[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AVIATION SECURITY RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT AT THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 24, 2008
__________
Serial No. 110-97
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
41-800 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
---------------------------------------------------------------------
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001
______
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
MARK UDALL, Colorado LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
DAVID WU, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
NICK LAMPSON, Texas JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JERRY MCNERNEY, California JO BONNER, Alabama
LAURA RICHARDSON, California TOM FEENEY, Florida
PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
JIM MATHESON, Utah MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BARON P. HILL, Indiana PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
------
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation
HON. DAVID WU, Oregon, Chairman
JIM MATHESON, Utah PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
CHARLIE A. WILSON, Ohio JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
MIKE ROSS, Arizona PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
LAURA RICHARDSON, California
BART GORDON, Tennessee RALPH M. HALL, Texas
MIKE QUEAR Subcommittee Staff Director
RACHEL JAGODA BRUNETTE Democratic Professional Staff Member
MEGHAN HOUSEWRIGHT Democratic Professional Staff Member
TIND SHEPPER RYEN Republican Professional Staff Member
PIPER LARGENT Republican Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
April 24, 2008
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative David Wu, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 6
Written Statement............................................ 7
Statement by Representative Phil Gingrey, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.......... 7
Written Statement............................................ 9
Prepared Statement by Representative Laura Richardson, Member,
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.................. 9
Prepared Statement by Representative Harry E. Mitchell, Member,
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.................. 10
Prepared Statement by Representative Adrian Smith, Member,
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.................. 10
Witnesses:
Dr. Susan Hallowell, Director, Transportation Security
Laboratory, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of
Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 11
Written Statement............................................ 13
Biography.................................................... 19
Mr. Adam Tsao, Chief of Staff, Office of Operational Process and
Technology, Transportation Security Administration, Department
of Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 20
Written Statement............................................ 21
Dr. Jimmie C. Oxley, Professor of Chemistry, University of Rhode
Island (URI); Co-Director, URI Forensic Science Partnership;
Co-Director, DHS University Center of Excellence in Explosive
Detection, Mitigation, and Response
Oral Statement............................................... 23
Written Statement............................................ 24
Biography.................................................... 27
Dr. Colin G. Drury, Distinguished Professor and Chair, Department
of Industrial and Systems Engineering, State University of New
York at Buffalo
Oral Statement............................................... 27
Written Statement............................................ 29
Biography.................................................... 32
Discussion....................................................... 34
Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Dr. Susan Hallowell, Director, Transportation Security
Laboratory, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 44
Mr. Adam Tsao, Chief of Staff, Office of Operational Process and
Technology, Transportation Security Administration, Department
of Homeland Security........................................... 51
Dr. Jimmie C. Oxley, Professor of Chemistry, University of Rhode
Island (URI); Co-Director, URI Forensic Science Partnership;
Co-Director, DHS University Center of Excellence in Explosive
Detection, Mitigation, and Response............................ 55
Dr. Colin G. Drury, Distinguished Professor and Chair, Department
of Industrial and Systems Engineering, State University of New
York at Buffalo................................................ 56
AVIATION SECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AT THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 24, 2008
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:10 p.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. David Wu
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Aviation Security Research and
Development at the Department of
Homeland Security
thursday, april 24, 2008
1:00 p.m.-3:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
1. Purpose
On Thursday, April 24, 2008, the Subcommittee on Technology and
Innovation will hold a hearing to review the aviation security-related
research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities of
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This hearing will also
explore how the Transportation Security Laboratory and other components
of DHS support the needs of the Transportation Security Administration,
the aviation industry, and passengers generally through research,
development, and education.
2. Witnesses
Dr. Susan Hallowell is the Director of the Transportation Security
Laboratory (TSL), a component of the Department of Homeland Security's
Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T).
Mr. Adam Tsao is the Chief of Staff of the Office of Operational
Process and Technology of the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA).
Dr. Jimmie Oxley is a Professor of Chemistry at the University of Rhode
Island and Co-Director of the DHS Center of Excellence for Explosives
Detection, Mitigation, and Response.
Dr. Colin Drury is a distinguished Professor and Chair of the
Department of Industrial Engineering at the University at Buffalo.
3. Brief Overview
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was
created in 2001 to act as a centralized federal authority to
manage transportation security efforts in the United States.
The Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) provides support
for TSA's mission through research, technology development,
testing and evaluation, and technical support for deployed
technologies. TSL became part of the Department of Homeland
Security Science and Technology Directorate in FY 2006.
Previously, TSL was managed by the Federal Aviation
Administration.
Research priorities at TSL are generally set through
the transportation security Integrated Product Team, which
convenes stakeholder components of DHS, including TSA, to
discuss capability gaps and determine which R&D projects are
most likely to meet users' needs. Additionally, TSL coordinates
with DHS S&T's explosives division and will work with the newly
formed Center of Excellence for Explosives Detection,
Mitigation, and Response. The lab also tests and certifies
equipment submitted by outside vendors for eventual inclusion
on TSA's qualified product list (QPL), which allows vendors to
sell those products to TSA.
Technology development priorities are also influenced
by outside requirements stemming from intelligence or publicity
of particular threats, such as the liquid explosives incident
in August 2006.
TSL has particular expertise in testing and
evaluation, and hosts specialized laboratories capable of
handling explosives for technology validation. However, TSL
currently does not have the capacity to test screening
technologies in a realistic setting, where a network of devices
are used to detect potential threats. Additionally, TSL does
not carry out field tests of technology, but does provide
technical support to TSA for technologies in use at airports.
4. Issues and Concerns
Will the ongoing research, development, testing and evaluation projects
at the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) meet the Transportation
Security Administration's present and future needs? Is there adequate
investment in basic research at TSL to allow the lab enough flexibility
to address rapidly emerging threats? TSA is responsible for setting
technology development priorities at TSL through the Integrated Product
Team process, but budget limitations and demand for immediate
technological responses to high-profile threats (such as liquid
explosives or shoe bombs) can distract the lab from longer-term needs.
Additionally, because of variations in airport design and passenger
capacity, TSA cannot have a standard checkpoint design that works at
every airport. A good solution to these conflicting pressures is strong
investment in basic research, which provides the scientific basis to
allow the laboratory to be flexible in its response to emerging threats
and varying needs.
Does TSL's testing and evaluation of aviation security technology
provide adequate information to the end-users at TSA? How are the tests
designed, and what are the criteria for success? Are technologies that
are tested or certified by TSL ready for deployment? If not, what
additional efforts are necessary to bring technologies to full
readiness, and how does TSL contribute to those efforts? TSL's testing
and evaluation (T&E) protocols are considered a model for the
Department of Homeland Security, but some technologies are deployed by
TSA in spite of technical or operational issues (TSL does not control
deployment schedules). Many of these issues could be identified or
resolved if TSL was able to test devices in a realistic checkpoint
scenario that incorporates a networked system of devices and carries
out tests based on screeners' and passengers' needs and capabilities.
Moreover, as technology develops, TSL must continually update
performance and technical standards to address new capabilities and new
requirements.
Additionally, at its current capacity, TSL will likely have an
increasingly difficult time keeping up with TSA's needs. According to
the Director of TSL, their work for TSA has tripled since April 2006
while funding for the lab has decreased. If this imbalance continues,
T&E capabilities at TSL will continue to suffer.
Does TSL adequately incorporate human factors engineering and human-
technology interface principles into technology design and testing? How
do TSA and TSL test and evaluate whether human-technology interface
principles have been properly applied in the design and manufacturing
of aviation security technologies? To move passengers and luggage
efficiently through checkpoints, screeners need technology to help them
search for contraband or dangerous items. As the list of forbidden
items grows in response to newly identified threats, screeners' jobs
become more and more difficult and need improved technological
responses. The best technologies take into account screeners' technical
skills and needs and looks at the ``human-technology interface;'' how
well technology meshes with those skills and needs. Moreover, since
these technologies are used in a public setting, passenger acceptance
is also crucial. Designers must consider whether passengers would
object or be seriously inconvenienced by technologies before they are
deployed to avoid public outcry that might ultimately harm the aviation
industry by driving away customers. Some recent controversies, such as
the deployment of the back-scatter machine--which appears to virtually
strip-search passengers-could have been avoided through careful
attention to human-technology interface issues.
5. Background
Technology plays a major role in aviation security operations.
Screeners employed by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
employ a variety of sensors to scan passengers and luggage for
dangerous items quickly and efficiently. Many of these technologies, as
well as other security devices, are developed, tested, or certified at
the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) in Atlantic City, NJ. This
lab, part of the DHS S&T Directorate, conducts research, development,
testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) for explosives detection and other
transportation security related technologies with the goal of deploying
these technologies to TSA.
The Transportation Security Laboratory, a component of the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and TSA before its transfer to the DHS
Science and Technology Directorate in FY 2006, hosts specialized
facilities for research, development, testing, and evaluation of
innovative technologies for detecting threats to the transportation
sector. In addition to basic and applied research and technology
development, TSL carries out certification, qualification, and
assessments of technologies developed by private industry for use by
TSA.
The laboratory has built capacity in a number of technology areas
critical to transportation security, including bulk and trace sensors,
devices for understanding the physics of explosions, technology for
enhancing explosion survivability, communications equipment, and access
control technologies. There are also six laboratories at TSL dedicated
to testing explosives and weapons detection equipment. Finally, in
addition to its RDT&E capacity, TSL also maintains models of all
deployed technologies at the Atlantic City facility for troubleshooting
and technical support purposes.
RDT&E priorities for TSL are generally set by TSA, though they are
influenced by the work of other DHS S&T components, including the
Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC)
and the DHS S&T Explosives Division. DHS S&T uses a formal process that
convenes Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) comprised of officials from
DHS components who advise the S&T Directorate on their technology
needs, thus informing specific research priorities. The planned
transportation security IPT will be lead by TSA and will include
stakeholders such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the U.S. Coast Guard
(USCG) who will select transportation security related technology
development projects for TSL to undertake. To date, TSA has indicated
that they are especially interested in projects for enhancing
checkpoint security. TSL also coordinates with the Explosives Division
of DHS S&T, which is guided by a separate but related explosives IPT
that is currently focusing on standoff detection of improvised
explosive devices (IEDs).
TSA is also responsible for guiding testing and evaluation (T&E)
priorities at TSL. Tests are constrained by the various lab
capabilities, but TSL is able to carry out testing and validation for a
wide array of technologies, including devices for baggage and personnel
inspection, cargo inspection, infrastructure protection, and conveyance
protection. The technologies that are tested at TSL include those
developed internally, as well as by outside industry. TSA can
specifically request certification of outside products for a qualified
product list (QPL) that TSA uses to determine whether a technology is
suitable for procurement and deployment. The laboratory will also begin
developing plans to create a testing facility to model a full airport
checkpoint, which would examine the technical performance of various
technologies when they are integrated into a realistic system. TSA is
also planning to build a similar facility for field testing
technologies that are integrated into a checkpoint, but the aim of that
facility would be technology operations and robustness.
Chairman Wu. I would like to welcome everyone to this
afternoon's hearing on aviation security research and
development at the Department of Homeland Security. Since 2001,
aviation security has vastly improved. There are new policies
in place to help protect passengers and aircraft, and aviation
security professionals are better trained to detect dangerous
items. Of course, technology plays a critical role. Significant
advances in aviation security technologies have led to
screening equipment that is faster and more reliable than the
last generation, allowing Transportation Security
Administration screeners to process passengers and baggage
efficiently while still keeping prohibited items off planes.
However, improvements still need to be made. Last year, a
Government Accountability Office test of airport checkpoints
found that explosive devices could be smuggled through
undetected. There have also been recent news reports
highlighting security failures, including a January 2008 CNN
segment that featured a TSA employee slipping a bomb past
screeners in a planned test. One of GAO's key recommendations
for dealing with these shortcomings was to invest in improving
security technologies.
The Transportation Security Laboratory, or TSL, is at the
forefront of developing the next generation of aviation
security technology. This laboratory, which was transferred to
the DHS Science and Technology Directorate in fiscal year 2006,
serves as the Nation's key resource for transportation
security-related research, development, testing, and
evaluation. In addition to groundbreaking research on
explosives, TSL develops and validates passenger and luggage
screening technologies, certifies devices developed by private
industry, and provides technical support to TSA for deployed
technologies.
Rigorous testing and evaluation are an important step
towards ensuring that new technologies meet TSA's technical
needs. Currently, TSA works closely with the laboratory to
develop test protocols and define criteria for success. But the
security failures discovered by GAO and others illustrate the
need to constantly update tests to ensure that technologies can
deal with emerging threats. Technologies deployed before they
are truly ready cement the perception that aviation security is
nothing but theater.
Finally, we often forget that a technology is only as
successful as the person operating it, and this is especially
true in the aviation security sector, where screeners must
determine whether objects identified by screening technologies
are truly dangerous. Additionally, passengers also play a key
role in any technology's performance and success. If passengers
find screening technologies too cumbersome or too intrusive,
the consequences can ripple across the entire aviation sector.
TSL and TSA must work together to ensure that human factors are
taken into consideration from the first stages of technologic
development.
Dr. Hallowell has said in the past that she envisions a
checkpoint in the future where no one has to empty their
pockets, take off their shoes, or try to fit their toothpaste
and deodorant into a tiny plastic bag in order to get on an
airplane, and I for one truly look forward to that day. The
Committee applauds that goal, and I want to work with you all
and the TSA to ensure that the next generation aviation
security technologies are effective and efficient while meeting
the needs of all screeners and passengers.
I would now like to recognize my friend and colleague, the
Ranking Member from Georgia, Dr. Gingrey, for his opening
statement.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Wu follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman David Wu
This hearing will come to order. Good afternoon. I'd like to
welcome everyone to this afternoon's hearing on Aviation Security
Research and Development at the Department of Homeland Security.
Since 2001, aviation security has vastly improved. There are new
policies in place to help protect passengers and aircraft, and aviation
security professionals are better trained to detect dangerous items. Of
course, technology plays a critical role. Significant advances in
aviation security technologies have led to screening equipment that is
faster and more reliable than the last generation, allowing
Transportation Security Administration screeners to process passengers
and baggage efficiently while still keeping prohibited items off
planes.
However, improvements still need to be made.
Last year, a Government Accountability Office test of airport
checkpoints found that explosive devices could be smuggled through
undetected. There have also been recent news reports highlighting
security failures, including a January 2008 CNN segment that featured a
TSA employee slipping a bomb past screeners in a planned test. One of
GAO's key recommendations for dealing with these shortcomings was to
invest in improving security technologies.
The Transportation Security Laboratory, or TSL, is at the forefront
of developing the next generation of aviation security technology. This
laboratory, which was transferred to the DHS Science and Technology
Directorate in FY 2006, serves as the Nation's key resource for
transportation security-related research, development, testing, and
evaluation. In addition to ground-breaking research on explosives, TSL
develops and validates passenger and luggage screening technologies,
certifies devices developed by private industry, and provides critical
technical support to TSA for deployed technologies.
Rigorous testing and evaluation are a crucial step towards ensuring
that new technologies meet TSA's technical needs. Currently, TSA works
closely with the laboratory to develop test protocols and define
criteria for success. But the security failures discovered by GAO and
others illustrate the need to constantly update tests to ensure that
technologies can deal with emerging threats. Technologies deployed
before they are truly ready cement the perception that aviation
security is nothing but theater.
Finally, we often forget that a technology is only as successful as
the person operating it. This is especially true in the aviation
security sector, where screeners must determine whether objects
identified by screening technologies are truly dangerous. Additionally,
passengers also play a key role in any technology's performance and
success. If passengers find screening technologies too cumbersome or
too intrusive, the consequences can ripple across the entire aviation
sector. TSL and TSA must work together to ensure that human factors are
taken into consideration from the first stages of technology
development.
Dr. Hallowell has said in the past that she envisions a checkpoint
of the future where no one has to empty their pockets, take off their
shoes, or try to fit their toothpaste and deodorant into a tiny plastic
bag in order to get on an airplane. The Committee applauds that goal,
and I want to work with you and the TSA to ensure that next generation
aviation security technologies are effective and efficient while
meeting the needs of all screeners and passengers.
I'd now like to recognize my colleague, the Ranking Member from
Georgia, Dr. Gingrey, for an opening statement.
Mr. Gingrey. Good afternoon, Chairman Wu, and I want to
apologize in advance to our distinguished panel because I am
going to have to step out after I make the opening statement,
hopefully to come back because I don't want to miss all of this
important, very, very important hearing from such a
distinguished panel. Dr. Oxley, I see you are a Professor of
Chemistry. I have a degree, a BS, in chemistry from Georgia
Tech from a long time ago. I hope if you are still doing any
teaching that you grade a little easier than those monsters
that I had at Georgia Tech. In any regard, Mr. Chairman, thank
you for holding this important hearing today on the Department
of Homeland Security's aviation security program.
Aviation security is an issue that affects every Member of
Congress, as passengers across the country put their faith in
the Transportation Security Administration to have the
technology in place to keep them safe as they travel. We have
an excellent opportunity today to discuss how to best put the
immense creative talent of our country's scientists an
engineers to use to prevent acts of terrorism in our airports
and skies. Aviation continues to be a target, no question about
it, as evidenced by the publicized liquid explosive plot from
2006 and of course the attempted attack by the famous, infamous
shoe bomber, Richard Reid, back in 2001.
A successful attack like the tragic one that did occur on
September 11, 2001, would yield an immediate and catastrophic
loss of life, create economic losses throughout the aviation
industry and possibly beyond. In fact, I think if that occurred
today, it would be a lot more devastating economically than it
was back in 2001, what with the price of jet fuel and the
airlines struggling.
But there is no easy, all-encompassing solution against a
cunning and committed enemy. We must continually review and
refine every defense and seek out new ideas and technologies
that will better nullify the threats that will continue to be
there. And we must also recall that this is but one challenge
to implementing an effective, efficient, and evolving defense
of our homeland.
I am eager to hear what the witnesses have to say about
this challenge and how we can improve our current aviation
security efforts. Mr. Chairman, we must also ensure that our
substantial investments of R&D and new aviation security
technologies work as advertised. They are coordinated
throughout the government, include appropriate university
researchers and private-sector companies. And to that end, I am
particularly interested in hearing how the TSA and
Transportation Security Lab witnesses describe their
relationship and what is the plan for the future. Formerly part
of TSA, the Transportation Security Lab became part of the
Science and Technology Directorate of the Department of
Homeland Security back in 2006. The lab possesses many of the
world's foremost experts on all kinds of aviation security
technology and of course supports research, development, tests,
and evaluation of activities based on the requirements and the
priorities of TSA.
Within the wide aviation security industry, some have had
difficulty understanding the roles and the responsibilities of
TSA and TSL and how other institutions, like universities,
national labs, or private companies can best contribute. I hope
that our witnesses today will be able to clarify and clearly
and concisely lay out who is developing our aviation security
strategy and how that strategy is being implemented. How can a
university researcher determine what TSA's most pressing, basic
research needs are? How can a private company translate broad
equipment requirements to technical specs that can lead to a
commercially available product? Is there a standard process for
tests and evaluation of new technologies? The answers to these
questions will lessen confusion outside of the Department of
Homeland Security and it will allow TSA to create more
successful partnerships.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our
distinguished panel, and with that, I will yield back the
balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gingrey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Phil Gingrey
Good afternoon, Chairman Wu. Thank you for holding this important
hearing today on the Department of Homeland Security's aviation
security programs. Aviation security is an issue that affects every
Member of Congress as passengers across the country put their faith in
the Transportation Security Administration to have the technology in
place to keep them safe as they travel.
We have an excellent opportunity today to discuss how best to put
the immense creative talent of our country's scientists and engineers
to use to prevent acts of terrorism in our airports and skies.
Aviation continues to be a target, as evidenced by the publicized
liquid explosives plot from 2006 and the attempted attack by ``shoe
bomber'' Richard Reid in 2001. A successful attack like the tragic one
that occurred on September 11, 2001 would yield an immediate and
catastrophic loss of life, and create economic losses throughout the
aviation industry and possibly beyond.
But there is no easy, all-encompassing solution. Against a guileful
and committed enemy, we must continually review and refine our defenses
and seek out new ideas and technologies that will better nullify the
threats against us. We must also recall that this is but one challenge
to implementing an effective, efficient, and evolving defense of our
homeland. I am eager to hear what the witnesses have to say about this
challenge and how we can improve our current aviation security efforts.
Mr. Chairman, we must also ensure that our substantial investments
in R&D and new aviation security technologies work as advertised, are
coordinated throughout the government, and include appropriate
university researchers and private sector companies. To that end, I am
particularly interested in hearing our TSA and Transportation Security
Lab (TSL) witnesses describe their relationship and plans for the
future.
Formerly part of TSA, the Transportation Security Lab became part
of the Science and Technology Directorate of DHS in 2006. The lab
possesses many of the world's foremost experts on all kinds of aviation
security technology and supports research, development, test, and
evaluation activities based on the requirements and priorities of TSA.
Within the wider aviation security industry, some have had
difficulty understanding the roles and responsibilities of TSA and TSL
and how other institutions like universities, national labs, or private
companies can best contribute. I hope that our witnesses today will be
able to clearly and concisely lay out who is developing our aviation
security strategy and how that strategy is being implemented.
How can a university researcher determine what TSA's most pressing
basic research needs are? How can a private company translate broad
equipment requirements to technical specifications that can lead to a
commercially available product?
Is there a standard process for test and evaluation of new
technologies? Answers to these questions will lessen confusion outside
of DHS and allow TSA to create more successful partnerships.
Again, I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel and
with that Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Wu. Thank you, Dr. Gingrey, and we look forward to
your return once you have taken care of other very important
tasks.
If there are other Members who wish to submit additional
opening statements, the statements will be added at this point
in the record.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Richardson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Laura Richardson
Thank you Chairman Wu for holding this very important hearing
today, and our witnesses for your attendance.
In a post 9/11 world, is there a topic that is more important than
the one we are discussing today? That awful day back in 2001 stole our
innocence and put our nation and Congress on high alert. No longer
could we take for granted the safety of the two million passengers that
pass through our nations airports. Our enemies raised the stakes, and
it was critical that we responded thoroughly in order to minimize the
chances that an event like 9/11 could never happen again.
While there has not been another terrorist attack on our soil since
9/11, at times it seems like we are two steps behind the terrorist in a
reactionary mode. First there was the shoe bomb incident. As a result
we all have to take our shoes off when we pass through security
checkpoints. Then there was the threat of liquid explosives, which
forced TSA to ban passengers from carrying liquids on board. While no
one could have predicted these events, it is imperative that TSA and
other federal agencies tasked with protecting all of us are more
proactive in their attempts to protect us. This can be achieved if we
were to heed the advice that our witness Jimmie C. Oxley offered in his
written testimony, and that is to ``increase communication to
technology suppliers with respect to emerging threats, scenarios and
threat levels.'' We simply can not protect ourselves, if our
researchers do not know the extent of the threat.
On that note my staff recently had the opportunity to visit the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) laboratories in
Gaithersburg, MD, where the scientist there are conducting research
into trace explosive detection. While the Transportation Security
Laboratory (TSL) is the primary source for aviation security R&D, I
hope that these two agencies can collaborate on more research projects,
because every federal agency plays a vital role in aviation security on
some level.
Let me conclude by stating that the timing of this hearing could
not be better as most of my colleagues, including myself will travel by
air back to our districts for the weekend.
I look forward to this discussion, and I hope that we as a
committee can learn from this hearing what we can do to assist TSA, and
DSH in their ongoing efforts to protect all who travel in the United
States.
Mr. Chairman I yield back my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mitchell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Harry E. Mitchell
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is tasked with
managing transportation security efforts to ensure that our airline
passengers can fly safely.
However, as the number and type of threats continues to increase,
it is essential to ensure that TSA has the tools it needs to protect
airline passengers.
The Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) supports the TSA
through research, technology development, testing and evaluation, and
testing support for security technologies.
Clearly safety and security must be our top priorities. But we also
need to ensure that our new technologies are practical, and can work in
a realistic passenger screening setting.
I look forward to hearing more from our witness on how we can keep
our passengers safe.
I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Adrian Smith
Thank you Chairman Wu. It's a pleasure to be here this afternoon
for this subcommittee hearing on the Department of Homeland Security's
Transportation Security Laboratory and aviation security. Subcommittee
Ranking Member Gingrey has been detained at a meeting of the House
Armed Services Committee and will be joining this hearing when
possible. He has an insightful opening statement that he will submit
for the record and which I urge everyone to read.
There is an obvious and immediate need for improvements in aviation
security within the U.S. and around the world. Airlines continue to be
targeted for attack, and new types of threats are being exposed
everyday. We need the help and support of scientists and engineers to
defend against the wide variety of explosives and weapons that could be
used in an attack.
Members of Congress take a lot of flights back and forth between
Washington and our homes. And while we may feel like aviation security
experts ourselves after the hundredth flight, the real expertise is
before us today. The panel has a wealth of experience and knowledge in
this area, and I'm looking forward to learning what I can from you.
Before closing, I would also like to echo a statement in Dr.
Gingrey's prepared remarks. A large number of companies and individual
researchers have looked at how they might improve aviation security
after the tragic events of 9-11. However, within this wider aviation
security industry, the roles and responsibilities of TSA, TSL, and
other institutions like universities, national labs, or private
companies are poorly understood. In your testimony today, I hope the
witnesses can provide clear and concise guidance for how our aviation
security strategy is set and how that strategy impacts technology
development.
Again, thank you for taking the time to speak with us today. Mr.
Chairman, I will yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Wu. And now I am delighted to introduce our expert
panel. Dr. Susan Hallowell is the Director of the
Transportation Security Laboratory. Mr. Adam Tsao is the Chief
of Staff of the Office of Operational Process and Technology
which handles technology procurement issues for the
Transportation Security Administration. I actually had to read
that phrase three times this morning so I wouldn't trip over it
right now. Dr. Jimmie Oxley is a Professor of Chemistry at the
University of Rhode Island and is the Co-Director of the newly
awarded DHS University Center of Excellence for Explosives
Detection--see, I should have read that more carefully--
Explosives Detection, Mitigation, and Response. And finally,
Dr. Colin Drury is a Distinguished Professor and Chair of the
Department of Industrial Engineering at the State University of
New York at Buffalo.
As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony should be
about five minutes long after which the Members of the
Committee will have five minutes each to ask questions. Please
feel free to summarize your written testimony, and we shall
begin with Dr. Hallowell.
STATEMENT OF DR. SUSAN HALLOWELL, DIRECTOR, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY LABORATORY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Dr. Hallowell. Good afternoon, Chairman Wu and
distinguished Members of the Committee. It is an honor for me
to appear before you today and provide information about the
Transportation Security Laboratory which is part of the
Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology
Directorate.
The Transportation Security Laboratory has historically
been responsible for turning aviation security applied research
into prototypes and products. Following the PanAm 103 tragedy
in 1988, the Aviation Security Improvement Act was enacted by
Congress. This law mandated the development of technology that
could be certified to be reliable and detect explosive
materials concealed in checked baggage. This resulted in the
creation of the Aviation Security Laboratory, my lab, which at
that time was an element of the Federal Aviation Administration
in 1992.
The ASL received direct funding by congressional line
explosives detection, infrastructure protection, human factors,
and aircraft hardening. Congress also required that the FAA
develop a certification standard that would define the
performance requirements for an explosive detection system
which we call EDS in terms of probability of detection, false
alarm rates, throughput rates, and detection of specific types
and configurations of different kinds of explosives. The EDS
Certification Standard was established and published in the
Federal Register in 1992, and the lab certified its first EDS
unit in 1994.
The ASL was integrated into the newly formed TSA after the
terrorist attacks on 9/11 and was renamed the Transportation
Security Laboratory. The TSL provided the intensive accelerated
effort necessary to develop, mature, and certify technologies
necessary to support the historic deployment of aviation
security technology screening devices in American airports.
During this timeframe, new standards of performance were
created for TSA and several technologies were qualified or
certified. In 2003, the TSA and the TSL joined the new
Department of Homeland Security; and in 2006, the TSL became
part of the Department's Science and Technology Directorate.
In the ever-changing landscape of potential threats, the
Transportation Security Lab continues to be recognized as the
foremost resource for applied research development,
integration, and validation of leading-edge science and
technology for detection and mitigation of explosives and
conventional threats.
The lab continues to work to provide both technical and
procedural solutions that will work in the field. The TSL
performs R&D at the request of the S&T directorate. The
laboratory currently supports S&T explosives division, checked
baggage, air cargo, and checkpoint program efforts. TSL also
performs work for the TSA on an as-required basis. This
includes certification, qualification tests, and technology
assessment testing. TSL is also the go-to laboratory for a
number of government agencies that are looking for explosive
detection devices.
Tests and evaluation activities at the TSL encompass two
independent functions. The independent tests and evaluation
function is responsible for evaluating mature technologies that
may meet TSA security requirements that are suitable for
piloting or deployment, and principally this supports the TSA
needs. The research, development, test, and evaluation function
has responsibilities ranging from evaluation of applied
research, to prototype development and maturation and supports
S&T or other R&D customers that we have at the laboratory.
These two groups set their priorities using different
methodologies. The IT&E group has a strong relationship with
TSA's Office of Security Technology in that they frequently
discuss testing requirements, priorities, and the results of
those testing evaluations. Results support TSA decisions for
field trials, deployment, or their investment strategies. The
IT&E office judges detection worthiness and product readiness.
The customer of TSA sets the requirements, and the laboratory
designs each test to determine if candidate systems meet those
requirements. The types and frequencies of independent testing
at the TSL has tripled in the last two years as acquisition by
TSA has become more diverse as more explosives and more weapons
detection equipment has become commercially available for
testing.
In general, there are three kinds of tests administered by
the independent testing evaluation team. The Certification Test
is focused on providing laboratory certification of matured
explosive detection equipment. Certification is recognized as
the world standard for explosives detection.
The Qualification Tests are designed to verify that a
security system meets the requirements specified in the TSA-
initiated Technical Requirements Document. The results from
this test, along with TSA-conducted pilots, field trials,
generally result in a determination of fitness-for-use by TSA.
Laboratory Assessment Testing is conducted to determine the
general capability of a system. The results of these
evaluations of candidate security systems drive future
development efforts or operational evaluations.
DT&E testing at the TSL assesses the strengths, weaknesses,
and the vulnerabilities of technologies as they mature. The
primary focus is to ensure that technology is robust and ready
to go to the final stages of testing done by the independent
test and evaluation group.
While the TSL performs testing certification of
technologies, its responsibility of TSA as our customer----
Chairman Wu. Dr. Hallowell, if you wouldn't mind summing up
in just a little bit.
Dr. Hallowell. Certainly, sir. In conclusion, I would just
like to say that the focus of R&D and test evaluation is done
by the TSL, and our focus is to develop immature and
transitioning technology to detect explosives. We have a close
relationship with our customer which is TSA, and it allows us
to understand the customer needs. The TSL does stand proudly
behind the fact that every piece of security equipment that is
in American airports has gone through the hands of people in
our laboratory.
Chairman Wu and Ranking Member who left and distinguished
Members of the Committee, I want to thank you for giving me the
opportunity to provide this testimony.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hallowell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Susan Hallowell
INTRODUCTION
Good Afternoon Chairman Wu, Ranking Member Gingrey, and
distinguished Members of the Committee. It is an honor for me to appear
before you today to provide you with information about the
Transportation Security Laboratory, part of the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T).
The Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) has historically been
responsible for turning aviation security applied research into
prototypes and products. The Laboratory emerged from many years of work
by Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) officials to increase aviation
security, originally in the light of high-jacking incidents in the
1970s. The Air Transportation Security Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-366)
granted the FAA authority to pursue methods aimed at preventing high-
jacking, and this authority was strengthened by the 1985 International
Security and Development Cooperation Act (Public Law 99-83), which led
to growth and expansion of the FAA's research and development program.
During the 1980s, threats to aviation safety began to include bombs
as well as high-jacking threats, and the sorts of technology needed for
detection and screening purposes started to change. Following the PanAm
103 tragedy in 1988, development of state-of-the-art technology that
the FAA Administrator could certify as reliably able to detect
explosive material in checked baggage was recommended. These
recommendations, codified in the Aviation Security Improvement Act
(Public Law 101-604) in 1992, resulted in the creation of the Aviation
Security Laboratory (ASL) at the FAA William J. Hughes Technical
Center, in Atlantic City, New Jersey.
The new ASL launched a multi-tiered program to develop automatic
methods to detect threat amounts of explosive in checked luggage as
well as develop hardened aircraft containers capable of preventing
another tragedy. The ASL received direct funding by congressional line
explosives detection, infrastructure protection, human factors, and
aircraft hardening. The Commission's mandate also required that the FAA
develop a Certification Standard that would define the performance
requirements for an Explosive Detection System (EDS) in terms of
probability of detection, false alarm rate, throughput rate, and
detection of specific types and configuration of explosives. The EDS
Certification Standard was established and published in the Federal
Register in 1992, and the ASL certified the first unit, an InVision CTX
5000 System, in 1994.
Following the events of 9/11, the Aviation Security Laboratory was
renamed the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) and joined the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA); in 2003, the TSA and the
TSL joined the new Department of Homeland Security, and in 2006 the TSL
became part of the Department's Science and Technology Directorate. As
a federal laboratory and extension of the Directorate, the TSL's domain
and customer base continue to grow. In the dynamic environment in which
we live, where both foreign and domestic entities pose real threats,
the Transportation Security Laboratory is recognized as the foremost
resource for applied research, development, integration, and validation
of leading edge science and technology for the detection and mitigation
of explosives and conventional weapons threats. The Laboratory is more
than a research institution, however; it is committed to providing
technical and procedural solutions that work in the field. This
testimony provides an overview of TSL's research, development, test and
evaluation activities, its customer interactions, and its roles in
technology transfer.
TSL's Role in Setting Aviation Security Research, Development, Testing
and Evaluation Priorities
Although the TSL provides research and development (R&D) input, the
TSL does not set priorities for this work. The TSL performs R&D at the
request of the S&T Directorate, and priorities for this work are set
primarily by the customer components. Under Secretary Cohen instituted
the Capstone Integrated Product Team (IPT) process to set priorities
for the Transition portion of the S&T Directorate's budget. Transition
programs are focused on providing technology solutions to meet customer
need in the zero to three years timeframe. Through this process our
customers identify and prioritize their capability gaps to mission
performance, which allows the Directorate to respond with applicable
technology solutions to fill these gaps. Aviation security efforts fall
under the Transportation Security Capstone IPT managed by the S&T
Directorate's Explosive Division. TSA is the customer lead for this
IPT. TSL currently supports S&T Explosives Division's checked baggage,
air cargo, and checkpoint program efforts. The Research portion of the
Directorate's budget is not completely tied to Transition programs but
aligned to provide breakthrough science to support longer-term (outside
of three years) needs of the customer.
The Capstone process has lead to a better understanding of customer
needs and how they set priorities, but it also has challenges given the
large number of identified capability gaps and the expanded role of the
Explosives Division beyond aviation and transportation explosives
detection. As a result, the current funding for aviation security R&D
for explosives detection is about what it was in 1996 (in absolute
dollars).
With the use of S&T `Core Funding' resources, TSL also performs
work for customers on an as-requested basis. This involves pop-up
requests from TSA, both from the TSA Office of Security Technology
(OST), and from TSA field offices and airports. TSL has also done work
for the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, DHS Customs and
Border Protection, the Department of State, and the Department of
Defense. These organizations utilize the TSL as a `go-to' laboratory
for explosives detection RDT&E. The lab conducts RDT&E evaluations of
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and next-generation prototype detection
equipment, provides laboratory and field testing standards for deployed
explosives detection systems, and acts as subject matter experts to
consult on a wide variety of issues involving weapons and explosives
detection.
Test and evaluations activities at TSL encompass two independent
functions: The Independent Test and Evaluation (IT&E) function is
responsible for evaluating mature technology that may meet TSA's
security requirements, suitable for piloting or deployment, and the
Research and Development function has responsibilities ranging from
applied research, to prototype development, to technology maturation
that produces prototypes suitable for evaluation by the Independent
Test and Evaluation Team. These two groups set their priorities using
different methodologies.
The IT&E group has a strong relationship with the TSA's OST, in
that they frequently discuss testing requirements, priorities and
results of evaluations. TSL conducts three main kinds of independent
verification and validation tests: certification tests, qualification
tests, and laboratory assessments. These will be discussed in greater
detail in the next section of my testimony, ``TSL's Testing and
Evaluation Procedures.''
The types and frequency of independent testing at the TSL has
tripled in the last two years, as acquisitions by TSA have become more
diverse and more explosives and weapons detection equipment has become
commercially available. The Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Bill for FY 2008 directs DHS S&T ``to report on the
costs and benefits of charging companies for certification of their
products (at Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) ) in light of the
potential to provide enhanced certification services and the capital
improvement needed to safely house the ITE program.'' S&T has performed
the review as directed and believes that TSL should be allowed to
charge companies for certification of their products. Since 1992, the
TSL has carried out their Congressional responsibilities while serving
as the focal point for technical exchange and excellence in the field
of security technology with industry, academia, other federal and State
agencies and foreign governments. Allowing TSL to charge companies for
certification of their products is appropriate for this enduring and
mature laboratory. The scope of investment required to meet the
expanding workload of the Lab addresses infrastructure and personnel
investment required.
TSL's Testing and Evaluation Procedures
Review of test and evaluation activities. There are different kinds of
Test and Evaluation (T&E) activities at the TSL. Independent Test and
Evaluation Activities include certification, qualification, and
assessment testing, and generally speaking, are performed to determine
if detection systems meet customer defined requirements. Developmental
Test and Evaluation Activities (DT&E) activities are designed to verify
that a prototype or near COTS system has met performance metrics
established within the R&D program, such that it can proceed to the
next R&D stage. Additionally, R&D may look at the science and
technology issues behind the technology, along with the development of
critical simulants or standards to perform laboratory or field testing
of explosives.
Independent Test & Evaluation: TSL's Independent Test and
Evaluation (IT&E) group conducts independent verification and
validation of detection systems for transportation commerce inspection
(people, goods, and baggage). Results support decisions of DHS
operating elements (such as TSA) for field trials and production or
deployment, as well as key program milestones, bench-marking, and
investment strategy. The IT&E office judges ``detection-worthiness''
and product readiness. The customer sets the requirements, and TSL
designs each test to determine if candidate systems meet those
requirements.
The Certification Test Program is reserved for detection testing of
bulk and trace explosives detection systems and equipment under
statutory authority 49 U.S.C. 44913 for checked baggage. The focus is
on providing laboratory certification of matured explosives detection
equipment, certifying that salient performance characteristics, such as
the probability of detection of all categories of explosives with
appropriate false alarm rates and throughput rates, are met. The
details of types and masses of explosives and false alarm rates are
classified. EDS must be certified before they can be deployed. P.L.
101-604 defined the requirement for certification of Explosives
Detection Systems (EDS), and P.L. 107-71 defined the requirement for
certification for Trace Explosives Detection Systems. Certification is
recognized as a world standard for explosives detection. The TSL is ISO
9001:2000 registered for certification of explosive detection systems.
The certification process is clearly defined in the EDS
Certification Management Plan (1993) which is available to those
entities seeking systems certification. The certification test
protocols were developed by a panel of experts (the National Academy of
Sciences). Certification tests are performed with dedicated personnel,
with the Test Director and an independent third party observer present.
In the last two years, TSL has certified eleven bulk EDS and six trace
EDS.
Qualification Tests are designed to verify that a security system
meets customer-defined requirements as specified in a TSA-initiated
Technical Requirements Document. This test, along with piloting (field
trials) generally results in a determination of fitness-for-use. This
process is modeled after the certification process, and is defined
within the Qualification Management Plan. Unlike the Certification
Test, the requirements of the Qualification Management Plan typically
expand beyond detection functions to include operational requirements.
The Qualification Test Program is conducted under statutory authority
different from certification testing. Covered by 10 U.S.C. 2319, 41
U.S.C. 253(e) and FAR Subpart 9.2 Qualification Requirements, the
result of Qualification Testing is a recommendation of whether
candidate systems should be placed on a Qualified Products List (QPL).
TSL has conducted 56 qualification tests in the last two years.
Laboratory Assessment Testing is conducted to determine the general
capability of a system. These evaluations of candidate security systems
are carried out in accordance with interim performance metrics, and the
results drive future development efforts or operational deployment
evaluations. While the IT&E group practices best scientific principles
in test design, execution, and evaluation of data, assessment criteria
are determined by the customer (TSA) and the customer's needs. TSL has
conducted 124 such assessments in the last two years on bulk EDS and 26
on trace EDS in the last two years.
Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) is performed by the R&D
team at the TSL, and involves testing in a controlled environment to
ensure that all system or product components meet technical
specifications. These tests are designed to ensure that developmental
products have met major milestones identified within the R&D project.
DT&E testing at the TSL assesses the strengths, weaknesses, and
vulnerabilities of technologies as they mature and gain capability. The
primary focus is to ensure that the technology is robust and ready for
Certification Testing. The criteria for success are based on the
operational needs of the customer and it is mainly based on technical
performance and the component agency's Concept of Operations (CONOPS).
Based on this key input, the customers' requirements are translated
into technical requirements with testable metrics of performance. These
metrics of success, and how they will be assessed, are detailed in the
test plan.
The ultimate goal is to ensure that equipment that will be deployed
in the field is usable, effective, reliable, and maintainable over its
operational lifetime. Thus, the time spent in DT&E assures that
promising research and technology development transitions smoothly to
the field and the end-users.
TSL's RDT&E personnel also perform testing of basic scientific
principles, development of laboratory and field simulants and
standards, testing of breadboard systems or components, testing of
prototype systems, and testing of near-COTS or COTS systems to
determine if systems meet the minimum requirements of the customer, and
are ready to transfer over to TSL's IT&E testing.
Basic scientific principles are tested or measured utilizing
expertise and advanced instrumentation at TSL to learn chemical or
physical properties of materials (threats) or interactions with
materials. This includes performing X-ray Diffraction and high energy
X-ray/CT measurements on existing and home made explosives (HME) to
determine the fundamental properties necessary for detection in COTS
EDS systems. Similarly, ion chemistry measurements are collected to
verify detection or interferences that may exist with ion mobility
spectrometry (IMS) based explosives trace detection (ETD) systems.
Testing and development of Simulants and Standards are critical to
the T&E of explosives detection systems both in the laboratory and
field. TSL has developed many sets of bulk explosives simulants (for X-
ray and CT systems) that allow testing of EDS systems without the need
for the presence of dangerous bulk explosives, permitting systems to be
tested in laboratory settings and for testing in the field for
government customers. TSL has also developed a number of trace
explosives standards for TSA, such as standards that are used for
quality control (QC) checks on lab and fielded ETDs, trace particle
standards to contaminate surfaces (baggage, laptops, vehicles, etc.) to
verify proficiency of both the screener and ETD as a system, and a
number of verification standards that other government performers or
industry utilize to measure the efficiency of their ETD system.
Breadboard EDS systems, which are developed either at TSL,
industry, academia, or a government laboratory, are tested or evaluated
by TSL as part of a product developmental cycle. This testing allows
TSL to utilize explosives threats to measure the technology's
feasibility to meet the customers' defined requirements, or in some
cases, general requirements to develop technology for S&T without
specific agency requirements, but with minimum technology
specifications. Often, Human Factors evaluations or assistance are
brought into the process to provide early guidance with the end-users
requirements for usability, interface, and suitability.
Prototype testing encompasses early developmental systems, which
are typically provided by industry, academia, or government
laboratories. Prototypes undergo testing to learn about detection
capabilities and gaps, in order to improve and transfer the systems to
the final production stage.
R&D Assessment of production stage prototypes is where TSL
determines if a system is ready to be transferred over to IT&E for
critical customer evaluation. This testing looks at the minimum
detection requirements of the evaluated system, the human factors
considerations for field use, issues with false alarms, interferences,
and systems engineering requirements. Often this is where industry will
get a chance to perform final product modifications to meet the
intended customer's needs.
Certification Readiness Testing is a DT&E test conducted to provide
quantitative evidence that a system meets (or fails to meet) the
performance requirements prior to certification testing. This test is
conducted in stages, in order to grow the candidate equipment
performance so that it will be robust enough to have a good probability
of passing the certification test. While certification may take only a
few weeks to administer, Certification Readiness testing may take
several months to a year of hard lab work with the industry partner to
mature the candidate explosives detection system. Typically, the TSL
presents increasingly harder Improvised Explosives Device (IED)
concealments to candidate explosive screening equipment, and the vendor
must, in turn, refine hardware and software to achieve detection of
explosives with high levels of detection and low false alarm rates.
The results of all of the above RDT&E activities normally end up in
technical documents which, along with oral debriefings, are provided to
the customer. This provides them with clear and concise test plans, T&E
data, summaries, comments and conclusions. With CRDAs, similar non-
sensitive reports and debriefs are provided to the industrial partner
to ensure they have gained the insight necessary to bring their product
to the next step in the developmental process.
Coordination with other DHS components. TSL works closely with TSA
in the translation of customer requirements into TSA technical
requirements that have performance metrics of success, so that
requirements are testable. The IT&E group provides the customer with
high quality test data that guides decisions concerning operational
robustness and detection capability of available systems. The IT&E
group also regularly convenes working groups, contributes to IPT
meetings, and produces rapid assessments to support TSA's efforts. The
TSL has also shared its expertise with other DHS components, including
the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Secret Service.
The TSL looks forward to contributing our expertise to the
University Centers of Excellence (CoEs) in the areas of transportation
and explosives. TSL personnel are working with the S&T Explosives
Division to identify and evaluate potential research projects of
interest, and TSL will be part of the proposal review chain. TSL has
welcomed assorted undergraduate and graduate students as part of the
DHS Scholars and Fellows program over the years. It should be noted
that, prior to the establishment of the DHS CoEs, TSL has had a long
and fruitful relationship with academia, via the Grants and Cooperative
Agreement programs (FAA Grants Program). With these funding mechanisms,
TSL has been able to work with academia to develop and perform RDT&E on
novel next-generation explosives detection systems.
TSL and Technology Transfer
While the TSL performs testing and certification of technologies,
it is the responsibility of TSA to define and judge readiness for
deployment. Technologies passing certification are demonstrated to have
efficacy, but do not necessarily demonstrate operational robustness.
Deployment decisions are, in part, based on unique laboratory tests
conducted at TSL that cannot be conducted in the field, along with
operational utility evaluations conducted by TSA. If TSA encounters
operational issues with a piloted or deployed system, TSL stands ready
to provide subject matter expertise to understand the issue and assist
in corrective action. Several examples of TSL's assistance in these
situations are described with other technologies we have transferred
below. Occasionally, TSL has taken the initiative to develop product
support systems (e.g., the Image Quality phantom and trace quality
control aids) to improve operational performance.
In terms of technology transfer, in addition to the clear
technology transfer milestones that equipment certification and
qualification play, the TSL offers continuous, daily support to enable
this process. Some efforts are obvious, such as subject matter expert
support for TSA programs, and some are more nuanced, such as
refinements to federal security officer's training for explosives
recognition, or training concerning use of an explosives detection
system.
In addition to testing and certification, TSL continues to work
with TSA as they plan for deployment. The Lab helps TSA develop
appropriate training modules for newly deployed technologies. The TSL
also continues to work with the TSA to aid in the monitoring and
oversight of the configuration of each piloted or deployed system. As
systems are upgraded to become more operationally robust, the TSL
assesses the extent and nature of system changes, and occasionally
calls for system recertification if changes may affect the performance
criteria of the system. Finally, the deployment of explosives detection
systems to the airports has created a secondary industry at the TSL: We
have created high fidelity explosive simulants, test articles, quality
control aides and other diagnostic tools that TSA uses to validate that
the equipment or screeners are performing at the appropriate high
standards.
TSL/TSA Transition Activities
TSL has worked with TSA to transition many programs that could
improve transportation security. Examples of ongoing work include:
TSL has been actively pursuing R&D relative to
improving detection by bomb sniffing dogs, and provide training
tools for canine handlers, training aids for canines and canine
performance assessments for canines to TSA's National
Explosives Detection Canine Training Program.
TSL has a strong tradition of Human Factors
expertise, and TSL's Human Factors group is currently involved
with a number of projects in support of TSA. These efforts are
critical to ensure that sophisticated equipment can be easily,
safely, and effectively used by thousands of screeners in the
field. Past activities included the creation of a selection
test for X-ray screeners for TSA's Office of Human Capital;
this was transitioned to TSA in 2001 and it has been used to
hire all TSA screeners since then. Currently, the TSL Human
Factors team are:
Providing a formal analysis of the so-called ``re-
screening problem'' for a joint U.S.-Canadian Working
Group, and looking at possible alternatives to re-
screening of checked bags of Canadian origin at U.S.
airports.
Working on the development of On-Screen Alarm
Resolution (OSARP) procedures for Cargo, which presents
new and different challenges to screeners using EDS.
Participating in a TSA pilot on the development of
Cargo screening procedures for privately operated
independent air carriers that acquire X-ray, Advanced
Technology (AT) and Explosives Trace Detection (ETD)
equipment.
Participating in TSA's Passenger Screening Program
workgroup to develop measures of screening
effectiveness. TSL also supports research on screener
performance, screener attention focusing techniques,
screener fatigue, and optimizing screener interfaces,
which efforts are expected to contribute to TSA
processes in the future.
Providing support to the TSL's Independent Test &
Evaluation (IT&E) group assessments of Whole Body
Imagers (WBI) for TSA. In the last year, Human Factors
staff supported TSA with 14 separate WBI assessments
examining the effects of multiple technologies,
passenger poses, privacy settings, and threat sizes on
threat detection capabilities.
Through a long-term research grant with the
University of Central Florida, TSL's Human Factors
experts have created a new and highly effective method
for training TSA screeners to detect threats in carry-
on bags. This new method has been shown to produce
significant increases in threat detection in lab
studies, and an initial pilot showed improved IED
detection for screeners with this new training method.
A comprehensive pilot study is being planned with TSA's
Office of Technology Training to test 300 screeners
across at least 20 different U.S. airports.
TSL also has a tradition of supporting mitigation
efforts and has assisted TSA's Office of Security Technologies
with mitigation-related technology. In the late 1990's, TSL
successfully blast-tested two hardened aircraft luggage
container prototypes (HULD's), which were subsequently
certified to existing FAA airworthiness requirements. In 2006,
the TSA's Office of Security Technology implemented the HULD
Pilot Program in response to 9/11 Commission recommendations,
the objective of which was to determine operational impact
(security benefits, durability, maintenance, training impact,
and cost) of any subsequent HULD implementation. During the
course of the HULD Pilot, TSA placed a total of 25 HULD's into
operational service trials; to date, 20 HULD's have been
removed from service at predetermined intervals (between 100-
350 flights), and TSL has blast-tested these in order to
determine the effects of operational service on continued HULD
blast resistance. Over the next six months, TSL will complete
explosive testing on the HULD's remaining in operational
service.
Other Examples of Technology Transfer
TSL also provides technology transfer through its Communications
and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) group. These activities
include:
Cockpit-Crew Emergency Communications System Flight Tests.
TSL provides expertise and flight tests to support TSA's
Federal Air Marshals (FAMS) development of the FAMS Air-to-
Ground Communications Architecture.
Cargo RFID Seals Project. TSL is providing recommendations
and test bed support for TSA's efforts to have a Cargo
Screening System using RFID seals in place for 100 percent of
all cargo shipments by August 2010.
Canine Mass Transit Remote Sensor Project. This project is
providing a pilot of a Canine Stand-off Situational Assessment
for First Responders and was initiated by the TSA Deputy
Administrator.
Regional Maritime Security Coalition/Cargo Information
Action Center. TSL contributed subject matter expertise and
assistance with transference of Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence Network technology to Pacific
Northwest Airports and Columbia River Seaports, linking TSA
Federal Security Directors at Portland International and feeder
airports with the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Patrol,
FBI and State and Local Port Authorities and Emergency
Management Centers.
Atlantic City International Airport Testbed. TSL is working
with the South Jersey Transportation Authority for in-situ
RDT&E site for airport-related security technologies and
systems.
Another major role that TSL plays in technology transfer is working
with industry via Cooperative Research and Development Awards (CRDAs).
The CRDA mechanism allows industry to mature their technology in
partnership with the U.S. Government. TSL provides industry with a
unique opportunity to perform RDT&E (laboratory evaluation) of its
products with real explosive threats that are not typically available
to the private sector, while at the same time providing industry with
subject matter expertise to assist in the final development and
maturation of technology. This allows Industry a path to mature
technology that will meet performance standards required for DHS
applications. To date, these activities have been limited due to lack
of government funding and infrastructure/laboratory constraints.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the primary focus of the R&D and the test and
evaluation at the TSL is to develop, mature, and transition technology
to detect explosives. TSL combines a profound awareness of terrorist
capabilities with penetrating insight about the operational
environment. The Laboratory's close relationship with its customers
allows us to fully understand customer needs and incorporate
operational considerations into our R&D. By applying fundamental
understandings of science, systems engineering, and test and evaluation
protocols, the Laboratory is a unique national asset that is perfectly
positioned to continue providing effective technology solutions for
national security. The TSL stands proudly behind the fact that every
piece of security technology presently deployed in the Nation's
airports has at some point traveled through our doors. Whether it is
during development, qualification, or certification, the hands and
minds of the TSL team have played a role in all of today's
technological solutions for the detection of explosives and
conventional weapons in transportation security. Chairman Wu, Ranking
Member Gingrey, and distinguished Members of the Committee, I want to
thank you for giving me the opportunity to provide this testimony
today.
Biography for Susan Hallowell
Dr. Hallowell is the Director of the Transportation Security
Laboratory (TSL), a Federal Laboratory of the Science and Technology
Directorate (S&T) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This
laboratory is responsible for researching, developing, and evaluating
solutions to detect, deter and mitigate improvised explosive devices
used against transportation systems. Prior to this, she was manager of
the Explosives and Weapons Detection R&D Branch of the Transportation
Security Laboratory.
Dr. Hallowell was recently recognized, in 2007, by Under Secretary
Jay M. Cohen, S&T/DHS, with the Under Secretary's Award for Program
Management. She supervised the transition of her lab within DHS from
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to the Science and
Technology Directorate. Dr. Hallowell moved the TSL in a new direction
by reinventing it as a test and evaluation laboratory responsive to
customers in all components of the DHS and to stakeholders in the
public and private sectors. She has worked for the DHS, TSA, and FAA
for over 15 years in the area of explosives detection research and
development, and is an expert in the area of trace detection of
explosives. She has written numerous publications and has received many
awards in this area. Prior to working for the FAA, she worked as a
research chemist for the U.S. Army, in the area of detection of and
protection against chemical warfare agents, and technical measures
supporting CW treaty verification.
She was granted a Doctor of Philosophy in Analytical Chemistry from
the University of Delaware in 1989 for work in the area of biosensor
development. She holds a Bachelor of Arts from Western Maryland College
with a major in chemistry. Dr. Hallowell is a member of the American
Chemical Society, the American Association for the Advancement of
Science, the New York Academy of Science, National Association of
Female Executives, and is an elected member of Sigma Xi, the society of
research scientists.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Dr. Hallowell. Mr. Tsao,
you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. ADAM TSAO, CHIEF OF STAFF, OFFICE OF
OPERATIONAL PROCESS AND TECHNOLOGY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Tsao. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good
afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the
Committee. I am honored to be here today to appear on behalf of
the Transportation Security Administration to discuss our
research, development, and testing needs and discuss how S&T
supports our mission.
If it pleases the Committee, I would like to request that
my written testimony be submitted for the record.
As you know, TSA operates at over 450 airports. WE operate
screening operations 24 hours a day, seven days a week across
six time zones. On a daily basis our 43,000 transportation
security officers will see two million passengers or 1.8
million bags. My job as the Chief of Staff for Operational
Process and Technology is to make sure the technology we feel
provides the men and women of TSA the best opportunity in a
very demanding environment against a determined foe.
As Dr. Hallowell pointed out, in 2006, the Department of
Homeland Security consolidated all research, development, and
testing functions of the component agencies within the DHS S&T
Directorate. As such, TSA relies heavily on S&T to satisfy our
basic applied and development research needs. At the same time,
we maintain responsibility for operational testing and
evaluation, operational integration, and deployment of new
security technologies. We are also the ones that set the
security strategy and that everybody works off of. We have a
very strong relationship with each of the divisions of the S&T
Directorate, but we have a particularly close affiliation with
the Transportation Security Lab. Our histories go well back to
when these activities were in the FAA. We depend heavily on, as
Dr. Hallowell said, independent test evaluation at TSL. I know
all the professors there, I know all the doctors, I know all
the projects that they are working on. We talk on a daily
basis. We have a very open dialogue on the information we need
as well as the ways they can help us.
For each technology, we will identify the requirements that
have to be met, and then the IT&E group will take those
requirements, develop a test plan, test it, provide us the
results. We will take these thorough and unbiased results and
we will take them into consideration as we make our policy and
investment decisions.
I think there were also some questions about how we
participate in the S&T capstone integrated product teams. Last
year I believe was the very first year for this process, and we
engaged at a very high level. Administrator Holly himself co-
chaired the first round of the explosives IPT with the Director
of the U.S. Secret Service, Mark Sullivan. The process has been
extremely valuable to us. Through the process, I think we have
been able to better articulate our operational needs, not just
our technical needs, but our operational needs to the rest of
the department. Also, it has given us a fuller understanding of
the needs of the other operating components, and it has given
us opportunities to enter partnerships that we don't think we
would have otherwise considered.
So, Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for the opportunity to
highlight our progress in making aviation more secure, and I
look forward to responding to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tsao follows:]
Prepared Statement of Adam Tsao
Good afternoon, Chairman Wu, Ranking Member Gingrey, and Members of
the Subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before you today on behalf of
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to discuss the
research, development, and testing/evaluation needs of the TSA and how
the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate supports the TSA mission.
TSA is the global leader in transportation security. We operate at
airports across the country, 24 hours a day, seven days a week across
six time zones. TSA employees screen more than two million passengers
and 1.8 million of pieces of luggage daily. It is my job to provide the
right technology to the field to support our vital security operations.
As an operating agency, we rely heavily on S&T Directorate to
satisfy our basic, applied and developmental research and development.
We have a strong working relationship within each division of S&T
Directorate, with a particularly close affiliation with the
Transportation Security Lab (TSL) in Atlantic City, New Jersey.
In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) consolidated all
research, development, and test and evaluation functions of its
component agencies, with the exception of the U.S. Coast Guard, within
the DHS S&T Directorate to achieve efficiencies through economies of
scale. As required by the FY 2006 DHS Appropriations Act, the S&T
Directorate assumed responsibility for the TSL from TSA. Since then,
TSA has relied almost exclusively on the TSL for testing needs.
TECHNOLOGY AND THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS AT TSA
TSA works with the Independent Test and Evaluation (IT&E) group at
TSL to develop programs that test whether or not a new technology meets
its stated requirements. After completing testing procedures, the IT&E
group provides TSA with thorough, unbiased testing results. We use the
results to make policy and investment decisions.
TSA'S ROLE IN TECHNOLOGY TESTING
For each new technology, TSA develops and identifies the
requirements that must be met for a procurement to proceed. The IT&E
group within the TSL then takes these requirements and develops a
testing program to determine whether or not a new technology meets the
stated requirements. The role of TSA in designing these technology
tests varies and is based on operational needs and the criticality of
the technology and corresponding processes and procedures.
Both the TSL and the DHS S&T Directorate divisions have a strong
working relationship with TSA. Their collective efforts are divided
broadly into six areas.
The six areas are described in more detail, below:
Basic research includes all scientific efforts and
experimentation directed toward increasing knowledge and
understanding in those fields of physical, engineering,
environmental, social, and life sciences related to long-term
national needs.
Applied research includes all efforts directed toward
the solution of specific problems with a view toward developing
and evaluating the feasibility of proposed solutions.
Advanced development includes all efforts directed
towards projects that have moved into the development of
hardware for field experiments and tests.
Operational testing verifies that new systems are
operationally effective, supportable, and suitable before
deployment.
Operational integration is the process by which TSA
enables successful transition of viable technologies and
systems to the field environment.
Deployment is a series of actions following the
determination that the: base-lined product or system meets
TSA's performance, operational, and user requirements and is
accepted by the program manager and integrated product team;
designated locations are selected, configured, and optimized
for product/system integration into the screening operating
system and the installed product/system passes acceptance
testing at the designated location; logistics support is in
place and all users are trained for operational use of the
product/system. Only then is the product/system declared
commissioned or cleared for use.
Additionally, DHS S&T Directorate is responsible for conducting
basic and applied research, advanced development, and developmental
test and evaluations. TSA maintains responsibility for operational
testing and evaluation, operational integration, and deployment of new
checkpoint screening technologies.
Integrated Product Team (IPT) Process
The S&T Directorate Capstone Integrated Product Team (IPT) began
with 11 Capstone IPTs: Information Sharing, Border Security, Chem/Bio
Defense, Maritime Security, Cyber Security, Explosives Prevention,
Cargo Security, People Screening, Infrastructure Protection, Inter-
operability, and Prep & Response.
At their February 26th, 2008 meeting, the Technology Oversight
Group (TOG) determined that the Explosives Prevention Capstone IPT
would be split into two IPTs--one focused on Transportation Security
and the other on Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED). As the
result of this breakout, there are now a total of 12 Capstone IPTs. The
Transportation Security Capstone IPT will be chaired by the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and address priorities
relative to venues (Airports, Mass Transit, and Maritime), checkpoints
including air cargo, and explosives characterization and homemade
explosives (HME). The C-IED Capstone IPT will be chaired by the Office
for Bombing Prevention (OBP) and the United States Secret Service
(USSS) with the objective of providing the technology to address the
IED threat per Homeland Security Presidential Directive 19.
The IPTs program has been successful in many of its goals,
including establishing budgetary funding priorities as part of the FY09
budget process and to prioritizing the research and development needs
of TSA. As of November 2007, the Explosives Detection Division Capstone
IPT has shown that TSA is able to articulate to DHS S&T Directorate a
clear understanding of its science and technology needs to procure
solutions that not only meet stringent detection thresholds, but also
meet throughput requirements in support of the aviation sector.
TSA's involvement in setting user requirements for technologies
developed or funded by S&T Directorate.
TSA no longer has primary responsibility for funding or managing
the research and development of airport screening technologies. TSA
does however remain primarily responsible for developing functional
requirements for new technologies, including setting threshold
standards for detection, and for conducting operational tests and
evaluations of these technologies in airports. In the future, TSA's
involvement will likely vary based on the maturity and criticality of
the technology, as well as the operational rigor required to implement
it.
Apart from the research and development efforts under S&T
Directorate, TSA invests annually in engineering projects designed to
improve or upgrade existing technology as new requirements are
generated. In certain cases, existing technology is unable to support
new requirements due to hardware or software constraints. In these
instances, TSA undergoes a proposal solicitation process to evaluate
new technology systems whose enhanced functionality will meet the
revised requirements.
CONCLUSION
The needs of people must continue to drive the focus of
transportation security. The American people and the traveling public
require a transportation infrastructure that can be secured without the
expense of unreasonable burdens. The people in our workforce require
investments that will allow them to perform effectively and grow
professionally. The people within our homeland security partnerships
and network require cooperation, communication, and leadership. The
strength of these relationships has been fundamental to our progress
and must continue to remain a focal point as we move forward.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity to highlight the
progress TSA has made in aviation security. I look forward to our
continued work together and would be pleased to respond to your
questions.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Tsao. Dr. Oxley,
please proceed.
STATEMENT OF DR. JIMMIE C. OXLEY, PROFESSOR OF CHEMISTRY,
UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND (URI); CO-DIRECTOR, URI FORENSIC
SCIENCE PARTNERSHIP; CO-DIRECTOR, DHS UNIVERSITY CENTER OF
EXCELLENCE IN EXPLOSIVE DETECTION, MITIGATION, AND RESPONSE
Dr. Oxley. Thank you, Chairman Wu and Congressman Smith. I
always like to talk to Smiths since I am married to one.
The question I was asked--three questions and the third
question I think Dr. Hallowell has answered admirably, so I am
going to start with the question about current state of
research and explosives, and I gave first of all a very general
answer because we do--all countries do current research in
explosives. We have a very minor effort in the U.S. The NRC
report that was published in 2004 estimated we had two dozen
chemists working in energetic material new chemical synthesis.
Now, I am talking about new military explosives, I am not
talking about counter-terrorism type issues when I say that. We
do work on formulating new devices to make our explosives safer
to handle, more effective, and have longer or shorter lifetimes
depending on what it is we are trying to accomplish. Device-
centered research also occurs at the military labs. We are we
are going on military labs and national labs. That is a general
answer to a question of tell us about explosive research.
Governments all over the world put restrictions on military
explosives. Despite that fact, if you look at the table I gave
you, you will see that half of the explosive incidents have
been with military explosives, in fact, not with commercial
explosives, which may speak very well to the control that folks
exert on commercial explosives.
You asked me a question about liquid explosives. Since
solid explosives perform equally well to liquid explosives, we
usually prefer to handle solid explosives, less handling
problems. There is not new research, or very little, in new
liquid explosives. However, there is much more literature on
liquid explosives and what you see is terrorists pulling out
that old literature and making use of things that are
commercially available like hydrogen peroxide or nitro methane.
These are not surprise materials, they are just taking
advantage of what is already known.
We do need to have new research in detection across the
board. The issues with detecting liquid explosives are related
to (a), if manufacturers detect what they are asked to detect,
and they have said we would like to know ahead of time what we
are going to be asked next. They can't afford to have
instruments detecting a threat that hasn't been asked for
because it raises a false alarm rate. So you go right where you
are asked and that type of detection.
The issues with liquids are we don't want to open the
bottles, so it is a sealed container issue, and we have all the
same issues if we have a well-filled solid to deal with.
Detection issues must be addressed.
Concerning the chemicals themselves, we need some basic
research in detonation to see what commodity chemicals that we
are not aware of could be detonable. We need basic research in
that area. There was a famous chemist in the World War II
timeframe who said give me enough peanut butter and I will blow
up the world, and we don't know if he is right or not about
that one.
In this country we use 6.4 million metric tons of ammonium
nitrate a year. Worldwide production is 39 million metric tons
with nine million metric tons in transit. Urea is four-fold in
terms of production and export of urea, and I have given you a
table on those two issues. I consider those two the premiere
explosive precursors to take a look at, and indeed the House
and the Senate have passed the Secure Ammonium Nitrite law, and
I believe that DHS is going to administer that. I think we need
to look at a handful of explosive precursors for administrative
control. That is very doable. We have been collecting this data
since the 1980s, 30 years of data on who the end-users are. We
just haven't really worked at making that a useful policy in
terms of interdicting and following what happens from the
manufacture to the end-user of specific precursors.
If I now move my 26 seconds to detection issues, across the
board we have issues on getting the sample to the detector. We
need basic particle surface studies in that area. Those are
primarily for the detectors that require a molecule of the
explosive to get into the instrument.
Our other detectors rely on a signal, an emission-type
technology and those are bulk detectors and stand-off
detectors. They have to have an emission signal. We need lots
of development, but we need some basic research into what is
physically, scientifically possible to do.
And my last point is that the manufacturers across the
board and they come into my lab and they say, help us out. We
want to know what is happening next. And if you want to engage
the wonderful research that universities can do and the vendors
themselves can do, we need a little better flow of information.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Oxley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jimmie C. Oxley
What is the current state-of-the-art in explosives research, especially
as relates to homemade and liquid explosives? What are the key
knowledge and capability gaps, and what types of research projects are
needed to fill these gaps?
Little explosives research in the United States (U.S.) is focused
on making new explosives, i.e., new chemicals. A 2004 National Research
Council (NRC) report (Advanced Energetic Materials) wrote: ``The U.S.
effort in the synthesis of energetic materials at present involves
approximately 24 chemists, several of whom are approaching
retirement.'' In the National Labs or Military Labs new formulations
and new devices may be sought with goals of safer, more destructive,
longer or shorter shelf-life. Device-centered research undoubtedly
proceeds under government contract labs, as well.
Despite the fact that responsible governing bodies have emplaced
various administrative controls to keep military explosives out of the
hands of terrorists and criminals, international terrorism has relied
heavily on these. Interestingly, military, rather than commercial,
explosives have generally been their tool. This fact either speaks well
of industrial safe guards or points the finger at State-sponsored
terrorism.
The military has few applications for liquid explosives. Solid
explosives perform equally well and have less handling and storage
issues. For this reason, little new research in liquid explosives is
performed. However, the old literature is rife with descriptions of
liquid explosives, many of which are readily prepared and some of
which, e.g., hydrogen peroxide and nitromethane, are commercially
available. Liquid explosives are a detection challenge only because, in
the past, detection equipment manufacturers had not been asked to
detect them and because U.S. policy is not to open bottles. This does
not mean liquids cannot be detected; the difficulty is the same as with
any number of military or homemade explosives under these conditions.
Research in all areas of detection is required.
The U.S. began to focus on homemade explosives after the bombing of
the Murrah Federal Building (April 19, 1995). One tangible result was a
1998 NRC book ``Containing the Threat from Illegal Bombings.'' In 2006
various governments began to use that report as guidance on explosive
precursors. What has not been done is to follow the report
recommendations for testing of materials to identify actual explosive
precursors.
A methodical study is needed to identify the likely explosive
precursors. We must probe the fundamentals of detonation to identify
the energetic materials which could be made detonable with modest
effort.
My criteria for homemade explosive threats are simple: (1) the
required synthesis must be minimal--mix and use or mix and separate;
and (2) large amounts of the precursor must be available and readily
acquired so that large a bomb can be assembled. [``Large'' bomb is part
of the criteria with the rational that the bomb should be more of a
threat than a gun or rifle.]
First on my list of homemade explosives are ammonium nitrate (AN)
formulations and urea nitrate.
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) made kilogram-scale
bombs mixing AN with icing sugar. Timothy McVey used AN with the
traditional industrial fuel--diesel. In 2006 the U.S. manufactured 6.4
million metric tons AN, its usage split between agricultural and
industrial applications. Indeed, most commercial explosives are AN
based. Worldwide about 39 million tons of AN are manufactured annually
at about 200 chemical plants and about nine million tons of AN end up
on the export market.
Worldwide urea production is significantly greater than AN--133
million metric tons annually and 31 million tons in export. Urea is
used in agriculture, pharmaceuticals, NOX abatement, and melamine
synthesis (which with formaldehyde, forms resins used in adhesives,
laminates, coatings and textile finishes). Urea is made from ammonia
and carbon dioxide; typically plants producing ammonia produce urea as
well. Ammonia is produced using natural gas and nitrogen from air;
thus, areas with cheap natural gas make ammonia: China, Russia,
Ukraine, the Middle East and Latin America. Urea plus nitric acid form
urea nitrate; therefore, it is not surprising that urea nitrate, rather
than AN, is frequently used by terrorists in the Middle East.
In investigating all avenues of preventing terrorist bombings, we
should consider administrative controls on the most likely to be used
homemade explosive precursors. We should consider administrative
tracking of a small number of precursor chemicals (e.g., AN, urea,
nitric acid, hydrogen peroxide, chlorates) from manufacturer to end-
user. Such a program would involve identification of potential
precursors and their legitimate place in society. It would require the
cooperation of the manufacturers from the time the product left the
factory through distributors, traders, and transporters to end-users.
Such a system would not evolve overnight, but it should be possible
with modern computer technology and international cooperation. Of
course, it will not stop all diversions, any more than our present
controls stop illicit use of military explosives. A 2007 NRC report
``Countering the Threat of Improvised Explosive Devices'' recommends
among other areas of research: ``Perform case studies of actual IED
construction and events to determine whether and how resource control
might be implemented, with the eventual goal of developing the ability
to model the connection between resources and the IED threat chain.''
How does current university research in the field of explosives and
explosives detection contribute to technology development for aviation
security? How is university research coordinated between institutions
and with the Federal Government?
Failing to prevent a bomb from being made, we must consider
detection of the bomb. Detection methodologies can be divided into
those which require the actual explosive molecule to enter the
instrument--these are called particle or vapor detection--and those
which can detect characteristic emissions from the bulk explosive.
Emission detection techniques can be passive, relying on a natural
emission from the chemical, or active, probing the chemical with some
sort of radiation to cause emission. Emission detectors can be
differentiated as those having the potential to see, (1) with special
detail, through sealed containers--check luggage or cargo--``bulk''
detection; or (2) through the atmosphere at distances--``standoff''
detection.
Trace techniques are at various levels of development. Even the
commonly fielded ion mobility spectrometer (IMS) faces many operational
challenges. For all trace techniques probably the toughest problem is
getting the sample, the explosive molecule, into the detector. Solid
explosives, generally, have low vapor pressure. Therefore, detection
equipment attempts to sample microscopic particles, rather than vapor.
To get a ``detect'' particles of explosive must be present; harvesting
techniques must remove the particles from the surface; and the transfer
technique must get the particles into the business end of the detector.
Basic surface-particle interactions need to be studied. I understand
the National Institute of Standards and Technology is working in this
area and the Transportation Security Lab is funding further work.
Among emission detection techniques we find some of the most
significant successes and the biggest gaps. As you know standoff
detection and cargo screening need further research. As with other
detection technologies we can expect to see imperfect systems fielded,
but they can only improve with time, funding, and experience. One of
the recommendations of the NRC report (``Countering the Threat of
Improvised Explosive Devices'' 2007) I would like to emphasize:
``Determine the fundamental physical limits on the active and passive
detection of arming and firing systems, as well as the physical and
chemical limitations for trace and standoff detection.''
One last gap I wish to highlight. If Universities are to
significantly contribute their vast research skills to the National
needs, we need a more open access to information in this area of
threats and detection. I fully understand the need not to give
terrorists information, but in many cases it is those who would help us
whom we are keeping in the dark. Uniformly the technologies providers
have asked: ``Increase communication to technology suppliers with
respect to emerging threats, scenarios and threat levels.'' ``Provide
threat and precursor information to enable development of broad
detection strategies.''
Biography for Jimmie C. Oxley
Dr. Jimmie C. Oxley is Professor of Chemistry at the University of
Rhode Island (URI) and Co-Director of the URI Forensic Science
Partnership and Co-Director of the recently announced DHS Center of
Excellence in Explosive Detection, Mitigation and Response. Dr. Oxley
has authored 80 papers on energetic materials. She worked with the FBI
simulating the World Trade Center bombing, with Forensic Explosive Lab
of the Defense Science and Technology Lab (UK) examining large
fertilizer bombs, and with ATF/TSWG studying the behavior of pipe
bombs. Dr. Oxley has taught over two dozen explosive short courses for
various government labs and agencies and has served on five National
Research Council panels: Commercial Aviation Security (1995-98);
Marking, Rendering Inert, & Licensing of Explosive Material (1997-98);
Chemical Weapon Destruction (1998-99); Advanced Energetic Materials
(2001-02); Basic Research Needs to Interrupt the Improvised Explosive
Device Delivery Chain (2005-08).
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Dr. Oxley. Dr. Drury,
please proceed.
STATEMENT OF DR. COLIN G. DRURY, DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR AND
CHAIR, DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL AND SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, STATE
UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO
Dr. Drury. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to this
hearing on such an important issue. I am a Human Factors
Engineer from University at Buffalo, State University of New
York. My research covers human performance in inspection
systems from manufacturing industry through civil aviation to
detection of threats on people. I have worked with people on
the front lines such as TSA screeners and also been a member of
committees on research in this field such as the NRC's
committee on assessment of security technologies.
Human factors engineering uses data on the performance of
humans, for example, security screeners; in complex systems,
such as aviation security; to design better systems that make
best use of the unique capabilities of both human and the
automated devices to reduce error and increase throughput.
There are three aspects of aviation security, three measures
that we have already heard about. These are important, mis-
threats, false alarms, and time taken to process each item. All
of these translate into two overall measures, risk and delay.
To integrate human factors engineering into the design of
future technological systems, we can use successful design
techniques from other areas, design of military systems, civil
aviation cockpits, chemical and nuclear facility control rooms
have all be done.
The first step is to recognize that humans are going to be
present in security systems. The traveling public is no more
trusting of completely automated security systems than they are
of unmanned airliner cockpits. The issue is not whether we can
eliminate the human but how best to use the human who is going
to be there.
An example is the in-line check baggage inspection system
at many airports. It is based on 3-D scanning of each bag.
Automation is used to highlight those areas that contain a
potential threat. This is a search function. The highlighted
bag is shown to the human operator who has to mark it for
further inspection or pass it. This is a decision function.
Humans are relatively quite reliable in decisions whereas
machines are much more reliable in search. So this is quite
sensible.
In general, automation is allowed to perform rapidly within
strict rules while humans provide the flexibility to respond
when the rules don't apply.
The next steps after this are to design specifically for
the humans. They human interface with the technology, the
training programs, they interface between people, for example,
at check points. There are standard techniques in human factors
that have been used in these other fields to do this.
Currently, the TSA has professionals within the human
factors engineering area with expertise at the Transportation
Security Lab. And all of these are currently listed as members
of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, but they have been
working extensively with researchers and manufacturers on
improvements to the interfaces as well as longer-term research
studies such as developing selection procedures for screeners
and human problems in container security. They have also funded
some more fundamental studies of human factors engineering and
security. For example, I have got a one-year grant from them at
SUNY.
Could more be done? Certainly. The last time I visited a
manufacturer which was a couple years back, there was little
evidence of using human factors engineering professional
expertise in design of systems. Without early involvement of
human factors engineering, the human in the system may not make
the ultimate decisions resulting in increased risk and
passenger delay.
We can measure the effectiveness of human factors
engineering as we have been talking about in security equipment
in two ways. The first way is to evaluate whether the machine
shows evidence of having human factors engineering used. The
second way and the third way is to evaluate the performance of
the whole system, the human plus the equipment. And if this is
done correctly, with performance measures and observations
measures, we can measure the errors and performance times to
get a figure of merit for the system. But the observations
provide the locus of any performance defect, so we can see
perhaps why these things are happening.
To sum up, overall there is really no down-side to using
human factors engineering in the design of security systems.
Without it predictable performance lapses can occur, leading to
increased risk and passenger delays. The additional cost of
incorporating human factors engineering early in the process
has been found in aviation and military domains to be rather
low.
Thank you for your time.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Drury follows:]
Prepared Statement of Colin G. Drury
In your testimony please answer the following questions:
1. What role does human factors engineering play in the design and
testing of aviation security technology? How well do current aviation
security technologies incorporate human factors engineering and human-
technology interface principles?
2. How does human factors engineering impact the effectiveness of
these technologies to detect or deter threats? What are the possible
detrimental effects of not involving human factors engineers throughout
the technology design process?
3. How should the Transportation Security Administration and
Transportation Security Laboratory test and evaluate whether human-
technology interface principles have been properly applied in the
design and manufacturing of aviation security technologies?
I am a Human Factors Engineer from University at Buffalo: State
University of New York. I have spent much of my life in research and
intervention in the area of human performance in inspection systems.
This started in manufacturing industry (cars, electronics, glass
products) but transitioned to aviation inspection of civil airliners
and inspection of people and goods for security threats. My CV provides
samples of the technical papers published in inspection for
manufacturing, aircraft maintenance and security. This work, as with
all Human Factors Engineering (HFE), involved working with people on
the front lines (e.g., maintenance technicians, TSA screeners) as well
as membership in committees on research and development in this field
(e.g., the NRC's Committee on Assessment of Security Technologies in
Transportation, and the FAA's Research, Engineering and Development
Advisory Committee).
Human Factors Engineering (HFE) is a discipline dating from World
War II that uses data on the performance of humans (in our case
security screeners, airline passengers) in complex systems (in our case
aviation security) to design better systems that make the best use of
the unique capabilities of both humans and automated devices while
reducing the impact of their respective limitations. The diagram of the
airport security system used by the National research Council (Figure
1) shows the level of complexity and the numerous places where humans
can both make errors and act to prevent errors.
Standard texts in this area include Wickens, Lee, Liu and Gordon-
Becker (2002). It has a record of designing systems to prevent human
error and inefficiency, beginning in the military but subsequently
moving into civil aviation and industrial systems. If HFE is not used,
then often the system errors only become apparent when the system is
put to operational use, for example the control room and training
deficiencies at the Three Mile Island nuclear power station.
There are three aspects of aviation security inspection performance
where humans have a large impact: missed threats (failure to stop a
threat), false alarms (stopping a person/item that is not a threat) and
time taken to process each passenger or baggage items. All translate
into two system performance measures: risk and delay. HFE applied to
aviation security inspection can, and has, addressed each of these. A
good example is the Threat Image Projection System (TIPS) which
presents images of guns, knives and IEDs to screeners performing an X-
ray screening task. This counteracts the known human tendency to detect
fewer threats when there is a low probability that any single item
contains a threat. TIPS has the added benefit of providing embedded
training and performance measurement for screeners. TIPS act as a
motivator to screeners, as well as reducing monotonly, but it must be
technically well-executed to prevent non-threat-related artifacts from
cuing the screener that a TIPS image is being displayed. HFE tells us
that these three aspects of performance trade off against each other.
In any given system, fewer missed threats are accompanied by more false
alarms (e.g., National Research Council, 2007, p. 25; McCarley et al.,
2004). Also there is a Speed-Accuracy Trade-Off in that fewer threats
are detected if insufficient time is devoted to the inspection of each
person or item (Drury, Ghylin and Holness, 2006). Mathematical
relationships can be used to model these trade-offs (Drury, Ghylin and
Schwaninger, 2007), so that we can deploy security systems to meet
specific needs. The interaction between the screener and the technology
is not the only application of HFE to security systems: passengers too
interact with the system. Obvious examples are queuing at airports,
where the screening delays turn into passenger dissatisfaction (Marin,
Drury, Batta & Lin, 2008), and HFE input into helping novice passengers
deal with the complexities of required tasks in a timely manner.
To integrate HFE into design of future technological systems for
aviation security, successful design techniques from other domains can
be used. HFE has been successfully applied to the design of most
military systems, to civil aircraft cockpits and to chemical and
nuclear facility control rooms. The issue in all of these, as in
aviation security, is to use data on human behavior to blend the
automation and human components of a system so that human and
automation each do what they do best. This is known as Allocation of
Function (e.g., Hollnagel and Bye, 2000; Lee and Moray, 1992) and has
been applied to inspection tasks previously (Hou, Lin and Drury, 1993)
The first step is to recognize that humans will be present in all
security systems. The traveling public is no more trusting of
completely automated security systems than they are of unmanned
airliner cockpits. The issue is not whether we can eliminate the human,
but how best to use the human who will be there. An example is the in-
line checked baggage inspection systems at many airports. The
technology is based on 3-D scanning of each bag to build a 3-D image of
the bag. Automation is used to locate areas of potential threat (e.g.,
atomic numbers associated with explosives) within the whole bag, i.e. a
search function. The bag image with the potential threat area
highlighted is displayed to the operator who then has the decision
function of choosing to pass the bag as ``no threat'' or mark it for
further screening, typically hand search (which is itself not error
free). This allocation of functions between the automation (search) and
the human (decision) capitalizes on known strengths and limitations of
humans in inspection (Hou, Lin and Drury, 1993). For humans the search
function is consistently quite error-prone, while the decision function
(with suitable training and aiding) can be reliable (Drury and Spencer,
1997). Overall, automation provides the ability to take rapid and
consistent action within strict rules, while humans provide the
flexibility to respond when the rules do not apply (e.g., Parasuraman,
Sheridan and Wickens, 2000).
Having decided what roles humans and automation should play in each
future system, the next steps involve designing specifically for the
human. This means working from the human outwards rather than the
technology inwards. It means devising the interfaces between the human
operator and the technology, identifying the training (and retraining)
required for top performance, and designing the interfaces between the
front-line operator (e.g., screener) and others in the system (e.g.,
other front-line personnel, supervisors, law enforcement officers,
etc.). Interface design uses standard HFE methods with data and models
of human functioning (from sensory and cognitive capabilities to
physical size and strength) and applies it to design of the physical
interface and computer software (Wickens et al., 2002). Applications
range from comfortable seating and sightlines (e.g., for X-ray
screeners) to human computer interaction (e.g., display and response
logic for body scans or checked baggage inspection) using standard
texts, e.g., Helander, Landauer, & Prabhu (1997). Training design can
be based on well-known adult learning techniques. Design of human--
human interaction can use techniques from either Crew Resource
Management (CRM) or socio-technical systems design (STS) as found in
Helmreich, Merritt & Wilhelm (1999) and Taylor and Felten (1993)
respectively. Many comprehensive systems exist for including the human
in the design of complex systems, e.g., Cognitive Work Analysis
(Vicente, 1999) and even earlier in Systems Analysis (Singleton, 1974).
All of these methods will help eliminate errors in the final human-
machine system.
Currently TSA has HFE professional expertise at the Transportation
Security Laboratory, although none of these professionals are currently
listed as members of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. They
have worked with researchers and manufacturers on short-term
improvements to the interfaces as well as on longer-term research
studies such as developing selection procedures, socio-technical
systems design of the whole security checkpoint and human problems in
container security. They have also funded some more fundamental studies
applying cognitive science to security modeling, including a one-year
grant to me at UB:SUNY as listed in my disclosure letter to the
committee. Could more be done? Most certainly. There are new ideas
where HFE expertise can be incorporated early in the design process. A
recent example is data fusion, that involves humans as one of the many
sensors whose data is fused to enhance decision-making, (e.g., NRC,
2007). Most manufacturers and researchers still see the physics and
chemistry of detection as central, with design for the human in the
system limited to training design and design of the computer screens
and response keys. The last time I visited a manufacturer (for the NRC
Committee) was several years ago but there was no evidence of using HFE
professional expertise in systems design. Without early involvement of
HFE, the human in the system may not make optimum decisions, and by
then only small changes can be made to the system at evaluation time.
This does not ensure that risk and passenger delays have been
minimized.
How can we measure the effectiveness of HFE design in security
equipment? This is important to ensure that we are indeed designing the
systems optimally. Two alternatives are possible: examining the
equipment for evidence that HFE has been used in its design, and/or
evaluating the complete system (equipment plus human) and analyzing its
performance and errors. Both have been used successfully. A design
checklist can be rather simplistic for complex equipment embedded in
operational systems, but the design procedures can also be reviewed to
see how the deasign team took HFE into account. The TSL has used such a
checklist to assist machinery designers in applying HFE to their
products. The current, and recommended, method is to evaluate the
performance of the complete system in as close as possible to real use
conditions. Here we can measure the errors and performance times and
also observe and interview users. This evaluation gives a figure of
merit for the system (misses, false alarms, delays) and uses behavioral
observation and structured interviews to examine the locus of any
performance deficits.
Overall, there is no down-side to using HFE in design of security
systems. Without it, predictable performance lapses occur, leading to
increased risk and passenger delays. The additional cost of
incorporating HFE has been found in aviation and military domains to be
low.
References
Drury, C.G., 1994, Function allocation in manufacturing. In S.A.
Robertson (ed), Contemporary Ergonomics 1994 (London: Taylor &
Francis, Ltd), 2-16.
Drury, C.G., Spencer, F.W. (1997). Measuring human reliability in
aircraft inspection. Proceedings of the 13th Triennial Congress
of the International Ergonomics Association '97, Tampere,
Finland, Vol. 3, 34-35.
Drury, C.G., Ghylin, K.M. & Holness, K. (2006) Error analysis and
threat magnitude for carry-on bag inspection. Proceedings of
the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 50th Annual Meeting--
2006, 1189-1193.
Drury, C.G., Ghylin, K.M. & Schwaninger, A. (2007) Large-Scale
Validation of a Security Inspection Model, Contemporary
Ergonomics 2007, Taylor & Francis, London.
Helander, M., Landauer, T. & Prabhu P. (1997) Handbook of Human-
Computer Interaction (2nd Edition) Amsterdam, North Holland.
Helmreich, R.L., Merritt, A.C., & Wilhelm, J.A. (1999). The evolution
of Crew Resource Management training in commercial aviation.
International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(1), 19-32.
Hollnagel, E., and Bye, A. (2000). Principles for Modeling Function
Allocation. Int. J. Human-Computer Studies. Vol. 52, pp. 253-
265.
Hou, T.-S., Lin, L. and Drury, C.G. (1993). An Empirical Study of
Hybrid Inspection Systems and Allocation of Inspection
Function. International Journal of Human Factors in
Manufacturing, 3, 351-367.
Lee, J. and Moray, N. (1992). Trust, control strategies and allocation
of function in human machine systems. Ergonomics 35(10), 1234-
1270.
Marin, C.C. Drury, C.G., Batta, R. and Lin, L. (2007) Server Adaptation
in an Airport security System Queue. OR Insight, 20.4, 22-31.
McCarley, J.S., Kramer, A.F., Wickens,C.D., Vidoni, E.D. & Boot, W.R.
(2004) Visual Skills in Airport Security Screening.
Psychological Science, 15(5), 302-306.
National Research Council (2007) Fusion Of Security System Data To
Improve Airport Security, The National Academies Press, DC.
Parasuraman, R., Sheridan, T.B. and Wickens, C.D. (2000). A model for
types and levels of human interaction with automation. IEEE
Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics--Part A: Systems
and Humans, Vol. 30 (3), May 2000.
Singleton, W.T. (1974) Man-Machine Systems (Penguin, UK).
Taylor, J.C. and Felten, D.F. (1992) Performance by Design, Prentice
Hall.
Wickens, Lee, Liu and Gordon-Becker (2002) Introduction to Human
Factors Engineering (2nd Edition), Prentice-Hall, NJ.
Biography for Colin G. Drury
PROFESSIONAL PREPARATION
University of Birmingham, Ph.D., Engineering Production specializing in
Ergonomics, 1968
University of Sheffield, B.S., Honors Physics, 1962
APPOINTMENTS
2007-present--SUNY Distinguished Professor, University at Buffalo,
SUNY.
2002-2007--UB Distinguished Professor, University at Buffalo, SUNY.
1979-2002--Professor of Industrial Engineering, University at Buffalo,
SUNY.
1976-1979--Associate Professor of Industrial Engineering, SUNY-Buffalo.
1972-1976--Assistant Professor of Industrial Engineering, SUNY-Buffalo.
1968-1972--Manager of Ergonomics, Pilkington Brothers Ltd., St. Helens,
England.
1967-1968--Visiting Assistant Professor of Industrial Engineering,
UMass at Amherst.
1962-1964--Research Engineer, Motor Industry Research Association,
Nuneaton, England.
INSPECTION ACTIVITIES and MAJOR AWARDS
Colin Drury has been actively researching inspection tasks since
the 1970s, for which he was awarded the Bartlett Medal of the
Ergonomics Society in 1981. In the 1980s he started applying this to
aircraft safety inspection through a series of FAA grants, resulting in
successful Best Practices Guides to several Non-Destructive Inspection
techniques used in aviation. For this work he was awarded the FAA's
Excellence in Aviation Research Award in 2005, and the Human Factors
and Ergonomics Society's A.R. Lauer Award in 2005. In the 1990s he
applied this to security inspection with contracts from the Air
Transport Association and Atlanta's Hartsfield Airport. He has served
on several NRC/NAS committees and panels on aviation security
technology, during which he has studied the security systems at many
airports in USA and Europe. For this work with TSA and FAA he was
awarded the American Association of Engineering Societies' Kenneth
Andrew Roe Award in 2006. He is currently a member of INTERTAG, the
international human factors coordinating group on aviation security. In
2003 he was awarded a TSA grant to form the Research Institute on
Safety and Security in Transportation (RISST) at University at Buffalo.
In 2008 he was elected as Honorary Fellow in The Ergonomics Society,
UK.
PROFESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS (OUT OF OVER 300)
(i) PUBLICATIONS MOST RELATED TO TESTIMONY
1. Marin, C.C. Drury, C.G., Batta, R. and Lin, L. (2007) Server
Adaptation in an Airport security System Queue. OR Insight, 20.4 22-31.
2. Drury, C.G. (2001). A unified model of human security inspection.
Proceedings of Third International Aviation Security Technology
Symposium, Atlantic City, NJ, 27-30.
3. Drury, C.G., Hsiao, Y-L., Joseph, C., Joshi, S., Lapp, J. and
Pennathur, P.R. (2008) Posture and performance: sitting vs. standing
for security screening, Ergonomics, 51.3, 290-307.
4. Drury, C.G., Ghylin, K.M. & Holness, K. (2006) Error analysis and
threat magnitude for carry-on bag inspection. Proceedings of the Human
Factors and Ergonomics Society 50th Annual Meeting--2006, 1189-1193.
5. Ghylin, K.M., Drury, C.G., Batta, R and Lin, L. (2007) Temporal
Effects in a Security Inspection Task: Breakdown of Performance
Components Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Societ 51sty
Annual Meeting--2007, 93-97.
6. Drury, C.G., Ghylin, K.M. & Schwaninger, A. (2007) Large-Scale
Validation of a Security Inspection Model, Contemporary Ergonomics
2007, Taylor & Francis, London.
7. Ghylin, K.M., Drury, C.G., & Schwaninger, A. (2006). Two-component
Model of Security Inspection: Application and Findings. Proceedings of
the 16th World Congress of the International Ergonomics Association,
2006.
8. Panjawani and Drury, C.G. (2003). Effective interventions in rare
event inspection. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics
Society 47th Annual Meeting, 2003, 41-45.
9. Drury, C.G., Saran, M. and Schultz, J. (2004) Temporal Effects in
Aircraft Inspection: What Price Vigilance Research? Proceedings of the
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 48th Annual Meeting--2004, 113-
117.
10. Drury, C.G. (2001). Human Factors and Automation in Test and
Inspection, In G. Salvendy, Handbook of Industrial Engineering, Third
Edition, Chapter 71, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1887-1920.
11. Hong, S.-K. and Drury, C.G. (2002). Sensitivity and validity of
visual search models for multiple targets. Theoretical Issues in
Ergonomic Science, 1-26.
12. Drury, C.G., Green, B.D., Chen, J. & Henry, E.L. (2006) Sleep,
sleepiness, fatigue, and vigilance in a day and night inspection task,
Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 50th Annual
Meeting--2006, 66-70.
(ii) OTHER SIGNIFICANT PUBLICATIONS
1. Karwan, M., Morowski, T.B. and Drury, C.G. (1995). Optimum Speed
of Visual Inspection Using a Systematic Search Strategy. IIE
Transactions, 27, 291-299.
2. Hou, T.-S., Lin, L. and Drury, C.G. (1993). An Empirical Study of
Hybrid Inspection Systems and Allocation of Inspection Function.
International Journal of Human Factors in Manufacturing, 3, 351-367.
3. Baveja, A., Drury, C.G., Marwan, M.H. and Malon, D.M. (1996).
Derivation and Test of an Optimum Overlapping-Lobes Model of Visual
Search. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics--Part A:
Systems and Humans, 26(1), 161-168.
4. Drury, C.G. (1997). Ergonomics and the quality movement (The
Ergonomics Society 1996 Lecture). Ergonomics, 40(3), 249-264.
5. Mazumder, S., Drury, C.G. and Helander, M. (1997). Binocular
Rivalry as Aid in visual search-r--95/539A, Human Factors, 39(4), 642-
650.
6. Drury, C.G. (2001). Inspection. In W. Karwowski, (Ed.),
International Encyclopedia of Ergonomics and Human Factors, Taylor and
Francis, Inc., 1249-1253.
7. Drury, C.G. (2001). Human Factors and Total Quality Management. In
W. Karwowski, (Ed.) International Encyclopedia of Ergonomics and Human
Factors, Taylor and Francis, Inc., 1246-1248.
8. Drury, C.G. (2005). Inspecting, Checking and Auditing,
particularly of Human Factors. In G. Salvendy (ed.), Handbook of Human
Factors and Ergonomics, J. Wiley & Sons, Inc., NJ.
9. Drury, C.G. (1992). Design for Inspectability. In M.H. Helander
and M. Nagamachi (ed), Design for Manufacturability: A Systems Approach
to Concurrent Engineering and Ergonomics. Taylor & Francis, Ltd.,
London.
10. Drury, C.G. (2003). Service Quality and Human Factors. AI and
Society, 17(2), 78-96.
11. Drury, C.G. (1985). Stress and Quality Control Inspection. Chapter
7 of Job Stress and Blue Collar Work. C.L. Cooper and M.J. Smith (Eds.)
John Wiley, Chichester, UK.
12. Human Reliability in Quality Control. (1975) C.G. Drury and J.G.
Fox (Eds.), Taylor & Francis, London.
13. Drury, C.G. (2000). Global Quality: linking ergonomics and
production. International Journal of Production Research, 38(17), 4007-
4018.
SERVICE ON NATIONAL RESEACH AND ADVISORY COMMITTEES
1. National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council
Human Factors Committee, member, 1997-2004
Panel on Musculo-Skeletal Disorders, co-chair, 1998
Workshop on Work-related Musculoskeletal injuries:
The research base, 1998, co-chair of the steering committee
Panel on Musculoskeletal Disorders and the Workplace:
Low Back and Upper Extremities, member 1999-2001
Committee on Review and Evaluation of the Army
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, member 1992-1996
Committee on Evalauation of Chemical Events at Army
Chemical Agent Disposal Facilities, member 2000-2002
Committee on Monitoring at Army Chemical Agent
Disposal Facilities, member 2004-2005
Committee on Deployment of New Technology for
Aviation Security, member, 1999-2004
Committee on Assessment of Security Technologies in
Transportation, member, 2004-
Committee Continuing Operations at Army Chemical
Agent Disposal Facilities, member 2006-
2. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Chair, Science and
Technology Working Group (STWG), 2000-2004
3. Transportation Security Administration, Scientific Advisory Panel,
2004-2005.
4. Federal Aviation Administration Research, Engineering and
Development Advisory Committee (REDAC), member 2002-2007, Chair Human
Factors Committee, 2003-2004.
5. International Aviation Security Human Factors Technical Advisory
Group (InterTAG), member, 2004-
Discussion
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much. At this point, we will
open our first round of questions, and the Chair recognizes
himself for five minutes.
It is not that we don't have better things to do, but we do
fly a lot. We Members of Congress do fly a lot, and we, at
times, well, we speculate about all sorts of things. And after
September 11, one of the things we speculated about is if you
were to bring down an airplane, how would you do it? And top of
the list for those of us in the Oregon delegation was a
flammable liquid. That was in the fall of 2001 or the winter of
2002, and yet my recollection is that restrictions on liquids
or the focus on liquids didn't occur until much more recently.
Now, you all are responsible for implementation and for
research. We Members of Congress are not scientists. We are not
reputed to be very smart, but how come we were thinking about
something that TSA didn't start looking for until much later,
and was research being done in this field prior to the
implementation of limitations on liquids on board airplanes?
Dr. Hallowell, Mr. Tsao, would you care to handle that first?
Dr. Hallowell. Well, first off, I believe the FAA prohibits
handling flammable liquids on aircraft, and I know this because
they took a whole bunch of rum from me coming back from an
island.
Chairman Wu. Well, I know the FAA prohibits that, but there
was no method of--there was not an active search or
prohibition--I mean, the prohibition might have been in place
but I believe until relatively recently you could take a large
bottle of something, whether it is rum or water, on board an
airplane. When did the ban go into place where it was actually
looked for by the TSA?
Mr. Tsao. We actually implemented the ban on August 10th of
2006.
Chairman Wu. So that is a four and one-half year window----
Mr. Tsao. Yes, sir.
Chairman Wu.--from September 11 to the ban.
Mr. Tsao. Yes, sir.
Chairman Wu. Did folks think that that might be a threat?
Mr. Tsao. We did look at, and some of that predated my time
at the agency, but we did look at the various threats to civil
aviation and the threats of--whenever we look at risk, we
really look at three components of risk. One, what is the
threat stream? Is there an adversary interested in this? What
is the adversary's ability to carry that out? Two, what is the
consequence? What will happen if the adversary, and three, what
is the inherent vulnerability of the system? So I think when
you start looking at those factors, the threat of a flammable
liquid taking down an aircraft is relatively low compared to
other threats at the time. During August of 2006, it was
determined that there was a new threat using a liquid explosive
which was judged to be powerful enough to cause catastrophic
damage.
Chairman Wu. Forgive me, Mr. Tsao, if I am, you know,
imagining things that can't happen, but it was another Member
of our delegation, one much more senior--who is much more
senior than I and with substantial aviation experience. The
methodology would just be to take a bottle of gasoline, run
down the aisle, and have one person behind you ignite the
stream and the consequences would be pretty dire.
Mr. Tsao. Relative to other threats we are facing, sir. We
believe that is a lower threat.
Dr. Oxley. Chairman, may I say something?
Chairman Wu. Please.
Dr. Oxley. The difference between a deflagration, a burn,
and a detonation is huge.
Chairman Wu. Yes.
Dr. Oxley. And I think that is what Mr. Tsao is telling
you, that relatively speaking, the detonation threat that came
in late 2006, the summer of 2006, was substantial.
Chairman Wu. But if you have a burning cabin, I mean, that
is a bit of a concern in an airplane, isn't it?
Dr. Oxley. Certainly, and there is a whole group I have run
into in--I don't know if they are FAA or TSA--that is looking
at protecting aircraft from fire.
Chairman Wu. Well, you know, the point of the question is
not what has happened in the past. The point of the question is
are you properly identifying threats for the future?
Mr. Tsao. We believe so. Again sir, take three parts of our
methodology. What are the adversaries looking at, what are the
inherent vulnerabilities to the system, and what are the
potential consequences, primary and secondary?
Dr. Oxley. And I wanted to add that prior to the overt ban
on liquids, our lab was already doing research because we had
been asked by a federal agency to do so. So this was not a
surprise that these liquids were a possibility. It was just a
prioritization. If everything is looked at once, you miss the
high priority items.
Chairman Wu. I understand, at least among the Oregon
delegation, the flammable liquid scenario is our number one,
and we found it rather curious that that was not on other
folks' list. Dr. Oxley, what you had to say is the most
comforting thing that I have heard thus far.
I recognize the Member from California for five minutes--
Nebraska. My apologies. It is California without an ocean.
Mr. Smith. I will get back to you on that.
Chairman Wu. California with a football team.
Mr. Smith. Needing a little extra work there. But thank
you, Chairman Wu, and witnesses.
Again, I am not an expert. You are. I guess if routine or
repetition makes us experts, some of us could be in terms of
airline security.
I think Dr. Drury you might be best to respond to this, but
how do you decide, you know, what the threshold is for a
discretionary decision as someone is--as a TSA worker--is going
through a check point?
Dr. Drury. The rules are fairly clearly written by this TSA
and TSL. But the point about having the human in there is that
they make fairly routine decisions pretty well. The better you
can organize it so that they are doing what is called rule-
based work so they follow a set of rules, just as in landing an
airliner. You have a set of rules, a rule-based decision
system. So you have a pilot in there who can look for things
that aren't covered by the rules, look for the unusual things.
The person who found explosives coming over the border into
Washington State, for example, customs agent, security agent
there, this was a beautiful piece of human following things
that weren't directly part of the thing you have to do every
time. So humans have two functions, one is to follow a set of
rules where those rules apply, and they do that reasonably
well. They don't do it perfectly but neither do machines. And
the other one is to bring their unique human capabilities into
there of reasoning it out so it is not a rule-based decision.
It is called a knowledge-based decision where you work things
out from first principles. Yes, this looks suspicious. I will
do this.
Mr. Smith. So there is--I mean, I don't expect a quick
formula necessarily, but I am curious as to how or what the
approach is. Sometimes what would appear to be common sense to
me doesn't appear to be common sense as I go through a
checkpoint at an airport. And I am just using my own anecdotal
experience from repetition. But can you explain how perhaps
they eliminate some of those decisions?
Dr. Drury. Many of them are rules they have to follow. For
example, when they check on your ticket and so on. So there are
strict rules they have to follow here. And at the checkpoint,
they have got higher levels of authority. They can pass things
up, too, if needed. So they are not entirely on their own. But
they are the first people who can trigger a response. So if
they trigger a response, the system can move ahead. If they
don't trigger a response, it doesn't. So in some ways it is
reasonably optimum for them to make some false alarms to make
sure that they have got, they have covered the things that are
unusual.
Mr. Smith. For example, and I hate to get hung up on
details here, but a container that its ultimate capacity
exceeded the restriction but its obvious contents are far below
the limits and yet the whole line is stopped, the passenger is
asked how much exactly or letting them know that it is going to
go in the trash or whatever the case is. I mean, to me that
could be avoided. Am I missing something?
Dr. Drury. No, I have had exactly the same thing where I
was carrying a small amount of liquid in a larger container and
they were following rules. You know, their first line of
defense is to follow the rules, and if you look at the
consequences for not following them, you can see why people
might wish to follow them because they could be checked up on
easily and somebody could say--you or I could be a person going
through testing them and saying do they follow the rules. So in
this case, they wouldn't. Does it make sense on every occasion?
I don't think so, but the question is which error do you want
to make? And I think the error of potential inconvenience of
passengers as I was and presumably you were is probably less
than letting something through that could be construed as a
threat.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Mr. Tsao, if you wouldn't mind
elaborating perhaps on how the rules are made? And also, would
someone with more seniority or more authority be able to just
automatically pass over something such as that? Maybe if you
could speak to uniformity as well?
Mr. Tsao. Certainly. I think one of the real difficulties
for our screening workforce is again the number of people we
see in any given day, two million passengers a day going
through various different types--coming with very different
travel patterns, you know, whatever they are coming through. It
is difficult for us to train for every single opportunity or
exception that may occur. And so giving the screeners leeway
which we are leaning towards is very difficult to train. We are
moving toward a system where instead of being a rules-based
system, you focus more on your interaction with the passenger.
But again, that is very complicated for us to initiate and we
are just starting that. But it really comes down to volume. You
may have two ounces of water in a 16-ounce bottle, we will let
you through, but does that mean the next 400 people in line do
the same thing? So it becomes a process where you have got to
draw the line somewhere. And then unfortunately the next time
you will know, don't come with a 16-ounce bottle with only two
ounces of liquid in it. That is the only way we can keep the
lines moving. It is the only way we can have a consistency of
product.
Mr. Smith. And so you would argue then that they actually
end up doing it faster? And I will accept that. That does
make----
Mr. Tsao. In the long run, yes, sir.
Mr. Smith.--sense.
Mr. Tsao. Again, if you have too many exceptions, you know,
every time you have got to call over a supervisor to answer
certain things, is it worthwhile for the traveling public? Is
it worthwhile on a security basis to again start making
exceptions to every possible scenario that can go through?
Mr. Smith. Is it conceivable that the smaller the number of
passengers through a checkpoint on a given day, the stricter
the scenarios seem to be?
Mr. Tsao. Again, sir, the screeners and the screening
supervisors are instructed to follow a set of standard
operating procedures.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wu. I thank the gentleman from Nebraska and
recognize the gentlelady from California.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To my colleague
there from Nebraska, being a graduate of both UCLA and USC, I
would say they neither have the coast, football or a basketball
team. They need a little help coming from the west side. We are
going to get a gingerly game going here.
I have three questions, and if you could be as brief as
possible because they are going to call votes in a moment. Dr.
Hallowell, in your written testimony, you note that funding for
aviation security R&D for explosives detection has not
increased in real dollars since 1996. What budget would you
have requested, why, and how would you use it?
Dr. Hallowell. Yes, ma'am. I think I would have been
inclined to ask for budgets that were very similar to what we
received in 2004, 2005 timeframe in that there are still
daunting R&D issues that we really haven't attacked properly.
And here I am thinking screening of cargo which certainly is
looming on the horizon and a few other technological
breakthroughs that we need to pursue to have some technology
enablers to look at other things such as checkpoints that are
more user friendly and more integrated and faster as well.
Ms. Richardson. Would you supply this Committee in the
future that information?
Dr. Hallowell. Yes, ma'am, I will take that for the record.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Thank you. My second question is what
is the status of the frequent traveler program? I heard a
little bit about it six months to a year ago where if people
who fly on a regular basis, they would get a certain kind of ID
card and it was being used, piloted at a few of the locations.
What is the status of implementing that program?
Mr. Tsao. Yes, ma'am. I believe you are referring to the
registered traveler program?
Ms. Richardson. Yes.
Mr. Tsao. That program is basically a private-sector
program. It is run by a coalition of private-sector interests
which we interact with. I am not the expert on that program. I
can tell you it is out of the pilot stage and it is being
broadly used at some of the airports. We have been asked to
evaluate some of the technology that they have used, but I am
really not qualified to answer any of the programmatic
questions.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Could you supply this Committee with
the information----
Mr. Tsao. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Richardson.--of who is doing the program how the
results are?
Mr. Tsao. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Richardson. And then my third and final question which
I think is to you, Mr. Tsao, how many TSA employees would you
say, a percentage, are non-U.S. born and how do you recruit?
Mr. Tsao. I am afraid I am going to have to get back to you
on both of those questions, ma'am. I don't know specifically
any of the statistics.
Ms. Richardson. I realize that the Oklahoma City bombing
that occurred was a domestic issue. One of the things I
oftentimes get in the airport of people who notice how many
people are not U.S.-born who are working as TSA employees. And
so I am just curious what the percentage is and what you do to
recruit for everyone. So I look forward to that information as
well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I hit my deadline in enough time
for the gentleman from Nebraska to tease me again.
Chairman Wu. We will do a quick round. Those bells, horns,
whistles, et cetera, you hear in the background are calling us
to votes, and it will be a lengthy series of votes. So it is my
intention to permit all Members who wish to do so to ask one
further round of questions and then to adjourn the hearing.
And I have only one question, and this is for the entire
panel and this is about research priorities. You know, my
understanding is that the TSL priorities are set by DHS S&T
Directorate which is supposed to look to its customer
components, specifically TSA. How do you integrate research
priorities from other sources such as the Homeland Security
Science and Technology Advisory Committee and industry
stakeholders, and also, since IPTs focus on short-term
technology development priorities, how do you determine
priorities for long-term and more basic research? And I look
forward to commentary from folks outside of TSL and TSA also.
Dr. Hallowell. Yes, sir. I think right now the research
priorities are being driven by the capstone integrated product
teams Under Secretary Cohen has set up. He has a number of
capstone integrated product teams, certainly the one,
government explosives detection, is chaired by Administrator
Polly and also has other sitting Members as well. The purpose
of that capstone team is to identify gaps that need to be
addressed in terms of what the customer needs. It is the role
and responsibility of the Science and Technology Directorate to
turn those gaps into an idea of what kind of research, enabling
research, needs to be conducted to start identifying the R&D
needs. So prioritization is made within S&T. The capstone
process has just really initiated this year, and I believe it
has been fairly successful. The point is the integrated product
team is not just a two-year initiative. This was actually
driving R&D that goes out far into the future. Adam, would you
like to comment as well?
Mr. Tsao. Yes, sir. I think the community is really
starting to come together, and quiet honestly, it has been
sparked by Admiral Cohen's institution of IPT's. Last year was
the very first year for that, and I think we have learned a lot
about who we are and who has expertise within DHS and outside
of DHS. And that community is coming together through this
process.
Chairman Wu. Doctors Oxley or Drury, would either of you
care to comment on the setting of priorities and the balance
between short-term and long-term research?
Dr. Oxley. I certainly hope that that is something that we
will accomplish in setting up our new center which has been
announced but not officially awarded yet. It is something we
are having constant discussion on and reaching out to the
entire community of folks, not just the university people so
that we are in touch with that.
I think to counteract terrorist bombings and IED's, it is
going to take a multi-prong approach. It is not simply
protection, it is pre-bomb making and it is post-bomb making.
So it is hardening. And all of those issues are addressed at
various places, and we hope to pull them together.
Dr. Drury. Purely from a human factors engineering point of
view, there has been considerable work done but focused largely
on the screening process. There are a lot of other areas where
this work needs doing on a more developmental, short-term
basis. I think there is a lot more work that needs doing on a
long-term basis of how people make decisions under stress
effectively and how you can support them in doing that.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much. The gentleman from
Nebraska?
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Tsao, if you
wouldn't mind, how does TSA determine aviation security
strategy and equipment requirements? Do you consult with the
technical expertise at TSL in order to do so? And furthermore,
how does science and technology adjust its R&D efforts to
reflect the equipment requirements from TSA?
Mr. Tsao. Thank you, sir. We absolutely discuss--we have a
very open dialogue with TSL. Again, we set the requirements. We
know what the threat streams are, we know what the
vulnerabilities are, we know what our screeners need. We are
understanding our passengers I think better than we have in the
past. So it is incumbent upon us to set the tone on where
research and development, both short-term and long-term, need
to go.
As far as how we determine the technologies, often
something will come through the door. It looks promising. TSL,
will you look at it? Does it do what it say it is going to do?
They will test it. Yes, it does what it says it is going to do.
Okay. We will look at it. If it can do what it says it can do,
how can we use it? All right. Now, this is how we are going to
use it. Will using it in this manner meet our operational
needs? They will go back and a look and say yes, in this manner
it will detect with a certain probability of detection, a
certain false alarm. We will go back and then we may--ased on
that laboratory results we may start a pilot and it may turn
out that in the airport environment, you know, this brand-new
widget cannot handle the volume of people we need to put
through it. Or in some cases there are a lot of very promising
technologies where the timetables are just too long. I mean, we
really need to average any process we have. It can't really go
beyond 15 or 20 seconds, otherwise you start significantly, you
know, jamming up our checkpoints which causes additional
security problems.
So there are things that may be useful but they need to get
themselves engineered to the point where they meet our
operations. If all that occurs and we find something that meets
our detection needs, meets our operational needs, we know it is
not going to break down. We know that the screeners are going
to be able to use it. We deploy that stuff fairly quickly. I
think one example you might see, in the work we had done with
the lab, is the procurement of the FIDO Paxpoint. This was a
piece of equipment that was really in a rack looking for bombs.
We were able to modify it to look for the emerging homemade
explosive threat. We did that, made a procurement, had it on
the street in less than six months. So I mean, we are really
trying to be more, I should say, adaptive as the threats come
in.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you. Dr. Hallowell, in your
testimony you state that the independent tests and evaluation
group and research and development group ``set their priorities
using different methodologies''. How do you see these
methodologies varying and how would their priorities compare
with those laid out by TSA?
Dr. Hallowell. Well, there are two different teams of my
people in my laboratory. The independent test and evaluation
team really does the kinds of tests and evaluations that
directly support activities planned by TSA for piloting or
deployment. So that particular team works very, very closely
with Mr. Tsao and his group to determining their priorities.
And this happens every day. Priorities will change based upon
what their interests are and what the threat level is in Intel
and things like that. So far we have been actually able to test
almost everything I believe he asked us to do and get it done
on a fairly timely basis.
The other team, the R&D team, actually is doing different
things for a living. They are looking at technology at various
technology readiness levels. So it could be like a breadboard
or a prototype, and those things typically come out of R&D
land, although we do have a pretty active program where we work
directly with industry under cooperative research and
development agreements to help mature technology.
So if you work for a company, you think you have a solution
that can find a bomb, what I say to you is please bring it to
my laboratory and let us shake it down. And the way we shake it
down is of course we have every flavor explosive and we can
evaluate it understanding well what our customer needs are so
we can advise companies as to how to grow their technology to
get closer to the requirements of the customer.
So that is more of an R&D kind of look-see, how are you
doing, what can you do, what can you not do, and what are the
opportunities for improvement.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wu. I thank the gentleman. The gentlelady from
California?
Ms. Richardson. Yes, Mr. Tsao, in your testimony you said
that talking about the standard and your turning around
products, in your testimony you say that TSA develops and
identifies the requirements that must be met for procurement to
proceed. We have heard from aviation security industry
stakeholders, however, that testing new technologies sometimes
suffers because new and emerging technologies are tested
against old standards of performance. What is TSA doing to
update those standards in light of new technologies, and what
support does TSL provide to this process? And finally, how do
you engage in the private sector when setting performance
standards for these newer technologies?
Mr. Tsao. Yes, ma'am. I guess it all goes to what our
current capabilities are and what the needs are. If we are
talking about a new technology competing with the old
technology, that new technology has to do at least what that
old technology does. So there is very little we can do about or
we would be interested in doing in degredating those standards.
However, if there are situations again where our
capabilities are not where they are supposed to be and we see a
new technology, we are very flexible in the sense that it gives
us a chance. If you have something that gives us a chance, you
know, I am not going to hold it to a standard that is not
reachable in the short-term. That just doesn't make any sense
from a risk standpoint.
Now, we would expect that over time you would be able to
get to, you know, develop and again provide more capabilities,
but we are in a very adaptive world and I need to be as
adaptive as possible.
Dr. Hallowell. Yes, ma'am. I would just like to add to that
that often TSA does come to us, and they are interested in the
technology and they ask us what is the art of the possible?
Right now we are involved in doing a market survey and also
just evaluating technology for a product line that the CTO is
very interested in. So we do an evaluation of what is available
and advise them so they have a heads up. It is a little bit
more than just detection, but we do look at emerging technology
to help TSA.
Chairman Wu. I thank the gentlelady, and before we bring
the hearing to a close, I want to thank all of our witnesses
for testifying before the Committee today. The record will
remain open for additional statements from Members and for
answers to any follow-up questions that Members of the
Committee staff may ask of the witnesses. I thank you all for
making the journey for your presence today, and despite
whatever our discussions have been through this process, I
actually feel better about going to the airport the next time I
will be going. Thank you very much for being here today. The
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:10 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Susan Hallowell, Director, Transportation Security
Laboratory, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of
Homeland Security
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1. In your written testimony, you said that funding for aviation
security R&D for explosives detection has not increased in real dollars
since 1996.
How has the lack of investment affected aviation security
generally?
A1. Aviation security is continually improving with the introduction of
new homeland security technologies. For example, in April, the
Department announced checkpoint technology improvements that will
further strengthen aviation security while decreasing the hassle factor
for travelers. The S&T Directorate's work in transportation security
R&D will lead to the next generation of passenger screening. This
includes stand-off detection of explosives, detecting suicide bombers,
improving the capabilities of canine explosives detection teams and
creating the next-generation passenger checkpoint. Investment in this
and other aviation security R&D is based on priorities identified by
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the
Administration, as supported by Congress.
Performers carrying out aviation security R&D include the S&T
Directorate's Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) as well as
universities, national laboratories and industry.
Q2. What projects have been delayed or canceled because of a lack of
funding?
A2. The S&T Directorate's investment in R&D related to aviation
security includes a broad range of activities across the S&T
Directorate. Several projects address priorities identified by TSA
through the S&T Directorate's capstone Integrated Product Team (IPT)
process. Those priorities include:
- Technologies to screen people for explosives and weapons at
fixed aviation and mass transit checkpoints--In particular, to
allow higher detection rates with minimal disruption to
passenger flow;
- System solutions for explosives detection in checked and
carried bags--In particular, automated systems to screen for
conventional explosives, liquids, weapons, and homemade
explosives;
- Capability to detect homemade or novel explosives--In
particular, characterizing potential homemade explosives for
use in developing detection systems for screening at
checkpoints;
- Optimized canine explosive detection capability--In
particular, techniques, training tools, and methods to improve
performance for all transportation venues; and
- Technologies for screening air cargo for explosives and
explosive devices--In particular, technologies for screening
break-bulk, palletized, and containerized air cargo.
Lower priority project areas that are not funded or have reduced
funding include: (a) development of containerized and palletized cargo
inspection technologies, (b) shoe scanner technology development, (c)
advanced explosives detection systems for checkpoints and checked
baggage, (d) enhancing trace ``puffer'' portals, and (e) developing
integrated checkpoint systems.
Q3. How will the continually decreasing investments affect aviation
security as a whole over the next five to ten years?
A3. The investment in aviation security technology is not ``continually
decreasing.'' There are numerous projects across the S&T Directorate
that will help ensure the safety of passengers throughout the
transportation sector. The S&T Directorate's investment in aviation
security R&D spans basic research to technology transition to customers
in a number of areas, including hostile intent, transportation security
and countering improvised explosives devices. Investment which
explicitly applies to detecting and mitigating explosives on aircraft
was $23.5 million in FY 2007 and $25.3 million in FY 2008. The
President's FY 2009 budget request of $42.3 million nearly doubles that
amount. The S&T Directorate plans to continue significant investment in
aviation security R&D in the out years.
Q4. You noted that TSA is responsible for setting performance
requirements for technology.
Has TSA done an acceptable job at sharing their performance
requirements for new technology in a timely and useful manner?
A4. The process for receiving requirements from the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) has improved with the implementation of
the S&T Directorate's Integrated Product Team (IPT) process. Through
this process the S&T Directorate receives requirements from TSA and
designs programs that will develop products to meet these requirements.
In addition, there is frequent and open discussion between the S&T
Directorate and TSA on the development of certification and
qualification requirements for specific products.
Q5. What improvements are necessary in the communication between TSA
and TSL?
A5. The S&T Directorate's capstone IPT process brings leadership and
staff from TSA and TSL together to discuss research and development
priorities and plans. While the IPT process has improved communication,
security requirements for the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) can change rapidly given the adaptation of terrorist techniques.
This makes having numerous and open lines of communication vital.
Examples of ongoing efforts to improve communication with TSA include:
The S&T Directorate has detailed several of its
Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) staff to TSA. A test
engineer was detailed to TSA's Network Management group to
support cargo projects and a Human Factors subject matter
expert is about to begin a detail to TSA headquarters. This
should facilitate open and frequent dialogue about TSA
requirements with TSL R&D personnel knowledgeable in the
science of detection and deterrence.
The S&T Directorate and TSA are looking for ways to
exchange expertise to provide input on available technology
opportunities. The S&T Directorate's R&D scientists at TSL
recently investigated millimeter wave technology, and are
providing an overview of the technology's capabilities to TSA.
The S&T Directorate plans to schedule more frequent
program and technical reviews between TSA and TSL, which should
contribute to collateral pursuit of optimal security solutions.
Q6. You describe the Transportation Security Laboratory as ``committed
to providing technical and procedural solutions that work in the
field.'' Yet TSL does not carry out field testing of technology.
How does TSL gather information on technology successes and
failures after those technologies are deployed?
A6. The Independent Test and Evaluation (IT&E) group at the
Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) receives information on post-
deployment performance through regular briefings from teams conducting
field performance verification testing for the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), as well as during S&T Directorate Integrated
Product Team (IPT) project-level IPT meetings, where deployment issues
are routinely discussed.
Q7. What steps does TSL take to improve technologies after problems
are identified, and how do you test whether those problems are indeed
solved?
A7. When issues arise in the field, TSA notifies the lab and TSL works
with the vendors to address problems. This often includes review of the
vendor's Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) to, in part; determine if
additional testing is required to validate the solution. In addition,
TSL maintains an operational version of a given product, and pursues
diagnoses of field issues by trying to replicate problems on these
maximally performing systems. When new threats are identified, as with
the homemade explosives threat, TSL works closely with TSA to identify
capability gaps and pursue solutions with industry and international
partners.
Q8. In your testimony, you argue that the Transportation Security
Laboratory should be allowed to charge companies for certification of
their products.
If TSL was authorized to charge for certification services, how
much additional lab capacity and how many additional employees would
need to be created in order to offer this service, especially given
TSL's increasing workload from TSA?
A8. If the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) was authorized to
charge for certification services, TSL would need to increase
laboratory capacity and employees over the next several years as
follows:
a) Administration of Customer Charging. TSL estimates this
would require additional personnel to perform financial
management, financial analysis, customer coordination and
scheduling services.
b) Infrastructure Investment. In order to accommodate the
increasing need for services, TSL would need to add (i) an
Explosive Storage Facility, (ii) an Independent Test and
Evaluation (IT&E) Facility, (iii) a Test Article Storage (non-
explosive) Facility and, (iv)Expanded Office Space.
c) Personnel. TSL would need to add eight additional personnel
to meet the added workload, including four general/system
engineers, one mathematician, one explosives specialist and two
explosives handlers.
d) Operations and Maintenance. TSL would require additional
Operations and Maintenance investment to support the new
facilities and added workload.
These investments would enable TSL to fulfill the inherently
governmental function of maturing and certifying technology and expand
testing and development to additional customers.
Q9. How would TSL determine which products to accept for
certification, and how would you set performance requirements?
A9. The S&T Directorate's Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL)
performs certification at the request of the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), using performance requirements set by TSA. As DHS
develops standards for other DHS applications (beyond transportation
security), the S&T Directorate plans to certify equipment for other
applications. Vendor products that have achieved a sufficient degree of
technical readiness would be accepted on a first-come, first-served
basis, provided TSL has sufficient capacity to take on work beyond its
DHS directed workload.
Q10. Would all companies be charged for testing services, or only
those that approached TSL without a request from TSA?
A10. TSL does not plan to charge companies that are responding to a
request from TSA. TSL would charge companies that approached TSL
without a request from TSA. These may include, for example,
international technology developers.
Questions submitted by Representative Phil Gingrey
Q1. Frequent travelers are continuing to enroll into the Clear
Traveler Program that allows them to navigate security lines at
airports more expeditiously. While Clear is one example of how a
private company can work to both keep us safe and move us through the
security screening process in a speedy manner, to what extent does the
Federal Government partner with companies such as this to stay on the
cutting edge of security screening and airport safety?
Furthermore, since this is the general direction that we are
moving for aviation security, what potential challenges will we face in
terms of public/private partnerships in this realm, the storage of
biometric information, and the continued advancement in aviation
security technologies?
A1. In support of a formal, systematic approach for coordinating with
stakeholders and facilitating an effective and efficient exchange of
information regarding Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
requirements and future deployments of screening technology, the
Industry Outreach group within the TSA Office of Security Technology
(OST) was created to formalize the communication mechanisms by which
OST, customers, and security partners exchange ideas, information, and
operational expertise. Collaboration on the technology security
requirements and deployment strategies leads to the successful
deployment of cutting-edge, state-of-the-art technology solutions.
In order to ensure that the TSA is increasing its efforts to
strengthen the relationship with security partners, Industry Outreach
regularly participates on industry and association-sponsored panels to
discuss technologies available for passenger, baggage, and cargo
screening. Currently, Industry Outreach is in the process of organizing
industry roundtables where security partners will be afforded a better
understanding of TSA's vision for future technologies. Industry
representatives will also be asked to provide the OST with feedback
regarding their concerns. OST understands the importance of receiving
industry feedback and to that end the ``Planning Guidelines and Design
Standards for Checked Baggage Inspection Systems,'' distributed in
October 2007, now has an e-mail address where our industry security
partners can submit comments for consideration in the next version of
the guidelines. The OST Industry Outreach also participates with the
Office of Commercial Airports in TSA's Office of Transportation Sector
Network Management on a regular basis. Individual airports are
encouraged to contact OST Industry Outreach with any airport specific
concerns they may have. In addition, Industry Outreach also regularly
conducts site visits and attends conferences. Industry Outreach is also
supporting a new planning process for airports to apply for fiscal year
(FY) 2009 and FY 2010 funding for electronic baggage screening systems.
As mentioned above, on September 11, 2007, TSA issued the
``Biometrics for Access Control Qualified Products List.'' This
document is an excellent example of how TSA is working with industry to
stay on the cutting edge of biometric technology. This qualified
products list (QPL) is intended to identify biometrics devices for
access control systems which have been tested and found to be in
compliance with performance specifications as set forth in the Guidance
Package Biometrics for Access Control published on September 30, 2005.
The testing/qualifying process is a continuous, open, and ongoing
activity and is not intended to endorse one product over a competitor's
product, and the TSA does not recommend one over another. The QPL is
established merely to provide information to airport operators on
products that have been tested and meet TSA standards, for their use in
conducting source selections and procurement actions, if needed. Users
are cautioned to only rely on the presence of a product on this list as
one important but not comprehensive piece of information in an overall
airport biometric acquisition and deployment decision.
OST is currently working with the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) to establish a process to qualify biometric
testing facilities to further update this QPL (Transition Phase), while
also working with NIST and other organizations within the Department of
Homeland Security, to develop an agency-wide biometrics testing lab
accreditation process. Once that process is established, testing labs
must obtain NIST Accreditation (NVLAP) in order to test devices for
inclusion on the QPL. Manufacturers may submit their devices to a NVLAP
accredited lab of their choice and the lab will submit test results to
TSA for analysis and inclusion on the QPL.
All manufacturers/vendors of biometrics for access control systems
may participate in planned future testing and the QPL will be
periodically updated to include new information about existing products
and additional products that qualify. Government and industry working
together will ensure that the biometric systems are effective,
reliable, and secure.
The potential challenges in the storage of biometric information
include privacy protection, records retention, and the systems required
to house the data. However, only minimal data is stored on the
Registered Traveler (RT) card. The card contains only enough biometric
data, stored within an applet on the card, to confirm a person's
identity when he or she travels. As a safeguard against biometric
theft, fingerprints are not stored on the RT card as an image, but as
biometric template data which prevents unauthorized parties from
replicating the fingerprint image.
TSA will continue to look toward partnership opportunities to
assist in expediting the security process.
Q2. How should TSA determine the appropriate mix of technology and
people in its aviation security and other modes of transportation?
A2. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) constantly
advances its technology usage to stay ahead of emerging threats. We
know there's no single silver bullet technology, no game-changing
technology that will, at once, take us back to pre-9/11 convenience.
But by upgrading what we do have--our workforce and technology
resources--and combining this with the other layers of security and
process innovation, we can get the security result we need, with a lot
less hassle for passengers.
TSA's layered approach to security seeks to identify and deter
threats well before they reach the Nation's airports, railways,
highways, mass transit, ports and pipelines. This risk-based security
strategy relies on transportation-specific intelligence, so TSA
coordinates closely and shares information with other Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) components, the intelligence and law
enforcement communities, other government departments and agencies such
as the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation
Administration, and the transportation industry. Transportation-
specific intelligence is critical to TSA's overall risk-based security
strategy, and the products of such intelligence provide a threat
framework to prioritize limited security resources.
TSA reviewed all modes of transportation and set risk-based
priorities. These priorities focus TSA's attention and limited
resources--both people and technology--on the most critical issues. TSA
has conducted or participated in various risk analyses that compare
risks across different transportation modes, including the DHS
Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment. Surface
transportation, transit, and rail are, like aviation, high priorities
for TSA. The level of funding is determined by the degree to which TSA
can effectively mitigate the risks, compared to the degree with which
industry and other stakeholders can mitigate the risks.
TSA takes a network approach to transportation security and views
it as a shared responsibility and effort among all of TSA; the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS); other government agencies and
entities at all levels, including federal, State, local, tribal and
territorial; and owner-operators.
Much of the Nation's aviation infrastructure is federally owned.
Surface modes of transportation are approximately 95 percent privately
owned and operated. They receive security funding support from multiple
streams (i.e., State, local, private, as well as federal). The
Department has consistently stated that responsibility for surface
transportation security is a shared responsibility among a variety of
stakeholders, including State, local, and federal agencies, and private
owners and operators. The appropriate role for the Federal Government
includes: using the substantial resources already in place and
providing critical information; setting national priorities; developing
transportation security fundamentals; coordinating ongoing efforts; and
encouraging certain actions that reduce risk to the Nation's
transportation system.
The bulk of federal spending in aviation security has covered the
compensation and benefits of Transportation Security Officers, who work
every day in more than 450 airports nationwide to ensure the skies
remain secure. Aviation security allows for point defense. We can seal
off an area of the airport and only permit entry to those with tickets
who have passed through screening.
The rail and mass transit modes do not accommodate this type of
approach. These systems operate over a broad geographic spread with
numerous stations and transfer points providing the efficiency and
fast-pace that are essential to moving thousands of passengers,
particularly during daily rush hours. The point defense approach taken
at the airports is neither practicable nor desirable. Rather, an
integrated strategy, tapping the strengths of the Federal Government,
State and local governments, and passenger rail and mass transit
agencies, must be pursued.
In evaluating the resources required to address surface
transportation risk issues, it is important to account not just for
TSA's budget and statutory obligations in aviation, but also the
substantial efforts, capabilities and expertise that already exist in
the surface transportation environment, as well as very different
operating, legal, and resource requirements. Therefore, the level of
TSA's budget allocated to surface transportation security relative to
aviation only partially reflects the overall relative risk between
them. In fact, TSA does give attention and priority to surface
transportation, but TSA's role relative to the security partners in the
networked approach is different than it is in aviation.
The appropriate way, therefore, to determine the appropriate mix of
technology and people in aviation security and other modes of
transportation, is to use the same criteria that we use to evaluate all
proposed security measures. These criteria are based on risk management
(how substantial is the risk that the measures addresses and how much
does it mitigate the risk), layers of security (how does the measure
complement and enhance other existing security measures) and the needs
and constraints posed by any given mode of transportation where the
measure might be applied.
Q3. Please respond to the three questions below:
What is the technical background of employees working at TSL?
A3. The S&T Directorate's Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL)
federal staff is composed of scientists (physicists, chemists, research
psychologists and mathematicians) and engineers (aerospace, mechanical,
chemical and electrical), certified project managers, explosive handler
specialists, safety and security specialists and administrative
personnel.
Q4. How many of your employees have science or engineering degrees?
A4. Twenty three percent of TSL staff members have obtained doctorate
degrees, mostly in science and some in engineering, 38 percent of the
staff hold Master's degrees in science or engineering and 11 percent of
the staff holds Bachelor's degrees, predominately in science and
engineering. The rest of the staff has Associate's degrees in a variety
of areas. About 70 percent of the staff performs technical roles, while
the remainder perform program management, administrative or safety and
security functions. Of the technical staff, about half support research
and development (R&D) activities and half support test and evaluation
activities for the Integration, Test and Evaluation (IT&E) and R&D
groups.
The TSL federal staff is supplemented by an equivalent number of
contractors as well. Their technical background and distribution of
labor functions are similar to the distribution of the federal staff.
Q5. Can TSL recruit qualified scientists to perform testing and
evaluation without also providing for opportunities to perform basic
and applied research?
A5. The S&T Directorate successfully recruits highly qualified test
engineers as well as scientists to work at the Transportation Security
Laboratory (TSL). Highly qualified professionals are attracted by the
range of work conducted at TSL, which involves basic and applied
research in the development of new standards and technologies. Many of
these professionals are also attracted by TSL's rich history of
successful product development and technology life cycle management as
well as the international recognition TSL has received for its role in
the development of standards, protocols and test articles necessary for
detection technology assessments. However, due to the length of time it
takes to hire, we do loose recruits to other jobs.
Q6. Your testimony describes how TSL uses core funding to respond to
unforeseen requests for scientific and technical advice.
How much of your budget has gone to these activities over the last
five years?
A6. It is estimated that about 25 percent of the Transportation
Security Laboratory's (TSL's) budget has been used to meet unforeseen,
rapid response requests from TSA and other customers. These requests
have included rapid turnaround analyses of developing or deployed
technologies, requests for advice on technology suitability, and
requests for analysis in support of TSA's project-level Integrated
Product Teams (for cargo, checked bag and checkpoint technologies).
Q7. Do you believe TSL is prepared to quickly respond to similar
requests in the future?
A7. Yes.
Questions submitted by Representative Laura Richardson
Q1. In your written testimony you note that funding for aviation
security R&D for explosives detection has not increased in real dollars
since 1996.
What budget have you requested and how would you use it?
A1. Aviation security is continually improving with the introduction of
new homeland security technologies. For example, in April, the
Department announced checkpoint technology improvements that will
further strengthen aviation security while decreasing the hassle factor
for travelers. The S&T Directorate's work in transportation security
R&D will lead to the next generation of passenger screening. This
includes stand-off detection of explosives, detecting suicide bombers,
improving the capabilities of canine explosives detection teams and
creating the next-generation passenger checkpoint. Investment in this
and other aviation security R&D is based on priorities identified by
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the
Administration, as supported by Congress.
Performers carrying out aviation security R&D include the S&T
Directorate's Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) as well as
universities, national laboratories and industry.
The S&T Directorate's FY 2009 budget request for Laboratory
Facilities funding in support of the Transportation Security Laboratory
(TSL) is $21.55 million. This would fund TSL operations, maintenance,
employee salaries and expenses. In addition, the S&T Directorate's
budget request includes program funding that would fund activities at
TSL. A significant portion of this investment would come from the S&T
Directorate Explosives Division's FY 2009 budget request of $96.15
million to fund the following programs. TSL will be one of the
performers carrying out this work.
- Homemade Explosives (HMEs) Program--Investigates all
potential detection technologies capable of detecting and
distinguishing explosives and flammable liquids from benign
liquids (e.g., drinks, hygiene products and contact lens
solutions).
- Cargo Program--Develops advanced air-cargo screening systems
and improves canine detection capabilities.
- Check Point Program--Develops advanced capabilities to
detect explosives and concealed weapons, including small
Improvised Explosives Devices (IEDs) or HMEs, which terrorists
could use in the hostile takeover of mass transit.
- Manhattan II Program--Initiates cost performance tradeoff
studies to provide TSA better information upon which to acquire
the ``best performance and affordability'' screening systems.
- Conveyance Protection Program--Assesses risks and mitigates
consequences of intentional assault on air, surface and marine
vehicles.
- Explosives Research Program--Improves explosives detection
capabilities by performing multi-disciplinary research and
development in imaging, particle physics, chemistry, and
algorithms. These result in the development of enhanced
detection capabilities and lead to next-generation detection
systems.
- Deter Program--Conducts social and behavioral sciences
research to identify actionable indicators and warnings of IED
threats posed by individuals and groups in the United States.
- Predict Program--Develops technologies to secure U.S.
borders that will automatically identify, alert on, and track
suspicious behaviors that precede a suicide bombing attack; and
automatically identify and prioritize the risk of likely
potential targets of attack.
- Detect Program--Develops advanced technologies to detect
explosive threats to the Nation's aviation, rail and ship
transportation systems.
- Respond/Defeat Program--Conducts R&D to better respond to
and defeat explosive threats.
- Mitigation Program--Reduces the effects of bombs that cannot
be detected or cannot be rendered safe through practical and
available means.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Adam Tsao, Chief of Staff, Office of Operational Process
and Technology, Transportation Security Administration,
Department of Homeland Security
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1. How does TSA define field testing protocols? In what ways do field
tests differ from lab tests and certification procedures, and how are
the results reported to TSL?
A1. Independent operational (or ``field'') testing and evaluation
(OT&E) is the means by which the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) Office of Security Technology (OST)
characterizes the operational effectiveness and suitability of viable
security technologies and systems in the field environment. Operational
testing uses typically-trained operators and maintainers, operating
production-representative systems, in accordance with the approved
concept of operations within the intended operational environment.
Operational testing primarily differs from laboratory or
certification technical testing in the degree of operational realism
afforded by testing within the intended environment. In addition, OT&E
supports increased focus on suitability evaluation areas (including
operational reliability and maintainability, logistics supportability,
manpower and personnel requirements, training, and human factors
engineering) through use by the intended target audience and with the
intended support concept. As such, OT&E results present the most
realistic portrayal of anticipated system performance within the field
environment.
The Department of Homeland Security Transportation Security
Laboratory (TSL) provides TSA with results of their laboratory testing
through classified briefings and formal reports. TSA operational field
tests are conducted subsequent to laboratory testing. The results of
field testing are for TSA use and it is not a requirement to provide
operational test reports to TSL. Although results are not formally
reported back to the TSL, the TSL does provide representatives to TSA
project specific Integrated Product Teams. All program aspects,
including operational test results, are discussed in this forum.
Q2. According to Dr. Hallowell, the Transportation Security Laboratory
has formal procedures in place to ensure that they are responding
directly to TSA's research, development, testing, and evaluation needs.
How successful has TSL been at meeting TSA's needs? Does the Integrated
Product Team process capture adequate information about TSA's
capability gaps and research priorities? Are there any changes to this
process that you would recommend?
A2. The Integrated Product Team (IPT) process is in its initial stages,
having just been included in Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA) fiscal year (FY) 2009 budget. The IPT has been organized into 13
capstones programs, to complement the research and development efforts
of TSA. The Explosives Detection Division Capstone IPT was created
during the current FY 2009 budget cycle.
This initial pilot program was successful in many of its goals,
including establishing budgetary funding priorities as part of the FY
2009 budget process and in prioritizing the research and development
needs of TSA. As of November 2007, the Explosives Detection Division
Capstone IPT has shown that TSA is able to articulate to the Department
of Homeland Security Office of Science and Technology a clear
understanding of its science and technology needs to procure solutions
that not only meet stringent detection thresholds, but also meet
throughput requirements in support of the aviation sector.
Currently, a more in-depth report card of the IPT Process is
premature at this time, as the program is still too new. As already
stated, the goal of the IPT Process is to address and reach a better
understanding of the operational needs of TSA and to ensure the
research and development efforts of TSA are timely and relevant.
Initial feedback on the initial capstone program has been very
promising.
Q3. How often does TSA turn to the Department of Energy's National
Labs or private labs to carry out testing that could be performed by
the Transportation Security Laboratory? In those instances, why does
TSA choose to use resources other than TSL, and what is the added cost
to TSA?
A3. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) actively pursues a
number of options to readily interject new screening technology into
the operating environment. TSA coordinates with the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) to
determine the most efficient way to achieve that goal. In general, TSA
and DHS choose to use the National Labs when the opportunity is
available to leverage existing expertise that has been developed for
other government programs. It would be cost prohibitive for S&T to
develop similar in house capability and expertise.
Q4. In her testimony, Dr. Hallowell says that ``it is the
responsibility of TSA to define and judge readiness for deployment.''
How does TSA determine whether a technology is ready for deployment? If
technologies are deployed in spite of expressed reservations from TSL,
what steps are taken to ensure that those technologies meet performance
and technical requirements?
A4. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) considers
evaluation products from a variety of sources (including the Department
of Homeland Security Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) and other
technical testing data sources, such as independently validated vendor
information) in considering readiness for deployment of security
systems and technologies. In addition to reviewing the demonstrated
effectiveness and suitability of candidate systems (as evaluated
against Operational Requirements Documents, procurement specifications,
and other applicable statutory and regulatory requirements) as noted
during both developmental and operational testing, the TSA Office of
Security Technology also considers the operational capabilities
afforded by the system of interest, as well as resource requirements,
operational need, and threat information, among others, in determining
how and whether a system should be deployed.
Q5. How are human factors taken into account when developing
functional requirements for new technologies? In what ways do
requirements take both screener and passenger needs into account?
A5. Human Factors Engineers participate at every stage of the
requirements development process and in system reviews. They ensure
that requirements for human interfaces effectively address usability
and ergonomic aspects. These requirements are written to ensure that
screening equipment is user friendly so that operators can work
efficiently and safely and passengers will be able to submit to
screening in ways that are safe and minimize stress. The Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of Homeland Security's
Science and Technology Directorate work together to provide human
factors input into requirements development, system and critical design
reviews, and system qualification. TSA then evaluates Human Systems
Integration when systems are piloted in the field.
Q6. Dr. Drury's written testimony describes the Threat Image
Projection System (TIPS) as one example of how human factors research
can positively affect the efficacy and speed of aviation checkpoints.
TIPS enhances screener performance by randomly inserting threat images
to ensure that screeners are regularly presented with potential threats
and can react accordingly. Does TSA plan to include a system like TIPS
in airports?
A6. Threat Image Projection (TIP) is currently active on over 1,800 TIP
Ready X-ray (TRX) machines at all passenger screening locations
nationwide. TIP provides screeners experience in identifying threat
objects including improvised explosive devices, guns, knives, and other
deadly and dangerous prohibited items (i.e., martial arts weapons,
tools, and brass knuckles, among others). The TIP library contains over
2,400 fictional threat images captured at various angles and difficulty
levels. TIP serves as an invaluable, multi-functional system that
extends well beyond an evaluation tool; it provides immediate feedback
and functions as a reinforcement system that increases screener
accuracy. TIP enhances screener attentiveness and vigilance through
random and periodic presentations and exposure to new and emerging
threats. TIP results, which have been collected and analyzed on a
monthly basis since January 2004, have shown a steady increase in
screener performance on threat detection. These results are used to
track trends in screener performance on threat detection, as well as
identify additional training needs.
Q7. What is the technical background of employees working at TSA? How
many of your employees have science or engineering degrees? How has TSA
staffed its teams responsible for developing functional requirements
for new technologies with respect to R&D expertise?
A7. Overall, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) tracks
the education level completed, such as Associate degrees, Master's
degree, and so on. We do not capture the course of study; that is,
Engineering vs. English, mathematics or biology. Attached is the
information available about degrees.
TSA's Office of Security Technology (OST), which is primarily
responsible for developing functional requirements for new technology,
has 77 employees on board. Of that number, approximately 40 employees
have science or engineering degrees, many with advanced graduate
degrees and a few with Doctorate level degrees. The OST staff includes
a Chief Scientist and Chief Engineer, adequately addressing the need
for research and development expertise and the functional requirements
for new and emerging technologies. OST continues to hire in the
science/engineering fields.
Question submitted by Representative Phil Gingrey
Q1. Your testimony states that ``TSA's involvement will likely vary''
in future technology development and implementation. What factors would
lead to decreased involvement by TSA in any particular aviation
security project?
A1. The statement about the Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA) involvement in future technology development does not mean that
TSA envisions decreased participation in future efforts. Based on the
maturity of screening technology at the time of assessment as well as
the operational rigor required for implementation and integration, the
project areas of responsibility are shared but will vary between TSA
and the rest of the Department of Homeland Security.
Questions submitted by Representative Laura Richardson
Q1. What is the status of the Registered Traveler (RT) Program?
A1. The current phase of the Registered Traveler (RT) Program is known
as the Registered Traveler Inter-operability Pilot (RTIP). The RTIP is
entirely fee-funded and intended to test inter-operability between
multiple RT Service Providers. A Service Provider (SP) is a private
sector vendor chosen by a Sponsoring Entity to implement RT as its
agent. As of May 2008, 19 Sponsoring Entities, participating airport
authorities or air carrier operators, are operating RT at 18 airport
locations, three Transportation Security Administration approved SPs
are hosting operational RT Programs, and approximately 110,000
participants are active in the RT Program.
Q2. How many TSA Employees are not US Citizens? How do you recruit TSA
Employees?
A2. Currently, all Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
employees are United States citizens.
TSA participates in various recruitment activities to enhance
awareness of opportunities for employment with TSA and maximize the
number of highly qualified candidates for consideration. Recruitment
efforts include posting job vacancies on USAJobs, web boards, college
campuses, and in various print media. TSA recruiters participate in
career fairs and conferences nationwide; establish relationships with
community-based organizations, educational institutions, military
associations, and cultural organizations. TSA recruiters also
participate and attend professional association conferences to network
with colleagues, business leaders and individuals in the field who may
be resources for identifying qualified candidates. TSA also
participates in Department of Homeland Security corporate recruiting
events and job fairs, including Veterans Outreach efforts.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Jimmie C. Oxley, Professor of Chemistry, University of
Rhode Island (URI); Co-Director, URI Forensic Science
Partnership; Co-Director, DHS University Center of Excellence
in Explosive Detection, Mitigation, and Response
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1. You noted in your testimony that operational difficulties
undermine the performance of explosives-detection technologies
currently in use in the field. Do existing tests and evaluations of
explosives detectors adequately predict these field performance
challenges? If not, what additional tests should detectors be subject
to in order to ensure high quality performance and robustness?
A1. It is a general phenomenon that lab-scale results will not be
directly applicable to real-world scenarios. Therefore, there is an
intermediate step--the pilot-scale. In airport security, the pilot-
scale is use of a new device or protocol at a few select airports
(test-beds) under carefully controlled conditions. Still, the final
performance will also be affected by repetitive use and by
incorporation of ``lessons-learned'' improvements. These steps cannot
be avoided. The only way to speed this process is by use of more test-
bed facilities. The obvious lack in present technologies is the need to
include ergonomic considerations at an early point in instrument
design.
Question submitted by Representative Phil Gingrey
Q1. How should TSA determine the appropriate mix of technology and
people in its aviation security and other modes of transportation?
A1. It is important to continue vigorous funding for developing and
improving technologies--old and new. However, ergonomic factors should
be considered early in the development. Presently, people are used in
security screening at points where instruments fail. It would be better
to assign assets keeping in mind that people are better at decision-
making and instruments are better at screening. The only way to get the
right balance is to continue and expand use of test-bed arenas.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Colin G. Drury, Distinguished Professor and Chair,
Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, State
University of New York at Buffalo
Overall Response: These are excellent and thought-provoking
questions that will help advance the cause of improved security, and
particularly the role of Human Factors Engineering in helping assure
that improvement. I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for the
chance to respond.
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1. In your opinion, is there adequate awareness of the need for human
factors engineering in the private aviation security technology
industry? If not, how should the Transportation Security Administration
change their performance requirements to compel companies to consider
human factors when designing technology?
A1. There was much talk in security about Human Factors since before
TSA was formed, but the term tended to be used rather loosely in the
aviation security technology industry. It often meant ``training'' or
``human resources'' or ``computer screen design.'' This has improved
over the years, so that the equipment manufacturers I have met have a
more realistic view of human factors as an engineering discipline. I am
still not convinced that they see it as a systems engineering
discipline, with all that implies about designing from the start for
the human operators rather than meeting a set of fixed requirements.
To ``compel companies to consider human factors when designing
technology'' it would be useful for the TSA to set requirements for the
design process as well as requirements for the finished product. These
could include employing at least one Human Factors Engineer and
ensuring that the process of design was documented to show how that
design input was used. Currently full membership in the Human Factors
and Ergonomics Society in the USA would ensure adequate technical
competence in Human Factors Engineering, but full certification by the
Board of Certification in Professional Ergonomics (BCPE) would
represent proven expertise in practice of the Human Factors Ergonomics
discipline. The design process for the variety of different security
systems is unlikely to benefit from rigid requirements. It would be
preferable to have a process that called for the manufacturer to use
good Human Factors Engineering practices in the design and demonstrate
this to competent Human Factors Engineers in DHS (e.g., DHS's Science
and Technology or TSL's human factors personnel). Of course, the
government Human Factors Engineers would need to demonstrate the same
level of credentials called for above.
Q2. You mentioned in your testimony that technology can be tested for
human factors by either analyzing the final product or carrying out
field testing. Are there options for carrying out performance tests in
the lab that would reveal any human-technology interaction problems?
A2. In my written testimony I mentioned both of these as valid
evaluation methods. Analyzing the final product for compliance with
Human Factors Engineering guidelines may not be as successful because,
as noted in the testimony, security technologies are complex and varied
so that no single checklist could hope to ensure a well human-
engineered system. The field testing alternative favored in the
testimony could encompass a range of testing from breadboard testing of
early prototypes in a laboratory through to in-service trials at
airports or other points of entry. Product and system testing has a
long history in Human Factors Engineering, and all levels have been
used at different times on many systems. We now have excellent software
for simulating working systems using computer workstations so that more
realistic tests can be applied at an early stage of systems
development. For example, with X-ray screening of carry-on baggage it
is quite possible to test new technology and algorithms for detection
of threats prior to the technology actually being available for in-
service use. In this way we can test, for example, increased system
resolution (as was done at TSL) to determine whether or not increased
resolution will make any practical difference to threat detection
performance.
In all off-line testing it is easier to detect problems than to
assure future performance. If the simulated system works well under
test conditions, then it may still have undiscovered problems in the
field (e.g., maintenance errors), whereas if problems are found during
testing they almost certainly would occur in field conditions. Where
the test is sited, laboratory vs. field, may be less important than the
psychological and biomechanical fidelity of the simulation in
predicting future in-service performance. The choice of participants,
for example, is crucial. Using personnel from the development team
introduces a bias as they both know too much about the new system and
have poor current experience of the in-service situation. Similarly
using a subject pool of university students may answer some questions
(e.g., how well do novices perform under different display options) but
is unlikely to yield valid predictions of in-service performance. The
measures in off-line testing are also important. As noted in my written
testimony, we can take measures beyond performance (hits, false alarms
and throughput) under test conditions. We can be prepared to observe
human-system interaction errors and interview experienced users after
the test to help determine not just that a problem exists but why it
exists and how to prevent it. Because off-line testing is controlled,
we can use a broad range of threat types and methods of concealment to
determine in advance of service use where difficulties are possible,
and where the greatest strengths of the new system lie. The textbook
Evaluation of Human Work by J.R. Wilson and E.N. Corlett (3rd Edition,
2005) has chapters on many of the issues of human factors testing from
simulator fidelity to experimental design.
Questions submitted by Representative Phil Gingrey
Q1. Your written testimony describes the Threat Image Projection
System (TIPS) as one example of how human factors research can
positively affect the efficacy and speed of aviation checkpoints. Can
you tell us a bit more about that program including where it was
developed and at what cost?
A1. This is a question for which I do not have complete data, so I
would refer you to TSL for full information on who exactly developed
TIPS and what it cost. I would expect that Dr. Hallowell would be able
to make this information available. TIPS was developed at the TSL and
won the team the FAA's Distinguished Achievement in Technology Transfer
Award. The idea behind TIPS is that it provides realistic test images
of threats to the screener during actual operations. These threats
images are superimposed almost seamlessly onto items (carry-on bags
etc.) that are actually passing through the X-ray scanner at the time
and so the threats appear to be items within the bag. The screener
presses one of two buttons to release the bag: OK if no threat is seen
and Not OK if a threat is seen. If there was a TIPS threat projected
onto the bag, the screener gets a response to the effect that they
missed a threat (if they indicated OK) or a congratulation on correctly
detecting a threat (if they indicated Not OK). When they correctly
detect a threat they are instructed to re-inspect the bag in case it
also contains an actual threat. The data on hits and misses of TIPS
images is collected automatically on most newer X-ray equipment and is
downloaded periodically for analysis.
There are five main advantages of the TIPS system:
A. Because of the very low rate of actual threats, TIPS images
provide a means of increasing the effective rate of threats in
a realistic manner. The higher the effective threat rate, the
better the performance in almost any inspection task.
B. This increase in effective threat rate also tends to reduce
any time-on-task decrease in performance due to fatigue (the
Vigilance Decrement).
C. The rapid feedback of success / failure data to the
screener also reduces any vigilance decrement. True feedback is
problematical in any inspection task, as we almost never know
the true presence of a threat. If we did know that, there would
be no need for the inspection! Thus the artificial (but
realistic) feedback provided by TIPS overcomes a longstanding
problem in maintaining inspection performance.
D. Data can be collected on individual screeners, whole
screening lines, complete checkpoints and even whole airports
for monitoring purposes. In any inspection task, the system
will make errors and that is true of automated, manual and
hybrid inspection tasks. Collecting the TIPS data on errors
permits analysis of differences between screeners, checkpoints
etc. and so can point up instances of both high performance and
low performance. Action can then be taken to reward or retrain
individual screeners, or seek to replicate good screening lines
or checkpoints.
E. Finally, the database generated by TIPS can be used to
answer many research questions. For example, if threat
detection does indeed decrease with time on task (vigilance
decrement) the magnitude of the effect should be measurable in
TIPS data. It should also be possible to test time-of-day
effects, effects of growing screener expertise, the
effectiveness of changes to X-ray set-up or procedures, etc.
Note however that for any of these to occur, the TIPS data must be
valid. Thus the TIPS library of images must be large enough to avoid
screeners recognizing images already seen. Also the managerial
procedures must be followed reliably, for example ensuring that
screeners actually sign out when they take a short break. The TIPS data
collection system should not malfunction. Also, managers with little
knowledge of statistics must beware of over-interpreting data from
small samples. In fact QinetiQ in the UK has developed excellent
software that helps interpret TIPS data, and specifically warns when
the data are insufficient to evaluate a particular screener.
Q2. How should TSA determine the appropriate mix of technology and
people in its aviation security and other modes of transportation?
A2. This is a key question in any application of Human Factors
Engineering, and so is especially relevant to security systems. At the
most simplistic level, my written testimony included: ``Overall,
automation provides the ability to take rapid and consistent action
within strict rules, while humans provide the flexibility to respond
when the rules do not apply (e.g., Parasuraman, Sheridan and Wickens,
2000).'' This is a general guideline but more specific information is
needed for each particular system. The Allocation of Function
literature (e.g., Hollnagel, E., and Bye, A. (2000). Principles for
Modeling Function Allocation. Int. J. Human-Computer Studies. Vol. 52,
pp. 253-265) gives techniques for applying this methodology, as does
the automation literature (e.g., Parasuraman, R., Sheridan, T.B. and
Wickens, C.D. (2000). A model for types and levels of human interaction
with automation. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics-Part
A: Systems and Humans, Vol. 30 (3), May 2000). There are complete
design methodologies under the headings of Socio-Technical Systems
Engineering (Taylor, J.C. and Felten, D.F. (1992) Performance by
Design, Prentice Hall) and Cognitive Work Analysis (Vicente, K.J.
(1999). Cognitive Work Analysis. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum) which lead to
specific answers in specific instances.
Note that there may be quite different appropriate mixes of
technology and people in different detection systems at a single
checkpoint, and certainly between different modes of transportation.
The task of searching an X-ray image of a cargo container is many times
more difficult for a human than searching a carry-on bag image for
similar threats. Minimally-aided human search may well be an effective
solution for the smaller task, but software assistance in at least the
search function would probably be required for a whole container to
achieve the same level of threat detection.