[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COAST GUARD AND NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
CASUALTY INVESTIGATION PROGRAM
=======================================================================
(110-130)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 20, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, JOHN L. MICA, Florida
Vice Chair DON YOUNG, Alaska
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
Columbia WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
JERROLD NADLER, New York VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
CORRINE BROWN, Florida STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
BOB FILNER, California FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas JERRY MORAN, Kansas
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi GARY G. MILLER, California
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa Carolina
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
RICK LARSEN, Washington SAM GRAVES, Missouri
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York Virginia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois TED POE, Texas
DORIS O. MATSUI, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
NICK LAMPSON, Texas CONNIE MACK, Florida
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii York
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr.,
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota Louisiana
HEATH SHULER, North Carolina JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona THELMA D. DRAKE, Virginia
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOHN J. HALL, New York VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
JERRY McNERNEY, California
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
(ii)
?
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Chairman
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington DON YOUNG, Alaska
CORRINE BROWN, Florida HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York, Vice TED POE, Texas
Chair JOHN L. MICA, Florida
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California (Ex Officio)
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vi
TESTIMONY
Higgins, Kathryn O'Leary, Board Member, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 4
Richards, Anne L., Assistant Inspector General for Audits,
Department of Homeland Security................................ 4
Watson, IV, Rear Admiral James, Director of Prevention Policy for
Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship..................... 4
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., of Maryland............................ 37
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Higgins, Kathryn O'Leary......................................... 50
Richards, Anne L................................................. 60
Watson, IV, Rear Admiral James................................... 69
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Higgins, Kathryn O'Leary, Board Member, National Transportation
Safety Board, responses to questions from the Subcommittee..... 57
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HEARING ON COAST GUARD AND NTSB CASUALTY INVESTIGATION PROGRAM
----------
Tuesday, May 20, 2008,
House of Representatives,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Elijah
E. Cummings [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. Cummings. This hearing is called to order. Good
morning, everyone.
Today we convene this hearing to receive a report issued by
the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector
General regarding the Coast Guard's marine casualty
investigation program and the legislative proposal made by the
National Transportation Safety Board to be the lead
investigative agency for those accidents which the Board elects
to investigate.
The Subcommittee has been examining the multiple facets of
the Coast Guard's marine safety program throughout much of the
110th Congress. We began the examination in August of last year
when witnesses from the maritime industry testified regarding a
number of troubling concerns they had about a loss of
professional expertise among Coast Guard marine inspection
personnel, unprofessional treatment, and extreme delays in
pending rulemakings.
Many of these problems were subsequently documented in a
report developed by retired Coast Guard Vice Admiral James C.
Card at the request of the Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral Thad
Allen, following the Subcommittee's hearing. Admiral Card's
report detailed not only the loss of professional competence
among marine inspectors and investigators, it indicated that
frequent transfers prevent marine safety personnel from
developing technical or geographic expertise and it documented
a deterioration in the relationship between the Coast Guard and
the maritime industry regarding the achievement of safety
goals.
The allision of the COSCO Busan with the San Francisco Bay
Bridge in November 2007 and the report developed by the
Department of Homeland Security's Inspector General on the
Coast Guard's response to that incident have demonstrated in a
single event many of the challenges the Coast Guard's marine
safety program faces, particularly in the casualty
investigation mission, which is the cornerstone of all marine
safety missions.
With the issuance of today's report, however, we finally
have quantifiable assessments of the Coast Guard's challenges
in the casualty investigation program, and we have clear and
disturbing conclusions: the Coast Guard's marine casualty
investigations program is both ``hindered by unqualified
personnel,'' by ``investigations concluded at inappropriate
levels,'' and by ``ineffective management of a substantial
backlog of investigations needing review and closure.'' Ladies
and gentlemen, this is simply unacceptable and we can do much
better, and we must.
Just to look at one of these findings, the lack of
qualified personnel, I note that this was foreshadowed in the
IG's study of the COSCO Busan accident, which found that five
of the six individuals assigned as casualty investigators to
Sector San Francisco were not qualified. For the life of me, I
cannot figure out how we can avoid accidents from happening in
the future if the very people who are investigating them are
not qualified to do the investigation. Something is simply
wrong with that picture.
The report that we received from the IG today indicates
that, among a sample of individuals assigned as casualty
investigators throughout the Coast Guard, more than half were
not qualified as casualty investigators. Perhaps more
staggering to me, however, is that during last month's hearing
on the COSCO Busan, Admiral Brian Salerno, who is in charge of
the Coast Guard's marine safety program, testified that he did
not know how widespread the lack of qualifications among
casualty investigators was.
We look forward to the testimony of Ms. Anne Richards,
DHS's Assistant Inspector General, who will expand on the IG's
findings. However, let me note that one of the most troubling
findings of the IG report is that some of the challenges we
will discuss today were identified more than 10 years ago by
the Coast Guard itself, and even as far back as the seminal
oversight report, Semi-Paratus: The United States Coast Guard,
1981, issued during the 97th Congressional session.
In other words, the Coast Guard's challenges with the
marine safety program far predate the service's assumption of a
expanded responsibilities following 9/11. While these new
responsibilities make finding balance among all missions much
more challenging, they also make it much more important.
Frankly, as anyone who follows this Subcommittee knows, I
find it to be a disservice to the American people when
Government kicks around the same issues year after year or, in
this case, decade after decade. The marine safety mission is a
critical mission performed by our thin blue line at sea, the
United States Coast Guard, and it needs to adequately serve the
safety needs of the maritime industry.
While I appreciate the efforts that the Commandant has
taken to strengthen the program, including the requests of 276
new billets in marine safety, I believe that the only way to
ensure that the Coast Guard's marine safety program is staffed
by qualified and experienced personnel will be the enactment of
legislation that codifies new processes and procedures to
ensure that robust standards are in place and met by the marine
safety program. For that reason, I believe that the enactment
of the Coast Guard Authorization Act, H.R. 2830, which passed
the House of Representatives, even with a presidential veto, by
a resounding 395 votes to 7 is absolutely critical.
Against this backdrop, we will also hear today from the
National Transportation Safety Board regarding their proposals
to align their relationship with the Coast Guard regarding the
investigation of major marine casualties so that it parallels
their relationship with the modal administrations of the United
States Department of Transportation. The Board's proposal would
provide NTSB with the legislative authority to take the lead in
important marine casualties, an authority that they already
have for all the other modes.
Given that the Coast Guard infrequently empanels Marine
Boards to investigate major casualties, they have done so only
twice in the past eight years, it would seem that the NTSB,
which has conducted 23 marine casualty investigations in the
same period, is in many ways already fulfilling this role.
Since this is the first time that our Subcommittee has met
since our reauthorization legislation passed the House, I take
this moment to thank on the record all the Members of our
Subcommittee for doing outstanding work, because without the
outstanding work of this Subcommittee, there is absolutely no
way that we would have been able to get the vote that we got on
the floor of the House.
With that, I yield to my colleague and the former Chairman
of this Committee, Mr. LoBiondo.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, for
holding today's very important hearing. I believe you are aware
that Ranking Member LaTourette, while he is not here now, is
supposed to be here very shortly. As a result, I would ask
unanimous consent to insert his prepared statement into the
record.
Mr. Cummings. So granted.
Mr. LoBiondo. The Subcommittee will be hearing from the
Department of Homeland Security's Office of the Inspector
General regarding their review of the Coast Guard's marine
investigation program. I am concerned by the report's findings
that many of the Coast Guard's investigating officers do not
meet the qualification standards prescribed for those positions
and that the service has relaxed its review and management of
the program.
I am encouraged by the Coast Guard's positive response to
the report's recommendations. However, I would like to hear
more regarding the plans of the Coast Guard and how they will
put into place the different measures to improve the
investigation process.
I am also concerned about the scope of the new authorities
being proposed by the National Transportation Safety Board,
which would authorize the Board to establish itself as the lead
investigating agency at its own choosing and without regard or
consultation with the Coast Guard. This policy could have the
effect of muddying the waters farther, allowing the two
agencies to move forward with competing investigations with
different aims and needs. I look forward to discussing the
proposed language further with the witnesses to determine if
such an expansion is necessary.
Finally, I know there has been some valid concerns about
the ability of the Coast Guard to conduct marine casualty
investigations. I would like the record to reflect that the
investigation concluded by the Coast Guard in response to the
Athos I oil spill on the Delaware River a few years ago was
handled very professionally and was completed in a timely
manner. I want to commend them for it.
Mr. Chairman, I want to again thank you for the recognition
and thank you for holding this very important hearing.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Coble.
Mr. Coble. Mr. Chairman, I have no detailed opening
statement. I will just reiterate what I have said previously at
these various hearings. I think the American people probably
get more bang from its buck with the U.S. Coast Guard than any
other Federal entity known to man, and I look forward to
hearing the testimony today, and thank you for scheduling this
hearing.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Let me be clear that, as I have said many times and I
reiterate, I am the biggest fan of the Coast Guard. But I am
also the biggest critic, because I want it to be the very, very
best that it can be because there is so much that depends on
it. All of our efforts are aimed at trying to strengthen the
Coast Guard so that it can be the very, very best that it can
be not just for the present, but for generations yet unborn.
With that, we will now hear from our witnesses. We welcome
all of you. We will hear from Ms. Anne Richards. She is the
Inspector General for Audits with the Department of Homeland
Security. Then we will hear from Rear Admiral James Watson, who
is the Director of Prevention Policy for Marine Safety,
Security, and Stewardship, United States Coast Guard. Then we
will hear from Kathryn Higgins, who is a Board Member with the
National Transportation Safety Board.
With that, we will now hear from you, Ms. Richards.
TESTIMONY OF ANNE L. RICHARDS, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
AUDITS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; REAR ADMIRAL JAMES
WATSON, IV, DIRECTOR OF PREVENTION POLICY FOR MARITIME SAFETY,
SECURITY, AND STEWARDSHIP; AND KATHRYN O'LEARY HIGGINS, BOARD
MEMBER, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Ms. Richards. Good morning, Chairman Cummings and Members
of the Subcommittee. I am Anne Richards, Assistant Inspector
General for Audits for the Department of Homeland Security.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our report on the
Coast Guard's management of the marine casualty investigations
program.
I would first like to express our appreciation to the Coast
Guard's Office of Budget and Programs, as well as the staff
assigned to the marine casualty investigation program, for
their timely and thorough responses to my staff's requests for
information and documentation.
Our audit was conducted at the request of the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure and the Senate Commerce,
Science, and Transportation Committee. My testimony will
address three areas of concern identified in our audit. They
are, first, the training, experience, and qualification of
marine casualty investigations; second, the levels at which
marine casualty investigations are conducted; and, third, the
Coast Guard's process for reviewing and closing its backlog of
marine casualty investigations.
Concerning the training, experience, and qualifications of
investigators, we found that 15 of the 22 marine casualty
investigators in our sample were not qualified to conduct
marine casualty investigations based on the standards
applicable during our audit period. This problem can be
attributed to inadequate management oversight and internal
controls to ensure effective assignment, training, and
development of qualified marine casualty investigators across
the Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard's 1988 standard for determining who was
qualified to conduct marine casualty investigations, which was
in effect at the time we analyzed our sample, required a
combination of experience, investigative tasks, and training.
To be considered pre-qualified for the marine casualty
investigations program, personnel had to be qualified as a Hull
or Machinery and Small Vessel Inspector, or be trained in port
operations as a Boarding Officer, Facility Inspector, and
Harbor Safety Officer.
The 1988 standard also required that personnel
satisfactorily complete specific investigative tasks and
satisfactorily complete the basic marine investigator training
course.
Seven of the 22 investigators reviewed at the five
locations visited during our audit met the pre-qualification
standards by either fulfilling all port operations requirements
or through a combination of inspector qualifications. The
remaining 15 marine casualty investigators, or 68 percent of
the investigators we reviewed, were not qualified under the
1988 standard. Of particular concern were four investigators
who did not meet any of the requisite training, experience, or
qualification requirements, and did not attend the basic marine
investigator training course.
In August 2007, the Coast Guard revised the qualifications
for marine casualty investigators by updating the tasks that an
investigator must perform to qualify for the position. The
revised qualifications also removed the pre-qualification
requirement of being a Hull or Machinery and Small Vessel
Inspector. According to the Coast Guard, knowledge in these
specialty areas is essential to the ability of the
investigators to correctly identify the causes of marine
casualties and issue appropriate safety alerts and
recommendations. Consequently, removing the standard may
negatively affect the qualifications and capabilities of Coast
Guard marine casualty investigators.
The Coast Guard claims the pre-qualification standard as a
Hull or Machinery and Small Vessel Inspector are still
required, although not specifically outlined in the August 2007
standard, since this pre-qualification is a prerequisite for
attending the basic marine investigator training course.
However, we found that five of the 15 investigators that we
reviewed that had attended the basic course did so without
meeting any of the prerequisites for attendance. Further, the
current prerequisites for the course call for certification as
a Hull or Machinery or a Small Vessel Inspector, which we
believe degrades the prerequisites.
The problem of unqualified marine casualty investigators
can also be attributed to the lack of a clear and desirable
career path for investigators and the Coast Guard's decision to
reduce from four years to three years the tour of duty as a
marine casualty investigator, which hinders investigators in
acquiring the experience needed for career development.
In contrast, civilian marine casualty investigators are not
subject to the three year tour of duty rotation standard. Over
time, civilian investigators can gain a greater knowledge of
specialties, such as local waterways and industries or
experience in enforcing maritime regulations. Of the 22 marine
casualty investigators we reviewed, one was a civilian. In
fiscal year 2007, the Coast Guard reported there were six
civilians serving as full-time marine casualty investigators.
To its credit, as part of its efforts to enhance the marine
safety program, the Coast Guard is planning to add civilian
investigator positions.
Unqualified marine casualty investigators are not a new
issue to the Coast Guard. Coast Guard studies in the mid-1990s
of various aspects of the marine casualty program also
identified many of these same problems with marine casualty
investigator qualifications. Although the Coast Guard studies
included recommendations to address these problems, there were
little progress made in this area.
The second area I want to discuss concerns the level at
which marine casualty investigations are conducted.
The Coast Guard has guidance identifying the appropriate
level to conduct an investigation based on the severity of the
incident. The levels of marine casualty investigations are:
preliminary investigations, which are initial investigative
efforts; data collection activity investigations, which usually
consist only of collecting basic factual information; informal
investigations, which are less exhaustive than formal
investigations, but determine and report on the causes of the
casualty; and formal investigations, which are reserved for the
more serious or significant incidents in which the most
investigative value can be gained.
Data provided by the Coast Guard showed that between
January 1st, 2003 and October 31st, 2006, 93 percent of all
marine casualty investigations were conducted at either the
preliminary or data collection activity level, the two lowest
levels of effort that consists only of collecting information
and do not require an analysis of cause. Only 13 of 15,000
investigations were conducted at the formal level.
Our detailed review of a sample of 145 marine casualty
investigations from the five Coast Guard locations visited
showed that 53 percent of the investigations were conducted at
a lower level than that recommended by Coast Guard guidance.
The Sector commands have the leeway to conduct investigations
at other than the recommended level; however, to maintain
control over the program, the Sector commands should document
departures from Coast Guard guidance.
We also compared an extract of 15,327 marine casualty
investigations contained in the Coast Guard's database against
the Coast Guard's guidance on the recommended levels of
investigation. From this comparison, we identified 1,255 cases
which were investigated at a lower level than prescribed by
Coast Guard guidance. As a result of formal and informal
investigations conducted at the lower data collection activity
level, causal factors were not always determined. Without such
determinations, the Coast Guard may have lost the opportunity
to issue safety recommendations or alerts to prevent or
minimize the effect of similar casualties.
Finally, we found the Coast Guard Headquarters was not
timely in its review and closure of marine casualty
investigations. On November 9th, 2006, Coast Guard Headquarters
had a backlog of 4,240 investigations, of which 2,466, or 58
percent, have been awaiting review and closure for more than
six months. One Headquarter staff member was responsible for
reviewing and closing all of the investigations. This function
is only one of several functions performed by this staff
member.
To reduce the backlog, the Coast Guard resorted to a mass
closure of investigations without thorough review. On September
29th, 2006, Coast Guard closed 3,848 investigations that it
deemed low risk. However, based on the data provided by the
Coast Guard, there were 194 informal investigations and one
formal investigation included in this mass closure project.
Although the Coast Guard deemed them low risk, we considered
the investigations as high risk because they involved serious
incidents requiring complete causal analysis.
Coast Guard studies dating to 1994 have identified these
same basic problems affecting the marine casualty investigation
program. In September 2007, the Coast Guard issued a plan for
strengthening the program. This plan included recommendations
similar to those made in 1994 and in our audit report. Coast
Guard senior leadership must take seriously implementing these
recommendations to have a lasting impact on the marine casualty
investigations program.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, this concludes my
statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may
have.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Rear Admiral James Watson.
Admiral Watson. Good morning, Chairman Cummings,
Representative LoBiondo, Members of the Subcommittee.
Thirty years ago, when I entered the Coast Guard, it was
not uncommon to lose whole ships to the sea, inspected ships
with professional crews like Edmund Fitzgerald, The Poet, Ocean
Ranger, and Marine Electric. Poor designs, loading, training,
and maintenance led to structural failures. The Coast Guard
investigated and analyzed each casualty and made the necessary
changes to design, construction, manning, and inspection
standards. Today, the risk of a serious marine casualty on an
inspected vessel is less than one in a million, but we can do
better.
Just one year into George Washington's first term,
Alexander Hamilton created the U.S. Revenue Marine Service,
which is today's Coast Guard. He charged our first officers
never to forget that their seafaring countrymen are free men
impatient of domineering government officials. He charged them
to carry out the law and warned that sloppy work would create
clamor, disgust, and alarm. The combination of maritime
service, leadership, professional law enforcement has
characterized the Coast Guard for 218 years.
Your alarm regarding our casual investigation program has
reverberated throughout the Coast Guard. Nothing gives us more
resolve than suggesting we have neglected Alexander Hamilton's
warning.
In response to the questions you raised, I can tell you we
currently have 136 persons assigned to marine casualty
investigating officer billets. 110 of those persons are
certified as marine casualty investigators; the other 26 are
apprenticed investigators. Coast Guard-wide, we have a total
448 civilians, officers, and warrant officers who are certified
marine casualty investigators. Every Coast Guard sector and
marine safety unit has at least one certified casualty
investigator; most have more. But we are completing a review of
all personnel conducting marine casualty investigations and
will assign veteran marine casualty investigators back to
investigation billets to fill critical gaps. Our military
workforce is perfectly suited to adjust when necessary.
Ultimately, the Coast Guard's marine safety program,
including marine casualty investigations, will have to grow to
match the growth of the marine industry. By this time next
year, we plan on having a marine investigation center of
expertise and over 40 new investigator billets.
The Coast Guard and the NTSB are each authorized to
investigate major marine casualties. NTSB has a staff of 16 and
investigates about seven marine casualties a year; Coast Guard
provides the immediate response to all reported marine
casualties and completes about 5,000 investigations a year.
Unlike the NTSB, Coast Guard investigations must go beyond
determination of the cause and determine if a violation of law
or regulation warrants administrative, civil, or criminal
action. Our overall marine safety mission, which includes
search and rescue, pollution response, waterways management,
and marine inspection, also requires characteristics unique to
Coast Guard investigations, such as speedy dissemination of
safety alerts, notice to mariners, and policy updates.
We strongly believe that the existing statutory and
investigatory regimes work well and should not be changed.
Neither agency's role in casualty investigations should be
diminished. Any change would seriously disrupt the existing
well-considered statutory balance and interagency cooperation
between the Coast Guard and the NTSB.
NTSB primacy in marine casualty investigations would not
only disrupt the good order and discipline of the U.S. maritime
community, it would also proclaim to governments around the
world that the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard has
been summarily demoted, a message we do not want to send.
The Coast Guard is keenly aware of what is at stake for
America's waterways, our economy, and for the thousands of
people who go to sea. We stand ready to work with the NTSB and
Congress to address all the marine casualty investigation
issues in the context of the existing statutory and
investigatory framework.
I look forward to this hearing and responding to your
questions.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Ms. Higgins, I don't usually do this, but the Rear Admiral
just said something I want you to answer, to save us some time.
He feels that NTSB taking over the responsibilities that you
all are proposing would, in the eyes of the world, I think he
said, be a demotion of the Commandant. Would you address that
in your opening statement, please?
Ms. Higgins. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and Mr. LaTourette
and other Members of the Committee. Let me just say that
Admiral Allen is a personal friend of mine and I have the
highest regard for him and all of the members of the Coast
Guard, many of whom I consider good friends. Our objective is
in no way to diminish the role of the Coast Guard or to send
any signal that would in any way indicate any kind of demotion
in terms of the important role that they play.
As you know, the National Transportation Safety Board is an
independent Federal agency charged by Congress with
investigating every civil aviation accident in the United
States and significant accidents in other modes of
transportation--railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and
hazardous materials--and issuing safety recommendations aimed
at preventing future accidents.
I want to talk today about our request to modify the
authority we currently have to investigate marine accidents.
The Board proposes to have the right to elect to lead or
have primary status in major marine investigations. This
proposal is not intended to serve as an expansion of the
Board's authority, but to provide the clear authority if at any
time in the immediate aftermath of a marine casualty there is a
disagreement between the Safety Board and the Coast Guard over
interpretation of the regulations we have jointly issued. Such
authority is consistent with what we now have in other modes of
transportation.
The Safety Board and the Coast Guard currently enjoy a good
working relationship; however, there is no assurance that a
disagreement concerning primacy in a high-profile marine
accident can be resolved in the short time frame necessary to
respond quickly and efficiently. We believe that in the
aftermath of an accident there should be no confusion or
uncertainty about which Federal agency has the lead and which
investigative protocol will be followed.
The Safety Board and the Coast Guard take different
approaches to accident investigation. We use a party system to
leverage the resources of technical experts from operators,
manufacturers, and professional organizations. They provide us
specialized knowledge to help develop the factual record, and
the Coast Guard is almost always a party to our marine
investigations and, under our legislation, would have a
statutory right to party status.
We may also convene a public hearing to gather additional
data. That factual information gathered from various sources is
routinely released to the public to inform them of the progress
we are making. After the record is developed and analyzed, the
Board then discusses the report and deliberates on findings of
probable cause and recommendations in a public meeting.
Coast Guard investigations, as Admiral Watson has
indicated, address law enforcement as well as safety
considerations, but the cause is not determined in a public
meeting. The Coast Guard may also convene a Marine Board of
investigation, but it has not done so regularly in recent
years.
The Safety Board enjoys a worldwide reputation for
technical excellence. Many of our marine investigators,
although they are small in number, hold the highest U.S. Coast
Guard licenses, are vessel masters or chief engineers. We also
have investigators with extensive experience as Coast Guard
marine inspectors and marine investigators. Our investigators
also include specialists in other engineering, operations, and
human performance disciplines. And we have staff dedicated to
the analysis of ship voyage data recorders and they can draw on
years of Safety Board experience in reading out cockpit voice
recorders and flight data recorders.
Just last week, the International Maritime Organization
adopted a code for safety investigations into marine
casualties. Reflecting the current practice in many countries
and the growing trend in many others, the code states: ``a
marine safety investigation should be unbiased to ensure the
free flow of information to it. In order to achieve the
outcome, the investigator carrying out a marine safety
investigation should have functional independence from: the
parties involved in the marine casualty or marine incident; and
anyone who may make a decision to take administrative or
disciplinary action against an individual or organization
involved in that incident.'' The Safety Board has that
independence.
The Coast Guard will always be in charge of rescue,
response, security, and port safety. Their investigations and
investigators are geared to frequent and routine accidents and
the Safety Board has no intention or capability to take over
that role. We excel at the unusual accidents, which are often
the most serious and also, fortunately, the most rare. It is
only on those that the Safety Board seeks clear and unambiguous
authority to lead. This approach works very well in our
aviation, rail, and pipeline investigations, and will work
equally well in the future for marine investigations.
I would be happy to answer any questions.
Mr. Cummings. I want to thank all of our witnesses for your
testimony.
Ms. Richards, there were several items that the Committee
suggested that the Inspector General's Office might examine,
but to which you did not devote much attention in your report.
For example, the Committee suggested that the IG examine
whether any changes to current statutes would clarify the Coast
Guard's responsibilities for marine casualty investigations and
reports. To this, the report responded that there are some
conflicting interpretations in applications of the Coast
Guard's September 2002 policy letter, such as regarding the
question of what constitutes a loss of propulsion. You also
suggested that dollar estimates for damages in the various
categories of investigations should be updated.
Are there any other suggestions that you would have to make
to us with regard to potential statutory changes?
Ms. Richards. No, sir. When we started the audit, we were
looking at the broad spectrum, but when we found the problems
in the qualifications of the marine casualty investigators and
the issues on what level they were actually completed the
investigations, we concentrated our efforts on those issues,
believing that the Coast Guard needed to address those first,
and that there would be time to look at the broader issues
after those critical issues had been addressed.
Mr. Cummings. On that note, you noted in the report that
the Coast Guard marine casualty investigation program needs
additional qualified personnel, and you have recommended
increasing the number of civilians in the casualty program or
extending the tour of duty for Coast Guard personnel. Can you
comment on how many personnel the Coast Guard needs overall in
the casualty investigation program to conduct all the casualty
investigations at the recommended level?
Ms. Richards. We did not complete a workload analysis, in
part because, with the investigations that have been done being
at levels other than what was recommended by the Coast Guard
guidance, the amount of time it took to complete those
investigations wouldn't shed accurate light on the full
staffing that would be needed by the Coast Guard. We would ask
that the Coast Guard complete a workload analysis to project
how many investigators they need total.
We did suggest that increasing the number of civilian
investigators would be beneficial to the Coast Guard in part
because as the civilians do not rotate, similar to the military
members, they would have time to develop the local expertise in
that particular waterway or the industry at a particular port.
The Coast Guard has a number of civilian investigators
currently, but we believe that they should look into increasing
that number.
Mr. Cummings. Now, Rear Admiral, I heard what you said
about the image of the Commandant, and certainly we do not want
the image of the Commandant diminished in the least bit. But I
guess one of the things that I am concerned about is
effectiveness and efficiency. I often talk about how we can get
caught up in a culture of mediocrity.
I talk about that with regard to Katrina, where not, thank
God, the Coast Guard was great, but other agencies were caught
up in a culture that did not allow us to respond the way we
should have responded. And in this instance I think when we are
talking about the NTSB doing investigations, there have been
times in the past when the Coast Guard was of the belief that
there may have been a conflict of interest and asked the NTSB
to intervene. Is that correct?
Admiral Watson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Did you see that as might possibly
diminishing the image of the Commandant?
Admiral Watson. No, sir..
Mr. Cummings. So, in this instance--and I realize that the
NTSB--and I want you to be ready for this, Ms. Higgins--has a
limited budget. We saw that when we were working on the ALJ
situation. The NTSB was very sensitive about the little bit of
money that they have and how tight things are. We are familiar.
But here we are, the NTSB asking to take on--although you
were very careful in your testimony to say we are really not
trying to get more authority here, but there are some things we
need to be in a position to do, but no matter how you look at
it, it is the probability of taking on some more work, and I am
just trying to figure out how does this all come together. In
other words, I take it that there are cases, based upon your
testimony, that the NTSB would look at and say, wait a minute,
this is something that we really need to be involved in.
Tell me the kinds of facts or factors that would cause you
to be able to get in a case under the proposed changes, that
you are not able to get into now. Do you understand the
question?
Ms. Higgins. Yes, sir. Let me just say that I think we look
at this request--and we think of it really as a modest change--
as not changing the underlying guidelines or criteria that we
use to select accidents. We are looking at this essentially to
be a tiebreaker in the case of high profile accidents where
there is a dispute. And I am not suggesting that happens very
often. Right now, because of the people involved, we have a
very close working relationship.
But essentially the criteria we use is the definition that
is in the statute of major marine casualty. We also look at
some other factors in terms of the cost involved_there is a
dollar value assigned to it. We use the term catastrophic,
which, for example, was applicable in the Ethan Allen accident,
where it was not on navigable waters, so the Coast Guard wasn't
involved. We use that criteria, which is in our statute, to be
able to look at that accident, even though it was under State
jurisdiction.
So, fundamentally, we think the criteria are not going to
change. But we want to make sure we have that authority in our
statute, just as we have the authority in aviation to take the
lead, and all of what that means. And it really means following
our protocol, so that it is clear that we are the spokesperson,
and our investigator is in charge.
There was a question or comment made earlier about parallel
investigations. We fully expect, as with the FAA, that the
Coast Guard would continue to carry out its investigation if
they think that there are enforcement issues that have to be
addressed. That is not in conflict. In fact, that happens now.
What we want is to be sure that, in a major casualty like the
COSCO Busan, there is one voice speaking to the public about
the accident, that the facts are developed under the guidelines
that we have put forth, and that we work cooperatively. And,
again, it mostly works, but there have been some examples where
it hasn't.
I hope that answers your question.
Mr. Cummings. Yes, you did. Now, you used the word
tiebreaker, isn't that right? Didn't you use that word?
Ms. Higgins. That is my word, yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Who would break that tie right now? Right
now.
Ms. Higgins. Right now it would be a standoff. If we
couldn't agree, presumably, we would both move forward.
Mr. Cummings. So both of you would be doing investigations.
And what you are saying is that it would be better if there was
this tiebreaker and with the NTSB, I guess, being more of an
independent sort of agency. Am I right?
Ms. Higgins. That is the way our statute was written.
Mr. Cummings. Right. I understand.
Ms. Higgins. Congress wanted us to have the independent
responsibility to look at all the modes of transportation,
including marine.
Mr. Cummings. Okay.
Ms. Higgins. Because if you are the regulator, you do the
certification, a lot of these issues come into play, and it is
important, I think, when Congress created the statute 40 years
ago, that they wanted somebody who didn't have that
responsibility, who wasn't the enforcement agency, wasn't the
regulator, who wasn't the certifier, who didn't issue the
licenses to be able to look impartially at all those issues.
And it has worked very well, but we want to make sure that in
the event that there is that kind of disagreement with the
Coast Guard, that we could, by statute, assert the lead in an
important marine investigation.
You made the point about resources. We are not asking. We
would like more resources, but they are not reflected in the
President's budget. So we are not going to have more
investigators. We don't anticipate we are going to have the
resources to do many more investigations than we do. We are
pretty selective about the ones where we want to assert our
lead. We just want to be sure that in the event of a dispute
that can't be resolved through the informal process of our
office working with the Coast Guard, that we can say we want to
take this and we have got the authority to do it.
Mr. Cummings. In other words, these are cases that you
would be investigating, probably, no matter what. But with this
tiebreaker situation, it would allow you to, I guess, to work
closely with the Coast Guard to move forward. Is that basically
what you are saying? Hopefully so you would be more effective
and efficient.
Ms. Higgins. Exactly. This issue of efficiency, I asked the
staff to put together--we now have seven open investigations.
None of them are older than a little over a year old, a year
and a couple months old. In the last 10 years, with our limited
staff, we have issued 22 reports and 17 briefs, and a total of
244 recommendations, half of those to the Coast Guard, and we
closed half of those, 120, acceptable.
So when we pick accidents, we are pretty selective, but we
get the job done. We have had some problems in the past with
backlog, we admit that, but in the last couple of years I think
we had a GAO report that we paid attention to. We have really
improved our operations. So we want to make sure that we can
continue to focus on the most difficult high profile accidents,
because we think those have the biggest payoff in the long-run
in terms of safety.
Mr. Cummings. Just one last question, then I will come back
later. Rear Admiral Watson, respond to what she just said. It
sounds like it makes sense to me. Maybe I am missing something.
She is talking about effectiveness and efficiency; talking
about a tiebreaker situation; talking about NTSB, which is
supposed to be the more independent agency; not really trying
to take away any authority, I don't think. I am just trying
figure out--I just need your response on that.
Admiral Watson. Yes, sir. What my point was is that when
Congress changes the legislative authority of the Coast Guard
to be able to manage when it is going to do an investigation
and when it isn't, shift primacy to another agency, that
appears to everyone around the world as a type of a demotion.
It is an appearance thing. We shift the lead to NTSB on a
regular basis right now.
The system that we have, working under the Memorandum of
Understanding between the two agencies, works very well and, in
fact, I think it sends a much more powerful statement when the
Commandant, who has the authority to do an investigation,
voluntarily says I think this is one that ought to be given to
the NTSB to lead because there is involvement of a Coast Guard
operation with respect to that particular incident.
It could be the VTS, it could be a marine inspection, it
could be a buoy out of place. And we have been doing that. The
system that we have with the authorities that both agencies
have right now works very, very well. I think the improvements
that have been made in the marine industry bear this out.
Mr. Cummings. I think that--and then I will turn it over to
Mr. LaTourette, but in my opening statement I talked about how
some of these issues have been passed on year after year,
decade after decade, and I do believe that it was the actions
of this Committee, and perhaps the Senate, that caused action
to take place with regard to marine safety. And I give credit
to both sides; it is not a Democrat thing, it is not a
Republican thing. I think we all had something to do with that.
I think we saw significant movement--significant--with regard
to marine safety.
I guess what my concern is that I would hope that everybody
who takes on the position of Commandant would be as good as
Admiral Allen, and his decision-making. He has caused this
Committee to have a tremendous amount of trust and faith in
him. But I am just wondering when a new Commandant comes in, or
in future generations, when we all are having hearings up in
Heaven,--hopefully, we won't be having hearings----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Cummings. I just want to relax.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Cummings. Anyway, I just want to make sure that we put
in what is necessary to make sure that it works. You follow
what I am saying? I don't think we can depend just upon people.
So sometimes you need to put in mechanisms so that it makes
people's jobs easier. But I understand what you are saying.
Admiral Watson. Well, I had one more point, sir. The
tiebreaker concept, that could be driven by the amount of
interest that there is in a particular marine casualty; it may
not be driven by anything other than that. We don't know. You
are suggesting that the authority should be given to the
National Transportation Safety Board to make that decision.
The unintended consequence of that could be--the focus of
any national Marine Board investigation is just to find the
cause of the casualty. What if there is a situation where there
needs to be some discipline there, that it needs to be done
fast and information needs to be moved out to the Coast Guard's
inspectors or our boarding officers in order to correct the
maritime? This really is a good order and discipline kind of an
issue that is not unlike what the Coast Guard does for
ourselves, and it is very important for the commanding officer
to be able to have that authority.
Mr. Cummings. But with regard to punishment authority, that
would remain with you all, right? Isn't that right?
Ms. Higgins. Absolutely. The enforcement responsibility
would continue with the Coast Guard. Let me just say that this
is how we work currently with the FAA and with the Coast Guard.
We fully respect the missions of both the FAA and the Coast
Guard in terms of their enforcement responsibilities. In fact,
our process allows for that kind of action to be taken
immediately if that is what is called for. That does not in any
way get in the way of the safety investigation, which may take
a little longer to identify the probable cause.
We feel strongly that the way to improve safety over the
long term is to take action as quickly as possible, so we in no
way want to use our process or currently use our process to
delay any kind of enforcement actions, whether it be against
pilots or mariners, that need to be taken.
I was, for example, the Member on scene for a cruise ship
accident in Juneau just about a year ago, and we worked with
the Coast Guard. We were the lead agency, but at the same time
they took the actions necessary to engage the crew and ask the
crew member who was on the deck at the time of the accident. He
voluntarily surrendered his license and they are still having
conversations with the captain. That is the kind of process
that is currently working. It would not change under this
authority.
Mr. Cummings. Very well. Thank you.
Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
having this hearing, and I apologize for not being here at the
very beginning.
I have to say the Chairman and I have worked really well
together for the last year, but I have a little different take
on today's hearing and NTSB's proposal, and I will try to make
that evident during the course of my questions.
Admiral, to you, before I came here I was a prosecuting
attorney and we had this really, really big murder, and I was a
little naive country lawyer, so on. It was apparently budget
time, appropriations time and we were lucky enough to be
assisted by some Federal law enforcement agencies. The next
time I came back to the crime scene, FBI and ATF and DEA
agents, who had appeared in jeans and work clothes, they all
had slickers on that said FBI, ATF, DEA, and I thought, it is
not raining; why do they have these slickers on? And it became
apparent to me, when I watch television, it was so we could all
see back at home that their tax dollars were at work and the
FBI needed more money than the ATF because they had more
jackets working on the murder.
This, to me, as I read the Inspector General's report, I
think the Coast Guard is responsible for creating a vacuum in
this area, and I think the Inspector General's report, by
pointing out deficiencies, has sort of left the playing field
open, and I do fault the Coast Guard for that.
I will say, though, Ms. Higgins, that I think NTSB's
proposal is not benign, it is not minor, and it is a pretty
big, aggressive attempt to fill that vacuum. I thought it was
interesting that you used the word tiebreaker, and the Admiral
picked up on the word tiebreaker.
A tiebreaker, to me, means that if, at the end of the game,
the score is tied, you flip a coin, you go into overtime. In
your version of tiebreaker, you always win. So if there is a
tie and there is a disagreement, the tie is broken because you
say you are going to take the lead, right? You can never lose a
tie. You can have a tie, we can have a disagreement, but if
NTSB says, hey, tiebreaker time, you win, right? I am not wrong
about that, am I?
Ms. Higgins. You are right.
Mr. LaTourette. That is what I thought. And to the
Admiral's point about it appearing to the world to be a
demotion, I look at the proposed legislation that NTSB has set
up here, particularly Section 1132(a) subparagraph (c) and the
participation of the Commandant in marine investigations, the
last sentence is: ``However, the Commandant may not participate
in establishing probable cause.'' I mean, you are cutting the
Commandant out of the equation.
So if I am the Commandant, and to this moment in time we
have had a system that has worked pretty well and everybody has
gotten along, you like the Commandant, you like the Coast
Guard; they have got some deficiencies that the IG has
indicated, but you are taking him out of a process that he is
now involved in.
Ms. Higgins. Sir, if I could explain. When we talk about
probable cause--and I mentioned in my statement that probable
cause is determined in a public meeting that is convened by the
Chairman of our Board, five-member Safety Board, and we
publicly vote on a probable cause. We do that for all our
accident investigations.
The Coast Guard, under this provision, and as currently
exists, would serve as a party to the investigation, our
investigation, and they would sit at the table, we would share
information with them, they would share information with us.
They may conduct an independent enforcement investigation if
that is so required. But under our process, which is, again,
what we use now for marine investigations, we, as the Safety
Board, charged by Congress, determine the probable cause of the
accidents.
Mr. LaTourette. Then why do you need to put that sentence
in there?
Ms. Higgins. We tried to, in that language, just parallel
the authority that we currently have in investigating aviation
accidents. If you were to look at them side-by-side, we
substituted marine for aviation. All we are trying to say is
that this is the same system that we currently have in
aviation, where we have the clear lead and this is the process
we follow. I would make a distinction, though, that in aviation
we are charged by statute to investigate every aviation
accident. Under the statute, which we are really not changing,
we would only investigate major marine accidents as defined by
regulation
Mr. LaTourette. Okay. Thank you very much for that.
To you, Ms. Richards, under the current Coast Guard
personnel requirements that apparently came up short in terms
of meeting them, in your report, a marine casualty investigator
must be either a Hull Inspector, a Machinery Inspector, or a
Small Vessel Inspector, and have served as a Boarding Officer,
Facility Inspector, or Harbor Safety Officer. Did the IG, as a
part of its investigation, look at the qualifications of the
NTSB investigators?
Ms. Richards. No, sir
Mr. LaTourette. Okay.
And then to you, Ms. Higgins, can you tell me how many NTSB
investigators meet the requirement of Hull Inspector, Machinery
Inspector, Small Vessel Inspector, and have also served as a
Boarding Officer, Facility Inspector, or Harbor Safety Officer?
Ms. Higgins. I have with me the resumes of our safety
investigators, which I would be happy to provide to the
Committee. I don't have the information characterized or
classified in the way you asked for, but we can certainly get
that for you.
Mr. LaTourette. I would ask unanimous consent that those
documents be made part of the record.
Mr. Cummings. So granted.
Mr. LaTourette. And then if the Chairman would permit me
one more question.
Mr. Cummings. Please.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you so much.
Ms. Higgins, you indicated in your testimony that the
proposed language would give the Board clear authority to move
forward in the case that there is a paralysis between the Board
and the Coast Guard created by this agreement over
interpretation of the regulations that they have jointly
issued. I would ask you has such a paralysis ever occurred?
Ms. Higgins. It is my understanding--and I have been with
the Board about two and a half years--that in recent history
there has not been such paralysis. Admiral Watson and Dr.
Spencer from our office were colleagues when they were both
with the Coast Guard, before Dr. Spencer came to the Safety
Board. So as has been explained to me, this is done as much on
personal relationships now as it is in terms of the process
that is outlined in the regulations.
But there have been instances in the past where it has been
a problem, and we can get you specific examples of that, if
that is helpful to the Committee.
Mr. LaTourette. Well, I would want you to supplement the
record because what I think you are telling me is that
everything works well because the Commandant is a great guy,
the folks at NTSB are great people, but you think that somehow
the new Commandant might be a jerk and we may get some jerks
over at NTSB, so we have to make some rules. We are not having
any problems at the moment, but we have to make some rules
taking away some authority from the Coast Guard because we
might get people who don't get along in the future.
Ms. Higgins. I think that we are looking for clear
authority, the same authority we have in investigating every
other mode of transportation when there is an accident. We have
had problems in the past. Currently, things are working well.
They could work better. We have had some specific issues, for
example, in the COSCO Busan, that we worked out, but it is not
without its problems. We are looking for the same authority to
elect to lead marine investigations that we have in aviation,
rail, pipeline, and hazardous materials.
Mr. LaTourette. Okay. Then if the Chairman would just
indulge me, because you brought up the COSCO Busan.
Was the confusion regarding the COSCO Busan illustrative of
a faulty process or was it the failure of certain individuals
to follow the appropriate steps outlined in the current
process?
Ms. Higgins. My understanding of what happened in the COSCO
Busan is that the information that was provided to us
initially, in terms of the amount of the spill, was inaccurate.
I think everybody knows that that was part of the problem. We
learned through press accounts the next day that the spill was
much greater than what had been originally told to us. We then
decided perhaps we should take a closer look at this, and the
Coast Guard then also contacted us.
But we didn't get the information about the actual
dimensions of the casualty directly from the Coast Guard, we
got them from press accounts. So we didn't get on scene until
three days after this accident happened. As a result of that,
some of the important information, like the voyage data
recorder, was not secured, and mistakes happen and we have made
it better, but we think if there had been a better process in
the beginning, in terms of more accurate information, we could
have made a decision earlier that this was a major
investigation and we would have launched sooner.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you so much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I really don't need an answer on this first comment, it is
just a possible answer to Ms Higgins' questions about you don't
understand why NTSB doesn't have this lead authority when you
have it in other areas. I don't have an answer to that, but I
personally would like to look into that. It could be because
the Coast Guard has had this investigative function since 1832
or so, and it is possible that it has been relatively effective
over that time as it has changed to meet the needs of maritime
transportation; whereas, in other areas, we didn't have an
effective way to investigate accidents. So that is certainly
possible.
I also want to throw it out to NTSB. In my district we had
the pipeline explosion in 1999 of the Bellingham pipeline. NTSB
was johnny-on-the-spot, did a great job with investigation,
took the lead. So it is not to say that NTSB can't take the
lead on these things; they were great. But that itself, though,
was not without its conflicts between NTSB and other agencies
in terms of who gets to penalize who and for how much. So it is
not a totally perfect process either when you all get the lead.
On page 4 of your testimony, in the last paragraph you say
``There may be some incidents where the Coast Guard disagrees
with the Safety Board's position that the Board's investigation
should take precedence over the Coast Guard's investigation,
and a change to the law would enable this dispute to be
resolved unambiguously and quickly.'' This gets into the
tiebreaker issue. I am just curious why you decided that you
ought to be the tiebreaker and you didn't come to recommend to
us that the Coast Guard ought to be the tiebreaker. It would
seem to us that it would be just as unambiguous and resolved as
quickly if we gave the Coast Guard the tiebreaker.
Ms. Higgins. Well, I am representing the NTSB. I think it
is important to step back and remember why Congress created the
NTSB 40 years ago. The FAA has investigative authority, the
Federal Railroad Administration has investigative authority.
Congress wanted an independent agency--who was not the
regulator, was not the law enforcement agency, didn't do the
certification, didn't do the inspections--to have the
responsibility to investigate accidents. We don't have a
history, necessarily, with any of the players in a particular
accident. We don't inspect the ships, we don't license the
ships. I think that is why it would make sense in----
Mr. Larsen. If I may, I think it would be very important
for us to go back and look at the same question, which is then
why did not Congress include the Coast Guard in that. And that
is all I am saying, is perhaps I need to go back and look at
that history to understand that better.
Ms. Higgins. Sure.
Mr. Larsen. Because if it happened on purpose that NTSB got
the lead for these other investigative efforts, then it must
have happened on purpose that the NTSB didn't get the lead for
maritime. It is an interesting question for me to try to get an
answer to, and I may have to do that independently myself.
With regards to the criteria that NTSB would use to make a
decision, you used the term high profile. I hope there are
other criteria other than high profile cases that you would use
to decide that NTSB was going to be the lead or have primacy.
You discussed those somewhat. Can you be specific about the
criteria NTSB uses and would use to determine lead?
Ms. Higgins. Sure. I can submit for the record all the
criteria that we use. Significant loss of life is one criteria.
Another criteria would be the dollar amount in terms of the
damage done to the vessel itself. The other criteria we look at
is whether the accident raises important safety implications
that would have significance for the marine industry overall,
or whether this is an accident that we have seen before.
Mr. Larsen. What is your process and time line, say, in an
airplane investigation to make that determination?
Ms. Higgins. Well, we have to investigate every aviation
accident, by statute. So even for civil aviation accidents, we
have to determine the probable cause. We may work with the FAA
and they provide us the information. So it is a little bit
different. In marine we have to be more selective, so that is
why the criteria is developed and put in regulation.
Mr. Larsen. Okay.
Ms. Higgins. The statute talks about major marine
casualties, and then all of that is defined in regulation.
Mr. Larsen. Okay, that is fine.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Coble.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is good to have you all with us.
Ms. Richards, I am referring to my notes. I want to revisit
the 22 investigative officers who were interviewed. How many of
that group did you say were found to be unqualified?
Ms. Richards. Fifteen of the 22 of the marine casualty
investigators in our sample were not fully qualified.
Mr. Coble. So that would be seven were qualified, I guess,
then.
Ms. Richards. Yes.
Mr. Coble. Admiral, do you want to refute or embrace those
findings?
Admiral Watson. Sir, I think one of the main factors that
led to the conclusions--first of all, I am not disputing the
IG's findings.
Mr. Coble. And I am not initiating a fight between you
either.
Admiral Watson. That is right, sir. In fact, I think it is
important to reiterate that we agreed with almost all of the
recommendations from the IG and we are actively working on
implementing changes as a result of those recommendations. But
back to the data, I just want to clarify that the issue there
was the prerequisites of an officer or warrant officer, perhaps
even a civilian, that we have in our policy to begin the
process of becoming a marine casualty investigator.
And as Ms. Richards said, we had a standard that had a
requirement that you have qualifications in other areas of
marine inspection, the Hull Inspector, Machinery Inspector,
Small Passenger Vessel Inspector; or over in the port operation
side, Harbor Officer, Facility Officer, and so on. That was the
main cause for the IG's determination on these unqualified
people. Some of them had actually achieved their qualifications
through going to school in Yorktown, at our marine casualty
investigation school, and then performing investigations as an
apprentice, and then sitting before the Board, but they
bypassed the prerequisites. So it was determined that they were
unqualified.
Now, those people, some of them may have been lawyers, they
may have been naval architects, like myself, that hadn't been
in those particular assignments prior to being an investigating
officer, but they were given exceptions to becoming marine
casualty investigators by virtue of other qualifications. So
our policy, our guidance doesn't cover every different
situation, and we have that allowance for the assignment
officers and the commanding officers to make these changes.
Mr. Coble. I thank you for that. Admiral, let me put a two
part question to you. We have heard that the Coast Guard needs
additional personnel--I have heard potentially up to maybe
10,000 more--to carry out its responsibilities. Two part
question: What areas would the Coast Guard focus upon with the
additional personnel, A? And, B, what is the Coast Guard doing
to strengthen the casualty investigation program?
Admiral Watson. Sir, the areas that we would focus on are
the areas where the maritime community--whether it is boating,
cruise lines activities--all of the different growth areas of
the maritime communities are growing. We need to right-size the
Coast Guard, since we have missions that affect all of these
waterways users. We need to match that with the size of the
activities that we are responsible for. So that will be one
area.
The other thing is that we have been charged, through the
Safe Port Act and some other recent legislation, to do things
that we haven't done before. We have joint command centers that
Congress has asked us to manage in all of the port areas. We
need staffing in those command centers. We also are
anticipating to do inspections of towing vessels, approximately
7,000 new vessels that are currently uninspected. Things like
that. We are looking at ballast water inspections, air
emissions. We have got a lot of activities associated with
environmental protection. Those are the types of things that we
are going to need to grow to fill.
Now, with regard to marine casualty investigators, we have
a program to enhance the whole marine safety program, of which
the investigations program is a critical part of that. Our
fiscal year 2009 budget requests 276 total new billets for the
entire program, of which 44 would be for the investigations
program, 20 of those would be for civilian marine casualty
investigators; and then there are some other billets in that
batch that are to support the training system.
Mr. Coble. One final question, Mr. Chairman.
Is the 10,000 number an accurate one, additional forces,
Admiral?
Admiral Watson. Sir, that was a number that Admiral Allen
suggested. I don't have the details of all of the accumulation
to reach that figure.
Mr. Coble. Thank you. My time has expired.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Ms. Richardson.
Ms. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I noticed our Chairman had
entered. Did you want me to defer to him? No? Okay. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
You know, as I listen to this discussion, this is the
reason why we live in America and we have a democracy. I am
going to be really frank with you. I represent an area with
ports. There is no need for egos in this room. It really
doesn't matter to me who does it. It is important that it is
done and it is done right.
I respect, Mr. Admiral, the need for not wanting to appear
to be demoted or whatever, but the bottom line is this isn't
about who is demoted or who is promoted. This is about ensuring
we don't have accidents, so people are not killed and our
environment is not caused such harm that it costs all of us for
generations.
When I look at what happened in San Francisco, it doesn't
matter to me. I have relatives who served, and I understand the
need to want to be respected and to be honored, and we give you
that. But I don't believe we should jeopardize our personal
safety upon that.
Now, the gentleman from the other side asked you about some
additional responsibilities and I didn't hear you reference--I
think the Coast Guard is now going to be working with also
inspecting and being involved with LNG facilities, as well,
vessels, and it is like when I look at all the additional
responsibilities, I don't view it as a negative. I think what
we would be saying to you--and I remember other hearings that
we have had of all the additional responsibilities now that is
being laid on the Coast Guard. I would see it as a welcoming
assistance.
Now, I would challenge Ms. Richards and Ms. Higgins to
figure out how we can, as adults, coach this or present it that
it is not viewed as a negative, but I would be extremely
opposed to us maintaining jurisdiction just for the sake of
because we always had it, because the American people deserve
better than that. And you have done a commendable job and all
the folks that work with you have done an excellent job, but we
should not jeopardize our personal safety for the sake that you
have handled it for the last 100 years.
With that, let me say, Ms. Richards, in your testimony you
stated that the Coast Guard has not established a clear and
desirable career path for its instigators. I think this means
investigators, actually. That was typed here. You also state
that the Coast Guard has not focused on addressing
recommendations related to the investigators qualifications.
Can you please go further in detail about these
recommendations?
Ms. Richards. Yes. During our audit, we spoke to a number
of investigators, both currently in investigator billets and
previous investigator billets, as well as personnel in
positions of authority. It was suggested to us very strongly
that the reason that it is difficult to fill the billets as a
marine casualty investigator is that it is not seen as a
desirable career move, that it doesn't lead to additional
promotions. Coast Guard personnel expressed some reluctance to
go into the marine safety line and specifically the marine
casualty investigators because, of course, as normal
individuals, they are looking for advancement and promotion,
and they don't feel that this is the quickest or easiest path
to get there, or even a sure path to get there.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Now, the gentleman on the other side
there mentioned that this really may not be that big of a
problem, but according to your testimony, Rear Admiral Watson,
the IG found that five out of the six individuals assigned to
the marine casualty investigators in the Sector San Francisco
were unqualified. The IG report also found in its sample that
the casualty investigators, 68 percent of those assigned to
these positions are not qualified.
And then to further add burden to this, in a report that
was done in August of 2007, the standards were removed from
requiring pre-qualifications that the requirement that an
individual have experience as a Hull or Machinery Inspector and
a Small Vessel Inspector, those were removed, and the IG found
that this change in fact lowered the standard, which we see an
impact today in accidents that have happened.
So that would bring me to the question, Rear Admiral. It
says that you guys have developed a plan. When is it going to
be implemented and why did you wait so long?
Admiral Watson. We had developed a plan prior to the IG's
report. I touched on a few of the parts just a few minutes ago
with the additional capacity that is needed for our program.
Last year, 2007, we implemented a completely new training
regime, as well as a qualifications process.
Once a graduate of our training program in Yorktown reaches
the field and becomes an apprentice and works under a mentor,
they are using something called a personal qualification
system, which has been revamped so that they have experienced
every element of the program before they go before a board of
fully qualified senior investigators to be tested in their
knowledge. That whole system has been in place for years, but
the specifics of it was revamped in 2007.
Ms. Richardson. But again, Admiral, I stated to you that
the IG said that those revised standards, the IG found that
these changes, in their words, was, in essence, it lowered the
standard.
Admiral Watson. Yes, that was in reference to the
prerequisites for assignment to a marine casualty investigator
billet in the Coast Guard. The old standards there were based
on a 1980s version of the marine industry. Today we have a
whole new set of qualifications for inspectors and for other
officers in the Coast Guard sectors that we have today such
that the prerequisites can go well beyond Hull Inspector and
Machinery Inspector and Small Passenger Vessel Inspector.
We have a large number of our people that are busy every
day doing what we call port state control, which are exams of
foreign vessels that by far the larger number of vessels where
there is Coast Guard activities is foreign vessels today,
compared to U.S. flag domestic vessel. So we shifted to those
being the qualifications.
By the way, we removed or are in the process of removing a
prerequisite that existed back then that would have allowed a
person who only experienced limited activity as a Coast Guard
boarding officer for certain navigational checks on a vessel or
harbor patrol officers, they are not going to be allowed to
begin the process because they really don't have the adequate
background. So all we have really done is some shifting; we
have not gone backwards.
Ms. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, if I could just get 30
seconds to wrap up.
Ms. Richards, would you agree, then, that the standard has
in fact been met?
Ms. Richards. No, I would not. It is our opinion that, in
particular, the standard to be a Hull or Machinery Inspector,
as well as a Small Vessel Inspector, is very important to the
prerequisites of becoming a marine casualty investigator. The
way it was explained to me was that those qualifications
allowed the investigators, when they were doing an
investigation and talking to the operators of the vessel in
question, to basically tell if they were hearing truth or they
were hearing a fabricated story, or at least have some basic
knowledge of how a vessel would be operated and the components
of a vessel would be operated in order to make that initial
determination which drives their investigation.
One of the individuals that we spoke to during the course
of our audit was the Captain of the Port of New York. He
suggested to us that six to nine years experience as an
inspector in those areas would be a sufficient criteria to
become an investigator. So we believe those are very important
still.
Ms. Richardson. So, Mr. Chairman, I would just say that, to
me, what I just heard here the last minute is of great concern
to me, that we have our Admiral, who feels that the standards
are appropriate, and yet we have the Inspector General who says
clearly they are not. So I look forward to us exploring this
further.
Again, Admiral, we have nothing but respect for you. In
fact, our Chairman has talked continually about the additional
responsibilities that has been put on you, and we support you.
So if there is a way that we can help you to do the job more
effectively, we want to do that; and it shouldn't be viewed as
a demotion, it should be viewed as thanking you for what you
have done, and we know the tremendous challenges you have
before you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
As we now go to the Chairman of the Full Committee, let me
just ask you this. Rear Admiral Watson, if you just heard what
Ms. Richards said, that is a pretty tough statement she just
made about what they found. We have a lot of confidence in Ms.
Richards. And Rich Johnson, who is sitting behind her, I want
to thank you too, Mr. Johnson, for all your hard work. We
really do thank you and the whole team there.
But I guess there are just two things I want to get to
before the Chairman asks his questions. Of the 110 people you
cite as being fully qualified to meet all the prerequisites, as
well as having completed all required training, is that
accurate? You said 110 were fully qualified. Is that true? And
while you are doing that, you mentioned certain people like
yourself, I think you said, where exceptions are granted. Is
that written somewhere, that if I am a plumber, I can get an
exception; if I am a lawyer I can get an exception? Do you
remember mentioning that?
I guess what I am trying to get to is that if I want
somebody to operate on my heart, I don't want people that got
exceptions and they have never had to go through the heart
classes--you follow what I am saying?--in medical school. I am
just trying to make sure that when we have people who are
doing--because these casualty investigations have the potential
for so much impact, I want to make sure that there is some kind
of a standard. So where is that standard of who gets an
exception?
And then we will hear from Mr. Oberstar.
Admiral Watson. Yes, sir. The policy, the guidance is
designed for the majority of the people that you would--the
pool of people that you would draw from if you were the Coast
Guard assignment officers and you were needing to put
apprenticed marine casualty investigators out to the sectors
and begin the process. We are talking about who do you use for
the pool.
So we wrote the guidance for the majority. And we have got
to remember that we are not saying there are any exceptions to
the sequence of going to the school, doing the PQS, going
through the Board to get examined, and then having the
commanding officer actually sign your designation as a marine
casualty. No exceptions there.
What we are talking about is, is it acceptable to look
beyond that assumed pool and choose somebody whose background
has been in the technical side of the program. This gets into
some of the same issues I think that you probably had to think
about in the recent bill; what should those qualifications be
for different positions. We could have hired somebody from the
American Bureau of Shipping, for example, as a civilian in the
Coast Guard. That person may have years and years of
experience, but he has never gotten the Coast Guard
qualification as a marine inspector of hulls or machinery.
Mr. Cummings. Well, of that 110, how many of them were
given exceptions, the 110 that you cited that were fully
qualified?
Admiral Watson. I don't know, sir. But those exceptions
were, in effect, not exceptions because our system, our policy
accommodates those reasonable alternatives.
Mr. Cummings. Admiral, I have to stop here, but I have got
to tell you what you just said concerns me more than anything
else you have said here, because what that means is that
anybody can come up with a pie-in-the-sky this is an exception
and say, okay, this person has now met the requirements. That
is the impression I get from what you said. Maybe I am wrong,
but Mr. Oberstar can pick that up. I see he is anxious to get
started.
Mr. Oberstar. Oh, no, you are doing well. I am in agreement
with you. I am very concerned about the direction this is
going.
I think some of the problems that we are covering here, and
have in the past work of the Committee leading to this hearing,
are going to be addressed if we ever get the Coast Guard
authorization bill enacted, making substantial improvements in
the marine safety function of the Coast Guard and establishing
full course in marine safety work and qualifications of Coast
Guard personnel.
What disturbed me so much was a comment that, well, our
people aren't up to ABS standards. Oh, my goodness. The ABS
should be up to Coast Guard standards, it shouldn't be the
other way around. I was at the Coast Guard Academy recently, a
month or so ago, and talked to the Commandant of the Academy
and Commandant of the Cadets, talked with several of the
cadets.
They are pretty excited about the idea of having a full-
time safety course, and the other provisions that we have
crafted into that legislation will ameliorate the existing
situation, but two-thirds of Coast Guard marine casualty
investigators don't meet Coast Guard qualifications, let alone
the NTSB qualifications; and five of the six Coast Guard
personnel who investigated the allision in San Francisco were
unqualified.
Now, if you look at the NTSB--and I won't name them, need
to do that, but their qualifications--Master of U.S. Steam or
Motor Vessels of 100 gross tons, Master of Steam or Motor
Vessels of not more than 1600 registered gross tons, graduates
of Massachusetts Maritime Academy; Chief Engineer Unlimited
Horsepower for Steam, Motor and Gas Turbine, Bachelor of
Science Marine Engineering, Marine Maritime Academy; Master of
U.S. Steam or Motor Vessels of any gross ton, Master of
Science, World Maritime University, Bachelor of Science,
California Maritime Academy.
I am not going to go through the others, but they are of
that qualification. That is the standard the Coast Guard should
have internally. That is what we are expecting of the Coast
Guard, to be the gold standard. Those are NTSB investigators.
Thirty percent of casualty reports surveyed had factual
errors. And until we pressed this issue in Committee, Coast
Guard had not established a career path for casualty
investigators.
Now, when I first immersed myself in this issue of the
division of responsibilities between the NTSB and the Coast
Guard was in the aftermath of a vessel inspected by the Coast
Guard that just a few days later sank in Arkansas. A duck gone
through the Coast Guard. And there were fatalities. The Coast
Guard insisted on investigating itself. Now, Admiral, don't you
think that was a conflict of interest?
Admiral Watson. Sir, I think a organization like the Coast
Guard needs to investigate itself. We need to have a process to
do a critical examination of ourselves. We do that----
Mr. Oberstar. You should, but should you be the lead
investigator in a situation where just a few days before the
Coast Guard said this vessel is fine to operate and a few days
later it sinks? Should you be the lead investigator of
yourself?
Admiral Watson. Sir, we have a long tradition of doing
that. We investigate when an accident occurs involving a Coast
Guard cutter, involving an aviator, and we certainly need to
investigate ourselves when the incident involves a Coast Guard
marine inspection.
Mr. Oberstar. Well, I submit that the Coast Guard is a
human institution, and you are fallible when you are
investigating yourself; and, at the very least, the MOU that
resulted from that incident that was preceded several years
earlier by a previous MOU between the Coast Guard and the NTSB,
I think that should be refined. There are two differing
responsibilities. Can you tell me what the differences are
between the role of the NTSB in an investigation and the role
of the Coast Guard in conducting an investigation?
Admiral Watson. Yes, sir. The role of the NTSB is to
determine the cause, and the role of the Coast Guard is to
determine the cause for the purpose of the management of the
marine safety program, which runs all the way from the
inspections, standards for search and rescue, waterways
management, all the missions that we have, as well as to ensure
good order and discipline in the U.S. maritime.
Mr. Oberstar. Okay, but you shortcut the NTSB. Not only
determine the cause, but make safety recommendations. In the
investigation of aviation accidents, the NTSB engages the FAA,
the aircraft manufacturer, the airline, a range of outside
interests. They bring metallurgists in to the investigation,
whatever specialty they need, but the NTSB is in charge of the
overall investigation and, in the end, they make the
recommendations independent.
If Boeing were the only one to have investigated the crash
of a 737 at Aliquippa, Pennsylvania following an uncommanded
rudder movement, Boeing would have cleared itself of any
responsibility, said this just doesn't happen; we have 93
million hours of operation of 737s and we have never had an
uncommanded rudder movement. Oh, really? There were at least a
dozen. There were two unexplained crashes.
Now, the manufacturer should not be in charge of
investigating its own aircraft or failure of its own. Yes, they
should be engaged, they should be part, but they should not be
the one to make the final determination. There are certain
incidents in which the NTSB ought to have the lead. And where
there is clearly a conflict of interest where the Coast Guard
has, in the incident I cited a moment ago, I think that surely
the Coast Guard should be engaged, as provided for in the MOU,
but I think the NTSB in those situations ought to be the lead,
because they have the independence and the objectivity.
Admiral Watson. Sir, I agree with you. We have an MOU which
lays out those conditions in which it is expected that the
Commandant will shift the lead to the NTSB. It has been working
very well and it has been working through a number of
Commandants now. The responsibility of the Coast Guard to have
the overall charge for the marine industry needs to stay with
the Coast Guard. I think that is the larger question: Does
Congress, which exempted maritime from the NTSB's authorities
when NTSB was created, and then subsequently reinforced that
original decision, is it a good idea now to change the primacy
for the maritime?
Mr. Oberstar. I think that time has arrived and we have to
raise that question and review the issue. That separation of
authority was done in the 1970s by the Merchant Marine &
Fisheries Committee which had jurisdiction over Coast Guard at
the time, and it was done without a great deal of thought.
But let me ask Ms. Higgins and Ms. Richards whether you
think the MOU is in fact working satisfactorily. Do you work
out the question of primacy in a satisfactory manner?
Ms. Higgins. Mr. Chairman, based on my experience and in
what I have been told by our investigators, it has worked
pretty well. I think our concern is--and we talked about this a
little earlier--if we can't reach agreement--and I don't want
to say that we haven't been able to reach agreement, but in
that instance we think we ought to be able to look to the
statute to be able to assert our jurisdiction to take the lead
for all the reasons that you just suggested, because we are an
independent agency and we have a responsibility to look at the
regulatory agencies as we do in aviation and the other modes to
reach probable cause and safety recommendations regardless of
who that might affect.
Mr. Oberstar. Ms. Richards?
Ms. Richards. Sir, we did not look at the interaction
between the Coast Guard and the NTSB on determining who would
take the lead on investigations, so I don't have any
information to offer at this time.
Mr. Oberstar. Well, Homeland Security is rather new to this
as a department and new to this subject matter.
Ms. Higgins, let me come back. The NTSB has a very
different relationship with other modes of transportation. It
has a primacy role.
Ms. Higgins. We do, with every other mode. It is very
clear.
Mr. Oberstar. What is different about maritime? Why should
that be different?
Ms. Higgins. We believe it shouldn't be different. We
believe historically it has been different. It has been refined
over time through previous reauthorizations where the MOU was
first called for and then later modified. Again, I don't want
to suggest here that we haven't all tried to make it work, but
we do think that, from the standpoint of the Safety Board, we
ought to have the authority to exert primacy and take the lead
without any question about that in investigations where we
can't reach agreement.
As we talked about earlier, the regulations and the process
that we currently follow would be what we would look to for
guidance, but if for some reason we can't reach agreement, then
we think we ought to be able to assert jurisdiction, because we
think we have a track record that shows that our investigations
were very selective. We only look at those we think will have
national significance in terms of the recommendations we make
and we have demonstrated the benefit of having an independent
investigative body take the lead in certain kinds of
investigations.
Mr. Oberstar. Well, the most recent serious accident, that
of the COSCO allision, is a good example where the Coast Guard
rather early on dismissed the issue as of not very great
significance and did not dispatch personnel to the scene for a
substantial investigation and only later rose to the incident
when 58,000 gallons of pollutant were discharged.
It reminds me somewhat, in a different vein, of TWA 800.
The FBI arrived on the scene immediately, they were right
there--they had offices all over the Country--and took charge
of the scene as a crime scene. That substantially inhibited the
ability of the NTSB to conduct its complete investigation as an
accident, as a failure of a system--gaining control of
material, gaining control of the engines, for example, to
inspect those engines and determine whether engine failure
occurred; to rule out or rule in a missile strike, as was
hypothesized at the outset. It is a very, very important
distinction to be made between the role of the FBI and the
NTSB, between the role of the Coast Guard and the NTSB.
I am not suggesting that the Coast Guard step aside, nor is
the NTSB that the Coast Guard step aside and stay out of the
investigation; it should be a partner in it. But there are some
situations where the NTSB should take the lead and where its
current role under the MOU should be strengthened.
Ms. Higgins. Mr. Chairman, we would agree with that. As you
probably know, I was very involved in a different capacity in
the standoff, if you will, between the NTSB and the FBI on the
TWA 800 investigation, and in the end the two agencies worked
together until it could be determined that, in fact, it was an
accident rather than a criminal act, but it was very hard to
make that work. As a result of that, we have changed our
procedures and now it works much better.
Again, I think we said at the outset we have enormous
respect for the Coast Guard and the challenges that they face
in terms of all their responsibilities. They would be, as they
are now, a party to any investigation where we would take
primacy. We need their resources; we need their capability to
help manage the site on scene and to do all the good things
that they do in terms of search and rescue and everything else.
But in the COSCO Busan, for example, the voyage data
recorder was not protected immediately, until our people got
there. There wasn't recognition that there even was one.
So these are just some of the things that are important in
major investigations that we think we have the expertise and
the experience to handle, taking nothing away from the Coast
Guard and all the good work they do, but there are some special
circumstances and special accidents where we think it would be
important for us to be able to clearly take the lead and then
have our protocol and our process followed in terms of leading
the investigation.
Mr. Oberstar. The Coast Guard would argue that they should
have, among other reasons, because they lead the U.S.
delegation to the IMO. The FAA leads the U.S. delegation to
IKO, the international civil aviation organization. But the
NTSB is the lead entity in an aviation accident.
Admiral, do you see any further adjustments that could be
made to the existing MOU without undermining the Coast Guard's
proud and historic role?
Admiral Watson. Absolutely, sir. I think we are very
anxious to engage with NTSB and make improvements to the MOU.
We have learned a lot since the MOU was written originally, and
we would like to incorporate those changes for the betterment
of NTSB's investigations and Coast Guard investigations. We are
very supportive of the MOU process; it is the way to go. I
think there are things that we can look back on to where it
could have been improved.
My personal experience was with a boiler explosion on a
vessel called the S.S. Norway down in Miami, Florida. That
investigation, quite frankly, was, per the MOU, given to NTSB
to lead. My concern with it is that it took years before we had
any results from that. In the meantime, there was a DOJ
investigation, and just this year, about five years later, both
agencies, DOJ and the NTSB, had outcomes.
But the Coast Guard can do both of those roles. As you say,
the difference between the Coast Guard and the NTSB is that we
do have an obligation to do the law enforcement side, the
disciplinary side. So when a Coast Guard investigation is
ongoing and the Coast Guard has the lead, we can do both of
these things at the same time; we can accommodate both the NTSB
and the DOJ, and we don't have a Flight 800 type of situation.
That is what we have been doing for over 100 years, so I think
that is part of the reason why Congress has left our system the
way it is.
In addition, I think it is important to note that, for
aviation, NTSB does all aviation casualty investigations. Were
they to do that for maritime, they would add the 5,000
investigations that we are currently doing to their area of
responsibility, and if you think that there needs to be
separation, how is that justified just for a very small handful
out of the total number? I just think that there is a lot of
unintended consequences that could come from this.
Mr. Oberstar. For a very long period of time, the Marine
Board was headed by Justice Department official. That was
changed in 1948. And I think the Coast Guard's personnel
qualifications are going to improve with enactment of our
authorization bill and establishment of these programs.
Meanwhile, I think there are at least refinements to the
MOU that should be made, and I would like to recommend and
request specifically that the Coast Guard submit their thoughts
to the Chairman and Ranking Member, and that the NTSB submit
their language comparably for changes, and then let us evaluate
those and see if we can play the role of honest broker and
achieve what I see as a need to upgrade the quality of safety
investigations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. I am going to pass.
Mr. Cummings. Very well.
Let me just go back. Rear Admiral Watson, you said that you
all had looked at the recommendations from the Inspector
General's Office and that you were in agreement, I think. Don't
let me put words in your mouth. Tell me what you said, because
I am going to hold you to it.
Admiral Watson. Sir, I think there were about seven
recommendations.
Mr. Cummings. There were eight.
Admiral Watson. Eight recommendations, yes, sir. We
concurred with all except for one that we agreed with some of
it but disagreed with----
Mr. Cummings. And which one was that?
Admiral Watson. That was the one that was about the hull
and machinery inspectors and small passenger vessel inspection
as a prerequisite, versus hull, machinery or small passenger
vessel inspectors as an entering prerequisite condition for
assigning a person to a marine casualty investigation billet.
And if I could just touch on that, sir.
Mr. Cummings. That is recommendation number 4. It says
revise the August 2007 marine casualty investigation
qualification standard to include the pre-qualification of all
or machinery and small vessel inspectors. Is that the one?
Admiral Watson. Yes, sir. And it is the word ``and'' that
is the issue.
Mr. Cummings. And small vessel inspectors.
Admiral Watson. Our standard is or. If you are a small
passenger vessel inspector--actually, that goes beyond that. A
variety of other inspection qualifications. You don't have to
have them all before you can begin the process of becoming a
marine casualty investigator.
Mr. Cummings. Now, Sam tells me that you all made that
change. It used to be ``and.''
Admiral Watson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. So now it is still ``and.'' So what happened?
Admiral Watson. We made it into an ``or.''
Mr. Cummings. Now you want to go back?
Admiral Watson. Yes, sir. It was almost impossible for us
to have enough of a pool of people with prerequisites to feed
our marine casualty inspection program, which requires 136
Coast Guard officers to fill the billets, if we had that
``and'' in there, and the reason is because we really don't
need that large of a number of hull and machinery inspectors
for U.S. flag vessels like we did in the 1980s.
There aren't as many of those type of vessels. Our fleet of
10,200 inspected vessels is largely small passenger vessels.
The industry has changed significantly, and the way you get
experience on the large vessels these days is doing port state
control, which is a whole other set of qualifications different
from hull and machinery.
Mr. Cummings. Do you have an opinion on that, Ms. Richards,
since they are your recommendations?
Ms. Richards. Yes, sir. In the August 2007 publication, the
Coast Guard actually did not include the prerequisite to a hull
or machinery or small vessel inspector. They believe that it is
covered because it is a prerequisite for attending the basic
investigator training course. And that is one of our problems
with the Coast Guard's position, because we know from our work
that it is possible to attend the basic training without
meeting the prerequisites for the basic training. So we believe
that the qualifications need to be specifically set in the
Coast Guard's guidance.
We also believe that the Coast Guard is taking a step
backwards by eliminating the ``and'' and lowering the
standards, and we don't understand why the Coast Guard would
choose to do so other than perhaps it is difficult to fill its
billets because they don't have a number of personnel trained
to meet all those inspector qualifications. Our work showed,
and the people that we talked to said that it was very
important to have both the hull or machinery and the small
vessel inspector qualifications.
Mr. Cummings. All right, I get the picture. Let me go on to
something else very quickly. Going back to these qualifications
of the 110 investigators you cited as being fully qualified,
Rear Admiral, I am just wondering, do you think the IG team
would find all of them to be qualified? I guess what I am
trying to understand is in a sample of the IG, they found 68
percent of the investigators were unqualified. You say that 110
of 136 assigned individuals are qualified. So either the IG had
a non-representative sample or we are not talking about the
same thing, and I am trying to figure out where the problem is
here.
Admiral Watson. Yes, sir. Well, both of these sets of
numbers are a snapshot in time. That is one thing. The 68
percent is from a sample of five units some time last summer, I
believe. Now, you have got to remember that in the spring there
is typically going to be more people that have reached their
qualifications than in the summer, when people just get
assigned to a unit. So there is a cycle to this that is a
natural cycle.
The 110, I would have to give all of the data to the IG for
them to be able to tell me whether they agree with us, but we
look at the data. It is like Chairman Oberstar looking at the
resumes. They are what they are. We make our own rules for this
and we determine that they are fully qualified.
Mr. Cummings. I understand. I guess, based on what you just
said about seasonal and cycles, would it be safe to say that
there are times when a small percentage are qualified? In other
words, you are talking about the snapshots and the fact that
certain things happen at certain times of the year, what have
you. Would that be an accurate assessment, do you think?
Admiral Watson. Yes, sir. There is always going to be some
apprentices in the system, people that are assigned to a billet
that have yet to be qualified, they are working on their
qualifications.
Mr. Cummings. And what we need is consistency, because we
never know when these things are going to happen and when we
are going to need these personnel to use certain skills. I am
just trying to figure out how do you plan to--I am sure you
would agree with me that we want more consistency. You
understand what I am saying, right?
Admiral Watson. Yes, sir. We have 448 fully qualified
marine casualty investigators throughout the Coast Guard. Most
of them are not in marine casualty inspection investigator
billets, but we are a military organization. If we need
somebody that has the experience and knowledge to deal with a
marine casualty on an LNG ship, some special ship, we will get
the right person to the right place at the right time.
Mr. Cummings. Well, did that happen with the San Francisco
incident?
Admiral Watson. No, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Well, see, that is the problem.
Admiral Watson. Well, I think there was----
Mr. Cummings. Listen to what you just said to me.
Admiral Watson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. You just said if we have a problem, we will
find the people and we will get them here. In this instance it
didn't happen, and that is the problem. I understand the Coast
Guard is stretching, and I am telling you, we fight on both
sides to try to get you the personnel and the expertise you
need. But one thing I do know is that if I haven't learned
anything in my 57 years on earth, I have learned this: in order
to deal with a problem, you have got to first acknowledge you
have got it.
I remember when my daughter--I have to tell you this little
story, and then I will turn it over to Mr. Taylor. When my 26-
year-old was 3, she used to come up to me, Admiral, and I can
remember this as if it was happening right now. She would come
up to me and she would put her hand over my eyes and she would
say, daddy, let's play hide and go seek. And she is standing
right in front of me and then she would say you can't find me.
Well, that is all right for a three-year-old, but we have to
face up to whatever the problems are that we have so we can try
to address them, because I think that we all want to work
together to make this work.
I think Mr. Taylor wanted to ask a question.
Mr. Taylor. Admiral, thank you very much for being here.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for recognizing me.
I have to admit that I have mixed feelings about this whole
hearing because I realize that the Coast Guard is increasingly
asked to do more things, and then we scratch our heads in
amazement when you are not experts at everything we ask you to
do, and that is just not realistic. But there are a couple of
things that come to mind that make me wonder whether or not
something does need to improve.
Number one, the case of the Seabold Trader, which is a
vessel in the American flag that had major modifications done
to it over in China. Folks brought me photographs of those. I
don't know how they smuggled them out of China, but they
brought me photographs of it. We handed it to the Coast Guard
and I think the answer was, well, we don't have enough people
to inspect this. That wasn't a good thing.
Second thing, obviously, that still continues to stick in
my craw is the mess up on the 110s to 123s. To this day, I
haven't heard anyone in the Coast Guard--and you do have some
very knowledgeable people working for you at Baltimore; they
walked me through the vessels. But to this day I haven't heard
anybody say this is where they screwed up. We should have taken
a coupon; we should have known the hull wasn't ready; we should
have done the hogging and sagging. To this day. So the Nation
is out $100 million. We have got eight tied-up vessels. That
tells me you lack expertise.
And I would give you the opportunity to tell me that I am
wrong, but those two things really jump out at me.
I appreciate your willingness to make some changes. What I
haven't seen, and I am curious if you have considered, is I
can't believe that you need the best team every day. You are
not going to face a major collision every day. You may not even
face a major collision once a month. But when you do need a
good team, you need a good team. Using the example of the Air
Guard and the Reserves, who are on a daily basis we have people
out there flying 747s, 757s, 767s in the commercial world
within transit over to fly a C-130, C-17s as a Guardsman, and
we get that world of experience, and when we need them they are
there.
Has the Coast Guard considered some sort of a reserve
outfit where people could have a career either in the Merchant
Marine or working for ABS or Lloyds, but also have a reserve
commission that when you need that pool of experts for a major
collision like you saw in San Francisco or any other similar,
that you could call those people up and that is how they
perform their active duty? I have got to believe that in this
Nation there would be people who would be chomping at the bit
for that opportunity. I am just curious if the Coast Guard has
considered it.
Admiral Watson. Sir, we have a Coast Guard Reserve and
there are large numbers of those people that have their primary
job in other elements of the maritime. Do we recruit
specifically for Master Mariners, Chief Engineers? I think
maybe that is the question you are asking. And the answer is
no, we allow everybody to apply and compete on a more or less
even playing field for the Coast Guard Reserve, and then we
train them after they answer the service.
Mr. Taylor. Okay, Admiral, reclaiming my time. Keeping in
mind that this is a specialty, keeping in mind that you may
have some 50-year-old ship captain out there who would be a
phenomenal investigator, but who may not be up to the day-to-
day activities on one of your big cutters, or who may be,
beyond that, financially just couldn't take that sort of hit to
come back in the active force. But he would have all those
years of experience in determining the cause of an accident.
I would think it would make abundant sense for the Coast
Guard, rather than, again, spending more money to train a
handful of people that you are not going to need every day
pursuing some sort of a reserve officer corps of trained
engineers, of trained marine architects that you could call on
when you have a major accident that you need a pool of experts
wearing the Coast Guard uniform to make a determination.
I would ask that you consider that as well, because, again,
I can hear this Committee asking you to do a lot of things with
a limited budget, and what troubles me is there are times when
you do phenomenally well, such as Hurricane Katrina There are
times, such as stretching the 110s to 123s, where to this day I
don't think you have done the Nation any favors. And I think
that this might be somewhere in between where we can accomplish
that goal by thinking outside the normal course of action.
Admiral Watson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Taylor. I would ask that you or the Commandant get back
to me on this, because I do think it is a way of getting a heck
of a lot of expertise when we need them, and only when we need
them, without paying for them all year long.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think Mr. Taylor, as he often does, has really hit on an
outstanding idea. I know that in the Coast Guard
reauthorization that was just shepherded through by Chairman
Cummings and Chairman Oberstar, the Commandant--and I know he
didn't like some portions of it because he and I have had
conversations, but on the marine safety side was a little
resistant to adding some civilian posts within that marine
safety.
I supported that and continue to support that, and I know
that my support is based upon the fact that all of the
testimony before this Subcommittee relative to rotation and
career paths and things of that nature, and longevity in the
service, point to the fact that on the marine safety side, and
now on the marine casualty side, the Country would be better
served with a civilian component that augments the uniform
corps, and I think that is what Mr. Taylor was talking about. I
had never thought of reservists, but that makes perfect sense,
and I would ask you to take that back to the Commandant,
because it does in fact make sense.
Just a couple of cleanup things. I was talking to the
Chairman and I do think, Admiral, that this business of
exemptions or exceptions has sort of a negative connotation in
this hearing today, and I don't think it needs to be left that
way. I don't want anybody to be left with the impression that
the Coast Guard, using the Chairman's analogy, would send a
plumber to do heart surgery.
What I indicated to the Chairman was, I am a lawyer, he is
a lawyer, and we have continuing legal education requirements.
Some States have equivalencies. And by virtue of being a Member
of Congress or a member of State legislature, you get credit,
so you don't have to sit in the classroom for two hours
listening to some pointy-headed guy talking about rules of
evidence, because you are actually creating laws at the
national level. So you get credit for that.
I assume that that forms the basis of your exemptions or
your exceptions, but if you could perhaps supplement the record
as to how that process works. In other words, somebody coming
from ABS and opting out of the hull inspector course is
different from the Chairman's example of a lawyer. Because you
happen to be a lawyer, you don't have to take the hull course.
So if you could do that.
My other difficulty is--well, it is not a difficulty.
Chairman Oberstar, the reason he is such a great Chairman is he
often, almost always comes up with sort of the middle course
that is good. I do think that the legislative language set up
by the NTSB, even though I have great respect for the work they
do, is a power grab in this instance, and we will respectfully
disagree on that.
So the Chairman's suggestion that both NTSB and Coast Guard
come up with suggested modifications to your Memorandum of
Understanding I think would be a great idea, and I would urge
you both to accept the Chairman's invitation. Admiral, to you,
I would say I really urge you to do it because I do get the
sense that, absent that, the NTSB will be successful and tie-
breaks will now always be determined in favor of the NTSB
unless you provide the majority of the Members of this
Committee with a reasonable alternative.
And my objection to the power grab is that the Inspector
General's report found eight deficiencies, and you have
acknowledged seven of those. I would just say on number four,
which is the eighth of the eight, the Coast Guard created the
original standards, and my understanding is you went from Hull
Inspector or Machinery Inspector and Small Vessel Inspector
plus Board Officer plus Facility Inspector plus Harbor Safety
Officer to now it is either Hull Inspector or Machinery
Inspector or Small Vessel Inspector plus the other three; and
that is the change that caused the Inspector General to say
that you sort of dumbed down the standards.
I have had a chance to sort of review the resumes of the
folks that work for the NTSB, and I have to say that all of
them have outstanding credentials. But I would note that 95
percent of them are former Coast Guardsmen. So you can't make
the argument that people trained by the Coast Guard can't do
the job when the NTSB has now hired the same people--maybe they
pay them more money, I don't know--to do what it is the Coast
Guard does.
And again I would say that just making a change for change
sake, because of the deficiencies found by the IG b the Coast
Guard, if the IG has not looked at the qualifications of the
folks that work for the NTSB, I think it is silly to say, well,
let's give NTSB primacy even though their inspectors may not
meet the qualifications that you are being criticized for. So
change for change sake is not very attractive to me either.
So, at the end of the day, please accept Chairman
Oberstar's invitation; come up with modifications to the MOU
and let's see if we can work this out in a peaceful way that
will continue to demonstrate great cooperation between the
Coast Guard and the NTSB.
Ms. Higgins, last thing. I had a train derailment in my
district and I am still waiting for your report. So if you
could get that to me, I would very much appreciate it.
Ms. Higgins. We will do that, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you so much.
Mr. Cummings. Ms. Richardson.
Thank you very much.
Finally, let me just ask two other questions. Admiral, when
it comes to revocation and suspension hearings, I would imagine
that if you have these investigators and a charge is
appropriate, it would be likely that they would testify or
definitely provide some type of evidence in these hearings. Is
that a reasonable expectation?
Admiral Watson. Yes, sir. They shouldn't even be charging a
mariner with any kind of charge unless they have evidence.
Mr. Cummings. Yes. I guess what I am getting at is, as you
know from previous testimony in other hearings, a lot of times
the mariners felt that they were not necessarily treated
fairly. We had testimony from some judge or two--I think it was
two judges--who had concerns about the ALJs. I guess what I am
getting at here is if we have people who are not qualified
doing these investigations, trying to present evidence of their
findings in a hearing, it seems to me that there might be a
problem with that. Would you agree?
Admiral Watson. Yes, sir, but I don't have any evidence
that we have used unqualified people to present a case to an
ALJ.
Mr. Cummings. Did you have a comment on that, Ms. Richards?
Ms. Richards. No, sir. We didn't trace the investigations
done by the individuals we have determined to be unqualified
through the whole process to see if they had been adjudicated
before an ALJ.
Mr. Cummings. All right, I want to thank you all very much
for your testimony. As usual, as you can see, we act in a very
much bipartisan manner, and I think a lot has come out of this
hearing, and I am hoping that the issues that Chairman Oberstar
and Ranking Member LaTourette have raised and the suggestions
that have been made here, that you will take heed and would
hope that you would also--there are all kinds of ways to
resolve issues; some of them you do through statute, some you
do by way of people sitting down and working out their
differences, or agencies sitting down. So where you can try
your hand at that, we would love to do that, consistent with
what Chairman Oberstar had to say.
Again, thank you all very much and have a good day.
[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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