    [House Hearing, 110 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 110-96]

    MEASURING AND INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION
                                     TEAMS

                                   __________

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                   OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                OCTOBER 18, 2007

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                   OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

                         VIC SNYDER, Arkansas, Chairman
    JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina          W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
    LORETTA SANCHEZ, California          ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
    ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California        WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
    ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey           JEFF MILLER, Florida
    SUSAN A. DAVIS, California           PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
    JIM COOPER, Tennessee                K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
    HANK JOHNSON, Georgia                GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
    JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania
                    Greg Marchand, Professional Staff Member
                    Thomas Hawley, Professional Staff Member
                    Roger Zakheim, Professional Staff Member
                         Sasha Rogers, Staff Assistant

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                         CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
                                      2007

                                                                       Page

    Hearing:

    Thursday, October 18, 2007, Measuring and Increasing the
      Effectiveness of Provincial Reconstruction Teams...............     1

    Appendix:

    Thursday, October 18, 2007.......................................    29
                                  ----------

                           THURSDAY, OCTOBER 18, 2007
    MEASURING AND INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION
                                     TEAMS
                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking
      Member, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee..............     2
    Snyder, Hon. Vic, a Representative from Arkansas, Chairman,
      Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee......................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Bowen, Stuart W., Jr., Special Inspector General for Iraq
      Reconstruction.................................................     3
    Perito, Robert M., Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-
      Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, U.S. Institute of
      Peace..........................................................     5

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Akin, Hon. W. Todd...........................................    34
        Bowen, Stuart W., Jr.........................................    37
        Perito, Robert M.............................................    48
        Snyder, Hon. Vic.............................................    33

    Documents Submitted for the Record:
        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:

        Dr. Snyder...................................................    57
    MEASURING AND INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION
                                     TEAMS

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                     Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee,
                            Washington, DC, Thursday, October 18, 2007.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in
    room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
     ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

        Dr. Snyder. The hearing will come to order.
        Good morning. I appreciate you both being here. Welcome to
    the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations' hearing on
    measuring and improving the effectiveness of provincial
    reconstruction teams, that we know as PRTs.
        Over the past one and a half months, the subcommittee has
    held a number of hearings and briefings to examine PRTs in Iraq
    and Afghanistan, as part of an interagency case study. These
    sessions have included military and civilian personnel who have
    worked on PRTs, government officials with PRT oversight
    responsibilities, and outside experts who specialize in civil-
    military affairs and reconstruction-related activities. We are
    so impressed with these really magnificent and thoughtful and
    brave people who serve on these PRTs.
        One question that we have not heard sufficiently addressed
    to this point is whether PRTs, as currently constituted, are
    effectively accomplishing the missions they have been given.
    Some of you may recall at a hearing a couple of weeks ago, Mrs.
    Susan Davis from California put this question directly to our
    Department of Defense witnesses: How are we measuring the
    effectiveness of PRTs?
        Their answer was that there are no standardized metrics for
    determining whether PRTs are effective, because it is too
    difficult to establish such standards in a way that also
    accounts for the different regional conditions faced by each
    team.
        I am pleased that we have the opportunity at today's
    hearing to consider the newly-released third report of the
    special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction on PRTs.
    SIGIR has played a leading role in examining the development of
    PRTs in Iraq, and today's report is an important step along the
    way to measure the effectiveness of PRTs.
        Our witnesses today are Mr. Stuart Bowen, the special
    inspector general for Iraq reconstruction; and Mr. Robert
    Perito, a senior program officer with the Center for Post-
    Conflict Peace and Stability Operations at the U.S. Institute
    of Peace.
        Thank you both for being here.
        Mr. Akin, I will recognize you for any comments you want to
    make.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the
    Appendix on page 33.]

    STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI,
       RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

        Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome to the committee here. We have had some very
    interesting hearings on PRTs. This is the third public hearing,
    and the focus is on measuring the effectiveness of PRTs. While
    the subcommittee has studied the concept of how an interagency
    team comprised of civilian and military personnel works to
    extend the reach of the government in regional provinces and
    local areas, we have not investigated how the PRTs in Iraq and
    Afghanistan are performing.
        Measuring the PRTs, it would seem to me, is an art and not
    really a science. As our witnesses' testimony reveals, each PRT
    faces a unique set of challenges that make it difficult to
    judge one against the other. As a result, success in Ninewa
    province in the northern region of Iraq may look entirely
    different from an effective PRT in Baghdad or Anbar province.
        The ethnic composition of a province, the relative
    permissiveness of the area, and the education and skills of the
    population are just a few variables that will shape the
    conditions and challenges a PRT will face and determine its
    potential for success. Thus, what may be a great success in one
    province may look like marginal progress when compared to
    another province. Nevertheless, as the Congress continues to
    fund PRTs, it is our responsibility to assess the effectiveness
    of the project.
        I would thank both of our witnesses. You have done an
    admirable job in completing this task.
        So finally, the subject of stabilization operations
    generally is critical to transitioning a local area from a
    combat zone to business and development zone or a quiet
    residential neighborhood. In my view, sufficient troop
    strength, combined with increasing the numbers of PRTs, is a
    formula we should continue to use to stabilize both Iraq and
    Afghanistan. The exact moment when the PRTs' work is done,
    however, is unclear, as these countries will be in a perpetual
    state of improving governments and increasing economic
    development. I would like our witnesses to comment on how they
    would determine when a PRT's work is done.
        Thank you very much for joining us.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for another interesting hearing
    topic.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the
    Appendix on page 34.]
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Akin.
        Your written statements are made a part of the record, as
    is your complete report, Mr. Bowen, from the very beginning
    introductory page to every attachment, will be made a part of
    the written record. When you are done with any oral comments
    you want to make, we will ask questions. We will put ourselves
    on a five-minute clock, and we will go in order of people here
    at the sound of the gavel, in the order in which they come in.
        We will put the timer on you so when the red light goes
    off, it will be at the end of five minutes, but we want you to,
    if you have other things to tell us beyond the red light
    territory, you go ahead and do that. That is primarily just to
    give you an idea of where you are at.
        So we will begin with you, Mr. Bowen.

     STATEMENT OF STUART W. BOWEN, JR., SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
                        FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

        Mr. Bowen. Thank you.
        Good morning, Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Akin and
    members of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.
    Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to present
    the findings of our latest report on PRTs, a review of the
    effectiveness of the provincial reconstruction team program in
    Iraq.
        I am pleased to be joined this morning by the lead auditor,
    Pat Dickriede, who traveled all over Iraq and visited over 20
    of the PRTs and really did an outstanding job of putting
    together one of our very best audits, and a very important
    audit because, as this committee rightly has recognized, the
    PRT program is an essential element to success in Iraq.
        As SIGIR as described it in our quarterly reports, the PRT
    program is the most important nationwide--that is country-
    wide--capacity building program the United States is supporting
    right now. Its focus is on building government capacity among
    the provincial councils and promoting recovery, economic and
    otherwise, within each of the 18 provinces.
        About $2 billion has been appropriated already by the
    Congress to support this program. Another $1 billion, roughly,
    is in the mix, and 600 persons have been identified and
    deployed on the ground or enroute to Iraq to work in this
    program. So this is a good moment to have a detailed review
    like this of what has happened and what has been achieved thus
    far.
        The PRT program is a civil-military integrated program run
    by the Department of State and the Department of Defense. It is
    a joint effort, an integrated effort to assist Iraq's
    provincial and local governments to develop democracy. That is
    the core issue economically, politically and otherwise. It
    employs integrated multidisciplinary teams composed to U.S. and
    Coalition civilian and military personnel to teach, coach and
    mentor provincial and local government officials in their core
    competencies.
        It has evolved since it started in November of 2005, when
    the first three PRTs were stood up in Mosul, Kirkuk and Hillah.
    As of this past August, the program comprises 10 PRTs from the
    original program, 7 provincial support teams which help provide
    additional capacity building in those provinces that don't have
    a permanent standing PRT, and 15 of the recently deployed
    embedded PRTs, or ePRTs, part of the surge program. Those ePRTs
    are focused primarily in Baghdad and in Anbar province.
        This report is our third one, and it provides a detailed
    review of what has been accomplished in each region and looks
    at each region's PRT performance in five areas: governance,
    rule of law, economic development, reconstruction and
    reconciliation. The core finding is that there is work to be
    done in developing effective and measurable strategic plans and
    milestones for the existing PRTs. That was a finding we had one
    year ago. It was renewed in our July report, and we renew it
    again here.
        The other finding we have is the need to coordinate
    Commander's Emergency Response Program funding within the PRT
    system, especially now that the quick reaction force funds, QRF
    funds, are moving out. These are the PRDC funds and others that
    will help build and recover each of the provinces.
        With respect to each of the subject areas that we looked at
    among the PRTs, in governance the prevailing theme was that the
    key obstacle was the failure of the council representatives to
    pass the provincial powers law. It is the enabling legislation
    that authorizes what the provincial councils and local councils
    will be able to do once stood up. It is a long-overdue piece of
    legislation and one of the five key elements that are currently
    being pushed by the embassy with the Iraqi government right
    now.
        Rule of law, it speaks for itself. It has been problematic
    for the last four years in Iraq. General Jones's report
    identified the challenges within the MOI at the national level.
    Those challenges, of course, filter down to the local level.
    When I was in Baghdad this last August, I met with a judge who
    complained about continuing intimidation, and that is not just
    in Baghdad, but it is elsewhere.
        Economic development, there is some progress there. The
    microloan program has been working reasonably well, and we have
    seen signs of new factories open and employment, but
    unemployment continues to be a key issue and will be essential
    to making progress.
        Reconstruction, the PRDCs continue to move forward on
    projects, continue to build their own capacity locally to
    execute and oversee key reconstruction elements. Political
    reconciliation, the PRTs played a significant role in the Anbar
    awakening, if you will, the fact that Anbar, once a place where
    the provincial council could not meet at all and the PRT could
    not even operate. They would operate from Baghdad, and now
    operate in Ramadi and progress has been made there
    significantly.
        This is a key update on what has been going on nationwide
    among the various PRTs. The staffing issues I know continue to
    be a concern of this committee and are a valid concern. The
    funding is appropriate to push this initiative forward, but for
    you to understand how they are doing, specific plans need to be
    developed for each PRT that provides metrics and milestones,
    and thus provide you feedback on that progress.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Bowen can be found in the
    Appendix on page 37.]
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
        By the way, our ranking member, Mr. Akin, has
    responsibilities on another subcommittee so he will be jogging
    in and out of here.
        Mr. Perito.

     STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. PERITO, SENIOR PROGRAM OFFICER, CENTER
        FOR POST-CONFLICT PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS, U.S.
                           INSTITUTE OF PEACE

        Mr. Perito. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very
    much, members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity
    to appear before the subcommittee and to talk about the U.S.
    experience with provincial reconstruction teams in both Iraq
    and Afghanistan.
        I would like to share with you some observations that I
    have on the U.S. PRT program and some recommendations I have as
    to how it might be improved. I am required to say that these
    are my own views and not those of the U.S. Institute of Peace,
    which does not advocate specific policy positions.
        Provincial reconstruction teams, as we heard, are small
    civil-military units that assist provincial and other levels of
    government to govern more effectively and deliver essential
    services. The original PRTs were started in Afghanistan in
    2002. The idea was to combine Army civil affairs teams, called
    ``chiclets'' at the time, with a force protection unit and with
    civilian representatives from government agencies. The idea was
    to provide a platform which would allow civilian government
    agencies to operate in secure environments.
        As we have heard, there are now 25 PRTs in Afghanistan
    operating under a NATO-led international security assistance
    force. These PRTs are led by the United States and 12 other
    NATO and Coalition partners, and another dozen or so countries
    contribute personnel, financial and material support.
        On November 11, 2005, Secretary of State Rice inaugurated
    the first of ten PRTs in Iraq. Unlike their counterparts in
    Afghanistan, these PRTs are mostly civilian, led by the State
    Department. They include private contractors and Iraqis. Then
    on January 10, the President announced the creation of ten
    additional PRTs as part of his New Way Forward in Iraq. These
    PRTs, so-called ``embedded'' PRTs or ePRTs, are part of
    military brigade combat teams that operate in Baghdad and Anbar
    province. In addition to the U.S. PRTs in Iraq, there are three
    PRTs that are operated by our Coalition partners, the U.K,
    Italy, and South Korea.
        It is difficult to discuss PRTs because there has been such
    a proliferation of styles and models. In Afghanistan, the U.S.
    practice was to establish PRTs and then hand them off to
    Coalition or NATO partners. The result has been a proliferation
    of different kinds of styles and models. For example, the
    German PRTs, in contrast to our own, have over 300 people, a
    very large civilian component, that operates very separately
    from a small and highly restricted military component.
        The U.S. has three models for PRTs. The Afghan model has 80
    personnel. All but three of them are military. Civilian
    representatives are from the Department of State, generally a
    junior officer or retiree, a USAID contractor, and a volunteer
    from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The force protection
    unit is a U.S. National Guard platoon, and then there are two
    teams of civil affairs.
        In Iraq, the original ten PRTs were composed mostly of
    civilians from State, from the Justice Department, and from the
    Agriculture Department. The only military were a couple of
    civil affairs teams, some odd civil affairs soldiers that did
    jobs that no one else can fill, and somebody from the Army
    Corps of Engineers. There were also civilian contractors and
    some Iraqis that provided translation and other services.
        And then the new PRTs, the embedded PRTs, are very small.
    Each has a core group of someone from State, DOD, civil
    affairs, and a translator-interpreter cultural affairs adviser.
    And then there are from 8 to 12 civilian specialists who make
    up the team, and they operate as almost advisers to the
    commander of the brigade combat team.
        PRTs not only have different organizations, but they also
    have very different missions. In Afghanistan, the mission of
    U.S. PRTs is to extend the authority of a weak central
    government into the provinces where warlords and what the
    military called ``regional influentials'' have traditionally
    held sway. In Iraq, it is the exact opposite. The mission is to
    strengthen the provincial governments against the traditionally
    strong center.
        Beyond some rather vague mission statements for the
    embedded PRTs and talk about enabling moderates and dissuading
    extremists, there is really no agreement within the U.S.
    Government or between the U.S. and its allies on what PRTs
    should accomplish. The priorities and programs often reflect
    local conditions and obvious opportunities. There is no
    interagency-approved concept of operations for PRTs. The Army's
    lessons learned program recently published a PRT playbook on
    its website, but this playbook was not approved by the civilian
    government agencies State, USAID, et cetera that participated
    in drafting the document.
        PRT priorities, programs and effectiveness are strongly
    dependent on the personalities of those who serve on the teams.
    In the absence of an overall concept of operation doctrine or
    other guidance, personalities are able to determine what the
    teams do. It is also very important that personalities get
    along. In teams that gel, things go smoothly. In teams where
    people have their own agencies or can't get along for some
    reason, then things go very badly.
        The staffing of PRTs has highlighted a problem that affects
    our government particularly. U.S. civilian government agencies
    do not have any kind of surge capacity to staff PRTs or any
    other kind of post-conflict operations. This does not just
    involve providing bodies. It involves providing skilled
    specialists who are Federal employees with a broad range of
    critical skills who can go out and represent their agencies and
    do the job.
        In the new ePRTs, because the State Department did not have
    any people to take the civilian slots, the slots were filled by
    Army Reservists and members of the National Guard. State now
    has the funds to hire contractors, but the handover will not be
    completed until next summer.
        There is a myth that PRTs provide security because they
    involve military personnel, but this is simply not true. In
    Afghanistan, PRTs do form part of the ISAF general security
    presence, but PRTs have no offensive capability, and their only
    security mission is to protect themselves. The role of the PRT
    platoon is to provide convoy security when people decide to go
    outside the wire.
        PRTs in Iraq live on U.S. military bases and depend on base
    security and on U.S. military forces to provide their security.
    Under a February, 2007 MOU, State and DOD finally agreed, after
    a year of wrangling, that the military would provide convoy
    security for PRTs, but this was not before incidences where
    State was very disturbed to find that when convoys were
    attacked carrying PRT members, soldiers did what they were
    trained to do--they stood and fought--or that they combined
    escorting PRT members with patrols against insurgents.
        PRTs have contributed to improved governance and economic
    development in some areas. PRTs have been successful in
    facilitating cooperation between provincial governors,
    representatives of central government ministries, and elected
    provincial councils in Iraq. They also have been able to prod
    the central government to approve funding for provincial-level
    project proposals and to release funds so that projects can be
    implemented. Increasingly, PRTs are demonstrating that these
    efforts have resulted in improved conditions in provinces in
    Iraq.
        EPRTs, which operate at a sub-provincial level dealing with
    municipal and district officials, perhaps are just too new to
    be able to demonstrate such success. In Afghanistan, PRTs work
    with provincial governors and the provincial police chief on
    the general assumption that since these people are appointed by
    the central government, they represent President Karzai and his
    priorities and his programs. In some cases, this is true. In
    others where regional leaders or provincial leaders have their
    own agendas, then PRTs are either stymied or they use all their
    energy to try to get these officials removed.
        While PRTs vary in size, organization and function, they
    share several common problems which could be solved if they
    receive proper attention. The first of these could be
    summarized under the phrase ``improvisation is not a concept of
    operations.'' PRTs really need an agreed concept of operations
    and an agreed organizational structure with a single chain of
    command.
        In PRTs in Iraq, there is a bifurcated chain of command. A
    State Department official is responsible for political and
    economic issues. His military deputy is responsible for
    security and movement. There is no one in charge, thus no one
    to referee disputes. Even simple things like who gets the
    security escort to go out on a daily call can be an issue of
    some concern and dissension.
        The second problem might be summarized by the phrase,
    ``Without agreed objectives, it is difficult to judge
    effectiveness.'' There is need for an agreed set of objectives
    for PRTs and an agreed set of measurements for measuring their
    performance. Absent a means of determining whether PRTs are
    effective, it is difficult to determine whether alternative
    mechanisms might better achieve our purposes.
        As one colonel in Afghanistan told me, ``Well, we just sort
    of look at the province. If it is doing well, we figure the PRT
    must be doing its job.'' The lack of means for evaluating PRTs,
    however, has not prevented their proliferation. As we have
    seen, there are five new PRTs operating in Iraq without any
    real judgment having been made or any real scrutiny applied as
    to whether this form of organization does a better job than
    perhaps others.
        The next problem might be summarized with the phrase,
    ``Stability operations is not a game for pickup teams.'' U.S.
    civilian agencies need to recruit Federal employees with
    expertise and the skills required to staff PRTs. This is a new
    requirement for government service. The government needs to
    create the capacity to meet this need.
        Permanent agency representatives can serve and train
    alongside their military counterparts and represent their
    agencies. This is not possible using commercial contractors or
    relying on military reservists and National Guardsmen to staff
    civilian functions.
        If I could digress for just a minute, when I came into the
    foreign service way back in the late 1960's, in the midst of
    the Vietnam War, we were involved in something called the CORDS
    program in Vietnam. There were 15,000 AID foreign service
    officers at that point. Thousands of them and hundreds of my
    fellow foreign service officers served in CORDS in Vietnam.
    This is a capacity which we had and we have lost. We need to
    regain it.
        Finally, I would say that ``Silence is not a public
    information program for PRTs.'' The U.S. PRT program suffers
    from a lack of public information on the nature and the results
    of its efforts. Other than these very helpful reports produced
    by SIGIR, it is very difficult to tell what PRTs are doing. In
    the massive amount of media reporting that is going on about
    Iraq and Afghanistan, it is very difficult to find articles
    that are written about what PRTs are up to.
        AID recently has published a magazine called ``Iraq PRTs,''
    both in English and Arabic, which talks about PRT operations.
    This is a commendable step forward, but long overdue. In this
    regard, I would like to express my appreciation to you, Mr.
    Chairman and to the members of the subcommittee for this series
    of hearings. I think it is very important to shed light on this
    operation and to raise questions about this program and to
    subject it to some kind of systematic analysis and scrutiny.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Perito can be found in the
    Appendix on page 48.]
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you both for your testimony.
        Our systematic analysis will be delayed for a few minutes
    while we go to vote. We have one vote. I will come back, and
    with the arrival of the first Republican member, we will begin
    our questioning. After that, we should have well over an hour
    before we are interrupted again.
        We are recessed.
        [Recess.]
        Dr. Snyder. We will come back to order here. We will go
    ahead and start the five-minute clock. If we don't have any
    other members return by the time my five minutes is up, I will
    just keep rolling.
        We appreciate your testimony. I just want to make a comment
    before I ask a couple of questions. I was struck I think it was
    a couple of weeks ago in the newspaper by a newspaper photo of
    an Iraqi man holding the body of his three-year-old son that
    was wrapped in a carpet. Apparently, the boy had been
    kidnapped, and I don't know what the result was, if this was
    what he received in return for a ransom, but anyway he ended up
    with the dead body of his three-year-old son. If you think
    about the expectation of people somehow trying to do economic
    development and raise a family and get their kids educated in
    that kind of environment.
        So I was struck in response to your report, Mr. Bowen, the
    suggestion that perhaps some people should be removed from some
    of these areas for security, and the embassy came back and
    said, ``No, they shouldn't; we think that our people need to
    keep working in those areas.'' I think it is consistent with
    the impression we had from some of these really fine people
    working on PRTs that they are very committed to what they are
    doing, and they understand the risks, and they understand that
    they can only do their job when they are out on the road. So
    once again, I commend them for their work.
        On page 34 of your report, it seems to be the whole gut of
    the thing. In fact, I think I will read it. ``We recommend the
    U.S. ambassador to Iraq and the commanding general MNF Iraq
    take these actions: number one, in an expeditious manner,
    jointly establish a comprehensive plan for the PRTs, including
    embedded PRTs, with elements tailored for each PRT.
        ``At a minimum, the plan should, (a), clearly define
    objectives and performance measures; (b), clearly define
    milestones for achieving stated objectives; (c), be linked to
    funding requirements; and (d), identify the organizations
    within each agency that are accountable for the plan's
    implementation.
        ``To provide senior-level attention to this issue, the plan
    should be approved by the office of the chief-of-mission and
    the MNF Iraq commander to demonstrate each agency's commitment
    to this effort; two, develop guidance on the use and
    synchronization of CERP funds to support the U.S. government's
    capacity development mission.''
        My question for both of you is, at what level should these
    clearly defined objectives and performance measures, clearly
    defined milestones, at what level in these agencies should this
    occur? This has been one of the concerns of the committee, I
    think, on the broader issue of a lot of folks in this town
    about the lack of coordination between different agencies. At
    what level should these kinds of objectives and performance
    measures and milestones be established?
        Mr. Bowen. Well, we raise it up a level here in our
    recommendation, asking the ambassador and General Petraeus to
    review it and sign-off on it to give it the authority that we
    think it needs, given that this is the third time that this, or
    a recommendation like it, has been put forward in our
    reporting.
        There is an Office of Provincial Authority over there
    already. It is administering the program. OPA was stood up in
    the spring, succeeding the previous organization, but it is
    still getting its own organizational sea legs. It has a new
    director as of six weeks ago. That is why it is important to
    get a higher level buy-in in-theater about how to measure the
    progress so ultimately you in the Congress can ascertain, is
    the PRT program achieving its goals.
        Dr. Snyder. Mr. Perito.
        Mr. Perito. As someone who has served about 35 years in the
    U.S. Government, including a stint on the National Security
    Council staff and at both State, Justice and Commerce, I
    believe very strongly that this should be done in Washington at
    an interagency level equivalent to, say, the deputies committee
    currently, if not the principals committee on the NSC.
        It is very difficult and perhaps somewhat unfair to foist
    this off on an embassy or on a field staff without Washington
    providing any kind of direction. I was invited to participate
    in the interagency working group that came up with the PRT
    playbook. I was struck by the fact that people at that level
    simply did not seem to want to engage. It just seemed too hard
    to them to do this.
        Based on my own experience in government going back years,
    this strikes me as somewhat unusual. In previous
    Administrations dealing with previous problems that also looked
    extremely difficult, the interagency engaged and decisions were
    made and they were brought to high levels of authority and
    signed off on by people with real responsibilities in their
    agencies. So I don't see why this should be any different. It
    is difficult, but why should this be any different. Without
    that, then people in the field are really left to their own
    devices.
        Dr. Snyder. I would like us to continue to have a
    conversation about this, because I can understand, Mr. Bowen,
    why you say what you said, which is different than what Mr.
    Perito said.
        Mr. Perito. But it is not inconsistent.
        Dr. Snyder. No, it is not inconsistent. I guess that is
    right. You could still have your Washington group and then have
    your group at that level.
        Mr. Perito. Right. It has to go out to the field. What is
    decided in Washington has to reflect input from the field and
    has to go out and be acceptable to the field.
        Dr. Snyder. We currently have wars in two nations and PRTs
    in two nations, Afghanistan and Iraq. If I understood what you
    said, that it ought to be at the General Petraeus-and
    Ambassador Crocker-level, then we are not going to have the
    kind of, I don't know if you want to say lessons learned or
    consistency. I mean, I recognize that Afghanistan and Iraq have
    some dramatically different challenges.
        On the other hand, I think we would all agree that there
    are lessons to be learned from work done in other countries,
    and if everything is decided at the country commander-level,
    don't we lose out on the kind of consistency or the lessons
    learned? Help me with that, Mr. Bowen, and your thinking there.
        Mr. Bowen. It is a great point. It is exactly what our
    latest lessons learned report is focused on, and that is the
    need--but this is a bigger need--to develop within the
    interagency a more effective approach, a more effective
    structure to taking on post-conflict contingency relief and
    reconstruction operations, of which the PRTs are a big part.
        If the story of Iraq reconstruction tells anything, teaches
    any lesson, it is that the U.S. Government is not well
    structured and was not well poised in 2003 to engage in the
    kind of post-conflict relief and reconstruction operations that
    we have faced for four years.
        Lessons have been learned. We have done three: one on human
    capital management, one on contract procurement, and the latest
    one on program and project management. They have been applied,
    but they have been applied along the way or ad hoc. That is not
    the way to run a post-conflict operation. In our latest lessons
    learned report released last March, and the focus or our next
    one--our capping report will come out next year--we be in
    putting forth the body of evidence that will allow this issue
    to be addressed and solutions to be developed.
        We will provide some recommendations on that, on how
    integration--we call it the ``beyond Goldwater-Nichols''
    initiative--how the integration of agencies can be more
    effectively structured so that the execution of these problem
    doesn't have to be figured out while the problem is being
    addressed.
        Dr. Snyder. I know there is a lot of interest by members of
    this committee on that issue, as you are probably aware. Mrs.
    Davis and Mr. Davis from California and Kentucky have an ad hoc
    group, their working group on interagency reform, but it is to
    get at that. I think it came out at one of our hearings, but I
    think you discussed it some in your statement, Mr. Perito.
        When we met with some of our folks from Iraq and
    Afghanistan who were working on PRTs, one of their very
    specific--or at least one of them kind of overstated it--but
    just said, ``you need to change the names; we use 'provincial
    reconstruction team' in Iraq and 'provincial reconstruction
    team' in Afghanistan like they are doing the same work.''
        And they say, they are not. In their view--and this is from
    the people on the ground--the provincial reconstruction teams
    in Afghanistan were like project builders. They did bricks-and-
    mortar projects. They did water projects, and it was all good
    stuff. In Iraq, folks felt like, no, what they were doing was
    kind of government capacity building, that they are helping
    other people decide, local people, how they are going to do a
    water project and find funding and sustain it and get it
    repaired and all that kind of thing. But they felt like they
    had dramatically--and ``dramatically''--I don't think it was an
    overstatement, it was dramatically different functions.
        And yet, I am not sure we are getting--and I don't think
    the American public understands that, and I don't think the
    Congress understands that--and that may come from what you are
    talking about, Mr. Perito, that we don't have that kind of
    whatever up-the-stovepipe somewhere interconnection coming
    across.
        Mr. Perito. One of the ways this works out is that you hear
    a lot of loose talk within government circles about, well, why
    don't we send a PRT off to this situation or that situation,
    with people not really understanding what you just said. And
    that is that PRTs are kind of amorphous. We really need
    something which is much more descriptive to describe the kind
    of capacities that we are going to provide. PRTs are a
    misnomer. That term is often misleading. In Iraq, many PRTs
    don't even work with provincial-level authorities.
        Dr. Snyder. Yes. That is a good point.
        Let's see. I have lost page 34. Mr. Bowen, this is your
    chance to educate us at a very basic level. I don't know what
    the difference is between a performance measure and a
    milestone.
        Mr. Bowen. A milestone is an interim achievement along the
    way to an ultimate goal--in other words, a chronology of
    milestones eventually leads to success. That is the plan.
    Performance measures are a finer calibration, perhaps, between
    milestones. They are related, obviously. It is about the PRTs
    doing what they need to do to achieve those goals. It has to do
    with the performance, the personalities involved.
        As we have seen, absent a strategic plan, the story in Iraq
    has been somewhat personality-driven, as Mr. Perito pointed
    out. Having more concretized performance measures and defined
    milestones will hopefully limit a personality-driven
    enterprise.
        Dr. Snyder. Before I go to Dr. Gingrey here--I will give
    him a minute to get his thoughts together--could the two of you
    put your heads together here and give me a couple of examples,
    let us say one from economic development and one from
    education, of a clearly defined objective, a performance
    measure, and a milestone?
        I will throw one out. If I am a PRT, my objective would be,
    I need to have a functioning educational system for grade
    school children to age 12, and then would some of my
    performance measure objectives be--I have to have in this area,
    I need 10 schools in secure areas, with teachers that are
    getting paid.
        Is that the kind of thing we are talking about? And then a
    milestone--I don't know what the milestone would be. I guess
    the milestone would be we actually made it through a school
    year, and everybody was safe. Is that the kind of specificity?
    I see some heads nodding behind you, so maybe I am not totally
    off-base here. Is that the kind of thing we are talking about?
        Mr. Bowen. Yes, sir, I think it is. I think the key element
    in this recommendation is they have to be tailored for each
    PRT.
        Dr. Snyder. Right.
        Mr. Bowen. The provinces vary greatly in north, central and
    south, by region, and by locale.
        Dr. Snyder. I am with you there. I just need to----
        Mr. Bowen. You are right. Concretizing it like that is
    good.
        Dr. Snyder. Because you are asking these groups in a very
    difficult environment to come up with things measurable, and I
    just want to get some specific examples, because I didn't see
    that kind of specificity in your statement. I assume that folks
    that do this work have an understanding of this kind of
    specificity. I just don't. But am I in the ballpark of what we
    are talking about? Mr. Perito, do you have any comments?
        Mr. Perito. Yes, although I want to kind of bring this down
    to what the realities are, particularly the realities in Iraq.
    Just looking at a report yesterday about PRT activities, the
    PRT in Kirkuk, its objective is to get the provincial council
    to meet. The provincial council has not met for a long time and
    there are divisions between the various ethnic groups in the
    provincial council.
        What the PRT has been doing is working with two of these
    groups, talking to them about how to do negotiations and
    actually has now gotten them to engage in negotiations, and
    they are working out an understanding between them so they will
    agree to come to a meeting.
        That is the level, I think, on which a lot of this work is
    being done. As one fellow from Fallujah told me, ``Our job,
    what we are doing now is we are trying to go out. Our rule of
    law work right now is we are going out and we are trying to
    find the judges that are still alive and still around, and get
    them to come to work.'' I mean, it is not in Iraq very often
    that we are setting up education systems. The PRTs are doing
    these very, very fundamental things.
        Dr. Snyder. But let us use that as an example. So your
    objective would be in this town, you want to have an ability of
    citizens to see a judge on a relatively regular basis--weekly
    or monthly or something like that. And your objective is, you
    have to find this many judges, be sure they are paid, be sure
    they are secure. And your milestone is going to be at the end
    of the year, have we had them meet 30 times in a year. Is that
    a reasonable way to look at that of thing?
        Mr. Perito. Or have we got a working court.
        Dr. Snyder. Have we got a working court, and what does that
    mean.
        Mr. Perito. These are very rudimentary, often.
        Dr. Snyder. I understand.
        Mr. Perito. At this point in Iraq, PRTs are working at a
    very rudimentary level, often.
        Dr. Snyder. Yes.
        Dr. Gingrey.
        Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        I want to thank the witnesses for being with us this
    morning. I apologize as usual for the break.
        Mr. Bowen, in your testimony, of course you were talking
    about the five measurements. I want to have you speak a little
    bit more to that.
        Mr. Perito, I really enjoyed your testimony as you kind of
    explained to the committee once again how these PRTs work, both
    first in Afghanistan, and then subsequently in Iraq, and then
    you explained the difference in embedded PRTs versus another.
    There are a lot of different models out there. We have heard
    about that from other witnesses, but I think you did a very
    excellent job of summarizing that for the committee, and I
    appreciate that.
        Inspector General Bowen, the first report, I guess, and you
    were asking for both the Departments of State and Defense to
    get some metrics and some measurements that we could evaluate
    in a better way. I think that was back in October of last year,
    so here we are October of 2007, a year later. It seems that we
    are not really getting the kind of information that we need in
    regard to performance.
        One of you testified that it seems that the measurements
    are based almost anecdotally on the personalities of the
    different PRTs, particularly civilian members. Of course, you
    have these different models in the two countries, and even
    within the country of Iraq, you have these two different models
    of the embedded being so different from the original ten that
    we created.
        So I want some information on why we don't have good
    metrics to measure, and not just hoping that the personalities
    gel, and you get good people, and they all get motivated and
    they are fired up and it is a good team and they do a good job,
    but you don't really have any standards of measurement. So you
    have bad personalities that don't gel, and they don't
    accomplish anything and maybe make matters worse.
        I think I probably would have done very well in the
    military because I like rules and regulations and standards of
    behavior in regular order. I don't see that we really have that
    yet in these PRT teams. So I would like for both of you to
    speak to that.
        Mr. Bowen. You asked directly the core finding of our
    audit. It is full of information about what the PRTs have done,
    but that is not helpful in to unless you have some standards to
    determine whether those activities have achieved milestones,
    have achieved the goals of the PRTs. That, as you rightly point
    out, was our recommendation of a year ago.
        I would like to have been able to come today and tell you
    that those plans have been developed and those metrics are
    being applied, but they haven't. Our audits speak for
    themselves, and it is information for you that that is job one,
    I think, for the new OPA director to ensure that there are
    well-tailored, clear, fundamental metrics, measures and
    milestones for measurement of how the PRTs are doing.
        The other important issue is that it is not one-size-fits-
    all. As you noted, first of all there are two very different
    groups. The ePRTs are reporting to the battalion commander and
    are part of the surge element. The original ten PRTs are
    carrying out their mission, that is governance-oriented
    capacity building. And so the tailoring has to be very
    specific.
        Mr. Perito. Yes, I think in order to establish metrics, you
    first have to establish objectives. You have to know where you
    are going before you can measure where you got there or not. As
    we have discussed before, there really are no objectives for
    this program. And so beyond a rather vague series of mission
    statements and beyond things like ``bolster moderates, assist
    with counterinsurgency'' and things of that general nature,
    there really are no objectives here.
        I had a conversation which I thought was very instructive
    yesterday with someone from the State Department who said,
    ``Well, we now have a metric. We have demonstrated in Iraq that
    PRTs can be very effective at the provincial level in assisting
    the Iraqis to go through the budget process, produce proposals,
    take them up to the center, get the center to release money,
    and actually have the money come down to the provinces and
    distribute it. Now we have a metric. We can say this proves it
    works.''
        Well, you know, that is sort of circular reasoning. What
    they discovered sort of through trial and error is that PRTs
    can do this, and it is very useful and it helps, but that is
    very different, and that is not really a metric. That is just
    kind of, well, you know, through trial and error we have done
    this. Now, that is very useful, but maybe you should be doing
    other things.
        It takes a kind of objective top-down view, like we have
    talked before, of setting objectives, deciding what PRTs should
    be doing, are we best utilizing these resources that are
    available, and then coming up with measures to see whether we
    have achieved these objectives.
        Dr. Snyder. Mr. Akin for five minutes, followed by Mrs.
    Davis.
        Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I am sorry. I have these committees going on at different
    times, and I missed some of your statements.
        It seemed to me that what you are saying would probably
    help at least in certain ones of the PRTs to have a very
    clearly defined statement up front that this is what we are
    trying to do, and this is some way of measuring. I used to do a
    lot of that when I worked in the business world.
        Even things that are simpler, like one of the things I was
    responsible for was railroad tracks and a steel mill. Well, you
    know, if you have a lot of trains off the track, you know
    something is going wrong, and you would think that is something
    you could measure.
        But even so, trying to put specific measurements and
    everything on it can be pretty tricky. I think that it would be
    even more so with the diversity of the different environments
    where these PRTs are working. That shouldn't be an excuse for
    not having a clearly defined mission, though.
        Are the PRTs that are--and I don't know where we came up
    with this ``capacity building'' word; it sounds like political
    correctness to me. I mean, we are just trying to help stand up
    local governments, I gather. Those PRTs that do that, who do
    they work for?
        Mr. Bowen. They work for the chief of mission. The ten
    original PRTs that are in the provincial support teams have PRT
    team leaders that report.
        Mr. Akin. What is the chief of mission? Who is the chief of
    mission? What does that mean?
        Mr. Bowen. The ambassador.
        Mr. Akin. So that is going through State, then?
        Mr. Bowen. That is right.
        Mr. Akin. Okay. In this case, that would be Ambassador
    Crocker?
        Mr. Bowen. That is right.
        Mr. Akin. So these ten teams all report directly to him?
        Mr. Bowen. Through the OPA. There is an ambassador-level
    appointee who works for Ambassador Crocker who runs the
    program.
        Mr. Akin. Okay. So in other words, there is an in-between
    guy?
        Mr. Bowen. Yes.
        Mr. Akin. That is the chain of command for these.
        Mr. Bowen. That is the program. That is right.
        Mr. Akin. Now, is there a clear-cut definition for what
    they are supposed to be doing, written down on paper somewhere?
        Mr. Bowen. There is a generalized objective, as Mr. Perito
    pointed out, that is a bit vague, to use his term, but what is
    missing, what the core of our finding is that there are not
    comprehensive plans for what the PRT should be doing to achieve
    building the capacity, which is really, as you say, teaching
    the Iraqis how to do local government.
        Mr. Akin. In addition, did I gather from just before we got
    called out at the bell, is it also true that the financing that
    comes from the parliament and the central government is
    completely at their discretion, whether they are going to give
    that to the local provinces?
        Mr. Bowen. If it comes from the minister of finance?
        Mr. Akin. Right.
        Mr. Bowen. About $6 billion, as I recall, is allocated and
    has been distributed. That is an area of progress, as our
    report points out--budget execution, another term of art--how
    are the provinces doing in spending the money that is
    committed.
        Mr. Akin. Here is my question. To put it in our terms, if
    the Federal Government controls all the money, then the state
    government basically, they are just going to be a lapdog for
    whatever the Federal Government wants. So my question is, is
    there in the distribution of the oil money to the local
    provinces, is there a guarantee that they are going to get a
    certain percent of the cut based on population or something, so
    that they can start working federalism? Because federalism
    doesn't work if your local government, every last penny they
    get is coming out of the centralized government. Is that
    problem being dealt with?
        Mr. Bowen. That is the revenue distribution portion of the
    hydrocarbon law that has yet to be passed by the council of
    representatives. They are using an interim measure now.
        Mr. Akin. Yes. So there is no federalism until that gets
    fixed, is there?
        Mr. Bowen. That is right. And then next year when the
    regions law kicks in, a very much strengthened federalism will
    occur in Iraq.
        Mr. Akin. Say again?
        Mr. Bowen. There is a provision in the constitution for the
    formation of regions that will concentrate power in two or more
    provinces that choose to form a region.
        Mr. Akin. So that is going to become even more centralized?
        Mr. Bowen. No, that will decentralize.
        Mr. Akin. It will decentralize it?
        Mr. Bowen. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Akin. Okay. Is there anything in their constitution
    which specifically forbids the central government from doing
    certain functions so that you can guarantee, for instance,
    police and hospitals and schools or whatever are done locally,
    as opposed to centrally? Or do we not have any limitation on
    what the central government can do?
        Mr. Bowen. Those limitations will accompany the formation
    of regions. So when the regions law begins, that sort of dual
    system like we have, divided federalism, will begin to develop.
        Mr. Akin. Is there anything in the constitution which
    guarantees certain areas to be local responsibility, as opposed
    to be central, or not?
        Mr. Bowen. I don't know if it is that specific with respect
    to regions. I will have to get back to you on that.
        Mr. Akin. I am just trying to get a handle on how you drive
    federalism in that environment.
        I am out of time, and Vic is going to throw one of his
    hammers at me.
        Thank you.
        Dr. Snyder. No.
        In fairness to Mrs. Davis, I need to let her know that I
    quoted her in my opening statement, and then referred to you
    and Mr. Davis and your ad hoc working group on interagency
    reform, because you asked a question at one of our hearings
    about how do you measure this stuff.
        You mentioned, I think, metrics, Mr. Perito. I was in a
    discussion several years ago at a full committee hearing. I
    think it was Secretary Rumsfeld, and he used the term
    ``metrics,'' and I thought he said ``matrix,'' and we had like
    the movie with Keanu Reeves. And he talked about his metrics
    room, and I thought he was talking about a room like in the
    movie ``The Matrix.'' We start pretty basic here in the House
    of Representatives.
        Mrs. Davis for five minutes.
        Ms. Davis of California. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I appreciate your reference, and I am going to read it in a
    minute so I know what you said.
        Thank you very much for being here. I know that the issue
    of metrics and how we evaluate it has been addressed. I am not
    sure that it has been addressed thoroughly, but I wanted to
    just go to another question for a second.
        Mr. Perito, you mention that this should not be a game for
    pickup teams, and we should have a surge capacity. You have a
    lot of experience in multiple agencies. How would you do this?
    And also you mentioned that Germany has about 300 folks on the
    ground doing this. How do they organize this? Is there anything
    that we can learn from that?
        Mr. Perito. Just to take the first one, I have long
    believed that what the United States government means to do,
    and it can be done by the State Department of it can be done by
    a group of agencies, is that we need to recruit professionals
    who have these skills, who are a part of the Federal
    Government, Federal employees that we deploy in times of need.
        The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
    Stabilization in the Department of State now has a plan to do
    this. The plan calls for the creation of an active reserve
    corps, which will be made up of civil servants, of Federal
    employees who would have these skills, be located around
    government agencies, would be on call, and could deploy
    rapidly. The money for that, unfortunately, is being held up by
    the Senate at this point, so that plan isn't going forward.
        That active reserve corps would be supported by a civilian
    reserve corps composed of Americans from across the country who
    would be trained, equipped and prepared to deploy on a more
    lengthy timetable. All of this reflects some work that I did
    and the USIP did several years ago, which recommended that this
    kind of capacity be created. So there are plans and they need
    to be actualized and they need to be funded, and they need to
    be funded at a level where we would have several thousand
    people ready to go. Right now, the plans call for 200, I think.
    So that is one answer to this.
        When you look at the way other countries approach this,
    other countries bring to the PRT equation their own strengths
    and their own weaknesses. The German PRTs reflect the strength
    of the German economic assistance programs, and so you have
    this large economic assistance team.
        They also reflect the weakness of the military component.
    On the German side, the German military component in
    Afghanistan is highly caveated and there are very few things
    that it can actually do. One of them is take risks at all. So
    the German military hardly goes out. That is not because they
    are not brave, but just because they are heavily restricted by
    their own government.
        Ms. Davis of California. When you think of this reserve
    corps, are these people who would sign up and would have every
    two months that they would be coming together and doing some
    training across the board?
        Mr. Perito. Yes, this concept is still kind of unfirm at
    this point--that is not a word, probably--but the idea would be
    that these would be people who would have required skills. They
    would sign Federal contracts. They would be available to
    deploy. They would be trained and equipped. They would exercise
    to the point where they would be able to function together, and
    then they would move out.
        But more important than the civilian corps, which I think
    is critical, is this idea of creating a corps of Federal
    employees who have these capacities and who are there working
    in the government and on call and can go. That is something we
    just don't have at this point.
        Ms. Davis of California. And you said the funding has been
    tied up.
        Mr. Perito. Yes.
        Ms. Davis of California. Also, it is the will, too. Is it
    because we can't quite envision this group of people doing this
    or putting them at risk in some way? What do you think is
    underlying the fact that we have not been able to get this
    together?
        Mr. Perito. Specifically, as I understand it, and I haven't
    checked in the last week, there is a single senator who has a
    hold on the money. There was $50 million in the Iraq
    supplemental that was provided to stand up this capacity. The
    bill required that an authorizing bill be passed as well, along
    with the appropriations bill. The authorizing bill has been
    held under a Senate hold now. The Administration has not been
    able to get the senator to release it.
        Ms. Davis of California. What I am really asking, though,
    is this has been going on for a number of years. It isn't just
    probably the senator. Part of it is education.
        Mr. Perito. And part of it--to go to a larger perspective--
    political will is a critical element here. We have not had the
    political will to go forward and create the kind of civilian
    agency capacity that we need. We do a very good job on the
    military side. The U.S. military spends a great deal of time on
    lessons learned and on improving its performance. We have the
    best military in the world.
        Civilian agencies in post-conflict have operated on the
    assumption that this is a one-time thing and they are never
    have to do it again. They were that way in Somalia and in Haiti
    and in Bosnia and in East Timor and all the other places that
    we have been. And now we are paying the price.
        Ms. Davis of California. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, we have
    people who decide to go into USAID. They have development
    backgrounds. We have people who go into the Peace Corps,
    obviously. Is there something about incentivizing young people
    to think in this way? Or is that not the path? Is it just
    people who are already in a capacity already, that have the
    skills?
        Mr. Perito. I don't really think it is a matter of getting
    recruits. I think it is a matter of the size of these
    institutions. USAID right now has 1,200 foreign service
    officers. That is barely enough people for all of its jobs
    worldwide. That is barely enough people to provide people to
    every embassy.
        When you go out to PRTs in Afghanistan and you meet the
    USAID rep, it is very likely to be a contractor, generally a
    young person, terribly enthusiastic, extremely brave, but brand
    new to the field, not able to draw upon expertise; not able to
    draw upon associations with the agency, a deep knowledge of how
    USAID functions, with a huge, steep learning curve. And that
    you find across the board.
        And so, what we need to do is increase the capacity of
    these agencies. The foreign service of the United States can
    staff only 75 percent of its jobs worldwide. It just doesn't
    have enough people. They do a very good job of staffing Iraq
    because there is a lot of emphasis on this, but the Foreign
    Service Association told me the other day that 40 percent of
    the foreign service has already served in Iraq.
        Ms. Davis of California. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
        We will go around again, gentlemen, if you want to start
    the five-minute clock again.
        Just a follow-up question, Mr. Perito, from the line of
    questioning Mrs. Davis was going. We had a hearing earlier in
    the week about this whole issue of staffing and the issue of
    the civilian reserve corps came up. In your statement, you
    specifically were critical of using military reservists.
        Now, I can understand that kind of across the board you
    don't want the Army Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve to be a
    substitute for trained people. But in fact, we have certainly
    had occasions where military reservists might be the perfect
    person.
        We have a mayor of a fairly vigorous, rapidly growing city
    who has been mobilized more than once, and I suspect he has
    some pretty good thoughts on capacity building. Now, he was not
    selected for a PRT, but just because somebody is a military
    reservists rather than a civilian reserve corps, they may in
    fact--you know, we have had thousands of guard and reserve
    members over there at any one time.
        They may in fact be the perfect people for some of these
    tasks, would they not? They certainly would have a different
    background than your 23- or 24-year-old who has been in the
    military for 4 or 5 years. Is that a fair statement?
        Mr. Perito. It is a fair statement.
        Dr. Snyder. I assume what you are saying is that we should
    not rely on somehow having guard and reserve.
        Mr. Perito. But there are other considerations which go
    beyond what you said, which is true. Police is the area I know
    best. In the beginning in Iraq, when we activated the guard and
    reserve to get police officers, we got people who, in their
    civilian lives, were police officers. Those people came, and
    they served once.
        Now, when you look at the police transition teams in Iraq,
    you will find military police. They are mostly guard and
    reservists. They were artillerymen before they were given a
    two-week training program and made military police. These
    people are not police officers.
        The fact is that you can get on a one-time basis the person
    you need for the job, but over a five-year effort, you end up
    with people that are--you know, the classic is the guy who is
    sent off to advise the provincial education representative, and
    while he works in education, but he is a schoolteacher. And
    that happens again and again.
        Dr. Snyder. Right. I understand what you are saying.
        Mr. Perito. Yes.
        Dr. Snyder. One of my towns a few years ago had both their
    mayor and their police chief mobilized in the same unit.
        I am thinking of how to pursue this. At the hearing a
    couple of days ago, we had representatives from different
    agencies. I don't know if you heard anything about that, but we
    had in the written statements of the persons from the
    Department of Agriculture and the person from the Department of
    Justice talking about--this was a hearing on the incentives for
    their civilian folks to go to Iraq and Afghanistan, not just in
    PRTs, but in other capacities as well.
        There was a paragraph that I go onto him a little bit
    about, because it had the exact identical language in both
    paragraphs that they acknowledged had apparently come from an
    National Security Council staff person who reviewed the
    testimony and inserted that language and suggested that
    language. I actually have no problem with the language.
        I am going to read it again and see if that is the
    direction you think that we should be going in, Mr. Perito, and
    any thoughts you have, Mr. Bowen: ``To improve our ability to
    respond to overseas challenges and provide the personnel
    expertise needed will require that we increase our numbers of
    available, trained and deployable personnel within our
    department and others, and that we support them with a
    structure in Washington that conducts planning and
    coordination.''
        And then in this particular situation, this one means
    Agriculture, but the other one was Department of Justice.
    ``Agriculture is working with interagency partners and the
    coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization at the
    Department of State to build that capacity and to support
    development of a civilian reserve corps of outside experts that
    we can also call on to fill additional requirements.''
        Well, basically we came out of that hearing and we had both
    the Department of Justice and Department of Agriculture and
    apparently NSC thinking this should be as a fairly strong
    statement of where we ought to go. But I read two things into
    that, or three things into that. One, civilian reserve corps--
    everybody seems to be behind that, although it is still being
    fleshed out--but then the first sentence was we need to
    increase our numbers, a redundancy.
        I talked with Richard Armitage, who said there needs to be
    redundancy so that when you pull people for emergencies that
    come up, you are not gutting the mission in Africa or China or
    Latin America or wherever it is. But that is different than a
    civilian reserve corps that actually has people working in
    agriculture projects in Mongolia that you can pull out and say,
    ``We have to have you now for the next year.''
        And then the third part of that, which I think gets back to
    the questioning some time ago, where it talks about ``we
    support them with a structure in Washington that conducts
    planning and coordination,'' which may get to the guts of your
    report, Mr. Bowen, which is, your criticism today and your
    suggestions may reflect the fact that we don't have the
    structure in Washington that does the kind of planning and
    coordination, still sensitive to on-the-ground decision-making
    and the kind of vagueness of some of these relationships in
    provinces and so on.
        I am not sure what kind of structure we are working on
    right now in Washington. You may not have any comments about
    anything I have said, but if you want to comment on that. Was
    that paragraph a pretty good paragraph, from the written
    statement?
        Mr. Perito. If we had that capacity----
        Dr. Snyder. Maybe you had that in your written statement,
    too, Mr. Perito, and I missed it. I don't know.
        Mr. Perito. No. But in other things I have written, yes. If
    we had that kind of capacity, it would be excellent. There
    needs to be a place in Washington that has the authority to
    coordinate post-conflict interventions, particularly on the
    civilian side, and to be a partner to the military, which we
    don't have right now.
        There is no place in the Federal Government where you can
    go and have somebody who can say, ``Yes, I can bring together
    all of this expertise and all of this capacity and deploy it
    and direct it.'' That doesn't happen. We have debated about
    where this should be located, but my personal preference is it
    should be a new independent agency, which would be created with
    its own culture and its own staff, and would be made up of
    professionals who do this professionally.
        We would do it over time, so you would have the benefit of
    people who gained experienced moved up in the ranks and could
    direct these operations. Currently, what we do is we rely on
    contractors. Contractors come and go. The firms change. There
    is no residual. There is no learning that takes place. Or we
    don't do it at all, or we pass it off to the military, which is
    unfair because it places ever-increasing burdens on the
    military and forces them into areas where it is just not their
    expertise.
        Dr. Snyder. You made a pretty strong statement. There is no
    place in the Federal Government where that is being done now.
        Mr. Bowen, do you have any comments before we go to Mr.
    Akin?
        Mr. Bowen. Yes, that is exactly the point of our lessons-
    learned program and our latest report recommends addressing
    this. Our next report will present that kind of recommendation
    to the Congress to create a new entity. If it is a balkanized
    problem, we want to beware of a balkanizing solution.
        NSPD-44 creates SCRS and has done some good things and our
    lessons-learned report supported their civilian reserve corps
    efforts, but 3000.05, the DOD parallel directive, also is
    moving forward with bolstering the Department of Defense's
    approach to post-conflict relief and reconstruction issues, a
    new entity that coordinates those elements and brings them
    together, and the other agencies' interests as well.
        It is not just AID, State and DOD. Those are the primary
    players, but as you learned, Ag and DOJ have interests as well
    and they need to be addressed appropriately and filtered in.
    SCRS has done good work, but it is still awaiting authorization
    of its own and its own appropriation. That has been a
    continuing challenge for it. So we will continue to speak to it
    through our lessons-learned project.
        Dr. Snyder. Mr. Akin for any further questions.
        Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I didn't hear anything, Mr. Bowen, just at a gut level,
    taking off the very specific measurable things. What is your
    sense of how the PRTs are doing? You probably have seen more
    and looked into it pretty far. Do you feel like just a little
    American ingenuity is being applied and that we are making some
    progress, even if that is a little bit checkered or varies a
    little bit from place to place? What is your overall gut sense
    as to how we are doing?
        Mr. Bowen. Absolutely, our report demonstrates areas of
    progress within the PRT program. There is no doubt that the
    progress in Anbar is attributable in part to the work of the
    PRT out there. The microloan process, which is helping employ
    Iraqis locally and get businesses started up, is having an
    effect.
        The provincial reconstruction development councils, which
    are Iraqi group-managed and advised by the PRTs, are approving
    and submitting projects to the embassy for Iraqis to manage and
    construct in their provinces. That is $1 billion in U.S.
    construction aid that they are helping to decide how to spend.
    A key lesson learned is get buy-in from the host nation to
    ensure that what is being provided is what they need. So I
    think that the PRTs just in those three instances, as our
    report points out, are making an enormous difference.
        The other issues on federalism I wanted to follow up is the
    provincial powers law, as I alluded to in my opening statement,
    is a key element to promoting federalism locally. They need to
    have that law passed so they know what their powers are.
        Mr. Akin. So that is not defined yet either. That is all
    part of that whole piece that has to come together. Are they
    trying to bite off too big a political project of doing that?
    Can they break it into pieces or not? I mean, we have that
    problem here in D.C. Sometimes we say, well, we are going to
    fix all of Social Security or we will fix all of Medicare or
    something, and the thing just gets too weighty and basically it
    would be probably better to surgically go in and fix different
    pieces.
        Mr. Bowen. They have broken them up into pieces for the
    hydrocarbon law, which has the revenue sharing issue you were
    talking about; the provincial powers law which defines local
    powers; and constitutional reform; provincial elections are a
    key element that needs to happen. But the challenge is none of
    the pieces, other than de-Baathification, and it is not moving
    very fast. It is moving forward.
        Mr. Akin. Okay. But your bottom line is you are saying you
    do think the PRTs are providing valuable service.
        Mr. Bowen. Yes.
        Mr. Akin. There are very measurable successes in various
    areas, maybe not as well coordinated or defined as it might be.
    Is that a fairly accurate assessment?
        Mr. Bowen. That is very accurate. The challenge, of course,
    is the lack of a permissive environment. The place where the
    PRTs are struggling the most is in the south, as our regional
    recommendation alluded to. The Basrah PRT is having to work
    from the airport because of the dangerous situation in that
    very large city, and is having minimal impact at this point.
        Mr. Akin. I thought the south was one of the safest areas.
    How far south are you talking about?
        Mr. Bowen. There are parts of the south and the mid-south
    that are safe, but Basrah is not.
        Mr. Akin. Is that Sunni?
        Mr. Bowen. That is Shia.
        Mr. Akin. Shia.
        Mr. Bowen. It is intra-Shia factions that are fighting
    there.
        Mr. Akin. Okay. They have to have some level of--there has
    to be some kind of civilization before these people can get out
    and make the contacts and all.
        Mr. Bowen. That is right.
        Mr. Akin. Right. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Snyder. Mrs. Davis for five minutes.
        Ms. Davis of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        You just mentioned al Anbar. I was wondering, have the PRTs
    been able to help bridge the gap between what is happening
    there with the local efforts and the government as a whole, and
    the Iraqi government? Is that part of their role at all? What
    specifically have they done to help bridge that gap so that in
    the end you do have that movement?
        Mr. Perito. It is my understanding that one of the things
    that PRTs have been able to do in al Anbar is get the central
    government to respond to requests for funding from the
    province, in what was a very strong reluctance on the part of
    the central government to respond to al Anbar because of the
    Shia-Sunni divide. PRTs have been able in some circumstances to
    overcome that and get the central government to release funds
    down. That is one of the things that PRTs can do effectively.
        Ms. Davis of California. Is that because they are educating
    people to ask for those things?
        Mr. Perito. Well, one of the things they have been able to
    do, the PRT in Ramadi, for example--the big provincial-level
    PRT, not the ePRTs, but the original one--a year ago had six
    people in it. It was a non-permissive environment and they were
    able to do very little.
        I talked to somebody who was there a month or so ago, and
    he said, ``Now, we are up to 25 people. The environment is
    permissive enough that we can get out. We are getting the
    provincial council to move back from Baghdad to the province.
    We are trying to reconstitute the judicial system and the
    police and get the organs of government up and functioning.''
    So that is one thing that the PRT has been able to do. So yes,
    they are effective there, and that is the sort of thing the PRT
    can do.
        Ms. Davis of California. I missed some of the discussion
    about metrics. What role do you see public opinion polls
    playing? There are public opinion polls that seem to state
    generally that people don't necessarily like our presence. But
    in areas in which PRTs are actively involved, what is the reach
    there?
        If you went in to a PRT area that you thought was pretty
    successful, would you expect those opinion polls to be a lot
    different? Do they do them? Do they use them as a tool to try
    and register generally what is going on? How far does it spread
    in terms of people's general sense?
        Mr. Bowen. I don't think that PRTs are doing polling
    themselves, but I think it is an idea to consider, to judge the
    impact locally. But it wouldn't be a metric. I think it would
    just be another element of feedback for the PRT team leader to
    see that the 50 projects that the provincial reconstruction
    development council approve and execute actually help change
    the community spirit with respect to how things are going with
    respect to the council, not the council, not the PRT, but with
    respect to how the council is doing its business--the
    provincial council.
        Ms. Davis of California. And are you saying that they
    probably don't have much idea about that right now? That they
    haven't done that kind of base----
        Mr. Bowen. The PRTs don't do polling, and part of it is
    simply the non-permissive environment. But it would be useful
    feedback for the provincial councils, I think. In many areas,
    the PRTs have to be careful about revealing themselves and
    revealing an American face on any project that is U.S.-funded
    or ongoing because of the potential controversy and conflict it
    could stir.
        Ms. Davis of California. Yes.
        Mr. Perito, did you want to comment on that?
        Mr. Perito. Yes. I think that overall, public information
    and public affairs programming for PRTs has been a shortcoming.
    In the Iraq PRTs, there is supposed to be a State Department
    officer who has that responsibility and whose job is to get the
    word out. Sometimes that officer is present; sometimes he is
    not. There is no counterpart in the Afghan PRTs at all.
        One of the things that, of course, PRTs try to do is they
    try to put an Iraqi face on success. So in a certain sense,
    that masks their participation. But I think in terms of just
    getting the word out about what the PRT program has
    accomplished, that has not happened.
        I find it very difficult in Washington to actually find out
    what PRTs are doing, and I am sort of inside the government and
    very often get invited to government meetings. But it is not
    open. So I think public affairs could be something we could do
    better.
        Ms. Davis of California. You are saying that it is a pretty
    well-kept secret. It sounds like a well-kept secret there. It
    is also a well-kept secret here. Is that by design, to again
    not have an American face on that?
        Mr. Perito. No, I don't think it is by design. I think it
    is by a sort of inadvertence. It is something that people
    haven't focused on, but should.
        Ms. Davis of California. Thank you very much.
        Dr. Snyder. We have been joined by Mr. Cooper from
    Tennessee, for five minutes, for any questions you may have.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to continue the gentlelady's line of
    questioning. How do I explain to my taxpayers back home that
    the American face on a project makes it unappreciated? They
    would probably say that it is like people biting the hand that
    is feeding them. They would probably say, ``Why are we doing
    this?''
        Now, we don't need to stick our chests out and want too
    much credit, but is the United States reduced to being the
    world's anonymous donor today? So we get no credit for anything
    and it makes everybody happier? People are out there risking
    their lives in these PRTs to help people and we can't say they
    are U.S.? You certainly can't wear a uniform because that would
    militarize it.
        This is an untenable situation. So why are we doing it? We
    are humanitarian. We are good folks and we want to help the
    world, but if they don't want the help. In fact, an economist
    would say decrease their marginal utility or something. If they
    actively despise us for it, why are we there?
        Mr. Bowen. To the extent that that is answerable, I would
    say that it depends on the region in Iraq where the PRT
    presence is. Just by definition of how the PRT program is
    structured is reflective of the difficulty of being there. In
    the south, there are very few permanent PRTs.
        They are supported by the provincial support teams, the
    PSTs, because of the danger of a U.S. citizen traveling across
    the country. It is not just being disliked. It is being shot.
    That has been the struggle in Iraq with respect to
    reconstruction for four years.
        Mr. Cooper. I know in the scheme of things with government,
    it is a relatively small amount of money. For our own self-
    image and self-esteem, we would probably do this because we
    perceive ourselves as the good guys. But if so few other people
    do, particularly the folks that we are directly trying to help,
    isn't this counterproductive?
        Mr. Bowen. Well, I think that it is a cost-effect balance,
    is the question that you are asking. Our report catalogues a
    series of successes as well, in light of all these limitations.
    I think the PRT program is aiming at building democracy at the
    grassroots level by teaching provincial councils, which didn't
    exist before in Iraq, how to do local government.
        That, in conjunction with trying to build some sort of
    local capacity to plan a recovery and reconstruction program,
    and then sustain it--a continuing weakness--are all worthy
    goals of the overall PRT objective. The point of our audit is
    those goals need to be better defined, better tracked, and
    better measured.
        Mr. Cooper. You are speaking as an auditor. I am detecting
    a marked chamber-of-commerce attitude here. I love chambers of
    commerce, and they work well in America. I am not sure they
    work well overseas. For example, corruption--it is endemic, and
    we are not going to eliminate it in our lifetimes. We are the
    infidel. We are not going to persuade them otherwise in our
    lifetimes. Other things--tribal, ethnic relations matter far
    more to them than they do to us, and we are not going to change
    that in our lifetimes.
        It almost seems like we are doing this for our own
    purposes, and not to actually have an impact. If we wanted to
    have an impact, we would have to channel the aid through third
    parties and have no U.S. fingerprints on it, no U.S. presence,
    and have it delivered by non-infidels. This is a strange
    situation we are in. I am not aware of in history an effort
    that is so unappreciated, in fact actively scorned. Has anyone
    proposed terminating it, the PRTs?
        Mr. Bowen. No.
        Mr. Cooper. At least in those areas where----
        Mr. Bowen. Oh, yes. We did in our original draft report. We
    proposed pulling personnel out of the dangerous areas in the
    south, but as a result of the responses we got from MNFI and
    from the embassy, we modified our recommendation.
        Mr. Cooper. So you yielded to their pressure?
        Mr. Bowen. No, we were persuaded that they have a plan that
    is calculated to succeed, and therefore it is worthwhile to
    keep those open for now.
        Mr. Cooper. The chamber of commerce-type plan that is
    completely not understood in many parts of the world.
        I see that my time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
        Why don't we go ahead and start the clock again.
        I wanted to ask, and I have several questions that may not
    take so long. Mr. Bowen, not in your report, but in your
    written statement you made mention of the five of your folks
    that were wounded or injured. Were all those U.S. Government
    employees?
        Mr. Bowen. Yes, they were.
        Dr. Snyder. Were you satisfied with the care and the
    follow-on care that has occurred for them?
        Mr. Bowen. Yes, I am.
        Dr. Snyder. One of the issues that you bring up in your
    report is the issue of the CERP money, where the local military
    had some money, our military had money and they could do
    projects, and you make the point that it actually seemed to
    work against ourselves when you are trying to build capacity of
    local people to do projects. How does that get resolved?
        I know on my first trip back when General Petraeus was our
    commander in Mosul, one of the things he talked to us about was
    he wanted the ability to have more money for local projects.
    That was, I think, probably the early acute phase of the
    situation. Is that how you would look at this, that there would
    be a progression in a fairly rapid amount of time from when the
    military has funds to where it would need to be coming through
    the local government? How do you see that?
        Mr. Bowen. The Commander's Emergency Response Program is
    separate from the PRT spending. However, it is operating in
    similar locales addressing similar projects. The PRTs now have
    a quick response fund program, the QRF program similar to CERP,
    actually, to rapidly turn around high-value, high-need
    projects.
        The point that we make in our audit is that better
    coordination between the PRTs and DOD with respect to the use
    of CERP funds is necessary because we ran into situations where
    the PRTs were addressing a project through the provincial
    reconstruction development council, and suddenly it was
    completed independently by CERP program.
        Dr. Snyder. That is certainly an indication of the lack of
    coordination.
        Mr. Bowen. Yes. It is another example of just the need to
    communicate more clearly on the ground.
        Dr. Snyder. Yes. In one of your introductory--I don't know
    the page, 9, I guess it is--of your report, I will just read
    this statement which I think is probably stating the obvious,
    but I quote: ``Despite the best efforts of PRT civilian and
    military officials who are working under dangerous and austere
    conditions to accelerate the rocky transition to self-reliance,
    resolving these problems will likely be a slow process. It will
    require years of steady engagement and will depend heavily on a
    security environment and political settlements at the national
    level.''
        I assume by that you are not saying it will take years of
    PRT involvement, but the hope is that at some point we can
    transition from PRTs to the normal State Department, USAID,
    Department of Justice relationship.
        Mr. Bowen. Yes. That is what I am referring to.
        Dr. Snyder. Right. My last question, Mr. Bowen. We have had
    some ongoing discussions in this committee, but there have also
    been press discussions about the issue of staffing, the
    civilian side of things. In fact, there was a reference in
    either the Post or the Times yesterday in which is kind of
    rehashed the criticism that had come from the military and from
    Secretary Gates about the inability of the civilian side to
    staff up some of these positions.
        From our testimony from our civilian side as recently as
    Tuesday, we had somebody from the State Department, the Justice
    Department, Treasury, Ag and USAID, they felt very strongly
    that they were meeting the needs now in terms of what they had
    been asked to do in terms of staffing these PRTs.
        That is contrary to what Ginger Cruz testified before us a
    few weeks ago, or a couple of months ago, I guess, now, in your
    previous report. This report did not cover that, but we seem to
    have either a breakdown of information or there is new
    information. Do you have any thoughts about that issue in terms
    of the staffing on the civilian side?
        Mr. Bowen. I do. I have some new information on that that I
    got from my staff over in Baghdad today. With respect to phase
    two of staffing of the ePRTs, that phase concluded on August
    31. The goal was to fill 133 slots; 104 are on the ground there
    now, and 16 are enroute; 13 still need to be employed and
    deployed.
        With phase three, which we are in now, the deadline is the
    end of the year. The goal is 111. There are 20 on the ground
    right now, 47 enroute, and 44 yet to be filled. So obviously
    there are some significant staffing issues pending with respect
    to ensuring that the ePRTs can do their mission.
        At the same time, the ePRTs are about 300 and the existing
    PRTs are a little bit over 300. Those existing PRT tours--I
    don't have information on that, but we need to look into it--
    are going to expire. There oldest one has been around for two
    years, and so I expect there will be some turnover issues
    ongoing in the existing PRTs as well.
        Dr. Snyder. Mr. Akin, any further questions?
        Mr. Akin. That was a good question, and I don't have any
    additional.
        Dr. Snyder. Mr. Cooper.
        Mr. Cooper. No, thank you.
        Dr. Snyder. We appreciate you all being here today. I am
    sorry we got interrupted the one time. Members may have
    questions that they would like to have you submit a written
    answer to. I will just give you an open-ended question, if when
    you get back to your office you realize you should have said
    something differently, or your staff says, ``you know, what you
    said was really dumb,'' you should feel free to submit any kind
    of written statement in response, and we will be glad to add it
    to our record.
        Thank you both, Mr. Bowen and Mr. Perito, for being here.
        Yes, Mr. Bowen?
        Mr. Bowen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Perito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Snyder. We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                October 18, 2007

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                October 18, 2007

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        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                October 18, 2007

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER

        Dr. Snyder. Please provide one or more concrete examples of
    possible objectives, measures of effectiveness, and milestones as those
    terms apply to the PRT program.
        Mr. Bowen. As discussed in our report, each PRT has differing needs
    and the plan for each PRT would contain elements tailored to the needs
    of the province.
        An example might be that a particular province has difficulties in
    budgeting. The objective might be to help the province develop
    budgeting and fiscal policies. The steps leading up to improving the
    province's budgeting capacity might be to (1) help it learn financial
    forecasting, (2) develop and adopt financial policies, (3) identify the
    costs of government services, (4) set government charges and fees, (5)
    develop a strategic plan, and (6) develop a capital asset support plan.
    Each of these steps would have an achievement plan that identified the
    steps planned and a timeline for accomplishing each step. This would
    give senior management and the Congress a sense of what we are trying
    to accomplish, whether progress was being made, and whether sufficient
    resources were in place.
        Dr. Snyder. In your discussion with Mr. Akin regarding central,
    regional, and local government authority under the Iraqi constitution,
    you stated that you would get back to the subcommittee with additional
    detail. Please describe your view of the current state of
    ``federalism'' and how it affects relations between the different
    levels of Iraqi government under Iraqi law, and your view of how that
    might change under a provincial powers law.
        Mr. Bowen. Iraq's central government has a predominant role in
    decision-making, including decisions related to the allocation of
    resources, especially outside of Iraqi Kurdistan. In the rest of Iraq,
    significant decisions must usually be made in Baghdad--the powers of
    the provinces are vague de jure and scant de facto.
        Three legal elements directly affect the state of federalism in
    Iraq today: the ``regions provision'' in the Constitution; the nascent
    new provincial powers law; and the nascent new elections law.
        The effect of the Constitution's ``regions provision'' was
    suspended at the end of 2006. It is scheduled to become effective on
    April 18, 2008. Once effective, the provision permits two or more
    provinces to form a region, reducing the central government's power
    over the provinces within the region, particularly in the areas of
    security and fiscal affairs. One reason why there have been delays on a
    number of significant pieces of legislation long pending before the
    Council of Representatives is that the regions law will create a
    significant shift in the balance of power between the central
    government and regional governments, and political forces whose support
    is concentrated in particular regions appear to be awaiting a shift in
    power which may make concessions within the national legislature
    unnecessary. The regions law (rather than the provincial powers law,
    discussed below) will be the catalyst for potentially fundamental
    change in the balance of power between the central and provincial
    governments.
        The US Mission in Iraq has identified passage of the provincial
    powers as one of the five most important priorities in our political
    engagement with Iraq. Among other things, the law will clarify the
    authority of provincial councils. Passage of the provincial powers Law
    will enable US Provincial Reconstruction Teams to provide capacity
    building programs more clearly focused on the mechanisms to help
    provinces use the powers they will have in the new dispensation.
        A new elections law will permit the holding of new provincial
    elections, which will correct the imbalances that now exist in a number
    of provincial councils. The imbalances occurred because the Sunnis
    boycotted the January 30, 2005, elections. The problem is particularly
    acute in Diyala Province, which has a majority Sunni population but has
    an all-Shia council. Similar problems exist in Nineveh, where the
    Sunnis have no representation on an all-Kurdish Council, despite having
    a significant presence in the populace.
        Dr. Snyder. Are you are aware, from your investigation of PRTs, of
    whether the U.S. conducts or sponsors Iraqi public opinion polls to
    determine the local impact of U.S. programs, specifically whether PRT
    operations have resulted in increased positive opinion towards the
    U.S.? Would such polls be a useful tool to help evaluate PRT progress?
        Mr. Bowen. In October 2006, SIGIR recommended that the Secretaries
    of State and Defense take action to define PRT objectives and
    performance measures and to develop milestones for achieving program
    objectives. To date, OPA and the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) have
    not clearly defined PRT objectives and performance measures. Therefore,
    neither we nor, we believe, PRT management at any level can easily
    report on what the PRTs and ePRTs are accomplishing, individually or
    collectively.
        Assuming that the PRT program, as a whole and in individual
    locations, has clear goals, it may be possible to use polling to help
    determine if those goals are being met--changing perceptions may be
    good evidence of meeting goals. Polling is carried out in Iraq but it
    may be difficult to poll a sufficiently representative group in certain
    geographic areas.
        Dr. Snyder. You provided information regarding current staffing of
    PRTs in Iraq. What is your source for those numbers, and have you
    received additional updates since then?
        Mr. Bowen. The current information on staffing of PRTs was derived
    from information provided by the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA),
    which oversees the PRT program at the US Embassy, Baghdad.
        Dr. Snyder. In its September 10, 2007, response to the draft SIGIR
    recommendations, the Embassy stated that an interagency working group
    was actively updating objectives and developing performance measures,
    and expected to complete the task with [sic] a month. Given that it has
    been over a month since that response, are you aware of whether they
    have completed this task?
        Mr. Bowen. SIGIR has been told by OPA and State Department
    officials (as of November 9, 2007) that work is nearly complete on
    updating objectives and performance measures for PRTs. We have asked
    for copies of those documents and await their receipt.
        Dr. Snyder. Do you have any specific observation regarding the role
    to be played by PRTs in areas that have been turned over to Provincial
    Iraqi Control (PIC)? At what point should we consider security to have
    progressed to where non-governmental organizations or traditional USAID
    missions would be capable of taking over for PRTs?
        Mr. Bowen. In meetings on November 9, we were informed by State
    Department officials that there have been assurances from the Multi-
    National Corps-Iraq Commander, Gen. Odierno, has committed to provide
    military support for PRT mission in provinces which have transferred to
    PIC. PRTs will continue to have an important role around the country as
    military presence is reduced, but military security is still needed by
    PRT staff. When PRT staff have been able to live in and move around
    within their areas of responsibility without military support, other
    modalities for providing assistance to Iraq, which may include
    traditional USAID missions, could be substituted for PRTs.
        Dr. Snyder. Is there any additional information you would like to
    provide to the subcommittee for the record, or any corrections or
    clarifications you would like to make with respect to your testimony?
        Mr. Bowen. While we appreciate the opportunity offered by this
    question, we have no additional comments at this time.
        Dr. Snyder. In your testimony you stated ``There is a need for an
    agreed set of objective for PRTs and an agreed set of measurement for
    their performance.'' Please provide one or more concrete examples of
    possible objectives, measures of effectiveness and milestones as those
    terms apply to the PRT program.
        Mr. Perito. One goal for all PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan are self-
    sufficient, transparent, accountable and capable provincial
    governments. For Iraq, one practical objective on the path to achieving
    that goal has been budget execution. PRTs have been able to assist some
    provincial governments to develop and implement provincial budgets
    utilizing funds obtained from the central government in Baghdad.
    Milestones have included the number of provincial governments that can
    accomplish this task. Metrics include the amount of money obtained and
    disbursed and the number of projects completed.
        Dr. Snyder. Are you aware if the U.S. conducts public opinion polls
    in Iraq or Afghanistan to determine the local impact of U.S. programs,
    specifically where PRT operations have resulted in a more positive
    attitude toward the U.S.? Would such polls be a helpful tool to
    evaluate PRT progress?
        Mr. Perito. A far as I know, US authorities have not conducted
    public opinion surveys in either country to access popular attitudes
    towards PRTs. For Iraq, State Department officials believe such polls
    might indicate that PRTs were trying to upstage Iraqi officials to take
    credit for providing services. In Afghanistan, NATO or ISAF may have
    done polling. US PRTs are under ISAF. This may affect popular attitudes
    toward US PRTs.
        I believe polls would be useful in assessing popular attitudes
    toward PRTs, if done appropriately. It is not in our interest or either
    the Iraqis or Afghans for the role of PRTs to be invisible to the
    general public. Both governments will require our assistance for the
    foreseeable future. Host Government officials should get the credit,
    but the public should understand that we are providing assistance.
        Dr. Snyder. Mr. Cooper discussed whether it is worth the U.S.
    continuing to sponsor PRTs when in parts of Iraq the U.S. is ``actively
    despised.'' Would you care to address Mr. Cooper's concerns as to
    whether it is counter productive to continue this work in the face of a
    lack of consideration for U.S. generosity?
        Mr. Perito. In a counterinsurgency, it is important that citizens
    identify progress with the efforts of their own government and not with
    its foreign supporters. US PRTs try to give credit to the host
    government whenever possible and to emphasize the role of local
    officials.
        The opposite approach can be counterproductive. At the start of the
    PRT program in Afghanistan, US PRTs built schools without first
    determining whether the Afghan education ministry could provide
    teachers. The response from villagers was: ``The US helped us by
    building a school, but our government failed to send a teacher.''
        PRTs need to coordinate their efforts with local authorities,
    reflect local concerns and meet local needs. The target audience is not
    the small group of extremists that despise us, but the majority that is
    looking for reasons to support the government.
        Dr. Snyder. SIGIR and many PRT officials have observed that rule of
    law issues are problematic. Are PRTs the appropriate organization to
    deal with these issues? Are they adequately resourced and staffed in
    Iraq or Afghanistan, or do they require additional support from the
    Department of Justice, military Judge Advocates, or others?
        Mr. Perito. In Iraq and Afghanistan, US assistance for police
    training, assistance to the justice sector and support for corrections
    is provided through the US military training commands and not through
    the operational commands, which are responsible for the PRTs. In
    Afghanistan, US PRT support for rule of law is generally limited to
    paying for construction of police stations and courthouses and advising
    the Afghan police, if the PRT has a US military police officer
    assigned.
        In Iraq, the PRT rule of law officer is usually a lawyer from the
    Justice Department or a commercial contractor working for the State
    Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
    Affairs. PRT Rule of Law officers have access to PRT project funds, but
    their ability to influence the Iraqi judicial system is limited. PRTs
    would need substantial increases in staffing, funding and authority to
    make an impact on Rule of Law performance. This assistance should be
    provided by the Department of Justice and not by contractors of a
    commercial firm.
        Dr. Snyder. Do you have any observations regarding the role for
    PRTs in areas that have been turned over to Provincial Iraqi Control?
    At what point is security sufficient to justify turning over PRT
    operations to traditional USAID missions?
        Mr. Perito. In Iraq, the Italian PRT is located in Nasiriyah, Dhi
    Qar province, which was transferred to Iraqi control in September 2006.
    The Italian PRT has a USAID component that is staffed by American and
    Iraqi contractors. The Italians call the Dhi Qar PRT a ``Reconstruction
    Support Unit.'' The staff is entirely civilian. The Dhi Qar PRT has no
    military component.
        For security, the Italian PRT relies upon foreign contract guards
    and the Iraqi military and police. It is located in a Shia area that
    has not experience insurgency or sectarian strife. As the PRT operates
    in a permissive environment, it does not use armored vehicles, nor does
    it restrict its activities to the provincial capital. The PRT has
    successfully established excellent working relations with Iraqi
    officials and tribal leaders. The PRT carries out a wide range of
    development projects. As security improves, other PRTs could transition
    to this type of operation.
        Dr. Snyder. Is there additional information you would like to
    provide or corrections to your testimony?
        Mr. Perito. No.