WEDNESDAY, JULY 18, 2007
IRAQ: TRENDS AND RECENT SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services .................................................. 2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services ......................................................... 1

WITNESSES

Kagan, Dr. Frederick W., Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute ..... 11
Mathews, Dr. Jessica T., President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ................................................................. 7
Perry, Dr. William J., Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Center for International Security Cooperation, Stanford University ......................... 4

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Kagan, Dr. Frederick W. ................................................................. 75
Mathews, Dr. Jessica T. ................................................................. 55
Perry, Dr. William J. ................................................................. 66

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

List of Notional Political Timeline, dating from September 2006 to March 2007 ................................................................. 91
Map of the Locations of the Major Iraqi Army and National Police Divisions submitted by Dr. Frederick W. Kagan .......................... 92

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Loebsack ................................................................. 95
IRAQ: TRENDS AND RECENT SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:12 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. And before we welcome our witnesses, I have a very sad announcement that former General Wayne Downing, the former commander of Special Operations Command (SOCOM), died yesterday suddenly of meningitis, and a good friend of all of ours through the years, and I ask that we have a moment of silence and respect the memory of General Wayne Downing, please.

[Moment of silence.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Today our committee gathers to conduct another hearing on the ongoing war in Iraq. This series of hearings, which will continue through this month and into September, all are designed to look at the American national security interests in the Middle East and Iraq and what strategy might best safeguard those interests while allowing for the reset of our military to be prepared for challenges elsewhere.

We are fortunate to have with us three well-respected experts to share their views on Iraq on where we should go from here: Dr. William Perry, the former Secretary of Defense and member of the Iraq Study Group; Dr. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, the President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Dr. Frederick Kagan, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. And we welcome each of you and thank you for appearing with us to discuss the trends regarding Iraq.

The last two weeks have seen several major developments in the political discussion about the way forward in Iraq. Last week the President issued the interim report on progress made by the Government of Iraq toward meeting the benchmarks included in the recent Supplemental Appropriations Act. The interim report showed little or no progress made toward reconciliation in Iraq. The report judged satisfactory progress on only 8 of 18 benchmarks, even though most of the political benchmarks were approved by the Iraqi Political Committee on National Security, a body that includes the President of Iraq, Vice Presidents, the lead-
ers of major political parties, and reaffirmed by the Iraqi President of the Council last fall.

I might also mention that based on unofficial translation, that group approved 16 benchmarks called “Notational Political Timeline” dating from September 2006 to March 2007. And, without objection, I will place this list in the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 91.]

The CHAIRMAN. Further, a realistic reading of the report shows that even on most of those benchmarks rose claim that the Iraqis were making satisfactory progress. The progress was at best incremental and could not provide a reliable indication that the benchmarks could actually be achieved either by the time of the September report or in the foreseeable future. The only exception to this conclusion were two benchmarks that were actually achieved by the Iraqis before either the President or Congress established benchmarks.

Last week, not long after the interim report was issued, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 2956, the Responsible Redeployment from Iraq Act. This bill passed by a bipartisan vote, and it would require the President to begin a redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq and would mandate that the transition to a more limited set of missions in Iraq be complete by April of next year. It would also require a comprehensive diplomatic, political, economic strategy in which these limited missions could be undertaken.

I introduced this bill because I believe that we are doing a real harm to our military by following a failed policy in Iraq, and that by blindly pursuing the President’s latest strategy, we are accepting too much strategic risk.

The third recent development was release of the unclassified key judgments from the National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat to our country. The NIE confirms what I feared for some time now; that while our forces have been tied down in Iraq, al Qaeda has been rebuilding its strength in the border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Iraq has proven to be a distraction from the war on those who attacked us on September the 11th. I believe we must move to a more limited presence in Iraq so we can dedicate more resources toward finally eliminating al Qaeda and posturing our forces to deal with future strategic threats.

Again, I would like to thank our witnesses, our outstanding witnesses today, for appearing before us. I hope they will address their views to the current developments and trends in Iraq and share their thoughts on where we go from here.

Now our Ranking Member, my good friend Duncan Hunter, would you make your comments please?

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for teeing this hearing up today. I think it is very timely. Gentlemen, and
ma'am, thank you for being with us today and sharing your thoughts with us.

We have all watched or seen this interim report and seen the ranking and the grading that the Administration has given on the 18 factors, 8 with some satisfactory progress, 8 with nonsatisfactory progress, and 2 that haven’t been pursued long enough to be given a grade. And we know that everyone, including the insurgents and the terrorists, as well as this Nation and our allies, are looking forward to the September 15 report. And so I think it is absolutely appropriate that you folks appear before us and give us your take on how things are going in the theater.

So especially with respect to the operation that is—this Operation Phantom Thunder, which is the name given the surge which has now been in place at full strength for some 33 days. So we are looking forward to your comments on this.

One thing that I am particularly interested in is—and in my personal view is more important than the political accomplishments of the Iraqi Government—is the standup of the Iraqi military. So I would particularly like to get your thoughts on the state of equipment and training, and I think, most importantly, the military operational experience of the Iraqi Army. And the last report we had was that there are 121—or 129 battalions existent, that many of them now have some fairly—have been in some fairly contentious zones for extended deployments and have considerable amount of combat experience. Others have been in more benign areas and still don’t have a great deal of combat experience.

But your thoughts on that, on how the rotation is going in the Baghdad region particularly, but also Anbar and in the Sunni Triangle. You may recall that one thing that a number of us had felt was important was rotating Iraqi battalions from some of the more benign areas into the contentious zones, getting battlefield experience under their belts and providing at the same time some relief for the units that have been operating on an extended basis in those battle zones. So if you could give us your thoughts on that, particularly—and with respect to what combat missions the Iraqi forces have been able to accept the lead in and what others you think they are now primed and ready to take the lead in, and what steps we can take and the other Coalition partners can take to encourage them to take on greater combat roles.

Understanding the Iraqis are an independent nation, they take our recommendations for their deployment of troops as just that—as recommendations. And particularly I would like to have your thoughts on what other actions we can take to ensure that when we leave Iraq, we leave it with an Iraqi military in place that has a good deal of battlefield experience under its belt when the United States hands this security burden off to them.

So thank you very much for being with us today. And, Mr. Chairman, this is absolutely the most important issue before the American people right now and before us. So I look forward to the hearing. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.

Dr. Perry, why don’t you be the lead-off batter?

Dr. PERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. We understand that you just got in, and we appreciate your extra efforts in being with us this morning. Dr. Perry.

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM J. PERRY, CO-DIRECTOR, PREVENTIVE DEFENSE PROJECT, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Dr. Perry. Thank you. I would like to submit my written testimony for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. Thank you.

Dr. Perry. And I would give you some highlights of that in my oral statement.

Last December the Iraq Study Group (ISG), a bipartisan group commissioned by the Congress, reported that the situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. They recommended a new strategy that entailed a decreased role for the U.S. military and a dramatically increased role for political and diplomatic engagement. In effect, they were recommending a surge in diplomacy.

In January, President Bush rejected these recommendations and announced, instead, a surge in American military forces, with no apparent change in diplomacy. Since the President announced his surge strategy, our forces in Iraq have gradually been increased, and the full complement of about 25,000 additional troops was reached late in June. The bulk of these additional troops were sent initially to Baghdad. But as violence increased in other districts, some of them have been moved to troubled districts.

To this date, the overall level of violence in Iraq and the casualties suffered by American troops has not gone down. Generally, whenever American troops are deployed in a district, the violence decreases in that district but increases elsewhere. One positive exception, however, is the Anbar Province where violence has decreased throughout the province. However, the decrease in violence in Anbar does not seem to be directly related to the surge.

When the Iraq Study Group was in Iraq last September, General Chiarelli reported that the Sunni tribes in Anbar were beginning to cooperate with American forces in fighting the al Qaeda units in that district. We reported that favorable trend in the ISG report and recommended that this political development should be exploited to the maximum extent possible. It is encouraging to see that happening now.

This development demonstrates how profoundly political combinations can affect military operations. Indeed, it is a clear indication that any chance of success in Iraq depends not on a military surge, but a political and diplomatic surge. In my testimony today, I will explain why I believe the ISG proposal better serves the interests of the United States than the current military surge. But first I will briefly look back to consider how the disastrous situation in Iraq arose.

The Administration invaded Iraq because of the alleged imminent dangers to the United States from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and their alleged connection to al Qaeda, neither of which turned out to be correct. They also cited their goal of bringing stability to the Mideast by creating a democratic government in Iraq. But the task of imposing a democratic government in Iraq turned out to be substantially more difficult than the Ad-
administration had imagined. Indeed, we may never know whether it was even possible, since the Administration’s attempts to do so were burdened with serious strategic errors.

In particular, four errors were the most consequential. The Administration failed to get support from regional powers and from key allies. They did not send in enough troops to maintain security after the Iraqi army was defeated. They disbanded the Iraqi army, police, and civil servants a few weeks after the Iraqi army was defeated, and they pushed the Iraqi Provisional Government to establish a constitution and hold elections, but in a faulty process that did not adequately protect minority rights, thus setting the stage for a bloody power struggle between Shias and Sunnis.

The cumulative effect of all these strategic errors is a disastrous security situation in Iraq which continues to deteriorate. The media reports every day how many American troops have been killed. But I want to point out an even greater tragedy that does not get as much attention. Since the war began, almost 30,000 U.S. military personnel have been killed, maimed, or wounded. The media also reports on the statistics of Iraqis killed in the sectarian violence. But I want to point out that well over a million Iraqis already have left the country, including most Iraqi professionals on whom the country’s rebuilding depends.

As grim as this situation is, it could become even worse when U.S. soldiers leave, as the Administration has stated. But in the absence of political reconciliation, that could be true whether we leave a year from now or whether we leave five years from now. I want to repeat that. In the absence of political reconciliation, the increase in violence could be true whether we leave a year from now or five years from now.

In the face of this growing disaster, the Congress commissioned an independent bipartisan study, charged to reach consensus on the way forward in Iraq. We met two or three days each month from March to August of last year, being briefed by military and political experts. A very important part of our fact-finding was consulting with the Iraqi Government, so we went to Baghdad in September and spent four days meeting with all of the top officials of the Iraqi Government as well as our military commanders in Iraq. After we returned from Iraq, we spent six intensive days trying to reach a consensus. This process was very difficult, and it is a tribute to our cochairman that we were able to succeed.

The ISG report was released to the public on 6 December, and we recommended the following changes:

Shift the mission of U.S. troops from combat patrolling to building up the proficiency and professionalism of the Iraqi Army, including embedding some U.S. soldiers so they could provide role models and on-the-job training for Iraqi soldiers.

Begin pulling out U.S. combat brigades with a goal of having them all out by the first quarter of 2008, except—except for a strong reaction force needed for force protection and for the fight against al Qaeda in Iraq.

Continue for the indefinite future the support of Iraqi forces with intelligence, logistics, and air support.
Provide both positive and negative incentives for the Iraqi Government to accelerate their reconciliation process and oil revenue-sharing so the Sunnis have a stake in a stable Iraq.

And finally, mount an intensive diplomatic effort to persuade friendly regional powers to assist economically, politically, and with training, and to put pressure on unfriendly regional powers to stop arming militias and fomenting violence.

I would point out to you that this is not a defeatist strategy, but one that recognizes the importance of stabilizing Iraq, and proposes that change in strategy that recognizes the reality that for four years our strategy has not achieved that stability in spite of the heroic efforts of our troops.

If the recommendations to the ISG would be followed, many of our combat brigades would be out of Iraq by the first quarter of next year. As our Army combat brigades and Marine units return to their bases in the United States, the Defense Department will have a huge budget and management problem in restoring them to full combat readiness. This problem is of special concern to this committee because of the constitutional responsibility of the Congress in constituting and equipping our Armed Forces.

The Army, all of whose active brigades with high readiness levels at the beginning of the war, presently has no active brigades not already deployed, that readiness level needed to meet future contingencies, and low readiness levels invite such contingencies. Indeed, our security may already have suffered because of the perception of Iran and North Korea that our forces are tied down in Iraq.

The Congress also needs to consider the role of the National Guard, since the compact with these citizen-soldiers has been shattered by extended deployments that have caused many of them to lose their jobs, or even their families.

In sum, I believe that the President’s diplomatic strategy is too timid and his military strategy is too little and too late to effect the lasting and profound changes needed. His strategy is not likely to succeed because it is tactical, not strategic; because it does not entail real conditionality for the Iraqi Government; and because it would only deepen the divide in this country.

The ISG proposal has a better chance because it recognizes that the key actions needed in Iraq to effect lasting results must be taken by the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi Army and because it provides the support and the incentives for those actions.

Most importantly, the recommendations of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group provide an opportunity for Americans to come together again as one Nation indivisible.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, Dr. Perry. Again, we appreciate your effort in being with us this morning.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Perry found in the Appendix on page 66.]

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Mathews, Jessica Mathews, thank you for being with us also.
STATEMENT OF DR. JESSICA T. MATHEWS, PRESIDENT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Dr. Mathews, Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great pleasure to be here, Mr. Hunter.

We are sitting in front of the Armed Services Committee, but what I have to say to you today is mostly about politics. After four years, it is necessary for us to look behind the tactics, the things that we know the most about, and to correct the fundamental mistake that has characterized this war from the beginning, which is that U.S. strategy has had more to do with the political needs and interests and rhythms in Washington than it has had to do with realities on the ground in Iraq. It is time for us to examine whether the underlying strategy is sound. And I would like to offer some thoughts on that.

My first point is that the premise of the current strategy, the so-called surge, is that a political solution would follow if the violence could just be reduced. In my judgment, that is false. What is underway in Iraq today is the natural and usually inevitable struggle for power that follows a political vacuum. The American presence is actually prolonging and delaying that struggle.

Our use of the word “reconciliation” too is a huge distortion to ourselves of what needs to happen. “Reconcile” means to restore friendship and harmony, and that is not what is needed on the ground. The assumption that political reconciliation, that movement toward a political solution was moving forward until the attack on the Samara mosque is not supported by the evidence. And what we have to remember is that we are looking at a struggle for political power within sectarian groups as well as between them. I will come back to why this is so important.

A political power-sharing agreement is going to eventually emerge from Iraq but likely only after the various parties have exhausted themselves, have tested each other’s strengths, and have convinced themselves that they can get at least as much at the negotiating table that they can in the streets. This is not going to happen by September or by March of 2008. It is unlikely to happen in the next five years. Historical experience with civil wars, once they get going, they take a long time. Those of the last—the post-war period since 1945 have lasted ten years on average, with more than half—with half of them running more than seven years. So let’s not expect a quick outcome from this.

To believe that the present strategy will succeed, one has to make three heroic assumptions.

One is that, together with Iraqi Security Forces, we have enough force on the ground to contain a long-term guerrilla violence that springs from many directions.

Second, that a combination of political and military assistance and coercion can impose a kind of artificial peace that would leap over the usual phase of political sorting out and struggle.

And third, that we can maintain that peace for long enough that people will put aside their own natural fears and hopes, and believe that the present distribution of power represents a stable and inevitable future. If we were willing to stay for a decade or more, I think that might be true. But few people believe that we are prepared to do that. And even then, it would be an uncertain bet, be-
cause people hold political dreams and desires for revenge for far longer than that. And the Iraqis know that they live there and we don't, and that someday we will be gone and they will remain. And many of them would plan that way, even if they believed that we would maintain our present commitment for many years.

So, based on the experience elsewhere and a three-plus-year test on the ground, I think it is unlikely that more of the same will produce a united Iraq, at peace with itself. It is a bitter but, I think, a sounder and wiser conclusion that the American presence and strategy in Iraq is, as I said, prolonging and delaying a struggle for power that will ultimately resume when we depart.

Second point is that while we have had many—countless changes in tactics, we have been pursuing the same political goal in Iraq since 2004, and that is a united government of Sunnis, Shia, and Kurds working together. We have made no significant—no real progress toward that in this time.

And the present description of the needed next steps as mundane and achievable benchmarks if only the Iraqi Government would work a little harder and not take a summer vacation is a form of dangerous self-deception. The reason why we have made so little progress is because these needed steps are hugely difficult and important ones, in which every Iraqi faces enormous personal potential gains and losses. They would be hardly achievable in the best of conditions, and these are the worst of conditions. Why worst? We know that four million Iraqis are either refugees out of the country, internally displaced, or dead. In U.S. per capita terms, that is 50 million people.

Think for a few minutes about what that would be like. Could we under such conditions come together as a Nation, bury past and present wrongs, and under foreign occupation and direction make painful and scary political accommodations, amend our Constitution and reallocate wealth? The question obviously answers itself, and yet we continue to pretend that the Iraqis can.

Third, we are debating this problem almost entirely in military terms, which distorts the options available to us. Secretary Perry has pointed this out. A change in political strategy in Iraq and a shift in our political attention and economic and military priorities across the region redefines the possibilities. The analysis has to recognize, which generally it does not in Washington today, that a significant change in U.S. policy would change what others are willing to do.

I believe that the Iraq Study Group’s call for a multinational regional effort and diplomatic offensive is a step in the right direction, but it still presumes that the government—that the current Government of Iraq would represent that country and, therefore, that the current U.S. political strategy would continue.

A better approach, a more difficult one but I think a better one, would be one that more resembles the bond process that successfully laid the basis for political transition in Afghanistan. In that case, Iraq would be represented by all its major parties. The key foreign governments would participate and support their various clients. This would be lengthy and chaotic, I recognize, a much higher political risk than the U.S. has heretofore been willing to undertake. But it holds at least the possibility that broad represen-
tation and debate among Iraqis heretofore short-circuited by U.S. policy, might produce a viable political outcome with less continuing destabilization.

In this plan, a necessary ingredient would be an active role played by Iran's more immediate neighbors and that would depend on the United States' intent to begin a military withdrawal. The process should be proceeded by intensive bilateral consultations as to the best format, likely under U.N. auspices. And while making its direction absolutely plain, the U.S. Government, in my view, should not set a time line for the end of its withdrawal, or specify a predetermined number of residual troops. Both of those should be determined by the political outcome.

We might be asked to stay in Iraq in a substantial way. We might not. A key point here is that its success would depend on a shift of the political energies of the United States—and some fraction of the enormous economic cost that is now consumed by Iraq, as you know, at a rate of $10 billion a month—to other conflicts and other theaters in this region that hold inherently greater long-term national security threats to the U.S. than does Iraq. Among these are Iran; Afghanistan, because of the Taliban and al Qaeda presence and its links to Pakistan; Pakistan itself, which is an immense threat because of these two, and its nuclear reference and its instability; and the Israeli Palestinian dispute; and, I would say, the growing crisis in Iran.

One of the Iraq war's greatest long-term costs, I think the Chairman was suggesting this in his opening remarks, has been and will be the attention it has diverted from issues of greater long-term inherent importance to the United States.

Next I want to briefly point out that assertions are being made about what would happen if we left Iraq, for which there is little or no evidence, and significant evidence to the contrary. Because the choice we face now is among all bad options, it is easy to make a case against any one of them. And while the uncertainties are immense, it is therefore imperative to examine these claims with as much care and knowledge as we can command, and at least to set aside those fears for which there is little evidence.

It is asserted by many in the Administration and outside it that the violence in Iraq would spread across the region if the U.S. were to leave. Why? Iraqis are fighting among themselves over power. There is no reason why they would travel abroad to do so.

Moreover, there is a history that argues strongly in the opposite direction, that civil wars in this region suck others in, rather than spread across borders. Algeria, Afghanistan, and even Lebanon, which sucked in direct troop deployments by Syria and Israel, are among the civil wars that did not spread. The case for a spreading war has not been made.

It is likely, however, that an American departure would result in the war sucking others in more deeply than they are today. This is most likely, however, through financial and arms support and proxy fighters rather than troops.

Iran's neighbors are well aware of the dangers of greater involvement, and neither of the two key players, Saudi Arabia and Iran, wants a direct confrontation. They and other neighbors are deeply aware of the risks of a sharper divide between Sunni and Shia
countries as evidenced by the sound rejection of recent American efforts to organize a coalition of Sunni states against Iran.

Another frequent claim is that an American exit would be a tremendous psychological victory for radical Islamists. This echoes the fear of the dominoes that didn’t fall after Vietnam. In this case, an American exit from Iraq, not the region, would be a cause for celebration among some terrorists and perhaps a temporary source of strength.

But it is at least equally true that the American occupation of Iraq—I use that word because that is how it is seen in the region—is jihadists’ principal recruiting tool. Who is to say, then, that an American departure would be, on balance, a shot in the arm or a significant mid- and long-term loss?

Let me briefly make one final point which I think is directly within the jurisdiction of this committee, and that is that I believe it is urgent for Congress to address and end the dangerous charade that has been underway between Congress and the Administration regarding the question of whether the U.S. is currently planning a permanent military presence in Iraq. Congress has passed numerous provisions prohibiting the use of its funds, of allocated appropriated funds, for building a permanent presence; in one case, by a Senate vote of 100–0. Initially, the Administration strongly opposed these provisions, but afterwards allowed them to pass, presumably on the grounds that the language is meaningless because no one can say that anything is going to be permanent.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has continued to construct at enormous cost, an unknown cost, a massive self-contained embassy, as we know, and military bases whose facilities, military facilities and amenities and costs, could only be justified by a very long-term planned use. The major bases are designed to support force protection across the region and in North Africa.

After years of evasions and denials, late in May the White House and the Pentagon finally revealed what had been obvious on the ground all along, in my judgment. Defense Secretary Gates remarked that the U.S. was seeking, quote, a long and enduring presence in Iraq, for which the model was Korea and Japan. U.S. forces have been in both of those countries for more than half of a century. His comments did not receive anywhere near the attention they deserve.

What is the Administration thinking regarding a long-term U.S. military presence in Iraq? How big a presence? And for what purpose? Is there a settled policy? Is there a document of any kind? Has it ever been debated at senior levels? Or did the planning and building begin, as one general has said, by engineers who wanted to stay ahead of the policy curve and continued on auto-pilot ever since? This issue is of immense political consequence to the United States.

Repeated polls show the Iraqis strongly oppose the bases. Across the Middle East, the enormous American footprint supports those who believe that the U.S. invaded Iraq in order to control the country and its oil resources and establish itself as a permanent presence in the region. Congress needs to end the Kabuki dance about spending and call the question on policy. What are the Administration’s plans and thinking? And are they wise?
In my view, any serious attention to political and social realities in Iraq and to opinion across the region and globally would lead one quickly to the conclusion that major U.S. military facilities in the Middle East should be located outside that country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Mathews can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

The CHAIRMAN. I welcome our friend back to this Armed Services Committee, Dr. Frederick Kagan. The floor is yours, sir.

STATEMENT OF DR. FREDERICK W. KAGAN, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Dr. KAGAN. Mr. Chairman, honorable members, it is a pleasure to be in front of you again, speaking on this very important topic. I note that, as usual, I appear to be in the minority among the witnesses. I have gotten pretty comfortable with that role. I have been in the minority throughout this discussion, sometimes very close to being a minority of one, because, although I supported the initial invasion, I have been a pretty staunch critic of the way the Bush Administration has pursued the war from, honestly, even before the invasion began until January of this year. And if you want to think about what an uncomfortable position it is, support a war and then oppose the way the Administration fights it.

I would like to take up one point that has been mentioned here—and it has been mentioned on a few occasions—that I think requires a correction. The United States is not an occupying force in Iraq, and I know that Dr. Mathews did not indicate that she thinks that it is, simply that people say that it is.

I have heard a number of prominent leaders in Congress describe our presence there as an occupation, and I think it is very dangerous for us to use this misleading term. The United States is in Iraq today pursuant to U.N. Security Council resolutions and at the request of the Iraqi Government. That is a very different thing from being an occupying power. And it raises the question of how we are interacting with our Iraqi ally, because the Government of Iraq right now is an ally, and for all of our frustrations with it, it is one of the best allies on the war on terror that we have.

If you measure the quality of alliance by the determination to fight our number one enemy, al Qaeda, Iraqi troops take casualties at a rate of about three to one to ours, many of them in the fight against al Qaeda. And Iraq has taken far more casualties in that fight, I believe, than any other country in the world.

Let’s step back for a minute and think again about how we got into the current situation. I don’t want to revisit the question of whether we should have fought the war or not. I think we are well beyond the point where that is a discussion that is of significance. But I would say that from the end of 2003 until early 2006, we faced a consistent and coherent challenge in Iraq, and that challenge was the Sunni Arab insurgency based primarily in Anbar Province and driven primarily by the refusal of the Sunni Arabs in Iraq to accept the subordinate position that any sort of democratic state in Iraq would consign them to.
We had a great many discussions of what the best way would be of dealing with this insurgency. In my view, the Administration chose an inadequate strategy that did not focus on suppressing the insurgency, but instead relied on an emphasis of training Iraqi forces to do it themselves, something which I always feared would lead to greater sectarian violence and also an ineffective result.

At the same time, starting in early 2004, the organization al Qaeda in Iraq, established by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, aimed to establish—aimed to bring into being in Iraq a full-scale sectarian conflict. That was his stated goal. He desired to do that for a number of reasons which he made clear in a series of publications. For one thing, al Qaeda is a anti-Shia organization, at least in the form in which it established itself in Iraq, and Zarqawi regarded it as an absolute good to kill Shia. But in addition, he also wished to spur the mobilization of a Shia majority in Iraq and, to that end, he desired to go into the Shia community to launch attacks on the Sunni community, so that community would be more heavily mobilized.

In the face of this challenge, we did not respond adequately, in my view, and we allowed too much scope for al Qaeda in Iraq to continue its activities, attempting to draw the country toward sectarian conflict. Astonishingly, despite determined efforts by Zarqawi and al Qaeda in Iraq from 2004 through early 2006, the Shia community largely responded with restraint. And the primary security problem that we faced in Iraq in that period stemmed from the Sunni Arab insurgency and not from sectarian violence.

The destruction of the Golden Dome of the Samara Mosque in February 2006 by al Qaeda changed that equation, and it led finally to very large-scale, widespread, reprisal attacks by Shia against Sunni Arabs and the beginning of a tit-for-tat cycle of escalation.

In response to this change in the situation, unfortunately, Administration strategy did not change very dramatically. We continued to focus on putting Iraqis in the lead. We continued to focus on trying to maintain a small footprint in Iraq. We continued to focus on trying to maintain a low visibility presence in Iraq.

As a result of this policy from 2003 through early 2007, although the number of U.S. combat brigades in Iraq has fluctuated from about 15 to about 20 or 21 at any given moment prior to 2007, all but two or three of those would be based on forward operating bases (FOBs) and conducting mounting patrols through areas, but not maintaining widespread or permanent presence in neighborhoods for which they had the responsibility to help establish security.

I want to emphasize that throughout this period, there almost always were two or three brigades that were engaged in such operations, but they were generally unsupported by operations in their vicinity. They generally had, of course, inadequate support from Iraqi Security Forces, not yet mature enough either to engage in the struggle or not yet numerous enough to do so on a wide scale. And these operations did not form part of any coherent operational or strategic approach to the conflict. As a result, sectarian violence spiraled out of control.
With a few exceptions, each month in 2006 was worse than the last. And by the end of 2006 it seemed apparent to all, including me, that we were on the path to defeat. In January 2007, the President announced a new strategy, and it is a strategy, it is not simply a change in tactics. It lays out a clear strategic objective, a path going there. It is a clear military strategy. It is perfectly appropriate to question it. You can disagree with it, you can disagree with its premises, but it is a strategy. And the assumption is indeed that political progress in Iraq will not be possible or would not have been possible at the level of violence we saw prevailing in the country at the end of 2006. And furthermore, that the Iraqi Security Forces by themselves were unlikely to be able to bring the level of violence down to a point at which normal political process would be adequate without significant assistance.

As a result, President Bush announced a new strategy whose military component focused heavily on establishing security in the core areas of Iraq that were most violent. And to that end, he sent additional forces into the country. I want to make the point people frequently focus on this number of 20,000 troops and how can 20,000 troops make a difference. And it is just five brigades and so forth. But it is not just a question of what those 20,000 additional troops were doing. It is also a question of what the other brigades in the country were doing as well, what the other combat troops were doing. Because even as the new brigades started arriving at the rate of one a month in January, the commanders in the field began to take all of the units that had been on FOBs and push them into the neighborhoods pursuing a fundamentally different approach.

So it is not just a question of another 20,000 troops. It was a question of what all of the U.S. combat troops in Iraq were doing, whereas in the past only a handful at a time in any one given place would be undertaken to establish security. Now, almost all of the U.S. security forces in Iraq were seeking to establish security.

Neither is it the case that the new troops were initially earmarked to Baghdad and subsequently sent elsewhere as a result of spreading violence. From the outset, Generals Petraeus and Odierno were explicit that they thought it was not going to be possible to secure Baghdad without eliminating terrorist sanctuaries in what they called the “Baghdad belts,” the areas north and south to the city, in many of which we have had no combat presence for many years, and that have become very serious terrorist sanctuaries.

As a result, by design, as the new forces flowed in, of five Army brigades that went in, two brigade headquarters went into Baghdad, three brigade headquarters went into the belts. Of the Marine forces that went in, all of them were directed outside of Baghdad, and that was by design. Forces did move around some outside of Baghdad in response to changing security situations. But the plan to attempt to control both the belts and Baghdad was the plan from the outset. And it is, in my view, from a military perspective a sound plan.

I will emphasize very briefly that it is a plan that is very different from anything that we have tried in the past. In the previous period as we tried to establish security in one part of the
country or another at a time, we did indeed allow the enemy to establish safe havens in parts of the country where we were not. The current operation is attacking almost all of the safe havens that al Qaeda has established for itself in Iraq at the same time, from Fallujah through Lake Tharthar, to the southern belt, through Yusufiyah, Mahmudiyyah and now even into Arab Jabour and Salman Pak, which had been absolutely no-go terrain for us, held by terrorists for years.

Around into the north in Diyala, we are finally clearing Baquba, and we are moving around to the north of the city, clearing areas around Taji and Tarmiya which have also been insurgent strongholds.

If you look at Iraq, Iraq is not a limitless place. And when you speak about the possibility of al Qaeda displacing away from this operation, there are a limited number of options that they have. They can move into Kirkuk and attempt to inflame the situation there, as they have done, although I would note that the recent attacks that we have seen in Kirkuk are actually a continuation of what has been a steady drum beat of periodic attacks in Kirkuk that al Qaeda has been carrying out at least since the beginning of the year.

They can try to move into Ninawa Province, of which Mosul is the capital, and inflame sectarian and ethnic tension there. They have made some efforts to do that. We have been very aggressive in response with Special Operations, and the Iraqi Security Forces in that region have been very effective.

Outside of those areas, it is very difficult for al Qaeda to find any bases. They are not going to be moving into the south, into Shia land, where there is no support and indeed active hostility to them, and they are not going to find very good safe havens in Kyrgyzstan either. So, in fact, the operations that we are currently conducting severely limit the areas al Qaeda can try to move into and push them fundamentally, with the exception of Mosul, into areas that are of far less strategic importance than the area we are currently engaged in securing.

Now, I do believe it would be necessary to conduct follow-on operations to clear those areas out, but this is not just a question of pushing them around from one region to another.

At the same time as the surge strategy was being debated, as Dr. Perry mentioned, we were presented with an opportunity. And it was an opportunity that few had foreseen. And the opportunity was that the Sunni sheiks in Anbar Province were turning against al Qaeda. That was not something that was of our doing primarily. It was something that resulted from al Qaeda mistakes. But they are mistakes that are inherent in the nature of that organization, which in fact pursues a version of Islam, if you want to be generous and call it that, that is loathsome to most Iraqis and indeed to most Muslims, and that has very little popular support in the Muslim world. And the evidence is just about anywhere al Qaeda establishes itself and immediately attempts to impose its version of Islamic law, the locals begin to resist, and al Qaeda engages in a cycle of violence with them. It did that in Anbar Province, killed a popular sheik, committed a number of other atrocities, and the
people of Anbar, particularly the leadership, started to turn against al Qaeda.

That process was facilitated by the skillful operations by U.S. military forces in the province, the U.S. Army brigade, commanded by Colonel Sean McFarland in Ramadi. Marine forces throughout the province working to clear the area were very important in shaping this process. These were among the handful of units, as I mentioned, that had been attempting to establish security in their areas despite the larger strategy of not doing that, that prevailed in the theater, and they were successful.

I will confess that as I read about this project in 2006, I was skeptical. I looked at the low force ratios that the Marines had in Ramadi, and I said they are never going to be able to do this. I was wrong. They were able to do it. And they were able to do it in large part because they were able to work synergistically with this movement of the Sunni sheiks against al Qaeda in the province. The surge has dramatically increased the speed with which this process has been moving forward. As some people put it, even when you are operating with Sunni tribes and many tribal systems, there is the desire among them to be friends with the strongest tribe. And we have established ourselves for the moment as the strongest tribe in al-Anbar, which is one of the reasons why the Sunni sheiks are comfortable working with us and allowing us to serve as a bridge between them and the Iraqi Government, and, most of all, seeking our assistance in fighting al Qaeda, which they now perceive as a deadly foe. This process has expanded beyond al-Anbar.

Similar awakening movements have developed in Salahaddin Province in the north of Baghdad, in Bago Province, which is a mixed province to the south where we have even had Shia tribal leaders come forward and say, hey, we want to do some of the stuff that the Sunnis are doing in al-Anbar. And it is happening in Diyala Province where we have had tribal agreements coming together, tribal cease-fires and tribes reaching out to us to work with us working against al Qaeda as well.

So this is a process that has been spreading and accelerating over the last year, fueled, I believe, by the confidence that these leaders have that we will stand by them and help to ensure that they can prevail in the struggle against al Qaeda.

It is a very important development. It is not one that I believe can continue in the absence of a strong military presence engaged in the sorts of operations that we are now pursuing.

Let me also step back for a moment and point out that this shift in attitudes in Anbar and throughout the country is pivotal not only in Iraq but in the global war on terror. We have actually seen this process occur in Afghanistan as well. We have seen it occur in Somalia. The fact is that al Qaeda does not have very much of a brand that has much mass appeal in the Muslim world, but it is frequently the case, because they are such fanatical fighters and so determined, that unless an outside force is present to defeat and contain them militarily, they can terrorize local populations into supporting them against their will.

I think that is a very important lesson for us to take away from this conflict as we think about pursuing the global war on terror in general and the counterterrorism fight in Iraq in particular.
Responsible people in this city understand and say repeatedly that we cannot simply abandon Iraq and allow it to become an al Qaeda safe haven, and advocate leaving U.S. forces behind to engage in counterterrorism. I am not sure I would challenge them to describe exactly what sort of counterterrorism operations they have in mind if they don’t look like what we are doing. The sectarian violence that we are seeing in Iraq right now resulted from the deliberate efforts of al Qaeda to create it for their own benefit, and they are benefiting every day. If we were to leave, they have made it clear that they will attempt to recreate the sectarian violence, which has been coming down steadily, get it up to previous levels and continue to benefit from it.

I do not understand in this context how we can imagine that we could fight al Qaeda in Iraq without addressing the sectarian violence that is their primary tool for establishing themselves in the country.

I would like to make one last point about the discussion of what the likely consequences of U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would be. I respectfully disagree with Dr. Mathews about the absence of historical evidence for the likelihood of difficulty there. I would refer the committee to the excellent report done at the Brookings Institute by Ken Pollack and Dan Byman called “Things Fall Apart” that brings to bear significant evidence that would lead us to believe that the consequences will indeed be very dangerous. But I would like to caution the committee and everyone in this discussion for making the same mistake that the President is accused of having made—and I think with some justice before the Iraq war—of assuming that the post-conflict scenario would be rosy, would be optimistic, would go the way we would want it to be. I think we can make just as large a mistake if we choose optimistic scenarios about the post-withdrawal situation that are questionable in the face of many, many reports, some very solidly based, about the possibility that the optimistic scenarios will not play out. I thank the committee for its attention.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kagan can be found in the Appendix on page 75.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman for his comments. I am reserving my questions until a later moment. Mr. Hunter just informed me that he will reserve his comments until a later moment in this hearing.

Mr. Saxton, you are called upon, please.

Mr. SAXTON. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you for permitting me to be the lead questioner here. Let me just begin with this. As I sat and listened to the witnesses and, of course, most recently Dr. Kagan, it occurred to me that what we are really trying to do here is to figure out over time—you don’t have to turn the clock on for me. That is all right. The lights aren’t working.

The CHAIRMAN. The lights aren’t working. Why don’t we start all over for him. Start over.

We will start all over for you, and we will watch the clock here.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, as I was saying, thank you.

It occurs to me what we are all trying to do regardless of our perspective on Iraq, what we are all trying to do is to figure out how to counter the threat caused by al Qaeda and extremist Islamic
groups who wish us harm. And as I look at the history of this, there are efforts that have been made which I think have all been made in good faith.

We first noticed perhaps—or at least this is my perspective—that al Qaeda—that extremist Islam was a factor to be dealt with during the 1980's, and we chose a course of action which was in concert with them because we had an enemy that we recognized as being a more—an enemy that we needed to deal with in a more direct fashion. Of course, that was the Soviet Union. So we supported the efforts of the Taliban. And I guess we could make a case today that maybe that wasn’t the smartest thing to do.

And then during the 1990’s, we entered a new phase of engagement with extreme Islamist groups. During the 1990’s, we had the attack on the Khobar Towers, we had the attack on the African embassies, we had the attack on the Cole and others, and our decision at that point was not to do anything to directly confront them. And I believe that today we could make the case that that was an error in judgment.

And then, of course, we had the events of 2001 and a new period of engagement with Islamist terrorist groups, Islamist fundamentalist groups when we went to Afghanistan. And for a time Afghanistan seemed to be a successful engagement until, of course, the groups fled to the other side of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and set up shop all over again, and we found ourselves in that region of the world with newly constituted groups which today are said to be as strong as or perhaps even stronger than they were before 2001.

And, of course, that brought us to Iraq, and as Dr. Kagan pointed out, our intentions were good. We thought we had to deal with Saddam Hussein, and we went there. And under the leadership of the Bush Administration and Don Rumsfeld, we decided that our policy would be a limited military one where we would seek to bring on board an Iraqi security force that we would be able to leave in charge. And once again we lived through an era—we worked through an era where we made mistakes.

And so the question today is what should our future policy be? And I think I have heard two diametrically opposed sets of ideas about where we ought to go.

Let me just ask Dr. Kagan this. Looking at the history of where we have been in this fight against fundamentalist extremist groups, what is your best guess as to what we ought to be doing and doing in the future and based on where we have been, Dr. Kagan.

Dr. KAGAN. I think we are pursuing the right approach in Iraq right now, and I think it is very important that we see it through to the end. I think we are making tremendous progress in defeating al Qaeda in Iraq in conjunction with the Iraqi people. And I think the historical examples that you have brought to bear are very telling.

We made a tremendous mistake in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in deciding that Afghanistan was a far-off place of which we knew little and something we could afford to ignore. And as a result, we allowed the Taliban to seize power, and
we allowed al Qaeda to metastasize there, and we found the problems subsequently coming home to roost.

I believe if we let al Qaeda up off the mat in Iraq, we run the serious danger of having a serious development occur. The enemy in Afghanistan was very little threat to regions outside of the country while the Soviets were there. As soon as the Soviets withdrew and the situation collapsed, they became a global threat. I think we are very likely to face a similar situation in Iraq if we would leave precipitously. So I think it is very important that we stay and help the Iraqis finish off this very potent threat.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlemen.

The clock is now working, and we will call on Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you all for your excellent and very provocative testimony.

Dr. Perry, you have testified that when the Iraq Study Group went to Iraq and met with our commanding officers in the field there, all of them—Casey, Chiarelli and Abizaid—when put the question would three to five additional brigades help the situation decline the additional troops, would you elaborate further on why they indicated negatively that they did not need or seek additional American troops?

Dr. PERRY. Now, Mr. Spratt, my recollection of the discussion—first of all, I am completely clear that they said, no, this would not help. When we asked them why not, my recollection of the discussion was that they said that it would delay the Iraqi Government taking responsibility and taking the decisions that they needed to be making. They thought that a political reconciliation was necessary for success in Iraq, and that the Iraqi Government was not taking the necessary actions, and our sending in more troops would only delay their doing that. That was my best recollection of how they explained their view.

Mr. SPRATT. Did they indicate, or did anyone indicate, did you determine independently that additional Iraqi troops are necessary over and above the 135 battalions now being trained?

Dr. PERRY. They were continuing—as we were there, they were continuing to train additional Iraqi battalions, but their main conclusion was that the quality of the training needed to be improved. And that is why we were discussing with them the notion of embedding more American forces in the Iraqi battalions, for the purpose of increasing the professionalism and the capability of the Iraqi forces by working with American non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who could serve as role models and who could help train them, on-the-job training so to speak.

The training that the Iraqi forces had before they went into the field was basically the kind of training we give our troops in basic training, and we would not expect to send troops with just basic training out into combat missions without having experienced NCOs and officers working with them.

Mr. SPRATT. Dr. Kagan, you indicate that the first phase is finished with reasonably good results, and you look forward to a successful second phase. Do you think that can be accomplished with the existing Iraqi forces?

Dr. KAGAN. I do believe that the current operation is designed to work with the Iraqi forces that are available. Our commanders now
have expressed every confidence that they can achieve their objectives with the forces that they have. I believe General Odierno said, I don't need more forces, I just need more time.

And I would also note that we have changed the training of Iraqis force. Iraqi forces that deploy into Baghdad now first run through a training area in Nasiriyah to the east of Baghdad, which is designed to give them a much higher quality of training before we deploy them into the streets. And, of course, since last fall many more Iraqi forces have been engaged directly in combat and have received quite a lot of on-the-job training. Reports from the people that I spoke to when I was in Iraq in May tell me that many Iraqi units are fighting extremely proficiently and professionally.

Mr. SPRATT. Dr. Mathews, you indicated that we are asking the wrong questions. One of the series of questions we try to impose, for lack of any kind of metric, any kind of yardstick by which to measure progress, were some benchmarks which were put into law recently, and now we are seeing the answers to those benchmarks. Were those benchmarks the wrong criteria? Do they go in the right direction? Some have suggested that we are being a bit too harsh, holding them to standards that are too tough in the midst of a civil war of this intensity.

Dr. MATHEWS. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I tried to suggest—excuse me, Mr. Spratt—the benchmarks—and I think the use of the word and particularly this list suggest—as I said, these are achievable. They are rather straightforward. In fact, we are asking, first of all, to amend the Constitution, which was only agreed to because we promised the Sunnis that it would be fixed to give them a better deal. And that was a somewhat unrealistic promise. It has encouraged them to fantasize about what they can get and to dig in their heels against further work with the government until they can. And there is no prospect that we are going to. Meetings do not mean progress, as any Member of Congress knows. The same thing is true on the oil deal.

What we are talking about here are fundamental allocations of political power. And I believe that the Iraqis are not yet ready to make those choices themselves because they haven’t yet tested each other's strength and will. And there are too many organized groups determined to do that. So I believe we are engaged in a rather elaborate exercise of self-delusion about the benchmarks.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McHugh from New York.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome to you all. I appreciate you being here.

Dr. Kagan, we have heard, and I think understandably, that there is a deep concern that somehow American forces today are in the middle of a civil war, that we can extract ourselves from that civil war. And whether it is the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group group or the bill that the distinguished chairman had on the floor just last week focus in on al Qaeda. Do you think that is achievable? Are we in the middle of a civil war? And can you separate the two in this current environment?

Dr. KAGAN. In my view, any insurgency is definitionally a civil war, and I have always found this discussion to be a little bit problematic. If you mean are we in the midst of a full-scale civil war...
in which everyone is trying to kill everyone else, absolutely not. It is a very organized struggle in which a number—as Dr. Mathews pointed out—a number of hostile groups are competing with one another by attacking each other's populations. We have been in situations like this, in fact, continuously since about 1995 when we went into Bosnia, and we have demonstrated that we can be successful in such things. But I don’t want to get into the comparisons between this and the Balkans.

But the answer to your second question is unequivocally no. I can’t imagine how we could possibly confront al Qaeda and Iraq without addressing the sectarian conflict that they are themselves stoking and attempting to benefit from. I don’t understand and no one has ever explained to me what that kind of engagement, what that kind of counterterrorism campaign would look like.

Mr. McHugh. Would you say that because your argument would be predicated on a central strategy of al Qaeda is to fulminate the sectarian violence that we would try to extract ourselves from?

Dr. Kagan. Not only that, but that they benefit from that sectarian violence because they create sectarian violence, and then they use the resulting lawlessness to terrorize local people into supporting them. And they also then pose, ironically enough, as the defenders of the local people against the Shi’a attacks that follow.

And the result of this is that it is a very different situation from what we saw in Afghanistan in the 1990’s. These guys are not establishing large training bases in the desert away from the population. These guys are burrowing into villages, moving into homes, moving people out, you know, living among the population in the area that they control. You are not going to be able to get intelligence about these people unless the locals are confident that we are going to be available, that we are going to be around to protect them when they turn against al Qaeda. And this is what we have seen. As we moved into areas and announced that we are going to be there for a while, the locals start fingerling the outsiders who are al Qaeda. Whether they are Iraqis or not, they tend to be outsiders in the local village. I simply don’t see how we can continue to struggle against al Qaeda without engaging in this.

Mr. McHugh. Thank you, sir.

Dr. Perry, forgetting for the moment Dr. Kagan’s comments, the Iraq Study Group spoke about and you commented about a strong reaction force, about a residual force. Again, the Chairman’s bill last week spoke about residual forces to protect our embassy, the largest in the world when completed for us, to train Iraqi forces, to pressure and disrupt al Qaeda, to provide force protection. I assume we have to feed those troops. You have to provide logistic support, intelligence, air support. How many troops do you think we could leave behind safely and effectively? What size force would that take?

Dr. Perry. I don’t think I would be qualified to give you the size of that——

Mr. McHugh. Doctor, you are the former Secretary of Defense, with all due respect.

Dr. Perry. As the Secretary of Defense, I would have gone to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, now here is the mission we want——
Mr. McHugh. That is fair, and I respect that. But the Iraq Study Group recommended this.

If you made a recommendation, I presume you formulated some figure of some sort. What would that be?

Dr. Perry. We did not formulate a figure. We discussed the figure. We discussed it with some of the military people. It would clearly lead to a reduction in force over what we now have, but it would still be—I think we said in the report it would still be a sizeable military force remaining in Iraq.

Mr. McHugh. Okay. Dr. Kagan, do you have any idea what that force would take, what it would look like? We have about 160,000 now. What would that force look like, forgetting if it would be successful or not?

Dr. Kagan. Well, it depends. If the mission is as usually described, to support the Iraqi Security Forces and also to conduct counterterrorism operations in some form, there have been a number of proposals out there that suggest anywhere from 60- to 100,000 troops would be required for that. I haven’t yet done all of the math for that. I think the higher estimate of that is probably more accurate when you consider how heavily obligated we are to support the Iraqi Security Forces right now logistically.

Mr. McHugh. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you so much for your testimony this morning. I have asked this question before from our military leaders, and you mentioned this, Secretary Perry. When they disbanded the Iraqi Army, the police and the civil servants, I have asked them who made this decision. And the reason I asked this question is because we hope that this is not repeated again. Was this a military decision? Was this a civilian decision? I think it was a very, very big mistake to disband the army, the police, and the servants. And I have asked the military leaders and nobody seems to know where that decision came from.

Do any three of you have any idea how they were able to arrive at this conclusion that it was for the interest of our troops and their people to disband the army, the police and the servants?

Dr. Perry. I was not there at the time and do not know why or how that decision was made. I know when it was made, and it was made shortly after the general who was in charge of the divisional forces there was relieved and replaced by Mr. Bremer. And I believe it was Mr. Bremer that made the decision. And I do know that the general strongly opposed that decision and argued to Mr. Bremer against doing it.

Mr. Ortiz. Ever make a decision like that without getting all the mice together, because I think that it was a very costly mistake that we made.

Dr. Perry. That is my judgment also.

Mr. Ortiz. You know, what is the impact on the United States military of continuing our involvement in Iraq? Are we in danger of breaking the United States Army through the high rate of deployment and repeated deployments? And one of the reasons I ask
this question, I just had a call from my constituent, the family of a constituent, about five days ago. This individual had been deployed three times. He has been back less than six months, and he has been called again, and he is going to be activated to go back to Iraq for a fourth time. I think this is too much.

Not only is this impacting on our reserves, on our National Guard, the soldiers are tired. And this is why—I was just wondering, I mean, are we in danger of breaking the United States Army through this high rate of deployment?

Dr. Perry. I don’t know whether I can answer that question in the sense you ask it. I would say, though, that I am very much concerned about the Army National Guard. I think they have been overextended. I think, in effect, we have broken the compact that we had with the guard. After this war is finally over, it will not be just a matter of rebuilding the guard. I think we need to reconsider from first principles what the mission of the guard would be and have a new compact with them that would be more appropriate for the future. And I think that would be a very important role for this committee to take on that job.

Mr. Ortiz. I just wonder if anybody else from the witnesses that would like to respond to that same question since I have a little time left.

Dr. Kagan. Well, I will.

I am also very concerned, of course, about the strain that this war is placing on our military. I am also concerned about the consequences for our military of inflicting the first ever defeat on the all-volunteer force. This is not a force that is accustomed to losing wars, and I am very concerned about what the consequences of that will be.

But I would like to echo Dr. Perry’s comment that there is more to consider here than simply the strain of the current war. I began advocating for larger ground forces in 1997, and I have been consistently saying since then that the ground forces need to be larger. And I know that there has been support in this committee and on the Hill in general for expanding ground forces even as successive administrations have opposed doing that. I am happy to see the Bush Administration has now finally called for an increase in the ground forces, which I think is urgently required, even if you think we are going to be out of Iraq in the near future.

If you look at the scale of the potential of future threats, it is simply unacceptable for us not to be able to undertake an operation of this scale without imposing such strains on the ground forces. And I would hope that the committee will continue to work actively with this Administration and subsequent Administrations to, in fact, attempt to accelerate and expand the expansion of ground forces that this Administration has proposed.

Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Jones, North Carolina.

Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

And, Dr. Kagan, I want to—I agree with you. We can’t go back, but we can learn from mistakes made by looking at the past. I want to read one statement to you, and I have a question for each one. This is an article written by Lieutenant General Greg Newbold, a man I have great respect for, gave up a star simply because
he saw what was happening before we went into Iraq; an article written April 9, 2006, *Time Magazine*: From 2000 until 2002, I was a Marine Corps lieutenant general and Director of Operations for the Joint Chief of Staffs. After 9/11, I was a witness and therefore a party to the actions that led us to the invasion of Iraq and unnecessary war.

Inside the military family, I made no secret of my view that the zealots’ rationale—the zealots’ rationale for war made no sense. The reason I want to mention that—the zealots, the neocons. Are you a part of the neocon group that wanted to go into Iraq? Yes or no.

Dr. KAGAN. I supported the invasion of Iraq. I am not sure what exactly the neocon group is. Usually that is used as a pejorative term.

Mr. JONES. Well, I would put Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, you know, the people—Rumsfeld included—that seemed not to care about the professionals whose intelligence was warning us what would happen. But that is history. I won’t agree with that. This is the question: Before the war in Iraq, what was the size of al Qaeda in Iraq when Saddam was in power?

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I don’t know for sure, but I assume that it was very small. That is what I understand.

Mr. JONES. Okay. Dr. Perry, would you agree with Dr. Mathews that there was very little, if any, strength of al Qaeda in Iraq before the invasion?

Dr. PERRY. Yes.

Dr. MATHews. I think we are confusing two different groups, al Qaeda in its global form with individuals in Iraq and the group al Qaeda in Iraq, or al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, which didn’t exist.

Mr. JONES. Okay. So the presence now, whether it is one group or the other group, is obviously growing inside of Iraq since now that we have this sectarian war, civil war. I mean, there is no question about that.

Dr. MATHews. No question.

Mr. JONES. Okay. Dr. Mathews, I think I understood you to say that there is no way to say what will happen when we and if we downsize the number of American troops in Iraq, whether there would be a civil war that will spread and grow throughout the nation, that all the countries will come in and try to add fuel to the fire of a civil war.

Dr. MATHews. I would guess that it is very likely that other countries will get sucked in more deeply than they already are with more arms and more money and maybe more proxy fighters. I think it is very unlikely that the war will spread across the borders. Iraqis are principally fighting for power in Iraq. That is what 90 percent of the violence is about. Why would they go across the borders to do that? Also history tells us that this is not what happens with civil wars in this region. They suck others in rather than spread.

Mr. JONES. Dr. Perry, as a former Secretary of the Navy—and I appreciate your concern about the National Guard. We have had hearings on that. There is no question that the National Guard has done a magnificent job in supporting the effort in Afghanistan and
Iraq, but primarily Iraq. And many of the Governors are very upset with the fact that there is so much presence of the National Guard.

My time is about to run out. I have got a quick question. Would you think it would be—if a bill was put in by a Member of Congress to say that the guard would be significantly reduced over the next year and come back to the States so that they can help the States during hurricane seasons, floods and every other—do you see this would be a major hurt for the effort in Iraq?

Dr. Perry. I would like to see two related changes made. First, agreeing with Dr. Kagan, I would like to see an increase in the size of the active duty ground forces, particularly the Army. And then second, if that were done, that would allow, I think, a restructuring of the mission of the guard to be primarily homeland defense.

Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my time is up.

The Chairman. Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor is not here.

Dr. Snyder.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for being here.

Dr. Perry, in your end statement at the end you say, quote, in sum, I believe that the President’s diplomatic strategy is too timid, his military strategy is too little and too late to effect the lasting and profound changes needed. His strategy is not likely to succeed because it is tactical, not strategic, because it does not entail real conditionality for the Iraqi Government, and because it will only deepen the divide in our country, end of quote.

Last week at our Oversight Investigation Subcommittee, we had a great panel including General Wes Clark, who stated very strongly he thinks it is too early to give up militarily on what is going on in Iraq, but says the thing is going to fall apart, and there isn’t any point in continuing unless there is a dramatic change in strategy.

Dr. Mathews, in your statement you state we are—quote, we are debating this political problem almost entirely in military terms, which limits and distorts the available options. A change in political strategy in Iraq and a shift in political attention on economic and military priorities across the region redefines the possibilities. Analysis of options must recognize, and it generally does not today, that a significant change in U.S. policy will change what others are willing to do, end of quote.

Last week when we had the vote in the House, I was one of the ten Democrats that voted against it. And one of the reasons I did is because it focused only on the military. It was purely a discussion about military options, and it had nothing about the strategy. I think one of the problems, Dr. Perry—I am going to address my question just to you if I might. I don’t think that many of us have a clear understanding of what we are saying when we say strategy. Summarize for me. What do you think should be our strategy toward Iraq and the region?

Dr. Perry. My best judgment of the appropriate strategy for Iraq was the strategy we laid out in the Iraq Study Group, but I think the important point, to follow up on the specific point that you made, is that the strategy should entail military, political, and diplomatic. It has to involve all three components for it to be a full-blown strategy.
Dr. Snyder. Give me a one-sentence summary—and I realize that is unfair—one-sentence summary of what each of those components should be, do you think, toward that region in Iraq.

Dr. Perry. The military strategy should be focused on building up the Iraqi Army, to make it fully professional and fully capable and continuing to fight al Qaeda in Iraq. The political strategies should be focused on trying to get a reconciliation between the Sunnis and the Shi'as in Iraq. And the diplomatic strategy should be focused on bringing the friendly countries in the region in on a positive supportive role, and helping—and providing the disincentives for Iran and Syria to continue to arm the militias and culmination violence.

Dr. Snyder. A couple of days ago, Dr. Philip Zelikow provided a written statement to the committee, and one of the things he said is this. And I am going to read from his statement. He says, quote, "We should all be humble about predicting Iraq’s political future. Don’t scapegoat their leaders. Many of them are handling and balancing sets of personal and political concerns that are difficult for us to even comprehend. The bottom line, Iraq is still undergoing a full-bore political and social revolution; assume further change.” And as I thought about that—Mr. Smith and I were talking about when I walked to work this morning, I didn’t have to think about, you know, would our families be shot because we were serving in an elected position. I cannot comprehend what they must be going through.

That statement seemed to be in contrast with what a lot of us, including myself, have said in our speeches, that somehow we need to put pressure on these people, implying that there is not enough pressure on them today. Are we scapegoating the Iraqi leaders? And are these benchmarks just clearly—if they were all met 100 percent, all 18 of them, would it get us—you know, would the lions and the lambs be laying down together in Iraq? And I would like to hear from all three of you. If you would start, Dr. Perry.

Dr. Perry. And the benchmarks which the Iraq Study Group urged to be followed were benchmarks that were proposed by the Iraqi Government, not benchmarks which we made up, but benchmarks which the U.S. Government imposes on them.

In terms of Dr. Zelikow’s statement about the uncertainty in the political situation in Iraq, I agree with that, but I think the same statement can be made a year from now or five years from now.

Dr. Snyder. Dr. Mathews.

Dr. Mathews. I don’t know about scapegoat, but I think the core of your comment is exactly what I was trying to say, which was this has nothing to do with being lazy or recalcitrant, but being asked to do a task that would easily defeat any conceivable effort in the United States, for example, under conditions where in our terms 50 million people—50 million are dead or displaced or outside the country. It also tells you a great deal about the training effort that every Iraqi officer who can do so has his family and his wife outside the country. It tells you a great deal about why we cannot get a better result and why the result is so incommensurate with the investment we made. We are asking something which I think most people who have really studied this know in their hearts is not an honest request of another government.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Perry, thank you for being with us today. And I know you have been with us a lot of times as a former Secretary of Defense. You mentioned in your testimony that you think we needed to have a surge in diplomacy rather than a surge in troops, and that the surge in diplomacy hasn’t been undertaken by the Administration. Now, when you were Secretary of Defense, we had the—of course in 1993—or Under Secretary—we had a car bomb explode in the World Trade Center. We had something like 326 separate attacks over that period of time, that 4 years from 1993 to 1997. We had, of course, in 1996 the Khobar Towers attack which killed 19 American service people.

What surge in diplomacy did you undertake at that time to blunt this—what appeared to be then a burgeoning campaign by extremists against American—the American people and in some cases American service personnel?

Dr. Perry. Let me refer specifically to the Khobar Towers bombing, which is one I am very familiar with in some detail. Two different things we did in response to that. One of them was we worked extensively with the Saudi Government to prevent the action which that bombing was intended to cause, which was to cause the American troops to leave Saudi Arabia. We announced strongly that we were not going to let the bombing drive us out of Saudi Arabia. We worked with the Saudi Government to prepare an entirely new base for American troops located in the center of the desert which we could provide better force protection for. That was a major diplomatic thrust with the Saudi Government to get them to do that move.

Second, I’d like to comment specifically——

Mr. Hunter. Dr. Perry, I am talking about a diplomatic thrust.

Dr. Perry. That was a major diplomatic thrust with the Saudi Government. They were not at all anxious to make the move we are talking about. In terms of the decision not to confront the people, we were prepared to confront them, to confront forcibly and with military action the perpetrators of that. At the time we thought that had been engineered by the Iranian Government, and we had a contingency plan prepared to have a retaliatory strike if that could be confirmed. As it turned out, neither the FBI nor the Saudi police were able to finally determine who did that, who actually perpetrated that bombing, so we were not able to. But I can assure you that we were quite prepared to do that.

Mr. Hunter. Okay. So you were prepared, but you weren’t able to ID the perpetrators. So you didn’t——

Dr. Perry. Exactly. As far as I know, they have not been identified to this date.

Mr. Hunter. Now, you said you didn’t think there was enough troops—that was in your preliminary statement—in Iraq. The figures that I am looking at here—and correct me if I am wrong. When you became the Under Secretary of Defense and later Secretary, we had 14 Army divisions. You then took that down to 10 Army divisions. Do you think in retrospect that was a mistake?

Dr. Perry. At the end of the Cold War, first the Bush Administration reduced the military by 25 percent.
Mr. HUNTER. We had 18 divisions.

Dr. PERRY. Twenty-five percent. And in the Clinton Administration, that was reduced another 8 percent, from 25 percent to 33 percent.

In retrospect, no. I think we should have maintained more Army divisions.

Mr. HUNTER. Let me ask Dr. Mathews.

You talked about the need to engage diplomatically. What actions would you take with respect to the Iranians right now, with the Iranians in diplomatic engagement?

Dr. MATHEWS. I think our best hope of conversation with Tehran that moves forward is about Iraq, because oddly enough, that is where we share the greatest overlap in common interest.

The other issues that we have with Iran right now are even tougher, notably the nuclear one. I do think that it is as difficult as it has been because that government is so divided and so unable even to agree internally on anything. The prospects for success are slim, but there is no question that there have been overtures from the Iranian Government that we have rejected which suggest that notably and particularly in 2003, but more recently as well. So I do believe that there is a slim hope for a conversation that moves forward based on the common interest in Iraq. I think its prospects would be improved if the U.S. had suggested that it was changing its political strategy in the country, as I mentioned.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Now, you told me where you think we have failed in rejecting what you think are some slim overtures from the Iranians.

What do you think should be our message to the Iranians? And how would you engage with the Iranians beyond what Ambassador Crocker did here a month or so ago with the Iranians with respect to Iraq? Because, in fact, that is exactly what they did, they limited the conversation, as you know, to Iraq when they had the conversation with the Iranians. You made the statement that we were spending ten billion a month in Iraq and that that money would be better spent engaging in other areas of vital concern to us, including Iran. So I just wondered, how would you engage with Iran?

Dr. MATHEWS. I think it has to be done at a higher level from Ambassador Crocker, much higher level. And it has to be sustained over a long time. It will not be easy. And again, I do think its chances of moving forward would be much larger if the U.S. had changed not its diplomatic strategy, but its political strategy in Iraq, and probably if the U.S. had indicated its intention to withdraw.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. What should be the substance of this engagement, of our message to Iran, from your perspective?

Dr. MATHEWS. I think the U.S. and Iran share an interest that Iraq not degenerate into total chaos. That is not in Tehran’s interest any more than it is ours. And we have various of each other’s interests, including the five interdeals, which is of critical concern of Iran’s. So we have some mutual leverage. Those are the subjects that I would put on the table and pursue.

Mr. HUNTER. Dr. Kagan, tell us about your thoughts in terms of the capability of the Iraqi forces now, the stand-up of the Iraqi forces. In particular, too, I would like to have your—you know, one
thing that has been given constantly by what I call the smooth road crowd, that somehow there is a smooth road to occupation, and trying to deliver in an area that is very unfriendly to democracies, trying to deliver democracy, the idea that we should have kept Saddam Hussein's army in place with its 11,000 Sunni generals, and somehow that would have been the smooth road to security in Iraq right now. But give us your unvarnished assessment of the capability of the Iraqi military right now in terms of its experience and its equipment and its leadership.

Dr. KAGAN. The Iraqi Security Forces, of course, comprise the police and the army, and the situation is very different in each. Speaking to the question of the Iraqi Army, it is a young force. It has not been in existence for very long. We have faced a very daunting challenge of starting from scratch and building that force.

I agree with you that revisiting the question of what should have been done with Saddam's army is probably not fruitful at this point, but we certainly did face an undaunting challenge in putting any Iraqi force in the field. We have corrected many of the deficiencies in that force that have led to its failure to show up and fight adequately in 2005 and 2006. And, in fact, Iraqi Army battalions and brigades are in the fight across the country, and they are in the fight, it is worth noting, not simply against al Qaeda, but also against Jaish al Mahdi.

And when we were in Iraq in May of this year, I had the opportunity to go down to Diwania and meet with the Commander of the 8th Iraqi Army Division who has been conducting a very aggressive clear-and-hold operation in that very large city with very minimal coalition support against very serious Jaish al Mahdi fighters who are funded and advised by Iran. So you have Iraqi Army units fighting across the country with us in Baghdad, but I think we tend to focus too much only on what they are doing in Baghdad.

I saw a press briefing recently that said there are 7,000 Iraqi fighters in the southern belt working with Major General Lynch, and there are about 18,000 Iraqi Army soldiers in the north who are keeping Nineveh Province from falling apart. So I would say that the vast majority of the Iraqi Army is in this fight, it is doing well. It needs to be larger. Unquestionably it needs to be much larger. It needs to be better equipped, unquestionably. It needs to be better equipped. Both of those things should be a matter of priority, and I believe under the new command they are becoming a matter of greater priority.

Mr. HUNTER. And just for all of you, one aspect of al Qaeda involving itself in a way in attempting to end successfully, drawing Sunnis against Shiites and vice versa, the world has been treated to a specter on the international television of car bombs going off in the middle of crowds of women and children detonated by al Qaeda and reflected in that way by the commentators in the international news media over and over and over again. I can't help but think that the popularity of al Qaeda in what I would call the responsible Muslim community in the world, when they see these car bombs going off or ripping apart crowds of women and children, must be diminishing.

What is your take on the perception of al Qaeda now by the world, the Muslim community, at this point in the Iraqi operation?
Do you think they are losing some of their shine that they had initially and losing some of their popularity?

Dr. Kagan. Congressman, I think it is very hard to gauge the popularity of a movement. I think what we can say with a fair degree of confidence is that there is an attitude in the Muslim world “not in my backyard” as it comes to al Qaeda. You will still find Muslims who are supporting the anti-American message of al Qaeda and supporting various other aspects of that message, but what we have seen regularly is that as al Qaeda actually establishes itself in a country and starts to implement its version of radical Islam, locals start to resist, and a cycle of violence begins. That to me tells me that whatever else is going on, the message that they are carrying beyond anti-Americanism is not selling very well.

Mr. Hunter. Dr. Mathews and Dr. Perry, what do you think about that? Do you think they are losing some of their initial popularity?

Dr. Perry. I don’t have an informed judgment on that question, Mr. Hunter.

Dr. Mathews. I don’t either in a broad sense, but I wanted just to refer you—and I wish I could remember the reference—recently reported polling results in Egypt which show that more than 90 percent of the people viewing attacks on civilians is illegitimate and immoral, but over 93 percent view attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq as—including those that result in civilian deaths. We have to recognize the distinction that is being made that is related to what is viewed as a greater evil.

Mr. Hunter. Well, I understand that. But al Qaeda is—I noticed in the Arab media is being identified as—when they show these mass bombings with women and children, body parts laying in the street from these big bombs, they are being identified in the media, international media, as being al Qaeda bombings. That certainly doesn’t reflect on attacks on American troops.

So my question is do you think that that is bringing down the image, giving them a demotion in the propaganda war, if you will, as a result of those attacks? The commanders who make those decisions to blow up crowds of women and children have to look at the upsides and the downsides. Do you think there is a downside for them in terms of their position in the Muslim world?

Dr. Mathews. I don’t know. I do think that attacks in Iraq are judged differently.

Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Regarding the Iraqi Army, General Peter Pace a few days ago made reference to the fact that the number of active brigades in the Iraqi Army has dropped—and I don’t have the numbers before me—but has dropped by several numbers. I am sure someone can get that statement for us. But needless to say that is of great concern.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, let me say I agree substantially with Dr. Mathews and Dr. Snyder’s comments that, you know, a foreign military occupying force being able to solve the issues of such a power vacuum, power struggle, civil war in Iraq is hard to imagine, and also the
notion that there is a certain amount of political pressure that we can put on them to get them to resolve their differences. The differences are heartfelt and deep, and they are not going to resolve them, because the bulk of Shi'a and Sunni are both sort of holding out for the notion that their side can win, and they don't want to reach political accommodation because their constituents don't want them to. And we can bang our heads against that wall for a long time. Those fundamental realities don't seem to me like they are going to change.

And if there is some assurances that any of you can give me that I am missing something here, and that there is a greater possibility of reconciliation any time in the future that we can see, I am happy to hear it. I doubt it. But even assuming for the moment that that is wrong, that we could, in fact, somehow, you know, force a political solution there, the troop numbers are disturbing to me in terms of our commitment. Let me say why. And I have heard even the generals—I think General Petraeus said this, it might have been somebody else, that the surge at its current level is not sustainable past next spring no matter what; that basically we don't have the troops to sustain it at that level.

So if you accept the clear-and-hold strategy—as I see it, there are two flaws to it. One is the one that I mentioned, clear and hold for how long? Until they decide to resolve their differences politically? Well, as I just said, and as many of you have said, it doesn't look like that is going to happen. But the second is we don't have the troops to do that.

If we could be sort of everywhere in Iraq for as long as we want, then possibly that level of military presence could keep things under control, but as it stands right now, we are squeezing a balloon. We go into one area, get it under control, leave to go to another area, and it just continues. And given that we don't have the troops to maintain this past next spring under any scenario, how do we get over that hump? How do we deal with the troops?

I guess two parts to that question. One, is it wrong? Do we have the troop strength to maintain this level of troops past next spring, or under what scenario does this work if we don't have those troops, given the incredible emphasis on the hold part of this? We don't have the troops to hold it past next spring. How is that possibly a sufficient amount of time? I start with Dr. Kagan.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. As the gentleman can notice, the light is not working, so we are keeping time here at the desk.

Mr. SMITH. I trust you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Please proceed.

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, first of all, we are not squeezing the balloon. We are operating. We are not simply hitting them in one area and then moving to another. We are deliberately clearing a large swath of central Iraq, including almost all of the major insurgent havens, all at once. And it has been frequently reported by soldiers on the ground and even by media over there that the insurgents are having a hard time finding new places to move to in the area that they care most about and reestablish themselves because they are tending to find there are also American forces working with Iraqis there as well.
Mr. SMITH. But the violence is popping up. I mean, it just popped up in Kirkuk. It popped up in Baquba when we were in Baghdad. It seems like they may not be happy there, but they are certainly killing and causing destruction there.

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, there has been al Qaeda attacks in Kirkuk at least once a month going back to January before that, and there has been violence in Baquba well back in 2006. This is not a new thing. This is not a question of them moving back to Baquba. They have been there all along. Zarqawi was captured not very far from Baquba, which is where they established the Islamic State of Iraq. This is not squeezing the balloon. We have just cleared Baquba, in fact, for the first time. And we have cleared it, and we are holding it, and we are holding it simultaneously as we are operating in Fallujah and Yusufiya and Mahmudiya and Salman Pak and Arab Jabour and Taji and Tarmiya and Lake Tharthar.

Mr. SMITH. Skipping forward to next spring when we can’t hold it any longer because we don’t have the troops to maintain the surge, what happens then?

Dr. KAGAN. I don’t accept that premise, Congressman. I think people have said various different things about this. We can sustain the surge beyond April if we choose to, if it becomes necessary. And then the other question is how rapidly do we start drawing down, because you can start drawing down potentially in the spring. The assumption that would undergird that would be an optimistic scenario, that violence—would get violence sufficiently under control while we are increasing the size and capability of the Iraqi Security Forces; that it will actually become possible to hand over to them and have them maintain it, because that has been the aim of the strategy all along. This has always been designed to be a bridging strategy, to bring the level of violence down to a point of which the Iraqi Army and police can secure it and continue it. Will that happen by the spring? I am not sure. Could we continue this surge beyond the spring if we chose to? Yes, we could. We will have to see what will become necessary. But I think we should make that decision when the time is upon us and when we have a better idea of what the situation on the ground actually is.

Mr. SMITH. Well, I guess I am out of time. I was interested in the comments of the other two panelists.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the question fully answered?

Mr. SMITH. It was fully answered by Dr. Kagan. I was curious of Dr. Perry or Dr. Mathews.

The CHAIRMAN. Quickly, Dr. Perry.

Dr. PERRY. If we want to extend the surge beyond spring, the most obvious way to do that and the most undesirable way to do it would be to extend the deployment of the troops that are already there.

Dr. MATHEWS. I would just add that I think U.S. Generals have made pretty clear that their judgment is that Iraqis would not be able to manage the security of Iraq alone for several years. This is not a question of next spring.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The information to which I was making reference a few moments ago from General Peter Pace is that earlier there were ten battal-
ions of the Iraqi Army operating independently, and today there are six Iraqi battalions operating independently.

Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to ask a question at this time.

Let me just ask this. Well, let me say this first. I think it is important that we all recognize who our enemies are in the war and particularly in the front in Iraq. Recently a top al Qaeda leader in Iraq was arrested by U.S. forces. His name was al Mashhadani, also known as Abu Shahid. He was actually captured in early July. And information, according to press releases, indicate that al Qaeda central, that is the main al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan or wherever they are, is providing direction to al Qaeda in Iraq. Al Mashhadani states, quote, the Islamic State of Iraq is a front organization that masks the foreign influence and leadership within al Qaeda in Iraq in an attempt to put an Iraqi face on the leadership of al Qaeda in Iraq.

I guess I am interested to know what your take is on this specific information. I just open that up to anybody that wants to comment.

Dr. KAGAN. I was very pleased to see the release about the capture of this individual, who, according to press release, I believe, is the top Iraqi in al Qaeda in Iraq. The group, as we know, is headed by Abu al Massari, who is an Egyptian. The number two—another—al Massari just means an Egyptian, another fellow who was identified in that way was recently captured.

We have been rolling up this al Qaeda network in a variety of ways, and I hope that this capture will help lead us to others as previous captures have done. It supports, in my view, unequivocally the fact that al Qaeda in Iraq is connected to the global al Qaeda movement, which is apparently important because some people in this town have been casting doubt on that. It is not equivalent to it. Al Qaeda is a franchise movement. Individual groups pop up on their own, as this one apparently did in Iraq, but they then do attempt to link into the global movement, which is significant because the global movement then directs resources in various ways to different regions depending on its prioritization. It has been prioritizing Iraq very heavily, and it has been sending, according to General Petraeus, anywhere from 40 to 80 foreign fighters a month into the country. That sounds like a very small number, but we also know that about 80 to 90 percent of the suicide bombers in Iraq are foreign fighters, and the suicide bombings create a disproportionate sense of defeat here, a disproportionate sense of violence in Iraq and were, as you know, critical to helping establish sectarian violence.

So I think that there is no question this capture along with many others supports on the one hand the conclusion that this al Qaeda in Iraq is tied to the global al Qaeda network in a way that is very worrisome, but it also shows that we are being successful in Iraq in identifying these individuals based largely on local tips and information that we get from being there, rounding them up and unraveling this network.

Mr. SAXTON. I do have a follow-up question, but I would offer the opportunity for either of the other witnesses.
Dr. Perry. I don’t have anything to add to what Dr. Kagan said. Thank you.

Mr. Saxton. Dr. Kagan, with regard to the al Qaeda network, when we think of an organization, particularly a military organization, we think of a line of command and a formal structure within which that military organization operates. Based on your experience, could you describe for us the nature of the al Qaeda organization?

Dr. Kagan. I will do my best. It is not an easy thing to do without access to the classified information since most of our understanding of this comes from sensitive intelligence, and I don’t have that, but it appears that al Qaeda in Iraq does have actually a fairly impressive hierarchical organization, and they do tend to establish regional emirs in different parts of the country that are responsible for that, that are coordinated with the central leadership cell.

That having been said, it is a cellular organization based on old revolutionary principles, that it is designed to maximize security. So it is difficult when you grab one of these guys to just get everyone else rolled up. And it is an organization in which local initiative plays a big role balanced with the allocation of resources and priorities from the top. So it is a very flexible, very adaptive organization. It is one that is very difficult to go after.

The best way to go after it is to get—is to eliminate its popular support, and that is what we have been helping to do in Iraq, because the Iraqis have turned against al Qaeda, and we have been supporting them. That is by far the most significant, most permanent and most likely to be successful approach that we can follow. Chasing these guys around with Special Forces is a much harder thing that is much less likely to lead to success.

Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Dr. Kagan.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. Davis of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to all of you for being here.

I wanted to follow up a little bit on this discussion, because, Dr. Kagan, you are suggesting, I think, that al Qaeda in Iraq is composed of the Sunni insurgency essentially, that they make up basically al Qaeda in Iraq. I wanted to explore that a little bit further because we certainly know that there are many experts out there, among them Dr. Cordesman and others, who have spoken more to the fact that these are not necessarily jihadists, they are Sunnis who are opposed to the occupation, and they certainly are involved in a power grab, which we can well understand. But there is a difference here of how we describe the Sunni insurgency as al Qaeda versus Sunni insurgency. Could you break that down in your thinking, particularly in terms of numbers and ideology?

Dr. Kagan. Very happily, Congresswoman. I am not sure you were here for my opening remarks.

My focus was on saying that I do believe from 2003 to January of 2007, we were primarily dealing with the Sunni Arab insurgency. It was about the fact that the Sunni community did not
want to accept a lesser role in Iraq, and that a major shift occurred in February 2006 when the sectarian violence was ignited.

I absolutely do not think that al Qaeda makes up even the majority of the Sunni resistance movement. It plays a disproportionate role because of the nature of its attacks and its objectives and its organization.

One of the interesting things that we have seen is that in part, in my view, as a result of the surge and the pressure that we have been putting on the other Sunni insurgents, we started to see the Sunni Arab insurgents turning against al Qaeda themselves, and we have been able to broker cease-fire agreements with the 1920’s brigades which are very hard-core Baathist insurgents to cooperate with them against al Qaeda.

So it is absolutely possible. Al Qaeda is certainly the smallest in number of the insurgent groups, if you want to regard it as an insurgent group. Its objectives are fundamentally different in any event. It is a terrorist group.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. If I may, though, I think because of the way we discuss it in many ways—I don’t even think in your comments one would assume from that that it is the smallest group, and I don’t know whether Dr. Mathews or Dr. Perry wants to comment on that, But is part of the difficulty that it is perhaps more emotional? I am not suggesting in any way that their tactics aren’t horrific and that we need to respond to them, but I also wonder whether it is part of the way in which we are discussing and being somewhat unclear about the makeup of the insurgency.

Part of that leads me to a question that I would like you all to address, is how then we counter that, whether through propaganda, through our media, through their media. Have we really taken ahold of being able to do that, and isn’t it partly because we have done it—seeing them really as al Qaeda as opposed to other issues that we might address?

If I may, in another question, Dr. Mathews, I think real quickly with my time here, one of the things that you mentioned is that we really have not articulated our intentions, our long-term intentions, in the region.

And I wonder if that isn’t part of the problem that we have had as well, that we haven’t really put that out there. I mean, we are talking about the surge, clearly, but I was just in Iraq last week, and if you ask, what are our long-term strategies in Iraq and in the region, people start talking about the surge again, which is not—which is not the strategy that we should be focussing on.

So, number one, is part of the difficulty that we really are not being very discerning about these insurgent—about al Qaeda and the insurgency? And also, what do you think our strategy should be to counteract that in the media perceptions not only in Iraq, but here at home?

Dr. MATHEWS. Well I think, Congresswoman, that there are two different ways to send a message about what our intentions are. One is what we say, and one is what we do. I was trying to make the point that what we are building there suggests very strongly to people there and in the region that we intend a permanent presence, and we intend to use Iraq, as somebody has said, sort of as an American aircraft carrier to project power in the region.
I think that is a big mistake. I think this body ought to take on that issue and debate it, debate its wisdom. Instead this question of funding provisions has been sort of an ineffective proxy for that.

On the other question that you were asking, you know, I think it is a terrible mistake to grant al Qaeda in Iraq more importance than it deserves and, even in a broader sense, to obsess more about al Qaeda as a threat to the U.S. more than it deserves. And finally, I think it is important to note that I think it was either General Petraeus or General Pace who ranked it fourth among—out of five among the threats that we face in Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Jones has a question, I understand, and then we go to Mr. Murphy.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I just want to read very quickly, and then I do have a question primarily for you, Dr. Perry. An article in the North Carolina paper, The News & Observer, April 23, 2007, the title, “Deployed, Depleted, Desperate”. Here is a question to those who still support President Bush’s strategy to stretch out the Iraq war until after he has left office, and for those who think we should be prepared to continue our bloody occupation of Iraq for five or ten years. This is the question—not you personally. But this is the question in the article: Are you ready to support reinstating Selective Service? I have Camp LeJeune in my district. I have met with many Army and Marines. They are the best, but they are tired, and they are worn out. If we are going to increase the numbers, where in the world are we going to get the people?

And let me read quickly—and I will let you answer. And from the same article: Did demands of the war on our troops and their aged and worn-out equipment already have pushed the annual cost of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses above $1 billion, and of recruitment advertising to $120 million annually?

I hope I am wrong, but I will tell you that I have been here for 14 years, I go to all the meetings I can go to learn because I am not an expert in anything, but I just don’t see where we are going to get the manpower if we don’t discuss the draft, if we are there with what we have now. If we increase the numbers, where are we going to get the manpower? Do you think there is going to come a time that this Congress and the President, whoever he or she might be, are going to have to discuss the draft?

Dr. PERRY. Yeah. If you consider a draft and ask me to testify, I would testify against it. I think the all-volunteer force has been an amazing success in this country, and I strongly support it, and I would not support going to a draft.

Mr. JONES. Well, I guess I will ask Dr. Mathews. If projections—and projections sometimes are wrong, I am the first to acknowledge that—but if projections are accurate, and we have got fewer people who are going into the voluntary service because of our commitment in Iraq of thousands and thousands of troops, and they know they are being worn out, and then you have to say, well, where are we getting the manpower pool? I am not saying do you advocate a draft or not, but where do you go?
Dr. MATHEWS. Congressman, I am really—I am not enough of an expert. I have views on the draft, but they are views of a layman, and they really don't deserve, I don't think, to be aired here.

Mr. JONES. Well, I guess the point is are we going to have to grapple with that, Americans are going to have to grapple with that. And if it continues to go the way it is going with our troops going four and five times around, somebody at some point in time is going to have to think, where do we get the manpower from?

Dr. MATHEWS. I think that is undeniable.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Chairman.

And I know Mr. Jones's kind of question about the manpower here in America. My focus is about the manpower over in Iraq. When I was there as a soldier in 2003–2004, I had trained over 600—helped train over 600 Iraqi at that time, called Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), now called Iraqi Army. And we continually hear from the President that the critical mission in Iraq from—we hear this from President Bush is that when they stand up, we will stand down. However, when you look back—when I was there in 2003, when we trained these ICDC, we didn't have uniforms for them. In fact, we gave them Chicago White Sox hats to identify them. That is how little support the Administration gave us to execute this critical mission.

That was four years ago. Now it doesn't seem like we are moving forward far enough. Five days ago, July 13, I know Chairman Skelton mentioned it in the New York Times article, said, American commanders in Iraq said, and I quote, “The effort to train Iraqi Army and police units had slowed in recent months, and would need to be expanded to enable any large-scale reduction in American force levels,” end quote.

The reason given for this lack of progress was in large part because preparing Iraqi units to operate without American backing have become a secondary goal under the current war strategy, which has emphasized protecting Iraqis and the heavy use of American combat power. In short, the surge strategy emphasizes peacekeeping and force protection and deemphasizes training Iraqi troops.

The President's escalation has simply enmeshed American troops even further being peacemakers in Iraq's religious civil war. General Pace recently said that there are 6,000 American soldiers involved in the training mission, 6,000 out of 158,000. That is less than 1 in 25, 4 percent. In fact, a number of Iraqi battalions rated as capable of operating without American assistance fell to six this month. That is down from ten in March, shortly after the escalation of troops.

With this in mind—and all that the escalation has done is to make the Iraqis even more dependent on our American GIs and marines, not less. I would like to have your thoughts on my comments. If I could start with Dr. Perry.

Dr. PERRY. I concur with the assessment that you just gave me. The Iraq Study Group's recommendations were to increase the—increase, not decrease, the emphasis on training, and to do that by
putting an emphasis on embedding troops, American troops, within the Iraqi forces, a way of increasing their professionalism.

We got various assessments to how many troops we have involved, but we are talking about probably 15,000 to 20,000 troops involved in the training and embedding missions as opposed to the 6,000 that you are describing now.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

Dr. Mathews, please.

Dr. MATHEWS. I just wanted to add that there has never been a satisfactory explanation of the desertion rate in the Iraqi Security Forces. And General Pace's comments—you know, there is a quality of sand being poured into a bottle and running out the bottom that should make us, I think, ask ourselves something that you know well, which is that an Army's most important asset is its motivation, its will, its knowledge of who it is fighting for and for what. And that is a good part of why the return on the investment we have made in training has been so low, in my judgment.

Mr. MURPHY. Dr. Kagan.

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I would like to thank you for your service to the Nation both as a soldier and as a Congressman.

I don't agree that we are pouring sand into a bottle would just keep coming out of the bottom. The desertion rate in the Iraqi Army actually tends to be relatively low compared to desertion rates in armies historically. It is not low compared to ours, but ours is the best in the world by a long margin.

Mr. MURPHY. If I could focus now, Dr. Kagan, six now of the Iraqi battalions are dropping.

Dr. KAGAN. Yes. We have reduced—the number of Iraqi Army that is capable of operating independently has apparently decreased. The number of Iraqi units that are fighting actively against the enemy, fighting bravely, taking casualties every day and continuing in the struggle is increasing. Iraqis continue to volunteer. And when you keep in mind that Iraqis volunteering until very recently had to run the risk of being attacked with suicide bombs at the recruiting stations, and that basically because it is a volunteer force and because of the way the Iraqis do leaves, which has been criticized widely, but it is the way they do business, they basically have to re-up every month when they come back from their leaves, and they do that even in the midst of very hard fighting, even among very heavy casualties. So I really have to take exception to the notion that the Iraqi Army is not standing up to this fight in some way, not that you have said that, but others have been making that case, and I find that very disturbing.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Johnson from Georgia.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kagan, although you have been kind of like a lone wolf at your last couple of hearings, I think you have done an admirable job of presenting an alternative view on things in Iraq. And I would like to just ask you whether or not it is true that there are other strategic challenges that the U.S. may have to confront around the world in addition to the Iraq force that permeates violence over there, al Qaeda in Iraq, al Qaeda in general. There are other stra-
tegic challenges that we may face throughout the world; is that correct?

Dr. KAGAN. Yes, of course it is, Congressman. We face the challenge of being a global power with interests around the world, and we face a number of potential threats. In fact, we face a number of active enemies, including states that are actively working to support those who are killing our soldiers, which includes Iran in this case. And there are other threats that we can identify. Of course, North Korea is a major challenge, China is a major challenge, the instability in Pakistan is a major worry. Clearly there are all sorts of threats around the world, but I think that it is important to identify——

Mr. JOHNSON. I want to stop you right there. Are we at risk of being unable to meet other challenges because our U.S. military is bogged down in Iraq?

Dr. KAGAN. I am going to hesitate because I know that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs stated not very long ago that he did not believe we were at risk of being unable to meet challenges elsewhere based on his professional evaluation of the situation, the likely nature of those threats.

Mr. JOHNSON. What is your opinion about it?

Dr. KAGAN. Not having looked into what would be required in various scenarios very carefully, I clearly think we clearly do have challenges, and I have been on record all along as saying that I was concerned that the military was too small, and I worried about this even in the 1990's. So I believe we do continue to face challenges.

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. Thank you, Dr. Kagan.

Dr. Perry, thank you for your service to the Nation and your long and distinguished career in academia and business as well. It has well prepared you for the tasks, the recent tasks, that you have undertaken.

Dr. PERRY. Thank you.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you for your service.

What are your thoughts on our ability to meet any of the challenges that may arise around the world, given our——

Dr. PERRY. I think our overextension of our armed forces in Iraq puts at risk our ability to meet these other challenges. And indeed, I believe the perception of other nations, even if it is an incorrect perception, that we are tied down in Iraq has already led them to take actions which are adverse to American interests.

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you.

And, sir, you mentioned something about we need to create disincentives for Iran and Syria in supporting sectarian violence in Iraq. What are these disincentives.

Dr. PERRY. Pardon me?

Mr. JOHNSON. You mentioned something about we needed to create disincentives for Iran and Syria to continued support for sectarian violence. What are those disincentives?

Dr. PERRY. I would be most optimistic about our ability to work with Syria, which I think is working against our interests in Iraq today. I think we have leverage on Syria, and I think we could use that leverage effectively, but it would take a really concerted and sustained diplomatic effort to do that.
We have done that in the past with Syria. When Mr. Baker was the Secretary of State, he met a dozen times with Syria in trying to get them to take actions which we wanted to take relative to Israel and was ultimately successful in that. But it takes a long and sustained diplomatic effort. It cannot be done by our ambassadors in the region. It cannot be done on a one-time basis.

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you.

And, Dr. Mathews, you gave a very cogent analysis of our thinking in terms of this so-called troop surge, and you had stated that the struggle for power is created by the political vacuum that was left by the leadership void that was taken out in Iraq, and that this political power struggle is just a natural result of that, and it is not soon to end.

Do you have any ideas about how long it might take for the sectarian forces to fight their way out of this and come to some kind of a political solution and end the fighting over there?

Dr. MATHEWS. The record is that once these sorts of struggles start, they take a very long time to burn themselves out, because, of course, the longer they go on, the more people are hurt, the more people have lost family members, friends, houses, businesses, et cetera, and the greater the motivation is to keep going. So the record since 1945, if you look at all the civil wars that have taken place, is that on average they last ten years.

I do think that there is some hope, and it is a very small one, as I said, that we could attempt to go back and recreate the step that we tried to skip of allowing a full-fledged debate among Iraqis as to their political future. We tried, rather, to put our own set of, in my view, wholly unrealistic deadlines on them and to restrict the debate to a very tiny circle of largely exiles, and that produced a truncated political sorting out that has now manifested itself in the streets, in this armed struggle. If it goes on, I think it will—like this, it will go on for many, many years, and—

Mr. JOHNSON. And that is whether we are there or not?

Dr. MATHEWS. I believe so. I mean——

Mr. JOHNSON. We can't stop it by our presence?

Dr. MATHEWS. I think the evidence suggests not.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia may be interested, in 1994, on the way to the 50th anniversary of D-Day, I had occasion to go near the Royal Marine headquarters near Exeter, England, and I was briefed by two sergeants that had just returned from lengthy stays in Bosnia, and both of them agreed that this will end soon because everybody is getting tired of fighting. And sure enough, not too long thereafter, we had the peace accords.

I think the question might be, Mr. Johnson, as to if and when they will all get tired of fighting. And if there is any indication or any precedent, I think it would be that in Bosnia.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Perry, when the Iraq Study Group produced its report, there was about one page in the whole document dealing with the concept of partition. It was pretty much dismissed out of hand. And since the report was issued, and we now know from the United Nations that there are four million refugees in Iraq, two million inter-
nally, who have kind of fallen back into their own sectarian or ethnic enclaves, the central government clearly is not hitting on all cylinders in terms of trying to reach reconciliation.

You know—and we have talked about Bosnia now at least a half dozen times during the course of this hearing. It just seems to me that maybe we should revisit that concept. And again, I am not talking about hard partition or soft partition, but clearly people are retreating into their own—what they feel is the only safe place they can go, which is their families and their religious groups. And I was just sort of wondering, A, why was the study group that dismissive? And, B, do you think it is time to maybe revisit that?

Dr. Perry. Even though we had only one report about partition, we spent considerable time discussing it and debating, including hearing excellent briefings from Mr. Gelb and Senator Biden, both of whom are strong proponents of it, as you know. And I believe there was a time when that might have been an appropriate move for the American Government to take.

I do not believe we have the power to effect that today. When we were in Iraq, a question we asked each of the members of the Iraq—we talk to all members of the Iraqi Government, dozens of them. A question we asked each of them was would they support a move toward a partition? And to a man—and they were all men—to a man they all said no, very strongly opposed to it.

Now, to be sure, they all had a vested interest in a partition. But the point is this is a government which we helped set up the process by which it was established, the government which is elected by the Iraqi people. So for us today to impose partition, the first thing we would have to do is remove that government, which would be, you know, an enormous undertaking and set us back in ways that are really quite unpredictable. My judgment today is we no longer have the option, the United States no longer has the option of imposing a partition. In our discussions in the Iraq Study Group, many of us believed that that is what Iraq would evolve to in time anyway, but we did not have the power to make it happen.

Mr. Courtney. It does seem people are voting with their feet in that direction.

Dr. Mathews, I don't know if you have any observations on that issue.

Dr. Mathews. I would go one step further, which is—than Secretary Perry, which is I think it is a matter of U.S. policy. I agree with him that we don't have the U.S. troops to execute this policy peacefully or even reasonably peacefully, but I think as a choice, conscious policy, it would be a terrible mistake because it would convince all those in the region, and there are many, many of them, that we came there into Iraq to dismantle the strongest Arab State in the interest of Israel. And I think, you know, as a political choice of policy to pursue partition, I agree that it may very well be where things end up, but that is a very different thing than the U.S. adopting it as its policy. I think it would be very, very unwise as well as unfeasible.

Mr. Courtney. I mean, the other recommendation of the study group, which was to embed and train Iraqi troops. There was a comment—Colin Powell was quoted in State of Denial—I guess he had a conversation with President Bush after he left the Secretary
of State's office, where he warned that if you don't have a government that troops—that an Iraqi Army is connected to, then all you are doing is training militia. I was just sort of wondering what you thought of that observation.

Dr. Perry. I think it is a very good observation, and it is certainly one of the dangers of the tactic of training Iraqi troops.

I should say more generally that even if all the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group had been carried out, we had no assurance that that would lead to a stable Iraq because of the uncertainties about whether the Iraqi Government would be able to sustain. Not only the President's strategy, but the strategy of the Iraq Study Group really depends on the Iraqi Government being able to sustain itself, and I do believe that that is important, very much in question.

Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Sestak. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Perry, when you came here in February, I asked you the question, how long would it be before you became a date-certain person? And you answered, about six months. Do you still believe that? Are you there at this time as the best strategy?

Dr. Perry. I am not there yet.

Mr. Sestak. It is not six months yet.

Dr. Perry. No. But I agree with the President's assessment that a departure from Iraq today would lead to disastrous results. I think there is still an opportunity to try to make the situation stable before we leave, and I still believe that the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group are the best way of achieving that.

Mr. Sestak. With regard to the Iraq Study Group, two branch questions. Iran, in your testimony what I read and what you have said, we had Mr. Fingar, the head of the National Intelligence Council, here about a week—a few days ago. He reminded us that the National Intelligence Estimate about a year ago said that any rapid withdrawal, defined at 18 months, would have Iraq spin into chaos. Earlier he had said, however, that Iraq does not want, as you said, Ms. Mathews, Dr. Mathews, a failed state, a fractionalized government. When he was asked did that 18-month assessment of spiraling chaos include Iran being involved, he said no. When asked if it would make a difference, he said, you know, it would. Doesn't know exactly. Is Iran critical? Is it the critical piece with Syria to having—if there were to be by force of law a date certain, given enough time, key to leaving behind an unfailed state?

Dr. Perry. I think both Iran and Syria are playing critical negative roles today. As I have testified before, I think we have some opportunity to influence Syria in a more positive—take a more positive course. I am not at all confident we have—today have the ability to influence Iran to take actions which we want them to take.

Mr. Sestak. Dr. Mathews, you have kind of touched on this already.

Dr. Mathews. I am not sure I have more to add to what Secretary Perry just said. I think those are the two critical players.
But again, I think there—what they are willing to do depends enormously heavily on what our posture is.

Mr. Sestak. Correct. And that is why my question is, does date certain, we won't be there, not just on an interim basis, give the incentive for them to participate positively? Now, Dr. Fingar said yes, Mr. Fingar, the head of National Intelligence Estimate.

Dr. Mathews. I think it is—I am hesitating because I think we—that everybody in this town has been too sure about things that were—this is a multivariable equation, and we tend to always talk about it one at a time. I think that that is the most likely outcome, that they would be more willing, and that Tehran in particular shares an interest in not having chaos on its borders.

Mr. Sestak. Dr. Perry, one other thing. December 6 you came out with the ISG, and you had a goal of end of March for the combat troops to have been redeployed. I have watched Somalia where it took us 6 months to get 6,300 troops out of there, as you remember, and we had still another 17,000 over there just to make sure it was a safe redeployment. And we didn't have over 100,000 U.S. civilian contractors in that country as we do in Iraq. Many people now go to that date that you have established as the date to some degree twofold. That date, if it were to be a goal and become a date certain, is it really the right date, or did you really mean about a year and a quarter? And number two is——

Dr. Perry. Iraq Study Group was a date by which we could have the combat brigades that were patrolling the streets of Iraq out of Iraq. But even by that date, we would still have a strong rapid reaction force in Iraq, we would still have support forces in Iraq, there would still be contractors in Iraq. We did not describe a strategy for completely withdrawing from Iraq. I believe that would be a very, very complicated strategy to execute.

Mr. Sestak. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you.

I have left on the list Mr. Loebsack, Ms. Shea-Porter and Mr. Andrews in that order.

Mr. Loebsack.

Mr. Loebsack. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thanks to the three of you for being here and testifying today. I am sorry, I was in a previous hearing as well, markup. That is why I am so late. Some of the things that I may cover may have been covered already, and I apologize if that is the case.

I want to mostly address my comments and my questions to you, Dr. Kagan. I just want to make a couple of comments at the outset. When you were asked if we have enough troops for the surge, you quoted General Odierno. Of course, we know he is not the person who is in charge in Iraq. It is General Petraeus, and if the record shows otherwise, I will be happy to be corrected. But to my knowledge, General Petraeus has never stated so unequivocally as General Odierno has that we have enough troops for the surge. In fact, some of us were in Iraq in February, Congressman Andrews and some others, and if I remember correctly, we asked General Petraeus directly if we had enough troops, and essentially he said that is all the troops that he has. So I just want to make that clear at the outset.
Also, we had a bit of an interchange long ago, I think a couple of months ago, about Bosnia and whether we really should compare Bosnia to Iraq. Now, you began to make that comparison earlier, and then you qualified that by saying you didn't want to make that comparison, but nonetheless you sort of indicated there was a comparison. I just want to state for the record that Bosnia of 1994, 1995, is not Iraq of 2007. They are qualitatively different in a variety of ways, and I am sure you know which ways they are different. So I think it is very, very important when we talk about how complicated this situation is that we not even hint at some kind of historical analogies that don't begin to come close to describing the situation or helping to sort of—helping us here in Congress in particular, let alone the American people, to understand what is happening in Iraq at the moment.

Also, when you talked about al Qaeda and how much support they have, you mentioned the way they go about trying to increase their support, classic insurgency of one sort or another, as you mentioned, terrorize the population, what have you, also creating a situation where the population loses whatever confidence it may have in the authorities at the time. But then you mention later on that you are not at all optimistic that al Qaeda can hold that support for any length of time because of the terrible things they do to people and other things.

I do want to ask you a question. In, say, 2004 or even 2005, did you think that Iraq, Ramadi in particular, Fallujah, Anbar Province—that we may be today in Anbar Province where we are? Did you anticipate yourself that the sheiks—and not all the sheiks, as we know, are on board in this, most of them are. Did you anticipate that there was any possibility whatsoever that the sheiks would turn against al Qaeda? Did you personally anticipate that?

Dr. Kagan. I did not. I was very pleasantly surprised by that development.

Mr. Loebshack. I talked to people in the State Department at that time who were very confident that even if the United States were to withdraw at that time, that eventually the sheiks, those in control in Anbar Province, would, in fact, turn against foreign fighters. Now, we know that many of the al Qaeda now are apparently home-grown Iraqis, but at that time there were, in fact, people predicting that that would be the case. So again, you didn't anticipate that.

I have some concerns, obviously, about depending upon your analysis at the moment and how you see things going in the future. Now, that may not be fair, but nonetheless, that is the concern that I have. You mentioned at one point—and this goes back to your interchange with Congressman Murphy. But before that you mentioned that there are many Iraqis who are doing well, fighting well, they are brave and all the rest. I need more than many. Can you put any kind of numbers on this? And that will be my last question.

Dr. Kagan. Congressman, I would have to get back to you with that. I don't have the numbers off the top of my head about how many units. I can tell you that we have got about 7,000 in Baghdad, 7,000 outside of Baghdad. There is a division's worth in Diwaniya, there is a division's worth in Nasiriyah, and there is
18,000 in Ninawa. Those are the ones I can think of off the top of my head, a significant portion of the Iraqi Army.

You know, I can go back and try to top up what I think all the rest of the figures are. Oh, and we have 12,000 in Anbar, who have signed up this year, whereas previously we were not able to recruit anything in Anbar.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 95.]

Mr. LOEBSAK. For the record, I have difficulties with the words like "many" and "significant." I would like to know if there is any way—I would like to know precise numbers. If there is any way that you or our military can give us those numbers, I think that would be really important for all of us here who have to make decisions on these matters. So thank you very much, and I yield back my time unless Dr. Mathews would like to make a comment. You look like it.

Dr. MATHEWS. No. I was just struck that we have been here almost three hours, and nobody has talked about the police, which are absolutely critical to establishing peace in Iraq, and where we have a real disaster.

Mr. LOEBSAK. I might just make a comment. I think Congressman Andrews and I—now that things may have changed since February, but that was very disturbing when we were there, was the difficulty training police. And even prior to the training figure—trying to figure out who the people were who were being trained, and whether they were really folks we should be training as police. But again, I don't want to put words in Congressman Andrews's mouth, but I think he probably would agree with me while we were there. That is a good point and thank you.

And I yield back. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Shea-Porter.

Ms. SHEA-PORTE. Thank you.

Dr. Kagan, how many times have you been to Iraq? And when was your most recent visit?

Dr. KAGAN. I have been to Iraq twice in early April and early May for about eight days each time, and I am about to return next week.

Ms. SHEA-PORTE. And where were you at that time?

Dr. KAGAN. Each time I spent a couple of days in the Green Zone, and then I rode around with American units in battlefield circulations in various neighborhoods in Baghdad. I have been to Baquba, I have been to Taji, I have been to——

Ms. SHEA-PORTE. Okay. In what capacity?

Dr. KAGAN. What capacity?

Ms. SHEA-PORTE. Yes.

Dr. KAGAN. I was there as an observer.

Ms. SHEA-PORTE. Who invited you?

Dr. KAGAN. I was there at the invitation of General Petraeus.

Ms. SHEA-PORTE. I was there in March. Do you think it is a good sign or a bad sign that mortars are now hitting the Green Zone, and that people are having to walk around with their armor? Is it a meaningless sign, or is it a bad sign that maybe we are losing control right inside our embassy area?

Dr. KAGAN. Mortars have been hitting the zone all year.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Let us correct that for a moment. Mortars have not been raining on them all year. There has been quite a significant change. Yes or no?

Dr. KAGAN. There has been an increase in mortar attacks, but there have been more mortar attacks——

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. In the interest of five minutes, thank you. I appreciate that.

Do you agree with Peter Pace when he said—when he was asked if he was comfortable with the ability to respond to an emerging world threat, he said no, he was not comfortable because of the troops and all of the treasure in Iraq and the weariness of the troops. Yes or no, do you agree with General Pace on the comment?

Dr. KAGAN. I have been concerned about our ability to respond globally since 1997, and I am on the record about that.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Do you agree with Max Boot, who stated in a subcommittee hearing last week that we could get the troops that we needed from people who wanted green cards, and that they could come from other countries and go fight for us and get green cards? Would that be a good policy? Please say yes or no.

Dr. KAGAN. I cannot answer that with a yes or no, Congresswoman. I can tell you that it is a good idea to think about offering citizenship for a reward for service. The details of that program I would have to think about in greater detail.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Do we need them in order to continue fighting?

Dr. KAGAN. Do we need who?

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Do we need people who are not from our country but could use a green card?

Dr. KAGAN. Do we need them to continue the fight? No. I don’t believe we need them to continue the fighting.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Can you tell me specifically where you would get the troops? Because the testimony I have gotten from pretty much everybody is that our troops are exhausted, worn out, and we don’t have troops that could continue. Where would you get the troops? And if you could just—one sentence.

Dr. KAGAN. There are additional troops. We could either extend the tours of soldiers that are there—this has always been discussed by the Joint Staff—or we could redeploy National Guard units, which, as Dr. Perry suggested, would be very undesirable, but might become necessary. And I also believe that we need to work to expand the size of the ground forces as rapidly as possible.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. You and I both know that that would take a great deal of time, recruitment, training, et cetera. So your suggestion now is to extend the time that the troops are there?

Dr. KAGAN. Congresswoman, I don’t work in the Joint Staff, and I can’t tell you exactly how this would be done, but I can tell you that that is one method, and another method is redeploying National Guard forces who have already been there.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Well, that is good because since you have gone as an observer, it is important for me to know what you observed.

Now, when I spoke to General Petraeus and General Fill in March when I was there, General Petraeus and General Fill gave me widely varying numbers on the number of Iraqi military and Iraqi soldiers that were going to do the, quote, standing up for ev-
erybody. As a matter of fact, General Petraeus doubled the number in an hour. Do you think we have a better handle on the numbers of troops and Iraqi police now than we did in March? Do we have better data?

Dr. KAGAN. I believe that we do have an understanding of how many Iraqi Army soldiers there are, and how many Iraqi police there are, understanding that there is fluctuation in a force in wartime. But, yes, I think we have an understanding of that.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And how do you think we got there? Because when I asked them and they asked about the difference, they said, well, it is hard to tell, people come and they get their bonuses, they leave, they don't come back again, they might die, they might be sick. How are we basing the data now?

Dr. KAGAN. Congresswoman, when I was there, briefings that I received suggested they put new programs in place to identify exactly how many Iraqi police there were, who they were, and make sure that people were not simply coming in to collect their bonuses, but that they were actually on the rolls.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. So we are doing better administratively there.

Dr. KAGAN. That is what I was briefed when I was there, yes.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Last question—or two questions. Are we there to bring democracy to Iraq? Is that your overriding belief, that we are there to bring democracy to Iraq?

Dr. KAGAN. Ma'am, I think that we are there in pursuit of American national interests.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Is that to bring democracy to Iraq? Or could you tell me what it is exactly?

Dr. KAGAN. Well, I believe we have a vital national interest in not allowing Iraq to become a failed state and a haven for terrorists.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Was it a failed state before we went in?

Dr. KAGAN. Obviously not.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Last question, do you think we should do the same for Iran? Do you think we need to go into Iran?

Dr. KAGAN. Congresswoman, I have never advocated invading Iran.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I would like to thank the panel for their endurance and their very trenchant observations. Thank you very much.

Dr. Kagan, if today is a typical day in Iraq based upon the data of the last couple of months, there will be 145 attacks against someone. On the average, how many of those attacks are launched by al Qaeda?

Dr. KAGAN. A small number.

Mr. ANDREWS. How small?

Dr. KAGAN. I don't know.

Mr. ANDREWS. I am sure we don't either. If we could assume for a moment that by whatever strategy the al Qaeda forces in Iraq were completely vanquished, not one attack took place at all, there
would still be a very significant level of violence going on every day in Iraq; would there not?

Dr. KAGAN. There might be, Congressman. It depends very much on the circumstances. I mean, we can't in reality simply pluck Iraq out of the country and make it go away.

Mr. ANDREWS. There might be? There might be? I mean, let's look at this for a moment. In an instance where a Shia militia member attacks a group of Sunnis in a public marketplace, murders 70 or 80 people, are you saying that he might not do that if al Qaeda didn't exist, or he probably would do that if al Qaeda didn't exist?

Dr. KAGAN. What I am saying is that you actually have to ask the question, how do we make al Qaeda not exist? Because what we are attempting to do is establish security not simply by going after al Qaeda, but by taking measures that will establish security, but also make it——

Mr. ANDREWS. How did we reduce the efficacy of al Qaeda in Anbar Province? How did that happen?

Dr. KAGAN. Well, two things happened. One is that the forces that we had there conducted a clear-and-hold operation in Ramadi over a long period of time. And the other is local tribal leaders, as that clear and hold was proceeding, turned against al Qaeda. Both were necessary, in my view.

Mr. ANDREWS. Wouldn't you ascribe much more value to the second of those phenomena than the first?

Dr. KAGAN. I don't think you can separate them, Congressman. I think reports are that the sheiks would not have turned if we had not been there working to clear the area.

Mr. ANDREWS. It occurs to me that the—let me ask one other question that goes to Dr. Mathews's question about the police. I visited the Jordanian Police Training Academy in February. It was a remarkable experience, given the fact that we have absolutely no idea who came into the process and what they did when they left after spending an annualized base of about $50,000 year training these individuals. I think we have trained about 180,000 police thus far. Why do we need soldiers in Baghdad to pacify the area if the police were at all effective? Why is this a military problem rather than a law enforcement problem?

Dr. KAGAN. Because it is a war, Congressman. It is an insurgency, and the insurgents are using military tactics, among other things. This is not a policing problem, however important the police are in counterinsurgency.

Mr. ANDREWS. Right, Dr. Kagan. It is a civil war, and it is a civil war being fought with IEDs and being fought with small-arms fire. Why aren't the police effective, the Iraqi Police effective, in identifying the people who are making IEDs and the places in which they are making them? Why aren't they effective?

Dr. KAGAN. In some areas the police are. In some areas the police have been very uneven, and this has been a major focus the of the command for some months now.

Mr. ANDREWS. Why have they been ineffective in Baghdad?

Dr. KAGAN. In some areas of Baghdad, they have been ineffective. The police, as we all know, are infiltrated by the Jaish al Mahdi and other militia groups and have not been operating en-
tirely in support, to say the least, of what we have been trying to do, and this has been a major focus of the command.

Congressman Loebssack, I think, wanted numbers. As a result we have gotten, I believe, 7 of 9 police brigade commanders relieved, 17 of 24 police battalion commanders relieved for sectarian activities. The command has been working on this problem very hard, but there is still a long way to go.

Mr. Andrews. Dr. Mathews, why do you think the police have been ineffective in cases where the police have been ineffective, the Iraqi Police?

Dr. Mathews. Because we have largely been training militia who have different interests in pursuing their own interests.

Mr. Andrews. To whom do you ascribe the loyalty of Iraqi Police forces? To whom are they loyal?

Dr. Mathews. Well, I mean, these are very large numbers of people, but on the evidence, the bulk of whom we—that we have trained have been loyal to their own militia.

Mr. Andrews. Why is that, in your opinion?

Dr. Mathews. The militia saw an opportunity to gain power, to gain intelligence about American operations, to gain weapons and equipment.

Mr. Andrews. Why aren't they loyal to the new Iraqi Government?

Dr. Mathews. Well, it varies, you know, between—from one to the other. But I suppose the core answer is either they have prior loyalties or that this government doesn't command that broad a loyalty among the population.

Mr. Andrews. I think it is far more the second.

I thank the witnesses for your answers.

The Chairman. And I thank the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. Sestak has a follow-on question, please.

Mr. Sestak. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Your last comment, as I was talking, is, I think, correct; you know, it is a myriad approach. I have been taken by the ISG and by—what you wrote in your testimony—by the comprehensiveness that we have to have, a strategic approach, not a tactical one to this issue. I honestly believe Democrats have to turn from peer opposition increasingly to working toward the aftermath of this, because there will be an aftermath, and how well we handle it with a strategic, comprehensive, coherent approach to the Middle East is important.

I am concerned about your comments in the sense that I remember in the Clinton Administration, Mr. Secretary, when two divisions for 60 days went down to C3, C4 and the uproar that ensued. Now we don't have any non-deployed units in a state of readiness that could deploy. This is really hurting our strategic readiness.

So my—with that said—and I was taken with the ISG comment. There was one thing in there that I wonder if we step down—we talked about training and embedding people. Today out of the 160,000 troops we have there, about 48,000 are combat troops. I think we have 8,000 advisors right now. One think tank recently said we should have that be about 20,000 advisors and another 40,000 troops. When the Intelligence Community was here last week, they said they could not tell us with any accuracy, in fact,
it would be an art, not a skill, which military units of the Iraqis we could safely embed troops in, not to have an issue where—because of their motivation and loyalty.

Does that concern you, Dr. Perry, at all in the sense that leaving behind a rapid-reaction force, knowing that one-third of our troops there right now are combat, trying to have enough advisors or trainers embedded in units that could be of questionable loyalty—does that really mean much of a scale-down in forces, or does that also put us to the point that I think is true, that come next spring we are to the real verge of truly, maybe permanently, for some time breaking our Army?

Dr. Perry. Yes, that does concern me, Admiral Sestak. And at the time we made the recommendation, we made it after a very careful consultation with the commanders in Iraq at the time, General Chiarelli, General Casey and particularly General Dempsey, who is in charge of the training and a number of troops, small number of troops, we had embedded at that time. General Dempsey's view then was that this can be safely done, that there was no examples at all of the Iraqi troops turning against the Americans who were embedded in them. But I think that question has to be continually reexamined. What was true last September may not be true today.

I must say that my own personal experience of that is in my grandson, who has had three deployments in Iraq. His last deployment was embedded in an Iraqi battalion. He felt completely safe relative to the soldiers with whom he was embedded.

Mr. Sestak. My take on this, and the reason I raise it, is I am somewhat worried that the dynamics have changed since the ISG came out. And now there is much movement to say, let us see if that is the solution. We want almost a sequel two before they say March is the goal, before they say embed the trainers, because so much has happened.

Dr. Perry. I agree completely with that, Admiral Sestak, and I would not support specific recommendations of the group without reexamining them in light of the current—in particular I would like to carefully reexamine the embedding recommendations.

Mr. Sestak. That is what I meant earlier about a deadline.

If I could, one last question, Dr. Kagan. You point out Fallujah, how it sunk into chaos after we kind of pulled back out. You talk about Tall' Afar and Anbar, and that there is some—and like in Anbar, there was some political will among the tribal sheiks, things stabilized to some degree.

What I ask is two quick questions because my time is just about up. To some degree, where you point out any success, it was because the military was not acting in a political vacuum. So as I step back, and having been out there with Senator Hagel, the best three days I have had in Congress, and hearing the highest leaders of this government say, the highest leaders, it is appeasement, the re-Baathification law—can I just finish one thing? Is there really any possibility of ending this thing the way you want to without truly breaking us militarily, our Army?

Dr. Kagan. Well, Congressman, if I didn’t think there was a way of ending this without breaking us, I wouldn’t have advocated the strategy. I do think that it is possible. I think that it will be very
difficult. The sort of political support that we were talking about in Fallujah and Tall’ Afar and so forth was mainly support to conduct the security operation and willingness of the Iraqi Government to bear the onus for doing that. We have seen tremendous support from the Iraqi Government to conduct security operations, and I would add not simply against al Qaeda, but also against even Jaish al Mahdi militias, which months ago people were very concerned that this government wouldn’t let us go after.

I think that this is a long process. I think that it will take time for these political accords to be made. But I also think we can improve the security situation dramatically without necessarily having a hydrocarbons law pass, without necessarily having a de-Baathification law passed. I don’t believe that those legislative benchmarks are essential to bringing the violence in Iraq down, and I think that the recent months hear me out on this. Violence has dropped even though benchmarks have not been met. Will it continue; will it be stabilized if there is no progress? Obviously not. But the question of timelines, I think, is more complicated than some would like to make it in this regard.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman, and I appreciate the gentleman’s interest in the aftermath after the American and coalition forces do leave or limit their presence there.

Maybe one of the witnesses can correct me as to the source of the quote. I think it was Clausewitz who said that no war ever ends the way it was anticipated. If you don’t know to the contrary, we will turn it to Mr. Clausewitz, and with that, we will thank the gentleman for his questions, and the Ranking Member for sticking it out here with us.

And, Dr. Perry, Dr. Mathews, Dr. Kagan, you have just been excellent today. We really appreciate you doing this, and it has been an excellent hearing. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
The Situation In Iraq

TESTIMONY BY JESSICA T. MATHEWS
PRESIDENT
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
WASHINGTON DC

July 18, 2007
The current conversation in Washington badly distorts what is happening in Iraq and what our options are. As it has from the very beginning, U.S. strategy has more to do with political needs in Washington than it has to realities on the ground—to our continuing confusion and detriment. Five key considerations provide a more clear-eyed view and may offer a new approach for the way forward.

The premise of our current strategy—that a political solution would follow if the violence could be reduced—is false. What is underway today in Iraq is a natural and inevitable struggle for power. The American presence delays what will eventually happen anyway.

- National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley said it over and over this past weekend—the premise of the President’s policy is that insecurity blocks political reconciliation. If we can reduce the violence significantly enough, reconciliation will follow. On close examination, every part of this argument is wrong.

- First, the word reconciliation is a huge distortion of what must happen. To reconcile means to restore friendship and harmony. That’s not what’s involved here. What’s happening on the ground is the natural second stage of a government overthrow (through revolution or, in this case, externally-imposed regime change), namely a domestic struggle for power in a political vacuum. The assumption behind the strategy, that political reconciliation was marching along when the bombing of the Samara mosque ignited open sectarian violence, and is now waiting to resume—like a current that would flow were it not blocked by the dam of violence—is not supported by the evidence. Nor is it semantics to point out that it is equally true that the lack of a political solution creates the violence. Whether you call it a civil war or not, what organized groups in Iraq are engaged in today is a struggle for political power—within sectarian groups as well as between them.

- A political solution—a power sharing agreement—will eventually emerge but likely only after the various parties have tested each others’ strength and will, when their desire to fight has burned itself out, and when the key parties decide that they can do at least as well at the negotiating table as they can in the streets. This will not happen by September, or by next spring. Based on recent history, it is unlikely to emerge even in 5 years. Since 1945, civil wars have lasted ten years on average, with half running for more than seven years (James Fearon, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 2).

- To believe that the present strategy will ultimately succeed, one therefore has to embrace three heroic beliefs: that together with Iraqi security forces we have a large enough force to contain over a long term guerrilla violence that springs from many sources; that a combination of political
and military assistance and coercion can impose an artificial peace that could leap over the usual phase of political sorting out and struggle for power; and, that we can maintain that artificial peace for long enough that people will put aside their fears and hopes and believe that the present distribution of power represents a stable and inevitable future.

- If we were willing to stay for a decade or more this might be true. But few believe we will stay for that long, and even so it is a highly uncertain bet. People can hold a political dream or desire for revenge for far longer than that. Iraqis know that they live there and we don’t; that someday we’ll be gone and they’ll remain. Many of them would plan that way even if they thought we were willing to maintain our present commitment for many years.

- Based on experience elsewhere and a three year test, it is unlikely that more of the same will produce a united Iraq at peace with itself. It is a bitter but sounder conclusion that the American presence and strategy in Iraq is prolonging and delaying a violent struggle for power that will ultimately happen when we depart.

The U.S. has been pursuing the same political goal since 2004—Sunnis, Shi’as and Kurds working together in a strong central government—with many changes of tactics but none of core strategy and without success. The present description of the needed next steps as mundane and achievable “benchmarks” is a self-deluding fantasy on our part, continued in the recent report to Congress which greatly exaggerates “progress” on the political front.

- There has been little if any progress towards a political solution for two primary reasons: because the needed agreements are hugely difficult in the best of conditions and because the current situation in Iraq is the worst of conditions for taking such great risks.

- Amending the constitution, allocating the country’s one source of revenue, etc. all define the future allocation of power in Iraq. These are not simple pieces of legislation the current government could pass if its members would just try harder and were willing to work in August. These are fundamental political choices from which every individual in the country faces enormous potential gains or losses.

- What do I mean by the worst of conditions? Think of it this way. More than 4 million Iraqis are refugees, internally displaced, or dead from violence. In per capita U.S. terms that would be 50 million people forced out of their homes, sitting in Mexico or Canada, or dead. Think for a few minutes about what that would be like. Could we, under such conditions, come together as a nation, bury past and present wrongs and, under
foreign occupation and direction, make painful and scary political accommodations, amend the constitution and reallocate wealth? The question answers itself—yet we continue to pretend that Iraqis can.

- Think of immigration policy as an American “benchmark”. Remember what we just went through in trying to deal with a threat that is miniscule by comparison to any of the dozens an Iraqi faces. Then remember these conditions—50 million people displaced or dead—and you will have a clearer understanding of why these benchmarks aren’t being reached and won’t be any time soon.

We are debating this political problem almost entirely in military terms which limits and distorts the available options. A change in political strategy in Iraq and a shift in political attention and economic and military priorities across the region redefines the possibilities. Analysis of options must recognize—as it generally does not today—that a significant change in U.S. policy will change what others are willing to do.

- When they are careful, our leaders remember to say that there is no military solution to the problem in Iraq; that it is a political problem. But for obvious reasons Americans see this as a war and therefore as a military issue and the debate in Washington follows suit. For every time that someone remembers to say that Amb. Crocker and Gen. Petraeus will report in September, there are at least twenty times when only General Petraeus is mentioned.

- Similarly, the three broad options that are being debated—keep doing what we’re doing; reduce and redeploy the troops to focus on counterterrorism, force protection, border security and training; and, bring the troops home—are all defined almost entirely in military terms. They all assume that our core political strategy in Iraq doesn’t change. There is a different approach.

- The Iraq Study Group’s call for a multinational, regional effort to help find a solution in Iraq is an important step in the right direction. However, it assumes that Iraq is represented at such a conference by its current government and therefore that the current U.S. political strategy for the country continues. A better approach would be one that more resembles the Bonn process that laid the basis for political transition in Afghanistan. Iraq would be represented by all its major parties. The key foreign governments would participate and support their various clients. This would be a lengthy and chaotic with higher political risk and less control by the U.S. than we have heretofore been willing to assume. However, it holds at least a possibility that broad representation and debate among Iraqis, heretofore short-circuited by U.S. policy, might produce a viable political outcome with less continuing violence.
A necessary ingredient would be an active role played by Iraq’s immediate neighbors and other key states and that, in turn, would depend on an announcement by the U.S. of its intent to begin to withdraw militarily from Iraq. The process would be preceded by intensive bilateral consultations to determine the best format: most likely under U.N. auspices. While making its direction absolutely plain, the U.S. announcement should not set a timeline for the end of withdrawal nor specify a predetermined number of remaining troops. Both of these should be determined by the political outcome. Perhaps we would be asked to stay in Iraq in some substantial way, perhaps not.

This approach presumes a continuing, major American presence in the Middle East. Its success would also depend on a shift of the political energy and some fraction of the economic cost now consumed by Iraq (currently at a rate of $10 billion per month; $330 million per day) to other conflicts and threats in the region that hold inherently greater long term national security interests for the United States than does Iraq. Prominent among these are Iran, Afghanistan (because of the Taliban and Al Qaeda presence and its link to Pakistan), Pakistan (because of these, its nuclear weapons and its political instability) and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. One of the Iraq war’s greatest long term costs has been and will be the attention it has diverted from issues of greater inherent importance. The U.S. can not afford to continue to focus all its funds, military resources, and political capital on Iraq while leaving greater interests largely unattended.

Assertions are being made regarding what would happen if we leave Iraq for which there is little or no evidence or significant evidence to the contrary. Because the choice we face is among bad options, it is easy to make a case against any change in course. While uncertainties are immense, it is therefore imperative to examine such claims with as much care and knowledge as we can command, at least to set aside those fears for which there is little evidence.

It is asserted by the administration as a given, and echoed by many experts, that the violence in Iraq would spread across the region if the U.S. were to leave. Why? Iraqis are fighting among themselves over power. There is no reason why they would travel abroad to do so. Moreover, there is a history that argues strongly in the opposite direction—that civil wars in this region suck others in rather than spread across borders. Algeria, Afghanistan and even Lebanon, which sucked in direct deployments by Syria and Israel, are among the civil wars that did not spread. The case for a spreading war has not been made.

It is, though, highly likely that neighboring powers will get sucked into Iraq more deeply than they are today. This will most likely be through
financial support, supply of arms and proxy fighters rather than troops. Iraq’s neighbors are well aware of the dangers. Neither of the two key players, Saudi Arabia and Iran, wants a direct confrontation. They and other neighbors are deeply aware of the risks of a sharper divide between Sunni and Shi’a countries, as evidenced in part by the sound rejection that met recent American efforts to organize a coalition of Sunni states against Iran.

- Another frequent claim is that an American exit would be a tremendous psychological victory for radical Islamists across the entire Muslim world. This echoes the fear of the dominoes that didn’t fall after Vietnam. In this case, an American exit from Iraq (not the region) would be a cause for celebration among some terrorists and perhaps a temporary source of strength, but it is at least equally true that the American occupation of Iraq (I use those words advisedly because that is the way it is seen in the region is jihadis’ principal recruiting tool. Who is to say whether an American departure would be—on balance—a shot in the arm or a significant mid and long term loss? The danger from already committed terrorists after an American exit would probably increase outside Iraq as some would be forced out and others would be less likely to travel there.

- The fear that an American departure would leave open a field that would be claimed by Iran demands close scrutiny. Iran might seek to dominate southern Iraq, but Iraqi Shi’a are anything but monolithic. Some are close to Tehran, but without the infidel foreign presence many would fight Persian domination as they have before. Moreover, it is undeniable that American troubles in Iraq embolden and strengthen Iran. An American exit is a loss for Tehran in that respect.

- The greatest unknown after a carefully planned and executed departure is what effect the likely short term rise in violence in Iraq and generalized fear of the consequences would have on oil prices. This bears serious analysis it has not, to my knowledge received, and anticipatory planning.

Congress needs urgently to address and end the dangerous charade that has been underway between it and the administration regarding whether the U.S. government is currently planning a permanent presence in Iraq.

- Congress has repeatedly passed provisions prohibiting the use of appropriated funds to construct permanent military facilities in Iraq—in one case by a Senate vote of 100-0. On the first occasion the administration lobbied strenuously and successfully against the provision. Later, however, it allowed numerous such provisions to pass, presumably on the grounds that such language is meaningless because no one can prove that anything is going to be “permanent”.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has continued to construct a massive, wholly self-contained embassy akin to a 19th century foreign compound except heavily fortified, and equally large and self-contained bases with military facilities, amenities (stores, Pizza Huts and Burger Kings, swimming pools and exercise courses), and costs that could only be justified by very long term planned use. The major bases are designed to support force projection across the region and North Africa. The largest bases cover 15-20 square miles each and each accommodates 14,000-20,000 military personnel plus thousands more contractors.

After years of evasions and denials, one month ago the White House and the Pentagon finally revealed what has been obvious on the ground all along. Defense Secretary Gates remarked that the U.S. was seeking a “long and enduring presence” in Iraq under a yet to be negotiated Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). He went on to say “The Korea model is one, the security relationship we have with Japan is another.” U.S. forces have been in both of these countries for more than half a century. His comments did not receive nearly the attention they deserve.

What is the administration’s thinking regarding a long term U.S. military presence in Iraq? How big a presence and for what purposes? Is there a settled policy? A document of any kind? Has it ever been debated at senior levels? Or, did the planning and building begin—as one general has said—by engineers who wanted to stay ahead of the policymakers and continued on autopilot ever since?

This issue has immense political consequence. Repeated polls show Iraqis strongly oppose the bases. Across the Middle East, the enormous American footprint supports those who believe that the U.S. invaded Iraq to control the country and its oil resources and establish itself as a permanent power in the region. Congress must end its ineffectual Kabuki dance on spending and call the question on policy: what are the administration’s plans and are they wise? In my view, any serious attention to political and social realities in Iraq and to opinion across the region and globally, leads quickly to the conclusion that major U.S. military facilities in the Middle East should be located outside of Iraq.
DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: DR. JESSICA TUCHMAN MATHEWS

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

- Individual
- X Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: PRESIDENT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON DC

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**Federal Contract Information:** If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

- Current fiscal year (2007): 3
- Fiscal year 2006: 3
- Fiscal year 2005: 3

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

- Current fiscal year (2007): 3
- Fiscal year 2006: 3
- Fiscal year 2005: 3

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

- Current fiscal year (2007): Research 2
Fiscal year 2006: Research
Fiscal year 2005: Research

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2007): $209,527.69
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Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

- Current fiscal year (2007): 1
- Fiscal year 2006: 0
- Fiscal year 2005: 0

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

- Current fiscal year (2007): 1
- Fiscal year 2006: 0
- Fiscal year 2005: 0

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

- Current fiscal year (2007): Research
- Fiscal year 2006: Research
- Fiscal year 2005: Research

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

- Current fiscal year (2007): $250,000
- Fiscal year 2006: 0
- Fiscal year 2005: 0
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

It has become clear to the American public that we need a new way forward in Iraq. In December the Iraq Study Group (ISG), a bipartisan group formed by the Congress, concluded nine months of study and proposed a new way forward. The ISG proposal recognized that the key actions needed in Iraq must be taken by the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Army, and provided the incentives for those actions. The ISG proposal also recognized that we needed to begin the redeployment of our over-stretched ground forces in order to meet our security responsibilities outside of Iraq. Perhaps most importantly, the recommendations of the bipartisan ISG provided an opportunity for the nation to come together on Iraq.

In January President Bush announced what he called a “New Way Forward” in Iraq that does not follow the ISG recommendations. He has instead chosen a course of action that he calls a surge strategy, which I believe is not likely to succeed because it is tactical, not strategic; because it does not entail real conditionality for the Iraqi government; and because it has only deepened the divide in our country. Since the president announced his “surge strategy”, our forces in Iraq gradually have been increased, and the full complement of about 25,000 additional troops was reached early in July. The bulk of these additional troops were sent initially to Baghdad, but as violence increased in other districts some of them have been moved to the troubled districts. To this date, the overall level of violence in Iraq and the casualties suffered by American troops has not gone down. Generally, whenever American troops are deployed in a district, the violence decreases in that district, but increases elsewhere. One positive exception, however, is the Anbar province, where violence has decreased throughout the province. However, the decrease in violence in Anbar does not seem to be directly related to the surge. When the ISG was in Iraq last September, General Chiarelli reported that the Sunni tribes in Anbar were beginning to cooperate with American forces in fighting Al Qaeda units in their district. We reported that favorable trend in the ISG report, and recommended that this political development should be exploited to the maximum extent possible. It is encouraging to see that happening under the current American commanders. This development is a clear indication of how profoundly political accommodations can affect military operations.

In my testimony today I will explain the differences in the administration’s approach and the strategy proposed in the ISG report. I will conclude by explaining why I believe that the ISG proposal better serves the interests of the United States.

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
But before I discuss the ISG and its new way forward, I will first look back to consider how the disastrous situation in Iraq arose. (A partial list of references for my assessment includes “Squandered Victory”, Larry Diamond; “Assassin’s Gate”, George Packer; “Fiasco”, Tom Ricks; and “State of Denial”, Bob Woodward.)

The administration gave three reasons for the invasion of Iraq. The first was the alleged imminent danger from Iraq’s WMD programs. I believe that military action to stop an illegal nuclear program would have been warranted, but it would have been targeted against nuclear facilities, and not entail the occupation of Iraq. In any event, there was no imminent or even gathering danger from Iraqi nuclear weapons or other WMD. It appears that the UN inspections had, in fact, been working.

The second reason was the alleged imminent danger to the US from Iraq’s support of terrorism. Military action to defeat Al Qaeda could have been justified, as it was in Afghanistan. But while Al Qaeda had been using Afghanistan as a training area, it had no significant presence in Iraq prior to the invasion, and had no relationship with Iraq’s government.

The third reason was to bring stability to the Mideast by creating a democratic government in Iraq. Certainly a democratic government in Iraq could be a blessing to its people and a boon to the region. But the task of imposing a democratic government in Iraq turned out to be substantially more difficult than the administration imagined. Indeed, it is not clear that any strategy could have fully succeeded in achieving a democratic, stable government in Iraq. But we may never know whether it was possible, since the administration’s attempts to do so were burdened with serious strategic errors.

In particular, four errors were the most consequential:

- The administration failed to get support from regional powers and from key allies. As a consequence, US forces comprise almost 90% of the coalition, as opposed to about 50% in Desert Storm or Bosnia.

- The administration did not send in enough troops to maintain security after the Iraqi army was defeated. Thus, after the Iraqi army was defeated and Iraq broke out in looting, the US did not have enough troops to maintain control, giving the insurgency a chance to gain a foothold.

- The administration disbanded the Iraqi army, police and civil servants a few weeks after the Iraqi army was defeated. As a result, 500,000 angry young men were turned loose on Iraqi towns with weapons and no jobs, and Iraq was left with no security force except for the undersized coalition military force.

- The administration pushed the Iraqi provisional government to establish a constitution and hold elections, but in a faulty process that did not adequately protect minority rights, thus setting the stage for a bloody power struggle between Shias and Sunnis.
The cumulative effect of all of those strategic errors is a disastrous security situation in Iraq, which continues to deteriorate:

- Since the war began, almost 30,000 US military personnel have been killed, maimed or wounded.
- Last year more than 30,000 Iraqis were killed in the sectarian violence sweeping the major cities of Iraq.
- Well over a million Iraqis have left the country, including large numbers of Iraqi professionals.
- And the violence is still trending up.

As grim as this situation is, it could become even worse when US soldiers leave, as the administration has stated. But, in the absence of political reconciliation, that could be true whether we leave a year from now or five years from now.

B. THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP

In face of this growing disaster, the US Congress commissioned an independent bipartisan study charged to reach consensus on a way forward in Iraq. Jim Baker and Lee Hamilton were named as the co-chairmen and each of them selected four other members from his own party. Additionally they recruited forty expert advisors. Neither the members nor the advisers received any compensation. We met two to three days each month from March to August of last year being briefed by military and political experts. A very important part of our fact-finding was consulting with the Iraqi government. So we went to Baghdad in September, and spent four days meeting with all of the top officials of the Iraqi government, as well as our military commanders in Iraq.

After we returned from Iraq, we spent six intensive days trying to reach a consensus. This process was very difficult, and it is a tribute to our co-chairmen that we were able to succeed. All of our members were motivated by the belief that Iraq posed a serious problem for our country, and that to be of constructive help we had to reach a bipartisan consensus on how to move forward.

The ISG report was released to the public on 6 December. It called for a change in mission, a reinvigoration of diplomacy in the region, a strengthening of the Iraqi government, and the beginning of troop redeployments.

The change in mission proposed was the key to everything else in the report. We believed that we should try to strengthen the present government’s ability to hold off a full-scale civil war. We believed that we should continue our efforts to defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq. Although Al Qaeda was not a significant factor in Iraq before the war, it has since established a strong foothold, specializing in mass killings. We believed that we should reduce the commitment of our ground forces in Iraq and reestablish their readiness for other missions. The US has important security responsibilities outside of Iraq, which cannot be met if our ground forces are tied down in Iraq for the indefinite future.
We recommended the following actions to carry out these missions:

- Shift the mission of US troops from combat patrols to training the Iraqi army, including imbedding some US soldiers so that they can provide role models and on-the-job training for Iraqi soldiers.
- Begin pulling out US combat brigades, with the goal of having all out by the first quarter of 2008, except for a strong rapid reaction force needed for force protection and the fight against Al Qaeda in Iraq.
- Continue to support Iraqi forces with intelligence, logistics, and air support.
- Provide both positive and negative incentives for the Iraqi government to accelerate the reconciliation process and oil revenue sharing so that Sunnis have a stake in a stable Iraq.
- Mount an intense diplomatic effort to persuade friendly regional powers to assist economically, politically, and with training and to put pressure on unfriendly regional powers to stop arming militias and fomenting violence.

C. IMPACT OF IRAQ ON GROUND FORCES READINESS

If the recommendations of the ISG were to be followed, many of our combat brigades would be out of Iraq by the first quarter of next year. As our Army combat brigades and Marine units return to their bases in the US, the Defense Dept. will have a huge budget and management problem in restoring them to full combat readiness. This problem is of special concern to this committee because of the constitutional responsibility of the Congress in constituting and equipping our armed forces. The Army, all of whose active brigades were at high readiness levels at the beginning of the war, is at dangerously low readiness levels. Today, none of the non-deployed brigades are at readiness levels needed to meet other military contingencies. And low readiness levels invite such contingencies; indeed, our security may have already suffered because of the perception of Iran and North Korea that our forces were tied down in Iraq. The Congress also needs to reconsider the role of the National Guard, since the compact with these citizen soldiers has been shattered by extended deployments that have caused many of them to lose their jobs or even their families.

D. A COMPARISON OF THE PRESIDENT’S NEW STRATEGY WITH ISG PROPOSALS

In January the president announced what he called a new way forward in Iraq, I fully agree with the president’s assessment that failure in Iraq could have serious consequences for security in the region and, ultimately, American security. And I agree that we should make a serious effort to avoid such a failure. But I firmly believe that the bipartisan proposal made by the ISG gives us a better chance of avoiding that failure than does the president’s proposal.
The new way forward proposed by President Bush differs from that recommended by the ISG in several important respects. It calls for adding more than 20,000 combat forces, the bulk of them to be employed in securing Baghdad. When the ISG was in Baghdad, we discussed the Baghdad security problem in some detail with General Casey and General Chiarelli. In particular, we noted that Operation Together Forward (designed to establish security in Iraq) was not succeeding, and asked if they could increase the likelihood of success if they had another 3 to 5 American brigades. Both generals said no. They argued that the problem of conducting combat patrols in the neighborhoods of Baghdad had to be carried out by Iraqi forces, and that bringing in more American troops could delay the Iraqis assuming responsibility for their own security. They also said that there was no purely military solution to Baghdad’s security. Any solution to the security problem required the Iraqi government to start making real progress in the programs of political reconciliation that they had earlier committed to do. And they argued that more American troops tended to fuel that part of the insurgency that was fighting against American occupation forces. Finally, they noted that bringing in more American ground forces would be unlikely to have positive results on Baghdad’s security, but very likely to have negative results on the readiness of American ground forces. Their assessment was consistent with what we had heard from General Abizaid in an earlier briefing in the US. Moreover, the results of the surge to this date are consistent with their assessment.

Subsequent to our discussions in Baghdad, the president has replaced these generals and adopted a new strategy that is contrary to the advice they gave us. I note that the situation in Iraq has dramatically changed with the intense sectarian violence that was sparked by the bombing of the Blue Mosque about a year ago, and that our recent commanders’ assessments reflect on-the-ground experience of this intensification. Consequently, I believe we should have stayed with the recommendations of those commanders, and not have sent in more American combat forces.

The best chance of bringing down the violence in Iraq, if indeed it still can be done, lies with the Iraqi army and local security forces, and we can improve their chance of success by using US ground forces to provide the on-the-job training that would result from imbedding American troops in Iraqi combat units, as proposed by the ISG. Moreover, none of this military action will be effective unless the Iraqi government moves promptly to carry out the programs of political reconciliation they have committed to do—this involves the sharing of power and the sharing of oil revenues with the Sunnis. The Iraqi government has delayed carrying out these programs for more than a year now—not surprisingly given their desire to maintain full control of the government, and given the political difficulty of implementing these programs even if they wanted to. It is not clear whether the Iraqi government fails to implement the promised reforms because they are unable to or simply unwilling to. To this date American forces have backstopped the Iraqi government’s failures, so we do not know whether they could carry out the reforms if they were under sufficient pressure to do so. The ISG proposal would put maximum pressure for timely action on the part of the Iraqi government, whereas sending in the additional American troops provides them a rationale for further delays that effectively avoid making the fundamental changes that are necessary.

Finally, the ISG proposed a comprehensive diplomatic initiative involving all of the neighboring countries. We fully recognized that those diplomatic goals would not be easy to
achieve. They would require the dedicated efforts of the best American diplomats, both in and out of government. And even with such an effort, we probably would not succeed in all of our diplomatic goals. But we will never know how much, in fact, can be accomplished through diplomacy unless we give it such a dedicated effort. Two noteworthy precedents of successful American diplomacy in the face of equally daunting odds were the diplomacy by the first Bush administration that facilitated a peaceful ending of the Cold War, and the diplomacy by the Clinton administration that ended the Bosnian War. So far this year the administration has taken diplomatic actions far less comprehensive than envisaged by the ISG. They have had very limited discussions with Iran, apparently to no effect, and none at all with Syria, which plays a pivotal role in the region and with whom we could have considerable leverage.

F. CONCLUSIONS

In sum, I believe that the president’s diplomatic strategy is too timid, and his military strategy is too little and too late to effect the lasting and profound changes needed. His strategy is not likely to succeed because it is tactical not strategic; because it does not entail real conditionality for the Iraqi government; and because it will only deepen the divide in our country.

The ISG proposal has a better chance because it recognizes that the key actions needed in Iraq to effect lasting results must be taken by the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Army, and because it provides the support and the incentives for those actions. Most importantly, the recommendations of the bipartisan ISG provide an opportunity for Americans to come together again as one nation, indelible.
**DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION**

**INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES:** Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

**Witness name:** William J. Perry

**Capacity in which appearing:** (check one)

- [X] Individual
- [ ] Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:

**FISCAL YEAR 2007**

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**Federal Contract Information:** If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

- Current fiscal year (2007): 
- Fiscal year 2006: **NONE**
- Fiscal year 2005:

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

- Current fiscal year (2007): 
- Fiscal year 2006: **NONE**
- Fiscal year 2005:

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

- Current fiscal year (2007): 
- Fiscal year 2006: **NA**
- Fiscal year 2005:

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

- Current fiscal year (2007): 
- Fiscal year 2006: **NONE**
- Fiscal year 2005:
Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007): __________;  
Fiscal year 2006: __________;  
Fiscal year 2005: __________.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2007): __________;  
Fiscal year 2006: NA;  
Fiscal year 2005: __________.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007): __________;  
Fiscal year 2006: __________;  
Fiscal year 2005: __________.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2007): __________;  
Fiscal year 2006: __________;  
Fiscal year 2005: __________.
STATEMENT BY

FREDERICK W. KAGAN
RESIDENT SCHOLAR
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

IRAQ: TRENDS AND FUTURE SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

JULY 18, 2007
The New Strategy in Iraq
By Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan
*The Weekly Standard*  Publication Date: July 9, 2007

The new strategy for Iraq has entered its second phase. Now that all of the additional combat forces have arrived in theater, Generals David Petraeus and Ray Odierno have begun Operation Phantom Thunder, a vast and complex effort to disrupt al Qaeda and Shiite militia bases all around Baghdad in advance of the major clear-and-hold operations that will follow. The deployment of forces and preparations for this operation have gone better than expected, and Phantom Thunder is so far proceeding very well. All aspects of the current strategy have been built upon the lessons of previous successful and unsuccessful Coalition efforts to establish security in Iraq, and there is every reason to be optimistic about its outcome.

The first phase of the new strategy unfolded over five months—between the president's announcement of the "surge" on January 10 and the arrival of the last of the five additional Army brigades and Marine elements in early June (though critical enablers for those combat forces have only just arrived). As the new units entered Iraq, commanders began pushing forces already in the theater forward from their operating bases into outposts in key neighborhoods of Baghdad and elsewhere. The purpose of these movements was to establish positions within those key neighborhoods and to develop intelligence about the enemy and relationships of trust with the local communities.

Also during this first phase, additional Iraqi security forces were deployed to Baghdad in accordance with a plan developed jointly by the U.S. and Iraqi military commands. All of the requested units were provided. The Iraqi military has just completed its second rotation of units into Baghdad; as before, all of the designated units arrived, and they were generally closer to being fully manned than in the first rotation.

The new U.S. troops have increased the available combat power in Iraq by about 40 percent, from 15 brigades to the equivalent of 21 brigades. Generals Petraeus and Odierno allocated only two of the additional Army brigades to the capital. The other three Army brigades and the equivalent of a Marine regiment they deployed in the surrounding areas, known as the "Baghdad belt." There, under the guise of Operation Phantom Thunder, they are now working to disrupt the car-bomb and suicide-bomb networks that have been supporting al Qaeda's counter-surge since January.

But this second phase is designed primarily to support the clearing and holding operations in Baghdad itself, which will continue for many months. It is those operations that are meant to bring lasting security to Iraq's capital and thus create the space for political progress.

The United States has not undertaken a multiphased operation on such a large scale since the invasion, so it is unsurprising that many commentators are confused about how to report and evaluate what is going on. Indeed, the current effort differs profoundly from anything U.S. forces have tried before in Iraq. As Coalition forces begin the attempt to
establish sustainable security in Baghdad and its environs, it is worth reviewing past major combat operations in Iraq, since their clear lessons have informed planning for the current, much larger campaign.

Falluja, 2004

The U.S. Marines fought two big battles in Falluja, the easternmost major city in Anbar province not far from Baghdad, in the spring and fall of 2004. The enemy was a dense network of al Qaeda fighters and Sunni Arab insurgents who had prepared defensive positions throughout the city and had considerable support from the local population. The initial assault was ordered on short notice after the kidnapping and execution of several American contractors, whose bodies were prominently displayed from a bridge.

The Marines were not given adequate time to prepare for the attack. They could not establish forward outposts in the city, develop adequate intelligence about the enemy, or gain the trust of the population. The American command did not fully prepare the Iraqi government for the intensity of the battle or the controversy it was bound to generate. As a result, the Marines’ initial assaults resulted in heavy casualties and collateral damage. The Iraqi government was shaken, and the Marines were ordered to abandon the effort and rely instead on local forces to restore order in the city. Lacking troops, training, and support, the local allies were quickly either turned or slaughtered, and al Qaeda and the insurgents strengthened their hold on Falluja and Anbar generally.

The second Marine attack, in the fall, was much more successful. The local units were reinforced and given time to develop a much clearer intelligence picture, as well as to obtain local allies, although those were still few and unreliable. The much better-planned attack cleared the city, although with considerable collateral damage resulting largely from the sophistication of the defenses the enemy had been able to establish during the pause between the two attacks.

The Marines were not allowed to follow up on their success in Falluja, however. No effort was made to clear and hold Ramadi or the Upper Euphrates Valley for more than a year. In the meantime, the area between Falluja and Baghdad, including the Abu Ghraib neighborhood on the western outskirts of the capital, was left largely devoid of American forces and remained a major Sunni Arab insurgent and al Qaeda base. Nevertheless, Falluja was fairly stable for many months after the Marine attack, only slowly sinking back into chaos and enemy control.

Najaf and Sadr City, 2004

The summer of 2004 also saw the only major combat between Coalition forces and Moktada al-Sadr’s Mahdi army, or Jaysh al-Mahdi. This took place in the Shia holy cities of Najaf and Karbala and the Baghdad neighborhood of Sadr City. The Sadrists uprising followed close on the heels of the first Battle of Falluja, and it seemed briefly that the Coalition might be defeated simultaneously by Sunni insurgents and Shia militias across Iraq. But U.S. forces rapidly regained control of the situation in Sadr City, where Major
General Chiarelli’s 1st Cavalry Division restored order. Fighting in Najaf was greatly complicated by the fact that the Sadrists took up positions in and near the Imam Ali Mosque, one of Shia Islam’s most sacred sites. Skillful Coalition military operations dislodged the Sadrists from those positions without significant damage to the shrine, and killed many Sadrist fighters in the process.

The battles of Sadr City and Najaf continue to influence the situation in Iraq today. Sadr appears to have learned from these battles that his militia cannot stand up to American forces in pitched battles. He has avoided situations that might lead to such fights, preferring hit-and-run attacks, the use of IEDs (and now EFPs, explosively formed projectiles), and death-squad attacks on Sunni Arabs after the bombing of the Samarra Mosque in February 2006. The successes in Najaf and Sadr City were fleeting in another respect, however. U.S. forces left both areas quickly, and the Sadrist militias retook control of them within months. The Sadrists remain largely in control of Najaf and were long uncontested in Sadr City, although recent events have greatly complicated their situation there.

**Tal Afar and the Upper Euphrates, 2005**

After the uprisings of 2004, the United States focused its efforts on moving the political process forward in Iraq and on training the Iraqi army and National Police. It was widely expected in the government and especially in the military leadership that political progress would translate directly into improved security. It was also believed that the onus for conducting what military operations were necessary should fall on the nascent Iraqi military to the maximum extent possible.

Nevertheless, the Coalition command understood that only U.S. forces could provide the short-term security necessary for elections. The command requested and received significant reinforcements to this end in late 2005. The most dramatic battle before the elections came in September 2005, when Colonel H. R. McMaster’s 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment cleared Tal Afar, a city in Nineveh Province between Mosul and the Syrian border.

Tal Afar was a stronghold of the Sunni Arab insurgency and al Qaeda on the road from Syria into the heart of Iraq. As in Falluja, the enemy had prepared sophisticated defensive positions and terrorized the local population into providing support. McMaster had a number of advantages over the Marines in Falluja, however. He had a larger number of trained and reasonably reliable Iraqi soldiers, the first fruits of a new effort to build an Iraqi army capable of conducting counterinsurgency efforts. He was also able to establish outposts in and around the city, develop a sophisticated intelligence picture, and shape the situation to his advantage before beginning the major clearing operation. The result was a marked success. The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment isolated the city with a berm to control access and then cleared it house-to-house in conjunction with the Iraqi army. Some insurgent cells fought back determinedly, but the Coalition forces cleared the city without destroying it, and gained the support of the population in the process.
Tal Afar had been cleared twice before September 2005, and both times had immediately fallen back into the hands of the insurgents. Although U.S. forces in the area were again reduced sharply after this operation, the situation did not deteriorate rapidly or completely. Promised reconstruction aid from the Iraqi central government arrived in Nineveh only a few months ago, and tensions rose in the city in 2006, in part because the Iraqi government replaced several key provincial leaders with Shia extremists. Nevertheless, Tal Afar has not been retaken by the insurgents, and a spectacular suicide truck bomb in March 2007 did not trigger a renewal of sectarian strife. A few days of tit-for-tat sectarian killings followed, but the local government and Iraqi police and army units with very little Coalition support managed to bring the situation under control and stop the killing.

Nineveh Province today is held by 18,000 Iraqi army soldiers, 20,000 Iraqi police, and a small number of Americans. Al Qaeda and Sunni insurgent cells operate in the province, particularly in Mosul, but have not been able to take it over or establish uncontested safe havens. Operations in 2005, although inadequately followed up and sustained, created a lasting change in a critical province of northern Iraq.

Ramadi, 2006

Early in 2006, the U.S. military command withdrew the additional forces introduced to support the elections, and thereafter resisted all suggestions of a more active posture or a larger American presence. In 2006 the focus was on training the Iraqi military and transitioning responsibility for security to the Iraqis. It was hoped that the results of the 2005 elections would lead to the political progress that was seen as the key to reducing violence, and Generals John Abizaid and George Casey believed that an active American presence was an irritant that caused more trouble than it cured. They also feared that American forces conducting counterguerrilla operations would allow the Iraqi forces to lie back and become dependent on the Coalition. The overall U.S. posture in the first half of 2006, therefore, remained largely defensive and reactive, and the military command aimed to reduce the number of American forces in Iraq as rapidly as possible.

In the meantime, the situation was deteriorating dramatically. Al Qaeda terrorists destroyed the Golden Dome of the al-Askariya Mosque in Samarra (a Shiite shrine in the predominantly Sunni Arab province of Salahuddin), and a wave of sectarian violence swept Iraq. Within days more than 30 mosques had been bombed, and death squads began executing civilians across the country in large numbers in tit-for-tat sectarian murders.

The failure to follow up either on the successes in Falluja in 2004 or on the beginnings of clearing operations in the Upper Euphrates in 2005 allowed Anbar Province to sink deeper into the control of Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda terrorists. As late as August 2006, the Marine intelligence officer for the province declared that it was irretrievably lost to the enemy.
Nevertheless, the Marines and Army units in Anbar began a series of quiet efforts to regain control that ultimately led to spectacular and unexpected success. They began to engage local leaders in talks, particularly after al Qaeda committed a series of assassinations and other atrocities against tribal leaders and local civilians as part of an effort to enforce their extreme and distorted vision of Islamic law. U.S. forces under the command of Colonel Sean MacFarland also began a quiet effort to apply the clearing principles honed through operations in Falluja, Sadr City, and Tal Afar to Ramadi. There were never enough forces to undertake such operations rapidly or decisively, and success never appeared likely, at least to outside observers, who focused excessively on the force ratios.

But the effort was successful beyond all expectations. The tribal leaders in Anbar came together to negotiate an accord that ultimately produced the Anbar Awakening, an association of Anbar tribes dedicated to fighting al Qaeda. Recruiting for the Iraqi Security Forces in Anbar increased from virtually zero through 2006 to more than 14,000 by mid-2007. As the 2007 surge forces augmented U.S. troops in Anbar and began to change the political dynamic in Iraq, efforts to clear Ramadi and bring overall violence in the province under control also peaked. As New York Times reporter Jolan Burns noted after a recent visit to Ramadi, Anbar's capital has "gone from being the most dangerous place in Iraq, with the help of the tribal sheikhs, to being one of the least dangerous places." And the Anbar Awakening movement has spread to Sunni tribes in neighboring areas. Parallel organizations have developed in Babil, Salahuddin, and Diyala provinces, and even in Baghdad. As the new strategy of 2007 took hold, U.S. forces found that they could even negotiate and work with some of their most determined former foes in the Sunni Arab insurgency—groups like the Baathist 1920s Brigades that once focused on killing Americans and now are increasingly working with Americans to kill al Qaeda fighters. Coalition operations in Anbar, which looked hopeless for years, have accomplished extraordinary successes that are deepening and spreading.

Baghdad, 2006

The worsening sectarian violence after the al-Askariya Mosque bombing led General Casey to conduct two operations aimed at restoring stability in Baghdad. Dubbed Operations Together Forward I and II, they involved surges of fewer than 10,000 additional U.S. troops and a relatively small number of Iraqis into the capital to conduct clearing operations. Inadequate planning and preparation for the movement of the Iraqi battalions into Baghdad led to the refusal of many of those units to show up. The plans, moreover, relied on Iraqi forces to hold cleared neighborhoods on their own, while U.S. forces moved on to other troubled areas.

These operations failed. Six months of intense sectarian conflict had led many members of the mostly Shiite Iraqi police into death squads. They were not and could not be effective bulwarks on their own against sectarian violence of which they were a part. The fact that most Iraqi army formations did not show up reduced the force ratios necessary to clear neighborhoods and deprived the Iraqi command, which was poorly organized, of resources vital to holding areas that U.S. forces cleared. The very small increase in
American combat power (two additional brigades in Baghdad, but no overall increase in the American force levels in the theater) was inadequate to gain control of the situation. Sectarian killings dropped during the first two weeks of the second, and larger, operation, but then rapidly rose above pre-operation levels and continued to rise for the rest of the year. By November, Operation Together Forward II had mostly ground to a halt, having made no lasting improvement in the situation.

Lessons of the Past

A number of clear lessons drawn from these operations have informed the current strategy. First, political progress by itself will not reduce the violence. From May 2003 through mid-2006, the Bush administration and the military command focused on political progress as the key. The transfer of sovereignty in mid-2004, the election of a Transitional National Assembly in January 2005, the approval of a new constitution by referendum in October 2005, and the election of a fresh National Assembly in December 2005 were all expected to subdue violence by creating an inclusive and balanced government. Throughout this period, American armed forces tried to stay in the background, keeping their "footprint" minimal and pushing the nascent Iraqi Security Forces into the lead. Violence steadily increased. Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda terrorists dug into cities that U.S. forces left open, and Shia militias took control of abandoned Shia lands.

When local American commanders took the initiative to clear insurgent hotbeds, they were generally successful. These operations produced measurable improvements in important areas that decayed only slowly, despite the absence of follow-up or adequate continued presence. U.S. forces honed their skills in such operations, allowing them finally to clear insurgent-held cities without destroying them or excessively alienating the local population. Political progress and political solutions are essential to ultimate success in counterinsurgency, but they must often be complemented by major military operations sustained over a long time.

Second, all American efforts to establish local security in Iraq have been hindered by the paucity of U.S. troops there, yet some have succeeded even so. Colonel McMaster could muster nearly one Coalition soldier (American or Iraqi) for every 45 people in Tal Afar, which helps explain the speed and success of the clearing in that city. But General Chiarelli restored order in Sadr City in 2004 with fewer than one soldier per 100 inhabitants, and the Marines and Army units in Anbar cleared Ramadi slowly with similarly poor ratios. More soldiers and Marines, to say nothing of more trained and reliable Iraqi troops, would have made every operation proceed more rapidly and smoothly, but the evidence suggests that critical clearing operations can succeed even at these lower ratios. There are now well over 350,000 Coalition forces, including Iraqis, in the country, whose population is around 25 million—an overall ratio significantly better than what sufficed to restore order in Sadr City and Ramadi.

Third, rapid reductions in Coalition forces after clearing operations undermined the success of almost all past operations. In Sadr City and Najaf, the withdrawal led to the
complete if quiet restoration of the militias that had been driven out. In Falluja and Tal Afar, rapid reductions in Coalition forces led to slow deterioration, although not to previous levels of insurgent and terrorist predominance. Turning control of cleared areas over to Iraqi forces prematurely—as in Falluja after the first battle and in Baghdad after Operations Together Forward—generally led to rapid failure. The Coalition must plan to maintain a significant presence in direct and indirect support of Iraqi forces after clearing operations are complete in order to sustain success. The model is Ramadi, where Coalition forces have remained in strength even as the situation has improved, helping to deepen the positive trends underway there. The capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces have improved steadily, but it is highly unlikely that Coalition forces can leave areas as soon as they have been cleared without seeing security deteriorate.

Fourth, every successful operation was preceded by commanders’ taking the time to develop a good intelligence picture of the situation. To do this, they moved forces into the area and made contact with the local population. Advance forces help shape the environment by occupying bases from which subsequent operations can proceed and by establishing relationships with local leaders that will be exploited in subsequent phases. This also helps commanders and planners refine their estimates of the forces required in the clearing operation. Especially operations on a large scale, involving the physical movement of many forces, require significant preparation.

Fifth, Coalition casualties generally increase at the start of major clearing operations, when Coalition troops move into areas previously held by the enemy, especially where the enemy has prepared sophisticated defensive positions. As the enemy realizes that a major attack is underway, he often launches counterattacks, in an attempt to blunt the offensive and/or weaken the will of leaders in Baghdad and Washington. Depending on the scale of operations and the resilience of the enemy defenses, this period of increased violence can last for days or weeks. As clearing proceeds to its conclusion, however, violence generally drops and Coalition casualties begin to fall. This pattern has occurred in almost every successful clearing operation, including Sadr City, Najaf, the second Battle of Falluja, Tal Afar, and Ramadi. Higher force ratios combined with solid preparation can reduce the intensity and duration of this spike in violence and casualties, but cannot eliminate it.

Operation Phantom Thunder in Context

The new strategy for securing Baghdad was designed with all these lessons in mind, as well as lessons from other successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency operations elsewhere. So far, the campaign has the hallmarks of past successful operations; and it has a number of promising new elements. One of these new elements is Operation Phantom Thunder itself.

Many advocates of the new strategy—and many critics—bemoaned the staggered arrival over five months of the additional combat forces, which delayed the start of major clearing operations and seemed to threaten a ragged and uneven launch. But Generals Petraeus and Odierno put the time to good use. They immediately began to push U.S.
forces that were already in Iraq off of their forward operating bases and into the neighborhoods to be cleared. In some areas that were sufficiently stable to begin with, the mere movement of forces into permanent positions in the neighborhoods had the effect of a rapid clearing operation, even though the aim was only to gather intelligence and set the conditions for the clearing to follow.

More important, previous clearing operations in Iraq were not part of a coherent plan to establish security in a wide area, but rather reactions to violence in particular places. Thus, U.S. commanders made no extensive efforts to contain the accelerants to violence--vehicle-bomb factories, insurgent safe houses, training grounds, smuggling routes, and weapons caches--located outside the cities being cleared. By contrast, the current strategy aims to establish security across greater Baghdad, and Petraeus and Odierno have added a phase between the preparation phase and the major clearing. This is Operation Phantom Thunder, which aims to disrupt enemy networks for many miles beyond the capital, as far away as Baquba and Falluja. What's more, Phantom Thunder is striking the enemy in almost all of its major bases at once--something Coalition forces have never before attempted in Iraq.

Al Qaeda's operations in Baghdad--its bombings, kidnappings, resupply activities, movement of foreign fighters, and financing--depend on its ability to move people and goods around the rural outskirts of the capital as well as in the city. Petraeus and Odierno, therefore, are conducting simultaneous operations in many places in the Baghdad belt: Falluja and Baquba, Mahmudiya, Arab Jabour, Salman Pak, the southern shores of Lake Tharthar, Karma, Tarmiya, and so on. By attacking all of these bases at once, Coalition forces will greatly complicate the enemy's movement from place to place, as well as his ability to establish new bases and safe havens. At the same time, U.S. and Iraqi forces have already disrupted al Qaeda's major bases and are working to prevent the enemy from taking refuge in the city. U.S. forces are also aggressively targeting Shia death-squad leaders and helping Iraqi forces operating against Shia militias.

Still ahead, of course, is the challenge of completing the clearing and holding of a city of 6 million. The establishment of security, moreover, is a precondition for further political progress, not a guarantee of it. The enemy may find a way to disrupt the current operations, or to derail or defeat the subsequent clear-and-hold operations. It is possible that Iraqi Security Forces will prove unable to develop the numbers and capabilities required to maintain security once it has been established. And unpredictable disasters can always drive a well-designed strategy off course.

But there is every reason to believe at this stage that the current operation and its likely successor will dramatically reduce the level of violence in Baghdad, and do so in a way that will prove sustainable. That accomplishment in itself will be a major contribution to American security, in that it will entail a major defeat for al Qaeda and its allies, now surging in response to our stepped-up operations. And it will create an unprecedented situation in postwar Iraq: one in which Iraq's elected government can meet and discuss policies in a capital returning to normal; in which Sunni and Shia can afford to compromise without fear of an imminent sectarian explosion; and in which Iraqi
forces can become increasingly responsible for maintaining the security that they have helped to establish. The current strategy is on track to produce that outcome—which is why it deserves to be given every chance to succeed.

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 109th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: Frederick Walter Kagan

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

XX Individual
__ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:

FISCAL YEAR 2007

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<th>federal grant(s) / contracts</th>
<th>federal agency</th>
<th>dollar value</th>
<th>subject(s) of contract or grant</th>
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<td>Scharnhorst and military transformation (one contract over three fiscal years)</td>
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FISCAL YEAR 2006

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### FISCAL YEAR 2005

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**Federal Contract Information:** If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

- Current fiscal year (2007): ___ 1 (over three fiscal years);
- Fiscal year 2006: ___ 1 (over three fiscal years);
- Fiscal year 2005: ___ 1 (over three fiscal years).

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

- Current fiscal year (2007): ___ OSD
- Fiscal year 2006: ___ OSD
- Fiscal year 2005: ___ OSD

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

- Current fiscal year (2007): ___ Military transformation
- Fiscal year 2006: ___ Military transformation
- Fiscal year 2005: ___ Military transformation
Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2007): $18,675 (over three fiscals);
Fiscal year 2006: $18,675 (over three fiscals);
Fiscal year 2005: $18,675 (over three fiscals).
Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

- Current fiscal year (2007):
- Fiscal year 2006:
- Fiscal year 2005:

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

- Current fiscal year (2007):
- Fiscal year 2006:
- Fiscal year 2005:

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

- Current fiscal year (2007):
- Fiscal year 2006:
- Fiscal year 2005:

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

- Current fiscal year (2007):
- Fiscal year 2006:
- Fiscal year 2005:
UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

Notional Political Timeline

September 2006
- Form Constitutional Review Committee
- Approve law on procedures to form regions
- Agree on political timetable
- Approve the law for Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC)
- Approve the Investment Law

October 2006
- Approve provincial elections law and set date for provincial elections
- Approve a hydrocarbon law

November 2006
- Approve de-Ba’athification law
- Approve provincial council authorities law
- Approve a flag, emblem and national anthem law

December 2006
- Approve Coalition Provisional Authority Order 91 concerning armed forces and militias
- Council of Representatives to address amnesty, militias and other armed formations
- Approve amnesty, militias and other armed formations law

January 2007
- Constitutional Review Committee completes its work

February 2007
- Form independent commissions in accordance with the Constitution

March 2007
- Constitutional amendments referendum (if required)
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 18, 2007
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK

Mr. LOEBSACK. But before that you mentioned that there are many Iraqis who are doing well, fighting well, they are brave and all the rest. I need more than many. Can you put any kind of numbers on that?

Dr. KAGAN. A number of reports are about to be released that will provide far greater detail and resolution on this issue than I could, including the Pentagon’s 9010 report and the report of General James Jones produced by CSIS specifically on the Iraqi Security Forces, to say nothing of the testimony of General David Petraeus. Nevertheless, I will offer some information available from open sources on this important issue, including a map of the locations of the major Iraqi Army and National Police divisions included in the briefing given by Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno on August 17, appended at the end of this document. From that briefing and other reports, it is possible to state that elements of all 11 Iraqi Army divisions and 2 National Police divisions, as well as the Iraqi Special Forces, have been actively engaged in combat operations against al Qaeda in Iraq and/or Shi’a militias. General Odierno noted that the ISF “average over 2,100 company or above operations, over 20,000 independent patrols and over 19,000 independent checkpoints.” He described operations by the 2nd Brigade of the 7th Iraqi Infantry Division in Anbar, the 2nd Iraqi Army Division in Nineveh, and two brigades of the 4th Iraqi Army Division in Tamim Province (Kirkuk). During my various trips to Iraq in April, May, and July, I spoke with Iraqi Army and Police officers and American units partnered with them about operations by the 8th Iraqi Army Division in Diwaniyah, the 6th IA Division in Baghdad, and the 5th IA Division in Baqubah. Other reports describe continuous combat operations and patrols conducted by the 3rd IA Division in and around Tall Aifar, the 10th IA Division around Nasiriyah, and the 9th and 11th IA Divisions in Baghdad in support of Operation Fardh al Qanoon. I spoke with various American and Iraqi officers about the operations of the two Iraqi National Police Divisions in Baghdad, as well as numerous regular Iraqi Police in the provinces I visited: Anbar, Salah-ad-Din, Baghdad, Babil, and Diyala. General Odierno noted that “there are also over 100,000 Iraqi Police patrolling the streets,” MNF-I reports as well as the recent National Intelligence Estimate also relate the successful completion of two rotations of Iraqi Army forces into Baghdad in support of Operation Fardh al Qanoon. I am not in a position to offer the Congressman precise figures about how many Iraqi soldiers or policemen are actively engaged in combat or patrolling, but I can state without hesitation that every division in the ISF is engaged in the fight, and the overwhelming majority of brigades within the Iraqi Army are as well. General Odierno commented in the August 17 briefing, “I cannot recall for you the last report of an ISF unit avoiding a fight.” The story is by no means unreservedly positive. Sectarianism continues to prevail in some units, particular in the police but even in the Iraqi Army, and combat capability is uneven across the force. But the Iraqi Army and Police number over 300,000 personnel combined, and a high proportion of them are engaged actively in establishing and maintaining security in their country.

[The map referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 92.]