[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE TILLMAN FRATRICIDE: WHAT THE LEADERSHIP OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
KNEW
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
AUGUST 1, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-49
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
----------
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSISGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman
TOM LANTOS, California TOM DAVIS, Virginia
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN L. MICA, Florida
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts CHRIS CANNON, Utah
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
DIANE E. WATSON, California MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts DARRELL E. ISSA, California
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York KENNY MARCHANT, Texas
JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina
Columbia BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota BILL SALI, Idaho
JIM COOPER, Tennessee JIM JORDAN, Ohio
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
PETER WELCH, Vermont
Phil Schiliro, Chief of Staff
Phil Barnett, Staff Director
Earley Green, Chief Clerk
David Marin, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on August 1, 2007................................... 1
Statement of:
Abizaid, General John P., former Commander, U.S. Central
Command.................................................... 29
Brown, General Bryan Douglas, former Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command......................................... 29
Myers, General Richard, former Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff.. 29
Rumsfeld, Donald, former Secretary of Defense................ 16
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Davis, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Virginia, prepared statement of......................... 14
Issa, Hon. Darrell E., a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, Army Regulation 600-8-1............... 45
Maloney, Hon. Carolyn B., a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York:
Letter dated June 28, 2002............................... 40
Memo dated June 25, 2002................................. 42
Rumsfeld, Donald, former Secretary of Defense:
Letter dated July 26, 2007............................... 187
Prepared statement of.................................... 18
Waxman, Chairman Henry A., a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, prepared statement of............. 5
THE TILLMAN FRATRICIDE: WHAT THE LEADERSHIP OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
KNEW
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WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 1, 2007
House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry A. Waxman
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Waxman, Maloney, Cummings,
Kucinich, Davis of Illinois, Tierney, Clay, Watson, Lynch,
Yarmuth, Braley, Norton, Cooper, Van Hollen, Hodes, Sarbanes,
Welch, Davis of Virginia, Burton, Shays, McHugh, Mica, Platts,
Duncan, Turner, Issa, McHenry, Bilbray and Sali.
Staff present: Phil Schiliro, chief of staff; Phil Barnett,
staff director and chief counsel; Kristin Amerling, general
counsel; Karen Lightfoot, communications director and senior
policy advisor; David Rapallo, chief investigative counsel;
John Williams, deputy chief investigative counsel; David
Leviss, senior investigative counsel; Suzanne Renaud and Steve
Glickman, counsels; Earley Green, chief clerk; Teresa Coufal,
deputy clerk; Matt Siegler, special assistant; Caren Auchman,
press assistant; Zhongrui ``JR'' Deng, chief information
officer; Leneal Scott, information systems manager; Will
Ragland, staff assistant; Bonney Kapp, fellow; David Marin,
minority staff director; Larry Halloran, minority deputy staff
director; Jennifer Safavian, minority chief counsel for
oversight and investigations; Keith Ausbrook, minority general
counsel; Steve Castor and A. Brooke Bennett, minority counsels;
Susie Schulte, minority senior professional staff member;
Christopher Bright and Allyson Glandford, minority professional
staff members; Nick Palarino, minority senior investigator and
policy advisor; Patrick Lyden, minority parliamentarian and
member services coordinator; Brian McNicoll, minority
communications director; Benjamin Chance, minority clerk; and
Ali Ahmad, minority deputy press secretary.
Chairman Waxman. I want to welcome everyone to our hearing
today. I do want to announce this is a hearing of Congress, and
not a rally or a demonstration. Please keep that in mind.
As of last night, 4,063 of our bravest soldiers have died
in the Afghan and Iraq wars. Each death has its own compelling
story. Each brought incalculable grief for the soldier's family
and friends, and each is a tragic and irreplaceable loss for
our country.
In today's hearing we will continue our investigation of
the misinformation surrounding the death of one of those
soldiers, Corporal Pat Tillman. We are focused on Corporal
Tillman's case because the misinformation was so profound and
because it persisted so long. And if that can happen to the
most famous soldier serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, it leaves
many families and many of us questioning the accuracy of the
information from many other casualties.
To date there have been seven investigations into Corporal
Tillman's case, yet the Army announced sanctions against--
yesterday the Army announced sanctions against six officers,
while important questions still remain unanswered. Normally in
investigations we learn more, and the more we learn, the easier
it is to understand what actually happened. The opposite is
true in the Tillman case. As we learn more, everything that
happened in 2004, from April 22nd, the day Pat Tillman died, to
May 29th, the day the Defense Department finally announced this
was a friendly fire incident, makes less sense.
One possible explanation is that a series of
counterintuitive, illogical blunders unfolded, accidentally and
haphazardly. As the Army noted yesterday, in seven
investigations into this tragedy, not one has found evidence of
a conspiracy by the Army to fabricate a hero, to deceive the
public or mislead the Tillman family about the circumstances of
Corporal Tillman's death.
The other possible explanation is that someone or some
group of officials acted deliberately and repeatedly to conceal
the truth. Kevin Tillman, who served with his brother in
Afghanistan, expressed that view in our last hearing. He said
April 2004 was turning into the deadliest month to date in the
war in Iraq. American commanders essentially surrendered
Fallujah to members of the Iraq resistance. In the midst of
this, the White House learned that Christian Parenti, Seymour
Hersh, and other journalists were about to reveal a shocking
scandal involving massive and systemic detainee abuse in a
facility known as Abu Ghraib. Revealing that Pat's death was
fratricide would have been yet another political disaster
during a month already swollen with political disasters, and a
brutal truth that the American public would undoubtedly find
unacceptable. So the facts needed to be suppressed, and an
alternate narrative had to be constructed. This freshly
manufactured narrative was then distributed to the American
public, and we believe the strategy had the intended effect. It
shifted the focus from the grotesque torture at Abu Ghraib to a
great American who died a hero's death.
Well, that was the view of Kevin Tillman. Our committee's
challenge is to determine which explanation is true. At our
last hearing, Specialist Bryan O'Neal testified. Specialist
O'Neal was standing next to Corporal Tillman during the
firefight. He knew immediately that this was a case of friendly
fire, and described what happened in an eyewitness statement he
submitted up his chain of command immediately after Corporal
Tillman's death.
But Specialist O'Neal told us something else. After he
submitted his statement, someone else rewrote it. This unnamed
person made significant changes that transformed O'Neal's
account into an enemy attack. We still don't know who did that
and why he did it. We just know that although everyone on the
ground knew this was a case of friendly fire, the American
people and Tillman family were told that Corporal Tillman was
killed by the enemy, and that doesn't make any sense.
Our focus has been to look up the chain of command, but
that has proved to be as confounding as figuring out what
happened to Specialist O'Neal's witness statement. We have
tried to find out what the White House knew about Corporal
Tillman's death. We know that in the days following the initial
report, at least 97 White House officials sent and received
hundreds of e-mails about Corporal Tillman's death and how the
White House and the President should respond. Now, there is
nothing sinister about this.
I want that sign down.
There is nothing sinister about this, and there is nothing
sinister in the e-mails we have received. Corporal Tillman is a
national hero. It makes sense that White House officials would
be paying attention. But what doesn't make sense is that weeks
later, in the days before and after the Defense Department
announced that Corporal Tillman was actually killed by our own
forces, there are no e-mails from any of the 97 White House
officials about how Corporal Tillman really died.
The concealment of Corporal Tillman's fratricide caused
millions of Americans to question the integrity of our
government, yet no one will tell us when and how the White
House learned the truth.
Today we will be examining the actions of the senior
leadership at the Department of Defense. Much of our focus will
be on a ``Personal For'' message, also known as a P-4, that
Major General Stanley McChrystal sent on April 29, 2004. This
P-4 alerted his superiors that despite press reports that
Corporal Tillman died fighting the enemy, it was highly
possible that Corporal Tillman was killed by friendly fire.
Well, three officers received this P-4 report: Lieutenant
General Kensinger, General Abizaid and General Brown. General
Kensinger refused to appear today. His attorney informed the
committee that General Kensinger would not testify voluntarily,
and, if issued a subpoena, would seek to evade service.
The committee did issue a subpoena to General Kensinger
earlier this week, but U.S. Marshals have been unable to locate
or serve him. So we will not be able to ask General Kensinger
what he did with the P-4. We won't be able to ask him why he
didn't notify the Tillman family about the friendly fire
investigation, and we won't be able to ask him why he did
nothing to correct the record after he attended Corporal
Tillman's memorial service in early May and he heard statements
he knew were false.
Fortunately, we do have the other two recipients of the P-
4, General Abizaid and General Brown, here this morning, and we
will ask them what they did after they received General
McChrystal's message.
We are also grateful that General Myers and Secretary
Rumsfeld, who rearranged his schedule so that he could be here
today, are here to testify. And we are pleased that you have
taken this opportunity to be with us.
Members of the committee, like Americans across the Nation,
are looking for answers to simple questions. Who knew about the
friendly fire attack? Why wasn't the family told? Why did it
take over a month for the leadership of the Defense Department
to tell the public the truth? Today I hope we will at least get
answers to these questions and bring clarity to this
investigation.
I commend the Army for its continued investigation into the
Tillman case, and Army Secretary Geren for the forthright
approach he is taking. Progress has been made, but we still
don't know who was responsible for the false information and
what roles, if any, the Defense Department and the White House
had in the deceptions. We owe it to the Tillman family and to
the American people to get the answers to these fundamental
questions.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Henry A. Waxman
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Waxman. I want to now recognize Mr. Davis before
we call on our witnesses.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We continue
to join you today in pursuing key aspects of this
investigation, because our duty to the Nation's honored dead
and to their families is solemn and absolute. As a Nation and
as a Congress, we owe them our unity, our honesty and our
industry, untarnished by self-interest or partisanship. As long
as the committee is seeking authoritative answers to necessary
questions about the death of Corporal Pat Tillman, we will be
constructive partners in that effort.
This much we know. There are no good answers to the
necessarily tough questions raised about how the facts of this
friendly fire incident were handled, by whom and when.
Testimony from our previous hearing and the results of six
separate Army investigations all showed the tragic truth can
only fall somewhere between screw-up and cover-up, between
rampant incompetence and elaborate conspiracy. And once you are
descending that continuum, it almost doesn't matter whether the
failure to follow Army regulations about updated casualty
reports and prompt family notifications was inadvertent,
negligent or intentional.
As it has been observed, sufficiently advanced incompetence
is indistinguishable from malice, and the facts uncovered so
far clearly prove this was advanced incompetence, serial
ineptitude up and down the Army and civilian chains of command.
Still, confounding questions persist about how and why the
specifics of so high profile a death were so slowly and badly
conveyed, even after top Pentagon leaders and the White House
were known to be interested.
Since this committee's first hearing on these issues 4
months ago, the committee has received over 13,000 pages of
documents from the White House, the Department of Defense, the
Inspector General of the Department of Defense, and the
Department of the Army. Committee staff has conducted over a
half dozen interviews with those involved. Nothing in that
material suggests the Defense Secretary or the White House were
aware Tillman's death was a friendly fire incident before late
May, when his grieving family and the rest of the Nation were
finally told. But it is still not clear how or why the
Secretary, other defense leaders, and the White House
speechwriters remained impervious to the emerging truth while
so many others knew Corporal Tillman's death was a fratricide.
Yesterday another Army review by General William S. Wallace
was conducted, and the secretary of the Army imposed
disciplinary action against senior officers involved in this
sad cascade of mistakes, misjudgments, and misleading
statements. Consistent with the Pentagon Inspector General's
report, General Wallace found no evidence anyone in the chain
of command acted intentionally to cover up the fact Corporal
Tillman had died by friendly fire. Rather, the report
determined, as had others before, the delay in notifying the
Tillman family of the friendly fire investigation resulted from
well-intentioned but clearly wrong decisions to wait until all
investigations were complete. That, to me, is one of the more
troubling aspects in this case, that the default setting for
Army officers, lawyers, and others was secrecy.
This was their first friendly fire incident. No one
apparently bothered to read the regulations requiring immediate
changes to the casualty report, which in turn would have
triggered additional information going to the family, and
presumably others. Yesterday the Army Secretary said timely and
accurate family notification is a duty based on core Army
values. But in this instance, undeniably pernicious
institutional forces devalued that ideal. Why? What has been
done to cure that organizational bias against the diligence and
candor owed the Tillman family and every American?
I believe the job of this committee is to ask the tough
questions and let the chips fall where they may. It is our not
always envious job to root out the facts and hold people
accountable. That is what we are doing today. As I noted
earlier, nothing in our inquiry thus far demonstrates the
Defense Secretary or the White House were aware this a was a
friendly fire incident before late May. That we have not
learned otherwise may perplex those who are assuming the worst,
given the gross mishandling of this tragedy. But while we
continue to gather information and we together will leave no
stone unturned, let's not let these assumptions color or cloud
what our investigation is actually finding.
All our witnesses have served our Nation with distinction,
and we are grateful for their continued service and support of
this committee's oversight. I am particularly glad former
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld decided to appear today. His
perspective is an indispensable element of our efforts to
complete this inquiry. We look forward to his testimony and
that of all today's witnesses as we seek answers to these
painful, but essential questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Davis.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Tom Davis follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Waxman. Let me, before I recognize our witnesses,
remind everyone in the audience that this is a serious
congressional investigation. If anyone holds up signs, we want
to tell them not do it. And if they do, we will ask them to
excuse themselves from the hearing room. We will insist on
proper decorum.
I join with Mr. Davis in thanking each of our witnesses for
being here today, and certainly in the case of Secretary
Rumsfeld, who went to great pains to be here. And I appreciate
the fact that he did come. And also to all three of the
generals that are with us today, we want to hear from you.
It is the practice of this committee for all witnesses that
we administer the oath, and I would like to ask all of you to
please stand at this time to take the oath.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Waxman. The record will reflect that each of the
witnesses answered in the affirmative.
Mr. Rumsfeld, Mr. Secretary Rumsfeld, why don't we start
with you. There is a button on the base of the mike. We would
like if you would make your presentation. If any of you have
submitted written testimony, the written testimony will be in
the record in full. And we want to hear what you have to say.
STATEMENT OF DONALD RUMSFELD, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. You have requested that we appear today to discuss
our knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the death of
U.S. Army Corporal Patrick Tillman.
First, I want to again extend my deepest sympathies to the
Tillman family. Corporal Tillman's death, and the deaths of
thousands of men and women who have given their lives in our
Nation's service, have brought great sorrow to the lives of
their families and their loved ones. Theirs is a grief felt by
all who have had the privilege of serving alongside those in
uniform. The handling of the circumstances surrounding Corporal
Tillman's death could only have added to the pain of losing a
loved one. I personally, and I am sure all connected with the
Department, extend our deep regrets.
One of the Department of Defense's foremost
responsibilities is to tell the truth to some of the 3 million
military, civilian and contract employees who dedicate their
careers to defending our Nation; to the military families who
endure the extended absence of their fathers, mothers,
husbands, wives, sons and daughters; and to the American
people, for whom all of those connected to the Department of
Defense strive each day to protect.
In March 2002, early in my tenure as Secretary of Defense,
I wrote a memo for the men and women of the Department of
Defense titled ``Principles for the Department of Defense.'' I
have attached a copy of that memo to my testimony. You will
note that principle No. 1, the very first, addresses the points
that both you and Mr. Davis have made. It says, ``Do nothing
that could raise questions about the credibility of DOD.
Department officials must tell the truth and must be believed
to be telling the truth or our important work is undermined.''
Mr. Chairman, in your invitation to today's hearing, you
asked that we be prepared to discuss how we learned of the
circumstances surrounding Corporal Tillman's death, when we
learned of it, and with whom we discussed it. I am prepared to
respond to the questions which pertain to these matters to the
best of my ability.
In December 2006, I sent a letter to the Acting Inspector
General of the Department of Defense, Mr. Thomas Gimble,
describing my best recollection of those events, which by that
point had occurred some 2\1/2\ years previously. The committee
has been given a copy of that letter, and I would like to quote
a portion of it. ``I am told that I received word of this
development sometime after May 20, 2004, but my recollection
reflects the fact that it occurred well over 2 years ago. As a
result, I do not recall when I first learned about the
possibility that Corporal Tillman's death might have resulted
from fratricide.'' I went on to say, ``I am confident that I
did not discuss this matter with anyone outside of the
Department of Defense.'' Obviously, during that early period; I
have subsequently to that period.
What I wrote in December 2006 remains my best recollection
today of when I was informed and with whom I talked before May
20th. I understand that the May 20, 2004, date was shortly
before the Tillman family was informed of the circumstances on
May 26, 2004.
Your invitation to appear before the committee also asked
about my knowledge of a ``Personal For'' or P-4 message dated
April 29, 2004. That message was not addressed to me. I don't
recall seeing it until recent days, when copies have been made
available. There are a great many, indeed many thousands, of
communications throughout the Department of Defense that a
Secretary of Defense does not see.
I understand that the Acting Inspector General's report
concluded that there were errors among some of those
responsible for the initial reports. Any errors in such a
situation are most unfortunate. The Tillmans were owed the
truth, delivered in a forthright and timely manner. And
certainly the truth was owed to the memory of a man whose
valor, dedication, and sacrifice to his country remains an
example for all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Rumsfeld.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rumsfeld follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Waxman. General Myers.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL RICHARD MYERS, FORMER CHAIR, JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
General Myers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The only thing I
would like to say is just offer my condolences as well to the
Tillman family not only for the loss, but for the issues that
they have been struggling with since then, and the whole
notification issue that is being looked at by this committee.
They clearly don't deserve that for Pat Tillman's memory and
for what he meant to this country and to our Armed Forces.
And I would like--as the Secretary said, I would like to
also add my condolences, of course, to all those who have
sacrificed to keep us free, the men and women in uniform.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. General Abizaid.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN P. ABIZAID, FORMER COMMANDER, U.S.
CENTRAL COMMAND
General Abizaid. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Certainly we have lost a lot of good young men and women in
the past several years of combat. We have a tough fight ahead
of us, and we will lose more. I understand that one of the most
important things we can do is help our families through the
grieving process. That requires accurate and timely information
that goes to them, and it certainly didn't happen in the case
of Corporal Tillman.
It is unfortunate that we did not handle it properly.
Having had a son-in-law who was wounded in combat, and having
gone through the notification process myself, I can only tell
you it is a difficult process in the best of times.
We will answer your questions to the best of our ability.
Thanks.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you.
General Brown.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL BRYAN DOUGLAS BROWN, FORMER COMMANDER,
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
General Brown. Mr. Chairman, I would also like to add my
condolences to the Tillman family and to how poorly the
notification was done. I would also say that, like General
Abizaid to my right, I also had a son-in-law wounded, so I know
what that call sounds like. And my son-in-law, in fact, was
wounded by fratricide in the opening days of Afghanistan, so I
know how important it is and how the impact is on the family,
although I didn't lose my son-in-law.
So I am ready for your questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. OK. Thank you.
Well, I want to begin the questioning by framing the issue
for us. The basic point that we want to learn is what did the
senior military leadership know about Corporal Tillman's death,
when did they know it, and what did they do after they learned
it?
At our last hearing we reviewed a document known as
Personal For, or a P-4 memo. This memo was sent on April 28,
2004, by Major General Stanley McChrystal, the Commander of the
Joint Task Force in Afghanistan, where Corporal Tillman was
killed in 2004. General McChrystal sent this P-4 memo to three
people: General Abizaid, from Central Command; General Brown,
from U.S. Special Operations Command; and General Kensinger,
from the Army Special Operations Command. The purpose of this
P-4 was to have one or more of these generals warn President
Bush, the Secretary of the Army, and other national leaders
that it was, ``highly probable or highly possible that an
ongoing investigation was about to conclude that Corporal
Tillman was killed by his own unit.''
General McChrystal explained why this P-4 message was so
important. He stated, ``I felt it was essential that you
received this information as soon as we detected it in order to
preclude any unknowing statements by our country's leaders
which might cause embarrassment if the circumstances of
Corporal Tillman's death became public.''
Well, this P-4 memo was sent on April 29th, 1 week after
Corporal Tillman's death. This was 4 days before the memorial
service, at which the Tillmans and the Nation were told Pat
Tillman was killed by hostile fire. And this was an entire
month before the Pentagon told the Tillman family and the
public that Corporal Tillman was killed by U.S. forces.
For today's hearing, we invited all of the recipients of
the P-4 to determine how they responded. Did they, in fact,
alert the White House? Did they alert the Army Secretary, the
Secretary of Defense? Did they pass it up the chain of command?
One of the addressees is General Kensinger. He refused to
appear voluntarily, and apparently evaded service of the
committee's subpoena, so he is not here today, but we do have
two of the other addressees of the P-4 memo, General Brown and
General Abizaid, as well as General Myers, the former Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary Rumsfeld. They are
appearing here today voluntarily, and I thank you all for being
here. They have had distinguished careers and have served our
Nation with honor. They are continuing to serve their country
by cooperating with this congressional investigation.
General Abizaid, let me start with you. If you look closely
at the P-4, the third and fourth lines actually have different
levels of addressees. General Brown and General Kensinger were
listed as info, which I understand is the equivalent of a CC, a
carbon copy. But you were listed as a ``to.'' So General
McChrystal really wanted this to go to you. When did you
receive this memo?
General Abizaid. I believe that the earliest I received it
was on the 6th of May.
Chairman Waxman. 6th of May. And why did it take so long?
General Abizaid. Well, let me explain the timing sequence,
if I may, Congressman, starting from the 22nd, as I saw it.
Would that be helpful?
Chairman Waxman. Sure.
General Abizaid. On the 22nd, the incident occurred. I
believe about the 23rd, General McChrystal called me and told
me that Corporal Tillman had been killed in combat, and that
the circumstances surrounding his death were heroic. I called
the chairman and discussed that with the chairman.
Throughout that period I was in Iraq, Qatar, etc. On the
28th, I went to Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, I met with General
Olson and General Barnow, our commanders there, and I also had
the chance to talk to the platoon leader, who was Corporal
Tillman's platoon leader, and I asked him about the action, and
he gave no indication that there was a friendly fire issue.
On the 29th, General McChrystal sent his message, and it
went to my headquarters in Tampa, and it was not retransmitted
for reasons of difficulties with our systems within the
headquarters until the 6th at the earliest, and it could have
been later that I received it. But it is my recollection then
on the 6th, probably the 6th, it is a guess, I can't be sure
exactly the date, I called the chairman. I told the chairman
about having received General McChrystal's message that
friendly fire was involved.
Chairman Waxman. You immediately told the chairman?
General Abizaid. As soon as I saw the message. I can't
remember how the existence of the message came to my attention,
but it was known within my staff that something was out there,
and we found it. I called the chairman. I told the chairman
about it, and it was my impression from having talked to the
chairman at the time that he knew about it.
Chairman Waxman. OK. Your staff seemed to know about it.
Was that they knew there was a memo, or they heard it might
have been friendly fire that killed him?
General Abizaid. I think they had heard there was an
investigation ongoing within the Joint Special Operations
Command.
Chairman Waxman. Um-hmm. So you actually received the P-4
memo a week after it was written, but it was also 3 weeks
before the memorial service where the family still didn't know.
Your chain of command, you were the Commander of CENTCOM; you
had a direct reporting requirement to the Defense Secretary.
After you read the P-4, who did you contact? Just General
Myers?
General Abizaid. I contacted General Myers. And my
responsibility is to report to the Secretary through the
chairman. I generally do that. I talked to the Secretary a lot,
I talked to the chairman a lot during this period. But 90
percent of what I talked to him about was what was going on in
Fallujah, what was going on combat operationally throughout the
theater. And as a matter of fact, when I called the chairman,
there was a whole list of other things that I believe I talked
to him about concerning the circumstances in Fallujah in
particular.
Chairman Waxman. What did you say to him about this P-4
memo?
General Abizaid. I can't remember exactly what I said to
him. I said it is clear that there is a possibility of
fratricide involving the Tillman case; that General McChrystal
has appointed the necessary people to investigate to determine
precisely what happened; and that while it is likely that there
is fratricide, we will know for sure after the report is
finalized, which will reach me when it gets done.
Chairman Waxman. What did he say to you in response?
General Abizaid. Like I say, he gave me the impression--I
can't remember his exact words--that he understood that there
was an investigation ongoing.
Chairman Waxman. So he seemed to already know about the
fact there was an investigation?
General Abizaid. He seemed to, yes.
Chairman Waxman. And what about your own reporting
requirement to the Secretary? Did you ever discuss the
fratricide investigation with Secretary Rumsfeld or his office?
General Abizaid. No, I did not talk to the Secretary that I
can recall directly about it until I was back in D.C. around
the time period of the 18th through the 20th. And at the time I
informed him that there was an investigation that was ongoing,
and it looked like it was friendly fire.
Chairman Waxman. The P-4 memo said the President should be
notified that Corporal Tillman was highly possibly killed by
friendly fire. What steps did you take to make sure the
President received this information?
General Abizaid. I notified the chairman. I never called
the President direct on any operational matter throughout the
4\1/2\ years of being in the theater.
Chairman Waxman. OK. Well, General Myers, let's turn to
you. You were the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under
the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, you were the senior ranking
member of the Armed Forces and the principal military adviser
to the President and the Secretary of Defense. The P-4 was not
addressed to you, but General Abizaid just said that he called
you and told you about the suspected fratricide. First of all,
is that correct? Did he call you?
General Myers. I can't recall specifically, but it is
entirely likely that it is exactly as he recalls it. I would
trust his judgment in this matter.
Chairman Waxman. You don't remember what he said or what
you said back in that conversation?
General Myers. No. No recall of that.
General Abizaid. OK. General Abizaid testified, as you
heard, when he called you, you already knew about it. Is that
accurate?
General Myers. Yes. The best I can determine, once I got
the letter from the committee and talked to some of the folks
on my staff, is that I knew right at the end of April that
there was a possibility of fratricide in the Corporal Tillman
death, and that General McChrystal had started an
investigation. So when he called, if he called later than that,
then I would already have known that.
Chairman Waxman. How would you have known that? Who told
you?
General Myers. I can't tell you. I don't know how I knew.
To the best of my knowledge, I have never seen this P-4. It
could have come several ways. The most likely is in our
operations shop, we have folks from Special Forces that--from
Special Forces that might have known this and passed it to me
at a staff meeting. I can't tell you who passed it to me. I
just don't know. Or it could have been I have read General
Schoomaker's testimony in front of the DOD IG, and he said he
might have called me. That is another way it could have
happened. I just can't recall.
Chairman Waxman. General Myers, you told our staff last
night that at the time you received the call from General
Abizaid, it was common knowledge that Corporal Tillman had been
killed by friendly fire. Is that accurate? Was it common
knowledge that the fratricide was----
General Myers. No. If I said that, it was a mistake. I
don't know that it was common knowledge at that point.
Chairman Waxman. But you knew about it, and others around
you knew about it.
General Myers. Yes, and I told--in working with my former
public affairs adviser, I said, you know, we need to keep this
in mind in case we go before the press. We have just got to
calibrate ourselves. With this investigation ongoing, we want
to be careful how we portray the situation.
Chairman Waxman. Yeah. Well, was it fair to say it was
widely known by people in the DOD?
General Myers. You know, I can't recall. As General Abizaid
said when he mentioned this to me, we probably talked about a
lot of other things, to include the situation in Fallujah,
which was getting a lot of attention at the moment. But I just
can't recall.
Chairman Waxman. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. General Myers, when you learned that
this was a possible fratricide, what would Army regulations
require you to do or the chain of command to do at that point?
General Myers. I don't come under Army regulations, but--I
don't think there is any regulation that would require me to do
anything actually. What I would normally do--it was in Army
channels. What I would normally do, if I thought the Secretary
did not know that, I would so inform the Secretary. I cannot
recall whether or not I did that.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. We are going to find out in a
second.
General Myers. Yeah, well, I think--you can ask the
Secretary. But I don't recall if I did that.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. What would Army regulations have
required at that point?
General Myers. My understanding is the way the Army
regulations were written, and this is from research here
getting ready for the committee, is that they should have
notified the family at the time that there was a possibility of
fratricide as soon as they knew it.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Nobody at the top was ensuring
that--really looked at the regulations at that point?
General Myers. That wouldn't be our responsibility. When I
learned that General McChrystal had initiated an investigation,
that was--that was good for me. I know he had worked for me
before. I knew his integrity. I said, this is good, and they
are going to do an investigation. We will learn the truth.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being
with us today. How and when did you learn that Corporal Tillman
had been killed? There is a button on the base.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I don't recall precisely how I learned that
he was killed. It could have been internally, or it could have
been through the press. It was something that obviously
received a great deal of attention.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Do you remember did you take any
action at the time that you learned that he was killed?
Obviously, this was an American hero. This could be highly
publicized and of great concern to a lot of people.
Mr. Rumsfeld. The only action I can recall taking was to
draft a letter to the family.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. OK. Before he did so, were you aware
that President Bush was going to reference Corporal Tillman in
a correspondents' dinner speech on May 1st?
Mr. Rumsfeld. No.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. So to your knowledge or
recollection, you never had any conversations with the
President or anybody at the White House about that possibility?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I have no recollection of discussing it with
the White House until toward the--when it became a matter of
public record about the fratricide. At that point, and when the
family was notified, I am sure there were discussions with the
White House, but prior to that, I don't have a recollection of
it. Possibly Dick does. Dick Myers and I met with the White
House frequently, but I don't recall bringing this up.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. General Myers.
General Myers. And I don't recall ever having a discussion
with anybody at the White House about the Tillman case one way
or another.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Mr. Secretary, were you aware in the
period after Corporal Tillman's death of the extensive media
coverage being given to this tragic event and Corporal
Tillman's service as a Ranger?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I don't understand the question.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. You were aware of the extensive
media coverage being given to this event?
Mr. Rumsfeld. When he was killed, absolutely.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Did you instruct your staff at any
point to try to influence in any way the coverage?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Absolutely not. Indeed, quite the contrary.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice and the investigation
process is such that anyone in the command, chain of command,
is cautioned to not ask questions, to not inject themselves
into it, to not do anything privately or publicly that could be
characterized as command influence which could alter the
outcome of an investigation. And as a result, the practice of
most Secretaries of Defense and people in the chain of command
is to be very cautious and careful about inquiring or seeming
to have an opinion or putting pressure on anyone who is
involved in any portion of the military court-martial process
or the investigation process. And as a result, I have generally
stayed out over my tenure as Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Do you remember when you learned
that this was a possible fratricide?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I don't remember. And what I have been
told subsequently is that there was a person in the room when I
was--who says I was told when he was in the room. And----
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Do you remember when that was?
Mr. Rumsfeld. He said that he came back from Iraq on May
20th, and that, therefore, he assumes I was told on or after
May 20th. Whether I was told before that, I just don't have any
recollection. And the best I can do is what I put in my letter
to the acting Inspector General, which referenced that
instance.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. When you learned about this, then,
for the first time, do you remember did you decide you needed
to tell somebody else about this to convey this, make sure the
family was known, the White House or media people? Do you
remember?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I don't recall when I was told, and I don't
recall who told me, but my recollection is that it was at a
stage when there were investigations underway, in which case I
would not have told anybody to go do something with respect to
it. And as Chairman Myers says, this was a matter basically
that the Army was handling, and it was not something that I
would inject myself into in the normal course of my role as
Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Let me just try to get to that. Your
letter says that I am told I received word of this development,
i.e., the possibility of fratricide, after May 20, 2004,
because that is when this person had returned----
Mr. Rumsfeld. Right.
Mr. Davis of Virginia [continuing]. From Iraq.
Mr. Rumsfeld. That is where that came from.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Who was the person? Do you remember?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I do. His name is Colonel Steve Bucci, and he
told that to my civilian assistant.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. And the May 20th date, the
significance of that is the date he returned from Iraq?
Mr. Rumsfeld. That is my understanding.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. So it would have been at that time
or a subsequent date in all likelihood.
Mr. Rumsfeld. That is my understanding. That is not to say
that was the time, because I just simply don't recollect, but
that is my best information.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. As it gets refreshed. I understand.
When did you learn of the P-4 message? This message
suggested that senior leaders be warned about the friendly fire
possibility. And when you learned that these instructions had
been heeded, what was your reaction that there was a P-4
underway? Do you remember that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I don't remember when or from whom I learned
about the P-4, if at all. I don't recall even seeing it until
recent weeks in the aftermath of your previous hearings. But so
I just don't have any recollection of having seen it until more
recently.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. On March 6, 2006, you sent a
snowflake to your deputy, the Secretary of the Army, the Army
Chief of Staff and others, and in this memorandum you wrote, I
am not convinced the Army is the right organization to
undertake the fifth investigation of Pat Tillman's death.
Please consult with the right folks and come back to me with
options and a recommendation fast with the right way to
proceed.
Why did you believe the Army was not the right organization
to undertake the investigation which followed General Jones'
inquiry?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I don't remember the phraseology of
that, but my recollection is that I asked the question of the
deputy, who kind of is very deeply involved in the business of
the Department, that if there have been several investigations
by the Army, mightn't it be logical, that if still an
additional one was necessary, that one ought to consider where
is the best place to have that investigation conducted? I
didn't know the answer to the question, but I raised it with
the deputy, thinking that it is something that ought to be
addressed.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Did you believe the Jones
investigation was deficient in some way?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I had no reason to believe that, except that,
as I recall, we were moving into--the Army was moving into--the
command, whoever was doing the investigations, were moving into
the fifth one.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. So you were looking at fresh eyes,
basically.
On March 10, 2006, the DOD Early Bird publication included
a column from the Arizona Republic which discussed the Tillman
family's dissatisfaction with the notification process and the
subsequent investigations. On March 13th, you sent a copy of
this article, along with a memo, to the Secretary of the Army
and to Pete Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff. In this memo
you said, I would think you, Pete, would want to call and/or
write a letter of apology to the family and have it published.
This situation has been handled very poorly. It is not
acceptable, and you may want to say that. If you agree, you
will need to set about fixing the system or process that
produced this most unfortunate situation.
Do you remember that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I do. I don't have it in front of me, but
that sounds about right.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Do you know if they did as you
asked?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I don't. I know that--I have a vague
recollection that in one instance the Secretary of the Army
came back to me and indicated something to the effect that he
agreed generally with my note, but felt that he--they were
taking the appropriate steps or something. And I just don't
recall it.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. On March 13, 2006, 3 days later, the
DOD Early Bird publication included a column from the Atlanta
Constitution, which further discussed various complaints about
the notification process and the subsequent investigation of
Corporal Tillman's death. Two days later, March 15th, you sent
a copy of this article, along with another memo, to the
Secretary of the Army. In this memo you said, here is an
article on the death of Corporal Tillman. How in the world can
that be explained? I guess did the Secretary offer any
explanation on the various foul-ups in this matter to you? And
what was your reaction at this point to any explanation he
might have given?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I can't remember specifically, but as
you read those things, obviously, I, as Secretary of Defense--
one feels terrible that a situation like that is being handled
in a way that is unsatisfactory and that additional
investigations were required. On the other hand, a Secretary of
Defense has to try to pose it as questions rather than
assertions, because I didn't--I was not intimately
knowledgeable of the nature of those investigations. I wasn't
in a position to give direction without risking command
influence, in my view. And as a result, I posed these memos to
these people responsible with questions rather than assertions.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I would just last, seeing where we are today and how this
was handled, you are Secretary of Defense, how do you feel
about it?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I feel, as I indicated in my opening
remarks, a great deal of heartbreak for the Tillman family, and
deep concern, and a recognition that the way the matter was
handled added to their grief. And it is a most unfortunate
situation that anyone has to agree is something that the
Department has to find ways to avoid in the future. We owe the
young men and women who serve our country better than that.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. You think we certainly owe the
Tillman family an apology the way this was handled?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Indeed, as I said in my memo sometime back.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you.
Mr. Rumsfeld. And as I have said publicly here today.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. Let me announce to the Members there are
votes going on, but we are going to continue the hearing. So if
you wish to respond to the vote and come back, we are going to
proceed on the line of questioning.
Mrs. Maloney.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all the
panelists for your service and for cooperating with the
committee today.
I would like to followup on General Myers' testimony, where
you testified that you learned that Corporal Tillman had been
killed by friendly fire at the end of April, and that you
reached out to your public affairs officer to calibrate your
response in order to be absolutely accurate and precise in your
response. Yet May 3rd, there was a memorial service held for
Corporal Tillman, which got a great--he was on the cover of
Sports Illustrated. It was national news that he had been
killed in hostile fire. And at this memorial service he
received the Silver Star, if I recall. And yet the family and
the world at this point on May 3rd were told that he died with
hostile fire, when you knew, as head of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, that he died with friendly fire, and you knew this for a
month before, and in your own words you wanted to be precise
about this information.
Why did you not come forward and tell the family and tell
the public the truth? The family was not told the truth until
the end of May.
General Myers. Well, first of all, I did not know that
Corporal Tillman had been killed by friendly fire. I didn't say
that. What I said was that I was informed that it is possibly
friendly fire, and that there is an investigation ongoing.
In terms of notifying the family, that is in Army channels,
and we have just talked about the regret there is for the fact
that was not done properly. If it had been done properly, my
assumption would be they would have known before the memorial
service. So I did not know it was friendly fire until the
investigation.
Like Secretary Rumsfeld, when you are in a senior position,
you have to be very careful what you say about it. And that is
why I talked to the public affairs officer. By the way, I
talked to my former public affairs officer----
Mrs. Maloney. Yet, General Myers, you knew that he died,
that there was a possibility that he died by friendly fire. We
are told all the time in the press possibilities. We are told,
hopefully, the truth. So at that point you knew then, I assume
many people knew, that there was a possibility that he died by
friendly fire, and yet that was not disclosed until a full
month afterwards.
The family would have wanted to hear the truth. They
testified they would have wanted to hear the truth. And if
there was a possibility, they would have wanted to hear the
possibilities. And usually in this country what we hear is the
possibilities, and hopefully the truth coming forward. And yet
in this, this was not--you sat on your hands and you didn't say
anything about it. And I find that hard to understand.
General Myers. Well, as you understand, I think, from the
materials that have been presented to the committee so far and
all the testimony, this is the responsibility of the U.S. Army,
not of the Office of the Chairman. And so I regret that the
Army did not do their duty here and follow their own policy,
which we have talked about. But they did not. My assumption
would have to be--my assumption----
Mrs. Maloney. General Myers, do you regret your actions
that you did not reach out--you were the head of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The Army is under you.
General Myers. That is not entirely correct.
Mrs. Maloney. Let's get into what is right and fair and not
the----
General Myers. What is right and fair is exactly what
Secretary Rumsfeld talked about. What was right and fair is to
follow Army policy and notify the family when they think there
is a possibility.
Mrs. Maloney. So the family should have been notified that
there was a possibility.
General Myers. According to the Army regulations, as I
understand them, that is correct. By the way, the Marine
regulations don't. They don't notify until they are for sure is
my understanding.
Mrs. Maloney. So the Army did not follow their guidelines
that they should have told the family and the public that there
was a possibility that our hero, our football hero and war
hero, died by friendly fire.
General Myers. They should have talked about the
possibility of that as soon as they knew it, according to the
regulations, absolutely.
Mrs. Maloney. I would like to ask Secretary Rumsfeld,
Corporal Tillman was a very, very famous soldier when he
enlisted. It was very acknowledged by many people. He was a
professional football player; he was offered millions of
dollars in a contract that he turned down to serve our country.
He captured your attention when he enlisted in May 2002, and
you sent a letter on June 28, 2002, which I would like to make
part of the record. And in it you write him and you say, I
heard that you are leaving the National Football League to
become an Army Ranger. It is a proud and patriotic thing that
you are doing.
We also received yesterday----
Chairman Waxman. Without objection that will be made part
of the record.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you.
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Mrs. Maloney. We also received yesterday a snowflake that
you sent about Corporal Tillman that is dated June 25, 2002.
And a snowflake is a name that you give to memos that are sent
to senior defense officials. And you sent this snowflake to
Thomas White, then-Secretary of the Army. And the subject line
is Pat Tillman. And let me read what you said here. ``Here is
an article on a fellow who is apparently joining the Rangers.
He sounds like he is world-class. We might want to keep an eye
on him.''
May I put this in the record, sir?
Chairman Waxman. Without objection, that will be ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Chairman Waxman. The gentlelady's time has expired. Did you
want to----
Mrs. Maloney. May I ask for an additional----
Chairman Waxman. Were you leading to a question?
Mrs. Maloney. Yes, I was.
Chairman Waxman. OK. Would you ask it quickly?
Mrs. Maloney. When Corporal Tillman was killed in 2004, was
this a blow to you when you heard this news?
Mr. Rumsfeld. It is. Clearly it is a blow when you read of
a death of a young man or a young woman who is serving our
country in uniform and gives their lives. It is always a
heartbreaking thing for anyone in a position of responsibility
to read about.
Mrs. Maloney. That's----
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mrs. Maloney.
Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Myers, just for the record, you are not in the
chain--you were not in the chain of command as the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs; is that correct?
General Myers. No. The chairman is the principal military
adviser to the President and the National Security Council, and
I am not in the operational chain of command, no.
Mr. Issa. So your influence during your tenure there is
designed to be to make policy recommendations to the President,
to the Secretary, that then at their discretion are
implemented. And as a result, even though you are informed, and
obviously you have the respect of the men that you have served
with for so many years, in fact, when we want to look at the
chain of command, we should not be looking at you as part of
that except to the extent that you knew about something; is
that correct?
General Myers. I think that is substantially correct.
Mr. Issa. OK. And I am going to--first of all, I am going
to join with all of you in saying that we regret from the dais
the heartburn, the heartache and the suffering that the Tillman
family went through, and that is one of the reasons that
Government Oversight and Reform has to take a role in seeing
that this doesn't happen again, if at all possible.
I also want to make available for the record our
assessment, which is out of 41 Members on the dais here today,
there are only 8 who ever served in the military. And all of us
who served in the military served, as far as I know, at the
rank of captain or less. So I am not going to claim, as one of
those, that we are especially knowledgeable of everything that
could go wrong in every situation. But let's go through a
couple of things that seem to be left unchanged.
We understand that a three-star general has lost a star as
a result not just of ineptness during the process, but of false
statements. Is that your understanding also?
Mr. Rumsfeld. No.
Mr. Issa. That has not happened yet?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Not to my knowledge. I read the paper this
morning, and it said the issue as to whether or not he ought to
keep his third star is something that should be given to a
review panel, if I am not mistaken.
Mr. Issa. OK. I think I will join with the recommendation
that the general's lies--we are not a body in the military who
accept false statements. Mistakes, yes; false statements, no.
So I would hope that appropriate action is taken. But as far as
I can tell, that is the only lie.
But there is an unresolved issue, and I hope that is the
focus here today. As I understand it, the Army has a policy
that during an investigation of a possible fratricide, you do
inform the family that is a possibility. Is that all of your
understanding here today for the Army?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I have no knowledge of what that Army reg
says.
General Brown. It is my understanding and I think the
policy is no later than 30 days from the time that the
investigation--that there is an investigation, you must
immediately notify the family, but in no cases later than 30
days. I think that is a regulation that came into effect about
2003. And I don't know what the regulation was before 2003.
Mr. Issa. Army regulation 600-8-1 will be placed in the
record without objection.
Chairman Waxman. Without objection, that will be the order.
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Mr. Issa. It is also my understanding as someone who has
44,000 Marines, some of them on their fourth deployment in
Afghanistan and Iraq at Camp Pendleton, that the Marines have
the opposite policy, that in fact if Corporal Tillman had been
a Marine the policy is not to inform until the completion of
the investigation period. Is that also on your understanding to
the extent that you know?
General Abizaid. Yes, that is the Marine policy as I
understand it.
Mr. Issa. Then I certainly think from the dais here today
we would hope, General Brown, to the extent that you convey it
and for those behind you taking notes that we can't have two
policies. There has to be one policy because it is the only way
that in a joint world that we're going to have the kind of
joint understanding of what to do. And Secretary Rumsfeld, you
are one of the big cheerleaders and author of jointness.
Wouldn't you agree that we have to, much as possible, not have
two standards when people are fighting side by side?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Congressman, we have different policies in
the respective services on literally dozens and dozens of
things.
Mr. Issa. I know, Secretary Rumsfeld.
Mr. Rumsfeld. You know that.
Mr. Issa. I know, but the question here because we have
this O&R oversight we want to know why a legitimate hero who
died a hero, whose Silver Star should say he stood up to
protect his men while they were under friendly fire because he
tried to stop that firing from killing the rest of his unit,
every bit as deserving of that or even greater award, why that
wasn't correct. That is the oversight. We can't change that.
Others will have to.
But on the reform side--and I will ask indulgences for a
moment since we are a little short anyway--isn't it appropriate
that today we consider or ask the DOD to consider as much as
possible unifying those things? And General Brown, I will ask
it to you because you are the only one still on active duty. As
a supreme commander, as a combatant, as whatever role you are
in the future when you have multiple different forces, wouldn't
it be extremely desirable for the Department of Defense to
undertake unifying these standards to prevent the kind of
misunderstanding that clearly Colonel Nixon and others had in
this process.
General Brown. Absolutely, and I will be glad to take that
back to the Department of Defense and ask them to take a look
at that.
Mr. Issa. Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Issa.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much. Secretary Rumsfeld, I
want to ask how is it possible that you didn't know before May
20th that Corporal Tillman died by friendly fire? And I will
ask you--we developed a chart which I will put up now on the
wall. In this chart, we show what the committee had learned up
to that point, which was that at least nine Pentagon officials,
including three generals, either knew or were informed of the
suspected fratricide in the first 72 hours after it occurred.
We have continued to investigate.
And now I would like to put up another chart. Here we
identify Pentagon officials who knew of the fratricide before
the American public and the Tillman family at the end of May
2004.
This chart shows that at least 30 people knew, including
some of the highest ranking military officials in our
government. Even this is not comprehensive. The committee
interviewed Lieutenant General John Craddock on July 27th. In
2004 he was your Senior Military Assistant. He is now the head
of NATO. He told us that he didn't learn of the fratricide in
any official capacity but rather from his neighbor, General Jim
Lovelace, who was the Director of the Army Staff. This is how
General Craddock described it and we will put that on the
board. He said, Jim Lovelace is my neighbor at Fort Myer.
Because he was my neighbor, in a social setting we had, I would
say frequent, when a couple of times a month we talked to each
other outside or something on the weekend. The best that I can
recollect was over the fence at my quarters 1 weekend Jim
Lovelace said something to me that Tillman may have been killed
by friendly fire. I recall being surprised and taken aback
quite frankly.
If this was common knowledge among the top military ranks,
Secretary Rumsfeld, something that was talked about across the
backyard fences, how is it possible that you did not know?
Mr. Rumsfeld. You have a date, Congressman, on when this
backyard fence discussion took place?
Mr. Cummings. No, he didn't give us a specific date, Mr.
Secretary.
Mr. Rumsfeld. You're talking about an institution of
something like 3 million people. Active duty, reserve, guard,
civilians, contractors. There are so many things going on in
that Department in any given year, there is something like
7,000 courts martial with probably that many investigations
going on at any year.
It isn't possible--it is like a city of 3 million people,
it is not possible for someone to know all the things that are
going on.
Mr. Cummings. I understand, Mr. Secretary. Believe me, I
would not be asking you these questions if it were not for the
fact that we had a hero here, one that you were well aware of,
and so I thought maybe you might have knowledge of it.
I don't want my time to run out because I have a rather
more pointed question that I want to get to. In our hearing in
April, Pat Tillman's mother, Mary Tillman, and this is one of
the most wrenching hearings I have attended in 11 years, was
asked about the possibility that you didn't know and this was
her response. And I want you to listen to it. This is from a
mother whose son had been killed in war. She said, I've been
doing a lot of reading about former Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld. And I believe just from what I learned about him as a
person, and his expectations for his staff, that he would have
had this information.
I think what Mary Tillman said capsulates what many
Americans feel. It does not seem credible that you didn't know
this information. But let me go back to what you said in your
opening statement. And I was so impressed with the statement
that you said--that you put out. You said this and you wrote
it. It says, when you talk about what you expected of the
military, you said: DOD officials must tell the truth and must
be believed to be telling the truth or our important work is
undermined. And then you said something that was very
interesting. You went on to say in the closing remarks: Any
errors in such a situation are most unfortunate. The Tillmans
were owed the truth, delivered in a forthright and a timely
manner.
And then General Geren yesterday said that he didn't
believe that there was a cover-up. I ask you, sir, most
respectfully, do you think that the Tillmans received the
truth? And I ask all of you, do you think there was a cover-up
by DOD?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Let me respond this way. First, the words--I
read the testimony of your previous hearing. I agree with you
that they are--it was a heartwrenching hearing. And the words
that you cited from his mother obviously were the words of a
grieving mother. And as I recall the testimony, she did go on
to say that she has no facts nor paper, no information to
confirm her belief, which I thought was gracious of her,
because I know of no facts to confirm her belief. And I know of
no one else who has any facts or paper to confirm her belief.
Mr. Cummings. Sir, are you claiming there was an error? You
mentioned error, error. Is there a difference between a lie and
an error, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, certainly there is a difference between
the two. And I don't know how many investigations--some people
have said five, some six, some seven--but every single one of
them has suggested that was badly handled and errors were made.
But in no instance has any evidence of a cover-up, to use the
phrase you use, been presented or put forward. I know of
nothing that suggests that.
I know that I would not engage in a cover-up. I know that
no one in the White House suggested such a thing to me. I know
that the gentlemen sitting next to me are men of enormous
integrity and would not participate in something like that. So
of course there is a difference between error and cover-up.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Cummings, your time is up but you did
ask a question that you wanted all of the witnesses to answer.
And I guess the question would be since the information was
distorted and O'Neal's--Staff Sergeant O'Neal's statement was
rewritten to give a different statement than what he put
forward, and the family wasn't informed for the longest time,
and all these other problems, do any of you think there was a
cover-up of the errors or actions below?
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, I can only say that in the
places that I worked, I would agree totally with Secretary
Rumsfeld that whether it was the White House or in the
Secretary's office or when the Joint Chiefs of Staff met or
when I talked to General Abizaid, there was no--never any
attempt to cover up anything. In fact this was not an issue
that we discussed. I just didn't discuss this issue. We had a
lot of issues. We mourn every death. We really do. We cry with
the parents and the friends and family.
Chairman Waxman. I guess the question is different. I am
not asking you whether you were a part of a cover-up. Do you
think there was a cover-up?
General Myers. I have no way of knowing. I don't have all
the information.
Chairman Waxman. General Abizaid, do you have any comments?
General Abizaid. No, sir, I don't think there was a cover-
up. I think people tried to do the right thing and the right
thing didn't happen.
General Brown. I agree with General Abizaid, I don't think
there was a cover-up.
Chairman Waxman. OK. Thank you. Mr. Mica has arrived. So we
will recognize you now.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. Is that another vote? In any event,
thank you for yielding to me. Welcome, Mr. Secretary, and the
generals.
I didn't get a chance to make an opening statement but just
a couple of comments and a quick question or two. First,
welcome back, Secretary Rumsfeld. I have been around this place
since 1970. My first boss was Congressman Cramer from Florida
who passed away some time ago. But I've never seen more
dedicated public servants--dedicated servant or service to this
country than Donald Rumsfeld has provided.
I think on my dying day I will remember September 11th when
I was with Donald Rumsfeld in the Pentagon for breakfast that
morning. He invited me and half a dozen Members, I think, over
to the Pentagon. And the subject of the conversation Donald
Rumsfeld was interested in was the military had been downsized
during the nineties since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and what
we were going to do about a situation if we had another--the
word used was ``incident.'' I remember in the conversation
sitting in the room right off of his office for coffee that
morning, and he was trying to make certain that we were
prepared for something that we might not expect.
I was with Pete Geren, too, who is now the Secretary of the
Army and Pete has done an excellent job. He did an excellent
job for you then and he has done an excellent job for you too.
I can't remember if he was a Democrat or a Republican. I think
he was a Democrat that you enlisted as an aide, well respected
by everyone on both sides of the aisle.
There is a hero sitting right there, because that morning I
left just a few minutes--we learned together of the attack on
the World Trade Center. And this Secretary rolled up his
sleeves and went down to save people who had been victimized by
the terrorist attack on the Pentagon. I just made it back here
as the plane hit. I will never forget that morning or your
service to our Nation.
The purpose of this is, you know we do have a
responsibility to look into this, just as you do. But from the
information you provided, I don't see a cover-up. I see--and
they are looking for the higher level, I mean they are trying
to get the trail to the generals and to the Secretary and the
White House if they can.
Let me read from this comment Pete Geren said: We have made
a number of mistakes. In fact, I cannot imagine the situation
could have been more poorly handled. And he does go on and tell
how I believe this is appropriately handled and those who made
errors were held accountable. 99.9 percent of the military do
an outstanding job. And I thank you for setting an example.
These folks were held accountable; is that correct, General
Myers, all generals?
General Myers. From what I understand, that's correct.
Mr. Mica. Pete Geren said here: But at no time did the Army
try to cover up the truth or deceive the American public about
how Colonel Tillman died. Would you say that is correct Mr.
Secretary?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Congressman, thank you very much for your
comments. As you, I have a lot of respect for Pete Geren. And I
have every reason to believe that his investigation was
thorough and proper and that his remarks are correct. I was not
involved. I'm out of the Department now for many, many months,
and I have not reviewed the investigation by General Wallace
and therefore I can't comment.
Mr. Mica. OK. Also in this memo from Pete Geren it says,
it's important to note that consistent with the DOD's Inspector
General's report, General Wallace found no evidence that anyone
in the chain of command sought to cover up the fact that
Corporal Tillman died by friendly fire. General Myers, any of
the generals know anything other than this?
General Myers. I know nothing other than that. I have not
seen the Secretary's statement, but it is consistent with other
things I have seen.
Mr. Mica. OK. And when we held the last hearing on this, of
course our hearts go out to the Tillman family. The loss of
anyone--any life is a tragedy. But I remembered at the hearing
when we first held this it was at the time of the Corzine
accident in New Jersey and the first media accounts came out
that somebody had cutoff the driver and some bad driver had
caused the accident. And then we found out through some
investigation that they were actually going 90 miles an hour
and the Governor didn't have a seat belt on.
Here is an incident that happened halfway around the world,
and in a combat situation and sometimes it is difficult to get
those reports and the information back. Is that not correct,
General? General Myers.
General Myers. I think that's absolutely correct. And you
know, around the Department of Defense we usually say the first
reports, just like aircraft accidents, other mishaps, are
probably wrong and we generally don't react to first reports.
We wait for other data.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. May the other gentlemen respond.
General Abizaid. I would just say that reports initially of
a combat action always have some inaccuracies of some sort and
we always say the first report is always wrong. But I think
again we tried to clarify this as quickly as we could, and
that's where the difficulties took place.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. Anybody else want to respond? If not, Mr.
Tierney is recognized.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much. If we direct our
attention back to the P-4, the P-4 memo that General McChrystal
sent out, you said he had become aware, ``of suspected reports
that POTUS, the President of the United States, and the
Secretary of the Army might include comments about Corporal
Tillman's heroism and his approved Silver Star medal in
speeches currently being prepared, not knowing the specifics
surrounding his death.'' So obviously the objective of that P-4
was to get those specifics, the fact that there was a
fratricidal investigation going on, to the appropriate people
to the White House.
General Abizaid, you were the primary addressee on the
memo, and I think it was not uncommon for the President to
direct conversations with the combatant commander such as
yourself. Did you take any steps to alert the White House that
Corporal Tillman's death was suspected as friendly fire?
General Abizaid. No, sir. I talked directly to the
chairman.
Mr. Tierney. Having that direct relationship with the
President and knowing that it was specifically put in the P-4,
that in fact there was a concern that the President might make
a statement about the conditions surrounding that event, why
didn't you take it up yourself to make sure that the White
House was informed?
General Abizaid. I did not take it upon myself to inform
the White House directly nor did I ever when I was in command.
When something would come up in our normal meetings with the
President, I would have a free flowing conversation, but I
usually commented through the chairman or directly with the
Secretary.
Mr. Tierney. And that's the case even when there is some
immediacy in the memo indicating that the President might be in
the position to make an embarrassing statement unless he was
warned otherwise?
General Abizaid. First of all, I received the message late,
which is clearly a problem within my own headquarters. When I
received the message late, I talked to the chairman. I also saw
the two other addressees, General Brown and the Army, and after
having talked to the chairman, it became clear to me that the
chairman knew about it and I presumed that the information
flowed in Washington through Army channels as I might have
expected. Those assumptions were obviously incorrect.
Mr. Tierney. General Brown, what about you? Did you notify
the White House about the possibility that Corporal Tillman was
killed by his own unit after you saw that memo?
General Brown. No, sir. I didn't.
Mr. Tierney. And why didn't you do that knowing that there
was some immediacy to the memo?
General Brown. Well, sir, first of all on the P-4, I was an
info addressee, which is not the primary addressee.
Mr. Tierney. If I could interrupt, I understand. But
General Abizaid said the reason that he didn't do it was
because you were on the memo. So he must have expected that you
would do something. That was ill placed?
General Brown. No, I don't think anybody would expect me to
call the President of the United States based on the comment
made on an info message where I was an info addressee.
Mr. Tierney. General Myers, at that time you were the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You were the principal
military adviser to the President and the National Security
Council, the Secretary of Defense. Did you advise the President
or anyone at the White House that there was a fratricide
investigation?
General Myers. Bear in mind again I had not seen the P-4.
All I knew was that there was potential for fratricide, there
was an investigation ongoing. I do not recall and am fully
certain I didn't talk to anyone at the White House about that.
Mr. Tierney. Did anybody at your staff talk to anybody at
the White House?
General Myers. I can't tell you that. There are some
things, by the way, that circulate in public affairs channels
that could be like that. But I wasn't aware of that.
Mr. Tierney. Who on your staff would have been in that
loop, the public affairs loop?
General Myers. My public affairs officer was then Captain
Frank Thorpe, and I do remember talking to him about the
potential of fratricide and saying we have to be cautious here;
if we make any comments, we have to bear that in mind.
Mr. Tierney. And who would that person's contact at the
White House be?
General Myers. I don't know. Routinely he would never talk
to the White House. They would talk to the services' public
affairs officers. He would also talk to the Office of Secretary
of Defense's public affairs folks. But I can't imagine him ever
talking to the White House, unless it was on a conference call
where he was included.
Mr. Tierney. Secretary Rumsfeld, let me ask you the same
question to close things out. Did you advise the President or
anyone at the White House that there was evidence that Corporal
Tillman was killed by friendly fire at any time?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I don't recall. Clearly it would be logical
that I would have or someone in my office would have after the
information became readily available and the family was
notified and it became a subject of interest. Then one would
want to know--make sure that the White House was aware of it
and there were daily calls back and forth between the National
Security Council and the office.
Mr. Tierney. General Myers indicated at one point there was
fairly common knowledge around this. Who in your office or the
Secretary's office would have had the kind of contact with the
National Security Council staff or the White House on a subject
like that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. There are multiple contacts each day and they
would happen throughout military assistants, they would happen
through the civilian assistants, they would happen through the
public affairs. General Myers and I would meet with the
President at least once a week.
Mr. Tierney. Setting aside----
Mr. Rumsfeld. Just a second, please, and let me just
complete the thought. And in addition, we were in National
Security Council meetings and principal committees meetings on
a regular basis during the week. Probably five times a week.
Mr. Tierney. You are telling me that neither you or General
Myers have any recollection of either of you gentlemen telling
anybody, so who on your staff--who would you suggest on your
staff that we could talk to that might have had conversations
with the White House on that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I just don't know other than my response to
you as to the kind of contacts that took place on a regular
basis.
General Myers. I would agree. I wouldn't know who to say.
Mr. Tierney. You don't know who made those contacts on a
regular basis?
General Myers. There were multiple people depending on the
subject. But on this subject, I wouldn't know of anybody.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Tierney, your time has expired. Mr.
Platts.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
holding this hearing as we continue to address this very
important matter. And I know that all of us here, both our
witnesses, those in the audience and committee and staff,
continue to have the Tillman family and all the families of our
courageous men and women who have given their lives in defense
of our country in our prayers. And I know certainly with the
four of our witnesses, given your distinguished careers and
patriotic service to our Nation, that you all share in the
regret that we all feel in how the Tillman family learned of
the true manner in which their loved one gave his life. And I
certainly appreciate your volunteering to be here today so that
we can get to the bottom of this.
I want to followup, I know my colleague Mr. Issa of
California asked the question about uniformity and, General
Brown, you stated that you would take that recommendation back.
I want to add my support for the services coming together as
one who has followed up with 17 families in my district, either
whose loved ones gave their lives in Iraq, Afghanistan, off the
coast of Djibouti, and knowing how those families want as much
information as possible and have followed up with me, and we
worked with the various military branches.
Sometimes it is difficult as a Member in working with
families because of the variances in the branches, in how we
get noticed and when we get noticed and how we can then help
the families. I want to echo Mr. Issa's suggestion that this be
pursued. And in addition, General Brown, you doing it within
the ranks of Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers and General
Abizaid, given your historic and great service and your
knowledge of the importance of these issues, would encourage
you to even on the civilian side to join in in helping to push
that issue forward for uniformity within the branches.
Secretary Rumsfeld, I want to followup a question that
Ranking Member Davis asked. A memo of March 2006 where you, in
communicating to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of
Staff of the Army, of the unacceptable nature of how things
played out and that they need to address it. As we are here
today--because I think the reminder that we're Oversight and
Government Reform and to me what I hope we get out of today is
how to make sure this never happens again--is with, Secretary
Rumsfeld, you or other witnesses, your knowledge of what
changes have been made to ensure this does not repeat itself.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I very briefly, I am sure there have
been a great many changes made that I am not aware of. But in
the aftermath of the early investigations, I am told that the
Army instituted a number of changes and adjustments in how they
handled things and that those have been reported to the
committee and the Congress.
Mr. Platts. General Brown, could you comment on that?
General Brown. Well, I think the big--I think Secretary of
the Army Geren said yesterday the changes are important, but
you have to execute the changes and execute the process the way
it is designed if you are going to change the process.
And the fact that the Army regulation we talked about
earlier, 600-8 I think it is, that requires the family to be
notified and I think in that regulation it also says to keep
them constantly updated and no later than 30 days, I think that
regulation is the answer to a lot of these problems, having
been through fratricide problems before in my career; that
proper execution of that process will help us not to have these
kind of problems in the future.
While I'm on it, I would also totally agree with you. I
think the way that is written today sounds to me, and I am not
familiar at all with the Marines' policy or Air Force policy or
any of those, but it sounds to me like the right policy or the
right regulation for all the services.
So I think you can--they have made changes, I think, but
you have to execute the changes the way they are designed if
you want to solve, fix this very difficult process.
Mr. Platts. General Abizaid.
General Abizaid. Congressman, if I may, we found out a lot
of things in the course of this conflict about systems that we
have in place that really don't make sense for the modern
world. In the world of e-mail and in the world of
telecommunication, phones with the soldiers in the field,
cameras, etc., that it is almost impossible to stop the flow of
information from the field.
I can remember when my daughter was informed about her
husband's being wounded it came not from the Department of the
Army initially, but from an e-mail that came from somebody in
the field. Not only was it incorrect in the way that was
initially conveyed to her but it had some other bad information
in there.
Nevertheless, what we have to do is figure out how to deal
with these communications means that are ubiquitous in the
field and figure out how we are going to deal with them when
these bad things happen which will continue to happen.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, General Abizaid. My time has
expired. My sincere thanks for each of you being here and my
thanks for your service to the Nation.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Platts. Ms.
Watson.
Ms. Watson. I want to address my questions to Secretary
Rumsfeld. On July 26, 2007, you wrote a letter to the committee
which I'd like to make part of the record. And in that letter
you made the following statement: The Tillmans were owed the
truth, unvarnished and delivered in a forthright manner, and
the Department owed it to the memory of a man who sacrificed
his life, gave up a very lucrative career, to serve his
country.
And I certainly could not agree more. And in fact I believe
it is the standard that everyone in the Department should be
held to--everyone, including yourself. But my question is
whether or not you met this standard. We sent you a list of six
questions and you did not address those questions. And within
your letter you said I don't recall and I've not been here the
full time, but quite frequently you have said I don't recall.
Now I have a document here that the IG sent, and there is a
copy of it probably up on the marquees for all of you to see.
And it is a memo, six pages, with over two dozen specific
investigative questions, many with subparts, about your
involvement in handling the case. Do you remember the Inspector
General's questions? Do you remember this document that was
sent to you?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I do.
Ms. Watson. OK. And I won't read all of them. But here is
one particular one. When you were told friendly fire----
Mr. Rumsfeld. What number is that?
Ms. Watson. Let's see, I am just going to read it to you.
They are listed here, and there is a number. Let's see if I can
find the one I am reading. Let me read it to you.
When you were told friendly fire was suspected, did you
know the family was told that enemy fire caused Corporal
Tillman's death?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I'm sorry, could you repeat that? Your voice
dropped and I missed a word or two.
Ms. Watson. Sorry, I'm a little ways from the mic. When you
were told friendly fire was suspected, did you know the family
was told that enemy fire caused Corporal Tillman's death and
the family was not to be informed the death was under
investigation? Do you recall that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. No, I did not know that the family--I did not
know what you just said.
Ms. Watson. OK. You did not know that the family--I just
want to get it for the record. You did not know that the family
was told that enemy fire caused Corporal Tillman's death and
the family was not to be informed that death was under
investigation? You did not know that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I have no recollection that anyone ever said
to me that the family should not be told the truth or that it
was possibly friendly fire or friendly fire. I have no
recollection of anyone suggesting that.
Ms. Watson. You were unaware the family was told that it
was enemy fire that caused Corporal Tillman's death?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I think everyone was told that.
Ms. Watson. No, did you?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I was aware from the press and I knew nothing
other than in those early days, April 22nd, when he was killed.
I did not have knowledge other than what was in the press that
he was killed by enemy fire.
The information that it first was a possibility of
fratricide came later and in no instance was I told that people
had the belief that it might have been fratricide and that no
one should tell the family that. I had no knowledge of that,
which I believe was your question.
Ms. Watson. OK. I'm just giving you an example of what was
asked of you and my question is whether you remember these
questions.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I've got them in front of me.
Ms. Watson. Do you remember them?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I remember--I do not remember them from the
time they apparently were originally provided. But I do--have
seen them, I've read them and I believe I have answered all of
those that I am able to answer.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mrs. Watson, your time is up.
Ms. Watson. Maybe he can answer--I just wanted to mention
this so maybe he can respond while he is answering some other
questions.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, could I make a comment on a
couple of things that have gone prior to this? One is there
were a couple of charts shown up there. I couldn't read any of
it and I don't want to have anyone to believe that I could read
those two charts that were put up.
Second, the Congressman asked the chairman if he was in the
chain of command and of course he answered he was not. I would
not want that to leave anyone with the question that he did not
have the same standard of care with respect to his public or
private utterances with respect to the risk of command
influence. Because in his position as chairman, clearly he had
to exercise the same degree of care that I did with respect to
that issue.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much.
Mr. McHugh.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen,
for being here. I appreciate deeply your service. Just to kind
of fill in the blank a little bit for some who may not be aware
of the military parlance. Let me start with General Abizaid.
General Abizaid, what is a P-4? What exactly does that
designate?
General Abizaid. A ``personal for'' communication is
usually a direct command communication from one commander to
another or to a series of commanders designed to pass
information that is considered very, very important.
Mr. McHugh. And this P-4----
General Myers. If I can, Mr. McHugh, it is also my
understanding of the P-4 as well is that it is supposed to be
pretty closely held. It is personal for the addressees to and
the info columns.
Mr. McHugh. An e-mail for eyes only?
General Myers. Pretty much. It's not supposed to get wide
distribution.
Mr. McHugh. This particular e-mail, this particular P-4 was
addressed to whom now? General Abizaid, General Brown?
General Abizaid. It was addressed to me and it was
addressed personal for U.S. Commander CENTCOM, commander U.S.
SOCOM, commander USASOC.
Mr. McHugh. Secretary Rumsfeld, would it be the normal
course of business in the Pentagon for the Secretary of Defense
to review or have synopses of or be informed of on a routine
basis P-4s at combatant command level?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I don't recall in 6 years every seeing one
until this hearing--prior to this hearing. It may be that I
have, but I just don't recall them. And there is certainly no
one who reaches in and grabs communications that are addressed
to other people and then gives me a synopsis of them. It just
doesn't happen that way.
Mr. McHugh. So it would not? I heard Secretary Rumsfeld--
and if others have responded, I apologize, this vote schedule
has been an inconvenience to our guests, certainly, but to
Members as well. I heard Secretary Rumsfeld say that at no time
does he recall having a conversation early in the process about
the fratricide involved with--in the Tillman case, but I didn't
hear the same question directed to General Myers.
General, did you ever have a discussion with the White
House, with the President prior to the final determination as
to this case?
General Myers. I cannot recall any time that I had a
conversation with the White House with anybody.
Mr. McHugh. Speechwriters included?
General Myers. Speechwriters included, about this case one
way or the other.
Mr. McHugh. General Abizaid, you were a frequent visitor to
the Hill, we were always bringing you back here time and time
again. I suspect while you were under command performance at
Capitol Hill you perhaps stopped by and had a chat at the White
House. Do you recall addressing this case with the President or
any of his key operatives?
General Abizaid. I didn't expect once I retired I would
continue this, but so it is. I was in Washington from the 18th
to the 20th and I talked with the Secretary during that period,
and I believe during that period I discussed with him the
fratricide investigation.
Mr. McHugh. The Secretary of Defense?
General Abizaid. Right. I don't recall mentioning it to the
President except perhaps after the period where I signed off on
the report that said it was absolutely friendly fire. Once we
confirmed the friendly fire, which was on the 28th.
Mr. McHugh. Have you had a chance to review General
Wallace's report?
General Abizaid. I have not seen General Wallace's report.
Mr. McHugh. General Brown, I see you shaking your head.
General Brown. No, sir.
Mr. McHugh. General Myers, have you?
General Myers. No, sir, I haven't.
Mr. McHugh. This is perhaps in that context not the fairest
question I might ask, but I'm going to ask it anyway. Welcome
to Congress. Based on what you heard about it, do you have any
exceptions, objections, comments, anything that you find
remarkable about it or just merit having it entered upon this
record? Let's go from the right to the left, no political
indication intended.
General Brown. Is the question--I'm not sure I understand
the question. I haven't seen----
Mr. McHugh. You haven't seen it, but you have heard about
it. Based on what you have heard would you like to make any
comments?
General Brown. No, I don't think I would like to make any
comments.
Mr. McHugh. It is not the fairest question without having
had it before you. General Abizaid.
General Abizaid. No, sir, I don't have any comments on it.
Mr. McHugh. General Myers.
General Myers. No, sir, I don't have any comments on it.
Back to my previous statement on the White House. It would have
been logical in our many meetings with the White House for the
President or the Secretary or I to regret the Tillman death,
because it was widely known. But it would have been a 5 or 10-
second affair. And I don't recall that, but it would have been
logical that we would have done something like that.
Mr. McHugh. But not about the questions was this a friendly
fire or other kind of death?
General Myers. I don't recall that we ever talked about
that.
Mr. McHugh. I see my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. McHugh.
Mr. Clay.
Mr. Clay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Corporal Pat Tillman
committed to serve his country, not to serving as a symbol for
promoting President Bush's war. Corporal Tillman's mother,
Mary, believes that this has been a complete donkey show and I
certainly agree with her assessment.
The Tillman family gave the ultimate sacrifice for their
country and they deserve to know the full truth behind Corporal
Tillman's death.
Let me ask the entire panel, on April 30, 2004, the Army
Special Operations Command announced that Corporal Tillman has
been posthumously awarded the Silver Star. The award of a
Silver Star was a major development. It was rushed through so
it would be ready in time for the memorial service for Corporal
Tillman on May 3, 2004, which was widely covered by the press.
According to Pentagon regulations, the Silver Star is to be
awarded for gallantry in action against an enemy of the United
States. And before I turn to the specifics of the award, can
anyone on the panel tell me who officially awarded the Silver
Star to Corporal Tillman? Can anyone answer that? Mr.
Secretary?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I have no idea who the individual was who
actually awarded the Silver Star. I do know that the process
does not include the Secretary of Defense at all. It is signed
off on only by the Secretary of the Army and the recommendation
comes up from the command to the Secretary of the Army and the
Secretary of the Army signs the certificate. Who was physically
present to present that to the extent it was presented
posthumously, I don't know. But I wasn't involved in the Silver
Star at all.
Mr. Clay. General Myers, would you know?
General Myers. My understanding was it came up from the
Department of the Army channels and was approved by the
Secretary or the Acting Secretary at the time. In my prep for
this I was told that there was a board that usually meets on
those high level awards to approve the award. The chairman's
office was not involved in this award in any way. It was an
Army matter.
Mr. Clay. General.
General Abizaid. Sir, the awards go through service
channels, not through joint channels.
General Brown. Sir, I agree with everything they said, but
I do not know who awarded the Silver Star at the memorial
service.
Mr. Clay. The answer is President Bush. And let me put up a
copy of the Silver Star citation. As you can see, it says the
President of the United States of America has awarded the
Silver Star to Corporal Patrick Tillman. So this is important.
I know the President didn't actually review the supporting
documentation for this award, but this award was given in the
President's name. And that authority should be exercised only
with the utmost care. But that didn't happen. Instead the
Silver Star citation was false.
And here is what it says: Corporal Tillman put himself in
the line of devastating enemy fire as he maneuvered his fire
team to a covered position from which they could effectively
employ their weapons at known enemy positions.
In his March 26, 2007, report, the Defense Department
Inspector General concluded that the Silver Star citation and
supporting documents had materially inaccurate statements and
erroneously implied that Corporal Tillman died by enemy fire.
Everyone on this panel learned before the Tillman family and
the American public that Corporal Tillman was likely killed by
his own unit.
Can each of you please explain why you did not intervene to
correct the record? I guess we will start with you, Mr.
Secretary.
Mr. Rumsfeld. As I said, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense is not involved in the Silver Star award at all. I was
not knowledgeable about it, did not sign off on it, did not
know of the language at all.
Mr. Clay. Do you think he should have been awarded it?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I think from what I understand, the language
of the award is to be reviewed or has been reviewed in view of
the facts that are subsequently available.
Mr. Clay. Thank you. General Myers.
General Myers. My response is essentially like Secretary
Rumsfeld's. The chairman's office, the Joint Staff is not
involved in these awards. This is an Army responsibility. And
like the Secretary, I understand that the wording is being
looked at and I also understand--and I can't tell you where I
heard this--it may have been in the prep--that General
McChrystal thought the actions were heroic whether or not they
came from enemy fire or friendly fire. That was his
determination.
Mr. Clay. Thank you. General.
General Abizaid. Sir, in General McChrystal's personal
forward he said the potential that he might have been killed by
friendly fire in no way detracts from his witnessed heroism or
the recommended personal decoration for valor in the face of
the enemy. I believe that the Army has looked at the award on
several different occasions. They have upheld it on every
occasion. Whether or not the wording was correct or not in the
initial stage, I do believe that the Corporal Tillman deserved
the award that he received.
Mr. Clay. Thank you for your response. General, please?
General Brown. Sir, I believe that I agree with General
Abizaid. I have talked to General McChrystal several times and
the actions of Corporal Tillman, based on the discussion I had
with General McChrystal, certainly would warrant a Silver Star.
Awards goes through service channels, as everyone else here has
mentioned here, and do not go through Special Operations
Command, Tampa, FL. It is an administrative command, goes
through the administrative chain, which is U.S. Army, not
Special Operations Command.
Mr. Clay. Thank you for your response, and over and over
and again what we have heard--Mr. Chairman, may I conclude?
Chairman Waxman. If you will conclude.
Mr. Clay. We have heard the excuse that the military did
not want to tell the Tillman family and the American public
about the fratricide until the investigation was complete. As
General McChrystal put it, they didn't want to put out a half
baked story. But they did put out a half baked story. It was
the Silver Star. They didn't wait for the results of the
investigation. They rushed forward with false statements, and
that is why the military now faces such skepticism about its
motives.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Clay.
Mr. Bilbray.
Mr. Bilbray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, Mr.
Chairman, it is sad that the incidence of what historically has
been called blue-on-blue is as old as warfare itself. And it
doesn't make it any easier to address this issue.
You know, Mr. Chairman, this hearing really strikes home in
a lot of ways. I was just sitting here thinking about the
Tillman family and, let's face it, when you lose a child, you
lose a son or a daughter, in the best of situations it is a
tragedy and a family crisis. Add blue-on-blue and it just adds
that much weight on your back.
And I must apologize, Mr. Chairman, I don't know how much
of this hearing I'm going to sit through. I just realized that
today is the 23rd anniversary of my first son dying and I just
kind of relate to what would happen if Philip had been the
young man who died in a blue-on-blue incident.
But let me just sort of back up and say, Mr. Secretary,
we've always give the different branches of the armed services
flexibility to create a lot of their own internal policies, but
on this one and the notification and the procedures on not just
blue-on-blue but also any armed service death, do you think we
should be developing a uniform strategy that will be required
to be carried out by the Marines the same as the Army or any
other armed services or do you believe that we should still
maintain the flexibility allowing the individual services to
handle the situation in their manner?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I think the views of the general officers
here and their indication that they think this is something
that might best be handled in a uniform manner are persuasive
to me. I do think that I am not in a position to say that all
of the differing positions and policies that the services have
necessarily ought to be exactly the same. I am a great believer
in jointness and we have given enormous effort to that over the
past 6 years.
But as one example, the tours of Army people tend to be a
year and the tours of Marines tend to be 7 months, and that
creates a perceived inequity on the part of some families and
other people. And I have had meeting after meeting on it
suggesting that they find a common length of time for a tour,
and they believe very deeply that the differences fit the
respective services properly. So I think one size doesn't fit
all, necessarily.
Mr. Bilbray. Let me say as somebody who was raised in a
military family, I support that concept that the services are
different and they are designed to be different. The big
decision we made after World War II was not to make them a
uniform service, specifically to give that kind of diversity of
service.
Mr. Chairman, I would just like to close by saying that I
think the frustration of any family that loses a child is that
you always look around and say what went wrong? Who is lying to
me? What information doesn't happen? And with a blue-on-blue
situation it is just really aggravated and I hope that we have
learned from this.
But as somebody who has now reflected after 23 years of
loss of a child that if there is anything that we ought to
understand is that it is not only a responsibility of us to
inform properly, but it is the right of the family. Nothing
else, no matter how much you may think you are trying to
protect them, the worst thing you can do is not give the family
the truth up front as soon as possible. And I think that is a
right that every family has and that every armed service member
has earned for their family, that the truth is something that
is the minimum that the families are deserving of.
And I yield back to the gentleman from California, Mr.
Issa.
Mr. Issa. I thank the gentleman. And because in recognition
of the Tillman family being here today, we have talked about
them a lot without fully trying to do what we can to correct
what is left of the situation. I would like to go back to the
Silver Star. My understanding, correct me if I am wrong,
Corporal Tillman stood up to identify his unit, left a position
where he could have survived, in order to stop the friendly
fire. Is that correct? Anyone dispute that? OK.
So the bottom line is one of the most heroic acts anybody
could do is what Corporal Tillman did that day. Is there
anything in our regulations that would prevent him from
receiving a Silver Star simply because he stood up to protect
his people from friendly fire?
General Myers. No.
General Abizaid. No.
Mr. Issa. So as we sit here today, Corporal Tillman is
every bit entitled to and will continue to be a person who
earned a Silver Star, and maybe more. And the point of how he
died is that, and not who fired the shots. Is that correct for
the record?
General Myers. I believe that is correct. Absolutely
correct.
General Abizaid. I agree.
Mr. Issa. Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr.
Braley.
Mr. Braley. Secretary Rumsfeld, does the name Michael
Mullen mean anything to you?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Of course.
Mr. Braley. And can you tell us how you became aware of the
name of Michael Mullen?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Oh, I can't. He was the, as I recall, the
deputy to Admiral Vern Clark, if you are talking about the
father. There is also a son named Mike Mullen who is, I
believe, a lieutenant junior grade.
Mr. Braley. The Michael Mullen I am referring to was a
young man who was killed in 1970 while serving with the 198th
Light Armored Americal Division near Chu Lai. His mother, Peg
Mullen, is a constituent of mine, who lives in Waterloo, IA,
and was the subject of a book called Friendly Fire, that traced
the history of fratricide, and specifically the problem of
fratricide in Vietnam.
And as part of a congressional delegation who went to
Vietnam early in the 1960's during the Americanization effort
there and was part of a comprehensive investigation of some of
the U.S. economic, military, and assistance programs, and came
back to Congress as a young Member of Congress very critical of
the way some of those programs were being operated, I just was
wondering whether during this period of time you were aware of
the problem of fratricide, specifically because of the
visibility that this one particular incident presented?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Obviously, I was responding to the name Mike
Mullen referring to the current Chief of Naval Operations and
his son, as opposed to the individual you are referring to.
Needless to say, I have been aware of fratricide as a problem
for many, many decades.
Mr. Braley. In fact, General Stonewall Jackson was an early
example of fratricide that a lot of people in the military are
taught during military history courses. So this concept of
fratricide and the impact it has on unit morale is something
that has been known a long time. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes.
Mr. Braley. One of the concerns that Peg Mullen raised when
she embarked on this crusade to educate the American public
about the problem of fratricide in Vietnam, was a concern that
the American people, and specifically American families, were
not being given the whole truth about the circumstances of
their loved one's death. And yet the example that we have been
covering during these two hearings seems to suggest that very
little has been learned in terms of how the military chain of
command is dealing with fratricide.
What lessons would you like us to take away, as the body
responsible for oversight, on what we can do better to make
sure that future families, like the Tillman family, don't have
to go through this?
Mr. Rumsfeld. You are addressing that to me?
Mr. Braley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I think the comments that have been made, and
some of the corrections that have been taken by the Army, and
the indication that General Brown has discussed with respect to
greater degree of uniformity in reporting requirements are
probably all steps in the right direction. I think what you are
dealing with here is you are always dealing with human beings,
and human beings make mistakes, and human beings do things they
shouldn't do. And it is tragic and it is unfortunate, but it is
reality.
Mr. Braley. And isn't it one of the most important lessons
we teach our children that when you make a mistake, you become
accountable for that mistake and you vow not to repeat the
mistake?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
Mr. Braley. And do you feel that the Army's response to
this tragedy has been a good example to the children of this
country of accepting responsibility and accountability for how
this evolved?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I expressed myself on a number of occasions
in memorandums that were read earlier in the hearing that
indicated my concern about the way the Army was handling the
matter. I am not in a position to comment on the most recent
effort that Secretary Geren and General Wallace have
undertaken, because I just simply have not read what they have
decided to do. But there is no question but that there were--
that this has been a terribly unfortunate matter, and the
handling of it has contributed to the grief that fine family
has experienced.
Mr. Braley. General Myers, my next question is for you. You
made the comment during your testimony, we need to keep this in
mind--this reference to fratricide that we have been discussing
and the P-4 memo. In case we go before the press, we need to
calibrate this thing with that in mind. Do you recall that
testimony?
General Myers. Absolutely.
Mr. Braley. What steps did you take, as the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, once you became aware that the dissemination of
information about this event was inaccurate and potentially
misleading?
General Myers. Well, I didn't become aware of that until
much, much later. All I was referring to at that point was, as
the Secretary discussed, and I think I discussed as well, is
that we knew two things. We knew that Corporal Tillman had been
killed, and then a few days later we knew that there was a
possibility of fratricide.
So my comment was on, given that there is an investigation
ongoing, we have just got to be careful how we speak about this
because of the command influence. And that is what defense
lawyers use to get people off, when there is undue command
influence. You have to be very careful what you say.
Mr. Braley. In fact----
General Myers. That was the context of what----
Mr. Braley [continuing]. Those are similar to the precise
concerns raised in this P-4, where the author said suspected
reports that POTUS, the President of the United States, and the
Secretary of the Army might include comments about Corporal
Tillman's heroism in speeches currently being prepared. And
then it says, ``I felt that it was essential that you receive
this information as soon as we detected it in order to preclude
any unknowing statements by our country's leaders which might
cause public embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal
Tillman's death become public.'' And the circumstances he is
referring to here are the circumstances involving fratricide.
Correct?
General Myers. The possibility of fratricide, right.
Mr. Braley. So if you had access to the potential that
fratricide was involved and you were aware that public
statements were being made by the President and others about
Corporal Tillman's heroism, can you explain to the committee
what steps you took, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to raise
concerns that this information might be misleading?
General Myers. Bear in mind I did not see the P-4, so I
didn't have the benefit of General McChrystal's wisdom.
Mr. Braley. Let's eliminate the P-4.
Ms. Norton [presiding]. Let him answer the question, and
then the gentleman's time has expired.
General Myers. Can I finish answering?
Ms. Norton. You can finish answering the question.
General Myers. What logically I would have done, and I do
not recall this nor does the Secretary recall, that we would
have had a discussion that there is potential for fratricide.
And that would have been probably--I didn't know the President
was speaking about Corporal Tillman. I mean, that would not be
something I would know.
Ms. Norton. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Shays for
5 minutes.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Madam Chairman, may I just make a comment on
that same point?
Ms. Norton. Yes, you may. Go ahead.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I indicated that I have been reading some of
the materials, and there has been some confusion, I think,
about the White House. I have never heard of this person who
apparently sent an e-mail to the Pentagon. But the person who
responded from the Pentagon was described in a hearing as a
speechwriter. And she was actually a fact-checker, not a
speechwriter.
And second, my understanding of the e-mails that went back
and forth, which I was not aware of at the time but I have
familiarized myself with since, is that the subject that they
were discussing in the e-mails was not the nature of his death,
but rather the nature of his enlistment, and that was the
subject that was being asked, apparently, by the White House of
a fact-checker in the Pentagon.
Thank you, Mrs. Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Shays for 5 minutes.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. We all agree that Pat Tillman is a
true American hero, however he died. He died in battle risking
his life, and he volunteered for service. And it is also clear
he was such a high-profile member of the Army and the Special
Forces, it is understandable his death would have gotten
special attention. And frankly, it would be surprising if it
didn't.
Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for being here today. I
want to thank you for rearranging your schedule to be here. I
think this is perhaps one of the first appearances you have had
in Congress since you have retired as Secretary. And I want to
thank you, Chairman Myers, and Generals Abizaid and Brown, for
being here.
And I want to say I did not choose to ask questions at the
beginning. I think it centers around, you know, two issues. Who
knew what when, and who did they tell? And those answers have
come by pretty quickly. So, you know, it is almost like let's
get on with it. And we have General Kensinger, who clearly
needs to be here. But you really answered the questions. And
you are on record, and you are under oath, and so--but what I
wrestle with in this committee is we had one hearing where we
were going to subpoena Condoleezza Rice on yellowcake to try to
determine that--we had a hearing this week on the embassy in
Iraq, and the whole focus was on a temporary structure that
wasn't built as well as it could have been electronically for
$6,000, when we have learned that the embassy in fact is on
schedule and is built under cost. And now we have this hearing.
And what I am wrestling with, and I just want to say this,
Madam Chairman, is there are a lot of important issues. I mean
I have had differences with the Secretary and others that it
would have been interesting to have a dialog about that. Our
men and women are risking their lives every day. I mean I
wrestled with Abu Ghraib, one, that it should never have
happened, but we spent a whole year exposing our dirty laundry
while our men and women are risking their lives. I am hard-
pressed to know how this is going to save one American life. I
am hard-pressed to know how this is going to help us achieve
the results that we need to achieve in Iraq or Afghanistan. And
we have asked some of our best and brightest to come and spend
their time talking about this.
And so as far as I am concerned, gentlemen, you have
answered the question. And I am particularly grateful, Mr.
Rumsfeld, that you called their bluff, because really what they
wanted is for you to not show up, in my judgment. For you not
to show up, and then they could keep criticizing you.
So is there anything that you all would like to put on the
record that you think needs to be put on the record that isn't
part of the record? And I would be happy to use my time that
way.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Would you yield?
Mr. Shays. Absolutely.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Let me ask a question. General
Abizaid, you said personal e-mails from the field are a common
method of communication. I think we have all been there and
seen that and talked to families. Do you or any of you know
whether the Inspector General or the CID investigation looked
at personal e-mails about the Tillman matter sent from the
battlefield?
General Abizaid. Sir, I don't know. I believe that every
record was open to them. They came to my headquarters. I think
they went to all the headquarters.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Personal e-mails wouldn't have been
part of that necessarily, would they?
General Abizaid. I can't tell you whether they looked at
that or not, sir.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. That could be a source of
information from the committee dealing with what happened down
on the ground, Mr. Shays, not what happened here. I think these
members, they have come up here and they have spent the morning
with us, but I am not sure they have a lot to share. But thank
you very much.
General Abizaid. Although I would say, Congressman, that I
think from Afghanistan it is a lot different than Iraq.
Afghanistan is very, very isolated, and it is difficult for
information to flow as freely from that theater as Iraq.
Mr. Shays. Reclaiming my time, I want to be on record with
the fact that I think this was a huge screw-up, bordering on
the lines of malfeasance, and I think we all agree with that.
So I am not belittling the issue. I am just simply saying this
committee should be spending time dealing with some other
issues that we clearly have to wrestle with.
Ms. Norton. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. I thank the gentlelady. I think it is very
important for this committee to put into context the Tillman
case, because there is an underlying question here that I don't
believe has been probed adequately. With respect to my good
friend on the other side of the aisle, when you are talking
about matters of fact and fiction in a war, it is incumbent
upon this Congress in its oversight capacity to be able to
determine whether or not there was a particular type of
management of the news of the war.
And so in connection with that, Mr. Rumsfeld, can you tell
this committee whether or not in your capacity as Secretary of
Defense you had discussions within the White House regarding
press strategies that would be involved in the communication of
the events of the war to the American people?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I can say without qualification that I can't
recall ever having a discussion with anyone in the White House
on press strategy relating to the Tillman matter in any aspect
of it.
Mr. Kucinich. Did you ever have discussions in the White
House, generally speaking, about press strategies with respect
to the conduct of the war in Iraq?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I am sure that the subject of the press and
the government's dealing with the press has come up on a number
of occasions. I can recall one when General Casey was out there
and there were questions raised about the relationship that the
command had with some Iraqi press people. And there was a
criticism, for example, of the fact that stories were ending up
in the articles which were accurate, but would not have been in
there had there not been some relationship between his command
and the reporter. And there was a big debate on that.
I remember another example, which General Myers will
remember well, and that is the very phrase ``global war on
terror'' and the differences that some people had, thinking
that terror is not--you don't war on terror. Terror is a
technique of choice, a weapon of choice for a terrorist, but it
is not something you necessarily war against. And that type of
thing would be discussed. And I frequently would end up using
the phrase that this was the first conflict of the 21st
century, and it was really a struggle against violent
extremists.
Mr. Kucinich. Was there a press strategy in the White House
with the war in Iraq?
Mr. Rumsfeld. You would have to ask the White House. I am
not----
Mr. Kucinich. Was there a press strategy that the
Department of Defense was expected to be mindful of with
respect to the conduct of the war in Iraq?
Mr. Rumsfeld. To my knowledge there was no White House
press strategy that the Pentagon was told to be mindful of.
Mr. Kucinich. Was there a Department of Defense press
strategy with respect to the war?
Mr. Rumsfeld. If there was, it obviously wasn't very good.
Mr. Kucinich. You know, maybe it was very good, because you
actually covered up the Tillman case for a while, you covered
up the Jessica Lynch case, you covered up Abu Ghraib. So
something was working for you. Was there a strategy to do it,
Mr. Rumsfeld?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, Congressman, the implication that you
said ``you covered up,'' that is just false. You have nothing
to base that on. You have not a scrap of evidence or a piece of
paper or a witness that would attest to that. I have not been
involved in any coverup whatsoever, and I don't believe there
is an individual at this table, who I know well and observed at
close quarters in very difficult situations, who had any role
in a coverup on this matter.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you for acquitting yourself. I was
speaking of the Department of Defense, and I was speaking of
things that are manifest and obvious.
We held a hearing on the Tillman case, we held hearings on
Abu Ghraib, and the hearing on this. You have not been able to
establish how is it that this news could get out; no one
managed it, no one communicated it to the American public, it
just happened. I mean you haven't really given this committee a
good explanation as to how it happened, Mr. Rumsfeld.
Mr. Rumsfeld. This committee has held many hours of
hearings on the subject, and they have had the witnesses of the
people who were responsible for the management of this issue,
and it was the U.S. Army.
Mr. Kucinich. Was there any outsourcing of that message?
Was the Rendon or Lincoln Group involved in communicating any
messages----
Mr. Rumsfeld. You would have to ask them. You would have to
ask the Army.
Mr. Kucinich. Did the Department of Defense have any
connection at all with any outside individuals to communicate
messages to the general public to help in the shaping of that
message? Was there a press strategy involved?
Mr. Rumsfeld. On this subject, not to my knowledge.
Mr. Kucinich. Was there a press strategy involved?
Mr. Rumsfeld. On this subject, not to my knowledge.
Mr. Kucinich. Was there a press strategy involved generally
that you used----
Mr. Rumsfeld. I have already answered that question.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, I don't think you have. Not to my
satisfaction.
Mr. Rumsfeld. To the best of my ability.
Mr. Kucinich. Was the Rendon Group involved in
communicating a press strategy on behalf of the Department of
Defense with respect to the war in Iraq?
Mr. Rumsfeld. You would have to ask the people in the
Department.
Mr. Kucinich. You have no knowledge of this whatsoever?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I am aware that there have been, over the
years, contracts with that organization from various entities
within the Department and outside of the Department. Whether
there was in a manner that would fit your question, I am not in
a position to answer.
Mr. Kucinich. You just said that you have some awareness of
it. Could you elaborate on that, sir?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I elaborated to the extent of my ability. I
know that there are some entities in the Department that have
used contractors for some things of that type over the years.
And you would have to ask experts on that subject, not me.
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important
that this committee determine whether or not the outsourcing of
press was one of the elements responsible for communicating to
the public something that seemed to be beyond the understanding
of the Department of Defense.
Chairman Waxman [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Yarmuth.
Mr. Yarmuth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all the
witnesses. I apologize if the questions I ask will cover ground
that has already been covered.
Secretary Rumsfeld, you testified on a number of occasions
that you don't remember when you were first alerted to the fact
that the Tillman death had been mischaracterized. Do you
remember whether you were satisfied or dissatisfied as to
whether you had been notified in a timely fashion?
Mr. Rumsfeld. You are directing the question to me?
Mr. Yarmuth. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I tell you, earlier on in this hearing I
indicated that there was the problem of command influence. And
I think I indicated that it is not a surprise to me that the
Secretary is not brought into periodic reports on what is
taking place with various investigations of a criminal nature--
potentially criminal nature.
Mr. Yarmuth. I am speaking before there would have been any
reason for an investigation. When you were--at some point you
obviously knew that--you came to know that there was suspicion
that the Tillman death had not been characterized appropriately
or accurately.
Mr. Rumsfeld. True. And at that moment there was already an
investigation going on, because it was a----
Mr. Yarmuth. My question, though, sir, is do you remember
whether you were upset that you had not been notified, or was
this something that you would have expected not to be notified
about? Did this bother you that you weren't notified?
Mr. Rumsfeld. As I say, the fact that I was not an
addressee on the P-4 did not surprise me. There are all kinds
of communications that I was not engaged in.
Mr. Yarmuth. So you would not necessarily have expected to
be notified about this on a timely fashion. That is the
question I am asking.
Mr. Rumsfeld. It does not surprise me that I was not. It
was not something that I would have had a voice in or a role
in.
Mr. Yarmuth. How did people who worked for you know when to
tell you about things that they thought you ought to know?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Oh, goodness. How did they know? You would
have to ask them. But what we had is frequent meetings. We had
a roundtable session almost every day. And the senior people
from the various entities within the Department were there, and
their task was to raise issues that they thought the group and
I ought to be aware of. And General Myers participated in those
every day.
Mr. Yarmuth. So you didn't have any policy as to what
people should bring to your attention and what they shouldn't?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Except the one I mentioned earlier, which is
the one of command influence, where the general counsel issued
regulations--not regulations, recommendations for the senior
people in the Department to be very careful about getting into
and commenting on, internally or externally, investigations and
matters that potentially could end up in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, as indeed this has.
Mr. Yarmuth. General Abizaid, what about you? Did you have
policies as to when you should be informed about things such as
whether a casualty had been mischaracterized?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir. I wanted to know right away what
happened. Of course.
Mr. Yarmuth. And were you satisfied in this case that you
were?
General Abizaid. No, I was not satisfied.
Mr. Yarmuth. Some of this seems--and maybe I am naive--but
seems surprising to me, because we have this perception of
there being fairly rigid lines of command in the military. And
it seems to me it would be fairly simple--and I hope you will
explain to me why I am wrong--to go down that line of command,
starting at the top, and say, basically, did you know? Why
didn't you know? And to follow that line down. Is that not a
reasonable expectation?
General Abizaid. I think that this was a simple case that
should have been transmitted efficiently and quickly. It was
not. It should have been transmitted the day after the P-4
arrived in my headquarters. But as I have testified, there was
a problem somewhere between the 28th, and I guess that probably
the earliest I would have told the chairman is the 6th. But I
called him from Qatar. I was in Qatar the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th,
11th. And when I called him I was embarrassed about it. And I
do take responsibility for the fact that my headquarters
screwed up. I didn't punish anybody. We fixed the problem. It
wasn't the first P-4 that went astray and it wasn't the last
one. But it happened, and that is all I can say about it.
Mr. Yarmuth. I know my time is about to expire, so I just
want to ask one further question of Secretary Rumsfeld. Was
there ever, other than this particular--you talked about the
investigation. Was there any other circumstance in which the
people who worked for you were directed not to inform you about
certain things? Were there things that they were told you
weren't supposed to be informed about?
Mr. Rumsfeld. No. And I did not want to leave the
impression in this instance that I was--instructed anybody to
not inform me of something like that. What I was describing was
the admonitions that the general counsel issued directly to me
and to others that you must not get--you should not get
involved in matters where, as the general said, a defense
attorney could allege that you had exerted undue command
influence in a way that damaged the case or polluted the
environment for the defendant, either favorably or unfavorably.
And that is something that people were aware of. Not that they
shouldn't tell me something, but that I shouldn't get involved
in those things. And people watched a pattern of behavior, I
suppose, and I didn't get involved with them, except one time.
Mr. Yarmuth. Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr.
Burton, do you seek recognition?
Mr. Burton. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I am late. Mr.
Secretary, it is nice seeing you again.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. June 25, 2002, you wrote a snowflake to Army
Secretary Tom White, and you wrote, ``Here is an article on a
fellow who is apparently joining the Rangers. He sounds like he
is world class. We might want to keep our eye on him.'' Can you
tell us what you meant by that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Exactly what I wrote. That a fine individual
who was quite prominent had joined the Rangers. And that was a
good thing.
Mr. Burton. Well, when you said to Secretary White keep his
eye on him, you meant that he has potential?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I wouldn't know that. I just think here is an
individual who is serving his country and is prominent and gave
up a good deal to do that; and that we, as people in the
Department, ought to acknowledge that and be grateful for his
service, as I was.
Mr. Burton. You didn't single him out asking for progress
reports or anything like that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. No. Of course not.
Mr. Burton. OK. Thank you very much.
Chairman Waxman. Let's see, the next one in line is Mr.
Hodes.
Mr. Hodes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, as I understand it, there have been at least six
different investigations into this matter. It appears that each
of those investigations had serious flaws. First there was
Captain Scott's investigation, completed within 2 weeks of the
incident. Second, Colonel Kauzlarich's investigation--I don't
know whether I have butchered his name--which was finished on
May 16, 2004.
The DOD IG concluded that these two investigations were,
``tainted by the failure to preserve evidence, a lack of
thoroughness, and the failure to pursue investigative leads.''
Third was an investigation by General Jones completed 6
months later. The IG had similar criticisms of that report.
Fourth, the IG report itself, issued in March of this year.
But the IG was unable to determine who doctored key witness
statements supporting the Silver Star award.
And fifth, was an Army Criminal Investigation Division
investigation finished at the same time as the IG
investigation. This report inexplicably concluded there were no
rules of engagement violations, even though there was a
friendly fire fatality and multiple injuries.
And finally, as of yesterday, General Wallace has completed
his investigation. General Wallace's investigation apparently
suffered from an overly narrow scope, failing to examine the
actions of key military leaders. And we have before us the top
military brass involved in these questions at the time: General
Brown, General Abizaid, General Myers, and Secretary Rumsfeld.
Now, let's put aside for a moment the merits of each of the
individual investigations. Do you all, gentlemen, agree that it
should not take six different investigations, 3 years,
congressional investigations, and millions of taxpayer dollars
to address the significant failures that have occurred in this
case?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
General Myers. Agree.
General Brown. Yes, sir.
General Abizaid. Agree.
Mr. Hodes. Secretary Rumsfeld, the approach of ordering a
series of military investigations that are limited in scope and
that do not address the question of what top officials knew
appears to be the Department of Defense's MO when it really
doesn't want accountability.
When the allegations of abuse at Abu Ghraib arose in 2004,
the Pentagon took the same approach. First, there was the
Taguba investigation, limited to the conduct of the military
police at Abu Ghraib. Second was the Fay investigation that
examined the conduct of the military intelligence personnel at
Abu Ghraib, but there was no inquiry into the involvement of
the civilian leadership. Third was the Army Inspector General's
investigation, which focused on interrogation practices in
general in Iraq and Afghanistan, without examining the role of
top Pentagon leadership. In all there were over a dozen
investigations by the Pentagon into detainee abuse issues, but
none has resulted in a full understanding of the civilian
leadership's involvement in the abuses. None has resulted in a
full understanding of your involvement or the involvement of
the White House.
Mr. Secretary, do you see the parallels here? Do you see
why some would think that in the case of both Abu Ghraib and in
the Tillman investigation there were deliberate efforts to
avoid accountability? And if you see that, the manner in which
this serial kind of narrow investigating, never answering the
questions about who at the top knew what is a problem, what do
you think ought to be done so that the American people can be
assured that the top leadership in this country is accountable,
is willing to come forward and tell the truth, and is going to
take the actions to reassure the American public that abuses
won't happen again?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Congressman, I don't obviously agree with
your characterization of the history of this. There was an
independent panel that looked at Abu Ghraib at the senior level
and issued a report. There is a problem, I don't disagree at
all, with the perception that you end up in a situation like
the Tillman case, where you have five, six or seven separate
investigations. And there are a variety of reasons as to how
they got from where they were to where they are today with the
most recent Army investigation and announcement.
None of the answers are satisfactory. It is unfortunate. It
is harmful. It causes exactly the perception that you are
promoting. And it is regrettable.
Mr. Hodes. What should be done about it?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I don't know. I wish I had some brilliant
answers. One of the things I might just mention is that under
Goldwater-Nichols, the command responsibility is separated from
the organized train-and-equip responsibility. And as a result,
you end up with people who are down one of those chains of
accountability and responsibility, and some people who are down
the opposite chain, the administrative as opposed to the
command. However, in the middle at various places, there are
individuals who have a hat, if you will, in both of those. And
you end up frequently with a long pause as to who should do
what, who has the responsibility. Should it go up? Should the
court martial or the investigation be done at this level or
that level? Should it be done in the administrative chain or
the command chain? Obviously, the problems usually happen in
the command chain, so there is a tendency to be biased toward
that.
On the other hand, you take a man like John Abizaid, who
was the combatant commander in that case, he was fighting a
war. He was busy. He was traveling all over the world. And
there is an attraction to moving the responsibility for such an
investigation over to the administrative chain, because those
individuals are not engaged in the actual chain of command and
wrestling with those problems.
I don't know what the answer is. But I know that there is a
tension there that I find confusing as to who is going to take
responsibility for it from the bottom up. And you end up--
possibly one of these gentlemen who have lived it can make a
better analysis than I have, but I have been concerned about
it, and expressed concern about it within the Department, and I
think it in some way contributes to the problem that you are
talking about.
Mr. Hodes. Thank you. I see my time is up.
Chairman Waxman. The gentleman's time is up, but General
Abizaid, did you want to comment on that point?
General Abizaid. Sir, I think it is very important to
understand that the way the warfighting system is designed is
to keep the operational commanders' hands free with forward-
looking battlefield activities and operational decisions. The
administrative chain of command in this case, going through the
Department of the Army, handles things like notification of
families, awards, logistics, etc. And I think it would not be
beneficial to try to saddle the combatant commander with all
the administrative functions, because it would cause his staff
to become too big, too unwieldy, and would frequently cause
that person to take their eye off of the immediate actions
going on in the battlefield.
And I would like to point out that during this time period,
if it had been the only event that was occurring in the
theater, it could hardly be understood that the information
didn't flow freely. But the battle of Fallujah was taking place
around this time, all sorts of various military activities,
both in Iraq and Afghanistan, 27 different countries in the
region responding to various political-military activities,
etc.
It is absolutely essential that we keep track of what is
happening in order to make sure that the right resources are
applied at the right place and that lives are preserved in the
way that we conduct our military operations.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, General. Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. I have had my time.
Chairman Waxman. Oh, you have had your time. So the next
would be Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rumsfeld, I understand that Mr. DiRita was one of
your closest advisers. And I would like to ask about your
knowledge of Mr. DiRita's actions with respect to the White
House. In the 1970's you issued your famous Rumsfeld's Rules,
with lessons for the Secretary of Defense. Here was one of
those lessons: ``Manage the interaction between the Pentagon
and the White House. Unless you establish a narrow channel for
the flow of information and tasking back and forth, the process
can become quickly chaotic.''
Was Mr. DiRita your channel to the White House?
Mr. Rumsfeld. No, Mr. Congressman, he was not. He was a
link in the sense that he was in charge of the Public Affairs
Office. And the public affairs officers in the executive branch
of the government do communicate on a regular basis, including
the White House. There were multiple channels to the White
House. There was not a single one. There can't be, regrettably.
I mean the chairman has already indicated he not only was the
senior military adviser to me, but also to the President, to
the Secretary of State, the National Security Council, and the
Vice President. But the principal link tended to be my senior
military assistant.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. This may have been mentioned
earlier, but we have a copy of an e-mail dated April 23, 2004,
the day after Corporal Tillman was killed, from Jeanie Mamo,
the White House----
Mr. Rumsfeld. From whom?
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Mamo. From Jeanie Mamo, who was the
White House Director of Media Affairs, to Mr. DiRita. The e-
mail asked for information about the circumstances surrounding
Corporal Tillman's death. The question I wanted to ask, though,
is were you aware that the White House contacted Mr. DiRita and
requested information?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I have no recollection of that from that
time, and I have not heard of this e-mail even in the
preparation for this hearing.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Let me ask, could there have been
some reason that Mr. DiRita didn't inform you of these
communications, or would it be normal for him to inform you
that he had been contacted by the White House?
Mr. Rumsfeld. When he was head of Public Affairs, which I
think is the case at this time, he met in the roundtable, he
met every day with the chairman and with me. What he decided to
inform me of was his call.
But someone just put this in front of me, and I have not
read it. It says, ``Jeanie, is there anyone who can hook me up
with someone at the Pentagon that can give me an off-the-record
brief on the mission in Afghanistan where the former NFL star
Pat Tillman was killed yesterday?'' and that was from a press
person, I believe. Jeanie Mamo, I don't know who that person
is. I think it is a press person, not the White House, but I
just don't know. It says Sports Illustrated.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Well, when he replied to the White
House, Mr. DiRita stated, ``See what we can do. Details are
sketchy just now.''
Mr. Rumsfeld. Apparently this is a request from someone in
the press for him to give him some information. And the--it
looks like the request, this Jeanie Mamo is from the press or
else--and sent it to the White House or to DiRita. I just don't
know. I don't know anything about it.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Except that memo is actually a White
House official.
Mr. Rumsfeld. She is?
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Yes.
Mr. Rumsfeld. OK.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. But my question is did Mr. DiRita
ever tell you what information, if any, he ultimately gave to
the White House?
Mr. Rumsfeld. No, I have no idea. Normally what he would do
would be to talk to the Army and see what the Army had to say,
was saying publicly about it, and then have the Army talk to
the White House or the press person.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. One person the committee interviewed
was NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Vance J. Craddock,
who previously served as your senior military assistant.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Right.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. General Craddock told us bluntly
that Mr. DiRita often cut him out of the loop on military
matters. And here is what General Craddock said, ``I will tell
you there could have been discussions and meetings that I would
not have been privy to, because occasionally that happens. The
fact of the matter is, and I will just tell you that DiRita and
I occasionally got into a bit of a dither over the fact that I
felt he was not informing me of military issues or that he felt
I was usurping his authority to deal with political issues.''
General Craddock told us there were oftentimes events that
happened in Public Affairs that were, quite frankly, between
Mr. DiRita and the Secretary. And I guess what we are trying to
find out here is were there communications back and forth
between you and Mr. DiRita that the military people were not
getting?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I am sure that if you take the senior 8 or 10
people that reported to me, that in each case there were
activities that I would deal with them individually on and not
include the whole group. There is no way the whole group could
be involved in every single thing that was going on.
For example, the senior military assistant might be
involved in military personnel matters, whereas DiRita would
not be in Public Affairs. And vice versa. There might be some
Public Affairs issue that the senior military assistant might
not be involved in.
Chairman Waxman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. It has expired?
Chairman Waxman. Yes.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. So it is possible that Mr. DiRita
and yourself could have had discussions or communications about
military matters that----
Mr. Rumsfeld. No. No. That would be highly unlikely. I just
can't imagine it. No. The military matters I dealt with
basically were through General Myers and General Pace. And to
the extent the senior military assistant was appropriate to
have him involved, he was involved. But there was generally a
division of labor. It is not a perfect division. There is no
way you can say this matter was only military or only public
affairs. Obviously, the Tillman matter was a combination of
military and public affairs problems. And so too with any
number of things. So frequently the group discussed things in
the roundtable meetings.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. So you disagree with General
Craddock. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I can't do that. General Craddock is a
terrific officer. I don't know what he said. I don't know the
context of the questions he was asked. And therefore, to say I
disagree with him, I think probably wouldn't be accurate unless
I invested some time to really understand what he was saying.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Thank you very much.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Davis. Mr. McHenry.
Mr. McHenry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you all
testifying today.
The one thing that has not been read into the record--it
has been submitted to the record--is the chairman at the
beginning of this meeting, of this hearing, spoke of the word
``embarrassment'' in the P-4 memo. What he did not actually
highlight, which I think we all should highlight, is that there
was a man involved here. And I say this to my colleagues and I
say to all of those who were listening, there was still heroism
involved in this incident. And I think some of this is about
trying to point fingers and score political points.
I don't think that is what it should be about. Let's talk
about who Corporal Tillman was. And from this P-4 memo, the
potential that he might have been killed by friendly fire in no
way detracts from his witnessed heroism or the recommended
personal decoration for valor in the face of the enemy. I think
that is what this hearing should be about, that valor in the
battlefield of putting himself in harm's way, not about
pointing fingers after the fact.
I think this has been much covered, that there were screw-
ups in the bureaucracy. And there were screw-ups. And I think
everyone agrees. I don't think there was a coverup. I think
there was a screw-up, and that has had a lot of coverage.
Corporal Tillman was killed in a complicated battlespace
geometry involving two separate Ranger vehicle serials
traversing through severe terrain along a winding 500- to 600-
foot defile in which friendly forces were fired upon by
multiple enemy positions. This is a complicated battlefield
environment. And I know from the gentlemen testifying here
today who are generals or retired generals, you have been under
fire. And you know how complicated this is.
So let us think and give Corporal Tillman his due for that
heroism in the battlefield. Let us give him his due, and let's
properly quote the record of what he submitted himself to in
the battlefield.
And so with this, I would be happy to yield to my colleague
from California, Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. I thank the gentleman. I think you characterized
a lot of what this committee hearing should be about. I want to
take note of how it was advertised, to be quite frank. I think
that is appropriate at this point, the Tillman fratricide, that
is fair.
What Defense Department officials knew, you know, I don't
think that is what this hearing realistically is about. I think
it has become pretty obvious that at the lowest levels people
understood there were a problem. At the level of a full
colonel, it was reported and reported promptly. Clearly, there
was some confusion about when who got told during the specific
investigation, because those investigations don't just find out
was it friendly fire. They find out how it happened so it
wouldn't happen again.
General Brown, is that essentially the real reason behind
what I think is, what, a 15-6, is to make sure these don't
happen again?
General Brown. Right. A 15-6 is a military investigation.
Mr. Issa. Right. So the fact is that there was a failure to
disclose, pursuant to Army regulations that were about 2 years
old, to disclose that it may have been friendly fire to the
family. And that is certainly beyond regrettable.
But the actual investigation, I just want to get this into
the record, was begun promptly, related to how he was killed
and the possibility it was friendly fire. Is that correct?
General Brown. That is my understanding from General
McChrystal. He called me the day that he was going to initiate
the 15-6.
Mr. Issa. And at the end of that, is there an after-action
report? Are we better able to prevent this from happening in
the future as a result of that investigation? Has that circle
of quality been adhered to?
General Brown. I think it has. We had that discussion I
guess before I left command, to ensure that we were doing a
good job of capturing lessons learned to ensure that these kind
of events didn't happen again. I think in the TTP, or tactics,
techniques, and procedures that were used that day, the radio
problems, all the other issues I think have been addressed, and
they are trying to use that 15-6, at least at the Rangers and
down at General McChrystal's organization, to ensure we don't
have those kind of problems again.
Mr. Issa. Additionally, at the Department of Defense, as a
result of the pain and suffering the Tillman family went
through because of the misinformation, has it been made clear
that this should never happen again, that the family has a
right to be informed promptly so that this particular mistake
couldn't happen again?
General Brown. Well, I can speak for SOCOM, but at the
Special Operations Command it is perfectly clear.
Mr. Issa. OK. I thank the chairman.
Chairman Waxman. The gentleman's time has expired. Ms.
Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to be clear that the family asked this
committee to investigate the circumstances of Corporal
Tillman's death, and that Kevin Tillman himself indicated that
this hearing was no reflection upon the bravery of this hero.
And no implication should be left that our continuing
investigation is anything but an attempt to do what this family
wants done.
Secretary Rumsfeld, you have indicated, I think quite
eloquently, that it is your responsibility, the responsibility
of the military, to tell the truth. And I want to make sure
this also involves uncovering the truth, particularly in light
of allegations that have been made in the press and elsewhere
about whether you sought deniability in reconstructing what you
were told and when in responding to the Inspector General in
particular.
Your lawyer, in preparing a response to the DOD Inspector
General, said that you asked a junior staff member in your
office to help determine when you learned that Corporal
Tillman's death was a possible fratricide. The staff of our
committee then contacted that staff member, and he told us of
placing a few phone calls, found a person who had been in a
meeting with you on May 20, 2004, during which he said Corporal
Tillman's case was mentioned. Now, this person claimed,
however, that he was not the source of the information and
cannot remember who was. This does not sound like the most
thorough attempt to reconstruct what you knew or what actions
you took.
During our own investigation, the committee staff talked
with Lieutenant General Craddock. Now, he was your senior
military assistant at the time in 2004. And he told us that he
worked closely with you on a daily basis, sometimes in touch
with you many times a day. But he says that your office never
contacted him to ask for his recollection or documents. I am
asking, why did you not consult this close assistant of your
own, General Craddock, before responding to the Attorney
General [sic] concerning what you knew and when you knew it?
Mr. Rumsfeld. My recollection of this is close to that. It
was the--I believe the last series of days I was in the
Department. There were a great many things going on. The
Inspector General asked some questions. And my civilian
assistant, Mr. Rangel, as I recall--I said figure out if there
is any way we can know when I was told, because I don't
remember.
Ms. Norton. Your Senior Military Assistant might have been
one way you might have known.
Mr. Rumsfeld. He, of course, was gone.
Ms. Norton. That didn't keep him from being consulted.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I understand that. I am going to answer your
question. He then checked with some people, and one of the
individuals said what you said he said; namely, that he was in
the room when I was told, and it was on or after he got back
from Iraq. And that was this Colonel Bucci who has been
mentioned previously. We were not asked--we were asked what we
recalled and recollected. We were not asked to undertake an
investigation and go back and consult a series of people and
find out the answer. That was the job of the Inspector General.
I think you said Attorney General, and I think you meant
Inspector General.
Ms. Norton. Inspector General, sir.
Mr. Rumsfeld. That was his job to try to fashion all of
that. And he did, and he produced a report, and he said he felt
that my responses were--met his question.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Secretary, he was trying to find out
something very specific, what you knew and when you knew it.
And his job was to question you and to find out, to the best of
your ability, what you knew and when you knew it. And here was
your senior military assistant, the one person we would have
expected you to consult with, and he was not consulted. And I
am asking why was he not consulted?
Mr. Rumsfeld. My guess is there were any number of people
who were not consulted. And I guess the answer to that question
is one would have to ask the Inspector General or ask Mr.
Rangel.
Ms. Norton. No, I am asking you, because you didn't consult
them, sir.
Mr. Rumsfeld. No, they asked me what I recalled, and I told
them what I recalled.
Ms. Norton. I am simply noting that you did consult a
junior member of your office, but not the man who would have
been most likely to know, the man who reported to you several
times a day. You didn't consult as well with Mr. DiRita, your
director of communications, who during this period had been in
touch with the White House. Didn't you feel it important to
consult with him before responding?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I did not consult with a junior member of my
office. I consulted with the senior civilian assistant, who is
your principal assistant as Secretary of Defense, along with
your senior military assistant. Mr. Rangel was that individual.
He is the one who then talked to people to find out, and one of
the people he talked to was Colonel Bucci. Mr. DiRita also was
no longer in the Department. There are any number of people one
could have--we could have gone to Dick Myers, who was no longer
in the Department. And there must have been 20, 30 people who
were in the roundtable meeting, where I may very well have been
informed. But I was asked what I recalled, and I gave a very
direct, honest answer to that.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I understand. The
point is when the Inspector General is trying to find out
something that is very difficult for you, yourself, out of your
own consciousness, to have remembered, to have consulted with
those most likely to have helped you remember would have seemed
to be appropriate in uncovering the truth.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Ms. Norton.
Mr. Welch is next, but Mr. Davis wanted to just make a
statement.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to note
for the record you and I have signed a letter to Claude
Kicklighter, the Inspector General, and to Brigadier General
Rodney Johnson, the Provost Marshal and the Commanding General
from the Army Criminal Investigation Command, asking if they
did look at the personal e-mail accounts of soldiers, which was
a common means of communication over there, as we said, to try
to keep all the stones, look under every one of them. We think
this will make the investigation more complete. I want to note
that for the record.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you. We have joined together in that
letter. Mr. Welch.
Mr. Welch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
conducting this hearing.
There are, I think, two issues. One is the treatment of the
family of the fallen soldier. My impression and experience here
so far in Congress is that the military takes very, very
seriously its obligation to the soldier and to the family
members to try to provide them with as much information as
possible, understanding the desperate need that a mom and a dad
have, a brother and a sister, to know as much as they possibly
can about the circumstances of their loved one's death. And we
have been through that here with you, and I don't think I will
go onto that enormously.
I think there is a second issue that has been raised, and
it is whether the pressure on the administration to give good
news versus bad news about its initial decision to go to war at
times causes the information to be emphasizing the good instead
of the bad, and, at its worst, to actually distort what the
facts are.
What is significant about this war, in contrast to any
other in our history, is that the sacrifice associated with the
war has been borne entirely by the men and women and their
families of an all-volunteer military. It is the first war
where we have had multiple tax cuts. It is the first war where
we have paid for it by going off budget. It is the first
significant war where it has been an all-volunteer force, and
there has been no draft requiring middle-class or well-to-do
families to be part of it, whether they wished to or not.
And the question I have, and I am going to direct this
initially to General Myers, is this. General, in contrast to
Vietnam, which was a war that was going on when I was in
college, every time there was a fallen soldier whose remains
were returned to Burlington, VT, or Springfield, MA, or Chico,
CA, the local press was there. It was a solemn occasion. It was
sad, but it was real. And it conveyed to that local community
the awesome price that this war was inflicting on the lives of
their neighbors.
It is my understanding that the Pentagon policy in this war
is to deny access to the press upon the return, the official
return of the soldier's remains. And can you advise me whether
I am correct on that?
General Myers. My understanding is that the policy for the
folks returning through Dover, that there is no press there. It
is a policy in respect for the families. Other than that, you
are absolutely right. And I think, by the way, that is
appropriate. I don't think it is appropriate to hide the fact
that the men and women in this country are dying in the defense
of this country. And we should never do that, because people
need to understand the sacrifice. And as you pointed, out too
few people understand that.
I might just add it is not the military; there are
Ambassadors, foreign service officers, a lot of American
civilians and third-country nationals that share this risk with
us in Afghanistan and are killed, as well in Iraq.
Mr. Welch. This policy was changed. In the past the press
has been allowed to document the arrival of our returning
fallen soldiers. Correct?
General Myers. I can't tell you. I do not recall if it was
changed.
Mr. Welch. I mean you are my age or older.
General Myers. Right. Yeah. It must have been somewhere
along the line, if you recall it that way. I was overseas for
most of the sixties when Vietnam was going on and part of that
process, so I don't remember what was happening back home
frankly.
Mr. Welch. Secretary Rumsfeld, could I ask you to comment?
What would be the rationale for the Pentagon denying access to
a respectful press to document the return of the remains of a
fallen soldier?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I think you would have to ask the Department
of Defense Public Affairs people, but my recollection is the
same as General Myers'; that the policy at Dover is that the
press does not cover that arrival, but that it is up--I thought
it was up to the families to determine the extent to which the
press would or would not be involved in the actual memorial
services or burial services, and that--it leaves it to the
families to make those decisions.
Mr. Welch. But the official return in the custody of
military personnel of a casket----
Mr. Rumsfeld. They remain in the custody of the military
personnel until they reach the family.
Mr. Welch. But it is different the way this is handled in
this war, Iraq and Afghanistan, than it was, for instance, in
Vietnam.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I don't know that. I accept your comment but
I just----
Mr. Welch. General Abizaid.
General Abizaid. Sir, I don't know what the policies are on
returning soldiers. I do know that since I have been retired,
the press certainly covers those services that take place in
northern Nevada and eastern California, and they always do so
in a most respectful way.
Mr. Welch. And the soldiers when they return initially,
they arrive at Dover?
General Abizaid. Most remains go through Dover, yes, sir.
Mr. Welch. And no press is allowed to document their
return?
General Abizaid. I don't know. I think it would be best for
me not to answer. I don't know.
Mr. Welch. All right. I waive the balance of my time. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lynch [presiding]. The gentleman yields. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Idaho.
Mr. Sali. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Either General Abizaid or General Brown, it would be fair
to say that when there is an event that is suspected of
involving friendly fire, that has an impact on morale on your
troops, doesn't it?
General Brown. Absolutely.
General Abizaid. That is correct.
Mr. Sali. And if I understand things correctly, at this
point you really have to choose what the procedures will be for
the military. If you have an allegation of friendly fire, which
I understand was already in the works on April 23, 2004, you
knew that there was some suspicion at least.
You have to choose at that point whether you disclose to
the family or whether you don't disclose to the family and wait
until the outcome of the investigation before you announce that
there was or was not some, perhaps, involvement with friendly
fire from the death.
You have to choose between one of those two things; is that
correct?
General Brown. I don't think you have to choose. I think
that is maybe part of the problem. There are people that
believe that you have to wait until the investigation is fully
completed before the family is allowed to be told. I believe
those were older Army regulations.
The current Army regulation, as I understand it, is that
you immediately notify the family if there is an investigation
going on, but in all cases sooner than 30 days. No later than
30 days the family has to be notified if there is an
investigation going on and kept informed of the ongoing
investigation, as I understand the regulation.
Mr. Sali. Am I correct from the time of Corporal Tillman's
death to the time the investigation was finished was, in this
case, 37 days?
General Brown. I'd have to look at the time line. I don't
know, Congressman.
General Abizaid. Congressman, on the 28th I approved the
report that came from General McChrystal's command as being
definite proof of friendly fire. The May 28th.
Mr. Sali. May 28th, a little over 30 days in this case,
versus what you are telling me now, General Brown, is that the
requirement is now 30 days.
General Brown. The requirement is no later than 30 days.
Mr. Sali. But it could be up to the full 30 days.
General Brown. And I'm not sure why the regulation is
written that way. I am assuming there could be some extenuating
circumstances that they give you the 30 days, but I think the
requirement is to notify the family immediately, but no later
than 30 days.
Mr. Sali. Immediately following what?
General Brown. Immediately following the beginning of an
investigation.
Mr. Sali. But that could be up to 30 days later?
General Brown. I believe that's what the regulation says,
and I'd be glad to take it for the record and provide that Army
regulation to you.
Mr. Sali. OK. I would appreciate it if you would do that.
It seems like we're fighting over about 6 days here in
difference in time. If you are saying that it could be--within
30 days, no longer than 30 days would meet the current
regulation; is that correct?
General Brown. Well, I think it goes back to my earlier
point that it doesn't matter what the regulation says, it has
to be followed. So if there were errors made in the execution
of that policy or there were people that didn't understand that
was the policy, then that is where there may be a problem.
Mr. Sali. The regulations that were in place at the time
were followed; is that correct?
General Brown. I don't know. I'd have to go back and see
what--the regulation that we are talking about that is the
current regulation, as I understand it, was enacted in 2003.
Mr. Sali. Can you let me know about that?
General Brown. I will be glad to.
Mr. Sali. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to
the gentleman from California.
Mr. Issa. I thank the gentleman. I just want to--I hated to
get into Vietnam, but we have gotten into it. I want to go
through a couple of quick things.
During Vietnam, we drafted men and women. Several of you
are Vietnam vets. At that time, as I understand it, we were
drafting those who didn't go to college, those who couldn't get
deferments, that was a war of the poor and a war of the
minorities. At the time, that was the way it was said, and as
someone who entered the service in 1970, I saw it that way.
Today, isn't it true that every man and every woman joins
the military voluntarily, we have no draftees left on active
duty, they have all either enlisted or reenlisted; that every
one of these people for the first time is somebody who went to
war knowing they were going to war?
Certainly Corporal Tillman enlisted knowing that our Nation
was at war. Isn't that true?
And I appreciate--General Brown? I have just two quick
questions. One as a Vietnam era vet, a Vietnam vet actually.
General Brown. Right.
Mr. Issa. You remember the military where, if you were a
rich college kid, you didn't go for the most part; and we had
the minorities as draftees, the poorest as draftees, versus
today every man and woman enlisted, and we have no draftees on
active duty.
General Brown. Correct.
Mr. Issa. I wanted to make clear that Corporal Tillman,
like every one of the men and women serving today, did so
voluntarily.
The Vietnam War was not a panacea of the right way to do
it. What we're doing today is the right way, and I think you
would all agree this is the right way to run the modern
military as volunteers, knowing volunteers.
General Brown. Sir, it is my opinion--I served in the
draftee Army, and I served in Vietnam; and I also served in the
all-volunteer Army, and the all-volunteer Army is better.
Mr. Lynch [presiding]. The panelists are allowed to answer
the gentleman's question if they would like to elaborate.
OK. The Chair yields himself 5 minutes.
Gentlemen, I want to extend my thanks for your willingness
to come forward and help the committee with its work. I want to
acknowledge the Tillman family, and my heart goes out to them
for having to relive this every time a hearing is held.
Now, a number of us, including Mr. Murphy, Mr. Welch, Mr.
Shays and others, have been out to the area where Mr. Tillman
was ambushed. And we certainly appreciate the complex battle
space, as you have described it, and we can understand that
there was some chaos in this firefight.
However, I do want to follow the time line here because
Chairman Waxman spoke earlier about the testimony of Specialist
O'Neal. And as you may remember, Specialist O'Neal was with
Corporal Tillman on the ground there, on that canyon road near
Manah. And Specialist O'Neal went back to Salerno, just north
of that area, a couple of days after the firefight, and
actually he wrote a witness statement in the immediate
aftermath of Corporal Tillman's death that made it quite clear
that this was a case of friendly fire.
But then something happened. Someone rewrote that statement
and the revised version--we had Specialist O'Neal in, and we
showed him the statement and we asked, Did you write this part?
No, I didn't. Did you write this part? No, I didn't.
So there was a drastic revision between what the eyewitness
wrote and what eventually went to the press and went to some of
you. And we don't know if it went to the President or not, but
it served at least in part as the basis for the Silver Star
citation. We know that.
And while we understand the chaos that might have occurred
during this firefight, this rewriting, this revision, happened
after the fact, after the smoke had cleared. And I can
appreciate the frustration of some of my colleagues who feel
that something else is going on here, and we're not sure what.
Some people think it was a mix-up, not a cover-up; and I
can certainly appreciate them feeling that way. But we have had
an opportunity, all of us, a lot of us, to go out there and
also observe the high excellence of our military, the high
excellence of our military officers and folks in uniform. And
they have performed brilliantly. And yet here we have this
major, major disconnect between what the people on the ground
observed and recounted, and then the report that gets out to
the press and the public and to the family.
And another issue that is confusing is the P-4 memo. It was
written explicitly to warn the senior defense officials and the
President that Pat Tillman, it was highly possible that he died
of friendly fire. But from the testimony today it would seem
that no one passed this information to either Secretary
Rumsfeld or the President. And knowing what I know about the
best of the military, I find that mind-boggling, just stunning,
that this happened.
I want to ask you--because I haven't heard a good
explanation today, I have to say that, and I am trying to pull
all of this together--we talked about six different
investigations. Can anybody on this panel give me an answer,
how that happened, that the specialist, on-the-ground
eyewitness right beside Corporal Tillman, right in the unit,
wrote an accurate description of what happened indicating
friendly fire; and yet downstream we follow that time line, we
in the Congress and the American people got a different story.
And I need to know the answer to how that happened.
That's why we are having--we owe this to the family. And I
understand that there was some element of this that folks
wanted to honor the memory of Corporal Tillman in the highest
tradition of the military. And he was a hero; the minute he put
on that uniform, he was an American hero, and nothing changes
that.
But we also owe it to our servicemen to accurately account
for them. And we owe it to their families who offer up their
sons and daughters to serve this country.
So I ask you, can anybody here on this panel explain how
that happened? Explain to the American people how that
happened?
Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I--needless to say, it happened the way
you've described it and the way the various investigations have
reported it. It happened in the field that somebody took
somebody else's words and altered them. I have no idea who did
it. I have no idea what their motive might have been.
I had no knowledge that had happened.
Mr. Lynch. General Myers.
General Myers. It would be extremely difficult to divine
that. I would really like to know, obviously, why somebody
would do that. I don't have any idea.
And certainly it is the way you described it. I haven't
seen how the words were altered, but it is inappropriate and
inexcusable. But I don't know why.
Mr. Lynch. General Abizaid, good to see you again, sir.
General Abizaid. Sir, it is good to see you as well.
It is very difficult to come to grips with how we screwed
this thing up, but we screwed this thing up. It was clear to me
on April 28th, when I talked to the platoon leader who was
Corporal Tillman's platoon leader, that he did not think of it
as being anything other than an enemy action. We didn't talk
long about it. He had been wounded. But he didn't give any
indication of friendly fire at that time.
Clearly, General McChrystal knew by the 29th that there was
a high probability, as he described in his message, that there
was friendly fire. The message that General McChrystal sent to
me, which was delivered late for problems that took place at my
headquarters--as a result of problems that took place at my
headquarters, undoubtedly delayed the information being relayed
to the chairman in the manner that it should have been.
When I discovered the problem, I relayed it to the chairman
in as timely a manner as I could, given the circumstances. But
it was clear that somewhere between the 29th and the--and the
period where I notified the chairman that this P-4 just hadn't
gone to me. It had gone to General Brown, it had gone to the
Department of the Army, and it was my supposition that the
Department of the Army was acting on the notion that friendly
fire had occurred, which can probably be the reason that the
chairman accounts for--and again this is supposition on my
part, it is not a fact, I don't know what happened--which is
why the chairman recollects having heard it as early as the
30th or the 31st, whatever day it happened.
Again, no excuses can be offered, but I can tell you a
couple of facts. General McChrystal reported the incident in a
forthright and in a timely fashion.
That the information flowed poorly through the chain of
command to include me is a problem of the chain of command,
both administrative and operational. It should have been
handled better and it wasn't. From that, a lot of other bad
things may have flowed.
But it is clear that all along fratricide was called as
early as the April 29th, and that on May 28th, we conclusively
stated it was fratricide, a report that I rendered to the
chairman and to the Secretary.
In terms of fratricide investigations, by the way, that's
not a slow investigation. That's a fast investigation. In
looking back, of how we go about investigating these things
after they've happened, it may seem slow; but in my experience
with a lot of fratricides, it went probably faster than most.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
General Brown, any conclusion?
General Brown. Sir, I'd just say, as I mentioned earlier,
as Secretary of the Army Geren said, it could not have been
more poorly handled. I think it was a process--it is a
difficult process to start with, and it was just very poorly
handled.
When I got the P-4, I made the assumption--and probably a
bad assumption, since I was an ``info'' addressee and not the
``to,'' that flow of information would flow through the chain
of command. It would have been simple for me to pick up the
phone and call the General. I didn't.
I did respond to the P-4, back to General McChrystal. But,
quite frankly, I just made the assumption--a bad assumption
now, I know--that normal P-4 traffic moves pretty fast, that
would go to the chairman immediately.
So it's unfortunate it was poorly handled, and
unfortunately it is the Tillman family that had to pay the
price for it.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, sir.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr.
Murphy, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I understand we have
votes pending, so I will be brief.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today. I
joined Representative Lynch and some others of our colleagues
in a trip earlier this year to Iraq and Afghanistan; and
frankly, as someone who has never worn the uniform or fired a
gun or been shot at, I left there with a deep and, frankly,
unconditional sense of appreciation for what our men and women
are doing there. And I thank you for your role in leading them.
My question is this: It is my understanding that the
Pentagon regulations require that a family be notified that a
fratricide investigation is pending even before the official
results are concluded. And I have a little bit of trouble--and
I will present the question first to General Myers--with the
contention that simply because the malfeasance wasn't in your
direct chain of command that the leaders of the military didn't
have an accompanying personal or moral responsibility to act on
what they knew was misinformation being given to the public--
and certainly, if not misinformation, a complete lack of
information given to the family.
I know this is a complex question for military leaders when
you have a responsibility to break outside of the chain of
command, when you know that something is being miscommunicated
or you know that something is being uncommunicated. I will ask
it of General Myers first.
There are a couple of weeks, 2 or 3 weeks, that you have
been informed that there is a fratricide investigation going
on. The family has not been notified. There are Sports
Illustrated articles and much public awareness of the initial
conclusion of death of Mr. Tillman. As Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, in retrospect, do you feel that you had a
personal or moral responsibility to alert the family even
though the chain of command may not have dictated that it was
your responsibility?
General Myers. I think it would have been absolutely
irresponsible of me to interfere with the Army procedures,
frankly. First of all, they are not Pentagon regulations; they
are Army regulations. The Army was the one that had the
regulations that said we have to notify the family as soon as
we know of the possibility.
And frankly, with the investigation ongoing, what I was
concerned about was exerting any kind of undue command
influence if this ever got to UCMJ, if it ever got to the
Secretary's desk; if he ever said, What do you think, which
would have been the only reason I would ever look at it--if the
Secretary would say, Give me your opinion on this.
You want to stay out of those matters so that you cannot be
used by some defense attorney that, Gee, we have had Myers
saying this and the Secretary saying this; therefore, my client
who is accused of wrongdoing is not guilty. There is obviously
command influence.
So it didn't occur to me at the time, clearly. I knew there
was an investigation ongoing. I thought that was appropriate. I
didn't know what had been told to the family or not been told.
I just wasn't aware.
I mean, it sounds harsh, and it is harsh, but the reality
is there is a lot of things going on, and this--Corporal
Tillman's death was significant, but it wasn't the kind of
issue that occupied a whole lot of time. As John said, we were
working on the battle of Fallujah. We had a myriad of issues.
Abu Ghraib had just broke; we spent a lot of time in the media
with Abu Ghraib. There were a lot of issues taking our
attention.
I think it would have been irresponsible for the chairman
to get involved in what are Army matters. I would have to
override the Secretary of the Army, acting Secretary. That
would be something that would be totally inappropriate, or get
into General Schoomaker's, Chief of the Staff of the Army's,
business.
Mr. Murphy. I appreciate there were a lot of pressures
occupying your time and occupying an immense amount of the
public's time. There were some things that many, many people
were paying attention to. Do you feel, in retrospect, that you
should have asked during those intervening weeks whether or not
the Tillman people knew?
General Myers. No, the matter should have been handled by
the Army. And it would not--I mean, I don't think it would have
occurred to me to say, Gee--I mean, this was not--
unfortunately, not the first fratricide, not the first death.
Even if it is not fratricide, there are issues with the
family members that the services are handling. And I don't
think it is my position, certainly not in any of the statutes
or even morally, I believe, to get involved when other people
are trying to handle that.
I mean, that's the services' business, and it is pretty
explicit. It would have been very unusual for me to ask those
kinds of questions, and frankly, it didn't occur to me.
Mr. Murphy. General Brown, do you regret not looking back,
not asking more questions about what the family knew? Do you
feel you had an obligation, whether or not it was within the
direct chain of command, to intervene and try to make sure--I
am concerned mostly about the family, I think. As the family
has noted, this was a fraud perpetrated on the American public
as well. But specifically, in relation to the family, why
weren't more questions being asked within the chain of command
of whether or not the family was being told?
General Brown. What I would say is that the Army ran this
investigation. They also run the casualty notification process,
and so do it routinely. And so when you see them doing the
actions that they are supposed to be doing, I was not
questioning them every day, were you doing every step in the
process.
Quite frankly, when I found out there was an issue that the
family hadn't been notified, by asking the question--which was
before the press release, I asked the question, had the family
been notified by the Army and our Army component, and I found
out that they had not.
And then we tried to take actions to help facilitate
getting the family notified before the press release came out,
when I did ask the question.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman [presiding]. Thank you Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Honda.
Mr. Honda. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the
witnesses' presence and your endurance at this time. Let me get
back to the P-4 discussion, quick question.
P-4 is the classified memo to those that the memo has been
written to; is that correct?
General Abizaid. That's correct, sir. I mean, it is--in the
channels that this was sent, it was actually sent in very
highly classified channels.
General Myers. But a P-4 can be unclassified.
Mr. Honda. So it was an important memo?
General Abizaid. There are a lot of different P-4s that are
sent around, but it is usually commander-to-commander
communication.
Mr. Honda. And these are for the eyes, including those who
are cc'd?
General Brown. I'm sorry. I didn't understand the question.
Mr. Honda. It is also not only for--the memo is directed to
a couple of people, but someone said that the others were cc'd.
General Brown. Right.
Mr. Honda. And that also means that this was meant for your
eyes also?
General Brown. Right.
Mr. Honda. I'd like to read the last sentence of the P-4
memo and ask for a clarification of the gentlemen here.
In this sentence, General McChrystal writes that he feels
it is essential that the three generals receive information
about Corporal Tillman's death, and here is why.
He says, ``In order to preclude any unknowing statements by
our country's leaders which might cause public embarrassment if
the circumstances of Corporal Tillman's death becomes public .
. .''
He says, ``if the circumstances of Corporal Tillman's death
are ever made public.'' For the record, were you involved in
any discussion about withholding information about Corporal
Tillman's death from his family or the American public?
Second question: Was there any conversation that the
information about his death would never be released to his
family or the public?
General Brown. There was no conversation about his death or
fratricide ever not being released. There was never a
discussion on that.
The only discussion I ever heard--and we weren't the
investigating body or the notification and next-of-kin
responsible agency--was the normal assumption that people were
waiting until the investigation was concluded before the family
would be notified. OK.
So then that is--that is routinely understood. And as a
matter of fact, it is as I understand from this hearing this
morning, that is still current Marine Corps policy, that the
investigation is completed and then the family is notified.
So that information would have been protected at that time
so that it was not released to the press, so that the family
would not wake up and find it in the press prematurely, before
the investigation was completed and signed off by the combatant
commander.
General Abizaid. Yes, sir, there was never any intention at
any level to keep the idea that it was fratricide from either
the family or the public. It was clear that it would be
disclosed at the appropriate time, as decided by the Department
of the Army.
Mr. Honda. General Myers.
General Myers. I agree with General Brown.
Mr. Honda. You are saying that there were no discussions,
or you were not involved in any discussions about withholding
information from the family or the public?
General Myers. I was not involved in any discussions where
withholding information from the family or the public, or
anybody, ever came up.
Mr. Honda. OK.
General Myers. I was not.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Nor was I.
General Brown. Sir, if I could go back to that for just a
second, when we get a casualty notification, which in my
headquarters we will get for every one of our casualties, we
are very careful to protect the names of the individuals, and
the individuals, until the family notification of next of kin
has taken place. So that would fall into the same category.
Mr. Honda. The P-4 was written April 29th, 7 days after the
incident. So the 7 days ensuing, for 7 days there wasn't an
investigation, and there was a report by Mr. O'Neal; is that
correct?
General Brown. I don't know. A report by Mr. O'Neal, I'm
not familiar with.
Mr. Honda. He is the gentleman who wrote the initial
report.
General Abizaid. I know there was an initial 15-6 that was
initiated, but I would have to look at the report to say what
date it was initiated. Perhaps we could find that information.
Mr. Honda. And the contents of that first report were
changed, and it appears on the P-4 as it has been changed. Are
you aware of that? Or is that a correct statement?
General Brown. Just to be clear, could you restate that
statement again? And I think we will have better chance of
answering it.
Mr. Honda. There was previous testimony that there was a
written report by a combatant next to Mr. Tillman, who wrote
down the events, the accurate events of his death. And I
understand through the testimony today that has been changed
and that change is reflected in the P-4. Is that a correct
statement?
General Brown. I don't know.
General Abizaid. Here is what I do know, to make sure that
we are all talking about the same dates.
The incident took place on the 22nd. The chain of command,
through me, was notified of Corporal Tillman's death.
There was a P-4 sent on the 29th.
The first 15-6 report was completed on the 4th of May, and
it was deemed not sufficient by General McChrystal, and another
15-6 officer was appointed on the 8th of May.
And on May 25th, that report reached my headquarters, and
on May 28th, I approved that report.
Those are the dates as I know them.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Honda. I
appreciate your joining this committee for this hearing and the
previous one. You are not a member of the committee, but I know
of your strong interest in the concern about Corporal Tillman.
Could I just ask this question? Is it--on how many
occasions would you get a P-4 memo saying, Let the President
and the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Armed
Services know about a certain fact, get it to them because we
want to help them avoid embarrassment?
Have you ever received a P-4 like that, General Brown.
General Brown. Never, sir.
Chairman Waxman. General Abizaid, did you ever receive a P-
4 like that?
General Abizaid. Yes, I've received some very interesting
P-4s; and sometimes they would say, Make sure the President
knows, or make sure this happens or that happens.
There is an interesting thing about the P-4 that says,
Deliver during normal duty hours; and so again General
McChrystal did exactly the right thing. He sent a timely
message in a timely fashion through the most secure channels.
And, again, it went to Tampa. I was forwarded. It didn't
get to me in a timely fashion, forward. That's a problem that
was strictly in my command.
But, again, when I told the chairman, I did not tell the
chairman in order that the chairman would run to the Secretary
and then run to the President. I told the chairman so he would
know, and I explained to him in general terms the basic
information in the P-4.
Chairman Waxman. Did you tell him that this was something
that we ought to--he ought to let the civilian authorities in
the White House, even the President, know this information to
avoid embarrassment?
General Abizaid. I don't know that I used those words, but
I said that it was important that the leadership know. And
between the chairman and me--I mean, it's clear that the
leadership up above us is the Secretary and the President.
Chairman Waxman. Yes. See, the issue is not just failure to
let the family know; there is an issue of whether there was a
failure to follow the routine way things are handled, to let
the President know, to avoid embarrassment, let the President
know and our Nation's leaders know.
General Myers, have you gotten P-4 memos that asked you to
let the President and our national leaders know something?
General Myers. I probably have.
Chairman Waxman. And when you get that kind of information,
what do you do with it?
General Myers. You have to put your judgment on it, because
people are recommending to you what they think is appropriate,
and you have to put your judgment on it.
Like I said, in this case, what would have been logical
would have been to inform the Secretary. I can't recall that I
did that. I don't know. I don't have any documentation that
says I did that.
But that would have been a logical thing to do when I got a
P-4 like this, to say, Mr. Secretary, you know this has now
gone from ``Corporal Tillman was killed by enemy fire'' to
``possible fratricide.'' But that would have been the logical
thing to do.
I can't tell you that I did it, because I just don't recall
whether I did it or not.
Chairman Waxman. OK. Well, let me conclude the hearing by
indicating the facts that General Myers and General Brown knew
about the friendly fire issue at the end of April.
General Abizaid learned on May 6th.
Secretary Rumsfeld learned on May 20th.
All of these are the senior leaders that knew before the
public and the family----
Mr. Rumsfeld. Could I correct that?
Chairman Waxman. Yes.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I want to make sure this is precisely
accurate. I do not believe I testified that I learned on May
20th, and if that impression has been left, I don't want that
left.
My testimony is that I do not recall; that is the letter I
gave to the IG. I was told that a person was in a meeting after
May 20th when I was informed. But that is--I just simply do not
know when I first learned of the possibility of fratricide.
Chairman Waxman. I appreciate that correction.
General Abizaid. And, sir, if I may, I also wanted to make
sure that the 6th is a logical day. It is not ``the'' day; the
day is somewhere between 10 and 20 days after the event. It's
the best that my staff and I could come to a conclusion on at
this point.
Chairman Waxman. You were all very busy. There is no
question about it.
General Brown. Sir, one other thing, if I could interrupt
also to correct.
Your statement was that I knew about the friendly fire, I
knew that there was an investigation ongoing, the potential for
friendly fire.
General Myers. That goes for me, too.
General Abizaid. And for me, as well.
Chairman Waxman. Well, you all knew or didn't know within
that timeframe. But it appears that all of you had some
indication before the ceremony where the world was being told
that Corporal Tillman was killed in the line of duty. He was
getting the Silver Star. It was a memorial service where this
information, this misinformation, was given out.
And you have all admitted that the system failed. So I just
think that the public should have known, the family should have
known earlier who was responsible. But--none of you feel that
you personally are responsible, but the system itself didn't
work.
Ironically enough, the President could have called you all
in and said, Why didn't I know about this when there was a P-4
memo? But somehow or another it seemed like the President
avoided embarrassment as well. So maybe somebody did know at
the White House that this was likely to be friendly fire, on
more thorough investigation.
You have been here a long time. I appreciate your taking
the time to be with us. We are obviously trying to find out
what went on and who had responsibility, who dropped the ball.
The system didn't work. Errors were made. That's too
passive.
Somebody should be responsible, and we're trying to figure
that out.
That concludes our hearing today, and we stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]