PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS—
HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY

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[There were no Documents submitted.]

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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Dr. SNYDER. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Akin, the ranking member, is en route. He got temporarily hung up, but he will be here shortly. He said we could go ahead and begin. When he gets here, we will give him an opportunity to give his opening statement also.

Welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations’ hearing on Provincial Reconstruction Teams—PRTs—Historical and Current Perspectives on Doctrine and Strategy.

The subcommittee is conducting a series of hearings and briefings on the PRT programs in Afghanistan and Iraq to get a better understanding of what PRTs are, what they do and the contribution that they are making in stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq. We have used this project as a case study of interagency operations. In order to emphasize the importance of interagency operations and to reinforce why our efforts here are so important, I would like to quote the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Gates, on his recent remarks on the subject.

Quote, “One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win. There is economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more. These, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success. Accomplishing all of these tasks will be necessary to meet the diverse challenges I have described.” That is the end of the quote by Secretary Gates.

These imperatives cannot be accomplished by military alone. We need the capabilities of our entire government brought to bear in support of our current efforts.
The purpose of today’s hearing is to put our current efforts of stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan into context where Secretary Gates says, quote, “Context is important,” end quote.

The Nation has been here before. Throughout our history we have experienced the difficulties of transitioning from the use of force to the task of rebuilding war-torn societies from our own Civil War to the hot and cold 20th century wars in Europe and in the Far East and from smaller post-Cold War struggles such as in the Balkans and in Haiti.

Perhaps the campaigns which most closely resemble efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan are previous counterinsurgency efforts. In such cases, we engaged in armed insurgency while attempting to rebuild the physical and political structures of countries. Our goal has usually been a stable, peaceful, democratic, and independent nation state, friendly to the United States and its neighbors.

Secretary Gates recently cited the Vietnam Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) effort as an example. Again, quoting Secretary Gates, “However uncomfortable it may be to raise Vietnam all of these years later, the history of that conflict is instructive. After first pursuing a strategy based on conventional military firepower, the United States shifted course and began a comprehensive, integrated program of pacification, civic action and economic development. It had the effect of, in the words of General Creighton Abrams, ‘putting all of us on one side and the enemy on the other.’ By the time U.S. troops were pulled out, the CORDS program had helped to pacify most of the hamlets in South Vietnam. The importance of deploying civilian expertise has been relearned the hard way through the effort to staff Provincial Reconstruction Teams first in Afghanistan and, more recently, in Iraq. The PRTs were designed to bring in civilians experienced in agriculture, governance and other aspects of development to work with and alongside the military to improve the lives of the local population, a key tenet of any counterinsurgency effort.” That is the end of, again, Secretary Gates’ quote.

We hope that today’s witnesses can help us gain a better understanding of and perspective on our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have brought together practitioners and scholars who have experienced and/or studied these previous and current campaigns in great detail. As always, we seek our witnesses’ recommendations on what we should do, what this Congress should do, to increase the likelihood of the success of our Nation’s efforts both in the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the wars of the future.

Our panel of witnesses today includes Mister—is it “Ber-nerd” or “Ber-nard”?

Mr. CARREAU. Bernard.

Dr. SNYDER. Bernard, also known as “Bernie.”

Mr. CARREAU. “Bernie.”

Dr. SNYDER. We have Mr. Bernard Carreau, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University.

General Warner, retired U.S. Army, President and Chief Executive Officer of V.F. Warner and Associates.
It is my understanding, General Warner, that your bride is with you today.

General WARNER. Yes, she is——

Dr. SNYDER. We would like to acknowledge her presence here.

General WARNER [continuing]. And older son.

Dr. SNYDER. And older son. Good for you.

Brigadier General Rick Olson, U.S. Army, Retired, former Commander, Combined/Joint Task Force–76 in Afghanistan and former Director of the National Coordination Team in Iraq.

Our fourth witness is Ms. Kathleen Hicks, Senior Fellow of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

We appreciate your all being here. Your written statements will, without objection, be made a part of the record.

I also wanted to introduce a friend of mine, one of my constituents, Dr. Sharon Williams.

Dr. Williams, if you would not mind standing up so folks can see you. Wave and say hello.

She is going to be with us for a few minutes. She is from Little Rock, Arkansas. She has a husband and family and two lovely little girls back home. She spent six months in Afghanistan as a veterinarian with the U.S Department of Agriculture. She has spent seven months as the Ministry Adviser for Animal Health and Food Safety at the United States Department of Agriculture in Baghdad. She has been there for seven months. She came home for Thanksgiving. She spent time in Arkansas with her little girls and husband, and she is now heading back tomorrow to complete another five months in Iraq.

Once we finish with all of your opening statements, we will go to our five-minute rule. The members who were here at the gavel will go first, followed by other members as they come in. I also ask, without objection, unanimous consent for Dr. Charles Boustany to participate in the hearing today after all of the regular subcommittee members have finished.

We will now go to Mr. Akin for any comments he would like to make.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the Appendix on page 41.]

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Dr. Snyder.

Good afternoon to our witnesses. We appreciate your being here today.

Today's hearing is this subcommittee's fifth public hearing on Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Our witnesses will not only offer their perspectives on the current PRT program but will put these operations into historic context. The only thing really new about PRTs is the name. The concept of how an interagency team comprised of civilian and military personnel works to extend the reach of the government into regional provinces and local areas comes with significant historical precedent.
The most recent and commonly referenced analog to PRTs is the Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS, program the United States employed during Vietnam. The CORDS program was the interagency response to insurgency during the Vietnam War. Like the PRTs, CORDS teams are made up of civilian and military personnel. CORDS teams spread out to the 44 provinces and personnel with the provincial and district levels embedded with the local government officials.

Most importantly and critical to our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan is that many believe the CORDS fulfill the most fundamental mission of counterinsurgency. Proponents of this view believe the CORDS program increased the effectiveness of the local government and security forces by training 900,000 Vietnamese, including 300,000 civil servants. CORDS helped establish the vitality of the South Vietnamese Government by providing competitive services and local security. This marginalized the Viet Cong, and people no longer felt compelled to turn to the shadow Communist regime.

After the institution of CORDS, a Viet Cong colonel lamented, last year we could attack the United States forces; This year we find it difficult to attack even puppet forces. We failed to win the support of the people and to keep them from moving back to enemy-controlled areas.

This sentiment is exactly the type of thing we need to hear from al Qaeda and Taliban operatives fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Again, thank you all for being witnesses here today. We are very interested in what you have to say and in particularly the historic connect and in what we should be learning from our experiences in the past. Thank you.

Thank you, Dr. Snyder.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Akin.

We will put this little clock on there, which I assume you can see from your side. Now, we will put it on five minutes, but that is more just for your benefit to know when five minutes go by. If you have other things you want to get to, you can feel free to ignore it when the red light comes on.

Mr. Carreau, you are recognized, and then we will just go down the line to General Warner and then to General Olson and then to Ms. Hicks.

STATEMENT OF BERNARD T. CARREAU, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Mr. Carreau. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Snyder, Congressman Akin and distinguished members, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss current and historical perspectives on PRTs. I am honored to be here and with such distinguished fellow panelists.

Today, I want to talk briefly about civil-military and interagency relations in Vietnam. Although the scale and historical circumstances of Vietnam differ greatly from those of Iraq and Afghanistan, some aspects of intergovernmental relations in Vietnam may offer valuable lessons for today.
Like the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Vietnam was a war in which the United States was itself a belligerent, as opposed to a third party intervenor. It was a war in which the United States suffered significant casualties and extended significant resources, and it was a war which had an enormous impact on our national security interests and domestic politics.

Turning to the CORDS effort, pacifications efforts in Vietnam—what might today be called counterinsurgencies or postwar stability operations—involves returning government control to a country-side that was infiltrated by Viet Cong insurgents. It focused on local security efforts but also included distributing food and medical supplies, agriculture support, job creation, and land reform.

The Civil Operations and Rural Development Support program was created in 1967 after years of unsatisfactory attempts at coordinating the activities of multiple agencies under the U.S. Ambassador’s Country Team. President Johnson appointed Robert Komer to the position of Deputy to General William Westmoreland, the Commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). Robert Komer’s nickname was “Blowtorch Bob” to give you an idea of his forceful and no nonsense personality. The Deputy Commander carried a three-star rank. The union of the previously separate civilian and military pacification efforts into the combined CORDS program resulted in what may have been the only truly integrated civilian-military command in U.S. history. The integrated command placed civilians in charge of military personnel and vice versa. It also placed military resources, including logistics, transport and force protection assets, at the disposal of civilians. Military and civilian units were collocated, often in the same building at the national, regional, province, and district levels.

Komer developed a cordial relationship with Westmoreland, as did Komer’s successor, William Colby, with Westmoreland’s successor, General Creighton Abrams. In turn, Generals Westmoreland and Abrams showed great flexibility and allowed their civilian deputies considerable leeway in setting priorities and in allocating resources. By placing almost all pacification-related programs under a single headquarters and by investing the single manager with unprecedented access to resources, Komer had sufficient leverage to force the various agencies to develop and to implement a nationwide pacification plan in conjunction with the South Vietnamese Government.

Much of the impetus for reorganizing CORDS came from President Johnson himself. Johnson viewed pacification in Vietnam as an extension of his vision for his domestic “Great Society” policies, and began to describe the effort to help the Vietnamese people as the “other war.”

I wanted to make just a couple of observations about the CORDS program and today’s PRTs. Of course, the scale of the pacification of it in Vietnam dwarfed the PRT efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, there were almost 8,000 U.S. participants in CORDS and as much as 800,000 South Vietnamese army, national police and local government officials, all of this against the backdrop of about 500,000 U.S. troops and 400,000 South Vietnamese conventional forces. Compare this to Afghanistan where there are approximately 30,000 coalition forces and about 3,000 personnel in
the PRTs. There are more troops, of course, in Iraq, but there are fewer PRT personnel.

The lessons from CORDS have more to do with organizational structure. Many former participants—State, the United States Agency for International Development and the military—talk about the surprising level of cooperation, large amounts of financial resources available for pacification projects in Vietnam. They talk about the symbiotic relationship. The military needed civilian expertise, local governance and job creation. The civilians needed the military protection, of course, and their expertise in counterinsurgency operations, and they needed their lift and force protection abilities.

One point I would make is to compare CORDS with the original structure in Iraq. In Iraq, originally under the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), there was a retired three-star general who was appointed to head up the reconstruction efforts, separate from the military command, with no access to resources. No matter how competent, a retired three-star cannot compete for resources and influence with an active duty four-star general in charge of the entire operation.

I wanted to make a couple of points also about nontraditional security assistance, which I know is on today's agenda and which my fellow panelists will talk more about. I want to draw a sharp distinction between stabilization, pacification and counterinsurgency activities in a war zone and security cooperation arrangements, training equipment activity and longer term development activities in noncrisis countries.

In my view, it is entirely appropriate for the military to have the lead on reconstruction activities in a war zone. The lesson of CORDS in Vietnam is that this structure works better than having a civilian lead. In Vietnam, pacification had priority over traditional development assistance, although in practice on the ground it was often hard to tell the difference between the two. Everyone agreed that security had to come before reconstruction.

One example I would cite today as a contrast to that from Iraq is the example of state-owned enterprises. It is an issue I know well because when I was in Iraq with Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) I was on detail from the Commerce Department, and my area was private sector development.

There is still disagreement today between the State Department and the Department of Defense over whether to rehabilitate state-owned enterprises or to privatize them. It is my view now, as it was when I was in Baghdad, that the state-owned enterprises should be rehabilitated where possible in a war zone to get people back to work and off the streets, even though of course this view is entirely contrary to traditional long-term development orthodoxy.

So, in some final concluding remarks, I would say that unity of command in a war zone is essential, and I say that as a civilian and as a former civilian participant in one of these operations. In a major contingency such as Vietnam or Iraq, the unity of command between military and civilian efforts which brings along with it the enormous military resources I think is an imperative element. I think there needs to be a mandatory control structure. A civil-military chain of command should be established at the very
highest levels of the government because without top-down direction there will be intense organizational resistance to the concession of the control of agency assets to a unified interagency headquarters. There should be a focus on the local population, which CORDS incorporated. Counterinsurgency and stabilization activities require a focus on local populations and on understanding and in fulfilling their needs. The focus in CORDS was on security first, then economic well-being.

The final point I would make is that, in these types of activities in a war zone, we need to encourage host nation ownership. CORDS was designed to empower the South Vietnamese Government to provide security and essential services to the districts and villages. In fact, the ratio of the U.S. participants was about 1 to 1,000, U.S. to South Vietnamese participants.

The final point I would make is that the lesson is to build the local private sector. CORDS was designed to build the agriculture and economic livelihoods of local villages and districts rather than as a temporary employment or as a one-time donor contribution. I will stop there.

I thank the committee for the opportunity to appear before you today. [The prepared statement of Mr. Carreau can be found in the Appendix on page 46.]

Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Carreau.

Before you begin, General Warner, I want to acknowledge the loss of your granddaughter, First Lieutenant Laura Margaret Walker, who died in combat in Afghanistan on August 18th, 2005. We know that has been a tremendous sacrifice for your family, and you still have six other members who have served in the military. We appreciate your service and the service of your family.

General Warner.

STATEMENT OF GEN. VOLNEY F. WARNER (RET.), U.S. ARMY, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, V.F. WARNER AND ASSOCIATES

General Warner. Thank you.

Well, it has been over 25 years since I have been in the building, this building, so I appreciate——

Dr. Snyder. It looks about the same, does it not?

General Warner. There are still cakes in the hallway. I noticed that, but I am honored to be here and to have a chance to participate.

I was thinking on the way over, since I have not been to Afghanistan and I have not been to Iraq, the reason for my appearance had to be my presentation given to the National War College, and I wanted to in my opening statement just mention what that was. I think it is related to what happens next, really, and I believe the committee has been provided the notes on my presentation given to the National War College. I titled the presentation Getting Past Iraq and that my greatest interest was to ensure that we come up with a better solution to assist future failed states, where U.S. vital interests are involved, without resorting to the deployment of conventional military force.
The U.S. cannot resolve most of the instability in the world militarily. Winning all battles is not excellence. Excellence is achieving our goal without fighting, and the best way to win wars is to make them unnecessary.

If there truly is to be a global Islamic movement and our enemies are extremists, nonstate players using asymmetric warfare, if that is the case, then the nature of future conflict, which includes both hard and soft power, is more political than military. As such, we need to fashion a better interagency preemptive response. Let us call it “counterinsurgency,” commonly referred to as “COIN.”

How should we proceed?

My thought would be that, first, we need to put together an overarching national counterinsurgency plan to start the process. The national plan should be built from the bottom up by integrating those counterinsurgency plans as coordinated between the Regional Unified Commanders, called “Commander in Chiefs” (CINC) in my day—it has changed somewhat recently—and their ambassador counterparts. Priority should be given to failed states where a vital U.S. national interest is involved. The Congress should mandate and fund the soft power agencies of the U.S. Government to enable them to perform their part of the interagency task, to include the State Department, the U.S Agency for International Development, the Central Intelligence Agency, and a new U.S. information agency, just to name a few.

A new Department of Stability coequal to Defense and State in authority and funding may be required to manage the efforts at the national level under the watchful eye of a special assistant to the President. Having been under the watchful eye of Komer for about two and a half years, I understand exactly what that means. If we could find a Komer clone somewhere in the United States, he would be a welcomed special assistant to the President to bring the agencies on board in the Washington region and to backstop the Petraeuses of the world and those who are out on the ground trying to get the job done.

Once that would be established and the teams would be then trained, we could have a microcosm country team, PRTs, in terms of Afghanistan and Iraq. They should be trained and tailored country by country to support the forward-deployed U.S. ambassadors and their Military Assistance Advisory Group Staffs, MAAGS, which were greatly reduced in 1973 and should once again be augmented so that they can actually do the job required of them in the countries they find themselves and, certainly, in working with the local populations in counterinsurgency efforts at the province level.

Secure, hold and build is a good paradigm. It is very descriptive of the team activities once deployed. As we have just heard, that is exactly what happened in the Vietnam. The objective should be not to impose our political and economic ideals on the locals but to devise and fund plans supportive of both their and our interests in the region. Only when it appears that an advisory effort has failed will the President be faced with the critical decision of whether to deploy conventional military force or to withdraw support or to seek multilateral support.

I thank you for letting me make that pitch.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. ERIC T. “RICK” OLSON (RET.), FORMER COMMANDER, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE-76, FORMER DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COORDINATION TEAM, U.S. ARMY

General Olson. Mr. Chairman, thank you and thanks to the members. I think the order that we are speaking is fortuitous because you have gotten a good introduction to the historical context. I am going to talk a little bit about history that is more recent, and then Ms. Hicks will talk a little bit about policy, I am sure, since she has got a good background in that.

My association with PRTs began in Afghanistan where I served, as the chairman said, as the Combined/Joint Task Force (CJTF) Commander there, responsible for all U.S. military operations, and as such I also ran the PRTs. In Afghanistan, PRTs are run by the military. That is not the case in Iraq. Then in August 2006, as an official of the Department of State, I became the Deputy Director of the Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office and the Director of the National Coordination Team. So, as a State Department official, I ran all of the PRTs in Iraq. There were very different effects there, and we can talk about that more later on if you would like to.

PRTs in Afghanistan were first established by Ambassador Khalilzad. The first one was in Gardez Province in 2003, about 50 miles south of Kabul. The purpose of these organizations—and all PRTs are civil-military, as you are well aware—was to serve as the primary interface between the Coalition and Afghan provincial and local governments, not the national government but the provincial and local governments, and to assist them in governing their provinces more effectively and to deliver essential services to the people.

PRTs in Afghanistan were commanded by military officers. That is not the case in Iraq. In Iraq, they are not PRT commanders; they are PRT leaders. Again, there is a difference. That produces a difference as well. The PRTs in Afghanistan were initially manned primarily or staffed primarily by military personnel, overwhelmingly by military personnel. Later on the State Department and USAID officials entered the fray.

The PRT program in Iraq was instituted in November 2005. Again, Ambassador Khalilzad is the one who brought it on board. By that time, he had moved from Afghanistan to Iraq. The first PRTs there were opened up in Mosul, Kirkuk and then later on in Baghdad. There were eventually 10 PRTs. That is how many standing PRTs there are now. There are now 25 PRTs in total.

There are really three types of PRTs. There are the standing PRTs, which are located within the provinces where they operate. There are 10 of those in Iraq and about 25—all of the ones in Afghanistan are standing PRTs.

The next is what is known as a provincial support team. They exist in Iraq, not in Afghanistan, but these are small civil-military
teams that are located outside of the province in which they are supposed to operate, and they go back and forth into the province from some type of hub PRT. Normally, you will see a PST in an area that does not support from a security standpoint the actual establishment of a PRT in that province.

Then there is what is known as the embedded PRT. Those were started early this year in Iraq. Those PRTs are actually embedded in brigade combat teams, and those PRTs work for the brigade commander. It is very similar to the CORDS concept as I understand it.

I would like to very quickly go over some of the accomplishments, if you will, the successes of the PRTs and then areas where they have fallen short or where they have been challenged. The first area is provincial and local governments in both Afghanistan and Iraq are functioning. They may not be what we would all recognize as, you know, the paragon of good governance, but they are up and they are functioning in each one of the provinces, and that was not the case before the PRTs were stood up.

There are reconstruction projects that the PRTs have started that are having an effect and that are actually making a difference in the lives of the people.

Third, micro-loans and micro-grants channeled through Provincial Reconstruction Teams are having a salutary economic effect, so economic development is occurring as a direct result of the work that PRTs are doing. PRTs have contributed to the reconciliation process. This Sunni awakening in Anbar Province was, in many ways, facilitated by the PRT, then, later on, the embedded PRTs located in Anbar. Right now, there are four PRT organizations in Anbar, and they are helping with the reconciliation process.

Then, finally, cooperation and coordination between provincial and national governments has been improved through the efforts of PRTs. PRTs have been directly involved in taking—take Iraq for example—Iraqi officials to Baghdad and, in some cases, introducing governors to their ministers, and that is through the efforts of PRTs working with the military located in those provinces.

Very quickly, there are some challenges. Obviously, the demands of the geography in both countries exceed the reach of the PRTs, and the PRTs are not resourced with transportation assets to enable them to get out and to really reach into the provinces in some of the remote areas. Especially in Afghanistan the geography is very, very tough, and it is hard to travel in there.

In some of the more unstable provinces of Afghanistan and Iraq, security restrictions have hindered the ability of PRTs to do their business. In my personal opinion, some of those restrictions are artificial. There are civilians who are subject to much more restrictive security requirements than the military are. That not only makes it difficult for PRTs to operate, but it also engenders some hard feelings between the civilian and the military elements in the PRT.

There is no established proponency for PRTs. Nobody really owns them. The Department of Defense does not own them. The Department of State does not really own them. The PRT concept has no godfather.
Then, finally, considerable lip service notwithstanding, PRTs are not a resourcing priority. For the agencies tasked to support them, we had some real difficulties in both Afghanistan and in Iraq in getting people to man positions in the PRTs, especially from some of the civilian agencies.

In conclusion, despite the significant challenges being faced by PRT members—a lot of brave men and women who are out there on the ground, making a difference—I think that the value added by PRTs to the operations both in Iraq and Afghanistan has been understated and, I think, underrecognized. I also think that PRTs—and the colleagues to my right here talked about civil-military cooperation at the national level. I think PRTs can serve as a good model. There are good lessons learned from PRTs that can be applied to civil-military relations at other levels.

I thank the committee. I am sorry to run a little bit late.

[The prepared statement of General Olson can be found in the Appendix on page 63.]

Dr. Snyder. Ms. Hicks.

STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN H. HICKS, SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Ms. Hicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee.

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Defense Department’s evolving role in delivering security and humanitarian assistance. Over the past year, my colleague Stephen Morrison and I have codirected a pretty unique task force on nontraditional security assistance that has sought to understand the evolution of Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) role and its international, interagency dynamics. This task force is co-led by your colleagues, Representatives Robert Andrews and Mark Kirk, and it formed from a simple, yet surprisingly unusual concept to bring together experts from the defense, diplomacy and development sectors to examine military and civilian roles in U.S. security assistance and development. As you might imagine, these stakeholders brought a wide range of experience and expertise to the problem set. The task force’s recommendations, which are scheduled to be released later this month, reflect a strong majority viewpoint that spans across each of these sometimes divided domains.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the U.S. concept and approach to global security has changed fundamentally. Weak and failing states, long neglected, have risen in priority. We understand threats to the United States can emanate from within states with which the United States is not at war; importantly, that persistent poverty can be a significant contributor to those threats. There is now a strategic imperative to devise multi-decade, integrated approaches that are preventative in nature. Foundational to this preventative approach is sustainable overseas partnerships that build capacity for good governance and security, that foster economic prosperity and social well-being, and that more effectively promote community-led development.

Accordingly, we now place a far higher premium on the unity of effort of our foreign and national security policy instruments, espe-
cially defense, diplomacy and development. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are emblematic of this trend.

In just a few short years, the Pentagon's role as the direct provider of foreign assistance has surged. From 2002 to 2005, DOD's share of U.S. official development assistance increased from 5.6 percent to 21.7 percent. The Defense Department has assumed an expanding role in counterterrorism, capacity-building, post-conflict operations, and humanitarian relief. Beyond implementing traditional military-to-military programs supported by State Department funds, the DOD has been granted temporary authority to use directly appropriated funds both for prevention and for post-conflict response, concentrated in conflict-ridden, nonpermissive environments where civilian actors have difficulty operating or where civilian capacities are weak or absent.

The DOD has also provided billions of reimbursement dollars to Coalition members, such as Pakistan and Jordan, outside of the formal, State Department-run economic support funds process. Meanwhile, the United States has continued to underresource the diplomatic and development instruments of its national power. All of the other panelists have pointed out the staffing programs and operational capacities of the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department have continued to stagnate at the very moment in history when diplomatic and development agencies should be better, not less well-positioned to advance the United States' new, evolving global agenda.

By defaulting to the reliance on the military, the United States is aggravating these existing institutional imbalances. Compelling reasons exist, as Bernie pointed out, to give the DOD flexibility to provide foreign assistance in specific circumscribed crisis situations. Granting more permanent global authorities, however, does not address the larger structural problem and must be handled carefully, as it risks undermining those sustainable, capacity-building and broader U.S. foreign policy interests.

To unify the U.S. Government's approach to security and development assistance, the task force intends to make the following four major recommendations:

First, the executive branch must provide increased budget transparency to Congress in the form of an integrated resource picture of U.S. foreign national and homeland security policy. Wholesale revision of the existing Congressional authorization of the appropriations structure would require bold leadership and near unanimous support in Congress, conditions that I do not believe we will obtain in the near future. Nevertheless, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the National Security Council (NSC) should be required to document more systematically how the foreign assistance streams for AID, State, DOD, and other relevant U.S. agencies fit together. Such transparency would help provide an accurate portrait to Congress of what the United States is actually spending across agencies to meet its most pressing national security challenges as well as to facilitate the creation of benchmarks to assess progress in meeting these objectives through various instruments of national power.

Second, Congress should take steps to ensure more effective and comprehensive oversight of foreign and security assistance pro-
grams across existing committee jurisdictions. One potential solution much discussed would be the creation of a select committee on U.S. national security in the Senate and in the House, but simply improving coordination processes across existing committees might also bear fruit.

Third, both Congress and the Executive need to elevate the priority attached to development, placing it on an equal footing with defense and diplomacy in U.S., foreign and national security policy. To this end, the task force is going to call for a significant increase in U.S. official development assistance and for better integration again of the multiple streams of development aid.

Finally, to improve the performance of civilian agencies in conflict prevention and post-conflict response, the task force will be recommending that the next Administration appoint an NSC Senior Director For Conflict Prevention and Response to serve as a locus of interagency coordination on these issues at the White House level and to work in close concert with OMB. At the same time, the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, S/CRS, should be empowered with a larger multiyear funding stream so that it may lead contingency planning for the State Department and USAID in support of the NSC’s coordinating efforts. Congress should move now to fund S/CRS’ plans for improving civilian response capacity, including its Rapid Response Corps and Civilian Reserve Corps. Congress and the White House should expand the expeditionary capabilities of other civilian agencies, particularly USAID’s.

Before closing, I would like to very briefly review the task force’s recommendations with respect to PRTs. PRTs are a potentially promising platform for integrating civilian and military instruments working in unique and difficult operational environments. At the same time, PRTs suffer from important limitations, many of which have been described to you today or in previous hearings, and we largely echo those. To maximize the potential PRTs, the task force intends to make the following recommendations:

Advise the NSC to initiate a governmentwide process to clarify PRT mandate and doctrine, including agency roles in ownership; recommend that DOD and its civilian partners conduct more comprehensive strategic planning for the use of PRTs and create baseline assessments to identify the needs these teams should be addressing; recommend expanding the predeployment training of these interagency teams and other interagency teams; endorse a streamlining of USAID funds in post-conflict settings. AID’s quick impact project funding is a good start, but it is insufficient, and many other resourcing streams exist that must be integrated; call for greater monitoring and evaluation of the impact of PRT projects, including from security, governance and development perspectives; advocate the development of robust civilian response and reserve corps as a human capital base for future civilian-military teams and provide them again with attendant training and participation incentives; and welcome the recent DOD agreement with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) on rules of the road to guide their interaction in insecure environments.

I want to conclude by restating what I am sure everyone in this room believes. Meeting the security challenges of the 21st century
requires the United States to march with a full range of instruments of national power and influence. Creating a whole-of-government approach and requiring the executive branch to explain how its budgets and programs support the unified national security and foreign aid strategy will substantially improve the Nation’s ability to address the structural roots of poor governance, instability and extremism in the developing world.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hicks can be found in the Appendix on page 74.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you all for your testimony.

We have also been joined by Dave Loebsack, who is a member of the full committee, and without objection, will be allowed to participate after the other members of the subcommittee have asked their questions.

Goodbye, Dr. Williams. Good luck to you. See you in Arkansas.

By the way, she was nodding in response to some of the things you all were saying about PRT.

You know, this subcommittee, this Oversight Investigations Subcommittee, is in a bit of a peculiar situation because we really have had a lot of control over what we can look at, and you know, when people talk about oversight or investigations, we think about contracts and cost overruns and all of those kinds of things, but there has been a lot of enthusiasm on both sides of the aisle of this subcommittee in looking at the issue of what is going on on the civilian side of our government because, in many ways, we see that as maybe the key to our success today in Iraq and Afghanistan and to our success in the future in other wars, and I am going to, I guess, carry that point to the extreme here.

General Warner, in your written statement that we have from you, which I think is part of the text of your previous speech you referred to, you talked about the need to have, quote, “a vastly empowered, funded and resourced State Department,” not Defense Department but State Department, “that only the Congress can mandate and make happen,” was the end of your quote.

Then, Ms. Hicks, on page one of your statement, you say, “Meanwhile, the United States has continued to underresource the diplomatic and development instruments of its national power of the staffing programs, and operational capacities of the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Department of State have continued to stagnate at the very moment in history when diplomatic and development agencies should be better, not less well-positioned to advance the United States’ new, evolving global agenda.”

Then on page six, Ms. Hicks, of your statement, you ask “Perhaps the key question of this is how realistic—” I am quoting you “—how realistic is it to expect that robust civilian capacities will actually emerge and be funded?” end of your quote, and you discussed that a little bit.

I think that issue of—we have been spending quite a bit of time on how that relationship between DOD and the military and the civilian side should work. I would think that the answer to your question is, if we come up with a model that seems to point in the right direction, we will greatly enhance our ability to get it funded
and operational because I think there is really a lot of concern about where we are going.

I wanted to ask one preliminary question, perhaps starting with General Warner and General Olson, and any comments the other two—you need to start the clock on me here. I am sorry—want to make.

Take a step back, and look just at the military side. As to the troops that we have in the military today who we are sending to Iraq and Afghanistan and knowing of the work that they are doing, the ones that are on almost a daily basis dealing with Iraq and Afghanistan civilians, is there more that we could or should be doing to prepare them for success and to prepare them to avoid mistakes? I am thinking of language skills, culture skills, those kinds of things.

What should we actually be looking at with regard to our troops on the ground, the boots on the ground guys, who are really involved on the fighting side of it? Should we be doing more with an eye toward these other goals that we have?

General Warner, we will start with you.

General WARNER. I think, as to the troop increase that is forecast and the existing capability of Special Forces, Rangers, civil affairs, civic acts and psy war, the Army soft-power components, if you will, are fairly well-attuned.

What they need to do is their military input to what we have been talking about today, and I think, with the personnel increase, that some of those, whether they go to Special Forces or elsewhere, will be able to do that. I think, if you have a return, though, back to where we were 15, 20 years ago where we had certain people dual-tracked within the military who basically could pop in and out of military assistance advisory groups, be immersed in a particular region and have a regional orientation and also have language training, that you could eventually then build a cadre of people who you could call on when needed to go to Bogota or to go to Lisbon or somewhere else and who could be used rather than waiting until you have a problem and then suddenly saying, “Well, we do not speak the language, and nobody has been there in 25 years.”

So there are things that can be done. Just from what I have heard the military say in recent days, I believe that is fairly underway.

I do not worry about the military’s capacity to respond to what is required of them on this issue. I worry a great deal about the civilian side as well and about the fact that the civilian side has a tendency, as they did in Vietnam, to go mufti, borrow Army, put them in civilian clothes, and then perform their mission. That is not a good long-term solution to the problem.

Dr. SNYDER. General Olson, any comments?

General OLSON. Yes, thank you.

I think you have got to break the answer to that question down into short-term and long-term. If we are confused about what we can do right now, I do not think there is a lot of programmatic help—I agree with General Warner. There is not a whole lot of programmatic help that they need right now, but I would like to highlight, really, three things.
First of all, the military is starting to integrate in a big way into their mission rehearsal exercises, the integration of soft power with their kinetic operations, and that needs to be encouraged and probably expanded.

The second thing that I—and I am not familiar with how far this has gone, but a good “lessons learned” process that takes the lessons that are being learned in Afghanistan and Iraq right now about dealing with civilians and then the sharing that, especially with units that are going over there, I think is important.

Then I am going to underscore what General Warner said. I think there is work that can be done right now to train key civilian personnel who are going to Iraq and to Afghanistan and who are going to work with the military to train them and to indoctrinate them about military culture or about processes, systems and that kind of thing. Just a planning process, I think, is a great example of that.

Longer term—and I will not go on too much about this, but there are organizational issues. I think especially ground force formations could be modified to, let us say, capitalize on the potential of the integration of military and civilian efforts. It has to do with the manning of headquarters, for example, and at lower levels as well.

Then there are some real institutional issues that I think need to be addressed, and that is how do we build into the professional development system and the military education system. Enough of this, the impact of soft power. Are we doing that enough? I think there is certainly room to improve in those areas. So those would be my comments.

Dr. SNYDER. My time is about up.

Ms. Hicks, do you have any comments or Mr. Carreau?

Mr. CARREAU. I just wanted to follow up a little bit on what General Olson just said.

I totally agree. I think that the civilians need to join on to some of the military structures and capabilities. I think one of the secrets of the CORDS program is that the civilians joined in on existing military structures because they are much larger; they were better resourced; also, they do operational things that most civilian agencies do not know how to do, like planning and training. So I think that that sort of thing, as Mr. Olson was saying, would be extremely important. I think you need cross-pollination on both sides, but I think that would be very helpful for this agency.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

Mr. Akin for five minutes.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just sort of backing up a little bit, as to the experience in Vietnam, which is of interest to some of us oldsters who are kicking around here, did these reconstruction teams do some good? Apparently, from your testimony, they were doing some good. If they were doing good, why did we end up where we were? Were we on the right track and gave up too soon? Is that the bottom line?

Mr. CARREAU. Well, I think it is a difficult question to answer, and historians will argue over this.

I think what the consensus seems to be is that the program itself, the CORDS program itself, achieved its limited objectives, but the patience still died anyway. Remember, CORDS was set up
to defeat the Viet Cong infrastructure, so it was really about local insurgencies. Local insurgencies were extracting rents and taxes and land and grown goods from the local people. The idea was to win over the hearts and minds of those people. It was never intended to defeat the North Vietnamese, the conventional army. So what ultimately happened was it was a combination of the counteroffensive and a lot of the CORDS programs in all of the little villages that pretty much was fairly effective in defeating the Viet Cong insurgency, but it did not stop, you know, the North Vietnamese conventional army from invading the south.

Mr. AKIN. Okay. I guess the other question I had was:

My understanding was that there is quite a lot of difference between the way these teams work in Afghanistan and Iraq. What is your impression about what we are doing? Should they be operating the same in both or is the situation different enough that they need to be different in the way that they are focused?

Last of all, if you are trying to build depth, which is always hard for us politically to try to plan more than just what dinner is going to be tonight, let alone what language skills we are going to need five years or ten years down the path, how would that best be funded? You know, politically and logically, where would that repository—I remember back in the Vietnam days that my friend was in the Green Berets, and they were getting cross-trained in the Czechoslovakian language and, you know, on how to fix a dog that had its leg shot off and all kinds of different things, so you had people who were cross-trained to do a lot of different things. I assume that was pretty expensive, and to be well prepared in terms of PRTs would probably be an expensive commitment as well.

So just a few thoughts on that subject. Thank you.

General OLSON. I will take a shot at the first part of the question about Afghanistan compared to Iraq.

The answer is, yes, they are different. I think the fundamental purposes—it starts right there—are different, and I think that is appropriate. The purposes are tied to the respective missions, and they are different.

In Afghanistan, the purpose of those PRTs is more directly linked to the counterinsurgency effort of winning the hearts and minds, to use that term. Some people are reluctant to use it. I think it is a good term. So their focus is on short-term, high-impact, high-visibility actions, activities and projects directly in support of a military commander.

In Iraq, the purpose is a little bit different. It is a little bit longer term, and the purpose of the PRTs in Iraq, very broadly, is to accomplish capacity-building to rebuild, in many cases, institutions that will endure over a longer period of time. Functional——

Mr. AKIN. For rebuilding local government or for something beyond that?

General OLSON. Yes, it means local government. It means rule of law. There are actually five pillars: Local government, rule of law, economic development—there is one other I am forgetting—and then public diplomacy. Oh, the infrastructure, reconstruction of the infrastructure.

Mr. AKIN. But in Iraq we are not having road builders and sewer builders and stuff like that.
General Olson. No, but we are having experts who can advise where to go to contract for a road builder. We have got experts who can advise how a government should determine that there is a requirement for a sewage treatment plant. So it is a little bit more on the side of the institution building, the longer term, and a little bit less focused on the short-term, directly tied to counterinsurgency. There is obviously some slopover.

The last point I would make is that the embedded PRTs are a little bit different in Iraq. They are, in fact, working directly for a brigade combat team commander, and they are focused on his counterinsurgency efforts, and they are also very successful.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis for five minutes.

Ms. Davis of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all of you for being here.

I wonder if we could just turn for a second to the international efforts because I had an opportunity over the break to speak with some of our NATO counterparts, and there was certainly a lot of frustration about the fact that we really are not doing a lot of sharing of information or necessarily learning from one another of the PRT operations. I wondered if you could speak to that. I think maybe at the higher levels there is some discussion, but there did not seem to be—at least it was not getting down to the folks who are really doing the work.

How should we be organizing that? Even if we did, is that important? Is that something that we ought to be looking at if we are engaged in this kind of effort with our partners?

General Olson. First, to talk about Iraq, where my most recent experience is, there are two Coalition PRTs from Europe. One is supported by Italy, which is in Di-Qar, and then by the United Kingdom, which is in Basra.

I think there what you would find is that—you know, you are always going to find the one PRT member who has got a complaint along those lines, but there, I think, you would find that there is a sharing of information, a cross-pollination, because there is an organization there that used to be called the National Coordination Team that is now the Office of Provincial Affairs. It is specifically designed to coordinate the efforts of all PRTs, to include the Coalition PRTs.

In Afghanistan, at least while I was there as the CJTF Commander, there was no like organization that was specifically focused on running PRTs. It was a chain of command function.

Ms. Davis of California. We are focusing mainly on Afghanistan.

General Olson. Okay. Then I am not 100 percent current there, but I will speak for when I was there.

There was no organization that was focused on PRTs and on coordinating their efforts. It was a chain of command function. As you know, in Afghanistan the chain of command’s focus is very busy. They are focused on a lot of different things.

Ms. Davis of California. Is that something that we should be at least trying to address and to understand how we can best——

General Olson. I think so. I think an organizational improvement would be to have, in operations like this, a separate, I will
say, headquarters, a military term, where they are specifically fo-
cused on coordinating the efforts and supporting PRTs. That
seemed to work pretty well in Iraq. In Afghanistan we did not have
it. I will admit to you, frankly, as a CJTF Commander, at times
the PRTs were kind of an afterthought.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Yes. Yes. I think why this should be
important is partly for moving public opinion and in helping to see
that this is an effort that is succeeding in some ways and that it
is an effort that is important.

You know, what strikes me as well is that there are a lot us who
have had an interest in trying to pursue this question, and there
are a lot of efforts actually going on. I actually did not know about
the task force, and we have talked about trying to do a number of
different things, really, to just bring Members of Congress up to
speed and into the fold so that we might even see our committees
as having more of an interagency focus, if you will, across jurisdic-
tions—and an understanding.

I think what I always come back to in some ways is, you know,
why aren’t we getting this? Why is it really taking us a while to
get to the point of seeing that the investment, certainly in this
interagency work, is so important? I am just wondering if you
could—you know, why is that? Why are we struggling with this?

Ms. HICKS. I do have thoughts on that.

My view is that, if you look around this room, you will see—obvi-
ously, a lot of people who have spoken today and I know a lot of
you on this committee are involved in this interagency working
group up here on the House side, but most people are coming at
it from a defense perspective, and it is very ironic in some ways
that it is the defense community, the well-resourced, large defense
community, that feels most passionate, really, about this issue of
interagency reform. That is not to say there are not parts of the
civilian agencies that feel similarly, but I do not think it is organic
there the way it is on the defense side, and that is a real hurdle
to overcome. I will not say you cannot have reform without it—I
think that would be too pessimistic—but I think you need to have
State and AID, State in particular, start to feel, again, organically
within their own organization that things have got to change.
Without that, you do not have, really, willing recipients on the ci-
vilian side where a lot of the change is harder to come by. They
have got a harder resourcing battle to make, and they have got no
constituency throughout the United States the way the defense
community does. So I think it would be difficult but important.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Okay.

Dr. SNYDER. We will go to Mr. Sestak, and that will conclude
the folks who were here at the gavel, and then we will go to Mr. Bart-
lett.

Mr. SESTAK for five minutes.

Mr. SESTAK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

If I could, maybe, give an observation and then ask your opinion
on it. We will start with you, Ms. Hicks.

To some degree, I have always been taken that the military has
forces, and then there is military force, which of course we use in
war. Military forces have been used at times from intelligence to
logistics to help humanitarian or other self-efforts. As I have lis-
tened to—or if I have not been here, I have at least perused—testimony on this issue over time, I have begun to kind of slightly change my mind about our moving to an interagency process on this, particularly as I think about, oftentimes, these types of what you call in the military a “general’s phase four operations” that often come about at the end of a conflict where strife is still present or of concern.

As I step back—and with all due respect to the Army generals—is there potentially a different model we might pursue much like in the Marine Corps where they are supposed to be light, fast, quick, in there, and where they kick open the door, and then the Army with its half comes in? Might we not accept the cold, brutal reality of the fact that the DOD has forces because they are so well-resourced and accept that the, quote, “PRTs” that may be initially helped to stabilize or to do things should be built around the DOD? They are often there in strife where we need these. We just do not calmly or quickly walk into these countries sometimes. Really, the interagency process is one where it is the Army’s, so to speak, coming in afterwards, built around not trying to have them there initially. Maybe it is the National Guard with a bunch of armor that initially starts moving them toward something, because I am struck, Ms. Hicks, by your saying we do not have any interagency doctrine and that we need to institutionalize this and that there is lack of significant resources. Maybe that is okay, much like we do not tend to live by our doctrines in the military anyway as the Russians always told us.

So my question is: Would that potentially be a different model to look at rather than this wonderful interagency thing that is supposed to come in? Maybe it is this quick corps presently built around DOD, and then there should be a natural transition that is ready to go but that kind of comes in rather than forces this in in an unknowing, strife-worn situation.

Ms. Hicks. I definitely think the right model is that in the early stages of a conflict, as the security environment is difficult, you are going to have it be military led. And I think there is wide recognition that that is the way you have to go at the problem and then transition into a civilian led. And of course, I defer to my military colleagues on how they sense the time is right to make that transition. But having said that, I think it is very important not to lose sight of the idea that the military is not always the right face. Even if you said well, we want to build all the right skills into the military, we are going to focus on the military, give them all the right skillsets, which is a good thing to do.

The problem is, if you then come to rely on the military as your instrument, that is not the face of development in foreign policy that other countries or other individuals in countries, populations, want to see in their nation. And it alters the way our foreign policy then is presented overseas.

Mr. Sestak. But for that quick rapid opening, like the Tsunami report, our military probably got better play, and I saw all and purposefully went to see the foreign press, and gave more of a positive face to our military than we garnered in Iraq. So I understand the long-term implication as to what you are saying, but I am talking about opening that door.
Ms. HICKS. I completely agree. In our task force report, as an example, we look at humanitarian assistance as one of our core issue areas. And we end up strongly endorsing the way in which we currently have a civil military division of labor, for lack of a better term, on humanitarian assistance. The military can get there faster often, they can bring resources to bear. And that is a good thing. It is a great public diplomacy approach, it is a great true humanitarian effort. But in the long run when you have to transition that into sustainable development, that is not where the Department of Defense is A, trained, or B, necessarily the face you want to put forward.

Mr. SESTAK. General, comment?

General O LSON. I would say that I agree with what Ms. Hicks said. But I also think that if, in fact, the type of missions that you are talking about are going to become core missions for the military, that is going to require some culture changes. There is a real controversy in the military. I don't speak for the military, but there is a controversy about whether or not, you know, whether we do windows, do we do nation building. Even in the opening phases, some of these things can amount to nation building.

So if, in fact, the military buys into that, then there are going to be organizational changes they need to make. And there is definitely some resistance, as this committee is probably well aware. And then it flows from there; doctoral changes, provincial military education changes, equipment changes and on and on. So though I might agree that this is a good approach, to do this across the military would take some effort.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Bartlett for five minutes.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you for your testimony. A day or two ago, I was reading a reprint on Early Bird of an op-ed piece. I forget which newspaper it appeared, which said that Iraq was the third most corrupt, I forget whether it said country or government in the world. When I read something like that, I am always curious who the heck is number one and two, you know.

General OLSON. You may not want to know the answer to that question.

Mr. BARTLETT. Yeah, I do want to know the answer. Who is number one and two? They said that like everybody ought to know. I thought gee, maybe I just wasn't on the know on this thing. Who do you think they might have had in mind as number one and two as one of the most corrupt countries or government in the world?

General OLSON. It might have been Russia.

Ms. HICKS. I think Somalia might be up there.

Mr. BARTLETT. Somalia and Russia? Okay. I will check to see if that is what they had in mind. They said that a third of all of the money in our grants and contracts in Iraq just disappear or are stolen. That is about right?

General OLSON. My current position is working as the chief staff of the special inspector general for Iraqi reconstruction. I am not here in that capacity. But just based on my general knowledge, that is probably a good figure. It is a very hard figure to estimate. But about a third is probably not overstating the problem.

Mr. BARTLETT. It just disappears or is stolen. Do we have an opportunity to help them understand that this is not productive, that
at the end of the day, they will be better off if they can somehow control this, or do we just have to accept this as a part of the cost of doing this kind of business?

General Olson. I think some of it is the cost of doing business in an area where there are tremendous security challenges in where you have got a government that is not transparent, that is developing, actually being built in some cases. But some of it must be addressed. I think Prime Minister Maliki has made that one of his top priorities. He calls that the second war, the war against graft and corruption. There are organizations, the Board of Supreme Audit inside the Iraqi Government, that is specifically focused on graft and corruption. So the problem is recognized. It is debatable whether or not recognition translates to actual action.

Mr. Bartlett. Help me understand the reason for this problem. In many countries in the world, we have a lot of corruption simply because they don’t pay their public officials enough. And if they are going to feed their family, they have got to be blackmailing people and so forth. Is that the case here? Is this just a way of life in that country, that if you have a job that is what you do, you steal and so forth?

General Olson. The Iraqi Government has a remarkable record in terms of budget execution. It is remarkable because of how poor it is. One thing they can execute, however, is their operating budget. In other words they pay salaries very well. So I don’t think it is a case of government officials who are starving on the street. I do believe that there are government officials in fairly high positions who are corrupt and on the take. They have been historically in Iraq, and I believe that continues to be a problem.

And then some of the money disappearing is not necessarily disappearing into Iraqi pockets. As you well know, Congressman, there is ample evidence about corruption in fraud, waste and abuse that is attributable to international entities that are working in Iraq, some of which are American.

Mr. Bartlett. I am concerned that we not be seen as a supporter or facilitator of this kind of thing. Is this such an ingrained practice in their country that it is probably inevitable and there is darn little we can do about it unless we plan to stay there for 50 or 100 years?

General Olson. I think you would get varying answers to that question. There are differences of opinions. I am an optimist, and I think that the more developed the Iraqi Government becomes, the more they are supported by the Iraqi people, the more transparent they become, and the more measures that are put in place to ensure that they are transparent. I think that the graft and corruption problem gets better. Let us face it, they are a Third World nation, and graft and corruption are a sad fact of life in virtually all Third World nations.

Mr. Bartlett. I thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. We will now go to our two representatives who are not a member of the subcommittee in the order in which they came. And Dr. Boustany is recognized for five minutes, and then we will go to Mr. Loebsack.
Dr. BOUSTANY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you extending the courtesy to me. And I want to commend you on this hearing. This is an excellent hearing. This whole issue of post-conflict stabilization is something I developed an interest in about two years ago. I have been reading extensively on it in books and papers by a council on foreign relations, some work done by General Nash, General Rupert Smith's recent book, The Utility of Force, where he talks about deployment versus employment of force. And what is remarkable as I go through this, I remember reading Churchill's first book in the 1890's where he described his deployment in the Swat Valley where we are currently seeing problems.

And he decried the lack of political expertise on the ground to complement the military expertise and that they were constantly trying to quell these rebellions, but yet they couldn't get long-term stability because of a lack of a civilian political component. And here we are, we fast forward and we see a State Department that has 6.5 percent of the funding that the Department of Defense has. We have currently about 6,000 foreign service officers worldwide, which puts us about on par with the United Kingdom today and yet we are a superpower. And Mr. Carreau's testimony indicated we had 8,000 personnel in Vietnam alone. So we don't seem to learn from history what we should be doing.

This testimony was excellent. And I think the order of testimony was just perfect as well. And you pointed out many, many things that we need to do. And from my reading, what you have pointed out today corroborates everything I have read. It is astounding to me that there is all this information out there in the think tank community, yet Congress is not acting and our Administration has not really worked in that regard as well. And so clearly we have got problems in Congress with stovepiping our committee structure and so forth, which Ms. Hicks, you offered some recommendations which I think are excellent.

One of the things that strikes me, I spoke with Barbara Stevenson starting back in December about PRTs in Iraq. And I have been talking to her on a regular basis about how is it going with the different phases. And particularly phase three with the backfill has been very difficult in mobilizing the civilian component and having a reserve force. So this is clearly something that you all addressed and it is something that needs to be looked at. One question I have for the panel would be instead of trying to put together ad hoc PRTs, should we have PRTs or some sort of equivalent put into place that participate in the scenario planning, contingency planning, so that we don't get into certain difficulties late into the crisis, and that we avert a crisis with that type of expertise and planning and so forth? And I open it up to the panel for their comment.

Ms. HICKS. I will start. I think from what I understand of what Ambassador Herbst is attempting to do at the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), that is exactly the plan. And they will require the Department of Defense's openness to their participation in their planning process. But also S/CRS needs much more empowerment to run an interagency planning process as they are chartered to do for post-conflict and stabilization issues. But the idea is that you will have,
if you follow the model they are attempting to put in place, a standing civilian response capability of U.S. Government employees.

And then two tiers beyond that, the last of which is the civilian reserve corps, which I think most people have heard because it was in the President's State of the Union Address that is calling upon—it is a reserve model like the military has. It calls upon folks in every day life who have skillsets to provide to be pulled into service when we have more time. But inherent in that whole model is planning well before you are actually in a contingency for how you are going to use these forces. And under the Clinton Administration, there was a process known as Presidential Decision Directive-56 (PDD–56), which was both a directive and then it directed a process for how one plans in peacetime for these events.

There is a follow-on National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) in this Administration for the same thing. And I think inevitably what you really need to move to is that sort of standing peacetime, if you will, process of planning.

Mr. CARREAU. I would just like to follow up on that. I absolutely totally agree with everything Kathy has said. I would make a couple of other observations. One about PDD–56 which a lot of folks are looking to as a model. It is an interesting document. It was written though for peacekeeping operations. It was, you know, at the time it was the Balkans, it was Kosovo, Haiti. And the instruction to the PDD–56 actually talks about it wasn’t intended to apply to armed conflict. Again, I draw a sharp distinction between a peacekeeping operation and a war zone where the U.S. is itself a belligerent. I think that requires a different level of planning. But as Kathy said, S/CRS is working on this issue. I would actually like to see it go maybe even a little bit further.

And I want to follow up on something that you started with. The civilians, I believe, do need to be involved in the planning and it needs to be steady state. Again, I think this is something that needs to glum on to the military system that is already there. Civilians with the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs), this sort of steady state, very top secret planning that is going on, that is when the civilian agencies need to get involved.

Mr. BOUSTANY. One thing I thought about——

Dr. S NYDER. Charles, your time is expired. Let us go to Mr. Loebsack and then we will go around again. Mr. Loebsack.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you Mr. Chair. I will be very brief. I just have a couple basic questions. And I missed the—and I apologize for being late and missing some of the testimony. But in particular, I guess I just want to ask General Olson, in your testimony you mentioned that on page six the establishment of measures that reflect true outcomes, that is the actual impacts that PRT operations have had on achieving large coalition objectives has been an elusive goal. I am new to the Congress. I hear a lot about—I am a former educator. I taught at a small college in Iowa. My wife taught second grade. I heard a lot about outcomes based education, I heard a lot about accountability, I heard about that before I got to this office, I have heard a lot about it since I have been here, I have been to Iraq a couple of times.
I am very concerned about measures. The military has developed certain kinds of measures obviously to sort of indicate to us that as a result of surge, we have seen a significant decline in violence in Iraq. I get very frustrated when I read something like this because I really want something that I can sort of wrap my head around as far as what these PRTs are accomplishing if anything, especially in Iraq. And I think I was, when I came I think there was reference to the sort of economic development, political development, military success and all the rest. I remember when I first got here, we had in the Armed Services Committee, the large committee, we heard from a number of our military folks about sort of the three-legged stool. And maybe that is what was being referenced when I came in, I don't know.

Economic development is hugely important obviously. Can you talk to us about any other sort of more concrete measures, if there are any, because you have a few examples here of successes, but it is kind of loosy goosy for me in some ways. Sorry about the slang.

General Olson. I will use an educational metaphor, Congressman. You can measure the number of hours that a student studies, input measures, and make some determinations about how conscientious a student is, or she is. You can measure how that student does on tests. The grade or the score that they get on an exam. That is an output measure. But how do you really measure whether or not that student is becoming a better person, better mathematician, better political scientist? Grades won’t do it for you. And so I turn that question back to you. I would be interested in talking about how you did that.

What I will say is this: We have wrestled really hard with PRT measures that really mean something. And so good governance, let us take that as an example, in Iraq. We have, in fact, reported the number of government officials at local levels that we have trained. I am not so sure that that is all that good. Then we went to output measures. How many successful council meetings did they hold in a given period of time? An output measure again. Very problematic from all standpoints. But then we went to things like asking a question what do good governments really do, can they execute a budget, can they pass laws, can they stand up entities that we would consider to be associated with a good local government? And we try to capture those.

I will tell you that there are some problems with doing that, as I am sure you are well aware. There is a causality issue. Does the fact they can execute a budget, is that directly related to anything that the PRT did or was there some other factor that is involved? So I would say, I would stand on my statement that it is still an elusive goal. But I will tell you it is getting better and better. The last thing I will say on that is one of the measures I used was getting out there and seeing what was going on and talking to Iraqis in the streets and saying, how do you feel about your local government, are they doing better, are they doing worse? And the other thing I did is talk to local military commanders. You can think what you want about this measure, but the military commanders are impressed with and very much rely upon their PRTs in their overall effort.
Mr. LOEBSACK. I appreciate that. And I realize that there is nothing systematic that is going to come from this any time soon, in all likelihood. But I get very concerned about sort of anecdotal evidence and then using that one way or another in what still is a political argument about whether we ought to stay in Iraq and for how long and all the rest. So it is just a concern I have and thank you very much and thank you, Mr. Chair. I will turn it back.

Dr. NYDER. Thank you, Mr. Loebsack. We will go a second round if you got the endurance, of course. I want to ask Ms. Hicks this question because you say both Congress and executive need to elevate the priority attached to development and place it on equal footing with defense and diplomacy in U.S. foreign national security policy, and I agree with that.

What I find, I guess, frustrating right now, if you asked probably about everyone that is in the Congress what do you think is one of the top one, two or three issues, it would be immigration that concerns the American people. In the view of a lot of people, that issue will never be solved for this country until Latin and Central America are economically developed. That as long as we have this incredible economic engine up here it is going to draw in people who want to support their families and do well?

So you would think that kind of development issue would be part of our answer to immigration. But I think Americans have gotten pretty frustrated through the years, maybe not justifiably so with the impact that U.S. development dollars have on other countries. But I'll ask you one specific question and you can comment on that if you want.

I have gone back and forth about whether I think that the answer to this inter-agency deal is like one big Goldwater-Nichols-type process that you talk about, or more, just a series of legislative actions, executive actions, that we are more on the spirit of nudgings on different bills kind of on down this road that recognizes perhaps this is not just one big magic bill that's going come up and solve our problems. Where do you come down on that given that you make some very specific proposals that would indeed take both legislative and executive action.

Ms. HICKS. I hope you’ll indulge me answering both of those, because I just returned from Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) last week.

Dr. NYDER. Maybe it is just my ears, Ms. Hicks, your microphone—

Ms. HICKS. I just returned last week from SOUTHCOM, and as you probably know, they are undergoing sort of a transition there under Admiral Stavridis in trying to raise the profile, both of Latin America, but also the sort of the mixed smart power hard and soft power approach that the military is attempting down there. And they are explicitly actually attempting to tie the issue of immigration.

So I would just encourage you to speak a little bit to them about how they are thinking about the importance of development and creating noncorrupt, nongang-ridden sustainable societies, not as a military instrument alone, but as part of a whole approach from the U.S. Government, and how they think that they can sell that, if you will, because of the immigration link.
So I think you're really on to something there. On your second question, you know, I think I tend to think I was trained as a strategist in the Department of Defense, and I tend to think in a systems level. And as a systems kind of person, I prefer to think of it as putting all the solutions set out there together and understanding the whole concept. I think there's a lot of value in that.

Having said that, I think the reality is that you have to make progress piece by piece sometimes, but I don't think the two are mutually exclusive, I think they are mutually supporting. I think in the environment we are in today where we don't have broad-based support for inter-agency reform, or at least there doesn't appear to be. Where we can make change we should; there are small specific changes we can make that are important, particularly the executive branch about its business, if you will, and the Congress about its business. I think good leadership on both sides can lead to internal reforms that really help.

Having said that, I do think at some point there is going to need to be a holistic look at the national security process, at the structure we have, at how we train our people and how we populate our organs of government. And that change is coming. It is just a matter of when there is openness to it.

Dr. Snyder. Do you have any suggestions on how that holistic look might come about? We have one oversight investigation subcommittee, and I think we are the only game in town right now in terms of the legislative side of things that is looking at this in any systematic way.

Ms. Hicks. I belong to an organization that has done several such looks beyond the Goldwater-Nichols effort and I won't talk more on those. I am also part of what I think some of you are familiar with the project on national security reform, which is seeking to gain funds to do just such an approach.

And we are divided into seven working groups that look across issues of resource. I lead the process group. We will be looking at strategy and planning across the inter-agency. There are groups who are looking at the structural elements and so forth. Groups that are within that who might look at Congress and see how Congress might play into this. That effort, again, it is waiting for funding, it was funded in the appropriations bill. It was funded on the defense appropriations. We are waiting to see if the Department of Defense picks that up, I think some of the reluctance again is that it is all coming on the defense side. It is the defense community that has been interested; it is defense who would have to fund it, and there just doesn't seem to be the same ground swell—there is in the intelligence world and there is, to some extent, in the homeland security world, but not in the State and AID world.

Dr. Snyder. Mr. Akin for five minutes.

Mr. Akin. Could you speculate as to why there isn't the interest or support in the State Department particularly? If I had to point to places where I would do things differently having been in Congress now seven years and taking a look at what's happened in Iraq particularly, I think my, probably I would want to change things in State more so than things that the military did, per se. Why is it State doesn't have an interest in that?
Ms. HICKS. Well, first I wouldn't say that all of State doesn't have an interest, but I do not think there is again what I would call a ground swell of support from the bottom up. And.

Mr. AKIN. Is it partly because they are not engaged and involved and don't see the need as obviously as Defense does? I mean, Defense has to live with it every day. State has got all these different places in different countries and they go there for couple years and then they go to another one. They are not seeing what is happening, is it that?

Ms. HICKS. No, again, I am really speculating, but I will give you my thoughts on that. Part of it is that they are very beleaguered, they are small and they are underfunded. And when people say you need to change, they take that as not—you need to change in the sense that we are going to resource you more. They take it as, oh, great, one more complaint about how we are not doing not enough with too little. So I think that is part of the issue.

I also think there is a basic cultural difference. I think the Defense Department, and actually PRTs are, in some ways, a good example of this. The culture of the military as I have observed it over my time at DOD, is to have a very can-do attitude. If there is a vacuum, they are going to try to fill that vacuum, very whether the best instrument or not, even knowing they are not the best instrument. They know there is a void and it has to be filled, so that is a very leaning forward attitude, very can-do attitude.

So I think, the same thing is what you are seeing with DOD on the inter-agency piece, and Secretary Gates' recent speech was a good example of this; things are broken we need to fix it, and that is the military way.

My observations on the State Department side are more cautious. They are just trained differently. They are trained to find the right tool for the right job. They need to define what the problem is and then fix the problem. And that is a very different and more cautious approach that takes longer to get to the solution set.

Mr. AKIN. Anybody else want to speculate?

Mr. CARREAU. I would like to offer just a few thoughts. I agree absolutely with everything Kathy said, and many of us are looking at these issues. I wrote a case study at the National Defense University (NDU) on the formation of S/CRS and sort of the international problems and bureaucratic issues that arose within State and within other agencies. There was contention with AID as well.

I agree with Kathy, it is largely an issue of agency culture. It is how they think, what their core missions are. In some ways, it is almost an odd thing to ask a diplomat who is trained to do conflict prevention and to negotiate and to prevent problems from occurring to plan for post war stabilization. Obviously, if war or conflict breaks out and you are a diplomat, something has gone horribly wrong, and it is just sort of contrary to the way they think. So I think you have to overcome that cultural barrier first.

General WARNER. Just to add one point. State definitely is not an operational agency. They report on what exists, but they really don't try and get down at the provincial or district level and do much about it in X country. I do think, though, as the ambassador being the direct representative in country X, that one of the better ways to move forward is to strengthen this country teams, straight-
en the mag, strengthen the mission, so he has more wherewithal to work in the country. Then that feeds back into the government as a better assessment of what is needed. In my sense, if you have to deploy conventional forces into country X then the ambassador of this country team has failed.

Mr. Akin. I didn’t hear any of you say that the thing that first springs to my mind, but maybe just looking at it more from a political point of view, I think of State Department as always a bunch of commies that are working at Foggy Bottom and everything, and I don't trust them too much. I have a little bit more confidence in the military, they’ll go solve the problem. I am drawing a caricature to a certain degree. I am just wondering whether or not the sense that State sort of perspective in what we should even do in a country may be different than what we are talking about. So it is maybe beyond a culture, it is almost a political mindset.

General Olson. It is interesting, just based on my recent experience, the younger foreign service officers that come into the field going to what General Warner said, they have this sort of operational mindset and they jump into these missions because they believe in them. Some of the more senior foreign officers keep this whole business a little bit more at arm’s length. I don’t think it is because they are not patriots or they don't agree with the mission. I think it is a combination of what everybody said here, they see their role differently. Plus they have not been—they have come up through a system, a professional development system, an education system.

Mr. Akin. That has not encouraged that.

General Olson. Exactly. It is focused on diplomacy. It is not focused on stability and security operations.

General Warner. On the other hand, if you look at Vietnam you have Ambassador Holbrook, Ambassador McManaway, Ambassador Wisner. There are about eight or nine ambassadors either currently serving, or recently serving who are 6s and 7s in the mid 1960’s to beginning of the 1970’s performing in an operational capacity and running accords for Ambassador Port. So it is possible.

Ms. Hicks. I just want to add one very concrete thing, which is in the military you have a practice of doing lessons learned after action reports; you have a self-reflective professional development approach where you come out of the service periods of time when you are an officer to spend some time in a think tank or at a war college. And that has a big impact in how reflective the military is on its own need to adapt. It makes it, as much as we all decry the lack of adaptation sometimes, relative to other agencies of government, it is much more adaptive. You don’t have a parallel like that for State.

Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Snyder. Mrs. Davis for five minutes.

Ms. Davis of California. Thank you. And maybe we can just continue this conversation. I was watching the General. It looked like you wanted to say a few things in response to the State Department role as well. Part of the problem is that there is a bias against soft power I think. I heard someone say it should be smart power, not soft power. But there is kind of that built-in bias. And yet at the same time, it seems like so much of what we anticipate
of our role in the world is based on that effort. And I don't know, is that a correct assumption?

I mean, because I am hearing that even among our NATO friends, that they think they don't do civilian very well either. You know, that somehow we all have to try and find a better way to use this capacity, which I think we have. We just haven't utilized it very well. Everything seems to be, at least from here, we see it as much more DOD centric than probably I hope that we might see that in the future. Could you comment on that?

General Warner. I think you have already identified it. The Army, the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, they will fill the gap, they will do the job whatever it is. Even though they may be a volunteer service and the sergeants didn't really volunteer to come in and figure out how to move trash, they want to defend their country, that is the reason they are there, if they are told to figure out a plan in Baghdad to get rid of trash, they will do it and they will do it and they will do it as well as anyone in the world.

Whether you have a big enough army and whether you can continue to get people to reenlist for that and whether they are the right structure to do that, that is a completely different issue. And my feeling is that the soft power, or smart power, really needs to be shaken a bit to pick up that mission, take that pressure off the Armed Forces, who really have too few to do the missions they have now and do it well, but from another agency, another approach.

Ms. Davis of California. You suggested the department of stability in your comments.

General Warner. If you have to get the mid level people out from other care worn bureaucracies in order to permit them to do a job they know how and will do, then create another bureaucracy. Not necessarily another homeland defense. I don't think that mixture is good enough. But I don't think we are talking about that many people that have to come from the various agencies or expand aid as the operational arm of the State Department to be able to do development as we are talking about. It doesn't take that much. But it does take somebody at the top to drive it.

Ms. Davis of California. One of the questions I think we have asked a few times in this committee is where do some of these individuals come from? And I think part of the answer has been, well, you know, they are really out there and it is just a matter of trying to, I think, provide the opportunities perhaps in some cases, but at least build something that is sustaining. And it seems to me that one of the things that we haven't discussed very well, partly because it is a long-term solution, is how you incentivize young people in school to think about going into a field which maybe they don't think State Department, they also aren't thinking military. But they maybe would think along Peace Corps lines or something. And we haven't done that. I am just wondering, is it the Peace Corps model that you think is good? What model out there that we have utilized or internationally has been utilized that we ought to be thinking about in a long-term way?

Mr. Carreau. Well, it is a difficult issue, and many of us have been grappling with this. I think most of us would agree it is a problem of core mission. When you look at stability operations, it
doesn't belong to anyone. And in my more cynical moments, I would say that no one really wants it either when you go around all of the agencies, and that is a problem. And it hasn't been given. It hasn't necessarily been put on anyone's plate. The military gets stuck with it.

As General Zinni has said, we have become the stuckee. But it doesn't mean that they actually want to do it. I think that there is a lot of movement afoot right now, as Kathy was saying and General Olson was saying. The President has signed a national security professional development executive order. And this idea sort of that you would develop a cadre in all of the agencies who would specialize in national security issues. And maybe it is going to be post-war stabilization, maybe it will be a Katrina type event. But where you need the Department of Transportation, you need Commerce, you need Justice, you need Labor to get involved. Mr. Chairman you were asking earlier what is Congress' role. Many of us have talked to Jim Locker, who was involved at the time of Goldwater-Nichols I. And that was complicated enough dealing with just one congressional committee; two in both Houses.

To do sort of a Goldwater-Nichols II might involve as many as six or eight committees. But I think at the margins we don't necessarily need to change that much. If you could create some, and I don't know what the percentage is, maybe it is two percent, maybe it is three percent. But if all of the agencies and if all of the congressional committees could mandate that all of the domestic agencies, what I call the domestic agencies, the Commerces and Justices out there, as opposed to the foreign ops agencies, to have some kind of a national security focus such that when there is an emergency, when an Iraq comes along, when an Afghanistan comes along, Commerce, Justice, and Treasury and Labor has some small contingency, and maybe it is only 100 people, who have been specially trained, they have exercised with the military, that is their job.

You can't convert USDA into a foreign agriculture development organization. Obviously you can't do that. But you can take small portions of it and have them specialize in agricultural development and overseas contingencies.

General Olson. If I can just, there really are two models. The one is the one the chairman mentioned about nudging various legislative pushes. That is certainly one of the models, one of the courses of action. The other is very much along the lines of what Bernie was talking about. I think the need is recognized. I think the basic requirement is what gave rise to this war czar concept. Now, there is all sorts of—that has evolved as it has for lots of reasons. But there was a recognition that somebody needed to be in charge when it came to integrating the civilian and the military effort. Now, the problem of a war czar ad hoc, he is not empowered. He is a great guy, a great military professional. But he cannot make these things happen. Now, I think there are models. Governmental models of standing organizations that can kind of care for the integration of civilian and military effort on a continuing basis. That is what it is going to take. Because it is going to take doctrine, it is going to take education, it is going to take training. And we can't just, all of a sudden, do that when a crisis breaks out. So
the other model is a standing organization. And there are, you are more familiar than I am with what they are, but there are models that integrate a multi-developmental effort in other areas that could serve perhaps as a model.

Ms. Hicks. The only thing I would add is that we have sort of evolved a little bit in answering the question, but I want to stay on the line we are on, which is if you look at the problems the United States faces as it moves in the future, it is not just stabilization, they are all complex. Almost all of them are multi-agency. We are not going to be able—you know, we can pick and choose particular issues that are so important that we are going to create an organization, a standing structure to deal with them, and that is fine. But what we really need overall is to have a different approach to our problem sets. We have to understand that organizations need to be working across them. That we need to have more horizontal integration approaches. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is one example that really, I believe, was not empowered effectively to do what it was asked to do. But if empowered appropriately, if able to go above and beyond what the cabinet agencies can do independently and really break that sort of what becomes a resource budget lock that the cabinet secretaries have, then you start to see well, maybe there are ways to get into that interagency space and empower individuals in organizations or collective units of people to look at prioritization across basic missionaries.

And it is very much along the lines of what DOD is looking at internally in terms of capabilities. Portfolios, for instance. A whole sort of, you think about that interagency wide, a portfolio approach to how we look at national security would be very useful.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mrs. Davis. The issue of the—I forget who I was talking to. It may have been Mr. Armitage who we were having a conversation about some of these issues. And he said it is just real hard from the State Department side. The word goes out they need 200 people and they have got to have these specialties, these specialties, these specialties. And it means when you are pulling them, it leaves work undone in Uzbekistan and Bulgaria, wherever it is that you are working on it. And I suspect if we would take what you say, Ms. Hicks, and General Warner said and others are saying about the under—pretty dramatically underresourcing of the State Department and do a little bit of a carrot and a stick, which is we are going to recognize that and do a fairly dramatic increase in budget, which will reflect staffing.

But as part of that there has got to be a sense of some of these people are going to be a bit redundant and they will be available, don't be surprised if one of your two ag people get pulled to go someplace else. I would think that that is really hard to do right now when they are underresourced.

I wanted to ask two final questions. And if Mrs. Davis has any final questions. The first one, Ms. Hicks, on your upcoming task force report, you talk about your four main recommendations. And we talked, I think, about one of them, the issue of development. So it is the other three I want to at least touch on. This issue of an NSC senior director for conflict prevention and response to serve as
the locust of inter-agency coordination on these issues in the White House.

And then you also talk about the importance of having better congressional oversight and following. It is hard for us in the Congress to do oversight of NSC. They are not required to testify. They are Presidential advisors. If that is where the game is going to be, we might as well say let us put money into a black box and we don’t ever see it until we evaluate years after what happened to it.

I don’t see how that is going to work in terms of practice. Why are we choosing somebody within the NSC? Now, in defense of that approach I talked to one former Secretary of State about this whole issue a few months ago who said we don’t need to do interagency reform, it is supposed to be the NSC. They just need to do their job. If they would recognize that they are the ones who should be putting all this together. How is that going to work when, in fact, it will not be something that we will have any impact on.

Ms. HICKS. Right. The thought there is that if you have—basically it takes what is S/CRS’s, well, sort of mandate now, and moves it up to the National Security Council level to give it higher visibility, to have to the extent that the President endows that senior director with his confidence or her confidence and trust, it gives that person an ability to look all the way across the inter-agency and as you quoted, act as the NSC ought to act.

But that does not mean that you lose oversight of what it is seeing. All it says is that the executive branch’s activities need to be coordinated. And to coordinate that is the role of the NSC, and it ought to be elevated to an NSC position. The individual pieces that support that and how they are put together is still absolutely under the oversight of the Congress. It is under the oversight of various jurisdictions.

Dr. SNYDER. Looking ahead, doesn’t that put us, if I understand what your suggestion is going to be, I recognize this is one of about three sentences of what I suspect will be a fairly lengthy discussion, doesn’t it put the Congress in a position to say, well, we have got the person in the State Department sitting here, I got the person in the DOD sitting here, and we have got a problem in country, why are you all not coordinating?

And they both say, well, we did our part, we did what the NSC asked us to do and we don’t hear from NSC. The buck has got to stop somewhere. I would say it stops at the President. That is how it operates. But I was thinking we would end up with some kind of a body that we have more—that there is a trail that we can follow. You talk about having the big joint committee or some kind of select committee on U.S. national security. But we can create all the committees we want to. If we can’t get at the person that you designate as being ultimately responsible to have to be held accountable for decisions in that interagency process I am not sure we are going to accomplish what you are hoping to accomplish by these changes.

Ms. HICKS. I think the more radical approach again is the NCTC model. If you wanted to, you could create an organization that sits in interagency space and that has authority over the various cabinet agencies to coordinate and to prioritize, if you will, budgets. It is sort of the drug czar approach, but taken to an organizational
level and placed outside of the White House. And that is, I think that is a more radical solution.

You could look at the problem as getting it set up appropriately so that other agencies do recognize it. The fact of the matter is today in the system in which we operate there is only one organization that the foreign policy communities even sort of recognize as perhaps above them. And that is the White House. And the fact of the matter is that is the National Security Council. So it has to come. It has to be the National Security Council. Again, not just stabilization, but across all areas that is trying to coordinate and bring these issues together.

Dr. Snyder. But my concerns are not off the mark about that?

Ms. Hicks. No. The fact of the matter is if you wanted to call witnesses, you are right. You would get the rep from the Defense Department and the rep from the State Department. You would not get that one view. And they would just tell you what they are supplying upward.

Dr. Snyder. I wanted to, my final question is very quickly, the one piece that is sitting out there that potentially addresses some of these concerns is the President’s proposal for a civilian reserve corps, the money has been appropriated, the legislation hasn’t been moving it, but would you quickly talk about what you think about that proposal and where it fits in and do we need to move ahead with it in an expeditious way?

Ms. Hicks. I strongly support it. I think the Congress needs to move forward in an expeditious way. And frankly it is not a one-shot issue. There is going to be a need to grow that capacity beyond what has been requested for this tranche over time.

General Olson. I support it too. And it is based on experience. When we went to expand the so-called civilian surge, expand the PRTs and the number of people serving there, we were looking for people with specific specialties. And there is no data bank we could really go to for who was an expert in this particular area. We were lucky to get Sharon when she came in as an agricultural expert on veterinary affairs. But if there were some kind of system as you just described, I think it would be much easier to get the right type of capabilities to match requirements.

General Warner. If you don’t do it, civilian contractors will probably fill it.

Mr. Carreau. Yes, I support it as well. With the caveat that I think it is almost more important to get sort of the interagency element of government up and running first to make sure you have proper oversight so that you don’t end up with a Blackwater-type situation where you have contractors running amuck.

Dr. Snyder. Then that presents a question what does that mean to have an interagency up and running? And that could be some years down the line. I don’t think we want to wait that long in doing something. Mrs. Davis, anything further?

Ms. Davis of California. Just to follow up with this because it is an idea that is out there, it is expensive and maybe people think that it is pie in the sky a bit. But something like the civilian academy to mirror our military academies where you have young people again who study and plan and do the kind of strategic thinking hopefully that we have in the military academies and some sharing
that goes on. So some of those folks eventually will take on a major responsibility. In thinking about these things, is that part of the discussion? I mean, is that sort of, wow, we will never get there, or do you think that is realistic, or not necessary, I guess?

General OLSON. Military cabinets are focused on precommissioning development, whereas your idea has excellent applicability further on down the line. Right now the Army runs the School of Advanced Military Studies. The Marines have an equivalent that they call School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW), SAWS. As a matter of fact, USAID, for the first time, has a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies. And that is where the Army anyway learns how to think strategically and do strategic planning. And now this USAID official is going to be able to go to an operation, let us say, and plug in very comfortably with a military planning team, whereas right now military planning teams stand up, officials from civilian agencies go there and they are completely lost. They don't understand the processes. They don't think strategically about operations like the military guys do.

So I think your idea is right on the mark. I would say bump it up a level in terms of where these officials are in their careers and I think you have got a great idea there.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Ms. Hicks.

Ms. HICKS. I would just add there is this concept of the national security university, which is more along the lines of what Rick is pointing to. And the thought there is that you would bring together sort of maybe in brick and mortar, but also sort of in a virtual sense a consortium of institutions where individuals, whether it is the Fire Academy in Emmitsburg for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or it is the Foreign Service Institute for State or it is the National Defense University, you have these centers of excellence that can teach these bodies, folks coming from all across the interagency a common skillset, and at the same time, a diverse set of issues.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I appreciate that. I am trying to get them a little younger, I guess. But just one other quick question about the asymmetry between civilian and military, Ms. Hicks, that you have spoken to, and again what can Congress be doing and seeing that as really it is a budgetary role. You know, how you share those resources, how do you—any suggestion?

Ms. HICKS. Well, I think, again, it has to—it is essentially at its core a cultural and then resource issue. And I do think you can make the resource the leading edge of the change. So if you can increase the float, so to speak, for the foreign service and for the foreign service that are serving out of USAID that helps tremendously in terms of their ability to support operations. And then also to go get trained. To go down and be at the war colleges or other institutions or even the Foreign Service Institute (FSI). So I think that the resourcing piece of it is just really bumping up their total personnel, making sure they have funds for adequate training, and then starting to think having those organizations be tasked to think strategically about now that they have these things or as they are going to get these resources, how they are going to think strategically about employing them.
General OLSON. Can I take 30 seconds? I think it was the chair-
man that said it is hard to put resources against something where
there is no real model yet. I think we need to have the model. I
think we need—the model needs to be on the table. I think also one
of the members said that there are a lot of, there is a lot of energy
being put into looking at this problem. CSIS is doing it. And there
are other think tanks and governmental agencies out there. I
think, and I am not sure exactly the mechanism, but if there were
a way to tie these all together, I think we could come up with
something pretty good for Congress to consider.

I am not proposing another commission or anything exciting like
that. But I think there are ways for Congress to work a more—to
force, let us say, a more collaborative effort here. I think organiza-
tions would be interested in doing that if there was something to
kind of coalesce around it. Right now there isn't. Everybody is kind
of moving in different directions. Looking at different pieces of it,
but it is stitching all the different pieces together that I think could
really help the overall effort.

Mr. CARREAU. I would like to add just a couple of comments. I
totally agree with what my colleagues have said. I spent the first
year at the Pentagon trying to organize the civilian agencies to
send folks to Baghdad and it was one of the most frustrating years
of my life. I think that one of the things I think that Congress can
do, the agencies don't respond because it is not their core mission.
And they really have no reason to. They are not being graded on
it. There is no accountability, as you mentioned Mr. Chairman.
And I think one thing that Congress could do is give them that ac-
countability. Give them a modest mandate or authorization to care
about the stability activities. the Department of Agriculture
(USDA), the Foreign Agricultural Service, their mission in life is to
sell U.S. soybeans and corn. And God bless them for it. That is a
national interest that we want to do. But there comes a time when
we are going to need agricultural experts to help out in Kosovo and
in Afghanistan. The same with the Foreign Commercial Service at
Commerce. They are to promote U.S. exports.

But there will be a time when they need to help out to do busi-
ness development and private sector development in Iraq. And
until they have that mandate and until someone is put on the hot
seat, someone at the Commerce Department, and asked what are
you doing to support the effort in Iraq as you were mandated to
do, you won't find that kind of an effort.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you all very much. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mrs. Davis. Thank you all for being
here. Let me just extend you an open invitation to submit any ad-
tional materials as a question for the record right now. So if you
think of something you think would be helpful, please feel free to
send it in. We appreciate you-all's service and we appreciate your
thoughts. Ms. Hicks, we look forward to your report. We hope we
are one of the first on your list to receive it when it is done. Thank
you all. The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

December 5, 2007
Opening Statement of  
Chairman Dr. Vic Snyder  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations  

Hearing on "Déjà vu all over again: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT’s):  
Historical and Current Perspectives on Doctrine and Strategy"  

December 05, 2007  

The hearing will come to order.  

Good morning, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations'  
hearing on “Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT’s):  
Historical and Current Perspectives on Doctrine and Strategy.”  

The subcommittee has conducted a series of hearings and briefings on the PRT  
programs in Afghanistan and Iraq to get a better understanding of what PRTs are,  
what they do, and the contribution that they are making in stabilizing Afghanistan and  
Iraq. This project is a case study of interagency operations.  

In order to emphasize the importance of interagency operations and to reinforce why  
our efforts here are so important, I’d like to quote the Secretary of Defense from his  
recent remarks on the subject:  

“One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that  
military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-  
building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good  
governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping  
indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more –  
these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success.  
Accomplishing all of these tasks will be necessary to meet the diverse  
challenges I have described.”  

These imperatives cannot be accomplished by military alone; we need the  
capabilities of our entire government brought to bear in support of our current  
efforts.  

The purpose of today’s hearing is to put our current efforts of stabilization and  
reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan into context for, as Secretary Gates says:  
“...context is important.”. The nation has been here before; throughout our history we  
have experienced the difficulties of transitioning from the use of force to the task of  
rebuilding war torn societies- from our own Civil War, to the hot and cold 20th Century  
wars in Europe and the Far East, and smaller post-cold war struggles such as in the  
Balkans and Haiti.  

Perhaps the campaigns which most closely resemble our current efforts in Iraq and  
Afghanistan are previous counterinsurgency efforts. In such cases, we engaged an
armed insurgency while attempting to rebuild the physical and political structures of countries. Our goal has usually been a stable, peaceful, democratic, and independent nation-state friendly to the United States and its neighbors. Secretary Gates recently cited the Vietnam CORDS effort as an example:

"However uncomfortable it may be to raise Vietnam all these years later, the history of that conflict is instructive. After first pursuing a strategy based on conventional military firepower, the United States shifted course and began a comprehensive, integrated program of pacification, civic action and economic development...It had the effect of, in the words of General Creighton Abrams, putting all of us on one side the enemy on the other. By the time U.S. troops were pulled out, the CORDS program had helped pacify most of the hamlets in South Vietnam. The importance of deploying civilian expertise has been relearned, the hard way, through the efforts of staffed provincial reconstruction teams, first in Afghanistan and more recently in Iraq. The PRTs were designed to bring in civilians experienced in agriculture, governance and other aspects of development to work with and alongside the military to improve the lives of the local population, a key tenet of any counterinsurgency effort."

We hope that today's witnesses can help us gain a better understanding of and perspective on our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have brought together practitioners and scholars who have experienced and/or studied these previous and current campaigns in great detail. As always, we seek our witnesses' recommendations on what we should do to increase the likelihood of the success of our nation's efforts.

Our panel of witnesses today includes:

Mr. Bernard Carreau  
Senior Research Fellow  
Center for Technology and National Security Policy  
National Defense University

General Volney F. Warner, US Army (Ret.)  
President and Chief Executive Officer  
V.F. Warner and Associates

Brigadier General Rick Olson, US Army (Ret.)  
Former Commander of Combined/Joint Task Force-76 in Afghanistan, and former Director of the National Coordination Team in Iraq

Ms. Kathleen Hicks  
Senior Fellow, International Security Program  
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon to our witnesses, we appreciate you being here today.

Today’s hearing is this subcommittee’s fifth public hearing on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). Our witnesses will not only offer their perspective on the current PRT program, but will put these operations in an historical context.

The only thing really new about PRTs is the name. The concept—how an interagency team, comprised of civilian and military personnel works to extend the reach of the government into regional provinces and local areas—comes with significant historical precedent. The most recent, and commonly referenced analogue to PRTs, is the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program the United States employed during Vietnam. The CORDS program was the interagency response to insurgency during the Vietnam War. Like the PRTs, CORDS teams were made up of
civilian and military personnel. CORDS teams spread out to the forty-four provinces, and personnel at the provincial and district levels embedded with local government officials.

Most importantly, and critical to our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, is that many believe that CORDS fulfilled the most fundamental mission of counterinsurgency. Proponents of this view believe the CORDS program increased the effectiveness of the local government and security forces by training 900,000 Vietnamese, including 300,000 civil servants. CORDS helped establish the viability of the South Vietnamese government by providing competent services and local security. This marginalized the Viet Cong and people no longer felt compelled to turn to the shadow communist regime. After the institution of CORDS, a Viet Cong colonel lamented "Last year we could attack United States forces. This year we find it difficult to attack even puppet forces... We failed to win the support of the people and keep them from moving back to enemy controlled areas." This sentiment is exactly the type of thing we need to hear from al Qaeda and Taliban operatives fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.

[So, if indeed the CORDs program was successful, the question I'd like answered today is whether the PRTs incorporate the features of the CORDs program that proved so essential to counterinsurgency? While the CORDs analogy is not perfect – Iraq and Afghanistan are substantially different from Vietnam in a number of ways – it seems to me that critical study of this subject is required and lessons should be learned. I look forward to hearing our witnesses address this point.]
Finally, I'm curious to hear from our witnesses what happened to the counterinsurgency capability the military and civilian agencies gained during the Vietnam era? Did this capability atrophy? We recently had a hearing on DOD Directive 3000.05 and NSPD-44 – how the military and civilian agencies are trying to develop a capability to conduct stabilization operations. I'm interested in learning how the military and civilian agencies, which participated in the CORDs program, were able to grow this capability, and whether that experience should inform implementation of the DOD and Presidential Directives.

Again, thank you to our witnesses for being here today. I look forward to your testimony.

[Yield to Chairman Snyder]
Statement by

Mr. Bernard T. Carreau

Senior Research Fellow

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

Before the 110th Congress

Committee on Armed Services

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

United States House of Representatives

December 5, 2007
Introduction

Chairman Snyder, Representative Akin, distinguished Members, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss current and historical perspectives on doctrine and strategy for Provincial Reconstruction Teams. I applaud the Committee’s efforts to examine the effectiveness of PRTs and explore lessons from past civil-military operations.

Today I want to talk briefly about two previous civil-military and interagency operations and discuss possible lessons for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. I will talk about the CORDS program in Vietnam and post-war reconstruction efforts in Europe. These cases have particular relevance for Iraq and Afghanistan because they involve or follow wars in which the United States was itself a belligerent (as opposed to a third party intervener), wars in which the United States suffered significant casualties and expended significant resources, and wars which had an enormous impact on our national security interests and domestic politics. Of course the scale and historical circumstances of these two cases differ greatly from each other, as well as from those of Iraq and Afghanistan. Still, certain organizational aspects of these cases offer valuable lessons for today.

Vietnam CORDS

“Pacification” efforts in Vietnam — what might be called counterinsurgency or post-war stability operations today — involved returning government control to a countryside that was infiltrated by insurgents. It focused on local security efforts, but also included distributing food and medical supplies, agriculture support, and land reform. As the American commitment to Vietnam increased, the military, USAID, CIA, and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) in-country teams all began to expand accordingly. All elements were nominally under the leadership of Ambassador Lodge, but the staffs of each of the civilian agencies outnumbered his, and all were dwarfed by the military command. Each of the agencies was semi-independent, with Congressionally mandated statutory authority and responsibilities. They disagreed
among themselves as to which policies to pursue, but none had overall responsibility for Vietnam, nor the power to impose their views on the rest.

The Civil Operations and Rural Development Support program was created in 1967 after years of unsatisfactory attempts at coordinating the activities of multiple agencies under the U.S. Ambassador’s Country Team. President Johnson appointed Robert Komer to the position of Deputy to Gen. William Westmoreland, the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). The deputy commander carried a three-star rank. The union of the previously separate civilian and military pacification efforts into the combined CORDS program resulted in what may have been the only integrated civilian-military command in U.S. history. The integrated command placed civilians in charge of military personnel and vice versa. It also placed military resources, including logistics, transport, and force protection assets, at the disposal of civilians. Komer developed a cordial relationship with Westmoreland, as did Komer’s successor, William Colby, with Westmoreland’s successor, Gen. Creighton Abrams. In turn, Gens. Westmoreland and Abrams exhibited flexibility and allowed their civilian deputies considerable leeway in setting priorities and allocating resources. By placing almost all pacification related programs under a single headquarters and investing the single-manager with unprecedented access to resources, Komer had sufficient leverage to force the various agencies to develop and implement a nation-wide pacification plan in conjunction with the South Vietnamese government.

Much of the impetus for reorganizing CORDS came from President Johnson himself. Johnson viewed pacification in Vietnam as an extension of his vision for his domestic “Great Society” policies and began to describe the effort to help the Vietnamese people as the “other war.” Before becoming Westmoreland’s deputy in Vietnam, Komer had already received authority over the seven civilian agencies participating in the pacification efforts and a large say in the allocation of military resources to the program. Perhaps most importantly, Komer had the right of direct access to the President, which empowered him to bypass the Washington bureaucratic decision-making process to solve problems directly.

Marshall Plan
The process of creating an organization to oversee the management of American assistance under the Marshall Plan led to a number of bureaucratic and political debates in the summer and autumn of 1947. President Truman envisioned a planning process involving extensive discussions among Executive Branch agencies, under the leadership of the State Department. Secretary of State George Marshall created an Advisory Steering Committee, chaired by an Under Secretary, to confer with the President’s staff, the Departments of War, Navy, Commerce, Agriculture, Interior, and the Budget Bureau. However, given that Congress would have to approve the appropriation of the huge sums of money to be devoted to the European Recovery Program (ERP), interest in participating in the planning process soon expanded beyond the Executive Branch to Congress.

A debate emerged as to whether the proposed administrative entity should be an agency of the State Department or an independent government corporation. The Republican Party had taken control of Congress in the off-year elections in 1946. Some Congressional Republicans harbored a mistrust of the State Department and questioned the advisability of giving responsibility for administering economic development assistance to State. The Select Congressional Committee on Foreign Aid developed a proposal for an export corporation that would be administratively independent with a single administrator, a policy council, and a bipartisan board of directors. Such an independent organization, its backers argued, would spare the State Department from operational responsibilities for which it lacked experience and personnel. A corporate set-up would attract managerial talent from the private sector and allow the ERP to be run in a bipartisan fashion. Private sector cooperation would be crucial, as individuals were needed with practical experience in stabilizing currencies and exchange rates, reviving industry, liberalizing trade, fostering integration, and boosting productivity.

Marshall and the State Department disagreed with this approach, arguing that giving an independent organization so much responsibility would undercut the President’s authority over foreign policy and complicate coherent policy-making. However, fearing that opposition to an independent ERP corporation might jeopardize Congressional will to fully fund the recovery effort and encourage it to enact burdensome policy restrictions, Marshall proposed instead the creation of a semi-independent
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), geared toward limited operations within Europe, which would work jointly with the State Department. But when Congressional hearings began on the proposed Marshall Plan in early 1948, the State Department further retreated from its insistence on controlling the ECA, largely in deference to Congress. Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, played a large part in congressional deliberations over the administration of the ERP. He had long fought the expansion of executive power that occurred during the war, and sought a greater role for Congress in foreign policy. Vandenberg agreed with the arguments that the State Department was not an “operational” agency and that the problems of European economic recovery were best addressed by private sector specialists familiar with economic criteria and business judgment, as opposed to policy and politics.

Vandenberg and his colleagues largely carried the day in the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, signed by Truman on April 3, 1948. The act established the ECA as an independent agency, with its director possessing cabinet-level status, who would be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Both the ECA director and the State Department could appeal disagreements on policy matters to the President. The ECA director would coordinate and cooperate with other cabinet secretaries, with private advisory committees, and with a bipartisan Public Advisory Board in making policy and operational decisions. Congress empowered the ECA to establish its own missions in each participating country separate from the State Department, which would be overseen by a United States Special Representative in Europe. Both the Special Representative and the mission chiefs reported directly to the ECA director.

The first ECA director, Paul G. Hoffman, president of the Studebaker Corporation, negotiated the specific mechanics of the ECA’s overseas operations through long exchanges with the U.S. Special Representative in Europe. The concept they worked out came to resemble a civilian counterpart to the military theater command. It defined a clear line of authority from the ECA director in Washington, to the Special Representative in Paris, and on down to the various divisions, offices, and branches in the Paris headquarters.
Conclusions

The two cases represent vastly different circumstances. Vietnam was a regional war with an active insurgency, and the Marshall Plan followed a devastating world war in which, largely because of the extent of the destruction and the completeness of the defeat of Germany, internal security was relatively under control. Yet the problems of interagency coordination were similar in both cases. In Vietnam, the executive branch compelled a solution to the interagency problem; with the Marshall Plan, Congress compelled a solution. Both CORDS and the Marshall Plan took several years to develop, the former several years after the insurgency had begun, the latter several years after hostilities had ended. CORDS is primarily a lesson in civil-military relations. The Marshall Plan, because it was administered in a relatively permissive environment, is primarily a lesson in interagency relations.

These are the key lessons:

- **Unity of command.** In a major contingency, such as Vietnam, post-war Europe, or Iraq, there should be unity of command between military and civilian efforts. In a non-secure environment, the lead should be with the military. Unity of effort can only be assured with an integrated command structure. No matter how collegial or well-intentioned, interagency coordination and cooperation cannot substitute for focused, integrated leadership.

- **Mandatory control structure.** The civil-military chain of command should be established at the highest levels of the executive branch, and the interagency chain of command should be established at the highest levels of the executive branch or by Congress. There will be intense organizational resistance to concession of control of agency assets to a unified interagency headquarters.

- **Integrated command, integrated resources.** Where civil-military relations are involved, the single chain of command should also entail integrated personnel and financial resources. Only military assets can bring sufficient resources to bear on the local problems faced. With CORDS, the command arrangement gave Kom"
and Colby a seat at the military table when decisions were made and resources were distributed.

- **Focus on local population.** Counterinsurgency and stabilization activities require a focus on local populations, on understanding and fulfilling their needs.

- **Security first, then economic well-being.** CORDS stressed village security above everything else. Along with security, the restoration of economic livelihoods is a critical factor in establishing security or defeating an insurgency. Economic progress was always considered the linchpin of the containment policy.

- **Encourage host nation ownership.** CORDS was designed to empower the South Vietnamese government to provide security and essential services to the districts and villages. European governments designed their own recovery programs under the Marshall Plan.

- **Build the private sector.** CORDS and the Marshall Plan were designed to build the agriculture and industrial bases of Vietnam and Europe rather than as temporary employment programs or one-time donor contributions.
Prepared Statement of
General Volney F. Warner, USA (Ret.)
President and Chief Executive Officer
V.F. Warner and Associates

Before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on
Oversight & Investigations

December 5, 2007
Opening Statement

I believe the Committee has been provided notes from my presentation to the National War College Alumni on 25 October which served as the basis for inviting me to this hearing. I titled the presentation “Getting Past Iraq” in that my greatest interest was to ensure that we come up with a better solution to assist future failed states where U.S. vital national interests are involved without resorting to the deployment of conventional military force. The U.S. can not resolve most of the instability of the world militarily. Winning all battles is not excellence, excellence is achieving your goal without fighting. The best way to win wars is to make them unnecessary.

If there truly is to be a global Islamic movement and our "enemies" are extremists, non-state players using asymmetric irregular warfare, then the nature of future conflict which includes both hard and soft power is more political than military. As such, we need to fashion a better interagency preemptive response. Let’s call it Counterinsurgency (COIN). How should we proceed?

First put together an overarching National Counterinsurgency Plan to start the process. The National Plan should be built from the bottom up by integrating those counterror insurgence plans as coordinated between Regional Unified Commanders, (CINCS), and their Ambassadors counterparts. Priority should be given to failed states where a vital US national interest is involved. The Congress should mandate and fund the “soft power” agencies of the US Government to enable them to perform part of the interagency task to include: State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, Central Intelligence Agency and a U.S. Information Service to name a few.

A new Department of Stability coequal to Defense and State in authority and funding may be required to manage the effort at the national level under the watchful eye of a Special Assistant to the President. Then microcosm country teams (PRT’s) should be trained and tailored country-by-country to support forward deployed U.S. Ambassadors and their Military Assistance Advisory Group staffs (MAAGS) in working with the local populations in counterinsurgency efforts at the provincial level. See, Secure, Hold and Build is a good paradigm descriptive of team activities once deployed. The objective should not be to impose our political and economic ideals on the locals but to devise and fund plans supportive of both their and our interests in the Region.

Only when it appears an advisory effort has failed, will the President be faced with the critical decision of whether to deploy conventional military force, or withdraw support, or seek multilateral support.

Volney Warner
GETTING PAST IRAQ

Theme – The Best Way To Win Wars Is To Make Them Unnecessary

Introduction – Pheasant Story
A Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals person was seated next to me on the plane as I traveled to South Dakota to hunt pheasants. I was dressed in hunting garb with an Army of One Pin attached to my hunting coat. She gave me a curious sidelong glance and finally asked pointedly “Do you eat everything you kill?”
I Responded: “Yes, except for people.”
She asked to be re-seated and I went back to my Martini.

Moral: Soldiers and Marines kill people and break things in order to defend our country WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS. Today, I want to talk primarily about the “all else” aspect, and how best to improve it.

Disclaimer – Must first express my personal bias and identify Vietnam as the template from which I draw my views and project forward to solutions in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. My Vietnam experience, plus numerous discussions with the 8, now 7, members of my extended family who have served as Army officers in Iraq and Afghanistan in positions ranging from Assistant Division Commander and Division Chief of Staff and Division Engineer, to a knock on the door MI intelligence collector. Then you can apply your personal credibility percentage to what I am about to say in both problem identification and solution as to how to configure for the future fight against those who would do our vital interests harm. I will not call the conflict “GWOT” nor its participants Islamic Fascists or any other acronym of the moment.
Suffice it to call them collectively Insurgents and Counterinsurgents, inclusive of state and non-state participants, regardless of wherever they may be, and whatever is their motivation for conflict.

**My Conclusion** - There are situations in the world the US cannot resolve militarily. Vietnam was one of them. Iraq is another. Neither war was ours to win, and both were theirs to lose. We always have been very poor at making distinctions between military and political victories and losses, and prone to support the losing side in Civil Wars – except for our own.

We simply need a better formulation than “bomb now, build later.” Clear, hold and build is a good start. Secretary Gates in his speech to the AUSA last month encouraged innovative approaches to implementation. What follows could be one of them and lifts considerably from writings as far back as Vietnam, and as current as the words of LTG Chiarelli, Nagl, Killebrew, Daly and that team of experts helping Petraeus salvage Iraq with a possibly too late, but nonetheless correct, focus on people as the target of joint Iraqi-US efforts both military and civil. We understand the model. But for the future, we need a different implementing organization than the splendid kinetic force that took down the country we must now help rebuild. In Vietnam, we went from advisors to a kinetic conventional force to resolve the conflict. It did not work. In Iraq, we are proceeding from a kinetic conventional force to an advisory force and the outcome is still in doubt. Ironically, the same social force that defeated our efforts in Vietnam because of our inability to conquer it, now defeats our efforts in Iraq because of our inability to create it -- a sense of nationalism among the locals.

**My Vietnam** - It was indeed a political war incapable of military resolution. No amount of bombs dropped on the North could create a viable government in the South. US civilian and military
leadership schooled in WWII saw an umbilical cord through which communism flowed from Moscow to Beijing to Hanoi then on to the southern reaches of Vietnam all the way to Ca Mau. This was a political ideology, reinforced by the fear that the dominoes would surely fall in Asia if we did not respond militarily to prop them up.

All my experience as an Advisor proved the contrary. The little old ladies with 30 years longevity who pressed their noses together when we approached in mistaken conclusion that we were French proconsuls recently repudiated and thrown out of country, belied the myth. As they attempted curiously to pluck the body hair from our arms since they had none, it was like being in a prehistoric world. That these pleasant peasants were indeed imbued with communist ideology bordered on the ridiculous. Security, food and education for their children remained their basic goals. Yet we struggled on and lost thousands of dedicated Soldiers of all stripes and nationalities in the process. Then we finally realized our strategic mistake and recognized Vietnam as a single geographic and cultural entity, an entity which I understand is now duly represented on the UN Security Council.

We lost the war wrong! We should have withdrawn in the early ‘60’s when it was clear that the advisory effort had failed as had the Saigon Government it attempted to create. We promptly closeted the hard earned lessons of Pacification and took apart the microcosm country teams in Province and District after withdrawing, considered them as one time anomalies, and returned to defending Western Europe and winning the Cold War. However, we did learn that the advisory effort in Vietnam functioned best when its command chain was separated from that of our conventional forces and when individuals were especially selected and trained in what would be required of them as Province and District Senior Advisors.

In the future, we, the United States, must be able to conduct both Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Conventional Operations given
our current force structure and planned personnel increases. Then we need to get Congress to fund and mandate that the other agencies of US Government similarly get ready to perform their part of the interagency COIN task.

Iraq - Attempting to democratize a country and to create popular will for a central government controlling disparate groups is proving a long term task requiring more security than we can provide and possibly taking more time and treasure than Americans will concede to the effort – some estimate 10 years. I hope not. But this time, unlike in the aftermath of Vietnam, we need to capitalize on our hard earned experience if we are to avoid future such threats to our Nation’s vital interests.

The Solution for the Future - We are fully engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Army, Marine Corps and our Allies offer a temporary fix by doing those tasks better done and done better by the “soft power” Agencies of the US Government. Indeed, if we conclude that wars of the future will be waged by insurgents as in Iraq, using the weapons of asymmetric warfare, we need to select individuals from of our military forces and civilian agencies to deal with this threat as an “interagency effort.” Notably, all such undertakings must recognize the utmost need for reliance on the locals, and not merely become an American injection of our own views on what is best for the countries of concern.

Changes in Force Structure – The overarching requirement for the defeat of an insurgency is to separate the insurgents from the general population, whether by military operations or by police action through the power of arrest. Destroying the insurgents is truly the first step in what is now popularly known as the secure, hold and build process to nation building.

The US Navy and US Air Force and Space Command can fill out the joint response admirably, temporarily, as the first line of
defense in dealing with future peer competitors. It is critical that we ultimately reconstitute a strategic reserve that contains both nuclear and conventional deterrent sufficient to discourage adventurism from those countries most likely to challenge us. Meanwhile, selected members of the Army and the Marine Corps should develop and hone their skills in COIN as their parent forces prepare for their conventional role in employing the new technologies now being spun out of the Future Combat Systems program.

COIN is the Antidote for Insurgency – As to future war's nature, Kinetic is checkers, COIN is chess. Iraq is already creating, as did Vietnam, individual Kasparovs and Kasparovesses that understand the task—even if its application is about 3 years late. We must be able to play both games as the situation demands and COIN must be an interagency effort to succeed. COIN is not only the province of generals and is in fact more likely the results of studied actions of Majors and Lieutenant Colonels and the Senior NCO's that support them. Individual selection is key. The US Military should play a supporting role to local forces in regions where security is not a major issue or the national police are deemed capable of providing security to the civilian population through the power of arrest. Sure, elements of the Army (and Marine Corps) must be recruited (or drafted), funded, trained, promoted and prepared to do both Kinetics and COIN. But those Service elements and individuals therein selected for the head game that is COIN need Psyops, Civil Affairs, Language, Regional Immersion etc. Call it Foreign Area Specialist Training (FAST) or whatever. Giving the mission to one or the other Services or to Special Forces is not the answer. Nor is creating a COIN Division or a Civilian Service Corps. Start with volunteers and a solid plan for promotion and reward for participants. Run a selection and screening process for candidates within both military and civilian agencies—as in creating Delta—and be ruthless in culling out non-performers. LTG Pete Chiarelli made a
significant contribution to the effort in his “Learning From Our Modern Wars” article in *Military Review*. His focus on the need to add an interagency effort in broader US Government support to the long term requirements of stabilizing and rebuilding nations is precisely correct. As he states, “we must embrace the concept of nation building and we must maintain our ability to defeat conventional military threats as well.” His call for a top down review of roles and missions of all national power is a good place to start the task. Congress must be involved to provide the necessary funding to strengthen nonmilitary agencies. Think 1947.

Preparing for COIN requires substantial augmentation of MAAGS and Missions performing under the Ambassador to administer preventative measures for failed and failing states—not to forcibly democratize them but to devise politico military plans supportive of both their and our own interests in the region.

Again, it requires a different command structure to control the COIN effort. Organizationally it must begin with NSC over watch and cascade downward through a vastly empowered, funded and resourced State Department that only the Congress can mandate and make happen. It is essential to have a Presidential Assistant (Czar) at the top of the decision pyramid armed with full presidential authority to coordinate the interagency effort in Washington to assist those downrange. Microcosm country support teams should be tailored country -by- country for and implement a jointly arrived at host country support plan. The Ambassador, as the President’s representative, should be held accountable for plan execution. If this smacks of colonialism, so be it. Let's do it right and in our national interest as well as that of the host country.

*In Summary* – Kinetic is checkers and COIN is indeed chess. We need a National Advisory Corps (NAC) of dual tracked midlevel
grades, selected from all government agencies, trained to the truly preemptive task of helping failed and failing states and fielded based on priority of a given states’ ability to affect our vital national interests. The program should start by selecting some 200 major and junior Lieutenant Colonels, men and women, and their FSO equivalents capable of leading such teams. One size does not fit all. The teams themselves would not be a “cookie cuttered” and parachuted in country-by-country, but teams well grounded in the basics of specific country plans and armed with the skill sets that permit them to become the “mechanics of implementation.” These civil military teams should perform in-country underneath the supervision of the Ambassador as part of the country team and be capable of working with the locals at the lowest political division within any given country. I have no doubt the Army is fully able to put together their contribution by screening Special Forces, Rangers, Psyops and Civil Affairs organizations for their contribution to the effort. Advising the local military to win their own war against the insurgency and transferring security to police to perform with the power of arrest is a logical outcome. Finding those with required skill set in the other agencies such as State and USAID, reincarnating USIA and the like will be a more demanding effort.

So there you have it. As with all proposals, implementation will prove most difficult. At least Washington seems now to be engaged in the discussion having recognized that we truly do have to plan now for “getting past Iraq.”

Volney Warner
Implementing A National Counterinsurgency Plan

As for dealing with the rest of the future World trouble spots, ultimately the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs need to go forward to relevant Congressional Committees with a National Counterinsurgency Plan (NCP) and a request for the authority and assets to implement it to include full participation by the so called “soft power” Agencies of the US Government. There are a number of such plans under various names floating around Washington that should be evaluated as a first step. John Hamre, and someone from State could well lead that evaluation effort and consolidate relevant results. This background data should then be formatted and turned over to an Interagency Group (IG) jointly led by JCS/State with Interdepartmental participation, and tasked with writing the NCP for approval by Gordon England and John Negroponte. Like the Unified Command Plan (UCP), the final NCP would be a living document updated periodically to reflect the changing insurgency threat and the willingness of risk countries to accept our assistance.

Concurrently, the Regional Military Commanders (CINCS) should be tasked by the JCS to put together a Counterinsurgency Plan for their own areas of responsibility, done as first priority in conjunction with those Ambassadors in countries with the most serious insurgency problems affecting our national interests. (Pakistan is an excellent case in point.) CINC inputs would become individual country Counterinsurgency Plans to be incorporated by the Interagency Group into what essentially would become a National Counterinsurgency Plan (NCP) specifying priority countries for implementation. Once interdepartmental agreement is reached, the NCP should be carried forward by principals to the Congress for approval and funding. The NCP should recommend required mission changes and personnel augmentations for State, Defense, USAID, USIA, Justice, CIA, and other operating Agencies required to provide host country support at both national and provincial levels.

Vol Warner
Prepared Statement

Eric T. “Rick” Olson

House Armed Services Committee
Sub-Committee Oversight and Investigation

December 05, 2007
It is a pleasure for me to appear before the Committee to speak about this important program. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT’s), first established in Afghanistan in 2002, have yielded significant positive results in both Afghanistan and Iraq in support of the overall military effort in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), and have furthered broader US goals in those two nations. Perhaps more significantly, the experience with PRT’s in both OEF and OIF can provide lessons learned that will serve the purpose of finding ways to better integrate the programs, policies, and activities of civilian and military agencies to produce a more coordinated and effective US approach to post-conflict or post-crisis operations.

**History and Background**

PRT’s were first established in Afghanistan as an initiative promoted by AMB Zalmay Khalilzad, who serve at that time as the US ambassador to Afghanistan. The first PRT was inaugurated in January, 2003 in Gardez Province, located about 50 miles south of Kabul. The purpose of these small, civil-military organizations was to serve as the primary interface between the Coalition and Afghan provincial and local governments, and to assist them to govern their provinces more effectively and deliver essential services to their people. PRT’s were commanded by military officers and initially staffed predominantly by military personnel, mostly Civil Affairs officers and enlisted soldiers. Gradually personnel from civilian agencies have been added, mostly foreign service officers from the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The PRT program in Iraq was instituted in November of 2005, again by AMB Khalilzad who had at that time recently arrived at US Embassy, Baghdad to serve as our Ambassador to Iraq. The first PRT’s were located in Mosul and Kirkuk in northern Iraq, and Hilla, south of Baghdad. PRT’s in Iraq were led by civilians, usually by relatively senior foreign service officers or Department of State hires, and were generally manned by a more representative mix of personnel from civilian and military organizations. As a result of this difference in the composition of staffs in Afghanistan and Iraq, the PRT’s in the former were initially more specifically focused on short term reconstruction efforts in support of the requirements of
military commanders fighting a counterinsurgency, while PRT’s in Iraq have been able since their inception to assist with the counterinsurgency fight while simultaneously focusing on the longer term, more enduring need to develop and strengthen institutions and build capacity at the provincial and local level.

My association with PRT’s began in Afghanistan where as a major general I served as the Combined/Joint Task Force (CJTF) Commander of CJTF-76, responsible for all US military operations in OEF from 2004-2005. Upon the standing up of CJTF-76 and taking charge of combat operations, the headquarters assumed operational control of all PRT’s in Afghanistan. At that time there were 14 PRT’s that had been established; by the time we relinquished control of combat operations in February of 2005, we had stood up an additional 4. Currently there are 25 PRT’s operating in Afghanistan.

In August of 2006, as an official in the Department of State, I became the deputy director of the Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) responsible for civil-military and regional affairs. In that capacity I was also the director of the National Coordination Team (NCT), with responsibility for the stand up and operation of all the PRT’s in Iraq. At the time of my assumption of duty there were 5 PRT’s that were considered to be at full operational capability (FOC). On my watch we stood up an additional 4 standing PRT’s (in Salah-ad-Din, Diyala, Iribi, and Dhi Qar provinces) and brought one PRT in Anbar province back from initial operational capability to FOC. We also developed a new operational concept for the program—the embedded PRT (ePRT)—and fielded 10 of these organizations. In May of 2007, IRMO’s mandate ran out and the NCT was stood down. In its place, the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) was established, headed by an Ambassador from the Department of State. Currently OPA runs 10 standing PRT’s and 15 ePRT’s throughout Iraq.

Since August of this year I have served as the chief of staff of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR) and as such have been able to keep abreast of the progress being made by PRT’s in both Afghanistan and Iraq, though I have no direct responsibility for their operations or administration. In sum, my experience with PRT’s is unique, having run the program in both Afghanistan and Iraq.
PRT’s Today

There are 3 types of PRT’s in Afghanistan and Iraq today. The first type are those PRT’s, informally known as “standing PRT’s”, that are assigned to and located within the provinces that they serve. They are generally the more established organizations with approved work plans and predetermined resourcing to match. The second type, found only in Iraq, is known as a Provincial Support Team (PST). PST’s are located outside of the province for which they are responsible. They conduct business with provincial officials by travelling into the province, but generally do not spend a prolonged period of time there. PST’s are small in size, with only 4-6 US personnel assigned to them. Their reach can be augmented through the hiring of local nationals (Iraqis) who work as implementing partners of the PST, charged with carrying out key programs under the guidance of the PST leadership, albeit from afar. There are 6 PST’s covering provinces in Iraq where the physical presence of a PRT is deemed unnecessary or ill advised. The third type of PRT is embedded into the brigade combat team (BCT) of the Multinational Corps, Iraq that is operating in the area for which the PRT has responsibility. Embedded PRT’s (ePRT’s) are generally located in provinces where there is already a standing PRT but where commanders have determined that local governments at levels below the province are in need of PRT-like services. Commanders in Anbar Province and Baghdad and neighboring provinces have accepted control of ePRT’s that are working with local governments at the district and neighborhood levels. ePRT’s take guidance and direction from their counterpart BCT commander. The size and exact composition of the ePRT is determined by the needs of the commander and the ePRT leader. The ePRT work plan is generally more flexible than that of the standing PRT, regularly modified to suit the needs of a changing battlefield.

Regardless of the type, the objectives of PRT’s are generally drawn from 5 established pillars:

- The first is the governance pillar. PRT’s work with provincial and local governments to teach them the fundamentals of governing, substantive and procedural. This is important in both Afghanistan and Iraq where the tradition of modern day governing at levels below the federal government is not well established.
The economic pillar has been developed to address the development needs of local
governments, communities, and populations. Objectives associated with this pillar
include fostering development of the private sector through assistance to small businesses
and factories, and the establishment of government systems and procedures (e.g., those
associated with budget execution).

Infrastructure reconstruction or development is the third pillar. The theory is that the
ability to deliver basic services to the people—electricity, water, sewerage, medical—
will be a critical determinant of the long term success of local government.

Rule of law is a critical pillar in both nations. The establishment of a system designed to
apprehend law breakers, try them, and then punish them for their crimes in accordance
with an established and acceptable set of laws and procedures is needed both in
Afghanistan and Iraq.

Public diplomacy is the final pillar. The effort of PRT’s in this area is to assist the local
government to manage the increasingly important functions of public relations and
information services.

In addition to the benefits that come from efforts in these five areas, there are positive
collateral effects that have been realized. From the standpoint of Coalition operations, one rather
significant benefit of PRT activities in military operations has been the understanding gained of
the “human terrain”. PRT’s are not intelligence gathering entities, but the information that they
routinely obtain about local customs, tribal and other groupings, the distribution of power (both
formal and informal), and the like can be invaluable to military commanders. PRT’s have also
been able to extend the reach of the Coalition into areas that would otherwise be inaccessible to a
military force. Many local leaders who would otherwise be unwilling to work with the US
military are less reluctant to cooperate with civilian PRT members in such a way as to assist in
the achievement of overall Coalition objectives. Similarly, the work of certain international and
non-governmental organizations can at least be coordinated with, if not harnessed in support of,
critical Coalition activities.
Successes

It has been difficult to quantify or statistically measure the effects that PRT’s in Afghanistan and Iraq have been able to achieve. There are a wealth of input measures available (e.g., funds successfully expended in support of the objectives of the PRT’s and local governments), and several attempts to strike upon meaningful output measures have also been attempted (e.g., the number of local leaders trained in a given period). But the establishment of a set of measures that reflect true outcomes, that is, the actual impacts that PRT operations have had on achieving larger Coalition objectives, has been an elusive goal. How does one quantify improvement in governance or the success of rule of law measures at the local level in a province where collecting data and other statistics is a largely inexact science? Nonetheless there is a wealth of evidence, readily apparent to those who have been on the ground, and offered regularly by military commanders and PRT leaders, that stands as testimony to the success of PRT’s—an record of success that often goes unnoticed by those who are not intimately familiar with the nature of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, or who don’t understand what conditions must be established before success can be achieved in either area of operations:

1. **Provincial and local governments have been established and are functioning, even in many of the most unstable provinces in both countries.** Provincial councils are meeting, budgets are being developed, requirements of the populations are being identified and, in many cases, at least partially met. Diyala Province in Iraq is an excellent example. Six months ago, when Diyala was the most violent province in Iraq, it was through the efforts of the PRT working with Coalition forces in the area that the provincial council began meeting again after several months of inactivity. The improvement in the security environment in that troubled province since that time is at least in part attributable to the re-establishment of a quasi-functional government there, whose efforts to deliver to the people what they might expect from their government surely reinforced the military efforts of the Coalition and the Iraqi Army to restore order.

2. **Reconstruction projects implemented by Iraqi officials working with the PRT’s are making a difference in the level of essential services and in the effectiveness**
of local governments. The Provincial Reconstruction and Development Councils that have been established in provinces in Iraq are Iraqi entities that identify reconstruction requirements and budget available resources to meet those requirements. In Baghdad alone, PRDC’s funded over $100 million in reconstruction projects, which had a salutary effect on the delivery of services in the capital city. These Councils initially funded projects with US dollars ($300 million last fiscal year across all of Iraq), but the systems and procedures that provincial governments developed to use these funds greatly enable the provinces to become self-sustaining in the area of budgeting and meeting their fiscal responsibilities. It is true that progress in the area of the restoration of services has been slow, and that the Iraqi government at all levels has been only partially successful in developing the capability to execute its own budget. But it is also true that progress has been far more noticeable at the provincial and local level than at the national level. A large part of the responsibility for this success is attributable to the work of PRT’s.

3. **Micro-loans and micro-grants channeled through PRT’s are contributing directly to economic development at the local level.** Several programs administered by USAID in Afghanistan and Iraq through their representatives in PRT’s have had a fairly dramatic effect on stimulating the growth of small business and the economy in those countries. The Community Action Program in Iraq and the Quick Impact Project program in Afghanistan are targeted at this type of development. There is a clear multiplier effect associated with programs like these. Successful small businesses create jobs, which in turn takes potential insurgents off the street and prevents them from being enticed to support extremist causes by the offer of cash rewards. But beyond that, the growth of small business creates demand for other goods and services up and down the supply chain, which in turn generates additional demand for labor and brings prosperity to the local community at large.

4. **PRT’s have contributed to the reconciliation process.** Reconciliation of former combatants is deemed critical to success in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan former warlords have been brought to the table through the efforts of PRT leaders and other PRT members. The ensuing Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) process was at least in part facilitated by PRT’s in several
of the provinces in which it was successfully carried out. In Iraq, the reconciliation of Sunni insurgents with the Coalition and, to some extent, with the Baghdad government, though largely an Iraqi phenomenon, was closely observed and in some cases managed by PRT’s working with and advising their military counterparts.

5. **Cooperation and coordination between provincial and national governments has been improved through the efforts of PRT’s.** Neither Afghanistan nor Iraq has a well established tradition of strong working relationships between federal and local governments. PRT leaders working with military commanders have been actively promoting these relationships by serving as alternative advocates for the provinces, and as another conduit of communication between them and their national capitals. A good example of this concept in action is the program of regular visits by governors in the northern, Sunni provinces of Iraq (Nineveh, Kirkuk, Salah-ad-Din, and Diyala) to Baghdad to coordinate with ministers of the national government— in some cases for the first face-to-face meetings since the January, 2006 elections. This program has been supported by military commanders in Multinational Division, North in close coordination with the PRT’s in these provinces. It is also true in both Afghanistan and Iraq that better functioning provincial governments have placed an onus on central governments to improve their ability to deliver for the provinces— funding, goods and services and the like— with a corresponding positive effect on the effectiveness of the central government in both countries.
Challenges

The brave men and women who are assigned to PRT’s in Afghanistan and Iraq are doing their work in the same operational environment as the soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines who are assigned to the Coalition. They face certain challenges that must be overcome in order for the true potential of the PRT concept to be realized. Some of these challenges are owing to the specific characteristics of OEF and OIF. Others are more systemic in nature, and must be addressed as such if the operational concept supporting PRT’s is deemed worthy of replication in other, future situations where the US is involved in post-conflict or post-crisis reconstruction or stability operations:

1. **The demands of geography in both countries exceed the reach of the PRT’s that have been established to cover them.** Afghanistan is roughly the size of Texas. Anbar Province in Iraq alone is almost as large as South Carolina. In both countries the geography ranges from forbidding to impossible from the standpoint of transportation. The assets available to PRT’s for bringing PRT members from their home base to locations where their primary interlocutors are willing to meet them are almost wholly provided by the military. These assets-- primarily ground transport and, in rare cases, rotary wing aircraft are provided on an “as available” basis by the military for transportation of PRT members. In some cases the tyranny of distance combined with limited availability of transportation has severely impacted the ability of PRT members to do their business.

2. **In the more unstable provinces of Afghanistan and Iraq, security restrictions have hindered the ability of PRT’s to get the job done.** Civilian personnel in PRT’s are subject to Chief of Mission restrictions on travel based on availability of security assets. In PRT’s located on military forward operating bases (FOB’s), arrangements have been made to allow Chief of Mission personnel to travel with military convoys, so long as fairly stringent requirements are met. This dependence on the military for security limits
the freedom of action of PRT members. In addition, many of the key personnel with whom PRT members desire to maintain contact are extremely reluctant to find themselves near a highly visible US military formation. In PRT’s not located on military FOB’s, the challenges can be even more severe. These PRT’s are dependent on security assets contracted for by the Department of State, who are notoriously risk averse when it comes to travel away from the PRT. The expense associated with contracted security is also extremely high; that in itself can be a limiting factor on the number and type of PRT’s established in a given area, outweighing even mission requirements in the associated calculus.

3. **There is no established “propensity” for PRT’s.** PRT’s fall somewhere between the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DoS) in terms of how they are considered, supported and treated in the interagency community. As a result, there is no established doctrine for PRT’s, nor is there any agency who feels that it is their task to develop it. Training of PRT members is ad hoc, conducted by each agency providing members almost in complete isolation from other agencies. This lack of propensity also translates to the theater of operations. For example, in Iraq the agreement between DoD and DoS that governed the support and security arrangements pertaining to PRT’s was signed in February, 2007, over a year after the first PRT’s were inaugurated.

4. **Considerable lip service notwithstanding, PRT’s are not a resourcing priority for the agencies tasked to support them.** Staffing of PRT’s has historically been a challenge. In 2004, 2 years after the initiation of the PRT program in Afghanistan, the majority of civilian positions in PRT’s were vacant. In Iraq, the “civilian surge” announced by Secretary Rice in January, 2007, was designed initially to double the number of PRT’s (from 10 to 20) and civilian personnel to man them (from 300 to 600). The actual response to this challenge has been less than impressive. Of the first 160 requirements, initially to be filled by civilian officials, all but a handful have been filled by military personnel. If current trends persist, these DoD personnel will not be replaced by employees of the appropriate civilian agency by the originally agreed date (February, 2007), unless the respective agencies rely on contractors as opposed to their own employees. The remaining surge positions were to be filled by civilians from various civilian departments (approximately 120), but progress on identifying them and getting
them to Iraq has been slow. Financial support of PRT’s has been similarly meager, in the

case of both OEF and OIF just a fraction of overall expenditures on these operations.

Conclusion

Despite the significant challenges being faced by PRT members, they are making a
difference. The testimonials coming from the military commanders who work with PRT’s have
been universally positive. The value added by PRT’s is directly in line with the latest
counterinsurgency strategy that military commanders are attempting to implement in both
Afghanistan and Iraq. They are integral to the effort to win over populations and convince them
that the legitimate local government, supported by national and Coalition forces, can offer
opportunities that are far preferable to those offered by the insurgent.

Perhaps equally significant, the PRT can serve as a model for the integration of the
integration of the efforts of US government civilian and military organizations. The principals
that now guide PRT activities, and what we have learned from the lessons associated with their
establishment and initial operations—where things worked and where they didn’t, could well
inform the efforts of studies and analyses currently underway to improve interagency
cooperation and coordination.
Prepared Statement
Kathleen H. Hicks
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“The Evolving Role of the Department of Defense in Development and Security Assistance”

December 5, 2007

United States House of Representatives
Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Defense Department's evolving role in delivering security and humanitarian assistance. Over the past year, my colleague, Steven Morrison, and I have co-directed a unique Task Force on Non-Traditional Security Assistance that has sought to understand this evolution and the international and interagency dynamics it produces. This Task Force is co-led by Representatives Robert Andrews (D-NJ) and Mark Kirk (R-IL). Our task force formed from a simple yet surprisingly unusual concept—to bring together experts from the defense, diplomacy, and development sectors to examine military and civilian roles in new forms of U.S. security assistance and development. As you might imagine, these stakeholders brought a wide range of experience and viewpoints to the problem set. The Task Force’s recommendations, which are scheduled to be released later this month, reflect a strong majority viewpoint that spans across each of these sometimes divided domains.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. concept and approach to global security have changed fundamentally. Weak and failing states, long neglected, have risen as a priority focus. We understand that threats to U.S. interests can emanate from within states with which the United States is not at war and that persistent poverty can be a significant contributor to those threats. There is now a strategic imperative to devise multi-decade, integrated approaches that are preventative in nature. Foundational to this preventative approach is sustainable overseas partnerships that build capacity for good governance and security, foster economic prosperity and social wellbeing, and more effectively promote community-level development. Accordingly, we now place a very explicit, and far higher premium, on the unity of effort of our foreign and national security policy instruments, especially defense, diplomacy, and development. Provisional Reconstruction Teams are emblematic of this trend.

In just a few short years, the Pentagon’s role as a direct provider of foreign assistance has surged. From 2002 to 2005, DoD’s share of U.S. official development assistance increased from 5.6% to 21.7%. The Department of Defense (DoD) has assumed an expanding role in counter-terrorism, capacity building, post-conflict operations, and humanitarian relief. Beyond implementing traditional military-to-military programs supported by State Department funds, DoD has been granted temporary authorities to use directly appropriated funds both for prevention and post-conflict response, concentrated in conflict-ridden, non-permissive environments where civilian actors have difficulty operating or where civilian capacities are weak or absent. DoD has also provided billions of “reimbursement” dollars to coalition members, such as Pakistan and Jordan, outside of the formal State Department-run Economic Support Funds process.1

Meanwhile, the United States has continued to under-resource the diplomatic and development instruments of its national power. The staffing, programs and operational capacities of the US Agency for International Development and the US Department of State have continued to stagnate at the very moment in history when diplomatic and development agencies should be better, not less well positioned to advance the United States' new, evolving global agenda.

Focus of Inquiry

Our Task Force focused on three areas of DoD non-traditional security assistance:
• **Counter-Terrorism (CT) Capacity Building Assistance** to help partner countries police and control their territories, so that these territories do not become havens for terrorists, criminals and insurgents. Relevant initiatives include the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership, East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, and Section 1206 authority to train and equip foreign security forces for CT and stability operations.

• **Post-Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction** efforts to shore up weak states and prevent their deterioration and consolidate peace following “major combat operations;” including the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as a vehicle to promote military-civilian collaboration in the field, and the creation of new funding mechanisms, notably the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP).

• **Humanitarian Relief** in response to major natural disasters (e.g., the Indian Ocean Tsunami and the Pakistan earthquake), failed states and prolonged irregular warfare.

The Task Force also examined the newly-launched U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) with a view to how the military might pursue its coordination with the diplomatic and development communities most effectively to achieve success in the above three areas.

My testimony today will focus on the Task Force’s overall assessment of the military-civilian balance in security and humanitarian assistance and its specific findings and recommendations with respect to PRTs.

**Overall Findings and Recommendations**

The United States stands at a crossroads in defining the contours of its national security policy. The Department of Defense’s growing provision of non-traditional security assistance -- and the Pentagon’s request to expand and make some new assistance authorities permanent -- reflect an understandable effort to work around this asymmetry to respond to urgent contingencies. The Pentagon’s entry into new forms of security assistance does bring distinct short-term benefits in insecure environments, particularly in countries deemed critical to winning the global war on terrorism, where DoD conducts diverse missions such as helping improve the effectiveness of security forces, restoring systems of governance, and providing essential services.

By defaulting to reliance on the military, however, the United States aggravates existing institutional imbalances. The authority, responsibilities and resources of the U.S. military continue to grow as US civilian diplomatic and developmental capacities further erode. Moreover, recent trends risk over-extending the already stretched U.S. armed forces. Although there are compelling reasons to give DoD flexibility to provide foreign assistance in specific, circumscribed crisis situations, granting more permanent, global authorities does not address the larger structural problem and must be handled carefully to avoid undermining both sustainable capacity-building and broader U.S. foreign policy interests.

To advance U.S. national interests into the future, it will be critical to re-balance the military and non-military components of U.S. global engagement. This will entail systematically correcting
the asymmetry between civilian and military resources and authorities. Equally important, it requires building up relevant civilian expertise within State and USAID, so that they are in a position to deliver stability-creating assistance in difficult environments."

To unify the US Government's approach to national security, the Task Force intends to make the following four recommendations."

First, the Executive Branch must provide increased budget transparency to Congress in the form of an integrated resource picture for U.S. foreign, national, and homeland security policy. Wholesale revision of the existing congressional authorization and appropriations structure would require bold leadership and near unanimous support in Congress—conditions that will not obtain in the near term. Nevertheless, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the National Security Council (NSC) should be required to document more systematically how the foreign assistance streams for USAID, State, DoD and other relevant U.S. agencies fit together. Such transparency would help provide an accurate portrait to Congress of what the United States is actually spending across agencies to meet its most pressing national security challenges, as well as facilitate the creation of benchmarks to assess progress in meeting these objectives through various instruments of national power.

Second, Congress should take steps to ensure more effective and comprehensive oversight over foreign and security assistance programs across existing committee jurisdictions. One potential solution would be the creation of a Select Committee on U.S. National Security in both the Senate and the House, comprised of bipartisan leadership from all relevant communities. Simply improving coordination processes across committees could also bear fruit.

Third, both Congress and the Executive need to elevate the priority attached to development, placing it on an equal footing with defense and diplomacy in U.S. foreign and national security policy. To this end, the Task Force calls for a significant increase in U.S. official development assistance (ODA), and for better integration of the multiple streams of development aid.

Fourth, to improve the performance of civilian agencies in conflict prevention and post-conflict response, the Task Force recommends the next administration appoint an NSC Senior Director for Conflict Prevention and Response to serve as a locus of inter-agency coordination on these issues in the White House, in close concert with OMB. The Senior Director should also occupy the contingency planning role envisioned in Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), "Managing Complex Contingency Operations." At the same time, the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) should be empowered with a larger multi-year funding stream, so that it may lead contingency planning for the State Department and USAID. The State Department should create and Congress provide budget support for the standing Civilian Reserve Corps proposed by President Bush in his January 2007 State of the Union address. Congress and the White House should also expand the expeditionary capabilities of civilian agencies, particularly within the US Agency for International Development.
PRT Findings and Recommendations

I’d like to briefly review the Task Force’s findings and recommendations with respect to PRTs. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, these joint civilian-military teams seem to have enjoyed a measure of success in enhancing local security, conducting small-scale reconstruction efforts, and facilitating the expanding presence of the central government to localities. PRTs hold potential as a platform for integrating civilian and military instruments and provide sufficient flexibility to field commanders in unique operational environments. At the same time, PRTs suffer from important limitations, outlined below.

Ambiguous mandate and absence of interagency doctrine: Returning members complain about a lack of clear guidance on core PRT objectives, including the relative priority of security, governance and development goals. There is no interagency doctrine to provide a common frame of reference about the PRTs’ mission and how to achieve it, and the heavy focus on force protection and military considerations has often limited scope for reconstruction efforts. In Afghanistan, placement of U.S. PRTs under a military commander has often led allies and local populations to consider them overly militarized.

Little strategic planning or baseline assessments: PRT activities remain opportunistic and idiosyncratic, with individual PRT approaches evolving independently and shaped by the personality and interests of the PRT commander, rather than being embedded in a larger military or developmental effort. Although it is important that commanders retain operational flexibility, PRT activities have rarely benefited from an integrated, civilian-military planning framework linking their activities to broader USG strategies. Nor have most US PRTs conducted interagency needs assessments to inform projects in their areas of responsibility (AORs).

Shortfalls in the governance and rule of law components of PRT action: Inherent in the idea of PRTs is a continuum of activities ranging from quick impact projects and providing immediate physical security to more challenging institution-building efforts in areas like security sector reform, governance and the rule of law. Progress in addressing these higher levels of capacity-building remains modest. Despite the stated aim of expanding the reach of the Afghan central government, for example, PRTs have often empowered warlords as provincial governors and police chiefs, cementing their positions.

Little enduring developmental impact: The PRT emphasis on speed has sometimes contributed to unsustainable projects. In the words of a major interagency assessment of PRTs in Afghanistan, “Schools were built without teachers and clinics without doctors.” In response to these criticisms, Afghan PRTs have begun to adopt a “systems” approach to their intervention, reportedly including greater “synching up with USAID.” The impact of this change remains to be seen.

Inadequate civilian resources, personnel and training to match ambitions: State and USAID have been criticized for failing to deploy qualified personnel to PRTs in anything like the numbers required, and projects funded via USAID’s Quick Impact Project (QIP) resources remain significantly slower than those funded by CERP. These problems have been
compounded by rapid staff turnover—even at the highest levels—and inadequate pre-deployment training. Similarly, DoD has been criticized for failing to match the skill sets of those deployed to PRTs with the job descriptions they are asked to fill. Most PRTs have been formed in-country. The State is seeking to add 57 new billets at S/CRS, but this modest step falls far short of current or expected future requirements.

Fraught PRT/NGO relations: The use of soldiers to perform humanitarian and reconstruction tasks continues to draw opposition from other aid providers. This is particularly true of international NGOs, who believe PRTs blur the distinction between military and civilian spheres, erode “humanitarian space,” and encourage the targeting of relief and development workers. NGOs would prefer that the U.S. military provide ambient security and leave humanitarian and reconstruction efforts to them.

Lack of metrics to gauge PRT performance: In the absence of any clear criteria and indicators to gauge impact (as opposed to simply inputs and outputs), it is difficult to assess PRT performance. Nor have PRTs developed a clear “exit strategy” with benchmarks, outlining the transition of US/NATO operations to local control.

To maximize the potential of PRTs, the Task Force intends to make the following recommendations:

- Advises the NSC to initiate a government-wide process to clarify PRT mandate and doctrine, including agency roles.
- Recommends that DoD and its civilian partners conduct more comprehensive strategic planning and baseline assessments.
- Recommends expanded pre-deployment training of interagency teams.
- Endorses a streamlining of USAID funds in post-conflict settings.
- Calls for greater monitoring and evaluation of impact, including for security, governance, and development.
- Advocates the development of robust civilian response and reserve corps to support future civilian-military teams, with attendant training and incentives.
- Welcomes the recent DoD agreement with NGOs on “rules of the road” in insecure environments.

Conclusion

In charting a whole-of-government approach to security assistance and development, the Executive Branch and Congress need to answer the following key questions.

- Are recent trends exceptional—or are they part of a long-term trajectory of ever greater reliance upon DoD to provide non-traditional assistance? I believe U.S. national interests will continue to require effective development assistance, including in support of defense and diplomatic objectives as well as for traditional poverty reduction goals. Absent a concerted major effort to ensure significant improvements in diplomatic and developmental capacities, however, DoD will inexorably shoulder an increasing share of
the burden in building the capacities of weak and failing states and rebuilding war-torn countries.

- **Is the Department of Defense the right agency to be playing this role?** I think the answer is, generally, no. Other than in armed conflicts or similar discrete operations, it is inadvisable to yield leadership for humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism, and post conflict reconstruction to the military. Nevertheless, there is an ongoing need for effective military contributions to overall US security assistance.

- **What impact do recent trends have on U.S. foreign policy?** DoD non-traditional security assistance can be indispensable in responding to urgent U.S. security challenges and strategic needs. At the same time, care must be taken to strengthen rather than undermine State Department leadership in international affairs. Similarly, DoD programs must bolster broader U.S. foreign policy objectives to achieve enduring stability, economic prosperity and community development. Smart, agile concurrence procedures can help better align DoD aid programs with the broader U.S. foreign policy agenda.

- **What impact do recent trends have on U.S. development objectives?** The short-term security imperatives of winning “hearts and minds” apparent in DoD’s design and delivery of security assistance will sometimes undermine longer-term development considerations. This is necessary in some situations, particularly in cases of insurgency. As a rule, however, DoD aid programs should be nested within broader U.S. efforts to build effective, accountable, and sustainable local institutions, and the Pentagon whenever possible should work with – and be active advocates of – civilian agencies, international organizations and NGOs in the design and implementation of development and humanitarian projects.

- **What balance should the United States seek between DoD and civilian capabilities?** The Bush Administration and its successor should work with Congress to build more robust capacities within U.S. civilian agencies to help meet public security, good governance, and development challenges in unstable and post-conflict countries, and to reduce reliance on DoD for these tasks. A high priority should be augmenting and building up the capacities of civilian agencies. Not only will this allow stand alone civilian capacity, it will also create the necessary civilian capacity to liaison with and integrate into defense organizations. In the interim, the authorities granted DoD to build the capacities of partner countries, such as through Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act, should largely remain temporary and limited to named contingency operations, rather than be made global and permanent as the Bush Administration has requested.

- **How realistic is it to expect that robust civilian capacities will actually emerge and be funded?** A business-as-usual approach to these pressing issues is simply unacceptable. Meeting the security challenges of the twenty-first century requires the United States to marshal the full range of instruments of national power and influence. Creating a whole-of-government approach and requiring the Executive Branch to explain how its budgets support a unified national security and foreign aid strategy will substantially improve the
nation's ability to address the structural roots of poor governance, instability and extremism in the developing world.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I stand ready to answer any questions you or other members have at this time.

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1. To date, insufficient tracking of these funds has hampered DoD's ability to justify them on the grounds of reimbursement for coalition expenses. It is also questionable whether DoD, rather than the State Department, should have authority over disbursement of coalition funds. As recent events in Pakistan have highlighted, this is a significant and potentially worrisome issue area that warrants further study.

2. Remaining USAMID's once-respected technical expertise would be a good place to start. Reestablishing specialized units like the Office of Transition Initiative (OTI), USAMID has only modest standing, deployable technical expertise. There is only one person within USAMID, for example, engaged full time in security sector reform (SSR).

3. Although we acknowledged the many shortcomings in the outdated Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, the Task Force focused its energy on identifying smart, actionable steps that can attract broad bipartisan support and bring quick results.

4. These difficulties are compounded by the very different approaches adopted by other nations with PRTs, including in some cases the insertion of "national careers."

5. Another contested issue has been the provision of security and logistical support for PRTs. In early 2007 State and DoD hammered out agreement to resolve this long-running dispute.

6. **Provincial Reconstruction Teams In Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment**


8. In response, in winter 2007, the US began offering PRT teams pre-deployment training at the Foreign Service Institute.