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STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS: LEARNING FROM THE PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT) EXPERIENCE

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## TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2007

### STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS: LEARNING FROM THE PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT) EXPERIENCE

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STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS:
LEARNING FROM THE PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT) EXPERIENCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, October 30, 2007.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Dr. Snyder. The subcommittee will come to order. Good morning. We appreciate our witnesses being here this morning and all other folks in attendance.

This is the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation’s hearing on stabilization and reconstruction operations, learning from the provincial reconstruction team experience.

This subcommittee has conducted a series of hearings and briefings on the PRT problems and challenges in Afghanistan and Iraq to get a greater understanding of what the PRTs are, what they do, and the contribution that they are making in stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq.

Every witness and every PRT veteran we heard from, both at our public meetings and our private briefings, told the subcommittee that PRTs are a vital tool and are critical to the success of our operations.

We have heard that much of what any given PRT does is determined by the team on the ground based on local or provincial needs and the security conditions in the area in which it is serving.

In Afghanistan, we know the PRT’s job is to extend the reach of the Afghan central government out to the provinces. In Iraq, some PRTs are there to help develop provincial government capacity, while others are there to assist and advise the brigade combat team commanders in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations at the local level.

But beyond that, we have heard that the PRT mission statements are vague, that they need clearly defined objectives, and that there is no concrete means to assess their effectiveness.

One witness boiled the situation down into a single phrase, “Improvisation is not a concept of operations.” That witness, Robert Perito, of the United States Institute of Peace, argued that guid-
ance needs to come from Washington and that that guidance needs to be from a very senior level.

Stuart Bowen, the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction, testified that the U.S. experience with PRTs has been ad hoc and that we need a more effective interagency approach and structure for stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Throughout the discussions this committee has had and the testimony that we have heard, given these challenges, we have been very, very impressed with the personnel from the varied agencies that participate in PRTs. They are some of the most remarkable Americans and we commend them for the work that they do.

Our concern is that perhaps we in Washington are not doing everything we ought to do to help them in their efforts.

We chose the PRT topic several months ago now because PRTs are critical to our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. We also chose to examine them because they represent a case study on how the interagency process works or does not work in Washington and in the field, which brings us to this hearing today.

We have witnesses today from both the State Department and the Department of Defense who are working on improving interagency planning, resourcing, management and oversight of future stabilization and reconstruction operations, and one of them, Ambassador Herbst—is it Herbst?

Ambassador Herbst. Herbst.

Dr. Snyder. We have great expectations for you today, because there have been a lot of people bragging on you over the last several weeks from folks we have heard. We very much appreciate your efforts.

We also have Government Accountability Office (GAO) witnesses who have been examining the interagency efforts that our two executive branch witnesses are responsible for.

We also want to thank Mr. Shays, who allowed Mr. Akin and I to sign on as a co-requestor for the GAO report that has been prepared on the DOD efforts.

Our panel of witnesses today includes Ambassador John Herbst, the State Department’s coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization; Ms. Celeste Ward, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations capabilities; Ms. Janet St. Laurent, the director of the Defense Capabilities and Management, United States Government Accountability Office; and, Mr. Joseph Christoff, director of international affairs and trade team, also from GAO.

And I want to say, for our committee members, for those of you who have read or who have not read the statements today, I thought a lot of what we read in these reports today was some of the biggest [expletive] gobbly-gook I have read in a long, long time. That was the biggest [expletive] gobbly-gook, Dr. Gingrey.

The challenge for us is it important gobbly-gook, and we need to sort that out with the help of our witnesses here today, because at some point, it is having direct impact on very brave men and women we have in Iraq and Afghanistan today, and we will talk more about that later.

Now, I would like to yield to Mr. Akin for any opening statement he would like to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. Akin. Thank you, Dr. Snyder. And thank you all for taking time to be with us this morning. The fact that you have this many people on a subcommittee hearing means that you have interest. Usually, there is the chairman and maybe the ranking person.

This particular public hearing on provincial reconstruction teams, it is not our first, but we want to take a look at the policy framework for dealing with stabilization and reconstruction operations.

While we have studied the PRT concept, how an interagency team comprised of civilian and military personnel works to extend the reach of government into regional provinces and local areas, we have not investigated how the PRT experience is affecting how policy-makers in Washington plan for future stabilization contingencies.

While we may not be engaged in the future in a nation building operation equal to the scale of what we are currently doing in Iraq and Afghanistan, I think it is fair to say that the United States will likely be engaged in similar contingencies in the coming decades.

We were conducting similar operations in Bosnia and Haiti in the 1990’s. September 11 has only reinforced the importance of these missions.

Even those skeptical of nation building understand that stable states are less likely to have ungoverned spaces where terrorists find safe harbor.

The focus of today’s hearing, therefore, is to learn how the Defense and State Departments are ensuring that we are translating lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan in a 21st century interagency apparatus that has the resources, the capabilities, and plans to run seamless interagency stabilization operations.

This is the goal of the national security Presidential directive NSPD–44. Today our witnesses will tell us how these are progressing.

I am curious how the State Department, particularly, the coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization understands its role as lead agency for reconstruction and stabilization under the new directive. This subcommittee is certainly interested in learning more about how your office is building three distinct corps of civilian agency personnel for these types of missions. And this is a welcomed initiative.

I am particularly interested in what tools the civilian reserve corps will need to be successful. Such success will hinge, in large part, in determining the role of the Department of Defense in future stabilization operations.

The directive makes stabilization operations a core mission for Defense Department on par with combat operations. When I think this catches up DOD policy with the reality that has been true in the department for almost two decades, I am interested in how we
are going doing on policy execution, whether our combatant command-ers are planning for these missions and whether the services are budgeting and building the capabilities for this mission.

I would like our witnesses to comment on how they think the Department of Defense is progressing in terms of implementing this directive. If there are any hurdles, please identify what they are.

Again, thank you all for joining us this morning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for pursuing, I think, a very interesting line of questions for oversight.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 51.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Akin.

We have had requests from some members who are not a member of the Armed Services Committee nor this subcommittee to join us. So I will ask unanimous consent that they be allowed to participate, if they arrive.

We are going to go in the order that I—I think just right down the line here.

Ambassador Herbst, I want to begin with you, because you have the overall responsibility for some of the things we are talking about, and then we will hear from the other witnesses.

We will have Suzanne put the five-minute clock on you. So you will get a green light, then a yellow light, and then a red light. But in contrast to our members here, I will not rap the gavel on you. If the red light goes on, but you still have some things to share with us, you feel free to go ahead. It is just to give you a sense of where the time is.

So we will begin with you, Ambassador Herbst.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JOHN E. HERBST, COORDINA-TOR FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION, U.S. DE-PARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador HERBST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify.

Weak and failed states pose a serious security challenge for the United States and the international community. They can become breeding grounds for terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, trafficking in humans and narcotics, as well as organized crime.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been engaged in or contributed significant resources to more than 17 reconstruction and stabilization operations. The challenge persists and will persist well into the future.

If the U.S. Government is going to meet these threats, we must adapt our national security resources appropriately. State Department/Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was established in 2004 to do just that. Starting with just a handful of staff, the office has grown to over 80.

My office is charged with two tasks. The first is to ensure that the entire U.S. Government is organized to deal with reconstruction and stabilization crises affecting our national interests. That includes harmonizing civilian and military activities, making sure that civilians operate as one team.
Our second task is to enable the civilian capacity to staff these missions when called upon to respond. These tasks are easy to describe, not so easy to achieve.

They require nothing less than revolution in the way that the civilian part of the U.S. Government operates, something similar to the reforms in the military in the 1980's with the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.

In December 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 to improve the management of reconstruction and stabilization operations. The directive states that the secretary of state is responsible for this and that S/CRS is her executive arm for doing this.

We have made significant progress on implementing the National Security Presidential Document-44 (NSPD–44) and the pace has moved very quickly over the past eight months. Specifically, on task one, how we organize the Federal Government, we have created the interagency management system.

It has been approved by the National Security Council (NSC). It involves the following structures. There will be a policy group, a country reconstruction and stabilization group that will manage the policy for senior policymakers.

Under this, there will be a secretariat run by my office. All members of the interagency who have a role in the crisis are a part of the secretariat. Most importantly, the secretariat will draft a civilian plan of operations, ensuring that all parts of our government operate as one team and that this is linked up with the military.

To ensure linkage to the military even more strongly, we will create an integration planning cell. This is an interagency group led by S/CRS that would deploy to the relevant combatant commander if military forces are involved in the stabilization operation, if the U.N. military force they deploy to the U.N. military headquarters.

The purpose is to make sure that military and civilian plans are completely linked up.

The last institution that will be created in the interagency management system is the advance civilian teams. This is actually our phrase for PRTs. These will be an interagency team, probably, in most cases, led by S/CRS, but involving all members of the interagency that will deploy to the country in crisis.

If there is an American embassy in place, the ambassador will have control over this mission. If not, this will be the senior U.S. civilian’s authority in that country.

That is what we have done to achieve our first objective.

To achieve our second objective, building civilian capacity to respond, to actually go into the field, we have created three pools of people. The inner corps is what we call the active response corps. These are people who will sit in the government whose full-time job is to train and be ready to deploy to a country in crisis.

My office right now has ten such active response corps members. If you take, for example, the Lugar-Biden legislation that has been submitted to authorize this activity, they talk about 250 active response corps members seated throughout the Federal bureaucracy.

The second pool of people are the standby response corps. These are people sitting, again, in the civilian interagency. They have
full-time day jobs, but they will train for two to three weeks a year so that they could deploy in a crisis.

The Lugar-Biden legislation talks about 2,000 such members. Right now, we have, in the State Department, about almost 100.

The idea is that these folks would be ready to go when you have a crisis and within 45 days of a decision, they get deployed to the field.

The last corps is the civilian reserve corps. This functions much like our civilian armed military reserves. These are civilians who would sign up for four years. In this four-year period, they would be training two or three weeks a year. They would have an obligation to deploy for up to one year in this four-year period.

If we develop all of these corps, we would have the ability to put hundreds of people, maybe even 1,000 or more, on the ground in a crisis, civilians with the necessary skills, within 60 days of a decision.

Thank you very much. Under five minutes.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Herbst can be found in the Appendix on page 54.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Ms. Ward.

STATEMENT OF CELESTE WARD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Ms. WARD. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Akin and distinguished members of this committee, I would like to thank you for inviting me to discuss such a critical issue for our military and for our government.

I have submitted my written statement, but I thought I would make a few points of introduction.

As deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations capabilities, part of my charter is to make recommendations for how to enhance the capabilities of our military forces to confront irregular challenges, to include conducting stability operations.

I am also charged with exploring ways that our military forces can and should work with our interagency colleagues in operations that require the application of both civilian and military capability.

I have been at this work for a little over two months now. I am returning to government, where my last post was as the political advisor to Lieutenant General Chiarelli, the operational commander of our forces in Iraq, in 2006.

This was my second tour in Iraq. During my first tour, I participated in the rebuilding of the Iraqi ministry of defense and other Iraqi national security institutions.

So I come to my current job with some experience and some perspective about how we might adapt our government institutions to better prepare for them for the challenges we face now and in the future.

The Department of Defense has taken significant steps to adapt the armed forces to better confront irregular challenges and stability operations. Among these steps, in 2005, the department issued DOD Directive 3000.05, military support to security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations, by which the department was
instructed to accord stability operations priority comparable to major combat operations, as you noted, sir.

Since DOD Directive 3000.05 was signed, the department has taken steps to implement the directive’s vision by focusing on those areas most likely to generate systemic change throughout our armed forces, to include planning, doctrine, training and education, organization, intelligence, and information sharing.

The Defense Department has also taken major steps in better integrating our planning, training and operational concepts with our interagency colleagues. My office works closely with Ambassador Herbst and S/CRS as they build the State Department’s and the broader interagency capabilities.

As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said recently, “Our military must be prepared to undertake the full spectrum of operations, including unconventional or irregular campaigns, for the foreseeable future. The nonmilitary instruments of America’s national power need to be rebuilt, modernized and committed to the fight.”

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I genuinely appreciate your interest in these issues and the insightful questions that you are asking. I look forward to discussing these matters and to working with you to adapt our institutions to better confront the challenges facing our nation.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ward can be found in the Appendix on page 63.]

Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

I should have let you all know, too, that your written statements will be made a permanent part of the record.

Now, our two GAO folks, do you have a preference on which of you goes first?

Ms. St. Laurent. I will start out.

Dr. Snyder. Go ahead, Ms. St. Laurent. I assume you both are testifying, is that correct? You have different responsibilities.

Ms. St. Laurent. Yes. We have one written statement, but we would like to do separate oral statements.

Dr. Snyder. That is made a part of the record.

Ms. St. Laurent.

STATEMENT OF JANET A. ST. LAURENT, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Ms. St. Laurent. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting GAO to be here today to discuss DOD’s efforts to improve its stability operations capabilities.

Today I would like to focus on two issues—first, DOD’s new approach to stability operations and, second, DOD’s challenges in implementing this approach and enhancing its capabilities and plans and efforts to work in an interagency environment.

My remarks are based on a report we issued in May 2007 on actions needed to improve DOD’s stability operations approach. First, DOD has taken several positive steps to implement a new approach.
In November 2005, as other witnesses have mentioned, DOD issued a new directive, the elevated stability operations to a core DOD mission. We believe that this is a very important and positive step. The directive assigns responsibility for improving DOD's capabilities to 18 various DOD organizations, including the services, the combatant commands, the office of the secretary of defense, and assigned them over 115 tasks.

DOD has also modified its guidance to combatant commanders for developing routine military contingency plans. Specifically, DOD's new guidance places greater emphasis on pre-conflict efforts to stabilize countries or regions so that conflicts do not develop.

It also emphasizes the need to plan for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction activities, when they are necessary, in conjunction with civilian agencies.

Third, DOD has developed a new joint operating concept for stability operations that would address all of the services' efforts and involvement.

Finally, each of the services has begun to implement initiatives to improve their capabilities. For example, both the Army and Marine Corps are taking steps to improve cultural awareness and language training.

Despite these positive steps, we identified four major challenges that may hinder DOD's ability to improve its capabilities. First, although DOD's new directive requires the department to identify and prioritize needed capabilities, DOD has made limited progress in this area to date. Specifically, some officials we spoke to from the services and the combatant commanders expressed some confusion regarding what approach or process they are supposed to use to identify capability gaps.

Moreover, the undersecretary for policy has not yet developed a list of priority capabilities, as required by the directive. Completing a capability gap analysis in a systematic way is particularly important, since it can help to focus DOD's efforts on the highest priority issues and provide a foundation for resourcing decisions.

Second, DOD has made limited progress to date in developing measures of effectiveness. DOD's directive required numerous organizations within DOD to develop measures of effectiveness that could be used to evaluate progress in meeting the directive's goals. However, DOD has not completed this task because, again, significant confusion exists among the services and combatant commanders over how to develop these measures and limited guidance has been provided by OSC to date.

Third, DOD has not yet determined what mechanisms should be used to obtain interagency participation in the development of military plans. We found that the combatant commands are beginning to establish interagency working groups and reaching out to embassies. However, coordination with numerous embassies can be cumbersome for a combatant command and civilian agencies often do not receive draft military contingency plans until late in the planning process, if at all.

Several factors currently hinder interagency participation in the development of DOD's plans. First, DOD has not yet provided spe-
cific guidance to combatant commanders on what is the most effective mechanism to use.

Second, DOD's policy is to not share contingency plans with DOD agencies unless explicitly authorized by the secretary of defense and when that is authorized, again, it is usually late in the plan development process.

Third, DOD and civilian agencies, such as State and United States Agency International Development (USAID), lack a complete understanding of each other's planning processes, cultures and capacities.

In addition, we found that military planners are not consistently incorporating lessons learned from past operations. DOD routinely collects lessons learned in numerous databases. However, accessing and searching these databases is cumbersome and DOD's plans review process does not always evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are used.

Our May 2007 report included several recommendations to help DOD address these challenges. Specifically, we recommended that the undersecretary for policy establish a clear methodology for identifying and prioritizing capability gaps for stability operations; second, distribute better guidance on how to develop measures of effectiveness.

We also recommended that DOD, in coordination with the State Department, take efforts to establish mechanisms to involve civilian agencies in the development of combatant command plans, facilitate information sharing, and include civilian agencies in the development and the use of lessons learned.

In conclusion, although DOD has taken a number of positive steps to improve interagency cooperation, several obstacles must be overcome before significant results are achieved. Overcoming these obstacles and implementing our recommendations will require DOD's sustained leadership and partnership with other agencies.

Thanks very much.

[The joint prepared statement of Ms. St. Laurent and Mr. Christoff can be found in the Appendix on page 66.]

Dr. Snyder. Mr. Christoff.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH A. CHRISTOFF, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. Christoff, Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting us. I am going to address my remarks to the State Department side of the interagency approach.

Following problems with early reconstruction efforts in Iraq, the State Department concluded that the United States had relied on ad hoc processes for planning and executing stability operations in Iraq.

State also found that the U.S. Government had no civilian capacity to plan and manage these operations.

So in December 2005, the Administration issued NSPD-44 to improve the planning and implementation of stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Secretary of State was assigned to lead these efforts.
My testimony today discusses our preliminary findings, some of our report that we will issue next week. The report provides our assessment of State Department’s efforts to develop civilian response corps and an interagency framework to better manage and plan stability operations.

First, in terms of the interagency framework, we found that the National Security Council had adopted two elements of the proposed framework, an interagency management system and procedures for using the framework. State is currently rewriting a third component, the “Guide for Planning Operations,” to address the interagency concerns.

We believe it is difficult to determine the framework effectiveness, since it has not been fully applied to any reconstruction and stabilization operation.

While S/CRS has used draft versions of its planning guide to plan operations in Haiti, Sudan and Kosovo, implementation of the plans has been limited.

The Administration is using existing processes under NSPD–1 for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

As State completes the framework, it must address three key issues. First, there is inconsistent guidance as to who will plan stabilization and reconstruction operations. S/CRS interprets NSPD–44 as assigning these roles and responsibilities to itself.

In contrast, the foreign affairs manual assigns these responsibilities to State’s regional bureaus and chiefs of mission.

We have found that this has resulted in confusion and disputes about who will develop plans and policies for these types of operations.

Second, the framework does not define what constitutes stabilization or reconstruction operations. It does not distinguish these from traditional development assistance or counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations.

As a result, it is not clear when, where or how the Administration would apply this framework.

And, third, officials expressed concern about the framework’s usefulness. These state staff characterize aspects of the framework as unrealistic and redundant, because interagency teams had already devised planning processes under NSPD–1.

Others asserted that senior management had shown ambiguous support for S/CRS by not giving it responsibility for operations in Lebanon and Somalia.

We intend to recommend that State clarify S/CRS’ authority, complete the framework, and test it on an actual operation.

Let me turn to the civilian corps. Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to deploy rapidly to international crises. State established two units made up of State employees, an active response corps with active first responders, and deploy immediately to unstable environments to assess a country’s needs and coordinate a U.S. response.

A standby reserve corps would act as second responders and would provide additional skills and staff. And State is developing a third corps, the civilian reserve corps, which would be made up of civilian police officers, judges, public administrators and civil engineers from outside the Federal Government, and these civilians
would become Federal employees and would deploy for up to one year.

State and other agencies face challenges in establishing these three civilian corps, including, first, achieving plan staffing levels and training; second, securing resources for international operations that some agencies do not view as part of their domestic missions; and, third, ensuring that home units are not understaffed as a result of overseas deployments.

In addition, State needs congressional authority to establish the civilian reserve corps and to provide a benefits package that will attract volunteers.

As part of State's request to authorize the civilian reserve corps, we are considering recommending that the department provide Congress with complete information on the corps' annual costs, training needs, types of operations for which it would be used, and potential obstacles that could affect recruitment and retention.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. Thank you.

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Christoff and Ms. St. Laurent can be found in the Appendix on page 66.]

Dr. Snyder. Thank you all for your testimony. Mr. Akin and I and all the members of the committee will be on the five-minute rule, in the order in which they came.

We have been joined by Mr. Sam Farr from California, who is not a member of this committee, but I will ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to participate and ask five minutes of questions at the end of the members.

Go ahead and start the clock, Suzanne.

In my opening statement, I made reference—I think the phrase I used was a “bunch of [expletive] gobbly-gook” and I hope you didn’t take offense to that, because I suspect your very proud of some of that gobbly-gook, but you know what I mean. This is very complex bureaucratese language.

I want to read a statement that I think is not gobbly-gook and I am going to quote this, “The cultural barriers between the military, Department of State and other civilian agencies seem more striking than those between the United States and Iraqis, to me. We say the right things about breaking out of stovepipes, but our comfort level tends to put us right back in the mindset, language and ways of doing business.”

That is from a civilian employee in Iraq right now, as we are talking, multiple tours, has kids back home, working for a U.S. Government agency, trying to train PRT members to go out, and that is her perception of where we are at today, that he cultural barriers between agencies are more striking to her than between her and her Iraqis.

Now, that seems quite an indictment of what all of us are about today.

What I was struck, Ambassador Herbst, about your statement, aside from, I guess, the complexity of the task that you have, is the timeframes. At one point in your written statement, you say that there will be two to three years. In another statement, you say that it may be as long as ten years before we have the kind of setup that you think will help the folks that are dealing on the ground with the stovepipes.
Talk about the timeframe on this. Where do you see this going in terms of a timeframe where we will have the kind of structure that will provide the kind of support from here in Washington that my friend right now perceives has such striking cultural barriers with other agencies of the United States government?

Ambassador HERBST. I would like to start by noting that while we were—and from the very beginning, S/CRS has worked very closely with the military and I think that we in S/CRS are at the forefront of change in the State Department to prepare for the complex new world of destabilized countries.

That includes, that preparation includes coming to understand the military's culture and adapting the best of the military culture which fits into this new world for the State Department.

So we have, I think it is safe to say, the best planning capability right now that exists in the Department of State, because we have learned a great deal from our friends in the military, although we have a long way to go to be able to plan with the level of nuance that they plan. That is coming.

As to your specific question on timelines, we right now have an approved interagency management system that is ready for use. So in that sense, ensuring a unified approach, ensuring a whole of government approach to a crisis is ready.

What we don't have today is the civilian response capability that can be used to man that interagency system in a large crisis and to put people on the ground in large numbers.

For us to get that, we need to have both authorizing legislation and appropriations.

In the 2007 Iraq-Afghan supplemental that was passed on the springtime, up to $50 million was set aside to create a 500-person civilian reserve corps. That was a large definite direction of creating the civilian response capability.

But in order to get access to that money and to begin building this corps, we need to have authorizing legislation.

Dr. SNYDER. But what you are saying there, you are coming across as if the problem you have is staffing only. That is not the problem and the greater challenge is a structure of planning and coordination, is it not? That is what I am hearing from my friend here in Baghdad today.

She is not saying, “And by the way, we are short on staff.” What she is saying is there are cultural barriers between agencies that are not being broken down. That is not a manpower problem.

I will accept that we are all in this together. I said that at the outset, but I am more concerned about this interagency structure for planning and where that is going to go and your timeline, where you say we will have something, you are hoping—your exact words, “I have no doubt the U.S. Government will have this capability in the next ten years.”

We have been in this war a long time. We have been in Afghanistan for five years and we need to have a sense, I think, of trying to expedite this in a way so that our brave men and women in the civilian capacity in Iraq will have the kind of support they need, and I don't think it is just manpower.

Ambassador HERBST. I agree completely and that is why I have said we have two tasks. One is to organize effectively. The other
is to have civilians who could go out to the field with the proper training, the proper skills, the proper equipment.

We are at the point where we have a system that can be used and this system is the command—or can be, should be the command and control for reconstruction and stabilization operations.

This system is the key to breaking down these cultural differences between the agencies. My office sits in the State Department, but my office is very much interagency project. I have people on detail from other agencies.

As I said at the start of my answer, we have been working very closely, for example, with the Pentagon to develop the planning capabilities that will suit us for these operations.

We see the interagency management system when it is in action as completely an interagency structure. It is not a State Department structure. And our plans are for people in this active response corps, the standby response corps and the civilian reserve corps, to train together, to use the same tools, to operate as a single unit, but bringing into this single unit the specialized skills associated with different agencies of the Federal Government.

Dr. SNYDER. Suzanne got frisky with the clock here and the light went outs, but my time is up. I will want to hear GAO’s response to that, but we will do that another time or the opportunity will probably come along with other members.

Mr. Akin, for five minutes.

Mr. AKIN. It is a little bit tricky. We understand, in an overall sense, the problems of trying to create this jointness. Exactly how the structures work is not easy, because some of us aren’t even that familiar with the differences between State and DOD and other different things that have to come together.

But ultimately, I think what I heard you saying, Ambassador, is that what you are starting with, that when you go into a specific country, you are putting a team together there that has the responsibility of dealing with that particular situation. Is that correct?

Ambassador HERBST. That is right.

Mr. Akin. And that team is at what level? Is that at the top level in terms of planning our operations in that country?

Ambassador HERBST. The way it would work is you would develop the plan back in Washington through the secretariat to the county reconstruction and stabilization group and that plan—if we already have people in the country in crisis, we would be getting information from them, recommendations from them that would be factored into the plan, but the plan would be built in Washington.

The people who go into the field would have the responsibility of implementing that plan and, again, the people going into the field would represent all agencies which have skills that could be used properly in the country in crisis.

Mr. Akin. So in other words, we develop plans for various countries here ahead of time and then we put those plans into place by putting personnel into the field.

Ambassador HERBST. That is the ideal situation. That is what we are aiming toward.

Mr. AKIN. Now, first of all, right at that point, in the process of developing those plans, is there a lot of pushing and pulling as to what those plans should be or sort of the philosophy of them or the
over-the-top level of management, what we are trying to accomplish? Is there a lot of disagreement there or does that tend—is that something that you have an organization that people can work together and actually come up with something practical?

Ambassador HERBST. We have done planning in a few instances and in those planning processes, we have generally found clearly different points of view, but a recognition of the goals that we are seeking to achieve and a recognition that this is a common enterprise.

Mr. A KIN. Okay. So in other words, what you are saying is let us say we turn the clock back and it is 2000 and we may be going into Iraq. We haven’t gone in there yet.

What you are saying is you start with a plan for the country to begin with.

Ambassador HERBST. Right.

Mr. A KIN. Okay. And that plan is going to be developed by—over-all, it is under the auspices of State. Is that correct?

Ambassador HERBST. It would be under the auspices of a secretariat which we would share, but this is controlled by the interagency, ultimately under the NSC.

Mr. A KIN. Okay. So that is how it starts. Then you have people that go into the country. Let us say we have gone into Iraq and that the war has progressed and all.

Then you have people that go into the country that are directly executing this plan.

Ambassador HERBST. That is correct.

Mr. A KIN. And DOD is in the loop and they know what the plan is.

Ambassador HERBST. DOD is part of the secretariat that writes the plan. We also have, as I mentioned before, this integration planning cell that is an interagency group that would deploy to the command headquarters of our military to ensure that civilian and military planning is completely linked up.

Mr. A KIN. Because one of the things that we are dealing with here, we have been looking at, in a sense, a lower level. We have been looking at the reconstruction teams. That is where the rubber is on the road.

But we are trying to project backwards now and to say, okay, now, as you move up the line and you are planning, that gives you the mission for the reconstruction team, because they are executing the plan.

In a sense, that team that is going into the country is sort of a high level reconstruction team of itself, is it not?

Ambassador HERBST. Correct.

Mr. A KIN. Okay. I think that is at least, again, a concept of what you are trying to do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will pass on the rest of my time.

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Davis, for five minutes.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you all being here.

Quite a few of us have been sort of grappling with some of the concepts, and so I really appreciate that there is something at least down on paper to respond to now.
I want to thank Mr. Farr, as well, and I am interested in how you see at least the legislation that has been drawn up, that has been conceptualized, and where you see it really responding to the needs, and where do you think, in many ways, it is perhaps off base some way in terms of the reality.

Ambassador Herbst. You have House 1084, which Congressman Farr introduced, and you have Senate legislation, 613, introduced by Senators Lugar and Biden, and we think these pieces of legislation are very similar. They present the main elements of what is necessary and if they were approved, they would enable us to get cracking.

We are already working, but we need legislation to continue and speed up our work.

Ms. Davis of California. Are you familiar enough to respond in terms of what you think are—are the bones there that are appropriate, but in the implementation, what problems?

Mr. Christoff. Well, what we are going to probably recommend next week in our report is that there certainly is a need for having these civilian corps, no doubt about it, but I want to know what I am getting for the $50 million, such that I would want to know more detail than what is being provided and the costs, the annual costs.

I think there are still concerns about how much this 2,000-person civilian reserve corps is going to cost, the startup cost, the annual cost, according to what it is going to be used for. I want to know how you are going to define stability operations.

So I don't disagree with the concept, but I just want to know a little bit more before the Congress approves it. And in doing so and providing that authorization for these civilian corps, I think you should ask State to provide you with more details.

Ms. Davis of California. Ms. Ward.

Ms. Ward. The Defense Department strongly supports the legislation that would authorize S/CRS to get moving on the civilian response corps. We believe this is a vital capability and that it will create the civilian partners that our military folks need on the ground.

So we are very supportive of that legislation.

Ms. Davis of California. I noted in prior testimony people had suggested getting volunteers is not going to be an issue, that people are going to be interested in doing that.

But I would wonder a little bit about that, as well. Could you respond more how we would go about that in the country and do you envision—believe that in order to have the kind of leadership that we see in the military command and control, however you want to describe it, that you would need to have perhaps a more massive training?

This isn't something that takes place over six weeks, that all of a sudden people get how to do that. I am interested more in how you really are developing this kind of civilian corps and where you think primarily it would come from and how early in education and training we might reach to really do this in a way that we would all look back 20 years from now and say, yes, this is the way to do it.
Ambassador HERBST. First of all, regarding recruiting, right now, the appropriations that were made in the spring was for a 500-person civilian reserve corps, not a very large capability, but a substantial one, significant one, nonetheless.

We have had literally scores of phone calls, e-mails and such from interested civilians after the President referred to a civilian reserve corps in the “State of the Union” speech in January.

I spend a lot of time talking to professional organizations about what we are trying to do and there is always a great deal of interest in the crowd.

I believe if we are recruiting a corps of 500, we will be able, under the legislation that has been proposed, to find skilled people who we need.

Now, as for the training, you need to look at what we have proposed as a system as a whole and the active response corps, which would be the inner corps of the civilian response capability, will be made up of people whose full-time job it is to deploy and to prepare for deployment.

So these folks, if there is no crisis where they need to be, would be training constantly and they would provide the backbone of the system which others would join.

You are certainly right that it would be better, all things considered, if we gave both our standby response corps members, as well as our civilian reserve corps members more than a few weeks of training a year.

But you take intelligent people who are committed to the cause, you train them for a few weeks a year, you have a Web site and other ways by which, when they are not training or not deployed, they can get up to speed. You provide them leadership via both this active response corps, as well as others in the government who are going to be involved in an operation, and I think they will be able to perform admirably in crisis.

That is the basic concept.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. One of the things, having been in San Diego, obviously, in some ways, we do have this and my friend, Mr. Farr, reminds me we actually saw a quite spontaneous—numbers far—hundreds of people coming forward who thought to themselves, “Gee, I am a tour guide. I know how to organize people. Maybe I could help,” and they just came pouring into Qualcomm Stadium.

So I do think there is a local response, as well, that they were building on and I think it—I guess what is difficult with all this is that in every community, we probably could see this and yet wonder why it has taken us so long to somehow bring this about.

So can you go to the main problems in terms of the culture that kept us from starting to move this a lot sooner and how we overcome that? Because I think if you talk to people in the State Department, they feel as if they were really the poor stepchild in this.

Number one, they weren’t asked whether we have the capacity even to begin this kind of an operation at the beginning. They certainly didn’t have the skills or the breadth of expertise that was required.
So have we overcome that? What steps should we take to do that? Even though we have got all this on paper, which sounds good, but I am still concerned about getting there.

Ambassador HERBST. I think you are right. The key to this is to turn a concept into a reality. You are right that we have seen the problem at least for years and we are where we are today. We would like to be farther along.

I think the same could be said about the way our military operated in the 1970's and before, with a recognition that you had to have the different arms of the military operating jointly together, but it took a substantial push, including legislation in the mid 1980's, Goldwater-Nichols, to force a transformation.

As Congressman Snyder mentioned, citing his source from Iraq, you have different cultures and you have to break that culture. Our organization, S/CRS, is at the forefront of breaking that culture within the State Department, forcing within the State Department, and also within the interagency.

Again, we haven't moved as fast as we would like, but we have picked up speed over the past eight or nine months and we now need to continue that process.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Mr. Christoff, in thinking—you obviously took a really hard look at this over time and you have said you have got to keep asking those specific questions.

Some of those specific questions I think really amount to how do you begin to develop the real framework for being able to determine the extent to which we are being successful and what kind of standards, because in many ways, you have said, well, each one is different, each PRT is going to have to be different, not just each country, of course, is different, but each community, each village.

Do you feel that we are beginning to do that? And just one example of where you think we could look back in a few years and determine the extent to which that was a good measure, a good metric, if you will, a good tool.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, I think the concepts are good concepts of having this interagency framework. I think the concepts are good concepts in having us building a reserve corps.

But once again, I go back to my comments about the costs. I need more information about the costs.

Your point about training, I think it is not thought out well in how we are going to train these civilian and reserve corps and the standby response corps. We are talking about providing training for up to 4,000 people by fiscal year 2009.

I am not certain where that training is going to come from, how long it is going to be. The Canadians and the Germans have comparable reserve corps and our counterparts over at the Congressional Research Service had forum to discuss lessons learned from their experiences and one of their most important lessons learned was that you have to thoroughly vet and identify skills of the individuals that are volunteering to make sure that they fit with the needs of the mission that you are going to send them to.

And you have to make sure that you provide them real world training, not online training, not a week of training, but training that would help them work best with oftentimes military advisors...
and military personnel that they might be working with hand-in-hand.

Ms. Davis of California. Mr. Chairman, I suspect my time is gone.

Dr. Snyder. You have benefited from psychological malfunction.

Ms. Davis of California. I see this green light, but I know how many questions I could ask.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield.

Dr. Snyder. The co-head of the working group on interagency reform can have all the time she needs. We, frankly, can't get the green light off.

Mr. Bartlett, for five minutes. And, Roscoe, you may hear a gentle tapping at the end of five minutes instead of a red light.

Mr. Bartlett. Because the light is not working.

Dr. Snyder. The light works fine, it is just there is no meaning behind it.

Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much for your testimony.

Clearly, we are pretty much plowing new ground in this reconstruction effort. This is not what we have done in the past. We have been focusing primarily in this hearing on organizing ourselves to do that and that clearly is a bit challenge.

But I am also concerned about the challenge of deciding what we want to do. I have visited, in my 15 years in the Congress, a lot of foreign countries and generally we are met at the bottom of the steps coming from the airplane with the State Department and, depending on the country, you may be whisked off to a secure location where we are briefed.

And being as scientist, I often reflected that the State Department attitude toward the country we were visiting was very much like the attitude of the sociologist, the animal sociologist who was watching a troop of chimpanzees.

And it is understandable that we could have that kind of an attitude. We are one person out of 22 in the world and we have a force of all the good things in the world. We have been enormously successful.

And it is easy to understand how you would conclude that a country that has a system of government and a culture different from ours has to be somewhat inferior to ours and I think we fail to remember that we had several hundred years of cultural history from the Magna Carta before we decided to strike out on our own in this country.

So I am concerned that what we want to do may not be consistent with the realities of the country that we are trying to reconstruct.

Let me give you an example. When it comes to agriculture, we have been really successful there. We now have two percent of our people which feed all of us and have a lot of stuff to export, but that may not be the model that, in today's world, should be pursued in other places.

We brag that we have the most efficient agriculture in the world. That is because one man sitting on a 150-horsepower tractor can produce enough food to feed himself and 50 other people and some to spare to ship overseas.
But in an energy deficient world, that may not be the criteria we ought to be looking at. As a matter of fact, in terms of BTUs in and calories out, we probably have the least efficient agriculture in the world. But when oil was $10 a barrel, that hardly mattered. With oil at $92 a barrel, that may matter a great deal.

Also, there may not be jobs for people and when they are moving off the land to the city and turning over their land to—and we kind of see the John Deere tractor and the big combines as the way agriculture ought to be going and, for much of the world, that probably is not the way agriculture ought to be going, because it is enormously energy intensive, and with the cost of energy and its lack of ready availability in the future, that may not be the model we should be following.

How do we determine what we ought to be doing? Do we have people who really understand the cultures that we are going to so that we are helping them to develop the kind of a government, the kind of a culture, the kind of an economy that will be sustainable after we leave, with all the money we are pouring in?

How do we do that?

Ms. St. Laurent. I don't have a perfect answer for that, but I think that your comments illustrate why an interagency approach is needed, because I think if each agency devised its own strategy, it may not reflect consideration of all the factors that need to be weighed in coming up with what the U.S. approach should be.

For example, the military has a lot of resources at its disposal and engineering battalions and other units that can construct things and build things and one of the things I think, although they have those capacities, that needs to be thought through is what would be the benefit or the outcome.

What outcome would those kinds of construction projects achieve? And I think that is where input from AID and the State Department and Agriculture, if it is an agriculture-related project, need to be joined together with military personnel to decide what the strategy is.

The example, for example, of building a school. The military can construct a school, but unless enough thought goes into developing a comprehensive strategy that provides teachers for the school, makes sure that students can attend the schools, because they are not working in agricultural fields or in factories or otherwise occupied, and ensuring books are there and all the other things that go together with achieving a goal of improving an educational level within a country have to be thought through.

So I think, again, this idea of an interagency process to work out, first, at a national level, what the U.S. strategy ought to be and then have mechanisms where you translate that into the combatant command, country team level, and then further down to tactical capabilities in units like PRTs is very important.

Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. Johnson, for five minutes. The nightmare may be over. We may have a clock that works.

Mr. Johnson, for five minutes.

Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Ward and Ambassador Herbst, were both of your offices involved in the run-up for both Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom? In the run-up for those operations, were your offices involved?

Ambassador Herbst. No.

Ms. Ward. Actually, at that time, sir, my office didn’t exist and my office actually recently had been created in its current form as of December of this year. There was a stability operations before. To my knowledge, they were not involved in the planning and their task and purpose was a little different from what we do.

One of the things we are trying to do is look at those operations and derive the lessons from them as we make prescriptions about capabilities needed in our military forces in the future. But we weren’t involved in the initial planning process.

Mr. Johnson. So you are, both offices, now involved in the provisional reconstruction teams now operating in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Ms. Ward. Sir, on my wide, I do not have operational oversight of those. That is conducted by the regional offices, the Iraq and Afghanistan offices in OSD policy. But we are staying abreast of events in the PRTs and how they are organized and how it is going, again, for the lessons learned process, so that we can be thinking about civil-military teams in the future and make sure we understand what worked and what didn’t work, as well.

Ambassador Herbst. Our office does not have responsibility for the PRTs, but we are right now engaged in Afghanistan at the request of General Rodriguez and we have helped a couple of the PRTs with their planning process and we are now applying that to the rest of the PRTs in Afghanistan.

Mr. Johnson. Is that a formal structure or kind of an informal process that is taking place within both of your offices?

Ambassador Herbst. Well, we were, you might say, formally asked to take on this job that we have taken on and we have several people out in the field doing it. But, again, we are not overall responsible for PRTs in Afghanistan.

Ms. Ward. More informal on our side, sir, but we believe we have expertise to bring to the question, the stability operations capabilities center of excellence, if you will, in the Pentagon.

So we believe we have something to add, but mostly we are trying to make sure we integrate the lessons from those situations.

Mr. Johnson. It would seem that these two opportunities are great to learn from the activities in Afghanistan and Iraq with respect to future civilian reserve corps operations.

Is there any particular reason why the integration of your offices with these efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq by the PRTs are not more formalized?

Ambassador Herbst. Well, S/CRS was created in June of 2004, when both Iraq and Afghanistan had been going on for some time.

And the resources of our office are relatively modest and the resources going into both Iraq and Afghanistan are substantial. And the decision was taken at the time by then Secretary Powell and my predecessor that we would not be engaged in a major way in either place.

That has pretty much been true since then, although, as Ms. Ward said, we have been in touch with people coming out of both
places for lessons learned purposes and my office is staffed with a lot of folks who had served in those PRTs and have come to us precisely because they want to devise a better way to do this.

Ms. WARD. On that, sir, I would say that the organizational arrangements for managing those efforts sort of grew up before my office existed.

At this point, it might merely add a bureaucratic layer, but what we try to do is contribute the functional expertise and assist in those efforts where we can.

Mr. JOHNSON. Any response from GAO?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I would agree with your premise that there is a lot that one can take from the experiences in the PRTs and to bring up to the development of the interagency process.

The mere fact that you—the military had to provide a lot of the personnel for the initial staffing of the PRTs and we are still going through a three-phase process this year to try to replace some of the military personnel that were temporarily put in place in the PRTs with civilian personnel.

So I think the lessons learned from PRTs can bear on how we develop this interagency process and how we think through from the very beginning the makeup of these corps at the lowest levels within a country and who is going to be responsible for what.

Ms. S. LAURENT. And I would add that I also agree that that issue is very important and the lessons from the various models of PRTs need to be looked at very carefully.

The military has a process that it goes through in designing organizations and units and developing capabilities. Their shorthand is DOT and OPF, but I think it is reflective of the kinds of things that need to be looked at for the future.

What kind of doctrine for or what are the missions of these organizations, should they be in the future, if PRTs or something similar are going to be used? “O” stands for organization. How should they be organized? What are the command and control relationships? Who do they report to? What kind of training do they need? What kind of material and resources and do they need? What kind of personnel, both in terms of skill levels, where they come from, the mix of contractor versus DOD versus civilian personnel, and logistics support? What is the concept for providing security force protection and all other kinds of logistics support?

But I think that kind of a framework would be very useful to think about in analyzing the various models that have been used to date and then where we go for the future.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Gingrey, for five minutes.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And thank all of our witnesses.

Some of the testimony and the questions make me reflect back on Hurricane Katrina, when lots of people wanted to volunteer. They tried to call and find out where to go and sometimes they got in automobiles and tried to drive down to the Gulf Coast and some got there, some didn’t.

You had a lot of people wanting to help, I am sure. As Ms. Davis was just pointing out, in San Diego, the same situation existed with that natural disaster. And a lot of times, it just creates mass confusion.
I know after Hurricane Katrina, there was a lot of thought put into, but I don't know if any action was ever taken in regard to developing a civilian reserve corps of physicians, where you had a database and you not only made sure that they were appropriate to the mission, but that they were vetted very carefully. I think that is something that needs to be done.

But the bottom line is a lot of people in these emergency situations need to stay home, stay on their job, send money and pray. They don't need to show up at the theater of operation.

But I would hope, in regard to the civilian reserve corps, that you would want to train some physicians. I think all professions were mentioned except maybe health care, but you would probably want to have some of them, as well.

And maybe it is the active reserve corps that is full-time responders, if you will, civilian responders should be the ones that do the training of the civilian reserve corps, and that training, of course, should be done on a periodic and timely basis, because you may have 500 that get trained initially and then they don't get called for 5 years.

So you have to make sure you continue to have that group trained and up-to-date.

Now, I do have a question and I am getting to that and this is probably more for our GAO witnesses.

Given Directive 3000.05, equate stabilization operations with combat operations, how satisfied are you that DOD really accepts the critical role that effective interagency coordination and planning must play for success?

And more specifically, as I suspect, the answer would be yes, do you see resistance akin to the services' initial rejection of Goldwater-Nichols reforms?

I think that is a big, big issue, a big area of concern here and I would like to know your opinion on that.

Ms. St. Laurent. I would respond by saying that I think DOD's intent is in the right place. I think it was a very significant policy to say that stability operations equate to or are as important as combat operations.

And I think many folks that we have talked with in the services and the combatant commands recognize the need to place greater emphasis on stability operations and reconstruction activities and work more closely with civilian partners.

But I think, again, the devil is in the details in terms of how the military moves forward to do that and it may require very, very significant shifts in the processes that they have had for a long time.

For example, the military combatant commanders typically produce a very wide range of plans, theater security cooperation plans, contingency plans that are very, very detailed, others that are more concept oriented, and they have a lot of resources to be able to do that.

They have established coordination groups at each of the combatant commands where they encourage interagency representatives to attend and work with them. However, their model is that they want full-time agency representatives and that may not always be
possible for some of the civilian agencies that don’t have similar capacity as DOD.

So I think DOD is going to have to work with State, AID, Treasury and other Federal agencies in thinking through if there is a need to get more interagency input into the development of military plans, how do we go about doing that and understanding that other organizations——

Dr. GINGREY. Let me interrupt you just——

Ms. ST. LAURENT [continuing]. Don’t have the same structure.

Dr. GINGREY. Ms. St. Laurent, excuse me, I apologize, but my time is running out. I did want to ask this point.

Do you think that our office corps are getting sufficient training at command and general staff college or war college level or wherever in regard to preparing them and their mindset for this climate of interagency cooperation that we seem to be going to, a Goldwater-Nichols type approach to the interagency? Either one of you.

Ms. ST. LAURENT. I think it is changing. I think that military is moving in that direction. I have seen materials in terms of how DOD is trying to address some of the curriculum at the senior schools and a variety of other schools throughout DOD.

But it is taking time to develop those courses and get those initiatives in place, but there are already courses that have been put in place. It is a matter of expanding on them and moving this throughout the entire department.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, I see my time has expired. On a second round, maybe Ambassador Herbst and Ms. Ward would like to comment or if you will permit it——

Dr. SNYDER. If anybody has any comments, go ahead now.

Ms. WARD. I would like to comment on a couple of those, please. The analogy to the resistance to Goldwater-Nichols I think, in this case, is not apt. In my experience, the military is very interested in getting help from our interagency partners.

I would say, across the board, there is enthusiasm about integrating with the interagency and helping to build their capabilities so that they can take on some of the tasks that the military may have been doing, but maybe is not their core function.

So I would say that they welcome the integration a lot and it still needs to be worked out, but in terms of their disposition and their attitude toward that integration, I would say it is very positive, certainly in my experience.

As far as the training of our officers, I was recently at Fort Leavenworth and talking to them about that training and I think Ms. St. Laurent is right. We do see the training and education of our officer corps changing substantially now and some of these—many of these officers actually have personal experience on the ground. They are coming from Iraq and Afghanistan and they have a personal understanding of their interagency colleagues that they didn't have in times past and they are also learning about their interagency colleagues and trying to break down those cultural barriers significantly.

There is a lot of steps in that direction. More work to do, but I think we are going in the right direction on that.

Ambassador HERBST. I would agree with that. My staff spends a lot of time at the various combatant commands and the various
military war colleges and there is a great deal of interest and enthusiasm even for what we are doing.

We have overseen training, as well, for people going out to PRTs and a lot of officers have taken that and, again, we see the enthusiasm for what we are doing. So I think this is moving in the right direction.

I would just like to add, Congressman, that if I did not mention public health workers when I was talking about the people in our corps, that was my oversight. They are definitely part of the corps. We have already sent people out with those skills.

Dr. Gingrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Snyder. Dr. Gingrey and Dr. Snyder appreciate that acknowledgement, Mr. Herbst.

Mr. Jones, for five minutes.

Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Christoff, I really enjoyed watching your body language, particularly as State was speaking and DOD.

Your comment about concept and reality, concept and reality, and that seems not just from you, but from Ms. St. Laurent, as well. What is the government—I have been here for 14 years and any time a program is established, it doesn't seem like it ever goes away.

And I certainly am not criticizing the concept. I think the PRTs have worked extremely well. I think we all, as a nation, have made mistakes and, first of all, shouldn't have gone in, I understand that.

But the point is that it seems like you are saying at GAO that we need to slow down a little bit. We need to make sure that if this program is going to be in place and this program is going to be successful, there needs to be more work done before the $50 million is allocated, because the $50 million will become $100 million and it will continue to grow and expand.

This nation is in deep, deep financial trouble. We are borrowing money from foreign governments right now to fight the war in Iraq. We are borrowing moneys from foreign governments right now to pay the interest on the public debt.

And I hope that if this program is worthy, and I don't question your positions at all, but based on what—I have great respect for GAO as a whole. I listen to David Walker on a regular basis. I have tried to read, I have tried to understand what is happening in this country from the standpoint of expanding government, that the poor taxpayer can't even pay their grocery bills back home because we are getting so large and expansive.

My question to GAO, what would be your suggestions to this committee or to any committee—and let us take this concept as the purpose of my question.

What would you say to Congress? How can we have better checks and balances before—and I know I am not on appropriations, I am not being critical of appropriations, but this is a great hearing, Mr. Chairman. This has been a great Oversight Committee that we never had until a year ago.

But the point is that if we didn't have this oversight, many of us, unless we were on the committees of jurisdiction, we would not even know that this concept is trying to be developed into a reality.
What should we be doing to make sure, before the $50 million is allocated, that this program is ready to get on the ground and start to be effective?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. If this were the title of a GAO report, it would say “Concepts are good, more information needed.” And I think that is what we have been trying to say and that I think you agree with.

We agree that you need to have better interagency, you need to have this framework. You want to have civilians that can make a contribution and that can deploy rapidly to an international crisis.

But when we look at the framework, and, Dr. Snyder, you read a lot of the details and you saw a jargon, you saw a lot of what you characterized as gobbly-gook. It is hard to get through a lot of the details of this interagency framework.

And so our first recommendation is that you clearly define the roles and responsibilities of S/CRS, because there is disagreement within State. There are turf battles within State as to whether or not S/CRS should have the lead or the traditional regional bureaus.

So, one, you have got to clarify the roles of this important office. And, second, this concept remains a concept. It is a framework. Parts of have been tested, but the whole framework has not been implemented and you need to implement the whole framework for stability operations to see if it is a useful interagency process.

For the civilian corps, again, more information. How much is it going to cost beyond the initial seed money of $50 million? What operations would this corps be tasked to do? And you want to understand the complete framework of the civilian corps before you authorize it.

You have appropriated for it already, the Congress has, but it hasn't been authorized yet.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, I would hope, because I know my time is just about over, I would hope that this committee would write the chairman of the committee of jurisdiction and just say that we have concerns based on testimony before we move forward with appropriations, because I don't know where the money is coming from, to be honest with you.

I yield back.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Davis, for five minutes.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just listening to this debate and having come from the consulting world, dealing with process organization and following this interagency issue is probably our number one priority related to national security.

And my office, Dr. Snyder, Mrs. Davis and I have worked very closely on this. I am concerned that the establishment of the civilian reserve corps simply is responding to a symptom as opposed to the root cause.

And not to denigrate in any way the issue of having lots of professional resources, but more to the point, you have those folks, kind of like a political campaign, where you are going to bring a couple of hundred volunteers in, you have to have an infrastructure and a process within which they are going to function to have any level of productivity and not absorb additional costs.
And building off of Walter’s comments on establishing this process, I would ask probably a simpler question, and, particularly, I am going to confess that Congress is a big piece of the problem.

The Armed Services Committee has invested much of its time in minutia at a technical and a tactical level as opposed to strategy, which I think is important. The Foreign Affairs Committee has done the same thing, focusing on a variety of resolutions and programs, but not having an authorization in over a decade.

And here is my question, at probably a crude level. Why not simply reform that process that the military is crying out for? I have friends I served with in the military who are running entrepreneurial startup programs, ag programs, medical programs, educational programs. None of them have run a business, run a farm or been a school teacher or worked as a professional educator.

And certainly I commend our military and their ability to stand up for that, but fundamental problems. The CENTCOMM area of operations has four State Department bureaus overlapping it, which immediately is an impediment to efficiency in organization.

There is cost and overhead that is incurred just because of that inefficiency and rather than say, “Well, we are going to hire 500 more people,” why don’t we say, “We can fix the process and improve the productivity and the effectiveness of our frontline folks?”

Now, the turf battle that you talk about in State or in Defense or here on Capitol Hill, too, because I watched staff earlier this year actually kill an interagency reform because there was concern about offending the jurisdiction of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

My question is, why wouldn’t we want to coordinate more closely with NGOs, for example, in certain areas that have that regional and that cultural ability? They can do things much more quickly.

But at the end of the day, here is my question. Why not just simply reform the agency process first so you have a workable process and, second of all, what specific small steps in legislation would you all ask for that would allow closer coordination, more flexibility on the budget, for example, in an area so that resources could be passed to the appropriate agency?

Ambassador Herbst. There is no question that you need to have an effective interagency structure to use the resources we are asking for and we believe that the interagency management system does provide that structure.

Mr. Davis of Kentucky. I disagree with you and I don’t think we should provide resources until—there have been no substantive legislative reforms and that is the thing I am getting to.

We are creating departments, but I am talking to the folks out on the front lines who are doing this for a living and when you get personalities that can work well together, it is fine. But I receive a string of e-mails monthly from the PRT in Karbala who is pointing out exactly the opposite of what you were talking about here.

I am not impugning your integrity, but I am saying it is not working, because we are wasting a huge amount of money and not getting the level of productivity that——

Ambassador Herbst. Congressman, we are talking about two different things. You are referring to the system that is—rather, you are referring to what is currently underway. What is currently underway is not the system that we have created.
The system we have created has been devised, is being tested, but it has not been actually implemented. The idea is to use this for the next such operation, hopefully, not an operation on that scale. That is the point.

So when you say it is not working, you are not referring to what we are discussing today. You are referring to something that exists, but is not being——

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Just reclaiming my time. I don’t disagree with your point in concept, but I come back to the issue of treating a symptom.

This is a look back and saying, “Oh, what do we need different? We need more bodies,” when——

Ambassador HERBST. No, that is—excuse me.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. That is one piece of it. But here is the question, though, at the end of the day.

What congressional mandated agency reforms do you need, not done at an executive directive level, because having watched executive directives, where agencies can do what they want to do, again, the PRT example of standing up in Iraq with the so-called surge, it ended up coming back to the military, as a close friend of 30 years pointed out what exactly happened, because of internal regulations and a lack of authorization for the appropriate structure.

Ambassador HERBST. I would say most national security experts who have looked at the current theme see the need to create the type of capability that we are describing. There are different ways to do that.

Some people have said, in a sense, what you have just said right now. What we need is legislation comparable to Goldwater-Nichols on the civilian side. That is one way to fix this problem.

But given the efforts within the current Administration, within the Bush Administration, given the National Security Presidential Directive 44, given all the work we have done over the past 18 months to implement that, we are in a position, even without legislation, to make the necessary interagency changes, the fundamental changes that current international circumstances require.

The resources we are asking for we believe only work within the framework of a new system, the system we have described.

Now, the GAO is correct that it has not been used in an actual operation to date. We have used it to do specific things in the real world. We have done testing for the overall concept. This has to come.

But the point is we are on the cusp of doing that. As for the resources that we would use, $50 million is to create only a 500-person civilian reserve corps. That will give us an opportunity to test this capability in the real world.

The GAO said there are no figures for what it would cost to maintain a corps. Well, in fact, there are. To maintain a civilian reserve corps of 1,000 people would cost $20 million a year, of 2,000 people, $30 million a year, of 3,000 people, $42 million a year.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. If I could just reclaim my time.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Davis, your time has expired. What we will do, we will go to Mr. Farr for five minutes. We have votes. We will recess, and then we will come back after that and pursue this more.

We will recognize Mr. Farr for five minutes.
Mr. FARR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
the committee for allowing me to sit in on this hearing.
I think it is the first one I have experienced in all the years that
I have been here dealing with this issue, and what I find in the
questioning and answering is that there is a lot more going on than
you realize, and I really want to compliment your committee and
the Defense Committee, because, frankly, the lead on this post-con-
struction, reconstruction and stability has been led by the Depart-
ment of Defense rather than by State Department or USAID and
others.
There was a committee commissioned back many years ago,
about a dozen members of this House and the Senate sat on, and
I was asked to sit on it, and out of that came a whole list of rec-
ommendations, some of which you are still having before you.
But the IR Committee wouldn’t accept them, thought it was a
great idea, we need to do this, did nothing. The Defense Appropri-
ations Committee looked at it and said this is great, we have got to
get on with it and set up a center in the military at the naval post-
graduate school in Monterey, where, for the last four years, three
or four years, this center for stabilization and reconstruction has
been incredibly valuable in what the lessons learned are.
One, first of all, it is not just State Department and military. It
is our military and the extended IMET, which is about 400 dif-
ferent officers around the world that are studying at the naval
postgraduate school. Some of them are in this course.
It is U.N., it is NGOs, it is all the actors who go in to a country
when you need to stabilize. They have never been at the table be-
fore. They have never had a piece in it.
They have had several—you would call them war games. They
just call them games on very specific issues, like emergency re-
sponse in a war zone, with a natural disaster, I mean, throw every-
thing on top of it, and working out the protocols that would be
needed for rescues.
So I just have one question of the panel. And I know that the
ambassador has been to the program. I have spoken with him
there. But I don’t know if any of the other members have been.
Have you visited the center for stabilization at the naval post-
graduate school?
Ms. WARD. Sir, I am familiar with it. I have not visited yet in
my tenure. I haven’t visited it.
Mr. FARR. I think I would recommend that you go out and look
at it, because some of the concerns that you raise are already being
addressed there.
What is essential? What do we need to do? We know that we
have trained people in the civilian sector, as well as the military
sector, and we have—once they leave Federal service, we have no
contact with them.
I learned this from astronauts. After you are an astronaut and
you leave NASA, you don’t have any astronaut alumni program.
There is no getting back.
And what concerned me, I learned a language in another country
and when we had 9/11, we had no way to look to see how many
people in this country spoke Arabic. So we started a question of let
us create registries, let people go online, volunteer, say “I have this
language capability, I have this expertise, I would like to come in and be called if you need me.”

At least that gives you a starting point of where the talent lies. This reserve corps is made up of experts. This isn’t training new people. These are people that are already the linguists. They know the country. They know the politics. They know the geography. They know how to get around. They have worked in their careers with other groups and other people.

That you bring these people back in crisis and say, “All right, you all know this stuff. Now, let us go in as an organized team to try to help with stabilization and reconstruction.”

That is what is missing. And here is our problem. We have created it on our own. In the military, we have no title for this kind of work. So even though we offer a master’s degree in the program, we only have two naval officers, because Admiral Mullen has been real keen on it and insisted that we send officers out to get this degree. But guess what? After they get this master’s degree, where do they go to get assignment, because the Department of Defense has not yet created positions, other than FAOs, to deal with this.

So in this committee, I think you ought to think about how do you create people with this special category.

Second of all, the State Department has a lot of these people, but they have never been authorized to pull all these other groups together and that is what this bill that Biden and Lugar have in the Senate and Mr. Saxton and I have in this House.

It is essentially to authorize the readiness response corps of civilian experts in the fields of judicial, policing and finance and it establishes the curriculum for use by the Foreign Service Institute, the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, the National Defense University and the United States Army College, and it specifies how you would go about recruiting and training these people.

We need to get that legislation passed so we can get on with the next phase.

And, Mr. Chairman, I really appreciate you allowing me to come in and speak with this committee.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Farr, we appreciate your very able comments and participation.

What we are going to do, we have about three minutes left on the vote. There is going to be three votes, however. We are sensitive to your time. I understand Mr. Christoff has an afternoon testimony experience coming up and I am sure all of you have busy days.

We would ask, if you can, to wait here for the recess. The staff will be available to help you in any way. We will not be offended if you decide the best way to organize your day is to have lunch sitting in front of you when you come back.

We do not anticipate probably going much more than 45 minutes or so when we return, but we will come back.

We will stand in recess.

[Recess.]

Dr. SNYDER. We appreciate you all standing by. I don’t see any peanut butter-and-jelly sandwiches in front of you, so I guess you are holding up all right.
We will go ahead and start this temperamental clock and go around once or twice with the members we have remaining.

Mr. Herbst, I want to ask a little bit about this issue of the timing. I don't know if you saw the Monday night football game last night, but Brett Favre was Brett Favre once again and did the first pass of the overtime, threw an 82-yard touchdown pass, but he is the kind of player that puts people in the position to win.

There are no guarantees, but he puts his team in a position to win, and it seems like, as you acknowledged in your opening statement, the changing nature of war, we have always thought before our military wins wars.

And it may be that we are having to shift—part of the big picture is we are going to have to realize maybe our military, in certain wars, puts us in a position to win the war, but ultimately it is going to be civilians on the ground doing political reform and economic development and capacity building that actually wins the war.

By winning the war, we define it having the kind of democratic free government in place that is helpful to the world and not hostile to the world.

And so as you have described this today, I didn't realize until—I guess it was in response to questions—that you actually are setting up a parallel system, parallel to what is going on in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now you are going to impact on that and you are involved in training and those kinds of things. But that is where your timeline is from two to three years to ten years.

You all are entering into this really with no intention that, at some point, the system that you are setting up is going to replace what is going on in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Is that an accurate statement?

Ambassador Herbst. I would say the following, that the capabilities we are trying to develop, once we have them, could be used in Iraq and Afghanistan. We already have, as I said, the interagency system which is ready for use, but we don't have the civilians who are able to go out under this system in the countries in question.

But if we had the authorizing legislation and the appropriations to create these various capabilities, in theory, we would be able to put hundreds of people onto the ground within a year and certainly within two years.

Dr. Snyder. But I am confused. Now you have confused me once again. There are people on the ground. They are in the numbers now that the President had requested.

Part of the issue is personnel and we talked about that, but the other part of it is structure, a Washington structure that permeates out to Iraq or Afghanistan or wherever the field is.

But what you are saying is you are going back to this issue that it is like you need authorization for people power, but, in fact, it is a structural issue, is it not?

If you set up the structure that provides for better planning, training, coordination, breaks down the stovepipes that my friend in Iraq complained about, why can't that move in? Why would you not want that to move in with the personnel that are in place tomorrow or the next day in Afghanistan and Iraq?
Ambassador HERBST. Okay, I see what you mean. I think the answer is that you have—the structure is in place today. People are sitting in these positions and the decision has been taken that our capability is meant for the future.

Dr. SNYDER. I am sorry. Say that again.

Ambassador HERBST. The decision was taken at the very start when this office was created that we are to address future crises and not these.

Dr. SNYDER. Right. I am trying to think of a metaphor, Mr. Akin. Mr. Akin has done a lot of great work on this committee, from his visits at a time when he had a son in the Marine Corps in Iraq and came back early on saying there are some problems with the way we are armoring vehicles and he personally saw some of the vehicles.

In a way, what you are saying is we ought to armor the Humvees and come up with the MRAP and let us put them in South Korea and test them. We are not going to put them in Iraq or Afghanistan.

I don't understand. I didn't realize that what you are coming up with is not something intended to impact on what is going on in Iraq or Afghanistan, because part of that—no wonder the pace is leisurely. There is no pressure to perform. There is no pressure to ultimately win the war in Afghanistan or win the war in Iraq, coming from what you all are doing.

Is that a fair statement? I mean, if your mandate is not to deal with Iraq or Afghanistan——

Ambassador HERBST. It is geared to the future, but if we develop the human resources, we will put them. But, again, it is not the system. It is the way we would plug into the existing framework.

Dr. SNYDER. So Mr. Farr's legislation—when the President talked about the civilian reserve corps, I think every Member of Congress that heard that took that to mean it would try to impact on what is going on in Iraq or Afghanistan.

You agree with that.

Ambassador HERBST. That is correct.

Dr. SNYDER. But it would be through the structure that is going on currently in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Ambassador HERBST. That is correct.

Dr. SNYDER. Not through the structure that you all are devising.

Mr. Akin, for five minutes.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, then what you are saying, Ambassador, is you don’t have any direct impact at all on what is going on with the reconstruction teams right now, other than trying to create a model to make them more effective in the future.

Ambassador HERBST. We are, in fact, engaged in——

Mr. AKIN. It will work for you, though.

Ambassador HERBST. We have no oversight over PRTs in either place. But as I mentioned earlier, we have people in Afghanistan right now who have helped two PRTs develop a planning model and are going to be doing that for the rest of our PRTs, as well, in Afghanistan.

Mr. AKIN. Let me just ask, as I take a look a little bit back in my own limited history of being here, I have been here seven years,
I have seen at least the Iraq situation develop, and I take a look at different things that happened and some of them—and people talk about, well, we have made a whole lot of mistakes in Iraq.

I don’t know that we have made a whole lot, but there were certain things that did jump out at me. The first thing is we put Sharia law into the Iraq constitution. That seems to me to be really a dumb thing to have done, or we allowed them to.

Now, would your structure help prevent something like that from happening?

Ambassador HERBST. The step you have just described was, I would say, a political judgment and the system we are creating will likewise be subject to political judgments.

So I would not say that what we are devising is meant to solve the issue you have just described. What it is meant to solve is, one, coordination of the civilian side of the U.S. Government and, two, the provision of trained, equipped, skilled people for mission.

Mr. AKIN. My question is, would the organization that you are proposing or that you are theoretically developing, would it have the capacity to deal with a decision like whether or not we are going to put Sharia law into the Iraqi constitution?

Ambassador HERBST. Absolutely. The system that we——

Mr. AKIN. Would that system then have a considerable amount of input from different people before something like that was done?

Ambassador HERBST. For sure. We would create—we have created, I would say, a rational decision-making, information flowing process, where all factors would be considered.

Mr. AKIN. It was also pretty much—I assume it was Bremer did it. To a degree, we isolated or at least gave the Sunnis the impression that they weren’t really going to be players in the new government or they got that impression.

Is that the kind of thing that would be discussed and vetted in a more coordinated kind of approach?

Ambassador HERBST. The process we have described, the inter-agency management system would involved substantial regional expertise in order to make the right decisions.

Mr. AKIN. And one of the things that we have continually had as a problem over there is the fact that the major television station is totally hostile to everything that we stand for or are trying to accomplish. And so we are working in a complete media—we have no media to counter their media.

Would that be the kind of thing that your organization also would deal with that question?

Ambassador HERBST. What we have created is designed to ensure basic government operations and services in a place where none exists, if our national interests are engaged, and that would include media, as well as all affairs, all elements of government.

Mr. AKIN. And last of all, is the type of structure that you are working on, is it, in a sense, parallel to the existing State Department structure? So you are creating two separate organizations.

Ambassador HERBST. Secretary Rice talks about transformational diplomacy and she is trying to change the structures and the culture of the State Department.
I would say we represent the cutting edge in that process and the system we have devised is changing the way the department reacts in crises and we have a ways to go.

Mr. AKIN. I think that sounds like a fair answer. I appreciate it. Thank you for the time, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Akin.

Mrs. Davis, for five minutes. And we are really watching the clock this time, Mrs. Davis. I figured out how it works. You have to jiggle this wire.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. That was really impressive, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Getting back to the chairman’s comments, I think it really is interesting that there are two parallel engagements going on here in many ways. And I am trying to find a connection, if there is one.

I have to assume that the work that is going on, Ambassador, that you are doing in trying to bring this together and think it through over the next few years, essentially, that there has got to be some connection to what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan.

But I am still a little confused by that and what that might be, what lessons learned would be applied and back and forth.

What do you——

Ambassador HERBST. We have created this system to use the next time. Of course, it is related to Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the reasons or maybe the reason it was set up, the office was set up and we have doing this work is because we believe we can make adjustments and do it better next time.

As part of this, we are in touch with people who are in it and who have been in both countries. We are doing lessons learned. We are factoring that into the system we have devised.

My office gets lots of especially non-officers who have been in both places in PRTs and want to do it better. We are developing systems to measure, what we call metrics, systems to measure progress and we are also feeding that back to our operations in both places, although more so perhaps right now in Afghanistan, by having people on the ground helping PRTs plan.

So there is certainly a connection. But the thing to keep in mind is while our office has grown from a handful to 80-plus, that is a tiny number, small resources compared to the enormous number of people and funds that we are expending in both Afghanistan and Iraq. So there is a problem of scale.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. The order over the weekend, as I understand it, they reported that the State Department would be ordering diplomats into the region. I assume that is no longer on a voluntary basis.

How does that impact what you are doing, if at all, and are those folks available to do that? Even thinking in the short term and the long term, how is that going to affect your efforts?

Ambassador HERBST. Well, my colleague, Harry Thomas, the director general, is charged with helping ensure we have the right people we need currently in Iraq and Afghanistan and they are looking at various ways to do that.

If they wind up directing assignments, I am not certain that has a great impact on my operation. I think I already get—S/CRS already gets people who are interested in going to the world’s less
predictable places with all of the problems that are involved with that unpredictability and I think what you are seeing is as more people in the department are funneled to Iraq and Afghanistan, the culture is starting to change and some of those, a fair number of those people wind up coming to work in S/CRS.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I wanted to ask also about just the interplay of intelligence in all this and whether the culture has changed to the extent that as we begin to do this, and I think that my colleague, Roscoe, Mr. Bartlett, asked really a good question.

I mean, what is it that we really want to be doing? Do we have a role in essentially this kind of nation building and how do we do it and, I would hope, how do we do it differently?

But that interplay, though, with intelligence and information sharing, because sometimes there has been a reluctance to do that. I guess it is hypothetical, but would it have made a difference?

If somebody said, “You know what? You have no idea what you are doing here,” which I think some people in the State Department would have liked to have said, if they had been asked. How in the thinking does that play a role?

Ambassador HERBST. Our process includes the intelligence community. So decisions that would be made in this would be based upon the best information available.

I agree with you that what Representative Bartlett said is very important, that what we are trying to do is inherently difficult, but it is also true that we learned on September 11 that there are areas of the world which are destabilized, which represent very dangerous national security threats, and that our military is going to be involved in addressing those dangers and the military knows that they need the civilian component, as Congressman Snyder mentioned, Chairman Snyder mentioned, to have a chance of winning.

Without that, we are not in the game.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Right. And I guess just a quick follow-up. Do you believe, in your estimation, that we are moving from a DOD centric thinking to more agency centric?

Ambassador HERBST. We are definitely moving to an interagency centric thinking and our office, while the State Department represents the interagency, and this system, this interagency management system is precisely that one that involves the entire U.S. Government.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Farr, for five minutes.

Mr. FARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My first question I think is for the Department of Defense and that is that your directive, and I have copies of it here, of 3000.5, it is almost two years. It came out in November of 2005.

Why hasn’t the department then created the professional positions which all of your internal directives and coordination have all—it seems to me you have got everything in place except what you want these people to do after they get trained.

Ms. WARD. Well, sir, we do have a number of different skill identifiers and specialty skills in the military that relate to stability operations. I am thinking here—you mentioned FAOs, sir, but there are also civil affairs officers. We have—–
Mr. FARR. Excuse me for interrupting. But what I find is that—because when I traveled with a lot of young officers and they all know about the naval postgraduate school and now that they have had in-country experience, this is the kind of thing, they see “This is what I want to do,” the stability ops and things like that.

But there is no incentive to go get a master’s degree in doing that, because you still haven’t created those sort of, for lack of a better expression, the MOS when you come out with that training.

Ms. WARD. At my office, we are constantly looking at questions just like you raise. Should there be a specialized skill? What would be the career track for these people? How would it fit into the rest of the force?

So it is something that we relook frequently and something I intend to look at closely during my tenure. At this point, there isn’t a specialized stability operations MOS.

Mr. FARR. Can we create that? I mean, I think that is important, because you don’t have the high motivation. As you know, your ascendency promotions are going to be based on doing a good job with the job you are handling and if you don’t have that job, you are not going to apply for it.

Ms. WARD. True, but I think it is also true that you are seeing commanders now who have experience on the ground and recognize that they need to not only understand major combat operations, but they need to understand how they apply non-kinetic effects on the battlefield.

So the idea is you actually have a force that can do both of those things. They can conduct major combat operations and they can conduct stability operations, as well. So what you try to do is infuse the education throughout the force so that you have that full spectrum capability.

Mr. FARR. Well, I agree with that, too, but I also think you need to be keen on a really good education and you stand up in the Navy and Department of Defense, at the naval postgraduate school, the only graduate school that the military has, for master’s and doctorate degrees and you give them to our officers and officers around the world, that there you do have the center and it seems to me it is logical that that is where you start getting a lot more specified.

I want to ask the ambassador. We have the facilities, we have the programs. Do you see the State Department using that center more than just for the gaming purposes now? Do you see it actually sending State Department folks there to, again, maybe get a master’s degree or to be part of that study program, whether short course or long course?

Ambassador HERBST. I am not responsible for our—the training, you might say, of the foreign service officers in general, but it seems to me that this is something that can and should be looked at, just as we send—let people go for master’s programs at other universities. It seems to make sense to me.

Mr. FARR. Well, this is, I think, the one criticism. I am keen on what you are all doing and I think we should have done it years ago. I, frankly, think that had this all been set up, we wouldn’t still be in Iraq. We would have been smart about how to get in and get
out, and we get in and we get stuck, because we haven’t had this
kind of planning before.
So from the GAO’s office, from a cost-effectiveness standpoint,
this the ounce of prevention that is going to save us a lot of money,
but I am also surprised because you have all got it and why it is
so important and we yet haven’t created these career positions,
because this is a new—as you have all indicated, it is the interagency
and it is probably international, as well as interagency, and you
are going to have to have those skills.
And I would think those skills are linguistic skills and area
study skills and knowing—I mean, just think if we had non-
English speaking people from some other country to respond to the
fires in California, not even knowing where these roads are, where
these places are, couldn’t communicate with the people whose
houses are burning down. You would have a real mess down there.
I sit on the Homeland Security Appropriations Committee, and
what I find is that and what all the experts tell us is that if you
prepare for a natural disaster, you have prepared for a terrorist
disaster, because the first responders are going to be the same.
Maybe the prevention is different, but the response is going to be
the same.
It seems to me we would never think of responding to a disaster
in this country without people being prepared, yet we are offering
to be responding to war related or war created disasters without
being prepared. And we get it, but now we have got to start profes-
sionalizing it, because you are not going to have people seeking ca-
reers in this area, which is so keen right now, if you don’t give
them a job to do that.
I would like a response, if there is time, Mr. Chairman. Is it mis-
directed?
Ms. Ward. There is no doubt that we need to vastly expand our
language and cultural awareness skills throughout our military,
and I would argue that a lot of steps have been taken in that direc-
tion already.
I mentioned earlier that I was at Leavenworth recently and
talked to them about education at all levels and the language
training and cultural awareness training is spreading systemati-
cally throughout our military.
So I think we are taking that very seriously, the need for us to
understand other cultures and have more people who can speak
more languages more skillfully.
I think really the question you are getting at is whether there
should be a special category of people who are trained in this par-
ticular kind of operation. Right now, we are certainly taking steps
to spread this type of education throughout our force, not just lan-
guage and culture, but also the principals of counterinsurgency and
how to be successful in the stability operations, and that is going
really throughout our force.
And so I think you are looking at a question of, well, should
there be a specialty category, a cadre of people who do this specifi-
cally for a living, and I think that is an important question that
we are looking at and will continue to look. Right now, we do not
have that, that is true.
Dr. Snyder. We will go ahead and start the clock. We will go another round here, if you are still with us.

I want to hear from, I guess, Ms. St. Laurent or either one of you, Mr. Christoff, on one of the things that has been said here in the last ten minutes or so.

You have expressed concerns about more questions need to be asked about the $50 million and the appropriation and consistent with what Mr. Jones and some others have said.

I am now not clear. What do you all think about this idea that this is a parallel track that is being set up that is not going to be the way that services are going to be delivered to Iraq or Afghanistan and how does that impact on budgeting?

And from the perspective of the investment of the American taxpayers in this process that Ambassador Herbst is working so hard on, why would we not want to benefit somewhat sooner in Iraq or Afghanistan? If you could address some of those themes, please.

Mr. Christoff. Several comments I have, also in reference to some of your comments and Mrs. Davis about lessons learned.

But, first, in terms of the civilian reserve corps, I think we fully support the concept. I am not disagreeing with that. I am just suggesting that as the Congress moves forward and you are ramping up to 2,000 standby reservists and an additional 2,000 civilian reserve corps, you would want to know a little bit more about the details.

So I think that is something that is appropriate in terms of looking at any new program that will probably cost more money in the future.

But I want to try to see if I could relate this structure, the framework that we are trying to develop through Ambassador Herbst's office with Iraq, because you were talking about lessons learned.

Are there any lessons learned from Iraq that might be applied to this new framework? And I think there are and I think the development of the joint campaign plan, the campaign plan that was developed by the Multinational Force Iraq and the U.S. embassy is an example of interagency coordination and it was done at the field level.

And I think that in looking——

Dr. Snyder. Mr. Christoff, is this the joint campaign plan that the Department of Defense refuses to give to this committee, the House Armed Services?

Mr. Christoff. Correct.

Dr. Snyder. It is that very same joint campaign plan, but they give it to GAO.

Mr. Christoff. Correct.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you.

Mr. Christoff. But since it is within the Administration right now, it would be a good document to look at from the perspective of the lessons learned.

Dr. Snyder. We thought so for several weeks to months.

Mr. Christoff. But what I am saying is some of the concepts and the framework that Ambassador Herbst talks about I can see in the interagency process that is occurring within Iraq.

There is what is called the Iraq policy and operations group, the IPOG, which is at the NSC level, very much similar to the concept
that Ambassador Herbst is proposing for this country reconstruction and stabilization group.

The FACs, the field advanced civilian corps, are PRTs that are in Iraq right now and then you have interagency and coordination mechanisms within U.S. embassy Baghdad MNFI, as well.

So I think there are a lot of lessons learned in the development of our plans in Iraq that could be fruitful and come in completing this framework that we now have for our future stability operations.

Dr. Snyder. That doesn't answer my question, though, Mr. Christoff. I understand that. Mr. Herbst has been, I think, very aggressive about trying to learn from what is going on in Iraq.

It doesn't solve the problem of my friend who says the cultural barriers between the military, Department of State and other civilian agencies seem more striking than those between the United States and Iraqis, to me, somebody who is in Iraq right now.

I don't see it is going to go up. I don't see that the structural change that Mr. Herbst is working on, there is no intent of having that structure somehow help to break down those stovepipes.

From your all's perspective of trying to get the most bang for the buck, why would we not be insistent that this work be expedited and that we put a priority on it so that their good work can come back down to help the folks that are on the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan today?

Does that not concern you?

Mr. Christoff. Well, but, again, you have a process in Iraq now that is being implemented under NSPD–1.

Dr. Snyder. But we don't think it is working very well, do we?

Mr. Christoff. What difference—well, according to the GAO report, probably not.

Dr. Snyder. We have heard from GAO about you all reporting that it is not working as well, I mean, our anecdotal information. We think they are wonderful people. We think they are doing good things and are obviously working very hard at great risk themselves to do good things, but you all have pointed out, where are the measurable objectives, what are the goals and objectives and it is not measurable.

And the good things that are being done, we think, would be even greater, that there would be more good if we had the kind of structure that Mr. Herbst is working on to assist them, to break down some of these stovepipes here in Washington.

I think that is the direction we are heading. Well, anyway, I am getting too long.

I wanted to ask, Mr. Herbst, we have had this issue come up in the last day or so. I have used the example of my friend in Iraq there that you just heard me read her quote again and we have had this issue in the paper this morning about, the “New York Times” headline, “Immunity Deals Offered to Blackwater Guards,” that apparently State Department had a press report.

State Department security investigators offer some kind of immunity to these guards, unbeknownst to the Justice Department, that is now involved.

Is that not an example of stovepiping? I mean, should that—after five years of war in Afghanistan, with an abundance of contractors,
and heading into five years of war in Iraq, with an abundance, thousands of contractors, is that not the kind of issue that should have been broken down?

Somebody somewhere should have said, “You know, one of these tens of thousands of armed contracted personnel may have a legal problem. Perhaps we should ahead of time have a discussion with the Department of Justice about how to handle that.” Is this not a glaring example of the breakdown, of our failure here in Congress, the failure of the government to not have foreseen these kinds of issues and break down some of these stovepipes?

Is that not an example of that?

Ambassador HERBST. Congressman, I read that article, but I really don’t have any more information than what I read in that article.

All I can say is that the system, the interagency management system would have in all of its institutions the relevant agencies playing a role in the area in crisis.

So that State Department would be working with USAID, Treasury, Justice, et cetera, which should make it possible to formulate responses to events which reflect the outlook and the interests of the entire interagency.

Dr. NYDER. Which should not surprise another agency. Actions should not be taken——

Ambassador HERBST. Transparency is a very important part of the interagency——

Dr. NYDER [continuing]. That surprised another agency and it clearly was a surprise here.

Mrs. Davis, for five minutes.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to just wrap up my questions.

One of the issues, and I guess this really reflects on the House committee, as well, when we think in terms of personnel. It is my understanding, from a colleague, that if somebody serves in the PRTs, if one of our military offers serves in the PRTs, that is not considered a joint station, essentially, or joint experience in the same way that we think of jointness in the services and their need to be able to do that in terms of career development and career ladder.

So are you aware of that? And I guess the question would be, was the State Department, as well? It is my understanding, again, that initially there was no great incentive for anybody to serve over in Iraq or Afghanistan, because it didn’t help them in their ability to progress in their career.

Has that changed and what other changes do you anticipate?

And I think to GAO, to Ms. St. Laurent and Mr. Christoff, I asked about the DOD centric perception. What is your perception of that? How well do you believe that we are engaging agencies perhaps beyond State in this interagency now and in these new plans that are being developed?

Is it still 90 percent? Is it something other than that? And what is it that reflects that for you, that actually we have gone beyond that mentality?

Go ahead.
Ms. WARD. If I could take that as a question for the record on the joint billets, because I just don’t know the answer whether the PRT leaders are, in fact, joint billets. So I will provide the committee an answer on that.

I would say that I think the commanders on the ground see the PRT as an increasingly important capability in their counterinsurgency fight. So someone serving in that is certainly going to get recognition for that.

It is my understanding, in Afghanistan, that often the PRT leaders are coming off of the command list, so have been selected for command in any case or are actually doing their second command.

So these people are getting rewarded for their service on the PRTs. On the joint billet issue, I owe you an answer on that.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. And at the State Department?

Ambassador HERBST. Again, I am not responsible for personnel policies, but my understanding, as a career foreign service officer, is that people who have gone to both Iraq and Afghanistan have gotten consideration, for example, as they move toward next assignments and I think it has been helpful for people’s careers to serve there.

So that is I don’t think a problem in terms of our recruitment for those assignments.

Ms. ST. LAURENT. In response to your second question, I think, again, DOD’s interest is in expanding the extent to which they cooperate with other agencies, but if you look at the status of planning today, I think there is still probably very much a DOD centric view in the development of their own plans and there is also the issue of DOD having much more capacity to respond to these kinds of events today.

I think one issue I would like to raise with regard to the interagency management framework is it is still not clear to what extent that framework is going to be triggered and when it would be triggered to deal with future crises, because that has to be a specific determination that is made, whereas the military commands are able to carry out a wide array of routine planning.

So, again, unless this mechanism is tested and used, the military may still be in the position of having the most robust plans for dealing with potential conflicts.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Farr, would you like another five minutes of discussion?

Mr. FARR. Yes, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. Five minutes.

Mr. FARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Ward, in reading your testimony and understanding how keen you are on this Directive 3000.5 and recognizing the importance that the Department of Defense has set up in the naval postgraduate school center there, my question is do you intend to POM that in the next budget?

Ms. WARD. Sir, I do not know the answer to that question, but I will look into that. My understanding of the center is that it is seen by all to be a very important center and contributing a great deal. So I have no information that it won’t be POM’d.
But I would be happy to provide you an answer in writing on that.

Mr. FARR. Thank you.

And I guess to the ambassador. Ambassador Herbst, I am trying to get your bill passed and perhaps this hearing will make another committee in this House a little bit more interested in it, hopefully so, but without the authorization, we have appropriated the money and when the appropriators understand how important it is to get moving.

Without that authorization, what does that do to your——

Ambassador HERBST. We need the authorizing legislation in order to actually get the money and to use it to create the civilian reserve corps.

If we receive the money within the next week or so, month or so, a year from now, we will have a 500-person civilian reserve corps trained, equipped, obviously, recruited, with the right skills to deploy in a crisis.

Mr. FARR. Because that reserve corps has to be experts and when you are talking about recruiting, you are talking about people that have had careers in these various fields of need. So they come in with those language skills and with other kinds of skills.

What you are doing is honing them into a response team, right, so that they can operate internationally?

Ambassador HERBST. They will come in with the requisite technical skills needed. Some of them will probably have language skills, too, but we will make sure that the unit has the necessary language skills and the necessary area expertise.

So we would be hiring skilled people and then training and recruiting them for stabilization operations, yes.

Mr. FARR. I thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I think what is really important here is, again, the nature of this hearing is all about interoperability of our Federal agencies and it just strikes me that one thing we haven’t done, and maybe GAO could get into this, is we ought to at least keep a registry of who these experts are, even if we just set it up voluntarily.

We have the capacity to do that. But when I tried to set that up with the Manpower Defense Center in Monterey, which has the computer capacity to handle it all, they were saying it all had to go out to bid and had to all—it got so confusing that we haven’t even been able to do it, and we were just looking for a registry for linguists.

But I do think, as the Federal Government, we need to keep track of people. The policy is when you leave Federal service, unless you sort of want to be called, you are gone and we don’t know who you are, we don’t know where you are.

And what a waste of just having an alumni association directory and that is what I think part of this, setting up this reserve corps, crisis corps is made up of those people, and we wouldn’t have to be looking to draft people to go to Iraq. We might have people that would come out of retirement and could do that job very well.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. And I think there are some good lessons from how the Canadians and the Germans are trying to put together this list that could help our purposes, as well.
Mr. FARR. I think these incidents are international, we have international partners, and they ought to be at the table, too. So I would like to see us move as quickly as possible to get the skill level and the one-stop process going.

And I want to just applaud the military for taking a lead. It is certainly a long way from saying we don’t do nation building to Directive 3000.5. I think that is an admission that we can’t stabilize or lead without this skill set.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Farr.

I have just one or two short questions and then we will conclude. I know that Mr. Christoff and others need to get going.

My question for GAO, in your conclusion, you know, we read these little highlights over here and what GAO recommends, “GAO recommends that DOD take several actions to improve its capabilities in interagency planning. DOD partially agreed, but did not specify actions it would take to address them. Therefore, GAO suggests Congress require DOD to do so.”

We love legislation, you know, so we are glad to hear those kinds of recommendations. Then you amplify that, stating, “We have also suggested that Congress require DOD to develop an action plan and report annually on its efforts to address our recommendations.”

Would one of you comment on that, amplify on that a little bit? Since we, I think, are all in agreement that DOD is the one who has been most insistent on doing something different and yet the action plan, you are wanting a legislative mandate on DOD rather than the other agencies.

Would you comment on that?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Certainly. We made several recommendations in our report. Again, we see DOD making progress and moving out and implementing the directive, but we think there are several areas that it needs to address more systematically, and one is the question of how to best define and what process to use to identify needed capabilities and then whether we have gaps in those capabilities today.

So that was a recommendation we made. When we got the department’s response to our report, it was not clear that they were going to take any specific steps in response to that recommendation.

We made other recommendations that they provide better guidance on, how to go about determining measures of effectiveness or performance measures, again, for how they are doing in implementing all the things in the directive.

And because DOD’s responses to all of our recommendations were rather vague, we think these are issues that need to be addressed with very specific action plans. So that is why we then suggested to the Congress that they might want to require, in some future legislation or committee report, that DOD report back to them on what they are doing in response to the recommendations we have made.

Dr. SNYDER. A week ago or so, we had a hearing here with representatives from State Department and USAID, Justice, Treasury, Ag, and we had a minor little dust-up, because two of the opening statements, written statements, one from the Department of Jus-
practice and one from Ag, had an identical paragraph in it that apparently came from the NSC, which I am fine with the paragraph.

I just think it surprised the witnesses to find out that they had each had an identical paragraph, even though they were coming through two different agencies. I think it was a little bit embarrassing for them.

But I wanted to read the one sentence from that paragraph, which I assume that at least we have a buy-in from Justice, Ag and NSC, since they all had that as part of their—have acknowledged some joint authorship.

“To improve our ability to respond to overseas challenges and provide the personnel expertise needed will require that we increase our numbers of available trained and deployable personnel within our department and others and that we support them with a structure in Washington that conducts planning and coordination.”

I think that—and you are working on it, Mr. Ambassador. My only perhaps minor criticism today would be I understand the importance of the civilian reserve corps, and I think we under-fund the State Department. You have no redundancy around the world.

If we pull an Ag person out of Uzbekistan to go to Iraq, there is no one to step forward and do the work in Uzbekistan. There are a lot of issues there. But to me, the most important issue here is “and support them with a structure in Washington that conducts planning and coordination.”

And what we are hearing today is you all are working on a structure that you hope will be ready in two to three to ten years, but the concern is it is not going to be helping, we don’t think, in any immediate way with the work that our folks are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan today.

And that may be something that we all need to spend more time talking about and how we can impact on that.

I did want to acknowledge Mr. Akin’s absence. He would have been here, but he has an amendment on the floor today.

Mr. Ambassador, did you want to make a final comment?

Ambassador Herbst. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The structure is ready now. I think the reason why we have a bit of confusion is it is not being applied directly to run the current crises, but the structure is ready now.

What is not ready now is the human response capability which has the necessary—all the training and the skill sets and the inter-agency elements that we have devised.

Dr. Snyder. Well, I think we have had that discussion. I am still not clear why there is not more immediate impact on what is going on with our current PRTs overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan. It sounds like a parallel structure.

We appreciate you all being here. You all should take this as an open ended opportunity, if there is anything you want to clarify for the record, take as a question for the record, feel free to add any additional comments.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

October 30, 2007
Opening Statement of
Chairman Dr. Vic Snyder
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Hearing on “Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations: Learning from the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Experience”

October 30, 2007

The hearing will come to order.

Good morning, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations’ hearing on “Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations: Learning from the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Experience.”

The subcommittee has conducted a series of hearings and briefings on the PRT programs in Afghanistan and Iraq to get a better understanding of what PRTs are, what they do, and the contribution that they are making in stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq. Every witness and every PRT veteran we heard from told the subcommittee that PRTs are a vital tool and are critical to the success of our operations.

We’ve heard that much of what any given PRT does is determined by the team on the ground, based on local or provincial needs and the security conditions in the area in which it is serving. In Afghanistan, we know the PRT’s job is to extend the reach of the Afghan central government out to the provinces. In Iraq, some PRTs are there to help develop provincial government capacity, while others are there to assist and advise brigade combat team commanders in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations at the local level.

But, beyond that, we’ve heard that the PRT mission statements are vague, that they need clearly defined objectives and that there is no concrete means to assess their effectiveness. One witness boiled the situation down into a single phrase: “Improvisation is not a concept of operations.” That witness, Robert Perito of the United States Institute of Peace, argued that guidance needs to come from Washington and that that guidance needs to be from a very senior level. Stuart Bowen, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, testified that the U.S. experience with PRTs has been ad hoc and that we need a more effective interagency approach and structure for stabilization and reconstruction operations.

We chose the PRT topic because PRTs are critical to our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. But, we also chose to examine them because they represent a case study on how the interagency process works or doesn’t work in Washington and in the field. Which brings us to our hearing today.

We have Department of Defense and State witnesses who are working on improving interagency planning, resourcing, management, and oversight of future stabilization
and reconstruction operations. I’ll be very interested in hearing how our experience with PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq is shaping their work and what support they are providing or could provide to the PRTs conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq today because, frankly, that’s what we need. Ambassador Herbst, you should be gratified to hear that almost every witness and briefer over the past six weeks has mentioned your efforts.

We also have GAO witnesses who have been examining the interagency efforts that our two Executive Branch witnesses are responsible for. GAO has already published a report on DOD’s efforts. They are about to publish a report on State’s efforts, which Mr. Shays requested. I’d like to thank Mr. Shays because, with his consent, Mr. Akin and I are now co-requestors on that report, so our committee can benefit from the study as well.

Our panel of witnesses today includes:

Ambassador John E. Herbst  
The State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

Ms. Celeste Ward  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Stability Operations Capabilities

Ms. Janet St. Laurent  
Director,  
Defense Capabilities and Management  
United States Government Accountability Office

Mr. Joseph A. Christoff  
Director,  
International Affairs and Trade Team  
Also from GAO

Welcome to all of you and thank you for being here.
Statement of Ranking Member Todd Akin  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations  
House Armed Services Committee  

Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations: Learning from the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Experience  

October 30, 2007  

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good Morning to our witnesses, we appreciate you being here today.

Today’s hearing is this subcommittee’s fourth public hearing on Provincial Reconstruction Teams, but the first to take a look at the policy framework for dealing with stabilization and reconstruction operations.

While this subcommittee has studied the PRT concept—how an interagency team, comprised of civilian and military personnel works to extend the reach of the government into regional provinces and local areas—we have not investigated how the PRT experience is affecting how policy makers in Washington plan for future stabilization contingencies. While we may not be engaged in the future in a nation-building operation equal to the scale of what we are currently doing in Iraq and Afghanistan, I think it is fair
to say that the United States will likely be engaged in similar contingences in the coming decades. We were conducting similar operations in Bosnia and Haiti in the 1990s. September 11th has only reinforced the importance of these missions. Even those skeptical of “nation building” understand that stable states are less likely to have ungoverned spaces where terrorists find safe harbor.

The focus of today’s hearing, therefore, is to learn how the Defense and State Departments are ensuring that we are translating lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan into a 21st century interagency apparatus that has the resources, capabilities and plans to run seamless, integrated interagency stabilization operations. This is the goal of National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44). Today our witnesses will tell us how we are progressing.

I’m curious how the State Department, particularly the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, understands its role as lead agency for reconstruction and stabilization under NSPD-44. This subcommittee is certainly interested in learning more about how your office is building three distinct corps of civilian agency personnel for these types of missions. This
is a welcome initiative. I am particularly interested in what tools the civilian reserve corps will need to be successful.

Such success will hinge in large part in determining the role of the Department of Defense in future stabilization operations. The 3000.05 Directive makes stabilization operations a core mission of the Defense Department on par with combat operations. While I think this “catches up” DOD policy with a reality that has been true in the Department for almost two decades (at least), I’m interested in how we are doing on policy execution: whether our Combatant Commanders are planning for these missions and whether the services are budgeting and building the capabilities for this mission? I’d like our witnesses to comment on how they think the Department of Defense is progressing in terms of implementing this Directive, and if there are any hurdles, please identify where they are.

Again, thank you to our witnesses for being here today. I look forward to your testimony.

[Yield to Chairman Snyder]
PREPARED STATEMENT

AMBASSADOR JOHN HERBST
COORDINATOR FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

OCTOBER 30, 2007
INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today to address the Department of State’s efforts to build civilian capacity for reconstruction and stabilization crises.

Weak and failed states pose a serious security challenge for the United States and the international community. They can become breeding grounds for terrorism, weapons proliferation, trafficking in humans and narcotics, organized crime, and humanitarian catastrophes. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been involved in or contributed significant resources to more than 17 reconstruction and stabilization operations. And the challenge persists. RAND recently reported that in this same time period, the pace of U.S. military interventions has risen to about one every two years. If the U.S. Government is going to meet these threats, we must adapt our national security architecture. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, or S/CRS, is part of that effort within the Administration.

S/CRS was established in 2004. Starting with just a handful of staff, the office has now grown to over 80. While S/CRS is based in the State Department, it has been designed as an interagency office. During the past three years, we have had staff detailed from other parts of State, USAID, Defense, Treasury, Justice, Homeland Security, CIA, Labor, and DIA. We now have a modest rapid response capability and a growing cadre of civilian planners.

My office is charged with two tasks. The first is to ensure that the entire U.S. Government is organized to deal with reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) crises affecting U.S. national interests, to include harmonizing civilian and military activities. The second and equally important task is to build the civilian capacity to staff these missions when called upon to respond.

These tasks are simple to describe, but not so simple to achieve. It requires a major, perhaps even a revolutionary, change in the way the U.S. approaches conflict response. Just as the military underwent tremendous reform in the 1980s following the passage of Goldwater-Nichols legislation, we are proposing shifts across our civilian agencies that similarly promote unity of effort so that we best leverage limited resources, and avoid working at cross-purposes.

S/CRS’ MANDATE: IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT’S DIRECTIVE FOR R&S

In December 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) to improve management of reconstruction and stabilization operations. The Presidential Directive states that the Secretary of State is responsible for leading and coordinating integrated U.S. efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. Depending on the situation, these operations may be conducted with or without U.S. military engagement. It further tasks the Secretaries of State and Defense to harmonize civilian and military efforts so that civilians are planning with the military from the start. In 2005, the Pentagon released Defense Department Directive 3000.05, “Military Support to Security, Stabilization, Transition and Reconstruction,” which complements NSPD-44.
The goal of NSPD-44 is to provide senior policy-makers with a comprehensive picture of existing capacity, needs, gaps, and priorities to enable civilian agencies to respond to conflict and effectively partner with the military in R&S operations. It also lays out the vision for how we build up the capacity of the U.S. Government to ensure this unified effort.

Implementation of the directive is a priority for the Secretary of State, and I have been tasked with making it happen. S/CRS has been working with more than 20 agencies and bureaus including USAID, DOD, DHS, HHS, Treasury, Justice, DNI, Commerce, and Agriculture, and a number of bureaus in State to fully implement NSPD-44. The Defense Department’s participation alone included representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Army Corps of Engineers, the Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the Department of the Army, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and participants from several Geographic Combatant Commands.

We have made significant progress on implementing the NSPD, and the pace has only accelerated in the past eight months.

A NEW WAY TO ORGANIZE FOR S&R: INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The U.S. Government has many capable entities that are responsible for various parts of foreign assistance and engagement; these all play important roles in responding to any crisis and must be integrated for maximum effect. We have reached interagency agreement for how the U.S. Government should organize itself to deal with a stabilization crisis. The new approach, called the Interagency Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization, consists of three inter-linked elements:

Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG): A Washington-based decision-making body at the Assistant Secretary level. All agencies involved in a particular R&S mission will have members in the CRSG. This is a typical structure managed by the NSC, but it is created to focus exclusively on a single country or regional crisis. However, there is a critical additional function that we have learned is necessary to be effective – a full time staff to collect all interagency interactions and integrate them. To facilitate its operations, a Secretariat run by S/CRS will be established for each CRSG. The Secretariat ensures that there is a single channel for providing information, helping to formulate options, and monitoring the implementation of policy decisions. The Secretariat oversees the writing of a unified plan taking account of all U.S. Government capabilities that will be used in the crisis.

Integration Planning Cell (IPC): A civilian planning cell deployed to the relevant Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) or multinational headquarters to harmonize civilian and military planning, processes, and operations. It will generally consist of civilian planners, and regional and sectoral experts from across the U.S. Government.

Advance Civilian Team (ACT): One or more rapid response teams that deploy to the field to support the Chief of Mission in implementing the U.S. R&S strategic plan. If a U.S. Embassy exists, the ACT will operate under Chief of Mission authority and be integrated with existing
Embassy and USAID mission structures. In the absence of an existing U.S. diplomatic presence, the ACT will help stand it up. If necessary, the ACT can deploy Field Advance Civilian Teams (FACTs), to provide maximum capacity to implement R&S programs at the provincial or local level, similar to PRTs that have been operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Depending on the situation, FACTs can integrate with U.S. or other military forces to foster U.S. and coalition unity of effort.

The value of the IMS is that it clarifies roles, responsibilities, and processes for mobilizing and supporting interagency R&S operations. It provides the tools to ensure unity of effort, guided by whole-of-government planning. The IMS is flexible and scaleable to meet the particular requirements on the ground and can integrate personnel from all relevant agencies. It can also be used in engagements with or without military operations.

The IMS is designed to provide coordinated, interagency policy and program management for highly complex crises and operations that:

- Are national or security priorities,
- Involve widespread instability,
- May require military operations, and
- Engage multiple U.S. agencies in the policy and programmatic response.

The IMS is not intended to respond to the political and humanitarian crises that are regularly and effectively handled through current organizations and systems. As a country situation evolves over time, these groups can be absorbed into more routine Embassy structures and the responsibilities for assistance will be cycled back into normal planning and budgeting cycles.

Testing the IMS, including the establishment of civilian-military cooperation, is an important part of our work. We have been using Unified Action, an interagency experiment similar to a military exercise and supported by Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), to do that. Unified Action is part of the JFCOM-led Multinational Experiment series. It is the first civilian-driven experiment of its kind to test and refine the planning and coordination processes necessary to implement NSPD-44 via the Interagency Management System. It is designed to improve U.S. whole-of-government capacity to plan for and execute integrated conflict and crisis prevention, mitigation or response operations.

BUILDING CIVILIAN CAPACITY FOR DEPLOYMENTS

Civilian officers from across our government have served and continue to serve our nation honorably in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Kosovo, and numerous other troubled places around the world. But the reality is we simply do not have sufficient resources to meet the needs arising from states in peril. Hence, my second task — building a civilian response capability that is trained, equipped and prepared to deploy in a crisis. This requires not just improving the recruiting, training, and expectations of our workforces but also ensuring we can call-up additional resources when needed. We have devised a three-tiered system to get civilians on the ground quickly in a stabilization mission. It too has been approved at senior levels of the U.S. Government, but the requisite legislative action to authorize all departments and agencies fully to
staff these new positions has not been enacted. Together, this civilian response corps will have the skills necessary to operate in a country with a weak or non-functioning government.

Active Response Corps
The core of U.S. civilian R&S response capacity is the Active Response Corps, or ARC, and our Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) rapid responders at USAID. ARC officers are federal employees whose full-time job is to work in support of reconstruction and stabilization activities, which includes training and preparing to deploy immediately to crisis spots. Seventy-five percent of the ARC is deployable at any given time for up to six months. Currently, we have ten ARC officers, all of whom are in the State Department. They have already been sent to such places as Darfur, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Haiti, Chad, Liberia, Iraq, and Kosovo. For FY08, the President is requesting funding to triple the size of the ARC to 33 and to add staff positions in S/CRS to provide the necessary planning and deployment support for them. USAID and Treasury also have a small dedicated capacity for deployment and we need to build a similar capacity across government. Having on-staff personnel who are dedicated to this purpose ensures that they can deploy quickly without leaving other critical work unstaffed.

Standby Response Corps
The second tier of rapid responders is the Standby Response Corps (SRC). These are existing U.S. Government employees with a range of skill-sets and expertise. They have full-time jobs but have volunteered to undergo training and to be considered for deployments of up to six months on 30-45 days notice. The SRC currently has 90 members, all of which have been drawn from the State Department. Over 200 retired State Department employees have signed up, as well.

One of the most important aspects of the SRC is that it widens the pool of available personnel and skills so that we can identify just the right person to meet the needs of a specific mission. We have already begun deploying SRC officers. Last year, one served in Darfur and another in Eastern Chad to monitor the refugee situation across the Sudanese border.

Given the challenges we will face in the coming years, it is essential that the U.S. Government grow both the ARC and SRC not just in State but in USAID and throughout the other civilian agencies involved in R&S efforts, such as Justice, Commerce, Treasury, and Agriculture, hence the need for a comprehensive legislative approach. We hope to work with Congress to ensure that necessary authorities to enable other departments and agencies to gain the personnel and other resource requirements needed to effectively provide support to the Department of State to execute these missions. We will expand the size and training requirements as resources allow with a goal of 500 on the rosters by the end of FY 2008.

Civilian Reserve Corps
An enhanced civilian capacity within the U.S. Government for reconstruction and stabilization is essential. But these environments require larger numbers of available, skilled, and trained personnel and a broader range of expertise than the U.S. Government would be likely to have on-staff in adequate numbers – from police trainers to engineers to city planners. That is why the President called for the creation of a Civilian Reserve Corps in his 2007 State of the Union address. Such a corps will allow us to have a pool of experts on call, without the expense of
bringing them on as permanent U.S. Government employees. They would be able to work on a range of R&S projects for State, USAID, Justice and other agencies. As we have seen in Iraq, such experts play a critical role in reconstruction and stabilization, and quicker access to them can contribute to the overall success of a mission. When deployed, reservists would provide management capacity to the Embassy and technical assistance to the host government. Having this capability through a reserve system would provide two advantages over relying solely on contractors for additional response: faster response and more accountability. While reservists would provide immediate expertise in the field, we would still need to use grants and contracts with implementing partners to deliver long term assistance.

The generosity and patriotism of the American public is beyond doubt. Following 9/11 we saw ordinary citizens channel their grief into service – they joined the military or looked for ways to volunteer in their communities. The Civilian Reserve Corps gives Americans another way to share their skills with people in need while serving their country. The Civilian Reserve Corps would be comprised of Americans from outside federal agencies who, as with military reservists, have careers in state and local government or the private sector. We are talking about people like a police officer in Chicago, a city administrator in Atlanta, a civil engineer in Denver, or an accountant in San Francisco who all share a desire to work overseas for their government in a challenging environment for a short period of time, and then return to their previous life.

Interested individuals would sign up on a voluntary basis as reservists for four years, with an obligation to deploy for up to twelve months during that period. While on reserve status, they would train for two to three weeks every year, and become U.S. Government employees only when activated for training and deployment. We estimate that at full strength, we could deploy up to 25 percent of the CRC at any given time. We understand that calling up private citizens for service in the CRC would be a serious decision, as it would have implications for families, communities, and employers. Therefore, a call-up would require a Presidential decision and we anticipate this only occurring for major R&S efforts in which the United States is engaged.

The State Department is ready and eager to take on the challenge of building civilian response capacity. In late April, the Department formed an interagency task force that was charged with tackling the final tough questions for the design of the CRC. The task force was led by SCRS, with staff detailed from across the U.S. Government. Once necessary authorities are received and the funds are available, I am confident that the State Department would have the first corps of reservists prepared and ready to deploy within twelve months.

What would this inaugural corps look like? The CRC task force has carefully identified 121 different career skill categories needed in R&S missions. They broke down the first 500 slots accordingly. The initial priority would be for public security and rule of law specialists, with a proposed 350 positions being allocated for those functions. On the public security side, we would recruit for police trainers, patrol police, customs and immigration advisors, evidence and forensics experts, criminal investigators, counter-terrorism and explosives experts and a range of administrative trainers who can assist in rebuilding a government’s law enforcement capability in countries torn apart by conflict. To help reestablish the rule of law, we would recruit corrections experts, prosecutors, judges, defense advisors, court administrators, and specialists in trafficking in persons, organized crime, and war crimes. The remaining 150 reservists would have skills in
essential services, transitional economics and business development, as well as democracy and governance.

We appreciate Congress making available up to $50 million for the CRC in the FY 2007 supplemental appropriations act (P.L. 110-28). This level of funding, would allow us to recruit, hire, and train the first 500 CRC reservists. It will also allow us to pre-position equipment so that they are fully prepared to deploy. In order to use this funding, we need authorization legislation. Senators Lugar and Biden and Congressman Farr and Saxton have proposed such bills (S.613 and HR 1084, respectively). These are important pieces of legislation, and the Administration hopes that they soon can be turned into law.

Multiple outside experts have analyzed the need for civilian personnel and proposed various numbers of staff to respond to international requirements. S.613 legislation calls for an Active Response Corps of 250 and a 2000 person Standby component. The CRC task force has proposed an initial civilian reserve of approximately 2000. This level is premised on the historic need to respond in any given year to 1-3 operations – a small, medium, and large scale operation. If we had those numbers of personnel on board and with the proposed levels of deployment availability, we would be able to put close to 1200 trained and skilled civilians into the field within the first eight weeks of a crisis. This is a significant capability. Future capacity levels will be determined based on our experiences with initial cadres and funding available.

Training
The military would never consider sending soldiers to a conflict zone without proper training and exercises. And neither should we. S/CRS established a training working group that brings together representatives from the State Department, USAID, Defense, Justice, Commerce, USDA, HHS, DHS, Treasury, and the U.S. Institute of Peace. This group fosters collaboration among participating agencies to develop the training necessary to prepare officers for reconstruction and stabilization operations. The training working group is building on and leveraging existing resources. It is therefore connected with the National Security Education Consortium, the Security, Stabilization, Transition, and Reconstruction Senior Leaders Roundtable activities, and many other interagency training venues. This effort supports the President’s May 2007 Executive Order on National Security Professional Development.

To better prepare those engaged in R&S issues, S/CRS has been working with the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute to offer seven courses in conflict transformation, with two more on the way. In FY 2007, we trained 432 government employees – 196 from the State Department and 236 from other agencies. S/CRS officers have also contributed to courses designed for those deploying to PRTs, assisted in the development of courses for Joint Knowledge Online to promote interagency understanding, and presented at the National Defense University and the Army, Navy and Air War Colleges to senior level staff from across the U.S. Government.

All Active Response Corps members attend the full spectrum of S/CRS courses, as well as additional training available through the military, other civilian agencies, international counterparts, and outside organizations. Moving forward, we are looking to expand and formalize training opportunities for Standby Response Corps officers.
INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION

Through the Transformational Diplomacy initiative, Secretary Rice has called on the State Department “to work with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people – and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.” Moreover, NSPD-44 instructs U.S. agencies, with the State Department in the lead, to work with international partners on early warning, conflict prevention and conflict response.

Building civilian capacity for S&R is not just a U.S. priority. We share a commitment with our international partners to prevent states from failing and to resolve both the causes and the consequences of violent conflict. From the beginning, S/CRS has strived to build close working relationships with international partner organizations ranging from the United Nations, to NATO and the European Union, and partner countries like the United Kingdom and Canada. We are also reaching out to other countries such as Australia, Germany, Japan and South Korea. Our work with these international partners has spanned both collaboration on civilian activities and understanding how civilians and militaries can plan and operate together more effectively.

A good example of our multifaceted international engagement can be found in our collaboration with U.S. Joint Forces Command. The JFCOM-led Multinational Experiment (MNE) series aims to improve civil-military cooperation among international partners in a crisis. MNE-4, held in March 2006, brought together eight countries and NATO, with the UN and EU observing. Planning for MNE-5 is underway.

Whether through these kinds of multilateral exercises, or through bilateral efforts, S/CRS consistently strives to increase global capacity to deal with the threats posed by failing or failing states, as well as with the human causes and consequences of conflict. We do this by developing and sharing tools with partners to help ensure we can work together more effectively and efficiently on the ground in a conflict environment.

CONCLUSION

Building civilian capacity for reconstruction and stabilization is essential to our national security and I have no doubt that the U.S. Government will have this capability in the next ten years. The Defense Department has been tremendously supportive of S/CRS’ efforts and has been arguably our greatest advocate. We have benefited greatly from their advice and expertise. The military understand better than anyone how critical R&S capacity is for troops on the ground. But it is also critical that the leadership for coordinating R&S operations and civilian capacity-building remain on the civilian side of the U.S. Government. Civilian leadership facilitates engagement with international and NGO partners who will be looking for – and quite frankly expect – a civilian interlocutor in the field.

Truly building civilian capacity ensures that we are able to partner with the military when necessary for the challenges that lie ahead and to be able to deal with some crises without having to invoke U.S. military power. A civilian R&S capacity would also help relieve the U.S. military
of post-conflict activities, and allow our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines to focus on their primary mission. We still have a long way to go to achieve this, but I can assure you there is strong support for this effort in the Administration. I am confident that with Congressional support, in the next two or three years we will be able to create the response capacity our country needs and our civilians and military in the field deserve.

Thank you.

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Good morning, Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Akin, members of the Subcommittee. It is an honor to be asked to testify in front of this distinguished panel, and I am pleased to be here today to address a compelling issue for the Department and the U.S. Government.

Experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan and other theaters have signaled to the Department of Defense the need to adapt our government institutions so they are better able to face current challenges to our national security and foreign policy interests. As Secretary of Defense Gates noted recently, “Our military must be prepared to undertake the full spectrum of operations – including unconventional or irregular campaigns – for the foreseeable future. [And] the non−military instruments of America’s national power need to be rebuilt, modernized, and committed to the fight.”

In 2005, the Department issued DoD Directive 3000.05 “Military Support to Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations,” by which the Department was instructed to accord stability operations priority comparable to major combat operations. This guidance was to accompany National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44), by which the State Department is leading the development of civilian capabilities and integration with military capabilities to plan, prepare for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction missions.

Since DoD Directive 3000.05 was signed, the Department has taken steps to implement the Directive’s vision by focusing on those areas most likely to generate systemic change throughout our Armed Forces, including: planning, doctrine, training and education, organization, intelligence, and information sharing. Some example initiatives from the past two years are the development of a Joint Operating Concept for Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction and integration of stability operations into Joint and Service capstone doctrine; an Army Action Plan for Stability Operations to provide critical decision points for the development of Army capabilities; adaptation of training and education to increase the focus on non-kinetic activities, cross-cultural communications, and civil-military operations; enhanced intelligence capabilities through use of social science expertise; and inclusion of stability operations in key strategic documents to influence resourcing decisions.

The Department has also supported implementation of NSPD-44 by detailing personnel to the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). These personnel are exploring new interagency concepts for reconstruction and stabilization by providing a testing ground through the Unified Action experimentation series led by U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and by developing a DoD Work Plan to Support NSPD-44 to ensure DoD expertise is appropriately leveraged and interagency efforts led by S/CRS are integrated into evolving DoD capabilities. I am happy to address these issues in further detail as you wish.

1 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Marine Corps Association Annual Dinner, July 18, 2007
Even though such steps have been undertaken, we still have much work ahead of us to implement DoD Directive 3000.5. We recognize such an evolution of our military capabilities requires change throughout the Department, which may take years to realize fully. As we examine the capabilities the military requires, we must define the appropriate role for the military in these types of whole-of-government operations and, particularly, the role of our General Purpose Forces in facing a variety of irregular challenges that were previously the sole purview of our Special Operations Forces. We are also focused on the adjustments to our institutions that are required for improved training and advising capabilities as well as civil-military integration.

In pressing forward with this work, we are looking to integrate lessons not just from Afghanistan and Iraq, but also other historical missions. We are aware that on the ground today, as in previous conflicts, our military and civilian personnel are devising ingenious adaptations to address the challenges they face. It is my office’s role to examine which of those adaptations must be institutionalized so we are better prepared in the future.

Organizing, training, equipping, and advising indigenous armies and police have become key missions for the military as a whole and no longer niche missions for our Special Operations Forces. Per the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, we are working to ensure General Purpose Forces are structured and prepared for these new roles, while maintaining an appropriate balance with capabilities oriented toward more traditional missions. Examples include the establishment of the Kabul Counterinsurgency Academy to teach counterinsurgency best practices to U.S., NATO, Coalition, and Afghan troops and the training programs of U.S. embedded advisors for Iraq underway at Ft. Riley and 29 Palms.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq are a key civil-military adaptation that we are examining. As we work with S/CRS in implementing NSPD-44, we aim to take the best from that tool set in order to build even more effective civil-military teams that can help respond to a variety of contingencies in the future. We are also looking at ways to expand upon our tactical, military-oriented lessons learned collection capabilities to develop a government-wide process to capture and disseminate lessons learned on interagency operations. Such a tool is critical in our efforts to institutionalize the best adaptations emerging from the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq.

In order for field-level civil-military integration to be effective, we need higher-level integration throughout our planning and our capabilities development processes. We are making progress on this front. We have worked with S/CRS closely on their development of a Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation, an Essential Task Matrix for operations, and the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction & Stabilization – a standard structure to coordinate planning and operations across multiple levels of the U.S. government, including integrated, interagency civil-military teams in the field. This construct was approved by Senior Leaders earlier this year and continues to undergo testing and refinement, partially through inclusion in military exercises. Within the Department, my office has played a key role in ensuring early and effective inclusion of civilian agency expertise and incorporation of stability operations into all relevant aspects of military strategic and operational planning.
As stated in DoD Directive 3000.05, the Department of Defense may be called upon to fill some gaps in U.S. government capabilities for stabilization missions in the short-term during operations and when civilians are unable to provide capabilities. Strategic success in such operations, however, will only be possible with a complete architecture for unified civil-military planning, deployment, and action -- from the earliest time possible -- and dedication of the resources necessary to create and expand the expeditionary capabilities of civilian agencies. We need a strong civilian partner to deal with conflict and instability not only alongside the military but before they become military requirements.

As I move forward in my role as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities my priorities are to use the lessons we have learned from past and current operations around the globe to ensure we have the right mix of capabilities within the General Purpose Force, improve training and advising capabilities, advance civil-military integration, and institutionalize the best practices for military contributions to stabilization and reconstruction operations.
Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
Actions Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for Future Operations

Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director
International Affairs and Trade, and
Janet A. St. Laurent, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management
STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

Actions Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for Future Operations

What GAO Found

State and DOD have begun to take steps to better coordinate stabilization and reconstruction activities, but several significant challenges may hinder their ability to integrate planning for potential operations and strengthen military and civilian capabilities to conduct them. State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is developing a framework for U.S. agencies to use when planning stabilization and reconstruction operations, but the framework has yet to be fully applied to any operation. The National Security Council has not approved the entire framework, guidance related to the framework is unclear, and some interagency partners have not accepted it. For example, some interagency partners stated that the framework’s planning process is cumbersome and too time consuming for the results it produces. While steps have been taken to address concerns and strengthen the framework’s effectiveness, differences in planning capacities and procedures among U.S. government agencies may pose obstacles to effective coordination.

DOD has taken several positive steps to improve its ability to conduct stability operations but faces challenges in developing capabilities and measures of effectiveness, integrating the contributions of non-DOD agencies into military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons learned from past operations into future plans. These challenges, if not addressed, may hinder DOD’s ability to fully coordinate and integrate stabilization and reconstruction activities with other agencies or to develop the full range of capabilities those operations may require. Among its many efforts, DOD has developed a new policy, planning construct, and joint operating concept with a greater focus on stability operations, and each service is pursuing efforts to improve capabilities. However, adequate guidance, practices that inhibit sharing of planning information with non-DOD organizations, and differences in the planning capabilities and capacities of DOD and non-DOD organizations hinder the effectiveness of these improvement efforts.

Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to deploy rapidly to international crises, but significant challenges must be addressed before they will be fully capable. State and other agencies face challenges in establishing two of these units—the Active Response Corps and Standing Response Corps—because of staffing and resource constraints and concerns that stabilization and reconstruction operations are not core missions for each parent organization. Congress has not yet enacted legislation necessary for State to obligate funds for the third unit, the Civilian Reserve Corps, staffed solely with non-federal volunteers. Further, State has not fully defined the types of missions these personnel would be deployed to support.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Department of State:

1. Issue formal guidance to improve the planning process for future stabilization and reconstruction operations.

2. Coordinate directly with the NSC and other agencies to improve the utility and effectiveness of the stabilization and reconstruction framework.

3. Incorporate the planning construct and joint operating concept into all future operations.

4. Establish a strategy to address the inherent differences in planning capacities and procedures among U.S. government agencies.

5. More fully develop a new policy, planning construct, and joint operating concept with a greater focus on stability operations.

6. Establish a strategy to address the inherent differences in planning capacities and procedures among U.S. government agencies.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the goals, opportunities, and challenges to improving an integrated government approach to stability and reconstruction operations, which is becoming an increasingly important aspect of our national security. Stabilization and reconstruction operations may include efforts to reestablish security, strengthen governance, rebuild infrastructure, and improve social and economic well-being in foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. These operations have increasingly become a central operational mission for the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (State), highlighted by experiences in the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The Defense Science Board's 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities noted that since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been involved in either a stability or reconstruction operation every 18 to 24 months, these operations typically last 5 to 8 years, and they are costly in terms of human lives and dollars.

In December 2005, the President issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), which established the overall government-wide policy related to interagency efforts for stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The purpose of NSPD-44 is to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for stabilization and reconstruction assistance to foreign states and regions. NSPD-44 assigned the responsibility for coordinating and leading integrated federal efforts to plan for and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities to the Secretary of State. It further stated that the Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmony with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. State and DOD have emphasized that success in stabilization and reconstruction efforts will depend heavily upon the ability to develop an integrated, interagency approach, and they have initiated steps to facilitate this shift in focus.

Our testimony today will address (1) Department of State efforts to improve interagency planning and coordination for stabilization and reconstruction operations, (2) Department of Defense efforts to enhance stability operations capabilities and plans, and (3) State efforts to develop a civilian response capability.
Our testimony is based on recently completed or ongoing work that addresses DOD and State efforts to enhance and better integrate stability and reconstruction capabilities. In May 2007, we issued a report to Representative Christopher Shays, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, on the DOD's approach to stability operations and interagency planning and made several recommendations for executive action. We are also completing work for Representative Shays and this subcommittee on State's interagency planning framework and civilian response capacities, and we have prepared a draft report summarizing our results. We are reviewing State's comments on our draft report and are developing recommendations to address the problems cited in this statement. For both our prior report and ongoing work, we obtained and analyzed National Security Presidential Directives, DOD, State, and other relevant agencies' internal policies; planning guidance; operational plans; budget requests and funding allocations for stability and reconstruction efforts. We met with cognizant officials from the Departments of Defense, State, Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, Justice and the Treasury, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and private research centers. We also met with various officials and military planners from the U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Pacific Command and, collectively, 14 component commands. While NSPD-44 also charges State with coordinating U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts with foreign governments, multilateral organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, these areas lie outside the scope of our review. Our work was conducted from October 2006 through September 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Summary

State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (SORDS) is developing a framework for U.S. agencies to use when planning and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations for countries at risk of, in, or emerging from conflict. The National Security Council (NSC) has adopted two of three elements of the framework—an Interagency Management System and procedures for initiating the

\[\text{GAO-08-577T} \]
framework's use. However, the third element—a guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations—has not been approved or completed. While SC/RS has tested parts of the framework, it has not fully applied it to any stabilization and reconstruction operation. In completing the framework, State must address three unresolved issues. First, NSDP-44, the Foreign Affairs Manual, and the framework provide unclear and inconsistent guidance on the roles and responsibilities of SC/RS and State's other bureaus and offices. Second, the lack of a common definition for stability and reconstruction operations may pose an obstacle to interagency collaboration. Third, some interagency partners expressed concerns over the importance and utility of the framework, stating that the framework is cumbersome and time-consuming for the results it has produced.

DOD has taken several positive steps to improve its ability to conduct stability operations but faces challenges in identifying needed capabilities and measures of effectiveness, integrating the contributions of non-DOD agencies into military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other operations into future plans. These challenges, if not addressed, may hinder DOD's ability to fully coordinate and integrate stabilization and reconstruction activities with other elements of national power, or to develop the full range of capabilities those operations may require. Since November 2005, the department issued a new directive focused on stability operations, expanded its military planning guidance, and developed a joint operating concept to help guide DOD planning for stability operations. Notwithstanding these positive and important steps, however, DOD has encountered challenges in identifying stability operations capabilities and developing measures of effectiveness—both of which are key tasks required by DOD's recent directive and important steps in performance-based management. In addition, DOD is taking steps to develop more comprehensive military plans related to stability operations, but it has not established adequate mechanisms at the combatant command to facilitate and encourage interagency participation in its planning efforts. This shortcoming has occurred due to inadequate guidance, DOD practices that limit the sharing of planning information without the specific consent of

\[\text{In this testimony, we use the term "framework" to refer to the key elements developed in plan and coordinate stabilization and reconstruction operations under NSDP-44. The first section of our testimony discusses three elements for planning these operations, while civilian response mechanisms, which SC/RS considers a fourth element, are discussed later in this testimony.}\]
the Secretary of Defense, and differences in the planning capabilities and capacities of all organizations involved. Also, although DOD collects lessons learned from past and ongoing operations, DOD planners are not consistently using these lessons learned as they develop future contingency plans. We have recommended that DOD take several actions, such as providing more comprehensive guidance to combatant commanders and the services on how to identify and prioritize stability operations capabilities and the mechanisms needed to facilitate and encourage interagency participation in the development of military plans. We have also suggested that Congress require DOD to develop an action plan and report annually on its efforts to address our recommendations.

Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to deploy rapidly to international crises but has not addressed key details for establishing and maintaining these units. State created two units within the department—an Active Response Corps (ARC) and Standby Response Corps (SRC) to serve as early responders to an international crisis. State also has collaborated with other U.S. government agencies to create similar units. In May 2007, State received funding, subject to further congressional authorization, to establish a third corps—the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC)—which would deploy a cadre of civilian volunteers such as police officers, judges, public administrators, and civil engineers. However, State and other agencies face challenges in establishing their response corps, including difficulties in (1) achieving planned staffing levels and required training, (2) securing resources for international operations that some agencies do not view as part of their domestic missions, and (3) ensuring that home units are not understaffed as a result of overseas deployments. State faces additional challenges in creating the Civilian Reserve Corps. State does not yet have congressional authority to establish the corps and offer personnel an attractive benefits package. Further, State is moving the civilian reserve concept forward without a common interagency definition of what constitutes a stabilization and reconstruction operation. We are reviewing State Department’s comments on our draft report and developing recommendations to address the problems cited in this statement.

Background

Both State and DOD recognize the need to improve stability and reconstruction capabilities of the United States, and the importance of coordinating military activities with those of other U.S. government agencies and international partners. Following the problems with reconstruction efforts in Iraq in the Fall of 2003, State noted that the U.S. government had no standing civilian capacity to plan, implement, or
manage stabilization and reconstruction operations and had relied on ad
hoc processes for planning and executing these efforts. State
recommended that a new office be established to provide a centralized
and permanent structure for planning and coordinating the civilian
response to stabilization and reconstruction operations.

In August 2004, the Secretary of State announced the creation of the Office
of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (SCRS) to
coordinate U.S. efforts to prepare, plan, and resource responses to
complex emergencies, failing and failed states, and post-conflict
environments. Such efforts could involve establishing security, building
basic public services, and economic development. The Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2005 granted statutory authorization for SCRS
within the Office of the Secretary of State.1

In November 2005, DOD issued DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support
for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
Operations, which established the Department’s policy for stability
operations. In its directive, DOD recognizes that stability operations is a
core U.S. military mission, but that many stability operations are best
performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals and that
DOD’s participation may be in a supporting role. However, it also states
that U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to
establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.

In December 2006, President Bush issued NSPD-44 to promote the security
of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and
implementation of stabilization and reconstruction assistance. NSPD-44
assigned the Secretary of State the responsibility to coordinate and lead
U.S. government efforts to plan for, prepare and conduct stabilization and
reconstruction operations in countries and regions at risk of, in, or in
transition from conflict or civil strife. The Secretary, in turn, delegated
implementation of the directive to SCRS. NSPD-44 identifies roles,
responsibilities, and coordination requirements of U.S. government
agencies that would likely participate in stabilization and reconstruction
operations. It also requires that State lead the development of civilian
response capability, including the capacity to ensure that the United States
can respond quickly and effectively to overseas crises. Finally, NSPD-44
established the NSC Policy Coordination Committee for Reconstruction

State's Planning Framework Lacks Full NSC Approval, Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities, and Interagency Support

SCRS has led an interagency effort to develop a framework for planning and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations. The NSC has adopted two of three elements of the framework—the Interagency Management System (IMS) and procedures for initiating the framework’s use. One element—a guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations—has not been completed. As of October 2007, the framework has not been fully applied to any operation. In addition, NSPD-44, the Foreign Affairs Manual, and the framework provide unclear and inconsistent guidance on roles and responsibilities for SCRS and other State bureaus and offices; the lack of a common definition for stability and reconstruction operations may pose an obstacle to interagency collaboration, and some partners have shown limited support for the framework and SCRS.

SCRS is Leading the Development of an Interagency Framework for Planning and Coordinating U.S. Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

SCRS is leading an NSC interagency group of 16 agencies to create a framework for developing specific stabilization and reconstruction plans under NSPD-44. The framework is intended to guide the development of U.S. planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations by facilitating coordination across federal agencies and aligning interagency efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Key elements of the framework include an IMS, a guide for planning specific stabilization and reconstruction operations, and procedures for initiating government-wide planning.

The IMS, the first element of the framework, was created to manage high-priority and highly complex crises and operations. In March 2007, the NSC approved the IMS, which would guide coordination between Washington, D.C. policymakers, Chiefs of Mission, and civilian and military planners. If used, IMS would include three new interagency groups for responding to specific crises: a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group, an Integration Planning Cell, and an Advance Civilian Team. The Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group would be responsible for developing U.S. government policies that integrate civilian and military plans and for mobilizing civilian responses to stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Integration Planning Cell would integrate U.S. civilian agencies’ plans with military operators. The Advance Civilian Teams would be deployed to U.S. embassies to set up, coordinate, and
conduct field operations and provide expertise on implementing civilian operations to the Chief of Mission and military field commanders. These teams would be supported by Field Advance Civilian Teams to assist reconstruction efforts at the local level.

The second element of the framework, which the NSC approved in March 2007, establishes procedures for initiating the use of the framework for planning a U.S. response to an actual crisis or in longer-term scenario-based planning. Factors that may trigger the use of the framework include the potential for military action, actual or imminent state failure, the potential for regional instability, displacement of large numbers of people, and grave human rights violations. The use of the framework for planning crisis responses may be initiated by the NSC or by a direct request from the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense. The NSC, Chiefs of Mission, and Regional Assistant Secretaries of State may request the framework's initiation for longer-term scenario planning for crises that may occur within 2 to 3 years.

The third element, the planning guide, has not been approved by the NSC because State is rewriting the draft planning guide to address interagency concerns. Although NSC approval of the draft planning guide is not required, SCIS officials stated that NSC approval would lend authority to the framework and strengthen its standing among interagency partners. The draft planning guide divides planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations into three levels: policy formulation, strategy development, and implementation planning. The guide states that the goals and objectives at each level should be achievable, be linked to planned activities, and include well-defined measures for determining progress.

As of October 2007, the administration had not fully applied the framework to any stabilization and reconstruction operation. While IMS was approved by the NSC, the administration has not yet applied it to a current or potential crisis. The administration also applied earlier versions of one component of the framework—the planning guide—for efforts in

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In completing the framework, State must resolve three key problems. First, NSPD-44, the *Foreign Affairs Manual*, and the framework provide unclear and inconsistent guidance on the roles and responsibilities of S/CRS and State’s bureaus and offices, resulting in confusion and disputes about who should lead policy development and control resources for stabilization and reconstruction operations. The *Foreign Affairs Manual* does not define S/CRS’s roles and responsibilities, but it does define responsibilities for State’s regional bureaus and chiefs of mission. Each regional bureau is responsible for providing direction, coordination, and supervision of U.S. activities in countries within the region, while each chief of mission has authority over all U.S. government staff and activities in the country. Moreover, according to S/CRS’s initial interpretation of NSPD-44, it was responsible for leading, planning, and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations. Staff from one of State’s regional bureaus said that S/CRS had enlarged its role in a way that conflicted with the Regional Assistant Secretary’s responsibility for leading an operation and coordinating with interagency partners. More recently, according to S/CRS officials, S/CRS has taken a more facilitative role in implementing NSPD-44.

Second, the lack of a common definition for stability and reconstruction operations may pose an obstacle to effective interagency collaboration under the framework. The framework does not define what constitutes stabilization or reconstruction operations, including what specific missions and activities would be involved. In addition, the framework does not explain how these operations differ from other types of military and civilian operations, such as counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and development assistance. As a result, it is not clear when, where, or how the administration would apply the framework. In our October 2006 report, we found that collaborative efforts require agency staff to define...

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1 NSPD-44 organized the NSC and its committees for the current administration.
2 *Foreign Affairs Manual*, 1 FAM 112 (a).
3 22 U.S.C. 2657.
and articulate a common outcome or purpose. Prior GAO work shows that the lack of a clear definition can pose an obstacle to improved planning and coordination of stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Third, some interagency partners and State staff expressed concern over the framework’s importance and utility. For example, some interagency partners and staffs from various State offices said that senior officials did not communicate strong support for SCRS or the expectation that State and interagency partners should use the framework. SCRS has not been given key roles for operations that emerged after its creation, such as the ongoing efforts in Lebanon and Somalia, which several officials and experts stated are the types of operations SCRS was created to address. In addition, USAID staff noted that some aspects of the planning framework were unrealistic, ineffective, and redundant because interagency teams had already devised planning processes for ongoing operations in accordance with NSPD-1. Further, some interagency partners believe the planning process, as outlined in the draft planning guide, is too cumbersome and time consuming for the results it produces. Although officials who participated in planning for Haiti stated that the process provided more systematic planning, some involved in the operations for Haiti and Sudan said that the framework was too focused on process. Staff also said that in some cases, the planning process did not improve outcomes or increase resources, particularly since SCRS has few resources to offer. As a result, officials from some offices and agencies have expressed reluctance to work with SCRS on future stabilization and reconstruction plans.

DOD Is Developing a New Approach to Stability Operations, But Faces Significant Challenges to Improve Capabilities and Planning

DOD has taken several positive steps toward developing a new approach to stability operations but has encountered challenges in several areas. As discussed in our May 2007 report, since November 2003, the department issued a new policy, expanded its military planning guidance, and developed a joint operating concept to help guide DOD planning for stability operations. However, because DOD has not yet fully identified and prioritized stability operations capabilities as required by DOD’s new policy, the services are pursuing initiatives that may not provide the comprehensive set of capabilities that combatant commanders need to accomplish stability operations in the future. Also, DOD has made limited progress in developing measures of effectiveness as required by DOD Directive 3000.05, which may hinder the department’s ability to determine if its efforts to improve stability operations capabilities are achieving the desired results. Similarly, the combatant commanders are establishing working groups and other outreach efforts to include non-DOD organizations in the development of a wide range of military plans that combatant commanders routinely develop, but these efforts have had a limited effect because of inadequate guidance, practices that inhibit sharing of planning information, and differences in the planning capabilities and capacities of all organizations involved. Finally, although DOD collects lessons learned from past operations, DOD does not have a process to ensure that lessons learned are considered when plans are reviewed. As a result, DOD heightens its risk of either repeating past mistakes or being unable to build on its experiences from past operations as it plans for future operations.

DOD Is Developing a New Approach to Stability Operations

Among the many improvement efforts under way, DOD has taken three key steps that frame its approach to stability operations. First, in November 2005, DOD published DOD Directive 3000.05, which formalized a stability operations policy that elevated stability operations to a core mission, gave such operations priority comparable to combat operations, and stated that stability operations will be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities, including doctrine, training, education, exercises, and planning. The directive also states that many stability operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S.

civilians, but that U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to maintain order when civilians cannot do so. The directive assigned approximately 115 specific responsibilities to 18 DOD organizations. For example, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for, among other things, identifying DOD-wide stability operations capabilities, and recommending priorities to the Secretary of Defense, and submitting a semiannual stability operations report to the Secretary of Defense.

A second step taken by DOD to improve stability operations was to broaden its military planning guidance beyond DOD's traditional emphasis on combat operations for joint operations to include noncombat activities to stabilize countries or regions and prevent hostilities and postcombat activities that emphasize stabilization, reconstruction, and transition governance to civil authorities. Figure 1 illustrates the change in DOD planning guidance.

"Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0."
As shown in figure 1, military planners in DOD's combatant commands will now be required to plan for six phases of an operation, which include new phases focused on (1) shaping efforts to stabilize regions so that conflicts do not develop and (2) enabling civil authorities. These are also the phases of an operation that will require significant unity of effort and close coordination between DOD and other federal agencies.

A third step taken by DOD that frames the approach to stability operations was the publication, by Joint Forces Command, of the Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept. This publication will serve as a basis for how
the military will support stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations in foreign countries in the next 15 to 20 years.

The military services also have taken complementary actions to improve stability operations capabilities. For example, the Marine Corps has established a program to improve cultural awareness training, increased civil affairs planning in its operational headquarters, and established a Security Cooperation Training Center. Navy officials highlighted service efforts to (1) align its strategic plan and operations concept to support stability operations, (2) establish the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, and (3) dedicate Foreign Area Officers to specific countries as their key efforts to improve stability operations capabilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Challenges Hinder DOD's Ability to Develop Capabilities and Encourage Interagency Participation in Combinant Command Planning Efforts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>We have identified four specific challenges that if not addressed, may hinder DOD's ability to develop the full range of capabilities needed for stability operations, or to facilitate interagency participation in the routine planning activities at the combatant commands.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOD has not identified and prioritized the full range of capabilities needed for stability operations.</strong> At the time of our review, DOD had made limited progress in fully identifying and prioritizing capabilities needed for stability operations, which was required by DOD Directive 3000.65. In the absence of DOD-wide guidance, a variety of approaches were being used by the combatant commanders to identify stability operations' capabilities and requirements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| We identified two factors that limited DOD's progress in carrying out the capability gap assessment process. First, at the time of our review, DOD had not issued its 2007 planning guidance to the combatant commanders that reflect the new 6-phase approach to planning previously discussed in this testimony. This planning guidance forms the basis on which combatant commanders develop operational plans and identify needed capabilities. Second, there was significant confusion over how to define stability operations. For example, Air Force officials stated in their ________________

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials stated they intended to identify capabilities through an iterative process known as capability gap assessments. They envisioned that geographic combatant commanders would conduct theater-specific, scenario-driven assessments of forces and capabilities required for contingencies through routine DOD planning processes, compare planned requirements for stability operations with current available forces and capabilities, and propose resources for eliminating any gaps in capability that they identify.
May 22, 2006, Stability Operations Self-Assessment that the absence of a common lexicon for stability operations functions, tasks, and actions results in unnecessary confusion and uncertainty when addressing stability operations. This lack of a clear and consistent definition of stability operations has caused confusion across DOD about how to identify stability operations activities and the end state for which commanders need to plan.

Because of the fragmented efforts being taken by combatant commands to identify requirements, and the different approaches taken by the services to develop capabilities, the potential exists that the department may not be identifying and prioritizing the most critical capabilities needed by the combatant commanders, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has not been able to recommend capability priorities to the Secretary of Defense. The department recognizes the importance of successfully completing these capability assessments, and in the August 2006 report on stability operations to the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary stated that the department has not yet defined the magnitude of DOD’s stability operations capability deficiencies, and that clarifying the scope of these capability gaps continues to be a priority within the department.

- **DOD has made limited progress in developing measures of effectiveness.** DOD Directive 5000.65 required numerous organizations within DOD to develop measures of effectiveness that could be used to evaluate progress in meeting their respective goals outlined in the directive. Our past work on DOD transformation reported the advantages of using management tools, such as performance measures, to gauge performance in helping organizations successfully manage major transformation efforts. Performance measures are an important results-oriented management tool that can enable managers to determine the extent to which desired outcomes are being achieved. Performance measures should include a baseline and target, be objective, measurable, and quantifiable, and include specific time frames. Results-oriented measures further ensure that it is not the task itself being evaluated, but progress in achieving the intended outcome.

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Despite this emphasis on developing performance measures, however, as of March 2007, we found that DOD achieved limited progress in developing measures of effectiveness because of significant confusion over how this task should be accomplished and minimal guidance provided by the Office of Policy. For example, each of the services described to us alternative approaches it was taking to develop measures of effectiveness, and three services initially placed this task on hold pending guidance from DOD. Officials in the combatant commands we visited were either waiting for additional guidance or stated that there were no actions taken to develop measures of effectiveness. Without clear departmentwide guidance on how to develop measures of effectiveness and milestones for completing them, confusion may continue to exist within the department, and progress on this important management tool may be significantly hindered.

- **DOD has not fully established mechanisms that would help it achieve consistent interagency participation in the military planning process.** The combatant commanders routinely develop a wide range of military plans for potential contingencies for which DOD may need to seek input from other agencies or organizations. Within the combatant commands where contingency plans are developed, the department is either beginning to establish working groups or is reaching out to U.S. embassies on an ad hoc basis to obtain interagency perspectives. But this approach to coordinate with embassies on an ad hoc basis can be cumbersome, does not facilitate interagency participation in the actual planning process, and does not include all organizations that may be able to contribute to the operation being planned.

Three factors hinder interagency participation in DOD’s routine planning activities at the combatant commands. First, DOD has not provided specific guidance to the commands on how to integrate planning with non-DOD organizations. Second, DOD does not have a process in place to facilitate the sharing of planning information with non-DOD agencies because department policy is to not share DOD contingency plans with agencies or offices outside of DOD unless directed by the Secretary of Defense. Third, DOD and non-DOD organizations, such as State and USAID, lack an understanding of each other’s planning processes and capabilities and have different planning cultures and capacities.

- **DOD collects lessons learned from past operations, but planners are not consistently using this information as they develop future contingency plans.** Lessons learned from current and past operations are being captured and incorporated into various databases, but our analysis shows
that DOD planners are not using this information on a consistent basis as plans are revised or developed. Three factors contribute to this inconsistent use of lessons learned in planning: (1) DOD's guidance for incorporating lessons learned into plans is outdated and does not specifically require planners to include lessons learned in the planning process, (2) accessing and searching lessons-learned databases is cumbersome, and (3) the planning review process does not evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are incorporated into specific plans. As a result, DOD is not fully utilizing the results of the lessons-learned systems and may repeat past mistakes.

In our May 2007 report, we recommended that DOD provide comprehensive guidance to enhance their efforts to (1) identify and address capability gaps, (2) develop measures of effectiveness, and (3) facilitate interagency participation in the development of military plans. We also recommended that the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Secretary of State develop a process to share planning information with interagency representatives early in the development of military contingency plans, and more fully incorporate stability operations-related lessons learned into the planning process. DOD partially agreed with our recommendations but did not state what specific steps, if any, it plans to take to implement them. Therefore, we included a matter for congressional consideration suggesting that Congress consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to develop an action plan and report annually on the specific steps being taken to address our recommendations and the current status of its efforts.

State Is Establishing Three Civilian Corps but Must Address Staffing Issues and Seek Additional Congressional Approvals

Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to deploy rapidly to international crises. State has established two internal units made up of State employees—the Active Response Corps (ARC) and the Standby Response Corps (SRC). In May 2007, State began an effort to establish the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC), which would be made up of nonfederal civilians who would become full-time term federal employees. State and other agencies face difficulties in establishing positions and recruiting personnel for the ARC and training SRC volunteers; securing resources for international operations not viewed as part of the agencies' domestic mission; and addressing the possibility that deployed volunteers could result in staff shortages for the home unit. For the CRC, State needs

\[\text{GAO-08-338T}\]
further congressional authorization to establish the Corps and provide compensation packages. Further, State is moving the civilian reserve concept forward without a common interagency definition of stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Agencies Have Partially Staffed Active and Standby Response Corps; Civilian Reserve Corps Still a Concept

To meet NSPD-44 requirements for establishing a strong civilian response capability, State and other U.S. agencies are developing three corps of civilians to support stabilization and reconstruction operations. Table 1 summarizes the three civilian corps.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Composition of Volunteers</th>
<th>Deployment</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
<th>Personnel, as of 2007</th>
<th>Government-wide personnel goal, for FY 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Response Corps (ARC)</td>
<td>Current State employees serving 1-year rotations as first responders</td>
<td>Within 24-48 hours for 3-6 months</td>
<td>Deploy to unstable environments to support a U.S. mission, engage with host country government, and conduct assessments in the field</td>
<td>11 field positions; 15 approved temporary positions</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standby Response Corps (SRC)</td>
<td>Current and retired State employees available as second responders</td>
<td>Within 30-60 days for up to 6 months</td>
<td>Deploy to unstable environments to assist ARC when additional or specialized personnel are needed</td>
<td>91 current State employees ready to deploy; 209 retirees on roster</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC)</td>
<td>Non-U.S. government employees with expertise in critical areas serving 4-year terms</td>
<td>Within 30-60 days for up to 1 year</td>
<td>Rapidly deploy to a country in crisis to conduct assessments; design, implement and evaluate programs; manage contracts, etc.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GAO analysis of State Department information.

In 2006, State established the ARC within SCRS, whose members would deploy during the initial stage of a U.S. stabilization and reconstruction operation. These first responders would deploy to unstable environments to assess countries’ or regions’ needs and help plan, coordinate, and monitor a U.S. government response. Since 2006, SCRS has deployed ARC staff to Sudan, Eastern Chad, Lebanon, Kosovo, Liberia, Iraq, and Haiti. When not deployed, ARC members engage in training and other planning exercises and work with other SCRS offices and State bureaus on related issues to gain relevant expertise.
Members of the SRC would deploy during the second stage of a stabilization and reconstruction operation and would supplement ABC staff or provide specialized skills needed for the stabilization and reconstruction operation. When not deployed, SRC employees serve in other capacities throughout State. Through October 2007, SCRS has deployed SRC members to Sudan in support of the Darfur Peace Agreement and to Chad to support Darfur refugees who had migrated into the country.

SCRS has worked to establish Active and Standby Response Corps in other U.S. agencies that could be drawn upon during the initial stage of a stabilization and reconstruction operation. Currently, only USAID and the Department of the Treasury have established units to respond rapidly to stability and reconstruction missions and have identified staff available for immediate deployment to a crisis. In July 2007, the NSC approved SCRS plans to establish a governmentwide SRC with 500 volunteers by fiscal year 2008 and 2,000 volunteers by fiscal year 2010.

In 2007, State received authority to make available funds to establish a CRC. This corps’ staff would be deployed to support stabilization and reconstruction operations for periods of time longer than the Active and Standby Response Corps. The CRC would be comprised of U.S. civilians from the private sector, state and local governments, and nongovernmental organizations who have skills not readily available within the U.S. government. These reservists would remain in their nonfederal jobs until called upon for service and, when deployed, would be classified as full-time term federal employees. They would have the authority to speak for the U.S. government and manage U.S. government contracts and employees. These personnel would receive training upon joining CRC and would be required to complete annual training. In addition, they would receive training specific and relevant to an operation immediately before deployment.

**The Administration Faces Several Challenges in Establishing the Three Civilian Corps**

Based on our work to date, State and other agencies face the following challenges in establishing and expanding their Active and Standby Response Corps.

- SCRS has had difficulty establishing positions and recruiting personnel for ABC and training SRC volunteers. SCRS plans to increase the number of authorized staff positions for ABC from 15 temporary positions to 50 permanent positions, which State included in its 2008 budget request. However, according to SCRS staff, it is unlikely that State will receive...
authority to establish all 33 positions. Further, S/CRS has had trouble recruiting ARC personnel, and as shown in Table 1, S/CRS has only been able to recruit 11 of the 15 approved ARC positions. State also does not presently have the capacity to train the 1,500 new SBC volunteers that S/CRS plans to recruit in 2008. S/CRS is studying ways to correct the situation.

- Many agencies that operate overseas have limited numbers of staff available for rapid responses to overseas crises because their missions are domestic in nature. Officials from the Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, and Justice said that their agencies or their appropriators do not view international programs as central to their missions. As a result, it is difficult for these agencies to secure funding for deployments to active stabilization and reconstruction operations, whether as part of a cadre of on-call first and second responders or for longer-term assistance programs.

- State and other agencies said that deploying volunteers can result in staff shortages in their home units; thus, they must weigh the value of deploying volunteers against the needs of their units. For example, according to State's Office of the Inspector General, S/CRS has had difficulty getting State's other units to release the SBC volunteers it wants to deploy in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations. Other agencies also reported a reluctance to deploy staff overseas or to establish on-call units because doing so would leave fewer workers available to complete the agencies' work requirements.

State also faces several challenges in establishing the CRC. In 2007, Congress granted State the authority to make available up to $00 million of Diplomatic and Consular Programs funds in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental to support and maintain the CRC. However, the legislation specified that no money may be obligated without specific authorization.


2Some civil agencies recently agreed to identify, train, and deploy employees to stabilization and reconstruction operations if State funds the efforts. According to S/CRS officials, however, the training and deployment of non-State ARC and SBC staff would not begin until at least Fiscal year 2008.

for the CRC's establishment in a subsequent act of Congress. Legislation that would authorize the CRC is pending in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, but as of October 2007, neither chamber had taken action on the bills. 8

In addition, State needs congressional authority to provide key elements of a planned compensation package for CRC personnel. 9 Proposed legislation would allow State to provide the same compensation and benefits to deployed CRC personnel as it does to members of the Foreign Service, including health, life, and death benefits; mission-specific awards and incentive pay; and overtime pay and compensatory time. However, the proposed legislation does not address whether deployed CRC personnel would have competitive hiring status for other positions within State or whether the time deployed would count toward government retirement benefits. In addition, deployed CRC personnel would not have reemployment rights similar to those for military reservists. Currently, military reservists who are voluntarily or involuntarily called into service have the right to return to their previous places of employment upon completion of their military service requirements. 10

Further, SCRS is moving the CRC concept forward without a common interagency definition of stabilization and reconstruction operations. According to SCRS staff and pending legislation that would authorize CRC, reservists would deploy to nonhumanitarian stabilization and reconstruction missions. However, SCRS has not defined what these missions would be and how they would differ from other foreign assistance operations. A common interagency definition of what constitutes a stabilization and reconstruction operation is needed to determine the corps' structure, the missions it would support, and the skills and training its volunteers would need.

8 See 110th Congress, S. 643 and H.R. 1144.
9 These benefits would include, among other things, salary commensurate with experience; danger, hardship, and other mission-specific pays, benefits, and allowances; recruitment bonuses for hard-to-fill positions; overtime pay and compensatory time; competitive hiring status; federal health, life, and death benefits; and medical treatment while deployed, and dual compensation for retired federal workers.
Conclusions

State and DOD have begun to take steps to enhance and better coordinate stability and reconstruction activities, but several significant challenges may hinder their ability to successfully integrate planning for potential future operations and strengthen military and civilian capabilities to conduct them. Specifically, without an interagency planning framework and clearly defined roles and responsibilities, achieving unity of effort in stabilization and reconstruction operations, as envisioned by NSPD-44, may continue to be difficult to achieve. Also, unless DOD develops a better approach for including other agencies in the development of combatant commander military contingency plans, DOD’s plans may continue to reflect a DOD-centric view of how potential conflicts may unfold. Moreover, better guidance on how DOD should identify and prioritize capability gaps, measure progress, and incorporate lessons learned into future planning is needed to ensure that DOD is using its available resources to address the highest priority gaps in its stability operations capabilities. Finally, unless State develops and implements a sound plan to bolster civilian capabilities to support stability and reconstruction operations and establish a capable civilian reserve corps, DOD may continue to be heavily relied upon to provide needed stability and reconstruction capabilities, rather than leveraging expertise that resides more appropriately in civilian agencies.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our prepared remarks. We would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

October 30, 2007
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER

Dr. SNYDER. NSPD–44 designates the Secretary of State as the lead for coordinating and integrating U.S. Government efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.

— What have been the most significant challenges that State, and S/CRS in particular, have faced as they attempted to coordinate and integrate U.S. government stabilization and reconstruction activities in the form of PRTs and their interface with other State and USAID and military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and how have these challenges informed your work in S/CRS?

Ambassador HERBST. Consistent with NSPD–44, the Secretary of State has directed the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to develop the mechanisms needed to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize civilian capability to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a more sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy. However, S/CRS was created after the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq were underway, and it has not been directly involved in the management of the PRTs.

Instead, over the three years since it was established, S/CRS has begun to create a fundamentally new approach to enable more timely, integrated, and effective management of U.S. Government efforts in reconstruction and stabilization. This new approach draws on lessons learned from the U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, in particular the importance of ensuring that adequate civilian resources are available to conduct effective reconstruction and stabilization operations and the need to maximize unity of effort among civilian agencies and between civilians and the military in pursuit of a common strategic objective.

For instance, in Afghanistan, S/CRS has developed a planning methodology with CJTF–82, the operational U.S. military headquarters in Afghanistan, and the Embassy to improve interagency PRT planning as well as to train new PRT leaders. Lessons from S/CRS' current work on PRTs in Afghanistan are being applied in the IMS operations guide, which, for example, lays out coordination procedures between the FACTs and the other structures in the IMS.

On the larger question, improved performance in future reconstruction and stabilization missions requires modification of long-standing bureaucratic practices and creation of new habitual relationships, lines of communication, and forms of cooperation. Creating these new forms of cooperation and securing the resources to carry out its mandate have been among the most significant challenges S/CRS has faced.

Dr. SNYDER. NSPD–44 designates the Secretary of State as the lead for coordinating and integrating U.S. Government efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.

— Do you agree with GAO's assessment that the roles and responsibilities of all organizations need to be more clearly defined? If not, why not? What steps are being taken to clarify the roles and responsibilities within State and among Government agencies that not only related to other interagency stability and reconstruction efforts, but could help the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan now?

Ambassador HERBST. The GAO report contains useful recommendations that we will consider as we move forward on developing the interagency procedures and mechanisms for effective management of reconstruction and stabilization operations. The Department believes that the GAO report, however, does not fully capture progress made toward achieving the goals articulated in the report recommendations, as well as the overall progress achieved toward developing a civilian reconstruction and stabilization capability.

S/CRS and our interagency partners continue to work on fine-tuning the Interagency Management System (IMS), the interagency policy and operational mechanism for managing the USG response to reconstruction and stabilization situations. In conjunction with our interagency partners and colleagues in State's regional bureaus, we will refine and test the IMS through a number of events, experiments,
and exercises with the goal of further identifying gaps and clarifying roles and responsibilities both within the Department of State and among executive branch agencies.

Over ten U.S. Government departments participated in a recent demonstration of the IMS and in the after-action review that provided very useful input to help the interagency fine tune IMS procedures and mechanisms.

These lessons learned and new ways of cooperation among State and the interagency can help facilitate integrated, coordinated civilian activity in the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Dr. SNYDER. NSPD–44 designates the Secretary of State as the lead for coordinating and integrating U.S. Government efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.

— From your perspective, do you see significant differences in the capabilities and capacities of U.S. Government agencies to engaged in stabilization and reconstruction activities as indicated by the challenges of standing up three different kinds of PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan and how are these differences best addressed as you move forward in planning for other current and future stability and reconstruction efforts?

Ambassador HERBST. Differences in interagency capabilities and capacities do exist and are being addressed through multi-agency working groups convened under the authority of the NSPD–44 Policy Coordinating Committee that bring together representatives from a dozen U.S. Government (USG) agencies, as well as National Security Council staff, to develop the means for effective future interagency management of reconstruction and stabilization operations.

The civilian response capability being developed by the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) under NSPD–44 will provide the ready, quick response, civilian surge capacity needed to meet short or long term personnel requirements for reconstruction and stabilization missions. It includes the following components:

- Active Response Corps (ARC), the USG civilian “first responders,” who are ready for immediate deployment within 48 hours to reconstruction and stabilization crises worldwide.
- Standby Response Corps (SRC), USG civilian employees who maintain their current government positions but are trained and ready to deploy within thirty days.
- Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC), the pool of civilian (private sector and state and local government) experts requested by President Bush that will, if authorized this fiscal year, provide trained volunteers with specialized skills.

S/CRS is working with its interagency partners to create, staff, and operate these three corps. Our coordinated effort will help harmonize differences among agencies' capabilities and capacities.

Dr. SNYDER. I understand S/CRS has been working with PRTs in Afghanistan, but I appreciate that they started and formed before S/CRS was up and running. If the U.S. Government decided to take on an entirely new stabilization and reconstruction task similar to what we are trying to accomplish in Afghanistan starting today, could you give us some idea as to how the work you have been doing in S/CRS would be applied? Why isn't S/CRS involved with PRTs in Iraq? Should it be? Why or why not?

Ambassador HERBST. In the initial stages of a new reconstruction and stabilization operation of a similar nature and size as that in Afghanistan, the U.S. Government (USG) can activate the Interagency Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization. When activated, the IMS is the structure by which the USG would plan for and manage an operation in Washington (Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group), at military headquarters (Integration Planning Cell), and in the field (Advance Civilian Teams).

In Washington, S/CRS would coordinate and co-chair with the NSC and the Assistant Secretary of the relevant State Department regional bureau an operation-specific Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) to oversee Washington-based whole-of-government strategic planning and operations. This planning process would follow the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation currently being refined by an interagency working group.

In addition to the Washington-based CRSG structure, the supported Geographic Combatant Command or multi-lateral military command would receive a team of USG civilian planners—called an Integration Planning Cell (IPC)—to harmonize civilian and military planning processes.
Finally, if requested by the Chief of Mission, an interagency Advance Civilian Team (ACT) would deploy to support the Embassy in implementing the U.S. strategic plan for reconstruction and stabilization. An ACT could also deploy with the military if there was no existing U.S. diplomatic mission, as was the case in Afghanistan in 2001. In addition, Field Advance Civilian Teams (FACTs) could be further deployed to extend the U.S. reconstruction and stabilization capacity to the regional or provincial level, serving a role similar to that played by PRTs in Afghanistan today.

The different components of the IMS structure would include representatives from all relevant federal agencies. To ensure adequate staffing for such missions, S/CRS has established an Active Response Corps (ARC) and a Standby Response Corps (SRC) of full-time federal personnel. President Bush has also proposed a Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) that would be comprised of civilians with the requisite skills who contractually obligate to serve—much as in the military Reserves—making their relevant skills available for Reconstruction & Stabilization missions if and when called-upon by the President.

In Afghanistan, S/CRS has developed a planning methodology with CJTF–82, the operational U.S. military headquarters in Afghanistan, and the Embassy to improve interagency PRT planning as well as to train new PRT leaders. Lessons from S/CRS' current work on PRTs in Afghanistan are being applied in the IMS operations guide, which, for example, lays out coordination procedures between the FACTs and the other structures in the IMS.

S/CRS also has been involved with PRTs in Iraq. In response to requests from the Department of State’s Near Eastern Affairs bureau, S/CRS helped design and field interagency training in support of the 2007 surge of PRT personnel to Iraq. S/CRS is also working to capture lessons learned from the Iraq PRT experience to inform PRT training and improve the USG's response to future contingencies.

Dr. SNYDER. As the PRTs have amply demonstrated, reconstruction and stabilization is not a task the U.S. should take on alone. What, in particular, are you doing to apply the key lessons from the experience of having international partners in Afghanistan and Iraq doing parallel work in some regions to a larger, overall planning framework for reconstruction and stabilization? Are other nations' efforts viable models for us to consider?

Ambassador HERBST. The USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation, currently being refined by an interagency working group, was initially developed jointly with the United Kingdom’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU). The principles, processes, and methodologies in the framework, including on conflict assessment and metrics, have been tested with more than 30 U.S. and international partners through Multi-National Experiments 4 and 5. We continue to jointly refine these tools with international partners to enable close integration of efforts in future reconstruction and stabilization operations.

In consultation with regional bureaus, some of these tools have been adapted for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.

Since its inception, S/CRS has engaged with potential partners around the world to establish relationships, learn from each other’s best practices, and generally set the stage for coordinated responses to future engagements. S/CRS is in close and frequent coordination with counterparts in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, France, United Nations, the European Union, NATO, Finland, Japan, South Korea, and the Netherlands, to name a few. To share lessons and refine procedures for future coordination, S/CRS staff collaborate on a working level with international counterparts and participate in training and exercises led by these partners, and vice-versa.

In future reconstruction and stabilization operations, as it is now, much of the work of finding and committing international partners will be diplomatic. The responsibility for diplomatic outreach ultimately rests with the Department of State regional bureau in support of the Secretary of State and the President. This effort would be bolstered by the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization (IMS), a newly agreed upon system for how the U.S. Government should organize itself to deal with a stabilization crisis. It would be a function of the Washington portion of the IMS, the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG), to identify the objectives, to know which international partners have capacity and expertise in which areas, to frame the discussion with these potential partners, and to integrate to the greatest extent possible planning and operations with these partners. By approaching these partners early and at a high-level and then planning deliberately together at capitals and in the field, we hope to avoid doing parallel work and better focus our efforts on our areas of strength.

Dr. SNYDER. We have been interested in learning about metrics to determine success for PRTs in both Afghanistan and Iraq and we appreciate that the work they
do is inherently difficult to measure, but as you consider what sorts of reconstruction and stabilization efforts you might be called upon to coordinate are you giving sufficient thought as to how the effectiveness or success of those missions might be measured? Describe the methodology you intend to use to measure the performance of civil-military teams involved in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Ambassador HERBST. Since its creation, S/CRS has developed methodologies and processes based on the principle that metrics must be integral to mission planning and operational management. From the outset, at the strategic level, policy options need to be paired with an understanding of what “success looks like” on the ground. At each level of planning (strategic, operational, and tactical), planners and decision-makers must arrive at a shared and realistic understanding of how success will be measured. Metrics, when used appropriately, should help policymakers determine when changes in strategy or tactics are required.

Effective metrics do not simply capture USG “outputs” alone (e.g., number of schools built or number of police trained). While those data sets are critical to program management and oversight, policymakers must be concerned with what “impact” our efforts are having on the lives of the people on the ground (e.g., do people feel safe and do people feel that their government is providing the necessary services). We and our international counterparts are learning to measure outcomes in addition to outputs. This will inform our policy towards the host nation; aid us in refining our continuing reconstruction and stabilizations efforts in the host country; and will be instrumental in the research and study done to improve the efficacy of future reconstruction and stabilization engagements elsewhere in the world.

Dr. SNYDER. Are you developing benchmarks or measures to determine when stability operations are no longer needed and more traditional means of providing development and diplomatic assistance can be used? How permissive does the environment need to be? Have milestones or standards been established to determine when to transition to more traditional means? If not, why not?

Ambassador HERBST. The transition from R&S operations to long-term development and diplomatic activities should occur when local government and other relevant local actors have the capacity to sustain a stable environment and adequately address spoilers and other instigators of conflict. In each country, potentially in each province, this transition point is different. Measures of success, similarly, should be tailored to the country and province.

S/CRS has partnered with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, USAID, U.S. Institute of Peace and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at the U.S. Army War College to develop a menu of possible indicators that focus on assessing the security of local civilians. This project is titled Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE). In addition, MPICE contains menus of indicators for the four other sectors (Governance, Rule of Law, Economics and Social Well-being) identified as critical to success by the report Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Dr. SNYDER. What are the resourcing considerations for future stability operations? How will they be reflected in future budget requests? Does the State Department require an increase in the overall number of FSOs?

Ambassador HERBST. In Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007, S/CRS worked to demonstrate through interagency assessment, planning, coordination, and deployment that it can provide more effective assistance for reconstruction and stabilization operations. In Fiscal Year 2008, S/CRS is answering the growing demand and will build on our proven value-added. We will expand the Active Response Corps, deploy more experts, increase our country planning engagements, increase our training, and continue to build our long-term ability to put interagency civilians teams on the ground where and when we need them.

For FY 2009, a unified budget request is being prepared for all resources needed to develop and deploy the interagency response, such as training, readiness, equipment, some deployment funds, and new staffing, including Foreign Service and Civil Service positions necessary to build the capacity for quick response during crises.

Dr. SNYDER. What types of incentives do you believe will be required to induce civilians to volunteer? Are you re-evaluating current incentives to determine if additional or other incentives are needed in light of the unanticipated need to direct assignments to Iraq?

Ambassador HERBST. We believe that patriotism will be a strong incentive for volunteers, keeping in mind that they are volunteering to be part of a national resource; not in response to a particular engagement. However, realizing the danger and hardship inherent in assignment to countries where conflict is ongoing or has
recently ended, members of the Civilian Reserve Corps who are activated will be eligible for the same monetary incentives available to other federal employees civilian employees when deployed. Depending on the location and conditions of the assignment, these may include Premium Pay, Post Differential, Danger Pay, Locality Pay, and possibly a Recruitment Bonus depending on the difficulty in filling positions.

There will be a dual compensation waiver for retired Foreign Service and Civil Service employees, which will be a significant incentive for federal retirees. Reservists, when deployed and on a term appointment in the civil service, will accrue the same Leave benefits as other federal employees and will be eligible for life and health insurance, workers’ compensation, and participation in the Federal Employees Retirement System and the Thrift Savings Plan.

We believe the incentives above as well as a desire to serve one’s country, as demonstrated by the high fill and re-employment rates of the “3161” positions in Iraq, will be sufficient. However, we will be regularly re-evaluating our recruitment efforts to determine if additional incentives are required.

Dr. Snyder. Describe the interaction and relationship S/CRS has with the Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan. Describe the role of the Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan plays in the Interagency Management System and in the Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation.

Ambassador Herbst. S/CRS plays a supporting role to the respective Department of State regional bureaus. As a result, our interaction with the Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan occurs through the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.

The Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan is not involved directly with the IMS and the USG Planning Framework, as these mechanisms are not being used for Iraq or Afghanistan. However, other components of the NSC monitor the progress of—and participate in—the implementation of National Security Presidential Directive-44 on Management of Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations, including the development of the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization and the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation.

Dr. Snyder. What policy and guidance have you set for the Services for selection and or training for stability operations?

Ms. Ward. DoD Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations” establishes policies governing stability operations training. It directs DoD institutions to develop stability operations curricula across the spectrum of training activities to include both individual and unit training. In keeping with the Directive’s overall mandate of giving stability operations priority comparable to major combat operations, stability operations training is an integral part of DoD’s training regimen.

Particular emphasis is placed on ensuring an appropriate balance in training for combat and stability operations, with the needs of current operations tipping the balance toward greater stability operations training. For stability operations, focus is placed on the skills necessary to:

- Analyze the environment, and apply kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities as the situation demands.
- Train and advise foreign security forces at the tactical, operational, and national levels.
- Work with civilian partners (USG, international, host nation, etc.).
- Support transitional security, civil governance, and essential services activities in conflict zones.
- Operate within a foreign culture.

DoD is capturing the best practices from current operations to ensure DoD maintains and enhances its capacity to prepare units for operations in any theater, including stability operations.

Dr. Snyder. GAO reported that DOD has yet to identify and prioritize the full range of capabilities needed for stability operations because of a lack of clear guidance on how and when to accomplish this task. What progress has DOD made in identifying and prioritizing capabilities needed to effectively conduct stability operations? What steps is DOD taking to ensure that different combatant commands approach the identification of requirements in the same way? How is CENTCOM doing it? Does CENTCOM have responsibility for U.S. PRT strategy and operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan? How have the capability requirements for the PRTs in Afghanistan been identified and addressed?

Ms. WARD. DoD’s approach has been to focus on updating strategic-level guidance documents to instruct DoD components, including Combatant Commands (CoComs), to incorporate stability operations considerations in the planning and conduct of operations.

The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities is working to more accurately identify specific capability gaps across the spectrum of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. The Army has also conducted an extensive stability operations capability gap analysis to identify missing stability operations capabilities.

The CoComs are an integral part of stability operations capability development for both U.S. and international partners. Through the standardized Integrated Priority List (IPL) process, CoComs provide information to the Department on the capabilities needed to conduct their mission. These requirements are assessed in program development across all CoComs using a prioritization process that seeks to balance risks. Each CoCom has priorities unique to the nature of their region. One region may require capabilities in the security sector while others require governance or rule of law capabilities. DoD does not expect that each CoCom will submit the same requirements, but instead expects each to provide an assessment of their requirements across the spectrum of capabilities. As any other CoCom, CENTCOM participates in this process and provides requests for information (RFI), requests for forces (RFF) and Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements (JUONS) to acquire specific capabilities to conduct stability and other types of operations.

USCENTCOM does not have sole responsibility for Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) strategy and operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. In Iraq, this is the responsibility of the Office of Provincial Affairs, under the Department of State. In Afghanistan, this responsibility is shared by NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), US Embassy, and USCENTCOM.

PRT capabilities and requirements have been identified as part of the Request for Forces process; specific equipment needs are met through a combination of unit equipment and Joint Operational Needs Statements. In certain instances, PRT capabilities are also requested in Joint Manning Documents, which are developed and submitted in support of headquarters elements, and through direct coordination with the Department of State for necessary civilian skills. DoD is tracking these capabilities and requirements in order to inform future capability development and institutionalization.

Dr. SNYDER. We have been interested in learning about metrics to determine success for PRTs in both Afghanistan and Iraq and we appreciate that the work they do is inherently difficult to measure, but as you consider what sorts of reconstruction and stabilization efforts you might be called upon to coordinate are you giving sufficient thought as to how the effectiveness or success of those missions might be measured? Describe the methodology you intend to use to measure the performance of civil-military teams involved in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Ms. WARD. DoD is supporting development of PRT metrics that include: (1) establishing clear objectives and end-states; (2) developing milestones and transition phases for achieving the objectives; (3) applying resources in a coordinated fashion; and (4) continuous joint assessments based on an agreed-upon model with indicators.

DoD (the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Institute for Peace, and the Fund for Peace are working on a model for conflict measurements to assist in campaign design for stability operations. The goal is to measure and evaluate success and progress against stated objectives. Such measures will also be applied to the development of milestones and transition points.

Although objective data are difficult to collect in a conflict environment, the aim of this undertaking is to reflect the reality of conditions on the ground. This is especially important for establishing trend lines, to include the ebbs and flows of shifting conditions, in order to inform decision-makers of needed resource allocation and pri-
orities. DoD is also examining existing models and data collection efforts by think tanks such as Carnegie, Brookings and commercial country risk assessment as a check on its internal measurements.

Dr. Snyder. What are the resourcing considerations for future stability operations? How will they be reflected in future budget requests?

Ms. Ward. DoD does not anticipate creating separate stability operations budget lines for DoD capabilities, but is instead driving an overall shift in priorities in capability development. As DoD continues to identify key capabilities, ranging from doctrine to organization to equipment, they will be reflected in the deliberations of the Department and in budget requests. DoD will work through existing budget frameworks and risk-informed deliberations of mission assignments and program development across the Department. Future resourcing for stability operations will be reflected in both programs and in application of key authorities, such as those needed to develop partner capacities.

Beyond DoD, the U.S. government is currently underinvested in civilian capacity to conduct stability operations. During his recent Landon lecture series speech, Secretary Gates highlighted the need for “a dramatic increase in spending on the civil instruments of national security—diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development.” Increasing resources for civilian capacity will be critical in order to conduct successful stability operations in the future. Likewise, as the capabilities of foreign partners become more critical, changes to U.S. government programs that support functions such as foreign train, advise and assist programs can be expected.

Dr. Snyder. According to GAO’s testimony, DOD’s policies and practices inhibit sharing of planning information and limit interagency participation in the development of military plans developed by the Combatant Commanders. Specifically, GAO reported that there is not a process for sharing plans with non-DOD agencies, early in the planning process, without specific approval of the Secretary of Defense. What actions is DOD taking to improve information sharing with interagency partners early in the planning process?

Ms. Ward. DoD believes that the quality of DoD planning improves with appropriate participation from other U.S. departments and agencies; this has been the experience in Homeland Defense and War on Terror efforts, where DoD routinely plans with other agencies in whole-of-government efforts. However, DoD must balance the benefits of sharing military contingency plans with the need for force protection, operational security, timely plan development, and the limited capacity of civilian agencies to participate in the DoD planning process.

Currently, DoD shares critical aspects of military plans with elements of other agencies, while not necessarily sharing the entire plan. In executing current operations, DoD encourages field coordination between CoComs and Chiefs of Missions, and the assignment of liaison officers for sharing information. DoD has recently taken the step of inviting interagency representatives to participate in the development of DoD strategic planning guidance. DoD intends to work with other agencies to test new processes and fora for plans coordination as well as solicit their input earlier in the planning process. Additionally, the Departments of Defense and State are reviewing personnel-detailing processes between the departments with the intent of increasing collaboration. Finally, DoD strongly supports National Security Presidential Directive-44 whole-of-government planning efforts, which will guide the development of U.S. government plans that military contingency plans may support.

DoD believes that these efforts, as well as increased involvement of civilian agencies in reviewing DoD plans, will build those agencies’ ability to support DoD planning efforts.

Dr. Snyder. According to GAO, previous DOD planning guidance considered four phases for military operations. However, DOD’s revised planning guidance now includes six phases of an operation. Could you explain the significance of this shift and how it affects stability and reconstruction operations?

Ms. Ward. The shift from four phases to six phases is significant in that it emphasizes the importance of planning for and conducting a variety of activities throughout an operation. The new construct recognizes that all military operations are a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The proportions of those activities vary based on the operation’s phase and type. This means that greater emphasis in military planning will be placed on activities conducted during:

Phase IV—Stabilize; Phase V—Enable Civil Authority; and back to Phase 0—Shape.

Dr. Snyder. Describe the interaction and relationship the Department of Defense has with the Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan in the implementation of DOD Directive 3000.05 and NSPD–44.
Ms. WARD. DoD’s primary interlocutors on the National Security Council staff for implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05 and National Security Presidential Directive-44 are through the Office for Defense Policy and Strategy and the Office for Relief, Stabilization, and Development (under the Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics). Those offices work with the Office of the Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan. DoD, as well as State and NSC, are working to ensure lessons learned from across the U.S. government and from these and other post-conflict engagements are integrated into the development of new interagency doctrine, policy, and capabilities.

Dr. SNYDER. Your testimony cited several challenges that DOD has encountered in implementing its stabilization and reconstruction policy.

• What are some of the significant challenges that DOD has faced in identifying needed capabilities and measures of effectiveness?

Mr. CHRISTOFF and Ms. ST. LAURENT. As discussed in our report on DOD stability operations, we found that the identification of stability operations requirements was occurring in a fragmented manner and that DOD had yet to systematically identify and prioritize the full range of needed capabilities.\(^1\) As a result, the services were pursuing initiatives to address capability shortfalls that may not reflect the comprehensive set of capabilities that will be needed to effectively accomplish stability operations in the future. At the time of our review we identified two factors contributing to DOD’s limited progress in identifying capabilities. First, DOD had not issued guidance or set specific timeframes for the combatant commands to identify stability operations capability requirements. Furthermore, Joint Staff officials explained that the combatant commanders were expected to identify capability requirements based on their own operational plans, but DOD had not issued planning guidance to the combatant commanders to revise plans to reflect stability operations activities. Joint Staff officials expressed concerns that if combatant commands based their requirements on existing plans that have not been updated to reflect new planning guidance, the requirements would not reflect the more comprehensive stability operations capabilities needed. Second, a lack of a clear and consistent definition of stability operations resulted in confusion across the department about how to identify activities that are considered stability operations. For example, Air Force officials stated in their May 22, 2006, Stability Operations Self Assessment that the absence of a common lexicon for stability operations functions, tasks, and actions results in unnecessary confusion and uncertainty when addressing stability operations. In March 2007 they reiterated that they still considered the lack of a common lexicon a hindrance in identifying stability operations capabilities. Without clear guidance on how and when combatant commanders are to develop stability operations capability requirements, and a clear definition of stability operations, the combatant commanders and the military services may not be able to effectively identify and prioritize needed capabilities.

Similarly, we found that DOD guidance did not clearly articulate a systemic approach for developing measures of effectiveness and because of significant confusion over how this task should be accomplished, DOD had made limited progress in developing them. For example, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps had placed the development of measures of effectiveness on hold pending more guidance and the Air Force believed that they had met the requirement to develop measures through a biennial review of Air Force Concepts of Operations.\(^2\) At the time of our review, officials from DOD’s office for stability operations stated they were aware of the confusion surrounding the development of measures of effectiveness and were planning on conducting training that would help in developing the measures. However, as noted in our report, without clear departmentwide guidance and milestones for completing the measures, confusion may continue to exist and DOD will be limited in its ability to assess its efforts to enhance stability operations capabilities.

Dr. SNYDER.

• How does DOD typically identify capability gaps and to what extent has this process been applied to examining stability operations capabilities?


\(^2\)Every two years, the Air Force conducts a comprehensive review of the Air Force Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) that articulate the capabilities needed and activities the Air Force must execute for the Joint Force Commander. The Capability Review and Risk Assessment (CRRA) process is the engine for capabilities-based planning. Inherent in the CRRA process is the use of both internal and external analyses. Within the CRRA process, the Air Force uses analyses provided by Risk Assessment Teams and analytic organizations. The capabilities identified in the CONOPS are consolidated in an Air Force Master Capabilities Library.
Mr. CHRISTOFF and Ms. ST. LAURENT. During the course of our review DOD identified a variety of methods being used to identify capability gaps, and in their official comments to our report, stated that the identification and development of stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations capabilities are not so different from other DOD capabilities that they require new or separate methodology to identify and develop military capabilities and plans. The methods highlighted by DOD included:

- Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy stated they intended to identify capabilities and recommend priorities to the Secretary of Defense through an iterative process where combatant commanders would compare planned requirements for stability operations with current available forces and military capabilities and propose remedies for eliminating gaps. The Joint Staff would review these assessments and provide guidance to help identify requirements. The combatant command requirements were then expected to drive each service's development of stability operations capabilities and capacity.
- The use of Integrated Priority Lists.
- Joint Quarterly Readiness Reviews, which are a scenario-based readiness assessment that identifies capabilities and risks associated with missions that support strategic-level planning guidance.
- Other approaches, such as the Army's ongoing process to address gaps in Army stability operations capabilities and capacities and the Air Force's use of an analytical capabilities-based planning model that identifies specific shortfalls related to stability operations.

At the time of our review, however, limited progress had been made by the department in identifying and prioritizing needed capabilities, and at the three combatant commands we visited, we found that the identification of stability operations requirements was occurring in a fragmented manner. This limited progress was caused by weakness in DOD's guidance, the absence of specific timeframes to complete capability gap analysis and confusion over how to define stability operations.

Dr. SNYDER. According to your report, previous DOD planning guidance considered four phases for military operations. However, DOD's revised planning guidance now includes six phases of an operation. Could you explain the significance of this shift and how it affects stability and reconstruction operations?

Mr. CHRISTOFF and Ms. ST. LAURENT. By expanding its planning construct to consider shaping efforts to stabilize regions so that conflicts do not develop and expanding the dimensions of stability operations that are needed in more hostile environments after conflicts occur, DOD has recognized the importance of deliberately planning for stability and reconstruction operations. This change in the planning construct reflects a fundamental shift in DOD's policy that designates stability operations as a core mission that shall be given priority comparable to combat operations, and emphasizes that planning for stability and reconstruction activities is as important as planning for combat operations. In addition, this shift in policy and planning guidance requires DOD planners to understand and incorporate the roles, responsibilities, and capabilities that all agencies and organizations can contribute to stabilization efforts into military plans. Additionally, DOD must collaborate with non-DOD agencies to coordinate its planning efforts with representatives from various U.S. agencies, organizations, other governments, and the private sector.

Although DOD has taken steps to establish interagency coordination mechanisms and to improve interagency participation in its planning efforts, it has not achieved consistent interagency representation or participation at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of planning. At the time of our review, we identified the following three factors that limited interagency participation in DOD's planning efforts:

- DOD had not provided specific guidance to commanders on how to integrate planning with non-DOD organizations.

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3 A list of a combatant commander's highest priority requirements, prioritized across Service and functional lines, defining shortfalls in key programs that, in the judgment of the combatant commander, adversely affect the capability of the combatant commander's forces to accomplish their assigned mission. The integrated priority list provides the combatant commander's recommendations for programming funds in the planning, programming, and budgeting system process. Also called IPL.

4 The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for conducting a Joint Quarterly Readiness Review, which is a scenario-based readiness assessment that identifies capabilities and risks associated with missions that support strategic-level planning guidance. Participants in this review include the Combatant Commanders, senior representatives from DOD, the Military Services, and other DOD components.
The NSC Deputies and Principals Committees must approve use of IMS for any operation.

- DOD practices inhibited the appropriate sharing of planning information with non-DOD organizations.
- DOD and non-DOD organizations lacked an understanding of each other’s planning processes and capabilities, and non-DOD organizations had limited capacity to fully engage in DOD’s planning efforts.

As a result, the overall foundation for unity of effort in stability operations—common understanding of the purpose and concept of the operation, coordinated policies and plans, and trust and confidence between key participants—is not being achieved.

Dr. Snyder. According to your testimony, recent changes in policy and guidance require State and DOD to integrate their stabilization and reconstruction plans and to coordinate those plans with relevant government and non-governmental organizations. Can you describe the relationship between the planning framework State is developing under NSPD–44 and the planning improvements you suggest DOD pursue for improving interagency participation in military planning?

Mr. Christoff and Ms. St. Laurent. As a part of its implementation of National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD–44), State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) led development of the Interagency Management System (IMS) for managing high-priority and highly complex operations. IMS is designed to guide communications and interagency coordination between Washington policy makers and Chiefs of Mission, as well as between the civilian and military sectors. NSC approved IMS in March 2007. Although S/CRS and military combatant commands have jointly led exercises and simulations to test the system and train personnel in using it, as of November 2007, IMS had not been applied to any stabilization and reconstruction operations. As a result, it is difficult to know how effectively civilian and military plans would be coordinated in an actual operation.

As described above, the IMS is a mechanism that has been developed by S/CRS to integrate planning for high priority and highly complex operations, and the NSC Deputies and Principals Committees must approve its use. In contrast, the planning improvements we suggest in our report on DOD stability operations is focused on the wide range of military plans combatant commanders develop for potential contingencies on a routine basis for which they may need to seek input from other agencies or organizations. In our report, we stated that although DOD has taken steps to establish interagency coordination mechanisms and to improve interagency participation in its planning efforts, it has not achieved consistent interagency representation or participation at all levels of planning; and that to successfully integrate planning efforts, DOD and non-DOD organizations must overcome a lack of understanding of each other’s planning processes and capabilities, and differences in each others planning cultures and capacities.

To improve military planning efforts we recommended that the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Secretary of State take the following three actions:

- Provide specific implementation guidance to combatant and component commanders on mechanisms to facilitate and encourage interagency participation in the development of military plans that include stability operations-related activities.
- Develop a process to share planning information with the interagency representatives early in the planning process.
- Develop an approach to overcome differences in planning culture, training, and capacities among the affected agencies.

Dr. Snyder. According to GAO’s testimony, DOD’s policies and practices inhibit sharing of planning information and limit interagency participation in the development of military plans developed by the Combatant Commanders. Specifically, you reported that there is not a process for sharing plans with non-DOD agencies, early in the planning process, without specific approval of the Secretary of Defense. What actions should DOD take to improve information sharing with interagency partners early in the planning process?

Mr. Christoff and Ms. St. Laurent. As noted in testimony and our stability operations report, at the time of our review, DOD did not have a process in place to facilitate the sharing of planning information with non-DOD agencies, when appropriate, early in the planning process without specific approval from the Secretary of Defense. Specifically, DOD policy officials, including the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, stated that it is the department’s policy not to share DOD contingency plans with agencies or offices outside of DOD unless...

5 The NSC Deputies and Principals Committees must approve use of IMS for any operation.
directed to do so by the Secretary of Defense, who determines if they have a need to know. In addition, DOD’s planning policies and procedures state that a combatant commander, with Secretary of Defense approval, may present interagency aspects of his plan to the Joint Staff during the plan approval process for transmittal to the National Security Council for interagency staffing and plan development. This hierarchical approach limits interagency participation as plans are developed by the combatant commands.

Additionally, according to State officials, DOD’s process for sharing planning information at the time of our review limited non-DOD participation in the development of military plans, and invited interagency participation only after the plans had been formulated. In their opinion, it is critical to include interagency participation in the early stages of plan development at the combatant commands. Likewise, in the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy’s interim report to the Secretary of Defense on DOD Directive 3000.05, it was acknowledged that DOD would continue to face serious problems concerning the release and sharing of information among DOD, other U.S. government agencies, international partners, and other non-government organizations. The interim DOD report attributed issues in information-sharing to DOD policies and emphasized that to improve information-sharing capabilities senior leadership direction is required. Therefore, as stated in our report, we recommended that to improve information sharing between DOD and non-DOD agencies early in the planning process, systemic solutions are needed and can be achieved through improved guidance and more effective processes to appropriately share planning information with interagency representatives.

Dr. Snyder. According to GAO’s testimony, State’s planning framework provides unclear and inconsistent guidance on the roles and responsibilities within the agency between S/CRS and its regional bureaus.

- What steps should be taken to clarify the roles and responsibilities of organizations within State and among federal agencies? Who has the authority to clarify the roles and responsibilities government-wide?
- Please provide examples of what specific guidance is unclear or inconsistent.
- What consequences could occur be if State does not clarify the roles and responsibilities?

Mr. Christoff and Ms. St. Laurent. To address concerns about various actors’ roles and responsibilities within the framework, we recommended that the Secretary of State clarify and communicate specific roles and responsibilities within State for S/CRS and the regional bureaus, including updating the Foreign Affairs Manual. We also recommended that the development of the framework be completed, and that it be fully applied to an actual operation. Fulfilling this second recommendation would require that the Secretary of State work with interagency partners, including NSC, not only to clarify roles and responsibilities within State, but also the roles and responsibilities of agencies other than State. We also stated that although the NSC need not approve all elements of the framework, without such approval, it will be difficult to ensure that the U.S. government agencies collaborate and contribute to planning efforts to the fullest extent.

In November 2007, we reported that NSPD–44, related State and administration guidance, and the planning framework collectively do not provide clear direction on roles and responsibilities in two key areas. First, S/CRS’s roles and responsibilities conflict with those assigned to State’s regional bureaus and Chiefs of Mission. According to the Foreign Affairs Manual, each regional bureau is responsible for U.S. foreign relations with countries within a given region, including providing overall direction, coordination, and supervision of U.S. activities in the region. In addition, Chiefs of Mission have authority over all U.S. government staff and activities in their countries. As S/CRS initially interpreted NSPD–44, S/CRS’s responsibilities included leading, planning, and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations; these responsibilities conflict with those of the regional bureaus and Chiefs of Mission. S/CRS officials stated that they expected the next version of the Foreign Affairs Manual to include a clearly defined and substantive description of the office’s roles.

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8 Foreign Affairs Manual, 1 FAM 112(a).
Second, guidance varies regarding S/CRS’s responsibility for preventing conflicts. NSPD–44 and the memo announcing S/CRS’s creation include conflict prevention as one of the office’s responsibilities. However, S/CRS’s authorizing legislation and a State memo aligning S/CRS with the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance do not explicitly include conflict prevention as a responsibility. Ambiguity about S/CRS’s prevention role could result in inadequate prevention efforts. One DOD official in the Global Strategic Partnerships office stated that responsibility for prevention is currently unassigned, and the work might not be done without such an assignment.

The overlap and ambiguity of roles and responsibilities have led to confusion and disputes about who should lead policy development and control resource allocation. As a result, some of State’s regional bureaus resisted applying the new interagency planning process to particular reconstruction and stabilization operations. In addition, State and other agency staff said S/CRS had conflicts with Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance over which office controlled resource allocation for these operations, which also made it difficult for S/CRS to coordinate and plan reconstruction and stabilization operations using the framework.

Dr. Snyder. According to GAO’s testimony, State’s interagency planning framework for stability and reconstruction operations is not fully approved nor has it been fully applied to any operation. What are the most significant challenges that S/CRS is facing in completing and testing this framework and how would they be best addressed?

Mr. Christoff and Ms. St. Laurent. Three challenges have slowed development and acceptance of both S/CRS and the planning framework. First, some civilian interagency partners are concerned that S/CRS is assuming their traditional roles and responsibilities. Staff from one of State’s regional bureaus believed that S/CRS had enlarged its role in a way that conflicted with the Regional Assistant Secretary’s responsibility for leading an operation and coordinating with interagency partners. USAID staff noted how their agency had planned and coordinated reconstruction operations in the past and questioned why S/CRS now had these roles. Although most agency staff and outside experts we interviewed agreed that interagency coordination should improve, some USAID and State employees questioned why NSC was not given the primary role for planning and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations or for implementing NSPD–44.

Second, some interagency partners stated that senior officials have provided limited support for S/CRS and its planning framework. Staffs from various State offices said senior officials did not communicate strong support for S/CRS or the expectation that State and interagency partners should follow its framework for planning and coordinating reconstruction and stabilization operations. In addition, S/CRS was not selected to lead planning for recent high-priority operations, such as the ongoing efforts in Lebanon and Somalia, which several officials and experts stated are the types of operations S/CRS was created to address. Finally, NSC approved the Interagency Management System (IMS) as the mechanism for communicating and coordinating across U.S. government sectors and between the field and strategic levels. Although NSC approved the mechanism in March 2007, as of November 2007 it had not initiated its use despite a resurgence of civil unrest in Lebanon and Pakistan.

Third, interagency partners believe the planning process, as outlined in the planning guide, is too cumbersome and time consuming for the results it produces. Officials who participated in the planning for Haiti stated that the process provided more systematic planning, better identification of interagency goals and responsibilities, and better identification of sequencing and resource requirements. However, some officials involved in planning operations for Haiti and Sudan stated that using the framework was time consuming, involved long meetings and extra work hours for staff, and was cumbersome to use because it was overly focused on process details. Staff also said that, in some cases, the planning process did not improve outcomes or increase resources, particularly since S/CRS has few resources to offer.

Although many agencies participated in the framework’s development, concerns remain over the roles and responsibilities for S/CRS, State’s regional bureaus, and the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance. As a result, we recommended that the Secretary of State clarify the roles and responsibilities for stabilization and reconstruction activities within State, including updating the Foreign Affairs Manual. Moreover, the planning guide remains incomplete and unapproved by NSC. Although there is no requirement that NSC approve this element of the framework, without such approval it will be difficult to ensure that U.S. government agencies collaborate and contribute to interagency planning efforts to the fullest extent possible. Therefore, we also recommended that that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with NSC and other interagency partners, complete the framework’s development and test its usefulness by fully applying it to a stabilization and reconstruction operation.
Dr. Snyder. According to the preliminary observations GAO presented, State is facing several challenges in establishing and maintaining a rapid deployment corps.

- What are some of the most significant challenges that State and other civilian agencies are facing in developing a civilian response capability?
- What are some of the effects on stabilization and reconstruction operations if civilian agencies cannot develop the capability and capacity to rapidly deploy in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations?

Mr. Christoff and Ms. St. Laurent. State and other agencies face three primary challenges in establishing internal rapid response capabilities. First, S/CRS has had difficulty establishing positions and recruiting for the Active Response Corps (ARC) and training Standby Response Corps (SRC) members. S/CRS plans to increase the number of authorized staff positions for ARC from 15 temporary positions to 33 permanent positions, but S/CRS staff said it is unlikely that State will receive authority to establish all 33 positions. Although S/CRS has not had difficulty recruiting SRC volunteers, it does not presently have the capacity to ensure the additional 1,500 volunteers it plans to recruit by 2009 are properly trained.

Second, although other agencies have begun to develop a stabilization and reconstruction response capacity, most have limited numbers of staff available for rapid responses to overseas crises. Since most agencies primarily focus on domestic issues, it is difficult to obtain either funding or staff for international operations not directly related to their core domestic missions. Finally, deploying volunteers, whether from State or other agencies, can leave home units without sufficient staff to complete their respective work.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA

Ms. Davis. It is our understanding that if a military officer serves in a PRT it is not considered a joint station or joint experience in the same way that we think of jointness in the Services and that their need to be able to do that in terms of career development and career ladder. Are PRT commander billets identified as “joint billets”?

Ms. Ward. Officers serving in PRT commander positions may request their experiences be reviewed to determine if they warrant the award of joint experience points.

From the inception of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 until 30 September 2007, the DoD Joint Officer Management (JOM) program was a billet-based system. By policy, temporary positions (such as a PRT commander post) were not authorized on the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) due to the tour length requirements in Title 10, USC, Section 664. However, statutory changes in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 provide broader opportunities for officers to earn joint credit.

DoD re-issued DoD Instruction 1300.19 in October 2007, updating the Joint Officer Management Program and reiterating DoD policy that a significant number of officers be educated, trained, and experienced in joint matters to enhance the joint war fighting capability of the United States through a heightened awareness of joint requirements, including multi-Service, interagency, international, and non-governmental perspectives. The new Joint Qualification System is dual-track, counting both assignments in JDAL positions as well as the accrual of joint experiences, no matter where they occur. Therefore, officers may now earn joint experience points from duties other than JDAL positions. The accrual of joint experience points, along with requisite Joint Professional Military Education, leads to joint qualifications.