[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM,
AND HOMELAND SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 11, 2008
__________
Serial No. 110-135
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan, Chairman
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California LAMAR SMITH, Texas
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,
JERROLD NADLER, New York Wisconsin
ROBERT C. ``BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ZOE LOFGREN, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
MAXINE WATERS, California DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts CHRIS CANNON, Utah
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida RIC KELLER, Florida
LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California DARRELL ISSA, California
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MIKE PENCE, Indiana
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
BETTY SUTTON, Ohio STEVE KING, Iowa
LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois TOM FEENEY, Florida
BRAD SHERMAN, California TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York JIM JORDAN, Ohio
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama
DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
Perry Apelbaum, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Sean McLaughlin, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
ROBERT C. ``BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia, Chairman
MAXINE WATERS, California LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
JERROLD NADLER, New York F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia Wisconsin
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
Bobby Vassar, Chief Counsel
Caroline Lynch, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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MARCH 11, 2008
Page
OPENING STATEMENT
The Honorable Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Subcommittee
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security..................... 1
The Honorable Louie Gohmert, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security............................... 3
WITNESSES
Mr. Dana A. Brown, Director, Federal Air Marshall Service,
Assistant Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC
Oral Testimony................................................. 5
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 13
Mr. Jeffrey D. Self, Chief, Southwest Border Division, Office of
Border Patrol, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC
Oral Testimony................................................. 6
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 13
Mr. Raymond R. Parmer, Deputy Director for Investigations, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland
Security, Washington, DC
Oral Testimony................................................. 8
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 13
Mr. Michael Stenger, Assistant Director, Office of
Investigations, United States Secret Service, Department of
Homeland Security, Washington, DC
Oral Testimony................................................. 10
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 13
Rear Admiral Wayne Justice, Assistant Commandant for Capability
and Director of Response Policy, U.S. Coast Guard, Department
of Homeland Security, Washington, DC
Oral Testimony................................................. 11
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 13
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record........................ 39
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS
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TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 2008
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., in
room 2237, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Robert
C. (Bobby) Scott (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Scott, Delahunt, Nadler, Jackson
Lee, Gohmert, Sensenbrenner, Coble, and Chabot.
Staff present: Bobby Vassar, Subcommittee Chief Counsel;
Mario Dispenza (Fellow), ATF Detailee; Ameer Gopalani, Majority
Counsel; Veronica Eligan, Majority Professional Staff Member;
Kimani Little, Minority Counsel; and Kelsey Whitlock, Minority
Staff Assistant.
Mr. Scott. The Committee will come to order. I am pleased
to welcome you today for the hearing before the Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security on the Department of
Homeland Security law enforcement operations.
In 2002 the Department of Homeland Security was created in
the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001. The concept was
to transform and realign multiple agencies of various functions
into one department, to streamline intelligence and law
enforcement, and better protect the United States from
terrorist attacks.
One of the shortcomings that we had was we were trying to
get all the agencies together, because the FBI wasn't talking
to the Department of Defense who wasn't talking to the CIA. And
when the dust settled, we looked up and we had a new department
and none of those agencies were in the Department of Homeland
Security. So instead of three people not talking to each
other----
Anyway, the concept is the concept, but as part of the
creation of the department, the following law enforcement
agencies were either transferred to DHS or created by
consolidation: the Transportation Security Administration,
Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Secret Service, and the Coast Guard. These
agencies, their functions, their accomplishments, and their
challenges are the subject of this hearing.
The TSA's main law enforcement functions are the Federal
Air Marshals and the National Explosives Detection Canine Team
programs. Air marshals are deployed on flights around the world
and the United States to ensure the security of the plane and
the passengers during flight. During this hearing, the
Subcommittee will follow up on issues from the 2005 hearing and
inquire about the effectiveness of air travel security.
The TSA's National Explosives Detection Canine Team program
prepares dogs and analysts to locate and identify dangerous
materials that may present a threat to transportation systems.
Explosives detections canines can be a valuable tool in foiling
terrorists' plots, which is why a number of agencies outside
the DHS conduct explosive detections services with canines.
However, the training standards and methods differ among
agencies, which has caused controversy among the experts in the
field. The Subcommittee will inquire about whether multiple
efforts among agencies using different methods and standards
are the most effective use of Federal resources, or whether a
national standard should be established by one agency.
The United States Customs and Border Protection is
responsible for protecting our Nation's borders from terrorism,
human and drug smuggling, and illegal immigration, while
simultaneously facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and
trade. This agency must work a fine line of balancing the
urgency of securing the borders while being the least intrusive
on commerce and the liberty rights of Americans as possible.
Some privacy and civil rights groups have voiced concerns
about the techniques that might violate the first amendment.
They have demanded that CBP disclose its policies when
questioning travelers on first amendment protected activities,
photocopying individuals' personal papers, searching laptop
computers and other electronic devices, and we may discuss
these policies today.
The Committee will also inquire about the Operation
Streamline initiative, which targets for prosecution those who
enter the United States through high-traffic areas near the
United States' southwest border in violation of criminal law.
Concerns have been raised about Operation Streamline being too
aggressive, and allegations that have been raised by some U.S.
citizens about being improperly subject to deportation.
The Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE, is the
largest investigative branch of DHS and focuses on targeting
unauthorized aliens, people, money, and materials that support
terrorism and other criminal activities in meeting its mission
objectives. Today the Subcommittee will explore issues related
to ICE policies and practices related to investigation and
detention and removal of unauthorized aliens.
In 2007, the Government Accountability Office report about
ICE practices identified problem areas, recommended that ICE
update its policies for alien apprehension and removal,
streamline and improve its dissemination of legal updates, and
develop a system of determining comprehensive best practices to
uniform supervisory reviews of officer discretion. The
Subcommittee will inquire about how ICE is responding to the
GAO's recommendations.
In addition to its protection responsibilities, the United
States Secret Service also investigates financial crime
violations. The Subcommittee will want to know about the
investigation of financial crimes, which pose a tremendous
threat to our national security and the personal finances of
all Americans.
According to the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, more than
150 million records containing sensitive information--personal
information--have been involved in data security breaches since
2005. Since November 2005, there have been at least 436 data
security breaches in the United States affecting millions of
American consumers. The Subcommittee will inquire as to how the
Secret Service is responding to combat these threats.
The United States Coast Guard law enforcement mission is
maritime security, which is to protect America's maritime
borders from all intrusions hosting the flow of illegal drugs,
aliens, and contraband into the United States through maritime
routes, preventing illegal fishing, and suppressing violations
of Federal law in maritime areas. The Subcommittee will inquire
the Coast Guard's success in these areas, and will also explore
the Coast Guard's plan for updating its technology. For
example, the Coast Guard is developing an important homeland
security program called the Automatic Identification System,
which will enable the Coast Guard to employ a nationwide system
for identifying, tracking, and communicating with vessels in
U.S. harbors.
With that said, it is my pleasure to recognize the Ranking
Member of the Subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas--from the
1st Congressional District of Texas--former judge Louie
Gohmert.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Chairman Scott. I couldn't tell,
are these microphones working?
Mr. Scott. Yes, I believe it is.
Mr. Gohmert. You would be better off, probably, if mine
wasn't. But I appreciate Chairman Scott's comments.
I wasn't in Congress when Homeland Security was created; as
I recall it was a fairly bipartisan effort, because the 9/11
Commission recommended it. But in my layman state of ignorance,
I sure didn't think it was a good idea to add another level of
bureaucracy. Gee, if they are not communicating, let us add
another level of bureaucracy that everybody will have to
communicate through. And it seems that when I had that opinion
in my state of ignorance, that maybe I wasn't as ignorant as
one might have thought.
But I want to thank you for scheduling this hearing. This
is the first hearing the Subcommittee will have on law
enforcement agencies in the Department of Homeland Security.
This represents an opportunity to learn more about the vast law
enforcement mission given to DHS.
Last week our full Committee held an oversight hearing on
the entire department. At that hearing, Secretary Chertoff
focused his comments on answering questions on immigration
issues. Today we look forward to hearing from the
representatives of the five law enforcement agencies.
We want to hear about your missions, your capabilities, and
what challenges you expect to face in the near future. That
also will tell us what we need to do to help you.
The Department of Homeland Security has wide Federal law
enforcement authority to achieve its mission to secure the
homeland. That law enforcement authority is divided among five
agencies--of course, you know this well: the U.S. Coast Guard,
the U.S. Secret Service, the Federal Air Marshal Service, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, and U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement.
The United States Coast Guard patrols international waters
and America's coasts and waterways. With over 43,000 employees,
Coast Guard Service is the lead Federal agency to combat
maritime illegal immigration and for maritime drug
interdiction. Each year, Coast Guard drug interdiction accounts
for nearly 52 percent of all U.S. government seizures of
cocaine.
U.S. Secret Service is best known for its mission to
protect the President and other national and foreign leaders;
however, the Service combats the counterfeiting of U.S.
currency, and guards against cyber-attacks on our financial and
telecommunications infrastructure. In 2007, the Service seized
an estimated $147 million in counterfeit dollars.
Federal Air Marshal Service is the primary law enforcement
agency within the Transportation Security Administration. Each
year the Air Marshals deploy on thousands of flights,
domestically and internationally, to protect passengers and
crew from criminal and terrorist attacks in the air.
United States Custom and Border Protection is responsible
for securing the U.S. borders and ports, works to prevent
terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the U.S., and
combats drug trafficking and human smuggling along the border.
In 2007, CBP seized more than 87,000 pounds of cocaine, and
more than 307,000 pounds of marijuana in its law enforcement
operations.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is the largest
investigative arm of DHS. With the second-largest cadre of
special agents in the U.S., ICE targets the people, money, and
materials that support terrorists and criminals. Since 2003,
ICE has seized more than $600 million in cash and monetary
instruments, and more than $850 million worth of real property,
vessels, aircrafts, artwork, vehicles, and jewels.
DHS has had an impact in law enforcement, but there is
still more to do, of course. I look forward to working with
Chairman Scott on ensuring effective oversight of DHS law
enforcement agencies--and that is why I am pleased you called
this hearing--and look forward to this hearing and learning
more about the problems you face, the challenges you have
ahead, and how we can work together to solve them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
I will ask other Members to have their statements in the
record. If there is no objection, we will continue by
introducing our panelists.
Our first witness will be Mr. Dana Brown, assistant
administrator for law enforcement for the TSA, and director of
the Air Marshal Service. He served with the U.S. Secret Service
for 25 years, and is retired as assistant director for the
Office of Administration before bringing his expertise and
experience to the Federal Air Marshal Service in 2003. He has a
bachelor's degree from the College of William and Mary in
Virginia.
Our next witness will be Mr. Jeffrey Self, Southwest Border
Division chief, Office of Border Patrol. He is a 19-year
veteran of the Border Patrol, having served in numerous patrol
areas in leadership positions. As Southwest Border Division
chief, he is responsible for the activities of nine Southwest
Border sectors and over 11,000 Border Patrol agents.
Our next witness will be Raymond Parmer, deputy director of
the Office of Investigations to the U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. As deputy director, Mr. Parmer oversees
the largest investigative arm of the Department of Homeland
Security, is responsible for the policy planning, management,
and operations conducted under the five major investigative
program divisions within the Office of Investigations. He has a
Bachelor of Arts degree in criminal justice administration from
the University of South Alabama, and a Master of Science degree
in criminal justice management from the University of Southern
Mississippi.
Our next witness is Michael Stenger, the assistant
director, Office of Investigations, United States Secret
Service. He is a 31-year veteran of the Secret Service, and has
served in numerous protective, investigative, and staff
assignments. For his current assignment, he serves as the
senior official overseeing the agency's investigations. In this
capacity, he develops and implements policies as it pertains to
the cyber and fraud related crimes that the agency
investigates. He has a Bachelor of Arts degree from Fairleigh
Dickinson University in New Jersey.
Our final witness is Rear Admiral Wayne Justice, who serves
currently as the assistant commandant for Capability, and as
the director of Response Policy for the United States Coast
Guard. As the assistant commandant for Capability, he is
responsible for the allocation, distribution, management, and
recapitalization of all Coast Guard operation forces. As the
director of Response Policy, he is responsible for the
development of doctrine and policy guidance for all Coast Guard
forces to accomplish operational maritime missions in the areas
of search and rescue, law enforcement, defense operations, and
incident management. He is a 30-year veteran of the Coast
Guard, and has a Bachelor of Science in management from the
Coast Guard Academy, 1977, a master's in human resource
management with honors from Nova University, and a master's in
strategic studies from the Naval War College--College of Naval
Warfare--in 1996.
Each of our witnesses' written statements will be entered
in the record in its entirety, and I ask each witness to
summarize his testimony in 5 minutes or less. And to help you
stay within that time, there is a lighted device in front of
us, which will switch from green to yellow when you have 1
minute left, and we would ask you to conclude your testimony--
finish your thought--but conclude your testimony when 5 minutes
have expired.
We will begin with Mr. Brown.
TESTIMONY OF DANA A. BROWN, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL AIR MARSHALL
SERVICE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Brown. Good morning, Chairman Scott, Representative
Gohmert, distinguished Members of the Committee. I am
privileged to appear before you today to discuss the authority
of the Federal Air Marshal Service and the Transportation
Security Administration of the Department of Homeland Security.
September the 11, 2001, forever transformed our Nation. In
one moment we came face to face with a known enemy on American
soil, on a chance condition threatening to our way of life.
However, on that day something far greater than fear, something
much stronger than despair took root: an unshakeable faith in
our fellow citizens and our ideals in our Nation, and an
unwavering determination to protect and preserve what we stand
for as a country on virtue of the destruction, to guide our
efforts in the fight against terrorism and the quest to
preserve liberty; and I have my place of work at the Federal
Air Marshal Service due to that set of beliefs.
Over the past 4 years, Air Marshal capability has expanded
and contracted in reaction to hijack activity. Until 9/11, the
Air Marshals consisted of less than 50 personnel who operated
under the direction of the Federal Aviation Administration and
flew mainly international missions. In the aftermath of 9/11,
the Department of Homeland Security was envisioned, formed, and
is now in operation--Federal Air Marshal Service has been a
challenging and rewarding undertaking.
While we have come a long way since then, we still have
some distance to go. I was fortunate to be named as the
director of the Federal Air Marshal Service a little over 2
years ago. Since that time, one of my goals has been to build
on the accomplishments of the former director who did an
outstanding job in creating a full-fledged law enforcement
organization consisting of thousands of personnel in less than
1 year--is complete and the old condition stabilizes, my goal
to building success--blueprint for the future.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Mr. Self?
TESTIMONY OF JEFFREY D. SELF, CHIEF, SOUTHWEST BORDER DIVISION,
OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
WASHINGTON, DC
Chief Self. Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert, and
distinguished Subcommittee Members, it is an honor to have the
opportunity to appear before you today. My testimony this
morning focuses on law enforcement operations of CBP as well as
partnership with other Federal agencies to guard our Nation's
borders against terrorists and their instruments of terror.
Established in 2003, CBP is a consolidated agency brought
together to protect America's front line from terrorism while
facilitating legitimate trade and travel along our Nation's
border. The agency unites in inspectional work forces and broad
border authorities of the U.S. customs, Key West immigration,
animal and plant health and inspections services and the entire
U.S. Border Patrol.
The agency manages 326 ports of entry and 144 border patrol
stations within 20 sectors to secure almost 6,000 miles of
border with Canada and Mexico, and 95,000 miles of shoreline.
On a typical day in fiscal year 2007, the law enforcement
jurisdiction of the agency executed 70 arrests of criminals at
ports of entry, 2,400 illegal aliens between the ports,
intercepted 84 fraudulent documents and seized over 7,300
pounds of narcotics at and between ports of entry.
CBP has authority to enforce Federal criminal law, codified
in title 18 and elsewhere in the U.S. Code. CBP works in
coordination with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms, and other Federal agencies to enforce Federal
criminal law at the border.
CBP officers and border patrol agents may arrest without a
warrant for any Federal offense, including violations of title
18 and title 19, if the offense is committed in the officer or
agent's presence. The officer and agent may also arrest without
a warrant for any Federal felony that occurs outside the
officer or agent's presence if the officer or agent has
reasonable grounds to believe the person committed the felony.
Common immigration-specific violations of title 18 at the
border include false claim to U.S. citizenship, fraud involving
identity documents reproduction and fraud involving citizenship
documents forgery or false use of a passport and false
statements to a Federal officer. Other common violations of
title 18 that lead to arrest by CBP are: for an assault on a
Federal officer, and--possession of a firearm.
CBP has primary responsibility for enforcing the
immigration laws of title 8 and the custom laws of title 19 at
the border. The Immigration and Nationality Act within title 8
has its own criminal provisions. In addition, violations of
title 8 may also form the basis of a title 18 prosecution.
Common prosecution based on violations of the INA discovered by
CBP at the border are: alien smuggling, illegal entry into the
U.S., and illegal reentry into the U.S.
Many prosecutions result from the identification of
arrested subjects through the IAPS system. The IAPS system
resulted in over 144,000 hits this past fiscal year for crimes
ranging from homicide, sexual assault, robbery, dangerous
drugs, and other misdemeanor crimes.
In order to ensure these laws, CBP--in order to enforce
these laws, CBP utilizes partnership with other Federal
agencies. A key example of these partnerships are Integrated
Border Enforcement Teams and Operation Uniforce.
From January 13, 2008 to January 26, 2008 border patrol
agents from the New Orleans sector conducted Operation Uniforce
to interdict alien and narcotic smugglers. These multi-agency
operations were conducted utilizing traffic observation units
on Interstate 20, operating between the Mississippi River and
the city of Jackson, Mississippi.
Forty border patrol agents and two canine handlers from the
New Orleans Sector conducted operations with the Office of
Field Operations Special Response Team members, agents from the
ICE Detention and Removal Office, CBP Air and Marine, the
Mississippi Highway Patrol, the Rankin, Madison, and Hines
County Sheriff's Departments, along with the Pearl and Clinton
Police Department.
The intelligence data that was gathered during Operation
Uniforce provided valuable insight into identifying the
criminal organizations that use the I-20 corridor for human and
narcotic trafficking. Through law enforcement operations and
partnerships with other local, State, and Federal foreign and
international agencies, CBP front line officers and agents will
continue to protect America from the terrorist threat while
also accomplishing our traditional missions in immigration,
customs, and agriculture.
I would like to thank the Chairman and Members of the
Subcommittee for the opportunity to present this testimony
today and for your continued support of DHS and CBP. We will be
happy to respond to any questions that you may have.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Self.
Mr. Parmer?
TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND R. PARMER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR
INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Parmer. Good morning, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member
Gohmert, and distinguished Members of the Committee. It is my
privilege to appear before you today to discuss U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's criminal law enforcement
responsibilities.
ICE has broad responsibilities and we are leveraging them
by aligning our authorities with the risks that face the Nation
today. In this regard, ICE enacted a multi-year strategy of
improving immigration enforcement through efficient management,
focused enforcement efforts to target the most dangerous
illegal aliens, and worksite enforcement initiatives that
target employers who defy immigration law, thus reducing the
pull of jobs magnets that draw illegal workers across the
border in search of employment.
At the same time, ICE stepped up the battle against
financial crime and the exploitation of legitimate financial
networks by criminal organizations using methods to earn, move,
and store illicit funding needed to support their criminal
enterprises. Our risk-based approach extends from interior
immigration enforcement, in which we are prioritizing criminal
aliens and fugitives, to the application of our customs fraud
authorities to prevent the importation of tainted commodities
and counterfeit pharmaceuticals.
This approach shapes our methods to target drug and other
contraband smuggling with financial authorities and
international partnerships, and it means we continue to thwart
the illegal export of weapons and sensitive technology.
To target some of the most dangerous criminals and
sophisticated criminal organizations, ICE has developed robust
initiatives to enforce our immigration laws in the interior,
including programs that specifically target child predators and
gang members, ensure compliance on the part of those who visit
the U.S. for school or simply to tour, target alien absconders,
who are fugitives who have failed to comply with a lawful
judicial order to leave the country, and dismantle the
infrastructure that supports illicit immigration such as
illegal employment and the fraudulent document trade.
We are also working particularly close with State and local
law enforcement partners. Recognizing that there are more than
775,000 State and local law enforcement officers in the
country, ICE is leveraging our authorities to develop
partnerships under the ICE ACCESS program, including cross-
designation programs such as 287(g) and customs title 9
authority.
While the immigration authorities--I am sorry, while the
Immigration Enforcement initiatives I have described most often
relate to people wanting to come into our country, another key
risk we guard against is efforts to take sensitive technology
and arms out. In fiscal year 2007, arms and strategic
technology investigations resulted in 188 arrests, 178
indictments, and 127 convictions for export-related
violations--more than any other U.S. Federal law enforcement
agency.
Other dangers are less obvious. Traditional customs fraud,
in many cases, constitutes serious and unrecognized public
health risks. Take, for example, Operation Guardian, an ongoing
ICE-led operation with CBP, the FDA, and Consumer Product
Safety Commission, to investigate imports of substandard,
tainted, and dangerous products from China.
The operation to date has resulted in the seizure of more
than 59,000 tubes of diethylene glycol and bacteria-laden
toothpaste bound for U.S. markets and the initiation of joint
U.S.-People's Republic of China investigations. Diethylene
glycol, by the way, is a toxic chemical used to make
antifreeze. And this is one of many similar cases involving
tainted goods which would otherwise be on store shelves just
waiting for purchase by American families.
As I mentioned, the risk-based approach also shapes our
methods to target drug and other contraband smuggling. With
only 25 percent of our special agents authorized to conduct
drug smuggling investigations, ICE conducted investigations
resulting in the seizure of 232,000 pounds of cocaine, 1.3
million pounds of marijuana, as well as 5,900 narcotics-related
convictions.
Using our financial tools and international partnerships,
we are pushing out beyond our borders. Our Trade Transparency
Units represent unique relationships with foreign nations that
allow us to share import and export data to identify trade
anomalies that suggest money laundering. Our agents, thanks to
these partnerships, are effectively identifying schemes
designed to hide the illicit proceeds from the drug trade and
sale of dangerous consumer goods, foreign tax fraud, and other
transnational criminal activity.
This kind of approach--focusing on risk and going after the
money--yields real results. Since 2003, ICE has seized more
than $600 million in cash and monetary instruments, and more
than $580 million worth of real property, vessels, aircraft,
artwork, vehicles, and jewels.
ICE's Federal Protective Service, responsible for policing,
securing, and ensuring a safe environment in which Federal
agencies can conduct their business, seized more than 760,000
prohibited items last year. They investigated hundreds of
threats posed against the more than 8,800 Federal facilities
and millions of visitors to Federal buildings nationwide.
Our work can be dangerous and difficult, but we tackle our
responsibilities each day with pride and professionalism. I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf
of ICE, and look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Scott. Thank you very much.
Mr. Stenger?
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL STENGER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
INVESTIGATIONS, UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Stenger. Yes. Good morning, Chairman Scott, Ranking
Member Gohmert, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee.
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today
on the investigative responsibilities of the Secret Service.
While the Service is perhaps best known for our protective
responsibilities, we have a dual mission.
The Secret Service was established in 1865 to suppress the
rampant counterfeiting of U.S. currency. Throughout our 142-
year history, the Service has evolved and adapted to thwart
attempts by both individuals and criminal organizations to
exploit the Nation's financial infrastructure.
Today we investigate criminal violations relating to the
counterfeiting of obligations and securities of the United
States; financial crimes such as access device fraud, financial
institution fraud, identity theft, and computer-based attacks
on the Nation's financial payment systems and critical
infrastructure.
To accomplish our mission, we have 139 domestic offices and
21 foreign offices located in 16 countries. We work closely
with our Federal, State, and local law enforcement partners as
well as other U.S. government agencies and foreign counterparts
to maximize our efforts.
The Secret Service is proud of its role and success in
protecting U.S. currency. Last year, more than 2,200 suspects
were arrested for counterfeiting offenses, and over $147
million in counterfeit currency was seized. The agency
continues to adapt to the trends in counterfeiting, which have
been influenced in recent years by computer-based technologies.
Widespread use of personal computers and advancements in
digital printing technologies have provided more individuals
the opportunity to manufacture counterfeit money. Approximately
58 percent of the counterfeit currency passed domestically in
2007 was produced using digital printing.
In our role of safeguarding the Nation's critical financial
infrastructure, we have a long history of protecting American
consumers and the financial industry from fraud. With the
passage of legislation in 1984, we were provided authority for
the investigation of access device fraud and concurrent
authority with other law enforcement agencies in identity theft
crimes.
In recent years, the combination of the information
revolution and the effects of globalization have caused the
investigative mission of the Secret Service to evolve. Through
our work in the areas of financial and electronic crime, we
have developed particular expertise in the investigation of
financial crimes, cyber crimes and computer intrusions.
In fiscal year 2007, agents arrested over 4,300 suspects
for financial crimes, who were responsible for over $690
million in actual fraud loss. The most recent trend is the use
of computers and the Internet to launch cyber attacks targeting
citizens and financial institutions. Cyber criminals have
become adept at stealing victims' personal information through
the use of phishing emails, account takeovers, malicious
software, hacking attacks, and network intrusions resulting in
data breaches.
This stolen information is often sold in bulk quantities
through illicit Internet Websites known as carding portals. We
have established a national network of 29 financial crimes task
forces and 24 electronic crimes task forces in cities
throughout the United States. These task forces leverage the
combined resources of law enforcement as well as technical
experts from academia and the private industry.
Further, the Secret Service will have a key role in the
implementation of the Administration's cyber-security
activities, as outlined in the recent presidential directive
addressing cyber-security policy. As I have highlighted in my
statement, the Secret Service has adapted to the constantly
evolving criminal environment. We continue to aggressively
investigate all offenses within our purview, and are committed
to our mission of protecting the integrity of U.S. currency and
safeguarding the Nation's critical financial infrastructure and
financial payment systems.
This concludes my prepared statement. Thank you again for
the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Secret Service. I
am pleased to answer any questions.
Mr. Scott. Thank you very much.
Admiral Justice?
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WAYNE JUSTICE, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
FOR CAPABILITY AND DIRECTOR OF RESPONSE POLICY, U.S. COAST
GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Admiral Justice. Good morning, Chairman Scott, Ranking
Member Gohmert, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee.
It is a privilege for me to testify before you today about the
maritime law enforcement mission of the United States Coast
Guard. I feel passionately about this mission, having spent
nearly 30 years deeply involved in it.
While the written testimony covers the full spectrum of
Coast Guard's global law enforcement activities, for my oral
testimony today I would like to share with you some highlights
of how drug and alien smugglers continuously adapt their
technologies and tactics, and then ask your help in adapting
our criminal law to better counter two of the most dangerous
activities facing maritime law enforcement officers in our
Nation: self-propelled semi-submersible smuggling vessels and
maritime alien smuggling.
The influx of illegal drugs remains one of America's
greatest maritime security threats. One of the emerging and
most significant threats we face in transit zones today are
manned and unmanned self-propelled semi-submersible, SPSS,
vessels that transport multi-ton loads of cocaine and other
illicit cargo bound for the United States.
SPSS vessels are watercraft of unorthodox construction,
capable of putting much of their bulk under the surface of the
water, making them difficult to detect. You can see images of
recently interdicted SPSS vessels on the posters here, and we
have provided the Committee staff compelling video from a case
just 2 weeks ago that I urge you to watch.
SPSSs typically carry up to five crew and four to six tons
of illegal cargo at speeds up to eight knots. SPSS vessels
encountered by the Coast Guard are stateless vessels built in
the jungles of South America with no legitimate use. Their
crews typically abandon and sink the vessels and contraband
when detected by law enforcement in order to evade U.S.
prosecution for drug trafficking.
Although U.S. interdiction forces nearly always capture
imagery of detected SPSS and the crews abandoning them before
they sink, attempting to access and recover contraband before a
SPSS scuttles is very dangerous and almost impossible. The SPSS
vessel is an attempt to avoid both detection and consequences--
if territorial operation of and embarkation in stateless SPSS
vessels was a criminal offense in title 18 of the United States
Code, then U.S. interdiction forces and U.S. attorneys would
have the necessary tools to combat the SPSS threat even in the
absence of recovered drugs or other contraband. The Coast Guard
has closely coordinated with the Department of Justice to draft
an amendment to title 18 to address this concern.
We have briefed Committee staff on this amendment, which is
attached to my written statement, and urge Committee action on,
and House passage of, the amendment as soon as possible. The
Coast Guard projects the possibility of 85 SPSS events,
carrying possibly 340 metric tons of cocaine, during fiscal
year 2008. We need your help now to counter this dangerous
emerging threat.
As the lead Federal agency in maritime law enforcement, the
Coast Guard is also responsible for enforcing immigration laws
at sea. Thousands of people try to enter our country illegally
every year using maritime routes in dangerously overloaded,
unseaworthy, or otherwise unsafe vessels. This is why the Coast
Guard migrant-interdiction operations are as much humanitarian
efforts as they are law-enforcement missions.
Although Coast Guard has interdicted migrants of various
nationalities through the Western Hemisphere, the primary
illegal immigration threat comes from Cuba, Haiti, and the
Dominican Republic. In the Mona Pass between Puerto Rico and
the Dominican Republic, deployment of mobile biometrics
capability on 110-foot patrol boats and robust interagency
support have contributed significantly to a reduction in the
flow of illegal migration by nearly 50 percent.
The referral of 120 cases of criminal aliens identified at
sea through mobile biometrics, including 33 aggravated felons,
77 aliens illegally attempting reentry after deportation, seems
to have stemmed the flow in what was the single largest migrant
smuggling vector before biometrics-based prosecutions. This
project would not have been possible without the full
partnership of US-VISIT, CBP, ICE, Border Patrol, plus the U.S.
Attorney's Office in San Juan, Department of State, and the
Dominican Navy.
Like drug traffickers, migrant smugglers profit by adapting
their tactics and acquired technical innovations--particularly
high-speed multi-engine go-fast vessels. The enterprise brings
thousands of undocumented aliens to the United States for the
price of up to $10,000 a head. Despite a 35 percent increase in
the number of cutter and resource hours targeted against
migration in the Florida Straits, migration continues to
increase in that vector. The effectiveness of any interdiction
model is dependant on our ability to deliver consequences to
smugglers through prosecution and other action.
I would like to thank the House Judiciary Committee for
hearing and acting on our request in 2007 for enhanced offenses
involving maritime alien smuggling. The statutory amendment to
18 U.S.C. 2237, developed by the Committee last fall and now
appearing in title VI of our Auth Act, will be vital to Coast
Guard mission accomplishment.
That amendment would be strengthened further by making it
unlawful to smuggle any person or contraband into the United
States and permitting both civil and criminal forfeiture of
property. We would also like the provision to ensure that any
sentence under 2237 runs consecutively, not concurrently.
With these additions, title VI, if enacted this year, would
also assist us and U.S. attorneys to achieve these operational
requirements. With your help, sirs, we can reduce the flow of
illegal aliens and illicit goods into our country by ensuring
that the risks and consequences far outweigh the possible
benefits.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I am pleased
to answer questions at this time.
[The joint prepared statement of the United States
Department of Homeland Security follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of the United States Department
of Homeland Security
Good morning, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. We would like to thank you
for the opportunity to testify today on the law enforcement and
investigative responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)--specifically the responsibilities of the United States Secret
Service, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the United
States Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the United States Coast
Guard. As you will see, DHS has utilized its authorities to protect our
nation from dangerous people, protect our critical infrastructure, and
protect our nation from dangerous goods.
U.S. SECRET SERVICE
While the Secret Service is perhaps best known for protecting the
president, vice president, and other high-ranking public officials, the
Secret Service originated as an investigative law enforcement agency.
The Secret Service was established in 1865 to suppress the rampant
counterfeiting of U.S. currency. Since then, the Secret Service's
investigative mission has evolved and the agency has adapted to thwart
attempts by both individuals and criminal organizations to exploit the
nation's financial infrastructure through varied financial crimes.
Currently, the Secret Service investigates criminal violations relating
to the counterfeiting of obligations and securities of the United
States (18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 470-474); financial crimes such as access
device fraud (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1029), financial institution fraud (18
U.S.C. Sec. 1344), and identity theft (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1028); cyber
crime such as network intrusions, malware, and online organized crime
(18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030; and computer-based attacks on the nation's
financial, banking, and telecommunications infrastructure (18 U.S.C.
Sec. 1030).
To accomplish its investigative mission, the Secret Service
operates 139 domestic offices (including domicile offices) and 21
foreign offices in 16 countries. The agency works closely with federal,
state, and local law enforcement entities, as well as other U.S.
government agencies and foreign police counterparts to maximize its
efforts.
Counterfeiting:
The Secret Service is proud of its role and success in protecting
the worldwide integrity of U.S. currency. Last year, the Secret Service
arrested more than 2,200 suspects for counterfeiting offenses and
helped to remove over $147 million in counterfeit U.S. currency from
circulation. The agency continues to adapt to the trends in
counterfeiting, which have been influenced in recent years by computer-
based technologies. The widespread use of personal computers and
advancements in digital printing technology has provided more
individuals the opportunity to manufacture a passable counterfeit note
with relative ease. Approximately 58% of the counterfeit currency
passed domestically in FY 2007 was produced using digital printing
means, compared with less than 1% in FY 1995.
Financial Fraud and Electronic Crimes:
In our role of safeguarding the nation's critical financial
infrastructure, the Secret Service has a long history of protecting
American consumers and the financial industry from fraud. With the
passage of legislation in 1984, the Secret Service was provided
authority for the investigation of access device fraud, including
credit card and debit card fraud, and parallel authority with other law
enforcement agencies in identity theft cases. In recent years, the
combination of the information revolution and the effects of
globalization have caused the investigative mission of the Secret
Service to evolve.
Through our work in the areas of financial and electronic crime,
the Secret Service has developed particular expertise in the
investigation of identity theft, false identification fraud, credit
card fraud, debit card fraud, check fraud, bank fraud, online back
account and investment portfolio takeovers, cyber crime, malware, and
computer network intrusions. In Fiscal Year 2007, Secret Service agents
arrested over 4,300 suspects for financial crimes violations. These
suspects were responsible for approximately $690 million in actual
fraud loss to individuals and financial institutions.
In fact, the Secret Service has observed a marked increase in the
quantity and complexity of financial crimes in recent years--
particularly offenses involving identity theft and access device fraud.
The recent trend observed by law enforcement is the use of computers
and the Internet to launch cyber attacks targeting citizens and
financial institutions. Cyber criminals have become adept at stealing
victims' personal information through the use of phishing emails,
account takeovers, malicious software, hacking attacks, and network
intrusions resulting in data breaches.
This stolen information is often sold in bulk quantities through
illicit Internet portals. These portals, or ``carding websites,'' can
be likened to online bazaars where the criminal element converges to
conduct their business. The websites vary in size, from just a few
dozen members to more popular sites which boast memberships of
approximately 8,000 users. These websites are often composed of
separate forums which are moderated by notorious members of the cyber
crime community. Within these websites, cyber criminals can buy, sell,
and trade malicious software; spamming services; hacking services;
credit, debit, and ATM card data; and personal identification and bank
account information. The Secret Service is currently conducting
approximately 15 online undercover investigations targeting domestic
and international groups that are using malicious web-based forums to
trade stolen information.
The Internet has enabled criminal groups involved in financial
crimes to routinely operate in a multi-jurisdictional environment. By
working closely with other federal, state, and local law enforcement
representatives, as well as international police agencies, the Secret
Service is able to provide a comprehensive network of information
sharing, resource sharing, and technical expertise that bridges
jurisdictional boundaries. This partnership approach to law enforcement
is vital to our criminal investigative mission.
Financial Crimes/Electronic Crimes Task Forces:
The Secret Service has established a national network of 29
Financial Crimes Task Forces and 24 Electronic Crimes Task Forces in
major metropolitan areas across the United States. These task forces
leverage the combined resources of our federal, state, and local law
enforcement partners, as well as technical experts from academia and
private industry, in an organized effort to combat threats and
effectively investigate crimes directed at our critical infrastructure.
Collaboration between law enforcement and the private sector is
critical to our preventative approach to financial and electronic
crimes. We also build partnerships with academia to ensure that law
enforcement is on the cutting edge of technology by leveraging the
research and development capabilities of teaching institutions and
technical colleges.
To provide our special agents with the advanced skills needed to
identify and address cyber vulnerabilities, the Secret Service
established the Electronic Crimes Special Agent Program (ECSAP) in
1987. Agents trained through ECSAP are computer specialists, qualified
to conduct network intrusion investigations and forensic examinations
of various types of electronic evidence, including computers, personal
data assistants (PDAs), telecommunications devices, electronic
organizers, and other electronic media. Currently, the Secret Service
has approximately 770 ECSAP-trained agents assigned to more than 85
offices worldwide. We are continuing to expand this program and, by the
end of FY 2008, the Secret Service expects to have over 1,000 ECSAP-
trained agents.
Further, the Secret Service will have a key role in the
implementation of the Administration's cybersecurity activities, as out
lined in the recent Presidential directive addressing cybersecurity
policy.
The Secret Service has adapted to the constantly evolving criminal
environment. We will continue to aggressively investigate all offenses
within our jurisdiction to protect consumers and financial
institutions. The Secret Service is committed to our mission of
protecting the worldwide integrity of U.S. currency and safeguarding
the nation's critical financial infrastructure.
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Prior to 9/11, the air marshal program consisted of less than 50
personnel who were classified as civil aviation security specialists
rather than law enforcement officers. These personnel operated under
the direction of the Federal Aviation Administration and primarily flew
international missions. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Administration
and Congress agreed that a stronger federal air marshal program was
required. First under the Department of Transportation within TSA, and
now within DHS, the Federal Air Marshal program is the largest such
program in the world and has evolved into a critical layer of aviation
security. The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) today has not only
expanded in size, but has been enhanced in quality by requiring all air
marshals to meet the high standards associated with an 1801 law
enforcement series. Today, Federal Air Marshals fly on thousands of
domestic and international missions, conduct valuable surveillance
within airport perimeters, and participate in joint law enforcement
efforts with other agencies.
TSA's office of Law Enforcement/FAMS enhanced this operation and
promotes confidence in our Nation's civil transportation systems
through the effective risk-based strategic deployment of Federal Air
Marshals and other law enforcement resources in both air and land-based
mission assignments. The organization's primary focus is to detect,
deter, and defeat terrorist or other criminal hostile acts targeting
U.S. air carriers, airports, passengers, crew, and, when necessary,
other transportation modes within the Nation's general transportation
systems.
The authority for the Federal Air Marshals is found in Title 49 USC
section 114(q)--Law Enforcement; section 44917(a)--Deployment of
Federal Air Marshals; section 44903(d)--Authorizing Individuals To
Carry Firearms and Make Arrests, and, most recently, PL 110-53, section
1303, which authorizes Federal Air Marshals to participate in Visible
Intermodal Prevention And Response (VIPR) Teams.
In addition to the FAMs, the Office of Law Enforcement's resources
conduct Joint Vulnerability Assessments (JVA) and Man Portable Air
Defense Systems (MANPADS) assessments. The JVA is a joint effort
undertaken by TSA and FBI with the purpose of assessing current and
potential threats to commercial air transportation facilities within
the United States. TSA has committed to conducting MANPADS
vulnerability assessments--evaluations of close-range threats such as
shoulder-fired missiles--at all of the largest airports on an annual
basis. Also, the FAMS are full partners with the FBI's Joint Terrorism
Task Force (JTTF). FAMs are assigned to every FBI field office JTTF
(56) and the National JTTF as well.
The OLE/FAMS also operate a robust explosives detection canine
program. TSA has met projections for FY07 with the deployment of a
total of 422 canine teams in the aviation domain. Additionally, there
are currently 56 teams deployed in the mass transit environment for a
current total of 478 teams.
FAMs have participated in hundreds of TSA-led VIPR operations,
where FAMs, TSA inspectors, transportation security officers, and any
TSA assets assist federal agencies and local law enforcement responding
to specific threats or high-risk situations aimed at the nation's
transportation network. FAMs also began partnering with other DHS
agencies towards forming and deploying task-organized VIPR teams
utilizing the combined skill sets, resources, and expertise of DHS's
seven major operating agencies. The FAMs have participated in all
Departmental VIPR teams to date.
One of FAMS unique deployments includes our response following the
unprecedented events surrounding Hurricane Katrina and the relief we
provided to thousands of travelers who were trapped at the Louis
Armstrong International Airport in New Orleans, while other residents
inundated the airport in the aftermath of the storm. With virtually no
state or local law enforcement presence on the airport grounds, the few
federal officials and employees of the TSA there were quickly
overwhelmed.
The FAMS responded to this dire situation by activating a 24-hour
crisis center during the evening hours of Thursday, September 1.
Approximately 500 FAMs were then activated from 15 Field Offices. These
FAMs traveled to New Orleans, restored and maintained security at Louis
Armstrong International Airport for over three weeks, and ensured the
safety of TSA personnel as well as the displaced residents on hundreds
of humanitarian flights out of the stricken city.
The FAMS's unique capabilities were also exhibited in the early
morning hours of August 10, 2006, when the FAMS strategically
redeployed significant assets in reaction to the unfolding terrorist
plot to detonate liquid explosives to be carried onto airplanes
traveling to the United States from the United Kingdom. The FAMS were
able to deploy quickly and efficiently to the United Kingdom to provide
an additional layer of security onboard airplanes destined for the
United States. The rapid deployment insured that international
travelers were protected against any terrorist act that might be
perpetrated in connection with the plot. Over a 30-day period, the
FAMS's surge capacity enabled coverage of over 1500 flights between
major airports in the United States and United Kingdom, utilizing more
than 1,000 FAMs.
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) protects our nation's
borders from terrorism, human and drug smuggling, illegal migration,
and agricultural pests while simultaneously facilitating the flow of
legitimate travel and trade.
As the nation's single unified border agency, CBP's mission is
vitally important for the protection of the American people and the
national economy. Nearly 44,000 CBP employees and law enforcement
officers work in a variety of ways to secure the nation's borders both
at and between the official ports of entry and also to extend our zone
of security. CBP secures America's borders through three major law
enforcement entities: Field Operations, Border Patrol, and Air and
Marine.
CBP officers are responsible for enforcing over 400 laws for 40
agencies at the border, which govern both imports and exports of goods
and entry and exit of persons and conveyances. To that end, CBP
officers have the authority to enforce federal civil and criminal laws,
carry firearms, and make arrests for offenses committed in their
presence or for felony offenses where the officer has probable cause to
believe the person committed the crime. CBP's enforcement of border-
related laws is wide ranging, and CBP works closely with various other
agencies or departments to enforce these laws, including U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI),
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), and other
federal agencies. CBP works most closely with ICE, which acts, in most
respects, as CBP's investigatory arm.
For example, under Title 18 of the U.S. Code, CBP often enforces
non-immigration offenses such as smuggling, money laundering, child
pornography, and criminal trademark infringement. Common immigration-
specific violations of Title 18 at the border include false claims to
U.S. citizenship, fraud involving identity documents, reproduction or
fraud involving citizenship documents, forgery or false use of
passports, and false statements to a federal officer. CBP is also often
involved in arresting individuals for assault on a federal officer and
felon in possession of a firearm.
CBP has primary responsibility for enforcing the immigration laws
of Title 8 and the customs laws of Title 19 at the border. The
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), within Title 8, has its own
criminal provisions. For example, under INA section 274, the acts of
illegally bringing in, transporting, harboring, or encouraging someone
to enter the United States at someplace other than a port of entry can
result in serious felonies. In addition, violations of Title 8 may also
form the basis of a Title 18 prosecution. Common prosecutions based on
violations of the INA discovered by CBP at the border include alien
smuggling, illegal entry into the U.S., illegal re-entry into the U.S.,
and importation of aliens for immoral purposes. CBP also enforces
criminal provisions under Title 31; administers the currency and
monetary instrument reporting requirement of Title 31; interdicts bulk
cash smuggling; and enforces laws relating to imitation firearms in
Title 15, Title 17 copyright infringement, exportations contrary to law
in Title 22, including Trading with the Enemy Act violations of Title
50, and Arms Export Control Act violations in Title 22.
In order to enforce these laws, CBP utilizes partnerships with
other federal agencies. A few examples of these partnerships are
Operations Uniforce, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (BTA), and operations within the
CBP Air and Marine (A&M).
From January 13, 2008 to January 26, 2008, Border Patrol Agents
from the New Orleans Sector conducted Operation Uniforce to interdict
alien and narcotic smugglers. This multi-agency operation was conducted
utilizing traffic observation units on I-20 operating between the
Mississippi River and the city of Jackson, Mississippi. Forty Border
Patrol Agents and two canine handlers from the New Orleans Sector
conducted the operation with Office of Field Operations (OFO) Special
Response Team Members, agents from ICE's Detention and Removal
Officers, CBP Air and Marine, the Mississippi Highway Patrol, the
Rankin, Madison, and Hines County Sheriff's Departments, along with the
Pearl and Clinton Police Departments. The intelligence data that was
gathered during Operation Uniforce provided valuable insight into
identifying the criminal organizations that use the I-20 corridor for
human and narcotic trafficking.
The BTA authorized the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
receive information regarding imports, enabling the agency to target
shipments of food for human or animal consumption prior to arrival at
U.S. ports of entry. The BTA provides CBP the opportunity to assist FDA
with the prior notice requirements. CBP works jointly with FDA to
augment an existing automated interface to institute a prior-notice
reporting requirement with minimal disruption to the trade.
Under provisions of Title 18, CBP A&M operates in direct support of
the Coast Guard, Secret Service, DEA, FBI, ATF, and other federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies. CBP A&M operates in support
of DHS operations for CBP, ICE's Office of Investigation, and Federal
Protective Service and Detention and Removal Operations. CBP A&M also
provides critical air and marine support to other federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies, including the U.S. Secret Service, DEA,
FBI, ATF, and the Coast Guard.
CBP A&M operates in support of multi-agency and international
partnerships to deter and combat the threat of illegal activity. CBP
A&M has developed skills in air and marine operations by providing
training and vessel to vessel operations and the integration of air and
marine assets under the establishment of a joint DEA/Columbian/CBP
command center in Cartagena, Colombia, enabling the interdiction of
maritime targets leaving northern Colombia.
Overall, CBP is responsible for guarding 7,000 miles of land border
the United States shares with Canada and Mexico and 2,000 miles of
coastal waters surrounding the Florida peninsula and off the coast of
Southern California. The agency also protects 95,000 miles of maritime
border in partnership with the United States Coast Guard.
To secure this vast terrain, more than 15,500 CBP Border Patrol
agents and CBP Air and Marine agents, and approximately 20,000 CBP
officers and agriculture specialists, together with the nation's
largest law enforcement canine program, stand guard along America's
front line.
CBP officers protect America's borders at official
ports of entry, while CBP's Border Patrol agents prevent
illegal entry into the United States of people and contraband
between the ports of entry.
CBP Air and Marine, which manages the largest law
enforcement air force in the world, patrols the nation's land
and sea borders to stop terrorists and drug smugglers before
they enter the United States.
CBP agriculture specialists prevent the entry of
exotic plant and animal pests, and confront emerging threats in
agro- and bioterrorism.
While carrying out its priority anti-terrorism mission, CBP must
also work to facilitate the movement of legitimate trade and travelers,
as the agency processes all people, vehicles and cargo entering the
United States. On a typical day in fiscal year 2007, CBP processed
approximately 1.1 million passengers and pedestrians; 70,000
containers; 304,000 privately owned vehicles; and 83,000 shipments of
goods approved for entry. Through law enforcement operations and
partnerships with other federal, state, and local agencies, CBP's
frontline officers and agents will continue to protect America from the
terrorist threat while also accomplishing our traditional missions in
immigration, customs, and agriculture.
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the lead
investigative federal agency for enforcing that nation's immigration
laws under Title 8 of the United States Code, in addition to specific
law enforcement authority found under Titles 18 and 19, among others.
Some of the areas included in the enforcement of these laws are
National Security, Public Safety, Commercial and Identity Fraud,
Illegal Smuggling of Contraband, and Money Laundering. The merger of
the legacy federal authorities now makes ICE the second most diverse
law enforcement agency within the federal government. In 2003, the
Office of Investigations started with a total of 5,190 agents. As of
today, there are a total of 5,516 agents, although ICE plans to hire an
additional 296 agents in 2008 and the President has asked for an
additional 87 in 2009.
Given that ICE has such broad law enforcement and investigatory
responsibilities, we leverage these responsibilities by aligning our
authorities with the risks that face the nation today. ICE protects
national security and upholds public safety by targeting terrorist
organizations and other criminal networks that seek to exploit
vulnerabilities in our immigration system, in international trade, in
our financial networks, along our borders, at federal facilities, and
elsewhere in order to do harm to the United States. The end result is a
safer, more secure America.
In this regard, ICE enacted a multi-year strategy of improving
immigration enforcement through more efficient management, focused
enforcement efforts that target the most dangerous illegal aliens,
worksite enforcement initiatives that target employers who defy
immigration law, and reducing the pull of the ``jobs magnet'' that
draws illegal workers across the border in search of employment. At the
same time, ICE stepped up the battle against financial crime and the
exploitation of legitimate financial networks by criminal organizations
using methods to earn, move, and store illicit funding needed to
support their criminal enterprises.
ICE's risk-based approach shapes interior immigration enforcement,
in which we are prioritizing everything from criminal aliens and
fugitives to the application of our customs fraud authorities to
prevent the importation of tainted commodities and counterfeit
pharmaceuticals. This approach shapes our methods to target drug and
other contraband smuggling with financial authorities and international
partnerships--and it means that we continue to work to thwart the
illegal export of weapons and sensitive technology.
To target some of the most dangerous criminals and sophisticated
criminal organizations, ICE has developed robust initiatives to enforce
our immigration laws in the interior, including programs that
specifically target child predators and gang members, ensure compliance
on the part of those who visit the U.S., target alien absconders--
fugitives who've failed to comply with a lawful judicial order to leave
the country--and dismantle the infrastructure that supports illicit
immigration such as illegal employment and the fraudulent document
trade.
For example, ICE created its Detention Enforcement and Processing
Offenders by Remote Technology (DEPORT) Center in FY06, and it has been
integral to DHS's effort to halt criminal activity by aliens. The
DEPORT Center conducts interviews of inmates in remote prisons from a
centralized location. Through the combined effort of the DEPORT Center
and local ICE resources, coverage is provided to all 114 federal
detention facilities. This ensures that criminal aliens are taken into
ICE custody upon the completion of their federal sentences rather than
being released into U.S. communities.
While ICE's immigration enforcement initiatives most often relate
to people wanting to come in to our country, another key risk we guard
against is efforts to take sensitive technology and arms out. In FY
2007, arms and strategic technology investigations resulted in 188
arrests, 178 indictments, and 127 convictions for export-related
violations--more than any other U.S federal law enforcement agency.
ICE's 287(g) program, authorized under the 1996 Immigration and
Nationality Act, has emerged as a key partnership tool in allowing ICE
to train state and local officers in immigration enforcement. Once in
place, the 287(g) agreement allows ICE to delegate enforcement powers
to state and local agencies, who serve as force multipliers in
immigration enforcement in their communities. In August 2007, ICE
announced the launch of the ICE ACCESS (Agreements of Cooperation in
Communities to Enhance Safety and Security) program to expand the
opportunities for law enforcement partnerships. Under the ACCESS
program, ICE works with local officials to determine specific
enforcement challenges and develop partnership plans that help fight
document fraud, illegal immigration, gang activity or other critical
law enforcement challenges.
Recognizing that there are more than 775,000 state and local law
enforcement officers in the country, ICE is leveraging our authorities
to develop partnerships under the ACCESS program and the cross
designation programs such as 287(g) and customs.
ICE's risk-based approach also shapes our methods to target drug
and other contraband smuggling. ICE has developed a full cadre of
investigative expertise--including undercover operations, use of
confidential informants, wire intercepts, controlled deliveries,
consensual monitoring, and electronic surveillance--to combat smuggling
organizations. These smuggling organizations use every imaginable
method to smuggle contraband into this country, including the use of
aircraft, automobiles, trucks, maritime vessels, backpacks, tunnels,
and railways. Additionally, smuggling organizations infiltrate and use
legitimate businesses and industries as mechanisms for smuggling
illicit goods and narcotics into the United States.
In FY07, ICE conducted investigations resulting in the seizure of
232,000 pounds of cocaine and 1.3 million pounds of marijuana, as well
as obtained 5,900 narcotics-related convictions. Using our financial
tools and international partnerships, we are pushing out beyond our
borders. Our Trade Transparency Units represent unique relationships
with foreign nations that allow us to share import and export data to
identify trade anomalies that suggest money laundering. Our agents,
thanks to these partnerships, are effectively identifying schemes
designed to hide the illicit proceeds from the drug trade and sale of
dangerous consumer goods, foreign tax fraud, and other transnational
criminal activity.
Other dangers from which ICE protects this nation are less obvious:
Traditional customs fraud, in many cases, constitutes serious and
unrecognized public health risks. Take, for example, Operation
Guardian, an ongoing ICE-led operation with CBP, the FDA, and Consumer
Product Safety Commission, to investigate imports of substandard,
tainted, and dangerous products from the People's Republic of China.
The operation to date has resulted in the seizure of more than 59,000
tubes of diethylene glycol- and bacteria-laden toothpaste bound for
U.S. markets and the initiation of joint US/PRC investigations.
Diethylene glycol is a toxic chemical used to make antifreeze. And this
is one of many similar cases involving tainted goods which would
otherwise be on store shelves just waiting for purchase by American
families.
The Federal Protective Service, responsible for policing, securing,
and ensuring a safe environment in which federal agencies can conduct
their business, seized more than 760,000 prohibited items last year.
They investigated hundreds of threats posed against the more than 8,800
federal facilities and millions of visitors to federal buildings
nationwide.
ICE's approach--focusing on risk and going after the money--yields
real results: since 2003, ICE has seized more than $600 million in cash
and monetary instruments, and more than $580 million worth of real
property, vessels, aircraft, artwork, vehicles, and jewels. ICE's law
enforcement and investigatory work can be dangerous and difficult, but
we tackle our responsibilities each day with pride and professionalism.
U.S. COAST GUARD
The Coast Guard has served as our nation's primary federal maritime
law enforcement agency since the first Congress of the United States
created the Revenue Cutter Service in 1790 to enforce maritime laws,
interdict smugglers, and protect American shipping. The Coast Guard is
one of the oldest organizations of the federal government and, until
the Navy Department was established in 1798, we served as the nation's
only Armed Force afloat. Today, the Coast Guard is the only Armed
Service with statutory responsibility and authority for direct law
enforcement action.
Since the beginning of the Republic, Congress has granted our
Service expansive authority to board and inspect vessels at sea without
particular suspicion. After the Civil War, Congress removed geographic
limitations on our boarding authority and directed the Service to
enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable Federal laws on,
under, and over the high seas, in addition to waters subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States. This worldwide boarding authority,
now codified in 14 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2 and 89, is the foundation of the
Coast Guard's maritime law enforcement mission. Coast Guard boarding
activity is as critical to the national security and economy of the
United States today as it was in 1790. Not unlike the boarding officers
of the Revenue Cutter Service over 200 years ago, today's boarding
officers lead teams, usually embarked in boats and sometimes delivered
from helicopters, to ``make inquiries, examinations, inspections,
searches, seizures and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which
the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection and
suppression of violations of laws of the United States.''
The Coast Guard conducts an average of 190 boardings each day
around the world. The daily fare of Coast Guard assets and boarding
teams includes drug smuggling, alien smuggling, illegal incursions into
the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone, breaches of fisheries and living
marine resources laws, violations of boating safety and navigation
regulations, substance abuse while operating vessels, and environmental
crimes.
The influx of illegal drugs is one of America's greatest maritime
security threats. The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for
maritime drug interdiction in the transit zone--a six million square
mile area roughly the size of the continental United States including
the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and Eastern Pacific--and shares lead
responsibility for maritime threats within U.S. territorial waters with
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The Coast Guard's mission is to
reduce the supply of drugs from the transit zone, originating in South
America, by denying smugglers the use of maritime, as well as air
routes and conveyances. In order to overcome the ``tyranny of
distance,'' the Coast Guard depends on technological innovation,
partnerships with other federal agencies, and countries and actionable
intelligence.
One example of technological innovation is the broad expansion of
armed counterdrug helicopter capabilities used to disable fleeing
vessels or to compel them to stop (airborne use of force (AUF)). The
Coast Guard operates a special armed helicopter squadron of HH-65C
helicopters, which has been tremendously effective at interdicting
elusive, high speed go-fast vessels. United Kingdom (U.K.) Royal Navy
ships are also deploying to the Caribbean Sea with U.S. Coast Guard law
enforcement detachments who support the U.K.'s armed helicopters, and
U.S. Navy helicopters operate with Coast Guard gunners on board Navy
warships in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. The overwhelming success
of AUF has caused drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) to shift
tactics, using smaller go-fasts with contraband concealed within the
construction and avoiding the most direct deep water routes between
departure point and destination. DTOs have also been driven to the
littorals along Central America where they are more susceptible to
coastal State interdiction forces.
The Coast Guard relies on international and interagency partnership
to complete its missions. One example of this is the Joint Interagency
Task Force (JIATF) South, which is responsible for directing
interagency detection, monitoring and sorting of air and maritime drug
smuggling events; fusing intelligence activities; and planning and
conducting flexible operations within their respective joint operating
area. This enables the Coast Guard to interdict and disrupt drug
smuggling events in the transit zone. Every department and agency with
a drug interdiction responsibility and role participates in making
JIATF-South an extremely effective and efficient operation. JIATF South
also utilizes foreign liaison officers from 11 different countries to
facilitate transnational cooperative counterdrug efforts.
One of the emerging and most significant threats we face in
maritime law enforcement today is manned and unmanned self-propelled
semi-submersible (SPSS) vessels that transport multi-ton loads of
cocaine and other illicit cargo bound for the United States. SPSS
vessels are watercraft of unorthodox construction capable of putting
much of their bulk under the surface of the water, making them
difficult to detect. SPSS are typically less than 100 feet in length
and carry up to five crew and 12 metric tons of illicit cargo (4-6 tons
typically) at speeds of up to eight knots. SPSS vessels can travel from
the north coast of South America to the southeastern U.S. without
refueling. According to the Consolidated Counter Drug Database (CCDB),
23 SPSS drug smuggling events occurred between January 2001 and
September 2007. Between October 1, 2007 and February 1, 2008, the CCDB
reported an unprecedented 27 SPSS events that successfully delivered an
estimated 111 metric tons of cocaine.
The SPSS vessels encountered by the Coast Guard are stateless
vessels built in the jungles of South America with no legitimate use.
They are built for stealth and the capability to rapidly scuttle. Their
crews typically abandon and sink the vessels and contraband when
detected by law enforcement in order to evade U.S. prosecution for drug
trafficking. Although U.S. interdiction forces nearly always capture
imagery of detected SPSS and the crews abandoning them before they
sink, attempting to access and recover contraband before a scuttled
SPSS sinks is very dangerous and often impossible.
If operation and embarkation in an SPSS were illegal, U.S.
interdiction forces and U.S. Attorneys would have the necessary legal
tools to combat the SPSS threat even in the absence of recovered drugs
or other contraband. Criminalizing the operation of SPSS vessels on
international voyages would improve officer safety, deter the use of
these inherently dangerous vessels, and facilitate effective
prosecution of criminals involved in this treacherous and emerging
trend.
The Coast Guard has closely coordinated with the Department of
Justice to draft an amendment to Title 18, United States Code, to
address this concern. We have already briefed committee staff on this
amendment, and urge Committee action on, and House passage of, the
amendment as soon as possible. The Coast Guard projects 85 SPSS events
carrying 340 metric tons of cocaine during FY 2008, so we need your
help now to counter this dangerous emerging threat.
Drug trafficking innovation is, of course, not limited to SPSS
vessels. In 2007, the Coast Guard interdicted five separate vessels
carrying a combined 21.5 MT of cocaine concealed in liquid form.
``Liquid cocaine'' consists of cocaine paste and base dissolved,
usually in fuel oil, and concealed within tanks or holds onboard
smuggling vessels. This smuggling tactic allows smugglers to quickly
jettison the illicit cargo into the sea when encountered by law
enforcement assets. To combat this threat, the Coast Guard, with our
partners at ICE, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), JIATF
South, and PANEX, has developed procedures for the detection,
identification, and preservation as evidence of liquid cocaine.
Additionally, the Coast Guard has used advanced interdiction tactics to
board and secure smuggling vessels to prevent the crews from destroying
evidence or scuttling vessels.
As we turn to the Coast Guard's alien maritime interdiction
operations, we would like to thank the House Judiciary Committee for
hearing and acting on our request in 2007 for enhanced offenses
involving maritime alien smuggling. Once enacted, the statutory
amendment to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2237, developed by the Committee last fall
and now appearing in Title VI of the Coast Guard Authorization Act,
H.R. 2830, will be vital to Coast Guard mission accomplishment.
As the lead federal agency for maritime law enforcement, the Coast
Guard is responsible for enforcing immigration laws at sea. Thousands
of people try to enter this country illegally every year using maritime
routes, many via dangerous smuggling operations in dangerously
overloaded, unseaworthy, or otherwise unsafe vessels. The flood of
undocumented migrants in boats onto America's shores is both a threat
to human life and a violation of U.S. and international laws. Coast
Guard migrant-interdiction operations are as much humanitarian efforts
as they are law-enforcement missions. In fact, the majority of Coast
Guard migrant interdiction cases begin as search and rescue missions.
The primary illegal migration threat comes from Haiti, the
Dominican Republic, and Cuba; however, the Coast Guard has interdicted
migrants of various nationalities throughout the Western Hemisphere.
Successful illegal immigration potentially costs U.S. taxpayers
billions of dollars each year in social services. The Coast Guard's
mission is to interdict undocumented aliens as far from U.S. shores as
possible and return them to their countries of nationality or origin.
Swift repatriation deters many potential migrants and minimizes costly
processes arising from illegal entry into the United States. In
addition to relieving our citizens of this financial burden, the Coast
Guard's efforts help to support legal immigration systems. Protection
from political persecution and torture are also important concerns for
the U.S. During the course of migrant interdictions, Coast Guard crews
may encounter migrants requesting protection from persecution or
torture. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services and the Department
of State Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration establish
policies in this area and handle all potential protection cases arising
from interdiction at sea.
The Coast Guard relies on technological innovation and partnerships
with other federal agencies and countries to counter illegal alien
smuggling. In the Mona Pass between Puerto Rico and the Dominican
Republic, the deployment of mobile biometrics capability on 110-foot
patrol boats and robust interagency support have resulted in a
reduction in the flow of illegal migration by nearly 50 percent. The
referral of 118 cases of criminal aliens identified at sea through
mobile biometrics, including 33 aggravated felons and 77 aliens
attempting to illegally re-enter the U.S. after deportation, seems to
have stemmed the flow in what was the single largest migrant smuggling
vector before biometrics-based prosecutions. This project would not
have been possible without the full partnership of the DHS US-VISIT
program, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, the U.S. Attorney's Office in San Juan, the
Department of State, and the Dominican Navy.
Similar to drug traffickers, migrant smugglers also profit from
technological innovations--particularly high-speed, multi-engine go-
fast boats. Go-fast smuggling vessels are replacing rafts and rusticas
as the preferred mode of transportation due to the increased chance of
success. We estimate that the rate of success for a raft or rustica is
generally less than 25 percent, and never better than 50 percent. By
comparison, the rate of success for a go-fast is estimated at 70
percent. The multimillion dollar human smuggling enterprise brings
thousands of undocumented aliens to the U.S. at a price of up to
$10,000 a head. Despite a 35 percent increase in the number of cutter
and aircraft resource hours targeted against illegal migration in the
Florida Straits, migrant flow continues to increase in that vector. The
transition to go-fasts constitutes a significant challenge for
interdiction assets.
The effectiveness of any alien interdiction model is dependant upon
the ability to deliver consequences to smugglers through prosecution or
other action. It is imperative that we secure more effective
prosecution tools, including the closure of loopholes that currently
impede investigation and consequence delivery, longer sentences,
special seizure, and forfeiture provisions for vessels outfitted for
smuggling. We must also enhance sentences for vessels that fail to stop
while engaged in alien smuggling.
The President's Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan
provides for coordinated U.S. Government response to threats against
the U.S. and its interests in the maritime domain by establishing roles
and responsibilities enabling rapid and decisive response. The Coast
Guard, as the Nation's leading maritime law enforcement agency,
fulfills DHS's role as one of the principal MOTR agencies in the
maritime domain. The Coast Guard brings broad law enforcement and
military authorities, planning, and execution skills to operations
requiring interagency coordination through the MOTR process in support
of both maritime law enforcement and homeland security missions. The
operations can include the deployment of integrated and adaptive
capabilities (including use of force) required to locate, identify,
intercept, apprehend, exploit, and, when necessary, defeat maritime
threats. We use the MOTR process daily to engage and coordinate with
our domestic interagency partners and with our foreign maritime law
enforcement partners on drug, migrant, piracy, and fisheries cases.
The links between place, crime, control measures, and national
identity are becoming more complicated--especially at the border. To a
greater extent than ever before, crime and control measures are not
always linked to a common national territory. Instead, criminals often
exploit international borders, turning the seams between sovereigns
into operational barriers for law enforcement. The Coast Guard's unique
authorities, capabilities, competencies, and partnerships, foreign and
domestic, enable the Coast Guard along with our fellow Department of
Homeland Security agencies, to consistently and effectively enforce
maritime laws, interdict smugglers and drug traffickers, and protect
American resources.
CONCLUSION
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify on behalf of the
Department of Homeland Security's law enforcement and investigatory
responsibilities. Due to the breadth of the hearing, this written
statement necessarily only outlines some of the important
responsibilities that DHS fulfills in protecting this great nation. We
will be pleased to answer any questions at this time.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Admiral Justice. We will now have
questions from the members, and I will recognize myself for 5
minutes.
Mr. Brown, you had mentioned the standard for canines. Are
you working with experts to ascertain whether or not a national
standard for training canines would be appropriate?
Mr. Brown. Yes, sir, we are. We have an ongoing program
with the FBI and the National Institute of Justice called the
Scientific Working Group Dog and Orthogonal Detector
Guidelines. It is to establish the best practices to do this.
Mr. Scott. You also have a no-fly list. If you believe you
are wrongly on the no-fly list, is there a way to get your name
off the list?
Mr. Brown. There is a redress process that TSA has, yes,
sir.
Mr. Scott. Is that very complicated?
Mr. Brown. Sir, I am not that familiar with it, to be
honest with you. I can give you a little bit of information
about it. I know that you have to apply to it and it takes a
little--but I am not sure how complicated the process really
is. I can find out for you, though, and get back to you.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Mr. Self, you issued the ID cards for port workers?
Chief Self. No, sir--U.S.
Mr. Scott. Who does?
Chief Self. I believe that would be the Office of Field
Operations.
Mr. Scott. Office of Field Operations of what?
Chief Self. Under CBP, sir.
Mr. Scott. Are you involved in port operations at all?
Chief Self. U.S. Border Patrol, sir, typically are not. We
will help the OFO officers in the field doing certain
operations at times.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Parmer, if someone is detained at a port of
entry and has dependent children, and they are the only person
available, what happens to the children?
Mr. Parmer. We have protocols in place for humanitary
concerns. If it is a sole care provider then the totality of
the circumstances is taken into consideration, and ordinarily
if it is a sole care provider situation the individual is
released with a notice to appear later in order to take care of
the children.
Mr. Scott. If you have death of persons in the custody of
ICE, are those deaths reported under the Deaths in Custody Act?
Do you know?
Mr. Parmer. I do not know, sir. I am sorry.
Mr. Scott. If you could----
Mr. Parmer. We do keep track of the individuals who, within
our custody, who are obviously--die--but I don't know if it is
reported under that particular act.
Mr. Scott. You are coordinating your activities with local
law enforcement?
Mr. Parmer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. If local law enforcement begins enforcing
immigration law, is there any potential for problems with
community relations between the local police and the community
that may have many immigrant citizens?
Mr. Parmer. Yes, sir. As we have learned, there are--with
the merger of the agencies within DHS, there are--for those of
us who were unacclimated to the immigration arena before March
1, 2003, it has been a learning process for all of us. And
there are actually many social and political concerns that
relate to the immigration concerns. But if the State or local
authorities implement immigration statutes on their own, as we
have learned in the Federal arena, there are all these
implications for relations with the community.
Mr. Scott. What training is done to make sure that local
police do not engage in illegal profiling?
Mr. Parmer. Well, in terms of what we do within ICE, we
have--as part of title 8-287, section 287G, we provide training
for the State and local authorities to look for immigration
violations; but profiling is not a part of that--that is a no-
no within our scope of order. We don't profile, so----
Mr. Scott. That is because your agents have been trained.
Local law enforcement may not have the same training.
My time is expired, and I may come back for a second round.
Mr. Parmer. Sure.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Gohmert?
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you. And I appreciate you all's
statements.
First of all, let me ask Mr. Parmer: After your agency,
ICE, is notified that an illegal alien is in local custody,
does ICE have the authority to say, ``Go ahead and detain
them,'' and from that point forward the Federal Government will
reimburse local law enforcement for holding them?
Mr. Parmer. We have the authority to advise the local
authorities to detain them, but I am not sure what the
reimbursement protocols are.
Mr. Gohmert. Because of course if you advise local law
enforcement to detain somebody--and this is a complaint I have
heard from local law enforcement--they can be told to detain
somebody and then hold them for 30 days, and then ICE will come
back and say, ``Well, we decided not to pursue it,'' and so
they are out all that money for an individual they have held
which, around my jurisdiction is around $50 a day. And that is
an awful lot of money for the Federal Government to ask a local
government to be out, and then not reimburse. If you are not
familiar with the answer to that question, who do you think
would be?
Mr. Parmer. Well, sir, we are divided up within ICE into
the Office of Investigations, which is the component I am
representing here today, although I am speaking on behalf of
all of ICE, but we also have Detention and Removal Operations,
the Federal Protective Service, the Office of International
Affairs----
Mr. Gohmert. But my question, who would----
Mr. Parmer. The more appropriate entity to answer that
question would be Detention and Removal Operations.
Mr. Gohmert. But you don't know who is in charge of that?
Mr. Parmer. Mr. Gary Mead is the director.
Mr. Gohmert. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Scott. Since you are representing part of the agency,
we may have good questions that you could have the appropriate
person--that would be helpful.
Mr. Parmer. Yes, sir. He is not here today, but----
Mr. Scott. That is why we include the submitted questions.
Mr. Parmer. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Gohmert. Mr. Stenger, when personal identification
information is stolen from the Internet, how does and when does
the Secret Service become involved in that?
Mr. Stenger. Mr. Congressman, we don't have any specialists
for investigations. If a case is brought to our attention we
evaluate each one on the merits of the case----
Mr. Gohmert. Somebody has to bring it to your attention?
See, you brought that up in your opening statement and I wasn't
aware that you got involved in that, other than the FBI did,
but did I understand right? That is something you get involved
in if it is brought to your attention?
Mr. Stenger. That is correct, sir. There are a number of
agencies that have cross-cutting jurisdiction, including the
FBI, Postal Inspectors, as well as Secret Service, but if these
types of cases--if it is access device or computer fraud--one
of the violations that we investigate--if brought to our
attention, we will take the case in----
Mr. Gohmert. But someone has to bring it--my time is so
limited. I hate to be rude and keep cutting you off, but to go
to my question, at what point--what threshold--do you get
involved? That is when somebody brings it to your attention, is
that right?
Mr. Stenger. That is correct.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you.
Let me ask about the no-fly list, Mr. Brown. After TSA
takes somebody off that list--like I have got a general,--
general, served 29 years in the military, and he was on the
terrorist watch list. It took a while to get his name removed
by TSA, and yet the airlines still have trouble recognizing he
is not on the list because he is not off their list yet.
And so it seems kind of absurd to treat a real hero like
this, and I understood from Secretary Chertoff when he
testified last week, you remove them but it doesn't seem like
there is any follow-up to make sure the airlines remove them
off. And so it seems almost like a Seinfeld episode: You remove
them off, but nobody gets them out there in the field off the
list, which means what good does it do?
And so, is there follow up that you do with the airlines to
make sure they take them off the list?
Mr. Brown. Yes, sir, there is. I am not familiar with the
process, but there is some follow up. I do know that.
Mr. Gohmert. There is some follow up, but you don't know
what it is?
Mr. Brown. No, sir, I don't. I am not familiar with that.
Mr. Gohmert. Think you could find out what it is?
Mr. Brown. Yes, sir. Certainly.
Mr. Gohmert. So we can follow up on the follow up.
And then as far as Chief Self, we had a Border Patrol agent
from my district in Henderson, Clint Thrasher, that was--his
family was told he was following illegal aliens when his--I
believe it was a Cessna--went down. Of course there was some
concern, you know, was he being fired on? Was there anything
like that? I just wondered, did NTSB or any other Federal
agency find a reason for that crash and give a specific reason?
Chief Self. Yes, sir. NTSB, FBI, OPR, and FAA all
investigated that crash. The finding was pilot error, and he
was, of course, killed in 2007 while in the line of duty.
Mr. Gohmert. Okay. So they all attributed it to pilot
error. Was there any evidence at all that his plane was ever
fired upon?
Chief Self. No evidence whatsoever, sir.
Mr. Gohmert. Well, I might encourage you to pass that on to
Secretary Chertoff. He wasn't aware we lost anybody like that.
So, thank you. I see my time has expired.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Mr. Delahunt was next, and I understand you want to defer
to the gentleman from New York.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler?
Mr. Nadler. Thank you. And I appreciate the gentleman
deferring; I have a meeting to go to shortly.
Mr. Parmer--that the ICE has invaded people's homes--ICE
agents banging on people's doors--agents have entered people's
bedrooms. Assistant Secretary Myers stated, ICE agents only
enter with the--consent. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Parmer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Nadler. And when the police--your home brandishing--who
may not be able to understand, how do you get consent?
Mr. Parmer. Well, we have bilingual agents and officers who
are out on these, and that is--the early morning hours are
often the best time to catch individuals at home, but we always
have----
Mr. Nadler [continuing]. Many of these people that I have
known, I--the people banging on my door demanding entrance,
what did I do? Is that informed consent?
Mr. Parmer. I can't speak to anecdotal stories, but I know
that we have a professional and----
Mr. Nadler [continuing]. Lawsuits are pending, they are not
anecdotal stories.
Mr. Parmer. They are lawsuits pending, and they are still
in litigation, so----
Mr. Nadler. What standards?
Mr. Parmer. If an individual is asked to allow agents to
enter their residence, then they enter. We have had instances
where--in the lawsuit in which you are referring to--a great
many of the requested entries were--the agents wound up
standing by the residence for hours on end waiting for someone
either to come in or out of the residence so they could conduct
their interviews; but they did not forcibly enter any
residence. That is just against the law.
Mr. Nadler. Let me go further. ICE has stated--there have
been a lot of reports--U.S. citizens are being arrested. What
is ICE's policy regarding collateral corrections? What
compensation do you give to people who are illegally arrested?
Mr. Parmer. No one is arrested until their alienage is
determined. If someone is----
Mr. Nadler. Excuse me, I don't think that is true. U.S.
citizens have been arrested.
Mr. Parmer. If we can determine alienage on the spot then
they are immediately released. As soon as we can reasonably
determine the citizenship of an individual in our custody while
we are detaining----
Mr. Nadler [continuing]. Five o'clock in the morning. How
can you determine alienage? Five o'clock in the morning, on the
spot?
Mr. Parmer. Any combination of things: documentation, a
combination--any reasonable responses to questions,
documentation----
Mr. Nadler. So you think it is reasonable that anybody, as
an American citizen, should produce his passport or other
documentation, on demand, at 5 o'clock in the morning?
Mr. Parmer. I do.
Mr. Nadler. You do?
Mr. Parmer. I do think that is reasonable. I mean, if
someone awakened me at 5 o'clock in the morning, I would be
able to produce my driver's license or any other document to
show that I was a legitimate citizen. I do.
Mr. Nadler. And what if you didn't drive?
Mr. Parmer. Then most States have identification cards.
Mr. Nadler. How do you know when people don't have these--
identification cards----
Mr. Parmer. And our agents are not bound by just that
particular documentation.
Mr. Nadler. Are there any guidelines that have been
published to help to show what you would look for?
Mr. Parmer. Yes, sir. We have published guidelines to the
field; we have a checklist that we go down. We take great
precaution in ensuring that no U.S. citizens----
Mr. Nadler. Yet, ICE has admitted--U.S. citizens have been
arrested.
Mr. Parmer. No, sir. I don't acknowledge that----
Mr. Nadler. You don't. Then why--as collateral?
Mr. Parmer. Collateral arrest could be individuals who were
not targeted, but who happened to be illegal aliens who were
present at the time of the individual who was targeted----
Mr. Nadler. My time has expired, but I would request that
you supply the Committee, please, with all the written
guidelines that are supplied in training, that are supplied to
agents so that when you go to somebody's house at 5 o'clock in
the morning, what their instructions are to obtain consent, and
what the guidelines are to determine alienage under those
circumstances.
Mr. Parmer. I would be happy to do that----
Mr. Nadler [continuing]. Figures for the--how many U.S.
citizens have been arrested in the last year----
Mr. Parmer. I would be happy to provide that, sir.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble?
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is good to have you all with us, gentlemen.
Admiral, last year, I am told, the Coast Guard confiscated
more than 350,000 pounds of cocaine on the high seas,
surpassing all previous records. How has the interagency
efforts between the United States and our international
colleagues contributed to the Coast Guard's interdiction
success in transit zones?
Admiral Justice. Sir, we have established, over the past
few years, 27 separate bilateral agreements with foreign
nations--various foreign nations: Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela,
Dominican Republic, et cetera--and we use those bilateral
agreements to have the ability to do law enforcement with the
flag-state vessels. And we exercise those authorities on a
daily basis.
Our ability to work with those foreign nations--which we
do, as I said, daily--has the ability for us to deliver
consequences to those foreign nations, the peoples.
Mr. Coble. Are my figures correct: 350,000 pounds?
Admiral Justice. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Coble. Mr. Stenger, the USA PATRIOT Act mandates Secret
Service to establish a nationwide network of electronic crimes.
Have these task forces been helpful in combating cyber attacks
on the Nation's financial and banking infrastructure?
Mr. Stenger. Yes, sir, I believe they have. We have a
national network of 24 of these electronic crimes task forces
in conjunction with 29 financial crimes task forces, and I
think the sharing of information and the relationships that
have developed there--with academia, with the private sector--
especially the private sector, because they are, in fact, in
most of these incursions and hackings, are the victims.
So we are dependent upon them to inform us of this
information, and the electronic crimes task forces really
strengthen those relationships, as well as strengthen the
relationships with our local and State partners to develop that
sharing of information, that when they receive information on
something like this, we can share that information and bring
all of the appropriate resources to bear.
Mr. Coble [continuing]. Thank you.
Mr. Self, describe, if you will, ICE's efforts to identify,
arrest, and remove alien gang members.
Chief Self. Border Patrol really has no interaction with
ICE as it pertains to alien gang members, other than when we
apprehend an alien gang member, at that point in time we will
turn it over to ICE for prosecution. Sir, if you are speaking
operationally, as to what they do in areas such as San Antonio
or L.A., we don't take part in those operations with them.
Mr. Coble. Anybody? Anybody want to respond to that
question?
Mr. Parmer. Yes. We, through Operation Community Shield, we
do target illegal alien gang members. Since inception, we have
arrested well over 8,000 illegal gang members--illegal alien
gang members--within the last fiscal year, over 3,300. I am not
sure, other than--specifically what your question is, how we--
--
Mr. Coble. Yes----
Mr. Parmer. Very often, it is referrals from the local
constabularies--the State and local department--that they are
having a gang problem in their area, and we respond and try to
develop as much law enforcement intelligence as we can based
upon the referral, and then go out and do a sweep of the area
in question.
Mr. Coble. Admiral, before my time expires, let me come
back to--Alien Smuggling Act. The amendments were part of the
2008 Coast Guard authorization, generally, tell the
Subcommittee, if you will, why amending the Maritime Alien
Smuggling Act is essential to the Coast Guard anti-smuggling
effort.
Admiral Justice. Yes, sir. Right now, when illegal aliens
on the high seas are smuggled, when we catch the boat we have
got the crime in front of us. The current laws, the penalties
are misdemeanor-level offenses, they don't have any teeth, and
they are not an inhibitor to the smugglers. In this--that the
2237 will put some teeth into our ability to enforce these
laws.
Mr. Coble. Thank you.
My time has expired. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Admiral Justice, were you describing one that is on the
books, or the one that you want on the books?
Admiral Justice. The one that is on the books now is the
one that is not--it is weak; it is not strong enough. I am
describing the one that we have worked to get on the books,
sir.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt?
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Admiral, for the outstanding work
that the Coast Guard is doing on behalf of the country. You
indicated that we have an agreement with Venezuela. How is that
working? What kind of a grade--as far as that particular
agreement?
Admiral Justice. Surprisingly enough, sir, when it comes to
counter-drug operations and counter-drug interactions, there is
a facet of the Venezuelan government that will interact with us
and we will have communications with them. So that is ongoing,
sir.
Mr. Delahunt. They get a good report card?
Admiral Justice. Yes, sir.
Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Parmer, are you familiar with the case of
Mahir Arar? How long have you been with the--department?
Mr. Parmer. March 1, 2003.
Mr. Delahunt. March 1, 2003. Are you familiar----
Mr. Parmer. Since it's inception.
Mr. Delahunt [continuing]. Of Mahir Arar, a dual national
Canadian-Syrian?
Mr. Parmer. The name doesn't ring a bell, sir, but the
circumstances----
Mr. Delahunt [continuing]. Facts--because I am interested
if there is a policy within ICE or its predecessor, INS. On
September 26, 2002 this individual, Mr. Arar, was flying from
Zurich to Montreal, and he was transiting through JFK Airport
in New York, and there he was detained for hours by FBI,
presumably by ICE or its predecessor----
Mr. Parmer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Delahunt [continuing]. And the NYPD. And the next day
he was sent to a detention facility in Brooklyn where he was
further interrogated, and INS officials informed him that they
would like him to--return to Syria.
This is an individual who was born in Syria; he is around,
I think, around 35 years old. He had spent the last 20 years of
his life in Canada--was a Canadian national. He said no, he
didn't want to return to Syria. He was on the watch list; it
was alleged that he was an Al Qaida associate.
Subsequently that was proven to be correct, but on
September 28, he was given a document saying that he was
inadmissible under section 235C of the Immigration and
Nationality Act because he was a--of al Qaida. On October 2 he
was permitted a 2-minute phone call; he called his mother-in-
law up in Ottawa, and he expressed his concern to her that he
would be sent to Syria.
On October 4 he had a visit from the Canadian Counsel who
told him, ``Don't worry about it; it won't happen.'' October 6
he was asked by American officials why he did not want to go to
Syria, and he informed them that he was concerned about being
tortured because he hadn't met his military obligation prior to
his leaving at around, I think, 17 or 18 years old. In
addition, he was a Sunni, he indicated.
On October 8 he read a document saying that they decided,
based on classified information, that he was Al Qaida and that
the INS director had decided to send him to Syria. Protestors
say that he would be tortured, but that didn't seem to cause
any consternation. And they are saying that if he was taken in
change to a private jet, flown to Jordan and then on to Syria,
we--is there a policy in terms--you are not familiar with that
case, now that I am----
Mr. Parmer. Mr. Delahunt, no. I apologize----
Mr. Delahunt. Don't apologize.
Mr. Parmer [continuing]. But I am not familiar with it. But
my colleague, Ms. Acom, just passed me a note saying that she
is familiar with it, but as you alluded, there is a DHS-OIG
report dealing with that particular issue that is classified.
Mr. Delahunt. Right. I mean, well, just about everything is
classified. But I guess what I am looking for is an
unclassified to what the policy is when they are a dual citizen
of another country, and in this case specifically, why Syria
rather than Canada?
Mr. Parmer. That is a very good question, sir, and I don't
know--obviously he was not a U.S. citizen, so he should have--
it would stand to reason that he should have gone back to
Canada before any decision was made, but I--because of the
nature of the issue, I can't--and my unfamiliarity with it--I
can't respond to your question.
Mr. Delahunt. But somebody has got to respond at some point
in time.
Mr. Parmer. Perhaps our OIG could meet with you in a
different setting and----
Mr. Delahunt. But you know, the American people are very
concerned about how we are viewed across the world; and it is
incidents like this that erode respect for the United States,
because if one had an opportunity to examine the Department of
State reports, it was inevitable--at least if you can rely on
those reports--that he was going to be tortured in Syria, and
he was. That doesn't bespeak well of what occurred, and
hopefully there has been a review of that decision, and the
American people deserve to know why he was sent to Syria rather
than to Canada.
Mr. Parmer. Yes. Yes, sir. I can't speak to that; it
predates the Department of Homeland Security and Immigration
and Customs Enforcement. But I can assure you, in my tenure
with this organization, nothing like that has occurred.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you.
Mr. Parmer. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot?
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Last week--and I will address this to anyone who wants to
handle it--last week the Washington Post published an article
highlighting the very real possibility of a cyber attack on our
Nation's infrastructure by cyber terrorists. This article,
together with the reports that botnets have invaded more than 5
million computers across the Nation and are ``the weapon of
choice for criminals,'' according to FBI director Robert
Mueller, illustrate the seriousness of this issue.
What is the Department of Homeland Security doing to ensure
that our cyberspace is secure, and does law enforcement have
the tool it needs to effectively investigate and prosecute
these types of crimes to keep our Nation safe?
Mr. Stenger. Speaking for the Secret Service, sir, we work
very aggressively on cyber security issues and the various
aspects of cyber security; and some concerns the overall system
security. Our role in the Department of Homeland Security, as
an investigative agency, is to investigate the criminal areas.
And I think one of the issues that we have found a lot of
times is complementary: terrorism, law enforcement and crime
are not things that don't go well together. Many times we
find--and I think the old adage that not every criminal is a
terrorist, but every terrorist is a criminal--and we find more
and more, the methods of the criminals that are out there using
cyberspace and electronic crimes actually enable the funding of
some of their activities.
So the lessons we learn and the information that we are
receiving, both from our law enforcement partners here, from
the private sector, as well as many of our law enforcement and
private sector partners overseas, is really giving us some
information, I think, that is very important to move into the
overall cyber security strategy.
Mr. Chabot. Yes, sir.
Admiral Justice. Sir, I will add--I know, even this morning
listening to the Coast Guard CIO, you know, briefing our
commandant about what he is doing today, DHS is focused and
aggressively attending to this issue--DHS at large. There is a
meeting today; I think there is a tabletop sort of exercise at
that level where they are talking about these issues.
They are looking at having some sort of a national PFO,
similar to how DHS is attending to the pandemic challenge. You
know, cross-cutting, obviously is, as you know, an interagency,
intergovernmental issue. But it is absolutely on the front
plate of the DHS.
Mr. Chabot. Anybody else care to comment? Let me just bring
to your attention a bill that has been introduced called the
Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2007. It was introduced by
Congressman Adam Schiff, who is a Democrat from California, and
myself--I happen to be a Republican from Ohio--so it is a
bipartisan bill; we have 20 co-sponsors so far. In short, the
bill would amend the Federal Criminal Code to do a number of
things.
I will list those just briefly here: Number one, prohibit
accessing a protected computer to obtain unique identification
number, address, a routing code, or access device; two, revise
the definition of protected computer to include computers
affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communications;
three, expand the definition of racketeering to include
computer fraud; four, redefine the crime of computer-related
extortion to include threats to access without authorization or
to exceed authorized access of a protected computer; five--and
there are only seven--impose criminal penalties for conspiracy
to commit computer fraud; six, require forfeiture of property
used to commit computer fraud; and seven, impose criminal
penalties for damaging ten or more protected computers during
any 1-year period.
And it also directs the U.S. Sentencing Commission to
review and amend its guidelines and policy statements to
reflect congressional intent to increase criminal penalties for
computer fraud. Without going into great detail, does that seem
like something that might make it--might be a better tool for
law enforcement?
Mr. Stenger. Yes, Congressman, I am familiar with that. We
do support that because I think in today's environment with
cyber crimes, the evolving nature of these types of crimes need
to be addressed in evolving legislative initiatives in order to
be able to address those appropriately.
And whether it is new laws or enhancing the existing laws,
I think it is very opportune to be able to do that as these
crime types have developed. So we are very supportive of the
Committee looking at new ways to address the evolving criminal
nature of what is taking place.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
I see my time has expired, so I will yield back.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much,
and----
Admiral Justice. I would say it is a DHS issue, that TSA
should technically be overseeing the TWIC issue. We are
supporting it in the ports, and we feel at this time--it is a
phased implementation, and we feel we are on track to move
forward.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Even though----
Admiral Justice. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. And the question is, do you
have enough personnel to----
Admiral Justice. Yes we do, ma'am. The 2009 budget request
that we have, that is the right amount.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just ask----
Admiral Justice. Okay. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. I don't ask questions. Let me
go straight to the question?
Mr. Brown. Well, we work off of a protocol that is dictated
by threat--on our ability, and we have assessed all the flights
that we--by a risk-based strategic deployment policy. That is
how we identify the flights that we are wanting to address. I
am not quite sure what you mean, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me stop you----
Mr. Brown. Sure.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. What I would like to know
is----
Mr. Brown. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. That we are having difficulty
with the children at the border--, and I would like to know
what we are doing--children being held--what are you doing to
ensure that that is not happening.
Chief Self. Yes, ma'am. Border Patrol is presently working
with the Office of Refugee Resettlement. What happens is, when
we apprehend an unaccompanied minor, we will take him in and we
will go through the processing with the minor. At that point,
we start engaging with ORR and trying to find them bed space.
There are times when we can't find bed space; we just
revamped a hold room policy that ensures that that minor is
taken care of. Within the hold policy, it outlines that that
minor will have two to three hot meals a day, and any request
for----
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. For 72 hours, that
absolutely, without a doubt.
Chief Self. I cannot tell you that. But I can tell you that
we are doing everything we can to work with ORR, civil rights,
civil liberties, to ensure that they are moved out of our
detention space as quickly as we can.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me pursue that with you.
Chief Self. I understand, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And I thank you.
Mr. Parmer. Yes, ma'am. I think we will all agree that was
a very unfortunate incident. I did not personally attend the
function, which was intended to be a fundraiser, but I think it
is our overall regret and embarrassment, and this organization
is well on the record. And we have very proactive measures in
terms of sensitivities to ethnicity and EEO matters that have
been reinvigorated as a result of that incident. And I----
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. More detail.
Mr. Parmer. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. It affects, if you will----
Mr. Parmer. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. I appreciate--a more detailed
response.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
We are going to have a couple more questions, and I would
recognize myself.
First, Mr. Parmer, the GAO has a report on ICE practices
that identified some problem areas. Could you provide us with
the list of problem areas that were identified and what you
have done since October 2007 to address them?
Mr. Parmer. Yes, sir. I think the crux of the report had to
do with officers' discretion in the field about detention--
ability to release from detention and humanitarian concerns.
And as an organization, we have taken on----
Mr. Scott. If you could provide us with the report in which
you have got in writing, we would appreciate it.
Mr. Parmer. Yes, sir. I will----
Mr. Scott. Does ICE have a policy against torture?
Mr. Parmer. We do not torture, no, sir.
Mr. Scott. And to follow up on the gentleman from
Massachusetts, do you coordinate with other nations to have
people tortured?
Mr. Parmer. No, sir. We do not in any form or fashion
condone torture.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Mr. Stenger, there have been reports that some of the
government computers were hacked, possibly by people from
China. What is the status--can you give us any update in open
session as to what the status of that is?
Mr. Stenger. Mr. Chairman, because of, I think, the
sensitivity of it, it is going to be very difficult to comment
on it, but I do believe that there are steps being taken to
secure the systems--not only government systems, but military
systems and private sector systems--from malicious malware that
is out there to prevent losses like that could take place.
Mr. Scott. In the ID theft, one of the problems with
consumer ID theft is, what usually happens is when someone gets
their identification compromised and someone runs up charges on
their credit card, what usually happens is the bank writes it
off. There, at that point, are no complaining witnesses and the
thief pretty much gets away. What would it take to set up an
operation where routine ID theft could be actually investigated
and prosecuted?
Mr. Stenger. Mr. Chairman, because of the fact that it
really cross-cuts many jurisdictions, I think the task force
model that we have--we are a very strong proponent of both the
electronic crime and the financial crime task forces--is
really, ultimately, the answer to this situation; because we
don't have thresholds for investigations--I know there was some
discussion about thresholds for prosecution--but for us, as an
investigative agency, we take everything individually on its
merit. So if someone brings forth a case to us on identity
theft, we will take a look at it and try and work it in the
proper context.
Mr. Scott. So most of these can be solved, but they are
labor-intesive?
Mr. Stenger. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Scott. My question is, how much would we need to
appropriate? We appropriated a few million dollars when we
passed the last bill--that was about 2 years ago. We had in
there some funding for ID theft investigations. I assumed it
was woefully insufficient. My question is, what would we need
to do to have an operation that could routinely track these
things down?
Mr. Stenger. I think because of the nature--the evolving
nature of this type of crime in cyberspace, it would be
difficult to quantify an exact amount of money, but I do think
that we must maintain recognition of the evolving nature of
these crimes as well as legislation I think that is the right
path to take, especially for identity theft, because it is not
only a problem here, it is a problem overseas. And that----
Mr. Scott. You made a request for funding?
Mr. Stenger. Have we made a request? I would have to go
back specifically to track that, as far as----
Mr. Scott. We would be looking for that, because we would
like to fund sufficient operation to deter people from
committing identity theft.
Admiral Justice, you mentioned the legislation that you
wanted. Could you describe the--exactly what conduct you want
proscribed in the new legislation?
Admiral Justice. Yes, sir. We specifically are looking to
make it illegal to just operate one of these vessels in
international waters. A stateless vessel in international
waters, if you are operating it, that is a crime. There is no
good----
Mr. Scott [continuing]. Crime in the United States?
Admiral Justice. It would be a crime punishable in the
United States, yes, sir. There is no reason to have that out
there, other than illicit activity.
Mr. Scott [continuing]. Any criminal activity--without
proving any criminal activity, just the mere operation in
international waters----
Admiral Justice. That is correct. Yes, sir. What happens
is----
Mr. Scott. A crime prosecutable in the United States?
Admiral Justice. That is correct. Yes, sir. What happens,
sir, is you can see they are going along, and the minute they
counter-detect us, they throw one switch, the thing floods, and
it goes to the bottom. And we can't get the cocaine off of it,
and they are home-free.
Mr. Scott. If there is legitimate use of these----
Admiral Justice. If there is a legitimate use, there would
be a state; there would be a country that owned it, an owner.
And if they could produce some ownership, it is not a crime. I
am talking about a stateless vessel, there is no proof of where
they came from or whose nationality it is. That is the key
piece here.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Chairman. If you want to do
something on that, I would be glad to join in with you. It does
sound like if it is a stateless vessel that it is, you know,
basically--speaks for itself--that it is a violation, and that
is why they are wanting to remain anonymous.
Let me ask Admiral Justice, under the 1995 change to the
Cuban Adjustment Act, Cubans who attempt to enter the United
States over water are given parole status for 1 year and
allowed to seek U.S. citizenship if they make it to dry land.
If they don't make it to dry land, they are interdicted by the
Coast Guard, detained, and sent back to Cuba.
As a result of that policy, smugglers engage in dangerous
practices--place migrants in a dangerous situation. I am just
wondering, have you ever questioned the wisdom of this wet-
feet, dry-feet policy, and have you ever considered whether
that policy ought to be changed? I am just curious to your
thoughts on it.
Admiral Justice. It does create an extraordinary challenge
to us, and an incentive for lawlessness and for people to take
great risks as they try to get to our sand--to our beach. And
that--law, and that constitutes a definite challenge in the
Florida Straits; it requires us to have extraordinary amounts
of resources dedicated to the challenge, and it----
Mr. Gohmert. Well, without leaving our country completely
unprotected, do you have a policy that would cause less
challenge? Of course, less challenge would be where you don't
ever protect us from anybody coming in, but--policy like that--
--
Admiral Justice. What we are asking, sir--and you supported
it and we ask you just aim at some more definitive support--the
Interauthorization Act, the law we would like to see as I
mentioned to Congressman Coble, has stiffer penalties for the
people we do catch out there; and we catch people, again, daily
running high-speed, overloaded boats. We get them to stop, and
we don't have enough teeth in the law to really make it not
worth their time to do that. We want to make it not worth their
time to try to smuggle people at high speeds, you know, into
our Nation.
Mr. Gohmert. Chief Self, my office was told that I could
have access to the remains of the plane that Clint Thrasher was
flying. Do you know who has possession of those remains?
Admiral Justice. I believe it is going to be Air and Marine
under CBP, sir. The plane is presently located at the El Paso
International Airport.
Mr. Gohmert. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Stenger, who has primary jurisdiction to investigate
things like Congress' computer systems being hacked into? Is
that you or FBI--who has primary jurisdiction?
Mr. Stenger. Depending on what kind of crime it is--we
share jurisdiction in many of these things. If it is a criminal
attempt, obviously we share jurisdiction with the FBI; so
either one of us or both of us could work together depending on
what the case looked like when it was initially brought
forward. Certainly if it was terrorism, the Bureau would have
primary jurisdiction.
Mr. Gohmert. If it is terrorism; but if it is not for sure
that it is terrorism, then we don't have a delineation as to
who takes priority in investigating that?
Mr. Stenger. Unless it is set by MOU, Congressman, it could
be co-worked together.
Mr. Gohmert. Is there an MOU, or is it just MOUSE?
Mr. Stenger. I am not sure there is an MOU specifically on
that concerning the Capitol, but I do believe that we do have
an excellent working relationship with the FBI on this----
Mr. Gohmert. Well, I understand that, but it sometimes--I
know how it works: If two entities have the same jurisdiction,
sometimes there is a battle and things get falling in the
cracks. And we do have a problem, and I have been advised
that--our members' financial information, some of it has been
put online and made available to anybody out there on the
Internet; and that wasn't even a crime, it was our own people
getting it out there.
I am also told that the home address of all of you, all of
us, all of that information is obtainable on the Internet, and
I am just wondering if we don't need more protective laws to
allow people to have greater privacy, because there is so much
out there on everybody. I was at a briefing back when I was a
judge where we were shown how people in prison, who may have
been mad at us for sending them there, could get on the
Internet, not only find out where exactly we live, floor plans
for many of our homes, get a map printed out of how to get
there and where to go in the home to go after whoever you want
to go--it is amazing what is out there.
Do you feel like there ought to be more extensive laws
protecting private information online?
Mr. Stenger. Congressman, I think that the globalization of
information is a major problem--it is a major issue--and it is
instantaneous. It is not like it used to be in just being
delivered by the mail; it is instantaneous sharing of
information. Specifically for this location and the Capitol, I
believe the Capitol police would probably have the primary
jurisdiction, and depending on their resources and
availability, they would work together with us or the FBI.
But specifically--as mentioned by the congressman
concerning the new legislation, that is an issue. I think
existing laws need to be looked at, resources need to be looked
at on a regular basis----
Mr. Gohmert. That is why we are asking you not just, ``Do
we need to look at it?'' but, ``What do you recommend?'' That
is what I am getting to. You all are supposed to be the
experts.
Mr. Stenger. Well, I think the recommendation would be, as
crime evolves we do need to look at enhancing the existing
laws. First off, the--globalization--international aspect of it
needs to be addressed because it is continuing----
Mr. Gohmert. Well, I know it needs to be addressed, and we
thought we were doing that by inviting you up here. So we are
trying to do that; we just need recommendations on exactly what
to do. So I would ask if you would submit information in
writing to us after the hearing that would give specific
recommendations as to what we could do to better protect
ourselves and everybody out there, including you--you know if
all your private information online--have you ever checked?
Mr. Stenger. It probably is, and I am, too, concerned; I
think it has got to be everyone's concern. But we will be happy
to provide that to you.
Mr. Gohmert. Okay, thank you.
Thank you, Chairman, for your indulgence.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
This concludes the hearing. I would ask the witnesses to--
if there are other questions from the panel, they will be
submitted in writing--would ask the witnesses to respond to
those as quickly as possible so that they can be made part of
the record. Without objection, the record will remain open for
1 additional week for additional comments and anything else
people want to introduce.
With that, the hearing is now adjourned. Thank you very
much.
[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative
in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary
In 2002, we brought a number of agencies together because of their
expertise and capabilities so that we could create our best domestic
defense against terrorism. Although no system is perfect, I think that
we've had some success and I think that we're making progress. And, I
thank Chairman Bobby Scott for holding this hearing an exchange of
information and feedback such as this hearing is crucial for ensuring
that we remain on the cutting edge against terrorism because sadly in
today's world, we cannot afford to let our defenses down.
In today's hearing, I would like to emphasize that in keeping those
defenses up, we also have to be sure that we are working just as hard
to safeguard our civil liberties. After all, we could ensure our safety
easily enough by clamping down on rights and liberties but that's not
what America is about. If we were to do that, we would be safe but in
effect, it would be a victory for the terrorists because they would
change our way of life. So, we must strike that balance in which we're
physically safe and safe within our liberties as well.
Today, we will hear from the Transportation Security Administration
main law enforcement function, the Federal Air Marshals, the Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
the Secret Service, and the Coast Guard. Each has important functions
and enormous challenges but mainly I would like to discuss ICE CPB and
their operations.
I have three main concerns that I would like to address and the
first is humanitarian. Reports of poor conditions for detainees
particularly along the Southwest border raises some disturbing
allegations. ICE and CBP have adopted a ``zero tolerance'' policy has
pushed detention facilities past their capacities. Food, medicine, even
blankets are apparently hard to come by and people are sleeping on
nothing but concrete slabs. This concerns me because if the allegations
are true, we are depriving people of basic necessities and it must be
corrected.
The second is the delegation of ICE authority through the section
287(g) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act (IIRAIRA). We need to be sure that state and local law enforcement
officers who enforce ICE responsibilities receive the proper training.
They must be trained in the laws pertaining to unauthorized aliens,
what constitutes being an unauthorized alien and we also must ensure
and that their detention facilities meet the standards to ensure proper
care.
The third concern is whether Due Process rights are being properly
protected for detainees. The zero tolerance approach along the
Southwest border is not only causing poor conditions in the holding
facilities but apparently, access to adequate counsel is also in doubt.
There are so many detainees that one lawyer must handle up to six or
eight clients per day and there is little or no room to meet with
clients confidentially. This raises serious concerns about whether
detainees are receiving adequate counsel and if not, Due Process is not
properly awarded in these cases, which would be unconstitutional.
In addressing these issues, I would like to hear from these
witnesses about how their agencies are addressing the concerns. I
should think that if ICE and CBP continue to pursue zero tolerance we
would see requests for more and better detention facilities that would
include upgraded health care. We should also see continuous improvement
to their training of state and local officers to whom they delegate
authority and requirements for those officers to have continuing
education in order to keep their authority. Finally, I would like to
see recommendations for increases to the federal public defenders'
offices so that detainees can be adequately represented in our courts.
I am looking forward to discussing these issues today because they
are a great concern to me. Again, I thank Chairman Bobby Scott for
holding this important hearing and I yield back.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and Member,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your leadership in convening today's
very important hearing on the oversight of the Department of Homeland
Security. I would also like to thank the ranking member the Honorable
Louie Gohmert. Welcome to our distinguished panelists.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established six years
ago. The National Strategy for Homeland Security and the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 served to mobilize and organize our nation to
secure the homeland from terrorist attacks. As part of the creation of
DHS, the following law enforcement agencies were either transformed to
DHS or created via consolidation of two or more agencies: the
Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the United States
Secret Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard.
The primary reason for the establishment of DHS was to provide the
unifying core for the vast network of organizations and institutions
involved in the efforts to secure our nation. In order to better do
this and to provide guidance to the 180,000 DHS men and women who work
every day on this important task, the Department developed its own
high-level strategic plan. The vision, mission statements, strategic
goals and objectives provide the framework guiding the actions that
make up the daily operations of the Department.
DHS's vision is simple: to preserve our freedoms, protect America,
and secure our homeland. Its mission is to lead the unified national
effort to secure America; prevent and deter terrorist attacks and
protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation; and
ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and visitors,
and promote the free-flow of commerce.
DHS has seven strategic goals and objectives. These include,
awareness, prevention, protection, response, recovery, service, and
organizational excellence.
DHS has engaged in much good work over the past six years, but more
needs to be done. The five agencies that comprise DHS, their functions,
their accomplishments, and their challenges are the subject of this
hearing.
I. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA)
The TSA's main law enforcement functions are carried out through
the Federal Air Marshals and the National Explosives Detection Canine
Team Programs. The Federal Air Marshals are the primary law enforcement
entity within the TSA. They are deployed on flights around the world
and in the United States to ensure security of the plane and the
passengers during flight. The Federal Air Marshals staff several
positions at different organizations such as the National
Couterterrorism Center, the National Targeting Center, and on the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Forces. The
Federal Marshals also work among other law enforcement and homeland
security liaison assignments during times of heightened alert or
special national events.
In its 2005 oversight hearing, the Subcommittee questioned
administrators about several issues including undercover appearance,
aircraft boarding procedures, lodging policies and standards of
conduct. On March 5, 2008, during a full Committee hearing, DHS
Secretary Michael Chertoff stated that the biggest air threat posed to
the U.S. is by private jets entering U.S. airspace. During this
hearing, we plan to follow-up on these issues and inquire about other
aspects of air travel security.
II. UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP)
CBP is responsible for protecting our nation's borders from
terrorism, human and drug smuggling, illegal immigration, and
agricultural pests while simultaneously facilitating the flow of
legitimate travel and trade. CBP is responsible for guarding 7 thousand
miles of land border of the United States with Canada and Mexico and 2
thousand miles of coastal waters surrounding the Florida peninsula and
off the coast of Southern California. The agency also protects 95,000
miles of maritime border in partnership with the United States Coast
Guard. CBP is also responsible for enforcing trade and tariff laws to
ensure that industry operates in a fair and competitive trade
environment. This hearing will examine CBP standards for questioning
individuals at the borders, human trafficking and what CBP does to
combat this problem, and various problems associated with detention and
removal.
III. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
Immigration and Customs Enforcement is the largest investigative
branch of DHS. This agency was created after the tragic events of 9/11,
by combining the law enforcement arms of the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service and the former U.S. Customs Service, to more
effectively enforce immigration and customs laws and to protect the
United States from terrorist attacks.
Since its creation, ICE's workload has continuously increased. ICE
has increased its worksite enforcement arrests from 510 in fiscal year
2002, to 4,383 in fiscal year 2006. ICE's Office of Detention and
Removal Operations more than doubled its fugitive arrests from 7,958 in
fiscal year 2005 to 15,467 in fiscal year 2006. In fiscal year 2006
alone, ICE removed about 182,000 aliens from the United States through
its combined enforcement efforts. Nevertheless, at the end of fiscal
year 2006, there were still an estimated 12 million unauthorized aliens
in the United States.
In a report to Representative Lofgren and myself, the Government
Accountability Office recommended several changes for ICE to improve
its operations. GAO recognized that given the sheer number of
unauthorized aliens, ICE would need to prioritize workloads and
exercise officer discretion. For example, an alien who poses a threat
via terrorism or other crime must be detained. On the other hand,
humanitarian situations such as when an alien who poses no immediate
threat and is a primary care giver, may call for the ICE officer issue
a notice to appear rather than detention. Questions have been raised as
to whether ICE's policies and training have been sufficient to impart
the necessary expertise to the ICE officer to equip them to make the
proper determination as to whether an alien should be detained or
issued a notice. In addition to needing increased officer discretion,
detention space may also factor into whether to detain an alien. The
Subcommittee will request information about alternatives to detention
and the acquisition of additional detention space.
IV. UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
The United States Secret Service protects the president and the
vice-president, their families, heads of state, and other designated
individuals; investigates threats against these protectees; protects
the White House, vice-president's residence, foreign missions, and
other buildings within Washington, D.C.; and plans and implements
security for designated National Special Security Events.
The Secret Service also investigates violations of laws relating to
counterfeiting of United States currency and other financial crimes
including: access device fraud, financial institution fraud, identity
theft, computer fraud and other computer-based attacks on our nation's
banking and telecommunications infrastructure.
The Subcommittee plans to inquire about when the Secret Service
gets involved in state or local identity theft and the resources the
Service needs to adequately combat identity theft and other cybercrimes
in the United States and abroad.
V. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
The United States Coast Guard's law enforcement mission is maritime
security. The goal of maritime security is to protect America's
maritime borders from all intrusions by: (a) halting the flow of
illegal drugs, aliens, and contraband into the United States through
maritime routes; (b) preventing illegal fishing; and (c) suppressing
violations of federal law in the maritime arena. This Subcommittee is
concerned about the Coast Guard updating its technology and increasing
personnel to meet its increasingly challenging mission. The
Subcommittee will explore whether the Coast Guard has sufficient
resources to carry out its goals.
I am eager to hear testimony from, and question, all of the
agencies represented today. I welcome each of our distinguished
panelists to provide insight into the various agencies that comprise
DHS. The Department has achieved much over the past six years in
ensuring that America is a safer place; however, much work needs to be
done. I am hopeful that DHS will become more effective and diverse and
that this hearing will help start us along the way. Again, I welcome
the testimony from our distinguished panelists.
Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time.