[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-99]
CURRENT STATUS OF THE JOINT MINE
RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP)
VEHICLE PROGRAM
__________
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
MEETING JOINTLY WITH
AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
NOVEMBER 8, 2007
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi, Chairman
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
RICK LARSEN, Washington TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania
Jesse Tolleson, Professional Staff Member
Jason Hagadorn, Staff Assistant
------
AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas California
ADAM SMITH, Washington JEFF MILLER, Florida
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania TOM COLE, Oklahoma
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia ROB BISHOP, Utah
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
KATHY CASTOR, Florida W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
Heath Bope, Professional Staff Member
Lynn Williams, Professional Staff Member
Ben Kohr, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2007
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, November 8, 2007, Current Status of the Joint Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Program.............. 1
Appendix:
Thursday, November 8, 2007....................................... 53
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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 2007
CURRENT STATUS OF THE JOINT MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP)
VEHICLE PROGRAM
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Abercrombie, Hon. Neil, a Representative from Hawaii, Chairman,
Air and Land Forces Subcommittee............................... 3
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking
Member, Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee......... 6
Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Ranking
Member, Air and Land Forces Subcommittee....................... 6
Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman,
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee................. 1
WITNESSES
Heebner, David K., President, General Dynamics Land Systems...... 32
Hudson, Linda P., President, Land & Armaments Systems, BAE
Systems........................................................ 27
Massicotte, Archie, President, International Military and
Government, LLC................................................ 34
McGilton, Gordon, CEO, Force Protection, Inc..................... 29
Young, Hon. John J., Jr., Acting Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Director, MRAP Task
Force; Bill Greenwalt, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Industrial Policy; and Captain Cloyes R. ``Red'' Hoover,
Commanding Officer, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center
(SPAWAR) Charleston, U.S. Navy................................. 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Heebner, David............................................... 99
Hudson, Linda P.............................................. 76
Massicotte, Archie........................................... 106
McGilton, Gordon............................................. 87
Young, Hon. John J., Jr., joint with Bill Greenwalt and
Captain Cloyes R. ``Red'' Hoover........................... 57
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 128
Mr. Shuster.................................................. 129
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie............................... 117
CURRENT STATUS OF THE JOINT MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP)
VEHICLE PROGRAM
----------
House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee, Meeting Jointly with Air and
Land Forces Subcommittee, Washington, DC, Thursday, November 8,
2007.
The joint subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:04 p.m.
in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gene Taylor
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary
Forces) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Taylor. The joint subcommittee will come to order.
Congresswoman Carol Shea-Porter, a member of the full
committee, has requested permission to join us today during
this important briefing.
Without objection, I would like to make it in order for her
to participate. So moved.
Today, the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee
joins the Air and Land Forces Subcommittee to receive testimony
on the current status of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
vehicle, MRAP. This hearing continues our formal series of
oversight activities on the mine resistant vehicle. Force
protection will always be at the forefront of these
subcommittee meetings and brings us here today.
The United States of America has over 164,000 troops still
operating in Iraq. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's)
constitute about 70 percent--or are responsible for about 70
percent of the casualties in Iraq; and, regrettably, more than
half of those, or close to half of those, are caused by
underbelly attacks on vehicles in Iraq.
The MRAP family of vehicles offers significantly more
protection and survivability for our troops. This is due to
several factors: vehicle height, increased weight of the
vehicle, the V-shaped underbody which helps deflect the force
of the blast away from the body of the vehicle.
We are aware that a total, integrated approach using all
available technologies to combat IEDs is vital, but the last
line of defense for our troops in the IED chain is an armored
vehicle. Right now, MRAP should be that vehicle.
It is no secret that I, along with many other members of
this committee, have not been satisfied with the response of
this administration to force protection needs of our troops.
During our last hearing, we raised concerns over settling an
artificially low theater requirement, repeating past mistakes
in terms of vehicle production, adequately mobilizing the
industrial base, and failing to properly fund the program.
Three weeks ago, I had the pleasure of meeting with
Secretary Young in my office; and the information he briefed me
on showed me a substantial improvement in DOD's execution of
the mine resistant vehicle program. At the time of the July
19th hearing, just over 240 MRAPs had been produced and only
176 had been fielded to Iraq. There is an unfunded requirement
of over 5 billion.
Today, over 1,500 MRAPs have been produced and close to 700
vehicles have been fielded. The Department of Defense
requirement now stands at 15,000 vehicles, up from the initial
request by this administration just 1 year ago of only 4,000.
The amended supplemental now requests full funding for this new
equipment.
From day one, Congress has said to tell us what it would
take for MRAP and we will provide the money you need. We want
to reiterate that statement.
Now is not the time to be complacent. We still have major
production fielding and sustainment challenges ahead of us.
Over the next few months, there will be a steep increase in the
production of MRAPs. Over the next two months, production is
scheduled to jump from 440 vehicles per month to a steady 1,100
per month. This 700-vehicle increase is critical to the MRAP
fielding, and these subcommittees seek to be reassured that
this increase will proceed without a hitch.
If there are any potential problems that might disrupt
these ambitious goals, now is the time to state those concerns
so that we can help mitigate them. The subcommittees expect to
be reassured that industry has been mobilized to meet these
ambitious production goals.
The issue of MRAPs goes a heck of a lot farther than just
vehicles and people and production lines and kids in theater.
This young man is Sean Cooley; and, to my knowledge, he was the
first Mississippi guardsman to die. He was deployed in February
of 2003--I'm sorry February of 2005--his unit, the 155th; and
he died in a Humvee from a blast underneath that vehicle.
A few months later, the day after Easter to be exact, this
young man, William Brooks, was the driver of a Humvee. His
vehicle was blown up, again from a blast from underneath.
William lost both legs. To tell you what a unique individual
this young man is, he was saved by the heroic work of a
Sergeant Anthony and another sergeant who were able to get two
tourniquets on him in a minute. While recovering from his
wounds at Walter Reed, William volunteered to help in my office
to man the phone after Hurricane Katrina.
William is walking, as seen in this shot, on his
prostheses. His short-term goal is to finish Mississippi State
University and to walk across the stage to get his diploma on
these legs.
I think the sad fact is that Sean would probably be alive
and William would probably have his legs if MRAPs had been
fielded sooner.
Now there are 168,000 Seans and Williams in theater today.
So if this committee loses its temper, gets a little short for
people who aren't working as fast as we think they should or
funding that isn't there when it should be, I hope you
understand why.
I have had the pleasure to visit two of the facilities that
are building MRAPs in the past week. I want to first say, as
someone who has worked on a production line, I was impressed by
how hard the individuals were working. There is absolutely no
complaint there.
I was not impressed by the facilities themselves. There was
good equipment. There was a pretty good plan. But, quite
frankly, particularly what was done at Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Center (SPAWARs), where they are putting the
government-furnished equipment onto these vehicles, looked more
like a custom cycle shop than Honda mass producing motorcycles.
This isn't a jobs program. This isn't about feathering
somebody's nest or putting some jobs in somebody's district.
This is a rescue mission.
The most likely way for a young person serving our country
in Iraq or Afghanistan to die or be maimed is from an underbody
blast to a Humvee. We know that, and the enemy knows that, and
we have got to solve that problem.
Now, as someone who has been through a product of base
closure and having to lay off 1,300 people in my district,
believe me, I understand the misery of having to let people go.
But this isn't a jobs program, and we want the vendors to know
this. We want the Congress to know this. But, above all, we
want the troops to know this is a rescue mission; and we are
expecting the folks to tell us today how they are going to
perform this mission quickly, efficiently, and then we move on
to other challenges that face our Nation.
With that, I yield to the ranking member--I'm sorry--to the
subcommittee chairman of Air and Land, Mr. Abercrombie.
STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
HAWAII, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you. Thank you very much, Gene.
At our hearing July 1st, I indicated that we were having
difficulties reconciling MRAP vehicle program office provided
data on production schedules. At the time, I noted this as
indicative of the challenges involved with a program of this
size moving at such a rapid pace.
Since July, the program office and the Department seem to
have made significant improvement in responding to those
difficulties and providing accurate information; and I commend
that effort. However, the MRAP vehicle program continues to
present a major acquisition challenge that has broader
implications regarding the Department of Defense's tactical
vehicle acquisition strategy, expected future combat
environments and, of course, how that relates to future budget
requirements.
Mr. Chairman, I don't propose at this hearing to pursue
with our guests today the question of capital budgeting, but I
can assure you that at some point we have to come to grips in
the Department of Defense and the Congress has to come to grips
with the question of how we finance what we are doing,
particularly in capital acquisition of assets such as MRAPs.
We have to have a differentiation between a capital budget
and an operational budget; and failure to do that I think is
severely undermining everything that Mr. Young, for example, is
going to try to accomplish, I can assure you. We will pursue
that at another time, but I think it is fair to say that at not
quite subliminal level in today's hearing the question of how
we finance affects policy with regard to what we finance and
when we finance it.
In any event, not so many months ago the Army was reluctant
to embrace major procurement for MRAP vehicles and has only
recently done so, with the caveat that the MRAP program is not
a program of record, indicating that the MRAP vehicles only
apply to the current circumstances in Iraq and implying
possibly no further use of the vehicles after their use in
Iraq.
I know that that is not necessarily the full intention, and
for those who are not necessarily familiar with what a program
of record is and why we have it and what its implications are,
this may seem a bit esoteric. But I think it is fundamental to
our discussion not just about MRAPs but in the broader
discussion that I have already alluded to.
I am perfectly aware of the fact that the Army is going to
have further uses and sees a bigger picture but is also
constrained by the institutional requirements that it has,
especially if it does not have a program of record, precisely
because you get into conflicts over what gets funded and when.
Given that the Department of Defense has determined that
the MRAP vehicles are its number one acquisition requirement of
the moment, how is it that it appears that future combat
requirements are so much different than an MRAP-like vehicle
capability will not be required?
Now, again, I won't pursue that at any great length during
this hearing, but I assure you that I am going to need and I
think the committee is going to need--the committees will need
some indication as to why these kinds of vehicles with the kind
of armament protection that is proposed in the design protocols
that are proposed will not be useful in multiple environments
wherever--in warfare, guerrilla warfare--the current kind of
proclivities of those we might find ourselves in conflict with
might be utilizing.
The DOD has characterized the MRAP as a major defense
acquisition program in the highest category, with Secretary
Young as the primary acquisition executive, which,
parenthetically, I am very happy with and glad of, which
probably sends him on a path of doom almost immediately.
I am curious as to why shouldn't this program be considered
a program of record? Where do the MRAP vehicles fit into future
tactical wheeled acquisitions? Will the fiscal 2009 budget and
future years' defense program include appropriate levels of
operations and maintenance funding for the MRAP vehicle
inventory?
If we are going to make demands on the private
manufacturing sector of this Nation, they need to know just
exactly what it is that we want, what kind of priority are we
giving it and what plans can they make accordingly. That is
absolutely fundamental, it seems to me, if we are going to ask
the Nation to mobilize on behalf of the soldiers that Gene has
indicated are utterly and totally and completely dependent on
our good judgment.
I might note that the Stryker vehicle was once considered
an interim solution. I think that bears repeating, Mr.
Chairman. Other instances can be cited where something of the
instance became something of permanence.
Given the planned $25 billion commitment to MRAP vehicles,
a commitment that is likely to grow if history holds precedent,
and given the lack of proven armored technology that
significantly changes current correlation between weight,
height and vehicle protection, we had better plan on MRAP
vehicles as more than an interim throwaway solution for force
protection.
I am also curious as to when and how MRAP-2 vehicles fit
into the current strategy and what impacts this program will
have on the industrial supply base. Will the MRAP-2 vehicle
program be a program of record?
One other issue is that the MRAP program--that this program
has highlighted and which is of continuing concern to me is
fundamental to the broader issue of joint programs. Many of the
current defense acquisition programs are called joint programs.
Anytime, by the way--I'm sorry to say, Mr. Young, I keep
looking at you here--I'm sorry to say every time I see the word
``joint'' in front of it I figure, uh-oh, the smoke screen is
going up. We will use the word ``joint'' and then watch all the
in-fighting take place. They are labeled joint programs.
However, if you peel back a layer, you find that the program is
joint only in name.
While MRAP vehicles are being procured jointly, there is a
lack of standardization among the mission-essential equipment
being integrated into the vehicles. The MRAP vehicles are all
being used against the same threat in similar operational
environments, yet each military service and Special Operations
Command has its own specific equipment package. As a result, a
facility doing the installation work is potentially having to
integrate, at least by my count, now 24 different vehicle
configurations.
I don't see how that can be done. I am not sure it should
be done. I am open, I am not an engineer, I am not an
automotive engineer, certainly not an expert in this by any
stretch of the imagination in terms of manufacture and
configurations, but it strikes me that 24 different vehicle
configurations at a minimum causes enormous logistical
difficulties for the manufacturer and those we are asking to do
the production, let alone what the doctrinal implications of
that are in terms of jointness.
As monthly production numbers increase dramatically, these
many configurations could generate, I believe, major problems
once the basic vehicles are delivered to where the final
integration is done. Ultimately, this I think will result in
delay in the vehicles being delivered to Iraq or elsewhere.
If there was one standardized mission equipment package or
at least fewer configurations than currently planned for all
the services and the Special Operations Command, this could
potentially accelerate, I believe, the installation process
and, in turn, get more vehicles to Iraq and elsewhere at a much
faster rate. It is imperative in my judgment that the civilian
leadership and the Department of Defense effectively address
the problem of joint acquisition programs which may be in name
only.
I am hoping the witnesses today will be able to respond to
these issues, particularly the programs of record and the
question of joint acquisition programs and their efficacy, and
assure the subcommittees that every option is being pursued to
produce and field these vehicles since what we are really
discussing today, as the chairman has so eloquently expressed,
is the protection of our men and women in uniform.
Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you Mr. Abercrombie.
The Chair recognizes the ranking member and former chairman
of the Seapower Subcommittee, Mr. Bartlett.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I also want to thank our panel for being with
us today. Mr. Chairman, thank you for continuing to have these
MRAP hearings. The information we learn is invaluable.
During the last two MRAP hearings, I mentioned in my
opening statements that I wanted to hear assurances from our
witnesses that the industrial base was being positioned to
support this critical MRAP requirement. Based on the increased
requirement and the recent decision to down-select from five to
three MRAP vendors, I still have questions about the industrial
base; and I am very pleased that we have two distinguished
panels before us today to address my concerns. We need to gain
a better understanding of any industrial base constraints and
what mitigating measures are being pursued to remedy potential
choke points.
Thank you for being here, and I look forward to your
testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, the
Ranking Member of the Air and Land Subcommittee, Mr. Saxton.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY,
RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Saxton. Today he is the cleanup guy.
Thank you all for being here. This is indeed an important
hearing and an important topic.
I often think to myself of the changes, the dramatic
changes in warfare that have occurred since I first sat here in
this room at hearings like this one; and today is a hearing
that is intended to help us develop the capability to deal with
some of those changes. The MRAP program obviously is important
for those reasons.
At end of the day, I think we need to know the following:
Number one, is the recent decision to down-select from five to
three vendors in the best interest of our warfighters? Two, is
the defense industrial base postured to meet the current
requirement of approximately 15,000 MRAPs and by when? Three,
what are the potential bottlenecks and how can we help
alleviate them if there are some? And, finally, four, have we
provided you with the necessary funding in a timely manner to
execute all of the necessary requirements that you have?
I would like to just for a moment turn to another subject.
As I mentioned just a minute ago, things change quite rapidly.
One of the changes that I have seen happen is that this year we
will spend approximately 70 percent of our Defense budget on
operations and support and 30 percent on modernization. This is
different. In 1985, this was not the case. In the 1980's, we
spent about 55 percent of our budget on operations and support
and 45 percent on modernization. We established a 30 percent
modernization budget in the 1990's, and that is where we are
today.
Recently, General Casey and Secretary Geren were here; and
their message was that the Army is out of balance. I believe
that it is not just the Army that is out of balance, I believe
that it is our defense structure that is out of balance. It
seems to me that the situation that we are in today in terms of
our tactical wheeled vehicle fleet is a microcosm of this out-
of-balance theme.
And, without prolonging this, let me just say that it seems
to me that as we proceed down the road with MRAP, which we all
believe is a necessary element to protect our warfighters and
help them be successful, we also have recognized, as one of the
previous speakers said, that MRAP does not provide us with all
the answers. It has problems in urban terrain. It has problems
being agile. And it seems to us seems to me at least that we
need a fleet of MRAP-type vehicles or at least with MRAP-type
armor with different capabilities to enable our warfighters to
do the variety of tasks that we expect them to do.
This is not the place to talk about a future program, but I
want to make sure that in the future, regardless of the type of
mission environment that these light tactical vehicles must go
into, that every soldier and every marine has MRAP-like or
better protection, not just the heaviest variants. In other
words, the lighter vehicles that we have armored up today have
some advantages and the MRAP vehicle also has some advantages,
but they all can't do the same mission.
So it seems to me that what we ought to be looking at
beyond today, beyond today's hearing, is a vision for where we
need to go with armored vehicles and the various types of
missions that we expect our warfighters to carry out with them.
Mr. Taylor. The Chairman thanks the gentleman from New
Jersey.
We are fortunate to have a very distinguished panel of
witnesses with us today, and I mean that. We are also lucky to
have you gentlemen working for our Nation. I hope you
understand that.
First is the Honorable John Young, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the
Director of the MRAP Task Force. Second is Mr. Bill Greenwalt,
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy. Third
is Captain ``Red'' Hoover, United States Navy, Commanding
Officer, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, pronounced
SPAWAR, Charleston, South Carolina.
Mr. Young, we have about 10 minutes before we have to go
for these votes. It is going to be three votes. That is going
to kill about a half an hour, I regret to say. So I will leave
it up to you. If you would like to get started, we can do that.
If you prefer to wait, we can do that, too.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, JR., ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS, DIRECTOR,
MRAP TASK FORCE; BILL GREENWALT, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INDUSTRIAL POLICY; AND CAPTAIN CLOYES R. ``RED''
HOOVER, COMMANDING OFFICER, SPACE AND NAVAL WARFARE SYSTEMS
CENTER (SPAWAR) CHARLESTON, U.S. NAVY
Secretary Young. Mr. Chairman, I will make a brief opening
statement, probably well less than 10 minutes; and then proceed
as you will.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair recognizes the Under Secretary of
Defense.
Secretary Young. Chairman Taylor, Chairman Abercrombie,
Ranking Members Bartlett and Saxton and distinguished members
of the subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to discuss
the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle program with you
again. I will try to be brief while highlighting a few key
points.
Since I was last here, Secretary Gates has continued to
push the Department to build and deliver the maximum number of
MRAPs possible this year. In response, the MRAP team has
labored tirelessly to move forward aggressively while ensuring
the quality and effectiveness of these vehicles in theater.
The Congress has truly been integral in our MRAP efforts.
The Congress moved the MRAP reprogramming in days, provided
$5.2 billion in a continuing resolution, and has included $11.2
billion in the fiscal year 2008 defense appropriations
conference report. These are unprecedented actions. With these
funds, we are making significant progress in delivery and
production of MRAPs.
In December of 2006, we had the industrial capacity to
build less than 10 MRAP vehicles per month. We produced 161
vehicles in July. Between October 1st and November 4th, we have
taken delivery of about 550 vehicles. We are closing in on our
goal of producing roughly 1,100 MRAPs per month by the end of
the calendar year. In doing so, the defense industrial base is
displaying remarkable agility and exceeding commercial
industrial standards.
For example, I am told that Toyota took three years from
concept to manufacturing to reach a rate of 2,000 vehicles per
month for the Prius hybrid vehicle. Our industry partners are
leaning forward to accelerate deliveries, and the men and women
serving this Nation are counting on their continued success.
The MRAP program is perhaps the most significant rapid
acquisition program the Department has conducted since the end
of World War II; and, as a result, we are constantly confronted
with new challenges.
If we execute our plans, we will build over 15,000 MRAPs by
October of 2008. With each challenge, the Department has proved
to have the agility to adapt and react. The dedicated MRAP team
has worked to address the availability of steel, tires, axles,
transportation to theater and within theater, government-
furnished equipment installation, spare parts, maintenance,
operator training, and all the other issues necessary for the
program to deliver reliable, safe, and survivable vehicles.
Our unprecedented journey will inevitably include
challenges we cannot foresee today, but everyone is committed
to fielding these vehicles on time. We know our warfighters are
counting on us.
I want to recognize and thank all the members of the MRAP
enterprise, starting with Paul Mann of the joint MRAP program
office and his team, General Brogan and the Marine Corps
Systems Command, the vehicle manufacturers and their raw
material and subcomponent suppliers, the men and women of Space
and Naval Warfare Systems Center in Charleston, the entire
network of transportation professionals represented by U.S.
Transportation Command, the vast network of logistics experts
from the Pentagon to Iraq and the talented military and
civilian staff in the services and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense involved with this program.
Finally, I would again like to thank you and the other
Members of Congress and their staffs for your clear and
unambiguous support for this vital program. Together, we should
be able to increase and maintain a high level of production,
fielding, and sustainment of these vehicles and provide them to
our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines.
Thank you for your time and attention, and I look forward
to your questions.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Secretary Young.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Young, Mr.
Greenwalt and Captain Hoover can be found in the Appendix on
page 57.]
Mr. Taylor. Will there be any other members of your panel
speaking?
Mr. Greenwalt. No, sir.
Mr. Taylor. Secretary Young, thank you again for being
here; and I do value your service and each of the panelists'
service to our Nation.
My frustration comes in that it was about two years ago
when a former head of the Army Liaison Office came to me,
Colonel Littig, and said that we need to be doing better, that
the South Africans came up with a vehicle 20 years ago to
deflect mine blasts and the Russians came up with it in
approximately the same time line and then here we were two
years into a very, very--conflict in Iraq where people were
dying on a daily basis and we as a Nation had not responded.
Like everyone else in this room, I am pleased that finally
we are getting into line, but I am still not convinced that we
are doing everything that we can do. Like I said, I was able to
visit a facility in Charleston last week. I was able to go to
SPAWARs. In both instances I saw people who were working hard,
and I know the difference between people going through the
motions and people working hard. These guys were working hard
and these ladies were working hard. There was a lot of good
equipment on those production lines, and I would invite each of
the members of the committee to visit not only that plant but
the other plants.
But, as somebody who came from manufacturing, what I did
not see was that process being done in the most expeditious
manner. Congressman Abercrombie touched on it, and he raised an
excellent point. Why are there 24 different variants? Not that
long ago, a former Secretary of the Navy came before the
committee and talked about the need to build ships or build
anything, airplanes, in series. When we are trying to rush
something to the theater so that people don't lose their life
or their limbs, what in the heck are we doing coming up with 24
variants? Part of me says that somebody is trying to do this on
the cheap. Why don't we just build the best variant and make it
available and those people that don't need all of those
features just don't use them?
I will use the example that I tend to buy common cars. I
have an old Chevy Malibu. It has the same wiring harness as if
I had bought every nice option for that vehicle, because the
folks at GM know that it is cheaper to buy a whole lot of one
thing and run it through the factory and if you need those
additional wires for things then they are there. Why are we
coming up with the equivalent of 24 different wiring harnesses
and why are we coming up with so many different shapes?
Believe me, I very much appreciate and I want the American
people to appreciate the difficulty of your task. I could very
quickly understand the importance of a V-bottom to deflect the
blast. I did not see the importance--and I appreciate you folks
walking me through the importance--of getting rid of the fuel
tanks. Because it makes no difference if you survive the blast
only to incinerate the crew inside.
So you have got some challenges. I want to walk this
committee through those challenges. But there are simple
manufacturing processes that I don't see in place that need to
be in place.
And, again, I have got to believe that it is very difficult
to hire somebody and tell them this is just to get a job done.
This isn't forever. This is a task that is going to be for one
year. That is just the way it is. This is a rescue mission for
168,000 Americans in Iraq and the other 30,000 in Afghanistan.
And you know what? People did come down to south Mississippi
and New Orleans for one-year jobs cleaning up after Katrina.
This can be done and absolutely has to be done. What I want
to hear today is what steps are we going to be taking every day
to make that process faster, to make it more efficient? And
what do we as a Congress need to do to help you in your job?
Because this is not about beating you up. This is about solving
a problem.
Secretary Young. Maybe I will offer a few comments, Mr.
Chairman, and see if I have addressed your question.
One of the ways--I mentioned we delivered 161 vehicles in
July. We did that because we had multiple vendors. And, indeed,
we have two categories of variants. The Category 1's carry two
operators and four passengers. The Category 2's carry two
vehicle operators and eight passengers. So five vendors and
most of them have both categories, so you are up to 8 or 10
different types. And then if you have Army and Marine Corps
unique installations of those vehicles, a lot of variants.
We took the approach to get vehicles as fast as possible to
utilize all the manufacturing capacity that could produce safe
vehicles and get that 161. It was with some careful thought
that we made a decision with the October orders for which the
Congress provided funds in the continuing resolution that we
went down to three vendors, two category 1 types and two
category 2 types. They are the vehicles with the largest
payload.
At that point in time, there were two factors to that. One,
those vehicles having the largest payload have the best
capacity to carry additional armor and additional equipment;
and, two, because we have now moved from July to August,
September and October, those vendors can now keep and build
toward that rate and satisfy the desire to build 1,100, 1,200
vehicles a month.
So we believe this is the fastest path to the most vehicles
at rate and to address the issues you are properly raising.
Those were exactly our choices in making that decision, is if
we reduce the number of variety of vehicles we can process them
through the SPAWAR installation process of government-furnished
equipment faster, get them to the field faster and reduce the
burden on the troops in the field of having different vehicles,
each with some different installation which might have to be
repaired. They have a job to do, and it is not to work on these
vehicles.
So we are making choices to get there; and it also
addresses Chairman Abercrombie's point as we studied this and
make the decision, if we make this choice now, our long-term
inventory at end, the 15,000, will be mostly of single types of
vehicles that have large payload capacities and can potentially
serve us in the long term.
So we tried to address the short-term demand to get as many
vehicles as fast as possible if they provided better protection
than uparmored Humvees. We did that. We are now narrowing the
scope to continue to build as fast as possible but deliver a
smaller set of variants so that they can be more easily
outfitted in Charleston and more easily supported in theater.
Those are the two strategies that we have addressed to
address both of your concerns, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Young, again, as I mentioned, we have three
votes. We will try to get through them as quickly as possible.
The committee is going to declare a 30-minute recess. We
will be back at five minutes after the hour. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Taylor. The hearing will come to order again. We want
to again thank our witnesses for being here.
Secretary Young, I want to open this up to you, either you
or the Captain. It is obviously a frustration to a number of us
that we are delivering these vehicles one at a time, that we
are putting several of them on an airplane. I think all of us
would much prefer to see shiploads of these vehicles being
delivered to ports in Kuwait or coming down from Turkey. And
one of the things that I feel is a part of this jam is what is
going on in SPAWARS.
I, for one, am frustrated that we have 24 different
variants, and I am curious as to why we are doing that. I am
also frustrated--Captain, I want to give you an opportunity to
comment on this--that when you have 24 different variants, that
means in many instances different brackets, different holes
that have to be drilled through high-tempered steel, just a lot
of things that are done on a custom, one-by-one, very slow
basis, when we have a problem that needs a mass production
answer.
I am told by Retired Colonel Roach, and my observation in
Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding in Ingalls is that government-
furnished, very high-tech, very classified equipment is
installed on those destroyers, on those fighters, at the
manufacturer. I am curious, why, on a program where we really
need to be moving--as a former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
said, at the speed of light--why we are building the vehicle in
one place, shipping it to another, then adding the government-
furnished equipment. And in some instances, I have got to admit
it, it kind of reminded me of the middle of the night before
Christmas assembling my kids' toys, someone looking at a manual
and walking over to the vehicle.
Again, we need to be doing better than that.
So why don't you walk the committee through why we are
doing this, why so many variants, and what can we do to move
this along faster.
Secretary Young. Maybe I could start and let the Captain
add to it; and this gives me an opportunity to continue part of
the answer I offered before.
We have, I want to assure you, made a pretty determined
effort to create common equipment installations for these
vehicles. And there is a common turret; the Army and Marine
Corps agreed to install the same turret on these vehicles. Both
services will have Blue Force Tracker; both services are using
the same radio racks; and for a period of time we had an
agreement to install the same intervehicle intercom system or
radio system. But then the Army came back through the Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army and said, Army soldiers are trained
on their particular system; it is in all their other vehicles.
The common decision was to go with the Marine Corps system. The
Army was very worried about having to do differential training
for their soldiers in the field and their next-to-deploy, and
they said, can we please go back.
So I am pushing as hard as I can to get common to ease
installation issues at SPAWAR, but at the end of the day I have
to respect the senior military leaders' decision that says
certain things have to be unique.
And another piece of uniqueness is the jammers. The Marine
Corps has a different operating concept in theater, and so it
is currently using a different jammer than the Army is. That is
a significant difference, because the differences between those
two jammers are substantial in size, weight, and power. That
forces another different install.
If we get to the new Joint IED defeat organization CREW 2
jammer, which will be common between the Army and Marine Corps,
we will be able to ease that problem.
So all of these are those challenges. We are confronting
them, we are dealing with them as fast as we can.
To your specific question about installation, the jammers
and other things create circumstances--I only want to go so far
in the open hearing, and would be happy to talk to you more,
but there are a lot of radio emissions from this vehicle. And
so SPAWAR is, I think I would say, uniquely qualified from a
facility point of view and all to install this equipment, test
it on a range, make sure there are not interferences, make sure
the radio patterns that are produced by the vehicle are
sufficient for all the purposes desired, and move forward.
Every manufacturer doesn't have that kind of facility, and
so you would find yourself shipping vehicles from a
manufacturer where the equipment is installed; test it; if it
doesn't work, ship it back; and other things.
So I believe there are some significant efficiencies to
massing the government furnished equipment (GFE) at SPAWAR,
having people that have installed GFE in one vehicle install it
in the next vehicle and the next vehicle. Even though the
vehicle is somewhat different, it doesn't involve differential
training.
But to assure you of the next step, the team is making
those choices every day. They look at what could be done at the
vendor, and they are pushing things back to vendors that can be
done at the manufacturing site and, I believe legitimately,
only trying to do the things at SPAWAR that they feel they have
to do, or that are most efficiently done there because one
person can install all the jammers, all the radios, all the
other things.
Let me please give the Captain a chance to add to that.
Mr. Taylor. Captain Hoover.
Captain Hoover. Yes, sir. To add to the part about
commonality. We are already seeing successes every day in the
improvements of, the commonality of the various different
vehicles and the systems we are putting in. Our role,
obviously, is in the area of electronic engineering and
integration, and that is what we specialize in, in our
expertise in the testing and understanding of putting
complicated systems together in a small, confined area.
The biggest challenge that we have had to the different
configurations was doing the prototyping and getting through
those processes for all the different configurations.
The good side of where we are at today is, we have
completed a large number, especially a large volume of the
vehicles that we are going to be seeing; and so now--as a
matter of fact, every day--we are seeing a marked improvement
on the speed of that integration getting to those vehicles.
We still have challenges in working through those with a
very good teaming arrangement with our manufacturers. We have
recently seen a large number of engineering changes that we
have put changes back for brackets and those sorts of things,
and cable penetrations for the manufacturers--for those, to do
those in line with their processes, so that we can improve the
speed that we can do the electronic integration.
We have also had, working with a large group of industrial
engineers, to come in and look at our processes, seeing what
else we can do. And, again, that is a daily review, looking for
opportunities to continually improve.
And so the continual process, improvement, the engineering
changes back to the manufacturers. And then the learning curve
from now that we are through the biggest bulk of the
prototyping that we will see every day. Again, every day, our
numbers of production of doing the electronic integration are
improving.
Mr. Taylor. Captain, as a quick follow-up, and Secretary
Young touched on this: I very much appreciate the challenges of
the need for interoperability of the different electronic
components; and the folks that work with you did a very good
job for talking about the need for stand-off distances. But
once you have made the determination that this is where this
antenna needs to go, this is where the jammer needs to go, why
not send that work back to the factory?
It is my understanding that in the fall of 1989, Charleston
was hit with a very significant hurricane. It is also my
understanding that sometime in the history of that city they
have had a very dramatic earthquake there and that people in
the Charleston area still worry about that sort of thing.
Does it really make sense to have that as one focal point
where five or six manufacturers all send their equipment to be
put together? Doesn't that become a vulnerability? And what are
we doing? Since, again, I recognize that vulnerability, I would
hope you would.
So what are we doing to spread the work and to get this--
and, again, the whole idea is to get it done right and to get
it done quickly.
Captain Hoover. Sir, as far as the natural disaster from
the Charleston area, we have another alternate facility about
60, 70 miles outside of Charleston in a different part of the
State, the same square footage size, the same type of
industrial capability from an electronic integration-type
facility. So that is what we have in place.
And we are putting right now--between now and Christmas, we
will have in place an additional capacity for another 305
lines, actually above what our current plan was of the 50 lines
that we have already told folks about. And that will be
additional capacity and a backup plan if there ever was a
natural disaster, with a 72-hour plan to be able to relocate to
another continuing operations-type facility.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair will yield to the gentleman from
Maryland, Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
How many MRAPs will be in theater by year's end?
Secretary Young. Mr. Chairman, I believe in a previous
press conference, Secretary Gates indicated that he thought
there would be at least 1,500 in theater. I think we will do
much better than that, but I would really rather not predict at
this time.
But our production schedule calls for us to produce--for
industry to build and deliver almost 3,600 MRAPs by December
31.
I think Chairman Taylor rightly pointed out that if SPAWAR
is very successful, and they have plans and they have applied
Lean Six Sigma processes to it, that they can process those
vehicles. Then you have to factor in the shipment times and
some variability in the vessels.
So I have been very hesitant to put a final number. I think
it is significantly more than that 1,500, but if need be, we
could get you something for the record that we would be, I
think, conservative and comfortable with until we get closer to
December.
Because the other thing is, I have to build 1,000 vehicles
in November and 1,200 vehicles in December. That is the real
goal. Having built 500 in the last month, we are optimistic
about that, but I am very dependent on my industry partners to
be able to make the next jump from 500 to 1,000 and then to
1,200.
That is critical before I can answer your question as to
how many will be in theater.
Mr. Bartlett. It will be somewhere between the 1,500 and
the 3,600?
Secretary Young. That is probably a good estimate.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Acknowledging the significant work that has been done to
produce MRAPs, how are you dealing with the variation that you
find when the trucks arrive in Charleston that are not ready
for integration?
Secretary Young. Maybe I would ask Captain Hoover. He would
be best able.
Captain Hoover. Yes, sir. That has been a very good teaming
arrangement between DCMA, the vendors. We have field service
reps from each of the vendors right in Charleston working with
us. And in almost all cases we are able to get the prototyping
done, we can get the integration done in a parallel process,
working with the manufacturers to get the vehicles done in a
short amount of time.
Mr. Bartlett. Are they not inspected before they are
shipped? Or what is the problem that they arrive not ready for
integration?
Captain Hoover. Yes, sir, they are inspected. It is not a
problem.
It is basically that some of the vehicles were awaiting
some components, for some of the equipment like an air
conditioning unit or whatever. And so, due to the speed that we
are trying to go and paralleling our processes, we go ahead and
conditionally accept the vehicles. And then, again, the field
service reps come and work alongside our folks in our
facilities so that we can work together in a teaming
arrangement so that we can complete the vehicles.
Mr. Bartlett. Is there anything that we can do to help?
Captain Hoover. Continuing to support our efforts on what
we are doing I think is a great thing.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Taylor asked the next question I was
going to ask, and that is, why can't you have the C4I equipment
installation done at the manufacturers and avoid this
additional step?
And I think that you answered that question.
Is SPAWAR Charleston opening an MRAP integration facility
in Orangeburg, South Carolina?
Captain Hoover. Sir, in Orangeburg, South Carolina, is
where we have our continuing operations facility that we have
put in place. Again, it is similar, as far as capacity, to the
building that we are using now. And it is meant to be the
emergency backup facility if there was a natural disaster.
But also what we are doing in order to make that run as
smoothly and efficiently as possible, if we ever need to call
upon it, we are putting a limited number of lines over into
that facility. The other benefit of that is, it gives some
additional capacity above what we currently have.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Chairman, I have an obvious question to
ask. If we were really wanting to get MRAPs as quickly as
possible and if we have this fallback facility that we could
use in the event that we lost the primary one due to a natural
disaster, why aren't we using both of them so we are producing
more vehicles?
Captain Hoover. Yes, sir. That is the plan. Right now, the
other important portion of the location of the facility that we
are using now is the closeness to the testing, the electronic
testing that we need to do, only a couple miles away. And now
that is part of the prototyping; it is also part of the
engineering change process that we need to do for the
electronic testing.
As we get over the major hurdles in the completion of all
that testing, then we will be able to do more, basically, at a
more remote site away from the testing facility.
Mr. Bartlett. Is it a manpower shortage that prohibits you
from manufacturing at both facilities now?
Captain Hoover. No, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. I am just curious. We have a fallback
location that we could ramp up very quickly in the event we
lost the primary one. If we really want to get MRAPs in the
field very quickly, I think the obvious question is, why aren't
we using both of them now?
Captain Hoover. Yes, sir. Again, it is just the time it is
taking us to get the other facility up and running and ready to
go, and also where we are at in the prototyping process and the
maturity of the process.
Mr. Bartlett. I am still not getting a clear understanding
of what keeps us from doing it.
Secretary Young. Congressman, maybe I might add a couple of
comments to that.
One, we are anxious about some of the issues you all are
raising. I asked recently that the Army look, given its
experience in handling up-armored Humvees and kitting them with
Frag Kits, to look at what facilities they have and whether
they could participate in the MRAP program GFE equipment
installation.
So they are taking a look at that, and I am waiting for an
answer about that, because I would see them as either a backup
facility or a potential augmentation to the current capacity.
SPAWARS's estimates say that at the single Charleston
facility they can process the full vehicle rate of 1,200 per
month. I think we all have--you know, this is one of the risk
areas and a continuing learning experience. We need industry to
deliver 1,200. Then we need to see SPAWARS progress 1,200. They
are making very good process and have demonstrated the ability
to process as many as 20 a day right now, I think.
So it is not clear to us SPAWARS won't be able to handle
the workload, but we are looking at options for backup, either
through the alternate SPAWARS facility and/or Army facilities.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Captain, if I could follow up, I heard this
comment last Friday and I heard you say it again today when you
talked about 50 different production lines. My observations
were that there were, indeed, 50 lines, but it looked more like
50 different custom, one-of-a-kind events going on, as opposed
to even one straight production line where, at this station,
this is done; at the next station, the antenna is added; at the
next station, the weapons are added.
Truly--and, again, I very much respect your service to our
Nation, but I don't think we are going to get anywhere near the
results that this Nation needs with the situation that exists
at SPAWARS.
And I was curious, to what extent have you gone out to the
private sector, to folks who work at Toyota, Ford, GM, whoever,
folks who are in the business of mass production? You are in
the business of being a great sailor, and I understand that we
have asked you to do something on top of your normal role. But
to what extent have you tried to involve industry experts to
expedite this process?
Because I am not saying this to belittle the efforts of
anyone in your organization. I am saying this because kids are
dying in Iraq for lack of these vehicles, and we need to do
better. Tell me how you are going to do better.
Captain Hoover. Yes, sir. We have teamed with a large group
of outside industrial experts.
Mr. Taylor. Walk us through this. This is a chance for this
committee to learn something.
Captain Hoover. Yes, sir.
George Group, for one, who are experts in the Lean Six
Sigma processes, understands industrial engineering processes,
have teamed with them, have come in and are continually
observing our processes.
We also have local resident experts in the area of Lean Six
Sigma and process engineering.
And so that is a daily effort, to look through our
processes, to look for that continual improvement. And, again,
there are numerous examples on where we have had those
improvements in the tooling areas, in measuring the drumbeat,
the rate of the vehicles going through those efforts.
Also, working with the manufacturers on those engineering
changes and working with their team, their team of engineers,
on--already putting more of the brackets and the drilling and
the welding and those sort of things back into the inline
process of the building of the vehicles.
Mr. Taylor. Are you certain that when, on the industrial
side, on the manufacturing side, they get to full production,
that you have the people, the equipment, and the process in
place to match their production so as to field these so that
every time one rolls into Charleston, you are ready to take it,
and within a day or two it is going out to the field?
Captain Hoover. Yes, sir.
Mr. Taylor. You have everything you need? If you come back
before this committee in March, are you going to tell me that
you don't need any additional equipment, you don't need any
additional resources, you don't need any additional people?
Because now is the time to clear the air on this.
Captain Hoover. We have the people and the resources. We
need to continue the teaming relationship; and we need a tight,
close, working relationship effort with the manufacturers,
obviously, for us all to be successful.
That is a very important team, and I fully expect that that
will continue and only continue to improve.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas,
Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Young, thank you for being with us today--all
three of you.
As chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, we want to be
sure that our troops get the best equipment that we can give
them. And I understand that the MRAP contains some of the
newest, latest technology. But I see a chess game. We move,
they move. We come up with a new technology or new equipment,
then they come up with different ways to destroy our equipment.
I am pretty sure that as we are moving along and we are
using the MRAPs--and I know that there have been some attacks
on some of the MRAPs and, thank God, that some of our Marines
and soldiers have been able to walk away and not to be maimed
or injured like before. But the enemy has always been able to
adapt real quick.
Can we avoid that? As we are learning from experiences with
the MRAP there, are we telling our engineers, do they know
exactly what happens? How can we provide the information
learned from these experiences so that we can--because we are
providing the same vehicle all the time. It defeats the
purpose. We need to make adjustments as we move along. And
maybe you can give me a little insight on that.
Secretary Young. Congressman, probably a couple important
points to that.
One, the MRAP team has a competition under way for an MRAP
2 vehicle, giving people--to provide vehicle options against a
higher standard of protection.
Then I think you would be encouraged to hear that we are
testing the existing MRAPs against that higher standard, and
that testing is informing the team and leading people to make
changes on some of these vehicles. So the next orders of
vehicles will potentially have changes that will make them more
like this MRAP 2 standard we would like to achieve.
And so we are constantly testing and providing that data.
And then we get information from the field, as you said, and we
have the opportunity to make changes to the vehicles.
I would tell you, as General Brogan told me just during the
break in the hearing, the second series of development testing
on the existing MRAPs is going very well and showing that these
vehicles are very capable.
In addition to that process, we are working with the
supplemental funds that you all have provided to add additional
armor protection to those vehicles, to pace some of the threat
we see in the theater.
So we are taking all those steps, and we will probably
provide you with additional details in a different forum.
Mr. Ortiz. You know, we read in the newspaper about
individuals saying, well, we might be able to use it here in
this type of terrain. But if we go someplace else, we might not
be able to use it. But I am pretty sure that as we move along,
we will be able to make some changes to where, if we fight--and
I hope that it never happens that we have to fight a different
war, different techniques--that maybe we can continue to use
some of these vehicles.
Secretary Young. Maybe I would add a couple of additional
comments to that.
I mean, the vehicles have good survivability because of the
features that Chairman Taylor mentioned and, also, they are
heavy. They range from 30,000-plus pounds to 80,000 pounds at
the extreme end. That gives them some of the survivability
also.
That also deters to some degree their mobility and their
speed, and in certain terrain environments MRAPs are proving
not as effective for soldiers. And we are getting reports from
the field that some places they want to keep the up-armored
Humvees. They need those for mobility and speed and other
factors.
So the force is going to keep informing us about what best
lets them do their mission, and we will work toward that. And
then out of both of these programs, we are pulling knowledge--I
think it goes to Chairman Abercrombie's comment--we are going
to build a replacement for the Humvee. We call it the Joint
Lightweight Tactical Vehicle.
I recently urged that we look at building prototypes of
those vehicles and testing to see how survivable we can make
those vehicles. There is a desire for those vehicles to be
small and light and mobile like Humvees, but have MRAP-like
protection. Well, those are inconsistent goals, but with some
technology and design work, maybe we can get part of that. We
need to build prototypes, test them, and see how close we can
come; let that inform the requirement. And if any vehicles are
successful, we will move forward with developing those vehicles
to have a Humvee replacement.
So it is constantly improving the MRAPs. We will continue.
There is a Frag Kit 6 now for Humvees. We will keep gathering
information, test in the theater and make improvements on what
we have.
And then we are looking forward to the next generation of
vehicle.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Texas.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Hawaii, Mr.
Abercrombie.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me work backwards, Mr. Young. You just mentioned the
question of prototypes, which takes me to a--some of the area
that I don't want to go into at great length today, because I
don't think the hearing warrants it.
But you have a unique background. I won't go over all of
your biography, but for those in the audience and those
listening in or paying attention to this today, they may not be
fully aware of it. You have, I think, a unique and very useful
background in the sense of having worked on the Defense
Appropriations Committee.
Your familiarity with acquisition comes from both an
academic background and familiarity with the engineering side
of things, as well as the political side of things. And I don't
mean that in a pejorative sense. I am talking about the process
that is necessary, particularly from an appropriations point of
view; you are familiar with the history, the legislative
history.
So when you mentioned the prototype, I think--if you are
not aware, you will be at the end of my remarks that I am very
much in favor of what you are trying to achieve because I think
it makes good sense. That is why I wasn't quite sure what you
meant when you said that someone might, with regard to Humvee
replacement and the Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicle, that
the prototype might be seen by some as looking at inconsistent
goals.
Could you enlighten me? Or did I misunderstand what you
were trying to get at? I do not see, in other words, the
establishment of a prototype process as being inconsistent with
anything other than good fiscal--sound fiscal policy and sound
legislative policy with regard to what we should fund and how
we should do it.
Secretary Young. Mr. Chairman, I am very grateful for your
comments. I think what you sensed in my comments is, the
Department had embarked on a strategy that said we would like
to have a competition, pick someone based on a paper proposal
to build a vehicle to replace the Humvee, and have that vehicle
cost half or less of what MRAP cost and be more survivable or
as survivable as an MRAP.
I said, I am not sure technology supports that. Even if it
does, I think, consistent with your comments, I, as the acting
under secretary, said it is a better strategy, given the times
we have gone into later stages of development with immature
technology, to do prototyping work and convince ourselves that
technology will support and meet the requirement and we
understand about what it will cost, and then move into that
later stage of development to try to avoid schedule slips, cost
growth, and the other bad things.
So across the Department, I am urging we look very hard at
applying prototyping strategies, which I am actually very glad
to hear that might be consistent with your view.
Mr. Abercrombie. Too bad I am not a Senator that can
confirm you.
Secretary Young. I would agree with that also, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. But I have an idea that anybody in the
listening public, listening to what you are saying, would be a
little bit shocked and maybe a little perturbed that that is
not what we are doing right now.
The assumption, I expect, particularly in the private
sector, would be, let alone in the taxpaying public, would be,
isn't that the way we do things anyway? And, of course, the
answer is ``no.'' So what you are really talking about here,
are you not, is a change of culture.
Secretary Young. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. A change in approach?
Secretary Young. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. That is more than tinkering with the
process. It is an entirely different concept of what
constitutes the capacity to utilize--even create technology,
let alone utilize technology, on behalf of the national
security mission.
Secretary Young. Maybe I could add more.
What I particularly want to do is, I want to learn lessons
and make mistakes. Because we do have to learn, especially in
technically risky things. I want to learn those lessons and
make those mistakes when I am spending at lower monthly rates
of taxpayer dollars' expenditure in a prototyping phase, and
hopefully, not learn those lessons when I am spending money at
much higher rates in the very costly design and development
phase.
Mr. Abercrombie. Not only that. But you are also dealing
with the context of the military industrial complex. And,
again, I don't use that in the pejorative sense. I use that in
the sense of the warning that was issued by President
Eisenhower at the end of his term.
As someone who understood, as much as he helped create, the
military-industrial complex, he understood that there were
consequences and implications of it. There are sound reasons
for that, right?
And that is why I said, it is not pejorative on my part. It
is too easy a philosophical or ideological position to take.
But the reason I want to just pursue it a moment or two
more in this context of the MRAP. We don't want to be in a
situation, whether it is MRAP or anything else you may be
contemplating, what these subcommittees will have to deal with.
Hasn't part of our difficulty been that we hand out these
contracts, have a goal on a piece of paper, and then say, okay,
you go try to accomplish this? And what happens is, we start
spending not thousands or millions but sometimes billions of
dollars. You then create--and Mr. Taylor made it very clear,
this is not a jobs program we are looking at here. Some jobs
will come, some jobs might. They might be in some districts,
they might not be in others. They might change.
I have had discussions with some of the people on our
second panel, for example, saying, are you prepared, do you
understand that you may gear up to a very high percentage of
turnout--build-up and overhead both in terms of personnel and
investment--which may have a termination point, which may have
some kind of serious consequences for you financially? That is
one of the reasons that I am so interested in the question of
capital budgeting and so on.
But in this instance, then what happens--this is my
understanding of what you are driving at here--is that you then
get a vested political interest in continuing what is going on.
And it is hard, and I have full understanding of any Member's
situation when somebody comes and says, look, Congressman,
look, Senator, we have got 1,000 jobs here and this investment
is going.
Of course, nothing is being accomplished. We are not really
getting the helicopters, we are not really getting the planes,
we are not really getting the tanks. We think we are. Maybe we
will. Or we have got to slip it another four years or five
years, but you have got to keep giving us the money.
And then what happens is that the capacity to do what we
are talking about right now, this rescue mission that Mr.
Taylor is speaking of, is compromised. And it finds itself in
extraordinary difficulty or requires us then to move very
rapidly in another direction in terms of funding which, more
often than not, will involve a supplemental budget because we
didn't anticipate it during the regular budget process.
Am I being unfair in characterizing this?
Secretary Young. It is very fair.
Mr. Abercrombie. And if I am not, am I correct in saying
that you want to try and change that, that kind of doing
business?
Secretary Young. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. Does that then apply toward the MRAP
2?
Secretary Young. I think most aspects of MRAP are aligned
with some of the things we are talking about.
They asked multiple vendors to bring vehicles to test in
the first phase of MRAP. And, indeed, we leaned forward and
bought vehicles from some of those vendors, and one or two of
those vendors didn't pass the testing. And we have some of
their vehicles----
Mr. Abercrombie. And that's the way it is.
Secretary Young [continuing]. We are going to use for
training purposes so the taxpayer money is not wasted. But they
are not going to get more contracts.
Mr. Abercrombie. So if Members of Congress are serious
about wanting to limit government and wanting to spend the
dollar in the correct way, of wanting to utilize, we are going
to have to rely on some cold, hard judgments being made; and
that means some of us may have to say to our people, we don't
get this, maybe we will get something else. We will have to
move in another direction, as Mr. Taylor already indicated.
More than one of us have been through a situation where you
told 1,300 people or whatever it is, this is not going to
happen any longer. So, okay. So we are going to get rid of that
jobs approach here, per se.
Then the last question I have--thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
allowing it--we are getting lessons. You are talking about,
like, the 24 variations and so on. Without taking a whole lot
of time, maybe, that would be better spent in another hearing,
is it fair for me to say, or do you have then a kind of
lessons-learned concept or approach with regard to your
experience now with this singular focus on MRAPs and the
congressional push that is going on with it in the sense of
applying lessons in terms of the survivability?
Are you testing out in the field? That is what I am trying
to get at. Are we following up? Do I understand you correctly
that we are following up in the field, asking for the soldiers
in the field to give us information as to whether or not what
we are giving them actually is accomplishing what they need?
Or because I gleaned from what you were saying, in some
instances, a lighter vehicle, maybe not quite as armored, is
something that is seen as useful and applicable; and in other
instances, they are going to need something else.
Secretary Young. We are looking for that feedback. For the
MRAP program, per se, there has been a first round in
development tests; a second round which four of the vehicle
vendors are still in the process of.
Mr. Abercrombie. I am not talking about testing in a field
sense. I am talking about testing in a theater sense.
Secretary Young. Right. I wanted to, if I could, gradually
work my way there.
There is a third round. Those development tests are defined
by what we are seeing in the theater in terms of explosive
types and other things.
And then the actual results and experience in the theater,
we get that data and process that, both to define our tests and
to learn what we need to do about vehicles going forward.
So, yes, sir, that happens.
Mr. Abercrombie. And, Mr. Greenwalt, you escaped most of
the attention today. I presume you are Mr. Young's strong arm
or his associate in this? Do you associate yourself with this
approach?
Mr. Greenwalt. Yes, sir, I do. And I think it is the
lessons learned from this particular procurement: that our
industrial base is agile, that we rely on commercial products
and commercial vendors, and we have been able to pull together
in a very rapid period of time so you can rapidly prototype
with existing technologies and existing manufacturers.
And I think----
Mr. Abercrombie. I think the country and the Department
will be well served, Mr. Young, if you are able to move forward
with this.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Hawaii.
We now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.
Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank all of you for being here today. I am so
interested in the MRAP program. And I am interested as a Member
of Congress. I am a veteran myself, but I am particularly
interested in that I have four sons serving in the military.
One served for a year in Iraq, another is on his way to Iraq,
and so I am interested for our troops. And so much of the
feelings that I have are to provide the best equipment we can
to protect our troops. And what you are doing is so important;
and I want to thank you for your efforts.
In particular, I have had the opportunity, thanks to
Congressman Abercrombie, to recently be in Iraq and
Afghanistan. My National Guard unit is in Afghanistan. In my
visits--eight times to Iraq, four times to Afghanistan--as he
was talking with persons in theater to find out how successful
and how helpful the equipment that our young servicemen and -
women have, it is just really heartwarming. And so you are
making such a difference.
Also, Captain Hoover, I want to thank you. I have had the
opportunity to visit SPAWAR. You have excellent personnel. They
are so enthusiastic.
And, of course, I am a bit partial. The chairman has had
two daughters go to the College of Charleston. I had the
extraordinary opportunity to be born in Charleston. So I am
very pleased about what you all are doing.
As we look ahead, I am very interested in finding out, what
is the planning for long-term sustainment of the MRAP program?
And any of you could answer that.
Secretary Young. Congressman, I think, unfortunately, none
of us is exactly the right person to answer that question. The
service chiefs have indicated and Secretary Gates has asked
them to think about that very issue: How will you, long term,
integrate MRAPs in the force structure? And I think those
deliberations have not concluded yet.
In general, the chiefs have indicated these are heavy and
large vehicles, and for some of their operational concepts--
very expeditionary, mobile--they don't fit well. They fit very
well, obviously, for the circumstances in Iraq. So some of the
vehicles, the service chiefs have indicated, will be stored for
a period of time.
We might not need as many as we are buying for the Iraq
situation if we are successful in continuing to stabilize Iraq
and the force mission changes there. But those decisions are
being deliberated on and made as we talk; and Secretary Gates
is working on it.
I can't give you much more commentary than what I have
offered.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Abercrombie touched on this, too. And that
is, when do you require another influx of funds in order to
preclude a possible production break in the MRAP program?
Secretary Young. The funds that I understand are in the
fiscal year 2008 Defense Appropriations conference report that
is before, I believe, the Congress--today, even--give us what
we need for fiscal year 2008, which is really, to be candid,
awesome and incredible. In a matter of months here, the
Congress has provided $22 billion to buy these vehicles. It is
far and away the biggest program activity in a space of time in
the Department. So the Congress has been extraordinarily
helpful on this program.
Mr. Wilson. And, again--I know I am very supportive of what
this can mean to protect our troops.
The final question I have: Are you experiencing any supply
problems at the sub-tier supply base?
Mr. Greenwalt. In April and then just recently, a few
months back, I tasked the Defense Contract Management Agency to
look for potential bottlenecks, and they have identified a
number of them. But the most recent report is that these
problems are manageable, and that we are able to work our way
through them.
But there are potential choke points in steel, in tires, in
axles, and a few subcomponents. But, again, these problems are
being worked through on a daily basis.
And because the MRAP program has a DX rating, which is
essentially the MRAP program obtains priority to all of these
components and materials, we are not seeing the supply
disruptions that could have occurred.
So I think we are doing--it is a tremendous job that is
going on out there by the vendors and by government personnel,
and we have got our hands on it.
Mr. Wilson. Again, I want to thank you as a veteran and
thank you as a member of a military family. We want the best
for our troops, to protect our troops.
And thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentleman from South
Carolina.
We want to thank our witnesses.
We also want to recognize we are lucky to have former
Representative Dave Martin with us today, keeping us on our
toes.
Captain, last question. I am curious, what was your flow-
through SPAWAR in September? How many vehicles? In other words,
how long did it take a vehicle to enter your facility, to leave
your facility in theater, in September?
How long would it take that same vehicle to flow through
your facility today? And what is your anticipated time for
January?
Because, again--I hope I am dead wrong; I hope you are
exactly right; I hope there is not a train wreck on the way--
but I want to hear from you that you have a plan. And give me
an idea how these things are proceeding through your facility
quicker, so that we don't have a problem there.
Captain Hoover. Yes, sir. Right now, I will start with our
goal.
Our goal is to get from time of receipt to embarkation in
seven days, a seven-day flowing process. I do not recall the
exact numbers on average for the month of September. For the
end of the month of October, it was roughly 21 days; and the
reason for that, the difference--September was a little slower
than that. And the reason for the difference and the reason why
it is much longer than what we want it to be or require it to
be is because in August, September, even up through October, we
have been heavily involved in the prototyping process which
goes into the average flow rate, the calculation of those
numbers. And so when we have a group of vehicles coming in from
the manufacturers, as we are going through the prototyping
process, which takes us several more days than just doing the
integration itself, basically we have vehicles there that are
waiting to get into the integration process once the
prototyping is done.
Now that we are over the majority of those hurdles and we
are over the majority of those prototyping processes, from the
raw vehicle number at over 80 percent that now we are seeing--
and we are right where we thought we would be at this point,
knowing that November was our big month, knowing that we needed
to get through most of the prototyping so that when, in
November, the largest volume that we have seen to date, starts
to flow, we can continue to narrow down that 21-day time.
And it is not 21 days of integration, but that is from the
time that it arrives to the time that it departs, basically, to
get that down to that 7-day process. And now we are seeing
daily an improvement on that speed. And, again, that is due a
lot to the successes in getting through the prototyping,
working with the manufacturers, and now working on just that
continual process improvement to make sure we are making our
goals.
Mr. Taylor. When do you anticipate your facility will be at
that 7-day target?
Captain Hoover. Sir, by the end of the month of November,
we should have the capacity we estimate, that our capability
will be at 40 vehicles a day. So it is more that we are
tracking it, than the whole entire process, because we are
looking more at keeping up with the flow of, the drumbeat of,
the number of vehicles processing through. And then, by mid-
December is when we believe--we are showing right now that we
will be at the full 50-a-day vehicles, which is what we are
required to do to keep up with the drumbeat of, the flow of the
vehicles--keep pace.
Mr. Taylor. I have got to believe that you supply these
numbers of what is flowing through your facility to someone on
almost a daily basis. Is that correct?
Captain Hoover. Yes, sir.
Mr. Taylor. I would like to request that you also supply
those numbers to this committee.
Would you have a problem with that, or would Mr. Young have
a problem with that? Okay.
And, again, we very much appreciate all of you.
Yes, Mr. Young.
Secretary Young. Could I just add, every time I brief the
Secretary, he shares the concern you have.
I have also visited SPAWAR. They are pacing the vehicles.
They have had to deal with the fact that we contracted for new
vehicle types that showed up. But this is the metric we want to
watch, and this is why it is important for us to have some
backup plans, too.
It is of concern to Secretary Gates. And I share your
concern; I am happy to share that data with you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 117.]
Mr. Taylor. Captain, either you or somebody in your
organization last Friday mentioned that you see on the
deliveries that come to your facility, that it starts out kind
of slow and then toward the end of the month you tend to get a
wave of vehicles coming in, which certainly makes it harder on
your organization to process them in a straightforward, timely
manner. What is being done?
And I am also going to give our vendors an opportunity up
front to let them know this is part of their questioning.
What is being done to change that, to get it more balanced
out, one-quarter of a month's production in each week coming
from your vendors, again, to lessen the load on your people so
that it is neither too little nor too much?
Captain Hoover. Sir, I am only going to speak from what we
are seeing in our facility.
In the month of October, we saw an improvement, although at
the end of the month of October we did have a bigger bulk at
the end of the month, but not as bad as it was in the month of
September. Already in the month of November we are seeing
marked improvement on a steady flow, almost a daily delivery of
vehicles coming through.
So the program office has done a great job on changing
that. And we are seeing--again, at our facility, we are already
seeing a significant difference. Especially this month right
now in just this short month that we have started, we are
seeing an improvement in that area.
Secretary Young. Maybe I can add, because that is a
challenge for SPAWAR, and in anticipating this, I tried to get
that data. In the first 5 days of October, 21 vehicles were
delivered. In the last 5 days of October--maybe, actually, 7
days--231 vehicles were delivered. That was a very big wave at
the back end.
In the first seven days of November, so far, already 100
vehicles have been delivered from industry. That is a very
positive sign. Paul Mann and General Brogan and the MRAP team
have tried to move the contracts to be weekly-based deliveries
and are even looking at daily-based deliveries.
So we are going to try to force, through the contract, that
discipline, and work with the vendors to get to that steadier
flow.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Any additional questions?
Mr. Secretary, we very much appreciate you and this panel
being here. We appreciate your service to our Nation.
And I want to give you one last opportunity. If there is
anything you need from this committee, tell us now.
Secretary Young. I have one thing I need, but it is better
to talk to you.
Mr. Taylor. If you prefer to do it off the record.
But, again, this is a United States of America problem, and
we want to do our part. We expect you to do your part. If there
is anything this Congress is not doing, we need to know about
it.
Secretary Young. Let me not leave you with the wrong
impression. If the appropriations bill provides that $11
billion, we have the tools we need. We will have to work some
processes in the Department to execute it, and we will do that
and move forward.
Mr. Taylor. Again, we want to thank the panel for being
here. Thank you for your service to our Nation. The first panel
is dismissed.
The Chair would now like to welcome before the committee
our second panel. We are very fortunate to have a number of
representatives from industry, who are involved in the
manufacture of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle.
They include Ms. Linda Hudson, President of Land & Armaments
Systems, BAE Systems; Mr. Gordon McGilton, Chief Executive
Officer of Force Protection; Mr. David Heebner, President of
General Dynamics Land Systems; and Mr. Archie Massicotte, the
President of International Military and Government (IMG), LLC.
We want to welcome you here. It is normally the practice of
this committee to limit witnesses to five minutes. I am willing
to be flexible on that, but I would hope that you keep in mind
that there will be additional votes today. So, in fairness to
all of our witnesses, please try to do it as expeditiously as
you can, but we are willing to be flexible on the five-minute
rule.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Linda Hudson.
STATEMENT OF LINDA P. HUDSON, PRESIDENT, LAND & ARMAMENTS
SYSTEMS, BAE SYSTEMS
Ms. Hudson. Thank you. Chairman Taylor, Chairman
Abercrombie, Ranking Member Bartlett, I appreciate the
opportunity to address your committees. Having submitted my
statement for the record, I would like to provide a few opening
comments.
I appear before you today to discuss the MRAP systems
produced by BAE Systems. Before beginning, on behalf of BAE
Systems, I would like to thank the subcommittees and this
Congress for your support of the MRAP program.
I am the President of BAE Systems Land & Armaments
Operating Group. During my 35 years in the defense industry, I
have never seen industry and government accomplish so much so
fast. My organization has 18,000 employees across 17 States in
the United States, as well as the United Kingdom, Sweden, and
South Africa. All of my employees and the employees of the
greater BAE Systems Corporation have made MRAP our number one
priority.
Our global business designs, produces, resets, upgrades,
and provides worldwide support for combat vehicles, tactical
vehicles, military armaments, naval fire support systems,
advanced armor solutions, and individual soldier survivability
systems for the United States and our allies. We bring all of
those resources to the MRAP program.
Having recently acquired Armor Holdings, we now provide the
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, or FMTVs, and have played a
major role in improving Marine and soldier survivability by up-
armoring Humvees and providing advanced body armor on an
accelerated schedule to meet the evolving threat. The
combination of BAE Systems and Armor Holdings has resulted in
unmatched capabilities in warfighter and vehicle survivability.
To date, we have received orders for 2,933 MRAP vehicles. Allow
me to summarize our three MRAP systems currently under
contract.
First, the RG-31 vehicle has been produced since 1996 in
our Land Systems South Africa business. Our legacy of building
mine-resistant vehicles in South Africa goes back 30 years. We
have a business relationship with General Dynamics to allow
them to market and coproduce the RG-31. I will defer to my
colleague from GD to comment further on this contract.
Second, building upon our RG-31 experience in South Africa,
technology was transferred to our ground systems business here
in the United States, and a next-generation mine-resistant
vehicle called the RG-33 was developed by BAE Systems. This
design incorporates unprecedented survivability features
tailored for our U.S. forces. The RG-33 is currently being
supplied in four different variants, including the generic
Category I and II systems, and an ambulance and a SOCOM
variant. The contracted production currently under way runs
through April of 2008.
And, finally, as I mentioned previously, in July 2007 BAE
Systems acquired Armor Holdings. That acquisition added an MRAP
variant known as the Caiman, based upon the design of the U.S.
Army's Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles. In addition to
meeting the MRAP survivability requirements, this vehicle has
been designed to have parts commonality with the FMTV,
resulting in enhanced supportability. The contracted production
for Caiman runs out in February of 2008.
Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the
services should be commended for recognizing this critical need
to protect our troops and providing the necessary priority and
funding.
BAE Systems has been leaning forward, often self-funding
activities in advance of contract, with the sole focus of
rapidly delivering the most survivable vehicles to protect our
troops. These efforts have been challenging, with requirements
to deliver vehicles within weeks of contract award and only
months after initial design.
For example, we delivered Caimans 43 days after contract
award. We designed and delivered RG-33 in less than 7 months;
and subsequently, the ambulance variant, 13 weeks after
contract award.
We have five principal MRAP manufacturing sites: York,
Pennsylvania; Aikin, South Carolina; Sealy, Texas; Fairfield,
Ohio; and Johannesburg, South Africa. Assuming receipt of
additional orders in time to ensure continuous production, we
will achieve our currently planned maximum rate of 600 vehicles
per month in April of next year.
Moreover, activity is under way to ensure that components
of our MRAP variants can be built in all of our major
facilities. BAE Systems is prepared to make additional capital
investments to increase capacity.
Last, we stand ready to further expand monthly MRAP
production by allowing other manufacturers to produce our MRAP
design variants under license if so desired.
I would like to single out the MRAP program manager, Mr.
Paul Mann, for his unceasing leadership. It is noteworthy that
normal contractual practices could not possibly keep up with
the fast pace of this program. We have maintained an open,
direct, and professional relationship with Mr. Mann and his
program office. This collaboration within the framework of the
contract deserves commendation.
We are prepared to collaborate with the other prime
contractors to improve survivability, accelerate production and
fielding, and enhance sustainment of the MRAP vehicles. We are
already collaborating with the other prime contractors here to
cross-train our field service representatives on all the
vehicle variants to optimize in-theater support. We stand ready
to work with our colleagues here today to better meet the needs
of the troops.
In closing, and on behalf of BAE Systems and the Land &
Armaments team, I would like to thank you for this invitation
to come tell our MRAP story. We are very proud to be a part of
the MRAP program, providing these highly survivable vehicles to
the warfighters, and we are well positioned to respond rapidly
to the continuing program needs.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Ms. Hudson.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hudson can be found in the
Appendix on page 76.]
Mr. Taylor. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Gordon McGilton,
Chief Executive Officer of Force Protection.
STATEMENT OF GORDON MCGILTON, CEO, FORCE PROTECTION, INC.
Mr. McGilton. Thank you, Chairman Taylor, Chairman
Abercrombie, and members of the House Armed Services Committee.
Force Protection Industries appreciates this opportunity to
update with regard to the critical MRAP program.
As of the 1st of November, Force Protection has delivered
1,389 Cougar and Buffalo mine protected vehicles to our
servicemen and -women. They are as follows: 146 Buffalo route
clearance vehicles; 153 Cougar Iraqi light armored vehicles; 28
Cougar hardened engineer vehicles; 216 Cougar joint EOD rapid
response vehicles; 5 Cougar engineered vehicles delivered to
Canada; 108 Cougar Mastiffs for the United Kingdom; and 734
Cougar MRAP Category I and II vehicles.
In order to put the delivery of those vehicles into some
perspective, I will provide a brief synopsis of our history
relative to building mine protected vehicles.
Force Protection's sole mission is to manufacture, deliver,
and maintain vehicles that feature the best protection
available to the American and Coalition servicemen and -women
facing the threat of improvised explosive devices. MRAP
manufacturing is not an additional business line for us; it is
our only job. Every action we take, including investments and
partnerships, is designed to help fulfill this mission.
Force Protection Industries was incorporated in early 2005.
At that time, we employed 200 people and occupied 100,000
square feet of manufacturing space in South Carolina.
By the end of 2005, we expanded to 250,000 square feet of
space and 350 employees. Most importantly, we had delivered 60
vehicles. By the end of 2006, we had quintupled the number of
vehicles delivered to 296. In 2006, we also had expanded our
manufacturing facilities to 450,000 square feet and added 400
employees for a total of 750 employees.
Today Force Protection employs 1,800 workers and occupies
nearly a million square feet of manufacturing space in four
facilities in South Carolina and North Carolina. These
manufacturing facilities are also supported by a significant
research and development facility and a 300-acre blast and
ballistics testing facility also located in South Carolina.
In addition, we formed a new company, Force Dynamics,
through a joint venture with General Dynamics Land Systems.
This partnership gives us access to General Dynamics'
substantial manufacturing capabilities and as a result there
are now multiple facilities manufacturing Cougars. Our supply
chain has been expanded and our ability to rapidly incorporate
design improvements is greatly enhanced.
Of particular note, we have been able to reduce the price
of a Cougar by roughly $150,000 per vehicle to a current price
of under $490,000. We have expanded the enterprise to include
additional manufacturing by using subcontracting and licensing
agreements.
Because of the potential demand for MRAP we focused on two
program goals. The first was to establish enough manufacturing
capacity within our joint venture with General Dynamics so that
we could deliver roughly 500 vehicles a month. The second goal
was to license production to other commercial and military
industrial contractors to expand or contract our delivery
capacity as necessary to meet the demands that are likely to
change periodically.
Additionally, teaming allows us to spread our manufacturing
capability to ensure that we are not too reliant any one
supplier or any one plant. In fact, Mr. Chairman, this kind of
teamwork has been a hallmark of Force Protection's story. It
has provided tremendous benefits for our men and women in
harm's way.
The following is a summary to date of Force Protection's
interaction with other manufacturers. Through our joint venture
with General Dynamics, Force Protection has increased capacity
across all functional areas, including engineers manufacturing
supply management logistics planning and execution and
sustainability. GDLS produced more than 60 Cougar vehicles in
the month of October 2007 and will reach 194 vehicles a month
by February of 2008.
Through Force Protection's cooperation with Spartan Chassis
we have been able to expand our robust automotive and final
assembly capability. As a consequence, our enterprise can now
rely on Spartan to help us deliver several hundred Cougars per
month.
Working with Armor Holdings, formerly Stewart and Stevenson
and now BAE, Force Protection today has delivered 200
additional Cougar vehicles. This capacity could be available
for continuing delivery should sufficient orders require.
Force Protection along with Marine Corps Logistics Base at
Albany, Georgia, performs Cougar capsule manufacturing. This
military depot is in production and is a valuable part of our
enterprise.
By licensing our Cougar designs to BAE Ground Systems
Division, we have jointly delivered over 350 additional ILAV
vehicles to the Iraqi Army. Force Protection continues to
produce and support these vehicles in conjunction with BAE.
Ongoing discussions between Force Protection and Red River
Army Depot will facilitate the establishment of an Army MRAP
maintenance and training facility. We have also looked into Red
River's manufacturing capacity in some fashion to manufacture
Cougars should the demands dictate.
Likewise, Force Protection has an existing agreement with
Textron to manufacture Cougars. Although this agreement has not
been executed due to the lack of orders the opportunity is
still available to us. Should the demands of the program
warrant it, we will quickly add Textron to our team and expand
the manufacturing base for Cougar MRAPs.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, Force Protection is working with the
Medical University of South Carolina, MUSC, to help fund the
establishment of a research center to improve the medical
technology available for diagnosing and treating traumatic
brain injury resulting from IED attacks. Through this
agreement, MUSC will learn more about the physics of a blast
using our South Carolina test range. We hope to learn more
about the physical effects on the soldiers, thus enhancing the
vehicle designs in an effort to prevent the injuries from
occurring in the first place and also to try to minimize them
before they happen.
In June of 2007, representatives of the Department of the
Navy asked Force Protection to determine the maximum production
rates we could achieve by December 31st of 2008. Our exhaustive
review of every production aspect, including availability and
training of new employees and access to critical parts for the
Cougar, led us to conclude that the Force Protection led team
could produce 500 vehicles per month by April of 2008 and 1,000
vehicles per month by July of 2008. That would be for a total
of 12,100 MRAPs by the end of 2008.
Our analysis did find two areas of concern: Tapered roller
bearings which are used to manufacture our transfer cases and
axles. The conclusion of the DX DPAS rating has eliminated the
roller bearing concern and we have identified alternative axle
suppliers. Our analysis found no other show stoppers that would
prevent us from achieving production rates of approximately
1,000 vehicles a month, including steel, armored steel,
engines, transmission, glass, tires and wheels.
Force Protection has enjoyed a highly professional
relationship with all of our customer program offices
throughout three-plus years of providing these vehicles. Each
and every one of the program offices has undertaken ways to
facilitate our ability to deliver more efficiently. I would
like to publicly express my appreciation to Brigadier General
Brogan, Major General Catto,along with Mr. Barry Dillon at
Marine Corps Systems Command; Mr. Paul Mann, the current MRAP
Program Director and his predecessor, Marine Colonel Michael
Micucci, along with their staffs; brigadier General John
Bartley and his staff at the Army Tank Command and the Defense
Contract Management Agency that works so well with us to get
these vehicles out the door in the quality they need to be in.
The kind of growth that we have been able to maintain is
replete with challenges which stem from establishing the
requisite capacity, acquiring the necessary facilities, and
deploying the needed processes and procedures to manufacture in
a reliable repeatable fashion. Despite these challenges each
and every one every of our customer agencies has demonstrated a
willingness to focus on the end result: Delivery of these
lifesaving vehicles.
Today we have an established open line of communication
with our Marine Corps, Army, and DOD customers and work closely
with them in forecasting future demands to the maximum extent
that it is known.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I have been asked what can the
government do to help? The government can provide greater
visibility into the long-term plans for this program. That is
crucial for us to know what is coming down the pike. I think it
would be the same for all of us.
By the second half of this fiscal year the government can
facilitate the introduction of friendly foreign customers as a
means to further stabilize the program and allow industry to
achieve maximum utility for the capacity we are creating.
Likewise, the government can take advantage of long lead time
material orders as a means of enabling us to secure critical
supply deliveries in advance of production orders.
It has been and remains our distinct pleasure and privilege
to be able to play a small but critical role in helping to
ensure our servicemen and servicewomen execute their missions
and come home to their loved ones. We are rightly proud of the
efforts of our people and of their dedication to such an
inspiring cause.
Both Cougar and Buffalo vehicles perform extremely well in
our active theaters of operation. But as I said, Force
Protection's most important measure, the one that we take home
at the end of every day is simple: It is the number of lives
that our vehicles save. That is the mission that we live with.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide this update. On
behalf of all of the employees of Force Protection and all of
our partners, we look forward to continuing being a part of
this strategically important program. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McGilton can be found in the
Appendix on page 87.]
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. McGilton. The Chair now
recognizes Mr. David Heebner, President of General Dynamic Land
Systems.
STATEMENT OF DAVID K. HEEBNER, PRESIDENT, GENERAL DYNAMICS LAND
SYSTEMS
Mr. Heebner. Thank you, Chairman Taylor, Chairman
Abercrombie, Ranking Members Bartlett and Saxton, for inviting
us to testify today. My name is David Heebner and I am
President of General Dynamics Land Systems.
It is an honor for me to represent General Dynamics Land
Systems employees and our component suppliers who are building
MRAP vehicles for American forces. My objective here today is
to report to you that GDLS and our partners are focused on
meeting or exceeding the extremely aggressive plan to deliver
MRAP vehicles to our fighting forces.
We have added manufacturing facilities, hired and trained
employees and qualified suppliers, and are helping suppliers
increase their capacity. We have encountered issues common to
start-up programs, but we have dealt with them and have
continued to ramp up production.
I know you are aware that I have submitted a written
statement for the record, so in the interest of brevity please
let me simply address your specific questions in the next few
minutes.
I am going to answer the last question in your letter
first. Specifically, are we willing to communicate and interact
with our other MRAP suppliers to share best practices for MRAP
vehicles? The answer, Mr. Chairman, is absolutely. There are
minor contract terms that would need to be worked out, but we
are ready to collaborate if doing so improves the survivability
or production rates of these vehicles.
We are already cooperating in specific ways. For example,
at the Red River Arsenal our service employees and those of
other manufacturers are being cross trained in performing
maintenance on all MRAP vehicles that are being deployed. So
are the military mechanics. That means that no matter which
vehicle they might need to support the maintenance personnel
will have the training to keep MRAP vehicles in service.
In response to your question about relationship with the
program office, communication and cooperation with the MRAP
program office has been highly intense, professional and
effective. While we would have preferred earlier larger
contract awards, the program office provided early insights of
potential awards to enable our planning and rapidly issued
contracts as soon as funds became available.
Our product performance feedback from field testing and
insights on emerging threats has been shared. GDLS compliments
the program office for its responsiveness to changing
conditions and for their energetic and timely resolution of
issues requiring immediate attention.
You also asked about our industrial capacity, material
chokepoints at the subtier supplier level and the expansion of
GDLS Canada's industrial capacity. GDLS Land Systems is
producing two different types of vehicles for the MRAP program:
The improved RG-31 vehicle is under contract to General
Dynamics Land Systems Canada. We have established a U.S.
production site at Demmer Corporation in Michigan which will
allow us to deliver 600 RG-31 MRAP vehicles by March 2008. This
is an example of cooperation between two major defense
companies, General Dynamics and BAE, to provide urgently needed
capability to our forces.
The Cougar MRAP Category 1 and 2 vehicles are built in
partnership with Force Protection Industries of South Carolina.
With FPI's full support and less than 120 days following
contract award, GDLS capitalized, installed tooling,
established process documentation, hired and trained hundreds
of employees, and delivered its first complete MRAP vehicle
from a new production site in Alabama.
In addition, we established production at Spartan Motors in
Michigan which, together with our Alabama site, will produce
105 vehicles this month and their combined monthly rate will be
226 by April of 2008.
The Force Dynamics joint venture has combined the strengths
and full capabilities of both companies to better manage,
produce and successfully deliver MRAP Cougar vehicles. We are
currently 55 Cougar MRAP vehicles ahead of schedule and will
continue to accelerate production. Together the joint venture
will deliver more than 2,700 vehicles by April of next year.
Addressing your question about material chokepoints at the
subtier supplier level, axles and high hard steel supplies have
been challenges for us at times, and we are developing
alternative supply lines to overcome the issues.
For vehicle axles we are work with Arvin Meritor, American
Axle & Manufacturing, Axle Tech, Dana Corporation and Magna to
augment our current suppliers.
Similarly, we are bringing on second source for high hard
steel, Algoma, to complement the existing supplier, Mittal. We
constantly take the pulse of our supply chain monitoring to
ensure orders are placed inside our material lead times.
In summary, permit me to assure you that we share your
commitment to protecting our warfighters through the MRAP
program. We are doing everything possible to meet or exceed
planned deliveries and we are willing to share best practices
among MRAP suppliers. Maintaining high quality production
momentum is our most critical objective, which means that
funding for new orders must be in place and contracts awarded
by early December to avoid disruption at the Alabama, Michigan,
Ohio, and South Carolina production plants.
Thank you for this opportunity, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Heebner can be found in the
Appendix on page 99.]
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentleman. The Chair now
recognizes--you are going to have to help me out, sir. Mr.
Archie----
Mr. Massicotte. Massicotte. You got it right.
Mr. Taylor. President, International Military and
Government.
STATEMENT OF ARCHIE MASSICOTTE, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT, LLC
Mr. Massicotte. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, it is
an honor to be here in front of the committee, and thank you
for all you are doing in support of this program and the
oversight.
I am Archie Massicotte. I have 30 years experience with the
company within Navistar both from the engine side as well as
the truck manufacturing side. I have since taken over as
President of the Defense Group here, and it is quite an honor.
People may recognize us as International Harvester back in
our day, and for over 100 years we have been manufacturing
vehicles. In fact, in 2006 we manufactured 160,000 commercial
vehicles and 560,000 diesel engines that have been in all our
products, as well as supported other customers, and you see our
product all over the streets today.
When you look at our global presence, we have dealers in
over a thousand different states as well as in North America
and outside of the globe. And when you look at the dealers that
we have in other countries, we are in over 75 different
countries, including Iraq and Afghanistan. When you look at the
spare parts support and the things that we bring, we bring a
global presence from a commercial base.
We are not new to the defense business. We have been in the
defense business since World War I. In you look at the trucks
that were in World War I and World War II and some of the other
conflicts, we have been there. But the MRAP experience that we
have experienced, on May 31 is when we first received our first
contract. Since that date, May 31, 165 days later, we have
delivered 407 vehicles and 95 of those vehicles today are in
theater and there is more in the pipeline, obviously you heard
with SPAWAR as well as our manufacturing facility.
We are on the path to achieve 500 per month by the end of
February, and that is what we are under contract to deliver. We
have parts on the ground today within the military. We have
delivered 58,000 part numbers to Red River Army Depot to be
deployed.
In response to your questions regarding some of the
adequate funding and of the other concerns we have, I think as
my other colleagues here, we are concerned beyond April as to
whether or not there is going to be adequate funding to keep
these lines hot and making sure that we don't have a disruption
or a hiccup in the system that would cause us to idle the
facility.
When you look at the industrial base and where we are at
today, our issue is not building chassises, it is not getting
product, and it is not manufacturing at West Point. Our issue
today is bringing the supply base with us to achieve that 500 a
month goal. And when I talk about the supply base I am
primarily talking about armored steel and manufacturing that
armored steel into our product.
When you look at the cooperation that we see from the
program office, I, like my colleagues, General Brogan, Mr.
Dillon, and Mr. Mann, it has been outstanding. It has been an
open door policy. We pick up the phone if we have an issue, the
phone rings, they answer it and we get a resolution fairly
quickly.
The SPAWAR integration process that we are working with
that you spoke about today, we have had a collaborative
relationship with them and we are on the ground with them today
doing integration from our facility today and we have been
since September. So we have been incorporating some of that
SPAWAR integration into the product and so it does speed
through SPAWAR.
Leaning forward, that is one of the things that got us the
depth that we have today in being able to aggressively go out
and manufacture vehicles. We as a corporation took that risk
and we continue to take that risk. When we look at the
collaboration with the Red River Army Depot and doing all the
collaborative training, that has been a very wholesome
environment and I think working with TRACOM and some of the
folks there to get that message across and get field training
done across all of our products, and being able to train at Red
River Army Depot folks as well as putting FSRs in theater has
all been working very well.
Mr. Chairman, we took this contract on back in May. We told
our people, this isn't a contract, this is a privilege. And we
today at International look at that as truly a privilege. We
welcome the opportunity to continue. We look for the continued
support with the armed services that we are working with today.
And I close with, Mr. Chairman, you asked me to provide a
video, I don't know where that fits in this committee but we
are able to provide that if you choose.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Massicotte can be found in
the Appendix on page 106.]
Mr. Taylor. With unanimous consent, since most of the
members of the subcommittee have not had an opportunity to see
one of these facilities I would like to give the gentleman the
opportunity to show it to give us some idea and give the
American public some idea of what is involved in building an
MRAP if there are no objections. Without objection.
Mr. Massicotte. Thank you.
[Pause.]
Mr. Taylor. In the interest of time, if it starts we will
go ahead and we will stop. Again I want to thank all of our
witnesses for being with us. I hope they can get this going.
Mr. McGilton, while they are working on this and we
certainly want this to be shown, you mentioned some challenges
with long lead items and I would ask that you could clarify
that at this time. The point of this hearing is to express our
frustration, but it is an American frustration. And anything
that this Congress can do to help you in your efforts, we would
like to know now. If you could while we are waiting for the
video, walk us through what those frustrations are and let us
know what we can do to help with that.
Mr. McGilton. Well, sir, I am not sure who would be the
responsible people, so I will tell you what the challenges are
and you can determine if you are the right people. The four of
us that you see sitting on the panel today we had lunch before
we came to this and we had a telephone conversation prior to
that lunch. And the two things that we all agreed: First of
all, the cooperation on this has been tremendous. The barriers
that we have are the visibility. I believe that many of the
members have asked questions about visibility, how this program
needs to be a program of record. There needs to be visibility.
I think that this particular committee appears to have a
great understanding of what is necessary in manufacturing. So
the thing that we need most is visibility. We need to know what
is going to happen with the program. We can't operate month to
month. That is extremely difficult for us to make these
investments. I believe each and every one of us at this table
have leaned forward. We have purchased steel and components and
very expensive items in the belief that there was going to be a
need for these vehicles.
So the single most important thing for us is visibility
going forward. If we can resolve that issue, we are all
professional manufacturing people. That is the part that we
need. Everything else is up to us. Everything else is up to us.
We have resolved those issues up to this point by writing
checks out of our own small checkbooks at some times. Our
particular company does not have the luxury of some of these
companies. We have been around for three years. So when we
write a check for tens of millions of dollars, it is a big
deal.
So I would say, visibility. There is nothing else that
would be more valuable to us than that.
Mr. Taylor. As I am sure you know,--just a second, I am
sure the gentleman knows that just today by a very large vote
the House approved the defense appropriations bill for next
year, approximately $435 billion.
Mr. McGilton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Taylor. Do the provisions of that bill give you the
certainty that you seek to keep your program going for the next
fiscal year? And if not, what else do you need?
Mr. McGilton. Sir, I would have to see the provisions of
the bill. I am not familiar with it. Once I see the provisions
of the bill I could give you a better answer.
Mr. Taylor. For the record we would welcome your comments
toward that, because I would guess that there will be a
supplemental at some point. If we need to address it we need to
know specifically what you need.
Mr. McGilton. Yes, sir. We will get back to you with that
information. As soon as I see the details and we can understand
how the business is going to be awarded, I can give you an
accurate answer.
Mr. Taylor. I think we are ready. Could we have some
confirmation from down below? Are you ahead to show this?
[Pause.]
Mr. Taylor. Again, I apologize that this is taking longer
than anyone would have liked. So let me ask the next question.
About a month ago I was able to visit Aberdeen. I thought
that the folks there gave an excellent briefing. One of the
documents that they provided to me that unfortunately is
classified, but that each of you are probably familiar with, is
it listed the potential vendors across the top. And about eight
different requirements for each of the vehicles that they
sought. It gave a pass or failing grade and it even rated it
within the passing and failing whether it was marginal or did
the job well. And it was things like getting rid of the fuel
tank in the event of an explosion, are the seats designed the
best way to minimize the casualties to men and women on board.
What I found interesting was that one company only did one
thing well, but they got like an A-plus on that one criteria.
Several of your companies did several things well. And I asked
the people at Aberdeen then who were government employees
working with your products to what extent were they sharing the
information to all of the vendors and saying okay, you are
doing five things really well. This company over here is doing
that better and we want you to do that because at the end of
the day it is all about the troops. It is not about your
companies. It is not about this Congress. And it was about the
troops, and I was assured at that time that they were going to
be sharing that information, that they were going to get
together with each of your companies and get with your legal
staffs.
The Nation is paying for this information and the Nation is
paying for these vehicles. To what extent has that happened? To
what extent are they maximizing things that each of your
companies does well, but also enable to you do something better
if they say see another company managing a little bit better
than you? Or is that happening at all? Because I was told it
was going to happen.
You want to start, Ms. Hudson?
Ms. Hudson. We have not received any test result or
information about our colleagues' test results. To the best of
my knowledge, we have not seen any of that comparative data.
Let me confirm that with my colleagues.
They confirmed that we have not received.
Mr. Taylor. Ms. Hudson, as the President of one of the
competitors, would you object or would you approve of sharing
that information? Since at the end of the day it is about
saving lives and limbs in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Ms. Hudson. We are willing to support anything, sir, that
supports improving the survivability of MRAP and saving lives.
Mr. Taylor. Speaking on behalf of your organization?
Ms. Hudson. Absolutely.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. McGilton.
Mr. McGilton. Yes, sir, we are certainly willing to share
it.
Mr. Heebner. Yes, sir, we are.
Mr. Massicotte. Absolutely.
Mr. Taylor. What I would ask is for the other vendors who
may not be with us today, I am going to ask the staff to get
with them. If you could submit something to this committee and
to the DOD in writing to that effect, again I think it is in
the best interest of everyone.
The gentleman of Hawaii has some questions, and I yield to
him.
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. McGilton, I want to make sure I
understand. You said you have two points, and I think we got to
one.
[Phone rings.]
Mr. Abercrombie. I have got domestic tranquillity to
handle. ``I'll call you right back.''
Mr. McGilton. Sometimes when the message comes in from the
mother ship you have to take it.
Mr. Abercrombie. Can I get a witness on domestic
tranquillity? Didn't someone running for President do that?
Have to answer the cell phone? I commute 5,000 miles one way,
so you better believe that I am going to preserve domestic
tranquillity.
You said visibility. By that did you mean that you would
like some clarification on whether this is going to be a
program of record?
Mr. McGilton. Certainly, if it became a program of record
that would be a vehicle through which we would all have
clarity. Without assuming that it is a contract or a commitment
to us, the more visibility we have to the total program, the
better off we all are. Certainly, anything that is specific to
our company or any of my colleagues' companies, that is a
further help.
The next thing is that the program actually have some
duration to it. Managing a program from month to month is
extremely difficult. I personally am delighted regardless of
how the mix of contracts are awarded, I am personally delighted
that we have down selected to three, with a fixed universe of
vehicles that you are going to buy. To spread them out over a
large number of people can do nothing but introduce variation
and reduce the size of the opportunity that we get to invest
in.
So those two things. It was have visibility to the program
in large, but make the orders--don't manage the program on a
monthly basis with a series of small orders. I think you do
that in the beginning so that you get an understanding of who
can perform and who can't. But once you get that understanding,
it is to everyone's benefit to then issue long-term, larger
orders so we can gear up. We have built these machines. Let us
turn them on. Let us turn them on. So it was a two-part;
basically the same thing.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you.
Mr. McGilton, you have an extraordinarily interesting
background, I think, in terms of you are someone who can say
literally that you started out and where you are today is the
result of a very extensive line of experience going back to
being in the Marine Corps in the 1960's. Is that a fair
statement?
Mr. McGilton. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Now obviously being an infantryman in the
1960's is not necessarily the same thing today. But some of the
principles still apply; right?
Mr. McGilton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Can you give me your perspective from
where you sit today based on, from my point of you, your
extraordinary experience as a tool maker subsequent to your
service in the Marine Corps and on through all the various
manifestations. You have been through almost every
manufacturing existence there is. Is that a fair statement? I
don't think I have seen anyone come before the committee that
has more extensive experience than you with regard to literally
every aspect of manufacture leading to this MRAP manufacture
today. In fact, it almost seems that what you are doing today
is almost the culmination of a lifetime of experience. Is that
a fair characterization?
Mr. McGilton. Well, sir, when my family characterizes it
they call me unstable. But to answer your question seriously,
yes, sir, everything I have done to date prepared me for what I
had to do, which is take a company that virtually did not exist
three years ago. We had to build a company while building the
product and it wasn't one thing that had to be done. Everything
had to be done. Any system that we needed had to be created
before we could use it. And we had to introduce a product that
did not exist before and ramp up the production capability to
support this enormous demand that is created.
Mr. Abercrombie. What is your evaluation of the MRAP
vehicle? We all think we know what we are talking about but it
is a mine resistant vehicle, right? And it is assault
protective vehicle. What does that mean? There are people
listening to us, taxpayers, interested citizens. What does it
mean? What are you doing? And what is your evaluation of the
vehicle that you are building?
Mr. McGilton. My evaluation of the vehicle that we are
currently building is we have applied all of the technology.
The threat that we are seeing today in this war is not a threat
that is new in the world. We have become aware of it in the
Western world as a result of the most recent conflict. But all
of the terrorist countries around the world have been
experiencing these threats. So the threat is more than 40 years
old.
The vehicles that we build today at Force Protection and
that our colleagues build, our vehicle is under license and
their version of the same vehicle, it is generally building
around a ballistic capsule. We build a ballistic capsule to
protect the people and the equipment that is inside of it. We
consider everything on the exterior to be expendable and we
also design it in such a way that it is reusable.
The total cost for the reuse of a monocot construction,
which is the kind of construction we use to built our ballistic
capsule, the vehicle goes into harm's way and experiences a
threat that takes place in such a short time frame you cannot
imagine the speed with which these events take place.
Mr. Abercrombie. And what happens?
Mr. McGilton. Well, sir, I am going to describe it, I am
going to try to describe it as best I can without running afoul
of any of the restrictions that are placed on me relative to
describing the performance of the vehicle.
Either from the side or below the vehicle there is an
explosive force that can vary by tremendous amounts. The speeds
with which this takes place, there can be energy traveling at
maybe up to 7,000 meters per second. Everything that is in the
path of this energy is going to turn into a projectile. It can
come from the side or the bottom. There is an enormous blast of
hot gas. The force and the concentration of the force will take
just about anything in its way and it will do one of two
things. It will either rip it apart or hurdle it at great
speeds.
The acceleration that takes place in one of these vehicles
during one of these events it is almost unimaginable. That is
why the people inside have to be buckled in and you have to put
them in a capsule that regardless where it is thrown, they
still have to be safe when it lands.
Mr. Abercrombie. And the human bodies inside are subject to
explosive trauma; is that right?
Mr. McGilton. It is more acceleration. If there is a
penetration it could be explosive trauma by something coming
through and damaging the tissue. But by and large, if you can
maintain the integrity of the hull and keep the people strapped
in, they may suffer from injuries but they are likely to come
home alive.
Mr. Abercrombie. So this is about as basic as it can be for
an infantryman in a vehicle; is that correct?
Mr. McGilton. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. I would draw this
analogy.
Mr. Abercrombie. All right, draw the analogy.
Mr. McGilton. The analogy between the feelings I had when I
was in the military and the people that followed me was looking
at a life of 24 hours a day 365 days a year of terror. Because
no matter where you were someone was trying to kill you. They
might be your friend during the day but at night they might be
your enemy. They would kill you while you were sleeping or they
would kill you while you were on liberty. And to have that kind
of fear for such an extended period of time and to wonder is
the government doing everything that they can do to protect me?
And I think that awareness of that fear when I walked into
Force Protection the first time, I wasn't looking for a job, I
did not need a job, and I did not want a job. But when I walked
in and saw how much this technology could address the fear that
I know people feel when they are at war, and that somebody had
to stay and get the government to buy these vehicles, and then
build a manufacturing facility to build these vehicles, it was
a moral imperative for me to not go home.
I arrived at my company with one pair of trousers, two pair
of underwear and two shirts. That was three years ago. I
haven't been home since. I came just to give some advice, and
when I saw how effective this technology was and I understood
how much alleviation of fear we could give to anyone that
climbed into one of our vehicles, I couldn't go home. And I
still can't go home and I won't be able to go home until the
last person comes back from there or until there is enough
trucks over there that I feel that the people that need to go
on patrol without fear will have the ability to go on patrol
without fear.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you. Sometimes when you submit your
background, you might think who is going to read this? But I
did.
Mr. McGilton. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. And I appreciate it. I think people who
may not know exactly what we are doing here now have a good
idea what this is all about and why this is important.
Mr. McGilton. Sir, I would add this one thing. What I do is
far less important than what the people at the company that
have their names over their pocket do. If I did not show up, it
probably wouldn't make that much difference. But if they did
not show up things would not happen. And so I come here as
their representative. And I don't deserve any of the credit of
what is going on, but I represent the people who do deserve the
credit.
Mr. Abercrombie. I think you have done that very well here
today.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks Mr. Abercrombie. Apparently
our technical difficulties have been solved and thank you, sir,
for excellent responses to his questions and for excellent
questions. Technical problems have been solved.
Mr. Massicotte, if you could narrate what is going on,
please.
[Video shown.]
Mr. Massicotte. Sir, this is our Melrose Park engine plant.
This is where we produce the engines that are going into the
MRAP today. But this is also going back to our commercial base
as well. And this is just the manufacturing facility that
produces MRAP engines about three days before the chassis is
manufactured in Garland, Texas, and you will see that when it
comes up in the next slide.
It is very lean manufacturing. Just-in-time. All engines
are tested prior to being shipped and when they arrive at the
factory they arrive in the Garland assembly plant in Garland,
Texas. This is where the assembly line is that builds the
chassis. This chassis plant alone produces 60,000 vehicles a
year. And this is where the first truck could be a garbage
truck, a cement mixer and the third truck in the line could be
an MRAP.
And this plant has plenty of capacity. We are running it 4
days a week, 10-hour shifts, so we have plenty of capacity
either to go to a second shift or a Friday or Saturday in
overtime.
This is where the vehicle gets the integration done with
the armor. And this is the West Point, Mississippi, facility.
This was coengineered with Mississippi State University that
helped us do the process integration in that factory. And this
is literally an assembly line. This plant is facilitized for
500 a month and we are right now running at the current rate
next month of about, I think it is 250 vehicles is what we are
obligated to by contract.
We have got roughly 500 employees in that facility today.
When we get to the 500 a month coming in February, we will be
roughly about 900 employees strong. Many of the employees on
that line today have either relations or brothers or sisters
serving in Iraq. And these people are very proud people to be
able to provide this type of service.
This is the other line that we have just established when
we are doing the SPAWAR integration where we are taking the
work that we spoke to earlier and putting the SPAWAR
integration into the vehicle before it leaves our facility.
Every truck is road tested and BCMA goes through that. That is
our first delivery in theater. And I guess that is the real
test right there when the soldiers get in it and, as Mr.
McGilton said, bring them home safely, and we are not done
until we get everyone home.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you very much. The Chair now yields to
the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I don't
know how much more quickly we could have manufactured these
vehicles if there was no limitation on the availability of
subcontractors with the materials they need or if you had no
limitation on the materials that you need. As we are sitting
here discussing this, I thought back through my 81 years of
life and I am probably the only person in the room here that
lived through World War II. And I will tell you, Mr. Chairman,
our country is not at war. The military is at war, our military
families are at war. But our country is not at war.
Had this been World War II, we would have stopped turning
out these silly SUVs and pickup trucks for personal
transportation and those assembly lines would have been
producing these MRAP vehicles.
I think that might have been good for the American people
because they are not at war. Our military is at war. Our
military families are at war, but the average person in this
country, you know all they know about the war is what they see
on television and their life has not been impacted one bit. And
I think it would have been nice, Mr. Chairman, if we had had
high enough priority that maybe we could have impacted the
lives of the citizens of our country. I think they might have
appreciated the sacrifice that is made by our service people
and our service families.
I want to thank you all very much for the contribution that
you are making. You are kind of forced to do this at the
fringes. Thank you very much for your contribution, and I hope
that if we have another war, Mr. Chairman, that our country
will be at war.
We haven't been at war since World War II. We have fought a
number of wars since then but the country has not fought those
wars. Thank you very much for your service to our country.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett, for some excellent
remarks. The gentleman from Hawaii.
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Heebner and Mr. Massicotte and Ms.
Hudson, in terms of size, if you will, in terms of reach,
corporate reach, the three of you as opposed to our friend who
spoke previously are in much different corporate positions. And
I just want to make sure, especially in the context that Mr.
Bartlett has just enunciated for us, if I understood
particularly Mr. Massicotte's remarks. Do we have the
assurance, regardless of whether we move forward on a policy
side about program of record and legislative activity that
assures funding and reach, what about the question of the
logistics of supply? I believe steel was mentioned and of
course we have a particular kind without going into the
classified side of things, the steel not--all steel is not
created equal. And what is required of the components in the
Mine Resistant Assault Protected vehicles is different than the
SUVs that we are talking about, et cetera.
Are we assured or are you assured, particularly so with
International's reach, are we assured that your cooperative
agreements with one another are such that the supply side of
things will be there, that the materiel side of things will be
there and if we are able to achieve the kind of visibility and
continuity, if you will, in terms of policy that you will be
able to complete the task of providing these vehicles?
Mr. Massicotte. Congressman, if I may, we have today
secured adequate supply throughout our contract that we have
today. When we get into the expanded capability of the next
threat level where it is going to require more steel, there is
a concern that we are tapping the industry and we believe that
there is going to have to be a global review of where else can
we get high hard steel. I think when you look at the capacity
constraints, I am sure all of us here are using a lot of the
same supply chain. That supply chain only has got so much
capacity. And I think one of the concerns I have, and I am sure
my colleagues do as well, is that when you get into the next
threat level and it requires more steel, more capacity----
Mr. Abercrombie. What do you mean when you say the next
threat level? What universe are you looking at?
Mr. Massicotte. I am going to talk about that without
getting into the threat itself, but more of MRAP 2, it is going
to require much harder, broader base on the armor side. That is
going to bring----
Mr. Abercrombie. In other words, this will have logistical
implications in terms of supply, possibly in terms of pricing?
Mr. Massicotte. I think we are going to exceed capacity--
that is where I am coming from--of the steel supply.
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Heebner, do you have an observation
that you can share in that context?
Mr. Heebner. I would like to make an observation that
relates back to the comment that you made in the earlier panel
about whether or not program of record was an important element
of this program. As we look at the program of record issue,
what it really means is that you have the opportunity to gain
insight into the program's future. That allows you to
communicate with your supplier base, inform them of your needs,
and to ensure that the capacity is there when you need it.
The first point I would make is that is--my compliments to
Paul Mann and his team, because to the degree they have
information they did share it with us early in the process that
allowed us to communicate with our supply base. That is what
allowed us to go from an empty factory to production in less
than 120 days.
The second issue that once you have that supply base
conditioned for your program, having the timely receipt of
funding is imperative to be able to keep that supply base going
so that we have continuity of effort on their parts.
That is why in my comments I made the comment that the
earlier and the larger the contract elements can be, the more
we can condition that supply base to make the investments
necessary to move forward more quickly.
Mr. Abercrombie. You too in your biography you bring some
unique characteristics to the table. You have more than three
decades of experience in the Army, much of which prepared you
or caused you during your professional life in the service to
direct your attention to items like this; right? So when you
speak about the program of record you are not just speaking
from the point of view of what is convenient for you now in
your present capacity, but from your experience, I take it,
from your, as you say, your more than three decades of
professional focus.
Mr. Heebner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for mentioning that.
I did spend more than 32 years on active duty with the United
States Army. And in that period, I fell in love with soldiers.
And my concern for soldiers continues today in what I do.
But the point that I would make with you that is most
relevant to the discussion of this committee today is that the
employees of General Dynamics today who I oversee, and those I
am sure in other panel members' employ, share the same concern
for the soldiers that are out there in harm's way in the global
war on terror. So having worn the uniform does give me a
special credential, and I am proud of that, but working with
the employees who care as much about what they do in providing
a service to our deployed forces is equally rewarding.
Mr. Abercrombie. So the program of record is not just a
phrase of art that we are tossing around here today; it has
real consequences on both sides of the equation then, both in
the private sector and in terms of the direction for the
military service for which the term is being employed?
Mr. Heebner. That is correct, Mr. Chairman, and just making
sure that we see as far as possible into the future of the
program needs allows us to harness the full capabilities of our
companies and our employees to be there when we are needed.
Mr. Abercrombie. Ms. Hudson, in your testimony you paid
particular attention to the discussion we are having now; is
that a fair summary?
Ms. Hudson. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it is. And with regard to
your questions about the supply chain, at the moment we have
been able to ramp up our supply chain where we are able to meet
our commitments and our supply chain is committed to the
production schedules that we need to execute the contracts that
we have today.
But I echo Mr. Heebner's comments about the need to have
some visibility. Chairman Taylor talked about production
planning and execution. Where you are going to have the most
effective production, where we can have the opportunity to
maximize our production rate, we need insight into what is
going to come so that we can place orders for material in a
timely way, so that we don't ramp up to max production and then
have to stop for a month and then pick it back up again to meet
the coming orders and needs.
So to the extent any of you and our program management
staff on the government side can assist us with information
that will allow us to plan more effectively to keep these
production lines that we have worked so hard to get in place
and ramped up to maximum speed, to keep them going for as long
as the MRAP need requires, that would be very, very helpful in
executing the balance of the requirements for this program.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair yields to the gentleman from
Maryland, Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to note what
I meant by a country being at war.
We had daylight savings time in World War II so you could
grow a Victory garden, and if you did not you weren't a
patriot. Everyone I knew had a Victory garden. There were no
automobiles made in 1943, 1944, and 1945. Gasoline was
rationed. Sugar was rationed. We saved our household grease and
took it to a central repository. Everybody knew we were at war
because everybody sacrificed.
Today, I am afraid that the images of war that we see on
the television has little more relevance to many of us than the
images on a video game. I think it is quite unfortunate that
our military and our military families are bearing such a heavy
burden and life continues just as it did before for most of the
citizens of our country.
I hope the next time we are in a war, Mr. Chairman, that
our country is at war, and not just our military and our
military families. Thank you.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Maryland.
Captain Hoover, and again I want to thank him for his
service to our Nation. But he didn't get to be a captain by
saying, ``I can't do it,'' or, ``We can't do it.'' He was
rewarded for getting things done and saying he could get things
done, and that is why he has achieved the very high rank.
I have got to admit that, having seen that facility, I
remain concerned that when each of your organizations is up to
full capacity, that they will lack the capacity to keep up with
you, and, therefore, the vehicles won't be delivered on time. I
hope I am wrong.
My question to each of your organizations is what could
your organization do that is now being done at SPAWAR in an
effort to minimize what has to happen there, speed up
production, make best use of your facilities? I will open it up
to any of you or all of you.
Mr. Massicotte. If I may.
Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir, Mr. Massicotte.
Mr. Massicotte. We have worked with Captain Hoover and his
team up at SPAWAR in a very collaborative effort, and one of
the things that we were able to do with our engineering groups
that have been up there is that we have been able to integrate
back into the manufacturing processes at our West Point
facility the things that they were doing. And I echo what he
said earlier: The process is improving, and I am sure that the
vehicles are getting through that operation much quicker than
they were.
With regard to could we do more, we would be happy to look
at it and see what opportunities there are, whether or not the
entire integration could be done. We would be happy to look at
that and come back to Paul Mann and his group and work with him
and see what could be done. I am sure there is more that could
be done. Right now we are willing to step up and do what is
needed. So, right now we are integrating that kind of tech into
our vehicle today in the process. And whether or not we take on
the additional load of doing what they are doing up at SPAWAR,
that is going to have to be done through the program office.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. McGilton, just one ``for instance'' was for
some of the variants that they had to go back and use an
acetylene torch or possibly plasma cutter to make some holes in
the vehicle. They expressed the problem that, well, we have to
now wait to put the wiring harness on later so they wouldn't
burn it during this process. To what extent did they make their
predicaments your knowledge; and to what extent did they
include you in that process and give you or any of you vendors
the opportunity to say, we can do that at the factory?
Mr. Massicotte. Sir, we are doing that. And I think with
Captain Hoover's people, that was one of the things that we
looked at together. If we are sending a vehicle up there, and
they are taking it apart to install their equipment, we are now
integrating their equipment or that harness in our vehicle
before it leaves the factory. So I think that kind of
integration and the cooperation that we are getting with
Captain Hoover's team is working quite well.
Ms. Hudson. Just like Mr. Massicotte's team, we have been
working with the SPAWAR people as well, moving work that was
done there back into the factory, and that is an ongoing
dialogue as we all learn with these initial vehicles what can
be done better earlier in the process.
Mr. Taylor. Ms. Hudson, let me ask you a real simple
question. Is there anyone from your organization who is given
access to what is done at SPAWAR who can actually walk that
assembly line and say, we could have done that back at the
factory?
Ms. Hudson. We have had a number of people at SPAWAR
working with the team there, and suggestions have come out of
that activity back into the factory.
Mr. Taylor. Would other members of the panel wish to
comment on that?
Mr. McGilton. We have the luxury of being just down the
road from SPAWAR, as you know, and we have a manufacturing
engineer that is either full-time there or near full-time
there, and his only job is to identify opportunities like that
and bring them back. We have processed within the last 30
days--I think we initiated 9 engineering change requests, 7 of
which, I believe, have been implemented, 2 of which may be
implemented by the time we get back. And every time we find
one, we will put it in. We have someone assigned to do just
exactly that.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Heebner.
Mr. Heebner. I think the particular motivation that we have
is to make sure that in the processes that are performed at
SPAWAR, that there is not any disassembly work done and then
reassembly required. Trying to minimize that.
Mr. Taylor. I can assure you, there is disassembly going
on. There are holes being cut, and then things get welded,
things have to be reassembled, things have to be repainted,
which is what leads me to believe many of these things should
be getting done at your facilities before they get to
Charleston. So my question is to what extent are you, the
manufacturer, given an opportunity to make that observation and
fix that problem before it gets to Charleston?
Mr. Heebner. My comments on a direct answer to that would
be exactly parallel with Mr. McGilton's, because we are joint-
ventured to produce the same Cougar vehicle, so we use the same
processes. And as he suggested, there have been a number of
engineering changes already in place because of that, which
simply reflects the fact that there is a process in place to do
that. And the integration or interaction between the SPAWAR
people and our own people is not inhibitive in any way that I
am aware of.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South
Carolina Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I regret I had to
run off to another meeting, but wanted to come back. And I
particularly wanted to come back, Mr. Chairman, because I
appreciate the private sector, how they have really come to
play such an effort to protect our troops. And I have actually
visited the facilities of BAE and am really grateful. I was
present, Mr. Chairman, at the 25th anniversary of the BAE
existence. It is adjacent to the district I represent in Aiken.
Wonderful people, dedicated, working there. And then Force
Protection, I feel like I was with them when they were born.
And so I have had the privilege of even going ahead of the
Chairman to drive one of the Cougars and Buffalos. It is hard
to get ahead of Chairman Taylor, but I was. But we appreciate
so much, and General Dynamics and all of what you are doing to
protect our troops and provide for protection.
There has been discussion about the monthly production
contracts and working with SPAWARs and how to avoid the end-of-
the-month congestion. Is there any way to move toward weekly
production on contracts or even daily? And any of you who could
answer that would be good.
Mr. McGilton. I would be glad to answer that.
Earlier in the meeting we provided the statistics to show
how much of an improvement there had been to get away from the
hockey puck production delivery. Last month, by the middle of
the month. We delivered half of our vehicles, exactly what we
should have done.
In Force Protection, we are moving in the direction of
doing weekly and even daily production schedules. It is fraught
with a lot of risk when you do that, because on any given day,
if anything goes wrong, it is going to be a really bad day, and
there is going to be a lot of visibility relative to what went
wrong on that day. That is not necessarily a bad thing. All of
us in manufacturing understand that every day when you go in it
is a street fight. The number of variables that can work
against you, any one of them can stop the entire system. So we
are willing to do it. That is the direction we are working in.
But just the act of going to a daily production schedule
won't solve the problems that are created. You have got to
modify the processes that make it possible to do a daily
production schedule. But that is exactly what we are doing.
That is what all of us are trying to do. There is nothing that
would make us happier than every day when we go in, everything
happens on autopilot. It just isn't the case when you bring in
a new technology with as many variables as we have as fast as
we have to bring them together.
So any resistance to doing it is not founded in a
resistance to do it, it is that we may not in every case have
our entire supply base in a state that they can operate that
way. And there are varying processes. You don't make steel by
the day; you make steel by the heat. So somebodyis going to
deliver you 10,000 pounds of steel, and that has all got to be
processed. And so it is kind of the Catch-22. Some things come
to you in big bulks and you have got to manage them, and
sometimes the bulks don't show up. But there certainly isn't
any resistance to doing it from our side, but there certainly
is a lot of difficulty in doing it.
We are not a mature industry, and that is why it is
difficult to set up the daily consistent process. If we were
building Hondas or Camrys, and we had five years to design the
processes and get the supply chain in place, it would be a
snap. It is not that we are unaware that that is a better way
to run a business, it is that the time in order to get the
stability necessary to let your business operate that way has
not been afforded to any of us. The war didn't wait for us to
do it.
Mr. Wilson. And, Mr. McGilton, you itemized the different
vehicles that have been provided to American forces, Iraqi
forces, allied coalition forces, the different types of
vehicles. And I think, I know it would be reassuring to persons
who have young people serving overseas; can you tell us how the
performance of your vehicles have been that have been deployed?
Mr. McGilton. I have certain restrictions placed on me
about discussions of the performance of the vehicles. I think
everybody in this room can understand why.
Our belief and understanding is that within our vehicles,
when properly used, properly deployed, and the people properly
belted in, the survivability rate is amazingly high. I can't
get any more precision than that. It is amazingly high. We are
very proud of our record of survivability, and we won't
compromise in that measurement of interest in any way, shape,
or form.
The second thing I will say relative to the performance of
the vehicle; thus far, we have been able to enjoy a 95 percent
vehicle readiness rate. That is extremely important, because
these vehicles are only valuable when they are available. The
design of our vehicles allows the vehicle to experience a
blast, to sacrifice the external components. A truck comes and
picks up the capsule, but we protect the engine, the
transmission, the transfer case, and the important drive line
items. We take it back to the motor pool, and then the field
service reps from our company and those of our associates
restore that vehicle and put the vehicle back into service.
Very few of our vehicles have been taken completely out of
service. So the total cost to operate a ballistic capsule-type
design is significantly less than any other style of vehicle
because it is reusable.
Mr. Wilson. Again, I thank all of you for what you are
doing to protect the American and coalition forces. Thank you
very much.
Mr. Taylor. I thank the gentleman from South Carolina.
I got the impression that Ms. Hudson wanted to say
something.
Ms. Hudson. I was just going to comment on the weekly
deliveries versus the monthly deliveries. And Mr. McGilton's
comments were absolutely correct. Early on we were not in a
steady production flow. It was difficult to get material in,
and I believe that exacerbated the problem you mentioned. But I
did want to state that on our Caiman, MRAP system, we started
performing to a weekly delivery schedule in September, and we
plan to go to a weekly delivery schedule in February on our
RG33 variant as well. So it is important to us to have a steady
flow in the factory, as important as it is to our customers and
to SPAWAR in terms of receiving the vehicles. So that is the
direction we are heading in.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Heebner.
Mr. Heebner. Mr. Chairman, if I might add just a slightly
different aspect in response to that question, and I do this
both for the committee's benefit and also for the employees who
work on MRAP vehicles around the country and, frankly, around
the world, and that is we do not need additional motivation to
build these vehicles as quickly as we possibly can. Our
employees are committed to doing this as rapidly as it is
possible.
What happens on occasion is that we will nearly complete a
vehicle, and there will be a component that is deficient
because the supply system hasn't gotten there quite on the
schedule that we had anticipated, and that occasionally results
in the delivery to SPAWAR of a significant number of vehicles
at one time. Obviously, we try to minimize that. But our
commitment and the commitment of our employees is to move just
as quickly as we possibly can. And, believe me, we are
motivated to do that, and it would not take a different type of
contract to cause us to do that.
Mr. Taylor. I very much appreciate that, which leads to one
of the final questions.
Former Chairman Hunter, I think, did this committee a very
good service in looking into the delays in the up-armored
Humvees. One of the things that he and the staffers that he
dispatched to look into the problem discovered was that in many
instances the supplier did not know that what they were making
was going into something that was going to save the lives of
young Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan. And, quite frankly,
the committee was very disappointed to hear that.
Since that problem has already happened once, we sure don't
want it to happen again. Are you confident that each of your
suppliers is aware of what that component is expected to do,
why it is there, why we need it, and why they should be given a
priority?
And I hope you are also aware that our President and the
Secretary of Defense has the legal authority right now to walk
into any factory in the United States of America and say, the
troops need this, and I want you to put it to the top of the
list. And we want you to know that. I am sure you already do.
But we want each of our suppliers involved in this program to
know that. And we want this committee to be notified if that is
the message we need to relay to the Secretary of Defense or the
President to make sure that you get the things that you need to
make the product that is so important to troops.
So I guess going back to the first question: Do you feel
like your suppliers know the importance of what they are doing
and how important the product you are making is for the troops?
Mr. Heebner. Mr. Chairman, I don't believe I could answer
that question with certainty for all of our suppliers. What I
can tell you is that in those areas where we have felt
challenged for the supply of specific components, the fact that
these parts are a part of the MRAP program and the importance
of velocity in developing and completing these vehicles has
been communicated throughout our supply chain, and that we get
a very positive and prompt response from any inquiries we have
about the conditions of the supply base.
Ms. Hudson. Mr. Chairman, if I may add as well, given that
this program has a DX rating, the most important rating in the
country, and we have had the opportunity to work with our
suppliers on the implementation of the important priority
through a contractual arrangement and also through informal
arrangements, part of that is a discussion of why we are doing
what we do.
At BAE, we have a saying: We protect those that protect us,
and that the only thing that matters is doing the best thing
for the troops in the field. We talk about that every day. Our
employees embrace it, and our supply chain embraces it as well.
We do know why we are doing what we do, and it matters. We
talk every day about what we do is saving lives in theater and
protecting family members and friends, and it is ingrained in
each and every one of us.
And to Mr. Bartlett's comments. The general public may not
feel like we are at war, but I can assure you that we at BAE
Systems do. We have people that haven't had a day off since the
day MRAP started. We work around the clock, 7 days a week, and
there is absolutely no question that we understand the
importance.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you.
Mr. Massicotte. We supply a lot of our product that we put
into the vehicles. So as it goes across the various divisions
within the corporation, we absolutely know the importance of
this program. When you reach out beyond that to the supply
base, our dealer counsel and the people that we work with in
the supply community, we make sure that they understand what
the parts they are supplying and the DX rating, as you stated,
is absolutely out there in front of the curve of any production
material that we use today. We have a solid supply chain behind
us, and right now, just getting the production base up to speed
at the levels that we talked about earlier to get to the higher
levels of production is really all we have to do.
Mr. Taylor. To what extent--now that the vehicles are being
deployed and hopefully will be deployed in much larger numbers,
what is your mechanism for staying in touch with the field so
that, as things wear out, be it tires, ball joints, whatever,
as things wear out, that the factory becomes aware of that and
can replace those things in a timely manner? What do you have
in place to make sure that that happens?
Mr. McGilton. Currently Force Protection alone has
approximately 200 field service reps in theater. We have in
excess--I believe we have almost $100 million in inventory in
our warehouse awaiting to be shipped at any time it is
requested. We cross-trained with all of our partners. General
Dynamics have an enormous infrastructure of technical people to
do the restoration on the vehicles. We can't think of another
thing that we could do to address the issue. It is those
actions that have allowed us to keep our 95 percent readiness
rate. And we are not happy with 95 percent, so we are going to
continue to improve things. But it is the relationship that we
have with our partners that have this massive reach that allows
us to accomplish that.
I would also like to go back and address what Mr. Heebner
said; your question, and then one thing that Mr. Heebner said.
The way we made sure that all of our suppliers understand how
important it is, we had a supplier conference and we brought in
100 percent of our suppliers. And I didn't want their salesmen.
I brought in someone that was in a significant position of
management, and they spent a day with us. And we explained to
them what we were doing; we showed them videotapes; we
explained to them about our theory and our philosophy for
running our business, what part they played in it, and how they
could make our entire system fail. No matter how big or small
the part was that they manufactured, the entire system stops if
they don't perform. We spent a great deal doing that.
I would like to talk about Mr. Heebner's statement about
motivation. At one point in the program not too long ago,
people were concerned that we weren't motivated enough at Force
Protection. And in an effort to get us to work faster and
harder, the United States Government saw its way fit to offer a
$1 million incentive payment if we would improve our
performance. I am afraid I am going to cause significant chaos,
at the risk of challenging my relationship with Mr. Dillon.
When we got the offer, we felt insulted. And what we said was
that we weren't interested in an incentive; if you needed us to
do more, just tell us, and we will do everything we can. We are
already doing everything we can.
The more that they asked us to do we were able to
accomplish. And they came back to us again and said, you are
causing a problem because you won't agree to accept a contract
that has an incentive built into it. After a lot of
deliberation, I agreed that I would accept a contract with the
offer of the $1 million acceleration incentive in it as long as
I didn't have to invoice for the $1 million after I
accelerated.
So we accelerated, we improved the delivery, and we still
to this day have not submitted the invoice to claim the $1
million. We were going to do it anyway. The money didn't make
any difference.
Ms. Hudson. With regard to getting feedback from the field,
we have an established infrastructure for the Bradley fighting
vehicle with field service reps in theater. We are also
supplying field service reps for the MRAP program in theater as
well. And even though we have multiple variants of MRAP, we
have one program manager in charge of all the BAE Systems field
service reps working on MRAP. So we get daily feedback on what
is happening in theater so we know if we need to make any
changes or fixes into our manufacturing processes or our
design.
And I might also add that we have had two of our senior
executives in Iraq in the last month to personally assess the
situation and make sure there were no barriers that we couldn't
control and in having an effective infrastructure set up in
Iraq.
Mr. Taylor. Again, I do want to thank each of you for what
you are doing. I very much appreciate your walking this
committee and the American people through the importance of
this program, how we are addressing it. I want to extend the
invitation that anything that this committee can do to help you
be more productive as you encounter challenges, we want to
extend that invitation.
And, last, I want to apologize. I misspoke earlier. I am
certain that Sean Cooley wasn't the first Mississippi guardsman
to die in Operation Iraqi Freedom. And any pain I may have
caused to his family or any other family by misspeaking, I want
to apologize now.
So with that, this committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
November 8, 2007
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
November 8, 2007
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
November 8, 2007
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR AND MR. ABERCROMBIE
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. There has been a lot of debate
about the ability of the industrial base to meet MRAP production
requirements. Concerns include having sufficient ballistic steel,
tires, axles, transmissions, and engines to name a few. What is the
most likely production rate that the base can support and how confident
are you that it can be achieved? How does this match up with the rate
necessary to meet current requirements?
Secretary Young. Reaching a production rate above 1,000 vehicles
per month by the years end is a significant challenge. However, it is
achievable. By engaging with prime contractors, their key suppliers,
and with prospective new suppliers, we have helped industry put plans
in place to grow capacity in order to achieve our aggressive MRAP
delivery schedule.
Over the past nine months we have worked closely with the armor
steel, tire, and other industries to develop aggressive production and
delivery ramp-up rates to sustain MRAP growth. In particular, ballistic
grade steel plate for the MRAP baseline vehicle has required close
scrutiny. Production rates above 1,000 vehicles per month and
simultaneous fielding of add-on armor kits for MRAP and other ground
vehicles in our fleet will likely result in some temporary, but
manageable, steel plate shortages the first quarter of 2008. However,
in the broader sense, industrial capacity is sufficient to meet current
requirements.
As necessary, we will use the Department's Priority Allocation of
Industrial Resources Task Force to evaluate and manage shortages of
steel and any other MRAP commodities. With the assistance of the
Department of Commerce, we will use the Defense Priorities and
Allocations System to execute the decisions of the Task Force by
managing the distribution of steel and other critical components and
materials to ensure our highest priority needs continue to be met.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. To what extent did DOD's assessment
of the industrial base include vendors for the various items of mission
equipment? What are the potential challenges in producing this
equipment?
Secretary Young. The MRAP Joint Program Office monitors mission
equipment requirements and vendor delivery status with the help of the
mission equipment buying activities and the Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Center at Charleston. The MRAP industrial capability assessment
performed by the Defense Contract Management Agency did not include
mission equipment except for the ballistic steel used in the
fabrication of gun shields. There are no known challenges at this time
with receiving timely delivery of mission equipment except for
ballistic steel which has been mitigated through other proactive
measures.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. An adequate supply of ballistic
grade steel appears to be a major concern. Is there sufficient global
capacity to meet the needs of the baseline MRAP vehicle in the context
of DOD's other demands for the same kind of steel? What about meeting
the demand if a more robust design dictates the need for more steel?
Secretary Young. There is enough global production capacity of
ballistic steel to meet MRAP program needs. This is because when a
delivery conflict for ballistic steel occurs, an MRAP order
automatically gets filled first. The joint MRAP and similar Army Route
Clearance vehicles are the only ground vehicle programs currently
authorized to use the Defense Priorities Allocations System (DPAS)
``DX'' priority rating on their contracts and purchase orders. This
highest priority designation means that MRAP and MRAP-like orders for
ballistic steel receive preferential treatment over all other DPAS
lower rated ``DO'' and unrated orders.
Over the next few months, ballistic steel mills may not be able to
accept or meet delivery need dates for some new DO rated and unrated
ballistic steel orders. This is because the combined demands of MRAP
production, MRAP armor kit development, and all other DoD requirements
are expected to temporarily exceed available steel mill capacity.
However, when an unacceptable delivery delay occurs, a program may
request DPAS Special Priorities Assistance and adjustments are made to
delivery schedules to best meet operational needs.
To minimize delivery disruptions on DO rated orders that compete
with MRAP for ballistic steel, a DPAS Priorities and Allocations of
Industrial Resources taskforce has been monitoring and maintaining a
Department-wide forecast of thin gauge steel armor plate requirements
and an inventory of available steel mill production capacity. Working
closely with the Services and the ballistic steel producing mills has
enabled the task force to gradually expand production capacity and
balance the timing and placement of orders.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. Ramping up to meet requirements
will include hiring additional workers and some will need specialized
skills and certifications, such as in welding. How many more workers
will be needed in the coming months to support production rates and how
will they be trained to ensure they have the necessary skills?
Secretary Young. Current production rates show that the
manufacturers' production ramps are not being affected by lack of
labor, hiring or training of personnel. Individual manufacturers can
provide their further assessment if desired.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. MRAP vehicles have been undergoing
developmental testing since early this year and operational testing is
scheduled to start soon. DOD has on order about 8,000 vehicles and the
JROC has approved up to 15,000. The Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation has expressed some concerns about certain aspects of
testing, including the low number of armor ``coupon'' samples and the
low number of miles for the automotive tests. How are you addressing
these concerns? Has the department granted any waivers?
Secretary Young. In March 2007, the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation (DOT&E) recommended that the MRAP Program add additional
test vehicles to get more automotive miles and survivability testing.
The Program Office accepted these recommendations and modified the
testing approach. DOT&E concerns have been addressed. DOT&E approved
the MRAP Test and Evaluation Master Plan, the MRAP Live Fire Strategy,
and the MRAP Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) Test Plan
in September 2007. No Live Fire or Operational Testing waivers have
been requested or granted.
The Joint Program Office (JPO) and the DOT&E organization have
established a Joint testing Integrated Product Team (IPT) to determine
the path forward for all testing of MRAP vehicles and to develop test
plans.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. What human factors issues have been
raised by developmental testing, such as limits on the size of the crew
or passengers or their ability to get in and out of the vehicles
safely?
Secretary Young. Some non-mission critical human factors were
identified during testing and accepted temporarily in order to rapidly
field MRAP vehicles. We are pursuing Engineering Change Proposals to
correct deficiencies and improve performance. In the interim, these
issues have been mitigated by placing appropriate limitations on
vehicle operations.
The JPO recently stood up the Human Systems Integration--Integrated
Product Team (HIS-IPT) which had its first meeting on 13 Dec 07. The
HIS-IPT will be the focal point for addressing all human factors
issues--those raised during developmental testing and any issues
encountered in the field and will work with the manufacturers to
implement the changes necessary to incorporate human factors
improvements.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. What is the status of the material
safety release for the variants currently on order? What human factors
issues have been raised for vehicles already in the field?
Secretary Young. Every fielded MRAP vehicle has completed the
``Urgent'' safety release process and continues through our safety
program in order to complete the full safety release process.
In order for the Department to urgently obtain MRAP vehicles as
fast as we have, we accepted commercially designed, and commercially
manufactured vehicles. These vehicles vary and all have some human
factors issues. Issues that have been identified are: door handles
facing the wrong way, fire extinguishers placed in odd places or not
covered adequately, and lack of internal storage spaces or tie down
points.
The Joint Program Office (JPO) recently stood up the Human Systems
Integration-Integrated Product Team (HSI-IPT) which had its first
meeting on 13 Dec 07. The HSI-IPT will be the focal point for
addressing all human factors issues and will work with the
manufacturers to implement the changes necessary to incorporate human
factors improvements.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. Orders for these vehicles were
placed without being fully informed of the vehicles capabilities and
limitations. What risks are you assuming if these vehicles are fielded
without this knowledge?
Secretary Young. Risks associated with our aggressive fielding
schedule are mitigated by a phased testing plan and the use of
temporary, non-mission critical operational limitations. To mitigate
these risks, safety directives are prepared and promulgated to the
Joint Forces that prescribe operating limits until correction via
vehicle modifications are complete.
Early testing, which informed initial production orders, ensured
that vehicles were survivable, and that no major limitations relative
to mission requirements were present. The current phase of testing
fully characterizes vehicle capabilities and limitations. Issues
identified by the follow-on operational tests would be addressed
through retrofit of engineering change proposals (ECPs) on fielded
vehicles and with cut-in of the ECPs to production lines as they are
identified.
Capabilities and Limitations (C&L) reports are being written and
updated as we continue through the test phases. We do not view the C&L
Report as a one time event, but consider it a living document populated
with the latest information to inform Commanders (owners) of the MRAP
vehicles once fielded.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. Even as MRAP production began, DOD
acknowledged that the threat was changing and is now developing a
solution for that threat. How will this impact the current test
schedule and resources?
Secretary Young. Completion of testing for initial MRAP vehicle
designs is, and has remained, our priority. The original MRAP designs
are completing the developmental testing phase of the testing regimen
and migrating to operational test. These tests require different assets
and resources.
Testing for additional survivability solutions to meet the changing
threat have been, and continue to be, worked into the testing schedule.
While this has been difficult, and not without challenges, the
personnel at Aberdeen Test Center have conducted all testing within the
timelines required to provide decision makers with the data to make
appropriate decisions.
While this effort has required long hours, hiring of additional
personnel, and some prioritization of efforts, the schedule and
resource impact has been managed to ensure rapid fielding of survivable
vehicles to theater.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. MRAP vehicles come from the
manufacturers without any mission equipment. That is being integrated
under contract at the Naval Space and Warfare Center. The equipment is
being bought under other contracts and then shipped to the center for
installation. From there, vehicles are shipped to theater by air for
fielding. However, DOD is considering an option for contractors to
install the mission equipment at their own facilities. How many
vehicles can be equipped with the mission equipment that is already on
hand at the integration facility? How much more equipment is needed to
outfit the vehicles on order and is that equipment on order? How
confident are you that the vendors that produce the mission equipment
can meet the demand?
Secretary Young. In cooperation with mission equipment system
managers, the MRAP vehicle Joint Program Office (JPO) developed a
detailed plan that supports the current integration schedule. Equipment
on hand plus equipment that has been reserved from on-going production
lines is sufficient to support mission equipment integration for MRAP
vehicles per the current delivery schedule. Because of the pace and
flow of individual pieces of equipment, it is better to discuss the
availability of critical pieces of equipment to meet integration
schedules. The JPO attempts to maintain at least a 30-day supply of
critical equipment. While we watch this closely, we have not seen any
issues suggesting contractors will be unable to meet the required flow.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. How long is it taking to equip
vehicles with the mission equipment once they arrive at the center? How
much of that time is ``non-value added'', or time that a vehicle is
just sitting around waiting for parts or repair or a place in the
queue? To what extent is once-a-month delivery of vehicles contributing
to non-value added time and how can this be mitigated?
Secretary Young. I would like to take a broad view to this
question. The time it takes to integrate a vehicle at SPAWAR varies
from variant to variant, but since the hearing, we have data from late
November to mid December which provides a sense of where we are with
respect to integration time. Many of the MRAP variants are now taking
only one to two days to fully equip a vehicle once integration begins.
SPAWAR integration is pacing manufacturer deliveries.
The JPO continues to work with the vendors to deliver a smooth
delivery of vehicles. Additionally, the vehicle processing throughput
at SPAWAR has expanded to between 40-50 vehicles a day. This production
rate is sufficient to maximize airlift and provide MRAPs for sealift.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. What is the status of your effort
to prototype installation of mission equipment on each version of the
vehicle DOD is buying and fielding?
Secretary Young. Prototyping is complete on all vehicles except for
General Dynamics Land Systems--Canada's (GDLS-C) RG-31s.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. What are the advantages and
disadvantages of installing mission equipment at other locations, such
as the prime contractors--facilities?
Secretary Young. All mission equipment (also referred to as C4I
equipment or Government Furnished Equipment--GFE) is currently
installed at SPAWAR, Charleston, SC.
Potential Advantages to Integration Performed by Manufacturers:
DOD receives fully integrated vehicles direct from
manufacturer
No one choke point for GFE installation
May experience some cost savings due to competition
between GFE installing entities
May cut down on total enterprise integration over time
as manufacturers go through learning curve
Disadvantages:
Tracking and accounting for GFE in numerous locations is
complicated and reduces flexibility in creating GFE kits. Manufacturers
are armored truck builders not GFE installers.
Manufacturers would need to ramp up capabilities,
personnel, space, integration process, etc. The program would be
managing numerous learning curves rather than maximizing process and
progress made at SPAWAR.
New secure space for GFE would need to be located,
established and managed at multiple locations across the country.
All transportation times, inspections, and other steps
are still required (time to get vehicles to theater is still the same).
Having to gather and input transportation management
data gets more difficult due to multiple sources of the data vice one--
SPAWAR.
SPAWAR represents a unique, tested capability for C4I
installation and has ramped up a skilled workforce to meet MRAP program
needs. Establishing integration sites at multiple additional locations
would require a similar investment of time, facilities and personnel.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. If SPAWAR were to reach capacity or
if facility had to shut down or was unable to operate for more than a
few days, where else could integration of the OFE take place and what
would be the challenges?
Secretary Young. The Joint Program Office (JPO) and SPAWAR
established a Continuity of Operations (COOP) site for this exact
purpose. The COOP facility is set up to serve as a complete SPAWAR
Charleston replacement of all 25 lines within 72 hours. Several sites
were examined, and the Orangeburg, SC location was chosen due to its
large square footage and immediate availability for occupancy.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. What can the committee do to help
all stakeholders meet this urgent need?
Secretary Young. The strong support and commitment of the Committee
and the Congress has been the key to our success in producing and
fielding these life-saving vehicles at a rate that will result in more
than 1,500 MRAPs in theater by the end of this calendar year. Your
support of budget requests, reprogramming actions and an unprecedented
allocation of funds in the Continuing Resolution has allowed us to
``lean forward'' in a program that is essential to our brave men and
women in harms way. The Department asks for continued support for this
program to the same degree that has been demonstrated thus far. On
behalf of the men and women protected by these vehicles, we thank you.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. Are there any plans to offer an
MRAP configured cargo/logistics variant to Army and Marine Corps forces
in the immediate future?
Secretary Young. No, there has been no requirement from the
operating forces to configure MRAP vehicles into a cargo variant. MRAP
vehicles could be made capable of carrying cargo instead of personnel
at the discretion of commanders.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. What is the near term acquisition
strategy for the MRAP II program, e.g. when do you plan to stop
ordering MRAP I vehicles and begin ordering MRAP II vehicles? Is the
industrial base primed to support large contract orders for the MRAP II
vehicle?
Secretary Young. The acquisition strategy for MRAPs (both MRAP I
and MRAP II) is continually being shaped by the operational
requirements from theater. The significance of MRAP II is that this
vehicle provides options for the commanders in terms of protection and
mobility. We are progressing with MRAP II testing as the theater is
undertaking requirement reviews.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. How are you capturing the lessons
teamed from the performance of MRAP vehicles in theater and how are you
applying those lessons in terms of survivability to the existing fleet
of tactical wheeled vehicles?
Secretary Young. The Army and Marine Corps have ``Centers for
Lessons Learned'' that assess forward area operations and report
trends, findings and issues to combat developers and program managers.
The MRAP Joint Project Office also has a ``forward presence'' to
evaluate MRAP performance in the theater and note any shortcomings.
In addition, The National Ground Intelligence Center produced an
extensive predictive threat analysis of likely adversary actions during
the next 12-48 months. The classified report of the analysis was
distributed to combatant commanders, senior decision makers and program
managers within the Department and was used to energize Science and
Technology; Research, Development and Testing communities; and industry
to proactively develop and produce counter-measures to mitigate
emergent threat weapons and tactics. Examples of these proactive
efforts include incremental development of armor protection and
electronic warfare capability.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. Have you engaged with industry
about the sharing of technical designs in order to produce the most
effective and complete MRAP vehicle?
Secretary Young. There are several methods by which the Government
may encourage ``best of breed'' data a sharing between MRAP
contractors. These include encouraging MRAP contractors to enter into
cross licensing technical data sharing agreements; and structuring
future MRAP contract competitions to allow Government evaluation of
MRAP technical data lifecycle costs as part of the contract source
selection evaluation process.
To facilitate sharing of best practices among MRAP vehicle
manufacturers, the Joint Program Office (JPO) recently held a unique
performance review session consisting of two days of discussions on
test results and technical data. The first day consisted of one-on-one
reviews with each manufacturer of test results, successes or
challenges. This was followed by development of a briefing package for
the manufacturer to share with the other MRAP vehicle manufacturers.
During the second day, we briefed these packages to all manufacturers
and discussed issues and possible solutions. The interchange was open
and honest, and included feedback from the government engineering and
test teams. It led to improved insights on vehicle performance and
design, and identified potential solutions. Issues discussed included
vehicle floor and seat designs, and potential solutions to improve
recovery capability. We encouraged the manufacturers to work together
to share solutions and intend to continue regular performance and
design exchange meetings.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. How are you incentivizing industry
to accelerate production and facilitate their production and
manufacturing processes?
Secretary Young. Companies that demonstrate readiness to produce
vehicles that meet MRAP requirements receive significant production
orders. This incentive has been effective for a highly competitive
industry. After delivery orders are issued, the Navy and DCMA work
closely with contractors to monitor production progress to ensure that
promised performance is delivered.
We've also worked directly with MRAP suppliers to help them
accelerate production. For example, the Department authorized a DX
industrial priority rating for the MRAP program to assure priority
access to available material. Additionally, to increase the
availability of armor steel plate and thin gauge, quenched and tempered
steel from about 8,400 tons per month to about 21,000 tons per month,
the Department made slight specification changes to increase throughput
and encouraged steel producers to make modest capital investments. In
the cases where domestic source restrictions limited access to the
steel we need, the Department used the available waiver processes to
tap otherwise non-compliant domestic sources as well as reliable non-
domestic sources. We've also worked directly with industry to increase
tire capacity from about 1,000 tires per month to about 17,000 tires
per month by adding Goodyear as a second source and supporting the
addition of more tire molds at both Michelin and Goodyear.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. How is the theater receiving,
processing, and distributing MRAPs?
Secretary Young. Once MRAP vehicles receive Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE) integration at SPAWAR, SC, they are prepared for
shipping into the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Operations.
Up to 360 vehicles per month will be shipped via strategic airlift from
the United States to destinations in Iraq. The destination depends on
the fielding location. Three major hubs employ strategic airlift
(Forward Operating Base (FOB) Balad, FOB Liberty, and Al Asad). MRAP
vehicle shipments, beyond the 360 designated by strategic airlift,
depart via seagoing vessels to Kuwait. Once in Kuwait, the vehicles are
de-processed and loaded into intra-theater aircraft and sent into Iraq.
The Joint Program Office (JPO) MRAP develops the fielding schedule
in coordination with USCENTCOM priorities and objectives and JPO MRAP
production capabilities. MRAP vehicles are distributed in line with the
fielding schedule at the direction of USCENTCOM's priorities.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. Does the theater possess adequate
capacity to process the influx of MRAPs that will surely result from
the dramatic increase in production from now through February.
Secretary Young. Central Command developed and implemented a
fielding process with the capacity to support the fielding of MRAP
vehicles at a flow-rate based on the current production schedule. This
effort has been accomplished in coordination with the MRAP Joint
Program Office (JPO), and US Transportation Command. Theater validated
the fielding process through the conduct of two Rehearsal of Concept
(ROC) drills and shipment of 48 vehicles by surface in early Nov 07.
The MRAP JPO, serving as the Department of Defense lead agency,
will ship MRAP vehicles from the Space and Naval Warfare Systems
(SPAWAR) Center in Charleston, SC via strategic air and sealift
directly to Theater. There will be a total of nine fielding sites. The
first four fielding sites also serve as Regional Support Activities
sites where all limited Depot level maintenance and repairs will be
conducted in Theater. The strategic air shipment delivers MRAP vehicles
directly to Air Port of Debarkation (APODs) in the vicinity of each
MRAP fielding site. MRAPs delivered via sealift to the Surface Port of
Debarkation (SPOD) in Kuwait will be transported to a local facility
for deprocessing and staging for onward intra-theater movement to the
fielding sites in Iraq. Intra-theater transport from Kuwait to fielding
sites will be primarily completed via contract air. Surge vehicles will
be moved via ground Common User Land Transportation (CULT) assets. The
Marine Corps and Navy have been fielding vehicles in Iraq since Mar 07
and plan to continue under their current concept of operations. Upon
arrival at the appropriate fielding site, and completion of vehicle
deprocessing, USMC and USN vehicles are delivered to the user. The Army
and Air Force conduct delivery of vehicles to the user in a more
centralized manner at each of the fielding sites. As each Company
arrives at one of the fielding sites, they begin the five day process
of equipment turnover and user and maintenance training before
returning to their bases with the MRAP vehicles as a unit.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. What are the positives and
negatives to moving from monthly production contracts to weekly
production contracts? What about daily?
Secretary Young. The intent of moving from monthly to weekly
production contracts is to provide an even flow of vehicle deliveries
from the manufacturer to SPAWAR and allow for a smooth throughput
throughout the vehicle pipeline from production to end user.
Benefits of Weekly Production Deliveries:
Causes manufacturers to stabilize their production
processes.
Provides SPAWAR with a steady stream of vehicles.
Reduces wait time for integration at SPAWAR.
Expedites DCMA inspection and acceptance.
Provides smooth, predictable flow of vehicles throughout
the pipeline from production, through integration, to transportation
and deprocessing and into the hands of the end user.
Potential Challenges to Contracted Weekly Production Deliveries:
Manufacturers were pursuing steep production ramps to
meet aggressive monthly delivery schedules and may experience
challenges in shifting--production processes, timing, supplier orders,
supplier deliveries, etc.--to meet equally aggressive weekly schedules.
Manufacturers may experience initial delays in meeting
weekly targets during the transition; the risk increases if we require
a contract that binds them to new or changed requirements.
Increases management and transaction demand on the Joint
MRAP Program contracting team.
Daily:
Contracted daily delivery schedules would not provide
benefit to the Department or the program schedule to counter the
increased cost in managing such deliveries.
Manufacturers are shipping vehicles on a regular basis
and deliveries to SPAWAR are leveling throughout the month.
Daily delivery schedules would be difficult to negotiate
with the individual manufacturers and would put an undue burden on both
the manufacturers and the government contracting personnel required to
manage daily delivery schedules.
Manufacturers are still transitioning to a weekly
schedule, as described above, and realigning their processes, supply
chains, orders, deliveries, etc. would take an additional amount of
time and would not impact the system until several months from now if
at all.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. Do you expect MRAP vehicle
requirements to increase in the preceding months?
Secretary Young. Assessment by the military services of future
vehicle requirements is in progress. Tie final MRAP requirement will be
shaped by continual theater commander's evaluation of the vehicles
capability, the threat and the strategic landscape.
The Marines have been operating their vehicles in Anbar province
for several months and have made assessments based on the operational
performance as well as tactics used and will brief their proposed
requirements change to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
in the near future.
The Army will perform an operational assessment of the vehicles in
February 2008 after all variants have been fielded. Any change in the
Army's vehicle requirement from their current interim requirement of
10,000 vehicles will be predicated on the results of the operational
assessment, evolving force structure, and vehicle tactics, techniques
and procedures used in Theater.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. Producing enough vehicles to meet
DOD requirements will necessitate a steep ramp up of production between
now and February next year. How confidant are you that you can achieve
the ramp up necessary? Are your sub-tier contractors on board,
especially considering you have some in common with one another?
Ms. Hudson. From the perspective of Caiman we are already at the
contract-required rate of production for the most recent award. We have
a high level of confidence that we'll continue to deliver on schedule.
Regarding our sub-tier contractors, XPA armor is inhouse and the
government has funded the setting up of extra lines for XPA production.
From the perspective of RG33, the rate of production has been
negatively impacted due to the scope of customer changes, to the SOCOM
vehicle variant.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. Ramping up to meet requirements
will include hiring additional workers and some will need specialized
skills and certifications, such as welding. How many more workers will
be needed in the coming months to support production rates and how will
they be trained to ensure they have the necessary skills?
Ms. Hudson. We are fully staffed and fully trained to deliver the
required numbers.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. What are the advantages and
disadvantages of installing mission equipment at other locations, such
as the prime contractors' facilities?
Ms. Hudson. We have already worked with the Joint Program Office
(JPO) and SPAWAR to cut into production most of the required changes.
The integration of Government Furnished Equipment is still being done
at SPAWAR and SPAWAR have no difficulty in coping with that task.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. Have you been by the MRAP Task
Force or MRAP program management office regarding the sharing of
technical designs in order to produce the most effective and complete
MRAP vehicle? Would you be willing to share this type of information
with your fellow prime contractors?
Ms. Hudson. Yes, we have had two sessions with the JPO. The first
involved the sharing of data and the second was specifically aimed at
increased levels of protection. As for sharing this information with
our fellow contractors, we are willing and have already done so during
the JPO session.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. How are you incentivizing industry
to accelerate production and facilitate their production and
manufacturing processes?
Ms. Hudson. The supply base is set up to sufficiently supply the
required volumes and do not need further incentivizing.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. How do you feel about moving from
monthly production contracts to weekly production contracts? What about
daily?
Ms. Hudson. The Caiman vehicle has been on a weekly production
schedule since September 2007. We have provided a weekly production
schedule for the new contract award and are contracted to it. We do not
feel that anything can be more significantly achieved going to a daily
production schedule, considering the transportation requirements
associated with the delivery of each vehicle to SPAWAR.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. Producing enough vehicles to meet
DOD requirements will necessitate a steep ramp up of production between
now and February next year. How confident are you that you can achieve
the ramp up necessary? Are your sub-tier contractors on board,
especially considering you have some in common with one another?
Mr. McGilton. We were supremely confident in our ability to achieve
the ramp and had all mechanisms in place to ramp up to a delivery
schedule of 500 vehicles per month. All of our sub-tier contractors and
suppliers were fully prepared to execute this ramp. The actions we
took, at the urging of both the Under Secretary of Defense and the U.S.
Congress, led us to create a network of manufacturing capacity that is
today the only organization reliably producing ahead of schedule. We
have been led to believe that the Department is no longer planning to
have us continue our ramp. We are consequently initiating planning and
actions to reduce the network and scale back our manufacturing capacity
to achieve rates of roughly half, or less, of our original estimates.
The information that we have access to, appears to indicate that there
is no further level of demand that will sustain the need for our
production capacity. This seems, from our perspective, inconsistent
with the message we have repeatedly been given relative to the MRAP
program; specifically at a time when we are the only OEM reliably
producing ahead of schedule for what has been described as a ``rescue
mission,'' it defies our understanding as to why we would now be asked
to halt our efforts and eliminate precious manufacturing capacity.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. Ramping up to meet requirements
will include hiring additional workers and some will need specialized
skills and certifications, such as in welding. How many more workers
will be needed in the coming months to support production rates and how
will they be trained to ensure they have the necessary skills?
Mr. McGilton. We had plans in place to continue the steady increase
in manpower across all functional skills (welders/fitters, mechanics,
integrators/assemblers, engineers) at each of our network and
subcontractor locations. Based on the Department's current direction,
we have halted all hiring and are planning to initiate workforce
reductions across the next 90-120 days in order to scale back the
workforce to the size needed to meet the diminished demand placed
against our vehicles.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. What are the advantages and
disadvantages of installing mission equipment at other locations, such
as the prime contractor's facilities?
Mr. McGilton. The advantages are reducing the delays in fielding
the vehicles and offering the potential for elimination of a single
point of failure by introducing multiple sites for installation of
government furnished equipment (GFE). Disadvantages include multiple
ship to locations of materials and causing the potential complexity
from having to provide GFE to multiple locations (vice a single
location as it is currently executed) and potentially introducing
multiple points for failure.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. Have you been contacted by the MRAP
Task Force or MRAP program management office regarding the sharing of
technical designs in order to produce the most effective and complete
MRAP vehicle? Would you be willing to share this type of information
with your fellow prime contractors?
Mr. McGilton. Yes, before and since our appearance at the HASC, we
have been in contact with the MRAP Joint Program Office and
participated in a joint OEM review of test data. As we said during our
appearance, we are fully committed to any and all actions that will
lead to the improvement of MRAP vehicles across all OEMs. As a result
of this review, we have, however, uncovered what appears to be
potential inconsistencies in the application and gathering of the test
data and are responding through the MRAP program office with the aim of
ensuring decisions made are a result of accurate and consistent
evaluation. Without the urging of your committee to see that the test
data was shared, we feel strongly that we would not have become aware
of these issues. The HASC deserves credit for the oversight it
exhibited on this specific issue.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. How are you incentivizing industry
to accelerate production and facilitate their production and
manufacturing processes?
Mr. McGilton. Mr. Chairman, as I stated in my previous testimony,
and I can only speak for Force Protection, Inc., ``no incentives were
necessary, nor would they have helped us do a better job than we did''.
We viewed it as our job, our only job, to do everything we could to get
these vehicles into the hands of the troops! The only additional
assistance necessary from the DOD was having a firm understanding of
the long term plan for this critical program, so we could invest in
material and other resources to meet the need. As my peers and I said
repeatedly, small incremental orders would be the worst possible
scenario for ALL contractors. It now appears that the pleas for
``visibility'' and ``larger orders'' fell on deaf ears, at least as it
relates to Force Protection. To date, we still do not have visibility
or substantial orders for our vehicles. What we do have, is what was
requested, the capacity to deliver hundreds of vehicles each month. Our
repeated monthly performance of shipping ahead of schedule is the
objective evidence of that capacity. Our expectation, and what we were
repeatedly told, was that ``business would be awarded to those that
performed''. The majority of the business has now been awarded to those
that we outperformed, and continue to outperform.
Sir all of these issues may NOT be of concern to you, but some of
them certainly should be. I trust the wisdom of the committee to decide
which is which.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. How do you feel about moving from
monthly production contracts to weekly production contracts? What about
daily?
Mr. McGilton. We are already entering into weekly production
contract schedules with the MRAP program office but with the reduction
of orders we are experiencing it hardly seems to matter now.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. Producing enough vehicles to meet
DOD requirements will necessitate a steep ramp up of production between
now and February next year. How confident are you that you can achieve
the ramp up necessary? Are your sub-tier contractors on board,
especially considering you have some in common with one another?
Mr. Heebner. We have positioned ourselves to meet the ramp-up goals
at our manufacturing sites and within our supply base. This effort is
apparent in our current production, where we are ahead of schedule on
the production of Cougars by about 56 vehicles. Startup of North
American production of the RG31 is proceeding with expected completion
of contract deliveries in March 2008. In addition, we have identified
external vendors for items that would typically be handled internally,
providing us with the necessary flexibility to support both MRAP
vehicle demands.
We are confident the General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) and GDLS-
Canada enterprise can successfully attain previously stated surge
rates. We've already increased monthly production rates for Cougar. The
RG-31 North American and South African suppliers are well established
and producing products to support vehicle production in two locations.
Major Cougar assembly elements (such as capsule fabrication, auto
integration and final assembly) are mature and stable, inclusive of the
workforce and facilities. RG-31 production is on the same path.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. Ramping up to meet requirements
will include hiring additional workers and some will need specialized
skills and certifications, such as in welding. How many more workers
will be needed in the coming months to support production rates and how
will they be trained to ensure they have the necessary skills?
Mr. Heebner. We have been able to hire the additional manpower
required and we have developed internal training programs for required
specialty skills such as welding to support both our internal and
external manufacturing needs.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. What are the advantages and
disadvantages of installing mission equipment at other locations, such
as the prime contractors' facilities?
Mr. Heebner. There are essentially four advantages to installing
mission-equipment packages at prime contractor/original equipment
manufacturer facilities: experience, reach-back, facilities and
accountability.
Experience comes in two forms. The first is experience as the
manufacturer of the vehicle. An OEM's thorough knowledge of the
vehicle's manufacturing process flow, assembly operations sheets and
skills required in production allow them to integrate mission equipment
packages in the most efficient and economical manner. The second and
equally important aspect is experience as a systems integrator. OEMs
have years of experience integrating complex subsystems and components
into vehicles. OEMs understand their systems' performance better and
have a better ability to model, analyze and assess system level-impacts
of integration strategies in order to ensure the most effective
integration scheme for a given mission equipment package or a
combination of them. OEMs completely understand how mission-equiprnent
packages impact a vehicle's weight, space and power capacities and the
subsequent impact they have on system-level performance in mobility,
survivability, lethality and supportability.
The second advantage that integration of mission-equipment packages
at OEM facilities provides is reach-back to the point of installation
on the vehicle assembly line. Should problems arise during integration,
OEM have on-site systems engineers, design and manufacturing
engineering expertise, plant equipment and process and quality experts,
logisticians and a responsive supply chain all with experience focused
on the vehicle and similar vehicles/products. They combine with a
dedicated program manager to form a team that can easily and quickly
meet in the manufacturing facility if necessary, analyze problems and
develop solutions. Such a rapid response minimizes the impact to
production flow, system-level performance and cost. This team's
experience makes them better prepared to react and adapt to unknowns
because of their experience and broad perspective on the system.
An additional advantage to the integration of mission-equipment
packages at OEM locations are the facilities. OEMs production
facilities are geared toward providing integrated products. The
facilities are flexible, expandable and in most cases already equipped
for the work. That allows us to streamline the production process and
adapt to change quickly. The production facilities are already
structured for an efficient vehicle flow and incorporating mission-
equipment package integration into that flow would also be done with
efficiency in mind. Plants also have the capability to fully check
integrated system performance through their quality system before
handing off to the government.
Finally, having the OEM serve as mission equipment package
integrator establishes a single point of ownership and accountability
for the vehicle before it is handed off to soldiers and marines. The
OEM has responsibility for the entire vehicle and its performance. As a
result, the company must coordinate with its vendor network and the
mission equipment package provider to ensure the system meets
government needs. The use of a third party integrator complicates the
process and increases the likelihood for errors and slower response
times.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. Have you been [approached] by the
MRAP Task Force or MRAP program management office regarding the sharing
of technical designs in order to produce the most effective and
complete MRAP vehicle? Would you be willing to share this type of
information with your fellow prime contractors?
Mr. Heebner. General Dynamics Land Systems remains open to sharing
technology across the MRAP fleet given that the proper contractual
terms and conditions exist, especially in areas where we do not own the
intellectual property.
I have expressed my corporate and individual commitment to
supporting the MRAP program to Secretary Young and the Joint Program
Office. General Dynamics has not been approached by the government
about sharing MRAP vehicle designs.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. How are you incentivizing industry
to accelerate production, and facilitate their production and
manufacturing processes?
Mr. Heebner. The GDLS strategy to accelerate the current production
rate is to utilize existing idle capacity throughout industry, and
involve the current GDLS supply base from legacy products such as
Abrams and Stryker. We also explained to a select group of suppliers
that future business with GDLS is contingent on demonstrated
performance in the manufacturing of MRAPs. This approach coupled, with
an established Cougar supply base, enhanced our ability to achieve and
exceed monthly contract schedules.
A similar approach was used by GDLS-C in its relationship with BAE
Systems OMC, and the established supply base in North America.
Communication and loyalty to our key partners has been the
cornerstone for moving forward. Through efficiency already achieved,
the supply chain focus is to reduce current product span time and
increase core capacity for these platforms.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. How do you feel about moving from
monthly production contracts to weekly production contracts? What about
daily?
Mr. Heebner. We have structured our delivery plan to support the
need for mission-package integration at Space and Surface Warfare
Charleston, realizing that large-quantity, month-end deliveries do not
support the overall program objective. In most cases we have been able
to provide a uniform delivery rate of MRAPs to Charleston throughout
each month and will continue to pursue uniform vehicle delivery rates
to assure the components are available for mission-package integration.
As responded to in question three, by performing mission-package
integration at the manufacturers' facility, we gain efficiencies in
several areas. That could result in faster vehicle delivery to the
theater.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. What impact is the UAW strike
having on the IMG MRAP production and delivery schedules?
Mr. Massicotte. On December 16, 2007, International Truck and
Engine Corporation and the UAW settled their dispute and all aspects of
production have returned to normal. There was no impact to MRAP or to
our delivery schedule.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. Producing enough vehicles to meet
DOD requirements will necessitate a steep ramp up of production between
now and February next year. How confident are you that you can achieve
the ramp up necessary? Are your sub-tier contractors on board,
especially considering you have some in common with one another?
Mr. Massicotte. Since the date of our testimony we have
successfully increased MRAP production and in December 2007 we exceeded
our monthly commitment of 349 MRAPs. This monthly total is the highest
total vehicles produced by any contractor in any month.
We plan to produce 430 vehicles in January and 500 vehicles in
February. These increases in production remain a challenge that we work
towards achieving each and every day. Additionally we work closely with
each of our subcontractors individually to ensure they are prepared to
increase demand along with us. This is not an easy task but I am
confident that we will produce and deliver our future commitments.
Furthermore I assure you that we will maintain an open channel of
communication with the MRAP Program Office to identify potential
problems as soon as possible and work together to resolve issues before
they affect production.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. Ramping up to meet requirements
will include hiring additional workers and some will need specialized
skill and certifications, such as welding. How many more workers will
be needed in the coming months to support production rates and how will
they be trained to ensure they have the necessary skills?
Mr. Massicotte. The MaxxPro is a unique MRAP vehicle. The chassis
is assembled in our Garland Assembly Plant, in Garland Texas. This
plant is a commercial plant and the assembly of the MaxxPro chassis
does not require any unique skills. In addition, the MaxxPro
incremental volume to this facility does not have a staffing impact.
The armored capsule of the MaxxPro is assembled in our dedicated
armoring facility in West Point, Mississippi. Our armoring process
requires no welding and is assembled by bolting and bonding armored
parts on the chassis. Our workforce in West Point, Mississippi, that
assembles the armored capsule is 750 strong and can produce at our
practical plant capacity of 600 per month with little or no additional
hiring. We have invested in the existing workforce by carefully
interviewing, screening, selecting and training our employees to build
the MaxxPro vehicle. The skills required are basic automotive assembly
skills. We've matched individual aptitude with appropriate production
tasks. Our employees take great pride in the vehicles we produce and
the support we provide to our armed forces.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. What are the advantages and
disadvantages of installing mission equipment at other locations, such
as the prime contractors' facilities?
Mr. Massicotte. The advantages of installing mission equipment at
our factory are significant and include time savings, reduced
government costs and expedited delivery of vehicles to the Warfighters.
Working closely with SPAWAR we have already identified and implemented
19 GFE (government furnished equipment) pre-integration activities that
are being performed at West Point which enable the Government to
perform only `plug-and-play' tasks at SPAWAR and to ship the trucks to
theater more expeditiously. These activities have been performed on all
vehicles delivered since October. IMG is also poised to integrate the
full suite of GFE if this is desired by the government.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. Have you been contacted by the MRAP
Task Force or MRAP Program Management office regarding the sharing of
technical designs in order to produce the most effective and complete
MRAP vehicle? Would you be willing to share this type of information
with your fellow prime contractors?
Mr. Massicotte. Yes, we have been contacted and have in fact had an
open session with the Program Management office and our fellow prime
contractors regarding vehicle test characteristics and results. Even
though each prime contractor has different survivability systems
embedded in their designs, I believe there is a shared interest in
collaborating and in providing the Warfighters with the very best
equipment possible. International is willing to participate in any
event sponsored by the Program Office or MRAP Task Force that promotes
product improvement and effective sharing of lessons learned.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. How are you incentivizing industry
to accelerate production and facilitate their production and
manufacturing processes?
Mr. Massicotte. As a worldwide leader in commercial truck
manufacturing, we have a dedicated and attentive supply base that is
well positioned to meet our production needs. For our new or non-
commercial suppliers we have advanced millions of dollars to
subcontractors, at our own risk, to prebuy and prepare for production;
we have hired outside manufacturing expert consultants and assigned
them to work specifically on improving sub-contractor manufacturing
capabilities; we have dedicated significant engineering resources to
suppliers to develop capabilities and set up pre-agreements to perform
as required. In short we have worked very closely with each supplier of
critical components to `bring them along with us' to meet the steep
production challenges. The incentive for all our suppliers is to be
with IMG as IMG continues to grow in the military arena and also it's
the potential to either expand their current relationship or to become
a new supplier to Navistar's multi-billion dollar commercial truck
business.
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie. How do you feel about moving from
monthtly production contracts to weekly production contracts? What
about daily?
Mr. Massicotte. We are building MaxxPro MRAP vehicles as quickly as
we are able. At IMG we are motivated to get them built and delivered so
that we can complete the transaction and move on to produce more
vehicles. For right now, during an aggressive launch phase, I do not
think that moving to a more definitive schedule would enable us to move
any more quickly. But, once we achieve a successful ramp-up and our
suppliers are stabilized IMG will provide and deliver to a more
definitive schedule. Please note that IMG is communicating daily with
Program Management office and DCMA to ensure that downstream activity
is coordinated with vehicle delivery.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. Are you finding variation in trucks that arrive in
Charleston, SC that are not integration ready? If yes, how are you
dealing with that variation? Is there any congressional action that can
help you in this area?
Secretary Young. We are not experiencing variation of trucks
arriving at SPAWAR Charleston, SC wit m each manufacturer's vehicles.
The Defense Contracts Management Agency conducts quality assurance
checks prior to acceptance of the vehicles. Additional quality checks
are conducted during the integration process.
There is variation between the manufacturer's vehicles that
required us, in the past, to conduct a prototype install of Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE) for each manufacturer's variant. At this
point, all vehicles except General Dynamics Land Systems--Canada's
(GDLS-C) RG-31s, have been through prototyping and are progressing
steadily through the integration pipeline.
The Department does not need congressional action with regard to
vehicle variations.
Mr. Forbes. Why shouldn't we have C4I equipment installation done
at the manufacturers rather than sending the trucks to Charleston?
Secretary Young. All C4I equipment, referred to as Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE), is procured by the individual Services. We
determined it would be prudent for the Joint Program Office (JPO) to
have one common place to receive, store, inventory, account for,
secure, and integrate this GFE. That entity is SPAWAR. Completing all
these tasks at multiple sights would have complicated the GFE tracking
and accounting process.
Armored vehicle manufacturers do not inherently have the requisite
skills at their vehicle manufacturing plants for detailed installation
of C4I equipment or GFE. The JPO focused each manufacturer on its
``core'' capability to produce MRAP vehicles as fast as possible. The
production ramp was very steep and included some level of risk. Asking
a vehicle manufacturer to ramp up a specialized integration capability
as well as produce MRAP vehicles would have increased the risk of
receiving these trucks on time.
Now that the vehicles have all been prototyped (except General
Dynamics Land Systems--Canada (GDLS-C)) and the manufacturers are
achieving production ramps, the JPO is initiating an integration pilot
with one manufacturer. Transition to integration by a manufacturer must
be handled with great precision and planning to avoid any disruption to
the pipeline of MRAP vehicles to theater.
Mr. Forbes. Is SPAWAR Charleston opening a MRAP integration
facility in Orangeburg, SC? And if so, what is the purpose for doing
so?
Secretary Young. Yes. The Joint Program Office (JPO) and SPAWAR
established a Continuity of Operations (COOP) site for immediate
relocation of the entire integration effort from SPAWAR in the case of
natural disaster such as a hurricane. Several sites were examined, and
the Orangeburg, SC location was chosen due to its large square footage
and immediate availability for occupancy. Establishing several
integration lines at this COOP facility allows for seamless and
continuous operations of MRAP vehicle integration without impacting the
flow of MRAP vehicles to theater.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
Mr. Shuster. In response to my questions at the July 19 hearing on
Department of Defense plans to sustain and maintain the MRAP and what
depots are involved in the planning process, I received a response that
vehicles would initially be sustained and maintained via contractor
logistics support (CLS). However, the Department would conduct a Depot
Level Source of Repair (DSOR) analysis and a core logistics
capabilities assessment, which will also consider Performance Based
Logistics and public-private partnerships in determining the most
effective sustainment support. Has the Department of Defense started
the Depot Level Source of Repair Analysis (DSOR) and, if not, when do
you plan to begin this analysis? Will you consider the Letterkenny Army
Depot (LEAD) as a sustainment site? As you know, Letterkenny finished
number one in military value for tactical vehicles in the 2005 BRAG
analysis.
Secretary Young. Yes, we have started the Depot Level Source of
Repair Analysis and the Core Logistics capabilities assessment.
Yes, Letterkenny Army Depot, Red River Army Depot, Marine Corps
Depot at Albany, GA and Barstow, CA are all being considered by the
Joint community as potential depots for MRAP vehicle sustainment.
Mr. Shuster. Please tell me under your current contract when
production of your vehicle ends. Would there be a production break if
you received orders for new vehicles by the end of November. If so,
what would that break be? Would there be an additional cost to you of
ending and then restarting production?
Ms. Hudson. Since my testimony at the 8 November MRAP hearing, BAE
Systems has received two additional contracts, thus pushing forward
contract end-dates and, consequently, anticipated breaks in production.
Dates and production details for both the RG33 and Caiman vehicles are
outlined below.
RG33: The follow-on contract for RG33 has a projected completion
date of July 2008. We do not anticipate any break in production for
current contracts.
Caiman: The follow-on contract for Caiman is schedule to be
produced in May, June, and July 2008. We do not anticipate any break in
production for current contracts.