[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CRITICAL LAPSES IN FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION SAFETY OVERSIGHT OF
AIRLINES: ABUSES OF REGULATORY ``PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS''
=======================================================================
(110-109)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
----------
APRIL 3, 2008
----------
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
CRITICAL LAPSES IN FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION SAFETY OVERSIGHT OF
AIRLINES: ABUSES OF REGULATORY ``PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS''
CRITICAL LAPSES IN FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION SAFETY OVERSIGHT OF
AIRLINES: ABUSES OF REGULATORY ``PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS''
=======================================================================
(110-109)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 3, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
41-821 PDF WASHINGTON : 2008
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, JOHN L. MICA, Florida
Vice Chair DON YOUNG, Alaska
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
Columbia WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
JERROLD NADLER, New York VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
CORRINE BROWN, Florida STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
BOB FILNER, California FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas JERRY MORAN, Kansas
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi GARY G. MILLER, California
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa Carolina
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
RICK LARSEN, Washington SAM GRAVES, Missouri
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York Virginia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois TED POE, Texas
DORIS O. MATSUI, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
NICK LAMPSON, Texas CONNIE MACK, Florida
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii York
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr.,
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota Louisiana
HEATH SHULER, North Carolina JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
MICHAEL A. ACURI, New York CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona THELMA D. DRAKE, Virginia
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOHN J. HALL, New York VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
JERRY McNERNEY, California
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
(ii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ v
TESTIMONY
Andrews, Richard A., Aviation Safety Inspector, American Eagle
Operations Unit, AMR CMO, Professional Aviation Safety
Specialists.................................................... 126
Ballough, James J., Director, Flight Standards Service, Federal
Aviation Administration........................................ 60
Bassler, John, Principal Avionics Inspector, Dallas Fort Worth
Flight Standards District Office............................... 100
Bloch, Hon. Scott J., Special Counsel, U.S. Office of the Special
Counsel........................................................ 60
Boutris, Charalambe ``Bobby,'' Aviation Safety Inspector and
Boeing 737-700 Partial Program Manager for Aircraft
Maintenance, Southwest Airlines Certificate Management Office.. 10
Brantley, Tom, President, Professional Aviation Safety
Specialists, accompanied by Linda Goodrich, Region IV Vice
President, Professional Aviation Safety Specialists............ 126
Collamore, Vincent Larry, Aviation Safety Inspector, Southwest
Airlines CMO................................................... 100
Cotti, Paul E., Supervisor, American Eagle Airworthiness Unit,
AMR CMO........................................................ 10
Kelleher, Herb, Executive Chairman, Southwest Airlines Company... 100
Kelly, Gary, Chief Executive Officer, Southwest Airlines Company. 100
Lambert, Terry D., Manager, Safety and Analysis Group, Flight
Standards Division, FAA Southwest Region....................... 10
McNease, Bill, Retired Aviation Safety Inspector, FedEx CMO...... 126
Mills, Michael C., Assistant Manager, Dallas Fort Worth Flight
Standards District Office...................................... 10
Naccache, Robert A., Ret. Assistant Manager, SWA CMO............. 10
Peters, Douglas E., Aviation Safety Inspector and Boeing 757
Partial Program Manager, American Airlines Certification Unit,
AMR CMO........................................................ 10
Sabatini, Nicholas A., Associate Administrator for Aviation
Safety, Federal Aviation Administration........................ 60
Scovel, III, Hon. Calvin L., Inspector General, U.S. Department
of Transportation.............................................. 60
Stuckey, Thomas, Manager, Flight Standards Division, Federal
Aviation Administration, Southwest Region...................... 60
Thrash, Joseph P., Retired Aviation Safety Inspector, Continental
Airlines CMO................................................... 126
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Altmire, Hon. Jason, of Pennsylvania............................. 262
Brown, Hon. Corrine, of Florida.................................. 263
Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri................................. 266
Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois............................. 267
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., of Maryland............................ 272
Filner, Hon. Bob, of California.................................. 275
Johnson, Hon. Eddie Bernice, of Texas............................ 277
Matsui, Hon. Doris O., of California............................. 283
Mitchell, Hon. Harry E., of Arizona.............................. 286
Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota............................ 288
Walz, Hon. Timothy J., of Minnesota.............................. 304
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Andrews, Richard................................................. 306
Bassler, John.................................................... 310
Bloch, Hon. Scott J.............................................. 352
Boutris, Charalambe ``Bobby''.................................... 360
Brantley, Tom.................................................... 375
Collamore, Vincent L............................................. 387
Cotti, Paul E.................................................... 388
Kelleher, Herbert D.............................................. 393
Lambert, Terry D................................................. 429
McNease, William L............................................... 437
Mills, Michael C................................................. 439
Naccache, Robert A............................................... 452
Peters, Douglas E................................................ 459
Sabatini, Nicholas A............................................. 466
Scovel, III, Hon. Calvin L....................................... 543
Thrash, Joseph P................................................. 573
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
Federal Aviation Administration, Advisory Circular, Aviation
Safety Action Program, November 15, 2002..................... 142
Federal Aviation Administration, Advisory Circular, Voluntary
Disclosure Reporting Program, September 8, 2006.............. 174
Federal Aviation Administration, Airworthiness Directive, 14
CFR Part 39; Docket No. 2001-NM-246-AD; Amendment 39-13784;
AD 2004-18-06; Federal Register: September 8, 2004 (Volume
69, Number 173).............................................. 189
Federal Aviation Administration, Notice 8900.36, Special
Emphasis Validation of Airworthiness Directives Oversight,
Effective Date: March 13, 2008, Cancellation Date: June 30,
2008......................................................... 202
Federal Aviation Administration, Order 8000.82, Designation of
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) Information as
Protected from Public Disclosure Under 14 CFR Part 193,
Spetember 3, 2003............................................ 205
Federal Aviation Administration, Order 8900.1, Volume 11:
Flight Standards Programs, Chapter 2: Voluntary Safety
Programs, Section 1: Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP),
November 8, 2007............................................. 216
Federal Aviation Administration, Fact Sheets, FAA Customer
Service Initiative, April 2003............................... 248
Federal Aviation Administration, letter to Colleen Barrett,
President, Southwest Airlines Co., March 6, 2008............. 251
Federal Aviation Administration, FAA News, FAA Aviation Safety
Action Plan, April 2, 2008................................... 257
Oberstar, Hon. James L., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Minnesota, Chairman, Committee on Transporation and
Infrastructure, Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Oregon, Chairman, Subcommittee on Highways
and Transit, Jerry F. Costello, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Illinois, Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation,
letter to Nicholas A. Sabatini, Associate Administrator for
Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, James J.
Ballough, Director, Flight Standards Service, Federal Aviation
Administration, and Thomas Stuckey, Federal Aviation
Administration................................................. 298
Sabatini, Nicholas A., Associate Administrator for Aviation
Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, and James J. Ballough,
Director, Flight Standards Service, Federal Aviation
Administration, responses to questions from the Committee...... 478
ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD
Bruno, Gabriel D., Retired Federal Aviation Administration
Manager, ``An Insider's Analysis of the FAA's Failure to
Protect the Skies,'' written statement......................... 704
Diefenderfer, Mary Rose, Ex-FAA POI, Alaska Airlines Section,
written statement.............................................. 712
Southwest Airlines Pilots' Association, written statment......... 718
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS HEARING ON CRITICAL LAPSES IN FAA SAFETY
OVERSIGHT OF AIRLINES: ABUSES OF REGULATORY ``PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS''
----------
Thursday, April 3, 2008
House of Representatives
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room
2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable James
Oberstar [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
Mr. Oberstar. The Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure will come to order.
Before we begin the hearing which is the subject of today's
session, I have a housekeeping item to attend to, to welcome
the newest Member of the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Sires, who
replaces our former colleague from Indiana, the late Julia
Carson. Mr. Sires, unfortunately, is still in New Jersey
because they have a filing deadline for the November election,
and he has to be there in person to do that. But he assured me
that he will be an active, vigorous participant in all the work
of the Committee as we continue our work.
Ms. Carson's untimely death created vacancies on the
Subcommittee on Highways and Transit and on the Subcommittee on
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials. The Democratic
Caucus of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
unanimously recommended Mr. Sires fill these positions. So,
pursuant to the rules of the Committee, I ask unanimous consent
that Mr. Sires be appointed to the Subcommittee on Highways and
Transit and to the Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and
Hazardous Materials. Is there objection?
[No response.]
Mr. Oberstar. The Chair hears none. So ordered.
At the outset, I want to observe that we will have, as I
have notified Members, only four opening statements, in order
to expedite the business of the day and to assure that we hear
all witnesses in timely fashion. So we will have four opening
statements: mine; the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica; Mr.
Costello; and Mr. Petri.
Mr. Miller, will you close the door?
Today's hearing is a continuation of the long-established
practice and precedent of this Committee of overseeing the work
of the government agencies and the programs under the
jurisdiction of this Committee. The Special Investigating
Committee on the Federal-Aid Highway Program was established at
the direction of Speaker Sam Rayburn in 1959, three years after
enactment of the Highway Trust Fund and the Interstate Highway
Program.
My predecessor, John Blatnik, whose portrait hangs in the
corner of this room, was selected to head that Special
Committee to inquire into fraud, corruption, abuse, and right-
of-way acquisition practices, construction practices at a time
when the Interstate Highway Program was just beginning, when
unprecedented amounts of money were flowing from the Federal
Government to State Departments of Transportation, which our
Subcommittee investigative staff found had no internal audit
and review procedures; where money was flowing out fraudulently
to contractors; where Federal and State and local government
officials were being paid off by contractors to sign off on
shoddy or non-existent practices. Thirty-six people went to
Federal and State prison as a result of those hearings over a
period of six years.
The work of the Special Investigating Committee continued
as the Committee was then restructured as a standing
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Full
Committee on Public Works. It was a great privilege for me,
years later, beginning in 1985, to Chair that Subcommittee
through 1989, and later as Chair of the Aviation Authorizing
Committee, and to continue the work of oversight, inquiry into
issues of importance to the broad spectrum of activities of our
Committee on Public Works, and then Public Works and
Transportation.
Aviation has been a major focus of our oversight
activities. Practically the first hearing I chaired as Chair of
the Investigations and Oversight was an inquiry into the crash
of Galaxy Airlines in January 1985 in Reno, Nevada, when 93
people died. Other hearings inquired into an uprising, a rash
of near mid-airs.
At a time when the FAA was reporting that near mid-air
incidents, aircraft coming too close to one another in the air,
was down by 50 percent, we learned, through the AIMs reporting
system, that, in fact, near mid-airs had doubled throughout
1984 and that there was a rising incidence of aircraft coming
too close to one another and the FAA did not even have a
standard for measuring near mid-air incidents of aircraft
coming too close to each other.
Whistleblowers in the form of air traffic controllers,
flight attendants, mechanics, pilots, came to the Committee
with information about failures to uphold the highest standards
of safety in aviation. With my Committee colleague, Newt
Gingrich, first, and later Bill Klinger, Republican from
Pennsylvania, we followed up on all those leads and we
conducted intensive hearings and inquiries into aviation safety
issues. As a result of those hearings, first of Galaxy
Airlines, the FAA transformed its oversight into a holistic
view; not looking at one piece here and one piece there, but
requiring a holistic overall overview of aviation safety as
conducted by the airlines and their maintenance practices.
The near mid-air series of hearings led to establishment
and requirement of MTSI transponders in the terminal control
area. After the tragic crash of two aircraft over Cerritos,
California, our Committee colleague Ron Packard, Republican of
California, and our Committee leadership moved to, by law,
require establishment of ground proximity warning systems and
traffic collision avoidance systems on board aircraft, because
the FAA either was not moving fast enough or, as they told us,
that the regulatory process will take much too long. We did it,
bipartisan spirit, through legislation.
And then there were incidents of, again, whistleblowers
coming to the Committee, saying a foreign airline has a 747 at
Boeing's headquarters in Seattle, where they are removing the
over-wing exits in order to save weight and accommodate more
passengers and fuel, and we think that is a serious safety
violation. Flight attendants and mechanics brought it to our
attention. In this very Committee hearing room we held a
hearing on that subject with then FAA Administrator Don Engen
waiting in the audience to testify.
We had testimony from Joan Jackson, the lead flight
attendant in civil aviation's worst accident at Tenor Reef in
the Canary Islands, testifying how, shrouded in fog, with two
747s crashing into one another, one after another flight
attendant tried to get their passengers out the exit, only to
one be decapitated, another see the chute melt in flames; and
Joan Jackson led her 60 passengers out to safety through the
over-wing exit. We had testimony from other flight attendants
in other 747 tragedies where lives were saved because of the
over-wing exits.
To his great credit, Administrator Engen, sitting right
there in that front row, wrote out a note, sent it to the
Seattle administrator's office--it was a regional administrator
at the time--directing that the work be suspended on over-wing
exit removals.
In the aftermath of Aloha Airlines, where 18 feet of an
aircraft ripped off in flight, something that was not supposed
to happen, had never happened, could not happen, did happen.
The result of that tragedy in which the flight attendant was
pulled to her death, the flight crew, remarkably, was able to
safely land the aircraft.
I, working with FAA, called a worldwide conference on aging
aircraft. The result of that was the Aging Aircraft Safety Act,
in which Congress directed in-depth oversight of and
maintenance on high-time aircraft; complete tear-down at 35,000
cycles and every 4500 cycles thereafter. Significant because in
this incident, in this instant case with Southwest Airlines,
violation of that airworthiness directive was the cause of the
whistleblowing that we will hear about shortly.
Subsequently, the mysterious crash of 737 at Aliquippa,
Pennsylvania, 132 fatalities. Again, the NTSB investigation
ultimately found that it was an uncommanded rudder movement
that caused that aircraft to crash. Because of that finding,
the NTSB went back into its records and looked at other crashes
and other incidents short of crash in which there was a
movement they could not account for and attributed it back to
the uncommanded rudder control and the power control unit
within that. Significant because here again was an
airworthiness directive compliance with which was avoided by
Southwest in compliance with and in concert with FAA
inspectors.
Other oversight hearings which we conducted resulted in
changes in airport runway oversight by FAA and air traffic
controllers dealing with runway incursions, and air traffic
control staffing standards. In nearly every case of our
oversight hearings we have seen changes in practice, changes in
airworthiness directives driven by a need to adhere to the
highest standards of safety.
And I will say it and I will say it again, the opening
paragraph of the FAA Act of 1958 directs the newly established
agency ``to maintain safety at the highest possible level.''
Not the level the airlines want to spend money on, not the
level that they think is okay, but the highest possible level.
That is the gold standard of aviation safety worldwide. That is
what we expect the FAA to live up to, not some international
standards organization, not something that RKO does, but that
FAA is the gold standard for the world.
I made it clear when I took the Chairmanship of the Full
Committee that oversight would be an important part of our
work, and so it has become.
We are going to hear this morning from another generation
of whistleblowers, dedicated professionals who have put their
careers on the line in the interest of safety, willing to risk
what is necessary in the interest of the safety of the
traveling public. They will present testimony that Southwest
Airlines, with FAA complicity, allowed at least 117 aircraft to
fly with passengers in revenue service in violation of Federal
aviation regulations. Documents they presented to our
Committee, which I reviewed last summer and continuing through
the fall, set in motion an inquiry into the most egregious
lapse of safety I have seen in 23 years. The details will be
forthcoming from the witnesses.
They suggest to me that the voluntary disclosure initiative
instituted with good intentions by FAA, has migrated into
complacency at the highest levels of FAA management, reflecting
a pendulum swing away from a culture of vigorous enforcement of
compliance toward a carrier-favorable cozy relationship. This
shift from vigilance occurred at the very time that airline
maintenance has been massively outsourced by airlines, by
specifically network carriers except for American Airlines,
with less FAA enforcement, less airline management involvement,
and outsourcing to both domestic and foreign repair stations.
I understand full well from many years of doing this work
that FAA probably could not hire enough. Maybe they have some
3,000 inspectors. Ten times that many might not be enough to
conduct the in-depth, vigorous surveillance that is needed. But
certainly more than we have now are necessary. And, yet, the
partnership program FAA initiated with the airlines, that can
be beneficial to safety, has drifted into a system that is
inimical to safety. FAA needs to rethink its relationship with
the airlines and with the other aviation entities which it
regulates.
I was astonished to read off the FAA website their mission
statement: ``Our customers are people and companies requesting
certification, other aviation services or information related
to the products and mission of flight standards.'' The only
customer, if you are going to use that term, of the FAA is the
air traveling public. Airlines are not customers. FAA is not
providing a service to them. Bedrock responsibility of the FAA
is to ensure safety for the traveling public. FAA needs to
clean house from top to bottom, take corrective action, hire
more inspectors and give them a safety mission.
Congress should, and following these hearings will--I
will--draft legislation--I hope we can have bipartisan
concurrence on it--to establish a long post-service cooling off
period for FAA inspectors before they are allowed to go to work
for the airlines. This is something that FAA could do by
regulation, but it would take them way too long to do it. Just
as we do with other Executive Branch personnel, we should do it
for FAA.
Senior management at FAA has to develop a better way to
monitor local airline oversight offices and avoid lapses in
compliance such as we saw with Southwest.
It is no mere coincidence that FAA's recently initiated
audit began just after news of our hearing was revealed to the
public. We are going to look in-depth at the factors that
brought us to this point in the course of this hearing.
With that point, I yield to the gentleman from California,
Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Thank you for yielding and also thank you for
convening a very important hearing this morning.
Probably one of the most important responsibilities we have
as a Member of this Committee, whether it is Mr. Oberstar,
myself, or any other Members here is making certain that we do
conduct thorough oversight, and, particularly when it comes to
aviation, that we ensure, as is the charter set forth for FAA,
the highest standard of safety.
I do want to, though, assure the Members of Congress and
the American people that we have developed and maintained the
safest system of passenger aviation in the history of the
world. Last year, we had over 735 million people fly. In fact,
two-thirds of all the air traffic in the world took place
within the boundaries of the United States. Since 2001,
November 12th, we have not had a single aviation fatality in a
large aircraft in the United States of America. That record is
unparalleled, again, in the history of aviation.
But I think that today's hearing is very important because
we have had a couple of people step out at probably some great
personal risk and bring information to the Committee that, as
good as the system we developed and put in place, we can't sit
on our laurels; that, in fact, we have got to look at what we
put in place. And, you know, I was a strong advocate of a risk-
based inspections and also self-reporting system, and I think
so far it has proven to work well.
But what we have from the individuals that we will hear
from today is a wake-up call, a wake-up call that you can never
just accept a standard or a protocol or a routine in
government, and particularly where it involves safety, that you
have to be constantly vigilant of the system you put in place
and then take corrective action. So we are going to hear about
what went wrong with the system we had.
We are going to hear about some relationships the Chairman
described that probably are improper and that need to be
corrected. We are going to hear about some revolving door
relationships, too, that also need to be corrected. But what we
have got to do is come up with positive changes that ensure
that the record that we have had to date continues.
Now, again, I want to assure the American people the system
is safe; we found some flaws, but this hearing is going to
ensure that we continue that record and we correct the things
that we found and we will hear today what has gone wrong. Just
for example, last year, 43,000 people were killed in automobile
accidents. Since the last major aircraft crash and deaths in
2001, over 200,000 people have died on our highways and
millions injured. So just put all of this in perspective. But,
again, we can't rest on our laurels.
I have tried to take a look at what went wrong, and I think
that we have several problems, and at least three things need
to be addressed. First of all, the system that we put in place
was a self-reporting and risk-based system, which is a good
system. What we didn't put in place is somebody to check those
who are doing the checking; and I think that is what is missing
in the system. We can't just rely on what we created to be,
again, a self-policing, the fox guarding the hen house; we have
got to have some independent check of the checkers.
The second thing that concerns me in all of this is if you
look at the number of employees, we have 3800 people in FAA and
inspections. They do about 7,000 commercial aircraft. We
probably have enough people to do the job if everybody was on
the job. I think we are going to hear_and we need to ask
questions of Mr. Sabatini about_who are the people we have
doing the job and how many people we actually have in place.
My observation is we have a serious problem with
retirement, we have a serious problem with recruitment, we have
a serious problem with replacement, and we also have a serious
problem with looking at the number of people in administrative
positions versus the people who are actually online conducting
these inspections. So it is not always how many people you
have, it is how you use the people that you have and if the
positions are filled or will become vacant and then finding a
way to replace them.
My third and last concern is we are here today, we are on
our third extension of FAA reauthorization. Congress sets the
policy; we have basically failed in our responsibility to pass
FAA legislation reauthorization. We have not had an
administrator at the FAA, a confirmed administrator since
September of last year. This is particularly a very difficult
return to what we experienced in the past.
I have been on the Committee for 16 years. When I came on
at one point, we had five administrators in a very short period
of time, and then we had no administrators or acting
administrators for almost the same period of time. You cannot
run a Federal Aviation Administration without someone at the
helm.
And I have written every Member of the Senate before this
hearing was convened or announced and asked them to take action
on that. We have no deputy. It took us years to get a COO. The
COO left. We have a new COO. So I am not a happy camper as far
as the way FAA is rudderless, and, again, Congress has
abdicated its responsibility to confirm or reject the
President's nominee.
Out of all this, in closing, there is some good news, and
the public and you can take confidence when you have an
incident like this, as you have heard already, the planes are
being pulled out of the sky, there are re-inspections, there
are audits, there are reviews. Everyone is going to ``dot''
there ``I''s and cross their ``T''s as far as safety is
concerned, so in a bad situation some good things will happen.
But again, finally, the public has to be also assured in a
time when airlines are being forced. I mean, they are really
feeling the pinch. We had another one go down today. But the
public has to be reassured that even when there is cost-cutting
by airlines and cost attention to expenses, that safety will
not be compromised by the Federal Government, which has that
important responsibility.
So I look forward to working with the Chairman, Members of
the Committee, those that are left at FAA, the industry, and
others to make certain we restore confidence and correct
problems with the system. Thank you.
Mr. Oberstar. I appreciate the gentleman's affirmative
statement in favor of safety and concur on the points that he
has made.
The gentleman from Illinois, Chair of the Aviation
Subcommittee, Mr. Costello.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, I
think you have given a very good summary of why we are here
today and the issues before us. Therefore, I will submit my
statement into the record and make some brief comments. But
before I do, I want to follow up on Mr. Mica's comments. I
think he has made very good points concerning the lack of an
administrator and, secondly, the fact that the legislation that
we passed through the House is pending in the other body.
So the two points that I would make is that we on this
side, this Committee and the Subcommittee, as well as the House
of Representatives, we have not failed in our duties. We have
passed a reauthorization bill. It passed the House with
bipartisan support on September 20th of last year. It is
pending in the other body.
On the other issue of you have to have someone at the helm,
an administrator, I agree with Mr. Mica, but I would also point
out that many of these violations, when the inspectors were
reporting these violations to their supervisors, we did have an
administrator in office at the time. So I just want to, for the
record, point that out.
First, Mr. Chairman, let me thank Mr. Boutris and Mr.
Peters for being here, but for their persistence and
dedication. We would not be holding this hearing today had it
not been for their determination and their courage and their
persistence. They were the ones who exposed the violations, and
they should be commended for their actions.
It is a pretty sad day when employees of any agencies here
in the Federal Government, when they have to seek whistleblower
protections in order to do their job, let alone safety
inspectors from an agency whose number one responsibility is
protecting the flying public. The fact that Southwest failed to
ground planes that should have been grounded is inexcusable,
and they should pay a hefty fine.
However, this hearing today is not about Southwest
Airlines; it is about the total failure by the FAA to perform
sufficient oversight of its maintenance program. While
Southwest's failure is inexcusable, the fact that FAA
supervisors prevented FAA inspectors from doing their job,
preventing them from enforcing serious safety violations, is
nothing more or nothing less than outrageous.
We need to know, this Committee needs to know, the American
people need to know who at the FAA knew about these violations,
when they learned about the violations, and why the FAA waited
so long to impose a fine on Southwest. We also need to know
what action will be taken by the FAA to prevent this from
happening again in the future.
Mr. Chairman, we have seen a pattern at the FAA of being an
agency that is reactive, and not proactive. Since I became
Chairman of the Subcommittee in January of last year, I can
tell you that sometimes you get the feeling that the agency is
on autopilot until they are pushed into action, either by this
Committee, the Aviation Subcommittee, the media, or, in this
case, whistleblowers.
I can give many examples, but just to give you a few, the
issue of runway incursions. The FAA acted when we were at the
height of runway incursions back in 1999, 2000, and 2001. They
put together a committee. The administrator and the secretary
interacted with that committee, all of the stakeholders. They
created an Office of Director of Runway Safety. But then, when
the numbers started coming down, the FAA left the problem,
walked away from it, and left the office vacant; and no more
input or contact with the stakeholders.
Secondly, the issue of hazardous conditions in towers at
the FAA. We have had reports and the FAA has had reports from
air traffic controllers and their employees about the hazardous
conditions at the air traffic control towers, the TRACONs and
other facilities. They didn't act until the Subcommittee
started to take action. In fact, they didn't even put together
a list as to which facilities were in the worst condition in
order to address the problem. In my judgment, they ignored the
problem until we at the Subcommittee level held a hearing.
The issue of congestion and delays. It was when the
Subcommittee held a hearing. We pushed the FAA, in my judgment,
to addressing the issue by having the secretary and the
President of the United States issue a directive to the
secretary and the administrator to do something about
congestion and delays.
And last--and there are many other examples--consumer
issues like holiday travel and emergency contingency plans. You
know, only after my call to the Secretary of Transportation
saying, look, we anticipate, over Thanksgiving and the
Christmas holiday, more people flying than ever before, do we
have a plan to address this; are we going to bring airport
operators and the airlines together to put a plan together? And
I was told, boy, that is a great idea, we should do that. And I
said, well, let's begin meeting and we will do it around your
schedule.
The next call I got was, well, I am not going to be able to
participate because I am working over at the White House to try
to address the issue. And on the very morning that we held our
Subcommittee hearing on the issue of holiday travel and
congestion during that period the Secretary and the President
made an announcement that he was directing the Secretary to
come up with a plan.
It is very clear that the agency acts when they are pushed
to act. You know, it is not enough to have safety regulations
in place. We in this Committee, the Subcommittee on Aviation,
and the American people expect the FAA to enforce these
regulations.
As has been pointed out by the Chairman and others, we have
the safest air transport system in the world here in the United
States, but we can't become complacent and rely on the past.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say that I have said it
before and I will said it again, I have said it at Aviation
Subcommittee hearings and I have said it over and over again,
and I will say it again today: I want the FAA to know, I want
the industry to know this Committee is not going away, the
Aviation Subcommittee is not going away. We are going to
fulfill our responsibilities of aggressive oversight on this
issue and every issue. We owe it to the American people. That
is our responsibility and we are going to live up to our
responsibility.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses today, and I thank you for calling this hearing.
Mr. Oberstar. I thank the gentleman for his comments and
for his superb work as the Chair of the Aviation Subcommittee.
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Aviation,
distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Petri.
Mr. Petri. I thank my Chairman from Minnesota. And I would
like to thank you for having this important hearing on the
FAA's airline maintenance oversight and how they have
discharged that responsibility. I will summarize my remarks and
ask that the full remarks be made a part of the record.
Mr. Oberstar. Without objection, it will be included in the
record.
Mr. Petri. The roughly 6,900 employees of the FAA's Office
of Aviation Safety, including some 3,800 aviation safety
inspectors, oversee approximately 19,000 aircraft, including
about 7,000 aircraft that make up the U.S. commercial airline
fleet; over 500,000 pilots and approximately 5,000 repair
stations. Their charge is as important as it is obviously
large.
While it is true that we are enjoying the safest period in
aviation history, due in no small part to the hard work of many
at the FAA and at the airlines, we must keep a vigilant guard
to protect safety because lives, as has been pointed out,
depend on it.
Clearly, there were serious problems at the FAA's Southwest
Certificate Management Office. The dysfunctional make-up of the
office got in the way of proper safety oversight, and we are
fortunate that no lives were lost.
As we listen to today's witnesses, we need to pay special
attention to proposed recommendations to prevent such a
situation from happening again. Our emphasis today also should
focus on the future of aviation safety, on the ``how it
happened'' so that we can fix the problem, not just on ``what
happened.''
To this end, I am interested in hearing the Inspector
General's recommendations after having fully investigated the
events that occurred at the FAA's Southwest Certificate
Management Office, as well as recommendations from our other
witnesses.
Fundamental to this Committee's responsibility to safety is
to ensure that the FAA has the proper number of inspectors to
carry out the mission of the Office of Aviation Safety. The
FAA's Aviation Safety Workforce Plan, released Monday,
indicates that 14 percent of the engineers and up to 35 percent
of its inspector corps will be eligible to retire in budget
year 2009, compared to 4 percent that actually retired in
budget year 2007.
This Committee's FAA reauthorization bill included language
requiring the Administration to develop an aviation safety
inspector staffing model to account for retirement trends and
ensure adequate staffing. For this reason, along with many
others, I urge our Senate counterparts to move forward on their
bill so that we can address these important aviation safety
issues.
I thank the Chairman again for calling this important
hearing and yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Oberstar. I concur in the gentleman's appeal to the
other body and to Mr. Mica's vigilant efforts with the other
body, as we have all done, and hope that we can come to a point
where we have a conference with the Senate and move the FAA
reauthorization act.
We will now move to our first panel, ask members to rise,
raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony
you will give before this Committee in the matters now under
consideration will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.]
Mr. Oberstar. You may be seated.
Mr. Boutris, we will begin with you, but, at the outset, I
want to express my great appreciation to all of the members of
this panel for the public-spirited courage it took when you ran
the length of administrative procedures to call to account the
failing practices and came to no avail, that you had the
courage to step forward and come to our Committee and say
something serious is amiss. And I regret that a death threat
ensued in that process, but I am greatly relieved that it is
under investigation by law enforcement authorities. You deserve
the gratitude of the flying public and of the Members of this
Committee.
Mr. Boutris.
TESTIMONY OF CHARALAMBE ``BOBBY'' BOUTRIS, AVIATION SAFETY
INSPECTOR AND BOEING 737-700 PARTIAL PROGRAM MANAGER FOR
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT
OFFICE; DOUGLAS E. PETERS, AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTOR AND BOEING
757 PARTIAL PROGRAM MANAGER, AMERICAN AIRLINES CERTIFICATION
UNIT, AMR CMO; MICHAEL C. MILLS, ASSISTANT MANAGER, DALLAS FORT
WORTH FLIGHT STANDARDS DISTRICT OFFICE; PAUL E. COTTI,
SUPERVISOR, AMERICAN EAGLE AIRWORTHINESS UNIT, AMR CMO; ROBERT
A. NACCACHE, RET. ASSISTANT MANAGER, SWA CMO; AND TERRY D.
LAMBERT, MANAGER, SAFETY AND ANALYSIS GROUP, FLIGHT STANDARDS
DIVISION, FAA SOUTHWEST REGION
Mr. Boutris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr.
Chairman and Members of the Committee. My name is Charalambe
Boutris. I go by Bobby for obvious reasons. I have a lot to say
this morning, so if I speak too quickly and it sounds Greek to
you, more than likely it probably is. However, I will do my
best to ensure that everyone understands me.
For 20 years I worked in the aviation industry, performing
aircraft maintenance and inspections for several U.S. major
airlines and U.S. major cargo carriers. I also held several
management positions, including Director of Maintenance.
In February of 1998, I was hired by the Federal Aviation
Administration as an Aviation Safety Inspector. I am currently
assigned to Southwest Airlines Certificate Management Office as
the maintenance Partial Program Manager for the Boeing 737-700
aircraft.
For me, safety comes first and my job second. I am not a
disgruntled employee; I am a person with integrity and I do
believe that we should cooperate and collaborate with the
airlines, but not to the point that we go outside our guidance
and break the law. I have followed the chain of command,
without any results.
I am here today because I am concerned for the safety of
the flying public, which has been jeopardized by the abuse of
authority and violations of the Federal regulations. I have
summarized the information for my verbal testimony; however, I
would like to inform you that details for this information
which I am about to present were originally submitted to the
Division Management Team at the Southwest Regional Office and,
six months later, to the Office of Special Counsel. In
addition, I have provided the Committee with a detailed written
testimony.
Since 2003, I have been raising safety concerns regarding
my Supervisor/Principal Maintenance Inspector Douglas
Gawadzinski suppressing my inspection findings and his refusal
to follow FAA guidance regarding chronic and systemic non-
compliance maintenance issues that affect air safety.
The FAA issues Airworthiness Directives--we call them ADs
for short--in order to address unsafe conditions for aircraft
and their components. AD requirements are mandatory and by
Federal regulations.
In December 2003, I was the Partial Program Manager for
engines for Southwest Airlines. After reviewing the Southwest
Airlines AD compliance records for several aircraft engines, I
discovered the required AD compliance information was
inconsistent and was difficult to track the AD compliance. This
was contrary to Title 14 CFR Part 121.380.
After long talks with my supervisor, Mr. Gawadzinski, on
January 23rd, 2004, he allowed me to send Southwest Airlines a
letter of concern, not a letter of investigation, as I wanted
to and was required in accordance with our guidance. Southwest
Airlines agreed with my findings and took one year to complete
the project and bring the AD information into compliance.
In January of 2006, I became the PPM for the Boeing 737-700
aircraft. In reviewing the AD compliance records, I found
similar discrepancies to the ones I had found with the engines
two years earlier. I immediately informed my supervisor, Mr.
Gawadzinski, of my findings and told him I wanted to send
Southwest Airlines a letter of investigation, but Mr.
Gawadzinski refused.
After going to him several times and insisting that we had
to address the AD problem, Mr. Gawadzinski, in January 2007,
assigned me to perform the AD Management Safety Attribute
Inspection--SAI for short. This inspection evaluates the
content of the airline's manual system and procedures in
meeting the regulatory and FAA policy requirements for AD
management.
When Southwest Airlines found out that I was the assigned
inspector for this inspection, for the SAI, the Southwest
Airlines Director of Quality Assurance, Mr. Mats Sabel, and the
AD compliance team leader, Mr. Bill Krivanek, had a meeting
with my supervisor, Mr. Gawadzinski, and requested my removal
from doing the inspection. Mr. Gawadzinski called me into his
office and told me of this meeting. I went to the office
manager, Mr. Mike Mills, and complained to him that it was
obvious that Southwest Airlines wanted to cherry-pick the
inspector for this inspection. Mr. Mills talked to my
supervisor who then informed me to go ahead and do the
inspection.
On February 26th, 2007, I informed the Southwest Airlines
AD compliance team leader, Mr. Krivanek, that due to the fact
that both of us already knew that Southwest Airlines did not
have all the required procedures in place for the AD
management, I was also going to look and review some aircraft
records to ensure AD compliance.
Mr. Krivanek stated that he and my supervisor, Mr.
Gawadzinski, had discussed what my assignment was, and
reviewing aircraft records for AD compliance was not part of my
inspection. I told Mr. Krivanek he was correct; however, due to
my knowledge of the previous history with AD issues, I felt
that reviewing some of the Southwest Airlines aircraft records
for compliance was appropriate. Mr. Krivanek was not happy
about that, but he agreed to meet with me on March 15th and
start the inspection.
On March 15th, 2007, I went to Southwest Airlines and met
with Mr. Chris Roth. Mr. Chris Roth informed me that Mr.
Krivanek could not participate at the meeting because he was
working on a project. I went to my supervisor, Mr. Gawadzinski,
and told him that Mr. Krivanek could not participate with AD
management inspection because he was working on a project.
Before I had the chance to say anything else to my supervisor,
he stated, ``Yeah, they had some airplanes over-fly an AD and
they are going through the records to find out how many.''
At this point, it was obvious to me that since I had told
Mr. Krivanek that, along with the AD management SAI, I was
going to review some aircraft records for AD compliance, Mr.
Krivanek had decided to have the aircraft records reviewed
prior to my inspection and had discovered the AD over-fly
discrepancies.
On March 22nd, 2007, while I was performing night
surveillance inspections at Southwest Airline maintenance
facility at Chicago Midway Airport, I witnessed a Southwest
Airlines aircraft being repaired due to a crack that was found
on the fuselage. After returning back to my office and talking
with another inspector, I discovered that this aircraft was
flying in revenue service with overdue AD inspections, with the
knowledge of my supervisor, Mr. Gawadzinski. I immediately
reported this serious safety issue to my office manager, Mr.
Mills.
Due to my ongoing safety concerns with Southwest Airlines
and the inadequate procedures for tracking and complying with
AD requirements, I preformed a review of the aircraft records
and I discovered the following: On March 15th--that was the
date I was supposed to start my inspection for the ADs--2007,
Southwest Airlines informed my supervisor, Mr. Gawadzinski,
that they had discovered that some of their aircraft had
overflown the inspection requirements of Airworthiness
Directive 2004-18-06. At the time, Southwest Airlines were not
sure of how many aircraft were affected and estimated that the
number could have been up to 100 aircraft.
The AD requirements that Southwest reported that were not
being accomplished require inspections of the fuselage on their
Boeing 737-300 and-500. On the first page of the AD it states:
``This action is necessary to find and fix fatigue cracking of
the skin panels, which could result in sudden fracture and
failure of the skin panels of the fuselage and consequent rapid
decompression of the airplane. This action is intended to
address the identified unsafe condition.''
FAA records show that besides the March 15 verbal
notification, on March 19, also, Southwest Airlines, via the
Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program, reported the AD non-
compliance again, but this time they informed Mr. Gawadzinski
that their investigation had determined that there were 47
aircraft affected, not 100 as was originally reported to him on
March 15. Even though Mr. Gawadzinski was aware of this unsafe
condition on March 15th, 2007, he did not document anything
until March 19th, when Southwest submitted the self-disclosure
in writing.
In reading the VDRP report that was prepared by Southwest
Airlines and accepted by Mr. Gawadzinski, under the Initial
Notification, ``Did Non-compliance Cease After Detection?''
Southwest reported ``Yes.'' However, this is not the truth. The
aircraft records show that Southwest continued to operate the
affected aircraft in a known unsafe condition and fly
passengers until March 23rd, 2007.
From March 15th, 2007, the date that Mr. Gawadzinski was
initially informed for this non-compliance, to March 23rd,
2007, while Southwest Airlines was performing the overdue
inspections on these aircraft, and while these aircraft were
still operating in revenue service, records show that six
aircraft had cracks on their fuselage. Maintenance records show
that one of these aircraft had multiple cracks, ranging from
one inch to three and a half inches long.
This is enough evidence of a serious safety issue. When it
comes to ADs, our guidance is crystal clear, and had Mr.
Gawadzinski followed the FAA guidance, he should have notified
Southwest Airlines that the affected aircraft could not be used
in air transportation past the date that this non-compliance
was discovered and initially reported to him on March 15th,
2007. What is also aggravating and brings this unsafe condition
to the highest level of concern is the fact that, according to
the VDRP report, at the time of discovery, the violation for
compliance with the AD inspections had remained undetected for
30 months.
What is interesting here is that in reading the VDRP
report, under the ``Information of the Person Preparing the
Comprehensive Fix'' for Southwest Airlines is the name Paul
Comeau. Mr. Comeau is an ex-FAA inspector who was performing
oversight inspections for regulatory compliance issues for the
Southwest Airlines certificate at the Southwest Airlines CMO
with Mr. Gawadzinski.
While working for the FAA, Mr. Comeau accepted a job offer
from Southwest Airlines as the Manager for Regulatory
Compliance. I believe that Southwest Airlines knowingly hired
Mr. Comeau for his FAA connections with inspectors in our
office and, to their advantage, placed him in the position that
directly interfaces with our office on a daily basis in regards
to Regulatory Compliance issues in dealing with aircraft
maintenance.
I questioned Mr. Comeau's hiring by Southwest Airlines and
I was told by my supervisor, Mr. Gawadzinski, that his hiring
was cleared through our Regional Office. However, there is an
ethics issue here and, as proven, a conflict of interest. In
addition, in March of 2007, during an FAA security
investigation, I gave Special Agent Dave Friant a statement
regarding my concerns with the relationship of my supervisor,
Mr. Gawadzinski, and Mr. Comeau. I stated that since Mr. Comeau
was hired with Southwest Airlines, my supervisor was working
directly with him, and I was being bypassed and kept out of the
loop on reported safety concerns regarding my fleet.
I believe that this cozy relationship between Mr.
Gawadzinski and Mr. Comeau played a contributing factor and
allowed the 47 aircraft to remain in service and operate in a
manner that would provide relief to schedule the AD overdue
inspections at the Southwest Airlines' convenience while flying
paying passengers. Mr. Comeau, being an ex-FAA inspector,
should have known AD inspection requirements are mandatory and
address unsafe conditions. They teach that to the FAA
inspectors at the Academy.
Southwest Airlines is reporting that they are the ones that
blew the whistle on themselves. That is correct. What they are
not reporting is that at the time of discovery of the non-
compliance, back on March 15th, 2007, Southwest Airlines was
required by Federal law to immediately remove the 47 aircraft
from service and comply with the AD requirements. But Southwest
Airlines did not take immediate corrective action and kept the
affected aircraft flying passengers with a known unsafe
condition until March 23rd, 2007.
At the time of discovery, by not taking the 47 aircraft out
of service and by not complying with the inspection
requirements of the Airworthiness Directive 2004-18-06,
Southwest Airlines failed to resolve an unsafe condition and,
therefore, violated the requirements of Title 14 Code of
Federal Regulations, Part 39.11, which clearly states:
``Airworthiness Directives specify inspections you must carry
out, conditions and limitations you must comply with, and any
actions you must take to resolve an unsafe condition.''
As it is stated in the AD, due to the past events
pertaining to the Boeing 737, the skin fatigue and cracks could
have resulted in a sudden fracture and failure of the skin
panels of the fuselage, and consequently cause a rapid
decompression which would have had a catastrophic impact during
flight. This inspection requirements are the result of the
Aloha Airlines accident in which a Boeing 737 aircraft, during
flight, lost the top of its fuselage due to undetected cracks.
The requirements of the AD are stated on its first page as
follows: ``Airworthiness Directives affect aviation safety and
are regulations which require immediate attention. You are
cautioned that no person may operate an aircraft to which an
Airworthiness Directive applies, except in accordance with the
requirements of the Airworthiness Directive.''
There is no excuse for the actions of Southwest Airlines
and FAA personnel. Mr. Gawadzinski did not have the authority
to allow these aircraft to operate with a known unsafe
condition past the date at which time the AD non-compliance was
discovered and reported to him, March 15th, 2007. In addition,
it was his responsibility to ensure that Southwest Airlines had
taken immediate corrective action in taking these aircraft out
of service.
FAA Order 8300.10 under Inspector Responsibility states:
``An inspector who becomes aware of an unsafe condition in an
aircraft that is being operated or about to be operated and
fails to act under the provisions of Section 605(b) FA Act of
1958, as amended, is in dereliction of duty. This duty is
placed specifically by Congress upon the inspector, rather than
on the Administrator. If the inspector, after due
consideration, still has any doubts regarding whether or not to
ground the aircraft, the grounding notice should be issued.''
Also, there is a similar statement under Title 49 of the
U.S. Transportation law in the Air Commerce and Safety Section.
FAA inspectors are hired by the taxpayers to ensure
airlines conduct their business with safety as the utmost
consideration at all times. Allowing an airline to fly
passengers on an aircraft with a known unsafe condition puts
the lives of the flying public in jeopardy and, in my opinion,
it is dereliction of duty and should be criminal.
The 47 aircraft with the overdue AD inspections were not
the only ones that kept flying in revenue service and out of
compliance. On March 20th, 2007, via the VDRP, Southwest
Airlines reported to Mr. Gawadzinski that 70 of their aircraft
had overflow the requirements of their maintenance program for
the functional check of the rudder standby hydraulic system.
This required maintenance task is a very detailed and in-
depth functional check which ensures the integrity of the
hydraulic system for the standby rudder and its components. The
hydraulic standby system provides hydraulic fluid under
pressure to operate the rudder, among other components, in the
event of a main hydraulic system failure. In the past, several
catastrophic accidents have occurred with other airlines due to
the malfunction of the rudder control system.
Even though the 70 aircraft had been flying out of
compliance for over a year, at the time of discovery of the
non-compliance, again, Southwest Airlines and Mr. Gawadzinski
took no action and the 70 aircraft remained in service and
operated in a matter that would provide relief to schedule the
overdue inspections at the Southwest Airlines' convenience
while flying passengers. In the VDRP report, Southwest
Airlines, in part, states: ``Due to availability of the
equipment and man-hours needed for each aircraft, it will take
approximately 14 days to complete this task on all affected
aircraft.''
But in reading the VDRP report that was prepared by
Southwest Airlines and accepted by Mr. Gawadzinski, under the
Initial Notification question ``Did the Non-compliance Cease
after Detection?,'' Southwest reported ``Yes.'' However, this
is not the truth. As I stated earlier, the records show that
the non-compliance did not cease after detection, and the
affected aircraft were allowed to fly in revenue service and
out of compliance for an additional 10 days past the date of
detection.
These 70 aircraft were part of my fleet, but my supervisor,
Mr. Gawadzinski, kept me in the dark and worked this VDRP
directly with Mr. Comeau.
In one of the statements that were made by the FAA
regarding the operation of the Southwest Airlines aircraft in
revenue service with the overdue AD inspections, it was stated
that one FAA inspector looked the other way. I am here to
report that more than one FAA inspector along the FAA
management have been looking the other way for years. No
supervisor can do what my supervisor was doing without the
support from fellow inspectors, the support of the Division
Management Team, who were fully aware of what was going on; and
I believe the support of some people in Washington.
This should have been obvious. I was the only maintenance
inspector that kept finding and raising the safety concerns
since 2003. And when they were elevated to the Division
Management Team, nothing was done. Every time I pointed out to
Mr. Gawadzinski that he was not following our mandated guidance
regarding safety violations in the presence of the office
manager, Mr. Mills, Mr. Gawadzinski would respond that our
guidance was outdated and that he was talking with Mr.
Ballough, the Director of Flight Standards, who always informed
him of the ups and comings. According to Mr. Gawadzinski, he
spent a lot of time with Mr. Ballough at the Eastern Region
during his executive leadership program.
Mr. Mills always looked into my safety concerns and
supported my findings; however, every time he elevated them to
the Division Management Team, he received no support. Under the
circumstances that I just described, no matter how good of a
manager a person is, without upper management support, the
system makes him ineffective.
The FAA is a great organization with many good inspectors
and managers, and I am proud to be part of it. However, there
is no accountability throughout the ranks. As FAA inspectors,
we have taken an oath to uphold the rules and regulations
outlined in our mandated guidance, and we are told that safety
is our job. If that is the case, then how come the FAA does not
hold accountable the management and inspectors who look the
other way instead of ensuring that the airlines conduct their
business with safety as the utmost consideration? After all, we
owe this to the taxpayers who put their trust in us. To this
date, other than moving some personnel around, the FAA has
taken no action.
The Southwest aircraft that I reported flying with the
overdue AD inspections were not part of my fleet. The
inspector, Mr. Collamore, who is the Partial Program Manager
for those aircraft, had full knowledge of the serious safety
issue seven days before I did. He also had an obligation and
responsibility to follow our guidance and the Federal
Regulations and ensure that this unsafe condition was
immediately addressed. But Inspector Collamore chose to take no
action and went along with Mr. Gawadzinski's decision.
As for management accountability, after the removal of Mr.
Gawadzinski from our office, the current office manager, Mr.
Bobby Hedlund, promoted Inspector Collamore and gave him more
authority by letting him act in Gawadzinski's position as
Supervisor/Principal Maintenance inspector. I had a meeting
with Mr. Hedlund and expressed my concerns, but he was not
interested.
I wrote several e-mails to the Division Manager, Mr.
Stuckey, raising my concerns and stating that instead of
holding inspectors accountable for their inactions, the
management was rewarding them and giving them additional
authority. I requested a meeting and his immediate attention.
Mr. Stuckey never responded. However, I received an e-mail from
the Assistant Division Manager, Mr. McGarry, who informed me
that management has the right to assign acting personnel to
temporary supervisory positions.
We all hear statements that we have the safest air
transportation system in the world. I believe that the safety
we are enjoying today is the fruit of the aftermath of the
Value Jet accident in the mid-1990s, which forced us to refocus
and put in place new procedures. Unfortunately, that was done
after the accident. I do not think that we should be taking
credit for being reactive to accidents.
What is alarming is the fact that even today we are still
being reactive. This is proven by the notice that the FAA
issued two weeks ago, ordering FAA inspections of the airlines
in order to validate AD compliance because of this hearing.
Despite the fact that our databases are full of positive
findings, the current events are proving us wrong by having
hundreds of aircraft taken out of service with AD compliance
issues. Where are the ATOS risk indicators?
Southwest Airlines is reporting that, according to Boeing,
there was no safety issue regarding the 47 aircraft that were
flying passengers with the overdue AD inspections in which six
of them had cracks on the fuselage. It is nice of Boeing to
offer an opinion for their largest customer; however, if
aircraft manufacturers could predict accidents, we wouldn't
have the safety requirements of this AD today.
In addition, consultants have been reporting that after
reviewing the data, in their opinion, safety was not
jeopardized. I am reporting to you that calling Boeing for an
opinion or hiring a consultant is not an option, because
neither one has the authority over the mandatory requirements
of an AD, and that is the law.
The majority of the ADs are the result of catastrophic
accidents, and, as the industry saying goes, ``ADs are written
in blood.'' I am very concerned because these safety issues
affect the lives of the flying public, and, instead of being
advocates for safety, some people are still trying to mud the
water by down-playing this serious safety issue.
It is very sad that an FAA inspector has to become a
whistleblower in order to address safety issues. But I would
like to set the record straight because, for some reason, the
FAA Biweekly news is stating the following: ``In the Southwest
Airlines case of non-compliance, an inspector repeatedly raised
issues with his supervisors, but he felt he needed to use an
anonymous FAA hot line in order to be heard.''
That is not the truth. I did not use an anonymous FAA hot
line. These are serious safety issues, and I wanted the people
that received my concerns to be able to get in touch with me;
this way I could answer any questions they might have. For the
record, I have been raising safety concerns for AD compliance
and maintenance issues since 2003 on record and openly. I have
followed the chain of command from my manager all the way to
the Regional Office and the Division Management Team. Every
safety concern, every inspection finding has my name on it.
What you will find interesting is that in late March of
2007, after I discovered that Southwest Airlines, along with
the FAA, had allowed the operation of these aircraft with the
overdue AD inspections in revenue service, and once everybody
knew that I elevated this serious safety issue, I was removed
from my position and was placed under investigation due to an
anonymous complaint with allegations against me that was
forwarded to our office through Mr. Gawadzinski from Southwest
Airlines.
Along with the anonymous complaint, my office manager, Mr.
Mills, received an e-mail from the Director of Quality
Assurance, Mr. Mats Sabel--the same person who had previously
requested my removal from doing the AD SAI inspections--
requesting my restriction from Southwest Airlines property
until this investigation and any other official investigation
had been contacted. That day, Mr. Gawadzinski came to my cube
and told me, with that type of allegations against me, he did
not see a reason for me to stay in the office. I questioned the
timing of the anonymous complaint, but I got no response.
From March 2007 to the end of August of 2007, I was hoping
that the Division Management Team would do the right thing and
look into my findings and safety concerns. However, they did
not address anything. In July 2007, they closed the
investigation regarding my documented safety concerns and they
concentrated their efforts in silencing the messenger. By the
end of August, I realized that the Division Management Team's
interest was damage control and covering up the serious safety
concerns.
By the end of August, I put a package together, the same
package I had given to the Division Management Team six months
earlier, and I sent it to the Office of Special Council, and
again I went on record and openly identified myself. By the end
of September 2007, after the Division Management Team found out
that I had elevated the safety issues to Washington, they
reinstated me back to my original position and they reopened
the investigation regarding my reported safety concerns. I am
here to report to you that all my findings and safety concerns
have been validated 100 percent.
During the FAA town hall meeting in March 2008, Mr.
Sabatini stated that the FAA is working on a solution to
prevent this from happening again, and it is my understanding
that the FAA is going to put in place a hot line process for
inspectors to elevate safety concerns. But, with all due
respect, I have a question here: If FAA management did not
respond when I openly, and on record, raised the serious safety
concerns, how is the hot line process going to work? What we
need is accountability throughout the ranks, and that will fix
the problem. There is no need to burden the taxpayers with
another hot line process.
Additionally, I would like to inform you that for years we
had a similar hot line system in place that inspectors do not
trust, because hot line complaints and safety issues end up on
the FAA Administrator's desk, and then they are passed down to
the local FAA Regional Office to be investigated. The Regional
Office assigns the local FAA security, which reports to them,
to conduct these investigations. FAA security does not have the
technical background, and that is when the Regional Office
controls the outcome by assigning the technical portion of the
investigation to Regional FAA personnel that report to them
also.
From my experience, I believe the priority of the Regional
Office is damage control, and I see no interest in
accountability or doing the right thing. At the end of the
investigation, no matter what the evidence shows, it is
disregarded by the Division Management Team, who cherry-pick
the information from the investigation reports and, without
looking at the big picture, they apply Band Aids instead of
fixing the root of the problem.
I would also like to inform you that since the FAA put in
place the customer service initiative, the partnership programs
such as the Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program and Aviation
Safety Action Programs have become ineffective. We are told
that the airlines are our customers, and if they do well we do
well--more jobs for us. However, some of us have forgotten that
we have another more important customer--the taxpayers--who put
their trust in us to ensure that the airlines provide safe
transportation for the flying public.
The airlines take advantage of the customer service
initiative and they constantly remind us that they are the
customer. The best way to put this is like you are going down
the highway committing traffic violations and jeopardizing the
safety of others, and when the police officer stops you and
informs you that you are breaking the law by endangering
people's lives and you tell the officer that he cannot document
the violation because you are his customer. I know this sounds
funny, but this is as close to an example as I can come up
with.
We also have the customer service feedback line for the
airlines, which gives them the opportunity and the tool to
cherry-pick the inspectors that manage their certificate by
praising the inspectors that go along with their wishes.
However, there is nothing in place to support the inspectors
that are intimidated by the FAA management and by the airline
because they do their job by the book. In the performance of my
duties, I have been asked by Southwest Airlines management to
make a violation go away. In addition, I have been threatened
by Southwest Airlines management that they could have me
removed from the certificate by picking up the phone.
The airlines use the VDRP as a tool to circumvent the
regulations and provide relief for themselves from maintenance
and inspection requirements in order to keep their aircraft
flying. A good example of this is the Southwest Airlines VDRP
report of the 70 aircraft that were flying in revenue service
with the functional check of the rudder, which were overdue for
over a year, and they used the VDRP report to continue flying
the aircraft in revenue service and out of compliance for an
additional 10 days past the date of discovery due to the
shortage of manpower and equipment.
The ASAP program is also abused by maintenance personnel
who are no longer held accountable. They are using the program
for reasons other than its intent, and I will give you a couple
of examples. In the past, Southwest Airlines mechanics were
installing the wrong tire and wheel assemblies, B-737-300,
wheel and tire assemblies, on the Boeing 737-700 aircraft. The
first time this discrepancy was reported and accepted into the
ASAP, the mechanic that was involved received human factors
training and the tire and wheel assembly paperwork was revised
for future installations by adding a paragraph as a note right
above where the mechanic signs for changing the wheel and tire,
questioning him or her to check that the proper wheel and tire
assembly was installed.
The second time another mechanic installed the wrong tire
and wheel assembly on another aircraft, the ASAP accepted the
report and the mechanic also got human factors training. In
addition, a new safety net was put in place by writing on all
the tires with big letters on the sidewall indicating to what
type of aircraft they belong to. The third time another
mechanic installed the wrong tire and wheel assembly on another
aircraft. The FAA again accepted his ASAP report, at this point
I see accepting the first mechanic's report, but how can we say
that by accepting the other two mechanics' reports into the
ASAP we contributed to safety?
I can stand here and give you all kinds of similar
examples, but the bottom line is that some mechanics are not as
vigilant as they should be, and they do not worry about it
because they know that they can always ASAP the performance of
improper maintenance, even after an FAA inspector finds it. We
need to refocus and ensure that these programs meet their
intent, instead of being a get out of jail free card.
I hope the information I have provided today will help
bring some overdue changes and help inspectors like myself to
continue serving the public and give hope to the inspectors
that have lost faith in the system.
Thank you for your time and for giving me the opportunity
to raise my safety concerns in front of your honorable
Committee.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you, Mr. Boutris.
I will say to Committee colleagues that this is a lengthy,
in-depth statement, but it was necessary to hear in every
detail the journey of public interest and of safety that this
panel made, and this witness in particular. You have to hear it
all in its specific details.
Mr. Peters has a somewhat shorter statement, and after him
we will limit the other witnesses to five minutes.
Mr. Peters.
Mr. Peters. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee. My name is Douglas E. Peters, and I am an Aviation
Safety Inspector employed by the FAA and am currently assigned
to the American Airlines Certificate Management Office, or CMO.
I am the Acting Boeing 757 Partial Program Manager. I have been
employed by the FAA for a total of seven years, all of which
have been in the Flight Standards Service. Prior to my
assignment to the AMR CMO, I was assigned to the Southwest
Airlines CMO from April 2001 through October 2007, holding the
positions of Inspector, Assistant Principal Maintenance
Inspector, and Data Evaluation Program Manager. I have an
untarnished career at the FAA and, in February 2004, was
selected as the Southwest CMO Maintenance Inspector of the
Year.
Prior to my employment with the FAA, I worked for two major
U.S. air carriers and I am a veteran of the United States Air
Force. I have 27 years of experience in aircraft maintenance.
I have provided detailed records to the Office of Special
Council, the Office of Inspector General, and the FAA Security
regarding FAA employees of the Southwest CMO's participation
and involvement in violation of Federal regulations, abuse of
authority, and substantial and specific danger to public
safety. I am not a disgruntled employee, nor do I wish to
embarrass the FAA or ruin its reputation. I merely wish to
truthfully describe the events that brought me here today.
At this time, I would like to take the opportunity and
explain the events surrounding the Southwest AD overflight
issue and explain how that event became the catalyst that
brought us before the Committee.
In April 2007, the Southwest CMO conducted an internal
investigation of the Voluntary Self-Disclosure that was
submitted by Southwest Airlines to the FAA regarding an AD
overflight that was accepted by PMI Douglas Gawadzinski. I was
the lead inspector on that investigation. During the
investigation, the Division Management Team instructed Office
Manager Mike Mills to hand over the preliminary results of the
investigation to an audit team who were on-site in our office.
At that time, my investigation was ongoing and incomplete;
however, I had discovered that several aircraft had been
operated in an unsafe condition beyond the date of March 15th,
2007, three of which had cracks in the area inspection required
by the AD. A fourth was found to have cracks at a location
outside of the inspection area called out in the AD.
The audit team was constructed of management personnel from
other offices within the Southwest region. Following the audit
team's conclusion of the AD overflight investigation, a memo
from FAA Managers Teppen and Whitrock, dated April 18th, was
given to Manager Mills stating that Southwest Airlines had
indeed operated 47 aircraft in an un-airworthy condition and
that the PMI condoned such operation. Additionally, the memo
stated ``Southwest CMO has a relaxed culture in maintaining
substantiating data as well as any documents that would support
any decisions made by the airworthiness unit.'' PMI Gawadzinski
was the supervisor for that unit.
Following the memo by FAA Managers Teppen and Whitrock, on
May 8th, Mike Mills called the entire office to an all-hands
meeting where the Assistant Division Manager for Flight
Standards, Ron McGarry, temporarily removed both Manager and
PMI pending an investigation and announced Bobby Hedlund as the
Acting Manager of the CMO. Neither Mills nor Gawadzinski
attended that meeting.
June 11th, 2007, at approximately 1:00 p.m., Acting Manager
Bobby Hedlund stopped by my office. That was during the time
frame of the FAA's initial internal investigation of the AD
overflight. I was typing my written statement to FAA Security
Special Agent Jay LaFlair and I informed Hedlund that I would
be sending him a memo regarding unethical actions taking place
by inspectors in the Southwest CMO. He agreed to look into the
matter once he received the memo.
Before Hedlund left my office, I told him that I thought
writing my concerns about unethical actions was the right thing
to do. He stated and agreed that we should always do the right
thing, and that is what his father had always told him to do.
He got out of the chair and walked over to my bookcase, where I
keep pictures in frames. He picked up a picture of my son that
was taken next to an aircraft and said, ``This is what's
important, family and flying.'' He then pointed to a picture of
my family and said, again, ``This is what is important.'' On
the way out the door, he made the following statement: ``You
have a good job here and your wife has a good job over at the
Dallas FSDO. I'd hate to see you jeopardize yours and her's
career trying to take down a couple of losers.''
June 14th I sent the previously described memo to Acting
Manager Bobby Hedlund. As of today, I never received a formal
response to that memo.
On June 14th I submitted a 15-page written statement
following a two-day interview where I was interviewed by FAA
Security. Special Agent Jay LaFlair and Flight Standards
Manager Terry Lambert conducted the interview. During my sworn
statement, I described over two and a half years of PMI
Gawadzinski's improprieties, unethical actions, abuse of
authority, and misuse of government resources along with
relaxed oversight of Southwest Airlines. I also included in my
statement several instances where his subordinates were engaged
in unethical actions as well.
In July 2007, I made my first contact with Congressional
staff personnel at the T&I Committee. I informed them of the
situation in the office and that I believed that Southwest
Airlines was at risk due to the lax oversight that they had
been under in the absence of accountability actions with regard
to FAA personnel. I also informed them the conditions were
basically the same following FAA Security investigation that
had taken place in June. There was a serious divide within the
office. The divide consisted of those who followed national
policy and those who were loyal to Gawadzinski. I provided a
copy of the AD overflight disclosure to substantiate my initial
concern.
After waiting nearly two months for corrective action to
occur by either the Division Management Team or the Flight
Standards Director, James Ballough, for the improprieties
identified by the FAA security investigation, it was evident
that no action was being considered by FAA senior management
personnel, leaving a strong underlying tone that the happenings
of the Southwest CMO were not only condoned, but possibly
sanctioned.
In August 2007, after gathering additional facts and
documentation following the FAA security investigation that
occurred in June, Inspector Boutris and I filed disclosures
with the Office of Special Council. We supposed the OSC and the
T&I detailed documentation which substantiated our safety
concerns and supported our disclosures. The poor condition of
the Southwest Airlines regulatory maintenance oversight was a
risk that neither Inspector Boutris nor I was willing to
accept.
On August 28th, during a telephone conversation with T&I
Congressional staff personnel, I was informed that a call had
been placed to FAA Headquarters to the Director of Flight
Standards, James Ballough. Mr. Ballough was not available to
take the call; however, a message was left regarding the events
at Southwest Airlines and he was encouraged to return the call.
During the next few weeks, several unsuccessful attempts and
messages were said to have been made by T&I personnel to
contact the Director during the time period between August 28th
and mid-September.
According to T&I staff personnel, the FAA initially refused
to cooperate with a request for information regarding this
matter. Only under threat of subpoena in an October 5th, 2007
letter to Acting Administrator Sturgill from Chairman Oberstar
and Chairman Costello was the documentation from the FAA
internal investigation obtained.
September 9th, 2007, Acting Manager Bobby Hedlund called a
Southwest CMO for an all-hands meeting where Division Manager
Tom Stuckey and Assistant Division Manager Ron McGarry were
present. The meeting was called to announce that Bobby Hedlund
was selected as the permanent Manager of the Certificate
Management Office and that Mike Mills had accepted a position
as Assistant Manager at the DFW FSDO. To my knowledge, that was
the first visit by the Division Manager to address the CMO in
over two years. He spoke about change and made reference to the
train leaving the station, and if anyone didn't want to be on
that train, he might be able to help them in making
arrangements for that person or persons to work in another
location.
At the close of the meeting, I asked to speak to him. Mr.
Stuckey and Assistant Division Manager Ron McGarry visited me
in my office. I stated to the Division Manager that I did not
want to be on that train and that I had put in a request for
reassignment to the AMR Certificate Management Office. I also
stated that he was about five months too late. I made reference
to the divide in the office and how Gawadzinski's previous
subordinates with one other inspector had engaged in unethical
and inappropriate actions in May.
I presented a copy of the June 14th memo that I had given
to then Acting Manager Hedlund. He briefly scanned over the
memo and handed it to Ron McGarry. They both acknowledged my
request for reassignment and stated that they would have to
talk to the manager of the AMR CMO, but the final decision
would be entirely up to him.
On October 14th I was reassigned to the AMR CMO as the
Acting Boeing 757 Partial Program Manager.
Only under the watchful eyes of the T&I Committee, the OIG,
and the OSC did this gross misconduct by FAA management
personnel and the Southwest CMO, Regional, and Headquarter
levels receive the close scrutiny that was warranted.
It didn't have to come to this. Or maybe it did.
As a follow-up to the FAA town hall meeting which was held
March 18th, ironically, one year following the AD overflight
Self-Disclosure by Southwest, it was evident that management
personnel with the responsibility and the authority to take
appropriate action proved themselves unworthy to being
custodians of the public trust. The proof was provided by their
blatant disregard and failure to respond to significant safety
events that were constantly reported in both verbal and written
form to the Division Management Team.
Mr. Sabatini made several points in his FAA town hall
meeting which I agree with, first being that we have identified
a risk. However, I am not confident that the risk defined by
him is accurate. Secondly, I also agree that what is in the
media is troubling, and I believe that, as an agency,
appropriate action does indeed need to be taken. After being a
key witness to the lack of concern for public safety through
the intentional and blatant disregard of national policy, I do
not have the confidence that all responsible individuals will
be identified and held accountable.
There have been public statements made that indicate FAA is
conducting damage control to protect the agency's reputation,
while clouding the issues surrounding the impropriety that
occurred in the FAA's Southwest Region and was known by FAA
senior management. There is evidential proof that there are
more involved than just one man or a few individuals. It is my
earnest plea that this Committee take the accompanying data
along with the factual testimony that is being voiced today to
draw conclusions and submit a plan of action that not only
restores faith in the FAA, but also dispels any fears or
concerns that the American citizens might have towards aviation
safety.
The implications that this is all the doing of one man is
simply a misnomer. This one man, Douglas Gawadzinski, was
fueled and energized by others around him who were willing to
disregard policy. We operate on a documented and carefully un-
engineered system of rules and orders, and at no time is any
one of the individuals involved permitted the self-appointed
power to make determinations contrary to that guidance.
In the aforementioned FAA town hall meeting, Mr. Ballough
described the events surrounding Inspector Boutris' claims. He
stated, ``There were indicators, there were warning signs that
we should have picked up that go back for a period of over two
years, at least.'' Southwest Airlines, yes, I agree we have
identified a risk and a breakdown. Regarding Boutris, it wasn't
at the inspector level. Regarding Manager Mills, it wasn't at
the CMO manager level. These two individuals were raising
safety concerns to the Division Management Team for over two
years.
In addition to meetings by CMO Manager Mills with the
Division Management Team personnel, e-mails and memos from
Boutris and myself, several WEAT Team visits occurred. WEAT
Team was a term used for Workplace Evaluation Assessment Team,
where other FAA Management personnel would come to visit and
assess the environment within the office. These are the office
audits I spoke about earlier today. I personally communicated
my concerns during the past three years to WEAT Team members.
The audit that occurred in April 2007 revealed several
shortcomings regarding the lack of approval documentation for
Southwest Airlines' maintenance program.
The flying public and Southwest Airlines deserves to hear
the truthful facts surrounding the lack of oversight at this
carrier. They also deserve to board a flight without having to
worry if the FAA inspector responsible for the oversight of
that carrier has allowed them to knowingly fly in an unsafe
aircraft. They deserve to fly in a plane knowing that when
known safety concerns are brought to FAA Divisional,
Headquarter levels, that they are not ignored and pushed aside
until the threat of subpoena has been made by Congress.
In conclusion, let me say that I feel it is my duty to see
this matter through in hopes of the Committee assessing the
information and making the determination of what needs to
happen next. The unethical actions that have been identified
and permitted, as well as the known unsafe conditions, have
gone on for too long. The fact that FAA senior management knew
about these issues within the Southwest CMO is undisputed.
I have received unsolicited encouragement from field
inspectors all throughout the agency, with many of them
revealing examples of the same types of mismanagement that we
are discussing today. Not only for my sake, but for theirs, I
feel empowered and compelled as a United States citizen, and
having the privilege of being a Federal employee, to stand up
for the rights of all aviation safety inspectors. I am thankful
for the opportunity to come before you and explain the
obstacles that we face on a daily basis, placed upon us
oftentimes by our own agency that hinders us from our first and
foremost duty: safety.
As for Southwest Airlines as a whole, it is my opinion that
your company was led down the wrong path by a handful of
individuals both within your ranks and ours. Unfortunately,
these individuals have negatively impacted your company's
reputation and put passengers and crew at risk. I am not sure
how long it will take to recover from this, but I am sure that
if any company can do it, Southwest Airlines can. You have a
great company and your reputation will shine again.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you, Mr. Peters
I think the American public should take great heart from
the courage demonstrated by these two witnesses and, as we will
see, from the others in this panel, but also from the depth of
conviction with which they give their testimony. And I just
want to say, parenthetically here, Mr. Peters' statement I do
not have confidence that all responsible individuals will be
held accountable, I make the observation that Mr. Gawadzinski,
about whom you heard devastating testimony, is still an FAA
inspector. He has been removed from the Southwest Certificate,
transferred to the American Airlines Certificate as CMO at
$100,000 a year pay.
Mr. Mills.
Mr. Mills. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mica, and honorable
Members. My name is Michael Mills. I am currently Assistant
Manager of the Dallas-Fort Worth Flight Standards District
Office in Fort Worth, Texas. I have been employed with the FAA
for almost 13 years, including 6 years in management. Prior to
my employment with the FAA, I worked for 28 years as a
commercial airline pilot, and much of that time was spent in
airline operations management. I have accumulated more than
15,000 hours of accident-free flying, and in my employment with
the FAA I have enjoyed a blemish-free employment record until
May 8th, 2007, when I was abruptly removed from my position as
Manager of the Southwest Airlines Certificate Management
Office.
My removal occurred within a matter of days after I had
discovered and reported to my superiors that Southwest Airlines
had overflown critical safety inspections of some of its
aircraft and that one of my subordinates, the Principal
Maintenance Inspector, Douglas Gawadzinski, had apparently
suppressed this information.
Inspectors Boutris and Peters, along with one of my
supervisors, Paul Cotti, all of whom are appearing with me
today, were instrumental in discovering and analyzing the
records that led to my initial reporting of these overflights
to the regional level and my call for an investigation in early
April 2007. I applaud their courage in exposing this episode,
especially in light of the humiliating treatment that I have
received as a result of my actions. These are honest, hard-
working men, proud of what they do, and who attempted to work
within the system to have their concerns addressed. They saw in
me someone they could trust, and I decided to help them. My
dismissal for doing so was a fate that certainly was not lost
on them, so it is no surprise that they sought the
whistleblower protection that was available.
Even considering the damage to my reputation at the hands
of my superiors, I am still proud to be a part of this agency
and its important mission.
The partnership concepts that are the subject of this
inquiry have some use in the FAA toolbox, but this unfortunate
episode bears stark evidence that the success of these
partnerships is highly dependent upon the integrity of those
persons engaged in the process and the propriety of their
actions.
I was appointed Manager of the Southwest Airlines
Certificate Management Office by Tom Stuckey, the Southwest
Region Flight Standards Division Manager. After a few months on
the job, it became clear to me that the oversight mission of
the office towards Southwest Airlines was considerably degraded
by virtue of the informality of its business and the coziness
between some of the inspectors and their counterparts at
Southwest Airlines.
I also found that the FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector,
Douglas Gawadzinski, one of four supervisors who reported to
me, appeared to be unusually lenient with the carrier in
several areas, especially enforcing Federal aviation
regulations. He had also accrued among the office staff a
number of adherents to his philosophy of accommodation for the
carrier.
He professed to have been enlightened to this approach
through personal relationships he convincingly purported to
have had at FAA Headquarters with Flight Standards Director
James Ballough and Associate Administrator Nicholas Sabatini,
whose names he frequently dropped, describing them as his
mentors and the sources of this line of thought. As I was and
still am a strong advocate of regulation enforcement,
Gawadzinski considered me an impediment to his cause, and I
became a source of great irritation and conflict for him.
My assessment that the CMO's oversight and enforcement
posture had deteriorated led me to publish a memorandum
entitled A Time for Change, setting forth my goal of refocusing
the office toward a more business-like oversight model.
Mr. Chairman, I am running out of time. Would you like for
me to continue?
Mr. Oberstar. If you could summarize the rest of your
statement, please.
Mr. Mills. Okay.
Counseling Gawadzinski had proved futile and my attempts to
document his actions were met with a warning against doing so
from my supervisor, Ron McGarry. This exemplified a pattern of
protection of Gawadzinski from above my level. That I was
unable to penetrate into the Southwest Airlines AD overflight
occurred in March 2007.
My full testimony recounts the numerous occasions that I
reported to my superiors the concerns I had for the PMI's
actions, most of which were initiated through reports from Mr.
Boutris. The record will show these warnings and requests for
assistance were ignored, shelved, or responded to with
smokescreen events like office audits or forced mediation, but
did nothing to address the safety implications of what I was
reporting.
Finally, in late March, when I became aware of
Gawadzinski's role in allowing Southwest to fly unsafe
airplanes contrary to an AD, I reported the circumstances to my
superiors and called for an investigation. Soon afterward, I
found that Gawadzinski had allowed Southwest to overfly
required rudder system inspections and did also suppress this
information, which I reported to my superiors. Their response
was a chilling telephone call where I was informed that the
region wanted to keep this matter very quiet and low key.
Within five days I was removed from my position as Office
Manager.
In my view, my actions over the period of my tenure as
Southwest CMO were focused on the elimination of a serious
deficiency in the maintenance oversight of the carrier, an
imperative I felt I could not ignore even though I could not be
sure of its impact on my career. My actions were met with
indifference or roadblocks at every turn from the regional
level. The price of my effort to ensure safety, however, was
not recognition, as perhaps might be expected for the first
management official to report the incidents, but the
humiliating ejection from my job under circumstances that could
only invite questions as to whether it was a coverup attempt by
the region.
Within a few weeks after my removal, and still very
concerned about these matters, I wrote a prophetic e-mail to
the Office Manager who succeeded me at the Southwest CMO. I had
no idea then just how poignant my remarks would turn out to be.
In the message I mentioned that I suspected the region was
soft-peddling these events, and then I wrote, ``My feeling is
that this will likely not remain low profile, nor quiet. My
advice to you as my successor would be to ensure that you are
fully conversant with these two events, among others you may
ultimately discover, and take whatever measures are necessary
to validate the adequacy of Southwest's control over its
maintenance program.''
Because of the illumination of this unfortunate estimate,
Mr. Sabatini has announced that he will take steps to improve
employee communication at all levels, including a mechanism to
encourage employees to take their concerns to a higher
authority when there is a failure in the chain of command. Time
will tell as to whether this will be effective, and I would add
to that initiative a recommendation that higher level FAA
managers be rotated periodically so as to lessen the likelihood
that a dysfunctional management team perhaps too willing to
give in to outside influence can perpetuate what in this case
can only be termed a hoax on the flying public.
I thank this honorable Committee for the opportunity to
present this information.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you very much, Mr. Mills. Your last
comment about rotating high-level personnel comes right along
with the earlier proposal I made of limiting the revolving
door.
Mr. Hayes?
Mr. Hayes. Mr. Chairman, if I could interrupt just a
moment. I have a statement from the Southwest Airline Pilots
Group that I would like to submit under unanimous consent for
the record. They are obviously a very important part of the
whole safety program and not knowing what time constraints are
going to do, I would like to give it to you.
Mr. Oberstar. Without objection, the material will be
included in the record, along with the testimony from Southwest
Airlines.
Mr. Hayes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Cotti.
Mr. Cotti. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Members of the
Committee. My name is Paul Eugene Cotti. I am currently an
Airworthiness Unit Supervisor in the FAA's AMR Certificates
Management Office. I have been in the FAA Flight Standards
Service for nearly 18 years, four as a Principal Inspector and
over three now as a frontline supervisor.
My work experiences prior to the FAA include a variety of
aviation maintenance-related positions in commercial and
military aviation. Like so many in the FAA Flight Standards
Service, I care very deeply about ensuring the safety of the
flying public and for FAA's success in achieving the objectives
of its critical mission. I am honored to be appearing before
you today.
I served as the Geographic Unit Supervisor in the Southwest
Airlines CMO from March 2005 to May 2007. During that entire
period, the Office's management team was often divided on
matters relating to the management and oversight of the
Southwest Airlines operating certificate. This division can be
summarized as being between management officials that insisted
on adherence to the stated and implied intent of FAA orders and
those that insisted on exercising degrees of latitude and
discretion that often fell well outside of the parameters of
those orders.
Under the banner of collaboration with the airline, the
latter group, whose most important or prominent member was the
Supervisory Principal Maintenance Inspector, did so in a manner
that was often contrary to FAA orders and at times openly
hostile to the requirements of transparency and accountability.
Proper collaboration with airlines can be an effective
method for collectively reducing risks and improving safety;
however, in this case, it was engaged in an environment in
which regulatory compliance could be delayed or gained only
through deals which under the best of circumstances only
provided to the traveling public that to which it is already
entitled to on a continuing basis. It is unfortunate that the
resistant group was not as committed to collaboration with the
office manager as it apparently was to the airline. Had they
done so, the events and conditions that ultimately resulted in
these hearings would have been avoided.
By virtue of his important position, the PMI's erroneous
decisions and opinions were unfortunately afforded a
significant degree of legitimacy by the airline. Consequently,
a distinct contrast was created between the PMI and the
resistant group on one hand and the compliant management
officials and inspectors, such as Boutris and Peters, on the
other.
This had a very detrimental impact on how the airline
perceived the hazards and risks that were discovered and
presented to them by FAA personnel that were attempting to
follow FAA orders. By his words and actions, the PMI presented
a distorted view of FAA expectations and a very negative
example to his subordinates. Over time and for various reasons,
the PMI's resistance to transparency and accountability was in
turn adopted by a number of other inspectors in the office as
well. This further exacerbated divisions in the office and had
a very detrimental impact on the office's productivity and
effectiveness.
The expectation to follow FAA orders was specifically
expressed and elaborated on many times by the office manager.
It was also expressed by the Regional Division Manager at every
management conference attended by the Office Management Team
during the above period. In light of their obligations and such
frequent admonitions from their chain of command, I am at a
loss to understand how the PMI or the resistant group could
have possibly justified their actions, or why those actions
went uncorrected for over two years.
Although the office's Geographic Unit, which I supervised,
provided airworthiness and operations inspection services to
the principal inspectors, it was deliberately designed by the
FAA as a separate work unit, with its own supervisor and with a
line of responsibility and authority that was direct to the
Office Manager. This design constituted a control to ensure
that, from a supervisory standpoint, the Geographic Unit was
independent of the PMI and the other two principal inspectors.
The PMI, and at times the Principal Avionics Inspector,
were openly adverse to that organizational design, and
particularly so when I, as the Geographic Unit Supervisor,
insisted that the unit follow FAA policies that resulted in
inspection and enforcement outcomes that did not meet with the
PMI's personal desires. Regulatory violation findings by the
Geographic Unit were often met with active or passive
resistance from the PMI. On more than one occasion the PMI or
one of his direct reports improperly contacted one of my
subordinates to undermine my position with regards to
regulatory enforcement in order to effect an outcome that was
outside of the FAA's orders.
The PMI was also openly critical of my efforts to improve
the deficient safety inspection and enforcement performance of
a number of my direct reports. I concluded from his behavior
that the PMI was threatened by inspection and enforcement
outcomes which he personally could not influence and control,
regardless of the fact that those outcomes would fully conform
to FAA policies.
On quite a few occasions, responsible inspectors such as
Boutris and Peters brought disconcerting airline events or
circumstances to the manager's attention, apparently, because
they were unable to garner the level of acknowledgment and
support from the PMI that was necessary for appropriately
addressing those matters. A number of the issues they brought
forward were especially alarming because they represented
precursors for aviation accidents.
When the PMI failed to display appropriate reactions to the
manager's resulting inquiries, he often tasked the assistant
manager and me with conducting objective reviews in order to
determine the validity of the inspectors' concerns. The results
of those reviews were dutifully reported back to the manager
and further exposed the scope and nature of the office divide
with further discoveries that certain investigative enforcement
and airline safety oversight related processes were being
mismanaged. Examples included failures to take required
enforcement action in response to discovery of regulatory
violations by the air carrier.
It must be understood that I am referring to all levels of
enforcement, including simple administrative actions. There
were concerns with how voluntary disclosure and aviation safety
action programs were being administered; there were efforts by
the PMI and his ASAP representatives to prevent dissemination
of de-identified ASAP information to the manager, who is
responsible for approving continuation of that program; there
was misapplication of the ATOS surveillance process; and there
were concerns with the manner in which Southwest Airlines
maintenance time limitations for maintenance tasks were
approved and documented. When the results of these reviews were
brought to the PMI's attention, he was hostile, close-minded,
and resistant to efforts to professionally discuss and take
actions appropriate to those concerns.
The most glaring example of the PMI's failure to follow FAA
orders involves the manner in which he responded to the now
well-known voluntary disclosure from the airline that it had
grossly overflown a structural inspection Airworthiness
Directive. The prohibition against further passenger flights
until the AD was accomplished should have been immediately and
specifically conveyed to the airline, and enforced as
necessary. Such a response should be clear to any journeyman
inspector and a natural reflex for someone in the critical
position of Principal Maintenance Inspector.
The FAA's voluntary disclosure and aviation safety action
programs can be beneficial to the traveling public and to the
airlines and individuals that fundamentally commit to the
requirements of those programs. However, the effectiveness and
long-term legitimacy of those programs is dependent on sound
understanding of responsibilities, proper exercise of
authorities, and on effective efforts to detect and correct
abuses.
Throughout the above period, I communicated my concerns
through appropriate channels and maintained the expectation and
faith that FAA machinery would engage and appropriately correct
the PMI and those that were driving the office divide by their
resistance to authority and accountability. Unfortunately, I do
not believe that the scope and source of the serious safety and
compliance-related differences in the Southwest Airlines CMO
were ever properly acknowledged or understood outside of the
CMO during the above period.
My observations concerning events and conditions within the
Southwest CMO ended with my transfer to the AMR CMO in May
2007.
I trust that my statement and responses to any questions
are helpful to this distinguished Committee and its processes.
Whatever the outcome of these hearings, I am also hopeful that
the outstanding service and everyday commitment to aviation
safety by so many others in the Flight Standards Service is not
forgotten by those that we constantly strive to faithfully
serve. Thank you.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you very much, Mr. Cotti. The web, it
seems, gets ever more intricate.
Mr. Naccache.
Mr. Naccache. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members. In
response to your invitation, it is an honor and privilege to be
here to provide you with my testimony.
First, if I may, now that I have retired, I would like to
take a minute to introduce myself and state some of my
credentials. My name is Robert Andre Naccache. After more than
20 years of service in flight standards, I recently retired in
November 2007 from the FAA as an Assistant Manager of the
Southwest CMO.
During my tenure with the FAA, I served about three years
as a Principal Inspector for 129 foreign carriers, six years as
a Principal Operation Inspector for several 129 supplemental
air carriers operating domestically and internationally, eight
years as a Supervisor for Certificate, airman certification and
carrier certificate and surveillance, and, lately, three years
as an Assistant Manager at the Southwest CMO. While with the
FAA, I was presented the Southwest Region's Field Inspector of
the Year Award in 1994. I also twice received the Southwest
Region's Supervisor of the Year Award for the year 2001 and
2003.
Prior to my career with the FAA, I was an airline pilot for
17 years, flying overseas Boeing 707 and the Boeing 747, as a
captain, between Europe, Asia, Australia, and the U.S. Before
that, back in my mid-twenties, I was an FAA-certified flight
instructor for three years. This gives me over 40 years of
experience in the field of aviation.
Now let me tell you that I care a great deal about the FAA.
It is an excellent agency, unmatched anywhere else in the
world. And, trust me, I have experience of that, flying
overseas. The majority of employees produce outstanding work
for aviation safety. The FAA guidelines are well conceived. The
air transport industry and the FAA created partnership program
as a means of addressing safety problems and to prevent
potential safety hazards; however, they need to be consistently
and fairly implemented across the board.
This has been the problem in Southwest Airlines Certificate
Management Office. Of the FAA partnership programs, I notice
the abuse of authority of the following two, discussed in my
written testimony. They are voluntary disclosure reporting
program and Memorandum of Understanding addressing airman
certification. Very important.
Mr. Mike Mills and I were assigned to the Southwest Airline
Certificate Management Office simultaneously as Manager and
Assistant Manager, respectively, on November 14th and 15th of
2004. It was not long until we noticed that there was a lack of
substantiating data records, correspondence and other reporting
documentation related to certificate management. In addition,
we also noticed that the Principals, two or three of them, were
not adhering to FAA policy and guidance when it came to
enforcement actions.
My attempts to correct these issues were always met with
intense resistance, especially from the Principal Maintenance
Inspector. As our concern about the Principal Maintenance
Inspector and other inspectors' relationships with the carrier
increased, the Manager tried in vain, through numerous meetings
and memos, to correct the situation. Some of these inspectors
are still working at the Southwest Airlines Certificate
Management Office.
After communicating several times to the Regional Office
about this issue, the Manager was told it was a personal
problem between the Principal Maintenance Inspector and
himself. Ultimately, the Regional Office prepared an agreement
of cooperation which management at the office were told to
sign. The last version of this agreement was signed in January
of 2007.
Two months later, in March of 2007, Southwest Airlines flew
several aircraft without compliance with an unworthiness
directive. After self-disclosure by the carrier under the VDRP
program, this violation continued with the knowledge of the
Principal Maintenance Inspector and probably other inspectors.
Allowing Southwest Airlines to continue operation of these
aircraft in passenger revenue service by the Principal
Maintenance Inspector is an abuse of authority. I am not sure
whether the other two Principals knew or not. This was a
serious safety issue because cracks were found in the aircraft
fuselages.
About the same time there was another case of Southwest
Airlines operating aircraft without complying with the required
inspection concerning the standby rudder power control unit.
One airworthiness inspector who became aware of these
violations tried to do the right thing and kept insisting to
follow the agency guidelines. He was shunned as a troublemaker
and, for a period of several months, was suspended by the
Regional Office from any work related to Southwest Airlines.
The manager sent repeated requests to the Regional Office for
assistance. The last one relating to the power control unit was
sent the first week of May of 2007. A few days later he was
removed from his position and replaced by the Principal
Operation Inspector at the time.
I have more details in my written testimony.
On the operation side, guidance and policy were not
followed in the approval of a Memorandum of Understanding
concerning airman certification. According to Order 8400.10,
now 8900.1, Southwest Airlines is not qualified to have a
designee program; therefore, not eligible to have a Memorandum
of Understanding for training of FAA Aircrew Program Managers.
Despite their lack of qualifications, Southwest Airlines
has been approved by the Regional Manager's Office for many
years to have a Memorandum of Understanding which does not
limit the training to an Aircrew Program Manager as specified
in the Order I mentioned earlier. But this approval allows all
FAA Operation Inspectors, including FAA management, to receive
all required training and to obtain a type rating at the
carrier's expense. I believe that this improper approval was a
blatant abuse of authority by higher management, leading to
conflict of interest and unethical practices and, in addition,
endangering the public safety. This is well detailed in my
written statement.
In conclusion, we need to make sure that the job is done in
a manner consistent with FAA policy guidance and directives. I
believe that abuse of authority and regulatory partnership
programs should never be allowed because this will lead to
serious consequences. Thank you very much.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you, Mr. Naccache. Certainly, against
your extraordinary professional background, that is very
compelling testimony. Thank you.
Mr. Naccache. Thank you.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Lambert.
Mr. Lambert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Terry
Lambert. I have been a Federal employee for 37 years. I have
been an Aviation Safety Inspector with the FAA since February
1998. Those years, I had six years in management. I have been
assigned as a Manager of the Safety Analysis and Evaluation
Branch, ASW-290, Southwest region since April 1st, 2007. During
the last year, I have spent almost 100 percent of my time
investigating the issues within the Southwest Certificate
Management Office.
As you have heard, there is no way I could present all
these findings in a mere five minutes; therefore, I will
summarize a few of the most serious.
In April 2007, the Southwest Region Division Management
Team assigned ASW-290 to investigate into the Southwest
Certificate Office based on the following: a technical
evaluation conduct in April 2007; Workplace Evaluation
Assessment Team report from 2005; a review of letters of
concern by Bufford Eatmon in December 2005; AD 2004-18-06
overflight review conducted in April 2007 by Kermit Teppen and
Skip Whitrock; and a memo from Bobby Boutris dated April 30th,
2007, sent to the Office Manager, Mr. Mills. Here are some of
the results:
The technical evaluation team discovered 42 issues in the
office. The office file system was almost non-existent or not
current. The office did not maintain the proper documentation
of approvals or rejections. The office relied on documents that
Southwest Airlines maintained in their online system as
historical documents. Southwest Airlines called Mr.
Gawadzinski, the SPMI, Supervisory Principal Maintenance
Inspector, on March 15th, 2007, and informed him of AD issues
on 100 aircraft. Gawadzinski encouraged Southwest to self-
disclose the issue. Southwest filed a Voluntary Disclosure on
March 19th, 2007.
The initial report stated it would take until March 21st,
2007, to complete the inspections; it actually took until March
23rd. The report did not state which aircraft were affected.
Southwest Airlines stated the non-compliance issue had ceased.
A review of log sheets by ASW-290 indicated that Southwest
continued to operate the aircraft in passenger operation
between March 15th and March 23rd, 2007, and flew 1,241 flights
during that time with passengers onboard. Southwest's
comprehensive fix did not include any changes to the AD
management system. Mr. Gawadzinski was the only inspector to
address the disclosure and accepted Southwest's actions. The
Teppen-Whitrock report had similar issues with the AD, but only
two aircraft were reviewed.
A review of 29 letters of concern issued by Gawadzinski
indicated at least five of the letters should have been letters
of investigation. Mr. McGarry, from the Southwest Region,
instructed Gawadzinski to stop sending letters of concern and
send letters of investigation, as required. Mr. Gawadzinski
continued to send letters of concern. The Southwest Office
appeared to be divided between those that supported Mr.
Gawadzinski and those that support the Office Manager, Mr.
Mills.
Mr. Boutris wrote a memo to Mr. Mills on September 16th,
2005 with some of the same concerns as his April 2007 memo. Mr.
Boutris stated that Gawadzinski removed the letterhead from a
letter of investigation so he could personally go to Southwest
to resolve the violation. Mr. Gawadzinski instructed Don Back
to change his paperwork so that Southwest could voluntarily
disclosure an issue that Mr. Back had found. Mr. Gawadzinski
allowed Southwest to make changes to approved manuals without
FAA review. The review substantiated Mr. Boutris' concerns
addressed in his memo.
Safety Attribute Inspection 1.3.6 AD Management had not
been accomplished since 1999. In 1999, there were a multitude
of no responses. Mr. Boutris was assigned the inspection and
had approximately 20 no responses when he was put on desk duty
as a result of an anonymous complaint received by Southwest
Airlines. The inspection was assigned to John Bassler and Larry
Collamore. They did not use any of Mr. Boutris' information.
When completed, Mr. Bassler had seven no responses and Mr.
Collamore had zero. The inspection was reassigned to a regional
team.
Southwest Airlines overflew a rudder PCU check inspection
in March 2007. Southwest voluntarily disclosed the issue to Mr.
Gawadzinski; however, they continued to operate 70 aircraft
while the inspections were being accomplished. All this
information was contained in Executive Summary submitted to the
Division Management Team in May 2007.
In June 2007, ASW-290 was assigned by Mr. Ron McGarry to
assist Security with conducting an investigation to a hot line
complaint against Mr. Gawadzinski. Mr. McGarry requested that
ASW-290 provide technical assistance to the security inspector,
take notes, and provide a summary. The following was discovered
during the interviews.
Mr. Gawadzinski stated that he should have grounded the
aircraft, but he chose not to. Mr. Comeau stated that
Gawadzinski did not tell him to ground the aircraft. Mr.
Gawadzinski insisted he assigned the Voluntary Disclosure to
Mr. Larry Collamore. In his first two interviews, Mr. Collamore
claimed Mr. Gawadzinski never told him anything about the self-
disclosure.
Mr. Collamore changed his statement in his third interview,
indicating that Mr. Gawadzinski had told him as soon as
Southwest had called. Mr. Collamore said he did nothing because
Mr. Gawadzinski did not assign him any tasks. Mr. Gawadzinski
showed favoritism to Matt Crabtree, an inspector in the office,
when he paid out of his pocket for Mr. Crabtree to attend
training.
Office management has not effectively dealt with the issues
in the office. A summary of these events was given to the
Division Management Team in June 2007. It was also noted that
Mr. Gawadzinski continually suppressed the work efforts of Mr.
Boutris and his ability to do surveillance.
These are a few of the issues that have been and are being
worked at the Southwest Regional Office. Mr. Gawadzinski's
actions, his relationships with Southwest employees, and the
actions of other inspectors that have supported Mr. Gawadzinski
is outside the guidance and authority entrusted to FAA
employees. This has affected the oversight of the Southwest
Airline Certificate.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Committee Members.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you, Mr. Lambert.
I would note for the record that Mr. Lambert, as a member
of management at FAA, is in effect here testifying against his
boss, and that takes enormous courage to do that.
I thank all of the panel, all members, for the courage you
have shown in coming forward, I will say it once again, for
your public-spirited defense of aviation safety.
The FAA would have us believe that what took place was an
isolated incident and has been contained. In fact, the
testimony we have heard substantiates that, clearly, this is
not an isolated aberration attributed or attributable to a
rogue individual, but, rather, a systematic breakdown of the
safety oversight role of the FAA. It is misfeasance,
malfeasance, bordering on corruption. If this were a grand jury
proceeding, I think it would result in an indictment.
The FAA has incorporated into its oversight system, for a
variety of reasons, what is called the ATOS, Air Transportation
Safety Oversight System. That is supposed to be a rating,
supposed to be a structure, a system for tracking safety and,
through record-keeping, identify shortcomings. I think the
result of ATOS is that inspectors are spending more times
looking at databases than doing hands-on inspection. This is
not new. This goes back to the mid-1980s, when FAA inspectors
were telling me they were spending more time inspecting
paperwork than engine work; more time processing papers than
spending time on the floor of the maintenance shops and
observing the work being done.
So I have a question for Mr. Boutris and Mr. Peters. What
has happened here? Has the ATOS broken down? And let's look at
the chronology. March 6th, after revelation of our Committee
inquiry and your representations and documentation to the
Committee, FAA imposes a $10.2 million fine on Southwest; March
10, a special FAA team is sent to investigate Southwest; March
11, Southwest puts three employees on administrative leave;
March 12, Southwest grounds 41 aircraft for inspection; March
13, FAA issues a national order to all flight standard district
offices to conduct a special emphasis validation of AD
oversight; American Airlines grounds 200 aircraft, 200 MD-80s,
for further inspections; U.S. Airways loses a part of a wing
panel in flight; United Airlines grounds its entire 777 fleet
for further inspections; Delta Airlines grounds its MD-88s for
further inspections; Northwest holds back its 757s for slats
inspections; and Southwest grounds another 38 aircraft for
further inspections.
If ATOS is so good, why has it failed? Why have these
incidents come to light only after what your testimony has
submitted here took place? Mr. Peters.
Mr. Peters. Yes, sir. Unfortunately, ATOS is a generic
oversight system that applies to an air carrier that might
operate, let's say, 10 aircraft of one specific fleet type or
model. That also applies to an air carrier that might be
considered a mega-carrier, with over 600 aircraft and maybe six
different types of fleet types. I say it is generic that the
tools are the same; however, in this particular element, AD
management, it is considered a high criticality element, and
those generic procedures apply to both small carrier, large
carrier. High criticality requires an inspection twice a year.
Of course, the Principal Maintenance Inspector responsible for
that can increase that number based on the number of different
fleet types and the number of different models that they
operate.
ATOS doesn't really address that. Our guidance is weak when
it comes to the larger carriers that operate different types of
fleets of aircraft and they operate them whether in or outside
of the United States. It is generic and I don't believe that it
is adequate, our policies and procedures.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you. I have long felt that it is
insufficient. It is a useful tool, but insufficient, and in
this case, combined with the Voluntary Disclosures, resulted in
a major failure of safety.
Mr. Lambert, were you ordered to destroy your notes after
FAA Region learned that our Committee was investigating the
incidents about which you testified?
Mr. Lambert. If you are referring to the notes that I took
during the investigation?
Mr. Oberstar. Correct.
Mr. Lambert. Yes, sir, I was.
Mr. Oberstar. Who issued that order?
Mr. Lambert. I believe it was in October of 2007, and it
would have been Mr. Steve Douglas.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you.
Mr. DeFazio. And who is Mr. Steve Douglas, Mr. Chairman?
Who is Mr. Steve Douglas?
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Douglas is? State for the record his
title.
Mr. Lambert. He would be one of the Assistant Division
Managers at the Southwest Region.
Mr. Oberstar. Southwest Region, yes. We have that
information in our files.
In light of this testimony, what changes do you recommend
in the Voluntary Disclosure and the ATOS systems? Mr. Lambert?
Mr. Lambert. One of the changes I would make is we need to
train the inspectors on how to do the inspections, rather than
how to do the computer work associated with those inspections.
It is not just a matter of putting it into the computer; it is
a matter of doing the inspection.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you. Over-reliance on system rather
than people doing inspections, putting their nose into the
work. It is not a matter of going around and demeaning, saying,
well, we don't need people going around kicking tires and
putting hands on fuselage. That is demeaning of the role of
inspector. And you are right about the degree and extent of
training.
I will withhold at this point.
Mr. Petri.
Mr. Petri. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am interested in getting a sense of this. It is a very
traumatic thing for the agency and for the individuals
involved. Is it in part a difference of philosophy, of trying
to do things completely by the book, when the book may be
outdated, as opposed to creating an ethos of safety and working
together for a common end? Is this underlying this at all, a
difference in sort of management philosophy here, or is it
malfeasance by an individual? I don't know who would like to
testify to that. Mr. Mills, you would be in a position, I
think.
Mr. Mills. It is my opinion that there is a necessity that
is clear to Washington Headquarters that, based on the ever-
increasing airline industry and the failure of the FAA
oversight capability to keep up with that, some mechanism needs
to be put in place in order to allow the airlines to take a
bigger role in their oversight, and I believe that is why ATOS
was created, because we simply can't be everywhere to do
everything as inspectors.
I do not believe any of the people who run the FAA are
opposed to regulatory enforcement. I think perhaps that we may
have gone too far toward considering airlines as customers and
being customer-friendly. But in an effort to be everywhere and
do everything we can, I believe that is why this model was
created.
And there are different schools of thought within the FAA.
There is the old school of thought that says enforce the
regulations and make life difficult for those operators who
don't comply with them, and the school of thought that was
represented by the Principal Maintenance Inspector was that
this was outdated and we needed to secure the cooperation of
the operators in order to have some degree of effectivity in
our oversight.
In my view, ATOS needs to be a tool. We need to surveill
based on risk, but we also can't have the advice that it is the
be-all and end-all. I know of some inspectors who believe that,
when they are sent out and assigned a task under ATOS, that
they can't look at anything else but what they are specifically
assigned according to the risk.
There is also the element that it is easy to answer a
question yes when a question is raised by ATOS as to whether an
airline has a specific thing that it is supposed to have, and
it is sometimes hard to say no because it creates a great deal
of extra paperwork and it often causes the carriers to display
some difficulty with the FAA. So inspectors are human beings;
some of them respond poorly to that. I think the model may need
to be revised.
Mr. Petri. Let me just say it clearly is a management
problem if you have honest and very hard-working, able
inspectors who question the integrity of the framework in which
they are operating, not entirely, but in some respects here,
and that is not healthy. If there may be differences in
philosophy, then that is management's job to work with people
so that they understand what that is and have confidence in it;
and if there are differences, that they are treated and dealt
with, rather than intimidating people or pushing them under the
counter, and this seems to be one of the issues here.
Mr. Mills. It is a training issue, largely, I believe.
Mr. Oberstar. We have a vote in progress, but there is time
for further questions, and I will turn to Mr. Costello.
Mr. Costello. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A question for all of our witnesses. Do any of you have
evidence or reason to believe that the issues that have
occurred at this CMO is occurring in other parts of the
Country? Is this widespread or is it unique to this CMO? Mr.
Boutris?
Mr. Boutris. Well, sir, I cannot speak for the other
offices because I don't have any experience with the other
offices, but the observation that somebody can make, including
our CMO, is if our ATOS databases are doing the job they are
supposed to do, why do we have all these hundreds of airplanes
taken out of service? In my opinion and belief--and I have
lived it--management can control the outcome of the ATOS
database.
If you are a principal and you send me out to do the job, I
will come back with at least several noes, because no airline
has all the procedures they are required to be there. So if I
came back and put no in the database, then you, as a Principal,
will have to do a risk analysis; you will have some red on your
dashboard and you have to take action. If you send Inspector B
out that is going to give you all the yeses, you can sit back
and say my dashboard looks good. So you can manipulate the
system and by that have the results you want. And I believe
that what I am stating is the result, when you see all these
airlines grounding airplanes, they are under ATOS also.
Shouldn't the Principal have something on his dashboard saying,
hey, we have something wrong here?
Mr. Costello. The other members of the panel, do you have
either evidence or reason to believe that this is happening at
other CMOs? No?
Mr. Cotti. Mr. Costello, ATOS, or the Air Transportation
Oversight System, is based on system safety principles, and
those principles dictate that, in order to have appropriate
safety measures in place or to have an appropriate level of
safety, that you have to have controls in place and that, more
than anything, you have to factor out the human being as much
as possible from the equation because that is where a lot of
the errors occur.
I think, in response to your question, what happened at the
Southwest CMO, from my perspective, was unique in that it was
so out of line--and I have been to a number of different
offices around the Country--it certainly was unique, and it was
gross as compared to some of the things I have seen elsewhere.
But thinking in terms of system safety and the human element,
this could have occurred in any office, because our current
design is still pretty heavily dependent on the human being.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Boutris, you specifically say in your
testimony that you were told by Mr. Gawadzinski that you were
not to enter information in the ATOS system. Is that correct?
Mr. Boutris. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Costello. Why do you think he told you that?
Mr. Boutris. That was referencing the AD safety attribute
inspection I had started and the one that Southwest had
requested for me to be removed from. The first two inspections
I did on two different dates----
Mr. Costello. My question is, though, why do you think he
told you not to enter the information----
Mr. Boutris. Because, in my opinion, my supervisor knew
that in a week from there I was going to be under investigation
and, therefore, would be knocked from the database.
Mr. Costello. Very good.
We have got a vote, so, very briefly, if you will keep your
answers concise.
Each of you and the IG reviewed to two different camps, one
loyal to Mr. Gawadzinski and the other to Mr. Mills. Was Mr.
Stuckey and the Regional Office aware of these two loyalties
and these two camps?
Mr. Peters. Sir, I believe they were, and that is evident
by the office audits that were conducted and the WEAT Team
visits that were conducted during the past two years prior to
the AD event. And I think Mr. Lambert's testimony that he
briefed the Division Manager May 2nd of similar events, I know
that in my security investigation I explained the divide in
that as well, and I believe that he briefed the Division
Management Team.
Mr. Costello. Do either of you believe that this went up to
Headquarters in Washington, that they had knowledge of the
divide?
Mr. Peters. I know that they did as far as mid-September
they did, because that was the date that I contacted the T&I
staff, and they had requested to speak to Mr. Ballough. So I
can only say that date for sure.
Mr. Costello. And that was in 2007, September of last year?
Mr. Peters. Yes, sir.
Mr. Costello. But you have no knowledge or no reason to
believe that Headquarters knew about it before then?
Mr. Peters. I don't.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Boutris?
Mr. Boutris. The only thing, as I stated earlier, sir, was
that every time I went to my supervisor with non-compliance
issues which were direct violations of the Federal regulations,
I bring my manager in, Mr. Mills, and I will quote the
regulation, I will present my findings, and my supervisor will
state that my guidance was out of date. Well, we are talking
about Federal regulations here, so he is telling me they were
out of date. And he was talking to Mr. Ballough on a daily
basis; we have him the ups and comings. So, to me, right there
will say that he had communication with Mr. Ballough.
Mr. Costello. The final question before I run out of time
here, just so everyone understands the time line here,--we have
the time line in front of us, but so everyone understands the
time line--when did you, Mr. Boutris or Mr. Peters, first raise
the issue, your concerns that Southwest was out of compliance
with AD? When was the first time you raised the concern?
Mr. Boutris. Are you talking about the flying aircraft or
with out of compliance with having the required procedures in
place to manage the AD compliance?
Mr. Costello. Both.
Mr. Boutris. I started the process that Southwest Airlines
did not have the proper procedures in place and that were
required back in 2003. They accepted my findings and it took
them a year to bring the engine AD compliance records into
compliance with 121.380 14 CFR. In 2006, when I changed
positions and I had the airframes and systems for the 700
aircraft, I found the same discrepancies, and that is when my
supervisor did not want to send Southwest Airlines a letter.
And after going to Mr. Mills and asking my supervisor we have
to deal with it, he assigned me the inspection. That was the
same inspection that Southwest Airlines requested my removal
and that was the same inspection that Mr. Gawadzinski
instructed me not to put the negative findings in the database.
Mr. Costello. And can you explain for everyone the
difference in the two letters, the letter that you wanted to
write versus the letter you were directed to write?
Mr. Boutris. Our guidance does not provide any information
or does not really identify what the letter of concern is. This
is something that some principals or supervisors or management
come up with. You call it the letter of concern. Our guidance
is crystal clear: according to Order 2150, we have to document
the non-compliance--or even if it appears as non-compliance.
So even if it appears as non-compliance, we have to send to
the carrier a letter of investigation. That does not mean there
is a violation. What it means is we think there is a violation.
It appears there is a violation.
You do the investigation. You can close it with no action.
You can close with administrative actions. You can close it
with civil penalty. But you have to document what you think
might be wrong at the time that you looked at it, and this way
you can go back if you have previous violations or future
violations and compare your findings.
Mr. Costello. You were told not to send a letter of
investigation.
Mr. Boutris. Yes, sir. That was also told in front of Mr.
Mills, my manager, and that is when Mr. Mills.
There is a memo and I have testimony. Starting 2005, I sent
an e-mail to my supervisor, copied Mr. Mills on it: I will no
longer send Southwest Airlines letters of concern because I
have sent so many on the same previous issues and through my
surveillance I was finding the same problems that were not
fixed. In addition, I was finding new ones.
That e-mail is part of my testimony.
In addition, my supervisor, after I sent the e-mail out, he
grounded me. He told me I cannot do any more surveillance. So I
went to his office. I went to my manager's office, and I said:
According to my PD, the position description, part of my job is
to manage the program and also do surveillance inspections to
ensure Southwest Airlines is following their procedures.
His response to that was: I have other inspectors for that.
I do have an e-mail from him, stating that my area of
inspection is Dulles. Well, that is the only place that
Southwest Airlines flies.
Mr. Costello. I thank you, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. A further way of answering your question is
to say very simply that a letter of investigation has
consequences that can result in fines. A letter of concern does
not.
Mr. Boutris. Yes, correct. Yes, sir, that is correct, but
the letter of concern is nowhere identifying our guidance.
Mr. Oberstar. That is right. That is correct.
The Committee will stand in recess, pending the votes on
the House floor, and we will resume 20 minutes after the last
vote. The panel, since they are under oath, will be sequestered
by the Committee staff.
[Recess.]
Mr. Oberstar. The Committee will resume its sitting.
At the time that we broke for the votes, Mr. Costello had
concluded his questioning, and now we turn to Mr. Hayes of
North Carolina, a pilot, a diligent Member of this Committee.
Mr. Hayes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is a very important hearing. I think we have
established several things. That is serious mistakes in
oversight have occurred on the part of the FAA and on the part
of Southwest Airlines, and I am confident that we will move
aggressively on the part of everyone involved to correct the
situations that have been pointed out in great detail.
As others have said, thank you for the testimony from our
first panel.
I would like to pick up, if I may, on a question that Mr.
Costello asked. I think it is very appropriate to make sure
that we understand and have the right answer. His question, if
I remember correctly, was: Do you think the problem that we
have uncovered and discussed today is system-wide or restricted
to the area that you all have been covering?
There was yes and one acknowledgment, but I would like to
ask the panel that across the board. Mr. Boutris, would you?
Mr. Boutris. That was in regard to if this problem exists
in other CMOs and other FAA offices here?
Mr. Hayes. Correct. That is basically the question.
Mr. Boutris. Basically, the only thing I can say is what I
responded earlier, that the ATOS program can be manipulated and
the person that looks at the dashboard.
Mr. Hayes. Just a yes or no.
Mr. Boutris. No.
Mr. Hayes. Mr. Peters? Okay, no.
Mr. Peters. I think potentially it could, however.
Mr. Hayes. Well, obviously, it could, but do you think this
is a system-wide problem of this extent?
Mr. Peters. Maybe not to this extent.
Mr. Hayes. Okay. And, Mr. Mills, you shook your head a
minute ago as it is not a system-wide.
Does anybody disagree? Let's not belabor it.
All right. My point is we want to correct the problems that
we have identified from this hearing, but we also want to make
sure that the perception of the flying public is not mistakenly
headed in the wrong direction because of the issues we talk
about today.
The facts are very clear that aviation in general, whether
it is airline or general aviation, is in the safest period in
its history and that is what we all strive for. The airlines
have a similar record now of that type of safe operation. It is
far safer than driving.
So my point, again, is to make sure that people who are
flying or thinking about flying know how much effort goes into
keeping everything safe.
I have been flying for 40 years. Those of you who are
sitting behind the microphones there know that every time the
pilot does a pre-flight, he is an inspector. Now he doesn't
have everything dissected but, as someone said earlier, it is
important to focus on the fact that there is a culture of
safety that exists, that wraps around the entire issue. It
doesn't necessarily start with anybody, but everybody has their
part to play.
So, as important as this hearing is, I hope, again, that
the main end result is we take a situation that has been
brought to light, correct it, correct the problems that may
carry over. But there are people and there are machines and
there are subjective issues and there are objective issues. So,
again, the perspective is we can always be a little bit safer,
but we are flying in the safest time in history.
Mr. Mills, what is the main takeaway today for the FAA and
for the airlines?
What is the action plan? What is the first thing we do when
we walk out that door?
Mr. Mills. Well, I think the initiatives that I espoused in
my testimony would be worthwhile, a rotation of senior managers
to ensure that if something like this doesn't happen due to
entrenchment.
Mr. Hayes. Cordial but not cozy, is that what we are
saying?
Mr. Mills. Yes. I think it was my memo that coined the
term, coziness.
Mr. Hayes. Yes.
Mr. Mills. It was pretty clear to me what was cozy and what
wasn't.
And, to answer your question earlier about whether this is
pervasive, I don't really think it is. I think there may be
some degrees of problems among other offices, but this is a
unique situation where we had a rogue inspector who simply
could not be corralled and made to go in the right direction
and appeared to be protected at every turn.
Mr. Hayes. Okay. Thank you. That is very important.
I just had something I wanted to finish up with, but I
can't remember what.
Oh, in the letter that I submitted, Mr. Chairman, from the
pilots, they pointed out a very important issue. They, as
pilots, are obviously concerned as much, if not more so, than
anybody because they are responsible for their own safety and
the safety of their passengers. The pilots, in the case of
Southwest and other airlines, are very, very diligent in doing
their part.
I don't know about you all as flyers, but as somebody
flying an airplane I have a good relationship with the
mechanics that are turning the wrenches. I think that is
appropriate. There is a relationship, cordial, businesslike,
not cozy.
Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I can't yield back my time. I
don't have any.
Mr. Oberstar. I thank the gentleman for his observations.
He is a pilot of long standing, and he has been diligent in
participating in the work of the Aviation Subcommittee and the
Full Committee.
I do have to point out that my definition of safety is the
relative absence of risk. It is not whether the whole system is
working well, but is there risk, what is its relevance and how
wide is that risk and how wide are we establishing the margin
of safety.
When you have an egregious breakdown as occurred in the
instance that we have heard about this morning, in excruciating
detail, then there is the possibility that it creeps to the
rest of the system. The purpose of hearings of this nature and
oversight of this kind is to ensure that it does not creep.
We now go to Mr. DeFazio, former Ranking Member of the
Aviation Subcommittee and one who has had a longstanding
interest and participation in aviation issues.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, quite frankly, I am alarmed at what I have
heard today, and I am just going to recount a little history
because we have very short memories around here.
When I first came to Congress, there was something that was
referred to as the tombstone mentality at the FAA which is we
went after problems, after a bunch of people had died.
I got involved in the 737 rudder problem very early on
before the second plane went down, when the FAA was still
saying, oh, it was some weird rotor wind or the pilot had a
heart attack or whatever. We found out we had a severe
mechanical problem that was very occasional but, unfortunately,
very fatal. That took quite some time.
I fought for years to get over-wing access after the
Manchester flight when it was demonstrated that if you don't
have adequate access over the wings, people die piled up like
cord wood. It took years.
It took them six months in Britain. It took us years.
Then the whole issue of since I have been here I have been
trying to get OSHA coverage for flight attendants, which not
inconsequentially would provide for a safer environment for the
passengers, but the agency refuses.
Now a lot of this is embedded in history, and the history
was the agency was charged with promoting something it
inherited from the CAB, promoting the industry and regulating
safety. From the time I first came here, I said you can't do
both those things. It doesn't work.
I had administrators say, oh, no, no problem. No problem.
Then finally after the Value Jet tragedy, it was recognized
that that wasn't working, was it? And so, I got legislation
that Mr. Costello, Mr. Lipinski and I had introduced with the
support of Chairman Oberstar inserted into the FAA Bill that
year that stripped away the dual mandate.
Now I am going to get to a question, but this comes from
Mr. Boutris' testimony because, as I was listening to him and
reading this, I thought, have we rolled back the clock to the
dual mandate era? Are we promoting? Is this a result of
customer service initiative?
When you said in here, what is alarming is the fact that
even today we are still being reactive. This is proven by the
notice that the FAA issued two weeks ago, ordering FAA
inspections on the airlines in order to validate AD compliance
because of this hearing.
Then you ask about ATOS. I also had at least three meetings
with Nick Sabatini, as Ranking Member, expressing the same
concerns as the Chairman, saying, I don't get how this ATOS
thing is going to work. I want people out there watching, on
the ground, monitoring and doing real inspections.
A computer system to monitor a computer system. As we heard
from Mr. Boutris if you are told not to input something into
that computer system, well, it just goes away, doesn't it, or
maybe something worse happens.
Then you said down at the bottom of that page, the majority
of ADs are the result of catastrophic accidents and, as the
industry saying goes, ADs are written in blood.
So I guess my question would be to the panel: Did the FAA
take seriously the change in the law that I made in 1996,
stripping away the mandate to be a promoter and to be a
regulator in the public interest for public safety? Were we
making progress?
I knew there was a long culture. I knew it would take time.
Were we making progress up to 2003 or did nothing ever change
or did 2003, with this customer service initiative which came
from an Administration that hates government, is contemptuous
of government and hates regulation even more?
The customer service initiative, to me, is clearly intended
to say, we are not going to regulate really. You are our
customers, and we wouldn't want you to be upset with our
scrutiny.
If you read through the directive and Marion Blakey's
speech and all that, it becomes apparent.
So the question is, to anybody on the panel, did 1996 make
a difference when we changed the law? Was there a cultural
difference evolving?
Were we becoming more a regulatory agency and less a
promoter of the industry up to 2003, and did 2003 mark a sea
change with the customer service initiative and the culture of
the Bush Administration and all the political appointees
pushing to be customer-friendly to those people we are supposed
to be regulating?
Mr. Boutris?
Mr. Boutris. I will take that question, sir, and I think it
is a very good question. What you are saying, I agree with you
100 percent. I have been in the aviation industry for 30 years,
20 outside the FAA and 10 with the FAA.
What you eliminated, which was fostering promoting aviation
and trying to regulate at the same time, was excellent.
However, I think the facts are proving, but another thing came
in, the customer service initiative which took its place. So,
yes, we are promoting safety through customer service, and I
believe we cannot do both.
I believe that the airlines are our customer, and I will do
anything in my power to help them out like I did with the
engines when I found the problem. I worked with them for a
year.
However, we have forgotten the most important customer
which is the taxpayers. We have taken an oath that we are going
to ensure that the airlines provide safe public transportation.
Are we doing that? Well, from what I gave you, on our side,
I don't believe we are doing that.
And I do, though, with all due respect to Mr. Hayes, I want
to go back because he said the answer was no.
Actually, my answer was not no. The answer was yes because
if ATOS was working when the notice came out to do the
compliance for the ADs, he shouldn't have any airplanes
grounded, but he had hundreds of airplanes grounded. So this is
not just Southwest.
So, with all due respect, to Mr. Hayes, I just want to say
my answer was yes. It was not no, and I know it was cut short.
But if the system was working, a lot of these principal
inspectors should have a lot of red lines on the dashboard, the
ATOS dashboard having risk indicators. This way, they can do
these inspections prior to you having this Committee hearing,
and there was another knee-jerk reaction.
Let's issue the notice and see how things are going out
there. Let's take the polls. Well, the polls were not well. I
want to tell you that the patient is not that well.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you.
Anybody else want to reflect on whether the customer
service initiative could be part of the root cause here and/or
whether or not we ever saw a cultural changes resulting from
the change?
Were people aware of the change in the law? Was it made
aware to people in the agency when I changed the law in 1996?
Were people aware of that, that we had stripped away the
promotional mandate?
Anybody?
Yes, you were. Okay.
Does anybody think that things just never changed or we
kind of got set back as Boutris thinks by the so-called
customer service initiative, which again created this sort of
conflict?
Mr. Mills?
Mr. Mills. Well, I think the, excuse me, the customer
service initiative did set us back because I remember when we
started promoting this. I was mandated to go to every single
operator in the Dallas district office. It took me weeks to
drive to all those places and hand them materials that made
them understand how friendly we are now and how we want their
concerns to be elevated through this mechanism.
Mr. DeFazio. You had to hand deliver this package?
Mr. Mills. Yes, sir.
Mr. DeFazio. I want to hear this. Continue, but if you
could also relate to me how often you were able to get around
in an inspector's capacity to all of those same folks.
Mr. Mills. I was not able to do that, sir. I was the
manager at the time.
Mr. DeFazio. But in this, were you ordered to go see them
all?
Mr. Mills. Yes.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. So you were not able to get there in a
capacity of oversight and inspection because there were just
too many of them.
Mr. Mills. Right.
Mr. DeFazio. But you were torn away from those other duties
to hand deliver a package that could have been mailed or they
could have gotten on the internet about the customer service
initiative.
Mr. Mills. That is correct. We had to visit them
personally.
Mr. DeFazio. Anybody else want to comment on this thing?
Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am over my time. I will
have more questions later.
Mr. Oberstar. Mrs. Capito.
Mrs. Capito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that I will
hold my questions until later. I appreciate it.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Moran.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I appreciate the testimony I heard earlier today, and I am
glad to have the opportunity to ask a few questions.
Let me initially direct my line of questioning to Mr.
Mills. I am thinking about how we go forward from, this point
in time, and you point out the value of the self-disclosure
programs, but that it is highly dependent upon the integrity of
those that are implementing that disclosure program. In your
opinion, who is in the best position to exercise the oversight
of the Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program, at what level,
what position?
How do we prevent what you describe happening from
happening again?
Mr. Mills. I am not sure that at the journeyman inspector
level is the place for it. Perhaps, those individuals could be
participants, but I think there needs to be more review at an
upper level of that. I am not sure what level.
But it is, in this case, something that was terribly
abused, and I would say I would start perhaps at the manager
level, office manager level.
Mr. Moran. Can you briefly describe for me the scenario?
When you say it was seriously abused in this circumstance,
describe for me, again, that scenario. Where was the failure?
Mr. Mills. Well, the failure was on the part of the
principal maintenance inspector who, because of his cozy
relationship with Southwest, was not only accepting the self-
disclosures but encouraging the operator to file them so that
they wouldn't have to, so that he wouldn't have to file
enforcement actions against them. Of course, enforcement
actions are a matter of record and self-disclosures are not.
So that, I hope that answers your question.
Mr. Moran. It does.
The supervisory principal maintenance inspector that you
just mentioned, his personality you talked about and his
inference of his connections, rapport with those in more senior
positions. Does that accurately describe what you testified to
earlier?
Mr. Mills. Yes, it was a very strange situation. I presumed
that much of his hype, self-hype, was just that, self-hype, but
there were certain instances that occurred during my
relationship with him that led me to wonder if, in fact, some
of his purported support might have some legs.
For example, I do know that Mr. Gawadzinski and Mr.
Ballough were engaged in some sort of assessment of the
staffing of my office, and I found that out as the second hand,
and I always wondered why Mr. Ballough didn't afford me the
courtesy of letting me know that that was happening.
On another instance, we were attending, excuse me, a
conference at Southwest Airlines headquarters where Mr.
Sabatini was speaking, and our management team from the office
was invited, and we sat at separate tables. Mr. Sabatini and
his entourage sat at one table, and we sat at another one. And,
Mr. Gawadzinski abandoned our group and went over and sat with
Mr. Sabatini and his entourage for the duration of the
conference.
And, of course, that was not lost on our management team or
Southwest Airlines for that matter and probably gave him a good
deal of imprimatur in terms of his success in thwarting what we
were doing.
Mr. Moran. The effect this appearance of this relationship
had, what is the consequence of that appearance?
People believed that there was a relationship that may
affect their jobs if they crossed?
Mr. Mills. Absolutely and, of course, for Southwest
Airlines, that gave him a certain degree of appearance of
influence that he might not ordinarily have had.
For my office, the people in my office who reported to him,
it certainly elevated his stature in their eyes and made life a
lot more difficult for me.
Mr. Moran. Did he do things that would merit his
termination and, if so, why was he not terminated?
Mr. Mills. On at least five occasions, I sent to the
regional office, and I have records of it, instances of misdeed
that he was doing that certainly warranted an investigation,
and it was not until I reported the Southwest overflight of the
AD, that investigation actually occurred to my knowledge.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Mills, thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me the time.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Carney, the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We just came off of our votes and I was down on the floor,
speaking with a number my colleagues, and they really had
question as to why all of a sudden American and Delta and
United pulled significant chunks of their fleet down for
inspections all at once. We hear about the creep in the system,
and certainly I have to echo Mr. DeFazio's concerns about this.
I would like your assessment on why this is going on now,
suddenly, Mr. Peters.
Mr. Peters. Like I spoke about earlier, ATOS is generic and
it was designed to be generic for all 121 carriers. I believe
the FAA ensured that all 121 carriers would fall under the ATOS
oversight program sometime in 2007 or early 2008.
In doing so, the baseline inspections that were required by
ATOS in the early days, the baseline requirement for
inspections was a little bit higher, and I don't know the
numbers exactly. But if we are to base our oversight system on
data alone and then we have reduced the requirement for the
data, the data points being inspections, how can we say that we
have raised the bar?
I mean it seems like we are complacent with the fact that
we are at the safest time ever. If we are not looking enough,
which is evident by last week's groundings, how can we say we
are safer or we have raised the bar?
I mean it is pretty obvious to know that these generic
requirements, they do apply to small carriers and they do apply
to large carriers, and ATOS brings a lot of good questions and
discoveries when doing these inspections. There really is.
There are some really great tools.
However, I don't believe it has been properly executed for
carriers like the larger carriers where you have got several
fleet types, engine types and several different types of
operations. You can't look at that and use those baseline data
points that you would for a smaller operation that might fly
domestically.
Our guidance is it is almost like an assumption that we
should automatically increase our surveillance activity based
on the number of aircraft that we have, and we do have risk
indicators, but the risk indicators only raise it to a level of
high which is still a baseline requirement of two inspections
per year.
Had we been doing more, I think we would have found the
problems that we found last week throughout the past history
and several years prior. But this basically happened all at
once where we were going to look at them all, and I think it is
evident that our oversight, at least of the AD management,
which was the only one that we looked at last week, is
inadequate.
Mr. Carney. I am trying to get a sense then. Do you think
that this is coincidental with the announcement of today's
hearing or did today's hearing startle enough folks to say
maybe we ought to take a look at our airplanes?
Mr. Peters. I think we looked at it after the media
coverage. The FAA decided to reassure the public that we didn't
have a problem. Unfortunately, with all the groundings, it had
a negative effect.
Mr. Carney. Yes, it did, absolutely.
This is for all of you. Do you believe that the regional
management team was trying to play down the seriousness of any
of these issues?
Mr. Mills?
Mr. Mills. Without question. The phone that I got just
prior to my dismissal couldn't have been more cryptic. When the
staffer says, under his breath almost, Mr. McGarry wants to
keep this very quiet and very low key, what else could that
mean? I was dismissed five days later.
Mr. Naccache. I was his assistant, and I agree with that.
Mr. Carney. Anyone else?
Okay. Mr. Cotti, you state in your testimony that Mr.
Gawadzinski ``often took positions and made decisions that
defied FAA logic.'' Could you please elaborate?
Mr. Cotti. Sure. For that entire two-year period, issues
would pop up such as the application of our enforcement
policies, things like how we managed our inspection oversight
program, that he expressed positions or made decisions that
just made no sense in the context of the issue or how it was
governed by our guidance.
Things like the aviation safety program information where
mechanics can disclose to the agency that they have done
something wrong and if it fits certain criteria, in the
interest of safety, the FAA accepts that information.
He took a position_where de-identified information,
information where the mechanic's name had been removed and the
core safety information remained_he took the position that that
information went into a black hole where no one outside of this
very small event review committee, which is made up of the
airline management, the labor group and the FAA, that the
information could not be shared in any way outside of that
group.
And when the manager, Mr. Mills, attempted to rectify that
situation so that that data could be used for the purpose with
which it was intended, he was very resistant to that.
Mr. Carney. Did they defy the law, never mind FAA logic? I
know you are not a lawyer, but I am asking.
Mr. Cotti. Right. I don't know that it violates any sort of
law. I mean each situation would be looked at differently, but
certainly it was contrary to our policies and, as I expressed
earlier, it just didn't make any sense. Why would you tightly
guard and prevent that information from being disseminated to
appropriate folks when that was the whole purpose of gathering
that data?
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am a little over my
time. Thank you.
Mr. Oberstar. That is quite all right.
Ms. Hirono.
Well, first, Mrs. Capito, do you have any?
All right. The gentlewoman from Hawaii, Ms. Hirono.
Ms. Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think what really is described here is the too close
relationship, of course, between the regulators and the
regulated with people who come from the private sector, i.e.,
working for airlines, moving into the FAA as employees and
vice-versa, not to say that that in and of itself is a problem.
I realize that the Chair has said that maybe one of the
ways that we can prevent too cozy a relationship is to rotate
the assignments. Do any of the panelists have any other
suggestions on how we can prevent the too cozy relationships
from arising?
Mr. Mills. I think perhaps Mr. Sabatini has a good idea in
having some mechanism through which lower level managers can
have a voice unfettered by a dysfunctional superior. I am not
sure how that would work, but it seems to me that newspapers
have ombudsmen. I can't say the word, ombudsmen.
Ms. Hirono. Ombudsmen.
Mr. Mills. And there are many entities out there where you
have a no-fault avenue to take your concerns.
In the case of the Southwest region, it was unwritten but
understood policy that we would never go outside the chain of
command without some serious repercussions. And, at the point
where I was, I wasn't sure who was connected to what,
concerning Mr. Gawadzinski. So I was very careful in whom I
should speak to and fearful of the consequences that might
occur if I did get out of that loop.
Ms. Hirono. Any of the other panelists care to respond?
I know, Mr. Boutris, in your testimony, you raised some
concerns about that kind of a system when you, yourself, were
so clear in what you were pointing out.
I have another question especially to the first three
panelists. As more and more of our aircraft maintenance is
outsourced, do you have concerns that this makes it even harder
for the FAA to maintain the kind of oversight over maintenance
because so much of the maintenance is out of our Country?
Mr. Boutris. I believe that we should be concerned about
that. I hear statements and I read that the regulation applies
the same way if you do maintenance in this Country or if you do
maintenance in another country. Well, I can tell you the
requirements are not the same.
In this Country, the aircraft mechanics have to take a drug
and alcohol test. In other countries, there is no requirement
for that.
Also, in our Country, the mechanics have a duty time where
they have to take time off after so many days. There is no
requirement in other countries to do that. So we do have
differences.
As for oversight, it is harder to go and perform
surveillance, but on the same token I don't want this to sound
like every country that offers aircraft maintenance is bad
because a lot of countries out there that offer aircraft
maintenance are a lot better than, sometimes, our own
maintenance.
But for surveillance, for me, I participated three times
for oversight for different repair stations. I want to tell you
that that was part of the work group when they came out to do
these team inspections on the repair stations because, for
example, I am on Southwest Airlines. If Southwest Airlines
sends engines or their aircraft, for example--well, in Brazil,
for example, Southwest Airlines has a contract with General
Electric. The engines go to Brazil GE and that is where some of
the engines get overhauled.
Now if I went over there for Southwest Airlines, I did my
inspection for Southwest Airlines, I came back, and I reported
my findings based on the regulation and the Southwest Airlines
procedures. Now if somebody worked for American Airlines, they
go down there to do the same thing. If you work for
Continental, you go down there to do the same thing.
So they came up to do the team inspections. Instead of
sending 100 people, you just send a team of people. And then
you can take that report and, based on that, you can look at
the findings.
Well, my question to the work group was when they were in
the process of coming up with this team inspection was when I
go down there or any repair station outside the United States,
one of the questions specifically states: Does the repair
station follow the air carrier's procedures?
As you know, the air carrier's procedures take precedence
over the regulation because we approve some of them, and we
make sure that they follow the regulation and they meet the
regulation, and that is why the procedures are approved.
So my question was, if I go to Brazil, for example, and
look at GE engines that Southwest has in house for overhaul, I
answer that question just specific for Southwest, that GE is
following Southwest Airlines' procedures.
Now how can you tell the inspector who works for
Continental Airlines you have to accept that answer because I
don't know what Continental's procedures are. I know what the
regulations are, but each airline has above and beyond
procedures in place for that.
So the answer to that was from the group leader, that well,
that is why they have CASS in place which is a Continuous
Analysis and Surveillance System for an airline. So they are
going back then to self-policing themselves. So if you are
going to accept the answer from their program for the CASS
program, why go and do the inspection at all? Just accept their
whole inspection then.
So you see there is disconnect there, and as of today that
is what is happening. We are sending team inspectors out there
to do team inspections, and then you look at their findings,
and then you accept what they have found. However, you are not
ensuring that your airline is really part of it.
Ms. Hirono. Mr. Chairman, is my time up?
Mr. Oberstar. Your time is expiring.
Ms. Hirono. I saw a hand.
Mr. Oberstar. If you have a follow-on comment, you may do
it.
Ms. Hirono. Well, I saw a hand going up, Mr. Peters, and
really briefly if you care to comment.
Mr. Peters. Well, it will be brief, and I would like to
respond to that.
If we are having trouble seeing the carriers in the
Country, how can we effectively oversee carriers that are
outsourcing their maintenance?
The inspection team that would go and inspect this foreign
repair station to the air carrier's standards would have to be
very familiar with that particular air carrier, and in the ATOS
world that is an air carrier specific briefing that is a
requirement by each certificate office that oversees the
carrier that they are assigned to.
So, how can we say that it is an equivalent level of
inspection when we have inspectors that do a great job in an
international field office that might go in once a year for
recertification of that repair station, not know American or
Southwest or United or whatever the carrier's procedures are?
It takes quite a bit of time and effort. These carriers are
so complex and their maintenance program is embedded in several
different areas throughout the carrier manual system. For us to
go in there and give it a one shot quick inspection, calling it
a recertification and not knowing how the system works for that
particular carrier, I don't think we could honestly say to the
Committee or to the flying public that it is an equivalent
level of safety.
Ms. Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Moran.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you again.
I am sure, at least if the way things normally happen in
Congress happen again in regard to this issue, we will have a
discussion about resources to the FAA budget, money,
allocations.
Is what we are talking about here in this discussion today,
is it related exclusively to management, to personnel, to
management style, practice and operator's manuals and
instructions? This is a management issue, not a funding issue,
is that accurate?
Mr. Peters. We are not. Down in the field level, we don't
really know the particular budget issues, but I can tel you
that for the fleet that I am responsible to manage, from the
maintenance aspect, we are severely understaffed.
Mr. Moran. As a result of that being severely understaffed,
is the consequence the one that we are talking about today or
this is a totally different topic?
Mr. Peters. Well, I will be real honest with you. The
notice that was put out last week, every issue that I had on my
fleet, I had to put it to the back burner.
Prior to that, the aircraft that I am responsible for was
basically generating occurrences around the Country, and one of
them is in the news today about the 757 windshield crack. All
of those investigations, they take resources. I mean they
require myself and possibly another inspector to go and
investigate those occurrence or incidents that happen
throughout the Country.
We have got our surveillance, our regular surveillance
duties that we are required to do along with managing the
certificate. So if we are just reacting to the fires, we can't
assure the air carrier or the flying public that--I don't want
to say that they are safe because, of course, they have a
process in place that is designed to keep them safe, and it is
not getting the intention that we need due to the lack of
resources that our surveillance and investigations require.
Mr. Moran. So volume and staffing levels are an issue.
Mr. Peters. I would say they are. I couldn't say truthfully
that they are not.
Mr. Moran. But the circumstances that we are exploring with
you here today, they have occurred not as a result of lack of
money but a lack of management. Is that fair?
Mr. Peters. I think so.
Mr. Moran. Anyone disagree with that?
Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. I would call it a failure of management, not
a lack of management.
Mr. Moran. You are a more precise wordsmith than I, and I
agree with your choice of words.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Hall.
Mr. Hall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Forgive me, Mr. Naccache, if this is a repeat of a question
you have already been asked, but can you describe the type and
level of harassment that was inflicted on Mr. Boutris and Mr.
Peters for reporting things they thought were problems that
needed to be reported?
Mr. Naccache. The description is it was very intense.
Mr. Hall. I will just try to keep this brief and little
more general. We hear testimony about national security issues
relating to aviation, and it seems that the FAA is trying to
encourage and we are all trying to encourage a culture or an
atmosphere that would lead people to report problems that they
see when it comes to national security, i.e., terrorism.
I am just curious why we don't have the same emphasis
regarding reports of safety problems like, for instance, skin
fatigue and cracks that could have resulted in the sudden
fracture and failure of the skin panels of the fuselage,
consequently causing a rapid decompression which would have a
catastrophic impact during flight. That is a physical threat to
the physical security to the passengers and the crew.
It seems to me that everyone, the FAA, certainly the
airlines and the industry, ought to be at least as concerned
about this as they are about on time arrivals or food service.
What is more important to your image as a company and what is
really more important to the agency, to the FAA, in terms of
their charge?
I am just curious what and maybe, Mr. Lambert, you would
like to take a stab at this. Has this changed at all? What can
we do to change it in terms of encouraging, not punishing, the
reporting of problems that may actually be threats to safety of
passengers and crew?
Mr. Lambert. Well, I think we have systems in place for
that, maybe not adequate, but the systems we have in place
don't take into effect a manager or supervisor that totally
decided not to comply with the rules the FAA has provided in
the authority they are given. I don't know that we have
anything that can fix that right now.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Naccache, do you care to?
Mr. Naccache. Yes, I do agree with him.
And I remember concerning Mr. Boutris and Peters I sent an
e-mail--let me see just a second here--on April 19 to all the
supervisors. I was then Acting Manager. I sent an e-mail on
April 19, directing them to do their part in reducing tension
in any perceived adverse action concerning Mr. Boutris who was
the subject of a recent anonymous letter.
He could not have a private phone conversation without
everything said being repeated around the office, and Mr.
Boutris was to come to my office often and complaining. So I
directed the supervisors that day the directive to make sure
that they were sharing this information with their employees
and to try to stop that.
Then I had some other information that Doug Peters was to
come and let me know that some of the inspectors always gave
him dirty looks, rudeness towards them. They were also
badmouthing them to the carrier.
Mr. Boutris was also put as a persona non grata in all
maintenance meetings, which I was kind of shocked, and I
discussed it with Mr. Gawadzinski. Apparently, Mr. Boutris
informed me that day that one of his peers, Mr. Crabtree,
requested that he not be present at any of the maintenance
personnel meetings since he was shown that he had this letter,
anonymous letter against him. They didn't want him around to
participate in any of the personnel meetings.
Mr. Hall. Well, thank you, sir.
My time has just expired, and I just wanted to comment that
on the passenger side I have seen signs in airports telling the
public if you see something, say something. I have seen the
same signs in New York City subways, by the way. We are, on one
hand, trying to tell the customers and the passengers to speak
up if you see something wrong, but when our inspectors, when
they try to do the same thing, they are harassed and, in
effect, told to be quiet or removed from their positions.
I, and I assume other Members of this Committee, will be
working to make sure that the FAA helps guide the airlines and
themselves in the direction of encouraging openness and honesty
in the interest of safety and the security and airworthiness of
the planes.
With that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. I thank the gentleman.
Chairman Costello.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I could ask a lot of questions. I think we
could probably keep this panel here for another few hours. I am
anxious to get to the next panel actually, but let me make a
couple of comments.
One is a follow-up to my friend from Kansas, Mr. Moran, who
asked the question, is this a matter of funding or is it a
management personnel issue.
I would just like for the record for people to understand
that numerous times when the Administration and
representatives, both the Administrator and others representing
the FAA have testified before the Aviation Subcommittee, we
have asked that question: Do you have adequate numbers? Do you
have adequate inspectors in order to do the job or do you need
more?
The answer has always been we could always use more, but we
have adequate numbers.
I have said, if you need more, tell us, and we will attempt
to provide the funding so that you can hire more inspectors.
They have never come back, to my knowledge, with a number,
certainly not to me and certainly not to this Committee.
So I want to make that very clear, that it is not a matter
of the Administration or the FAA requesting additional
inspectors. We have asked that question. They have said, we
have adequate numbers.
Number two is that I think it is worth noting that in the
reauthorization bill that we passed on September 20th in the
House, that we have historical levels in the reauthorization
bill to accomplish a number of things including hiring
additional inspectors because it is our belief and certainly my
belief that we need to hire additional inspectors.
I wanted to make both of those points on the record so that
they were not missed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. DeFazio.
Mr. DeFazio. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I don't want to keep the
panel. I mean they have been very generous with their time, but
I wanted to go back again to Mr. Boutris' testimony.
I think the question is, at least among us--we may hear
differently from some of the Administration witnesses--there is
a larger problem than one rogue guy, and the question becomes
how do we deal with this more systemically.
I guess one of the proposals is to have a hot line, and I
thought Mr. Boutris' criticism of that was pretty well taken. I
would like him to comment, and others, where you say if
management doesn't respond when I openly and on the record
raise serious safety concerns, how is a hot line going to work?
I guess the answer is they say, well, you go higher up in
the agency. But then you go on to say, well, basically, I had a
similar hot line system in place that inspectors do not trust
because hot line complaints on safety issues end up on the FAA
Administrator's desk.
Then they are passed down to the local regional office. The
local regional office assigns FAA security who doesn't have
technical expertise, and then the technical portion is
reassigned to regional people who might be part of the problem
to report on. In the end, not much happens.
Can anybody else? Mr. Boutris, do you want to expand on
that at all and anybody else who wants to comment on problems
with the existing hot line?
Because if the idea, if the solution is to establish yet
another hot line, it sounds like this is a problem that needs
to be addressed and maybe it needs to be somewhere outside of
political appointees like the Administrator and other folks.
Maybe there needs to be a whole--I don't know. Could you
address that?
Mr. Boutris. Well, sir, I stand behind what I say there. If
we already have one system and inspectors like myself don't
trust it, why burden the taxpayers on another system, no matter
what you call it?
Like you stated, what I have in my testimony, I openly and
on record, for years now, I have been raising safety concerns,
and I got nobody's attention. How is the system gong to work? I
do not know.
But to me, what I want to state here is accountability and
like I stated there, I will state it again, there is no
accountability throughout the ranks in the FAA.
Case in point, I have the new generation 737s. This fleet
that was affected was not my fleet. The partial program manager
that is the inspector for that fleet also was fully aware of
the unsafe conditions seven days before I did, the same time
that Mr. Gawadzinski was aware. So we cannot just hold Mr.
Gawadzinski responsible.
That inspector was in charge for that fleet, and he had
knowledge at the same time that Mr. Gawadzinski had. He should
have raised the flag, followed Title 49, followed our handbook
on our responsibility which states: An inspector, who becomes
aware of an unsafe condition on an aircraft that has been
operating or about to be operated, must take immediate action.
Did that inspector take that action? I don't think so.
Why should that be seven days later?
Mr. DeFazio. Where is that inspector now?
Mr. Boutris. I am sorry, sir.
Mr. DeFazio. That inspector?
Mr. Boutris. That inspector is Mr. Collamore, and what
really I don't understand was after they removed Mr.
Gawadzinski, the new manager that took Mr. Mills' place
promoted him in Acting Supervisor/Principal Maintenance
Inspector.
I wrote to Mr. Stuckey, e-mail after e-mail after e-mail.
You are rewarding inspectors that look the other way, and I
have a problem with that because the safety concerns I raised,
they were seven days later. Had this inspector done what I did,
the airplanes wouldn't be flying for seven days because Mr.
Mills would have grounded them.
So, to answer your concern, I think we need to start with
accountability.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. Anybody?
Yes, Mr. Peters.
Mr. Peters. Mr. DeFazio, I know it might seem like harsh
words when I said that the management personnel with the
responsibility and authority have proved themselves unworthy to
be custodians of the public trust. That is my, that is coming
from my heart. I really don't.
Mr. DeFazio. You can see you feel very deeply about this.
Mr. Peters. Well, it is sad. It is sad that it has come to
this, but it has, and we have to face reality. That is why Mr.
Boutris and I were so persistent in getting the information
forward to the Committee so that we can take appropriate
action.
If you are asking us what the appropriate action might be,
I don't think the FAA can be trusted to police itself in
regards to this matter that you spoke about, with a hot line, I
don't see how that would help.
An external organization, I don't know what you would call
it. Maybe we have an organization in place that could do that.
Maybe give them more authority to come in and inspect what do,
where we would have to provide evidential proof this is how we
determined and this is how we got to where we are at in our
inspections.
Mr. DeFazio. That is something to think about, Mr.
Chairman. I liked your earlier idea on a legislative fix, but I
think that is someone who would not be in that political chain
of command and would be more responsive perhaps to these
concerns.
Mr. Oberstar. I think that is a very important line of
consideration and one that we will have to explore. To address
this issue takes more than one fix. It is going to take maybe a
series of actions that will result in a change in the culture
of the FAA.
This lingering question about manpower, workforce and ATOS,
I just go back to 1986, following the hearing our Subcommittee
held on Galaxy Airlines. Here is this so-called airline. It had
one flying Electra and two Hangar Queens from which parts were
scavenged to supply the flying aircraft.
When we uncovered all the wrongdoing behind the scenes of
the management of that so-called airline, FAA rushed in half a
dozen inspectors to oversee Galaxy, leaving a major air carrier
in the Southwest FSDO with only a skeletal maintenance
oversight crew of FAA inspectors.
They were, in effect, making the FAA the maintenance
provider for this scummy airline, and I say that with
deliberate intention. I know, well, I won't go into the
disreputable operation of that carrier.
So I went then to my good friend, Mr. Mineta, who was Chair
of the Aviation Authorizing Subcommittee and said, when the
appropriation bill comes to the House floor, I want you to join
with me in offering an amendment to increase funding for the
inspector workforce of FAA. He did. We offered an amendment to
provide an additional $10 million a year to hire at least an
additional 1,000 inspectors.
The amendment passed, survived the Senate and conference,
signed by the President and the FAA began expanding its
workforce. We need to do that again. We need to expand that
workforce.
But when I made that move, it was with full participation
and compliance--I shouldn't say compliance--full partnership
with the FAA top level management at the time. They said, you
are right. We are understaffed. We need the help. Help us do
this.
We need that same attitude today instead of what Mr.
Costello referred to a little bit ago.
I want to come back to one of the fundamental issues here,
and that is the voluntary self-disclosure. A non-compliance
issue is eligible for self-disclosure without penalty if it is
found by the airline first, correct? With no prior knowledge by
the FAA, correct?
That is a very fine line. If you have someone within the
FAA who is tipping off the airline, then they can get to first
base before the ball gets there. Is that right?
Isn't that a little bit of what happened here?
Aren't there some non-compliance issues that have been
filed over the last couple of weeks that were previously
allowed to be submitted as self-disclosure even though FAA knew
about it? That then would have made them ineligible, isn't that
correct?
Don't nod because that can't be recorded in the testimony.
Mr. Boutris. Yes, sir. It is correct. If the FAA finds out
about non-compliance first, the airline cannot self-disclose
the violation.
Mr. Oberstar. All right. We are going to explore this
voluntary self-disclosure in more detail at the next panel.
I also want to come to the customer service initiative.
After what we have heard today, my opinion is that it ought to
be withdrawn, repudiated, torn up, thrown away, and we ought to
start fresh. I wonder what you think about that.
Mr. Cotti. Mr. Chairman, I would be careful on throwing out
the baby with the bath water. I believe that program has some
merit, and in those cases where it did not work as advertised I
think it would be more appropriate to rectify those situations.
Mr. Oberstar. You wouldn't throw it out. You would modify
it.
Mr. Cotti. Yes, sir. I would put tighter controls on how it
is being used.
Mr. Oberstar. All right.
Mr. Lambert?
Mr. Lambert. Yes, sir. The customer service initiative was
initially put in place to where if there was a disagreement
between an inspector and a carrier, that it could be elevated
to get the right guidance approved or whatever they needed.
It has become a complaint system. If an air carrier doesn't
like a principal's decision, they do it in a CSI because they
know it will eventually get to you guys and they will get a
decision in their favor more than likely because it becomes
political at that point.
It needs to be modified and used as was intended to get the
guidance, the proper guidance to resolve the issue at the
lowest level.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you.
Other comments from other panel members? Mr. Peters?
Mr. Peters. Well, last week, when I was conducting the AD
inspections for my carrier, when I returned, I read an e-mail
that referred to my carrier as a client. It is a little
troubling for me to understand where I stand as an inspector,
as a regulator when I am dealing with my client which, to be
honest with you, I have never been trained on anything to do
with a client other than enforcing the regulations. So it is
kind of a gray area for some.
I think it does have some benefit, like Mr. Lambert said,
where we do work with a carrier and, if they need for
resolution, they certainly need to have the avenue to raise
their level or to raise their concern to somebody within the
agency if they are not getting the proper response.
But the client and customer initiative, as it is being used
today, I don't see the value.
Mr. Oberstar. This is a multi-modal Committee. We have
jurisdiction over all the modes of transportation except
elevators. There was one year when there were more fatalities
in elevators than there was in aviation. That was about 15, 20
years ago.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Oberstar. In the rail safety arena, in 1994, 1995,
1996, I found an astonishing practice between the freight
railroads and the Federal Railroad Administration in which
there were similar Railroad Safety Advisory Committees.
The railroads sat down nicey-nicey, patty-patty with the
Federal railroad inspectors while the members of the railroad
brotherhoods--the signalmen, the maintenance workers, the
conductors, the locomotive engineers--were saying there are
serious safety problems on the railroads that are not being
addressed because the Federal railroad inspectors are hand in
hand, hand in glove with the railroads. I exposed that at a
hearing and raised holy hell, put it this way, with the
Administrator of FRA.
The result was they changed that system. They didn't use
the term, customer, but instead of treating the railroads as a
partner, they changed their mind set to: We are here to oversee
safety. Our responsibility is to assure that you are running
your railroad in a safe manner for employees, for the cities
through which you operate and for the freight that you are
carrying.
And we need that same change of attitude. I don't think
that the role of the FAA is to consider the airlines as their
customer. They are not a service organization to serve the
airlines. Airlines are a service organization to their
passengers. If there is a culture of customer, then it has to
be by the FAA to the air traveling public.
I think we need, yes, Mr. Cotti, I think some sort of
cooperative arrangement where the airlines voluntarily bring
information forward but one that is done within a regulatory
framework.
In the end, the airlines have the primary responsibility.
There must be a culture of safety in the corporate board room.
It must permeate the whole organization and so with the FAA. It
has to start at the top.
Every one of you witnesses here has shown that you have
that culture of safety, that you have it in your soul and your
heart and your spirit on every day and every piece of action
that you take, and I want that demonstrated at the top in the
FAA.
As long as the FAA thinks of the airlines as their client,
thinks of the airlines as their customer, that culture of
safety is not going to take hold and not going to permeate the
organization.
Oh, Ms. Johnson has arrived, our Chair of the Water
Resources Subcommittee. At this time, the Chair recognizes the
gentlewoman from Texas.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing.
I ask unanimous consent to put my statement in the record.
Mr. Oberstar. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Johnson. I apologize for having to leave out earlier,
but I just want to be very quick with this.
As I see the problem, I put most of the blame on FAA
because if FAA inspects and reports it to the right avenue,
then I cannot understand why an airline would not take heed. So
what I would like to hear from you is where is the kink? Is it
the buddy system? What is it?
Where does it fall off the line? Anybody or all?
Mr. Cotti. Ms. Johnson, I would submit that it becomes an
issue of integrity. I think a lot of the issues we were talking
about today have had to do with the integrity of one or several
individuals. Integrity is one of the core values of our
organization.
And, I think there is lots of ways to look at this, but
this wasn't rocket science. This was there was an opportunity
to make a decision, and the wrong decision was made, and I
think it goes down to integrity with individuals
Ms. Johnson. Do you think rotating employees?
I know that it takes a certain amount of expertise for the
inspectors, but it seems to me that when people stay in one
place a long time they kind of get accustomed to letting things
slide based upon the fact that they don't think it will be
immediately that of a problem.
I have been trying to think through where we start. Do we
prohibit FAA employees from going to work for a private airline
for at least two years after they leave FAA or what do you
think?
I know it has to start from the top, but it has not started
from the top, it seems to me. So I am trying to deal with the
problem.
Mr. Mills. Well, I think that would certainly be a step in
the right direction. In this particular case, the employee who
left the FAA and went to work for Southwest Airlines certainly
raised the question in my mind about propriety and, because of
that, I asked for an investigation of that instance.
So I think it would be very helpful to have a waiting
period before an inspector leaves the FAA and goes to work for
industry.
Ms. Johnson. Anyone else? Do you concur?
Mr. Peters. Yes, I do.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you, Ms. Johnson.
I don't want to leave an impression here about whether the
situation under discussion today with Southwest and the FAA is
limited only to this particular FSDO.
Even if there were problems only with Southwest, it is
clear that we have a structural problem at FAA. The problem at
the operating level between the maintenance inspector and the
air carrier is evident in the testimony, but the chain of
command above the inspector level was at fault, and that
suggests that it could well be at fault elsewhere in the FAA
and other Flight Standards District Offices. Correcting the
problem at the top has to be our primary concern.
I want to thank this panel for their candor, their
integrity, for putting public service ahead of private interest
and personal interest, for risking yourselves for the safety of
the flying public. You have done aviation and aviation safety
an immense service. Thank you.
The panel is dismissed.
Mr. Boutris. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. Our next panel consists of the Honorable
Calvin Scovel, Inspector General of DOT; Scott Bloch, Special
Counsel, the U.S. Office of Special Counsel; Mr. Nicholas
Sabatini, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety at FAA;
Mr. James Ballough, the Director of Flight Standards Service;
Mr. Thomas Stuckey, Manager, Flight Standards Division, FAA
Southwest Region.
I ask you all to rise, raise your right hand. Do you
solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before this
Committee in the matters now under consideration will be the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.]
Mr. Oberstar. You are sworn in, and we thank you for your
presence at the hearing.
Mr. Scovel, we will begin with you.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE CALVIN L. SCOVEL, III, INSPECTOR
GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; THE HONORABLE SCOTT
J. BLOCH, SPECIAL COUNSEL, U.S. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL;
NICHOLAS A. SABATINI, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION
SAFETY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; JAMES J. BALLOUGH,
DIRECTOR, FLIGHT STANDARDS SERVICE, FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION; AND THOMAS STUCKEY, MANAGER, FLIGHT STANDARDS
DIVISION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, SOUTHWEST REGION
Mr. Scovel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize, but if I may request what I hope will be a
minor departure from protocol. I know the Committee's time is
limited. I estimate, however, that I will need about eight
minutes for my oral statement in order to inform the Committee
of our findings, our conclusions regarding FAA's programs and
our recommendations.
Mr. Oberstar. We do not want to limit witnesses arbitrarily
by time. I want you to give your testimony and what you think
is necessary in your oral remarks. Your written testimony, of
course, will be part of the record, and I have read all of that
already anyway, but please proceed.
Mr. Scovel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Petri,
Members of the Committee.
At the request of this Committee, we are reviewing FAA's
handling of whistleblower concerns regarding Southwest
Airlines' failure to follow a critical FAA airworthiness
directive or AD. As you heard from the first panel, these are
serious matters.
Let me clear. The events at Southwest Airlines and the
actions of an FAA inspector represent significant breakdowns in
safety oversight that unnecessarily increased risk to the
traveling public. We also have concerns about FAA handled the
matter, and we are deeply troubled by the treatment of the
whistleblowers. Corrective actions are urgently needed to
strengthen FAA's oversight and prevent similar problems from
recurring.
Before I discuss these matters in detail, let me highlight
some key facts. The AD in this case required Southwest to
inspect the fuselages of its Boeing 737s for potential cracks.
FAA issued this AD in response to the Aloha Airlines 737
incident in 1988 where an aircraft lost a major portion of its
fuselage in flight, resulting in one fatality and multiple
injuries.
According to FAA, when an air carrier determines that it
has not implemented an AD, it is required to ground,
immediately, all non-compliant aircraft. FAA inspectors share
this responsibility by ensuring that this is done.
We found, however, that Southwest did not have an effective
system to ensure it completed these inspections. As a result,
Southwest operated 46 aircraft in violation of the AD on over
6,000 flights for up to 9 months, carrying an estimated 6
million passenger. Southwest discovered it had violated this AD
on March 14th of last year and notified an FAA principal
maintenance inspector, a PMI, the following day.
However, the PMI did not direct the airline to ground the
affected planes as required and, Southwest continued to operate
them for nine more days. The PMI permitted and encouraged
Southwest to formally self-disclose the AD violation through
FAA's voluntary disclosure problem which allowed the airline to
avoid penalties.
FAA accepted the self-disclosure, even though multiple
disclosures on AD violations had already been accepted. This
should have raised the question of whether underlying problems
had been corrected. Once it self-disclosed violation, Southwest
stated that it had inspected or grounded all affected aircraft.
However, two FAA inspectors, whistleblowers, reported that
the PMI knowingly permitted Southwest to continue flying the
identified aircraft. Southwest officials confirmed this and
stated that the PMI gave them verbal permission to continue
flying the aircraft. When Southwest finally inspected them, it
found fuselage cracks in five.
While these critical safety lapses indicate problem with an
airline's compliance, they are symptomatic of much deeper
problems in several key areas of FAA oversight.
First, problems with FAA's partnership programs. We found
that FAA's Southwest inspection office developed an overly
collaborative relationship with the air carrier which
repeatedly self-disclosed AD violations without ensuring that a
comprehensive solution was implemented. The balance has tipped
too heavily in favor of collaboration at the expense of
effective oversight and appropriate enforcement.
Southwest violated four different ADs eight times since
December, 2006 including five in 2008. Lack of FAA oversight in
this area appears to allow rather than mitigate recurring
safety violations.
Partnership programs can help to identify and correct
safety issues, using information that might not otherwise be
available. However, FAA cannot rely too heavily on self-
disclosures at the expense of rigorous oversight and
appropriate enforcement.
Second, weaknesses in FAA's national oversight allowed the
problems at Southwest to go undetected for several years. Red
flags were flying and should have been warning signs to FAA.
As early as 2003, one of the whistleblowers expressed
concerns about Southwest's compliance with ADs. In 2006, he
began urging FAA to conduct system-wide reviews, but FAA did
not begin these reviews until after the details of the March,
2007 disclosure became public.
In fact, we found that FAA inspectors had not reviewed
Southwest's system for compliance with ADs since 1999. At the
time of the Southwest disclosure, 21 key inspections were
overdue since more than 5 years had elapsed since the last
inspection date.
As of March 25th, 2008, FAA still had not completed at
least five of these required inspections with eight years
having elapsed since the last inspection date in some cases.
We have identified problems with FAA's national program for
risk-based oversight in the past. For example, in 2005, we
found that inspectors did not complete 26 percent of planned
inspections and half of these were in identified risk areas. We
had recommended the need for greater national oversight in 2002
and again in that 2005 report, and this is still needed today.
Third, problems with FAA's process for conducting internal
reviews and ensuring appropriate corrective actions. In the
Southwest case, FAA's internal reviews found, as early as
April, 2007, that the PMI was complicit in allowing Southwest
to continue flying aircraft in violation of the AD.
FAA did not attempt to determine the root cause of the
safety issue or begin enforcement action against the carrier
until November, 2007. Too much attention was focused on the
messenger, not on fixing legitimate safety concerns. This also
raises questions about FAA's ability to investigate safety
allegations raised by inspectors.
We are deeply troubled by the fact that FAA failed to
protect the whistleblowers from retaliation. For example, after
one whistleblower voiced his concerns to FAA, Southwest lodged
an anonymous hot line complaint against him according to the
PMI. The complaint was nonspecific and never substantiated, but
the inspector was removed from oversight duties for five
months.
However, FAA did not suspend other inspectors who were
subjects of similar complaints, including the PMI who admitted
that he had allowed Southwest to continue flying in violation
of the AD.
Our work at Northwest Airlines found the same problem with
FAA's handling of an inspector who reported legitimate safety
concerns. As with the inspector in the Southwest case, FAA
managers reassigned the experienced inspector to office duties
and restricted him from performing oversight on the carrier's
premises based on a complaint from the airline. The inspector's
safety concerns were later validated.
Mr. Oberstar. By complaint from the airline, you mean
Northwest?
Mr. Scovel. Northwest, yes, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. Yes. Okay.
Mr. Scovel. Both the Southwest and Northwest cases
demonstrate that FAA must take steps to improve how it
investigates safety issues and protects employees who bring
important safety issues to light.
Finally, I would like to turn to the actions needed to
prevent these events from occurring again. As the Committee is
well aware, FAA has taken actions but only after events became
public last month and this Committee's investigation was well
underway.
FAA has proposed to fine Southwest over $10 million and
initiate a review of AD compliance at Southwest and other air
carriers. These actions are necessary but long overdue, given
the overflight was discovered a year ago. FAA must take actions
to improve oversight of all air carriers, strengthen the use of
partnership programs and restore confidence in the agency's
ability to conduct oversight.
In addition to steps underway, we recommend that FAA
establish an independent body to investigate inspector
concerns, periodically transfer supervisory inspectors to
ensure reliable and objective air carrier oversight, revise
guidance to ensure that air carriers take corrective actions to
address violations identified through self-disclosure,
implement a process for second level review of self-disclosures
before accepting and closing them, implement a process to track
field office inspections and alert local, regional and
headquarters offices to overdue inspections, and revise post-
employment guidance to require an appropriate cooling off
period for inspectors.
My office will continue to examine FAA's oversight approach
from a national perspective as requested by the Chairman. We
must ensure that these problems are not repeated and that
corrective actions are properly implemented. We will report to
you on our progress as well as other steps that can be taken to
enhance safety.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I welcome
questions.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you very much for a very strong, hard-
hitting, straightforward statement.
Mr. Bloch.
Mr. Bloch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Mr.
Petri, Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity
to discuss the work of the U.S. Office of Special Counsel
regarding today's important hearing.
OSC exists as the chief protector of whistleblowers and the
enforcer of the Whistleblower Protection Act.
The French have a saying: La plus ca change, la plus c'est
la meme chose, which translates the more things change, the
more they stay the same.
Things have changed in air travel but too much has stayed
the same like safety, compliance and oversight. Management at
FAA has fostered a culture of convenience and complacency which
compromises safety.
In this case, thousands of real passengers were put at real
risk because of FAA's breach of duty. The work of my office
over the last four years shows this is not merely an isolated
instance of one manager's cozy relationship with the airlines.
It shows FAA has a preference for reprisal against courageous
whistleblowers who point out breaches by management.
Through the efforts of this Committee, my office and the
U.S. Department of Transportation's Inspector General, it is my
hope real change will result in better compliance, greater
transparency and more effective FAA oversight.
In recent years, whistleblowers have made disclosures to my
office of wrongful conduct by officials and employees of the
FAA, conduct that endangers public safety.
Last July, I found there was a substantial likelihood that
Anne Whiteman and other air traffic controller whistleblowers
at Dallas-Fort Worth were correct in the disclosure that FAA
managers at DFW were systematically covering up operational
errors made by air traffic controllers. No one would listen to
her concerns until she made her disclosures to us.
Similar disclosures by Ms. Whiteman in 2004 were
investigated by the DOT Inspector General after OSC
substantiated them. The IG report noted a seven-year management
practice of under-reporting operational errors, but two years
later Ms. Whiteman alleged that nothing had changed. The IG had
been conducting a thorough investigation and we expect a report
soon.
OSC has received disclosures from a former Flight District
Standards Office manager, Gabriel Bruno, alleging that
unqualified mechanics remain in the aviation industry because
they have not been reexamined adequately. He and another
whistleblower made closely related disclosures to us in 2003.
We referred these to the DOT, and the IG investigated,
recommending that FAA reexamine mechanics certified by St.
George Aviation and reporting that the FAA was taking steps to
do so.
Mr. Bruno now alleges that despite FAA assurances, the
public remains at risk. I, again, referred this matter to the
U.S. DOT for investigation. It seems nothing has changed.
In December, I found a substantial likelihood that FAA
aviation inspectors, Bobby Boutris and Douglas Peters, had
disclosed wrongful conduct involving FAA's oversight of
Southwest Airlines and several years of coverup by FAA of
airline non-compliance. I ordered DOT to do a thorough
investigation.
They disclosed, the whistleblowers disclosed that the FAA
principal maintenance inspector for Southwest Airlines
knowingly permitted aircraft to operate in an unsafe condition.
Higher management knew about what was going on and tried to
keep Mr. Boutris from requiring Southwest's compliance with
airworthiness directives. Southwest Airlines had self-reported
it had not completed with an FAA airworthiness directive on
fuselage crack inspection only after it became obvious that the
whistleblower was going to catch them in the violation.
With the knowledge and approval of FAA officials, these
aircraft remained in operation until overdue inspections could
be accomplished. These inspections revealed fuselage cracks in
the critical areas of the airworthiness directive.
Southwest flew 1,400 flights, approximately, with those
fuselage cracks. So passengers were put at real risk for the
convenience of the FAA and Southwest Airlines.
When we receive the reports on these investigations, we
will transmit our findings and recommendations to the President
and Congress. Still, to ensure the flying public is not at
risk, we must determine if there are system-wide problems at
the FAA. So I have three recommendations.
First, an expert commission should be established to
investigate how the FAA could allow coverups that potentially
endanger the flying public, investigate the complicity of the
airline industry and recommend comprehensive reforms of
oversight and airline safety.
Second, more audits and no-notice inspections should be
done by a better financed and staffed U.S. DOT Inspector
General. The IG has the independence and knowledge to ensure
better oversight and compliance but needs more resources.
Third, wrongdoers and those who retaliate against them,
against whistleblowers should receive real discipline to punish
behavior, set the example and reassure the public that they are
protected by effective oversight.
These proposals are justified and safety demands them.
Otherwise, we may think we have caused things to change while
they have, in fact, stayed the same or become worse.
Thank you.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you very much, Mr. Bloch.
And now Mr. Sabatini.
Mr. Sabatini. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. Turn the microphone on. We want to hear every
word.
Mr. Sabatini. Sorry about that. I have been here enough
times. I should know about that button.
Mr. Chairman, Chairman Oberstar, Congressman Petri and
Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you once again.
With me today is Jim Ballough, Director of the Flight
Standards Service and Tom Stuckey, Manager of the Flight
Standards Division in the Southwest region.
Today, I would like to put into context the truly
disturbing incident that occurred last year when Southwest
Airlines knowingly continued to fly passengers after they
learned that they had over-flown an airworthiness directive
that required an inspection for cracks in the aircraft
fuselage.
That an airline of Southwest's reputation would ever think
that flying passengers in non-compliant aircraft was
appropriate is astounding to me. Even more alarming and
upsetting to me is that this was done with the implicit consent
of one of my aviation safety inspectors.
I want to state at the outset and in the most unequivocal
terms that it is never permissible for any airline to continue
to operate commercial flights that are in non-compliance with
an AD, and no one in the FAA, not the Acting Administrator, not
me, not Jim, not Tom, has the authority to allow such
operations. And, frankly, even if we did, none of us would
allow it. It flies in the face of everything we stand for.
This is such a fundamental tenet of aviation safety that it
is not surprising that the events of last year are receiving
the amount of attention that they are today. I will not condone
or defend anyone who was responsible for or complicit in the
events surrounding the decisions made to operate those flights.
Following our investigation, FAA issued a $10.2 million
proposed civil penalty to Southwest Airlines for their actions
in this matter. The amount of the civil penalty reflects the
fact that the airline knew they were in non-compliance and
deliberately continued to fly the aircraft in commercial
operations rather than grounding them as was required.
We know this because the airline voluntarily reported its
non-compliance to an FAA principal maintenance inspector, the
PMI, who failed to ensure that the affected aircraft were
grounded. The inspector is the subject of an ongoing personnel
action and has been removed from aviation safety inspector
duties.
We also know this because one of the inspectors working in
that office expressed repeated concerns about the PMI and
ultimately reported the Southwest Airlines incident to the
Administrator's hot line.
So where do we go from here? As an agency, we must accept
responsibility for our mistakes, understand why they were made
and implement safeguards to prevent them from happening again.
That is why Acting Administrator Sturgell and I announced
yesterday a five-point plan that addresses the issues of
responsibility, accountability, communication and ethics. I
believe these initiatives will help ensure that our rules are
being followed.
First, in order to assure our employees that they are
encouraged to raise their concerns without fear of reprisal, we
are going to develop and implement a safety issues reporting
system by the end of the month. SIRS, its acronym, provides a
totally new avenue for employees to raise their issues, to get
attention and results.
Second, we are initiating a rulemaking to address post-
employment ethics concerns. We want to consider a cooling off
period to ensure that there is greater objectivity when
overseeing or working with a previous employer.
Third, we are gong to work with the manufacturers and
carriers to help clarify the rules themselves to improve
effective implementation.
Fourth, we will amend the voluntary disclosure program to
require that senior airline officials sign off on the reports
to ensure that there is awareness at the highest levels of the
airline of what types of deviations are occurring within their
system.
And, finally, we are accelerating the expansion of our
aviation safety information and analysis program. Now that we
have all 117 carriers participating in ATOS, we are blending
this oversight data with our other data sources to enhance our
ability to protect nationwide trends and provide a better
perspective on the health and safety of the system.
In addition to this plan and to ensure that what happened
with Southwest Airlines was an isolated problem and not a
systemic one, I ordered a special emphasis surveillance, the
first phase of which has just been completed while a second,
more comprehensive phase is ongoing.
Our initial findings validate that our systems safety
approach of oversight is working as intended. Over 99 percent
of the ADs checked are being complied with by U.S. commercial
carriers.
Most importantly, if there was a question about the
technical compliance with an AD, the carriers grounded the
affected aircraft rather than take a chance that they were in
non-compliance. This is certainly the right response to a
potential safety risk.
While it is certainly not my intention to underplay the
severity and egregious nature of what happened at Southwest
Airlines, the initial findings of the special emphasis
surveillance support what we all know to be true. By any
standard, this is the safest period in the history of aviation.
I say this every time I appear before you because I am
extremely and extraordinarily proud of the hard work and
dedication it took by the thousands of safety aviation
professionals in both industry and the FAA to get us to this
point.
It is not a miracle, it is not a coincidence, and it is not
good luck. It is finding a way to identify and focus on risk in
order to effectively address it before it can result in an
accident. Clearly, the accident rate reflects that this is
working.
One of the reasons we have been able to do what we have
done so effectively is because of the important information we
receive from the airlines, their employees and even their
aircraft through voluntary reporting programs. Without these
programs, we had access to such limited information, less than
5 percent of what we are receiving now. Identifying and
responding to risk often involved using information we learned
about as a result of an accident.
Because of these programs, we now have access to a great
deal of information that we can analyze and evaluate to assist
in identifying trends that point to the risk we need to stay
ahead of. Again, the accident rate supports that using the
information obtained through these programs is effective.
It is entirely appropriate for us to discuss how these
programs are implemented and where the line should be drawn
between getting the information and taking enforcement action.
I am happy to talk about this today and at any time in the
future, but it is my hope that as we assess what happened at
Southwest Airlines or the value of reporting programs or the
relationship between FAA and industry, we do not lose sight of
the fact that the system is safe, and I will continue to work
as hard as I can to keep it safe.
Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to answer your questions at
this time.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ballough.
Mr. Ballough. Mr. Chairman, the FAA had one opening
statement, and we stand ready to answer your questions.
Mr. Oberstar. Okay, neither you nor Mr. Stuckey has a
comment. Thank you very much.
Well, very powerful testimony, Mr. Scovel, Mr. Bloch and a
very interesting rebuttal, in a sense, response from Mr.
Sabatini.
Mr. Scovel, you say corrective action is urgently needed,
and then you set forth several specifics: an independent body
to investigate inspector concerns; transfer supervisory
inspectors, that is move them around within the system, so they
don't get too comfortable.
The State Department does that with our overseas personnel.
They get three years at one station. They are moved to another.
The military does that. The Corps of Engineers does it with
district engineers, division engineers. It seems a pretty good
practice, so people don't get too cozy and comfortable with
those they are overseeing.
Revise the guidance. Now, what guidance are you referring
to there? Is that the voluntary?
You address self-disclosure the next recommendation. Do you
include that in your proposal to revise guidance?
Mr. Scovel. Your question doesn't refer to post-employment
guidance, Mr. Chairman. You are talking about self-disclosure
programs?
Mr. Oberstar. Revise guidance, this is your third
recommendation.
Mr. Scovel. Yes.
Mr. Oberstar. Ensure that air carriers take corrective
actions to address violations identified through self-
disclosure.
Mr. Scovel. Right. Our understanding of the voluntary
disclosure reporting program now is that it envisions the
inspector or the PMI, who receives the self-disclosure,
reviewing it, making sure that it contains the required
elements first of all, that if there has been an overflight,
that the offending action has ceased immediately.
Second, that there be a comprehensive corrective plan laid
out, that there be an implementation timeline and that there be
a follow-on audit planned.
At least in this case, in the Southwest case, it is clear
that the PMI basically simply rubber-stamped what Southwest had
submitted.
We would like to make clear by this recommendation that the
PMI, the inspector and, if our other recommendation were to be
accepted, for the second level approval authority, that they
ensure that the air carriers take the corrective actions
identified in that comprehensive corrective plan so that the
basic underlying violations can be corrected.
Mr. Oberstar. That is a very helpful clarification.
Then track field office inspections and alert local
regional headquarters office to overdue inspections. How would
you envision setting up such a tracking system?
Mr. Scovel. Let me begin to answer your question, sir, by
noting what we found in the Southwest case.
Our written statement makes clear that as of the date of
this oversight, this overflight that we are examining here
today, March of 2007, there were 21 key ATOS inspections that
were overdue. These were ATOS inspections that should have been
completed by the Southwest CMO that had not been done. And, in
fact, at the top of that list and most egregious is the fact
that the AD compliance program for Southwest had not been
inspected by FAA's CMO since 1999.
Now you well know that ATOS was first implemented in 1998.
Southwest was one of the first 10 or so carriers initiated into
ATOS. The following year, 1999, the CMO did review the
carrier's AD compliance program, but it had not been reviewed
since then.
It should have been reviewed at least a five-year interval,
making 2004 the drop-dead date. Yet, here we are sitting last
year, March, 2007, AD compliance program not done.
Our question was why didn't higher authorities in FAA know
that?
The data is sitting right there. We found it within the
last month or two, yet it was clear to us that no one was
beating on the door of the CMO, asking why have you not done
these 21 key inspections and particularly the AD compliance
program inspection.
We think there has to be a way in this program to track, in
the ATOS program, to track the progress of key inspections.
When are they completed? Are they in danger of becoming
overdue?
And when they do become overdue or even in a short period
of time before that, put up a yellow flag, notify the CMO that
they are in danger of crossing the trip wire. Then people,
higher headquarters in FAA needs to get on the CMO's back and
make sure that they follow through.
Mr. Oberstar. Now that makes very good sense, but I want to
come back. Ten years ago, ATOS was initiated. I thought of it
then as an adjunct, a supplement. It has become a replacement
for the historic inspection procedure and process and has led
to an over-reliance on an automated system with very little
personnel input and hands-on management of the system. I think
that has led to this easy, cozy relationship.
Mr. Scovel. Well, perhaps, Mr. Chairman. I can't speak to
how ATOS was originally envisioned or I hesitate to use the
word, sold, in 1998, but how it was explained to you and others
who are interested.
But what has clearly happened with ATOS over the years is
that it has evolved into a system for FAA, ideally in their
view, to better target or better channel their limited
inspector resources to areas of greatest risk. And that is we
have identified that, as you well know, in our past work as an
advantage we see to ATOS.
Given the fact that we do have limited inspector resources,
how can they be best used? Well, we think they ought to be
targeted on the highest risk areas.
How do I identify those risk areas? Through data, and that
data is supposed to be collected through the ATOS program.
Mr. Oberstar. If the right data isn't put into the system,
then it is not very useful.
Mr. Sabatini, you mentioned, without naming him, Mr.
Gawadzinski was removed from his position. What you didn't say
is he has been moved to another CMO at American, where he is
doing paperwork at full salary. Is that an appropriate thing
for him to do?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, sir, as you know.
Mr. Oberstar. I know he has employee rights, and I know he
there is an entire procedure, but is this an appropriate place
to put him after hearing what we heard this morning?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, Mr. Chairman, what we have done is put
him in a position where he has absolutely no responsibility for
safety decisions, and the investigation is not complete. We are
waiting for the other agencies to complete their component.
And, I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, I consider what has
happened here, egregious, and we will apply the full measure of
the law when we have all the information that we need to take
whatever action the law will allow. In the meantime, yes, sir,
he is still in the Dallas area, but he is not performing any
function related to safety.
Mr. Oberstar. That is encouraging, but I think he ought to
be taken out of a CMO and put some place else.
We heard from the whistleblowers this morning about your
proposal to establish a hot line. They said, what good is a hot
line going to do when we stood up, we put our names on or, in
the case of Mr. Boutris, he put his name on reports time and
time again, and nothing happened, and it went up the chain.
What good is going to be accomplished by another hot line?
Mr. Sabatini. This is more than just another hot line, Mr.
Chairman, while it has certainly that as part of its component.
What is absolutely essential is a clear communication I have
already made with our management.
Number one, I will not tolerate a management or any manager
who does not develop and encourage an atmosphere of a safety
culture, and that is the ability to report concerns that one
may have to his or her supervisor.
Secondly, if there is a professional difference, and this
process does not exist today, there will be a rigorous and
disciplined process subject to scrutiny by myself, personally,
as well as my other leadership people in the management chain.
It will require that if there is a professional difference,
that that professional difference be documented and a control
number assigned to it and, if it is not resolved at that level,
it will move to the next level.
It will have total transparency, and I will expect my
service directors, as well as division managers and
headquarters people, as well as regional people and field
office management level people to review on a periodic basis
the results of these controlled items.
And, if someone still feels that there is reason to not use
that system, then I don't want them to just use the regular
safety administrator's hot line but one that clearly comes to
my attention, and I will pay attention. I can assure you, Mr.
Chairman, that it will be subject to my review.
And I want to know if someone still feels that they cannot
report to their supervisor. It will speak volumes if they have
to choose to go around it.
Mr. Oberstar. That is very strong talk, and I appreciate
hearing it. I want to propose to you, not propose but to tell
you that I will institute a periodic review, say every six
weeks, with Mr. Petri, Mr. Costello, Mr. Mica and myself and
have you come in and your staff and review with us what you
have done.
Secondly, I want to point out a shortcoming of these
hotlines. You may recall the hard landing several years ago of
an air carrier flying from Tulsa to Kansas City and landed in a
rainstorm, landed at Tulsa, a hard landing in a rainstorm.
A ramp check was undertaken. They found no problems, but
the ramp check was done by a maintenance crew not of the
airline that had the hard landing and they were inspecting by a
different standard.
The aircraft went on to Kansas City. A flight attendant on
board that aircraft knew that this aircraft was damaged. It was
vibrating in a way that she knew there was something serious
wrong.
She called the FAA in Chicago which was their next stop.
When that aircraft landed in Chicago, an inspector jumped on
the aircraft, looked at it and found a six-foot crack and
grounded the aircraft.
The next day that flight attendant was removed from duty by
the airline. They knew who did it.
Don't let something like that happen to your hotline.
Now you say the low accident rate reflects success of our
work, but how can the program be called a success when 1,400
flights occurred with cracks in the hull of those aircraft?
That is reducing the margin of safety.
If you are looking at safety as a system, the system itself
has cracks and they need to be fixed. I believe you have the
public spirit to do that, but you are going to have to stand up
to superiors as well just as those whistleblowers did this
morning, stood up to their superiors at great risk, being
removed from position, shifted out of duty, subjected to
harassment.
We can't have a situation in which the customer calls the
FAA, complaining about their service person, Mr. Boutris, to
get him removed. That is intolerable, and I charge you with the
responsibility to make sure that never happens again.
Mr. Sabatini. I accept that responsibility, Mr. Chairman,
and I can assure you that I welcome review by this Committee
any time--three weeks, six weeks, any time. I will deliver to
you changes that will be made as a result of what we have
learned as a result of this.
And let me for a moment address what I believe happened.
What we have in place, because one of the witnesses said that I
referred to a human risk that we identified. I would like to
explain. We have processes in place to address how airlines are
operated. We have a mirror image template so that inspectors
can use it for the oversight. Those are processes.
What I feel is one of the risks that have been identified
is a failure on the part of the human in terms of integrity.
Humans are very much a part of everything we do, and we are
putting in place a process that assures that if someone fails
that integrity test I will find out about it and I will take
swift and summary action, I can assure you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you. We will hold you to that.
Mr. Petri?
Mr. Petri. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like
to begin by asking Inspector General Scovel if he has any
reactions or comments on the catalog of initiatives that Mr.
Sabatini has mentioned in his testimony here today as a result
of reviewing this whole situation.
Mr. Scovel. Thank you, Mr. Petri. Yes, I would, and I would
like to address primarily what may be called the newest hot
line or the newest communication channel. I don't want to
denigrate it. I don't believe it would be prudent for me to
preliminarily at this point, without data, cast doubt on any
new communication channel. To the extent that it may help, even
if only marginally, as Inspector General I would favor it;
however, it begs the question, How will complaints similar to
those raised by the panel this morning be investigated.
Mr. Sabatini has cast the SURS process as one where
philosophical differences between inspectors and supervisors or
different camps within a CMO might raise the question and have
it resolved, yet I see all kinds of situations, like those that
our panelists this morning addressed, that will perhaps come to
Mr. Sabatini and others through the new process. Unless they
are satisfactorily investigated, we are going to be back in the
same situation we are today, with an insufficient investigation
conducted on a catch as catch can basis within the aviation
safety chain of command, and perhaps therefore suspect from the
beginning as not being objective.
What our statement has proposed as an alternative is the
creation of an independent investigative body still within FAA
but certainly out of the aviation safety chain of command, so
it would be removed from under Mr. Sabatini and Mr. Ballough.
We would suggest that FAA and the Congress consider
marrying that up with the AOV system, which was created to
handle safety complaints handled by air traffic controls. That
was removed from the air traffic control organization and
placed perhaps ironically under Mr. Sabatini. But in our
experience with the investigative capabilities of that
organization, we have been favorably impressed. However, if we
were to marry the two of these up, we would suggest that it
report directly at a much higher level than Mr. Sabatini or the
air traffic organization.
There was talk earlier today of taking it out from under
the control of a political appointee, and that would certainly
be a point to merit consideration, as well.
Mr. Petri. One practical thing with these hot line or other
whistleblower, all these procedures, is that they can be
abused. I mean, they can correct abuses, but they can also be
used for all kinds of other hidden agendas or because of other
disputes. So how do you separate the sheep from the goats? It
seems to me there needs to be some willingness on someone when
they use that mechanism that they are willing to stand behind.
I mean, it should be secret. There shouldn't be retaliation.
But on the other hand, they should be accountable for raising
this and putting the systems through all this. Otherwise,
someone like Mr. Sabatini has 101 things he has to rely on his
team, and the next thing you know they are saying, well, this
was looked into. So how do you make this work in practice?
Mr. Scovel. At times it can be very difficult, Mr. Petri.
As an Inspector General, we have our own hot line, as well, and
we run into that.
We have several categories of complaints. We have
complainants who identify themselves by name and contact
information, and that is always most helpful because we can get
back to them and seek to substantiate the basis of the
complaint. We have other complainants who may identify
themselves but ask to remain confidential. And, finally, we
have complaints that are submitted anonymously, and oftentimes
those are the most problematic. They may lack detail and,
because we don't even have a name or any way to contact the
submitter, we are often at a loss.
In fact, the situation that you identified happened in this
very case with regard to Mr. Boutris. You will remember from
this morning that it was the PMI who identified to Mr. Mills
that an anonymous complaint from Southwest had been submitted
against Mr. Boutris, and in partial response to that Mr.
Boutris was removed from his inspector duties for a period of
five months.
We have examined that particular complaint, and in my
opinion as a former prosecutor and judge, and in the opinion of
our investigators on my staff, we consider it baseless. There
would have been good reason for FAA at the time not to have
removed Mr. Boutris from his duties. The complaint was
anonymous, it was non-specific, it related to supposed actions
that had no connection to Mr. Boutris' performance of duties. I
don't think any reasonable person after performing that kind of
scratch and sniff test would have questioned FAA if they had
decided to leave a competent, dedicated inspector like Mr.
Boutris on the job. Instead, they took him off.
It is very much a problem. What do you do? How do you sort
it out? All I can say is we apply common sense, good
investigative expertise, and take it case-by-case.
Mr. Costello. [Presiding]. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
Mr. Sabatini, tell us the current employment status of Mr.
Gawadzinski, just very briefly. I have several questions that I
want to ask, so be as brief as possible.
Mr. Sabatini. Mr. Gawadzinski is currently still employed.
He has been removed from his duties as a supervisory principal
maintenance inspector and has been placed in another office,
still in the Dallas area, where he has been relieved of any
responsibilities related to safety inspector duties.
Mr. Costello. Under the rules of the Department, could you
have suspended him with or without pay and relieved him of his
duties under suspension?
Mr. Sabatini. As you know, Mr. Chairman, there are definite
rules on what we need to do to put this case together.
Mr. Costello. That is my question. My question is, Could
you have suspended him with or without pay?
Mr. Sabatini. Not at this point in time, sir. This
investigation is still open, and we want to gather all the
evidence. The Office of the Inspector General is still
conducting its investigation, and when that is complete I will
have all the information I need to apply the full measure of
the law.
Mr. Costello. Is he the only employee at the FAA that
disciplinary action was taken against thus far?
Mr. Sabatini. Thus far. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Costello. And you heard the testimony of the
whistleblowers. You heard the testimony of the IG, the Special
Counsel. Surely you do not believe at this point that all of
this falls on one employee at the FAA, do you?
Mr. Sabatini. No, sir, I do not believe that it is just one
employee.
Mr. Costello. I would like you to elaborate on that.
Mr. Sabatini. Well, I believe that there was a failure on
the part of the leadership in the southwest region.
Mr. Costello. In the southwest region?
Mr. Sabatini. Yes, sir.
Mr. Costello. Let's get to the point. We know that back in
2003 through 2005 Mr. Boutris complained and said, Look, we
know that there is compliance issues, and he raised those
issues back as far as 2003. When did these issues reach your
office headquarters in Washington, D.C.? When did you, not
personally, but your office, become aware that issues have been
raised concerning the CMO with Southwest?
Mr. Sabatini. May of 2007.
Mr. Costello. May, 2007?
Mr. Sabatini. Yes.
Mr. Costello. And when did you personally become aware of
the issues, the safety issues that were raised by both Mr.
Boutris and others?
Mr. Sabatini. Several months thereafter. I don't have an
exact date, sir.
Mr. Costello. So May of 2007 is when your office became
aware of it, and you became aware of it several months
thereafter? Why did it take so long for the FAA to take action
either against one of your employees or assess the fine against
Southwest? And it has been noted by the Chairman and others
that the action was taken after this Committee started its
investigation. So the question is, If you were aware of these
issues back in your office in May of 2007, why did it take this
Committee to get involved to begin an investigation for your
agency to act against the airline and your employee S?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I have looked at the
data and what I have come to understand about this, for about
two-and-a-half years before the disclosure there were many
activities that were undertaken by the leadership in the FAA's
southwest region.
Now, I can tell you, Mr. Chairman, I have been a division
manager. This is not theory to me. I practiced for ten years as
a division manager. In looking at what happened, the division
manager in the flight standards division in the southwest
region, elected to give the information he received in his
office, and some time in early April, the investigation was
turned over to the security division, which is separate and
apart from my organization. It would result, in essence, in
being a third-party review.
What I would have done differently was to not hand over the
enforcement aspect of that investigation. What they had asked
security to look at was the investigation of the impropriety of
the individual supervisory principal maintenance inspector. I
would have separated that out. We have the sole responsibility
for the enforcement action and that should have been started
immediately.
However, there were several months where the security
division conducted its investigation, and it was during that
period of time that both the results of the impropriety on
behalf of an employee was investigated, as well as a slow
review_I don't think it was intentionally slow_review of the
enforcement process.
Mr. Costello. You heard the testimony of, again, the
whistleblowers. You heard the testimony of the IG and the
special counsel regarding this CMT and the concern, Is this a
systematic problem or is it isolated? I want you to comment on
that.
Mr. Sabatini. Mr. Chairman, while evidence has not been
given to me, although I asked for it, I have been told evidence
doesn't exist to document the fact that this is systemic. What
I have been told is that it could potentially be systemic, and
I take that very seriously.
So, while the evidence exists for the southwest region, I
take that as a lesson learned and put in place what I have
begun to describe in terms of the safety information recording
system to assure that this doesn't happen anywhere else.
Mr. Costello. I will have other questions after other
Members have an opportunity to ask.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlemen from Oregon, Mr.
DeFazio.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let's go back to what I think is partially the root of this
whole problem, which is the erosion of the mandate which we
reset in 1996 to exclusively focus on safety to this customer
service initiative, where regulated airlines became clients,
which obviously is causing tremendous confusion among people
who are supposed to be inspecting and regulating them.
Who initiated the customer service initiative? Where did
that come from? Mr. Ballough, you are a political appointee.
The first time I heard about it was a Secretary at a speech,
but where did this come from? Who wrote it?
Mr. Ballough. The customer service initiative, sir, was an
AVS effort with all of the lines of business, all directors,
from the respect of services in the AVS organization.
Mr. DeFazio. Well, you are using the language in all the
lines of business.
Mr. Ballough. Excuse me, sir. Let me clarify.
Mr. DeFazio. You are a Government agency.
Mr. Ballough. Yes.
Mr. DeFazio. And you are supposed to be regulating in the
public interest for public safety, and the law very clear in
1996.
Mr. Ballough. Yes.
Mr. DeFazio. So could we address it as a Government agency,
please.
Mr. Ballough. Yes. The Agency took this initiative to
address concerns and articulate rights for the industry,
whoever they may be. It was intended to elevate a question, to
get a right to an answer to a question that they would pose to
us.
Mr. DeFazio. So the industry complained to whom? Was this
initiated at the Secretary's level? At the White House level?
Or did professional employees other than politicals come and
say, We need this customer service initiative? Are you telling
me it was professional employees?
Mr. Ballough. This was in our safety organization, sir.
Mr. DeFazio. So the safety organization, line employees, at
what level? Since you are saying it was within the organization
and it was professionally generated, do you want to tell me
about this, Mr. Sabatini? Where did this come from?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, Mr. DeFazio, first let me say Jim
Ballough is not a political appointee, he is a career service
employee.
Mr. DeFazio. I am sorry. I forgot. I thought he was
political.
Mr. Sabatini. Sir, I would like----
Mr. DeFazio. He came from here working for Republican
staff, so I thought he was political. I am sorry.
Mr. Sabatini. So let's go back to the early 1990s, where
industry came in and complained to Congress that there was a
lack of responsiveness on the part of the FAA, who was heavy
handed in how they were treating the air carrier industry. As a
result of that, there was legislation creating_and it exists
today_a Management Advisory Council, which is the MAC, and it
is part of the mechanism that was put in place to improve the
FAA and force us to listen to the concerns that business people
have at that high level so that we can be responsive.
The customer service initiative has been taken totally out
of what it was intended to be. The customer service initiative,
sir, is to treat anyone, whether it is a student pilot or a
private pilot or an applicant for any one of our certificates,
in a respectful, professional, courteous manner.
Mr. DeFazio. Right. I can understand that, but the question
is it seems like this leans very far in the direction of where
the airlines, companies worth tens of billions of dollars with
tens of thousands of employees, become clients of individual
inspectors. Clients?
Mr. Sabatini. Mr. DeFazio, let me say----
Mr. DeFazio. I mean, we seem to have a little confusion
here. You heard from these people earlier. I do apologize, I
was confusing Mr. Ballough with Mr. Ballough, who is a
political appointee. Sorry. I apologize for that. It is spelled
differently, too.
Mr. Sabatini. The customer service initiative was never
intended for anyone in our organization, in our safety
organization, to ever start referring to people as clients. I
heard that for the first time today, sir. That is unacceptable.
What I am hearing is that we are going to re-calibrate and
make certain that we are, in fact, not abandoning enforcement,
that enforcement is part of our tools. That is part of how we
gain compliance.
What you said earlier this morning, Mr. Chairman, it is not
just compliance with the rules. That is an absolute. It is also
operating at the highest levels of safety day in and day out.
That is what we strive for.
Mr. DeFazio. But, as you can understand, Mr. Sabatini,
given the peculiar bent of this Administration to being, you
know, rabidly anti-regulatory, it seems that somehow at some
point to line employees the airlines became clients. I just
wonder where that came from.
Mr. Sabatini. Sir, I am the career senior safety officer in
the FAA. I can tell you this: no one ever instructed me to
treat entities differently than what they are in the
regulations, and that is they are applicants. They are air
carriers with the responsibility to comply with the rules. I
was never challenged on safety decisions. So I take that
responsibility and I also take the responsibility that we are
going to re-calibrate this misunderstanding, because clearly
there was a misunderstanding from what I heard today from the
witnesses. And let me add I consider Mr. Boutris a hero and I
commend him for coming forward, for having the integrity to
come forward and the courage to do that.
Mr. DeFazio. Because a lot of the emphasis in this and
materials provided, particularly the flow chart for how one
would file a complaint and where it would go, it really seems
to me that we sent out the wrong message here. I am just trying
to get at whether this is totally inadvertent or whether we
have political pressure applied here, as everywhere else in the
Bush Administration where they are saying we don't regulate,
markets will regulate. God, no one would fly an airplane that
was unsafe, because that would be bad for business when it
crashes. Markets can regulate themselves, just like Wall Street
just did.
I am feeling like we are coming in sort of a situation here
that is similar. Somehow this thing became perverted at the
application level, at least in one region, and I fear in many
more. And we are hearing from the IG he thinks the same thing.
Mr. Sabatini. Well, sir, I believe that it is inadvertent.
Mr. DeFazio. You believe it is inadvertent. I am glad to
hear that, but I still will have questions.
Mr. Chairman, I am over my time. I will have more questions
in another round.
Mr. Costello. Ms. Johnson?
Ms. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to pose this question to whomever, I guess the
chief safety person. At what point was Southwest Airlines
notified of the discrepancies in safety?
Mr. Sabatini. They are the ones who discovered it.
Ms. Johnson. But I hear you talking about a $10 million
fine. What is your justification?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, prior to their time where they
disclosed a possible noncompliance with the airworthiness
directive, they had flown those airplanes for an extended
period of time on thousands and thousands of flights.
Ms. Johnson. With no paper trail of you telling them that
that is not safe enough?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, it is the responsibility of the air
carrier for them to comply with the rules. The FAA----
Ms. Johnson. I understand that, but you have inspectors to
notify them when they are not in compliance, don't you?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, when we discover noncompliance we do
that.
Ms. Johnson. But you had to wait for them to tell you about
the problems they were having?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, I would characterize it as we were
informed, and when we were the people responsible in the FAA
for taking swift and summary action and putting those aircraft
on the ground failed to do that. During that period of time
between notifying the FAA until the time that they did get
those airplanes into compliance, they operated roughly 1,400
flights. The penalty is based on a calculation that is a
formula that is in our Compliance and Enforcement Handbook. It
is not an arbitrary or capricious figure. It is set in
guidance.
Ms. Johnson. Okay. I am still having difficulty
understanding that they are the ones who notified you. Where
was your responsibility?
Mr. Sabatini. Our responsibility_and it should have been
discharged by the supervisory principal maintenance inspector
was to say you cannot continue to operate those airplanes in
noncompliance.
Ms. Johnson. And did that happen?
Mr. Sabatini. No, it did not, ma'am.
Ms. Johnson. What happened to that person?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, that person has now been removed from
that position--is still employed by the FAA. The investigation
continues--and has been removed from any safety inspector
duties.
Ms. Johnson. No fine?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, we are continuing the investigation,
and I can assure you, Ms. Johnson, that I will take the full
measure of the law and apply it.
Ms. Johnson. Okay. Thank you very much.
Mr. Costello. I wonder if the gentlelady will yield?
Ms. Johnson. I will yield.
Mr. Costello. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Sabatini, let me follow up on that question and a
question I asked about the disciplinary action that was taken.
You said that you removed the employee and assigned him to
other responsibilities that are not related to safety; is that
correct?
Mr. Sabatini. That is true, sir.
Mr. Costello. I am told that he is now auditing the office
at Dallas Fort Worth and he is participating or supervising an
AFS pre-audit. Is that correct? As we speak, that is exactly
what he is doing?
Mr. Sabatini. That should not be what is happening. If I
may, I would like to ask Mr. Stuckey to address that.
Mr. Stuckey. Mr. Costello, when he was removed from the
Southwest CMO he was placed in a position where he had no
inspector duties, and his duties for the last year have been
preparing an office for an external flight standards audit. He
is looking at office files. He is reviewing manuals within the
office. He is checking compliance within the office of their
processes and procedures, but no inspector duties. And he has
not done any inspector duties since he was moved.
Mr. Costello. But he is participating in this pre-audit; is
that correct?
Mr. Stuckey. He is helping to rewrite manuals and check
files and do administrative work.
Mr. Costello. And under the current rules within the FAA,
Mr. Sabatini, how long will it take to go through due process
so that the Agency can reach a conclusion as to his future?
Mr. Sabatini. The Office of the Inspector General is going
to conclude its investigation, and when that is done we will
put that entire package together and we will----
Ms. Johnson. Reclaiming my time for one second, is he being
paid?
Mr. Sabatini. Yes, ma'am.
Mr. Costello. What do you have to do to get fired there?
Mr. Sabatini. Ma'am, you know we are so lucky to live in
these United States. Every single person has rights, no matter
what the charge may be, and this County affords that right to
whoever that person may be.
Ms. Johnson. Yes, but it seems to me that if this person
was responsible for allowing the condition to go on without
taking a positive step to do anything about it, and that was
his responsibility, in any other job there would be some kind
of disciplinary action. If it was somebody in my office, they
would be fired. So that is my point. I don't understand why he
is okay and the airline is being fined.
Mr. Sabatini. Well, the results of the investigation may
support that he is other than okay.
Mr. Scovel. Ms. Johnson, if I may?
Ms. Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Scovel. Let me shed a little bit of light. Mr. Sabatini
has referred to the OIG's report, which will help FAA make up
its mind in this particular case regarding the PMI. Three weeks
ago FAA contacted my office and indicated that they were
contemplating a personnel action against the PMI, which
consisted of a reduction of two pay grades and a reassignment.
I spoke with Mr. Sabatini on the telephone and advised him, of
course, that whatever personnel actions would ultimately be
taken were within FAA's purview. They are not the IG's. We are
not judge, jury, and executioner.
Ms. Johnson. Sure.
Mr. Scovel. But before the Agency took an action that some
might view as premature and overly lenient, that it would
certainly be helpful to the Agency to have all the facts.
It is my understanding, based on that, that FAA has,
indeed, held up. At that time we were working on information
concerning the PMI's approval of voluntary self-disclosure
submitted by Southwest in other instances than the one we are
talking about here today. That would certainly be information
perhaps that the Agency would want to consider in this case
where dereliction of duty would be the primary charge.
Another concern that I expressed to Mr. Sabatini at the
time was that the PMI be taken completely out of the safety
decision-making loop. As Mr. Sabatini has reported today, that
certainly has happened. We want to commend the Agency for that.
This week we have had further contact with FAA, and my
staff has informed FAA that, of course, at any time if they
believe they have sufficient evidence to fire him they can do
that. Of course, what they want to do was make it stick. I
thank them for their confidence in the IG's report. If they
believe that that is what will be necessary in order to make
the personnel action stick, then we will get it done as soon as
we can and turn it over to them so they can take their action.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. I would observe that, while the question the
gentlewoman from Texas, our Chair of the Water Resource
Subcommittee, may have sounded harsh, it comes from a woman who
in the private sector owned and managed six businesses. I think
she brings a very different judgment and perspective to bear.
I wanted to return just a moment, Mr. Sabatini, to Mr.
Gawadzinski. Can you state unequivocally that Mr. Gawadzinski
is not in a position to undertake inspections, to do oversight
of carrier maintenance; that he is not engaged in any such
action?
Mr. Sabatini. I have been assured that that is the case,
sir. I would ask Jim and Tom to confirm that for me.
Mr. Ballough. Mr. Chairman, it is certainly my
understanding, being the Director of the Flight Standards
Service, that he is not doing inspector duties at this time.
Mr. Oberstar. I have information to the contrary, and I
think you had better take a closer look.
Mr. Cummings, the Chair of the Coast Guard Subcommittee?
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sabatini, I am sitting here and I have been listening
to you and I have been watching you. I have got to say, when
Ms. Johnson asked the question about the firing of this
particular person, your reaction seemed like, just watching
you, how can we do that, this person has rights.
Let me tell you something: the flying public has rights,
too. The flying public has rights, and you have used some
wonderful words here. You know, they have been very nice. You
want to operate under a culture of safety. We want to do
everything in our power to make sure that we have the highest
level of safety day in and day out, but, you know, let me tell
you what, I guess as a lawyer and one who has tried a lot of
cases: something doesn't smell right here. I am just telling
you, it sounds like we are trying to boil down this thing to
maybe one person. I know the investigation continues, but it
seems like there are some other people that are probably
responsible. I don't know how high up it goes, but I will tell
you one thing: if I were in charge of a department and I had a
situation where these flights went out and the flying public
had established a trust--there is a book written by Covey that
is entitled, The Speed of Trust. The public, when we get on
this airplanes, all those people out here, I bet you every one
of them have flown on an airplane within the last month. But
when we get on an airplane, but when we get on an airplane we
trust that the people that we pay with our tax dollars are
doing what they say they are going to do.
We don't expect, for example, a doctor, if he is going to
operate on our heart, to party all night and then at 5:00 come
home and then do the operation at 6:00. There is a certain
level of trust.
I am just trying to figure out, does the buck stop with
you? Do you take responsibility for this, since you are the top
safety guy?
Mr. Sabatini. Absolutely, Mr. Cummings. I take complete
responsibility for this, and I am going to take action to
address what we learned here.
Mr. Cummings. Now, you said today that you have learned
some things just today that you didn't know; is that right?
Mr. Sabatini. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. You have said that several times. What is the
most significant thing that you learned today that you did not
know before today?
Mr. Sabatini. If I may, I would like to put it in context.
Mr. Cummings. That is fine, but, you know, the Chairman
just said something. Apparently you didn't know that. He said
that he had some information that somebody, this particular
person, is still doing certain types of duties. You and Mr.
Stuckey--is the immediate supervisor the person that Mr.
Oberstar was talking about? You are in charge of that region,
right?
Mr. Stuckey. Yes, sir, I am the regional manager, but not
Doug Gawadzinski's supervisor.
Mr. Cummings. Okay. Well, I guess what I am getting at, I
want to make sure that the information is flowing, because
apparently something is missing here.
Anyway, Mr. Sabatini, I would love to hear what you have to
say.
Mr. Sabatini. My entire life has been in public service. I
have been a police officer in the city of New York for 20
years. I know police work and I know law enforcement. I learned
aviation and I have spent four decades in aviation safety. I am
absolutely committed to aviation safety. I am second to none
when it comes to aviation safety, I can assure you, sir. And I
take responsibility for what happened in my organization, and I
will take what I have learned and correct that.
A couple of things have been learned. One, as an inspector
it was absolute, Safety 101, you do not allow noncompliance.
You will enforce the law. Obviously, there are some who thought
otherwise. I am going to deal with those people, but I must do
it--as a lawyer you know, Mr. Cummings, I must operate within
the law.
Mr. Cummings. I do, but I want to make sure you get
everybody up the line or down the line. Everybody.
Mr. Sabatini. Up and down.
Mr. Cummings. La-de-da and everybody who may be
responsible.
Mr. Sabatini. I will address that, Mr. Cummings,
absolutely.
Mr. Cummings. My time is running out, but I want to ask you
another question. Mr. Scovel talked about this whistleblower
hot line, for lack of a better term. He seems to think that his
recommendation is a better one than what is going on here. Can
you just react to what he said about whistleblowers, because he
makes a very good point. If somebody is calling and it is not
being reacted to properly, what difference does it make? As a
matter of fact, it is probably worse, because then the person
is subject to all kinds of repercussions.
I just wanted you to comment on what he said, because that
sounds like it makes sense. Since you said what you just said--
you are very concerned about safety--and I believe you, I
really do--I want to make sure we have the best system possible
so that whistleblowers can come forward.
Mr. Sabatini. Well, I believe that the process that we are
putting in place will allow everyone the opportunity to bring
forward their concerns. I also welcome the involvement of the
Office of the Inspector General. They are welcome to review
what I do as we speak today. But I would encourage even more
scrutiny on this particular subject.
I will be happy to work with this Committee, your staff,
and with the Inspector General.
Mr. Cummings. He has already said your system is not going
to be the most effective and efficient system. He has already
said that.
Am I right, Mr. Scovel?
Mr. Scovel. That is correct, sir, without a proper
investigative body.
Mr. Cummings. So all I am saying to you is why not, since
you are concerned, as you are, about everything operating
properly, and you just gave a wonderful statement about your 20
years, and here is this man who says your system is not going
to be the most effective and efficient one, and since all of
this goes to safety, why not say let's go with you, Mr. Scovel?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, I think maybe I didn't make myself
clear.
Mr. Cummings. No, you didn't.
Mr. Sabatini. I am willing to work with the Inspector
General and take in whatever his recommendation may mean, and
how do we----
Mr. Cummings. And put it in place?
Mr. Sabatini. Absolutely.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Oberstar. I thank the gentlemen.
Mr. Carney?
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Scovel, Mr. Sabatini, I will come back to the question
I asked in the earlier panel. We have seen the grounding of a
lot of aircraft lately. Why do you think that is, in the last
few days? What do you attribute that to? Mr. Scovel?
Mr. Scovel. Let me take a stab. I think carriers are gun-
shy right now. I think they see FAA waking up after this
incident last year. There has been a lot of publicity. The
Committee has certain made known its intent to hold this
hearing. FAA properly recognizes that AD compliance is a
vulnerability.
We have identified that with Southwest the key ATOS
inspection of its AD compliance system hadn't taken place since
1999. Southwest was certainly vulnerable. They got burned last
year. Other carriers now have seen what has happened. They are
feeling some of the heat. They are seeing the sunshine that is
coming in to this and they are taking all steps that they
possibly can to comply, even down to the letter. There have
been media reports of carriers with their MD-80s, MD-88s
measuring the spacing of their wiring bundles down to a quarter
of an inch. Great, because if that is what the AD requires,
that is what the carriers ought to be doing and that is what
the inspectors ought to be checking.
The Chairman earlier ran down a partial list. Probably it
was the whole list. I have only got a partial list of the
groundings lately. Starting with Southwest on March 13th and up
through United yesterday with its Boeing 777s, my count stands
at 565 aircraft. I didn't bother to count up the number of
flights and the number of passengers affected. Tens of
thousands. It is a serious matter.
Mr. Carney. Were reports suppressed? Did management
suppress some of these reports or have the airlines quietly
sort of self disclosed things, too?
Mr. Scovel. Well, they certainly did at Southwest. We
absolutely have evidence of that. I hoped during the break
before my panel came forward that you all received a copy of an
extract from our written statement. It is a timeline showing
Southwest's aging aircraft AD violations. It is the one
attached to that. That is the timeline of the March 2007
incident. It is the one right behind it.
You can see from December 2006, where we had earliest
access to the data, up through March 2007 and even continuing
into this year, Southwest has had problems with these
violations.
We don't know what may be happening at other carriers. I
would expect and welcome and invite this Committee's request to
my office to continue on these lines and find out what has been
happening in the voluntary disclosure reporting program
industry-wide. We already have an audit underway to investigate
the ASAP program, which is another partnership program of FAA.
Mr. Carney. I certainly think everybody on this Committee
would welcome that information.
Mr. Sabatini, can you answer that?
Mr. Scovel. That request will be forthcoming.
Mr. Sabatini. What we discovered is that an airworthiness
directive is a very complex instruction, and, again, a lesson
learned here is that in the future, when we issue airworthiness
directives, we are going to make certain, by working with the
manufacturers and the operators, to make sure that the language
is clear and understandable and essentially in plain language,
plain English, so that it can be executed without difficulty.
I must tell you, sir, that of the almost 2,400 inspections
that we have done, we found that 99 percent of the system was
in compliance, full compliance. That 1 percent represents
events like there was one carrier, because they had a low
utilization of an aircraft, the airworthiness directive was not
yet due, not due until 2028, yet they were in technical
noncompliance with the AD because they had not submitted their
plan on how they were going to implement the AD.
There were others. You heard about American Airlines and
Delta and the MD-80. Again, the AD requires precision and the
accuracy in order to be complied with. In this case, what we
were finding is that wire bundles that ran along a particular
part we will call the wheel well, where the landing gear
retracts, that this wire bundle was not fastened against the
bulkhead every one inch as specified by the airworthiness
directive. So they took the most prudent action. They put the
aircraft on the ground. Other cases were very similar to that.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Scovel, are you concerned that the FAA does
not have appropriate quality control mechanisms to maintain its
oversight for reasons of the CMO?
Mr. Scovel. We are concerned. In fact, I am not sure
whether it was the Chairman or Mr. Costello or perhaps Mr.
DeFazio who was asking if all of this was happening at the
Southwest CMO, who else knew about it or who else should have
known about it. Those kind of quality control mechanisms,
knowledge up the chain of command, should be in place.
When we are talking specifically about voluntary disclosure
programs, for instance, it is our understanding that there is
no reporting requirement up the chain to gain some insight into
how a particular CMO may be carrying out its duties on the
voluntary disclosure reporting program.
We do know for a fact that the data that is supposedly
being collected through the ASAP, which is another partnership
program, self-disclosure program, that FAA and other aviation
safety experts don't always have access to that data.
So while the intent of the program is to obtain information
that may not otherwise be available, it is useless unless the
data is collected and made available and subsequently analyzed.
Mr. Carney. Are we going to fix that?
Mr. Sabatini. Yes, sir. Absolutely. As a matter of fact, I
will ask Jim Ballough to tell you what it is that we have
underway as we speak.
Mr. Ballough. In terms of the data analysis, we recently
released a new version of our ATOS--Air Transportation
Oversight System--and it was called version 1.2. A part of that
is the national role of ATOS inspections so that we can give
ourselves that red, green, yellow light look at how many
completions we have in terms of surveillance and oversight of
our programs. That is one aspect of it.
In terms of the voluntary programs, voluntary disclosure,
ASAP programs, we have had, as you heard in the earlier panel
today, we have the national info share programs that brings the
member organizations that participate in those programs
together and shares information from a safety perspective.
What we haven't done a good job at, and what we are in the
process of modifying, is the notion of making that data
available to those who actually need it to make safety
decisions. That is a piece of it that we have yet to work on
and finish. It will migrate, as Nick said earlier, into the
data analysis program in the future. But we have some interim
steps that we can take.
In terms of integrity of the voluntary disclosure program,
you know, the IG made some very good recommendations to us and
we thank him for that, and we will review those recommendations
and we will put them in place.
What we learned from this Southwest incident or enforcement
is this: number one, we feel that senior leadership at the
airline must know that a disclosure has been filed and they
should be aware of it. That will be implemented in our guidance
material.
The additional piece of that, back in the paper system
before we went to a web-based voluntary disclosure program, the
office manager had to sign off on every file. You heard that
earlier today, a recommendation. That will be put back in place
as well, sir.
And then ultimately an analysis of the voluntary disclosure
program so that everybody can learn, one airline to another can
learn what we are learning out of this system.
We think that these initiatives to strengthen the voluntary
disclosure program will go a long way to put measures in place
so that we don't have a recurrence of this.
Mr. Carney. Well, hopefully from one airline to another and
one region to another, and I hope the ATOS 1.21 has flashlights
and screwdrivers involved with it, where they are actually
crawling through the aircraft.
Mr. Ballough. Mr. Carney, I can assure you we do a number
of on-aircraft inspections, as well.
Mr. Carney. Very good.
I have grossly violated my time. You are very generous, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Oberstar. Ms. Richardson?
Ms. Richardson. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all I have one question and four comments. The
question is to Mr. Stuckey.
We have seen documents that were sent to you alleging
repeatedly that your SPMI was frequently reducing letters of
investigation to simple letters of correction. Didn't that
cause some alarm bells to go off in your mind? We haven't seen
any evidence to indicate that it did. What were you doing?
Mr. Stuckey. Ms. Richardson, that is correct. We had
received a report in the fall of 2005 that Doug Gawadzinski was
issuing letters of concern instead of letters of investigation.
As was pointed out by the panel this morning, letters of
concern don't really have any application in our compliance and
enforcement program.
The importance of using letters of investigation is that
they get into our system and we can track them. That was
brought to the region's attention in, I believe, September or
November of 2005. We asked for an independent review of that,
and we took two assistant managers from another office assigned
to Continental Airlines who basically validated that yes, out
of, I think, twenty-nine letters of concern, at least I think
four or five of those should have been letters of
investigation.
At that time it was communicated to Mike Mills, office
manager, and then later to the supervisory principal
maintenance inspector that he should stop that practice. That
is not appropriate. The practice is not consistent with Agency
policy.
Ms. Richardson. Well, now I will get into my comments, and
I will direct them to Mr. Sabatini.
A couple of things. First of all, it disturbs me to hear
you kind of off-the-cuff refer to low accident rates, 1
percent. In five minutes I am going to be leaving here to get
on a plane, and I am not very thrilled at this moment. I think
if the American public really all understood clearly what we
were discussing here today, I think a lot of people would not
be.
In the business of public safety, as you said you are an
expert of, we are not held to the same standards of people who
manufacture pencils. We have people's lives in our hands and we
are expected to perform at 100 percent rate, not at 99. The 99
is not acceptable, because our failure to perform may cost
major life, which is not acceptable for us to think 99 percent
is okay.
I will tell you my background. I worked in corporate
America for 14 years. I have a master's in business. I would
strongly recommend--you talked a lot about your public safety
background. I would recommend going back and doing a little
business work. Let me tell you what I mean by that. And I mean
no disrespect, but I think we have to speak frankly here.
In the world of business school, this is a clear failure,
as has been said, of quality control. Clear failure. There must
be ongoing sampling, as there is in any industry. This should
not be viewed as bureaucratic Government, anything like that.
When you were talking about maintenance, sampling must occur on
an ongoing basis at every single level. When you have a lack of
independent review and you are not properly monitoring and
validating, you are going to have problems like this.
I don't understand, for the years that this has been done,
why this has not been caught.
Let me leave with my last point. I am really frustrated,
because you mentioned this was a failure of humans. I disagree
with you, with a business background. This was not a failure of
humans. A failure of humans is one individual who fails to
complete a report appropriately in 2005, who makes a mess up
and is addressed. What we see here, a pattern of several years
of lack of proper monitoring, validating, and really correction
I don't think is a problem of humans; I call it a problem of
process and management, which all of you here are responsible
for.
This is not just limited, as has been said by many of my
colleagues, of the one person back there. To me the problem is
right here, because it is ultimately your responsibility.
When I hear Congressman Cummings ask you do you know if
this person is still working, and you say it has been said to
me, you know, in the business world what we do, it was your
responsibility to go physically and to ensure. I don't care how
busy you are; you are not so busy that when we have planes
flying around with inches thick of leaks and all these other
things going on, it is your responsibility to get out of the
office and to get on the ground. That is my expectation, and I
think the public's expectation that you would do immediately.
So as I would close I will say to you that this has really
risen to the threshold that I think it is beyond the reports
and the headlines that we will see tomorrow. I think you owe
the public an acknowledgment of exactly what happened and
exactly what you intend to do.
We can talk all day long about the programs and processes
that you are going to put in place, but I will kind of break it
down really simple now, since we have talked about the business
side. You are lacking some hall monitors. You need people in
the halls making sure that people and the things that are
supposed to happen, of all these great things that you said
that they are going to do, all that is is another report this
thick for someone to read once a year. We need action. We need
people on the ground. And we need true monitoring and
validation. Anything less than that is unacceptable to the
American people.
Now I am going to put my life in your hands, unfortunately,
and say a prayer as I hop on this flight. We are,
unfortunately, working the angels overtime, and I hope that you
would do a better job of protecting all of us.
Thank you.
Mr. Oberstar. I thank the gentlewoman.
Mr. Petri?
Mr. Petri. Just to put things in context, I would rather
put it a little more positively. We want you to keep on batting
1000. We have gone four years. I think it was pointed out at
the beginning that 200,000 people have died on the highway and
zero have died during that same period of time in airline
crashes and airplanes. So if you are worried about going home,
fly. But that is not saying it is perfect and it is not saying
that things couldn't be a lot better.
You have done so well, and the last thing we want to do is
to start slipping down on the job or getting cozy arrangements
that then end up with loss of life, and so we want to celebrate
success. It is fantastic. It is unprecedented in world history,
I think. But we at the same time don't want to rest on our
laurels. We want to continue to keep on doing even better.
One other quick question. I will submit other questions for
the record. I am sure there is an explanation for it. I don't
know that it has been made part of the record. We have this
organization chart of your Agency from Mr. Sabatini all the way
down, and the aviation safety inspectors, supervisor. Principal
Maintenance Inspector Douglas Gawadzinski has been mentioned
often. He has not been here. I think there should be some
reason why.
And then the other issues I would like to ask Mr. Scovel if
there have been comments that Mr. Gawadzinski was talking to
people at headquarters or this or that. Did you uncover or did
you discover any of that, or was he basically speaking without
authority, so to speak?
Mr. Scovel. Mr. Petri, it is our understanding that, in
fact, he did know officials at FAA headquarters. To the extent
he is embellishing his relationship with them so he could puff
himself up in the eyes of colleagues down in the Southwest CMO,
that appears certainly to have been happening, as well.
Mr. Petri. Any of you like to respond? Mr. Sabatini? I
think both of your names have been mentioned. Mr. Stuckey?
Mr. Ballough. Yes, Mr. Petri, thank you very much for the
opportunity. Yes, it is true. I know Doug Gawadzinski, just
like I know a lot of my workforce. I spend a lot of time on the
road to interact with those folks. Mr. Gawadzinski came to New
York when Nick and I were in New York together and spent 90
days on a detail. He then went back to the southwest region.
Since 2001, when I became the Director of Flight Standards
Service, I have talked to him or seen him a very limited number
of times. Certainly the portrayal today of daily conversations
with Mr. Gawadzinski or the inference by the management in the
Southwest CMO that I somehow had some kind of relationship with
Mr. Gawadzinski is just not factual, sir.
I state for the record that I have been absolutely
consistent, from the day I became the Director of this
organization and went out and talked to the field. I attend
every management team meeting at the regions and speak to the
supervisory ranks as well as at offices. I have been absolutely
consistent for the last seven years that I expect, number one,
standardization; number two, that following national policy is
paramount for me. It always has been. So this notion that he
had somehow had some dispensation from following national
policy is a fabrication.
Mr. Petri. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. Now, Mr. Sabatini, you knew on July 12, 2007,
of the incidents at Southwest. A report was completed, correct?
Mr. Sabatini. I am not sure of the exact date, sir, but
certainly----
Mr. Oberstar. In July?
Mr. Sabatini. In that time frame. That would be correct.
Mr. Oberstar. But that is the date given to the document of
completion of the inquiry. Why did you wait until March of this
year to audit other airlines?
Mr. Sabatini. We didn't know the gravity at that time of
what was going on at the Southwest CMO.
Mr. Oberstar. Shouldn't something have gone off and said
maybe we ought to take a look at the system? Since we are
operating on a system_ATOS_maybe something else amiss?
What I am getting at is that there is an over-reliance on
ATOS, and that if it is so successful, why is it that old-
fashioned inspector feet on the ground, on shop floors, and
engine rooms, are finding airworthiness directive compliance
issues affected hundreds of aircraft? In other words, you need
more people, you need more inspectors, need more hands-on work,
and I want you to think hard about this, notwithstanding
directives from Office of Management and Budget--we have gone
through this with other FAA leadership in years past and other
Administrations--work with us to develop an inspector workforce
need list that we can realistically deliver on. Will you do
that?
Mr. Sabatini. You have my commitment, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you.
Now, the customer service initiative, what do you think
about, what was your reaction? What was your gut reaction when
you heard the statement in the earlier testimony from the
whistleblower panel, the customer, Southwest, called the FAA
and complained about the service they were getting from Mr.
Boutris to get him removed? What was your reaction to that?
Mr. Sabatini. Unacceptable. That is simply an abuse of what
our customer service initiative was intended to be. It was a
mechanism to allow citizens of the United States who contact
the FAA to express whatever concerns they may have, not to be
used as a vehicle to accommodate a like or dislike about a
particular inspector.
I will say time and time again, we are responsible for
enforcement. Voluntary programs do not mean that we have
abandoned enforcement. We will continue to enforce the
regulations. Our mission is to gain full compliance and to
operate at the highest levels of safety. You have my
commitment, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. Then I hope I have your commitment also to
revisit this customer service initiative and re-aim it and
redirect it, and thereby redirect back to its original purpose
the mission, the safety mission of FAA.
Mr. Sabatini. You have my commitment, Mr. Chairman. I am
planning to do that.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you. That may be the most significant
thing accomplished today.
Are there others who have questions? Mr. Costello?
Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, I really do not have any other
questions, but I would like to make a comment and express a
concern, and that is Mr. Sabatini has been before our
Subcommittee many times, and we have talked about safety and
other issues. You know, frankly, my concern is this: that you
have pointed out, and rightly so, that 99 percent of the planes
that have been recently inspected are in full compliance.
Frankly, I think that the Agency continues to rely on the fact
that we have the safest system, aviation system, in the world.
I know you are proud of the fact that 99 percent are in full
compliance, but again I go back to my comments in my opening
statement, and that is--and I don't think that you would
disagree with me, and if you do I want to hear it, but there is
no question when it came to runway safety that the FAA took
their eye off the ball. At one time in 2000, 2001, very serious
about it, brought together all the stakeholders, and then when
the numbers started going down the FAA went and directed their
attention to other things.
The same thing with the hazardous conditions in the powers
and facilities. Nothing was done until the Subcommittee took
action. Even though employees were reporting mold and other
hazardous conditions in these facilities to the FAA, there was
no action taken until the Subcommittee scheduled a hearing, and
then we started getting calls that said hey, finally the FAA is
reacting, and it is because you are holding a hearing on this
matter.
The list goes on and on with congestion and delays. I went
through the whole list earlier.
So my concern, frankly, Mr. Sabatini, is that 99 percent
compliance, what are people concerned about. We are concerned
about the one that is not in compliance, and we have a
responsibility and you have a responsibility to make certain
that we get as close to 100 percent compliance as we can.
The FAA here--and you have acknowledged it--has failed, and
we hope that you will produce a plan that will prevent from
this ever happening again.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you.
Mr. Sabatini, do you wish to respond?
Mr. Sabatini. I want to assure everyone here that the only
reason why I mentioned 99 percent is to just demonstrate what
we found in both cases. But I can tell you this: what I am
paranoid about is the 1 percent, and we do not rest on our
laurels. We strive every day to look at what is that remaining
risk, and that is the challenge of the future.
We no longer see common cause accidents. That is because of
the hard work that has been done over the years by many, many
safety professionals in FAA and in the industry across the
board. The challenge is: what are those risks out there and how
do we learn about those risks? That is what we work hard every
day to understand, and that is why it is so critically
important to have a professional working relationship with
industry so that together we can identify and resolve the
remaining risk.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. DeFazio?
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sabatini, I would like to know, you mentioned this
process is for citizens, the customer service initiative. What
are the aggregate numbers? Who has used the system and who are
they? Do you have those numbers, like how many are airlines,
operators, how many are repair stations, how many are
individual airmen? Do you have those numbers?
Mr. Sabatini. I can get you those numbers.
Mr. DeFazio. But has this process been used a lot? Have a
lot of resources been devoted to resolving problems through
this customer service initiative?
Mr. Sabatini. I would say it certainly requires resources,
but it is not a drain on the system.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. Well, I would like to see the numbers of
who has accessed it, what the categories were, etc. I am sure
the Committee would be interested.
And then how about when you heard from Mr. Mills, Mr.
Sabatini? Was that an Agency-wide directive that everybody
should drop everything they are doing? They haven't been out to
that particular repair station for the last eight years, but
they should go out to that repair station, not in an inspector
capability, but to hand-deliver the packet of the customer
service initiative that could have been mailed or e-mailed to
those people? Are you aware how widespread that practice was
that we diverted resources to hand-delivery of these packets?
Was that a unique thing?
Mr. Sabatini. I was surprised to hear Mr. Mills say that he
had to or had been instructed to hand deliver that. That
certainly is not in the guidance.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay, Mr. Ballough, are you aware of how
prevalent this practice was?
Mr. Ballough. Mr. DeFazio, from what I know, it was
supposed to have been delivered through routine carrier visits
and repair station visits.
Mr. DeFazio. But that would have meant that people wouldn't
see it for seven years, because a lot of times we only get
around to these repair stations once in a great while.
Mr. Ballough. At least once a year, sir.
Mr. DeFazio. Well----
Mr. Ballough. I was surprised.
Mr. DeFazio. How about you, Mr. Stuckey, since you are in
that region? Was this widespread in your region that people
were diverted to hand-delivering these packets?
Mr. Stuckey. Mr. DeFazio, as I recall, initially--and it
has been a few years ago--we had, like, three years to get out
to your major operators, your air carriers, your major repair
facilities, your taxi operators, and that is something that an
office manager would normally do. Mr. Mills at the Southwest
CMO had one operator. At the Dallas FSDO we probably had maybe
100 operators of that category.
Mr. DeFazio. Right.
Mr. Stuckey. So it depends on the particular office, but it
is important to get out and visit those operators.
Mr. DeFazio. Right, but he was not sent to visit. He wasn't
sent to do oversight. He wasn't sent to do safety inspections
to places he might not have been for quite some time; he was
sent to hand deliver something that you could have sent out in
e-mail, you could have faxed. I mean, you certainly had to know
how to contact these people. You could have mailed it to them.
I mean, this was widespread then? A lot of people were
delivered to hand deliver this thing?
Mr. Stuckey. I wouldn't say it was widespread. Again, I
think it was----
Mr. DeFazio. So you are not disturbed that one individual
spent three months hand delivering this?
Mr. Stuckey. That would not have been my expectation.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. I find it very disturbing.
Now, you have talked about Mr. Gawadzinski and his current
duties. You are telling us he is in an office somewhere and all
he is doing is reviewing manuals. Do those manuals have a
purpose? I mean, do they somehow dictate Agency actions that
relate to the real world, like safety?
Mr. Stuckey. We have a national flight standards evaluation
officer in headquarters, an SF-40, that reports to Jim. They
get around and do technical reviews, I think every three years,
and the office that Doug is assigned to now is going to get one
later this summer, so his duties would involve making sure we
have all the office files in order, do we have all the
documents that we should have in an airline----
Mr. DeFazio. So he is not editing? I mean, he is just like
a clerk level? At $100,000 a year he is just making sure the
files are complete?
Mr. Stuckey. More or less, and I have been----
Mr. DeFazio. That is an expensive clerk.
Mr. Stuckey. He has been assigned----
Mr. DeFazio. I tell you what I would do with this guy. If
you can't fire him, I would do what they have done here in the
past. You put his cube in the hall. He doesn't have a phone. He
is not allowed to read anything, and he just sits there.
Now let me ask you this: has he done enroutes in the last
year?
Mr. Stuckey. I think he has last year.
Mr. DeFazio. Within the last year has he done enroutes?
Mr. Stuckey. My information is he did three round trips,
one to training and I think he had two enroutes to do, I think,
job interviews within the FAA.
Mr. DeFazio. Mr. Sabatini, does that raise any concern with
you?
Mr. Sabatini. Yes, it does, because my expectation is that
this person be in the office essentially counting paper clips.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay.
Mr. Sabatini. I need to complete my understanding. If he,
in fact, conducted enroute inspections after he was moved to
this other position. I don't have that information. I intend to
get that information.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you. I appreciate that.
Now one last thing, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
generous grant of time, but I feel so strongly about this
issue.
I really think that--and I guess we had testimony in the
previous panel--we shouldn't throw out the whole customer
service initiative. But when I read through the rather lengthy
documents and the way they are worded, I can see where this
devolved from customer to client and the whole thing is set up
for talking about all the levels of appeal and the flow charts
and all those sorts of things.
I just really think, again, this is my supposition, but
Nick, did this advisory group of yours really initiate this
idea and write this and then you just handed it to the
administrator, who then went and gave the Aero Club speech?
This wasn't something she initiated or something she wanted to
do or something that came from some other political person or
political level? This really perked up from the professionals,
we want to start talking about our airlines, its customers, we
want to have all these multiple levels of review, we want all
these forums and all? That really came from your professionals?
Mr. Sabatini. Sir, what we know about our organization
across the board is that we do not behave in a consistent and
standardized manner. This was one mechanism put in place.
Mr. DeFazio. But it has a particular lilt to it, this whole
airlines are now customers and there are all these complaints.
There are other ways to deal with service quality, I think,
maybe the inspector general or others might address that, I
think, than this. I really think it deserves major overhaul.
And then finally, just one thing. I have heard a lot about
how great things are and how no one has died, and people have
qualified that by saying major or big or whatever, or 135s
versus 121s. We have had two deadly crashes in the last four
years. One was due to a maintenance issue, which was 21 people
at Charlotte. The other I think is still under investigation at
Lexington, which has been attributed to pilot error or under-
staffing of the air traffic control tower or other issues. I
don't think there has been a final disposition on that one yet.
But people have died. That was 49. So yes, the system is
doing pretty darned good. Can it do better? Yes. Are we
concerned about the number of AD deviations, we find out there
were deviations? Yes. And I understand there may yet be some
others out there. There are three airlines that have some AD
problems. Why aren't they named?
Mr. Sabatini. I would be happy to submit their names.
Mr. DeFazio. Well, why don't we just have them right now?
Mr. Sabatini. It is an open investigation, sir.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you.
Mr. Oberstar. I don't want to stimulate the gentleman
further----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Oberstar. This customer initiative sounds very
strangely like public-private partnership. The gentleman will
desist.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Carney and then Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, sir.
This is for the whole panel. Well, probably not Mr. Scovel.
I was thinking about Mr. Gawadzinski, who is still employed,
and Mr. Mills. Mr. Mills was not under investigation for
anything, he apparently did nothing wrong. Why was he removed?
Mr. Stuckey. Mr. Carney, initially, when we got the report
of the AD overflight, we also, that same month, had already
scheduled two office evaluations. As a result of all three
things that were going on in the month of April, it is standard
practice to remove someone from their position when you find
some serious issues involved. Mr. Mills was initially detailed
at his same grade, same pay, to an office in the DFW area until
an investigation was completed.
In Mr. Mills' case, it was decided that he was going to be
permanently transferred to that same office as an assistant
manager, same pay, same grade. Primarily because his supervisor
back in 2005 had given him instructions to follow national
policy, you have some issues here, letters of investigation,
letters of correction. There were several issues there
pertaining to relationships in the office that were causing
disharmony, including what you heard from the first panel this
morning. You really had two groups in the office, those that
supported Doug and those that supported Mike.
For those reasons, he was administratively transferred to
another office. That was made permanent I think in August of
last year.
Mr. Carney. Given all we have heard today, that sounds a
little suspicious, I have to tell you. That doesn't sit well.
That doesn't seem quite just, actually, from where I sit, at
least.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Oberstar. Doesn't sit well with me, either.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sabatini, one of the most, as far as I am concerned,
one of the most significant questions that has been asked today
is the one that the Chairman of our Aviation Subcommittee asked
you a few moments ago. He talked about, if you will recall, how
it seems like certain things have to come to the Congress
before certain actions are taken by your agency. That is very,
very significant.
Let me put that over here, and then I am going to take you
to another place. That is that you, when the Chairman asked you
a question about why didn't you at within a certain period of
time, you said, I think, and I am not trying to put words in
your mouth, that you did not realize, or you all didn't realize
the gravity of the situation. Is that right?
Mr. Sabatini. That is correct.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Now, to me, the one thing the
flying public wants, as I said a little bit earlier, is they
want to be able to trust. They want to know that when they get
on that plane, the plane has a pretty good chance of getting to
its destination. And I guess what I am concerned about and I am
wondering about is, are mechanisms now in place, and Mr.
Scovel, you may want to comment on this, too, so that one can
appreciate the gravity of the problem?
Because I would think that we could put all the mechanisms
in place of communicating a problem. But if there is no one on
the other end of the line who can appreciate the significance
of the problem, and the problem still takes, in other words,
for example, airlines are still flying that aren't supposed to
be flying, then it seems like it smacks in the face of what we
are about here, and that is trying to make sure we do what you
said, that is, have the highest degree of safety that we can
and to worry about the 1 percent that you and Mr. Costello
talked about.
So I am wondering what is in place now or what will be in
place to help you or whoever, your committee or whoever makes
these decisions, as to when we act, how we at, to what degree
we act, what is in place now that will help you to have a
better grasp of how significant a problem is? You can't get too
much more significant than this.
Mr. Sabatini. I believe there are a number of things
already in place, and I keep coming back to at the Southwest
region, that issue was mishandled for two and a half years. And
that was not evidenced at my level. Once the AD non-compliance
became apparent, then around the July time frame is when we
realized the severity of what we had in terms of the failures
that had occurred in the Southwest region.
Now, I am concerned about the 1 percent. I want to assure
you of that. And the system is a sound system. But it is not
perfect. And we strive to make it better. The recommendations
that have been made by the inspector general we take very
seriously, all of them. And we will be working with the office
of the inspector general to do what is being recommended.
Mr. Cummings. I want to come back to you, but my time is
running out, I want to make sure Mr. Scovel has a chance to
comment on that. I am hoping that we walk out of this hearing,
Mr. Scovel, with the public having a higher degree of trust
that may have been at least slightly eroded after reading about
the things that they read about. But not only do I want them to
have the trust, I want the trust to be deserved. I want it to
be reality. Because having the trust is one thing. If it is not
deserved, that is another thing.
So I am just wondering, are things happening now, and if
they are not happening now, are there things that we can do
immediately to make sure we have that? Do you follow me?
Mr. Scovel. I think I do, Mr. Cummings. One reassurance
then an observation or two, perhaps. We have talked extensively
about the problems at Southwest. We have seen threads of a
couple of aspects of the Southwest problem at other carriers
and CMOs. But it is not nationwide. I hope that the American
public and the Congress doesn't take that message away from my
testimony, at least, because that is not what I intended to
convey.
I think we are in a similar situation where we were last
August or September when the Minnesota bridge fell, and I know
Chairman Oberstar well remembers that. The natural question is,
what about all the other Nation's bridges, and national bridge
inspection program. Well, it needs to be looked at. And that is
where we are today with Southwest problems. Are they at other
carriers? Well, we will have to take a look at that. So that is
a reassurance.
An observation, however, of FAA's, some would call it
culture, some would call it its organizational model, there is
a disconnect between FAA headquarters here in Washington and
what happens out in the field. We saw it at Southwest. There
was a CMO in turmoil. There was a bitter struggle being waged
for the heart and soul of that organization. Aspects of that
were communicated to the region and then bounced right back
down. Not much if anything was coming up here to headquarters.
There has been a consistent lack of ownership, desire to
exercise ownership from the national level over some of these
problems that pop up at CMOs and elsewhere. We see it when we
have inspectors like Mr. Boutris or the Northwest Airlines
inspector who are put in the corner on the basis of an
airline's request or complaint. Mr. Boutris called it cherry-
picking. It evokes a dismissive attitude on the part of a
carrier, and it signals a regulator who has failed to command
the respect of the regulated entity. That should cause everyone
at FAA problems.
My office has made recommendations dating back to 2002 for
FAA to exercise greater ownership over the ATOS system. Those
recommendations have not yet been implemented. We have seen
problems with the voluntary disclosure reporting program and
the Chairman indicates that he will request my office to look
into that. Again, that was a problem that was happening at the
CMO, invisible to FAA headquarters. That needs to be fixed.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
Mr. Oberstar. I thank the Chairman for those inquiries. I
must also observe at this time my great appreciate for all but
one of our Subcommittee Chairs participating at this late hour
in this hearing.
The gentlewoman from Florida, Chair of the Rail
Subcommittee, is here, Ms. Brown.
Ms. Brown of Florida. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I just
want you to know, I thank you very much for holding this
hearing. Now that everything has been televised, you can watch
every aspect of it on television, even if you are not here the
whole time. So thank you again for having this hearing.
I guess I will start with Mr. Scovel. Does the FAA place
too much emphasis on the electronic surveillance of carriers
instead of the on-the-ground review and inspection?
Mr. Scovel. Ms. Brown, I don't think FAA has found the
right mix yet. If you are referring to the use of ATOS versus
inspectors on the ground and on the shop floor, as the Chairman
has referred to, ATOS is an imperfect system. That has been
made clear today. FAA headquarters needs to exercise greater
national program oversight over that. When we have an AD
compliance program at Southwest that has been left uninspected
since 1999, that is unsatisfactory.
Properly used, ATOS has potential, in order to target
inspectors to the areas of greatest need and then to put them
on the shop floor and on the airplane, crawling through all the
nooks and crannies and doing what they do best. But we are not
there yet.
Ms. Brown of Florida. How long do you think this breakdown
with FAA has been going on, this culture that we have been
talking about all day?
Mr. Scovel. Well, in this instance, we can date back, well,
my predecessors would probably harken back to instances from
their day that would highlight the same organizational culture.
I am relatively new in the position and I can testify on the
basis of my 15 or 16 months in office.
Regarding this problem specifically, I can say that since
2002, when my office submitted its first report on the ATOS
system, for instance, that the recommendation that we made to
FAA for national program oversight was not implemented
effectively.
Ms. Brown of Florida. Mr. Sabatini, I recently had the
opportunity to go back and look at the FAA vision statement.
Under mission, it listed the following one-sentence statement,
our vision is to improve the safety and efficiency of aviation
while being responsive to our customers and accountable to the
public. Do you think it is appropriate to view the airline as
an FAA customer?
Mr. Sabatini. Ms. Brown, I can tell you that what we have
learned here is that we have drifted away from what was
intended when we first used the term customer. Certainly they
are the people who are regulated and are subject to
enforcement.
Ms. Brown of Florida. Stakeholders, partners, yes. But not
customer.
Mr. Sabatini. I would agree with that. We are going to
recalibrate that.
Ms. Brown of Florida. Can you describe your customer
service initiative program?
Mr. Sabatini. It is designed to allow anyone who has come
to the FAA, either for a pilot's certificate or an applicant
for any one of the authorizations that are issued, once someone
demonstrates competence and qualifications. And if during the
course of that interaction one believes that the rules were not
followed, then there is a process to bring that to the
attention of the next level of management. What we require is
that when that documentation of that interaction clearly
applies the rule, the guidance, whatever that may be, so that
there is consistency in the organization. It was designed
around the issue of assuring consistency with whoever we might
be dealing with. To assure that we treat whoever comes in,
whoever we come in contact with, with the respect and the
courtesy and the professionalism and timeliness that you would
expect of a Federal agency.
Ms. Brown of Florida. Would you explain a little bit more
about the self-reporting?
Mr. Sabatini. Yes. That is the voluntary self-disclosure.
And that is a situation where anyone who finds that they have
made a mistake or are in non-compliance, if they are the ones
who come forward and tell us about it, then we will consider
that in the mitigation of whatever that penalty or action might
be. If we are the ones who first find that non-compliance, then
there is no self-disclosure. And there are various things that
can be done if it is brought to our attention.
The idea is to encourage people to tell us about mistakes,
so that we can address those mistakes.
Mr. Oberstar. Would the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. Brown of Florida. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. The question you raise is a very important
one and the answer is interesting. But we discussed it earlier
in this hearing. This voluntary disclosure system sets up a
race to the answer. If the airline knows that they have done
something, they can voluntarily disclose. If the FAA knows it
ahead of time, they can't voluntarily disclose, they, the
airline, can't voluntarily disclose.
That sets up a risky environment, especially when you have
someone within the FAA who is willing to pass information to
the airline, say, you are about to be inspected, you had better
get on the stick and self-disclose. That is where this
voluntary self-disclosure process has vulnerability. That is
the point that needs to be corrected.
Mr. Sabatini. And we are, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. You are going to find a way to correct it.
Thank you. The gentlewoman may proceed.
Ms. Brown of Florida. I yield back the balance of my time,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you.
Mr. Sabatini, I have had time to reflect a little on the
question I asked you earlier: why did you wait until March 13th
of 2008 to audit the other airlines. And your answer was that
you really didn't know the extent of problems. I find that
unacceptable. That is, you are a safety professional, committed
your whole career to aviation safety, starting even before you
came to the FAA in the police department of New York City. That
is something you have to have your hands on. That is your
responsibility.
Those incidents at the lower level should not have escaped
your attention. Let's go back to 1985. In the Miami FSDO, the
general counsel issued a ruling on safety to the inspector
corps in that FSDO. It didn't get around the rest of the
Country. And other FSDOs were doing things, taking actions that
were exactly the opposite. The administrator didn't know about
it. The head of the Aviation Safety Office didn't know about
it.
At the time, there were the nine fiefdoms, as they were
roundly called, the nine regional administrators. And they held
information, didn't share it with the rest of the FAA.
Centralization of FAA resulted in a very significant
improvement in safety, because information now was flowing
freely, flowing around the agency. And that centered
responsibility on the head of the Office of Safety. That was
your responsibility to know this stuff. I want you to think
about how you are going to do a better job of having hands-on
at the operational level within the agency.
Now, Mr. Scovel and Mr. Bloch, well, before I come to that,
I asked Mr. Stuckey, Mr. Lambert a question about a directive
he received to shred information that he submitted up the chain
of command. He was under oath when he answered. Are you aware,
were you aware, did you know about the directive to shred
records that Mr. Lambert referred to pursuant to my question?
Mr. Stuckey. No, sir. That is the first I had heard that
today.
Mr. Oberstar. I want you to think about that.
An ethics question, Mr. Bloch, and--Mr. Sabatini?
Mr. Sabatini. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to interrupt your
chain of thought.
Mr. Oberstar. Not at all.
If you have a response----
Mr. Sabatini. Not a response, I need a personal break.
Mr. Oberstar. I understand that. You may be excused.
Mr. Sabatini. Thank you.
Mr. Oberstar. Yes, please. I admire your holding ability.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Oberstar. Mine is not as good.
I have a question. Mr. Petri, do you have something?
Mr. Petri. Nothing urgent. I was going to ask something if
you were going to pause.
Mr. Oberstar. I want to pursue this. No, I think I will let
you go ahead, because I think Mr. Sabatini needs to be
responsive. So please, go ahead.
Mr. Petri. I just was curious, we didn't get a particular
response to this chart question about why Mr. Gawadzinski was
either not subpoenaed or given an opportunity to appear. Is
there any reason for the record?
Mr. Oberstar. The reason he was not called, we considered
that. He was under disciplinary order by the FAA, as we
understood it at the outset of this hearing. It now appears
that he is not under very sufficient disciplinary order. In
fact, he is probably in an operating position that is
inappropriate, given what came out at this hearing. And
secondly, his actions were the subject of the testimony by the
other witnesses. I thought that that would, with those two
factors together, that he would not be in a position to
respond, since he was under disciplinary action by the FAA.
Mr. Petri. People are obviously under oath, whether they
are sworn or not, and he is a central figure in all of this,
not only on the organization chart, but in the concern about
the operation of the relationship with Southwest Airlines and
that office and how the inspectors were treated and so on. It
would probably at some point be worthwhile, if it seems
appropriate.
Mr. Oberstar. We certainly can revisit the issue of his
role and bring him to the Committee.
Mr. Petri. Very good.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Scovel, the Southwest region, and Mr.
Bloch, of FAA has approved a memorandum of understanding to
provide type ratings to FAA inspectors at Southwest Airlines'
expense. The policy of the FAA stipulates that such MOUs should
be approved only when necessary for the FAA to issue a type
rating to air carrier pilots. Since Southwest hires pilots who
are already type rated and only such pilots, what is the
justification or need for this program at Southwest, that is to
have inspectors type rated at Southwest's expense when they are
also charged with the inspection and investigation of that
carrier?
I have made some inquiries about what that service might
cost, and it is in the range of $20,000 to $25,000 per type
rating. This exchange has somewhat the feel of a way of
acquiring influence at the FAA. And I understand that this
practice was approved by Mr. Stuckey. What is your reaction? I
know you don't have much advance warning of it, but just on the
basis of what I have described.
Mr. Scovel. I have had very little advance warning, Mr.
Chairman. I was informed within the last week of such an
arrangement. And I should caveat what I am about to say by
indicating that this is a matter that we would like very much
to inquire into in the course of our audit and investigative
activities surrounding the whole Southwest CMO incident.
It is a troubling process, if only for the perception that
Southwest is acquiring influence through FAA. On the face of
it, it certainly feeds our conclusion that there is an overly
collaborative and close relationship between the Southwest CMO
an the carrier. Very troubling. I can't speak for the CMO
except simply to speculate, and I know I am on very thin ice
here as an IG, and never speculate, you always go with the
data.
But I would suspect that the region would attempt to
justify it by saying that they gained expertise and insight if
their inspectors or their managers are able to know what key
figures in the carrier are doing and what they are experiencing
and what their particular maintenance concerns might be on a
day to day basis, as an operator as opposed to an inspector or
from a management level with the carrier.
But I see Mr. Stuckey is back, and I will defer to him.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Bloch, did you have a comment?
Mr. Bloch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't know the
details of this. It raises in my mind questions about
Government ethics rules. We have laws under the Ethics in
Government Act that prevent us from investigating someone or
having business before our agency where we have a substantial
interest in the outcome of the matter or our independence and
objectivity could reasonably be questioned by a third party due
to entanglements, such as financial or other entanglements.
So certainly from an ethics standpoint, such an arrangement
does raise serious questions. By analogy, if I am investigating
someone in the Government and they offer to pay for my child's
college education, I think a third party could reasonably
question my objectivity. So I think I would have to leave it at
that. I don't know what the details of this program are.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Stuckey, you came in just as I was
pursuing this matter. Let me restate it. The Southwest region
of FAA has approved a memorandum to provide type ratings to FAA
inspectors at Southwest Airlines' expense. The policy of FAA
provides that such MOUs should be approved only when necessary
for the FAA to issue type ratings to carrier pilots.
Since Southwest hires only pilots who already are type
rated, what is the justification or need for such a program at
Southwest?
Mr. Stuckey. Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you for the
break.
The APM, APD program goes back to the 1980s. It is a
national program and it was initially set up to make sure that
we could leverage our resources between the FAA and the airline
to where we would have inspectors. Back when I was an air
carrier inspector, we did all the check rides. We just don't
have the resources to do that. So they developed a program
where the air carrier check airman, highly qualified people
could do the check ride for the FAA, and that set up the
program back in the 1980s.
This program was reviewed back in the mid-1990s by the
inspector general's office and the FAA at that time I forget
the administrator, but he wrote a letter back to the IG and I
think that is a matter of public record, where they reviewed
that relationship. I think the problem here is that the policy
says that it would be to APMs, assistant APMs and FAA
inspectors to do certification check rides.
The issue that was raised to me was, why would the
principal operations inspector, the supervisory principal
operations inspector get that same training. That is not
consistent with FAA policy. So when that was raised as an issue
recently, we looked at it in the region and decided that would
be changed. It should only be for FAA inspectors that do
certification activities.
Mr. Oberstar. Well, and managers as well. I don't
understand. It just seems to me that on the face of it,
conflict of interest questions arise. And as Inspector General
Scovel said, it raises the appearance of impropriety, that
there ought to be firewalls around these activities. They
should not be receiving any benefit of that type from the
carrier that they are inspecting.
Mr. Stuckey. Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't disagree with that.
The main purpose as a regional manager or years ago, as an air
carrier inspector, we need our inspectors trained, just like
the air carrier inspectors are trained, in the same equipment,
same training programs. Because we do sample some of that work.
And if there is some way to provide that training by another
means, I certainly would support that.
Mr. Oberstar. And the training is very important. I concur.
But there has to be a way, and I will ask Inspector General
Scovel and Mr. Bloch to think this matter through, come back to
the Committee and back to the FAA, review with you means of
achieving that training without the appearance or the reality
of impropriety.
If there are no further questions of this panel, we thank
you for your time, for your answers, for your candor, for the
testimony. Mr. Sabatini, you have committed to a number of very
significant actions. I will look forward to following up
vigorously with you and with the FAA and with the IG's office
and Mr. Bloch as well. Thank you.
Our next panel includes Mr. Herb Kelleher, the face of
Southwest Airlines, the presence of Southwest Airlines, the man
who personifies Southwest Airlines. They sent their best and
the brightest, the most engaging, the most sweet-talking.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Oberstar. The softest hand-holding.
[Laughter]
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Gary Kelly, who is Chief Executive
Officer of Southwest; Mr. Vincent Collamore, Aviation Safety
Inspector at Southwest; Mr. John Bassler, Principal Avionics
Inspector, Dallas Fort Worth Flight Standards District Office.
Gentlemen, please stand, raise your right hand. Do you
solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the
Committee in the matters now under consideration will be the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you,
God?
[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.]
Mr. Oberstar. You may proceed.
We will begin with Mr. Kelleher. Turn your microphone on,
we want to hear every word.
TESTIMONY OF HERB KELLEHER, EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN, SOUTHWEST
AIRLINES COMPANY; GARY KELLY, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES COMPANY; VINCENT LARRY COLLAMORE, AVIATION
SAFETY INSPECTOR, SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CMO; JOHN BASSLER,
PRINCIPAL AVIONICS INSPECTOR, DALLAS FORT WORTH FLIGHT
STANDARDS DISTRICT OFFICE
Mr. Kelleher. I wish I were a prettier face, Mr. Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Oberstar. Oh, yours has been the face of Southwest for
so long, it is unmistakable.
Mr. Kelleher. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Petri and distinguished
Members of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, my
name is Herb Kelleher. I helped to start Southwest Airlines,
have been working on the Southwest business venture since the
fall of 1966, have been on the board of directors for 41 years,
have been the executive chairman of our board for 30 years, and
was the CEO of Southwest from 1981 through 2001. I guess I
could fairly be called the Methuselah of Southwest Airlines.
A friend, now a former friend, recently said to me, I hear
you have a connection with the Air and Space Museum. I said,
yes, I do. He said, are you on the board or are you an exhibit?
That is why I describe him as a former friend of mine.
From first-hand knowledge, not hearsay, I can tell you that
Southwest Airlines was founded upon the principle of providing
more value for less fare, not less value for less fare.
Professor Mike Levine was CEO of New York Air, and he
encapsulated this concept very adeptly. Mike stated at an
airline investor's conference that it is very easy to be
expensive and good, and very easy to be inexpensive and bad.
But that Southwest did a beautiful job of simultaneously being
both inexpensive in its fares and very good in its operations
and the service that it provided to customers.
Southwest Airlines, through the dedication, through the
energy and through the warm hearts of its much beloved and
truly cherished employees, has faithfully delivered on its
original promise of more value for less fare for 37 years.
In 1966, when I started work on bringing Southwest Airlines
into being, we said we were going to free the American people
to fly. And we did. At that time, something like only 15 to 20
percent of adults in the United States had ever flown on a
single commercial airline flight. Today, that number stands at
85 percent.
The DOT calls this phenomenon the Southwest Effect, the
Southwest Effect, which, based on Southwest's model, has
subsequently been emulated across our globe. Southwest Airlines
said, we are going to get you there on time. And we did.
Southwest has the best cumulative on-time performance record of
any major airline in existence at the inception of those on-
time statistics in 1987, 21 years ago.
Southwest Airlines said, our wonderful people are going to
provide the best customer service in the industry. And they
did. Among major airlines in existence in 1987, Southwest has
the best cumulative customer satisfaction record, the fewest
complaints per 100,000 passengers carried since the inception
of such customer satisfaction statistics in 1987, 21 years ago.
Southwest Airlines for many decades was the most heavily
unionized of the major airlines, and our unions are here today
in support of our company, such as Tom McDaniel and Mike
Massoni, officers of TW 556, people from our TW 555, the
Southwest Airlines Pilots Association, AMFA that represents our
mechanics. And I was going to introduce them individually, with
the Chairman's permission, but in light of the hour, I decided
that I would refrain from doing that.
But we said we are going to take good care of our splendid
people. And we did. Southwest instituted the first employee
profit-sharing plan in the American airline industry and no
Southwest Airlines employee ever, not one, has sustained an
involuntary furlough. And this perfect job security transpired
during a 37-year period when probably a million or more airline
employees experienced furloughs throughout the global industry.
And finally, we said, we are going to operate the safest
airline in the world. And we have. Conde Nast Traveler magazine
pointed out some years ago that Southwest Airlines had operated
more flights and Southwest Airlines had carried more passengers
without a single, not one, passenger accident fatality than any
other airline in the world. After 16 million flights carrying
1.2 billion passengers, without a single, not one, passenger
accident fatality, Southwest Airlines' record as number one in
safety, is intact today, the best airline passenger safety
record in the world. Although sadly and very tragically, we did
cause a non-passenger fatality with a runway over-run during a
snowstorm.
We have always, and we have constantly, jawboned our people
to the effect that flight safety is Southwest Airlines' number
one objective. And I submit to this Committee that our
superlative 37-year passenger safety record sustains the thrust
of my comments in this respect. An exhibit illustrating
multiple aspects of our leadership, and I do mean leadership,
in safety and also our devotion with respect to safety, is
attached to Gary Kelly's and my joint written testimony.
One of the things that has concerned me today is that this
Committee has an enormous reputation for what it has
accomplished in the field of safety and in the field of
transportation, and I am very familiar with that record when it
used to be the Public Works Committee, before it became
Transportation and Infrastructure. I know all the programs
which the Chairman mentioned earlier that you have initiated
and you have served in order to make transportation more safe.
And I didn't want anyone on this Committee to get the
impression that Southwest was just rumbling around the skies in
a contumacious manner, not having inspected cracks on its
airplanes. Mr. Oberstar earlier mentioned the leadership that
this Committee had taken subsequent to the Aloha accident with
respect to aging aircraft. My recollection is that he was the
keynote speaker at the international conference of airlines
throughout the world and regulatory bodies throughout the world
to decide what should be done about that situation.
What may not be so well known is that following the
leadership of the Chairman and this Committee, Southwest
Airlines is the one that originated, Southwest Airlines,
itself, originated the plan for inspecting for cracks in the
737 classics and for repairing those cracks. That led to the
Boeing service bulletin in 2002 as I remember or thereabouts
that really incorporated the Southwest Airlines plan for
dealing with this crack problem, and later led to the very AD
that has been in question and the subject of today's hearing.
That really originated in Southwest Airlines' work.
Now, if I may say this, Mr. Chairman, these ADs are not
like Dick and Jane's first grade reader, you know, this is a
ball, this is Spot, the dog. On this very subject, cracks,
there are six ADs encompassing 1,100 pages. And they are
interrelated, some of them, and overlapping.
What Southwest Airlines did, again, leaping ahead, in terms
of safety, was to develop a modification for our airplanes that
replaced the need to inspect and repair cracks. That was
launched with the Boeing Company and the FAA's approval.
So how did we get to the point where we screwed up by not
putting our planes on the ground when an AD had been violated?
Well, actually, what happened was because of the plane
modifications that we had made under another AD, we were
relieved of a lot of our inspection requirements. If you
replace the panels, you no longer need to inspect them.
Our engineering department in the midst of this welter of
ADs and this 1,100 pages issued a document, our engineering
department, which missed the fact that there was a small part
of the airplane, about maybe two inches high and about this
long, that still needed to be inspected despite all the
modifications that we had made. Now, that was our mistake. But
nobody realized it for quite some time. We weren't just
rumbling around saying, oh, gee, we failed to inspect this part
of the airplane. As Gary Kelly will explain more fully, we were
inspecting these airplanes interminably in regular inspections,
many, many times per year. And he can fill you in on that.
But all of a sudden we discovered, Southwest Airlines
discovered that we should have been inspecting that tiny part
of the airplane in a special inspection under the ADs, that the
engineering order, in other words, was erroneous.
So what did we do? We reported it to the FAA. We told them
what was going on. Here is where the big mistake came. The FAA,
at the principal maintenance inspector level, said we could
continue to fly the planes while we inspected that small
portion of the fuselage. And we did. And we should not have,
and we have learned our lesson. When another ambiguity came up,
and you have seen newspaper articles about this, at least, when
another ambiguity arose as to how to apply a Boeing inspection
requirement to our airplanes, we simply put the planes down
until it was resolved. Totally different behavior within a very
short period of time.
I apologize to this Committee. We realize those planes
should not have flown during that period while the inspections
were made of the window belts. But at the same time, I have to
say that maybe our people made some engineering judgments,
which they weren't entitled to make. Those airplanes should
have been all on the ground.
But at the same time, there was not even the remotest
chance of a repetition of the Aloha Airlines roof peel
incident, which some coverage has mentioned. The Aloha Airlines
737 was a 1969 89,000 cycle, non-advanced 737-200, embodying a
1960s lap joint adhesive process that was abandoned by the
Boeing Company in the 1970s. Southwest Airlines has not flown a
non-advanced 737-200 like the Aloha airplane since 1978, 30
years ago, and presently has no 737-200s of any kind in its
fleet.
And as Gary Kelly will more fully explain, Boeing has
carefully manufactured the fail-safe 737 models, which
constitute all of Southwest's present 737 fleet, so that small
cracks will not propagate into the 18-foot long roof tear
involved in the Aloha roof tear incident.
Now, is that any excuse for not putting those planes down?
I tell the Members of this Committee it is not. And we
recognize what the Chairman described earlier and some other
Members have spoken about, the creep, the creep issue. So I
apologize for not fulfilling our duty in that respect. But
again, some of these accounts have referred to these airplanes,
I am talking about media accounts, as uninspected. That is
false. Nothing could be further from the truth. And Gary Kelly
will explain why that is the case. They were inspected over and
over and over and over again.
So thank you very much for the opportunity to be with you.
Thank you for the opportunity to address some of the
allegations that have been made about Southwest Airlines'
behavior.
And if I may, there is one other thing that I apologize to
you for, and it has been a little bit of a burden today. I
think it is unfortunate that the name of the airline is
Southwest and the name of the region of the FAA is Southwest. I
think at some point, maybe when people are talking about
Southwest, some of the people in the audience were saying,
which one, the CMO or the airline.
Mr. Kelly is widely esteemed, very, very bright. Intensely
conscientious and intensely safety-conscious.
Mr. Oberstar. I assure you, Mr. Kelleher, that the Chair
knows the distinction between the Southwest region and
Southwest Airlines.
Mr. Kelleher. Thank you, sir. You noticed that I said, the
audience.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Kelly.
Mr. Kelleher. I didn't want to accuse any Member of the
Committee of committing that mistake.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Oberstar and Mr. Petri, Members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to be here today. My name is Gary
Kelly and I am CEO of Southwest Airlines since July of 2004 and
a Southwest Airlines officer since 1986.
As Mr. Kelleher has so eloquently stated, Southwest
Airlines has been a great success for a great many years. We
believe our people are the best in the aviation industry and
that they have enormous devotion to our company and tremendous
pride in its results. But above all, the safety of our people
and our customers and our own families is my top priority, and
it is Southwest Airlines' top priority. And on this, you have
my personal commitment on behalf of our 34,000 Southwest family
members. The need to be safe is a part of our history, it is a
part of our culture and certainly it is a part of our DNA.
On March 6th of 2008, Southwest received a letter of civil
penalty from the FAA related to a March 2007 matter of
regulatory non-compliance. I first learned of that matter in
February of 2008, and that this Committee was conducting an
investigation. So we then launched our own internal
investigation conducted through our general counsel.
On March 10th, I received the preliminary results. Two
issues had to be addressed immediately. The first was that
better judgment should have been exercised than to allow these
aircraft to continue to fly after there was a potential non-
compliance discovered. The second was that senior management
should have been consulted on such a significant issue, but was
not. So based on our March 10th preliminary briefing, we took
immediate action. I requested, and Southwest was granted, a
face to face meeting with top FAA officials in Washington on
March 12th.
We placed on leave the employees from our regulatory
compliance group that were involved in the March 2007 event. We
confirmed with our reorganized regulatory compliance group that
senior management will be involved in all decisions of that
magnitude, and then of course, we reaffirmed to all of our
maintenance and engineering leadership that we will not operate
an aircraft is there is any credible evidence of an AD non-
compliance.
Now, we also initiated a number of additional efforts to
strengthen our maintenance and engineering regulatory
compliance and our AD compliance functions, including the
following. We have done an audit of all open FAA airworthiness
directives, we have a review underway by outside independent
experts, we have a reorganization of our AD and regulatory
compliance function with enhanced management reporting. We have
a restructure of our continuing analysis and surveillance
system, otherwise known as the CASS system. We have an increase
in the number and the scope and the frequency of audits, and
also a segregation of the audit function from regulatory
compliance. And we have more stringent documentation of our AD
and maintenance plan changes.
So when Southwest, the FAA and independent consultants will
complete their reviews, we will act quickly to evaluate all the
findings and the recommendations and of course will make all
the necessary changes.
While there was clearly a mistake with our regulatory
compliance, we wanted to assure ourselves that safety of flight
was not an issue. And we have done that. That has been
confirmed by two outside experts. First of all, the Boeing 737
is the most popular commercial aircraft in the world, with over
5,000 produced. Southwest operates the 737 exclusively and has
the largest 737 fleet in the world. So in short, the experience
with this aircraft is extensive around the globe and at
Southwest Airlines.
The Boeing 737 classic was designed with a fail-safe
structure, and that affords a supreme margin of safety. The
fuselage design is fail-safe because there are three
independent structure elements: the external skin, the internal
bonded doubler and also the aircraft frames and stringers. This
design allows skin cracks and other skin damage to occur
without compromising structural integrity.
Next, the FAA-approved Southwest maintenance program
provides for frequent, scheduled, repetitive, overlapping and
comprehensive inspections and repairs with another supreme
margin of safety. Stated more plainly, our aircraft are
inspected far more often than is absolutely necessary. Routine
inspections of varying degrees occur daily, weekly, every 50
days, every 100 days, then we have intermediate half C
inspections every 250 days and then heavy wide checks are
performed every two years.
In addition to these regularly scheduled, baseline
maintenance skin inspections, there are also skin inspections
required by the six different ADs that Herb mentioned. The
combination of these inspections makes our 737 aircraft one of
the most carefully inspected aircraft fleets in the world. So
indeed, it is false to say that these aircraft were not
inspected. They were. And in fact, the error in the AD in
question was discovered through an inspection and a crack
repair in the very area that is in question.
So from a safety perspective, we found the non-compliance,
we voluntarily reported it, and we fixed it.
Now, our airplanes are designed to be safe and our
maintenance program is designed to keep them safe and we have a
culture of safety excellence. We have safely operated more than
16 million flights over 37 years serving more than 1.2 billion
customers. I think that easily makes us the safest airline in
the world, and a record that anyone would justifiably be proud.
I believe deeply that we have the best maintenance and
engineering employees in the airline industry.
But I do want to assure this Committee and the American
people that we will not rest on our safety record, no matter
how good it may be. And I do commit to you that we will
constructively and aggressively address the issues raised by
the FAA and this Committee. Because we want to enable our
proud, safe airline to continue as the safest in the world.
Our record makes credible this aspiration, our Southwest
people will accept nothing less and our customers deserve
nothing less.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you.
Do your colleagues have statements as well? I am sorry, you
are the FAA inspectors. I am sorry. I was distracted for a
moment. Mr. Bassler?
Mr. Bassler. Yes, sir, I do have a statement here I would
like to give to the panel.
Mr. Oberstar. Pardon me?
Mr. Bassler. I do have some testimony I would give.
Mr. Oberstar. Yes, you are next.
Mr. Bassler. My name is John Bassler. I came to Southwest
CMO from the Continental CMO, which I spent eight and a half
years down there, back in June of 2005, as the assistant
principal avionics inspector, under the supervisory principal
avionics inspector, Mr. Colin, up until December 2007, when I
requested to be moved to a different office.
When I arrived at the Southwest Airlines CMO in 2005, one
of the first things I noticed was how fractured the
Airworthiness group was. I came from the Continental CMO in
Houston where that Airworthiness unit had scheduled meetings,
including both specialties, avionics and maintenance, on a
regular basis. The Southwest Airlines CMO did not, and as a
matter of fact, it did not start having meetings of this nature
until the latter part of 2007. I found the Airworthiness unit,
in my opinion, to be dysfunctional.
I had not been in the office for very long when I witnessed
my immediate supervisor, the principal avionics inspector,
giving the middle finger gesture to the principal maintenance
inspector when his back was turned. I thought that very
unprofessional and I voiced my objections to my supervisor and
I told him that I did not appreciate that in my presence.
Things progressively got worse in the office. Most of the
friction was within the management ranks. During this time it
must be noted that the inspectors continued to operate at an
exceptional level, even without management support.
Around early March 2007, rumors began to fly that inspector
Mr. Boutris had a couple of hot line complaints filed on him
from outside the agency. This is when things really started to
become hostile in the office. Mr. Boutris began to spend a lot
of time conversing directly to Mr. Robert Naccache, the
assistant manager, and Mr. Michael Mills, the office manager,
behind closed doors, several times a day. Mr. Boutris also
began spending a lot of time with the data evaluation program
manager, Mr. Doug Peters.
I started to recognize what appeared to me to be the
obvious dislike Mr. Peters, Mr. Boutris, Mr. Mills and Mr.
Naccache had toward the PMI. This dislike, in my opinion,
seemed to be of a very personal nature toward this man. One day
Mr. Peters was overheard by several inspectors, including
myself, making a comment from Boutris' cubicle, the gloves are
coming off.
Mr. Boutris was removed from his duties and work program,
to my understanding, pending the outcome of the investigation
and the complaints made against him. He was to have no contact
in any capacity with the air carrier or its programs. This is
evidently right around the time frame with Southwest Airlines
contacted the PMI disclosing the possible over-fly of an
Airworthiness directive of some of their aircraft. Being of
avionic specialty, I was not privy to this information and
therefore had no knowledge of the details or specifics of this
disclosure.
Around the April 2007 time frame, the PMI was looking for
volunteers to help complete the job assignments that were
assigned to Mr. Boutris but that were not completed. Mr.
Gawadzinski was having difficulty getting anyone to volunteer.
He approached me and asked if I would be willing to work the
SAI on ADs 1.3.6, on the airworthiness directives. And I told
him I would be willing to do the assignment.
Had I known at the time Mr. Boutris' intentions, I would
have never volunteered myself for this assignment. It wasn't a
couple of days later I witnessed Mr. Boutris entering my
cubicle and removing data from the SAI folder I had just
acquired from him. Mr. Boutris never started the SAI. He had a
couple of notes on a decision collection tool, but that was it.
I had to start the inspection completely from scratch.
I began to become aware of the militant attitudes that were
developing in the office from the individuals I have identified
in the aforementioned paragraph. I became concerned that I was
going to be targeted by these inspectors due to my agreeing to
perform the SAI. I sent an e-mail to my supervisor, requesting
that I be removed from the SAI because of the hostile
environment developing in the office. My supervisor refused to
remove me from the SAI. I then requested to at least add some
inspectors to the inspection so that it would be a team event
and I would not be individually targeted. My supervisor agreed
and added one inspector, Mr. Collamore.
During this inspection, Mr. Boutris felt it important
enough to approach Mr. Collamore and notify him that the SAI
was being watched very closely. Mr. Collamore stated to me that
he felt very threatened by Boutris' comment. I also learned of
events that had transpired between Mr. Boutris and certain
Southwest Airlines employees, which I was told was almost
developed into a fistfight.
Mr. Collamore and I finished the inspection during this
month of June 2007. There was a lengthy delay in completing the
SAI due to Mr. Kervanik, who manages the Airworthiness
Directives portion of Southwest Airlines' maintenance program,
being on leave due to a medical situation within his immediate
family. The final product was sent to the DEPM, Mr. Peters, for
review. It was returned with numerous, two full pages of
comments. This upset me because in my ten years at the time
experience with ATOS, I had never seen so many comments from a
DEPM. I had performed inspections in the past and never had
anything like this returned from the DEPM in this fashion
before these events. This upset me deeply and I brought my
concerns to my supervisor. I explained that I felt, again, I
was being targeted and that the DEPM was using his position to
personally attack my credibility.
Nothing was done about my concerns. I made a couple of
spelling corrections to the verbiage and again forwarded it to
the DEPM for review. This time, it was satisfactorily entered
into the ATOS master record repository.
Several days later, the PAI wanted changes made again to
the SAI, no comments, and had me request it being sent back
from the repository. This is very unusual. Once an inspection
has been saved to the data base, it never gets returned unless
it is unusual circumstances. I have never witnessed it in my
ten years of working in the ATOS. Phone calls are made and the
SAI is returned. At this particular time, management personnel
are attending a seminar out of State. So the only permanent
management official still in the office was the assistant
manager, Mr. Naccache.
The SAI sits in the DEPM's possession for approximately 15
days. When management finally returns to the office, I send an
e-mail to the office manager, who now is Mr. Hedlund, and I ask
him the status of the SAI. He responds to me to let me know the
DEPM is waiting for PMI feedback. As a note, this is the third
PMI, second actor so far. I thought this peculiar, since this
individual had no information and was not present during the
time the SAI was being performed.
A meeting is held at the request of the DEPM to discuss his
concerns with the SAI with the PMI and the PAI. I was not
invited to the meeting, nor was Larry. I was the team
coordinator for this SAI. This upset me, because I was the team
coordinator. I felt my knowledge was instrumental in this
conversation. I voiced this concern to my supervisor. Nothing
was done about my concerns.
After the meeting, the PAI sent an e-mail to the SAI team
member, Larry Collamore, requesting the ``yes'' comments in the
control section of the SAI. At this time, ATOS 1.1 was the
national policy, and it did not require ``yes'' comments. Mr.
Collamore responded to the e-mail by respectfully refusing to
add the ``yes'' comments. His response also identified the
inappropriate behavior being displayed by certain inspectors in
the office.
Management meets in the manager's office to discuss the
SAI. The next morning, the SAI work instructions are changed to
require ``yes'' comments. This action was contrary to ATOS and
AFS 900 policy. A meeting is held to discuss the SAI. The
meeting included the PAI, Mr. Colin, the temporary PMI, Mr.
Hoover, the temporary POI, Mr. Nelson, the manager, Bobby
Hedlund, the DEPM, Mr. Peters, myself and Larry.
Larry and I voiced our frustration with the entire process
and the way this inspection is being handled. Both Larry and I
felt we were being targeted and that we were not getting fair
and equitable treatment. Our concerns went unaddressed again.
By the time the SAI was saved to the ATOS repository, it sat in
the DEPM's review for 20 days. This again is contrary to ATOS
data quality guidelines and the required disciplinary action on
the DEPM was not taken.
At this point, I was fed up with the office environment and
how I was being unfairly treated by management and certain
inspectors. I requested to be transferred to another office in
the local area. I was finally told by the manager, Mr. Hedlund,
that I received a transfer to the DFW FSDO. This meeting took
place in my cubicle. During the conversation, my supervisor
walked up, walked by and made some comments, then flipped me
off with both fingers from both his hands, in front of the
manager.
I sent a grievance to the region and I requested immediate
removal from the office. The SAI letter addressing the findings
during the SAI 1.3.6 still had not left the office. I do not
know what the final letter looked like, since I was no longer
employed in the office. I also cannot take ownership of the
final SAI, since I believe the data has been manipulated since
my departure.
I made every attempt to complete this assignment in the
most professional manner humanly possible. I followed national
policies and guidance through the entire process. I pride
myself as a public servant to make every attempt to make the
safest transportation system in the world. I swore an oath to
do just that.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you, Mr. Bassler.
Mr. Collamore, do you have a separate statement?
Mr. Collamore. No, sir, I don't.
Mr. Oberstar. Okay, thank you. Thank you very much for your
testimony. I appreciate your candor and your forthrightness.
Mr. Kelleher and Mr. Kelly, Southwest Airlines is not on
trial here. I want you to understand that. Your customer
satisfaction rating is not on trial or in question. What is at
stake in this hearing is the role of the FAA and the compliance
with the Airworthiness Directives.
At the very outset of all this disclosure, there was a
statement, initial public statement from Southwest Airlines,
implying that it had received concurrence from Boeing that it
was acceptable to continue flying the aircraft. Those were
statements from Southwest reported in the news media, copies of
which we have received. Is it Boeing's responsibility to give
approval on Airworthiness Directive matters, or is that the
FAA's responsibility?
Mr. Kelleher. Mr. Chairman, I think there has been a
mistake there with respect to what you read. We never asked the
Boeing Company to deal with the subject of regulatory
compliance. We simply asked the Boeing Company whether or not
there were any safety of flight issues involved in flying those
airplanes for the eight days that it took to re-inspect them.
The Boeing statement itself specifically says, we are not
addressing the issue of regulatory compliance.
Mr. Oberstar. Did they put that in writing to Southwest?
Mr. Kelleher. I believe it is.
Mr. Oberstar. Would you submit that for the record, so we
can have the record correct on that matter?
Mr. Kelleher. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Mr. Oberstar. It certainly gave a very inappropriate
impression to my investigative mind and my experience.
Mr. Kelleher. Yes, I understand that. But they didn't opine
on the regulatory aspect of it. They just said that they didn't
think there was any threat to the safety of flight during those
eight days, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. I appreciate your refreshing candor in
saying, we should not have flown when we found those cracks.
Mr. Kelleher. Thank you, sir. We respect this Committee and
will always be candid with it.
Mr. Oberstar. And I also appreciate your reciting, which I
did earlier in the hearing, the events that led up to the aging
aircraft legislation, the meeting out here at Crystal City with
over 400 aviation safety professionals from around the world
that eventually resulted in the legislation and the
Airworthiness Directive that took FAA an inordinately long time
to publish.
Now, I don't want to be nit-picking, but it bothers me to
hear someone of your caliber to say it was a tiny part of the
aircraft. It was a tiny part of that Aloha 737 that began to
unravel. It always starts with a tiny part. That is why
Airworthiness Directives are issued and that is why there is a
requirement for rigorous inspection. I stipulated at the outset
that this Aloha aircraft was one that had 89,000 cycles.
I should have gone further, which I do in other contexts,
and point out that that aircraft had flown over the continental
United States for most of its lifetime. Then it was, for a few
years, put in service with Aloha over salt air in a salt air
environment. As we know, those of us who follow these matters,
when an aircraft is pressurized, the skin expands
microscopically. Moisture is taken out of the interior of the
aircraft and condenses around the hull and drains around the
sides. With the 727, by the time it reaches altitude, it has
drained 120 gallons of moisture out of the interior of the
aircraft. And it drains out of weepholes, but not all of it
drains out. When it lands and is decompressed, some of that
moisture remains.
In the case of the Aloha, some of that moisture, some of
that water had an electrolytic reaction with the aluminum-
copper skin of the aircraft that proved to be fatal. It is
secondly true that Boeing abandoned the cold bond method of
manufacturing aircraft hull for much more stable and reliable
method.
But the point was that what should not have happened, what
was designed not to happen, what had never happened before, did
happen. The same with the PCU, the power control unit and the
rudder. It should not have happened. Boeing came into my office
in the aftermath about Aliquippa and said, we have flown 93
million hours of 737s and this has never happened before.
But it had. The NTSB, God bless them, went back after
Aliquippa to look at previous incidents, uncommanded rudder
movement incident for which they had not found a probable
cause, and attributed to the failure of the PCU that caused an
uncommanded rudder movement. That corresponded with other
similar incidents reported by pilots enroute that raised
concerns about the PCU and Boeing then went back and re-
engineered, did an enormous amount of work and Southwest, I
know, was engaged in that practice.
I go to this extent to say, these Airworthiness Directives
have very significant weight. And that it is not acceptable, it
is not acceptable within FAA regulatory proceeding to fly
beyond the airworthiness directive mandatory inspection time.
Mr. Kelleher. It is certainly not, Mr. Chairman. Everything
that you have said is 100 percent right, and I don't disagree
with anything you have stated. Your knowledge is really all-
encompassing regarding this matter.
When I said a tiny part, I didn't mean to demean the
significance of it. That comment was made in the context of
1,100 pages covering 6 ADs and the failure of the engineering
order to cover that tiny part of the airplane. What I was
saying was, not that it was, not that any airplane part is
insignificant. I didn't mean to convey that. But what I meant
was, out of the whole airplane, with 1,100 pages and 6 ADs, the
engineer missed a small part.
Mr. Oberstar. Yes, I understand that. And there is some
traffic on the websites of various skeptics saying, oh, there
are way too many Airworthiness Directives, they are way too
complex, way too many pages for us. Well, if there are, then
you'd better find something else to do. Because at 35,000 feet
in the air, there is no curb to pull over, look under the hood
and find out what is wrong. You have to do it right. That is
why there is redundancy built into aviation. You understand it.
You have a safety mind set, I appreciate that.
Mr. Kelleher. Yes, sir. And what I was suggesting, again,
that is not an excuse.
Mr. Oberstar. Good.
Mr. Kelleher. That is not an excuse. I was just saying, I
can understand how an engineer would miss a tiny part of the
airplane in the midst of all this hullabaloo. If you will, if
my recollection is correct, Mr. Chairman, yesterday,
Administrator Sturgell said himself during his press conference
that some of these ADs maybe need to be simplified, so that
they are crisper and easier to understand.
Again, that is not an excuse. But it would, making them
plainer and simpler and unified would facilitate, I think,
understanding them.
Mr. Oberstar. I would be very, look with a very skeptical
eye on any simplification they would do.
But what is the status of the Southwest employees you
announced had been placed on administrative leave? Mr. Kelly?
Mr. Kelly. They are at home. They are on leave, they are
being paid pending our investigation.
Mr. Oberstar. They are not at work, they are not at a desk?
Mr. Kelly. They are not. And of course, our investigation
is weeks old at this point, so we are not complete yet. But
yes, they are on leave.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you.
Mr. Petri.
Mr. Petri. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank you,
the witnesses, for putting in a long day here at the Capitol.
Just trying to shift the focus a little bit to kind of looking
forward, because what we want to do is certainly learn from the
past and do better in the future, and in that regard, I would
really be interested in hearing your discussion of how you
build safety into an organization and how you work with the
people who have responsibility for oversight, the FAA safety
inspectors in this case, to achieve what should be a common
goal. I can't imagine anybody is looking to have accidents and
all that.
There are different psychologies and some say, you know,
you can do the stick and keep beating them and that way, and
others say no, you kind of try to build a team. I learned a lot
from a fellow named Burt Rutan. I represent the EEA in Oshkosh.
And I sat in a lunch with him. He has built cutting-edge
airplanes for a generation. I think he has never had a loss of
life. And he didn't want one of those planes certified as an
airplane because he would have to defend the design. He wanted
to keep it as a spaceship, because he said every day, he wanted
every person working on that plane to try to think of a way to
make it safer. And if they once had a design that they had to
defend, they would go in and there would be 50 changes in it
and the inspectors would say, how could you possibly say this
is a perfect design?
So I just wonder if you could talk about the psychology
going forward. My bottom line is that it looks like your
biggest mistake is that you are operating under a dysfunctional
regional office that seemed to have not got its act completely
together. It is not an excuse, but some wanted to be punitive
and others seemed to want to work on a collaborative basis and
there you are trying to figure out what you are supposed to be
doing.
Mr. Kelleher. Well, I will tell you what. I learned more
about the alleged lack of harmony at their CMO this morning
than I think Gary and I ever had any idea. So that was kind of
a revelation to us. But I will say this, that I have worked
personally with the FAA, and I mean, for 15 years on a day to
day basis insofar as any alleged infractions were concerned,
insofar as FAA policies were concerned.
I must say that from my personal experience over that
period of time, I think the FAA did an excellent job, which
might be called a tough love job. Because the FAA was not
hostile, but indeed, it was firm. I can just give you one
little example of what I am talking about. And I am not talking
out of the side of my neck when I say this, I am telling you
the truth.
I was sitting in my office one day and the FAA inspector
comes in and he says, Herb, you have too many foreign objects
on the ramp. And I said, no, we don't, Eric, I said, I keep
track of foreign object damage to our engines, and I haven't
seen any. He said, are you going to be here for a couple more
hours? I said, yes, sure. He leaves, and he comes back and he
has a big bag full of bolts and nuts that he took off our ramp.
I said, I think he is right, let's get some magnetic sweepers
to clean the ramp.
In other words, it wasn't a kissy-kissy relationship. But
he just said, you are wrong and I am going to show you. And I
said, and you are right and I am going to act on it. We have
always had, historically had that sort of relationship with the
FAA. And I think the FAA has done a tremendous job over its
history. I know a lot of carriers abroad that would love to
have the FAA as their regulatory body instead of the one that
they have. And its record is superb and it is unparalleled.
But of course, I haven't particular cottoned, and I am sure
Gary hasn't, either, to anything that was said today by
previous witnesses with respect to the dysfunction of our CMO.
And of course, several times Members quite properly asked the
question, is this more widespread. Well, frankly, we are not in
a position to tell you, Gary Kelly or myself. But I think it
has to be like one of those relationships with, we are married
to each other, in effect. And we need to treat each other with
respect. We both need to be proactive with respect to safety
issues.
Having a hostile FAA, and I know no one here has suggested
that, but having a totally hostile FAA I think would cause
carriers to perhaps be less forthcoming about some of the
mistakes that they have made and to shy away perhaps from some
of the programs that we have put together to keep track of
trends and in cooperation with the FAA.
I think there is a balance that needs to be struck. But I
think it would be a mistake, I don't know whether Gary
disagrees with me, but I don't think he does, to toss out the
whole voluntary disclosure program. I do think from what I
heard today that maybe it could use some improvements.
Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir, I would just add that first of all, we
are accountable for the safety of Southwest Airlines. And
certainly we want to cooperate, and we respect what the FAA's
role is and they are the regulator. We fully understand that. I
would want our employees to disclose problems. If there was
such a punitive atmosphere created that people are incented to
hide things, that is in no one's best interest, and certainly
for the leadership of a company like Southwest Airlines. So a
voluntary reporting program, I think, is critically important.
Likewise, we want to share information with the FAA. This
particular matter has been under investigation for a year, but
we the airline are just now learning about it a year later. So
it would be nice, in other words, to know instantly if there
are concerns. There is always a matter of trying to reconcile
conflict among people. So there has to be a mechanism to do
that and we have to embrace that. But in the end, we have to
have leadership and accountability to be able to reconcile that
conflict.
Southwest Airlines, I think, it is a trendy term today, but
Colleen Barrett, our president, had a whistleblower line before
it was the thing to do. So you have to have an open door, you
have to welcome feedback and information. It is that kind of an
atmosphere that creates a culture of safety, quite frankly.
Mr. Petri. We need some ideas or some reasonable procedures
to prevent the self-disclosure program, which seems to be a
well-intended, constructive one, from turning into a heads-up
program where people, you are being accused of hiring, or
inside dealings basically, because employees come and then they
have relations with each other and the next thing you know,
they are calling their buddies up and saying, we just are about
to find out something that is going to, and you are going to be
in it, so that is not the spirit of self-disclosure.
Mr. Kelly. It is not.
Mr. Petri. It is not really in anyone's long-term interest.
Mr. Kelleher. No, it is not.
Mr. Petri. So you need to figure out ways, as an industry,
as well as we, to make something like this work for the
traveling public.
Mr. Kelly. We have found some opportunities here to put
better checks and balances in place, to have more frequent
audits, that would help mitigate the kind of thing that you are
talking about. But in the end, I would still rather hear people
disclose what problems are as opposed to have people incented
to hide them.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you, Mr Petri. I appreciate your
thoughts and you suggested some very important lines of further
consideration.
Chairwoman Brown, the Chair of our Rail Subcommittee.
Ms. Brown of Florida. Thank you. Mr. Kelleher and Mr.
Kelly, I want to tell you that most Members of Congress, they
think they are experts definitely with aviation, because we
travel two, four times a week. As I told you, I am from Florida
and I use your airline all the time. In fact, in my other life,
I used to be a travel agent. So I understand all of the
wonderful things, on time, the cost, the safety, the fact that
you have carried over a billion people.
But this little incident, as you know, is a black eye on
Southwest. I guess I have a couple of questions in that light.
One of them is that your Washington representative said that
neither you nor the management team had any knowledge of those
violations until some of the stories started appearing in the
press. Is this unusual? You know this has damaged the airlines.
What have you done to make sure that this doesn't happen again?
Mr. Kelly. Well, it is unusual. We have never found
ourselves in this situation before, quite honestly. To put this
particular matter into context, the reason that the mistake was
made in the first place was because Southwest Airlines was
making investments and modifications to our aircraft to make
them safer. So we were reducing areas that had to be inspected
previously by installing new solid metal panels.
This one small area that Herb mentioned earlier was left
off. Clearly, this experience has identified a change order
control process that we want to improve upon. We don't find
many errors, but I think what we have all heard all day is that
we want to strive to be perfect. And I can guarantee you that
we will strive to be perfect. I cannot guarantee you that we
will be perfect. But we are always looking for opportunities to
improve.
And it is a black eye. But my commitment to you is that we
are going to take this constructively and we are going to
better for that. We have implemented already a number of
changes within our regulatory compliance function so that we
will escalate these issues to the proper management level
without question. And we will address the root cause to
mitigate the number of errors.
Ms. Brown of Florida. Mr. Kelleher, if there was a song
coming up that I really liked, like, you have personality and
the airline represents kind of your personality, and you have
done a great job. But we just finished talking about, and I
know you heard it, about this culture as far as customer as
opposed to stakeholder and the relationship between you all and
FAA. Can you talk about that a little bit? Because basically,
it seems as if the relationship is too close. Not that we want
adversaries. But it is just the difference between me and Mr.
Oberstar and me and Ms. Johnson.
Mr. Kelleher. I think one of the things that the Committee
has touched on here that is very, very meaningful,
Congresswoman, and it is exactly what you said, from what I
have now heard and from what I have found out, since this
became an issue, there can be too much closeness between the
regulator and the regulated. And we were very, Gary in
particular, and Ron Ricks, were very disturbed to learn that
this decision had been made without bringing it to the
attention of even our vice president of maintenance. That will
not happen again. I can assure you.
But there was some kind of temporary malfunction there for
some reason. We certainly don't want a relationship that is too
cozy with the FAA. Because of course, that doesn't in the
longer run do the carrier any good. The carrier needs to have
people at the FAA saying, hey, wait a second, you are not doing
this right, you can do this better, you need to revise your
records. That sort of thing, that advice, that counsel, that
guidance, I think is very important to the carrier, coming the
other way. And apparently, we were a little shy on getting that
too.
Ms. Brown of Florida. Thank you. I yield back the balance
of my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you. I now call on Chairwoman Johnson,
Chair of our Water Resources Subcommittee.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am probably one of the few people on this Committee that
has known Southwest Airlines ever since there has been a
Southwest Airlines. What I am concerned about, Mr. Kelleher,
is, do you feel at any time that the safety of the passengers
was breached during this time?
Mr. Kelleher. No, I do not, in any way, shape or form. Let
me give you a comparison, if I might. And I am bearing in mind
the Chairman's admonition earlier against creep. I do
understand that.
But to put this in context, when you first come under the
aging aircraft AD, right, you are just getting under it, the
FAA gives you 4,500 cycles before you have to start inspecting.
With our operations, that is about a year and a half before you
have to start inspecting.
We flew these airplanes for about eight months. I think
Inspector Boutris mentioned 30 months, but that is not so. It
was June of 2006 to February of 2007. And so what I am saying
is that the FAA doesn't regard that there is any threat to the
airplane from cracks until you fly it for a year and a half. We
flew it less than a year and a half.
Furthermore, as Gary Kelly said, we probably inspected that
particular airplane and its fuselage 80 times during the year.
Don't think that an airworthiness inspection directive is the
only inspection that airlines apply to airplanes. We probably
have four times as many regular inspections on our airplanes as
the FAA requires. Those airplanes, it is like going to an
internist twice a week for an examination with respect to the
fuselage.
And there is another special AD inspection that comes
within seven tenths of an inch of where we are talking about.
So it would be unusual to do that one and not go seven tenths
of an inch and look at the other area of the fuselage.
So no, I don't think there was any threat whatsoever to the
safety of passengers during that time. And I base that on
technical analysis, not just saying, nothing happened, even
though we have never had anything happen from the passenger
fatality standpoint, as I explained. I think the planes were
perfectly safe and the public could have complete confidence in
them.AFTER 6:00 p.m.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you.
Mr. Kelleher. Nobody flies them more than we do.
Ms. Johnson. Mr. Bassler, have you been in communication
with the Southwest Airlines manager of regulatory compliance
since your reassignment?
Mr. Bassler. Was that to me?
Ms. Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Bassler. No, ma'am.
Ms. Johnson. Did you call from a Government phone or your
personal cell phone when you attempted to----
Mr. Bassler. After I was reassigned to the DFW FSDO? No.
Not to my knowledge, no. I haven't had any communication with
them. Not that I am aware of. Are you talking about Southwest
Airlines employees, correct?
Ms. Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Bassler. No.
Ms. Johnson. Did you say you requested the reassignment?
Mr. Bassler. Yes, ma'am, I did. Back in October of 2007.
Ms. Johnson. And what was your major frustration at the
time?
Mr. Bassler. There was a very hostile work environment. And
we had brought it to the attention of management up to region,
many, many investigations came through there over the issue.
And nothing was done about it. It was continually dysfunctional
and hostile.
Ms. Johnson. Did you have a conversation with the person
who is now on suspension that was in charge of the Southwest
Airlines inspection?
Mr. Bassler. The principal maintenance inspector?
Ms. Johnson. Pardon me?
Mr. Bassler. The principal maintenance inspector?
Ms. Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Bassler. Doug Gawadzinski?
Ms. Johnson. I am sorry, I don't know his name. The person
that got suspended from Southwest when they found out about
the----
Mr. Bassler. Mr. Gawadzinski, correct? Because there were
two, there was Mr. Mills, I think, the manager, and Mr.
Gawadzinski. If you are talking about Mr. Gawadzinski, I have
conversed with him since, yes. Not on these topics, though.
Ms. Johnson. Pardon me?
Mr. Bassler. Not on these topics, though.
Ms. Johnson. Okay. But do you feel that he was lax in his
responsibility and did you talk with him about it?
Mr. Bassler. As I said in my testimony, I wasn't privy to
the information because I am avionics and he was maintenance.
He wasn't my direct supervisor. I didn't directly work for him.
I did have, when my supervisor PAI was out of town or if he
was incapacitated, I of course would fill in for him as the PAI
on occasion. So during the two and a half years, I had gone to
meetings as the PAI with the PMI. And at no time had I ever
seen that type of behavior exhibited by Mr. Gawadzinski, at
least in my presence.
Ms. Johnson. Okay. Thank you. I apologize for having been
absent a period of time. But lots of things go on at the same
time here. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Cummings, Chair of our Coast Guard
Subcommittee.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank all of you for your testimony.
Let me talk very briefly, Mr. Kelly, you talked about
improvements to the voluntary disclosure program. I want to
know exactly what you may have had in mind. I want to go back
to something that Ranking Member Petri talked about. He was
saying sometimes you can have a voluntary disclosure and people
abuse it. That is true. In Baltimore, we had a situation where
at a hospital they were giving AIDS tests and hepatitis B tests
with equipment that did not work. Thousands of them, thousands
of AIDS tests, people getting the wrong results. And if it were
not for disclosure, we would have never known it.
Part of the problem with the disclosure is that when it was
disclosed, management sort of suppressed it and kept it sort of
in a little cocoon, and it never got past a certain point. I
guess what I am getting at is, I get the impression that you
are looking at your voluntary disclosure procedures and trying
to make sure they are what you want them to be.
I think we have to be very careful and set a different kind
of standard when we are talking about life or death. In other
words, I don't worry so much about, I do understand people may
abuse the process. But I agree with you that I would rather
know than not know. If you are talking about life or death,
those pilots sitting back there, if it is going to their lives
and al the passengers that they fly around, I want to know.
So I hope that when you reevaluate, you said you were
looking at it and whatever, I hope you will keep that in mind.
I understand what Mr. Petri is saying, but we are talking about
thousands of flights and thousands of people. We are also
talking about that thing that I talked about a little bit
earlier, that trust that things are in order.
Did you have a comment on that?
Mr. Kelly. Well, yes, sir and hopefully I can clarify. I am
a huge proponent of our voluntary disclosure program, because
we do want to know, we want to know the truth. If mistakes are
made, we want people to feel comfortable that they can report
mistakes without some kind of punishment.
The point that I was making earlier is we want to make sure
that that is a credible self-reporting process and have enough
proper research done, have enough independent checks and
balances to look at that to make sure that the proper decision
is being made about how to deal with a matter once it becomes
known.
I am more concern about that, in other words.
Mr. Cummings. And I guess at the earliest possible point.
In other words, making that determination.
Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir, and I think that is part of the
complication and trying to discuss these issues in a one size
fits all fashion. As Herb was describing earlier, he has
colorfully described this, the AD requirements as not being the
10 Commandments. So they are very complex, they are very
overlapping. It doest require research often to determine if
there is in fact an issue.
And Mr. Chairman, for the record, if I could, the rudder is
a similar scenario, where there was a possible non-compliance
that was discovered like the AD in question that we are talking
about for March. Both issues were self-reported. Upon further
research, one was ultimately determined to be truly a non-
compliance issue. The rudder issue, once we completed our
research there, it was found that it in fact was not a non-
compliance.
So out of an abundance of caution, we did the self-
disclosure there. So sometimes it does take some effort, and we
do want to do exactly what you said, which is encourage people,
once there is some credible evidence that there is a problem,
to bring it up so that it can be researched properly and we can
make the right, safe decision.
Mr. Cummings. I am running out of time, I just want to ask
you both this other question. I think you both talked about the
change order process, you were trying to improve the planes.
And come to find out, there is that space that you talked about
that you somehow were maybe not aware of that, that it needed
inspection also. Is there something that the FAA needs to do to
make sure that it is very, very clear that when you make X, Y,
Z improvements you still have to deal with certain things? In
other words, what we want to do is make sure that we don't, and
I know you don't, want to go down this road again. Since you
all are doing, trying to make your planes safer, it seems to me
we would want to make sure that we are very clear as to what
still needs to be inspected. Since I assume that this is an
ongoing process, you are constantly trying to make airplanes
better, how do you make sure that you have all the information
you need to be able to accomplish what I just said?
Mr. Kelleher. As the Administrator said, as I mentioned
earlier, Congressman, this particular set of ADs is six in
number, pertaining to the same issue. And furthermore, as a
result of the voluntary program that we have undertaken at
enormous expense to improve these airplanes, you get into a
situation where you get an interaction between the ADs. In
other words, if you replace the skins on this part of the
airplane, you don't have to inspect these other parts of the
airplane.
Well, airplanes are big. They have a lot of skin. And under
that circumstance, it is no excuse, but I can understand the
engineer missing the fact that you still needed to inspect this
part of the airplane, despite the fact that the rest of it was
exempt. And those particular ADs, I think, could be streamlined
and simplified. I don't mean to imply, nor does Gary Kelly in
any way, shape or form, as a way to get out from under them. It
is just to make them more understandable, so they are easier to
comply with and easier to enforce.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you, Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Carney, the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the
panel for their patience. I can imagine you are going to do a
lot of standing this evening.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Carney. Everybody understands the context in which
these hearings are being held, and the state of the airline
industry and Southwest is much better than your competitors in
many regards. But still it is tough context, fuel prices, tough
economy, et cetera. We never want to create the perception here
that the airlines are cutting corners on safety in this
context. I hope we can put that to rest, and we are all going
to have to work very closely in this Committee in particular.
We are doing our jobs from the Hill here, and you and all your
competitors are also going to have to do that.
Mr. Kelleher. Could I make a comment that might be helpful,
Congressman, in that respect? When deregulation took place,
there were a lot of predictions that because of the enhanced
competition in the industry, the safety of the industry would
be reduced. Because they said, ah, more competition, fewer
profits as a result of it, and airlines would start cutting
back on their maintenance. They didn't. Their record was better
after deregulation than it was prior to that time.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Kelleher, I understand.
Mr. Kelleher. And I think we are in that situation now,
where no airline is going to sacrifice, no matter what the
economy is like.
Mr. Carney. I certainly hope so. But you can understand the
perception out there, because I hear that from my colleagues,
and frankly, my constituents are a little nervous sometimes.
Mr. Kelleher. I want to reassure them.
Mr. Carney. Of course, although you don't fly anywhere near
my district, I am afraid. We can talk about that offline
sometime.
For Mr. Kelly and Mr. Kelleher, has your investigation been
able to determine whether anyone in your tech ops organization
pressured Paul Comeau to keep the airplanes in service after
the self-disclosure was filed, or was that his decision alone?
Mr. Kelly. That investigation is still continuing. We have
testimony and other words from some employees. We have been
able to audit some records, but there is obviously more input
that we could gain, so at this point, no, there is no evidence
of that.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Did you take 70 aircraft offline for the
rudder PCU issue? Or did you self-disclose at least 70?
Mr. Kelly. I would love to spend maybe two minutes
describing the rudder issue to clarify.
Mr. Carney. That is up to Mr. Oberstar. He has been very
generous today, so I think he will probably let us.
Mr. Kelly. This is a March 2007 matter.
Mr. Oberstar. This is the modification you made at Boeing,
that Boeing recommended that you didn't have to do but you did
anyway?
Mr. Kelly. On the rudder.
Mr. Oberstar. No, on the windows.
Mr. Kelly. No, this is on the rudder, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. You're talking about the rudder. All right.
Mr. Kelly. So just a little background. The rudder has two
separate power units. It has the main power unit with two
hydraulic lines coming in, it has the standby power unit. The
main power unit is subject to an Airworthiness Directive. The
standby power unit is not. It is not.
It is the standby power unit that we had information that
there was a possible non-compliance with our maintenance
program, not with an AD, with our maintenance program. And we
self-disclosed that. Initially, we did think it was 70
airplanes. After we researched it, we eliminated 52. They were
in full compliance. We discovered that a year ago. Once we
completed our research this year, we found that all of those
airplanes were in fact compliant with our maintenance program.
Mr. Carney. How long does research take on that sort of
thing?
Mr. Kelly. This particular one was confusing. Because of
again just all the complexities associated with the changes
that have been made to the rudder over the years. But in this
particular case, it took a while to look at the paper trail,
probably took three or four weeks. But we did not do, we did
not complete the research last year to determine whether we
were in compliance. We simply made the self-disclosure. We got
the proper FAA approval for the remedy and we made the remedial
action last year, even though we later found out that we didn't
have to do that.
So it was an abundance of caution and hindsight.
Mr. Carney. That is good to know. I appreciate that.
One more question, actually, for Mr. Collamore and Mr.
Bassler. Isn't it true that another team of inspectors
performed the same inspections at Southwest Airlines after you
did, and you found 50 favorable findings and 8 negative, is
that correct? And the other team found, changed it actually to
41 negative findings and 17 favorable ones?
Mr. Collamore. Actually, that SAI has been accomplished
five times with five different results.
Mr. Carney. Do we have an average of those results then?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Collamore. Not on me, no, sir.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Bassler?
Mr. Bassler. I would like to add something, too, Mr.
Carney. I pulled up the data, that ATOS data repository. We had
nine noes and of the nine noes, we had an inspector action
taken, which is required even under 1.1 on every single one,
including an investigation EIR for the one that was the only
one that was regulatory. An EIR was sent.
The one that they did right after ours, which was under
1.2, which has even stricter requirements, they had 17 noes and
out of the 17 noes, 15 have no action taken.
Mr. Carney. Why is that?
Mr. Bassler. That is a good question. And that is what I am
trying to raise, is that our data is skewed. I know, I can tell
you----
Mr. Carney. Hold on, hold it, hold it, Mr. Bassler, hold on
a second. I kind of want to get to the crux of something here.
How much subjectivity is actually in this process? It seems to
me that there is some hard science here that you actually have
to follow.
Mr. Bassler. You answer the question. You answer the
question. We are told, when we answer these questions, if it is
a yes, it can be no yes, but, it is a yes, move along. We have
been drilled on that for 10 years. In the SAI they have
incorporated now, yes comments are required, under 1.2. But in
the EPIs they are not still required to have yes comments. The
reason being is when you get, it is good information to have
when an inspector goes out there and he does an SAI of the
subsystem level, which is what the SAI is, to look at the
program, do they have a program in place? For the next
inspector that comes along a year or two later, you want to see
where is it, where is it in the manual system.
But like I said, here you have one, when this was right
after ours, when it was known that this was a hot, critical
issue, a supervisor was the TC and 15 noes have no action
taken. How did that get through the data quality, all the way
through the DEPM to the data base with no actions taken? That
means you have 15 no answers. What is the FAA doing about it?
I am pretty sure you can go to the office and find there
was a letter sent. I am almost sure. I know these two
individuals, there was a letter sent. But the data base doesn't
reflect it.
Mr. Carney. Well, data base management is certainly a
critical factor here. If we can't go back and do a research or
do a history on a plane or fleet, that is certainly an issue.
But I think that we probably need to get a lot less
subjectivity in the process and a lot more objectivity in the
process by all members, everybody involved in this process.
Gentlemen, I thank you for your time. It has been a long
time and I appreciate your patience. Thank you. No further
questions.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you.
Mr. DeFazio, Chair of our Surface Transportation
Subcommittee.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
regret I had to miss some of the testimony, I had to go do a
television feed.
To either Mr. Kelleher or Mr. Kelly, this is a very
substantial fine and in my recollection it is one of the
largest, if not the largest ever assessed. But I also know
historically with the FAA, things happen. There is a lot of
publicity about a big fine. And then the fine is appealed and
reduced and ends up in many cases being insignificant.
Have you or do you intend to appeal this fine and have it
reduced?
Mr. Kelleher. We have not sat down with the FAA legal
department to discuss what approaches might be taken one way or
the other. Although as soon as we found out about what had been
transpiring, Congressman, Gary did take all this to Washington
and sit down with the FAA with respect to the issue. But the
fine itself was not, the amount of the fine was not discussed.
Mr. DeFazio. Right. But you would not be unique among
airlines, it would be standard practice if you were to seek to
have this reduced. But the FAA has made much to do here today
about the magnitude of this fine and the gravity of the
situation and how serious they are about changing the systemic
problems we have. I just want to kind of put a caveat on that,
it may or may not end up being a $10.2 million fine.
Mr. Kelleher. That is possible. That is entirely possible.
And may I suggest in sort of a sotto voce way that perhaps, if
this Committee had not been as active as it is, it might have
been a lower fine.
Mr. DeFazio. Yes, and I am afraid we may not have gotten
some of the assurances we got. I have to say that Mr. Bassler's
testimony is a bit confusing to me, because initially I thought
in talking about the tumult in the office and the personality
conflicts, he was saying that effectively there were no
problems, which I would have questioned because of what the IG
found. But now what he is saying is there might have even been
more problems that somehow later got swept under the rug. Is
that the thrust of your testimony here, that those 15 that you
say are unanswered?
Mr. Bassler. Mr. DeFazio, I am raising the question that
the data bases that we have in the FAA and the policies and
procedures that we have in place, and you have to remember that
when these two SAIs were done, one was done under 1.1, which at
the time was the national policy, when Larry and myself did the
SAI, this was under 1.2 with even stricter requirements. How
does that pass all those quality processes.
And how can you do the same SAI five times by AFS 900, I
don't even know how many, because I haven't even been privy to
that, I just heard it was done five times after ours and they
all came out with different conclusions. There is something
wrong with either the process or the questions we are asking
here or how you view it.
Mr. DeFazio. I would reflect that when I was a ranking
Democrat and they were developing this ATOS process, I had Mr.
Sabatini and others in three or four times to explain to me how
this might work. I expressed at the time that I was really
dubious that this was going to be an effective program. I
understand the idea of mega data and trying to look for
anomalies and targeting those sorts of things.
But I said to them then, and I guess I would repeat now, I
would rather have the inspectors out in the field, the good
old-fashioned way, armed with as much data as we can give them,
but not sitting there just plugging stuff into a computer
program. Because it does seem that this program, which I have
never understood, does potentially have some problems.
Mr. Bassler. Sir, may I just add, and just remember that at
the SAI level, you are at a sub-system level. So you are
looking at the program. You are not necessarily touching the
airplane. That is where the EPI comes in.
Mr. DeFazio. I understand, and that is a big concern to me.
At the time, when I was relating this back to Mr. Sabatini many
years ago, I recounted how United did its in-house maintenance
then, and I had just been to the United facility at San
Francisco. And an old-time mechanic had found a problem with a
rotor that shouldn't have been there, but something wasn't
quite right, so then he required they do additional testing and
whatever they call it, flux testing, and they can find these
micro-cracks.
It is the same thing, people who are there with hands-on
experience and looking over someone's shoulder and seeing what
someone is doing and talking to them, I think they are going to
pick up some of the threads that we are trying to pick up with
this ATOS thing, personally, but that is my own Luddite
prejudice, I guess.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. It is not Luddite in the least, and Mr.
Sabatini earlier committed to modifying this voluntary
disclosure program and correcting holes in it and reporting
back to us in due course.
Ms. Brown.
Ms. Brown of Florida. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just have one
follow-up question.
With respect to all recent grounding, you know, Delta had a
big one, and I think American, do you think the type of non-
compliance we are now seeing with previously allowing aircraft
to continue in operation instead of grounding?
Mr. Kelleher. I am not really familiar from the technical
standpoint with what required the grounding at the other
carriers. And if I were to give an opinion on that, I think I
would have to be inside those carriers or inside the FAA. So it
is really hard to tell exactly what transpired. I have read
press accounts of what went on with respect to some of the
airplanes. But I really don't have any insight into how serious
the issues were with the other carriers.
Ms. Brown of Florida. Mr. Kelly?
Mr. Kelly. I don't have any insight at all as to what
happened at other carriers. I can describe our own March 11th
experience, which was in creating a new document for a change
order, and being ever-vigilant in this environment, we did find
an instruction that was conflicting. It was confusing. We used
the word ambiguous. It was unclear which type of inspection was
required for 44 of our aircraft. Mind you, we did an
inspection. We just weren't certain that we did the inspection
with the right method. It is either with an electrical device
or doing it visually.
We talked to Boeing, we talked to the FAA. All agreed that
the wording was ambiguous. So they asked us to perform the most
conservative inspection on the night of March 11th. Once we
tried to do that inspection, we found that it could not be
done. The metal was such that it would not accept this
electrical eddy current device. It took all day on March 12th
to resolve that particular discrepancy.
So I do think that you will find things like that when all
of this is subjected to that level of scrutiny. I am not
complaining about it, but I am just pointing out that some of
the reactions that you might be seeing are in fact just taking
it to that level of detail. We had one aircraft that was
grounded for an entire weekend over a washer that is less than
the size of a dime. Historically, manufacturing allowances are
such that you could use one washer, two washers, up to three
washers. We had two washers on one bolt that was about an inch
and a half long. And it took all weekend to resolve whether we
could use two washers instead of one washer.
So there is that kind of detail that is embedded in 1,110
pages of inspections that human beings are being subjected to
try to work their way through. So I am sympathetic to what some
of the airlines are going through.
Ms. Brown of Florida. Would either one of you like to
respond to that question?
Mr. Collamore. I think the thing that led us astray was if
you looked in the preamble to the AD 2004-1806, the particular
question was asked about the area that Southwest Airlines had
missed during the NPRM stage that because of the window belt
and the over-wing exits the extra skin and doubler inside made
that area on stringer 10 between body stations 540 and 727
extremely difficult, if not impossible to inspect. And the
FAA's response at that time, from the ACO, the aircraft
certification office, was that because of the extra skin and
the doublers in that area, they did not consider that area as a
cracking concern.
I can't speak for Mr. Gawadzinski. But I believe that that
was what he had based his decision on to allow those airplanes
to be flown, because that was the exact same area that
Southwest Airlines had disclosed to us.
Ms. Brown of Florida. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you for those questions. They are very
pertinent and very right on point.
Mr. Kelleher and Mr. Kelly, earlier in the exchange, you
one, referred to a statement by Mr. Boutris that, or attributed
to him the 30-month violation. In fact, this is documented in
your own self-disclosure detail document on page three, time
violation remained undetected, 30 months. This is your own
document.
Reason why the violation was inadvertent, your response is,
due to individual human errors during the document data
transition, I won't go through all the items, were
inadvertently, the inspections were inadvertently omitted.
Unfortunately, due to the extended time span, we cannot
definitively determine the exact reasons the initial error
occurred and was then overlooked during creation of the
document, its revisions and reviews. We can reason that the
error occurred because of the complex nature of the ADs
involved.
Do you disagree with the ADs?
Mr. Kelly. Mr. Chairman, I don't remember the 30 months.
But our executive vice president reminds me that the 30 months
maybe the time that the document was out there in error, but
the actual aircraft were not in non-compliance for that entire
time period.
Mr. Oberstar. But do you disagree with this directive?
Mr. Kelly. No, I don't disagree with the AD, no.
Mr. Oberstar. Good. There is a process by which you can
disagree with Airworthiness Directives, not only you but all
airlines.
Mr. Kelly. No, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. You haven't done that and you're not in
disagreement?
Mr. Kelly. We are not, no.
Mr. Oberstar. Count one of the FAA fine imposition reads,
``Fifty-nine thousand seven hundred ninety-one of the flight
cycles addressed in paragraph 16 were operated at the time when
Southwest Airlines was unaware of its failure to incorporate
the repetitive external detailed and eddy current inspections
of stringer 10 left and right at body stations 540, 597 and
663, 727 at intervals not to exceed 4,500 flight cycles.''
Number 17, ``The aircraft addressed in paragraph two were
un-airworthy when they were operated on the flights above
because required AD inspections had not been accomplished.''
That is the finding of the FAA. Do you disagree with that?
Mr. Kelly. I think we have fully admitted that once we
discovered the non-compliance and self-reported it, that we
should not have continued to fly those aircraft based on what
we know today. So we certainly don't agree with that.
Mr. Oberstar. And that is the statement Mr. Kelleher made
earlier, we should not have flown?
Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. There are maybe many other questions, but
again, I just want to underscore that it is your own document
that says, time violation remained undetected, 30 months. This
was not attributable to an FAA inspector. This is your own
filing, your own admission. And I think that is appropriate. It
is candid. You should not be disputing the time frame.
Mr. Kelly. Well, again, as I say, my recollection is based
on the schedule of aircraft that I looked at, that the time
that we were beyond the 4,500 cycle requirement, the longest
time period was eight months. What I think the 30 months refers
to is the time that the AD documentation was created that had
the small area missing from the inspection. So I believe that
that is what the 30 months is. But I apologize, otherwise I
just, I don't recall the 30 months.
Mr. Oberstar. It is clear from the body of evidence
presented today and the testimony that there is a great deal of
adjustment that needs to be made and process at issue here.
Voluntary disclosure, partnerships, relationships, the ability
of a carrier to call and complain about an inspector and have
that person removed, those are things that should not be
happening within the safety context of FAA and its relationship
with the airlines. As Mr. Sabatini said earlier in response to
my questions, there are going to be substantial adjustments on
a number of those policies, and we will follow those very, very
closely. We look forward to airline participation in this
process as well.
I thank the panel for their presentation and testimony, and
appreciate your being here throughout this very long day.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you very much.
Mr. Kelleher. Thank you for the opportunity to appear.
Mr. Oberstar. You are always welcome.
Our next panel includes Mr. Tom Brantley, President of the
Professional Aviation Safety Specialists organization,
accompanied by Linda Goodrich, Vice President, Region IV of
PASS; Mr. Richard Andrews, Aviation Safety Inspector, American
Eagle Operations Unit, also of PASS; Mr. Joseph P. Thrash,
Aviation Safety Inspector, retired, for Continental Airlines;
and Mr. Bill McNease, retired Aviation Safety Inspector, FedEx
CMO.
I will ask you all to raise your right hand. Do you
solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before this
Committee in the matters now under consideration will be the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you,
God?
[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.]
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you.
Mr. Brantley, we will begin with you.
TESTIMONY OF TOM BRANTLEY, PRESIDENT, PROFESSIONAL AVIATION
SAFETY SPECIALISTS, ACCOMPANIED BY LINDA GOODRICH, REGION IV
VICE PRESIDENT, PROFESSIONAL AVIATION SAFETY SPECIALISTS;
RICHARD A. ANDREWS, AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTOR, AMERICAN EAGLE
OPERATIONS UNIT, AMR CMO, PROFESSIONAL AVIATION SAFETY
SPECIALISTS; JOSEPH P. THRASH, RETIRED AVIATION SAFETY
INSPECTOR, CONTINENTAL AIRLINES CMO; AND BILL MC NEASE, RETIRED
AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTOR, FEDEX CMO
Mr. Brantley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to begin by quickly introducing the people here with
me. I think they may very well end up being helpful. Linda
Goodrich, as you said, our Regional Vice President,
representing our aviation safety inspectors. And Rick Andrews,
a retired FAA safety inspector. I want to thank Rick for
offering his own comments today.
In the interest of time, I am going to dispense with my
prepared remarks. I would just like to comment on a few things
I have heard today that I found very disturbing. They relate to
this idea of whether this is an isolated incident, what
happened in the Southwest CMO or whether it is a systemic
problem. I see the FAA trying very hard to portray this problem
as a Southwest CMO problem.
What I would offer is that there are problems in that CMO
that are unique. They have the two factions down there that are
battling constantly. That really exacerbated the problems with
their system. But I think what we are seeing is a systemic
problem. The fact that we are seeing delays and cancellations
at many airlines, because they are grounding planes for checks,
for maintenance that they are concerned hasn't been done or
that in fact has not been done, speaks to the fact that this is
a systemic problem. I think trying to portray it as anything
else is a little misleading by FAA.
Along those lines, one of the things that has been most
disturbing to me has been the way the FAA has described this
special review that they have undertaken over the last 10 days.
I think it is clear to everyone that was nothing more than an
attempt to paint a picture for this Committee, plain and
simple. That review was set up in a manner that there was no
way they would find problems.
I mean, quite frankly, they made a public announcement that
they are doing this special review, and then they quietly sent
direction to inspectors that unless the aircraft is already out
of service for heavy maintenance, don't worry about a visual or
physical inspection. Review the data that you are provided by
the airline and make your determination based on that. That is
exactly what they did before this review.
So to expect them to find a problem that hadn't already
been found is kind of ludicrous. I think the biggest fear that
I have isn't that we know how unsafe things are, it is that we
have no idea right now what the status of the industry's
compliance with these airworthiness directives is. Frankly,
right now, we don't have any idea. We can guess that the
majority of them are done, and I think that is safe.
But without having the physical inspections that verify
compliance, I think it leaves everyone wondering exactly where
we are. I think until the FAA integrates that piece back into
their process, it is going to be a flawed process. I don't care
how much data you collect, if you don't know that the data is
good, it is meaningless, it is absolutely useless, as you
mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman.
I think until the agency is forthcoming about that and
faces that problem and deals with it, this is not going away. I
will conclude on that and I look forward to any questions you
might have.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you for your candor.
Ms. Goodrich?
Ms. Goodrich. I am going to turn this over to Rick Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Chairman Oberstar, Members of this Committee,
thank you for holding these hearings on the relationship
between the FAA and the airlines. My name is Richard Andrews. I
was employed as an aviation safety inspector by the FAA at the
American Eagle Certificate Management Office in the Southwest
Region and assigned as an aircrew program manager in the
American Eagle unit until March 31st of this year.
I am a member of the Professional Aviation Safety
Specialists and I served as the PASS representative for the
American Eagle Airlines Operations Unit in that Certificate
Management Office.
I have worked for the FAA over 31 years. During that time,
I have witnessed dramatic changes in the aviation industry.
When I first started my career with the FAA, safety of the
system was the priority. With the financial hardships facing
many of the airlines and the pay for performance mentality of
FAA managers, safety has become a second thought.
My work at the Certificate Management Office has proven to
me that management's primary goal is to fill the quotas for the
office, in other words, producing members is the focus, rather
than getting the job done right. As FAA inspectors, we are the
workforce trained to focus only on the safety of the system. It
is beyond frustrating when we discover a problem with an air
carrier and are prevented from doing anything about it. We are
frequently stopped in our tracks by several layers of
management and our focus is on pleasing the airlines.
Thirty-one years ago, I was out in the field with my hands
on airplanes and looking for safety problems. I had the power
to make a difference. Now, in the age of self-disclosure and
the tight relationships between FAA management and the
airlines, inspectors are sitting at their desks getting their
information into a computer. Unfortunately, what suffers most
from all this is the safety of the system.
I have seen and experienced the repercussions of these cozy
relationships between the FAA and airlines in the past. A
recent situation illustrates the point. In October of 2007, I
met with the American Eagle Unit assistant manager and
principal operations inspector to discuss the status of
American Eagle Airlines' flight operations and training. It was
agreed that American Eagle should be under surveillance, and I
was asked to start doing an in-depth evaluation of their
manuals and programs. After several months of working on this
project, in addition to my other full-time assignments, I came
up with numerous issues that placed regulatory compliance in
question.
After completing my research, I drafted 11 letters
detailing handbooks, compliance issues, procedural problems and
training issues. The drafts were forwarded to the principal
inspector so that he could put them into formal FAA letter
format. The principal inspector forwarded those letters to the
unit supervisor. And in November of 2007 and again in January
of 2008, I asked the unit supervisor about the status of the
letters in the presence of the principal inspector and the
assistant unit manager. On both occasions, the unit supervisor,
who I have been told used to work for American Eagle, responded
that we cannot send all those letters to American Eagle, as it
``will overwhelm them.''
However, after details of this hearing were released, I was
notified last week by the principal inspector that the unit
supervisor has now told him, get those letters out of this
office. It took over four months for anything to happen with
these letters. I am confident that nothing would have happened
if not for this hearing.
Due to the extended delay in sending out the letters,
several of the compliance issues I discovered remain
unaddressed or undocumented. I was forced to attempt to do
work-arounds on many of the issues. This has not damaged my
credibility with the air carrier, but it is not the best way to
address situations so important to public safety.
As I previously stated, I retired at the end of last month.
I would have worked longer, but I could not do so under the
current conditions that prevail at the FAA. Inspectors in large
offices are confined by all these get out of jail free
programs, and FAA's management's refusal to hold airlines
accountable.
Again, I thank the Committee for holding these hearings and
investigating these serious issues. As an experienced FAA
inspector, I believe nothing should ever be more important that
the agency's safety mission. Thank you.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you very much, Mr. Andrews. I greatly
appreciate your testimony. It raises issues that I will come
back to in a moment.
Mr. Thrash?
Mr. Thrash. I have heard Sam Rayburn's name only once
today, so I would like to hear it again. I would like to thank
the people from Tennessee for sending Sam Houston down to what
we can now say is Texas, and that is where I came from, through
Houston, via Lufkin, Houston, up here.
So they sent us both, Sam Rayburn and Sam Houston. So if
there is any Tennessee people out there, I want to thank you
very much. And I hope we can invoke their spirit in your hearts
to have the strength to follow through on some of the facts of
the matter that you have heard today.
I look around here and some of the people that I wanted to
talk to are gone. That is Mr. Stuckey, Mr. Sabatini and Mr.
Ballough. By the way, my name is Phil Thrash, and I have about
40 years operational aviation experience, military, part 121
Frontier Airlines. I was in the FAA unit that oversaw
Continental Airlines for 20 years. My last 10 years I served as
an FG-1825, that is an aviation safety inspector, air carrier
operations. My job description was the aircrew program manager
over the Continental Airlines Certificate Management Group in
Houston, Texas.
We do, did, when I left, have a functional CMO. My beef is
not with the airlines, but it is with FAA higher level
management. I put my family in the back of any of those
airlines right now, because that was my job, to enure that
their manuals and training programs complied with the orders of
the FAA and the regulations. My executive summary, which you
have, Continental Airlines contract mechanic was killed during
ground operations January 16th at El Paso, Texas. This was a
fatal aircraft accident and the flight crews' actions were
accepted into FAA's ASAP program during the week following the
accident. The week following the accident.
As the FAA's Boeing 737 aircrew program manager in the
Continental Airlines Certificate Management Office, I sent a
February 14th, 2006 e-mail to my professional disagreement with
the ASAP's decision to Administrator Blakey. On February 27th I
was interviewed by Assistant Manager of the FAA's American
Airlines CMO, Mr. Don Klos, regarding my e-mail concerns at the
request of Mr. Thomas Stuckey, who has departed. We know who he
is.
During the interview, Mr. Klos stated the previous week
that he had visited Thomas Stuckey and indicated that
Administrator Blakey and FAA's Associate Administrator, Mr.
Sabatini, who was also a part of these proceedings, told Mr.
Stuckey to investigate how the El Paso matter had gotten
accepted into ASAP. Mr. Klos stated during this February 27th,
2006 interview that he and Thomas Stuckey agreed that the
accident should not have been accepted into ASAP, but that
``Washington FAA'' would have the final call.
I advised Mr. Klos that the Continental CMO certificate
manager, Bernie Mullins, and Principal Operations Inspector,
John Merrifield, had stated in previous meetings with me that
ASAP had not provided any precursors to the El Paso accident.
The horse was already out of the barn. There was no quid pro
quo. That is what ASAP is based on, you get amnesty, you give
something. There was no quid pro quo.
A December 17th, 2001 memo by AFS-1 Director of Flight
Standards Service, Mr. Ballough, might be the key that Mr.
Scovel can use in your wisely-directed order to him to inspect
this ASAP program. This is a key memo, because it gives the
ASAP FAA event review committee member total autonomy in his or
her decision to accept or reject the crew member's ASAP report.
This event review committee is made up of three people: two
Continental people, usually a senior management captain and
usually a union representative. The FAA event representative
ASAP in our Continental Certificate Management Office was a
retired was a retired Continental Airlines pilot.
After the El Paso accident occurred, another Continental
Boeing 737 safety-related incident occurred, which was accepted
into ASAP. The Continental manager then, Bernie Mullins,
removed this ASAP representative from the ASAP program. During
this FAA ASAP representative's tenure from 2001 to 2006, I was
never contacted regarding any ASAP reports. The manager, POIs
and APMs could not access APM's data repository to gather risk
indicators, accident precursors on which to focus our limited
inspector resources. From the summer of 2006 until my
retirement, I conducted two enforcement investigative reports
regarding FAR violations and four reexaminations of airmen
under 47 U.S. Code, that is the Aviation Code, 44709 paragraph,
which was after this former ASAP representative, the ex-
Continental Airlines captain, was removed from his ASAP
position and was replaced with the aviation safety inspector,
who was rated on the 737.
During this tenure, from 2001 to 2006, this former ASAP
person, the Continental Airlines representative, was not
qualified on any of Continental's all-Boeing fleet.
AFS-2, FAA Deputy Director of Flight Standards Service,
John Allen, wrote an FAA memo dated April 28th to Administrator
Blakey as FAA's Flight Standards official position to my
February 14th, 2006 e-mail. Allen's memo appears to obfuscate
the facts that happened at El Paso to cover up these facts to
support that FAA's highest level management in the FAA's Flight
Standards Service, AFS-1's, Mr. Ballough, who is not here now,
and AFS-2's decision to sustain this matter acceptance into
ASAP. This memo is in the written testimony. It contains
fictionalizations, false statements, innuendoes and unfounded
conclusions. I recommend your questions to me in that regard.
If Mr. Allen's official memo of record was an intentional
obfuscation of facts, he may be in violation of Federal laws.
If Mr. Allen's official record contains unintentional mistakes
and misstatements of facts, he might be seen as incompetent. I
don't know if the Secretary of Transportation is still Ms.
Peters or not, she is? Well, I think she might need to know
about that as well.
On September 21st, 2006, Mr. Ballough, that is Mr. Allen's
boss, Mr. Ballough, AFS-1, the Director of Flight Standards
Service, sent an official letter of response to the Honorable
Texas Senators Kay Bailey Hutchison and Jon Cornyn to close out
their Congressional inquiries into the El Paso ASAP matter. Mr.
Ballough included Allen's aforementioned memo to corroborate
the FAA's Flight Standards official position on the acceptance
of the El Paso ASAP matter, a fatal aircraft accident, into
ASAP.
If Ballough intentionally forwarded to United States
Senators known fictionalizations, false statements,
inaccuracies and obfuscation of facts, he may have violated
some Federal laws. If unintentional, his competency might be in
question. I was unable to accomplish my duties as aircrew
program manager, which is on the front of 110(a), based on the
FAA Act of 1958, to sustain Flight Standards' mission statement
to provide accident-free operations to the traveling public.
Due to the policies and decisions made by James Ballough,
AFS-1, FAA Director of Flight Standards Service James Allen,
and AFS-2, FAA Deputy Director of Flight Standards Service, Mr.
Ballough, Mr. Allen, they sustained the acceptance of that
fatal accident into FAA's voluntary disclosure program known as
ASAP.
The DOT OIG has had my file since October of 2006. It is
very comforting to hear you give them guidance and orders to
look into the ASAP matters. I think Mr. Scovel will be on
target in that regard.
I think the Achilles heel is the 2001 memo, which we can
share with Mr. Scovel. Twice I made myself available to discuss
the matter with Administrator Blakey, Sabatini, Ballough and
Allen, which did not happen.
Mr. Nicholas Sabatini signed Regulation 14, CFR Part 193,
under provisions of 49 U.S.C. 40123, to essentially prohibit
the release of ASAP and other certain FAA-approved voluntary
disclosure information on January 26th, 2005. The regulation
essentially protects ASAP, which is a non-regulatory, voluntary
program, created by an advisory circular, which supplants
Federal Aviation regulations in this particular case, from the
public's rights and the freedom for information regarding their
safety.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you. Very precise, very specific
references. I appreciate that very much.
Mr. McNease.
Mr. McNease. First of all, I would like to thank you for
inviting me here today. Before I get into my statement, FedEx,
where I was located, FedEx Certificate, the last guy on the
seniority list is called the caboose. And I am the caboose
here. I am not going to talk about ASAP, I don't need to do
that, talk very little about ATOS. I can, because I have had
the opportunity to listen to all of the testimony, there are a
couple of items before I get into my statement that I would
like to mention.
Mr. DeFazio, and well, let me wait and maybe he will come
back and I will mention that. ATOS is now being mandated to all
135 operators and all 141 operators. It is going to be an
impossible situation. There is not going to be any way for that
to work. In the general aviation part of it, if you have one
inspector, you can have 10 certificates, how is he going to do
the work that it takes a fleet of people to do in the current
situation with ATOS. So mandating the new, the operators, 135
and 141, to go to ATOS, is again going to be a real problem, I
believe.
Just a little bit of background about myself, and I wasn't
going to tell you all this stuff, but I need to, I have
received numerous awards from the FAA. I was nominated as
inspector of the year for the Southern region in 2005. I
received a letter of commendation from Admiral Bussey many
years ago. I graduated first in my military flight school
class. I flew 173 combat missions.
I was appointed as the chairman of the Government Safety
Inspector Working Group for the International Society of Air
Safety Inspectors. I am a member of the Royal Aeronautical
Society. I have been a test pilot. I currently hold an airline
transport certificate with more than 16,500 hours and 40 years.
I have 23 type ratings. I have pilots certificates from
Switzerland, Italy, Indonesia, Costa Rica, Saudi Arabia, Malawi
and Hungary.
I was also an undercover pilot for the DEA and Customs.
Currently, I am the Director of Safety, Security and Regulatory
Compliance for an air carrier in China.
Now I am going to read my statement, if you don't mind. I
have spent 14 years of my life working for the U.S. Government;
10 of those with the FAA. During my last assignment with the
FAA as an inspector on the Federal Express certificate, I found
an issue with FedEx that has implications not with just FedEx,
but throughout the industry.
Due to the loss of retirement benefits and large cuts in
pilot salaries, many pilots are supplementing their income by
flying for companies other than their primary employer. This is
legal and in accordance with current Federal aviation
regulations only as long as flight, duty or rest times are
complied with.
What I found was that the Director of Operations at Federal
Express was issuing authorization letters allowing pilots to do
outside commercial flying. When I contacted the Federal Express
crew scheduling section, I was informed that the company has no
policy nor method to track outside commercial flying.
During the course of another investigation, it came to the
attention of our office that a pilot for FedEx had been caught
flying an illegal charter trip. The pilot admitted that he had
flown the trip, and immediate his status as check airman,
representing the FAA, was rescinded. This pilot is an MD-11
international captain.
Since this pilot and the company had possibly violated the
Federal aviation regulations by not recording or tracking the
outside commercial flying, I asked my supervisor how he wanted
me to proceed. I was told not to continue my investigation. I
was given no reason why not to proceed.
I followed up with an e-mail to my supervisor to verify
what I was told. No answer via e-mail was ever received by me.
I later met with my supervisor, along with another inspector to
act as a witness, and asked once again if he wanted me to not
investigate this matter. I got the same answer, do not continue
the investigation.
I was amazed that I was being told not to continue an
investigation with such far-reaching implications. I am not
implying that FedEx or the pilot involved had violated the
Federal aviation regulations. What I am saying is that without
an in-depth investigation, the FAA and FedEx have no way to
determine if a violation has occurred or is continuing to
occur.
This same situation applies throughout the airline industry
and to my knowledge is not being investigated. Since I have
given you this statement, and I will provide a copy of this to
the Committee, it is an INFO, Information for Operators
concerning this subject was issued by the FAA on March 21st,
2008. I don't think this is a coincidence that this was issued.
On another issue, I was treated the same way but at a much
higher level with the FAA. I was told from FAA management in
Washington to stop working on a problem. I attempted to contact
the Associate Administrator, Nick Sabatini, via e-mail,
telephone and through the chain of command for more than two
years. I never once received any acknowledgement from him, in
spite of his so-called open door policy.
I had the same situation with Mr. Ballough. I finally did
get to see him. The purpose of my meeting with Mr. Ballough was
to discuss an issue with Thomas Stuckey. I was given 30 minutes
to present my case. I was told that I would receive an answer
within two weeks from his staff. I am still waiting, it has
been two and a half years.
I understand that the other issue that has to do with
security, Chairman Oberstar has referred that matter to another
Committee. So I won't go into details at this time. But it is
very serious. I have met with the Homeland Security Committee
people and something will happen with that.
Now that Mr. DeFazio is back and Mr. Carney and Ms. Johnson
also, thank you very much for sticking around. I appreciate it.
One other thing, to Mr. DeFazio, I waited to hold this, you
questioned a number of times about Mr. Mills' hand delivering
everything. The answers you got from Mr. Sabatini, Mr. Ballough
and Mr. Stuckey seemed to think that, or they seemed to tell
you that that wasn't the way things happened. That is
incorrect. It was the way things happened. I was in the
Southern region, not the Southwest region. In the Southern
region, my manager had to go out and deliver every one of those
to everybody. It took him really probably a month and a half,
or at least that long. He had other duties. But it happened
throughout the FAA, it is not localized.
I hope you see that the testimony from all of us is that
this is, I believe, a systemic problem with the FAA. It is
happening in other parts of the Country, not just in the
Southwest region.
Thank you for your time. I would be happy to answer your
questions.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you very much for that testimony and
for the reaffirmation of Mr. Mills' testimony.
I have one question. Each of you has referred to this shift
that we have been discussing throughout the day of emphasis at
the FAA from a regulatory compliance oversight role in
maintenance to one that is airline-friendly, cooperative with
these voluntary disclosure programs, with the customer service
initiative, with ASAP and ATOS. When did you see this shift
occurring? During what period of time? What time frame was it
happening? It didn't happen all at once, it just happened
somewhat gradually, but you have all testified to it. We have
heard it throughout the day. You are on the ground level, tell
me when.
Mr. McNease. I spent three tours with the FAA. I left in
disgust all three times. It is terrible that I had to do that.
But when I left the FAA before this last time, when I retired,
I left in 1988. In 1988, we didn't have this problem. We just
didn't have the problem that we have now.
When I came back in 2003, I noticed then that in 2003, we
had another significant problem. Things had changed
considerably over that period of time.
Mr. Oberstar. Well, 1988 was roughly the Bussey era?
Mr. McNease. Yes, sir, it was.
Mr. Oberstar. There was a very compliance-oriented period
then.
Mr. Thrash?
Mr. Thrash. Thank you. And I would like to say, it is a
wise leader who surrounds himself with aviation expert
professionals, as you have done, with Clay Thushay
[phonetically]. As a Greek Hermes who was the pathfinder to
help people along their way, on line-oriented flight training,
which incorporated aircrew decision-making, he, I could say, I
guess, fair Clay, Robert Helmick was a mentor. Dr. Robert
Helmick worked in a brain trust sponsored by FAA, NASA and the
University of Texas on 23, not 2317 Showcreek, but on Showcreek
Boulevard down there, Lamar Boulevard. He also was a pioneer on
advance qualification programs, which is a voluntary training
program, which incorporates what Clay started, the crew
resource management. And aircrew decision making has been
responsible or probably even in the Flight Standards Guide for
more than 60 percent of fatal aircraft accidents. So aircrew
decision-making.
Getting back to your point, Bill here drew a good picture.
We are in sort of a schizophrenic situation. In 1988, we were
operating under two sets of rules, essentially. We have the
voluntary disclosure, which came along in I would say 1998 or
so, along with ATOS. And prior to that, 1988, we have a
compliance and enforcement order, it is 2150.3(a), I believe
that is right, 2150.3(a), which is a compliance order. It is an
order. It tells us what we do. And we have like a 45-day
deadline, once we start on an EIR, to get our facts together to
get it up to legal at that point.
After 1998, ASAP 2001 to 2006, as I previously mentioned, I
did not do an EIR. We had one of our attorneys come down from
the Southwest region, Tim Duff, and he said they are farming
him out to the Southern region, because he didn't have any
business in the Southwest region.
So anyway, I think to answer that question, 1998, when ATOS
took over and we started the voluntary ASAP. But we are still
under this, I would submit, this schizophrenic, we have two
sets of rules here.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you very much. That is roughly about
what I was thinking.
I want to move to Mr. DeFazio and recognize him at this
point for questioning.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. McNease, for helping fill out the testimony
of Mr. Mills. I felt it probably wasn't isolated, and I am
going to hope in some way the Committee can pursue that,
whether through the IG or someone else. We need to know how
many people basically were sent on this mission, which is to
hand deliver something which could have been easily and
effectively delivered electronically or via the United States
Postal Service. But I guess this Administration wouldn't want
to do that, because that means you are using Government
employees to deliver it.
But something that took them away from their critical
safety mission.
Mr. Oberstar. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DeFazio. Yes.
Mr. Oberstar. The fact that Mr. Mills and others that Mr.
McNease identified a moment ago were directed personally to
undertake this mission shows the high level of significance
upper FAA management placed on this cozy relationship structure
that they were setting up. That goes right to the top.
Mr. DeFazio. Yes. How about Mr. Brantley? Have you heard
this from others? Could you survey your folks and ask how many
were given this mission, maybe since we can't get a straight
answer out of the upper echelons of the FAA?
Mr. Brantley. Yes, Mr. DeFazio, we can survey them and see
what kind of feedback we get. I can tell you that just in
talking with inspectors throughout the Country, my
understanding is they were directed across the board to do
this, that managers in every office were told.
Mr. DeFazio. Well, how could that be if Mr. Sabatini, Mr.
Ballough and Mr. Stuckey didn't know a thing about it? I wonder
who directed them? I guess maybe someone above them directed
them and left them out of the loop?
Mr. Brantley. Their memories may not be as good in this
room as they are outside.
Mr. DeFazio. Yes.
Mr. Oberstar. That is the only salvation they have, because
they were testifying under oath. If they have faulty memory
under oath, that is one thing. But we have them on record.
Mr. DeFazio. Mr. Brantley, I think it was you or someone
else from PASS at a hearing in the not too distant past
testified about, we were talking about basically the scope of
inspectors' jobs and as I remember the particular focus of this
hearing was outsourcing and trying to find whether or not it
was possible for people to even get to and inspect the people
who are theoretically under the purview. I remember some
testimony that, working as quickly as they could, it would take
some people years before they could get around. Is that
accurate?
Mr. Brantley. Yes, that is accurate, sir. Just the process
of getting permission, getting it arranged and then being able
to get out and do it, the lead time is anywhere from six to
eight months if things go well. That is on something out of the
Country, yes.
Mr. DeFazio. But yet we heard again from Mr. Stuckey in a
rather cavalier way, well, they are out there all the time,
they are seeing, going around visiting people all the time, and
it would be no problem to ask them to just carry this multiple
page document with them and distribute it.
Mr. Brantley. I am comfortable saying that is simply not
true, sir.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. Well, I hope we can figure out what the
consequences would be. Do we still have that little jail over
there in the Capitol?
[Laughter.]
Mr. DeFazio. I also asked questions of them, the previous
panel, the customer service initiative. I think you are well
familiar, I talked about the changes I made in the law in 1996.
I am trying to nail them, whether after we changed the law in
1996, to say the focus is safety, not promotion, if we started
down that path and we were making progress and kind of removing
that conflict from people's minds and from their workplace, and
if we did start down that path, when did we go wrong? Was it
before 2003 or was it particularly in 2003 with this customer
service initiative? Can you give us a little, anything on that?
Mr. Brantley. In my recollection, I think your instincts
are probably pretty good. Because I think there has always been
an undercurrent in the FAA, but I really saw it start to
blossom around 2002, 2003. It has been the last five or six
years that it has really started moving strongly that way.
Mr. DeFazio. That is what I was afraid of. And
specifically, ValuJet came at the end of a bad era, and with
outsourcing, and we are into even more outsourcing today. I am
very alarmed, if we are back to the pre-1996 attitude with more
outsourcing than we had in 1995, 1996. Most of the majors have
outsourced now.
Mr. Brantley. Yes, sir, I believe we are, if not in a worse
state, we are at least back to where we were in 1996, 1997.
Mr. DeFazio. Do you think ATOS will protect us? Is that a
substitute?
Mr. Brantley. Again, when the data can't be verified,
without physically checking that the maintenance is being
accomplished and just taking the word of the carrier, I think
that is a flawed process, and we will continue to see problems
like what occurred with Southwest. Hopefully, they will be
compliance issues and not accidents.
Mr. DeFazio. I think in the case of Southwest, they didn't
try and phony up compliance, they didn't report that they had
complied and get bad data in the computer, it was more
complicated.
Mr. Brantley. Yes, absolutely.
Mr. DeFazio. But there could be, and I think back to the
good old days of Frank Lorenzo, imperious management that is
basically telling people to phony up data.
Mr. Brantley. Yes, sir. One of the keys that we have seen
is, ATOS was set up to try to accomplish oversight with limited
resources. But it has evolved over the last decade as not just
a way to do that, but a way to further reduce resources, if
possible. So one of the things we hear frequently from the FAA
is, we are trying to find a way to get the work done without
having the people.
And quite frankly, they have gone to a point where there is
not enough of the people doing the work that they should to
make sure that the data base that they're relying on, that this
automated system is a tool rather than the ultimate authority.
And right now it is the authority and it doesn't know what it
is talking about.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. Chairwoman Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Brantley, would you describe your professional
responsibilities?
Mr. Brantley. Yes, ma'am. Actually, my professional
responsibilities, as it relates to--are you referring to what I
would do for the FAA? I come from a different workforce. I come
from the systems specialists that repair and maintain the
equipment that the FAA uses to control air traffic. So I am not
an aviation safety inspector.
Ms. Johnson. And you work with a number of other
specialists?
Mr. Brantley. Yes, ma'am. Not today, but I have, yes. Today
I work full-time for the union.
Ms. Johnson. Okay. Has there ever been any discussion of
some of the relationships or some of the things that might be
missed because of it in your group?
Mr. Brantley. It is a little bit different, because there
is not the outside interaction. What we tended to see more in
the workforce I came from was managers or even employees going
to work for a company right after leaving the FAA and sometimes
not in the, let's say under questionable circumstances.
I can recall, there was a director of what was then airway
facilities, six or eight years ago, that retired from the FAA,
went to work for a company immediately after. And the way he
got around, apparently, ethics rules was the last year, six to
twelve of his months of employment with the FAA, he just
recused himself from being involved in any decisions that might
be related to that company. That seemed like an ethics problem
to me.
So I think there are loopholes that are found throughout
the FAA. That is something that I have had a concern with for a
while. But it is a very different issue than I think what you
are looking at with the inspector workforce.
Ms. Johnson. Do you think it is widespread practice that
the flight standard managers alter information entered into the
FAA data base or anything to protect the airlines?
Mr. Brantley. Ma'am, I think that is not just a bad idea, I
think that is, if not criminal, it should be. I just think that
if there is a difference of opinion, there should be a way to
document that and get it to a place where a decision can be
made.
But to give anyone the authority to just unilaterally
override what has been found, and this is the findings of an
investigation or an inspection, to just override that is I
think extremely poor judgment by the agency.
Ms. Johnson. Do you think the ATOS is broken?
Mr. Brantley. I need to qualify my answer, because I think
there is a lot of things that could be fixed with ATOS and with
the voluntary disclosure systems. I think there is value in
both of them. But quite frankly, unless there is a change in
leadership in the FAA, none of that will matter. Because the
culture has to change. And that won't change because of changes
in the programs. That has to come with changes in the people at
the top. And that has to flow down.
Until that happens, I think anything else would be
cosmetic, and it may keep things out of the newspapers for a
period of time. But the problems will be there, they will
remain.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you for your questions, very pointed
and right on target.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Carney.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is for anybody
who cares to jump in. I have asked this of prior panels earlier
today, too. It is about, since the investigation broke in the
press a couple of weeks ago, we have seen the FAA order the
national audit. In the last couple of weeks, hundreds of
aircraft have been grounded in six of the major airlines. Why
is that happening now? Why shouldn't this have been occurring
all along?
Mr. Brantley. Well, sir, I think, if I might start, it is
clear in my mind that there is fear that something is going to
be found that they wouldn't want to be found. There is going to
be an incentive for the airline to disclose that. One of the
things that I didn't mention earlier that is also a part of
this ongoing review that the FAA is doing, they are doing this
jointly with the airlines. So it is not like just inspectors
doing it, either. That way, if there is a problem found, it can
very easily be voluntarily disclosed. Then it is non-punitive.
And frankly, I think that gets to the heart of the problem
again.
It feels to me like the FAA just doesn't get it, or maybe
they're just arrogant enough to believe that they can do it
anyway.
Mr. Carney. Anyone else?
Mr. McNease. I will chime in just a bit, since I am not in
the Southwest region. If ATOS worked, somebody said this
earlier, if ATOS worked, these other carriers would have
already been identified as having those problems. ATOS didn't
work, I don't believe it is going to work, it is certainly not
going to work for the 135 carriers of which there are
thousands, not just a hundred. I don't see ATOS working. I
believe it failed.
Mr. Carney. How much of a problem do you all think the
revolving door is, private industry and FAA?
Mr. Andrews. I don't see that as near a big a problem as
ATOS is.
Mr. Carney. Really?
Mr. Andrews. No. And something that not been mentioned
about ATOS here is the resources that it drains from the
inspector workforce. The AFS 900 is a virtual office, and I
believe, it is my understanding they employ close to 100
inspectors there. So there is 100 inspectors that could be out
in the field, looking at airplanes, flying with pilots, doing
the job that we used to do, they are sitting in an office
somewhere generating questions on a computer.
And to answer the Congresswoman's question about, she had
some question earlier about the questions, I have been here 31
years, and some of the questions, the question that came up
was, how can we do the same SAI 5 times and get 5 different
results. I was with the FAA for 31 years, and some of the
questions that are contained in those SAIs and EPIs, I have no
idea what they mean. I mean, literally, some of them I have
read over and over again, trying to figure out what they want
me to do.
That is not an isolated incident. The entire system is set
up like that.
Mr. Carney. Mr. McNease, I will close on this, Mr.
Chairman, when you raised the issue to your management about
the FedEx pilot that took the illegal charter trip, what was
their response? Why did they not pursue action against this
pilot?
Mr. McNease. Their response to me was, don't do anything.
Actually, his illegal charter that he flew, in his own
airplane, I might add, that particular trip, the guidance that
we have in our enforcement handbook calls for any deliberate
violation of a regulation, any regulation, equals a revocation
of your certificates.
He received a 30-day suspension, which he was able to
whittle down at a hearing, or at a meeting with the FAA, to 13
days. He took two weeks' vacation and a day of sick leave, so
it didn't cost him anything. Not a thing.
So the enforcement guidelines were not followed in that
case. But that was a separate case from my issue. My issue was,
was he flying over the requirements using that trip and what he
was flying at Federal Express. Simply I don't know, because I
wasn't allowed to do my inspection. Why my supervisor told me
not to do the inspection is a question you ought to ask him.
Mr. Carney. Maybe we ought to ask that question, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. We can certainly send written questions and
require their response.
Mr. Carney. Very good. No further questions. Thanks to the
panel.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you, Mr. Carney, and members of the
panel, I want to thank you. But before we conclude, the
Inspector General made several suggestions and I am sure you
heard those, let me repeat. Recommending the establishment of
an independent body to investigate inspector concerns, do you
think that is a good idea?
Mr. Andrews. Can I speak to that?
Mr. Oberstar. Certainly.
Mr. Andrews. I think that is an excellent idea. A question
came up a while ago about the manipulation of the ATOS data.
Less than two months ago, I wrote a hot line complaint to the
Inspector General, and part of the problem I addressed was the
manipulation of inspection data. The IG apparently felt that it
wasn't within their purview, and they forwarded that complaint
down to the Federal Aviation Administration Flight Standards
Division.
And guess where they sent it? They sent it down to the two
guys that I wrote it about to answer. So I don't think our
existing hot line is effective in any way at all. In the past,
I have used the Administrator's hot line and I have used the IG
hot line as a lever to move this organization where I saw a
serious problem and couldn't address it from the floor up.
Mr. Oberstar. As the first panel today said, or Mr. Boutris
said, I signed my name.
Mr. Andrews. I did too, every time. Every time I have
submitted one, I put my name and phone number.
Mr. Oberstar. So what is a whistleblower, unidentified
whistleblower line going to do? If they don't pay attention
when you sign it, then how are you going to pay attention if
you don't sign it?
Mr. Andrews. Exactly. I have never asked for whistleblower
protections and I have never submitted an anonymous complaint.
I think if you are going to have an effective hot line, and I
think you need an effective hot line, it is going to have to be
something similar to the way a police department works, like a
civilian review board that has no outside or governmental
interest one way or the other.
Mr. Oberstar. The question is, we are going to have an
independent body, the IG said, recommended that the FAA
established it. I think that would be dangerous.
Mr. Andrews. Absolutely.
Mr. Oberstar. Who should be the originating entity to
create an independent body? Mr. Brantley?
Mr. Brantley. Mr. Chairman, as everyone has said, another
internal hot line is the last thing the FAA needs. I think this
needs to be set up by, it has to be independent. I think the IG
could probably come up with some regulations for that very
quickly. And with all respect to both the Inspector General and
the Office of Special Counsel, I would have a hard time
recommending to any of the members that I represent that they
go anywhere but one of those two places. Because there is
nothing internal to the FAA that will get their problems
resolved without them becoming a target.
Mr. Oberstar. That is absolutely right. I have been mulling
this over and probably a combination of recommendations by the
Inspector General, the Comptroller General, the General
Accounting Office or Government Accountability Office and maybe
Mr. Bloch's office.
Mr. Brantley. Absolutely.
Mr. Oberstar. Or a recommendation from the NTSB, which has
independent authority. Something of that nature.
Mr. Andrews. Mr. Oberstar, if I might, I have to tell you,
too, I was amazed to sit here today and listen to Mr. Stuckey
and Mr. Ballough and Mr. Sabatini speak about what heroes they
thought Mr. Boutris and Mr. Peters are. Because it has been my
experience over the last years that people like Mr. Boutris and
Mr. Peters and these gentlemen sitting here next to me are not
treated like heroes by the FAA.
Mr. Oberstar. They certainly weren't until this hearing.
Mr. Andrews. That is exactly right. And they generally
define this as problem employees or disgruntled. That is why
the people in our organization are afraid to stand up and be
counted. The culture inside the FAA is, there is no problem in
my unit, there is no problem in my office, there is no problem
in my region and there is no problem in the FAA. Until the FAA
admits that we have serious problems, they are not going to be
able to fix themselves.
Mr. McNease. I would like to say that I do agree with an
outside agency, however it is set up. The hot line deal doesn't
work, because it does come right back down to the inspector.
And everybody knows who it comes back to. But you mentioned
earlier, and you mentioned in one of your press conferences
prior to this that we need to clean house here. It needs to
start from the top. I think all of us agree here on this panel
in particular that it certainly needs to happen from the top.
That is Mr. Sabatini, Mr. Ballough and Mr. Stuckey. If you
think integrity is an issue, there is more to check into. There
are a lot of integrity problems.
It is just unfortunate that they have been allowed to take
us down this route. I believe they have done it. I believe that
when Mr. Sabatini said, the buck stops here, I agree, it stops
there. And it should stop there and action should be taken.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you. Mr. Thrash?
Mr. Thrash. I would like to piggyback on what Mr. McNease
said. The ferret, warm-blooded animal, was used before the
common era, you have to say BCE any more to be sensitivity
proper, but nevertheless, it was used to exterminate vermin for
ages and ages and ages. It looks like a mink and it is small
and warm-blooded and thin-bodied and they can be domesticated.
They were introduced into the United States in the 1800s
from sailing ships, because they were infested with rats. The
sailors didn't like the rat terriers, because they barked and
kept them awake. The cats were a favorite, but the rats could
get into the hold and the cats couldn't get them.
But when they brought the ferrets in, the rats didn't have
any place to go. And of course, if you have some rats in the
rafters higher up in these places here in the Washington area
and the division area, the term, metaphorically of course, rats
of abuse, metaphorically speaking, obviously, the term ``ferret
out'' comes from that. And you all have the horsepower to get
that done.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you.
We are going to use that horsepower, and today's hearing
was a launch pad to do that. Your testimony and those of your
colleagues preceding you are powerful tools for us to use to
improve aviation safety.
The real question is, does the buck really stop with Mr.
Sabatini? Or does it go higher? That is a question that we
aren't really going to know until there is a sweeping change of
administration and a new administrator and we begin making
corrections from the top down.
My Italian grandfather immigrated from Naples. When you
look at a fish, you know whether it is good or not if the head
is in good shape. But if the head is rotting, then the whole
fish is no good. And we have to take a good look at this fish.
Thank you very much for your testimony, for your candor,
for your courage in coming forward. This has been a most
enlightening and invigorating hearing. We will proceed forward
with lessons learned today.
The Committee stands adjourned. I thank Members for
persisting throughout this day as well.
[Whereupon, at 7:37 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
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