstruction efforts
concurrently underway. One could argue that we currently have Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo,
Lebanon, and Congo, with Pakistan, Zimbabwe and Somalia waiting to explode. The
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization cannot personally lead all these efforts.
Rather, S/CRS must become the repository of skilled people who can lead such efforts, as well
as retain the planning capacity and experience to guide each planning effort, while drawing on
the best country-specific skills from the interagency community. Senior personnel, former high-
level officials and country experts would be trained on S/CRS tools and capabilities and be on-
call for emerging crises. If S/CRS is expected to lead each planning effort without such depth
of capacity on which to draw, it will fail.

3. **Create a 250 Person Active Response Corps (ARC).** Part of this Corps should be at State
and part in other civilian agencies. Its purpose is to have on active duty a team of people who
have trained and worked together to set up and support stabilization and reconstruction mission.
This corps would be the center point for the field leadership teams discussed above. After
completing service in the ARC, personnel would remain in a standby corps for five years.
Eventually, instead of having a few people prepared for rapid deployment, the USG would
realistically have 600-750 people ready on an active or stand-by basis.

4. **Require the U.S. Military to Provide Security under Joint Deployments for Personnel in
PRTs.** The first task with the PRTs is to have the personnel available through an ARC and
stand-by corps to deploy the level of civilians to make such missions effective. The other key
constraint to effectiveness is security. We have already seen the limitations of using contractors
for this purpose. For the U.S. military, securing civilian personnel becomes a distraction when
conflict erupts. Yet there is no way for civilian teams to lead and inform stabilization and
reconstruction efforts if they cannot get around. This is a minor addition to the demands on our military, yet without the PRTs, we will never get beyond short-term pacification.

5. **Authorize and Fund the Creation of a Civilian Reserve.** A 3,000 person-civilian reserve will cost about $55 million per year to maintain. A deployment would be in the hundreds of millions, but the cost of such deployments would have to be covered at some point in any case, and have been usually implemented through contractors. The creation of civilian reserve provides the capacity to get on the ground quickly, and address key issues before they get out of control. Building an indigenous capacity to sustain the rule of law is the most critical function toward long-term sustainability. Yet in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States still does not have a functioning strategy for civilian law and order. The investment is small in order to get skilled capacity on the ground quickly. Contractors will still be needed to take over the longer term operations, but with a Reserve the response time can be cut down to weeks rather than months or years and they would be pre-trained, ready to work with the USG civilians and military, and fully accountable as government employees. The FY2007 Defense Supplemental appropriated $50 million for a civilian reserve. That is a useful down payment. But the funds are frozen because Congress has not legislated the necessary authorities.

6. **Expand and Refine Pre-Compete Contracts.** The S/CRS Essential Tasks Matrix provides a fairly clear range of the kinds of skills that would need to be tapped in stabilization and reconstruction missions. These skill areas could not all be covered in a civilian reserve. Instead, pre-competed contracts need to be in place in critical areas. To some extent such contracts exist through USAID, State/INL and Treasury. The quality of the contracts and contractors is not uniform, and most do not have any seed capital to ensure that certain key personnel are always ready for deployment within given time constraints. A modest injection of $10-15 million could ensure that such contractual mechanisms are in place. A central database should be completed in S/CRS that allows all agencies to feed in contract information in a common format, with rights to reciprocal access.

7. **Create a $200 million replenishable Conflict Response Fund (CRF).** This is not a slush fund. The CRF would provide the resources needed to jumpstart deployments for 3-4 months in critical sectors that will fundamentally affect the success of a stabilization and reconstruction effort. At present, funds are provided either through a supplemental, reprogramming from other accounts, or both. Since the Foreign Affairs budget does not have the same cushion as the Defense budget, it is not possible to launch a deployment from within existing funding and then seek supplemental funding to pay back the loan. The CRF would surely not be large enough to cover all the costs of a mission. But it could trigger immediate action in areas that can alter the course of success. The fund should require submission of core plans and determination by the President. A consultative process between the administration and Congress before utilizing funds would be appropriate and desirable. This funding is not additive to the overall costs of any mission – it is a front loaded advance of funding that we end up spending anyway. The difference is that it allows a faster response to seize opportunities in the early days and may in fact save money in the long run.

8. **Create the Authority to Manage Available Funding more Effectively.** There are close to twenty accounts in the Foreign Affairs budget. These accounts are managed as fiefdoms by agencies, bureaus and offices. This practice destroys efforts at rational planning. The accounts drive the solutions rather than strategic requirements driving the strategy and budget. The U.S.
military could not function under such planning conditions. The Lugar-Biden Bill (S.613/H.R.1084) first proposed in 2004 has offered a practical solution through more flexible transfer authorities. The core requirement is to allow the creation of stabilization and reconstruction account for a country when the President determines that it is in the national security interest of the United States to help that country achieve a sustainable peace. In that case, funds could be transferred from other accounts in the Foreign Affairs budget into the new stabilization and reconstruction account. The funds could then be used for any function in the Foreign Affairs budget. This would allow the Secretary to put funding into whatever agency or program could best support the various objectives of the assistance. While this may seem an arcane issue, it is absolutely essential to achieve any rational planning process.

9. **Renew the Section 1207 Authorization for Defense Transfers to State for Stabilization and Reconstruction.** Section 1207 allows the Departments of Defense and State to determine that it would be in the U.S. national interest for the Department of Defense to transfer up to $100 million to State to support stabilization and reconstruction missions. Senior defense officials have realized that they cannot fulfill their mission unless states emerging from conflict develop the capacity to enforce the rule of law and govern effectively, even if with outside technical help. Without such capacity, military and peacekeeping deployments will be longer and more costly, and more lives will be at risk. This transfer authority is not a windfall for State. It is an appropriate reflection of the fact that national security depends on civilian capacity as much as on the ability to project force. Nor is there any risk that $200 million for a Conflict Response Fund and a Section 1207 transfer authority would overwhelm the scale of the problem. As we have seen from Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti and Lebanon, this would be just a down payment on the needed resources. And if more than one stabilization and reconstruction mission were to be needed at a given time, the $300 million window between the CRF and Section 1207 would at best be modest to launch initial responses.

10. **Coordinate U.S. Efforts with Key Partners, Particularly the UN, and Invest in Multilateral Capacity.** As argued earlier, most stabilization and reconstruction missions take at least 5-10 years. The costs and the skill levels exceed what any single nation can provide. The UN, for all its limitations, can bring legitimacy and mobilize support from countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and China. To most American audiences that may seem an odd rationale, but these countries have become the backbone of international peacekeeping capabilities. NATO has also tragically seen that the world's strongest military alliance is barely able to sustain a massive stabilization and reconstruction mission in Afghanistan. If Pakistan, Egypt and Nigeria were to explode from internal tensions, neither the U.S., NATO or the UN would collectively have the force levels, skills and capabilities to help these countries stabilize. A starting point for the UN would be to fund fully the assessed costs of UN peacekeeping, support the modest Peace Building Fund which serves a comparable role to a Conflict Response Fund, and contribute at a normal U.S. rate of assessed costs for the Peace Building Support Office, which is supposed to function like an NSC-type office at the UN to coordinate strategy for peace building missions.

**Strategic and Affordable**

The total cost of the U.S. capabilities outlined above – a stronger S/CRS, an Active Response Corps, a Civilian Reserve, improved contract mechanisms, and a Conflict Response Fund would be about $350 million annually. Even with a 20% margin of error, this is minuscule relative to the Defense budget. The costs to deploy these capabilities would be additional, and they can be massive.
as we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. But if the United States is resolved that weak and failing states are truly a threat to security, then it will spend the funds anyway for work on stabilization and reconstruction. What this suggested approach offers is the means to deploy more quickly, strategically and effectively when timing is critical and the momentum of a peace building effort can be radically altered. Consider this: if a faster and more effective stabilization and reconstruction mission had been planned and deployed in Iraq in 2003, and if that deployment had allowed the return of just one division to complete its mission one month earlier, it would have saved $1.2 billion, and that is secondary to the Iraqi and American lives it might have saved.

In short, as a nation we need to understand that addressing conflict and helping nations build peace is a national security priority. It requires both civilian and military capacity. Yet we do not have a national security budget – we have a budget for defense and another for foreign affairs. A stabilization and reconstruction capacity that is essential for the success of defense missions will remain under funded if it is not seen as part of an investment in national security that cuts across accounts. In that spirit, it is commendable that this Committee is holding this hearing to understand the ties between civilian and military capacity. If it can mobilize reconsideration of budget resolutions across accounts, reflecting the need to building civilian capacity to achieve our national security objectives, then this Committee will have take a landmark step toward reconsidering how we budget and act on our national security priorities.

Thank you for this opportunity to present this testimony.
Achieving Unity of Effort in Interagency Operations
Prepared Statement of Michèle A. Flournoy

January 29, 2008

House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Hearing on Prospects for Effective Interagency Collaboration on National Security

In the last two decades, the United States has experienced some truly stellar military victories: rolling back Saddam Hussein’s aggression against Kuwait in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, establishing a secure environment for the implementation of peace accords in the Balkans, driving the Taliban from power in Afghanistan in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and toppling Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime in a matter of weeks.

During the same period, however, the United States has also experienced some profound operational failures: from the unsuccessful effort to stabilize and rebuild war-torn Somalia to the failure to quell the insurgency and jump-start reconstruction early on in post-conflict Iraq. In such cases, the United States, and the international community more broadly, has had great difficulty translating military successes into the achievement of broader strategic objectives. Winning the peace has proven to be much more difficult than winning wars.¹

While some of these operational failures may have stemmed from misguided policy or mistaken judgment, others have resulted from poor policy execution. In numerous operations, the United States has been unable to bring to bear all of its instruments of national power—political, economic, military, and informational—in a coherent and effective campaign. In some cases, inadequate vertical integration meant that policy decisions made in Washington did not translate into intended actions on the ground. In others, poor horizontal integration meant that the various agencies involved in execution operated independently of one another rather than as a team, yielding an uncoordinated and ineffective campaign. Sometimes, unresponsive oversight meant that decision-makers in Washington were not providing policy direction in a sufficiently timely fashion to meet the needs of those who were executing policy in the field. And in all of these

¹ Many of the ideas presented here were initially developed as part of the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study, which I co-lead while at CNS. I have continued this work on interagency reform as President of the Center for a New American Security.
cases, the U.S. government simply lacked the unity of effort necessary to achieve its strategic goals and objectives.

These problems have several sources. First, unlike the U.S. military, which has doctrine and a standard approach to planning its operations, the U.S. government as a whole lacks established procedures for planning and conducting interagency operations. Each new administration tends to reinvent this wheel, either issuing new Presidential guidance—which too often overlooks the lessons learned and best practices of its predecessors—or ignoring the issue entirely until it faces an actual crisis. This ad hoc approach has kept the United States from learning from its mistakes and improving its performance in complex contingencies over time. It is no wonder that U.S. personnel who have served in multiple operations over the last 10-15 years lament feeling a bit like Sisyphus.

In addition, the U.S. government lacks the mechanisms necessary to coordinate and integrate the actions of its various agencies at all levels—in Washington, within regions, and in the field. For example, the NSC does not currently have adequate staff dedicated to coordinating the development of integrated interagency plans for complex operations and providing effective policy oversight of operations under way. Nor are there established mechanisms to enable the various U.S. government actors who will be involved in a given operation to develop a truly integrated, interagency campaign plan. And when the United States actually conducts an operation, there is no standard approach to fully integrating the activities of military forces and civilian agencies on the ground. To the contrary, an examination of the coordination mechanisms used in operations ranging from Haiti and Bosnia during the Clinton administration to Afghanistan and Iraq during the Bush administration suggests that U.S. civilian and military leaders tend to develop new approaches in each operation. These ad hoc, often personality-driven approaches too often ignore the experience gleaned from previous operations.

Finally, the civilian agencies of the United States government simply lack the capacity to rapidly deploy personnel to conduct operations on the ground. In practical terms, this lack of operational capacity in the agencies other than DoD has had two profound effects on the U.S. military in operation after operation. First, it has expanded the military’s mission substantially, as men and women in uniform have been forced to take on tasks (such as economic reconstruction and judicial reform) that might be more appropriately or better performed by civilian experts. Second, it has extended the duration and costs of the military’s mission, as milestones central to its exit strategy, such as the reconstitution of local police forces or the holding of elections, are delayed.
At the end of the day, unity of effort across the U.S. government is not just about being more efficient or even more effective in operations. It can determine whether the United States succeeds or fails in a given intervention. It can also determine whether the ultimate costs of success—both dollars spent and lives lost or forever changed—are as low as possible or higher than necessary. In this sense, unity of effort is not just something that is nice to have; it is imperative.

Achieving Greater Unity of Effort

The demand for the United States and the international community to conduct complex contingency operations of one sort or another is likely to remain quite high. Whether aimed at denying terrorists safe haven, spreading free-market democracy, stopping genocide, restoring stability, or keeping weapons of mass destruction out of hostile hands, complex contingency operations will be a defining feature of the early 21st century. Because these operations are fundamentally interagency in character—requiring contributions from multiple agencies—achieving unity of effort in their execution will be critical to reducing both the risks of failure and the costs of success.

Over the last decade, several efforts have been made to improve U.S. effectiveness in complex operations. In 1997, the Clinton administration’s PDD 56 articulated a standard approach to managing complex contingency operations based on lessons learned from Somalia and Haiti. Throughout the 1990s, a number of “pol-mil plans” were written and rehearsed at the strategic level, adding greater coherence to USG preparations for international interventions ranging from Bosnia to Sierra Leone. During the same period, interagency gaming and simulations explored the requirements of complex operations and identified both process and capability shortfalls.

More recently, Combatant Commanders have formed Joint Interagency Coordination Groups to bring interagency perspectives into their planning and operations. In the field, Civil-Military Operations Centers, Civilian-Military Centers, Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centers and, more recently, Provincial Reconstruction Teams have been used in various interventions to coordinate civil-military operations on the ground. These innovations have had varying degrees of success. But fundamentally, they have all been piecemeal approaches, and none has solved the larger integration problem.

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The Vision: Integrated Planning and Execution of Complex Operations

Strengthening integration requires thinking through how the USG is likely to approach different types of operations long before planning for a specific operation begins. The next President should task his or her NSC staff to work with agency counterparts to develop interagency “concepts of operation” for critical mission areas, from combating terrorism and homeland security to stability operations and combating WMD. Interagency concepts of operation would articulate the United States’ overarching objectives in a given mission area, identify critical tasks that need to be undertaken, lay out an overall approach to how these tasks would be performed, and assign responsibility for specific areas to specific agencies.

These concepts of operation would provide the basis for codifying an interagency division of labor in various mission areas and for better aligning agency authorities and resources with their operational responsibilities. They would also provide a basis for assessing agency capabilities to execute their assigned tasks, and developing action plans to remedy critical shortfalls. If fully implemented, this approach would significantly enhance the USG’s preparedness to deal with specific interagency operations when they arise.

The process of interagency planning for a specific complex contingency operation would begin with a decision by the President or by the Principals or Deputies Committee of the National Security Council. Following that decision, the Deputy National Security Adviser would be charged with guiding the development of planning guidance for the operation, overseeing interagency planning and rehearsals for the operation, and ensuring the President remains fully briefed on plans for the operation as they evolve and events on the ground as the operation unfolds. The Deputies Committee would be designated as the primary interagency decision-making body responsible for overseeing the planning and conduct of complex contingency operations. 4

Each operation would be overseen on a day to day basis by an Executive Committee composed of senior Presidential appointees (Undersecretaries or Assistant Secretaries) from the relevant regional and functional offices of all agencies participating in the operation. It would be chaired by the NSC Senior Director for the relevant region or a senior civilian appointed by the President for this purpose, and supported by a new NSC office for Complex Contingency Planning, which would provide functional expertise on the interagency planning process. A governing principle of this group should be the accountability of its members as Presidential appointees.

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4 This approach draws on elements of both the Clinton administration’s POD-56 and the Bush Administration’s draft NISP-D “XX”. (The NISP-D was given the designation “XX” because it was not signed.)
The Executive Committee’s first task would be assisting its chair in drafting the planning guidance for the operation. This guidance would define the mission, its overall objectives, the desired end state, the roles and responsibilities of various agencies, and the mechanisms to be used to achieve unity of effort across USG operations. The Deputies Committee would review the Guidance before its implementation.

While the guidance was under development, members of the Executive Committee would also help identify personnel from their respective agencies to serve on an Interagency Crisis Planning Team (ICPT) that would work intensively with military campaign planners from the relevant Combatant Command. Chaired by the NSC Senior Adviser for Complex Contingency Planning or his or her designee, the ICPT would comprise regional and functional experts from all of the agencies with responsibilities in the operation. The ICPT would also have extensive reach back capabilities, such as secure means of communications like video teleconferencing and collaborative web-based tools, to enable its members to engage experts in regional and functional offices of their home agencies in developing specific aspects of the plan. The ICPT’s purpose would be to develop a truly integrated interagency campaign plan for all aspects of the operation, to be approved by the Deputies Committee and ultimately the President. Based on the planning guidance, the ICPT would integrate the development of various plans to implement that guidance, de-conflicting component planning and seeking to create synergies wherever possible.

Ideally, interagency planning would be organized not according to the traditional phases of conflict but by parallel streams of activity. An ICPT preparing for a post-conflict reconstruction operation might, for example, include multiple interagency planning teams, each of which would plan for a given area of activity, such as security, governance, justice/rule of law, or social and economic well-being. This would enable interagency integration at a much lower level while ensuring that planning for winning the peace also received priority and attention from the start. The ICPT should also plan “backwards” from the desired end state to the point of intervention in order to ensure that the United States’ ultimate objectives in the operation drive how the intervention is conducted rather than vice versa.

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4 The proposed ICPT model builds on a similar model proposed by State/CRS, but with two important differences. First, it would be chaired by NSC rather than State, empowering the chair with a direct line to the National Security Adviser and enabling him or her to play more of an “honest broker” role in resolving agency disputes. Second, it would ultimately work for the President, not the combatant commander, making the latter a supporting rather than the supported player in the planning process. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Fact Sheet, (Washington, DC: Department of State, 11 March 2005), http://www.state.gov/s/cris/rll/43327.htm
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Much of the value of this exercise would lie not in the plans themselves, but in the planning process, as underlying assumptions are brought to light, information is shared across agency stovepipes, different interpretations of the planning guidance are aired and addressed, and critical working relationships are forged. Were the interagency planning team unable to resolve a dispute between agencies, they could seek further guidance from the Executive Committee, which would either resolve the issue and clarify the guidance or refer the issue to the Deputies Committee for decision. In this sense, the normal NSC process would remain the “court of appeals” for resolving issues that arise in the course of the planning process.

Prior to formal approval, the Deputy National Security Adviser would host a rehearsal of the interagency campaign plan for the Deputies. This rehearsal would review the interagency planning guidance, the interagency campaign plan, and supporting plans developed by agencies or teams. The primary aim of this table top exercise would be to ensure that the plans reflect the guidance as intended, to reveal any disconnects between agency plans, identify issues or possible events that plans have not adequately addressed, and identify ways in which U.S. efforts could be made more effective. Conducting this rehearsal before the first U.S. boot hits the ground offers an invaluable opportunity to further integrate U.S. efforts before lives are on the line.

At some point in this planning process, the President would appoint a senior civilian to serve as his Special Representative, responsible for achieving the intervention’s strategic objectives and accountable for the success of the overall campaign. Together, the Special Representative and the Commander, Joint Task Force, who is responsible for all military operations in the campaign, would lead an Interagency Task Force charged with integrating U.S. interagency operations in the field. The principal purpose of the IATF would be to enhance the unity of effort among all the U.S. government actors involved—civilian and military—and, ultimately, improve the chances of success on the ground. The Special Representative and the CJTF would be supported by a fully integrated civil-military staff, organized along functional lines (e.g. with staffs for intelligence, planning, operations, logistics, administrative matters, etc.). Both civilian and military...
representatives of coalition partners could also be integrated into the task force as appropriate.

Ideally, for each complex contingency operation undertaken, the United States would establish a core IATF staff early on, outside the area of operations, to participate in the interagency planning and preparation for the operation. The IATF would deploy to the field with the CJTF, relying primarily on the U.S. military to provide the security, communications, logistics, and other support it would need to function.

Admittedly, the IATF would require some profound changes in the way that various U.S. agencies are used to doing business. Agency representatives would have to share intelligence and information more readily with their counterparts from other agencies. They would also have to develop new ways of operating alongside each other—as members of an integrated team rather than in their agency stovepipes. They would also have to develop a deeper understanding of (and perhaps appreciation for) the capabilities each agency can—and cannot—bring to an operation. This may sound like a tall order, but it is not so different from what the nation has asked of members of the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps over the last two decades in developing the capacity to conduct truly joint military operations.

The bottom line is this: Interagency operations are the next frontier of jointness and one that the United States cannot afford to neglect.

Actionable Recommendations

A number of specific recommendations arise from this vision of a truly integrated approach to the planning and conduct of interagency operations. They would reshape how the U.S. government operates and is organized at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and also create the necessary capacity for operations on the civilian side.

At the Strategic Level:

The NSC needs to move beyond its traditional and well-accepted role of preparing decisions for the President and take a more active oversight role to ensure that Presidential intent (as reflected in those decisions) is realized through USG actions.

Integrated staff should incorporate and expand on the existing country team. Private contractors and NGOs might also be included. While providing the expertise and perspectives of their home agencies, the civilian USG personnel would be expected to take direction from the President’s Special Representative and the CJTF.
A stronger NSC role in providing policy oversight during planning and execution, however, does not mean that the NSC staff should be involved in the conduct of operations. NSC staff is neither equipped for an operational role, nor is it subject to the same level of Congressional accountability as the national security agencies. In particular, no NSC staffer should have directive authority; in those cases in which an NSC staffer may believe that Presidential guidance is being ignored, he or she can use the NSC process to raise the issue to higher levels for resolution.

Establish a new NSC Senior Director and office dedicated to integrating interagency planning for complex contingency operations.

The next President should appoint a new Senior Director for Complex Contingency Planning with a dedicated staff of civilian and military professionals with extensive planning expertise. This office would be responsible for chairing the Interagency Crisis Planning Teams described below and providing planning expertise to the Executive Committee for a specific operation. It would also be responsible for developing standard operating procedures for interagency planning. This office should be given the staff and resources necessary to support at least three simultaneous planning efforts. Ideally, a core staff of civilian and military planners would remain in place as administrations change to provide continuity.

Establish planning capacity for complex contingency operations in civilian agencies.

Effective interagency planning for operations will require agencies other than DoD to increase their capacity to participate in and contribute to the planning process. The establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction in the State Department is a first step in this direction. Other agencies that regularly participate in complex contingency operations, such as USAID, Treasury, Justice, and Commerce, should create staffs with operational planning expertise as well. This will be no small challenge in organizations that lack a planning culture, expertise, and resources. Congress should provide the necessary authorities and resources for the personnel required. Given its planning culture and expertise, DoD should offer to detail some of its planners to help jump-start and support new planning offices in other agencies.

Establish a standard, NSC-led approach to interagency planning at the strategic level for complex contingency operations, as described above.

This approach should be codified in a national security directive signed by the President and should build to the greatest extent possible on the best practices of the current and previous
administrations, such as the Clinton administration’s PDD-56 on Managing Complex Contingency Operations, the Bush administration’s NSPD-“XX”, and the State S/CRS essential task list planning template.

At the Operational Level:

Create rapidly deployable Interagency Crisis Planning Teams for interagency campaign planning.

Chaired by the NSC Senior Director for Complex Contingency Planning, the ICPT for a given operation would be responsible for developing a truly integrated interagency campaign plan, based on the President’s planning guidance for the operation, to be approved by the Deputies Committee and ultimately the President. Each ICPT would be composed of regional and functional experts from all of the agencies involved, and should have “reachback” capabilities to draw on the broader expertise resident in these agencies.

For any operation involving security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations, the COCOM and his CJTF should fully integrate these elements into their campaign plan. The COCOM should designate a subordinate commander to lead the military’s participation in the interagency planning process.

This commander would participate in all aspects of military planning as well as the interagency planning process described above. Working with the ICPT, this commander would ensure that military planning is responsive to interagency planning guidance, seek to identify and resolve conflicts or disconnects between DoD planning and that of other agencies, increase synergy, and clarify what DoD needs from and can offer to other agencies during the operation.

At the Field Level:

For each complex contingency operation, establish an Interagency Task Force in the field to integrate the day to day efforts of all USG agencies and achieve greater unity of effort on the ground.

Each IATF would be led by a senior civilian appointed by the President and the commander of the military’s joint task force for the operation. The President’s Special Representative would be

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4 The Special Representative could be the U.S. Ambassador to the country, if one was in place, or another senior civilian named by the President. In the former case, the IATF staff would build on and significantly expand the existing country team.
responsible for achieving the intervention’s strategic objectives and accountable for the success of the overall campaign, and the Commander, Joint Task Force, would be responsible for all military operations in the campaign. Together, they would be supported by a fully integrated staff of civilian and military professionals organized along functional lines. The IATF structure should be flexible enough to include representatives of coalition partners and be adapted to operational circumstances.

Establish a standing IATF headquarters core element that is ready to deploy to an operation on short notice.

This standing headquarters core element (and its associated logistics and command and control backbone) would be the foundation for building the rest of an IATF once an operation was anticipated. Creating such a standing capacity is critical to reducing the response time to crises and to enabling the development of standard operating procedures, the training of personnel, and the forging of interagency relationships that will be put to the test in real-world operations. This core IATF staff would participate in interagency planning for the operation, increasing the likelihood that operations on the ground would reflect the President’s intent and guidance, and would deploy to the theater to begin operations as soon as possible. The ideal initial home for this core element would be Joint Forces Command, where the construct could be fleshed out and refined through experimentation and exercises. If this organization proves its value in future operations, Congress should provide the additional resources necessary to establish a standing IATF headquarters core element for each region of the world.

Creating the Necessary Capacity

Create a new Training Center for Interagency and Coalition Operations.

An Interagency Training Center would provide rigorous training in integrated planning for complex contingency operations for NSC and agency personnel; pre-deployment training for those tapped for specific operations; and new employee (contractors and direct hires) training for those about to assume responsibilities for operational planning, oversight, and coordination. The Center could also train a cadre of senior leaders who could be rapidly inserted into the Interagency Crisis Planning Teams and Interagency Task Forces described above. A reserve of civilian team leaders who have spent months or years training and operating with their military counterparts would be an invaluable asset at the outset of an operation when coordinating civilian and military efforts is particularly critical.
The Center could also provide training in cooperation with U.S. allies and partners and develop standard operating procedures with these countries for the planning and conduct of stability operations. Finally, the Center staff could focus on the collection, analysis and dissemination of lessons learned and best practices.

- **Create a deployable cadre of civilian personnel with the requisite skills in the planning and conduct of complex operations.**

In the near term, the focus should be on making S/CRS successful in fulfilling its ambitious mandate and on strengthening the more operational parts of USAID. In the longer term, however, Congress may want to consider consolidating S/CRS and parts of USAID into a new field operating agency. Establishing a new independent agency would facilitate the creation of the operations-oriented culture so critical to the success of any civilian rapid response capability—a culture that is largely absent from mainstream State Department and mainstream USAID. It would also create an institutional home and a more viable set of career paths for civilian professionals who want to become true experts in planning and conducting various aspects of interagency operations. Currently, such activities are generally seen as a diversion from the types of experience one needs to be promoted within either the Foreign Service or the Civil Service in the State Department. In short, the current structure of incentives and disincentives within the State Department actually tends to discourage civilian professionals from gaining exactly the type of experience and expertise that is urgently needed to improve U.S. performance in interagency operations. Creating a new agency with its own culture, career paths, and incentive structures would likely create a more hospitable environment for growing the civilian operational capabilities the United States needs than trying to do so within the prevailing cultures of the State Department and USAID.

- **Congress should authorize and fund a “personnel float” within the civilian agencies involved in national security to enable professional education and development.**

If we want to be able to expect the same level of professionalism from career civilians as we have come to expect from our military personnel, we must allocate the resources necessary to enable them to undertake a comparable and sustained program of professional development. Congress regularly allows the Military Services 10-15 percent additional endstrength to create a personnel “float” that is used to enable training, education and joint rotations as military professionals come up the ranks. The same should be provided to civilian professionals in the national security domain.
Congress and the Office of Personnel Management should establish new promotion requirements for civilian professionals in the national security agencies: appointment to the career Senior Executive Service in any such agency would require a year of interagency education and a 2-3 year interagency rotation.

One of the most profound changes made in the landmark Goldwater-Nichols legislation was the creation of the Joint Service Officer designation and the associated incentives for officers in the U.S. military to seek joint service as a way of advancing their careers. Once joint service became a virtual requirement for promotion to Flag or General Officer, the best and brightest in each of the Services began to actively seek joint assignments. This cross-fertilization across the Military Services created the human and cultural foundation on which increasingly integrated joint military operations have been built over the last 18 years. Jointness began as a change of experience that begat a change of mindset and behavior.

But there is no comparable system of incentives and requirements to encourage interagency rotations among civilian professionals across the national security agencies. Quite the contrary: rotations out of one’s home agency are often viewed as the kiss of death for one’s upward mobility. In an era of interagency operations, we need to plant the seed of jointness in the interagency context by creating incentives that reward interagency experience.

Building on the success of the Joint Service Officer program established by the original Goldwater-Nichols legislation, Congress should work with OPM to establish a similar incentive structure to encourage civil servants in agencies that play a key role in national security—Defense, State, AID, Treasury, Commerce, Justice, Energy, CIA, and Homeland Security—to gain interagency expertise and experience. Better integrating the plans, policies and operations of these agencies requires a human resources approach that would expand opportunities to gain interagency experience and would reward those who seek broad-based, integrative approaches to problem solving.

Making promotion to SES (or equivalent) as a career professional contingent upon spending a 2-3 year rotation in another agency would likely turn the prevailing attitude toward interagency rotations on its head. Rather than being seen as a distraction from, if not a detriment to, advancement in one’s home agency, it would be seen as the most important ticket to punch for promotion. This requirement would be administered by OPM in partnership with the individual Departments, which would maintain control over the selection, assignment and promotion of their own personnel. Over time, this might provide the basis for developing something akin to a National Security Professionals Corps, which would seek to create a cadre of civilian professionals expert in national security and interagency management.
Conclusion

Unity of effort must start at the top with clear guidance from the President on what the U.S. is seeking to achieve and how these objectives should be met in a given complex operation. But it cannot stop there. Improving U.S. performance in complex operations requires creating a robust and interconnected set of integration mechanisms at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the U.S. government. It also requires developing a more sophisticated and standardized approach to interagency planning, management and oversight of these operations as well as investing in the necessary capacities in the civilian agencies.

Although this will require many in the U.S. government to change old ways of doing business, the potential payoffs cannot be overstated: greater success in achieving U.S. objectives, faster, at less cost, and with fewer lives lost. Given the high likelihood of U.S. involvement in complex contingency operations for the foreseeable future, achieving greater jointness and success in interagency operations must be one of our highest national security priorities.
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TESTIMONY

International Perspectives on Interagency Reform

NORA BENSAHEL

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Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to contribute to this important debate.

Over the past few years, the United States and many of its allies and partners have become increasingly involved in stability operations and nation building around the world. Yet ongoing efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere have revealed major capability shortfalls that can undermine their prospects for success. The single most important limitation has been a lack of civilian capacity for such operations, which has led to an overreliance on military forces.

Several countries, including the United States, have recently adopted bureaucratic reforms that are intended to improve civilian capacity for stability operations, nation building, and crisis management efforts. Unfortunately, these reforms have only been marginally successful so far. The reforms enacted by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the European Union all face a remarkably similar set of challenges and constraints – despite their differences in structure, purpose, and national context – that have prevented them from living up to their initial expectations.

The United States: The Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

The most important interagency reform effort in the United States has been the establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS) in July 2004. Its mission is to “lead, coordinate, and institutionalize” civilian capacities for post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization efforts. In December 2005, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44

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designated the State Department as the lead agency for such efforts, and directed the Coordinator to co-chair a new interagency Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations.

CRS has undertaken several notable initiatives. It created an Essential Task Matrix, which specifies the many different tasks that such operations involve. It is developing a database of deployable civilians, is collecting lessons learned, and has worked with Joint Forces Command to develop a civil-military planning framework. It has also led or participated in government planning efforts for Sudan, Haiti, and Cuba, and has worked on conflict prevention efforts in several countries including Congo, Nepal, and Zimbabwe.

I know that Ambassador Pascual will provide an insightful perspective on the strengths and weaknesses of CRS, since he served as its first Coordinator. From my perspective, though, it suffers from three key problems that prevent it from fulfilling its mandate.

1. **Lack of funding.** Congress has repeatedly scaled back the administration’s budget request for CRS, which has made it difficult for the office to build its own capacity and to conduct activities. As this committee heard in testimony by the GAO in October 2007, some agencies have criticized CRS for not being able to provide additional resources, and as a result, are reluctant to cooperate with it in future planning efforts.

   Congress has also consistently chosen not to fund the president’s request for a Conflict Response Fund, which would enable CRS to improve its rapid response cadre and other deployable capabilities. The Active Response Corps (ARC) is a particularly vital program for increasing the number of deployable civilian specialists, but it only includes 10 people so far. That is insufficient to meet global demands. The Congressional appropriation of $50 million for a separate 500-person Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) is a step in the right direction. But that money cannot be spent until Congress specifically authorizes the creation of the CRC, which it has not yet done.

2. **Lack of staff and interagency representation.** As of October 2007, 77 people worked for CRS (which includes the 10 members of the ARC). Not only is this a small number given the magnitude of its responsibilities, but more than 92 percent of its staff – 71 out of those 77 people – are from the State Department. If the two staff members from USAID are considered part of State, that number rises to almost 95 percent. Clearly this is a severe limitation for an organization that is supposed to take the lead in interagency coordination. CRS remains open to a much greater degree of interagency representation,
but its small size and limited budget means that it lacks the bureaucratic prestige and power to push other agencies to provide much-needed deployees.

Lack of operational role. CRS has not yet been designated as the lead agency for any stabilization or reconstruction missions, and the planning frameworks it has established have not yet been fully utilized. CRS has conducted several planning activities, and ARC members have deployed overseas for small advisory missions. While important, these activities fall far short of the active policy coordination role envisaged in NSPD-44. As long as it remains primarily a support organization with limited planning, expertise, and bureaucratic clout, it is unlikely to fulfill its mandate as a true lead agency.

The United Kingdom: The Stabilisation Unit

The United Kingdom has actively participated in many recent stability operations, including those in the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In 2004, the government created a new Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) in order to facilitate government-wide planning, to build a deployable civilian capacity, and to serve as a source of expertise and lessons learned from previous operations. It is a joint office of the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Department for International Development, and includes approximately 30 personnel. PCRU officially changed its name to the Stabilisation Unit in December 2007.

The Unit has three primary tasks, which are similar to those of CRS: to conduct planning and assessment activities, to provide deployable civilian experts, and to identify and disseminate lessons from previous operations. Its activities to date have included assessment and mission planning in Helmand province in Afghanistan; supporting the British-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Basra, Iraq; supporting the 2006 peace agreement in Nepal; and supporting the African Union in Sudan by developing a communications strategy for the Darfur Peace Agreement. In the fall of 2007, the Ministry of Defence asked the Unit to manage its £269 million Stabilisation Aid fund, which enables it to direct and prioritize a wide range of activities.

However, the Unit has had a hard time achieving true coordination within the British government. Having three agencies jointly direct the unit was intended to give it three advocates within the government, but it has not worked out that way. Instead, it lacks a single champion that is invested in its success and that has the power to promote its mission and force coordination among reluctant bureaucrats. These agencies have also limited the Unit’s operational capacity, and have instead directed it to focus on strategic planning efforts. But strategic planning and
policy coordination is the primary function of the Cabinet Office in the British system, which leaves the Unit without much influence.

Canada: The Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force

The Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) was established in 2005 within the International Security Branch of Foreign Affairs Canada. Unlike the other organizations discussed here, it did not build its organizational capacity from scratch: it was part of a larger reorganization of the foreign ministry. The offices that dealt with humanitarian affairs, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, peacekeeping and peace operations, and mines and small arms were moved from their previous branches and into START.

In its first year, START included approximately 60 full-time personnel, and reported supporting 176 projects around the world. Haiti has become a particularly high priority for START, where it is pursuing initiatives to increase security, enhance the rule of law, and improve regional stability. It funds its work through the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF), a fund within the ministry that has been allocated C$235 million for the 2007-2008 fiscal year.

START has been the most successful of any of these reorganization efforts so far, and the GPSF has been well funded. To be fair, though, it would be surprising if START were not successful. It avoided a lot of bureaucratic resistance by combining pre-existing offices into a new task force, rather than creating a new office with a completely new mission. But it is also not clear whether START has created much additional value and capabilities than the individual offices had to begin with. And since it remains in a single ministry, it has not made much progress in achieving interdepartmental cooperation.

Germany: Civilian Crisis Prevention

In 2004, Germany adopted an Action Plan on Civilian Crisis Prevention, with 160 initiatives that the government pledged to undertake within five to ten years. It directed each ministry to designate a commissioner working in these areas, and the commissioners would then meet as an Interministerial Steering Group for Crisis Prevention. A new office was formed within the Foreign Ministry, with the designation GF-K, to chair the steering group and serve as the overall coordinator. The office has a very small full-time staff – only seven people during its first year – and an annual budget of €25 million. It is deliberately not an operational office: its funds are designed to support projects within the ministries that do have operational responsibilities.
Its contributions to date remain fairly limited. The office has convened several working groups, on issues such as security sector reform and whether Germany should create resource pools like the GPSF in Canada and the Stabilisation Aid fund in the United Kingdom. There was also a discussion group that used Nigeria as a test case for crisis prevention strategies, but it produced little.

The office faces a formidable obstacle. There is a very strong tradition in Germany of ministerial independence—much more so that in other countries, including the United States. This is compounded by the fact that interministerial coordination meetings are not taken very seriously, with low-level staff members participating instead of more senior officials. They are not empowered to take decisions and they tend to accomplish little. Most policy coordination occurs in the Chancellor’s office instead. The office has been able to have a small impact by funding small projects within other ministries, but this is a long way from the interministerial coordination function that was originally envisaged.

The European Union: The Commission versus the Council

Interagency coordination is hard enough within a single country, but it becomes even more challenging when it occurs in a multinational institution. The European Union often emphasizes the importance of civilian capacity and crisis prevention efforts in its rhetoric, but it has had great difficulty building any actual capacity in this area. The main problem is that two distinct bodies have responsibility for EU crisis management and stability operations, and the division of labor between them is unclear.

- The European Council consists of the heads of state and ministers from each of the EU’s 27 members. It is the main decision-making body for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and decisions in this area require unanimity. The Council has undertaken a number of efforts to improve its military capabilities, including establishing the EU battlegroup initiative and declaring the intention to create a European Gendarmerie Force. On the civilian side, it established a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, which is supposed to promote the development of rapidly deployable civilian capacity for international police operations, the rule of law, civil administration, and civil protection. The Council has had great difficulties with both sets of initiatives, but the civilian capabilities have proven even more challenging because, unlike the military, member states do not already have national capacities that they can leverage.
The European Commission is essentially the executive body of the EU, and it possesses supranational authority in its areas of responsibility. Most of these areas are related to the administration of the common market, but they do include promoting international development and managing the EU’s external relations. In both of these areas, the Commission has funded a wide range of projects designed to reduce instability and prevent conflict. The Directorate General for External Affairs even has a branch dedicated to crisis management and conflict prevention.

In principle, the division of labor is clear: the Council conducts short-term operations with security implications, while the Commission supports long-term development and stability. In practice, it is virtually impossible to distinguish between the two, since both can involve immediate stabilization, peacebuilding and governance efforts. This problem is compounded by the fact that the Commission and the Council lack any formal coordination mechanisms. They exist as two separate branches of the EU, and each one plans, assesses, and executes its own programs with few mechanisms to ensure policy coherence.

Ideally, the roles of the Council and Commission would be complementary instead of competitive. The Commission has much of the expertise and resources necessary for crisis management, while the Council has the structure, political authority and operational capacity to respond quickly to emerging crises. The proposed European Constitutional Treaty sought to solve this problem by creating an EU Minister of Foreign Affairs, who would absorb the Council’s responsibility for the CFSP and the Commission’s responsibility for external affairs. Yet the French and Dutch populations failed to ratify this treaty. This provision is included in the Treaty of Lisbon that was signed by the EU heads of state in December 2007, but that treaty will not enter into force until and unless it is ratified by all 27 member states.

Common Problems

Several common problems have plagued all of these efforts to improve civilian capacity and interagency cooperation for stability operations, regardless of country. These include:

- **Bureaucratic turf wars.** The expertise needed for successful stability operations is usually spread out across multiple government agencies. The new offices described above were all designed to promote interagency coordination, but they often faced stiff resistance from the agencies whose efforts were supposed to be coordinated. The greater the mandate these offices possess, the more likely they are to provoke resistance from agencies that view them as intruding on their turf and interfering with their mission.
• **Poor organizational placement.** Some of these offices are too low in their government hierarchies to forcefully advocate their views or to compel other agencies to provide them with the information, personnel, and resources they need. Some are embedded in organizations that are less far removed from operational planning, and others suffer from not being part of any organizational structure at all. This makes them highly dependent on the personal connections and persuasive powers of individual leaders, which hinders the development of real institutional capacity.

• **Lack of financial resources.** Most of these offices lack the money that they need to achieve their missions. They have small operating budgets that can easily be targeted by legislators seeking to save money. Limited financial resources limit the programs and activities that these offices can sponsor, and can also exacerbate bureaucratic challenges because money and bureaucratic power are often closely linked.

• **Lack of qualified personnel.** These offices rely heavily on secondments from other agencies to include true subject-matter experts and to augment their relatively small staffs. Yet home agencies are often reluctant to approve such secondments, especially when they do not see contributing to stability operations as part of their core mission. They believe that they are losing valuable people and expertise, which indeed they are. When they do provide people to these offices and missions, they often prevent their best people from serving in these positions or limit the secondments to a few months to minimize disruption. Efforts to develop rosters of deployable civilian personnel are being undertaken by several countries, including the United States, but identifying qualified personnel remains an ongoing challenge.

**Overcoming These Challenges**

Why is this so difficult? Why have all of these countries, regardless of their differences, been unable to make much progress in promoting interagency reform? The main reason is that our political systems are not structured for it. These problems result from deliberate political choices about how our governments should be organized. The expertise needed for successful stability operations is spread out across multiple agencies, including many with domestic mandates and little or no interest in international operations. Experts in judicial reform, for example, are more likely to work for the Department of Justice than the Departments of State or Defense. Experts in economic reform are more likely to work for the Department of the Treasury. Experts in improving
agricultural output are more likely to work for the Department of Agriculture. Yet all of their expertise needs to be harnessed, integrated, and deployed for successful stability operations.

One potential solution would be to strip all of these functions out of their home agencies and put them together in a new office. This might improve policy coordination, but it would undoubtedly raise new challenges as well. And beyond the fact that it might not improve policy effectiveness in this area, it would also be very politically unpalatable. It would essentially create a standing department whose mission would be to reconstruct countries abroad, which would raise charges of imperialism and undoubtedly raise fundamental questions among the American people. Since this isn’t much of a solution, we are stuck with the problems of decentralization, which means that some amount of bureaucratic stovepiping, turf wars, and competition for resources is inevitable.

That said, there are some ways to minimize some of the negative effects of interagency competition and increase U.S. capacity for stability operations. These include:

1. **Manage interagency competition.** There is no silver bullet that will solve the problems of interagency competition, because the decentralized structure of the United States government will not change. Bureaucratic reforms or other initiatives that claim to solve these problems should be viewed very skeptically, because agencies will continue to do what is in their own interests. Successful reforms will create incentives for cooperation so that agencies perceive cooperation as providing some benefit.

2. **Create incentives for interagency secondments.** Right now, there are several strong disincentives that prevent even willing agencies from cooperating. The most important of these disincentives – and possibly one of the easiest to fix – is personnel policies for secondments. Experts who are willing to serve in other government agencies or to deploy for stability operations often find that their home agency prevents them from doing so, because that agency has to pay for all of the costs involved. It is not reimbursed for that expert’s salary, much less the cost of hiring someone to replace that person during the secondment. At a minimum, this disincentive needs to be removed so that the home agency can recover its costs and manage its workload. It would be even better to offer positive inducements for providing personnel to interagency assignments, and career inducements to the individual personnel, so that home agencies seek out these opportunities instead of simply relying on volunteers.

3. **Increase the capacity of USAID.** Interagency secondments must complement, but cannot substitute for, full-time professional expertise on stabilization and reconstruction. The
Agency for International Development is the government repository of knowledge on
promoting stability and development in post-conflict situations, but is hindered by its small
size and lack of resources. While this committee does not have jurisdiction over the
USAID budget, it does oversee a wide range of issues that are directly affected by the
lack of USAID capacity, since the armed services are consistently called on to fill that gap
during ongoing operations.

4. **Establish flexible funding mechanisms** This is the area where Congress can make the
greatest contribution. As the lead agency for stability operations, the State Department –
and CRS in particular – needs to be able to quickly allocate funds in order to respond
effectively to rapidly changing mission requirements. Yet Congress has consistently failed
to fund the Conflict Response Fund, largely due to concerns about maintaining oversight
over the use of these funds. While this is certainly an appropriate concern, effective
oversight can be created through a requirement to report any expenditures from the Fund
to be reported to Congress within 30 days, or some similar mechanism. Requiring the
State Department to specify the ways in which the funds will be used ahead of time
defeats the purpose of a contingency fund and hinders mission accomplishment.

5. **There is no substitute for an involved president and an involved Congress.** Only the
president has the political power necessary to break through the inevitable bureaucratic
frictions of the interagency process. The president needs to make this a high priority, both
by establishing clear interagency coordination procedures and then following up to
ensure that they are regularly used for both routine matters and crisis situations. Yet even
an actively involved president can accomplish little without Congressional support.
Building the civilian capacities necessary for effective stability operations will require a
sustained Congressional commitment to support interagency reform efforts and to
provide the funds necessary for capacity building in this critical area.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY

Mr. CONAWAY. You asked a very important question about the effectiveness of interagency coordination and collaboration during real-world operations if it is not practiced at home. Obviously, the ability to coordinate effectively is severely degraded when not practiced sufficiently prior to deployment. But the opportunities for that very training exist today. Actually, interagency workshops in 2006 developed an agreement among DoD, DoS, and USAID to implement SSTR training initiatives (specifically regarding PRTs) that would integrate the appropriate USG agencies into DoD pre-deployment training.

Do you have any knowledge of the progress of this integrated training? Are there examples where it’s working well? If not, what are the challenges that continue to prevent this invaluable opportunity?

Ambassador BODINE. There has been progress on interagency pre-deployment training and other steps taken toward improving interagency cooperation and collaboration run out of the NSPD–44 Training Workshop “Training, Education, Exercises and Experimentation” co-chaired by State/S/CRS, DOD and USAID.

In talking with those most directly involved, there is broad agreement that the introduction of training, education and lessons learned has improved the effectiveness of those in the field, and that with each training iteration; the training becomes more relevant to those to be deployed. There is also broad agreement that there are serious challenges that need to be addressed if the USG is going to realize the full potential of these changes, not just for the PRTs and not just for Iraq and Afghanistan, but our ability to respond quickly and effectively in future post-conflict, pre-conflict and disaster situations. We need to not only figure out how to do Iraq (and Afghanistan) better, but how to avoid the next Iraq.

Some of the positive steps taken to date include:

> Interagency PRT Training: Includes Iraq pre-deployment training coordinated through State’s Foreign Service Institute and Afghanistan training at Ft. Bragg. Each offering of these courses works to improve on the strengths and grow beyond the weaknesses of the previous offering, with feedback from recent graduates.

> A host of war colleges and institutes—NDU, PKSOI, Army War College, and Naval Post-graduate—have done a variety of interagency training, simulations etc. on the gamut of R&S issues.

> Exercises: The military has long included civilian agency personnel in its exercises. I personally participated in a number well over ten years ago with both the Army and the Marine Corps. This has ramped up considerably in recent years and State/S/CRS regularly participates in at least four large integrated exercises. These include:

  ○ United Action: One of the first to include State/S/CRS in the planning stages, it focuses on the three D’s (defense, development and diplomacy) and covers the spectrum of conflict prevention to post-conflict.

  ○ Multinational Experiment-5 (MNE–5): Focuses on multinational, interagency, comprehensive engagement and includes government, non-governmental and others. Includes crisis prevention.

  ○ Blue Advance: A SouthCom initiative that has in recent years sought increased civilian participation. State/S/CRS had a team of 84 civilians at the last Blue Advance.

  ○ Certain Trust: For newly-minted civilian affairs officers at Ft. Bragg, it mimics field-level interaction one might find in a PRT.

All of this is quite impressive, especially on paper, and certainly speaks to recognition on the part of the military that they need to train and exercise for an interagency environment and for non-kinetic operations. This is all to the good. In talking with a number of military officers and others involved, these and other opportunities all enhance the military’s understanding and appreciate of the capabilities,
organization, skill sets, mind sets of their civilian agency and, in some cases, NGO counterparts.

As one military officer described it, it reminds us we are all one government, that we each have strengths and weaknesses, and that together we can build on the strengths and cover/compensate for the others (including the military’s) weaknesses. As someone who has done civilian-military work her entire career, as has this army officer, it is reassuring to see that the mutual respect and sense of shared professionalism was being reinstilled in younger generations of civilian and military officers as an antidote to the culture of misperception and suspicion that had begun to grow in the past several years. This is without question important and perhaps of far greater lasting value than any Iraq or Afghanistan-specific training, however vital that is.

The Challenges:
This significant up-tic in interagency training and exercises is overwhelming, literally. It has become a beast the civilian world can barely begin to feed, and certainly cannot feed, continue its day-to-day functions and operations and address its own crisis prevention and response requirements.

- There simply are not enough civilians to meet the military's demand.
- There is no “one-stop shop” for PRT (or related) training. Each agency has its own programs, timelines etc. There is a central issue of a lack of overarching and sustained leadership.
- Iraq and Afghanistan training programs are not formally connected. Iraq joint training occurred only with the start of the surge. The State/NEA run program can best be described as “in flux.”
- Inadequate and uncoordinated use of human resources to design and deliver training exacerbated by the multiplicity of providers among and within agencies and divergent goals and operational and institutional needs.
- Most training is designed/scheduled to meet military deployment cycles and needs, which do not necessarily correspond with civilian cycles.
- Much of the pre-deployment training is of very short duration—less than a month—which is insufficient to build the full level of understanding needed for seamless collaboration, or understanding of the field environment. (See, for example, the training provided for CORDS/Vietnam).
- Since the planning and design is often done to meet military operational needs, and since there are not enough civilians to participate in the design phase, the training is less relevant to civilian needs than it could be. Thus, civilians may end up playing roles rather than acting as participants. Such role playing, while of some benefit to the military participants, draw civilians away from their own readiness requirements.
- Most of the training is crisis/operational driven. Of the three D's, “defense” is largely short-term, immediate and kinetic, while “diplomacy and development” are long-term, incremental and non-kinetic.

Some Efforts to Address These Issues:

The fundamental difference between the military's short-term/pre-deployment needs and timelines, the “urgent” (Iraq and Afghanistan), and the civilian/interagency need to prepare for the “important” (the ability to respond the next crises and conflicts) is, of course, the essence of the need for greater training toward the goal of greater collaboration, and its fundamental challenge. In talking with both civilians and military involved, there is a recognition that some rationalization of training and exercises needs to be done to both optimize its effectiveness and relevance for all parties, and to address the staffing, time and resource constraints on the civilian side. A pre-deployment driven training and exercise agenda drains the civilian side of highly limited resources without necessarily meeting the needs of those same personnel nor does it necessarily build a more sustainable structure of crisis identification, pre-emption and preparedness on the civilian side. (It goes without saying that the civilian side of the equation needs an equitable ramp-up on resources).

The operations-centric training needs to be reoriented or at least balanced with interagency training and acculturalization on pace and needs of “diplomacy and development” and how “defense” can be integrated into this longer-range dynamic. This is the very dynamic that is at the core of crisis prevention and crisis mitigation as well as post-conflict stabilization.

Two related initiatives have begun to address this more fundamental difference and the need to look beyond and prepare for the next crises. One, the Center for
Complex Operations (CCO), which includes representatives from State/S/CRS, State/PM, USAID and DOD (civilian and uniformed military and PKSOI), recently began work on lessons learned from existing PRT efforts with the goal to improve training and operations and, perhaps more importantly, develop new doctrine which can be supported by a structure properly resourced and staffed and then trained to.

Right now, we are doing this in reverse and building backwards.

The second, the Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) training strategy began in late 2005 under State/S/CRS resulted in seven course offerings for interagency participants at State’s FSI. The Stability Operations Division, originally at S/CRS and now at FSI, emphasizes integrated, one-government approaches to conflict assessment, strategic and implementation planning and conduct of stability operations beyond Afghanistan, Iraq or PRTs. This is being updated through the Training Workshop and will be revised following a comprehensive survey of all offered R&S courses, currently underway by the CCO and the US Institute of Peace.

Mr. CONAWAY. Many of the recommendations to integrate a form of Goldwater-Nichols into DoS and USAID seem to be quite valid. But I am concerned with some of the specifics of your recommendations. For example, a civilian reserve is a great idea on paper, but when it comes time to deploy these individuals, DoS will run into the same problems as they do today—struggling to fill the requirements. Unlike military reservists, the civilian reservists will not be held accountable if they refuse to deploy, and therefore, can not be forced to go. Also, overhauling the agency makes a great deal of sense. How can these incentives be adequately employed and deployed, consistent capability be maintained if this system isn’t completely self-contained within the agency?

Ambassador PASCUAL. There are 2 different types of reserve capabilities. One is a reserve within the government, which is focused on deploying staff to design, manage and implement U.S. government operations in a post-conflict situation. The second is the deployment of skilled specialists, such as police trainers and rule of law experts who are the deliverers of post-conflict stabilization programs.

A reserve capacity within government can be created through an Active Response Corps (ARC) and a Standby Corps has been proposed by the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) in the State Department. Both the ARC and the Standby Corps can include representatives from the State Department, USAID, and other civilian agencies. Individuals would apply for positions in the ARC as they do for other positions for Foreign Service deployment. At the time that these positions are advertised, it would be made clear that these individuals signing up for the ARC would accept overseas assignment anywhere, including places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Once the ARC is created, the Secretary of State would have the capacity to direct the deployment of these individuals as necessary in overseas assignments. The range of assignments could vary. They can include creating a new U.S. government civilian presence in places such as Baghdad and Kabul, where there is no such presence. It can also include supplementing existing operations, such as in Sudan or Haiti, in a moment of crisis. Incentives can be built into the personnel system to encourage individuals to apply for these positions.

Once individuals complete their assignments in the ARC, they can remain in the Standby Corps for a period of at least 5 years. Part of the requirement for the Standby Corps is participating in annual exercises to update and maintain their skills. Between an ARC of approximately 250 people at any given time and a Standby Corps that could be built up to 600–700 people over several years. The U.S. government would have a significant pool of skilled individuals from which to draw in order to staff immediate overseas emergency deployments.

A Civilian Reserve Corps overseas for delivery of stabilization and reconstruction services would need to be structured differently than the ARC or the Standby Corps and in a more similar way to which the military staffs its National Reserves. National recruitment capability would have to be established. It would need to include clear rules for participation in the reserve, including: reservists to have the right to re-employment in their jobs once they return; during the period of time that individuals are in the reserve, they would become U.S. government employees just as individuals who enter the military reserve become employees of the military.

Mr. CONAWAY. Ambassador Bodine asked a very important question about the effectiveness of interagency coordination and collaboration during real-world oper-
ations if it is not practiced at home. Obviously, the ability to coordinate effectively is severely degraded when not practiced sufficiently prior to deployment. But the opportunities for that very training exist today. Actually, interagency workshops in 2006 developed an agreement among DoD, DoS, and USAID to implement SSTR training initiatives (specifically regarding PRTs) that would integrate the appropriate USG agencies into DoD pre-deployment training.

Do you have any knowledge of the progress of this integrated training? Are there examples where it’s working well? If not, what are the challenges that continue to prevent this invaluable opportunity?

Ambassador PASCUAL. Some of the best examples that I have seen of interagency training across civilian agencies and between civilians and the military have occurred in the context of specific simulations that force civilian and military players alike to grapple with how they would operate in deployments with one another. S/CRS has undertaken a number of these simulations along with various combatant commands in the U.S. military. There have also been examples that have included international military and civilian participants. In one case, NGOs were also included in order to understand the equities and issues that arise in the integration of humanitarian personnel with other civilian and military actors.

The problem with undertaking more of these training programs is the lack of adequate staff. The military has tens of thousands of individuals who they can dedicate to such exercises and training. For the civilian parts of government, it is a struggle simply to get the number of individuals necessary for immediate deployments, much less for training programs for two to three weeks. Until the number of civilian personnel are increased in reserve mechanisms such as the ARC, it will be extremely difficult to have adequate numbers of personnel who can dedicate time to effective interagency training exercises.

Once training exercises such as these simulations are conducted, it then becomes possible to focus attention on how civilian and military agencies together can effectively plan with one another on how to extract necessary guidelines for doctrine that will direct future deployments and planning, on the necessary personnel and skills needed in order to make these deployments effective, and on resources that are needed in order to support the deployments. The issue of training cannot be looked unless it is examined alongside the supply of adequate personnel. Even the best training programs will fail because adequate numbers of people will not be able to participate in them and the lessons will not reverberate backwards through the bureaucracy.