[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-71]
A THIRD WAY: ALTERNATIVES FOR IRAQ'S FUTURE (PART 1 OF 4)
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JULY 12, 2007
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OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey JEFF MILLER, Florida
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
JIM COOPER, Tennessee K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania
Lorry Fenner, Professional Staff Member
Thomas Hawley, Professional Staff Member
Roger Zakheim, Professional Staff Member
Sasha Rogers, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2007
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, July 12, 2007, A Third Way: Alternatives for Iraq's
Future (Part 1 of 4)........................................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, July 12, 2007.......................................... 51
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 12, 2007
A THIRD WAY: ALTERNATIVES FOR IRAQ'S FUTURE (PART 1 OF 4)
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking
Member, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee.............. 2
Snyder, Hon. Vic, a Representative from Arkansas, Chairman,
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee...................... 1
WITNESSES
Boot, Max, Senior Fellow in National Security Studies, The
Council on Foreign Relations................................... 6
Clark, Gen. Wesley K., (Ret.), Former NATO Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe, U.S. Army................................... 4
Khan, Dr. Muqtedar, Assistant Professor, Political Science and
International Relations, University of Delaware, Non-Resident
Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings
Institution.................................................... 9
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Akin, Hon. W. Todd........................................... 57
Boot, Max.................................................... 67
Clark, Gen. Wesley K......................................... 61
Snyder, Hon. Vic............................................. 55
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Questions submitted.]
A THIRD WAY: ALTERNATIVES FOR IRAQ'S FUTURE (PART 1 OF 4)
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Thursday, July 12, 2007.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:06 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
Dr. Snyder. The hearing will come to order. I think there
is a pretty long line outside, so if any of you in the audience
go to the restroom, you may lose your seat. Who knows? But we
appreciate you all being here.
I want to welcome everyone here today.
This is the first hearing which I have presided over as the
subcommittee chairman since Mr. Meehan left. Mr. Akin and I
have worked on things together in the past and we are intent on
doing that with this subcommittee and look forward to working
with him and the rest of the committee members in this new
role.
I want to welcome everyone to this first in a series of
four hearings we are going to have this month at this
subcommittee level on alternative strategies for Iraq.
I was listening to NPR yesterday morning, and they had an
interview with troops that were deploying overseas and what
service to America means. One woman was briefly interviewed,
Staff Sergeant Nicole Walden. She said, ``I am Staff Sergeant
Nicole Walden. I dropped my kids off one and a half weeks ago
because my husband and I are both deploying, so my kids had to
go stay with their grandparents.'' And the interviewer says,
``Tell me again their ages? And she says, ``Three and one. I
wake up in the morning and they are not there and I just--it is
unreal.''
And she goes on to say that she is not complaining because
she gets so much support. But if you think of the tremendous
sacrifice that this family, this mother and father are making
to leave off those two young toddlers with grandparents, my own
view is that we in the Congress owe those men and women
everything we can do to have the right strategy of foreign
policy and our national security, but particularly with regard
to Iraq.
Mr. Akin and I have both been frustrated and have shared
our frustrations to each other about the tone of the debate for
this first six months of the year in terms of the polarization
that has occurred in the Congress. We wanted to have a series
of hearings in which we invite smart people, experienced
people, who can give us some other ideas. Maybe other ideas are
going to be that there are not as many other ideas out there as
we would like, but we want to hear from other smart people
about what other options are.
We hope to enhance the public debate and inform future full
committee deliberations. We have invited retired senior
military officers, defense policy experts, and academics who
specialize on the Middle East. The full committee under Mr.
Skelton's leadership is holding complementary hearings on a
broader scope.
Yesterday, I heard witnesses give their views on the global
security assessment. Upcoming full committee hearings will
address Middle East regional security issues, the interim Iraq
report, and General Petraeus' September report on the surge.
We have asked our witnesses both today and the ones coming
up in the rest of the month to look forward, rather than
backward. We are not intent on rehashing over mistakes that
have been made or how we got to where we are. We have asked our
witnesses to look ahead and explore options. I think for the
written statements we have received, we have got some witnesses
today with different views. So we hope that there will be a
vigorous discussion among them, too, about what they think of
each other's ideas.
Today's hearing will begin with testimony from retired
General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO.
General Clark appeared before the full committee in both 2002
and 2005.
He will be followed by Mr. Max Boot, who is senior fellow
in national security studies at the Council on Foreign
Relations in New York.
Our final witness will be Dr. Muqtedar Khan, who is the
director of Islamic studies at the University of Delaware and a
senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Gert would get mad at me if I didn't also acknowledge that
Wes is my neighbor and she walks past my house every morning on
her morning walk. He lives down the street from me, but I see
you more here, Wes, than I do back home.
So welcome to all of you.
And now we will hear from Mr. Akin.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the
Appendix on page 55.]
STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI,
RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Akin. Let me begin by recognizing our new chairman of
the subcommittee, Dr. Snyder.
I look forward to working with you, Doctor, and I know that
under your stewardship the committee will continue to work on
critical issues facing the Department of Defense in a
bipartisan manner. Thank you so much for choosing to be our
chairman.
That has been the tone of this committee, and I think it is
very positive. I think it is something that the general
American public should be pleased with, to see people who are
trying to solve problems instead of involve ourselves too much
in politics.
Today's hearing is the first of a series aimed at breaking
out of that sort of false concept of saying there are only two
alternatives in Iraq, either the precipitous withdrawal or to
stay the course. Somebody once told me that when somebody wants
to put you on the horns of a dilemma, you don't want to choose
either/or and it is a poor decision.
We want to know what are the different alternatives and
want to try to quantify those. Given the current political
environment the President's interim progress report on
benchmarks mandated by this Congress and the debate taking
place on the floor of the House today, I know that this series
of hearings could be challenging.
But I agree with the chairman that the Congress must carve
out space. We can focus and wrestle with policy, and not
politics. I hope these hearings provide the space for
thoughtful, nonpartisan discussion. So I agree this will be a
useful exercise, but only if it is done in that format.
The purpose of the hearing is to hear alternatives to the
current strategy that truly offer a different plan. Simply
critiquing the current approach is not the point of this
hearing. It may be helpful, but we need to say what are the
alternatives. I ask the witnesses to offer and define an
alternative plan and explain how it is different from the plan
General Petraeus is currently implementing in Iraq. Let me help
begin this exercise by identifying key features of the current
strategy.
In 2006, the U.S. began shifting its strategy from having
our armed forces pursue al Qaeda and building the Iraqi
Security Forces, to a strategy that emphasized having U.S.
combat forces go door to door performing counterinsurgency
missions aimed at securing and holding Iraqi neighborhoods.
Implementing this plan requires roughly 160,000 troops at a
cost of about $10 billion a month.
Currently, troop levels also allow the U.S. to train,
equip, and advise the Iraqi Security Forces and deter regional
actors from destabilizing the democratically elected government
of Iraq. There are signs that this plan is working, but
according to General Petraeus, the strategy cannot be fully
assessed until this September. I offer this broad sketch of the
current strategy to emphasize the strategic issues that any
alternative plan must address.
Any plan must, at the very least, do the following: first,
state the roles and missions of the U.S. forces in Iraq;
second, state the personnel levels required to complete these
missions; third, state the expected funding requirements to
execute the plan; fourth, clarify the U.S. role, if any, in
building the Iraqi security forces; and then last, at a
minimum, explain how the plan deters regional actors from
destabilizing Iraq.
Responding that the current plan doesn't work or fails to
adequately address these areas is simply not enough. Again, we
are asking you for an alternative, not another critique. I
would ask my colleagues on the subcommittee to be vigilant
about truly challenging these proposals so we can be sure that
what we are talking about are in fact alternatives.
With these parameters in mind, I look forward to hearing
out witnesses' statements, and again, thank you so much, Mr.
Chairman, to agree to work and take the committee, and I am
looking forward to today's hearings.
Thank you. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the
Appendix on page 57.]
Dr. Snyder. I wanted to mention that we have been joined by
Ms. Shea-Porter, who is actually not a member of the
subcommittee but has been an outstanding member of the full
committee and wanted to attend today. We will give her an
opportunity to ask questions, too, after the other subcommittee
members, if she would like to.
As you know, there is a very vigorous debate going on today
on an Iraq resolution by Mr. Skelton. We don't anticipate any
votes somewhere between 4:20 and 5, or so, so I think we are
going to have plenty of opportunity to get at least through one
round of the questioning, if not more, before those votes.
So, General Clark, let's start with you, and then we will
go to Mr. Boot and Dr. Khan. We are going to put the five-
minute clock on just so you will have a sense of where we are
at. If you see that red light go on and you need to say more,
you say more.
STATEMENT OF GEN. WESLEY K. CLARK, (RET.), FORMER NATO SUPREME
ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE, U.S. ARMY
General Clark. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have
prepared a statement for the record I would just like to have
included.
Dr. Snyder. All statements will be made a part of the
record, without objection.
General Clark. I am very proud to come before you and
Representative Akin and the other members of this subcommittee,
first to say thank you because all of us who have served in
uniform are very grateful for the long support of the House
Armed Services Committee, what you do and the seriousness you
bring to the task.
It is appropriate that you try to get out of the partisan
mode as you look through these things. I want to just summarize
a couple of things in my statement, and then talk more about
the issues that Representative Akin has raised.
I am not going to talk about every province today. I don't
think that is the point. But I do want to put this discussion
in perspective because I don't think it is appropriate--I think
we have been off-base in the United States for four years in
focusing excessively on Iraq to the exclusion of other problems
in the region. There is no solution in Iraq without addressing
the other problems in the region.
The idea that somehow a solution can deter outside
intervention is not going to happen. There is outside
intervention. Everybody knows it, and we are dealing with it on
a daily basis in Iraq. So we have to take into account the
region. We have very strong interests in this region. There is
hot competition economically. We are working to provide
protection and security for the state of Israel. We are dealing
with Iranian expansionism and extremism, and we are dealing
with al Qaeda in addition to Iraq.
So these are four long-term enduring interests in the
region, none of which is resolved in the on-off switch debate
about troop levels in Iraq, and none of which can be addressed
satisfactorily if we just pull the plug and leave Iraq. So we
can't use the Vietnam analogy appropriately in this region.
The problem, though, isn't troop levels. That was the
problem initially, along with the nation. We always needed more
troops in Iraq than what we had. The problem now is, first and
foremost, the U.S. national strategy in the region. So here is
my alternative: I would like to see a different U.S. national
strategy first.
Why? Because General Petraeus, before him General Casey,
before him General Abizaid, and everyone of us who have had any
military experience, have said you cannot win this war with
military power alone. Military is a necessary, but not
sufficient, ingredient for the solution. So you have to frame
the military activities properly.
The problem is that when we went into Iraq, we began with
the assumption that Iraq was the first of a series of dominoes
which could be knocked off or overturned or replaced. As many
as seven states were in the running as the dominoes, starting
with Iraq, then Syria, then Lebanon and Libya, then Somalia,
Sudan and Iran.
The word was out in the region that Iraq was just the
first. And so those states on the hit list had an incentive to
cooperate early to make sure we didn't move to the next domino.
Immediately, they began to become involved and take action.
We have been very careful publicly in trying to not
overplay their role, and certainly there is an insurgency going
on internally in Iraq. But the point is that there has always
been outside regional involvement. So what I would like to see
the U.S. strategy include is a full diplomatic and political,
as well as military, component. To do that, we have to start
with a different mindset in the region strategically.
So here is my alternative. I would like us to renounce our
aim of regime change, just renounce it. We are not interested
in changing regimes in the region. We are not interested in
overturning governments. We already have our hands full trying
to deal with Iraq and Afghanistan. We don't need to try to
simultaneously redo governments in three or four other
countries. It is just not there in terms of what we can afford
to do.
We need to engage in sustained diplomatic dialogue with
these states in the region even if we disagree with their
policies, even if, as some say, they are in a state of war
against us. From their perspective, we are probably in a state
of war against them. That is not an issue. We can still talk
and we can still find common interests, and we should be
talking to Syria and Iran. We should be listening to our
friends in the region like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the
Emirates and Qatar.
We have to understand that the work with Israel and the
Palestinian issue is part of this problem, because it has to
deal with Iranian reach. We have to find an alternative to the
isolation of Hamas in Gaza, because we are going to end up with
another destabilizing humanitarian catastrophe on our hands
there that further aggravates the U.S. strategic position if we
don't. Then we have to link these regional efforts to political
efforts on the ground to deal with people.
Now, those are the principles, and that is the change that
I believe we need. In terms of how that interfaces with the
troop strategy, well, the troop strategy is great. I mean, we
are sitting on an insurgency right now and the more troops you
put out, the harder it is for insurgents to move and fight and
organize and intimidate people. So sure, I am happy to have the
troops there, but I think we have overcommitted ourselves.
So what I am recommending to the committee is this: I think
we need over a six-month period to pull a couple of brigades
out so we have the possibility there of a strategic reserve in
the United States. There are no magic solutions on creating
more brigades, and the Army is having trouble recruiting now. I
think that Congress needs to demand of the Administration a
suitable strategy for the region, a realistic strategy.
The idea that we can continue to bludgeon away in Iraq with
the blood and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform, while
inviting the clear occupation of Iraq in an adverse way by Iran
and Syria and other regional actors is counterproductive. It is
not going to lead to the conclusions we are looking for. To be
honest with you, we have to raise this debate above the troop
levels to have the kind of impact on the outcome of the mission
that the American people seek.
So I am delighted to be here. I look forward to
participating in the dialogue, Mr. Chairman, but I hope this
committee will do its duty in helping to raise the dialogue
above troop strength and into the fundamental aims and purposes
of U.S. engagement in the region.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Clark can be found in
the Appendix on page 61.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, General Clark.
Mr. Boot, I am not entirely sure the red light is going to
come on. We seem to be having little clock problems, but Max,
try not to be longer than that anyway.
STATEMENT OF MAX BOOT, SENIOR FELLOW, NATIONAL SECURITY
STUDIES, THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Mr. Boot. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for inviting
me to testify. I am glad that you are holding this hearing to
look seriously at third-way options and what we can do in the
future in Iraq.
I will talk about that in a minute, but first let me just
caution you against too precipitous a pullout or draw-down of
U.S. troops in the pursuit of a third way option. That runs a
very real risk of disaster. Let me quote to you one prediction
of what will happen from a rather surprising source.
Americans must be clear that Iraq and the region around it
could be even bloodier and more chaotic after Americans leave.
There could be reprisals against those who worked with American
forces, further ethnic cleansing, even genocide. Potentially
destabilizing refugee flows could hit Jordan and Syria. Iran
and Turkey could be tempted to make power grabs. Perhaps most
importantly, the invasion has created a new stronghold from
which terrorist activity could proliferate.
Now, that quote is not from some supporter of the surge. It
is not from some Administration apologist. That quote was from
last Sunday's editorial in the New York Times, called ``The
Road Home,'' which advocates withdrawal. But the Times was an
honest advocate of withdrawal, and I give them credit for that
because its editorial board admits the terrible consequences
that would follow if we were to pull U.S. troops out.
The Times favors withdrawal all the same, because it
doesn't think our forces are doing any good at the moment. I
can certainly see how they reached that conclusion reading
their own reporting. But that is not my finding after spending
a couple of weeks in Iraq in April, and it is not the view of
many of our servers on the ground with whom I speak.
If I could just read briefly quotes from an e-mail that I
got a couple of days ago from a field-grade officer, a friend
of mine who is currently serving in Baghdad. He wrote to me:
``Max, I show some positive results of the surge strategy to
date. I am sure you have the negatives down pat from all the
media reports.
``Deaths caused by sectarian violence here in Iraq are down
75 percent from January to June. V-bads, car bombs and suicide
attacks have been cut in half from March to June. V-bads are at
the lowest level since August 2006. Casualties from V-bads are
cut in half from February to June.
``Attacks on al Anbar are cut by 80 percent since February.
The Iraqi security forces killed in action are two to three
times the level of coalition KIA. The Iraqis are fighting and
dying for their country. Tribes are rejecting al Qaeda in al
Anbar, Salah ad-Din, and Diyala provinces.
``Al Qaeda in Iraq is on the defensive and slowly dying,''
he writes, ``but we need time to finish the job.''
He goes on to say, ``The big negative, of course, is lack
of political reconciliation at the national level, but this is
a lagging indicator. Progress has been made at the local level,
and I believe that national leaders will follow in due course
once the trend is clear.''
Now, I agree with my necessarily anonymous friend in
Baghdad, and I would urge Congress to stick with the surge as
long as possible. On present trends, the surge can be
maintained through at least March of 2008. Then we can take out
one brigade combat team a month to get down to the pre-surge
level of about 15 brigades, or about 140,000 troops by August
of 2008.
That, in turn, could be sustained through 2009, assuming
that we maintain troops on their current 15-month tours, or we
could possibly do shorter tours if we are willing to call up
more brigade combat teams from the National Guard. Of course,
we can downsize further if General Petraeus so recommends.
Now, I think we all basically, all the serious participants
in this debate agree on what the eventual end-state should be--
that we should have a smaller American force focused on
advising and special operations designed to standup the ISF and
to disrupt al Qaeda operations. That is the crux of the Iraq
Study Group (ISG) recommendations that are being championed by
Congressman Skelton and Senators Levin and Reed. I think even
the Administration would generally agree that that is the long-
term game plan.
But there is disagreement on how fast to draw-down troops
and how many we need to leave behind. The Center for New
American Security, a Democratic think-tank here in town, has
outlined a credible model for an advisor-centric approach along
the lines of the ISG recommendations, but I think it is low-
balling troop estimates.
The Center for New American Security says its
recommendations will require 60,000 troops. Based on my
conversations with military strategists, I think the troop
figure might be more along the lines of 80,000 to 100,000
troops or maybe even a little more once you factor in the need
for force protection, logistics and other demands to maintain
our advisors and special forces in Iraq. That is the long-term
end state that I think we ought to try aiming for.
I think withdrawing all of our combat forces by April 2008
would be a very big mistake and would have very grave
consequences. A lot of suggestions have been made to cushion
the shock. For example, there are calls for diplomatic
offenses, for diplomatic moves that we can make, including some
that General Clark just outlined.
Now, in theory I think these are all good ideas to pursue,
but I don't think any of them have much chance of working in
the short term if we are losing the battle on the ground. I
outlined the plusses and minuses of a lot of those options in
my written testimony at much greater length.
I also don't think that concentrating solely on advisory
and special forces missions right now, which would require a
radically stripped-down force presence, could work in today's
climate. That would be essentially repeating the mistake of
2005 and 2006. As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down. We
know that didn't work.
Just look at what happened in Baqubah where jihadists set
up their own Islamic state, while we were moving troops out.
That happened at the Joint Special Operations Command stationed
only a few miles away at Balad. Our special operators couldn't
prevent the emergence of an Islamic state under their noses.
What would they have if they were stationed in the Kurdish
region or in Kuwait many miles away?
Our conventional troops, however, have managed to clean out
al Qaeda strongholds in Baqubah, just as they have previously
done in Fallujah, Ramadi, Tall'afar and other cities. In the
past, we didn't have enough troops to consolidate those gains.
Now, we may finally have enough troops to do all phases of a
classic counterinsurgency campaign. But that takes time.
There is no good alternative, unfortunately, unless we are
willing to accept the disastrous consequences described by the
New York Times editorial. The longer you allow the surge to
run, the greater the likelihood that the advisor-centric
approach will work down the road.
Now, I realize patience is running out here in Washington
and across the country. But keep in mind, we are not staying
with the same old failed strategy right now, a strategy that I
strongly criticized last year. We are trying a new approach
that has not been tried before. The surge is plan B. The surge
is the third way, and it has just started.
General Petraeus deserves a chance to succeed or fail with
his carefully thought-out plans, without being second-guessed
from thousands of miles away. If he succeeds, that will make
possible the responsible draw-down of U.S. forces without
risking the collapse of the government of Iraq and the Iraqi
Security Forces. But if we draw down right now, I think that
the consequences would be very negative, not only for Iraq and
the region, but also for America's national security interests.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Boot can be found in the
Appendix on page 67.]
Dr. Snyder. Dr. Khan.
STATEMENT OF DR. MUQTEDAR KHAN, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, POLITICAL
SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE,
NON-RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST
POLICY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Dr. Khan. Dr. Snyder, I am deeply honored to be addressing
this committee. I want to thank you and Representative Akin for
not only holding this important hearing, but also for the
diversity of opinion that you are soliciting.
I would like to open with two general observations, which I
think are necessary to provide a context. In the past four
years, we have been fighting three hot wars: one in Iraq,
against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and against al Qaeda
globally. We have been fighting one cold war against Iran, and
two proxy wars against Hezbollah and Hamas, and all of this
only in the Muslim world.
The scorecard is not exactly comforting. We have enjoyed
partial success against the Taliban in five and a half years.
We have failed and are failing in Iraq. Al Qaeda is back to
pre-9/11 strength. It will be a long time before the U.S. will
be back to pre-9/11 strength. Iran, on the other hand, is far
from it. Iran has consistently out-maneuvered us in the cold
war, and our proxies did not exactly distinguish themselves
against either Hezbollah or Hamas.
So the question that we ask as we seek alternative
strategies is how do we factor the monumental incompetence of
the current Administration? Even if you have a good third
alternative, will that good third alternative be effectively
and efficiently implemented? This is another question I think
the Congress should consider. It is not enough to have a good
idea. Can we trust the current Administration to execute that
good idea effectively is another important question.
I think that we all know why we need to withdraw from Iraq,
but I believe that if we were to withdraw immediately, it will
not only lead to a humanitarian crisis of genocidal
proportions, but a tiny or mini-al Qaeda state will emerge in
the Anbar Province. Al Qaeda is planning to use European
citizens as their actors, and I think that the war against the
West that al Qaeda is waging will be much, much tougher.
I think the conditions in Iraq would grow so bad that the
very public today that is demanding that the U.S. troops come
back, there will be pressure both at home and worldwide for the
United States to return to Iraq to fix the mess that it
created. The world will blame the United States for the mess in
Iraq if we withdraw, because before we went to Iraq, Iraq was a
tyranny, but it was stable. The population of Iraq was growing.
After we brought democracy to Iraq, Iraq's population is
diminishing. It is in chaos. Nothing works there.
So it is important for us to realize that we are in a
predicament where we cannot stay in Iraq and we cannot withdraw
from Iraq. We need to find a third way. That is, we need to
find a way to have troops in Iraq without having American
troops there. We must remember that we have more than 250,000
troops there--150,000 to 160,000 U.S. troops and nearly 100,000
mercenaries, who are unable with nearly a quarter-million
forces to stabilize Iraq.
How do we replace this? I think this is where we have to
call in the chips. In the Arab and Muslim world, we have so-
called ``allies''--Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. We have been
spending billions of dollars over the past few decades
supporting these regimes. This year alone, we are paying Egypt
$1.8 billion in military and economic aid; $468 million to
Jordan in economic and security aid; $370 million to Pakistan
in military assistance; nearly $100 million to Indonesia. We
should demand that these allies of ours replace the surgers
that we will withdraw. They need to put troops on the ground.
We need nearly 300,000 to 400,000 troops to patrol Iraq, to
squeeze the insurgency out. If we were to withdraw, not only
will the insurgency escalate into a civil war, but al Qaeda
will become a prominent player in that region. It is not in the
interest of Iran or Egypt or Saudi Arabia to have a
destabilizing force in the heart of the Middle East.
The countries in the Middle East are delighted that the
U.S. is failing, but are horrified at what is happening in
Iraq. Their delight at U.S. failure trumps their horror at what
is happening in Iraq. They believe that if the U.S. is
successful in Iraq, then the U.S. would go after them. So it is
essential for most countries in the region that the U.S. fail.
And so what it really means is there has to be not just a
tactical change in Iraq, but a fundamental change in American
security and foreign policy in the region. We have to say that
we are not a global check to the Muslim world. We want to work
with the Muslim world to stabilize the Muslim world.
If the threat, or perception of threat that Saudi Arabia,
that Syria, that Iran, that Egypt perceive from this whole
strategy of democracy promotion in the Middle East diminishes,
then they will be more willing to address the horror in Iraq.
If we provide logistics, if we provide financial support, then
I think we could compel these countries to put troops on the
ground. They don't have a choice. Either they work with the
U.S. now to stabilize Iraq, or get involved in a regional
conflict if the U.S. were to withdraw immediately.
On the issue, it is most important for us to re-think our
strategies toward Iran and Syria. Iran is essential to the
stability of Iraq now and after our withdrawal from Iraq. If we
need a strong Iran to stabilize Iraq, bombing Iran or weakening
Iran as we pull out of Iraq will essentially lead to chaos in
the region. We will be creating a power vacuum. We have to
determine who is going to fill the power vacuum.
I think it is important for the Muslim world to stop just
criticizing the U.S. and step up to the plate and dealing with
the mess that exists in the Muslim world. I think it is
important for us to call upon our allies to help us. We have
helped them for decades. We are in need, and it is time for our
friends to step up.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you all for your comments.
We will begin the round of questioning. We are having some
clock problems. The timer works, but the lights don't work, so
when you hear a gavel come down, that will be about your five
minutes and it will give you a chance to wind up.
Mr. Akin and I are going to put ourselves on the five-
minute clock so that we won't ramble on, I guess, is the bottom
line. We want to give everybody a chance.
So go ahead and start the clock there.
I have always enjoyed a good bar fight, and so my first
question is, I would like to give each of you an opportunity to
comment on anything that you heard from the other two.
General Clark.
General Clark. You know, I am all in favor of great work by
the military. Most of these guys have worked with me or for me,
and we have all been to the same schools. I admire our
leadership, our military leadership. Both Petraeus and Odierno
worked for me at times.
I understand, I think, what their motivations are and where
they are headed. Of course, they want more time. Of course,
other people in the chain of command below them see the
progress. It is inevitable that when you put more troops in,
you sit on an insurgency. It is harder for them to move; harder
for them to resupply; harder for them to organize; harder for
them to intimidate.
There is no question that you gain when you put troops on
the ground. The question is, what is resolved? The plan behind
the surge was that the presence of the troops, the sitting on
the insurgency, would lead to a political outcome that ended
the conflict and ended the motivation for the fighting. That is
what hasn't happened.
Now, is it a lagging indicator? My guess is it isn't. The
motivation behind the surge was that people are fighting
because they are afraid, and once you stop the killing, they
won't be afraid. I don't think that is the sum of the
motivations inside Iraq. Instead, it is a combination of an
opportunity to grab power. It is personal ambition. It is
regional incentivization with contacts with outside powers.
Without a diplomatic strategy for the region, those motivations
will not be addressed.
So I don't think it is adequate simply to say, let's defer
any strategic discussion, support the surge, and then we will
see what happens. This Congress needs to be heard that this
Administration needs a regional, diplomatic strategy different
than the current diplomatic strategy.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Boot.
Mr. Boot. Well, I certainly agree that we need a regional
diplomatic strategy, and we can always use more effective
diplomacy. But I think it would be a mistake to oversell what
diplomacy can do when our troops are not seen as winning on the
ground. In fact, the perception is that they are being defeated
and are on their way home. That does not create great
incentives for those countries in the region, those players in
the region who don't like us, to negotiate with us.
When you look at things from the standpoint of Iran and
Syria, why would they want to cut a deal with us right now?
They have us exactly where they want us. They are bleeding us
slowly. Their proxies are expanding their spheres of control
within Iraq. They have no reason to compromise.
The Iraq Study Group suggested they have a theoretical
interest in the stability of Iraq. That may be the case or that
may not be the case, but they have a greater interest in
expanding their sphere of influence, which they are doing at
the expense of the stability of Iraq, and they have an interest
in keeping the United States tied down and fighting us by
proxy. That is what they are doing very effectively.
Unless they see that their strategy is not going to work, I
don't see any reason why they should become any more
accommodating with us. There are also major concessions that
would be required in order to win Syrian or Iranian cooperation
that don't generally get mentioned by groups like the Iraq
Study Group or others.
For example, what about the Iranian nuclear program? Are we
going to allow them to go nuclear? Is that going to be the
price of some help that they might give us in Iraq? What about
Syria? Are we going to allow them to dominate the democratic
state of Lebanon? That is what they want. Are we going to allow
that as the price of some Syrian help in the case of Iraq?
Those are very, very hard compromises to make. In fact, the
Iraq Study Group shied away from making those very compromises
because they know how unpalatable they would be to most
Americans, when you think seriously about what is the price of
cooperation.
Dr. Khan also raised the issue of getting cooperation from
some of our so-called moderate Muslim allies in the region. I
am all in favor of it. If we could convince the Egyptians,
Saudis, Indonesians and somebody else to send hundreds of
thousands of troops into Iraq to take up what our troops are
currently doing, God bless them. I am in favor of it. That
would be a wonderful idea.
However, I think the odds of that actually happening are
basically a snowball's chance in hell. We tried to get those
troops when we initially invaded, which looked like a much
easier proposition than what we are asking them to undertake
right now. There is no chance that those countries are going to
willingly send their troops to face the kind of challenges that
our troops would face.
Even if they did send them, you have to think about the
political repercussions of that. Would the majority Shiite
population of Iraq welcome primarily Sunni troops coming from
countries that have expressed their fear and abhorrence of
Shiite control of Iraq--countries that basically want to help
the Sunni minority? That is very unlikely. Would the Sunni
minority in Iraq favor troops coming in from Shi'ite countries
like Iran? That is very unlikely, too.
So I don't think that there is an easy way out of this
where we can say some other troops will come in, or some kind
of diplomatic offensive. We have to face the harsh reality,
which is that we have to win or lose this war on the ground,
and no amount of diplomacy can make up for that hard military
reality.
Dr. Snyder. Let's give Dr. Khan time to make any comments
he wants to make, and then we will go to Mr. Akin.
Dr. Khan. Thank you. Time to take the gloves off.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Snyder. We call these ``vigorous discussions.''
Dr. Khan. Let me put it very bluntly as to what the U.S.
presence in Iraq today is. What the jihadists and insurgents
have accomplished in Iraq is amazing. They have contained the
United States in Baqubah and in Anbar province. These are a
bunch of fighters. They have held a superpower and completely
contained and boxed the United States in Iraq for four years.
They are providing a public good for all these rogue
regimes and all these regimes that we don't like by creating
conditions where the U.S. is unable to do anything to any of
these regimes--the dreams of reforming Syria, the dreams of
containing Iraq, the dreams of transforming Saudi Arabia and
Egypt--all of those are now down the drain.
The only thing that the U.S. now wants is to get out of
Iraq with its pride and not lose people. This is what these
people have accomplished, and this strategy of continuing with
the surge, with the United States unilaterally, with the rest
of the world hating us, and unwilling to cooperate with us, is,
as I have said, a disaster for the region as well as for the
U.S.
So there has to be a fundamental change. Yes, we have to
manage to keep stability in Iraq, but we have to recognize that
our strategies, our stated goals, have created more enemies in
the region than allies. The reason why Egypt, the reason why
all these countries do not want to cooperate with us in 2003
was because we were telling the rest of the world that you are
next.
Look at the Pew study report. We created an environment of
fear in the rest of the Arab world that we were going to come
after all of them. That is why they didn't cooperate in 2002
and 2003. Now, they are laughing at us because we are not even
able to go after and democratize Anbar province.
So we need to be able to come out and say that these goals
have changed, and we are real. I would call for a new America
with a new strategy. And then people will work with us. Nobody
wants a nuclear Iran in that region. Nobody wants al Qaeda
dominant in the world.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Akin, for five minutes.
Mr. Akin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thought your
question was great.
I guess the thing we were hoping to do was to say, are
there alternatives? It seemed like Dr. Khan, you got pretty
close to it by saying we are just doing to replace the troops
with the troops in these other countries.
I have to share with Mr. Boot, you probably have a lot more
knowledge of the area than I do, but I am a little skeptical
whether or not all these countries are going to send troops in
to replace ours, or whether they could be as effective as ours,
but it is at least an alternative. I think it is good.
We are here first of all to define some distinctly
different things. None of you talked about a three-nation Iraq.
Is that even an alternative? Or is that something that is not
an alternative? I thought of a completely wacky idea, but I
think this is a place where we throw out some ideas and talk
about them and say, what I have been encouraging this committee
to do, if it were up to me, and I am not in charge, but if it
were up to me, I would have a list of different possibilities
and then I would test those in terms of what is the proposed
success; what is our goal; and what it is going to cost us, and
all of that.
So we basically weigh a series of alternatives. We don't
have to pick on here. That is not the job of this committee,
but it would be helpful if we had some of them defined. Is a
three-nation Iraq even a possibility or not?
Here is the wacky idea: What happens if you change the
capital of Iraq? Baghdad is a big pain in the rear. Why don't
you move the government to some other place, and then let
Baghdad, if they want to just fight among themselves, at least
it is not the center of government. You can at least let
government functions go on without terrorism of Baghdad falling
into it. I don't know, maybe that doesn't make sense, but we
need some innovative kinds of solutions.
General Clark, your proposal in terms of standing back from
the forest to getting a little further back and defining what
our overall strategy is, that is fine. It still doesn't really
answer a whole lot. You are saying we are still going to have
to take on the chin that we have to beat the insurgents on the
ground, even if we have a little different strategy, we still
have to fight on the ground.
I think I am hearing Mr. Boot, you are saying the same
thing, that there is really no getting away from that. You just
have to beat these guys on the ground, and if you have enough
troops and given some time, we will succeed in that.
I think Dr. Khan, you are saying, I don't think you are
ever going to do that; you have to get the other nations in the
region more involved so that they have some buy-in.
So I just wanted you to respond to that. Give me some
alternatives and some differences.
General Clark. First of all, let me respond in reverse
order, if I could. Yes, you must succeed in creating an
impression of progress on the ground. That is important for a
whole host of reasons. But I disagree that you have to hold up
on the dialogue and diplomacy with Iran and Syria until you
have completed the surge.
The truth is, we have the greatest leverage that we could
possibly have. We are the United States of America. We are the
most powerful country in the world. We are the most legitimate
country in the world. We dominate every global institution.
What Iran wants, even more than a nuclear weapon, is the
blessing of the United States of America and the West and the
world system, of their civilization and their economic
opportunities and political opportunities in the future.
I know the statements of Ahmadinejad, but Ahmadinejad is
not the only guy in Iran. We have plenty of negotiating
leverage. What I continue to hear from some people associated
with the Administration is that there is not enough leverage,
if they could just get more leverage on Iran, they would be
happy to talk to them. I think it is the wrong approach.
I know I am taking up this time to explain this, but it is
an odd thing that you have a retired general who is an advocate
of diplomacy, and I am sitting next to a representative from
the Council on Foreign Relations, which is a specialist in
diplomacy, who is an expert on combat.
What I am trying to suggest is that if you are going to use
diplomacy, use it now, while there is some hope of progress on
the ground, while you can save a few more lives, and prevent a
little more heartbreak. But you cannot do it, as Dr. Khan says,
unless you sincerely change the U.S. strategy.
From Iran's perspective, they think we are at war with
them, and determined to destroy their regime. They don't think
we can do it. Ahmadinejad would like us to try, because we
strengthen him when we do that. What we need to do is undercut
him the same way we undercut these east European communists in
the 1970's and 1980's, through a host of other political
measures. If you do that, the strength of the resistance on the
ground will slacken. The diplomacy will enhance our ability to
cope with the insurgency and with al Qaeda. It is mutually
reinforcing.
I think the idea of splitting Iraq in to three nations, it
is a gimmick. I cannot support it in good conscience. I have
seen what partition does in the Balkans. Yes, we divided
Bosnia, but it was already divided. The pain of that ethnic
cleansing was enormous, and for us to propose it in Iraq, I
know it is happening, but for us to be the sponsor of it and
the author of it, and to own the consequences, and to have
Iraqis 30 years and 60 years from now saying, Mr. Bush gave
away my home in Baghdad. Why take that on ourselves? It is not
going to bring a solution to the violence. It is just a recipe
for another blame-America thing.
As far as the moving of the capital is concerned, it is
another effort. I don't think there are any short-cut answers
on this. We have a mistaken strategy in the region. It has
caused us the problem in Iraq. Until we go to the heart of that
strategy, all the political gimmicks we try and all the
military tactics we enhance are only marginal to a solution.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Akin, do you want to hear from Mr. Boot and
Dr. Khan?
Mr. Boot. I would be happy to weigh in and support with
complete agreement with General Clark that I don't think that
partition offers the way out of Iraq. It is impractical for a
variety of reasons, including the fact that the population is
so intermixed, especially in major metropolises like Baghdad
and Mosul and others.
Baghdad is the capital. The population would still be
there, and you have to figure out what to do with that. If you
tried to separate it, as General Clark said, the result would
be mass suffering on a terrible scale.
The only way it would really work I think is if it were
implemented the way it was in Bosnia, where you had an accord
among all the different sides, which was then enforced by a
heavy outside troop presence, which in the case of Iraq would
probably mean 400,000 to 500,000 troops. But that is a recipe
for keeping more American and foreign troops in Iraq, and not
getting them out.
So I don't think that would really accomplish the objective
that we are trying to achieve with partition in any case. It is
not a realistic solution right now because most Iraqis
themselves oppose partition. You don't have a situation as you
had in Bosnia where all the parties were exhausted by the
conflict and therefore were willing to come to the table and
agree on partition. That is not the case in Iraq today, so I
don't think that offers a very workable solution.
Let me, since you do want a full and frank exchange of
views here, while I am agreeing with General Clark in one area,
let me disagree with him on another, which is that while I
completely agree on the general importance of diplomacy, I
don't know that it really offers a way out of this.
What General Clark is basically suggesting is that--and
what Dr. Khan is also suggesting--is that we renounce goals of
regime change, and we basically say that we are happy with the
status quo in the Middle East; that we will work with the
existing regimes, and therefore this, in turn, will lead them
to work with us.
I am not sure it would be that easy. Keep in mind that this
is the strategy we were more or less pursuing prior to 9/11.
There is a reason why we changed strategy after 9/11 because
what we had seen prior to 9/11 was that we were in bed with the
dysfunctional status quo in the Middle East; that we were
backing these despotic regimes that were hated by their own
people. As a result of that, many of their own people hated the
United States.
Now, today it is true that we are at odds with the regime
in Tehran, but keep in mind that by all evidence, the United
States is very popular with the people of Iran, precisely
because we are at odds with the regime in Tehran, because they
know that we stand for liberty and against the oppression,
which they hate, which emanates from their own regime.
Even if we wanted to, I am not even sure we could cut a
deal on any acceptable terms with the regime in Tehran. Those
who say that we ought to reach out to them think that they want
to reach out to us. That is not the evidence that we see. When
our ambassador and the Iranian ambassador held talks in Baghdad
on May 28, what did the Iranian regime do at that very same
time? It was grabbing four Iranian-Americans and jailing them
on trumped-up charges of espionage, which was basically a giant
``up yours'' to the United States. And that is what they think
of diplomacy. That is what they think of political
negotiations. They are going to take these hostages.
And certainly the statements that you hear from President
Ahmadinejad are not those that would be conducive to a real
dialogue. In fact, I am not an expert on Iran, but a lot of
Iranian experts will tell you that the Iranian regime basically
depends upon keeping the great Satan as this bogeyman. They
don't want to establish relations because that would undermine
the rationale for their dictatorship.
So I don't think that the short-term prospects of reaching
a deal with Iran are very good. In any case, I go back to a
point where I think General Clark and I agree, that if you are
to have any chance whatsoever of reaching any kind of deal, you
have to improve the status on the ground in Iraq. You have to
stabilize the situation and negotiate from a position of
strength, not of weakness.
Dr. Snyder. Dr. Khan, I will give you a chance to respond.
I think we are going to need to pay a little more attention to
our time. We have seven more members that all will have
questions.
Dr. Khan.
Dr. Khan. I don't disagree with anything that General Clark
had to say. On the three-nation Iraq idea, I want to just point
out that the struggle in Iraq is not about territory, so a
territorial separation will not solve the problem. The struggle
is for power and resources.
So for the first time in 500 years, the Shiites have an
opportunity to dominate Baghdad. The Ottomans kept them away
for 500 years. For the Muslim world, this is not a small thing.
This is a major shift in power, with psychological implications
for the Arabs, as well as for Muslims in general. So it is not
a territorial issue that can be resolved through territorial
separation. That is the first thing to keep in mind.
Second, we do not want to become the new Great Britain, the
inheritor of the colonial and imperial legacy of Britain. That
is important for us to keep in mind. Even though I am from
Senator Biden's state, I disagree on this issue very strongly.
And finally, on the relocating of the capital, where would
you relocate it to? Basra? It will further underscore the idea
that we are trying to hand the whole of Iraq to the Shiites. So
to think of alternative capitals, quickly you realize that that
it is not a very good idea.
As far as the insurgency is concerned, we must realize that
we do not think very clearly about insurgency. There are three
or four kinds of things that are going on there: one, those who
oppose U.S. occupation; two, those who oppose Shiite
domination; and then those who are against the West in general,
that is al Qaeda. We have to separate all the three dimensions
of that insurgency and how we do it.
If we withdraw, then the insurgents who oppose U.S.
occupation will diminish, but there will be an escalation in
those who oppose Shiite domination. So we need a political
solution so that the Sunnis realize that they not going to live
in a Shiite-dominated Iraq after we withdraw, and that will
eliminate all forms of insurgency, and that will only leave al
Qaeda, and that we have to deal with, and we would have a major
ally in Iraq.
One, I just want to make this point, that Iran is out to
get us. Iran wants to bait us. So it is really very important
for us to remember Iran wants us as a friend, as an ally. They
want to go out with us. They want to be seen with us in the
U.N., et cetera, et cetera. The reason why Ahmadinejad says all
those things is very simple. We have made more concessions to
Ahmadinejad than we ever made to the moderate Khatemi, who did
great things which are pro-democracy.
So apparently, playing the bad boy seems to be getting more
rewards for Iran than playing the good guy, and of course, but
also partly moderated by our diminished position as a result of
what is happening in Iraq.
Dr. Snyder. We will now go to Ms. Sanchez for five minutes,
and hopefully we will be rededicating ourselves to the five-
minute rule. Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. I love how you call up the five-minute rule
after you are done.
Dr. Snyder. I know it. [Laughter.]
Mr. Akin and I, we are done, so go ahead. [Laughter.]
Ms. Sanchez. Anyway, gentlemen, thank you for being before
us.
I want to thank the new chairman of this committee. I have
had the pleasure of serving with you on personnel as my
chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I think you do a
great job, so I am real excited to have you head this.
And welcome to all of you, especially General Clark. Good
to see you before us again today.
Oh, gosh. You know, I think our troops are doing what they
have been asked to do. I think they are doing a great job for
what they have to do. I think from a military standpoint, this
really isn't about the military anymore. Unfortunately, Mr.
Boot, when you said they are bleeding us slowly, that is what
they are doing to us militarily out there.
So I really come back to what do we do about the economy
out there, and what do we do with this government, and what
kind of government do we have there. What do we need to see
from these people? I go back to in March, I led a delegation
over to Iraq, and Ms. Shea-Porter was with me.
Because we were all women, we sat down with some of the
parliamentarians of Iraq who were women. It was really
interesting to be in that room, because these three women--one
a Christian, one a Shiite, one a Sunni--was like they had
stolen each other's boyfriends. They weren't looking at each
other. They weren't talking to each other. We certainly
couldn't get anything done in a 435-member body if we couldn't
stand each other in the same room. I mean, we still have to
move forward.
It was very interesting, because if you listened to each of
them, each had a different interpretation of what was going on
in their country. The Shia woman thought everything was
wonderful. Of course, because that is really who is controlling
that government. And before, when we were under Saddam, you
know, her people were at the receiving end of something not
very nice. So for her the world was wonderful, and wasn't it
wonderful? And we were all women and it is all wonderful, and
Ms. Pelosi got elected. The list went on.
And then we talked to the Sunni woman from Anbar province.
She said, ``My people are starving. You want to do something
for us? Feed us. You took the troops out. We can't get convoys
through. My children are starving out there. Everybody is
starving. Do something. You want to help us? Get food to us.''
And then the Christian was like, ``Well, I think we can all
get along. We are going to work this out.'' They are not going
to work this out.
So my question to you, each of you, whoever, maybe starting
with the general and going down the list: What do we do about a
government that doesn't want to talk about dividing the oil up,
which is their main asset? What do we do about a government
that doesn't to each other? What do we do about a government
that doesn't want to redo the constitution?
We talked to NGO women who said, ``You gave us a worse
constitution than we had under Saddam. We have no rights. I
have the same rights as a child or a mentally disabled person
now. Thank you very much.''
So I want to ask you, what do we do? What do we do about
the political situation, because that really is for me what the
third way needs to be if we are going to stay out there.
General.
General Clark. Let me begin by saying first, it is not our
country. We don't own it. We cannot rewrite the constitution.
We cannot tell them what they should and should not believe,
and how they should behave toward each other. What we can do is
try to muster together all of the different ways of reaching
the political leaders and the factions they represent. We can
do this to try to change the outcome. That is why we must
combine the military, the diplomatic and more intensive
political work in the provinces in Iraq.
I cannot understand why this Administration and the people
who seem to support it refuse to engage in diplomacy in the
region. I don't understand it. They would rather see people die
than initiate a dialogue. I don't understand that. If we would
do that, I think there is a chance we could reduce the levels
of tension and then maybe some of these other changes could
work their way out. But our political options are limited
because we designed it in such a way that we gave the country
back to its occupants.
Mr. Boot. I don't think that the political solution to Iraq
lies outside of Iraq. The key is, how do you get the different
factions to come to some kind of agreement?
We have been trying very hard to do that over the course of
the last four years. Our ambassadors, Khalilzad, John
Negroponte, and now Ryan Crocker, they have all had these
meetings in Baghdad of representatives of the various factions
trying to work out an agreement, and they have not had a lot of
luck because even when they have worked out agreements, they
haven't meant very much on the ground because there has been
pervasive climate of insecurity and fear in which no faction
feels able to make compromises or concessions to the other one
because they are afraid they are going to get killed if they do
that, and their people are being killed in the streets.
Now, the theory behind the surge, the theory behind the
current plan is if we can create some stability, if we can
decrease the climate of fear, this will allow those Iraqis who
are more moderate, and they do exist--people like Ayatollah
Sistani, the former Shiite cleric in Iraq has been----
Ms. Sanchez. I understand the surge prospect. I don't need
to be schooled on that. Maybe I can hear from Dr. Khan, unless
you have something new to add.
Mr. Boot. Well, the only thing I would add is, I----
Ms. Sanchez. I don't think the surge is working.
Mr. Boot. Well, I think there are indicators that it is;
there are some indicators that are negative. It goes both ways.
But let me just, one point I will make in conclusion is, I
don't think the political problems are insoluble. That is the
same thing that people said about Yugoslavia in the early
1990's.
These people just hate each other; they want to kill each
other. Well, we saw that with farsighted American policy,
implemented by General Clark, with troops on the ground
providing security, we were able to solve those problems, and I
think we are able to do the same thing in Iraq if we just focus
on security first.
Ms. Sanchez. Dr. Khan.
Dr. Khan. I have a question for you. After that woman told
you that her people were starving, what did you do? Did you
step out of the room and immediately call for an aid truck or
food to her constituency?
Ms. Sanchez. No, certainly not.
Dr. Khan. Why not?
Ms. Sanchez. Because I am not in the executive branch. I
don't control the troops. That is what the President controls.
Dr. Khan. Well, this is exactly the thing. If we are doing
things like that, then the message would go that we really care
about the people to whom we have decided to bring democracy and
stability. If we really cared about the suffering under Saddam
Hussein, we will surely care about the suffering when they are
starving. An initiative such as that would have done a lot more
for winning hearts and minds. And believe you me, it will have
cost us far less than a single cruise missile.
This is really an important issue. The President promised
three steps when he talked about the surge. He talked about
fighting insurgency, moving development and a political
solution. And on the other two things, we have hardly achieved
anything. It is like this, we spent $600 billion on defense,
and we spent $100 million on public diplomacy in his budget,
and all of it was redirected toward Katrina--no money to do
nothing.
The rest of the world knows this. It also tells us very
clearly that we actually do not have any intentions to have a
sincere dialogue with these people. You know what the best
argument about not attacking Iran is? The best argument for not
attacking Iran is the bombing will not work. The message that
it sends is that our first choice is bombing. If bombing works,
why do we talk? But if bombing cannot work, let's try
diplomacy.
This is the message which really resonates very strongly in
the Middle East, and it is important for us to sort of get
behind that. We have to convey the message that America is
America. It is the city on the hill. We care about people
regardless of who they are.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Khan.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder. I want to recognize Mr. Johnson for five
minutes, but first acknowledge that he is Mr. Skelton's
appointee to this committee, following the resignation of Marty
Meehan.
We welcome you, and you are recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored to serve
on this committee and under your leadership, sir.
I would say that I think it is important for us to
understand how we got to this point. It was indeed a lack of
diplomacy that got us in this hot water that we are in. On the
flip side of it, it was actually aggressive behavior by our
executive branch, and the motivation of that aggression, what
was it?
Some believe it was to capture and control the significant
untapped oil resources that exist in the reserves in al Anbar
province, about 35 billion barrels of oil awaiting
exploitation. Some believe that was the real reason that we
went into Iraq and invaded that sovereign nation, against the
advice of many of our military leaders who told us that if we
were to do it, we would have to have much more boots on the
ground, many more boots on the ground, than we had the
resources to supply over there, but we went in anyway.
And so the result was predictable, and it has been a
colossal boondoggle. It is a tragedy that has resulted in close
to 3,600 deaths, $500 billion in resources. We are on the hook
for $2 trillion to recover from this. Our military assets have
been so degraded that we now don't have the ability to face any
other acts of aggression that may require our ground forces.
And so what do we do from here? Recognizing what got us
here was the lack of diplomacy and aggressive behavior. Now, we
need to engage in diplomacy to help us get out of this. I don't
see where if we continue this so-called military surge that it
is going to result in a better outcome than what has occurred
up to this point. In fact, it will just get worse.
So I like the idea of diplomacy, gathering the stakeholders
in that region together to talk about the challenges that
exist. I also like the idea of encouraging with this new
philosophy, the lack of aggressive pursuit of oil or whatever
the case might have been. I like the idea of us having a new
attitude when we approach our partners in the area, to
encourage them to get involved.
Certainly, there is going to be a need for a force in Iraq
to maintain the peace. The Iraqis are not able to do it
themselves, and so therefore some kind of contingent that is
made up of forces from other nations seems to be a great idea.
I would rather us help to fund that kind of operation than to
just simply step away from Iraq and let it fall into just a
cesspool of terrorist development.
So I like the ideas that I have heard from both Dr. Khan
and also General Clark. I think those can be melded together,
and I would like to see us have an executive branch that will
work with Congress to help fashion a new strategy for dealing
with Iraq. It also plays into the way that we deal with Iran
and other nations in that area. Do we send a message to them
that we are coming after you next? We are certainly not in a
position to do so militarily, General Clark.
So I would like to ask Mr. Boot to step out now from your
defense of the surge and just ask you to think just
theoretically now. How could diplomacy bring about a different
set of conditions in Iraq? Do you think it is possible that
diplomacy could make a difference there if would draw down some
of our forces, send a diplomatic message that we have changed
our outlook on things, and we now want to bring partners in to
help us solve this situation? Is that something that can work?
Mr. Boot. Congressman, I would love it if diplomacy would
work. I would love it if we didn't have any more fine young men
and women risking their lives in Iraq. Believe me, nothing
would make me happier. I just don't see any way we can get out
troops out of the line of fire and still achieve our basic
national objectives such as keeping al Qaeda on the run and
preventing them from taking over provinces of Iraq, and
preventing a civil war that will spill over into the
neighboring region and destabilize friendly states.
I think all three of us basically agree that if we just
pull out now, the results would be catastrophic. What I
disagree with is I don't think that diplomacy offers some kind
of magic way that we can somehow draw down our forces and still
achieve our objectives. I just don't think that there is that
magical solution. I wish there were.
Dr. Snyder. We will now go to those members who arrived
after the gavel. We will go in the following order in which
people arrived: Susan Davis, Geoff Davis, Mr. Gingrey, Mr.
Cooper, Mr. Bartlett, Mr. Miller and Mr. Jones.
Ms. Davis, for five minutes, and then to Ms. Shea-Porter,
without objection from the committee members.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome you as chairman of this committee as well.
Thank you all for being here. Actually, we don't always get
a chance to mix things up a lot, so we appreciate the fact that
you are disagreeing; that we can hear really the nuances of
that as well. It is important.
I just came back from Iraq as well, a very quick snapshot,
but there are a few things that certainly were clear to me. One
was that, yes, I agree, we need more time, but the reality is
that nobody could really put a finger on what that is, and
certainly short of five to ten years in terms of the
development of leadership, that probably wouldn't get the job
done.
The other thing that I think was apparent to me is the
threat is real. I don't think we can sugarcoat that in any way.
But then the reality is, what greater threat are we not
addressing because we are so focused on Iraq. If you could also
talk about that, that would be helpful.
But my question really is around the reality that no matter
what we do, I think, short of quashing our adversaries in every
way possible, that it would be seen as a victory by them. So
the question is, if that is the case--if you agree with that,
and perhaps you don't--how do we then manage that, without
accelerating or further creating even greater problems down the
line? I am not talking about just a good PR campaign. In
reality, how do we manage that message?
My guess is that no matter what happens, it is going to be
a little like Russia in Afghanistan. I mean, that is going to
be a message. If you agree or disagree, and how do you manage
it?
Whoever wants to go first--Dr. Khan?
Dr. Khan. I find your question very intriguing. You are
basically asking what are the larger implications of Iraq. I
think it is not just about Iraq or U.S. foreign policy in the
Middle East. It is about the status of the U.S. as a dominant
moral leader in the world, as well as a major player
economically. What has clearly been happening in the last five
or six years is that we are bleeding economically. We are also
bleeding militarily.
What Iraq has succeeded in doing is exposing the limits of
U.S. power. The single most important lesson that we can draw
from Iraq is that the United States is no longer capable of
achieving political goals through military means. Look at what
has happened? Israel's failure in Lebanon is another lesson,
that Israel cannot achieve political goals through military
means. Our proxy fight with Hamas in Gaza is another lesson
that we are not achieving political goals through military
means.
So in spite of the fact that when the U.S. is
unquestionably the most dominant military power, our ability to
achieve political goals through military means has completely
diminished. This is the most important lesson for us to draw.
And while we are bleeding in Iraq, China and India are
growing and growing and growing. The challenges to U.S.
domination is not coming from the Middle East. It is coming
from Asia. Europe is becoming economically very strong. The
pound today is $2.25 or $2.23.
So we have to recognize that are we going to lose the
larger picture by pursuing these goals of regime change and
transformation in Iraq, partly motivated by a vendetta post-9/
11. These are some very serious questions about which we need
to have debate.
And on diplomacy, we must understand--the diplomacy is
something that the State Department does. No. Diplomacy is a
way of doing business. So we can go to Egypt and say one thing,
and then Rumsfeld or somebody else says something completely
undiplomatic simultaneously, and let's hope that diplomacy has
to work.
We have to understand that diplomacy is the way of doing
business. The President is not just the commander-in-chief, but
also the diplomat-in-chief. It is time he recognized that.
Mr. Boot. Well, unfortunately I don't think that pulling
out of Iraq too soon will in any way help us to achieve other
vital objectives around the world. In fact, I think it would
imperil----
Ms. Davis of California. Can you just define for me ``too
soon''?
Mr. Boot. I will come to that in a second.
Ms. Davis of California. Okay.
Mr. Boot. Because I think if we pull out of the situation,
given what it is today, that would be seen as a victory for al
Qaeda and Iran. I think that would be a blow to American
interests around the world and it would cause our enemies to
redouble their efforts to hurt us elsewhere. For example, in
Afghanistan, where a lot of people say if we get out of Iraq,
we could focus on Afghanistan. Well, I think if we get out of
Iraq right now, the situation in Afghanistan will deteriorate
even further because al Qaeda will pour more resources into
there and they will feel more empowered to come after us the
way they felt empowered after the defeat of the Russians in
Afghanistan in the 1980's.
Now, how do we avert that? I think we have to realize that
at this point, there is no responsible alternative to a long-
term American presence in Iraq--five, ten years, something like
that--the way we have had a long-term presence in places like
Bosnia, Kosovo, South Korea and elsewhere.
Now, obviously it is untenable to have American troops
fighting at this level of intensity and suffering these losses
for five to ten years, but the hope is, and the plan is that if
the surge can try to stabilize the situation somewhat over the
next year or so, and as Iraqi security forces increase in
effectiveness, they can take on more of the burden and our
forces can downsize.
I think we all agree that eventually we want to have a
smaller force. I think something along the lines of the report
issued by the Center for New American Security, we would have a
force basically focusing on advisory, on special forces
missions and so forth. I think it would take more troops than
they think it would take. As I said before, I think it would
probably take around 80,000, but I think that we are probably
going to need to have 80,000 troops there for 5 to 10 years to
safeguard our interests.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you.
General Clark.
Dr. Snyder. Go ahead, General Clark.
Ms. Davis of California. My time is up, but I am trying to
get in a quick response.
Dr. Snyder. Go ahead, General Clark.
General Clark. I do think that when we pull out, we do have
to manage the perception of that draw down of force. I think
there is a risk, as your question implies. That is why I
believe that you have to change the strategy before you work
the draw down. That change in strategy has to involve the
principles of renouncing forcible regime change.
I agree with what Dr. Khan is saying about the movement to
take advantage of our engagement in Iraq by China and India and
other powers. We are inflaming the Islamic world. We are
feeding the al Qaeda recruiting machine. Change the strategy
first before we worry about changing the troop strength on the
ground.
We are debating the wrong issue in the American press. The
reason we have been debating that issue is because this way, if
you disagree, you can be said not to be supporting the troops.
It is convenient shorthand. Everybody understands troops.
Strategy is too complicated. Diplomacy is too abstract, and so
forth.
There is no magic bullet in diplomacy, but if we don't
change the strategy and start talking to the nations in the
region and change our aims in the region, then I don't think
there is much chance of the surge--whatever its military
success where the troops are at the moment--translating that
into political success is unlikely.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Davis for five minutes.
Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate Dr. Khan's comments very much and his
perspective. Frankly, I would like to meet separate with you
where we can have a more free-ranging discussion on this. From
my own experiences in the Middle East in the military and
otherwise, the one thing that I think has been interesting in
the dialogue both on the panel and also with some of the
members is I think we are falling into a false dilemma here
very quickly, and that is that it is diplomacy or military
force.
Particularly with General Clark's perspective, Bosnia's
diplomacy was effective because we had overwhelming military
force on the ground and the ability to enforce our will, albeit
somewhat ineffectively and ham-handedly in areas. Human beings
make mistakes, but it was necessary to preserve continuity and
peace in that part of the world. It was at a critical time that
much of the world wasn't aware of.
One of the reasons that the inefficiency, the
ineffectiveness of the interagency community, the non-uniform
functions, was I am convinced because there were no casualties.
As we see on the evening news and the General is agreeing with
me, these casualties are provoking negative public opinion on a
variety of factors.
I think one comment I have heard that has been
disappointing in is this Administration. I think I have heard
about eight or nine times. But there is more to it than that.
This is really where I would like to go with this discussion.
In Haiti, where many of our mutual friends served, we
encountered the same problems as in Iraq. The military could do
its function, but the non-uniform piece didn't. That was under
a Democratic Administration with a Democratic Congress, I might
add--a very liberal Democratic Congress. We had the same
problem. But again, the process is critical here for us to
understand.
In Iraq, what we are seeing exacerbated in a huge way, is
separating out the diplomatic piece. It is a broken national
security process desperately in need of reform. The term
``strategy'' has been thrown out, but I haven't heard anybody
say what that end-state strategy should be.
I think that in my mind, we need serious reforms of the
interagency process around a national strategy to integrate our
instruments of power, rather than deal with the silo of
diplomacy or the silo of military force, to work with the
spectrum that will advance our cause and ultimately--to your
point, as you rightly pointed out--solving that meal problem
would have built a relationship that would have transcended
politics. Frankly, we need more of that.
With that, I would like to open it up to the group to make
some comments about the need for governmental reforms that
aren't pejorative statements about one political party or
another. This is an American problem now. Much of what has
happened now has been demonstrated in Mogadishu, in Bosnia, in
Panama. In Operation Provide Comfort, we saw all out of
proportion to its size--this in Grenada.
What do we need to do to reform the national security
process to avoid the problems that we have today in the future?
I will start with the General.
General Clark. When we looked at Haiti in 1994, and I was
the J-5 then, we recognized that we needed to be able to write
an op plan for the U.S. Government. There was no capacity to do
so.
So we convened a group and we wrote the op plan, and it
said things like in the conventional operations plan, you give
your task to your subordinate units--this was written to come
from the President of the United States saying Department of
Justice provide civil police training and provide the
rebuilding of the legal system; Department of Commerce
encourage job creation in Haiti; Department of Health and Human
Services, look at public health, improve public health in
Haiti.
The problem is, of course, there is no mechanism to do
that. There is no appropriations for it. There is no
authorization for it.
Mr. Davis of Kentucky. For the record, to reclaim the time
for a moment, which is my point. I keep a PowerPoint
presentation--actually it was Harvard Graphics back in those
days that one of your officers put together--that actually got
it only 50 yards down the field--the football field analogy--
and there was no other agency support to do this, even though
the military force was there. I think that is one of the
missing pieces.
If you could continue?
General Clark. Having said that, once you develop these
tools, you have to use them wisely. The problem we have in the
United States if we have been leading with our military. The
military should be the last instrument used. It became the go-
to instrument in the 1990's because it had communications and
logistics, and because it could provide for its own security.
It is far better to have the civilian intervention
capacity, to be able to do real strategic planning on
preventive diplomacy.
Mr. Davis of Kentucky. I agree. I agree wholeheartedly with
what you are saying. But would you admit, though--and I think
it is very important for the record to depoliticize what I
think is going to define our policy as a nation for the next 25
years--would you admit for the record that in the 1990's, the
problems that you faced as a commander-in-chief are very
similar to the ones that Admiral Fallon and Dave Petraeus are
facing right now, where our let's say the more expeditionary or
deployable aspects of what I think are our greatest strengths
as a country--our values, our outreach, our ability to provide
continuity to people's lives.
So your troops had to improvise and do things that frankly
were outside the operational purview, in a way more fitting
with the small wars doctrine that we experienced at other times
in our history.
General Clark. Well, I am not sure why you are asking me to
make this comparison and make this admission----
Mr. Davis of Kentucky. The reason that I have is because
you have been very, very prominent nationally in using your
prior military experience in our common ground and common
heritage, to excoriate, and I think in many cases rightly so. I
have been a critic of Administration policies myself that have
led us to where we are.
However, I think it is important that we transcend that as
Americans versus Democrats or Republicans, and ask the bigger
question. If the same problem was there in the 1990's that is
there now, it is simply much bigger because we see it in the
state of this environment.
What we need to do is offer a solution, rather than
generalities, and say what are some of the reforms practically
that we could do and personnel policy. What are the things that
we could do that would allow us to go to the doctor's point,
the soft spectrum coming across that military force is the
absolute last, but we have a strong military deterrent were
that needed.
General Clark. I agree with where you are driving, but I
want to explain something. I didn't come to this dialogue as a
member of the Democratic Party. I became a Democrat because of
this Administration and its preference for using military
force. The difference is that in the Clinton Administration,
military force was a last resort.
In this Administration--and my friend Max Boot illustrates
some of the attitudes that I have heard from others in the
Administration--there is a reluctance to talk to people that we
disagreed with.
Look, before we went into Haiti, we actually sent Sam Nunn
and Colin Powell down there to negotiate, and we didn't have to
do the airborne drop in Haiti. We were able to talk it out,
rather than invading. We did not do the bombing at the outset,
and we tried everything to stop the bombing----
Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Let's stop right there. I am
reclaiming my time, General.
General Clark. I just want to make sure there is a clear
distinction. I am agreeing with you on the need for the tools,
but I am explaining the difference, and I think the difference
is fundamental, because it is too late, even if you reform the
United States government, to use those same tools to get us out
of where we are in Iraq. It is too late.
Mr. Davis of Kentucky. What we are talking about, again,
the political posturing aside, I think that one of the points
that I would come back to is you had the same fundamental
national security process and system, and you can't say, well,
we were diplomats then versus now, because all I want to do if
you have agreed that in fact the process was broken. The same
issues were in fact in place at that time.
It doesn't hide leadership errors, but I think it is
important that the American people understand that this is not
simply a personality-driven crisis that we are in. We have a
deeper crisis and the process of how we proceed with national
security needs to be addressed that transcends all of this.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
General Clark. Mr. Chairman, I just can't let the point go
because I want to make it clear, there is a difference between
the Administrations. In the Democratic Administration, there
was every effort made to learn from Haiti. PDD 56 was created
and we intervened in Bosnia and Kosovo in a much different
fashion and a much greater awareness of our limitations than we
did in Haiti.
Now, when I went to the joint staff in 2002 and talked to
the J-5 before the operation in Iraq, I said, what about PDD
56? And what about the planning process, and what we learned
from the Balkans, because he had been there? And he pointed to
the third floor of the Pentagon and he said to me, ``Can't do
it. It is them. They don't want it.''
We know now from all the work that has been done how this
Pentagon under Secretary Rumsfeld reporting to President Bush,
refused to do the post-war strategy planning that was
doctrinally required and that we did prior to the Kosovo
campaign.
So I agree with you on the need for governmental reform and
the tools, but I want to make clear there was a distinction in
the Administrations.
Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Mr. Chairman, could I indulge you
for 30 seconds?
Dr. Snyder. You certainly can, Mr. Davis. I like a good bar
fight. I have already expressed that, actually. Go ahead.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Davis of Kentucky. The only thing I am asking you to
make clear, because it is obvious I think the record is fraught
with ineptitude in various areas, but the one thing that I
would come back to is the process allowed that. It wasn't a
matter of personalities. I would tend to disagree from the
operational perspective that the Administration is gentle-
handed in its use of the military.
The bigger issue, and I think really for the record where
we need to leave this with, is we have a much bigger issue that
transcends personality, it transcends political party, that can
somewhat minimize mistakes in this process--to your point
earlier--that will allow us to use the full spectrum of our
instruments of power to get to a proper end for a true national
strategy, which I personally don't believe we have had as a
country since the end of the Cold War.
I yield back, and thank you.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Davis, to make a very mundane minor point
that agrees with part of what you are saying, is you may have
seen on page three of the interim report that came out
yesterday, this one sentence: Expansion of the PRT program is
not yet complete, with only about half of the approximately 300
additional PRT personnel deployed to date. A full complement of
civilian surge personnel will be completed by December 2007.
This is something Geoff and I have talked a lot about, the
frustration. This is not a Rumsfeld problem. This is not a
Gates problem. It is a problem that somehow in our system that
the State Department, USAID, or whoever it is, can't get
civilians on the ground, and here we are at the interim report
time, and they don't even have half the personnel yet.
We are giving Iraqis a bad time because they are hitting
less than 50 percent on their satisfactory/unsatisfactory, and
we only have half of the civilian personnel in the PRT, which
is an issue not talked about.
Mr. Davis of Kentucky. I think it points to the issue we
have discussed, the State Department authorizations for
manning, the lack of appropriations for costs, and the same
officer that did the Harvard Graphics presentation also made
the point quite clearly the night before the President's speech
that the State Department would not comply with those personnel
capabilities because they didn't have them, and that it would
be ultimately the military.
Thank you for your indulgence.
Dr. Snyder. It was really Dr. Gingrey's indulgence.
Dr. Gingrey for five minutes.
Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. That was
very interesting.
First of all, let me thank our witnesses, Dr. Khan, Mr.
Boot, General Clark. I am sorry I missed a lot of this. We had
a little activity going on on the floor, which is very
important.
General Clark, you said you didn't want to let that last
point go. I need to also say that I want to not let a point go.
You said under President Clinton, maybe the reason you became a
Democrat was that he used the military as a last resort and not
a first resort. I would say that that probably was the
appropriate posture, being that he had weakened the military to
such a drastic extent, as well as our national intelligence
capability.
But that being said, let me start by saying that I
appreciate that you have put forth specific details in your
redeployment plan. It is not a vague troop reduction amounting
to a limited presence within 120 days, with no plans or details
for how to make this occur, like something else going on on the
floor today.
You actually discuss specific troop numbers and areas in
which to focus. I do commend you for that. I largely agree with
your comments that our approach must be linked to a deeper,
more effective political effort, and that political progress on
the part of the Iraqi government certainly has been
disappointing.
I want to take issue, though, with some of your comments.
You say the issue isn't troop strength in Iraq, but rather
United States national security in the region. I don't know how
these two can be divorced. I want you to talk about that. If we
have this precipitous draw-down in Iraq, won't it affect our
national security in the region?
Dr. Khan said, and I heard his testimony just before I
left, that we have 100-something thousand mercenaries fighting
on behalf of the Iraqi government. I don't know who they are. I
didn't know that. I haven't heard a lot of intelligence, but I
certainly didn't know about that.
He says they have to be replaced. Are the Iranians and the
Syrians realistically going to come in there and do that on
behalf of this Iraqi government that we have paid such a
tremendous price and sacrifice and blood, sweat, toil and
dollars to stand up?
This is what I want you to talk to us about. Wouldn't our
national strategy be significantly hampered if the Iranians and
the Syrians fill the void left by our departure and dictate the
future course of Iraq?
General Clark. I think that we have to have a strategy in
the region that maintains an effective U.S. role, even as we
are pulling troops back from Iraq. I think the way to do it is
to change the strategy before you change the force structure
and force deployments and activities on the ground.
What I would like to see is a full-court diplomatic press,
the same way we did it to stop the war in Bosnia. We sent a
team over there. We had a kit bag of tools. We said we were
prepared to put so many troops in. If we get an agreement, we
are prepared to do such and such. There is so much aid that you
can get, and we are prepared. And there were seven things we
were prepared to do.
We also said that we want you to tell us what you want.
What we need is a list of principles that guide U.S. policy
that we could say, these principles apply throughout the
region. Let's say, respect for borders; respect for national
sovereignty. We say: Here are our principles; do you agree to
these principles? Can we get a statement on it? Can we move
forward from there and gradually work to enlarge a dialogue in
the region?
If we do that, we will take the venom out of the insurgency
and out of the resistance in Iraq. We will be able to slide
those troops out of there in good order, and we will be able to
maintain U.S. influence. If we don't change the strategy, if we
continue to say we are not talking to Iran because we don't
have enough leverage over them and they are evil, and we are
not going to talk to Syria because we don't like them, and
there is a U.N. commission; and we don't like Hezbollah and
Hamas because--if we say that, and we try to isolate these
states, what is going to happen is they feed the resistance. We
have more U.S. losses, more instability in Iraq. We undercut
our own strategy and we undercut our men and women in uniform.
Dr. Gingrey. General, I want to say that the key in your
remark, your response, is the modifier ``in good order'' in
regard to bringing the troops out. Elaborate on that. What
would you call ``in good order''--120 days?
General Clark. What I call for is a change in the strategy
first. I am not advocating a precipitous withdrawal like lining
the troops up on the road and marching out right now. I am not
saying that we should do that.
Dr. Gingrey. General, there is only one----
General Clark. I don't think----
Dr. Gingrey [continuing]. Highway of death.
General Clark. I don't think the situation in Iraq is so
far gone that we have to just throw up our hands and say, okay,
we quit. I don't think we are there. I think a year from now if
we haven't changed the strategy, we could be at the point where
the American people will believe that.
You know, there are 25 million people and they are
struggling to survive in Iraq. There is going to be an Iraq
whether U.S. troops are there or not. So the question is, how
do we relate? What we need to do is change the strategy now, so
that we empower the troops over there to work more effectively
against whatever elements, hard-heads that are there still
resisting.
We have to enunciate the kinds of strategic principles that
other people in the region can sign up to. If we say we will
only talk to democratic governments, then there is no point in
continuing to fight in the region because you are going to
invite the resistance of those non-democratic governments. We
don't have the power to effect immediate regime change in Iran,
Syria, and every other country in the region.
Why do we want to? Those are their countries. They have
their ideas. If our ideas are better, let them percolate in.
This should not be an ideological campaign. What we are trying
to do is fulfill our obligation to the people of Iraq by ending
the violence, and get out troops out of Iraq safely. That is
all.
Dr. Gingrey. General, my time has expired. I want to thank
you for your forthright testimony here. I appreciate it.
Dr. Khan. Can I make a quick 30-second comment?
Dr. Snyder. A 30-second comment, Dr. Khan. Go ahead.
Dr. Khan. Yes, sir. The 100,000 people that I was
testifying to, Congressman, were not mercenaries hired by the
Iraqi government. The U.S. presence includes 100,000 civilians
who are not employed by the U.S. Government. They work for
Blackwater, people who work for Halliburton, people who work
for various contractors--some armed, some unarmed.
So if the U.S. were to withdraw, the U.S. logistical
support is 150,000 troops plus 100,000 additional people, and
some put the figure at 120,000. So we are looking at more than
250,000 people to replace this. So if the U.S. were to withdraw
all its troops, there wouldn't be 150,000 people coming back.
There would be over 250,000 people coming back to the U.S. from
Iraq. That is the point I was trying to make.
Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, if we have a second round, I may
have an opportunity to pursue this with Dr. Khan.
Dr. Snyder. I might say, too, members may have questions
for the record, and we would hope to get those back timely. We
are going to be interrupted with votes at some point.
Mr. Bartlett for five minutes.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Do each of you have something to write with and a piece of
paper? Could you write four things down for me? First of all,
``hate each other''; ``hate al Qaeda''; ``hate us''; and
``something else,'' as a fourth line, ``something else.'' Just
write that down, ``something else,''--``hate Bush.'' Again,
``hate each other, hate al Qaeda, hate us, and something
else.''
Now, if you will write down a percentage by each of those
that you think accounts for the total violence that we see in
Iraq. How much of that violence comes from hating each other;
how much of that violence comes from hating al Qaeda; how much
of that violence comes from hating us; how much of that
violence comes from something else.
Can you write down those four numbers for me: ``each other,
al Qaeda, us, and something else''? Have you finished?
General Clark, if you would give your paper to Mr. Boot,
and----
[Laughter.]
Dr. Snyder. Roscoe, would you like me to be humming the
theme song from a game show? [Laughter.]
Mr. Bartlett. All right. This should really be in writing
for me because this is a question I have wanted answered for a
long time, and we have three really good experts here, for
which I am very appreciative.
Are all of your numbers written down?
Okay. Mr. Boot, if you will hand your paper to Dr. Khan.
And Dr. Khan will hand his paper to General Clark.
Okay. General Clark, what were the numbers that Dr. Khan
had for ``hate each other''?
General Clark. Fifteen percent.
Mr. Bartlett. How many?
General Clark. Fifteen percent.
Mr. Bartlett. Fifteen percent. What is his percentage for
``hate al Qaeda''?
General Clark. Five percent.
Mr. Bartlett. Five percent. What is his number for ``hate
us''?
General Clark. Sixty percent.
Mr. Bartlett. Sixty?
General Clark. Sixty.
Mr. Bartlett. Sixty percent. And ``something else''?
General Clark. Twenty percent.
Mr. Bartlett. Twenty percent. What is the ``something
else''?
Dr. Khan. The fear the Sunnis have of transition of power
in a Shia-dominated Iraq.
Mr. Bartlett. Okay.
Dr. Khan. We call them ``hating each other.'' It is a
strategic thing.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Boot, you have General Clark's paper.
Mr. Boot. Correct. It says----
Mr. Bartlett. What did he write down for ``hate each
other''?
Mr. Boot. Twenty percent.
Mr. Bartlett. Twenty percent. And ``hate al Qaeda''?
Mr. Boot. Ten percent.
Mr. Bartlett. How many?
Mr. Boot. Ten percent.
Mr. Bartlett. Ten. All right. And ``hate us''?
Mr. Boot. Thirty percent.
Mr. Bartlett. Thirty. And a huge ``something else.'' What
is the ``something else,'' General?
General Clark. They are in this for their own gain. This is
an opportunity to put together a new Iraq, and they want power
and they want their own values, their own interests, their own
opportunities, and they are fighting to get it.
Mr. Bartlett. Okay. And now I guess the only one I don't
have is Mr. Boot's numbers. Dr. Khan has those.
What number does Mr. Boot have for ``hate each other''?
Dr. Khan. He has no numbers for anything.
Mr. Bartlett. Sir?
Dr. Khan. He has no numbers for anything. He has a note.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Bartlett. Does he have any numbers?
Dr. Khan. No.
Mr. Bartlett. No? Okay.
Dr. Snyder. This was not an essay test, Mr. Boot.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Boot. I am better at English than at math.
Mr. Bartlett. If you were to put numbers down, Mr. Boot,
what would you put down? I don't want each of you informed by
the others, but you have----
Mr. Boot. Well, if I could just read the note, which is, I
have no idea what the answer is. I don't think anyone does. But
I think the primary driver of violence in Iraq is hatred and
fear of each other among the Iraqi sectarian groups, not of the
United States.
Mr. Bartlett. Okay. So you would put a big number by ``hate
each other,'' and the others have a relatively small number by
``hate each other.''
This is very informative, Mr. Chairman. I stayed within my
five minutes. Thank you very much.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Bartlett, you get an ``A'' on that test
because you did stay within the five minutes.
Mr. Jones for five minutes.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I always have
great amazement at my friend, the Ph.D., who sits beside me,
and I found that very interesting, I think.
I am one of many in Congress who, if I look at the last
five years--and it is going on five years--and I listened to
Dr. Khan, Mr. Boot and General Clark. I have great respect for
you, sir, as well as the two I have not met until today.
It appears that, Dr. Khan, I didn't hear your presentation.
I was late getting here, but in your opinion, do we have any
friends in the Middle East that would like to see--I know they
would like to see a stabilized Iraq. I assume that, but do we
have any friends in the Middle East? Or is the hatred so deep
for America being in Iraq that it is going to take generations
to be in a situation?
What I am going to ask you now, and this is the question. I
have felt for at least a year that if this Administration had
any hope for a stabilized Iraq, that somebody should be chosen
to be an ambassador for peace, someone that is internationally
respected. And then to use, because of his statement last week,
Colin Powell, because Colin Powell has said there would be no
military solution. It just is not going to happen.
Does it make any sense--it would not happen overnight--but
is there a potential, based on your knowledge of many people in
the Middle East, that the right person--and I don't know who
that is--that if this Administration really wanted to see that
we could maybe have the dialogue that you have spoken about,
and the general, does that make any sense? Is that even a
possibility, that the right person could begin a long process
of trying to develop a dialogue?
Dr. Khan. I think that the first step that we should take
is to not see the entire Middle East as monolithic. It is--very
different. For example, the government which we dislike the
most is the Iranian at the moment, and the people of Iran are
the most pro-American in the entire Middle East. The
governments that we like the most, one of them is Jordan, and
the people in the Middle East who hate America the most are
Jordanians. And people who also have the highest support for
suicide bombings are also in Jordan.
So we have to understand that there is a lot more
complexity to this. The people consistently in survey after
survey in the Middle East make a distinction between America
and American foreign policy. They consistently say ``we hate
American foreign policy,'' but they hate America.
Their biggest fear, hatred, and anger are directed at our
President, the people like Dick Cheney. They are suspicious of
people like me. They sometimes like me, and sometimes they
don't.
But they have a lot of hope from people like General Clark.
They have lots of expectations that the good side of America
will balance those from the bad side of America, and that is
the hope of ordinary people out there.
But have these all at a very different level. Their
animosity, their anger, their hatred, it is at such levels that
even if you agreed to everything that they wanted, they would
still come after us, because it is not just about diminishing
U.S. presence in the Middle East, but it is also for punishing
the U.S. for the past, according to their perceptions.
So they want to drive the U.S. out of the region. They have
other goals which are very similar--regime change, et cetera--
and also they want to punish the West for past crimes, et
cetera, and they have other theological agendas, too.
So I still believe that we have lots of friends in the
region. Plus, their anti-Americanism in the Muslim world is
much more rational than the anti-Americanism of the Europeans.
The Europeans don't like us just because of who we are.
So if you look at the anti-Americanism in Pakistan and
Indonesia before the earthquake and tsunami and after the U.S.
provided relief, the positive attitude toward the U.S. in
Pakistan and Indonesia jumped by 20 percent. It is a huge part
of the shift, which clearly shows that people in the Muslim
world are really rational. If we hurt them, they hate us. If we
help them, they like us. And that is a positive thing.
There are lots of people. I did see President Clinton in
one speech in Doha where he postulated a speech that Brookings
had written for him, and started reciting from memory verses
from the Quran. I could see people in the Arab world who had
tears. They seemed to respond to him antithetically. And people
like Colin Powell, or even Jim Baker from the Republican side,
will have a lot of legitimacy in the region.
I have a feeling that President Bush's father probably too
still has a lot of reservoirs of good will in the Arab world in
the places where his son doesn't have. So it is all that is not
lost. I mean, this is not a place which hates us.
But we must also remember that there is a cognitive
dissonance in the Muslim mind. Even those who love to hate us
would still love to live with us and live here. So there is a
lot of hope for us to build bridges very quickly.
Mr. Boot. Mr. Chairman, could I just make a very brief
statement on behalf of myself, and I will let Vice President
Cheney speak on his own behalf. You know, I agree with Dr. Khan
that the people of Iran are the most pro-American in the Middle
East, and as I mentioned before, why are they the most pro-
American in the Middle East? Because their government hates us.
Whereas if we adopt the policy, which has been advocated
here by General Clark, of aligning ourselves with the
government of Iran, we will probably turn the people of Iran
against us, as we have turned the people of Egypt and Jordan
and so many dictatorships around the region--Saudi Arabia--
against us.
Let me just make one other point, if I could, because what
I see here is a groundswell of people saying we want a
diplomatic solution to the crisis that we face in Iraq. As I
said before, I completely agree. But let me give you very
briefly two examples of seeking a diplomatic solution, one of
which worked and one of which didn't work; one in 1953 and the
other one in 1973.
In 1953, General Eisenhower got us out of the Korean War,
not by saying we are going to bring the troops home and try to
make nice with China and the Soviet Union and others. What he
did was he said we are going to keep the troops in and we are
going to escalate if necessary. We are going to do anything
that it takes to win. And he even dropped hints that he would
use atomic weapons. Within six months, the North Koreans came
to the table and we have an armistice that has now lasted these
many decades that has been stable.
In the early 1970's, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger
said we are going to bring the troops home, no matter what. And
by 1972, they had brought the last American combat troops home.
At that point, the North Vietnamese were happy to sign the
Paris peace accord because they knew it wasn't worth the paper
it was printed on. They knew that as soon as it was signed,
they were set to violate the accord and they would go on to
invade and conquer and occupy South Vietnam within two years of
the signing of the accord. And Henry Kissinger claimed this was
a great triumph of diplomacy. He got a Nobel Peace Prize.
Well, let me tell you, the South Vietnamese boat people
don't think it is such a great triumph of diplomacy. The
millions of Cambodians killed by the Khmer Rouge don't think it
was such a great triumph of diplomacy.
Now, the difference between the two is that in the case of
Korea, our diplomacy was backed by force, and as Congressman
Davis said, the very important point, it is not a question of
diplomacy or force. The most effective diplomacy is that when
used in conjunction with force.
But if we start withdrawals now, that would be toothless
diplomacy that would not achieve our goals, but will only
convince Iran and Syria and al Qaeda that we are a paper tiger
that can be attacked with impunity, and we will pay a very high
price for it, not only in Iraq, but around the world in the
future.
Dr. Snyder. Ms. Shea-Porter for five minutes.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
Dr. Snyder. We will go to Ms. Shea-Porter.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Okay.
Mr. Boot, how many times have you been to Iraq?
Mr. Boot. Three.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Three. And yet you said that you have no
idea what the people were thinking. When you were talking about
a diplomatic solution, and kind of pooh-poohing the idea, I
would have been happy with a diplomatic understanding to begin
with.
This is a problem that I think that we don't even
understand who the people of the Middle East are. You, I am
very certain, are aware of the fact that half of the Iraqi
parliament, more than half of the democratically elected Iraqi
parliament signed requests asking the United States to leave.
Right?
Mr. Boot. I am not aware that the Iraqi parliament has
passed legislation asking the United States to leave.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Did you know that they signed a petition
asking us to leave, and do you think that would be a good
enough reason to leave?
Mr. Boot. Actually, I don't think there is a single major
faction in Iraq other than possibly al Qaeda that actually
wants us to leave. Although if you look at public opinion
polls, they say that the vast majority of Iraqis do want us to
leave, but then the next question is, when do you want
Americans to leave. And they say, as soon as you stabilize the
situation, because if you leave now, there will be a disaster.
I have talked to many Iraqis over the course of the last
four years, and they are all virtually unanimous in saying
that, and that is the position of the Maliki government, the
elected representatives of the people of Iraq.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Reclaiming my time. They did ask us.
Mr. Boot. They have not. The Maliki government and the
congress and the parliament of Iraq have not asked us to leave.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Okay. Well, we will follow up on that, but
the idea that we don't know what they think is what is so
disturbing. In the past couple of days, I have had the
opportunity to sit in a couple of hearings. One of them
involved people from the CIA, so I can speak about it.
And we are doing a global security assessment. What they
said after they had been prodded was we are having trouble
getting the kind of intelligence that we needed because of our
strained relations with people on the ground in that area, and
also countries including European countries.
Now, they phrase it that countries with bad attitudes don't
give us the information that we need, but the point is that if
it is not working militarily, then clearly we need to try
something else. Today, I was fortunate enough to hear Major
General Bob Scales talk about with this particular
Administration, when we say we have a problem, the answer is
maybe we can find a better computer, or we can find a larger
weapons system.
Right from the beginning of time, good soldiers have always
understood that the way that you get the information from
people and the way that you win their hearts and minds has to
do more with the way that we speak to them and understanding of
their culture. We don't understand. In World War II they
understood chewing gum and chocolate went a long way simply for
finding out what was happening. We have not won their hearts
and minds.
So I am concerned because I think what is happening is in
the attempt to win militarily, what we have had happen to us is
that we have weakened the military dramatically, particularly
the Army, and I am going to ask General Clark to speak about
that in a moment.
But I just wanted to paraphrase General Pace, when he was
asked if he was comfortable with the idea that if there was an
emerging fight anywhere around the world, was he comfortable
with our ability to respond. All of us should be frightened by
his answer. He paused and then said, no, I am not comfortable.
If every resource is in Iraq, if every ideology is sunk
into Iraq--and I think that we are driven by ideology here--
then how will we respond in the world?
And so, General Clark, I was going to ask you, what do we
do now? Are you convinced that the Army is indeed strained to
its breaking point and that we are losing men and women who
would have gone career, and that we actually have a problem?
And do you think that Iraq has weakened us around the world?
General Clark. I do think Iraq has weakened us around the
world. I think we have wonderful people in the United States
Army and wonderful leadership, and I think they are over-
stretched, and I think you can see the institution beginning to
fray now. It has several different problems. One set of
problems is simply fatigue. The families are fatigued and
stressed. They have borne an unfair burden of this conflict.
A second problem has to do with relationships in the ranks,
and the trust and mistrust between lower and higher authorities
in uniform. I think that after the conflict, we are going to
need a full after-action review process, a sort of wringing-out
that we never did after Vietnam, in which seniors and junior
leaders exchange views, the same way we do after a tactical
operation.
I think that you can see the fraying of the recruiting
effort now, as well as the problem with the equipment. We
haven't budgeted everything we need even to re-set the
equipment, much less the people. So yes, I am quite worried
about it. I don't think we have the response capability we
need.
I would also tell you that more important than the military
is the distraction that the Iraq commitment is doing to our
national leadership. We are not focusing on the other issues
that need to be addressed--our economic competitiveness in the
world, our larger issues in the Middle East. And so this is a
highly destructive, very political debate. I just hope we have
enough wisdom to change the strategy before we pull the plug on
the troops.
I was in Israel just before I retired in 2000. I remember
speaking to the chief of defense, the minister of defense,
about they were going to pull out of southern Lebanon. It was a
strategically brilliant move by Ehud Barak, but it wasn't
covered diplomatically and legally effectively, and the result
was that when they pulled out, to regain legitimacy and
rebalance their force, they actually created the impression
that they were losers, and they were exploited.
I do worry about the perception management overseas. That
is why I think we have to have a strategic change before we
have an operational and tactical change.
Mr. Boot. May I just jump in with one fast comment? Because
I completely agree with General Clark that our military is
over-stretched. Some of us have been saying for years that we
need a much bigger Army and the Bush Administration has
belatedly listened to us, but I think too late.
I don't think you are going to help the Army or the Marine
Corps by pulling them out precipitously in defeat out of Iraq.
I think that would be the worst thing possible in terms of
their morale and their fighting fitness in the future. I think
a lot of soldiers have been hanging in there because they want
to be in the fight. They don't want to desert their comrades.
They want to stay and win.
Those who have been over-stretched, who have been on
multiple deployments overseas, if we pull out, you are going to
lose a lot of the junior leadership and you are going to lose a
lot of the NCO corps who have been in there as long as they had
a chance of winning. But if that chance is gone, I think a lot
of them will leave, and the Army will face a real crisis.
Ms. Shea-Porter. May I add that we are losing them. I am
interested that you are talking about it as if it would be a
future activity. The reality is that right now we are losing
our soldiers. They are bailing out, and I am worried about not
having institutional history and understanding for the future.
The word ``defeat,'' I think we have to get away from the
word ``defeat'' here. We went in for a mission, and whether it
was right or wrong, clearly we didn't have the right
intelligence, but we said we were replacing Saddam and we did.
And so at this point, I think I would have to argue at the word
``defeat.''
I think if we paint it that way, then we are all going to
be losers for that. If we say that we did what we hoped to do
in terms of replacing Saddam and giving them a democracy, but
we don't leave our soldiers in the middle of a civil war, we
could really start to have an honest dialogue about a
responsible exit strategy.
Thank you.
Dr. Snyder. Ms. Shea-Porter, we appreciate you being here
today.
Here is what we are going to do. We may have another 30
minutes or so. We are going to go a second round, but to my
committee members, we are going to do a strict five minutes,
which means the gavel will come down when the red light goes
on. I think we have a shot at getting around to everybody. That
means if you are in the middle of an answer, the next person
doesn't get to talk, so we won't be as liberal this time.
So we will go ahead and start the round. I am going to
start off here. Mr. Akin, by the way, is on the floor. He
wanted to speak on the resolution today.
General, I wanted to ask one specific question to you. I am
going to quote you from when you testified September 26, 2002,
remember, you and Richard Perle just a few weeks before we had
the vote on the authorization.
This is what you said a few weeks before that vote: ``We
should not be using force until the personnel, the
organizations, the plans that will be required for post-
conflict Iraq are prepared and ready. This includes dealing
with requirements for humanitarian assistance, police and
judicial capabilities, emergency medical, reconstruction
assistance, and preparations for a transitional governing body
and eventual elections, perhaps even including a new
constitution.''
I mean, you could see what was necessary. Anyway, in view
of your attitude then, what do you think about when we see the
report come out yesterday that we were talking about earlier
that says we have only been able to mobilize half of the 300
civilian PRT personnel.
What does that tell you as a military guy, knowing that
some of your colleagues that you were raised with and served
with are fighting and bleeding overseas, and we still don't
have the civilian folks on board that we would like to have.
What does that say to you? What do we need to do about that?
General Clark. Well, the government hasn't lived up to the
full set of requirements. And this is really a matter of the
President of the United States. If he wants the government to
live up to it, he will tell Dick Cheney, and Dick Cheney can
probably make it happen. He has made a lot of other things
happen. He makes it happen quietly, apparently, behind the
scenes, but if I believe what I read in the newspapers, he is
the most powerful guy we have ever had in the United States
government.
So I don't know why he couldn't produce the kind of PRT
support we need if we really need it. This government hasn't
been willing to mobilize and deal with the diplomatic and non-
military aspects of the mission. It has dumped it all on the
men and women in uniform.
Dr. Snyder. My second question for each of you, and just a
brief answer. You have already touched on this in some of your
written statements and some in response to questions. But these
predictions of what would happen if things go badly and we have
a precipitous withdrawal or things don't go well, the ability--
I think you used in your words, Mr. Boot, a catastrophe in
Iraq.
You know, the ability to predict human behavior, I can't
say what my wife is going to tell me tonight when I call her on
the phone. When you make these kinds of predictions about what
a society is going to be doing, when you make those kinds of
statements, how much reliability can we place on it? How much
reliability do you place on your statement?
Ambassador Crocker a few days ago I think in a New York
Times interview made some very strong similar statements. How
much reliability do we place on that, that those kinds of bad
things will occur? Thirty years from now if things go
differently we could be surprised and say, well, bad things
didn't happen. Tell me how you analyze it as a scholar and how
that will go?
Mr. Boot. Well, I think it is based on my general knowledge
of the situation and arraying the probabilities. I think
everybody undertakes that. Of course, there is no certitude in
these kinds of predictions, and I hope that I am wrong. I hope
that we could withdraw and things would work out much better
than I expect.
The problem is that we went into Iraq based on rosy
scenarios. We went in there expecting the best and we got the
worst. I don't think we can afford to leave expecting the best
and be surprised by the worst. Whereas, if we expect the worst
and plan for it, we can be very pleasantly surprised and things
may work out much better than we feared.
Dr. Snyder. Do you have any comments, Dr. Khan?
Dr. Khan. Yes. I think the United States has a long record
of not finishing business. After the Gulf War I, we did not
finish the job then. In Afghanistan, we just up and left after
the Soviet Union left. We did not finish the job of dealing--we
did not disarm them. We did not relocate them back to where
they had come. We left them.
On 9/11, and contemporary al Qaeda is a consequence of the
fact that we did not deal with the first problem of
Afghanistan. If we do the same thing--and I mean we are talking
of an Administration who did not have a plan in Iraq, but if
you do not deal with the post-withdrawal phenomenon in Iraq, we
will be facing something which is much more devastating and
much more horrific than what al Qaeda brought upon us. It is
just not about dealing with the public opinion.
We must also demand responsibility from the American
citizens. Over 70 percent support for this war. It is not just
President Bush's fault or Dick Cheney's fault or this
Congress's fault. They also supported this war, and now they
want to run away without thinking about it.
We need to think this thing through, and the civilians need
to back it up on what needs to be done in Iraq in the long term
as well as in the short term. It is important for the
leadership, working with Congress and the White House, to stand
up and demand from the Americans more responsibility.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Johnson for five minutes--a strict five
minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Clark, you have mentioned a couple of times,
several times, that we need to change the strategy before we
redeploy. You gave some examples of changing the strategy,
renouncing regime change, engaging in dialogue with the
stakeholders over there, pursue a solution to the Palestinian
issue between Israel and the Palestinians.
Are you suggesting that we should maintain the same troop
levels while we go through that pretty much diplomatic process?
And should we sustain our current boots-on-the-ground numbers
while we go through those diplomatic processes and get some
kind of positive result before we downsize? Is that what you
are suggesting?
General Clark. I think in terms of what I am recommending
for legislation and what the Congress should demand of the
Administration, it should demand a two-brigade withdrawal so
that you have a strategic reserve able to be reconstituted a
little bit earlier back in the United States. Those two
brigades should be out by Christmas.
Mr. Johnson. Approximately how many?
General Clark. Two brigades, that is probably about 10,000
people by the time you count the support. That shows that the
Congress then has the ability to direct the executive branch.
This is better than cutting off funding or other things.
And then I think the Congress needs to demand that the
executive branch come over within 60 days and lay out a new
strategy. And it needs to be debated and the American people
need to approve of a new strategy. I think if the American
people really realized what the current strategy is, they would
be in an uproar.
Mr. Johnson. Well, I will tell you one thing the American
public does understand is the intolerable number of escalating
deaths and maiming injuries that are occurring, as well as the
financial drain that we are undergoing. The American people, I
think, want to see a redeployment of the troops now. They want
to see an end to the hostilities, if you will, now, and that
may not be militarily the best solution.
General Clark. No, it is not. I hope that in the Congress
of the United States that we not only reflect the will of the
American people, but we help inform the will of the American
people. I think there is an educational function that is here.
Look, these are terrible deaths that we suffered, and
nobody can minimize the costs on the men and women and the
families in the armed forces. But there are many other issues
that are facing America right now. We have to get the strategy
right before we react emotionally to this, because the
consequences of what we would do were we to just pull the plug
and let the troops come out in 120 days are likely to be
profound and far-reaching.
Mr. Johnson. What exactly do you think would happen on the
ground?
General Clark. I think you will further super-charge al
Qaeda recruiting worldwide. I think you will incentivize more
attacks against Western institutions.
Mr. Johnson. In the Shia-dominated region, do you think
that al Qaeda would be able to take hold and take control of
that country?
General Clark. I think it is not Iraq per se. I am
addressing sort of the worldwide consequences. You disempower
U.S. credibility and legitimacy around the world. It is more of
the sort of ``U.S. doesn't have the staying power.'' So
obviously, I am an opponent of this strategy, and I was an
opponent of the war. But you have to get out of it the right
way. If we don't get out of it the right way, we will compound
our problem.
So right now out of frustration, a lot of people want to
pull the plug on the Administration, when what they need to do
is demand that the Administration change its strategy and its
approach in the region. That is what is required, and then the
troops can slide out.
Mr. Boot. If I may, before the Administration is forced to
change its strategy, I think it ought to be given a chance to
see if its current strategy, which was changed six months ago,
is working or not. As we know, Operation Phantom Thunder, which
is the surge of operations, finally began in mid-June.
It is far too early to say whether it is working or not,
although there are some positive indicators which I mentioned
to you earlier. So I think we ought to at least give the
current strategy a chance before moving on to the next new
strategy.
Dr. Snyder. Ms. Davis for five minutes.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you.
I think there is certainly an element here in terms of
trying to pursue an agenda. I think that everybody wants the
same thing here in the end. What I think is also at play is
trying to put our goals out there, and in many ways focusing
the mind. I think someone said a noose focuses the mind like
nothing else.
Do you think that there is an element at play here that is
actually helpful? At one point, I think even General Petraeus
acknowledge that the Congress being engaged and focused and
debating and putting proposals out there was helpful. I would
acknowledge that not every proposal was helpful, but on the
other hand I think that absent that, there is a perception that
somehow we are just going to let this go however it moves.
So I would like some response from you, and then maybe what
is missing in this, or what surprises you. How is it possible
for the Congress do you think to play a role other than doing
``stay or go''? Because that has not been helpful, and I know I
had an opportunity just two days ago to share that with General
Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, that we are getting to that
same rhetoric. It is not helpful.
Mr. Boot. If I could say, I completely agree with you. I
think Congress does have a very useful role to play and I think
these kinds of hearings are in fact useful to look very
seriously and get beyond the rhetoric and look into the
substance of proposals.
Look, I think the Bush Administration has made many, many
mistakes over the course of the last four years, and I think
Congress has been right and responsible in pointing those out.
In fact, I wish it had done a little more of that on mistakes
such as not increasing the size of the U.S. military so we
would have more options--I mean, things that have not gone
well.
But what I don't think helps and what I think really
hinders General Petraeus's mission is when we hear high-profile
politicians back home saying ``bring the troops out now,'' even
though when you read the fine print what they say is don't
bring all the troops out right now; we are actually going to
keep a force, and so forth.
But most people don't read the fine print, and the message
that gets conveyed to our enemies in Iraq is that we are not
there for the long haul, and therefore that takes away some of
the impact of our combat operations because they think they can
wait us out.
Whereas if we come together as a nation and say we are
committed to prevailing here, and we will not be driven out by
al Qaeda; we will not be driven out by Iran; we will stay with
the democratic government of Iraq, paradoxically, that kind of
commitment is our best chance of drawing down our forces.
Whereas if we keep talking about drawing down our forces, it
makes it very hard to do so because that empowers our
adversaries.
By the way, the Bush Administration is guilty of this, too,
because every few months they read from the Defense
Department--Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Gates--they keep
leaking, we are about to draw down our forces. That constantly
undermines what our troops are trying to do on the ground in
Iraq.
Ms. Davis of California. General Clark.
General Clark. I just want to say, look, this is not
General Petraeus's mission. This is the United States
government's mission. It is the mission of the United States of
America and it is the mission of President George W. Bush. And
that means all the elements of the government should be brought
to bear.
I happen to believe that these kinds of debates are
constructive. I think the Iraqi political leaders do need to be
incentivized. That is one of the reasons I am recommending a
two-brigade draw-down mandated by Congress by Christmas,
because I think they need a rap across the knuckles to get
their priorities straight.
I do believe that Congress has an important role to play in
terms of demanding the strategy. If you don't get the strategy
you want, then you go to the other measures--the troop
strength, the funding, the other things that are required.
Congress has a role not only to raise and maintain an Army, but
to help the United States correct a series of mistakes.
Ms. Davis of California. Dr. Khan.
Dr. Khan. I think that the election season is becoming a
major distraction for effective discussions about what needs to
be done. The fact that now the Democrats have an opportunity to
raise issues, I think there is a lot of posturing that is
taking place, and it is all about Presidential elections, and
also getting back and getting even with President Bush.
I think it was a mistake for this Congress to completely
surrender the agenda-setting after 9/11 to the Bush
Administration. And so now we are caught up upon the failures
of a failed agenda. His initial strategy was wrong to begin
with, and now he has made errors and failures that are
compounded by the errors and failures of a wrong vision, wrong
strategy.
What the Congress can do is reopen the post-9/11 debate and
say what was the right thing to do for us to begin with, and
can we now do those right things.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Davis for five minutes--and it will be five
minutes this time.
Mr. Davis of Kentucky. I would like to turn the dialogue
inward for a moment, because I think Dr. Khan brings up a very
good point. We are mixing strategy and operations and tactics
here quite a bit in terms of as we discuss this. One center of
gravity of this dialogue internationally that is taking place
clearly is seen as the American people. Perceptions overseas
certainly are--and policies for that matter--are being derived
based on our reaction to certain things.
Our debates now, our troops all over the theater last week
were commenting to me about things they were watching on
television. Our comments are interpreted through the filters of
different cultures as well. My concern at the moment is one
that relates ironically back to the friendly discussion that I
had with the General earlier regarding our ability to integrate
and to cooperate effectively, which I believe is less a
personality issue and more a process issue--rightly the United
States government, but what is that now other than a bunch of
silos that don't work well together?
This is a question I would throw out to the group. I think
one thing that is critical regardless of what we do--and I
preface my remark by saying I do not believe that the President
right now has a lot of credibility with the American people to
be able to enunciate this vision of where we need to go,
regardless of what solution that is, whether it is the current
one or a new one.
But in reality, we have a deep-root problem of how do we
articulate to our people to give them context? When I meet with
the many families that I have of young people who have lost
their young men--and I meet with every one in the district--
they have a context, a very clear message articulated from that
young person back to them of the filter of their experience. It
is sober. It also has a message of understanding being part of
a bigger context.
In talking to people out in the street with no connection
with the military, there is a dissonance that is very real.
They don't understand the end-state of the policy. We talk
about intolerable casualties. What does that mean? I lost nine
of my West Point classmates. Nobody talked about them in the
past. That was intolerable to me. But in World War II, we lost
440,000 of our citizens out of a population of 130 million,
when 10 percent of our population was under arms. People
understood a context.
My question for you, to open it up, is most important of
all explaining to the American people in a democracy how do we
get to where we are by giving them a vision of what it needs to
be, not in generalities, but why--not just what--but why we are
doing what we are doing.
I will start with Dr. Khan.
Dr. Khan. Frankly, I don't understand, myself, why we are
doing what we are doing, because of what the President says and
what he does----
Mr. Davis of Kentucky. I agree. We have a broken process,
but what would you articulate specifically to the American
people?
Dr. Khan. I think there are a couple of things that we need
to understand. There is turmoil in the world and we have to
understand that as America we have an important role to play.
It is our responsibility to play the role of the underwriter of
stability in the world as a sort of police officer because we
benefit from stability in the world.
But we must also realize that the threat to the United
States is not just a threat to the U.S., but it is also a
threat to the global order that we exist as Americans and it is
our responsibility to try to understand this. But our response
has to be much more compassionate, much more understanding.
Like, for example, our immediate reaction was to seek
security for the United States by making everybody else feel
insecure. That is the biggest philosophical error that we have
committed. We should have fought for the security of all.
Everybody in the world should have felt secure by the
initiative that we would take in the post-9/11 world, and we
would have the world on our side. Even today when I go across
Europe, I find that even those who are fighting the war on
terror--the intelligence community, counterterrorism--they have
absolutely no cooperation from the U.S. The cooperation is one-
sided.
And all of these things continue to undermine our
unilateralism. The biggest thing that happened to the U.S. was
we were an invisible empire before 9/11. We showed our fangs
after 9/11 and nobody likes that. And how do we tell the
American people what happened?
Mr. Davis of Kentucky. And I appreciate that perspective.
General, what would your message be to the American people
if you had a clean slate completely, and were dealing with the
circumstance, to give them context of why we need to do
whatever that let's say next strategy would be?
General Clark. At this moment in history, the United States
is the preeminent power in the world. We can't be safe in our
own values and institutions and interests at home unless we
reach out and help others abroad. We need to be helping. We
need to be promoting and supporting our friends and those who
share our ideas. That is what we need to be doing.
Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Thank you.
Dr. Boot.
Mr. Boot. I agree that we have a vital and important role
to play in the world. I think our top priority at the moment
has to be to attain an acceptable solution in Iraq. I think it
is naive to think that we achieve our other objectives if
things come apart in Iraq in the middle of the Middle East.
Dr. Snyder. Dr. Gingrey for five minutes.
Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I want to say to Dr. Khan and to my colleagues on this
side--Mr. Davis--that he was talking about the President having
very little credibility. I would remind both of them and
everyone present that Abraham Lincoln, President Lincoln, in
1864 had very little credibility as well. President Truman
didn't have a lot of credibility in 1945. And here we are
talking about the court of public opinion.
I want to remind everybody that in April of 1941, 80
percent of the American people felt that we should not get
involved in the situation in Germany, and what was going on
within imperial Japan. That was 7 months before the unprovoked
attack on Pearl Harbor. So I just would throw those points out
there for food for thought and consideration.
I will direct my question to again, General Clark.
First of all, again let me just say that I appreciate your
forthrightness. I think if you looked up the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) report when you ran for President, you
probably wouldn't see me as a contributor. You may see Dr.
Khan's name, from some of the remarks that he has made.
But since you are not a candidate for President this time
around, let me ask you this question. You talked about the
stress and strain on the military and the end strength----
General Clark. I want to warn you. I haven't said I won't
run. [Laughter.]
Dr. Gingrey. Reclaiming my time, because you certainly seem
very prescient in regard to your plan. In fact, indeed, I think
that after we get General Petraeus's report, what it should
outline to us today at this hearing may very well be what the
Administration has in mind and needs to do. So I commend you
for that.
Now to my questions, though. In regard to the cost of the
war and the strain on our troops, do you think that we should
institute a war tax? And do you think we should reinstitute the
draft?
General Clark. I think that the United States needs to
distribute the burdens of the war more equitably. I don't have
any problems with asking the American people or elements of the
American people or through some mechanism to collect the
funding that is required.
The government is running a deficit right now. We are not
funding the full support of this war. I think we need to take a
real look at the cost. You know, the cost isn't $400 billion.
The cost is probably between $1.5 trillion and $2 trillion when
you look at the total cost of what is going to take to recover
from it. That cost is going to have to be recaptured. The
government should responsibly start doing that.
As far as the draft is concerned, I don't favor
conscription, but I do believe that it is the obligation of the
government to have the kind of dialogue about how we are going
to man and support our armed forces if the volunteer force
doesn't draw in the people we want, and if we sustain our
commitment there. I think it is our obligation to have that
dialogue before the armed forces fail.
Right now, I am concerned. I know quality men and women are
leaving. I know we are not getting the kinds of recruits we
need. More importantly, we are allowing the United States Army
to become unrepresentative of the United States of America. It
is the obligation of the Congress and the Administration to
raise those issues.
So I am not advocating conscription, but I am advocating a
dialogue about how we are going to maintain our troop strength
other than simply raising the enlistment and reenlistment
bonuses.
Dr. Gingrey. General, I thank you.
I have a little bit of time left, if Mr. Boot would like to
respond to the question, and Dr. Khan. I have 30 seconds left.
Mr. Boot. Your question is about the war tax and
conscription?
Dr. Gingrey. Absolutely.
Mr. Boot. I don't think under the present circumstances I
would favor either one, because I think that the economy is
proving to be very robust in the last few years, and though the
war is extremely costly, we are absorbing the cost from the
financial perspective from the economic perspective, and we are
continuing to grow very strongly.
Now, the cost in human terms is harder to absorb,
obviously--the loss of fine young men and women--but I don't
think there is much support in this country for conscription.
If you will recall, there was a vote a couple of years ago in
the House, and there was something like only members supported
the draft. So I don't think that is very likely.
Dr. Gingrey. I believe that my memory serves me correctly,
the two that supported it were the chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee, Representative Charlie Rangel, and also one of
the cardinals on defense appropriations, Mr. Jack Murtha.
Mr. Boot. Well, so it is hard to pass legislation that only
has two votes in Congress. So I don't think that is very
likely. But I think we do need to look at expanding the
recruiting base.
One of the things that I would look at is to lift the
prohibition that you currently have to have a green card in
order to enlist, because there are a lot of people who don't
have green cards, but who would like to become citizens. I
think a lot of them would be happy to--in fact we are
expediting citizenship procedures for a lot of people in
uniform. I think we can do even more to expand our recruiting
base.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Jones for five minutes.
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Boot, I do agree that we have a robust economy, but we
are borrowing money from China, Japan, and the UAE like we have
never borrowed before in the history of this country. We are
borrowing this money to help pay for the war in Iraq. There is
no question about it.
This is my question, I guess. I guess you saw each one of
you today in The Washington Post, CIA said instability seemed
to be irreversible. This was said in November of 2006. CIA
Director Hayden was speaking to the Iraq Study Group. I am not
going to read everything, but just a couple more points, and I
do have a question.
``The government is unstable to govern,'' Hayden concluded.
``We have spent a lot of energy and treasure creating a
government that is balanced, and it cannot function.'' He
further stated, ``A government that can govern, sustain and
defend itself is not achievable.'' He was talking about Iraq.
I am not taking a view, but the point is, and you know the
statement that we were given that raises the scenario of before
we went into Iraq. And I quote General Gregory Newbold, who I
have great respect for--a three-star Marine general that gave
up the fourth star: ``I was a witness and therefore a party to
the actions that led us to the invasion of Iraq an unnecessary
war. Inside the military family, I made no secret of my view
that the zealots' rationale for war made no sense--the neocons
that sold us this information and created the justification
that was never justified.''
My point and my question, and I will start with you, and we
have a little bit of time and everybody could speak to this.
You say that we have to stay the course. That sounds like the
President of the United States. We have to stay the course.
Well, with this nation going bankrupt, both treasure and men
and women, and you are opposed to a draft, how in the world and
what do you see as victory in Iraq?
Mr. Boot. First, Congressman, you are citing a CIA
prediction of what would happen in Iraq. I think as we have
seen in recent years, the CIA is hardly an infallible oracle
about what will happen in Iraq.
Mr. Jones. So is this Administration's policy.
Mr. Boot. I agree. I have been critical of the
Administration, too, but let me cite you another intelligence
estimate which was leaked almost a year ago from the chief
Marine intelligence officer in Anbar province, where he wrote
that Anbar province was lost; there was nothing we could do to
retrieve the situation in Anbar province.
Well, guess what? In the last year there has been a
turnaround which nobody expected. The unpredictable happens.
Mr. Jones. Okay. Please. Reclaiming my time. Go back,
because I want the other two gentlemen to speak, and give me
what you see and how you would explain to the American people
what the definition of ``victory'' is. How would you explain
what is ``victory'' in Iraq?
Mr. Boot. I think victory is a sustainable representative
government in Baghdad that is able to police its own soil and
to prevent international terrorist from using it as a staging
ground. I think that is essentially what we are looking for.
You are right about the cost of the war. It is heavy in both
blood and treasure.
In terms of the treasure, I think that is not to sustain,
given how robust our economy is and how strongly it is growing.
The question of the sacrifice of our young men and women is
harder to sustain, but the question we have to ask is: As
opposed to what? If we could end the war by simply pulling out
and everything would be great afterwards, I would say pull out.
But my concern is that we will lose far more people in the
future if we pull out today.
Mr. Jones. Reclaiming my time. First of all, the robust
economy is that to the Chinese we have sent thanks to two
Administrations more manufacturing jobs to China than we ever
have. We have had a classified briefing on Red China and how
much money they are putting into their navy and air force, and
most of that money is coming from the trade deficit with China
which is over $200 billion.
Real quickly, General, what would you say to the American
people?
Mr. Boot. If I could just for 30 seconds on the trade
deficit?
Mr. Jones. I am going to lose my time. Let the general
speak and then the doctor.
I mean, how would you explain victory so that we would
recognize it?
General Clark. Well, I don't think it is possible to at
this point claim there is going to be a victory in Iraq. I
think you have to ask, what is an acceptable condition that we
could live with. It us a government that doesn't harbor
terrorists, doesn't commit acts of aggression against other
states in the region, and that will participate in the normal
diplomatic intercourse and trade and so forth in the region.
That is all.
I don't think that you are going to get a long-term
sustainable representative government. I think it is unlikely.
If we got it, it would be great. I just think it is unlikely
and I don't think it is a condition for America's achievement
of what it needs to be able to pull back.
Dr. Snyder. Ms. Shea-Porter, for five minutes.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
After just six months being in Congress, I am amazed at the
contradictions I have heard in what has been said at all the
hearings I have attended.
Mr. Boot, you just talked about giving a green card to
people to fight for us. Now, either we have the will of the
American people which is essential for what you call
``victory'' or we don't. And recruiting people almost sends
kind of a mercenary, that somebody else will fight our wars for
us. First, we want to borrow the money to have the war, and
then we want to borrow the people from other nations to fight
the war.
So I guess my question to you is, earlier, you talked about
defeat. So exactly what is your idea? You use the word
``defeat,'' so how could you say that you would pull out if you
thought that would work, because wouldn't that be defeat?
And what about that debt that we have to other nations? You
talked about a robust economy, but you can ask anybody anywhere
around the country about--and by the way, I hear from my own
constituents all the time that we don't have money for the
hospitals; we don't have money for the infrastructure; we don't
have money for social programs, which is a direct result.
So what exactly are you proposing as your idea? And could
you also tell me where we would get the troops if we didn't
take them from other nations?
Mr. Boot. What I said was if we could pull out without
suffering a catastrophic defeat, I would favor a pull out, but
I am afraid that the pull out under those circumstances would
result in a defeat.
In terms of where we can get the troops, we Army has had
some strains on recruiting, but it has struggled to meet its
numbers for a few months, but overall year by year is has met
its numbers, where it has seen very strong reenlistment rates.
On July 4 in Baghdad, General Petraeus led one of the largest
reenlistment ceremonies we have ever had. The troops have been
extraordinary and dedicated and committed, and have stayed in
this fight.
Now, I mentioned the possibility of lifting the green card
requirement, which is something we have done in the past. You
can call people who serve in expectation of citizenship or for
some other reason. Without being citizens, you can call them
mercenaries if you want, but that would have to extend to
people like Lafayette and General Kosciuszko who helped us to
win independence or the many fresh immigrants off the boat from
Ireland and Germany and elsewhere who helped the Union to win
the Civil War. We have used troops born abroad many times in
the past. They are fighting today. We have many non-citizens in
the military today who are serving very valiantly.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Reclaiming my time. I think they were
fighting in our country on our soil for our effort.
Mr. Boot. They have also fought for us abroad in other
places as well.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Excuse me--our war. And here, I am just so
confused by this. I mean, I have to tell you that you are not
the only one who shifts the wording around, because in March
when I was in Baghdad we asked General Petraeus how much time
did you need. And he said at that time, early summer, and he
would know clearly whether it was working or not, the surge.
And he used the word ``surge,'' and I have trouble remembering
which surge you are talking about, because we have had quite a
few surges.
Mr. Boot. The one that started on February 15.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Okay, because you named another one that
you dated back to June. But the issue is that----
Mr. Boot. The surge of operations--Operation Phantom
Thunder started on June 15 using the surge force----
Ms. Shea-Porter. This is the problem I think that we are
having, that we are talking past one another. But it is really
way past time to stop saying General Petraeus deserves more
time. It is interchangeable, depending--Secretary Gates
deserves more time.
Deserves more time for what? What we are asking right now
is for a responsible strategy to not necessarily win in the
terms that you use, but certainly stabilize Iraq. The very
first hearing that I attended we asked what the goal was--this
was back in January--and it was to stabilize Iraq. Nobody used
the word ``military victory'' except the President. It is
stabilize Iraq.
So how can we have a dialogue here--what can we really do
that would get at that sort of----
Mr. Boot. You won't find anything about the surge strategy.
The President has launched a new strategy. I was very critical
of his previous strategy a year ago. We have started a new
strategy. The surge of forces began on February 15. The last
troops in the surge arrived in mid-June. Operations using those
troops began on June 15. That is why I said it is too soon to
judge the results of the surge. However, there are a lot of
early indications have been positive, as I mentioned before.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Reclaiming my time. We are in year five of
this war--year five.
I yield back.
Dr. Snyder. Ms. Davis, are you just dying to ask a
question?
Ms. Davis of California. I really was, just in terms of
numbers, because one of the I think concerns that people have
was that the surge was likely too little and too late. Had
there been the ability of more troops, longer deployments, God
forbid--I mean, would we be in a different position even today
in your estimation than we are had we actually truly surged
with a lot more troops?
General Clark. I am not sure if the occupation was ever
going to succeed once we used military force, disbanded the
army, and let the anti-Baathists take charge. At that point, it
was just a matter of time. What we had to have done is thought
through the occupation, pre-identified that people who were
going to be important movers and shakers on the ground, the
institutions that had to be retained, the city leaders that had
to be identified--and dealt with those people.
It wasn't just a matter of troop strength, but it was
partly a matter of troop strength. It was more an attitude of
just total misunderstanding of the situation. To be instructive
on this, you should look at how the Soviet Union occupied
eastern Poland in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. It is an
amazing example of how one country can take. They knew every
village. They knew every enemy. They had special parties
designated. They had prepared for this. We did not prepare.
So the idea of maybe it would have been different if we had
three or four--maybe. But what we really needed was to
understand the situation.
Dr. Snyder. The timing is good.
Gentlemen, we appreciate you being here. That was a good
discussion. I want you to feel free, if things come to mind and
you would like to have an addendum written statement, you
submit that and it will be made a full part of the record and
be distributed to members of the committee.
Members may also have questions they would like you to
respond to for the record. We hope that we can get those in a
timely fashion.
With that, the committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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