[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PROTECTING THE MASS TRANSIT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN NEW YORK CITY
AND IN THE NATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 25, 2008
__________
Serial No. 110-109
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts Lamar Smith, Texas
Norman D. Dicks, Washington Christopher Shays, Connecticut
Jane Harman, California Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Tom Davis, Virginia
Nita M. Lowey, New York Daniel E. Lungren, California
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Mike Rogers, Alabama
Columbia David G. Reichert, Washington
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
Islands Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Bob Etheridge, North Carolina David Davis, Tennessee
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Henry Cuellar, Texas Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania
Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Al Green, Texas
Ed Perlmutter, Colorado
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas, Chairwoman
Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts Daniel E. Lungren, California
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Columbia Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Ed Perlmutter, Colorado Officio)
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Erin Daste, Director & Counsel
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Coley O'Brien, Minority Senior Counsel
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Secuirty and Infrastructure Protection.......... 1
Witnesses
Mr. Raymond W. Kelly, Commissioner, New York City Police
Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Mr. Michael Balboni, Deputy Secretary for Public Safety, State of
New York:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Mr. James C. Little, International President, Transportation
Workers Union:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Mr. Thomas C. Lambert, Senior Vice President and Chief of Police,
Metropolitan Transit Authority, Harris County, Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 41
Prepared Statement............................................. 43
PROTECTING THE MASS TRANSIT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN NEW YORK CITY
AND IN THE NATION
----------
Friday, April 25, 2008
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection,
Brooklyn, NY.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., at
the Brooklyn Public Library, Grand Army Plaza, Brooklyn, New
York, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee [Chairwoman of the Subcommittee]
presiding.
Present: Representatives Jackson Lee and Clarke.
Also present: Representative Nadler.
Mr. Reyes-Gavilan. Good morning. My name is Richard Reyes-
Gavilan, Director of Central Library. On behalf of our
Executive Director, Dionne Mack-Harvin, I would like to welcome
you to Brooklyn Public Library, and our Doctor S. Stevan Dweck
Center for Contemporary Culture, where we are honored to have
Congresswoman Yvette Clarke hold this crucially important
Homeland Security field hearing.
As is well known, New York lives underground. Ridership on
several Brooklyn subway lines has increased by staggering
percentages over the past 10 years.
New Yorkers want to know what is being done to ensure their
safety. Brooklyn Public Library is an ideal location for this
knowledge to be shared.
I would now like to recognize our distinguished guests,
beginning with Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, Chairwoman of
the Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection; Congresswoman Yvette Clarke; Congressman Jerrold
Nadler; and our witnesses, Michael Balboni, Deputy Secretary
for Public Safety, State of New York; James Little,
International President, Transport Workers Union; Thomas C.
Lambert, Senior Vice President and Chief of Police, Department
of Public Safety, Houston METRO; and, of course, Raymond Kelly,
Commissioner of the New York City Police Department.
Thank you, and I will turn it over now to Ms. Jackson Lee.
Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. This meeting is now called to order.
I wish to quickly thank Richard Gavilan, Director of the
Library, for his very kind and generous remarks and welcome. We
are delighted to be here.
He's absolutely right. We are delighted to be here at the
invitation of Congresswoman Yvette Clarke, who is a member--a
very diligent and vital member of this subcommittee, joined by
a very distinguished colleague, Jerry Nadler, who is the Chair
of the Constitution Subcommittee of the House Judiciary
Committee. These very fine and distinguished members of
Congress from New York have collectively been champions for
security and civil liberties here in this very fine city. They
have been champions for the concept of ensuring the depth of
security and the formula being used by the Department of
Homeland Security that is a, if you will, common sense
approach--a practical approach to assessing the at-risk cities
and providing the funding.
Before I begin my formal remarks, let me make note of the
fact that Mr. Nadler was an enormous advocate, after 9/11, for
the compensation and the orderly response, if you will, to an
enormous tragedy on behalf of New Yorkers. His leadership,
along with the delegation, was superb.
Congresswoman Clarke has come in and been, I believe, a
shining star on the Homeland Security Committee. She has
championed not only the important rights of New York and her
District, but she has brought a broad view to how we can
balance this very important question of workers' security and
ensuring the civil liberties of New Yorkers and all Americans.
So, I want to thank both of them for their presence here
today as this meeting comes to order.
As indicated, the subcommittee will come to order. The
subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
protecting the mass transit critical infrastructure in New York
City and in the Nation. Importantly, this testimony will
discuss mass transit security in the New York City area, and
how this applies to securing service transportation
infrastructure nationwide.
I would like to thank everyone for their participation in
this morning's field hearing entitled ``Protecting the Mass
Transit Critical Infrastructure in New York City and in the
Nation.''
As we all know, securing mass transit in this country is
critical to ensuring that we protect the American public from
terrorists. Each weekday, 11.3 million passengers in 35
metropolitan areas and 22 States use commuter heavy or light
rail. It is imperative that we in Congress continue to give
those on the front lines the tools they need to continue to
protect the traveling public.
Until recently, the Department of Homeland Security has
focused almost exclusively on aviation security. But we in
Congress changed that focus with the enactment of the 9/11
legislation last August, with the beginning of the leadership
of the new Congress led by our Democratic Speaker and Majority
Leader. The law now mandates that TSA put more focus on surface
transportation security.
To New Yorkers, we are awake and alert. We hear you. We
understand the vastness of the mass transit system in America,
and we are ready to protect it.
Included in the requirements of the 9/11 legislation is
expanded transportation grant criteria, protocols for frontline
employee training, authorization for visible intermodal
prevention and response teams, increases in surface
transportation security inspectors, and many other improvements
that will help to make our Nation's mass transit systems.
Let me offer my greetings on behalf of our Chairman, Bennie
Thompson, of Mississippi, who started in his efforts of
reorganizing the committee, established this separate committee
to make the statement to the Nation and around the world:
Terrorists, stand back. We are concerned about mass transit. We
are going to review mass transit. We are going to fund the mass
transit systems to ensure the security of all America.
Today in New York City, home to the largest mass transit
system in America, we are here to discuss how we can continue
to make mass transit safe for Americans. New York has been on
the forefront of securing mass transit for many years. As the
site of Ground Zero, the State of New York, the NYPD, Amtrak,
Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Port Authority, and all of
the frontline workers who work the subways, the trains, the
buses, bridges, and tunnels are all keenly aware of how
important their jobs are and what must continue to be done to
secure this city and, of course, the Nation.
Let me emphasize this again. We consider transit workers
frontline workers. They are in the eye of the storm. They are
our eyes and ears. They are our protectors. We want to ensure
the right kind of working environment, the right kind of
training, the right kind of security dollars. We want them to
work in the best conditions, so they can do the best work for
us.
We in Congress are your partners in ensuring that you have
the tools needed to secure surface modes of transportation. We
have already accomplished much in the passage of the 9/11 bill.
But surely, our work continues.
The dialogue we have today gives those of us in Congress
the opportunity to hear directly from those who work these
issues on the ground, so that we can continue to be a resource
for you.
I would like to thank Commissioner Kelly and Deputy
Secretary Balboni for sharing their perspectives with us today,
as well as Mr. Little and Chief Lambert, for your presence and
insight here today. The lessons we learn during this process
can help secure transportation across the Nation.
In my District, in Houston, we have the METRO System that
transports thousands of people around the downtown area every
day. We are growing in leaps and bounds. We expect great
growth. We want to be secure, as well.
While that system is different in many ways from what
exists here in New York, there are common threads that we can
share to make sure all mass transit systems have access to the
most effective, cutting edge methods of security. I am pleased
that Chief Lambert, as I indicated, is here today to share his
perspective.
Again, we are concerned about our workers, and so we look
forward to hearing the important insight of the President of
the International TWU, who is here to give his insight, as
well, Mr. James Little.
History has shown us that terrorists view rail and public
transportation systems as potential targets. London, Madrid,
Mumbai have fallen victim to attacks on rail and mass transit.
Even the underground pipeline explosion, if you will, that
occurred here in New York probably gave a number of individuals
fear more than they might have imagined.
So, we have to be on the alert on all kinds of issues. Even
more devastation could be caused by a successful attack on our
mass transit here in the United States.
Further, this threat is always present. In January of this
year, a plot was thwarted to attack the Barcelona public
transit system. This attempted attack is yet another reminder
that we must remain vigilant.
I'd like to thank my esteemed colleague--colleagues,
plural. Congresswoman Yvette Clarke, first, for hosting this
important hearing in your District. She is a valuable member of
the Homeland Security Committee. She has done excellent work in
bringing issues of transportation security to the committee on
behalf of this great city.
Again, thank you, all.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I'd like to yield 2 minutes to the
distinguished member of the committee at this time, and I'd be
happy to yield 2 minutes to Mr. Nadler at this time, as well.
Congresswoman Clarke, now recognized.
Ms. Clarke. I want to thank everyone for coming to this
hearing. In particular, I would like to thank our Chairwoman,
Sheila Jackson Lee, for bringing her committee to Brooklyn, and
for her hard work in making this all come together. Although
she now hails from Houston, she is a native New Yorker, and we
welcome her back home with open arms.
I also want to thank Commissioner Kelly, Deputy Secretary
Balboni, Mr. Little, and Chief Lambert for taking their time to
come and discuss this very important issue of mass transit
security. I'd like to also thank my colleague, Jerrold Nadler,
for being here and for being such a strong mentor to me, as a
new member on the Hill.
It is very important that the House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection is holding a hearing in New York City, and
particularly here in Brooklyn, home to millions of people who
depend on the subway and other mass transit to get them to
work, to school, to the store, to friends' houses, and anywhere
else you could imagine. Here in Brooklyn, riding the subway
isn't just for commuting. It's a way of life.
With millions of riders each day, the New York subway
system is far and away the busiest in the country, and it sits
in a city that is a well known favorite target of potential
terrorists.
The only way to keep our citizens safe in this situation is
to have outstanding coordination between everyone. This
includes the transit workers who are on the front line every
day; the first responders, like the NYPD, FDNY, and others;
State level agencies like MTA and the Port Authority; the
Federal Government; and the people at managerial levels that
run these organizations.
For a city the size of ours, this is a near monolith task.
However, the individuals involved in securing New York have
done an outstanding job, accomplishing far more than any other
city in America, setting a nationwide standard, and often
implementing practices and programs that surpass what the
Federal Government has done. There have been more than a few
occasions where DHS and other Washington agencies have looked
to what has been done in New York to determine the direction of
their own work.
As a Councilwoman during the 5 years following the attacks
on September 11, I was proud to play a role in helping New York
City to implement many of the new security practices. Now that
I am in Congress, I feel it is my duty to do everything in my
power to ensure that New York gets all the support it requires
from the Federal Government in order to keep our constituents
and visitors safe. That is why I'm the sole Representative from
New York City sitting on the Homeland Security Committee, and
why I'm very glad that the Chairwoman has brought our
subcommittee here today.
Thank you, very much.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Nadler is recognized.
Mr. Nadler. Well, thank you, very much. Let me begin by
thanking the distinguished Chairwoman, Ms. Jackson Lee, for
bringing this hearing here today, and for giving me permission,
as a non-member of the committee, to sit at this hearing this
morning.
Let me also thank Congresswoman Clarke for bringing this
hearing here, and for the diligent work she has done as a
member of the Homeland Security Committee.
We all know that New York is, perhaps, the major terrorist
target in the United States, along with Washington. We have
already suffered attacks. We know the daunting tasks of
protecting all our people and all our infrastructure.
We know that the city administration and the State
administration have done heroic work in this regard, and I want
to compliment Commissioner Kelly and Deputy Secretary Balboni,
in particular, for that.
We know that the Department of Homeland Security and that
the congressional formulas for distribution of aid under the
Homeland Security grant allocations have been skewed not
entirely in favor of where the risks are, to put it mildly. We
have had to struggle. The New York delegation, among others,
has struggled to correct that. Over the years, we have made
some considerable progress.
In the 9/11 bill that Congresswoman Jackson Lee referred to
last year, that bill also contained a number of provisions with
a direct relevance to mass transit. We are gratified that the
Department is finally recognizing that we have to devote real
effort to mass transit.
I know that when I travel on an airplane, and many of us
travel on airplanes, there is plenty of security. When I travel
on the New York City subway system or, for that matter, on
Amtrak, there may be security, but there is certainly very
little in terms of comparing to what one goes through when one
goes in the air.
Obviously, it's human nature to react immediately where the
attack occurred, but it is also obvious that we have to protect
ourselves not only where the first attack occurred, but where
the next may, God forbid, occur. So, I'm very gratified at the
efforts that are being made, and I'm particularly gratified at
this hearing to look into these matters.
Again, I thank the chairperson for her diligent work in
bringing this hearing and in looking over these questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you, very much.
For the formal record, I ask unanimous consent for Mr.
Nadler to join the hearing.
Hearing no objection, so ordered.
Let me welcome the panel of witnesses.
Our first witness is Commissioner Ray Kelly. Raymond W.
Kelly was appointed Police Commissioner of the city of New York
City by Mayor Michael Bloomberg, making Commissioner Kelly the
first person to hold the post for a second separate tenure.
Commissioner Kelly was formerly Senior Managing Director of
Global Corporate Security at Bear Stearns and Company. Before
that, he served as Commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service,
where he managed the agency's 20,000 employees and $20 billion
in annual revenue. For the record, that is where I enjoyed
Commissioner Kelly's service, as he visited with us before the
House Judiciary Committee.
Our second witness is Deputy Secretary for Public Safety,
Michael Balboni. Mr. Balboni has a day-to-day responsibility
for managing Homeland Security affairs, emergency preparedness
and response of law enforcement, an 18-year veteran of both
houses of the State Legislature. He has extensive experience in
security and law enforcement matters.
He was the author of New York's Antiterrorism Law of 2001,
that mandates severe penalties for those who commit terror
acts, make terror threats, or render assistance to terrorists.
He also authored a 2002 law that helps protect the State's
water supply from terror attacks. In 2005, he authored the
Chemical Plant Security Act, the first of its kind in the
Nation.
I have indicated that I look forward to having Mr. Balboni
come to our committee in Washington, as we move forward on
issues dealing with water security and chemical security.
Our third witness is James Little, International President
of Transportation Workers Union. Mr. James Little assumed the
office of International President in 2006.
Mr. Little has been serving TWU in numerous capacities for
three decades, including: TWU Local 540, Section Chairman for 3
years; President of TWU Local 542--Aircraft Dispatchers and
Meteorologists--for 12 years; TWU International Representative
for 7 years; and Air Transport Division and TWU International
Administrative Vice President since 2001.
He became a member of TWU in 1971 after hiring on in the
Fleet Service for American Airlines, after service to the
Nation as an AMT and Crew Chief for the U.S. Air Force
Strategic Air Command.
Mr. Little has been a vital asset to the House of
Representatives as it relates to the rights of workers. His
insight on the idea of transit workers as frontline workers is
vital. We look forward to seeing him, as well, in Washington,
on these issues, and continuing this discussion.
Let me also acknowledge and recognize the leadership he has
in Washington, representing TWU, and we thank all of you for
your leadership.
Our fourth and final witness is Chief Thomas Lambert,
Senior Vice President of Public Safety, Chief of Police of
Houston METRO--proudly, Houston METRO. Thomas Lambert joined
METRO in October, 1979.
He is currently the Senior Vice President and Chief of
Police of the Department of Police and Traffic Management for
the Metropolitan Transit Authority in Houston, Texas. He also
is the President of the Transit Chiefs of Police, and I would
like to say International--that might be the term for this
Nation--and by that, he leads the Chiefs of Police around the
Nation who are in charge of mass transit systems.
He has been a vital asset to our committee. We will be
working with him on a number of forward-thinking concepts as we
go forward on this question of transit security.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record. I know ask each witness to summarize
his statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Commissioner Ray
Kelly.
Mr. Kelly, welcome.
STATEMENT OF RAYMOND W. KELLY, COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK CITY
POLICE DEPARTMENT
Mr. Kelly. Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Congresswoman Clarke,
and Congressman Nadler, thank you for the opportunity to
testify.
With 36,000 uniformed police officers, and 15,000 civilian
employees, the New York City Police Department is the largest
municipal police department in the country. Our duties include
primary responsibility for the security of our mass transit
system. We have nearly 2,600 police officers assigned to our
Transit Bureau, which is dedicated exclusively to the safety of
our subways. If this Bureau were its own police department, it
would rank as the fourteenth largest in the country.
In the post-September 11 era, protecting mass transit from
acts of terror is one of our highest priorities. We go to
extraordinary lengths to defend the system every day. Nowhere
is that more evident than in the subways.
Yesterday, we launched another major initiative to protect
the subway system. The new plan, Operation Torch, takes teams
of highly specialized officers from our Emergency Services Unit
and deploys them underground, where they conduct daily searches
of trains with the help of bomb-sniffing dogs. These officers,
who carry automatic weapons and wear heavy, bullet-resistant
Kevlar vests and helmets, serve as a highly visible deterrent.
Operation Torch is an important complement to an extensive
program of transit security already in place, whose other
features I will discuss in a moment. But first, I want to talk
about why we devote so much time and so many resources to this
activity.
As you know, New York's mass transit system is
indispensable to the city's economy and the livelihoods of
millions of residents. Over 4\1/2\ million people ride the
subways each day, making this system one of the busiest in the
world. About half a million more commuters and tourists rely on
ferries and buses.
Adding to this challenge is the vast size and complexity of
the subway system, the second largest in the world after
Moscow. It covers 468 stations and more than 800 miles of track
which, if laid end to end, would stretch from here to Chicago.
Simply put, we have a lot of ground to cover.
Most importantly, we know that subways are a frequent
target for al Qaeda and its sympathizers. We have seen that in
successful attacks in Madrid and London that killed hundreds of
people and caused massive economic damage. Because subways, by
their very nature, are open and accessible systems, they can be
very vulnerable and present a unique threat environment for law
enforcement to defend.
Given that fact, the NYPD has taken comprehensive measures
to protect the subways as part of a wide-ranging
counterterrorism reform put in place over the last 6\1/2\
years. We have been helped in this endeavor by the Federal
Government, thanks largely to the excellent support and
cooperation we have received from the Transportation Security
Administration.
With the TSA's assistance, the Police Department has gone
from being ineligible for direct participation in the Transit
Security Grant program prior to 2007, to having a prominent
seat at the table. It is only fitting, given our size and lead
role in this crucial aspect of public safety.
I also want to commend TSA's emphasis on cooperative
agreements, which allow agencies like the NYPD and our regional
partners much needed flexibility in deciding the best mix of
equipment and operational strategies to use.
Operation Torch, which is funded by a Transit Security
Grant, is a primary example.
Our heightened visibility in the subway system has paid
dividends for conventional crime fighting, as well. Daily
subway ridership today is the highest it has been in 55 years,
in large measure because the system is so safe.
In 1990, there was an average of 48 crimes per day in the
subways. Last year, there was an average of six crimes per day.
This decline is part of an overall trend in which citywide
crime rates have fallen to their lowest level in decades,
including a further 26 percent drop in the 6 years after
September 11.
Whether above ground or below, we are making our presence
seen and felt in different ways, giving would-be terrorists and
common criminals cause to think twice. Still, we face many
challenges.
During a typical morning rush hour, there are 580 trains in
service throughout the subway system. On average, these trains
are filled with anywhere from 1,100 to 1,450 people. Obviously,
we can't be on every train or in every car at once, so we
devised strategies to keep terrorists off balance and increase
the risk of detection.
These strategies are informed by the expertise of our
Counterterrorism Bureau, which we created in 2002. It has
overall responsibility for defending the city from the
terrorist threat, and contributes additional personnel and
resources to the transit system.
We also draw heavily upon the work of our Intelligence
Division, which provides critical analysis of threat
information gathered from around the world. We do this with the
help of NYPD liaisons stationed in 10 global cities and a team
of civilian analysts.
In addition to Operation Torch, the Police Department
carries out daily Train Order Maintenance Sweeps, otherwise
known as ``TOMS.'' These are conducted through the system every
day by two separate teams, each consisting of a sergeant and
eight police officers.
They dedicate their entire tour to these sweeps. They board
trains that have pulled into a station, ask the conductor to
hold it there for approximately 2 to 3 minutes, and conduct a
quick security check of every car. On weekends, when ridership
is normally lower, we have one team carrying out these TOMS.
Subway stations are also the subject of periodic visits by
our heavily armed Hercules teams, working under Operation
Atlas. This is our umbrella program for protecting critical
infrastructure of all kinds. Similar to Operation Torch,
Hercules is manned by officers from the Emergency Services Unit
who carry tactical weapons and pay unannounced visits to
sensitive sites. Their deployments are determined by our
Intelligence Division and based on real threat assessments.
We have created specialized tunnel inspection teams within
the Transit Bureau. It is the job of the members of this team
to ride the trains, check the rails, and visually inspect the
14 underwater tunnels connecting Manhattan to New Jersey and
the outer boroughs for anything unusual.
In July 2005, in response to the bombings of the London
underground, the NYPD launched a random search program to check
the bags of subway passengers before the enter the system. We
establish checkpoints at dozens of different stations each day,
and select members of the public for bag inspections based on a
pre-determined, non-random formula that removes any possibility
of bias. Over the past 3 years, we have conducted approximately
48,000 of these checkpoints.
We also employ non-intrusive detection equipment at many
checkpoints, to determine whether or not baggage has come into
contact with explosive materials. This procedure, which takes
about 12 seconds, involves a chemical swab of a backpack or bag
that is immediately tested for explosive residue with a
handheld device.
The effectiveness of our bag searches have been supported
by prominent national security experts, such as former senior
White House Advisor and Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
Richard Clarke, who cited them as an important safeguard.
Regarding other modes of mass transit, we assign a minimum
of two police officers to every Staten Island ferry at rush
hour and additional officers to ferry terminals, which are also
visited by our Hercules teams. In addition, we deploy harbor
launches to escort ferries and keep watch over the waterways,
and we employ scuba divers and specialized equipment to check
the hulls of ships. We also assign officers to city buses to
deter crime and terrorism. We have placed hundreds of radiation
pagers in patrol cars, and we routinely set up radiation
checkpoints at major access points into Manhattan to detect the
movement of a nuclear or dirty bomb.
This week, we heard again from al Qaeda's No. 2 leader,
Ayman El-Zawahiri. Zawahiri promised new attacks against the
West in an audiotape in which he answered hundreds of questions
posed by jihadist sympathizers. We have no choice but to take
him at his word.
We know al Qaeda has reconstituted itself in the northwest
tribal areas of Pakistan. We have every reason to believe they
are gathering strength and preparing for such a mission. The
only thing we know with certainty is that we can never let down
our guard.
Suffice it to say, we welcome and need all of Washington's
help to protect mass transit. As I said earlier, we have seen
great improvement in this area.
I also want to thank the members of the subcommittee
present here today, along with Chairman Thompson and
Congressman King, for your vital support in defending this
essential component of our infrastructure.
Thank you, very much, for inviting me today.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman.
[The statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]
Prepared Statement of Raymond W. Kelly
April 25, 2008
Chairwoman Jackson Lee. Congresswoman Clark. Thank you for this
opportunity to testify. With 36,000 uniformed officers, the New York
City Police Department is the largest municipal police department in
the country. Our duties include primary responsibility for the security
of the mass transit system. We have nearly 2,600 police officers
assigned to our Transit Bureau, which is dedicated exclusively to the
safety of the subways. If this Bureau were its own police department,
it would rank as the fourteenth largest in the country.
In the post-September 11 era, protecting mass transit from acts of
terror is one of our highest priorities. We go to extraordinary lengths
to defend the system every day. Nowhere is that more evident than in
the subways.
Yesterday, we launched another major initiative to protect the
subway system. This new plan, Operation Torch, takes teams of highly
specialized officers from our Emergency Service Unit and deploys them
underground, where they conduct daily searches of trains with the help
of bomb-sniffing dogs. These officers, who carry automatic weapons and
wear heavy, bullet-resistant Kevlar vests and helmets, serve as a
highly visible deterrent.
Operation Torch is an important complement to an extensive program
of transit security already in place, whose other features I will
discuss in a moment. First, I want to talk about why we devote so much
time and so many resources to this activity.
As you know, New York's mass transit system is indispensable to the
city's economy and the livelihoods of millions of residents. Over 4.5
million people ride the subways each day, making this system one of the
busiest in the world. About half a million more commuters and tourists
rely on ferries and buses.
Adding to this challenge is the vast size and complexity of the
subway system, the second largest in the world after Moscow. It covers
468 stations and more than 700 miles of track which, if laid end-to-
end, would stretch from here to Chicago. Simply put, we have a lot of
ground to cover.
Most importantly, we know that subways are a frequent target for al
Qaeda and its sympathizers. We've seen that in successful attacks in
Madrid and London that killed hundreds of people and caused massive
economic damage. Because subways, by their very nature, are open and
accessible systems, they can be very vulnerable and present a unique
threat environment for law enforcement to defend.
Given that fact, the NYPD has taken comprehensive measures to
protect the subways as part of wide-ranging counterterrorism reforms
put in place over the last 6\1/2\ years. We have been helped in this
endeavor by the Federal Government, thanks largely to the excellent
support and cooperation we receive from the Transportation Security
Administration.
With the TSA's assistance, the Police Department has gone from
being ineligible for direct participation in the Transit Security Grant
program prior to 2007 to having a prominent seat at the table. It is
only fitting given our size and lead role in this crucial aspect of
public safety. I also want to commend TSA's emphasis on cooperative
agreements, which allow agencies like the NYPD and our regional
partners much needed flexibility in deciding the best mix of equipment
and operational strategies. Operation Torch, which is funded by a
Transit Security Grant, is a primary example.
Our heightened visibility in the subway system has paid dividends
for conventional crime-fighting as well. Daily subway ridership today
is the highest it has been in 55 years in large measure because the
system is so safe. In 1990, there was an average of 48 crimes per day
in the subways. Last year, there was an average of 6 crimes per day.
This decline is part of an overall trend in which citywide crime rates
have fallen to their lowest levels in decades, including a further 26
percent drop in the 6 years after September 11.
Whether above ground or below, we are making our presence seen and
felt in new and different ways, giving would-be terrorists and common
criminals cause to think twice. Still, we face many challenges.
During a typical morning rush hour, there are 580 trains in service
throughout the subway system. On average, these trains are filled with
anywhere from 1,100 to 1,450 people. Obviously, we can't be on every
train or in every car at once. So we have devised strategies to keep
terrorists off balance and increase their risk of detection.
These strategies are informed by the expertise of our
Counterterrorism Bureau, which we created in 2002. It has overall
responsibility for defending the city from a terrorist threat, and
contributes additional personnel and resources to the transit system.
We also draw heavily upon the work of our Intelligence Division,
which provides critical analysis of threat information gathered from
around the world. We do this with the help of NYPD liaisons stationed
in 10 global cities and a team of civilian analysts.
In addition to Operation Torch, the Police Department carries out
daily Train Order Maintenance Sweeps, otherwise known as ``TOMS''.
These are conducted throughout the system every weekday by 2 separate
teams, each consisting of one sergeant and eight police officers. They
dedicate their entire tour to these sweeps. They board trains that have
pulled into a station, ask the conductor to hold it there for
approximately 2 to 3 minutes, and conduct a quick security check of
every car. On weekends, when ridership is normally lower, we have one
team carrying out these TOMS.
Subway stations are also the subject of periodic visits by our
heavily armed Hercules teams, working under Operation Atlas. This is
our umbrella program for protecting critical infrastructure of all
kinds. Similar to Operation Torch, Hercules is manned by officers from
the Emergency Service Unit who carry tactical weapons and pay
unannounced visits to sensitive sites. Their deployments are determined
by our Intelligence Division and based on real-time threat assessments.
We've created specialized tunnel inspection teams within the
Transit Bureau. It is the job of the members of this team to ride the
trains, check the rails, and visually inspect 14 underwater tunnels
connecting Manhattan to New Jersey and the outer boroughs for anything
unusual.
In July 2005, in response to the bombings of the London
underground, the NYPD launched a random search program to check the
bags of subway passengers before they enter the system. We establish
checkpoints at dozens of different stations each day, and select
members of the public for bag inspections based on a pre-determined,
non-random formula that removes any possibility of bias. Over the past
3 years, we've conducted approximately 48,000 of these checkpoints.
We also employ non-intrusive detection equipment at many
checkpoints to determine whether or not baggage has come into contact
with explosive materials. This procedure, which takes about 12 seconds,
involves a chemical swab of a backpack or bag that is immediately
tested for explosive residue with a handheld device.
The effectiveness of our bag searches has been supported by
prominent national security experts such as former senior White House
Advisor and Coordinator for Counterterrorism Richard Clarke, who cited
them as an important safeguard.
Regarding other modes of mass transit, we assign a minimum of 2
police officers to every Staten Island Ferry at rush hour and
additional officers to ferry terminals, which are also visited by our
Hercules Teams. In addition, we deploy harbor launches to escort
ferries and keep watch over the waterways. And we employ scuba divers
and specialized equipment to check the hulls of ships. We also assign
officers to city buses to deter crime and terrorism. We've placed
hundreds of radiation pagers in patrol cars and we routinely set up
radiation checkpoints at major access points into Manhattan to detect
the movement of a nuclear or dirty bomb.
This week, we heard again from al Qaeda's No. 2 leader, Ayman Al-
Zawhiri. Zawahiri promised new attacks against the West in an audiotape
in which he answered hundreds of questions posed by jihadist
sympathizers. We have no choice but to take him at his word.
We know al Qaeda has reconstituted itself in the northwest tribal
areas of Pakistan. We have every reason to believe they are gathering
strength and preparing for such a mission. The only thing we know with
certainty is that we can never let down our guard.
Suffice it to say, we welcome and need all of Washington's help to
protect mass transit. As I said earlier, we have seen great improvement
in this area. I also want to thank the members of the subcommittee
present here today, along with Chairman Thompson and Congressman King,
for your vital support in defending this essential component of our
infrastructure.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask the witnesses if they would
indulge the questioning of Commissioner Kelly at this time, as
his duties, I understand it, have called him to another
meeting.
So, I ask each directly, and I thank you very much for you
indulgence.
With that, I yield myself 5 minutes. I would ask all of us
to adhere to the time limit on the questioning.
Commissioner Kelly, tell me what would be the fate of this
Nation if we failed to emphasize the vulnerabilities and the
risks that occur in a mass transit system?
Mr. Kelly. Well, clearly, you know, I can speak
specifically about New York City. The transit system here is
the lifeblood of New York. Four-and-a-half million people a day
travel on it.
If there were an attack on the transit system, I think it's
fair to say that the city would ground to a halt. The question
is how long. This is, as we have seen occurrences in Israel and
other societies, we don't have that experience, and I think it
would take quite a while for us to recover.
So, it is vital that we do everything we reasonably can to
protect the transit systems, of course not only here in New
York, but throughout the Nation.
We are particularly focused on protecting the system. Here,
as you see, we devote 2,600 police officers every day to
protecting the system.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So, that----
Mr. Kelly. So, it--it would have a catastrophic effect.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Because of the continuing seam of the
network, then, is it fair to say that there could be massive
loss of life?
Mr. Kelly. Well, certainly there would be a massive loss of
life, and it would have a catastrophic economic effect, as
well.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me pursue. You mentioned a lot of
areas where TSA has been effective in the Transportation
Security Grants. So, you obviously welcome the idea of
particular transit entities being direct recipients of Federal
funds through the Transportation Security Grants.
Mr. Kelly. I do. I would welcome even more the enforcement
agencies being the direct recipients, but that has changed. We
now receive our grants through the State, and I think that is
working well.
In 2007, we were able to receive a grant directly, and
ideally, that would be my choice.
Ms. Jackson Lee. In my questioning of Chief Lambert, I will
pursue that.
Let's go quickly on to Operation Torch. Could you--the time
is short. Could you quickly tell me how you developed the
program, what are the protocols for the use of firearms, and
was there any coordination with TSA as you developed the
program?
As I understand it, it is heavily armed individuals. Of
course, I will express my concern as to your perception of the
effectiveness of that.
I'd also ask you to respond to the idea of funding to
improve your intelligence. Would that not be a better approach?
So, if you'd start with how the program was developed, what
are the protocols, and whether TSA was involved, and are you
using any of your dollars for intelligence gathering, in
essence, to be preventative, as opposed to this approach?
Mr. Kelly. Well, starting in 2003, we put in place our
Hercules program, which is a program on the streets of the
city, that involves deployment of uniformed officers, heavily
armed uniformed officers.
We see this in Europe, but it was really the first of its
kind in the United States. It has been very well received by
the public.
The Torch program is simply an extension of that concept
into the subway system. Certainly, as we discussed this with
TSA, it enables us to use some of the money for the personnel
costs, the overtime costs, attendant with this program.
Now, Emergency Services officers are, I would say,
arguably, the best trained officers that we have in this
Department, and perhaps anywhere in municipal policing in the
country. Their training consisted--their initial training
consists of 6 months of additional training, very specialized
training in the use of weapons.
They are emergency psychological technicians. They are all
Emergency Medical Technicians. We send them to Federal schools
throughout the country. They man our radiation detectors. We
are very proud of our Emergency Services officers.
Ms. Jackson Lee. These are the ones that you use?
Mr. Kelly. These are the ones that staff the Torch program.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So, their gun training or the gun
protocols are what? When are they triggered to use----
Mr. Kelly. Well, they are----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Because they are traveling among the
public.
Mr. Kelly [continuing]. Guided, of course, by all of the
restrictions of the New York State penal law and our own
internal restrictions, which are the most restrictive firearms
policies of any major police department in the country.
As a matter of fact, the number of shooting incidents per
contact in New York City is the lowest of any major police
department in the country. We are proud of that. I mean, with--
--
Ms. Jackson Lee. I----
Mr. Kelly [continuing]. Twenty-two million citizen contacts
a year, we can't guarantee that every one of them is going to
go----
Ms. Jackson Lee. My time has expired. If you'd just answer
quickly the intelligence question. Are you focusing----
Mr. Kelly. We use----
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. On intelligence gathering?
Mr. Kelly [continuing]. Parts of this funding for
intelligence analysts. We have brought together a group of
intelligence analysts--25 of them--that are arguably, again,
the best in the country. They are from the top flight
educational institutions--Harvard, Harvard Law School,
Stanford, military academies. We have brought them together,
and I would submit that they are equal, if not surpassing, any
intelligence analyst cadre that exists anywhere.
So, we have our own intelligence analysts, but in this
program, there is funding that allows for two intelligence
analysts, and we are certainly in the process of bringing them
on board.
Ms. Jackson Lee. My time is expired. I yield to the
distinguished gentlelady from New York, 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, very much, Madame Chair.
To Commissioner Kelly, I just want to pursue the whole
issue of Operation Torch. I woke up early this morning to see
that it was in effect, and I thought that that was
extraordinary.
But, can you elaborate on how the program works, and where
the idea came from?
Mr. Kelly. Well, as I say, we have been doing a similar
program on the streets of the city.
We--every day, we bring together about 150 police cars,
with two officers, on three tours. They rally and they focus
primarily in Manhattan. Some of these officers have heavy
weapons and are--that component is called the Hercules Teams.
So, we have done that. It's met with very positive public
response.
This program through Federal funding, Torch, is an
extension of the Hercules program that we have on our streets.
As I said, it's been very well received. These are the best
trained officers that we have in the Department.
Ms. Clarke. In just listening to your testimony, you spoke
about cooperative agreements with TSA, as well as a number of
operations. You have Operation Torch. You have Operation
Hercules, Operation Atlas. These are grant dependent. Let me--
--
Mr. Kelly. Some are and some aren't.
Ms. Clarke. Some are and some aren't.
Mr. Kelly. Right.
Ms. Clarke. Which of those would you say are grant-
dependent?
Mr. Kelly. Torch, right now. But, the Hercules and the
critical response vehicles are not. We are doing that mostly on
our own dime.
Ms. Clarke. Okay. So, you know, were we to look at how we
strengthen that and make that, I guess, a mainline area of
defense for our city, would you say that it is important that
the Nation look at that as a protocol for other similarly-
situated cities around the Nation?
Mr. Kelly. Yeah. You know, there is a historical reluctance
on the part of the Federal Government to pay for personnel
costs, to pay for overtime costs. That's the major part of our
expense in the New York City Police Department, at least. We
put boots on the ground, and we need additional people to go to
sensitive locations.
We're a city that's been attacked twice successfully by
terrorists. We had six other plots that have been thwarted
since September 11. So, we need, in our judgment, the presence
of uniformed police officers, and it's a strain on our budget
to do it. But we, unfortunately, see no other way to protect
the city.
Ms. Clarke. You know, I guess, one of the things that we
are looking at, as we build out the Department, I have had a
number of observations where the one-size-fits-all, you know,
criteria is a challenge. Every environment across this Nation
is a bit different. There are certain things that, you know,
certainly can be applied across the board.
But, in looking at building out the Department, do you
think it would make sense that we either look at regional
approaches to counterterrorism activities, or, you know, enable
various jurisdictions to submit to the Department of Homeland
Security plans for what they believe is the best way to secure
their citizenry and have the Federal Government be a
participant in that?
Mr. Kelly. Well, I agree that one size does not fit all. We
see ourselves as being unique here, No. 1, because of our size;
and second, because of our history here. We are, as Congressman
Nadler said, at the top of the terrorist target list.
So, you just can't take a template and move it around the
country.
Ms. Clarke. Well, having said that, when you look at your
Department from a purely strategic perspective, how does the
NYPD handle counterterrorism differently from other big city
departments?
Is it just the amount of funding that you received? Is it
in the organizational aspects of the department?
What sets the NYPD apart, and what should other cities and
the Federal Government take from that?
Mr. Kelly. Well, I think it's up to other cities and the
Federal Government to take a look at New York and see what they
think is applicable. Because, I'm not really in a position to
say what other cities should do.
Ms. Clarke. Um-hmm.
Mr. Kelly. But, I can tell you what I believe sets us
apart. We have created a Counterterrorism Bureau, the first big
city department to do that, in 2002. We brought in top flight
professionals with Federal Government experience. David Cohen
is our Director of Intelligence, a 35-year veteran of the CIA,
former Director of Operations in the Central Intelligence
Agency. Our Counterterrorism Deputy Commissioners have been
retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Frank Libutti; Mike
Sheehan, a former Assistant Secretary in Counterterrorism at
the State Department; Richard Falkenrath now, a former Deputy
Homeland Security Advisor to President Bush.
We devote 1,000 police officers a day to our
counterterrorism duties. We understand very few police
departments can do that.
As I say, we have created a cadre of analysts that, I
believe, are second to none. We have officers assigned in ten
foreign countries, embedded with police agencies, to ask the
New York question. We have them in London, in Paris, in Amman,
Jordan, in Singapore, in Canada.
So, we are different. Why are we different? We are bigger,
and we see ourselves at the top of the terrorist target list.
Now, if you're in other cities, you may very well have other
priorities, and we understand that.
Again, we are just not able to devote the resources that we
feel are necessary to be devoted here in New York. So, that is
why I just have to caution against saying, hey, we are doing
this and other cities should do it.
We see ourselves very much at risk here, and we are going
to have to, in my judgment, continue to devote substantial
resources, even though our headcount has gone down. We have
problems hiring police officers.
Ms. Clarke. Um-hmm, um-hmm.
Mr. Kelly. We are 12 percent--I mean, we have experienced a
12 percent reduction in the size of the Department from fiscal
year 2001 to where we are now. Yet, we are still devoting 1,000
officers to counterterrorism. Why? We believe we have to.
Ms. Clarke. My time has expired. I thank you, Commissioner
Kelly.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentlelady, and yield to the
distinguished gentleman, Mr. Nadler, 5 minutes.
Mr. Nadler. I thank the distinguished Chairlady.
Commissioner, you just said that there has been a 12
percent reduction in headcount since 2002. Is that budget
authorized, or is that how many people are there, and you
haven't kept a full force?
Mr. Kelly. Both.
Mr. Nadler. Both.
Mr. Kelly. Both.
Mr. Nadler. Well, how much is each?
Mr. Kelly. Well, that's--we had 40,800 officers in fiscal
year 2001. Right now, as we speak, we are at 35,800.
Mr. Nadler. Authorized.
Mr. Kelly. No. Authorized is--this is complicated.
Authorized is 37,800 officers.
What we have done for this fiscal year coming up, for the
next fiscal year, is we have taken a temporary 1,000 person
reduction in that authorized headcount, because we can't hire
them. So, this is helping out the--you know, the budget crunch.
Mr. Nadler. You can't hire because there isn't enough
money, or you just can't process them, or----
Mr. Kelly. We can't hire them because an arbitrator lowered
our starting salary to $25,100----
Mr. Nadler. You're not going to----
Mr. Kelly [continuing]. A 40 percent reduction in starting
salary--so, $25,100 is----
Mr. Nadler. So, there aren't enough people to--there aren't
enough recruits.
Mr. Kelly. If you know, you can see the gap that we have,
but we're hiring classes of about 1,000.
Mr. Nadler. Okay. Let me switch subjects for a moment.
You said the Federal Government has a bias--I don't know if
that's the right word--but a preference against personnel
costs.
Mr. Kelly. Right.
Mr. Nadler. What percentage of the antiterrorism budget, if
you will, of the Police Department, is personnel costs?
Mr. Kelly. Ninety percent.
Mr. Nadler. Ninety percent. The Federal Government,
basically, doesn't fund that.
Mr. Kelly. Basically. You know, there's been some
exceptions in the past, depending--it even started 2 years ago,
when you had the code levels, and depending on----
Mr. Nadler. Is there----
Mr. Kelly [continuing]. The different codes and what is----
Mr. Nadler [continuing]. In your opinion, any logical
reason why personnel costs are disfavored, or should be
disfavored, in terms of reimbursement policy, by the Federal
Government?
Mr. Kelly. None that I can see. If it's, you know, spent
responsibly, with adequate oversight, I see no reason to limit
it.
Mr. Nadler. Does this preference--would you say that the 90
percent figure for personnel costs is unique to New York City,
or is pretty usual, or----
Mr. Kelly. I would say it's probably across the board. We--
our personnel costs, generally speaking, are about 94 percent
of our total budget.
Mr. Nadler. No, no, no, but I mean is 90 percent cost of
the counterterrorism program in New York typical of what other
cities spend on counterterrorism?
Mr. Kelly. Yeah, I'm assuming it is, yes.
Mr. Nadler. So, the Federal disfavor of personnel simply
gets the Federal budget contributions to counterterrorism down.
There's no particular reason. In other words, we only consider
10 percent of the costs.
Mr. Kelly. Correct. You can only buy so much equipment, you
know?
Mr. Nadler. Right.
Mr. Kelly. Our ongoing costs are personnel costs.
Mr. Nadler. So, the only real function of--from the Federal
point of view, of making that distinction, is to reduce the
perceived necessity of Federal grants.
Mr. Kelly. Perhaps, yes.
Mr. Nadler. Can you think of any other legitimate function?
Mr. Kelly. No.
Mr. Nadler. Okay. Now, you said that the Operation Torch
would be made less grant dependent as Hercules is, and that's
because----
Mr. Kelly. I'm sorry. Less grant dependent. Torch----
Mr. Nadler. Than----
Mr. Kelly. Torch is a grant.
Mr. Nadler. It is.
Mr. Kelly. It is funded by a grant. But, the other programs
are not.
Mr. Nadler. They're not. As you say--and, in other words,
you said Hercules is not funded by a grant.
Mr. Kelly. That's right.
Mr. Nadler. Torch is. You anticipate that Torch will be
made less grant-dependent. Is that because you anticipate that
after a specific time period, the Federal Government will not
continue to provide funding for--of personnel, in effect?
Mr. Kelly. Well, this particular program only goes through
2010.
Mr. Nadler. The program or the grant?
Mr. Kelly. The grant.
Ms. Clarke. The grant.
Mr. Nadler. But the grant might be renewed.
Mr. Kelly. Possibly----
Mr. Nadler. There's a possibility.
Mr. Kelly [continuing]. Yes.
Mr. Nadler. Okay. In general, what is--well, let me just
ask one other question.
You have a--there are various means of protection of
radiation and so forth, to protect against nuclear materials
hopefully coming in--hopefully not coming into the subway
system and so forth?
Mr. Kelly. Yes.
Mr. Nadler. Now, there was an article in the recent issue
of Scientific American that says that our means of detecting
nuclear materials basically don't work. Are you familiar with
this article?
Mr. Kelly. I'm familiar with the concept. We have talked
about it. I didn't read the article, but----
Mr. Nadler. Could you comment on that?
Mr. Kelly. Well, we believe that there are new, state-of-
the-art radiation detection means or equipment coming down the
pike and we----
Mr. Nadler. Yeah, we're aware of that.
Mr. Kelly [continuing]. We hope to receive that through the
Securing the Cities program, which I believe you're familiar
with.
Mr. Nadler. So, these new technologies you think will work
much more effectively than the ones we have now.
Mr. Kelly. Yes, we believe, yes.
Mr. Nadler. Do you have a time period or--that you can say
publicly as to when we might have them?
Mr. Kelly. We hope to have this program, the Securing the
Cities program, which is basically concentric rings around the
city, 50 miles out, and coming into the city. Some of the
equipment, we have radiation detectors, which are improved
versions of what we had a few years ago. We have that, and we
are deploying that to other jurisdictions.
But the--kind of the heavy duty radiation equipment will
probably be coming in within the next 18 months.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you. My final question is do you regard
the Federal grant structure as we have changed it--we've been
arguing for years that--I say ``we''--the New York delegation,
basically, has been arguing for years that the criteria by
which Federal antiterrorism grants were distributed were
unfair, not based on a real assessment of risks, based on
politics, and so forth. We have managed to change that
somewhat.
Do you regard the current structure as rational, and
reasonable, and sufficient?
Mr. Kelly. It is better than it was----
Mr. Nadler. Right.
Mr. Kelly [continuing]. But it needs to improve, and I
certainly give credit to the New York delegation. Because, we
have seen improvements, and it hasn't been an easy road. No
question about it. But, I think----
Mr. Nadler. So, do you think it needs further----
Mr. Kelly [continuing]. Some people are being dragged,
kicking and screaming, to what's a better position.
Mr. Nadler. Okay. I thank you, and I yield back the balance
of my time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the distinguished gentleman.
As you leave, let me quickly indicate that we will submit
additional questions and maybe the same questions, for answers
in writing, and we would appreciate, Commissioner Kelly, if
your office could work with us on some of the questions.
But quickly, as you leave, I wanted to just determine the
mass transit police force is under the NYPD?
Mr. Kelly. That's correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Integrated into it?
Mr. Kelly. For the New York City subway system, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is there a number for those individuals?
What is the breakout? You gave us 37,000, I believe----
Mr. Kelly. Twenty-six hundred.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Twenty-six hundred. Do you think that's
enough?
Mr. Kelly. Well, I think the department, as a whole, should
increase in size. As I said, we are not able to hire up to our
authorized headcount.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You had said----
Mr. Kelly. If we were able to do that, we'd deploy more
officers in the transit system, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. My other question is, as you well know,
one of our colleagues, Congresswoman Lowey, has been working
with all of us on this interoperability.
Do you think you're at the level that you need to be for
interoperability, in terms of communication, with the
backdrop--the sad backdrop being 2001, and that was certainly
one of the issues that was discussed.
Mr. Kelly. I think we are in very good shape, as far as
interoperability and the ability to communicate among city
agencies, and we are getting there regionally.
But, in terms of operating in the city, under the Mayor's
CIMS system--the Citywide Incident Management System--I think
we are in very good shape. I think there is some misinformation
about what happened in 2001.
I was not in this job on September 11, 2001, but still
there's some misinformation. It really wasn't an
interoperability issue. Don't get me wrong. The
interoperability is a good thing----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Um-hmm.
Mr. Kelly [continuing]. But there's just--and, we can talk
about it at another time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We would be delighted to have you talk
about it. Obviously, I think, Congress needs to be as informed
as it can be, and certainly we viewed it as a crisis, and it
was publicly represented, I imagine, that that was a crucial
issue.
Your interoperability is funded by the city or Federal
dollars? Your improved interoperability.
Mr. Kelly. It's mostly city funds, but a lot of our
interoperability is just taking place through the CIMS system,
which requires face-to-face interaction between the leadership
elements of various city agencies.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the witness for his
testimony, and his presence here today, and his time, and, as
well, you have indicated your statement is in the record.
We hope to submit additional questions to your office, and
would appreciate your due cooperation as you have already done,
in responding to them.
Thank you for your service, and we appreciate the fact of
your other responsibilities today.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Again, thank you.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you very much.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right.
To the other witnesses, let me thank you very much. You
won't get away as easy. We appreciate the time that you're
giving.
So, Secretary Balboni, you are able to present your
testimony. If you would, summarize your statement in 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL BALBONI, DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR PUBLIC
SAFETY, STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. Balboni. Thank you, very much, Madame Chairwoman.
Congresswoman Clarke, and Congressman Nadler, thank you very
much for not only your attendance and your dedication, but your
focus on this crucial issue as it relates to so many millions
of people on a daily basis.
When I first took this job, I looked at the protection of
the system regionally, which is exactly what the Department of
Homeland Security said we ought to be doing. Essentially, there
were four elements that I looked at: One was the identification
of vulnerabilities; the second was the means and methods that
might be used by the attackers; the third was the training of
personnel; and the fourth was the threat and information that
could come across.
So, one of the first meetings I had, which was with this
gentleman who just left, Commissioner Kelly, I sat in his
office, and we talked about some of the vulnerabilities of the
system.
Again, three States, seven different counties. When you
consider the number of transit systems that run independently,
it's about eight, one of the most complex transit systems, as
my good former colleague from the Assembly, Congressman Nadler,
understands probably as well as anybody in the Nation. So,
securing a system that is open, by definition, and as complex
and as vulnerable, is a huge challenge.
So, what did we do? Well, the first thing we did, we chose
the No. 1 vulnerability. Unfortunately, in a 2006 open source,
there was a reference to the New York City PATH System. So, I
met with the leadership of PATH, and one of the assets that I
have in this directorate is the National Guard. So, what we
established for the first time was a bi-State cooperation
between New Jersey and New York to utilize National Guard
members to do what they call ``pop-ups,'' where they work with
police officers to show force and presence on the platforms
and, while working with the police, ride the trains.
The second thing we did was a follow-on for the
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, that did directed
patrols. Essentially, the key in utilization of personnel is
force multiplication.
You cannot be everywhere you want to be. Ray Kelly has a
huge force, does a terrific job, and 2,600 officers sounds like
a lot. Given the length and breadth of the system, it is not
enough. He has to rely on outside forces, from the States, from
the cities, from the counties.
So, what we did was, we said, basically, if you have a
train that is in Croton-Harmon, or is out in Suffolk County,
and you are doing a patrol--Nassau County or Westchester--come
and actually do the patrol at the train station. Do the step-
on/step-off, again showing force. It has been demonstrated time
and time again that, in pre-operational surveillance of our
attackers, what they can't stand and can't judge is chaos,
unpredictability, and that is the use of force effectively.
Another thing we did was we developed a rail freight safety
system, where essentially we have taken a look at how freight
goes through New York. We have worked with all the freight
companies to make sure that there is intelligence--CSX in
particular. So, what we have right now is a real-time
operational capability of seeing what's on the trains and where
they are. So this is, obviously, crucial from a terrorism
perspective.
It's also crucial from an industrial disaster perspective.
You know, if you have a rail car that goes up in Selkirk, New
York, one of the responsibilities I'm going to be charged with
is overseeing the evacuation. Well, they key fact that I need
to know is what's in that rail car as fast as possible. So, New
York State was one of the first States in the Nation to have
this CSX program.
The other thing that we did was we took a look at how the
National Guard is being used in a form of deployment called
``Empire Shield.'' We were one of the first in the Nation to
establish this force. Essentially what it is, is that airports,
nuclear power plants, and train stations, you have National
Guard members standing watch.
But, what we realized, through the help of TSA, is that
after 6, 7 years after the event, they tend to get stale. They
do what people do all the time. They talk to one another. They
do not patrol.
So, what we are establishing as of May 1, is a brand new
capability. We believe this is, again, the first of its kind in
the Nation. It's going to be at Fort Hamilton, right here in
Brooklyn.
What we are going to do is we are going to pull the
National Guard out of the rail stations and the airports, and
we are going to use them in a surge capability. We are going to
create 24/7 hot start company-sized deployment capability. We
are going to use them to go surging in with the police, with
Ray Kelly's troops, and with the MTA troops to, again, bring
that unpredictability.
But, what we are also going to have is the ability to
respond rapidly, leveraging other assets. New York has the Air
National Guard, a very unique capability. We have an airlift
capability we are going to be utilizing. We have a navy. We
have eleven swift attack boats, essentially, that has the
ability to offset any of the surge requirements for the New
York City Harbor Patrol. Then, we are going to have a chemical
company there.
Hopefully, with your support, a second CST--civil support
team. We in New York use our CST all the time. I cannot make
enough of a pitch to support us in getting that second team.
This capability will be provided regionally. It will help
New Jersey. It will help Connecticut. It will help Long Island.
It will help Westchester. Help, obviously, the city of New
York.
But, the key factor--if I had--if I have had any impact or
any influence in the process since obtaining this position, it
was in the Regional Transportation Security Working Group.
This, as you have mandated, is the group that is supposed to
put the funding together across various systems.
Well, when I first got here, frankly, it went like this.
The largest of the systems threw up a project, and if it stuck,
that's what got funded. The smaller systems almost never got
any of the funding. There was not really a sharing of
information because it is almost like market share. You don't
want to tell your competitors what your vulnerabilities are.
But, what we were able to do was, in secret, classified
briefings conducted by the TSA, we essentially looked at all
the vulnerabilities and the gaps across the entire system. Kip
Hawley, the Chairman of TSA, tells me that we are the first
regional transportation work group to do that in the Nation.
What came out of that was the ability to recognize system-
wide enhancements--bomb dog teams, behavioral assessment
screening teams, counter-surveillance teams. These are the
pieces that we must focus on if we are going to use the funding
effectively.
When Ray Kelly talks about the personnel issue, what he
means is that when you have a bomb dog team--the bomb dog team,
the dog is considered capital, the officers who use the dogs
are not. That's kind of ridiculous. But luckily, we have been
able to change that.
There is more work to be done. I look forward to discussing
that in your questioning.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Balboni follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Balboni
April 25, 2008
PUBLIC SAFETY--OUR MOST BASIC DUTY
Thank you, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Lungren, and
Congresswoman Clarke for inviting me to appear before the House
Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation Security and
Infrastructure Protection to discuss securing New York's mass transit
systems. My name is Michael Balboni and I am Governor David Paterson's
Deputy Secretary for Public Safety. I have day-to-day responsibility
for managing the State's homeland security affairs, emergency
preparedness and response, and law enforcement activities. In 2006, I
was appointed to the United States Homeland Security Advisory Council.
In that role, I help leverage the ingenuity and expertise of State,
local and tribal leaders to provide Federal Advisory Council members
with the best possible advice on a range of homeland security issues.
I am pleased to share with the committee the steps the State of New
York has taken with its regional partners to better protect and secure
New York City's mass transit systems. Securing a deliberately open
system that must move millions of people quickly and easily each day is
challenging, but through effective multi-agency collaboration we have
made tremendous progress to enhance transit security.
It is well-established that New York remains a top terrorist
target. In addition to terrorism, hurricanes, natural disasters and
health-related emergencies prove our need to be ready to care for and
protect our citizens. Although nearly 6\1/2\ years have passed since
the attacks of September 11, 2001, New York State demands sustained
excellence in our emergency preparedness plans and homeland security
initiatives.
Last year's thwarted plot to ignite jet fuel tanks at JFK
International Airport in Queens reminds us that people with very bad
intent, if not the immediate means of doing harm, have New York
squarely in their gunsights. It was only through meticulous
investigation--``boots on the ground'' police work--and, most
importantly, the ongoing cooperation among law enforcement agencies led
by the FBI and New York City Police Department that this plot was
uncovered.
This event proves that we must continue to be ever vigilant--from
our first responders who are our front line of defense to every citizen
in this State. And it is yet another reminder to the public that if you
see something suspicious, contact local law enforcement or call the New
York State Terrorism Tips hotline at 1-866-SAFE NYS. In New York City,
call 1-888-NYC SAFE.
Because threats evolve and maintaining readiness for disaster is a
dynamic business, I would like to outline the major initiatives
launched by New York State.
We know that terrorists around the world continue to focus on mass
transportation targets. New York State has joined with its Federal and
local partners to enhance transit security, and we are continuing to
make regional rail security more robust by enacting these steps:
Joint National Guard/Port Authority Police ``pop-up''
patrols have been implemented on the PATH system. New York
State led this effort and worked cooperatively with our
security partners at the Port Authority and the State of New
Jersey.
The Metropolitan Transportation Authority has launched a
``Directed Patrol'' strategy for the region's commuter rail
systems (Metro North and Long Island Railroad). Working with
local law enforcement agencies in the communities these trains
travel through, police officers now regularly visit outlying
stations, platforms and parking lots to provide high visibility
deterrent patrols.
New York State Police, the Transportation Security
Administration and local police departments in the upstate
cities of Syracuse, Utica and Rome are conducting rail
passenger screenings at Amtrak stations.
Rail Freight safety has been improved by working with the
private sector. CSX Transportation has provided secure access
to State law enforcement and Homeland Security officials
regarding near real-time information on its hazardous materials
rail movements.
We are also in the process of establishing a standing New
York National Guard ``surge'' force headquartered at Fort
Hamilton in Brooklyn. This new unit will respond quickly to
threats in the New York metropolitan area, mobilizing key
equipment and manpower to protect critical infrastructure and
respond to incidents should they arise.
Additionally, we are enhancing the training for our valiant first
responders, who are our State's front line of defense. We are providing
threat-based training to hundreds of first responders from across New
York State at the State's Preparedness Training Center in Oneida
County.
We also have implemented a renewed focus on cyber security. New
York State has long been a leader in this field, serving as the lead
information sharing and analysis center for all 50 States. Most
recently, New York has focused on helping local governments achieve the
cyber security necessary to protect the computer control mechanisms of
critical infrastructure owned and operated by municipal governments
such as dams, water and traffic systems. The New York State Office of
Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Coordination also works
closely with the MTA on cyber security issues, providing insight on
data encryption and other key security measures.
TRANSIT SECURITY FUNDING
The State's efforts culminated in Secretary Chertoff announcing a
substantial increase in transit security funding for the New York City
metropolitan region in February.
The Secretary announced a fiscal year 2008 award of $153 million, a
substantial increase from the fiscal year 2007 grant award of $98
million.
The grant award recognizes that the threat to New York remains of
paramount concern and that New York's ridership of mass transit and the
economic importance of the system requires increased investment. I
would like to thank Congresswoman Clarke, Congressman King, and the
entire New York Congressional Delegation for their help in passing a
robust fiscal year 2008 homeland security appropriations bill that
increased funding for transportation security programs.
The grant also recognizes the incredible partnership of the
Regional Transit Security Working Group (RTSWG). This effort--long
encouraged by the Federal and State government--views mass transit as a
regional issue involving such partners as the MTA, the Port Authority
of NY & NJ, New Jersey Transit, the NYPD, Amtrak, TSA, NYC DOT, the
States of NJ and Connecticut, the ferry system and Westchester County
DOT.
Representatives of these great partners came together to reach
consensus on priorities for the 2007 round of funding and worked hard
to develop a comprehensive program aimed at addressing transit needs.
The NYPD and TSA were added to this partnership effort for 2007. We are
extremely proud of the work of the group, which put aside parochial
interests and focused on a regionalized approach to mass transit
safety.
Investments recommended by the group in 2007 included security
cameras, an increase in the number of explosive detection canine teams,
specialized training for law enforcement personnel and new explosive
detection technologies.
We have always recognized that risk should drive funding decisions
and are happy to see that 45 percent of the national share of 2008
transit funds are coming to the New York metropolitan region. This is
an important statement of support for the case that we have made to the
Nation.
In applauding the Federal Government for that recognition in the
context of transit security, I continue to hope that such appreciation
and understanding will be applied to all of the Federal homeland
security grant programs.
It would also be remiss not to mention another equally important
aspect of this transit award that satisfies another suggestion New York
and its regional partners have long expressed to the Federal
Government, which is that the transit grant programs be permissive in
allowing the dollars to be used for personnel costs. We strongly
support the committee's efforts to ensure that State and local
governments have the flexibility to use grant funds for personnel
related expenditures.
Federal dollars should be applied where they are most effective and
time and time again we have learned that investing in operational
packages related to transit security (VIPER teams, the K-9 teams) are
one of our most effective public safety tools.
I am pleased that this grant will allow such investment at a local
operational match share of 33 percent, which is less than the 50
percent match required in the 2007 program.
I am proud that Federal DHS has recognized our efforts at the State
and city level, but I am most pleased that this grant really recognizes
the efforts of the Regional Transit Security Working Group (RTSWG)
participants.
It is never easy to bring the various entities of government
together but because security is so important, we have succeeded in
doing that within the RTSWG concept.
We have built on our success in 2007 with recognition from our
Federal partners and a vibrant cooperative effort that will demonstrate
a coordinated and robust public security strategy across the three-
State metro region.
The Federal Government continues to indicate that as available
homeland security resources decline, it is important to develop
regional approaches and regionalized security strategies.
The February 1, 2008, announcement was proof positive that New York
made its case and is effectively leveraging an important regional
partnership. TSA has recognized the value of the RTSWG and rewrote
their fiscal year 2008 grant guidance to encourage more grantees to
follow the collaborative model New York developed.
I want to commend the partners of the RTSWG for participating in
that effort and making New York's mass transit systems safer. I also
want to thank Secretary Chertoff and our Congressional Delegation for
their continued support to our efforts.
Chairman Jackson Lee, Congresswoman Clarke, and Members of the
committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to discuss New York
State's transit security activities. With your support, we will
continue to build on the progress we have made to date. I would be
happy to answer any questions you might have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentleman's time has expired. Let me
also acknowledge our appreciation to Governor David Patterson.
Please give him our regards.
Mr. Balboni. I will.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Certainly, in the absence of Commissioner
Kelly--we appreciate both of them, Governor Patterson, looking
at his schedule and attempting to be present. But, we also
appreciate that he designated such an important witness.
We want to, in his absence, acknowledge that Mayor
Bloomberg was trying to change his schedule, as well, but we
acknowledge the presence of Commissioner Kelly.
President Little, we are delighted to have you here, and we
also want to thank Roger Toussaint for his great leadership in
Washington. Again, your presence is very important.
You are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JAMES C. LITTLE, INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT,
TRANSPORTATION WORKERS UNION
Mr. Little. Thank you. First of all, I would like to
commend the committee, certainly Bennie Thompson and yourself,
for your leadership in moving this 9/11 bill, I mean, not only
for the shepherding of it, but bringing it to fruition. I think
it's so important that we continue to exercise oversight over
it.
I think it's one of the strongest security measures ever
passed for the protection of surface public transportation and,
in addition to that, providing mandatory security training for
all rail and transport workers. I thought what I would do is
just cover a couple of the salient points that I actually
submitted in written testimony.
But, one of the things that I think is very important is
the continued oversight. The implementation of the 9/11
Security Bill has made certain that the grant programs are
conditioned on the application of 13(c) and also the labor
protections of the Davis-Bacon. Despite that, the executive
branch has actually done everything possible, especially in the
rail and transit programs and guidance it covers, to require
its in entirety. So, they have actually taken steps to avoid
that inclusion.
I think it's also important that we ensure that the
training mandates included in the 9/11 bill are implemented in
a timely manner, and that frontline workers are directly
involved in the process. We have already missed two steps by
the Department of Homeland Security, which failed to reach the
deadlines both in Section 1408, which is the Public
Transportation Security Training Program, and also Section
1517, which is the Railroad Security Training Program.
We have also seen that in the funding coming up by the
President for 2009, the executive branch has taken the position
that they are going to reduce the funding for those two types
by 85 percent, which they promised on the signing of the bill
we would have $1.2 billion for transit and rail, and now that's
been reduced to $175 million. Now, that goes to what
Commissioner Kelly was saying, the need for proper funding.
Now, the security and emergency preparedness duties, the
positions of people on board, such as we represented Amtrak,
where we have the cashiers on board for service, these are also
people that are obviously trained. They are trained in all
different measures of security, including CPR. They handle
everything from a nose bleed to being the first-time
responders. As soon as there is a budget crisis, the first ones
we want to cut is those people, and we want to end up putting
in vending machines.
If you looked at the same similarities, we would actually
be looking to do the same thing in the aviation, where we see
the need to remove flight attendants and put on some kind of a
vending machine, which everyone knows that the purpose of
having these people on board are not only for to service the
passengers, but also there in an emergency situation. I would
like to encourage the committee to take a look into that.
We have also learned a lot from what we have experienced in
other countries. Certainly what we saw in Spain assured us
that, in no uncertain terms, that aviation is not the only
vulnerable area. We have seen what happened in the rail.
We have also seen what has happened in London. We have had
the opportunity visit London and talk to some of the
counterparts in the labor side. We also met with Labor for
London Transportation Authority under the Mayor, and one of the
things I felt was very impressive is that they haven't looked
to reduce manning, but actually increased manning, and they
have actually put manning in the turnstiles.
A lot of people we talk about having frontline workers as
frontline responders, I think that, to coin a phrase, they are
also ``pre-responders.'' No matter how many cameras you put and
technology into these stations, and they are doing the same
thing on the buses over in London, it doesn't take away from
the human element. These cameras can decipher and tell where
the problem is, but it takes a human to actually do that.
As Ms. Clarke said earlier, I think that there is not one-
size-fits-all. You know, the Transport Workers Union, we
represent a lot of--130,000 members in a lot of the major
transportation areas, both in Philadelphia--in New York City,
we have about 38,000 workers within the MTA. We represent the
METRO in Houston, also in San Francisco, in Miami. We have
frontline workers in the airline side. We are also in the rail.
As Mr. Nadler had mentioned, he talked about Amtrak, and
that's the area that I was focusing on, because the first thing
Amtrak wants to do, and we fought it once before, was to remove
the on-board service people. I included in my testimony some
examples of exactly where they have played a vital role for the
passengers. Also, as you know, trains move across the country.
A lot of times, you are in rural areas and you can't have
people that are just serving food and not expect in an
emergency to have someone there to help service them.
We ran, again, into the same problem in New York City
where, due to budget cuts, the MTA wanted to reduce the
conductor. The conductor on a subway train is about mid-ship on
the train. They are there to make sure that passengers on
board, no one gets caught, and actually for some security
measures, and also for eyes and ears for the driver. Yet, that
was an area that they wanted to eliminate.
I thought it was very intriguing that when I was in London,
even the automated trains, the London for Transport, decided to
man them. I talked to one of the personnel on board and I asked
him specifically--I says, ``Why are you manning an automated
train?'' He says, ``Well, because we believe security is an
important piece,'' he says, ``and a lot of time,'' he says, ``I
can override the train in an emergency.'' He said, ``Also, the
fact that I'm walking around,'' he said, ``it's eyes and ears
and people--it's a deterrent.'' I think we have to not lose
sight of that. We happen to lose sight of having first
responders.
The police department can do a lot of things, certainly the
task force that the Commissioner talked about. But, having
people on board, and just having people that--New York City
alone, highly tourist popular. People are in and out of the
subway system. It's a viable source of getting around the city.
They rely on help.
Yet, by reducing people in those stations, you have
actually taken that away. You can't get it from an automated
machine. So, I think it's very important that we continue to
find ways to improve.
I'm a little disappointed that the--in part of the
regulations that are put together, we have Federal regulations
for airlines, and we certainly have the ability to put Federal
regulations for administration in rail, and yet we fell short
of including certain security measures in that. I think that's
something that really has to be taken a look at.
I'd also welcome any questions and answers that you may
have, and I'm trying to stay within the--the 5-minute rule.
Thank you, very much. I appreciate it.
[The statement of Mr. Little follows:]
Prepared Statement of James C. Little
April 25, 2008
The Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO (TWU) on behalf of
its 130,000 members in the transportation industry, including airline
workers, railroad workers on Amtrak, rail freight lines and Metro North
and transit workers in numerous American cities including Philadelphia,
Miami, Houston, and San Francisco as well as the MTA workers in New
York City, appreciates the opportunity to appear before this committee.
Before I speak to the security threats still facing the industry I
would like to commend the committee and its Chairman Bennie Thompson
and Subcommittee Chairwoman, Sheila Jackson Lee for the exceptional
steps you have already taken to improve transportation security in
drafting and shepherding through to passage the 9/11 Security Bill. I
think we can say without hyperbole that this bill comprises the
strongest security measures ever passed into law for the protection of
surface public transportation.
The 9/11 bill's mandatory security training for rail and transit
workers; the security funding and the grants to implement this training
reverses decades in which this critical component in transportation
security has been ignored in favor of well-lobbied, expensive
technology that never makes it out of beta testing.
The 9/11 bill further integrates frontline workers into the
transportation security umbrella by providing strong whistleblower
protection; a requirement that 13(c) transit labor protections be
attached as a condition on all grant programs; and requiring an
unprecedented degree of consultation and input from labor organizations
representing these workers.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 9/11 SECURITY BILL
At the same time as we praise the bill, and before I go on to a
broader discussion of security needs in the industry, I would be remiss
if I did not call attention to the woeful lack of implementation of the
9/11 security bill by the executive branch, especially those parts
dealing with rail and transit security.
To date there has been no rulemaking on the implementation of the
mandatory security training of frontline workers. And, while there has
been program guidance issued on the grant program, this guidance
blatantly disregards the explicit language of the law requiring 13(c)
transit labor protection and Davis-Bacon prevailing wage protection as
a condition of all grant programs. The program guidance we have seen so
far omits this requirement entirely.
GRANT PROGRAM COMPLIANCE WITH 13(C)
The requirement for continued 13(c) labor protections was designed
by this committee to make certain the grants were designed to implement
genuine security improvements, not as a devious way to get around
decades-old labor protections. This committee, which was adamant about
its inclusion in the legislation, understood that one does not get the
wholehearted cooperation of frontline workers needed to make this
program work, if one is undermining other protections they enjoy under
their labor agreements.
Law and Order does not mean the ``law'' is whatever the executive
branch ``orders'' it to be. We strongly solicit the committee's
assistance in preventing the executive branch from ignoring legislated
requirements they don't happen to like--13(c) transit protections and
Davis-Bacon in particular.
We are also deeply concerned that the grant program, which we
support, is proceeding while the security training program stalls. It
would be a great disservice to mass transportation if grants were
awarded and spent on other matters before the vital security training
of frontline workers even gets underway.
9/11 SECURITY BILL FUNDING
And, before I leave the subject of the 9/11 Security Bill, let me
make one more observation. Some people say that no legislative issue in
Washington ever goes away. But, with the strong bipartisan agreement
around the need to protect our transportation system from terrorism,
one might have expected the 9/11 Security Bill to be the exception.
Unfortunately we see in the fiscal year 2009 budget submitted by
the President that is not the case. The President appears quite willing
to talk about improving security. However, his request for $175 million
for public transportation and rail security is 85 percent less than the
$1.2 billion promised when he signed the 9/11 bill. It appears that the
fight to implement this ground breaking legislation will have to be
taken into the budget battle. I want to underscore our willingness to
work with the committee to assure full funding for this important
measure.
TRANSIT AND RAIL SECURITY
It will come as no surprise to anyone, least of all this committee,
that aviation security has received the lion's share of attention and
funding. Nor can the explanation lie solely with the horrific attack of
9/11. Even after the terrible attack on the Spanish railroad
demonstrated the vulnerability of other forms of public transportation,
transit and rail remain far more open to such attacks than does air
travel.
Part of the explanation is undoubtedly that airplanes are easier to
secure. Unlike transit, for example, passengers do not get on and off
airplanes in mid-trip. Hopefully. Air travel lends itself to secure and
sterile perimeters.
But the fact that transit and rail travel is difficult to secure,
and that it may never be as secure as air travel, does not explain the
minimal, and in some cases nonexistent, efforts to improve security for
transit and rail passengers.
I believe part of the explanation lies in the culture of
Washington. We take more seriously those matters that receive the most
attention. Much of that attention is lobbyist-driven. And the degree to
which lobbyists call attention to an issue is largely driven by the
degree to which it offers U.S. corporations opportunities to profit.
Securing airline perimeters lends itself to expensive hi-tech
solutions--various screening and detection devices, biometric
identification, etc. It's a small wonder that a Beltway cottage
industry has grown up pushing for adoption and purchase of these
technologies.
Mass transit security, however, by its nature is more likely to be
low-tech, as the committee recognized when it mandated security
training for frontline workers. More needs to be done in this area, as
I will discuss below.
FRONTLINE WORKERS: THE KEY TO RAIL AND TRANSIT SECURITY
One country that has struggled for years with domestic terrorism is
Israel. While their domestic air transportation system consists of only
a few flights a day and cannot be compared to ours, they do have an
extensive bus system.
In seeing what we could learn from their experience, the TWU was
struck by the observation of an Israeli security expert that they
relied most heavily on the eyes and ears of the workers on the scene.
Israel has apparently developed a highly sophisticated training program
to educate bus drivers and other employees on what to look for and how
to deal with it as well as a rapid alert system that gets immediate
response. In addition, I had the opportunity to lead a transportation
delegation to London to visit their transit systems where again we
observed, and discussed the benefits of having well-manned facilities
at the ticket booths and turnstiles. They have also added frontline
workers to their automated light rail system. Like Israel the London
for Transport (LFT) has taken advantage of adding more frontline
workers for security, and passenger safety. Perhaps these are areas our
Homeland Security Department might benefit from studying.
A great deal of attention has been given to the First Responders,
those brave souls who are first on the scene of any attack. We need to
pay as much attention to the ``Pre-Responders,'' if I can coin a word--
those people who are on the scene before an attack occurs and may be
able to prevent it from even occurring.
I know I am preaching to the choir here--this committee was first
and foremost to recognize the importance of these frontline workers and
to mandate their training in the 9/11 bill.
But training is not the only issue here. There is the further issue
of having sufficient workers on the spot to observe and react. This is
obviously not an issue with a bus where ``one bus, one driver'' assures
there will be someone there. This is not always the case in other
areas.
High-speed rail systems like those in New York, Philadelphia, Miami
and other mass transit systems represented by the TWU are often the
scenes of criminal attacks. Underground subway stations, in particular,
seem to lend themselves to this as recent high-profile crimes in
Philadelphia's SEPTA system and New York's MTA can attest. And wherever
a criminal can strike, there is an opening for terrorism as well.
Cameras in stations are all very well. But a camera cannot evaluate
what it sees. There is no substitute for station cashiers who can
observe suspicious or hostile activity and report it. Furthermore,
nothing so reassures passengers than the presence of a station employee
keeping them from being the only living, breathing human being in the
station. Passengers themselves are more likely to report suspicious
activity to a human presence than through some communication device
that may or may not work.
What works against violent crime in these situations, generally
works against terrorism--the presence of eyes and ears, training to
recognize situations and the ability of workers to react in a positive
manner.
Yet many transit systems, driven by the same cost center/profit
center mentality prevalent in the private sector, seem intent on
replacing as many cashiers as possible with automatic, mechanical fare
collection. ``Collecting fares?'' the argument goes--``a machine can do
it.''
But this reductionism can prove lethal in a mass transportation
setting. Ignoring or defining out of existence the security-related
functions of rail and transit workers takes out of play our single best
deterrent.
RAIL: ON-BOARD SERVICE WORKERS
The single best example of this is the attempt to replace Amtrak's
On-Board Service Workers with privately contracted workers to dispense
food and drink. Again the argument is made: ``anyone can dispense food.
They're just glorified McDonald's workers.'' Hardly.
On-Board Service Workers are currently required by Amtrak and by
law to undergo extensive emergency preparedness training and to be
prepared to assist in everything from emergency train evacuations to
first aid, CPR and the use of the public address system during train
emergencies.
Passenger trains, unlike McDonald's, travel throughout the
country--many times in locations where access to Emergency Medical
Service personnel may be nearly impossible. On-Board Service Workers
are trained as first responders to deal with everything from chemical,
biologic or radiological attack to a simple nosebleed.
Over the years, in response to a variety of crises, the National
Transportation Safety Board has suggested additional responsibilities
to their assignment and recommended Amtrak's implementation, and
training.
The record is replete with examples of On-Board Service Workers,
members of TWU Local 1460, dealing with emergencies as varied as
putting out fires, evacuating trains under bomb threats or after
derailments, and providing first aid medical assistance to passengers
until help arrived.
We have attached an appendix (Appendix A) outlining this record.
Nonetheless, Amtrak management is sorely tempted by its recurrent
financial crisis to cut safety and security corners by replacing On-
Board Service Workers with food dispensers. Again, I want to emphasize
how short-sighted this would be and how much rail security depends on
the presence of these workers who not only see to passenger comfort in
normal times but provide essential emergency assistance when things go
wrong.
And unlike airlines where Federal Airline Regulations (FAR's) and
Transportation Security Regulations (TSR's) have updated specific rules
that apply to aircraft security, Federal Railroad Administration
Regulations (FRAR's) and TSR's are behind the times in updating
railroad security requirements. This should be addressed.
SECURING VEHICLES WHILE NOT-IN-SERVICE
The other great vulnerability of public transportation systems is
through the vehicles themselves. We are familiar with the threat to
airplanes while being repaired or stored and protect them with a
layered series of perimeters, employee checks and screening systems,
both human and biometric. In the aviation industry we recognize that,
given sufficient time, a terrorist with access to an aircraft can find
any number of places to securely hide explosives or other lethal
devices.
Rail and transit vehicles offer no less of an opportunity for
terrorism. The difference is that almost no effort is done to secure
them from even casual attempts at access.
The Yards
Rail yards are where trains, subways and elevateds are stored when
not in service. Whether Amtrak or mass transit, the security is
generally the same--a wall, a fence, maybe a little barbed wire for
appearances. But workers have to get in or out. There are gates and
doors, but rarely with the kind of security protections common where
aircraft are stored. Rare is the rail yard where access is limited to
those with an electronic swipe card much less anything more
sophisticated. Nor are there sufficient guards, cameras, etc. to
prevent anyone from leaping a fence to gain access.
Maintenance Shops and Bus Garages
Maintenance shops are better secured than the yards. But not so
secure that strangers can't wander in off the streets and walk off with
expensive tools, a frequent complaint. There are often locked doors.
But that is irrelevant when the openings for buses and trains to enter
and leave the shops are generally kept wide open.
In the case of bus garages where buses are constantly coming and
going, it may be impractical to keep opening and closing the doors for
each vehicle. Especially during load lines vehicle entrances and exits
from bus garages must probably be secured by a guard checking IDs to
allow access. But rail and transit maintenance shops and storage yards
are susceptible to the same kinds of perimeter protections we apply to
aircraft.
I strongly urge the committee to look into implementing many of the
procedures we use to secure aircraft with regard to rail and transit
locations.
SUBCONTRACTING AND SECURITY BREACHES
Further holes are blown in the security perimeter, such as it is,
when Amtrak and transit agencies subcontract vehicle maintenance work.
At the MTA, for example, all employees undergo criminal background
checks. There is no such requirement of contractors and subcontractors
whose employees access thousands of security-sensitive areas of the
system.
Then there is the problem of unidentified personnel wandering
through the shop, moving vehicles, etc. Allow me to use the Beech
Grove, Indiana, shop as an example (See attached letter of April 16,
2008--Appendix B).
Amtrak, like many agencies, has an Employee Security Handbook that
seems convincing on paper. The company's handbook requires, for
example, that ``Vendors and contractors must display their company
identification and/or an Amtrak issued temporary identification while
on company property'' and that ``Vendors must be escorted while
entering restricted areas.''
In the instance described in the attached letter, on April 16, 2008
two unidentified men walked into the shop and attempted to power up a
railway car. They displayed no identification and at first refused to
identify themselves. They were without the required escort. Then, after
saying they worked for subcontractor Image Mark, but without producing
any identification and without engaging in any of the basic safety
procedures, they powered up the car.
Their ability to wander around the shop unescorted and actually
access vehicles displays a gaping hole in security. This time they were
subcontractors. Next time, who knows?
The letter indicates this is far from the first time there have
been problems with unidentified people wandering around the shop
unescorted. Worse yet, these cars are often removed from the property
for painting and other similar work. From the point these cars leave
Beech Grove until they return they are entirely open to anyone who
wishes to access them for whatever purpose. At times they have sat
outside the building at Indiana Rail for days at a time, not locked and
with no security whatsoever at the facility (See attached letter of
April 9, 2008--Appendix C).
THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN COMPANY POLICES AND ACTUAL PRACTICE
The Beech Grove, IN example is repeated endlessly across transit
and rail properties. It illustrates one of the greatest difficulties in
the Department of Homeland Security policing transportation security:
there is often a world of difference between what companies say they
are doing and what they actually do.
Rail and transit agencies have scores of lawyers who advise them on
the publication of safety and security manuals. They may issue numerous
memoranda detailing the policies to be observed.
But managers on the ground are driven by a different metric--get
the work out! They are evaluated on how well they ``make the line''
(i.e. provide the requisite number of vehicles to fill the scheduled
requirements on time). They are evaluated on the condition of the
vehicles and the quality of the work.
They are not evaluated on adherence to security procedures until
there is a breach with consequences. Workers and their elected union
representatives have hands-on knowledge of the actual security
practices on the ground. They, unlike middle level managers who are
responsible for implementing these procedures, have no self-interest in
covering up failures to comply.
Yet the Transportation Security Administration evaluates rail and
transit security on the basis of reports from top level management.
This committee wisely required worker input in the 9/11 bill. We need
to go further and require that any determination of actual security
procedures in the industry include a survey of workers as well as
management. And, further, that any discrepancies between the two
accounts be addressed in face-to-face meetings as well as onsite
evaluations.
MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) We encourage the committee to exercise oversight of the
implementation of the 9/11 security bill and make certain that
all grant programs are conditioned on the application of 13(c)
transit labor protections and Davis-Bacon prevailing wage
protection.
(2) Ensure that the training mandates included in the 9/11 bill are
implemented in a timely manner and that front-line workers are
directly involved in this process.
(3) Work to secure full funding for the 9/11 security bill.
(4) The security and emergency preparedness duties of positions
like cashier and on-board service workers should be enhanced
not eliminated. We should attempt to increase, not reduce, the
human presence in stations and on service vehicles. The
committee should encourage the requisite (Transport Security
Regulations) TSR's to be written and implemented.
(5) As much as is practical, we should apply the lessons and
practices of securing aircraft to securing not-in-service
passenger rail and transit vehicles.
(6) Any contracting out of passenger rail and transit maintenance
work or service must include a requirement of full adherence to
all the agencies' in-house security requirements.
(7) Any TSA (Transport Security Administration) determination of
actual security practices in mass transportation must include
surveys and other input from frontline workers and their union
representatives. Discrepancies between their reports and
management's should be carefully investigated.
Appendix A.--Safety, Security, and Service: Job Functions of Amtrak On-
Board Service Workers
Prepared by Gary Maslanka, Vice Chair of Amtrak Service Workers Council
(ASWC)
Part I.--Applicable Federal Regulations
Part 1 provides a listing of various Federal regulations, including
FDA Standards that are applicable to Amtrak On-Board Service Workers.
Some of these regulations mandate specific training, while others
require that On-Board Service Workers both familiarize themselves, and
comply with the regulation.
Part II.--Applicable Amtrak Rules & Policies
Part 2 provides a listing of numerous Amtrak Rules and Policies
that are applicable to and govern work performed by On-Board Service
Workers. Several of these Rules and Policies require specific training,
while others require that On-Board Service Workers both familiarize
themselves, and comply with the Rule or Policy.
Part III.--Safety, Security & Service
Part 3 provides examples of Amtrak's mandate that the Safety and
Security of passengers, employees, and the public are On-Board Service
Workers First Priority.
III-A
Part 3-A provides a listing of various Safety & Security training
programs that On-Board Service Workers are required to take.
Part IV.--Passenger Service Environment, Not a Fixed Location, Unique
in Several Aspects, and Involves Numerous Challenges
Part 4 provides examples of Passenger Train Service challenges
which separate Amtrak On-Board Service Worker responsibilities from so-
called food service workers outside the passenger rail sector.
IV-A
Part 4-A provides examples of actual emergency situations involving
Amtrak On-Board Service Workers.
Part V.--Additional Responsibilities of Amtrak On-Board Service
Workers, and Work Environment Issues That Separate On-Board Service
Workers From Food Service Workers Outside the Passenger Rail Sector
______
PART I.--FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Amtrak On-Board Service Workers, unlike ``Food Service'' workers
outside of the Passenger Rail sector are governed by several Federal
Regulations.
1.1
49 CFR 239 Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness
1.6
FDA Regulations
Reference Chapter 15 Amtrak Service Standards
Note 1.--This is not a complete listing of Federal regulations that
govern On-Board Service Workers.
Note 2.--Regulation applicability and training requirements, based
on On-Board Service Workers specific assignment may apply differently.
PART II.--APPLICABLE AMTRAK RULES & POLICIES
Amtrak On-Board Service Workers, unlike ``Food Service'' workers
outside of the Passenger Rail sector are governed by numerous Amtrak
Rules, Policies & Procedures, and On-Going Bulletin Notices providing
updated instructions.
2.1
Amtrak Service Standards Manual for Train Service & On-Board Service
Employees
Chapter 1 \1\ Standards of Excellence
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Policy, Procedures, and Rules directly applicable to On-Board
Service Workers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter 2 \1\ Business Diversity and Strategic
Initiatives
Chapter 3 \1\ Safety
Chapter 3A \1\ Safety Rules for On-Board Service
Employees
Chapter 3B Safety Rules for Train Service Employees
Chapter 4 \1\ First Aid and Related Emergencies
Chapter 5 \1\ Injury/ Illness Reporting Procedures
Chapter 6 \1\ Emergency Procedure Guidelines
Chapter 7 \1\ Public Health Issues
Chapter 8 \1\ Employee Support and Awareness Programs
Chapter 9 \1\ Customer Service Responsibilities and
Standards
Chapter 10 \1\ General Rules for On-Train Employees
Chapter 11 \1\ National Attendance Policy
Chapter 12 \1\ Uniform and Grooming Standards
Chapter 13 \1\ On-Board Services Crew Functions
Chapter 14 \1\ Revised Accounting Procedures for On-
Board Service Employees
Chapter 15 \1\ FDA Rules and Inspection Standards
Chapter 16 Train Service Crew Functions &
Accountabilities
Chapter 17 Train Service Accounting Responsibilities
Chapter 18 On Train Fare Rules
Chapter 19 \1\ Communication Systems
Chapter 20 \1\ Assisting Customers with Disabilities
Chapter 21 \1\ Unusual Occurrences
Chapter 22 \1\ Equipment
Chapter 23 \1\ Service Recovery
Chapter 24 Operations Standards Updates Still in Effect
Chapter 25 Customer Service Notices Still in Effect
Appendices
A. Phone Numbers
B. Personal Phone Book
C. Forms
D. Equipment Designs
E. Pass Policy
F. 3-Year Calendar
Note 1.--Employees are required to have the Service Standards in
their possession at all times while on duty.
Note 2.--Several chapters of these standards require specific/
specialized training. Others, not requiring training require an
employee's familiarization and compliance.
Note 3.--Employees are subject to review and audit to ensure they
are in compliance with these standards.
2.2
Amtrak Employee Security Handbook
2.3
Amtrak Standards of Excellence
Note 1.--Amtrak frequently cites these Standards when employees are
not compliant with rules as a basis for assessing discipline.
2.4
Numerous, Continuously Changing Amtrak Policies
Reference Employee Advisory, 2/14/05, Revising Alcohol and Drug
Policy
2.5
Continuous Customer Service Notices
Reference NEC Customer Services Notice 2001-41
2.6
Continuous Service Standards Updates
Reference Service Standards Update 05-03
2.7
Continuous General Bulletin Notices
Reference 3/01/05 Memo to OBS Employees on Sanitation Standards
Training
PART III.--SAFETY, SECURITY, & SERVICE
Amtrak On-Board Service Workers are governed by an Amtrak mandate
that places the Safety & Security of Passengers and Employees as their
first priority.
Safety & Security Are Priority No. 1
3.1
Testimony of Amtrak President & CEO David Gunn before Senate Commerce
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation July 10, 2002.
At Page 1, ``To begin with, I want to emphasize that the safety of
all passengers, employees, trains and facilities is our No. 1
priority.''
3.2
Testimony of Amtrak Vice President & Chief Transportation Officer R.
Stephen Strachan before House Transportation and Infrastructure
Subcommittee on Railroads June 6, 2002.
At Page 1, ``To begin with, I want to emphasize that the safety of
all passengers, employees, trains and facilities is our No. 1
priority.''
3.3
Amtrak's Standards of Excellence--Safety
At Page 1-4, ``Amtrak's highest priority is the safety and well-
being of our employees and passengers. You are essential in achieving
that goal. As an Amtrak employee you can begin by being sure you
understand and comply with all safety requirements related to you
position.''
Note 1.--Both the testimony of Amtrak's Senior Level management and
written Amtrak Policy make clear that the First Priority of On-Board
Service Workers is the Safety and Security of passengers and employees
alike.
Note 2.--Amtrak enforces these standards vigorously and subjects
On-Board Service Workers to stringent discipline, including lengthy
suspensions and dismissal when these standards are not complied with.
3.4
Amtrak's Employee Security Handbook
At Page 1, ``The Amtrak Employee Security Handbook summarizes the
basic security policies, procedures and protocols that all employees
must either comply with or be aware of.''
Note 1.--This Employee Handbook covers a wide range of security
issues from parking facilities to bomb threats and chemical biological
and radiological threats, and instructs employees on their
responsibilities in each of these areas.
3.5
Amtrak Security & Safety Updates
Examples:
10/26/01--Addressing handling of USPS mail due to anthrax
poisonings,
2/14/03--Taking precautions during trying times,
3/18/03--National Terrorist Threat level raised.
Note 1.--Information and instructions concerning security and
safety issues is continuously updated at which time On-Board service
Workers are provided notification and instructed to react accordingly,
following numerous and varying instructions and protocols.
3.6
Amtrak Safety Instructions
Examples:
10/03/01--Personal Safety/Security Alert,
10/26/01--Handling encounters with suspect packages and
substances,
10/30/01--Procedures for use, removal, and disposal of
protective gloves.
Note 1.--Amtrak safety instructions are issued on an on-going basis
to On-Board Service Workers who must familiarize themselves with, and
comply with such instructions.
3.7
Operations Standards Advisories
Examples: 10/23/02--Security and Safety Awareness On-Board Trains.
Note 1.--Amtrak Operations Standards Advisories are issued on an
on-going basis to On-Board Service Workers who must familiarize
themselves with, and comply with such advisories.
3.8
INS-9 Forms (Employment Eligibility Verification Form )
Employees are required to complete, and keep updated INS-9 forms
providing specific forms of identification.
Note 1.--An employee's failure to complete these forms and provide
the required identification may result in the employee being withheld
from service.
PART III-A.--EXAMPLES OF TRAINING REQUIREMENTS ON SAFETY & SECURITY
Amtrak On-Board Service Workers are subjected to take various types
of training concerning Safety and Security on an on-going basis.
Outlined below is a list of examples that is not intended to provide
every training program On-Board Service Workers are required to take.
Emergency Preparedness Training (PREPARE)
Reference--Amtrak's Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness Plan and
PREPARE 2000 Emergency Training documents, and Service Standards
Manual.
Reference--NTSB Report on April 18, 2002 Amtrak derailment in
Crescent City, Florida. Page 34--PREPARE Training requirements.
Employee Security Training
Reference--Amtrak's February 10, 2005 Security & Safety update
announcing newly developed system security training.
Chemical, Biological, & Radiological Training
Reference--Amtrak Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Emergency
Response document (February 2003).
First Aid/CPR Training
Reference--NTSB Letter to FRA (9/16/98) outlining R-93-23,
resulting in training for all On-Board service Workers in the areas of
emergency operating rules, First-Aid and CPR, and the use of Public
Address Systems, and Service Standards Manual.
General Safety Training
Reference--Amtrak Service Standards Manual.
Customer Service Training That Includes Numerous Passenger and Employee
Safety & Security Issues
Reference--Amtrak Service Standards Manual.
Public Health Issues Training (Food-Borne Illnesses, Communicable
Disease Procedures, and Blood-Borne Pathogens Exposure Plan)
Reference--Amtrak Service Standards Manual.
On-Going Instructions and Training With Respect to Safety
Reference--NTSB Letter to FRA (9/16/98) outlining R-91-71,
resulting in instructions to On-Board Service Workers to periodically
inspect passenger seats.
PART IV.--PASSENGER SERVICE ENVIRONMENT, NOT A FIXED LOCATION, UNIQUE
IN SEVERAL RESPECTS, AND INVOLVES NUMEROUS CHALLENGES
The operation of Passenger Train Service involves conditions that
are both unique and challenging, thus subjecting On-Board Service
Workers to elements that are not present in other so-called food
service functions outside of the Passenger Rail sector. Outlined below
are only a few examples.
4.1
There have been 181 documented terrorist attacks worldwide from 1998-
2003 resulting in 431 deaths and thousands of injuries. The continuing
threat of terrorism (Madrid Spain Bombing/Japan Chemical Attack)
require extraordinary prevention measures that On-Board Service Workers
are required to receive training for and exercise on a daily basis.
Reference--Homeland Security Update No. 02-13 (10/24/02). Outlines
reporting that al Queda is targeting the U.S. Railway sector.
4.2
Terrorism and Rail Security--Jack Riley
Reference--Testimony presented to the Senate Commerce, Science and
Transportation Committee on March 23, 2004. Rand Corporation, CT-224.
4.3
Unfortunately Train Accidents do occur, and involve serious injuries
and fatalities, which subject Passengers and On-Board Service Workers
to considerable risks, and further demonstrates the responsibilities
of, and need for On-Board Service Workers.
Reference--Amtrak Accidents 1980-2003, as reported by the National
Transportation Safety Board.
Reference--Amtrak Train Accidents 1980-2003, as reported by the
Federal Railroad Administration.
4.4
Passenger trains, unlike a restaurant, or other fixed locations, travel
throughout the country, in many locations where access for EMS
personnel may be extremely difficult making it essential for On-Board
Service Workers to be highly trained to assist until EMS crews arrive
at the scene.
Reference--NTSB Report--Derailment of Amtrak Train No. 12 on Portal
Bridge (11/23/96). Page 6--The first ambulance arrived at the scene 47
minutes after the initial notification.
Reference--FEMA Report USFA-TR-143 (9/02) on derailment of Amtrak's
California Zephyr train on March 17, 2001. Page 4--Key Issues--Access
was extremely limited due to the remoteness of the accident site.
Reference--Emergency Net News ``DEADLIEST TRAIN CRASH IN AMTRAK
HISTORY KILLS 44'' Article on the derailment of Amtrak's Sunset
Limited.
``According to survivors, it may have been as much as forty-five to
fifty (45-50) minutes before anyone arrived at the scene to begin the
rescue efforts.''
PART IV-A.--EXAMPLES OF ACTUAL EMERGENCY SITUATIONS INVOLVING AMTRAK
ON-BOARD SERVICE WORKERS
Amtrak On-Board Service Workers are, on an ongoing basis confronted
with the potential for emergency situations that require their taking
appropriate action to protect the safety and security of passengers and
employees on-board during a trains operation. Outlined below are just a
few examples of instances where On-Board Service Workers have been
involved in emergency situations.
December 1989 Bomb Scare Threat Aboard Train No. 19
Reference--February 21, 1990 letter to Ms. J.C. Frederick Thompson
recognizing this On-Board service Worker for the safe evacuation of
passengers during the bomb scare threat.
October 18, 2004 Fire Aboard Amtrak's Lake Shore Limited Train Near
Toledo, Ohio
Reference--Nomination of On-Board Service Worker Raymond Farris for
his actions in protecting the interests of On-Board crew members and
passenger during a fire on-board the train.
April 18, 2002 Auto-Train Derailment--Crescent City, Florida
Reference--Daytona Beach News Journal: Special Reports, April 19,
2005
``Reggie Jackson Jr. was working as an onboard attendant in one of
the sleeping cars when the train derailed.
``The tracks had come loose, like thread. They were turned all
different ways, and the wood was shattered,'' said Jackson.
``He climbed on top of a car where he had heard screaming and
popped open windows to help passengers to safety.
``James Pierce, also an onboard attendant, was working in another
sleeping car when the accident took place.
``It felt like it was sliding to the left and suddenly it just
toppled,'' said the onboard attendant.
``Pierce, 39 of Huntington, MD, said he grabbed hold of the
curtains and within seconds found himself hanging from a perch.
``After the train came to a stop, Pierce said he pulled out the
emergency window and began pulling people out of the cabin. He handed
out bandages to people with cuts and bruises.''
May 2001 California Zephyr Derailment--Iowa
Reference--Presidents Safety & Service Awards--Jimmie W. Coleman
Award for Excellence.
``A particular noteworthy example of Jimmie's extraordinary
commitment to customer service is his effort after the derailment of
the California Zephyr as train No. 5, in Iowa in May of 2001. Jimmie
was working two coaches, both of which went on their side. There were
numerous injuries in his car, and in spite of the difficulties, he
assisted more than 80 passengers to evacuate and then provided them
with comfort and assistance until medical personnel were at the scene.
Many passengers at the hospital singled him out for his calm and
gracious manner, even under the harrowing conditions. What was perhaps
most amazing was, in spite of his own bruises and cuts, Jimmie made his
next trip without missing 1 day of work''.
November 26, 2003 Texas Eagle Grade Crossing Accident, Poplar Bluff, MO
Reference--Presidents Safety & Service Awards--James C. Adams Award
for Valor.
``On November 26, 2003, James was working aboard the Texas Eagle,
train No. 22, when it was involved in a grade-crossing accident near
Poplar Bluff, MO. As a result of the accident, a truck was hit and
landed on its side. After first assessing and ensuring the safety and
well-being of his sleeping car passengers, James rushed to the side of
the unsteady vehicle. Ignoring the strong smell of diesel fumes and a
risk of explosion, he carefully but quickly climbed over the truck's
large tires, up the vehicle's side and kicked out the windshield.
Reaching through the shattered glass, he grabbed the driver and pulled
him through the window. He maneuvered him through the opening, away
from the metal and glass debris, and carried the driver to a safe
area.''
On-Board Fire/Emergency Medical Situation
Reference--Presidents Safety & Service Awards--Lisa A. Castillo
(Service Attendant), & Doug G. Wheeler (Service Attendant)
``Several years ago, when a small fire was discovered onboard, Lisa
extinguished it calmly and immediately. Another time, a guest needed
the Heimlich maneuver, but he was too big for Lisa to apply it
effectively. She called out for Doug, who ran from the other end of the
car and resolved the situation.''
PART V.--ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES THAT AMTRAK ON-BOARD SERVICE
WORKERS ROUTINELY CARRY OUT THAT SIGNIFICANTLY SEPARATES THESE WORKERS
FROM FOOD SERVICE WORKERS OUTSIDE OF THE PASSENGER RAIL SECTOR
5.1
Work Schedules--Long Hours, Away From Home, Unpaid On-Duty Time
Reference Position Bulletins
Reference Trip Report 6/06/99
5.2
Service Animals
Reference Standards Update 05-07
5.3
Passenger Car Watering/Point of Water Sanitation
Reference May 27, 2003 Memo
5.4
On-Board Service Standards--Uniforms, Grooming, Badges
Reference May 23, 2003 Memo
5.5
Americans With Disabilities Provisions
Reference Bulletin outlining Rule #0003
5.6
Meal Check Procedures
Reference NY Crew Base Meal Check Procedures
5.7
Uniform Standards & Requirements
Reference July 20, 2004 Service Advisory
5.8
On-Going Customer Service Training
Reference September 30, 2003 Memo to On-Board Service Employees
5.9
Environmental Training
Reference Environmental Training Course Form
5.10
Crew Luggage Identification Tag Requirements
Reference Service Advisory 04-23
5.11
Transportation Department Review System
Reference 5/31/05 OBS Review Form
5.12
Annual Safety Plans
Reference 2004 Mid-Atlantic Division Plan Document
5.13
Food Temperature Monitoring Requirements
Reference Draft LSA Temperature Monitoring Report
5.14
Employee Training Delivery
Reference December 7, 1992 Letter--David C. Irish, HDR Training
Note.--In addition to being required to take on-going training,
Amtrak On-Board Service Workers deliver various training programs.
Appendix B.--Letter From Gary Maslanka to Vince Nesci
April 9, 2008.
Mr. Vince Nesci,
Chief Mechanical Officer, National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 4001
Vandever Avenue, Wilmington, DE.
SUBJECT: Beech Grove
Dear Mr. Nesci: This is in reference to Amtrak's outsourcing
practices at the Beech Grove Shops and a follow-up to previous
correspondence concerning High Level Sante Fe (Parlor) cars.
As stated in my letter dated April 1, 2008 members of the Beech
Grove committee worked diligently to demonstrate that they could
complete the paint work on this series of cars well below the initial
quote of 400 hours. Beech Grove management's response, with no
reasonable explanation was that the work would not be performed at the
Beech Grove facility. I also pointed out that consistent with
management's decision to outsource this work car 39975 was shipped to
Indiana Rail to be painted by vendor Image Mark.
Since car 39975 was shipped to the vendor we have monitored its
handling. Our information indicates that this car also incurred
unnecessary delay, for the same reasons outlined in my April 4, 2008
letter concerning Superliner 1 coach 31014. Much the same as coach
31014, it is our understanding that car 39975 was shipped on March 28,
2008, was initially delayed due to the vendor not having space in a
shop to paint it. Then the vendor made a decision to paint it outdoors
resulting in the need to remove the first paint application and repaint
the car.
For the same reasons outlined in my April 4 letter it is quite
obvious that management's outsourcing practices are resulting in
avoidable delays to equipment currently being overhauled at the Beech
Grove Shops. In this particular situation it is further worthy to note
that Beech Grove management has asserted, as an excuse for outsourcing
that there is a very tight time schedule for the work on this series of
cars being completed.
In addition to delays that could have been avoided by this work
being performed at the Beech Grove Shops, the handling of both these
cars, the Superliner I (31014) and High Level Sante Fe (Parlor) 39975
raise another concern with respect to security. As pointed out, both of
these cars required a second paint job, both requiring that the initial
application of paint to be removed and paint preparation work for the
second application.
During this process observations were made that indicated the crew
employed to remove the initial paint application was not just the
normal crew, but also a much larger crew of workers. Although we are
unable to confirm at this point, the possibility that there were
numerous temporary workers employed by the vendor to perform the work
of removing the initial paint application appears likely. In this
regard, and as you are well aware, the issues of safety and security
are of the utmost importance.
Inasmuch, and as it should, the possible employment of temporary
workers not only raises questions with respect to qualifications to
perform certain work, it raises serious questions concerning security,
including but certainly not limited to the following:
(1) Do vendors that have access to Amtrak equipment require any
type of security clearance?
(2) Do temporary workers hired by a vendor require any type of
security clearance?
(3) What measures, if any, are employed by Amtrak to ensure the
security of equipment from the point it is shipped from the
shop to a vendor until its return?
(4) Does Amtrak's current security program govern any of these
concerns?
Your attention in these matters, and assistance in providing
answers to these questions would be appreciated.
Sincerely,
Gary Maslanka,
International Vice President, Director, Railroad Division.
Appendix C.--Letter From Gary Manslaka to Vince Nesci
April 16, 2008.
Mr. Vince Nesci,
Chief Mechanical Officer, National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 4001
Vandever Avenue, Wilmington, DE.
SUBJECT: Beech Grove--Security Concerns With Contractor Employees
Dear Mr. Nesci: I am once again writing with regard to security
issues at the Beech Grove Shops. As you may recall, I sent you a letter
on April 9, 2008 concerning this matter which, to date you have not
responded to. Subsequently, on April 16, 2008 an incident occurred in
the Trim Shop at Beech Grove that highlights Amtrak management's
failure to properly adhere to company policies governing security.
BEECH GROVE INCIDENT (Trim-Shop)--APRIL 16, 2008
At approximately 12:30 a.m. on Wednesday April 16, 2008 TWU member
Mike Unger who was working in the Trim Shop observed two strangers
walking through the shop. In that he had never seen these individuals
in the past he approached them as they were attempting to power-up car
34058. Upon approaching them he took note that they were not displaying
any type identification or wearing required safety glasses and hearing
protection. When he asked who they were with, and what they were there
for, initially these individuals just ignored him. Upon questioning
them again they responded in a rude manner asserting that they did not
have to tell Mr. Unger who they were or anything at all. Then they
stated they were from Image Mark, further making unnecessary comments
to the effect, the guys you hate. Before even entering the car to check
to see if any Amtrak worker was in the car or to properly check
circuits these individuals hooked the power to the car.
The above referenced incident not only raises issues with respect
to security and safety, it also raises a concern about the behavior of
contractor employees creating a hostile work environment.
Security
With respect to security, as we have brought to management's
attention in the past, contractor employees are permitted to roam
around the shops with no identification. Inasmuch, Amtrak workers in
the shops at times have no idea who these contractor employees may be,
or if they pose any type danger to their well being. Simply put, this
is unacceptable.
Likewise, this incident points directly to Amtrak management's
failure to ensure the security of its workforce by establishing,
providing guidance on, and enforcing a clear and understandable
security policy. To make this point clear outlined below are references
to Amtrak's Employee Security Handbook and Policy governing Employee
Identification Cards dated December 12, 2006--P/I Number 3.15.0.
Amtrak Employee Security Handbook.--Amtrak's Employee Security
Handbook sets forth certain requirements for vendors and contractors
entering onto Amtrak controlled property, as follows (Excerpt from
Amtrak Employee Security Handbook):
``VENDOR AND CONTRACTOR SECURITY--PAGE 16 Security Handbook
``Vendors and contractors entering onto Amtrak controlled property must
have a valid form of photo employee identification with specific
employee information.
``Vendors and contractors must display their company
identification and/or an Amtrak issued temporary identification
while on company property.
``Vendors must be escorted while entering restricted areas.
``All vendors and contractors must sign in with Amtrak
Police and/or security officer prior to entering any Amtrak
facility, when applicable.
``Vendors working on or near the right of way must receive
Right of Way Protection Training,
``Vendors and contractors are not permitted to park in
restricted areas without permission from the facility manager
or Amtrak Police.
``Vendor and contractor vehicles are subject to search by
Amtrak Police.''
As outlined above, Amtrak's policy requires that vendors and
contractors must display valid employee identification when on Amtrak
property. These contractor employees had no such identification and
were roaming the shops unaccompanied by any Amtrak personnel,
indicating that requirements in the Security Handbook are being treated
as more of a paper exercise, not a policy that is being enforced by
Amtrak management.
(Excerpt from Amtrak's Employee Identification Card Policy:)
``EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION CARD POLICY--December 12, 2006 3.15.0
``6.0 EMPLOYEE INQUIRY PROGRAM
``6.1 Non-display of Identification.--Employees are to approach any
individual not displaying authorized identification and request to
review their identification in a business-like and professional manner.
If authorized identification is produced, remind the individual that
corporate policy requires that an individual must display their
identification above the waist level and must be visible at all times.
``6.2 Individuals Without Identification.--If an employee approaches
an individual who does not possess an authorized form of
identification, or their authorized form of identification is not valid
(ex. expired), inquire as to their purpose in the area. Accompany the
individual to an exit and notify a supervisor who will assure proper
processing through an escort, if warranted.
The above referenced excerpts from Amtrak's Policy (3.15.0) again
point to a requirement that contractor employee's display authorized
identification. In addition, this policy sets forth an Employee Inquiry
Program directing Amtrak employees to approach any individual not
displaying authorized identification. In this case employee Unger did
just that, and was confronted with a rude response. This incident, the
likes of which could easily lead to a hostile work environment could
have, and would have been avoided if Amtrak's management properly
complied with and enforced its own policy.
Amtrak Standards of Excellence
The incident referred to herein also raises a concern with respect
to the applicability of Amtrak's unilaterally imposed ``Standards of
Excellence''. In particular--Professional and Personal Conduct.
(Excerpt from Amtrak's Standards of Excellence:)
``PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL CONDUCT--PAGE 8
``Projecting a professional image is important in a customer-service
business like ours. We make an impression by the way we look, the way
we act and the way we treat our customers and each other.
``Conduct
``On the Amtrak team, there is no place for activities or behaviors
that compromise the safety, satisfaction and well being of our
customers, the public or our fellow employees. Therefore, boisterous
conduct such as fighting, rudeness, assault, intimidation, horseplay
and using profane or vulgar language is unacceptable. It is important
to remain calm and be courteous to all customers, even those that may
be difficult at times.''
The fact that these contractor employees were rude to Mr. Unger
when he approached them points to contractor employees on Amtrak
property not being held to the same standard as Amtrak workers. Amtrak
management's permitting contractor employees to act outside the
requirements of standards Amtrak workers are governed by is completely
unacceptable. Moreover, contractor employees being permitted to act
outside these standards places Amtrak workers at a disadvantage and
presents the potential for the safety and well being of Amtrak workers
being compromised. Inasmuch, I am requesting that Amtrak promptly
pursue measures that will in the future prevent situations such as this
which subject Amtrak workers to inappropriate behavior from contractor
employees.
Safety
The incident referred to herein also raises serious concerns with
respect to safety. As just one example, contractor employees arriving
in the shops and powering-up equipment without even knowing if Amtrak
workers may be in, on or about the equipment presents a serious safety
risk to Amtrak workers. Likewise, and as I stated in my April 10, 2008
letter, management's permitting these contractor employees to enter the
shops and remain in the shops without the required safety apparatus
points to a different set of standards for contractor employees that is
unacceptable. Moreover, Amtrak management's condoning this type of
behavior from contractor employees is certainly not consistent with
Amtrak's Standards of Excellence.
(Excerpt from Amtrak's Standards of Excellence:)
``SAFETY--PAGE 5
``Amtrak's highest priority is the safety and well being of our
employees and customers. Your help is essential in achieving that goal.
You can begin by being sure that you understand and comply with all
safety requirements related to your position. In many instances, it may
be a matter of using plain common sense.
``Familiarize yourself with and obey safety guidelines
pertinent to your department or craft. They contain wisdom
gained from the experience of others who have come before you.
``Use only company-approved or company furnished tools and
equipment. Safety glasses, aprons, gloves, hardhats, etc. are
provided for your protection; use them when required.
``Working safely is required of all employees, regardless of
position.''
As outlined in the above referenced excerpts from Amtrak's
Standards of Excellence, Safety is stated to be the highest priority.
However, permitting contractor employees to perform work at Amtrak
facilities not in compliance with these standards is not only
inconsistent with these standards but presents and undue risk to Amtrak
workers. As you are aware, my letter to you on April 10, 2008, yet to
be answered, outlined several issues relating to Amtrak's application
of policies to contractor employees. The incident outlined herein
verifies that my requests for Amtrak to either apply Amtrak's standards
to contractor employees, or enforce these standards with respect to
contractor employees has fallen on deaf ears.
As asserted in Amtrak's Standards Safety should be the highest
priority. Unfortunately however, the incident on April 16, 2008,
especially when considering these problems were just brought to your
attention less than a week ago tells a different story. Inasmuch and in
interest of safety, please consider this an urgent request from this
organization for Amtrak to promptly require contractor employee
compliance with Amtrak's security and safety policies when in Amtrak
facilities.
Also, with respect to security, as outlined below I am restating
the same questions I presented in my April 9, 2008 letter which has not
received a response.
(1) Do vendors that have access to Amtrak equipment require any
type of security clearance?
(2) Do temporary workers hired by a vendor require any type of
security clearance?
(3) What measures, if any, are employed by Amtrak to ensure the
security of equipment from the point it is shipped from the
shop to a vendor until its return?
(4) Does Amtrak's current security program govern any of these
concerns?
Your prompt attention in these matters would be appreciated.
Sincerely,
Gary Maslanka,
International Vice President, Director, Railroad Division.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentleman's time has expired.
Let me acknowledge Mr. Nadler, Congressman Nadler. We thank
you very much for your presence here today and your service. I
know that we will be working together on these issues in
Washington. Thank you.
Let me thank you, Mr. Little, for your testimony, and I am
delighted to recognize Chief Thomas Lambert, to summarize your
statement, Chief Lambert, for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS C. LAMBERT, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
OF POLICE, METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY, HARRIS COUNTY, TX
Mr. Lambert. Madame Chair, members of the committee: Thank
you. I refuse to accept that you are not truly tied to Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You are absolutely right.
Mr. Lambert. Thank you for your leadership and the
opportunity to appear this morning.
I'm going to really quickly summarize, I think, some
points. You have heard a lot of great information about the
importance of transit security, and I think the real value that
transportation brings to our communities.
As Commissioner Kelly said, transportation is really the
life blood. If it goes away, our cities shut down, our economic
vitality shuts down. So, the importance, we have got to make
sure is that we are focusing on the safety and security of our
systems and the people who operate those systems.
We applaud the Transportation Security Administration for
really focusing on aviation security after the attacks of
September 11. Clearly, that was the method of the attack, and
we think they took the right approach. But we believe now the
time is to get more money to securing our mass transit systems.
Madame Chair, as you said, 34 million people a day use
public transportation systems across this country. We believe
that you compare that to the number of folks using commercial
aviation, although important, we believe that we need to be
investing more funds into securing our mass transit systems
across our country.
I want to applaud Administrator Kip Hawley. You have heard
me say this before. We had an opportunity, a group of transit
police chiefs and security directors--Commissioner Kelly has a
member of his staff that's on the peer advisory group--had an
opportunity meet with the Administrator, and basically made it
very clear we were not pleased with the approach that TSA was
taking by not involving the industry.
Now, to his credit, he's the one that set up the peer
advisory group. We now work with him monthly, with conference
calls. There is a great relationship that exists because
nobody's feelings get hurt if we really raise issues we all
need to be talking about. So, I want to compliment the
Administrator for that.
However, as Mr. Little said, we are concerned we are not
getting enough money. Congress has allocated, under House
Resolution 1, some funding that should be coming to mass
transit security. By the President's budget for fiscal year
2009, he's only proposing $175 million, compared to $400
million that Congress said should be going. Under the House 9/
11 Commission Recommendation Act of 2007, Congress said we
ought to be looking at $750 million authorized for transit and
security. We are clearly not at that point.
Several points I'd like to make. One, we believe funding
should go directly to the transit systems. The Federal transit
administration has a program that's been in existence a long
time, where funds go directly to transit agencies. They are
accountable to make sure they are providing the services that
they are getting the funds to do, and that by steps the process
that we think slows down the process.
We believe that there is a difference. There's Tier 1
systems and there are Tier 2 systems. Although the Houston
region is a high risk vulnerability area, and the City of
Houston and the Port of Houston are Tier 1s, the transit system
is a Tier 2. We think that there is some disconnect.
So, when you are looking at vulnerability in transit
systems operating in an environment that's high risk, the
transit system should also be considered high risk in how we
are approaching that. So, we think there should be some
clarification to how the tier approach is going. We recognize
vulnerability. We believe we ought to be looking at making sure
that consequences, threat, and vulnerability is important when
we are at a priority of how we are doing funding, but we think
it's very important that that looks at the entire region one is
operating in.
We also believe that, as the Commissioner said, as the
Secretary said, as Mr. Little said, it's not just capital
dollars. We think there should be some operating costs
associated with providing for people that have to be out there
to provide the service. That's not to say we don't believe in
technology, because we do. Houston METRO has invested a lot of
money in technology and will continue to do so. But, we have
got to make sure that technology stays up with the real world,
that it's got some flexibility, where there's intelligence that
lets people that can then take that information and make good
operational application of what we need to be working on. So,
we think that's very important.
The VIPR teams, I think, are the perfect example. If we
could use operating dollars to put more officers on overtime,
more visibility, as well as more plainclothes, in the VIPR
model, we believe that that does, as the Secretary said,
basically puts the chaos where people don't know where we are
out there and what we're doing. We think that's very important.
So, we believe that we have got good tools, we have got
good approaches. We just think there needs to be more funding.
Last but not least, front line transit employees.
If you want to know what goes on in a transit system, talk
to a bus operator, talk to a rail operator, talk to a
maintenance employee, because they will tell you want's going
on. So, the more we train them, the more we make them more
aware of their role, their opportunity to benefit, the more
important we are in securing our systems, and our communities,
and our country, and we think that's something good for us all.
So, Madame Chair, thank you again for the opportunity to
appear this morning. I really look forward to working with you
and your committee, and Congress, and working with TSA.
Again, we applaud TSA. We think they have done things that
they believe are the right thing to do. We want to be very open
with them to do more. We just believe that more funds should go
to transit security in our Nation's transit systems, and we
look forward to working with Congress and TSA to make sure that
that occurs.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Lambert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas C. Lambert
April 25, 2008
Good Morning Chairwoman Jackson Lee and members of the committee. I
thank you for the opportunity to speak before this committee on the
extremely important issue of transportation security as it relates to
mass transit systems in our great Nation.
As the Senior Vice President and Chief of Police of Houston METRO,
the transit agency for the Houston region, I have first hand knowledge
of the challenges of securing a transit system in a high-threat
metropolitan area.
Let me start by saying that we in the transit industry applaud the
efforts of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in working
to secure the Nation's transportation systems in the various modes.
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, TSA has focused the bulk of
its resources, including funding, technology, and programs, on securing
our aviation systems. While this focus was understandable in light of
the nature of the attacks, we believe that TSA must now invest in
securing other modes of transportation, including our mass transit
systems.
In 2007, the over 6,500 providers of public and community
transportation services saw a ridership of 10.3 billion trips; the
highest ridership level in 50 years according to the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA). The number of people using public
transportation has risen by 32 percent since 1995. Weekday boardings
numbered 34 million compared to the 2 million daily domestic travelers
using commercial aviation.
When you take these statistics, couple them with the fact that our
transit systems are open to the public with many access points, and add
the historical precedent of repeated attacks overseas on surface
transit; one can clearly see that our transit systems, left unsecured,
are viable and attractive targets for terrorists. This was evidenced in
the attacks on the surface transportation systems in Madrid, London,
and Mumbai. Transit agencies that have both rail and bus systems are
particularly vulnerable to attack.
Transit agencies have worked closely with TSA to highlight the
importance of transit security. Our efforts have resulted in
establishment of the Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group,
the Transit Security Grant Program, and the current effort to train
front-line employees. Also, the Transit Security and Safety Roundtable
was established as a means for representatives of the 50 largest mass
transit systems to share ideas and information, discuss security
issues, and engage in collaborative efforts to secure our transit
systems nationwide. This sharing of information and lessons learned
ensures that we are doing the most that we can with the resources
available. These programs are a good start; however, they fall short of
addressing the bulk of the security needs of transit agencies and
continue to leave our systems, particularly in high risk cities,
vulnerable to attack.
The Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group provides TSA
with the experience and expertise of 15 transit Police Chiefs and
Security Directors from systems across the Nation in addressing
security concerns of transit systems. This group was instrumental in
bringing about the accelerated front-line employee training effort that
is currently underway.
The Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) provides grants to the
larger transit agencies to implement security programs and measures.
This program, however, does not provide adequate funding for transit
agencies to address their security needs. President Bush's fiscal year
2009 budget only proposes $175 million for transit security grants,
compared to $400 million provided by Congress in the fiscal year 2008
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations legislation. It also
falls far short of the $750 million authorized for transit security in
fiscal year 2009 under the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007.
In addition to the lack of funding, there are several other issues
with the program that we believe should be addressed. First, despite
Congress' direction to DHS to provide funding directly to transit
agencies, TSGP funds are funneled through State Administrative Agencies
(SAA's) thus creating delays in the receipt of these funds by the
transit agencies. The direct awarding of these funds to transit
agencies as is currently done with Federal Transit program funding
would greatly improve the process and maximize the use of such funds.
Second, the awarding of funds should be predicated on legitimate
security exposure that is based on consequence, threat, and
vulnerability; regardless of a transit agency's location, ridership, or
Tier ranking. Third, transit agencies should be able to use the funds
for operating expenses related to security efforts in addition to
capital expenses. The Visual Intermodal Protection and Response (VIPR)
team initiative is a good model for this concept. Agencies could use
these funds for overtime and backfill in support of random and
unpredictable patrols that would greatly improve the ability to deter
and interrupt terrorist activities. The individual agencies know best
what they need in order to secure their systems, and we believe that
greater latitude should exist to leverage TSGP funds in furtherance of
operational efforts in transit security. A major strength of the TSGP
is the funding of training, drills, and exercises; the valuable tools
that allow agencies to identify gaps, and prepare their employees to
mitigate, prevent, and respond to the threat of terrorism.
Vulnerability assessments must continue to be funded under TSGP as they
compliment drills and exercises. Together they form a comprehensive
approach to continual evaluation and improvement. These tools are
essential in teaching our employees how to implement plans and
procedures including how to respond to terrorist threats and actions.
The initiative that is currently underway to train front-line
transit employees is a great example of how partnerships between TSA
and local transit agencies can work in resolving transit security
issues. Transit agencies nationwide realized a need to train their
front-line employees on security awareness, behavior recognition,
immediate emergency response and local emergency procedures. These
agencies also realized that addressing this need would require reducing
their current funding of on-going security efforts in order to cover
the costs of overtime and backfill so that front line employees could
get ``out of the seat'' for training. Local transit agencies worked
with TSA and the Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group to
resolve these issues. The effort resulted in additional funds that were
granted during the fiscal year 2007 TSGP. The granting of these funds
was accelerated in order to allow the transit agencies to provide this
much needed training in a timely manner to their most critical
employees.
In closing, I would like to commend TSA for their efforts to
implement programs to ensure that our Nation's transportation network
is safe and secure. I believe that transit agencies across the country
stand ready to partner with TSA and Congress so that together we can
secure this country's public transportation systems in order to protect
the passengers, employees, and public at large from the threat of
terrorism.
I want to thank the chairwoman and committee members again for this
opportunity to speak, and we stand ready to provide you with any
additional information that you may need.
Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentleman's time has expired.
I thank each of the witnesses for their testimony.
Let me, for the record, remind members of this subcommittee
and other members that are not present, that any statements may
be submitted for the record.
I also want to make note that all of the witness's
statements will be submitted in their entirety into the record,
and I appreciate again their presence here as we move forward.
The members present now will be recognized by the
chairperson in accordance with our committee rules and
practice. I will recognize members who were present at the
start of the hearing, of course based on seniority on the
subcommittee, alternating between the members who are present.
I would also like to again thank the witnesses for their
testimony and recognize that when we have field hearings, the
idea is to be on the ground, and to be able to see first hand,
and to hear from witnesses who are grappling with these issues
on a daily basis. We are in New York. We expect to be out west,
and we hope in the city of Houston, as well, as we begin to
understand how the Federal dollars are being utilized.
In these questions, gentlemen, we hope that you will be
vigorous in your answers. The give-and-take helps us construct
legislation. That can be important to make the determinations
that we need to make.
So, let me begin the questioning by asking the Secretary
from New York, and having had legislative experience before,
how good a job is the Federal Government doing after 9/11, in
the backdrop of 9/11, in working with the States transmitting
Federal funds and being accurate in how those funds are being
utilized? Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Balboni. Madame Chairwoman, in 2003, I was appointed by
Tom Ridge to serve on a task force to actually chart how monies
flowed from the Federal Government to locals for homeland
security. So, that's the perspective from which I start.
It's gotten a lot better. But it really needs to get to the
next evolution. The next evolution is that Washington does not
truly represent the first line of defense when it comes to
local transit security. That is done at the local level.
Oftentimes, we still have issues of intelligence sharing,
we still have issues of sustaining the funding over time. The
worst thing you can do to a transit system and security is to
modify the amount of funding year to year. It's just you can't
build a budget on that. You can't build expectations on that.
You can't pay down and buy down the risk over time.
Because, as you know, you know, particularly in a transit
system like New York's, which is really elderly and fragile, it
takes a great amount of money, a great--and therefore, a great
amount of time, to buy down the risks. I mean, for example, the
Metropolitan Transportation Administration, they are spending--
they want to spend another half billion dollars on capital
security needs. You know, the first tranche of half a billion
dollars--actually, $780 million, was utilized to secure the
East River tunnels, do some station hardening, and a variety of
different efforts in that regard.
The second half is going to be used for bridges. Because,
as we all know, we may be focusing on trains, but if the
bridges go down, the suspension bridges, the devastation would
be enormous.
So what government has to do at this point--the Federal
Government has to do is recognize that continuous funding at a
level that is anticipatory, and that continues to work on the
long range regional plan, is absolutely essential.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me, Mr. Little, thank you for, I
think, both--and thank you, very much--think both of you and
Chief Lambert have noted some fractures in our commitment that
I'm certainly going to be immediately pouncing on, if you will.
We are right in the middle of the appropriations process. We
worked very hard to pass the 9/11 Commission in its totality.
Speak again to this issue of the promises made on funding
for training, an issue that you know we have worked extensively
on in this subcommittee and fought hard to get that language in
the 9/11 bill. Tell me what you have made note of in the drop
in the funding. I think the commitment was $400 million, and
you say $175 million.
What is the impact on that decrease, but what is the impact
on untrained transportation workers?
Mr. Little. Well, I think there's----
Ms. Jackson Lee. What is the impact on our security by
having untrained transportation workers?
Mr. Little. Well, in the funding piece, I believe the
President had really allocated, initially, that he was going to
put $1.2 billion into transit and into rail. Now, we actually
have a reduction with it, and in the fiscal year of 2009, as
Mr. Lambert said, it's down to $175 million, which is about an
85 percent reduction.
Not having the proper funds, obviously you can't train
first time responders. We--you know, as the Commissioner talked
about, and I think that he gave an excellent example, is that,
first of all, we have an inherent problem in our system where
they cannot hire police officers because they don't have the
salary structure that's conducive for people to want to take
the job. That's a problem, in itself.
We have the same problem in the transit, when it comes to
training our particular workers, because we have these gaping
holes. A lot of time, management puts together a set of rules
that are written by attorneys, and it shows all the things that
they are going to do, and it looks good on paper. But, when it
comes to reality, they miss the point of not talking to the
workers on the field, to find out what can be done. Can we not
work together for a common good?
But, as soon as you talk that it may increase staffing,
that's a no-go item. As soon as staffing becomes an issue, no
one wants to talk about staffing.
As I mentioned, Amtrak is a prime example. They want to put
servers on there, similar to McDonald's-type servers. There's
nothing wrong with McDonald's-type servers. It's good jobs for
some people.
However, on board a train that's traveling throughout the
country, those workers there play the same role as we have for
flight attendants. Flight attendants are not there just to
serve. They are there to handle emergencies.
The NTSB, in numerous rail accidents, has actually added
more work to those on-board service people. They gave them work
that will require them to have more training. They are trained
in CPR. They are trained in everything from a nose bleed, as I
mentioned earlier. These people are trained in radioactive and
biological stuff. They are there as a first line.
Sometimes, you are out in a rural area that takes quite a
bit of time for even the people who have the discipline,
whether it be the police departments, or the fire departments,
or the medical facilities, to get there. So, you have to have
someone there. So, eliminating them to try to save some money
because of funding for Amtrak, they are missing--they are
missing a key element of security.
As the Commissioner said, having people there is a
deterrent. But, not having them there is worse. If you don't
have the right people there--and we said we should have learned
from what we have seen in Israel and in London--but exactly,
you know, when Israeli--and just to add one more piece.
Israeli aviation is small in comparison to what we have in
the United States, yet they have one of the most dynamic
security pieces in place. But, what you don't realize is they
also have a massive transportation system in buses. They have
spent a great deal of resources training those first time bus
operators to witness things, look for certain intelligence, and
report it. So, I think that's something that we are missing. I
think we have the wherewithal in this country to do similar, if
not better, but yet we are missing that point.
Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I believe, then, that the transit
workers--trained transit workers, conductors and others, that
level that you have just mentioned, I think you call them
cashiers, and they wanted to move them off, put a machine, then
put a server that just stands behind the counter--and, as I
said, we respect everybody that works--really provides an
opening, creates a major threat opportunity for terrorist
activity.
Mr. Little. Well, yeah.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is that what you are suggesting?
Mr. Little. Yes, ma'am. You can actually see it. If you
look at a--and, I will use Philadelphia, and SEPTA, and I will
use MTA as an example.
I mean, in the subway system, we have crimes committed, and
some of them get high play and high visibility. Those crimes
are more susceptible to having crime if you don't have someone
there who's there to witness and see what's going on and report
it.
So, if you are having no one at the booth, a person who's
standing there, they may be the only living soul in that area,
because there's no workers available. There is no one else
there to maybe pick up the phone and call for aid, or maybe
even stop something from happening.
Because, if you see someone there--so, opening up for
criminal activity, it leads into terrorism activity. Because,
if it's--if it's susceptible to criminals, it's certainly
susceptible to terrorism.
The part that no one seems to be putting their arms around
is when we have equipment that is not necessarily in the
station. A lot of times, those trains, those elevateds, the
buses, are in an area where they really don't have the
security.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just indicate that we will be
introducing legislation that will congratulate TSA, as you all
have indicated, that they have made great strides, but focused
on them complying with the 9/11 recommendations, which includes
focusing on the professional training of staff. I think you all
have emphasized the importance of that.
We expect to mark it up very soon, and your testimony will
be very helpful.
Let me move to Chief Lambert, and help walk me through this
extreme dilemma and confusion of Title 1 surrounding areas, and
Title 2 mass transit.
Please help me understand that and how it undermines the
effectiveness of a synergized security mechanism in an area.
Mr. Lambert. Madame Chairwoman, I'm not I have a full
understanding, but let me give you a perspective.
The Secretary----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, you need to underline it, so I can
run back to Washington and get it fixed, quickly.
Mr. Lambert. Well, I'm going to try to help with that.
The Commissioner said, the Secretary said, and Mr. Little
have all said what you really have to do is look at things in a
regional perspective. Transit does not operate in isolation. It
does not operate in a vacuum.
Transit operates in a region with a lot of different moving
parts. Quite frankly, my perspective is if you have got high
risk threats in an urban area, and you are operating in an
urban environment, that tells you you've got some exposure, as
well.
So, I don't understand the logic, to be honest. I think the
assumption was, because our concern initially was tunnels,
bridges, underwater activity, to understand the logic, but I
think as we continue to evolve and expand, a transit system
operates within that broader community.
We serve the Port of Houston. We serve the airport. We
serve the Texas Medical Center. We serve downtown. We serve
financial. We serve petrochemical. Every infrastructure that's
critical to the vitality of that community is impacted, and we
are a part of that.
So, we should, in our view, be considered a Tier 1 system,
if that's the criteria that's being used. Unfortunately, that
has not been the determination. So, I raise it more from this
standpoint, because I don't understand the logic there.
It seems to me that if you are operating in a high risk
environment, that's exposed to threat, you are just as
vulnerable from what we have seen overseas that we think that
there ought to be a logic to that. At this point in time, we
are not really sure what that logic is.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, my end----
Mr. Lambert. I will also, Madame Chair, as you know, I have
also communicated this to TSA, so it has not been something we
have been silent about.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, the mechanism of change moves
slowly. But, it's not being propelled by this field hearing. We
thank you for that explanation.
My time having expired, I'm going to yield to the
gentlelady from New York for 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, very much, Madame Chair.
I'd like to pose this first question to Deputy Secretary
Balboni. We have been holding a host of hearings on the Hill
around transition, quite frankly. Transition in government.
It occurs to me that that may be a moment of vulnerability,
because to a certain degree, while an infrastructure is put in
place for a transition, there will be a need for regions to
look at their protocols and their autonomy during that period.
Even when the government is fully stood up, there are
vulnerabilities. Imagine during a transition period.
So, you have placed great value on the Regional Transit
Security Working Group. Do you believe, Deputy Secretary, that
you all have taken this into account, and you are coordinating
in a way in which you are able to be autonomous in being able
to secure the region during the period of transition?
Mr. Balboni. Congresswoman, you are preaching to the choir.
This is one of the key points that I have made to the entire
directorate. As a matter of fact, I'm going to be heading up to
Lake George this evening to speak to the Army National Guard.
Essentially, my message to them is that during the period
of vulnerability, we must be ready and prepared, regardless of
what happens in Washington.
Ms. Clarke. Um-hmm.
Mr. Balboni. As I said before, the rubber meets the road in
terms of transit security at the State and local level. Well,
the same is true with Homeland Security.
I referenced the Congressional Research Service, a report
that just came out, talking about how al Qaeda has had
attention to the political calendar. In addition to which, if
we consider that the attacks of 2001 came shortly after the
burst of the dot-com bubble, there are a series of fatwas and
edicts that talk about damaging a Nation economically.
So, if we take the current economic malaise and we take
this new--the first change of administration since 9/11, and
the fact that there will be new personalities and new
directions, new leadership, and we probably won't know what the
fact of the Department of Homeland Security looks like until
probably, maybe even March, you know, when you take a look at
all the different levels, in that period of time we must have a
seamless transition, but we also must have the underpinnings of
the State ready to respond at any moment.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you. It's reassuring to know that
brilliant minds think alike.
Let me just go on further to ask can you give us a little
bit more detail on how the RTSWG does its work, and the
initiatives that have come out of it? Is it a unique idea, or
are there other similar organizations in the United States?
Mr. Balboni. Essentially what we did that was unique was--
and Ray Kelly had mentioned that they had asked to be a part of
this Regional Transit Security Work Group. So, Commissioner
Falkenrath approached me, and said, ``Why can't we
participate?'' I said, ``You know what? You ought to
participate. You are 2,600 officers. You are not a transit
agent, quote/unquote, but you certainly provide most of the men
and women and services for the system.'' So, we let them in.
But, when they came in, suddenly the other groups looked at
the pie and said, ``Oops, mine. We are not going to participate
with this, or we are going to shut down.''
Ms. Clarke. Um-hmm.
Mr. Balboni. So, I came in a meeting in March, and put
everyone together, and we started hearing back and forth. Then,
I raised my hand, and I said, ``Wait a minute. Have you ever
all sat in a room, at a secret level, and talked about your
vulnerabilities?'' They said, ``No, we've never done that.''
That's a part of trying to protect their market share, as well,
not share their vulnerabilities.
So, I instructed that we would do just, in fact, that. I
asked TSA to provide a secret clearance briefing on
vulnerabilities, and we did it at the NYPD Counterterrorism
Center in Coney Island. We had only the top security officials
of all the systems in the room, including the FBI, and we went
through all the vulnerabilities. It was an eye-opening process.
We then came back in August, and talked about other things
that had been done, to see what kind of vulnerabilities were
there. Then, we came and we said, ``All right. Now, how do we
fix the system? Not the individual transportation system; the
system itself.'' Recognizing that if a bomb goes off on New
Jersey Transit, it will shut down the rest of the transit
system, whether it's in New York State, or Connecticut. We had
to make that recognition, that securing vulnerability system-
wide was going to secure each one of the intricate parts.
That--and, that was done with Kip Hawley in the room. He
sat in the room through all of those 2-day meetings. What he's
told me is that's the first time that's happened.
I know Houston has got its act together. They provide a
great amount of service and security. But, I think that what
the Chief talked about, in terms of Tier 1 and Tier 2, that
happens more often than it should. We don't have uniformity of
designation of security risks.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you. My time--can I get in one more
question, Madame Chair?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Absolutely.
Ms. Clarke. Great.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Absolutely.
Ms. Clarke. I'd like to get in one more question, then.
This is actually split between both you, Chief Lambert, and
you, Mr. Little. I'm going to be more specific to Mr. Little,
because I'm a little bit more familiar, but you raised this in
the discussion today.
You discussed in your testimony today, Mr. Little, the role
of rail and transit workers as being on the front line, and I
very much agree with that, and I'm glad I was able to actually
add the amendment adopted to help ensure in the 9/11 bill that
we would provide grant funding to unions for security training.
Can you tell me what your union has done on this?
Particularly here in New York City, or anywhere in the Nation.
We'd like to have evidence that an infrastructure is being put
in place, that funds are being utilized, but not enough is
being done. Likewise, any benefits that you may have seen for
the workers, Chief Lambert.
Mr. Lambert. Let me respond, real quick----
Mr. Little. Okay.
Mr. Lambert [continuing]. To Ms. Clarke.
Again, I want to credit TSA because they did, in working
with the industry and partners, they did do some fast track
funding for frontline employee training.
We have got 1,200 operators that have already been trained
in Houston. That's been very fast track. We started back in
March, I believe.
We got direct funding not only for the training but
something that was critical. Transit systems have peak
operations they have got to get done. You cannot pull operators
out of seats for training when you are trying to run the
service.
Ms. Clarke. Right.
Mr. Lambert. So, the TSA, again to their compliment, in
talking to the industry, agree in that grant funding to pay
overtime for training. So, that is something that's in the
works now.
Houston's got 1,200 employees that have gone through that
training, out of 2,200, and we are scheduled to get ours
completed by August. So, we are trying to fast track that.
I will make one final comment and turn to Mr. Little.
Transit systems are very similar to a neighborhood, in my
view. People that take care of their neighborhood are people
that are engaged. Frontline employees are engaged, understand
what's occurring on the system. When something is out of the
norm, they are going to report it. That's the criticality of
the frontline employees and how they work to make sure our
systems are secure.
So, the more we can improve their capability of awareness,
and not just one time, but I think now we've got to look to the
future of recurring in-service type training, because
circumstances are going to change----
Ms. Clarke. That's right.
Mr. Lambert [continuing]. Conditions are going to change,
and our application of operations and technology will change.
So, we need to make sure that this is an ongoing program, as
well.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
Mr. Little. I can add to that. I think even the most, you
know, robust emergency response system, and we have found out
that it was--it's--it can be overwhelmed, as we saw on 9/11--
one of the things that we have been doing internally is that we
have actually--our Local here in New York has handed out kits.
I don't want to call it survival kits, but it basically gives
you some things that you need in an emergency situation. Each
one of our workers was done--has been handed that----
Mr. Balboni. The ``go bags.''
Mr. Little [continuing]. I think--yeah, the go bags. It's
really been very helpful. I think that was worked out through a
grant, as well. So, it was kind of a working together project.
We have also--the MTA has put together some films to start
to begin a process of making our members more educated in what
to look for. The film, itself, I think we can expand on that. I
think we can do some, like, kind of a first--it's hard to do
it.
Let me just say this, as the Chief said, it's not easy to
take people off the clock all the time, because we do have some
financial problems, as we all know. We are all faced with it. I
don't care whether you are in the private or public sector.
However, I think we have to find maybe different ways to do
that. I don't know the answer right now today. But, it's
something I think collectively we should be looking at, and
find ways to help. Because, I really am a firm believer that
the best deterrent we have is the human deterrent. I think the
more people that we educate--because I think the infrastructure
of the United States is important to every citizen, not only to
transport workers, but I think we owe it to the United States
and everyone who lives here to protect our infrastructure at
all costs.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you. My time has expired.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Your time has expired.
We are going to enter into a second round, and so you will
have the opportunity. This is a rapid-fire round, and I thank
you gentlemen.
It's what we call building a record. I do want to make it
clear that field hearings are to generate solutions,
legislatively and policy-wise, and you are very helpful to us
as we try to build this record.
President Little, let me ask you to give your defined and
informed opinion of the underpinnings of prevention and
protection strategy as you deal with your transit worker force.
That is, do you view it as training, screening, information
sharing, or more technology?
These are your workers, and I wonder whether or not workers
leave out in the morning on their shift and they gather and if
there's any appropriate intelligence that they should have, do
you know whether they are getting it, as they get out on the
subways and various other facilities that they are utilizing?
So again, what involvement do you believe your workers have
in helping to protect, as they are the pre-responders, if you
will, in the transit system?
Mr. Little. Well, as I mentioned earlier, I don't think we
have actually gotten there yet. I don't think we are at any of
those pieces that you mentioned.
We don't do basic, you know, what's happening in the area.
I don't think we have enough collaboration between management.
Because really, the main object is to get the buses out, get
the subways out, get them out on time. We don't spend enough in
trying to de-brief, or brief. So, that's not happening, to the
best of my knowledge. If it is, I will correct it. But, to the
best of my knowledge, that doesn't happen today. As I said, I'm
not aware that it happens in any of our cities that we
represent our transit people--Philadelphia, Miami. I don't--I'm
not aware of any of that, that I have--so I can say reasonably
that I don't believe we do any pre-briefing.
We have a tremendous amount of vulnerabilities out there. I
think we need to educate more, especially on the subcontractors
that come on the property. That's a whole other subject. But,
there's areas that we need to start briefing people and holding
accountable for.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So, we have an overall need in technology,
in training, in intelligence sharing. You think, overall, we
need to have a greater focus on what we do with the numbers of
transit workers across America.
Mr. Little. Absolutely. I think that the TSA and everyone
has put a lot of emphasis and dollars into the aviation side. I
think we are quite there. We are probably not exactly 100
percent, but, you know, we are getting there on the airlines
side.
The rail and transit has been totally behind. We have so
much vulnerability. Not to be crude but, I mean, I was visiting
one city, in Chicago, where I was at a rail yard, and--and this
is no exaggeration. Osama bin Laden could be waling down the
mainframe, leading a band, and no one would have stopped him.
I mean, that's how bizarre--I know that sounds bizarre, but
that's exactly--there was a limited, if not any, security.
Sometimes, it's just a little bit of a fence, a brick wall,
maybe some barbed wire, you know, it looks good. But, when it
comes right down to it, no one stops you.
So, and we also have that, and I submitted some of that in
our written testimony, where we showed examples where
subcontractors, people come on the facilities, they have access
to all of our facilities.
So, there has to be some funding placed into manning some
security checkpoints. We don't have any security checkpoints.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You know, I don't think it is facetious or
sounding out of order. One would think, if you look at the
transit or rail system across America, it is found in our
backyards. You know, I live in a city where you look out your
window, and you are seeing major rail freight traveling down in
back of your back yard.
Beyond Osama bin Laden leading a band, he might be taking a
ride. I do think it is crucial that this be a wake-up call for
what we need to do.
My next question to the Deputy Secretary and to Chief
Lambert, both cities--both New York and Houston have been in
the Olympic chasing game, and we wish each of the cities well
as we move forward into the opportunities for having the
Olympics.
That means large crowds. Certainly one of the assets, or
one of the, I assume, offerings that any package gives is a
transit system.
So, my question is what thoughts have been given when you
think of even beyond the normal utilization, that you need to
have in protecting these systems? These are open systems, so do
you think it is the advance in technology? If so, what kind of
technology are each of you using, as it relates to your own
transit systems?
Deputy Secretary.
Mr. Balboni. As the 2004 Convention--Republican National
Convention here in New York City, as the Pope's recent visit
has demonstrated----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Um-hmm.
Mr. Balboni [continuing]. What is absolutely crucial is a
strategic collaboration that identifies technologies, but
almost more importantly, identifies individuals that are on the
same page of protection.
There are many different strategies that can be employed.
What we are doing now, in various parts of the system there are
chemical, biological, radiological nuclear detection systems
that are being put together, utilizing camera--CTV cameras,
training individuals, doing the surge with National Guard, as
well as with police officers, increasing the number of
officers.
We have developed a new program that--See Something/Say
Something--where we try to utilize the riding public. Now, we
are taking the information and we are putting it into computer
system called CISAR. Essentially, what it is, it is a
infrastructure mapping for the entire State and region. What we
do is, every time we get a report of a suspicious activity, we
pin map it around the critical infrastructure. We are able to
develop a baseline.
Then, if we get a threat through our Federal partners, we
are able to then go into that sector or that specific site and
say, ``You know, you've had activity that is of this nature
over the past period of weeks, months, years. You need to pay
attention to this, particularly as it relates to this threat.''
That type of interaction, interactive behavior and
collaboration, is absolutely essential because technology, by
itself, as you know, is just not the silver bullet.
I'll give you one last example. There was a company that
was assigned with the task of providing a camera that we would
be able to use an algorithm, to be able to determine if there
was a package left in the scene. There was great hope and
promise when it was first announced. Well, what we found, it
really doesn't work. Too many false images. Too many false
alerts.
That's really the thing that we have to keep in mind. Every
time you put in new technology, if you have too many false
positives, then the system you are trying to protect simply
doesn't work, and that doesn't work.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, you believe that then it is an
integrated system, when you begin to talk about large crowds
and we can talk about prevention. You have to have overall.
You know, it's interesting because we go from a virtual
fence at the border. I think we have fallen into the technology
trap and, frankly, believe that we can put all our eggs in one
basket.
You're suggesting that you want to see a seamless
integration of----
Mr. Balboni. Absolutely. I mean, if you look----
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. Of people, research,
technology----
Mr. Balboni. Oh, yeah, if you----
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. Is that what I'm hearing?
Mr. Balboni [continuing]. If you look at--there's parallels
drawn to our intelligence community and structure. When we went
away from HUMINT--human intelligence--and we really rely so
much on the SIGINT--you know, signal intelligence--and all of
the technology, we lost the granularity. Because, it's not just
information. It is the truth, it is the accuracy, it is the
means, it is the method, it is the motivation and the
capability that really inform us as to whether or not a threat
is really a threat or it's simply another rabbit hole.
Every day, I get a threat briefing. I can't tell you how
many times my hackles have been raised that something is coming
and I need to pay attention, and it just evaporates into
nothingness.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Um-hmm.
Mr. Balboni. That exercise, in and of itself, though
enormously important, is also part of the war of attrition that
I know our enemies are working against us. The point of
terrorism is to terrorize.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Um-hmm.
Mr. Balboni. They want to keep us constantly in fear, and
constantly expending dollars in a way so that we are distracted
and not investing in the assets we really, truly need to
prevent, and respond, and mitigate.
Ms. Clarke. Exactly.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you think we have enough people on the
ground--and I'm going to yield to Chief Lambert, and I
recognize your time frame--just bear with us for a moment.
Mr. Lambert. Okay.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you think we have enough people on the
ground to see--in this city, for example--in any place--bags
and other items placed randomly----
Mr. Balboni. Madame Chairwoman----
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. The potential that it has?
Mr. Balboni [continuing]. The reality of the situation is
that you would have to be--even if you added, you know, even if
you doubled the police officers, and you wouldn't want to
necessarily do that, because you don't want to make it a police
state--even if you dramatically increased the number of
officers, the chances of an officer seeing a vehicle-borne
explosive device or a backpack being placed, just in time to
get it out before it does its damage, is just--you know, it's
not reality.
We need, again, the integration of training, of utilizing
the public, of making sure we have really good threat analysis,
but even better sources, and take all that information and get
it real time to the people who need it. That's the system--
that's the paradigm we are working towards. We are not there
yet.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So, I think what president Little has said
is that all the eyes and ears are important.
Mr. Balboni. Absolutely.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just go quickly to Chief Lambert.
Houston is certainly in the Olympic-searching opportunity,
but answer the question that I posed, in terms of whether or
not other resources are needed, or how you respond to
protecting, in terms of large usage of the transit system
because of large events.
Mr. Lambert. Madame Chair, let me say, as you know, we have
a great partnership, regional partnership in our community,
with the city, the county, the State and Federal agencies
working with transit in any major event we do, like we did the
Super Bowl in 2004. That took all of us working together. As
the Secretary said, it takes everybody working together. As you
said, it's got to be integrated.
Technology for technology's sake, we should not do. But
technology that gives better information to boots on the
ground, as the Commissioner said, is good technology. We
believe technology does have a place.
As you know, we are doing a lot of things with technology
on buses. It's not just closed circuit television that you
record. It's the ability to then transmit that video out where
any car along a corridor can see what's going on in the bus. If
there's a problem, it protects the officer in how they are
responding to the circumstance that takes place on the bus. It
gives the operator a better sense that they know that
something's gone wrong and we are aware of it, and assist in
that regard. It's tied into vehicle location systems. It's tied
into radio communication systems. It's tied into systems in an
integrated approach.
So, I say that as an example. I think there still needs to
be more research with that. Now we are building wireless clouds
in our communities that all potential users can use, so the
more we get communications capability, I think the more things
we can do. The way we are trying to approach technology is does
it give a benefit to officers in the field in doing their job,
does it give them better information to do their job. If that
does work, then you've basically got a multiplying effect. We
think that's the reasonable approach.
The frontline employees, again, it's very challenging and I
think there is more we need to do. We have very few--you have
about 15 minutes with a bus operator coming into work in the
morning. So, I think what we have got to figure out is how can
we put information systems in place in club rooms that passes
this information along in quick bursts. That hasn't been
figured out yet, but that's something we need to be doing.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Deputy Secretary, do you know how much you
spend on mass transit in New York?
Mr. Balboni. There's a number of different pots. I mean,
the last that it was announced by Secretary Chertoff, $153
million was done for the Regional Transportation Work Group.
However, as you know, dollars are fungible.
In the Urban Area Security Initiative for the New York
region, approximately a quarter billion dollars was utilized
last year, again thanks to the great work of members of the New
York delegation.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So noted on the record.
Mr. Balboni. Right. Also, you know, there's the port
security pot, also.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes.
Mr. Balboni. All these dollars are utilized for the region,
and that's some of the things that I have really demanded and
stressed as we apply these dollars. What is the capability that
we are actually investing in? That is the question that is not
asked enough.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We are going to ask you to--we will
probably submit a question for you to give us the structure of
this regional cooperation.
Mr. Balboni. Sure.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We are glad that TSA has been involved in
it, and we may begin to look at what you and Houston does with
respect to that.
Do you know how much you spend on mass transit?
Mr. Lambert. How much grants we have received, or how much
we spend?
Ms. Jackson Lee. How much you spend.
Mr. Lambert. Our total budget annually is about $20 million
for my department. That's both for system safety and security.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have direct funding?
Mr. Lambert. Direct funding from grants?
Ms. Jackson Lee. TSA. Have you gotten--yes.
Mr. Lambert. The--no, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. It's to the agency?
Mr. Lambert. It's to the State----
Ms. Jackson Lee. To the agency or the State?
Mr. Lambert [continuing]. Administrative agency.
Ms. Jackson Lee. To the--pardon me?
Mr. Lambert. The State administrative agency.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And then down?
Mr. Lambert. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right.
Let me just quickly say, do you have a counterterrorism
roundtable, or----
Mr. Balboni. Yes, I do.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. I heard--I know you said the
regional. But, you have that----
Mr. Balboni. Yes----
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. A counterterrorism, where all
the law enforcement and others are on it.
Mr. Balboni. Yes. By the way, I just have to say, on the
SAA, so I just have to say SAAs are OK, all right? You know, I
know that everyone wants the direct funding, but we----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I wanted you to defend yourself.
Mr. Lambert. Please do not take that personally.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We are going to have a question, but we
will put it in writing----
Ms. Clarke. One size doesn't fit all.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. How you expedite getting
funds to the boots on the ground.
Mr. Balboni. We'd love to be able to address that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yeah, we will do that.
Mr. Balboni. Well, we do a----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have a counterterrorism group?
Mr. Balboni. We do have it. At the State level----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right.
Mr. Balboni [continuing]. We are utilizing about 16
different agencies, from the Department of Health, Department
of Transportation. Because, as you know, it's all hazards. You
know, it's not simply counterterrorism. It's also pandemic.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But these are not a--sort of a law
enforcement counterterrorism unit?
Mr. Balboni. Yes, there is.
Ms. Jackson Lee. In the city? Would it not--would
Commissioner Kelly be on it, and----
Mr. Balboni. Yes, well actually, Commissioner Kelly has his
own counterterrorism force. There is a counterterrorism----
Ms. Jackson Lee. No, but I'm talking----
Mr. Balboni [continuing]. For New Jersey----
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. About these--this group that
sits and listens to the intelligence, the chatter, the
information.
Mr. Balboni. They are a part of the Joint Terrorism Task
Force----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes.
Mr. Balboni [continuing]. That is headed up by the FBI----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes.
Mr. Balboni [continuing]. Counterterrorism Division for New
York City.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. Then, let me just ask this
question. Do we have a representative of the workers on that,
then?
Mr. Balboni. No, we do not.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just say this. Obviously, they
would have to secure security clearance.
Mr. Balboni. Right.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I believe that that is a missing link in
any counterterrorism unit, coalition, coordination. I know we
have one in Houston, Chief Lambert, and I would suggest to you
that is a link.
I believe it is important, and I'm going to put it on the
record, that we provide an opportunity for a designated
individual--for example, the staff of Mr. Little. He's the
International President and he happens to be here in New York.
I'm sure that it would not be an International President in
other areas, but if a vehicle was made available for them to
secure their security clearance, I think it is crucial that you
have that insight.
Because, if it's not the local law enforcement, MTA police,
or a subset of the NYPD, or it's not the METRO Police, it is
some bus driver, conductor, another person whose eyes and ears
are being utilized as they go through this process.
So, I want to put on the record that I think that is
another missing element when we don't have the eyes and ears
that are actually there, and to be able to avoid those--those
entities.
Let me just do one other. Chemical and water tunnels. Have
you got any special initiative? It's the other part of
infrastructure protection. Any special initiatives on that?
Mr. Balboni. Well, we--as you noted first off, that
Congress has moved forward on the Chemical Plant Security Act.
We are waiting, again, for the regulations to----
Ms. Jackson Lee. But I want to know if you and the State
had any specific----
Mr. Balboni. We are watching how those regulations come
out. In terms of the water, essentially what we are really
focusing on is the aqueducts for New York City, in particular.
As you know, they are----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Very important.
Mr. Balboni [continuing]. They are fed through upstate New
York.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Very important, yes.
Mr. Balboni. We are monitoring them. It's really the
infrastructure, itself, as opposed to the threats from
polluting the source. We are really focusing on how the water
gets from one place to another, making sure that that's secure.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me go on the record by saying I think
we'd like to have an opportunity to first hand view those
aqueducts----
Mr. Balboni. Great.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. And get an understanding
first-hand how that works.
Mr. Balboni. Right.
Ms. Jackson Lee. With that, let me gavel myself, and yield
to the gentlelady from New York.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, very much, Madame Chair.
Deputy Secretary Balboni, your testimony alludes to the MS
ISAC program, created by the New York State Office of Cyber
Security and Critical Infrastructure Coordination, which has
been so successful that you are now running the program
nationally, as virtually every other State in the country has
requested New York's support in keeping their systems secure.
Can you explain what this program is, and how it helps
secure our city's transit infrastructure? Also, what
developments do you see for MS ISAC in the future?
Since this is essentially a national level program, are you
getting the Federal support you need to continue this
development?
Mr. Balboni. That's a great question. Thank you,
Congresswoman.
Essentially, what we have in Albany is a 24/7 operation
that provides monitoring, detection, mitigation, and recovery
services to a variety of different private and public sector
clients. It's the first of its kind.
Ms. Clarke. Um-hmm.
Mr. Balboni. What essentially is the backbone of it is the
recognition that--I don't want to use the word ``war''--but
certainly we are in conflict on a minute-by-minute basis for
outside sources seeking to breach our computer systems, to take
information. We don't know what they really want, ultimately.
Are they preparing the cyber battlefield?
But, there is a specter that has been thrown over all of
the--whether it's the transit system, or chemical company
system--and that is the specter of SCADA manipulation--
supervisory control and data access.
This is the way we run things remotely in this Nation, and
we use the Internet oftentimes. So, whether it's the operation
of a dam, the operation of a shut-off valve for a chemical
company, we sent it through the Internet.
Because it's through the Internet, it can be hacked into.
If it's hacked into, we are very concerned that you could take
over the SCADA system and then manipulate the operation. There
have been demonstrations that have been done through Homeland
Security that show that this is a fact, a capability.
So, we have two parts. One is a service where we say, ``You
know, you've been attacked. Here is where it's come. Here's how
you mitigate it.'' I get alerts daily on this happening all the
time. They seem to be happening more and more. Everything from
defacing a Web page. They are actually going in and trying to
plant Trojan Horses and compromise computer systems, massive
computer systems.
The second is this SCADA system, where we are trying to
inform local governments in particular. Much of the critical
infrastructure at the local level is run by local governments.
So, what we have to do is inform them of this threat and give
them the ways in which they can secure their system within
their budgetary constraints.
Absolutely, it's two crucial aspects. What we need from the
Federal Government, and I have talked to Bob Stephens at the
Office of Homeland Security, we need them to invest. We had a
grant proposal before the Department of Homeland Security and
unfortunately we hear it's not going to go.
That's a shame, because we can, again, force multiply. We
can add value to the cyber operations, not just of New York
State and its municipalities, but of other States, as well.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, very much.
To Mr. Little, I'm just wondering whether the city has
taken any steps that other--that have not been undertaken
overall through the Federal initiative, to involve workers in
security plans, to your knowledge?
Mr. Little. I don't believe we are involved in any security
planning.
Ms. Clarke. Well, that, I think, speaks to your
recommendation, Madame Chair. I concur.
Just in closing, with my time, I have no further questions.
I want to really thank you, gentlemen, for re-affirming my
belief in being proactive and forward thinking. One of the
things that have just sort of, as a freshman, observation, is
the way that we think after the fact, it seems. You all are
leading the way, and it was important that you testified here
today. I certainly appreciate it, and thank you for your time
and sacrifice for being here today.
Mr. Little. Thank you.
Mr. Lambert. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I can't thank Congresswoman Clarke
enough for her, I guess, aggressive approach to homeland
security, but more importantly, her very strong advocacy for
the city in insisting that we come and undertake this important
field hearing, and as well, this important field visit that we
will be doing.
As I close, I'm trying to make sure that the record is
clear.
Deputy Secretary Balboni, your tunnels in New York, does
New York, itself, have a special initiative on securing your
tunnels? Do you have enough money, and have you secured money
from the Federal Government?
Mr. Balboni. As it relates to the water tunnels?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Water tunnels and all of your underground,
including your subway tunnels.
Mr. Balboni. The subway tunnels on the East River tunnels,
they are, we believe, as secure as they can be. Obviously,
there's no foolproof system, itself.
However, the Port Authority tunnels, the PATH tunnels still
remain of vital importance, and unfortunately a vital
vulnerability. We do not have the funding necessary to do that.
If you were to have an off-line discussion with Director
Hawley, I'm sure he would agree with me that it is a top
priority in securing these tunnels, particularly as it relates
to the rebuilding of Ground Zero.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Um-hmm.
Mr. Balboni. In terms of the aqueducts for the New York
City drinking water supply, really crucial. There are
initiatives to try to shore them up, as it were, and to develop
another tunnel. But certainly, we do not have a separate grant
source, and we would really, really need and appreciate that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Little, we spoke over you. Would you
find it helpful if there was a set place for a representative
of workers who would have security clearance to be part of the
counterterrorism group?
Mr. Little. Well, I think it closes the loop. I think it
brings workers as part of the process. As I said, I think it's
everyone's efforts. I have heard that from every one of the
panel, the people here, how important it is to have these eyes
and ears. Not one agency can handle all of it.
So I think, by closing the loop and making us part of it, I
think also enhances our abilities, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You are way out west. So, Chief Lambert,
you have a lot of chiefs under your jurisdiction. Are we doing
the job that we need to do in intelligence sharing? Are you
getting time sensitive information as you may need it?
Mr. Lambert. I think we can continue to do better at it. I
think it's getting better, but I think we can do more.
I want to compliment the New York Police Department. We get
intelligence from the New York Police Department, and
Massachusetts Bay Area Transportation Authority does a weekly
intelligence bulletin that we are getting, as well. The Federal
Government is doing more on intelligence sharing.
I just think we've got also, with the Joint Terrorism Task
Force, as you know. In our region, we are building a fusion
center with the Houston Police Department, the Sheriff's
Department, our department is involved, the Texas Department of
Public Safety. I think we are getting better at that. The more
timely we get real information, the sooner we get out to where
we need to be, and I think we are still building on that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. A person with security clearance, that
represented workers in the appropriate position would add to
any round table on counterterrorism?
Mr. Lambert. Yes, ma'am. I think the more perspectives we
get, and the more insight we get, I think the better off we are
going to be in how we are collectively resolved to address any
issue we are confronted with.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just say again we came to seek, to
look, and to determine. This has been a very forthright
discussion. The witnesses have brought us a very broad array of
concerns, as well as insight on how we can improve the
conditions of transit security, but also, as we mentioned,
infrastructure. The protection of your underwater tunnels and
you aqueducts, as you just mentioned, is vital for us to take
back to Washington.
I cannot thank enough Congresswoman Yvette Clarke for her
service on this committee and, as well, her invitation.
We look forward to inviting you to our Washington hearings,
as we pursue legislation, to address some of the concerns that
you have made.
We are in the appropriations process on behalf of Chairman
Thompson and Ranking Member King. The Authorization Committee
is a very large part of the appropriations process.
When we begin to see how the authorization is not matching,
it's time for us to insert and engage, and we will do so. Your
bringing to our attention the concerns regarding training, the
concerns regarding funding for certain infrastructure and, as
well, not the oversight, but the need to expand our review and
oversight of mass transit across America has been vital, not
only to the city and State, but to the Nation.
For that, gentlemen, we are grateful, and we thank you for
your presence before this committee.
Mr. Balboni. Thank you.
Mr. Lambert. Thank you.
Mr. Little. Thank you, very much.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]