THE USE OF IN LIEU OF, AD HOC
AND AUGMENTEE FORCES IN
OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDOM
AND IRAQI FREEDOM

HEARING
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OF THE
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FIRST SESSION
HEARING HELD
JULY 31, 2007

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### TUESDAY, JULY 31, 2007

**THE USE OF IN LIEU OF, AD HOC AND AUGMENTEE FORCES IN OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDOM AND IRAQI FREEDOM**

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THE USE OF IN LIEU OF, AD HOC AND AUGMENTEE FORCES IN OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDOM AND IRAQI FREEDOM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE,

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon P. Ortiz (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. ORTIZ. This hearing will come to order.

I know we are few, but we have got the most important members this morning here. [Laughter.]

I thank your distinguished witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today to talk about the employment of airmen and sailors in combat and combat support roles outside their services’ traditional core missions. We also will be looking at whether sailors and airmen are adequately trained and equipped for these predominantly Army missions in both theaters of operations.

Today, we will examine the impact on readiness of using airmen and sailors in place, as individual augmentees to, or as ad hoc replacements for soldiers and Marines. Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have created continuing high demand for certain combat support and combat service support skills. Needed skills include civil affairs for post-reconstruction teams, intelligence and counter intelligence, medical, communications, logistics, construction, engineering, and security forces.

Facing shortages of available personnel in some skills, the Department of Defense (DOD) has used strategies such as reassigning and retraining service personnel to meet the combat commanders’ requirements, especially in Central Command’s areas of responsibility. The role of the services in augmenting emergency forces has expanded as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan continue. Joint Forces Command has stated a fiscal year 2008 requirement of 17,376 service in lieu of (ILO) commitments.

In addition to support from the other services, the Army is providing its own soldiers to fill shortage requirements through the use of individual augmentation and changing the mission of units. Currently, the Army estimates that there are 2,000 individual augmentee soldiers in Central Command’s area of responsibility.
Fifty percent of these soldiers are mid-grade officers, captain through lieutenant colonel.

The subcommittee will be interested in hearing about the net effect on readiness of pulling so many mid-career officers out of their units to support the war. The Navy began providing sailors to augment Army forces in the summer of 2005 at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). To date, more than 46,000 sailors have been transferred from their normal jobs to support joint service requirements.

In fiscal year 2004, the Air Force ILO level was 1,905. This has grown to more than 5,300 airmen now serving in ILO positions. Furthermore, the Air Force estimates that 19,963 airmen are needed to sustain a 2:1 dwell ratio if current manning requirements continue.

Because our research on this issue has shown differences in how the services approach ILO training, equipping and tracking, the subcommittee is concerned that service members are receiving training that is to task or limited by time versus training to combat proficiency.

Among the questions we hope to answer today are: Who is responsible for establishing baseline training standards? What checks are in place to ensure that sailors and airmen are adequately trained for the mission they will perform when deployed? What is the feedback loop upon deployment to determine if the sailors and airmen were fully trained for the mission they were sent to perform?

Government Accountability Office (GAO) has pointed out that there are issues with equipment, where ILO sailors and airmen trained on equipment that was inconsistent with the equipment being used by existing ground forces. The subcommittee will need to know: How are ILOs equipped? Is the equipment identical to what ground forces in-theater have, and if not, why not? What methods are the services using to ensure that deploying ILO units will have the equipment they need for pre-deployment training and in-theater missions?

The subcommittee also is concerned about the strain on readiness and the increased risk to national security created by taking soldiers, sailors, and airmen out of their core service roles. Service members could potentially miss training and other opportunities to enhance their careers in their parent services. Recruiting and retention could be hindered because potential recruits or experienced personnel may not want to retrain for missions and skills other than those they originally planned to perform.

The chair now recognizes the distinguished friend from the great state of New Jersey, Mr. LoBiondo.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK A. LOBIONDO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Chairman Ortiz. I appreciate very much your holding this hearing today.

Congressman McKeon asked me to apologize to you. He had a floor schedule on the House floor and asked me to sit in in his place. With your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, Mr. McKeon had an opening statement that I would like to make on his behalf.
He starts off by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this timely and important hearing on joint force sourcing solutions. This is a very complex subject. And it is one that I believe the subcommittees must understand in order to adequately assess and support the readiness of our forces.

In spite of the tremendous combat capability that our military can bring to bear, the war we are fighting today has placed unique demands on the Department of Defense. Combatant commanders have had to augment their traditional toolkits of the infantry, the artillery, and the blue-water Navy. They now have requirements for forensic teams to do post-recovery inspections of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), security forces with skills in detainee or convoy operations, and civil affairs experts to support provincial reconstruction teams.

While these duties are aligned with the military missions in the Central Command area of responsibility, they were not readily available to the force we ended the Cold War with. In order to meet these mission requirements, the Department of Defense has developed an in lieu of sourcing solution. It is my understanding that the department estimates that over 17,000 personnel will be part of the in lieu of sourcing solutions for fiscal year 2008.

Although the services claim that over 90 percent of those personnel will be fulfilling missions related to their core competencies, all of these personnel will be tasked to perform their mission outside the operating environment their fundamental training was centered on.

Today, our military men and women face a complex battle space. The remissioning, retraining, and joint sourcing of in lieu of forces greatly adds to that complexity. While this sourcing solution may not be optimum, it is necessary to meet the emerging requirements of the war on terror.

In my view, the role of this subcommittee is to ensure that the personnel asked to fill these in lieu of missions and emerging assignments are properly trained and fully equipped to accomplish their missions.

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today and am particularly interested in learning more about the in lieu of sourcing progress, the training protocols, and the Administration and support of personnel once they arrive in the theater of operations.

It is extremely important that these augmentees are properly prepared for the mission they are assigned to undertake, and it is equally important that the gaining commanders are well aware of the capabilities and limitations of the augmentees assigned to their command.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for holding this hearing. I look forward to hearing the testimony.

Mr. Ortiz. Thank you for your statement.

Today, we have a panel of distinguished witnesses representing the Central Command, Joint Forces Command, and the services will address the use, training and equipping of in lieu of service personnel.

Our witnesses are Brigadier General Jack B. Egginton, U.S. Air Force, Deputy Director of Operations for the United States Central Command; Major General Jason K. Kamiya, U.S. Army, Director of

Without objection, the witnesses’ full testimonies will be accepted for the record.

General Egginton, if you can begin with your testimony, and then be followed by General Kamiya, General Halverson, Admiral Giardina, and General Gibson in that order.

So you can begin, General, whenever you are ready.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. JACK B. EGGINTON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE

General EGGINTON. Thank you very much. Good morning, Chairman Ortiz, honorable members of the subcommittee. Thanks for the opportunity to meet with you today to talk about the in lieu of forces that are supporting the Central Command (CENTCOM) so honorably. It is a pleasure to be with you today, and I thank you for this opportunity.

It is my understanding that you want to hear how these forces are performing in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. We will discuss that as we go.

Overall, CENTCOM is extremely satisfied with the performance of the in lieu of forces that are supporting the combatant commanders on the ground in those three areas of responsibility (AORs). Not only do these units greatly assist in force flow gap mitigation, but in lieu of forces have demonstrated an exceptional level of expertise and professionalism while performing these capabilities that are often in short supply in the United States Army.

Additionally, in lieu of U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard personnel bring additional knowledge and skill sets to the fight based on their augmented experiences from their civilian careers, which is greatly appreciated.

The bottom line requirement for CENTCOM in dealing and working with the in lieu of trained folks is that they be manned, equipped, trained, and certified prior to deployment and to perform their duties when they come to the AOR. I am happy to report that, by and large, we are very satisfied and those forces are performing honorably when they come and support us in CENTCOM.

Sir, I thank you for this opportunity to speak to you and the subcommittee and I look forward to answering any questions you may have as we proceed.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Egginton can be found in the Appendix on page 33.]

Mr. ORTIZ. General.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JASON K. KAMIYA, DIRECTOR, JOINT TRAINING AND JOINT WARFIGHTING CENTER, U.S. ARMY

General Kamiya, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, on behalf of General Lance Smith, the commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), I want to thank you for allowing me to appear before you today.

The readiness of the men and women of our nation's armed forces is our number one priority. This is a task that cannot be overstated, and we appreciate the hard work of this subcommittee and the U.S. Congress in this regard.

Personally, I believe that I am extremely fortunate to serve as JFCOM's director of joint training, where I can apply the hard lessons learned during my recent service as the commander of an 18,000-service member U.S. and coalition joint task force in Afghanistan from March 2005 to February 2006.

Force preparation and readiness we believe is intrinsically linked to unit notification and stabilization. The combined work of the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JFCOM, our combatant commands, our components, and the services to the global force management process is expected to bring an increased level of predictability, which should enhance training.

Our vision is holistic, a holistic approach that links force generation, force management, and training. JFCOM is committed to providing an agile, comprehensive training environment that prepares our leaders, our units, and individuals for the tough missions they have ahead. Your support in Congress is essential to getting this right.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for approving my witness statement for inclusion in the record. I stand by for your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Kamiya can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, sir.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. DAVID D. HALVERSON, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, READINESS AND MOBILIZATION, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G–3/5/7, U.S. ARMY

General Halverson, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for my opportunity to appear before you today and discuss how the Army supports in lieu of sourcing and provides individual augmentation in support of the combatant commanders' requirements.

On behalf of the secretary of the Army, Mr. Pete Geren, and Chief of Staff of the Army General George Casey and the approximately 1 million active, Guard and Reservists that comprise the Army, more than 145,000 of whom are serving in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, I welcome the opportunity to discuss this important topic. The Army remains committed to providing the combatant commander with the best-trained, the best-equipped, and the best-led force in the world.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, thank you for your service to this committee and the considerable support you provide
the United States Army. I do look forward to answering your questions during our time today.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Halverson can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. TIMOTHY M. GIARDINA, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION, PLANS, AND SECURITY DIVISION

Admiral Giardina. Good morning, Chairman Ortiz, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the training, equipping, and employment of our sailors in combat support roles.

As we continue to support this effort, we are maintaining our core mission areas and level of readiness to meet our global security requirements. While many of these missions do not fall within our core mission areas, we continue to provide a wide variety of sourcing solutions where shortfalls exist in the joint force.

Utilizing our sailors' core skills and additional training provided by the Army trainers, our sailors are performing very well. By leveraging the Army's existing expertise in training of personnel for combat support and combat service support missions, Navy is provided trained personnel as part of the total force solution.

We will continue to provide augmentees, principally to relieve stress on those ground forces where it makes sense, and to provide forces where emerging missions do not cleanly fall into any service-specific core mission areas.

To be clear, we are not creating combat soldiers. We are providing personnel to combat support and combat service support missions, and these sailors are making significant contributions. As testified by the vice chief of naval operations recently, Navy's current readiness posture remains excellent.

Congressional support has been outstanding and critical to this success, and in this regard has resulted in Navy units and individual augmentees to deploy combat ready, properly trained, and properly equipped. Navy stands ready to respond to the full spectrum of assigned missions.

I appreciate your support, and I stand ready to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Giardina can be found in the Appendix on page 52.]

Mr. Ortiz. Thank you.

General Gibson.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. MARKE F. GIBSON, DIRECTOR OF CURRENT OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS, AND REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR FORCE

General Gibson. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, my name is Brigadier General Marke Gibson. I am currently the director of Air Force current ops and training. With regards to today's topic, I served in Iraq from 2003 to 2004 as the first Air Force commander of ILO forces.
Thank you for the opportunity today to appear before you to discuss Air Force in lieu of taskings and other programs that are important to your Air Force and to our nation. I proudly report that your Air Force remains fully engaged around the world, fighting terrorism and insurgents in the global war on terror, while fulfilling our roles as airmen in the joint team.

Simultaneously, we stand prepared for rapid deployment to respond to any global crisis as part of our nation’s strategic reserve. We fly, fight and dominate in three warfighting domains: air, space, and cyberspace, giving the United States sovereign options to employ military force like no other nation in the world.

Of the 25,453 airmen deployed to CENTCOM AOR, 6,293 are considered to be filling ILO tasks, mostly, in lieu of Army specialists. Since 2004, we have deployed approximately 22,000 airmen to perform ILO tasks.

Also, ILO tasks to the Air Force have been increasing 33 percent annually through this year 2007, in which the increase was 57 percent. The U.S. Air Force also fills another 1,880 joint manned positions with Air Reserve component individual augmentees, which has increased approximately 10 percent per year since 2003.

These ILO tasks draw from across the board of Air Force specialty codes to include civil affairs, public affairs, judge advocate, chaplain, intelligence, counterintelligence, medical, communications, logistics, engineering, security forces, and operations. Currently, 87 percent of our ILO task airmen work joint-sourcing solutions in line with their core competencies. The remaining 13 percent are part of the retraining ad hoc teams who are serving outside their core competency.

Your Air Force takes great pride in serving and defending our great nation. We take every measure to ensure that our airmen are organized, trained, and equipped to perform the CENTCOM requirements and mission with competence.

However, there is a growing cost to ILO tasks to our Air Force, especially when they fall outside our airmen’s core competencies—costs in both manpower to effect the training and costs to the Air Force core competencies. These costs impact overall readiness and our ability to respond to unforeseen circumstances such as providing humanitarian assistance or supporting other operational surges.

This concludes my remarks. I have provided a more extensive statement and ask that it be included in the record. I will be happy to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Gibson can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]

Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much.

I see this hearing this morning as one of the most important hearings that I have had, at least since becoming chairman of this committee. This is important for many reasons. I know that if the war goes on, strategies have been changed, actors have been changed.

General Gibson and Admiral Giardina, are the airmen and sailors who have been killed in Iraq, are you confident that they all received the necessary training? And that the training they re-
ceived was adequate to prepare them for the missions to which they were assigned?

General GIBSON. Sir, I will take your question first.

Yes, sir. As you alluded, this is an evolving fight, and has been. The enemy's tactics and techniques have evolved and continue to change, and therefore ours need to, as well, both in our tactics and in our equipment.

But to date, I am pleased to report to you that I think as our airmen go out in support in these in lieu of taskings, that they are receiving the best training and equipment that our nation has to offer.

Mr. ORTIZ. Admiral.

Admiral GIARDINA. Mr. Chairman, the limited number of casualties the Navy has had in response to these missions, we believe that the training was adequate. These forces received all scheduled training and it was conducted to standard.

Mr. ORTIZ. You know, how do we know, and let me begin with this question now. How long—because, do you change the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) or they keep the same MOS? What if they go from one job to another one? Do they change MOS's or they keep the same MOS that they had prior to being an augmentee?

General GIBSON. Sir, in the case of the Air Force, they don't change AFSCs or Air Force specialty codes, MOS if you will, because they are filling an in lieu of tasking.

Admiral GIARDINA. Sir, for the Navy, it kind of depends on what they are doing. If they are doing something that is directly in line with their core competency, for instance an Individual Augmentee (IA) on a staff fulfilling a mission that they would normally do, there is no change in MOS or officer designator or NEC, Navy enlisted classification.

For some of the specialized training that is done to track that, the personnel command has added tracking systems to actually change the MOS, but it is more of an additional qualification designation as opposed to a change in their permanent core competency.

Mr. ORTIZ. Now when I was in the military, that was a long time ago. It took us at least 16 weeks to get our MOS. How long are you training those augmentees before they go to their place, after you augment somebody? What is the training, and where do they get their training?

General GIBSON. Sir, in the case of the Air Force, of course they have received their basic Air Force functional and underlying training. They receive, as a minimum, 19 hours of local training as refreshers in all those kinds of courses, everything from medical support combat buddy care and those types of things.

They then cut over to, in this case, most of our in lieu of taskings in support of the Army, to one of their nine training locations in which they receive an additional, I think the vast majority of the syllabus are five weeks of additional specialized training unique to that mission and task that they are going to be asked to fulfill.

Mr. ORTIZ. I am sorry, the training is being conducted where?

General GIBSON. Right now, across nine locations within the Army, sir.
Mr. Ortiz. In the United States?

General Gibson. Yes, sir. There is some additional training that is offered as required and, as permitted, within the AOR in the sense of refresher and top-off training.

Mr. Ortiz. Admiral.

Admiral Giardina. Yes, sir. From a Navy perspective, it kind of depends on exactly what they are doing, but at the very minimum the training that all of the Navy folks get is about a two-week course. All of our training, the Navy does through agreement with the Army and is being either conducted under the purview of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC, or Army Forces Command.

Navy individual augmentee training course, NIACT, is conducted at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. It is Army trainers who actually conduct that training. The training is as specified by the combatant commander, in this case CENTCOM, and provides those requirements. The Navy validates that training, and we have personnel on-site at NIACT to ensure that that training is conducted.

Once they have completed that course of instruction, if that is all that they are going to need because they are working within a skill-set that they don't need additional training, then they go in-country. And then the combatant commander has additional training that is conducted in the CENTCOM AOR to their specification.

Now, for Navy missions where it is an ad hoc training and it is a different mission set, what is essentially done is we take commensurate training that the Army would provide to Army forces that are conducting similar missions. And again through not just Fort Jackson, South Carolina, but a number of Army bases, again either under the Training and Doctrine Command or Forces Command. They conduct that training with our liaison there, and the training conducted is exactly the same training that they would conduct for soldiers going to do similar missions. Then, they would also have the follow-on training in-country.

Mr. Ortiz. I have some more questions, but let me yield to my good friend from New Jersey for any questions that he might have.

Mr. Lobiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Some of this overlaps with what the chairman was just asking about, but it seems to me that the training has to accommodate varying degrees of skill or level of experience and how that gets integrated into what is expected.

What checks are in place to ensure that the sailors and airmen are adequately trained for the mission that they are going to be deployed for? Is there some standard or some checklist that somehow is out there? This is for anyone.

General Gibson. Sir, I will step up initially on that one.

From the Air Force perspective, through our chief, we have established through our training command down to Second Air Force at Keesler Air Force Base a team that is dedicated to ensuring that the training is adequate, meeting Combatant Command (COCOM) requirements, and is standardized.

When those airmen travel to one of those nine locations to train with the Army, we have detachments forward that work in conjunction with the Army trainers on the syllabus and course of training and to ensure that those airmen are meeting the same
standards any other soldier or sailor would need to meet to go forward and do that mission and task. And then it is constantly in a feedback loop, if you will.

We evaluate their sense at court completion, at between 45 and 60 days when they have been deployed, and then upon completion of their tour—again, continually having that dialogue with the COCOM also to make sure that those forces are meeting their needs.

Mr. LoBiondo. You covered what my second question was going to be on the feedback loop, so that is something that is constant in the beginning and throughout.

Who tracks whether the individual augmentees, not those with a remissioned unit, are completing each of their training requirements before they arrive in-theater? How does that work?

Anyone?

General Kamiya. Sir, the current process is that the providing service certifies that individual’s basic combat skill competencies. The gaining service, in the case of the Air Force and Navy, when they go to an Army training base, for example, for additional training, the Army in that case would certify to the parent service that that functional competency has been trained to standard.

It remains up to the parent service to certify that individual, or in some cases units, are certified read for combat in accordance with the combatant commander requirements. Hopefully, that clarifies this. So it was always the parent service that certifies that the individual and units have met all training requirements for deployment to the CENTCOM area of operations.

Mr. LoBiondo. GAO has pointed out that there appear to be some issues with equipment where in lieu of and individual augmentees of sailors and airmen trained on equipment that was inconsistent with equipment being used by existing ground forces. Is that accurate from your point of view?

Anyone?

Admiral Giardina. From a Navy perspective, the equipping of our sailors is done by the Army and it is done to the same standard for Army forces fulfilling similar roles and missions. So to my knowledge, all of the equipping has been to that standard.

Mr. LoBiondo. So the equipment that sailors and airmen are training on is the same equipment that they are going to find in-theater? Is that all of your understandings?

General Egginton. By and large, that is true. As they come into theater, they may have modified or improved systems that have not been distributed throughout the training process, but when they come in they will get top-off training.

In Kuwait, for example, IED and counter-IED devices and that sort of thing that are the latest developments with the latest software upgrades and that sort of thing, so they get hands-on training, real time prior to going forward.

Mr. LoBiondo. And last couple of questions, Mr. Chairman.

I am curious about how you would categorize the morale by those that are affected by the in lieu of. How do you find this?

I know that I have a dad of one of the soldiers that has some question marks about how the soldier feels.
Can you comment from your experience on the morale aspect of this?

General EGGINTON. Sir, from my perspective, speaking to airmen and sailors and the folks that are doing things they don't normally do in their core competencies that, by and large, they are excited about the opportunity to serve in some capacity in direct support to the combat operation.

Some folks in the transportation business, for example, back home are normally either driving a truck in the local area or working logistics issues in the office. They receive this training, for example, Camp Bullis for the Air Force elements that come over, on the securing convoy support role. They come over there and they are excited about the opportunity.

I had previous commands, and many folks would come back from their deployment beaming about their opportunity to serve in that capacity. Commanding convoys through the combat zone, a lieutenant logistics officer that normally would never think when she came into the military as a second lieutenant she would ever have the opportunity to serve in that kind of capacity, and comes back with a bronze star for heroism for the efforts that she did. The training she received at Camp Bullis prepared her to do that.

We grow and we evolve and we learn new skills in the process of doing this, and it has been a morale builder for the most part with anybody I have ever talked to.

General HALSEY. Sir, if I could just articulate a little bit. That is a good question because I think leadership has to stay engaged to ensure they know the task purpose and why they are doing it. Many times, you have artillery units that are now doing security force missions that have had to do those things.

Obviously, in high-spectrum type of things, they would want to be shooting their howitzers or doing those aspects because that is what they came in and that is what they picked from their source and their commission or whatever.

So if they do that, you have to balance that out to ensure that this is either a one-time in lieu of-type thing. Then he can get you back into that training that you are set for. But obviously, you have to make sure. And us in the Army, especially as we are in not only the counterinsurgency fight that we are in today, but if we have to be prepared for another scenario, you have to invest in it. And that is the degradation of readiness at times that we just have to be cognizant of in this consistent conflict that is going on.

So good leadership in telling the task purpose and articulating that to our junior leaders are very, very important because they may have concerns because they are not doing their artillery missions. But getting them in there and working on those core competencies tasks are very important for us. We keep a good pulse on that, but it is a great concern of us to make sure that we stay focused on all those tasks.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Admiral.

Admiral GIARDINA. From a Navy standpoint, I think the vast majority of our sailors feel that they are contributing to important missions in a wide variety of mission areas. They look at it as an opportunity to contribute. I think when you look at our accession
numbers, readiness numbers, attrition throughout the pipeline in the entire chain, they remain positive.

The chief of naval operations, the vice chief, and other senior leaders when they have testified have consistently stated the good morale that the Navy sailors have had. My personal observation has been the same, including individual augmentees from my staff that have gone, and I maintain a relationship with them, and it is very positive.

So, yes, sir, I think it is very positive morale at this point.

Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ortiz. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. Taylor. I want to thank each of you gentlemen for being here and for your service to our nation. I have to admit my disappointment in your opening statements. I really felt like you told us almost nothing.

One of the things that I have hopefully learned from your counterparts over the years is the importance of training as a unit, teamwork, getting very good at something.

What I fear is happening in the case of these augmentees is you are losing all of that. I remember reading Stephen Ambrose’s “Citizen Soldiers” where he talks about the appalling rates of casualties among the replacements that, unlike the original teams that went in and trained for years together, the augmentees did not have a sense of connection with the rest of the unit. Guys didn’t tend to look out for them as much. They didn’t really know what they were doing, and they suffered a disproportionately high percentage of casualties.

So my question is, has anyone tracked the casualties among the IAs to see if they are suffering a disproportionately high percentage of casualties?

General, to your point, I have been to Camp Shelby several times. I was there about a year ago April, and I remember a young guardsman who was getting ready to leave for Afghanistan the following Monday—this is a Friday. I asked him if he had trained on a jammer. What is your job? “I am a Humvee driver.” Have you trained on a jammer? His answer was, “What is that?”

Now, this is a guy who has trained for months at Camp Shelby before he is going to Afghanistan, so if that guy hasn’t trained on a jammer prior to deploying, what kind of a chance does an IA have who might have been a boatswain mate one day and is driving a truck the next day, or a sonar technician? Who is tracking this?

I will open that up. Let’s start by service, is anyone tracking the casualties of your IAs to see if they are suffering a disproportionately high percentage of casualties?

General Gibson. Sir, I will open for the Air Force. To date, our best numbers are that we have had approximately 152 of our ILO-related airmen suffer casualties, various forms of those; 13 have been killed since February 2004 when we began. Frankly, I can’t comment today on whether that is disproportionate to our other folks that are forward or not.

Mr. Taylor. Okay, General Gibson, for the record, I would like that figure.

General Gibson. Yes, sir. I will take that for the record.
Mr. TAYLOR. Of the total airmen in-theater, total IAs in-theater, total casualties with the total force, total casualties for the IAs.

General GIBSON. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 88.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral.

And for the record, I would like that for each of the services that are represented today. If you have that number off the top of your head, I would like to hear it now.

Admiral.

Admiral GIARDINA. Yes, Mr. Taylor. I will provide for the record the actual numbers with a breakdown for the entire theater.

At this point, in lieu of forces the Navy has had three casualties. Two of those casualties were as a result of IEDs from convoy operations, and one was in a combat fire situation where a service member suffered smoke inhalation. Those are the only three IA casualties that we have had to date.

I will provide that for the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 88.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, sir.

General.

General HALVERSON. Sir, I don’t have the specific number that you want. You know, we have had about 36 and 147 casualties in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) since the start of the war. The majority of those are not individual augmentees because the majority of those are on staffs or filling other things.

There have been some incidents where indirect fire and those types of actions have actually hurt some of our individual augmentees. But we do track it very carefully at the combat readiness centers at Fort Benning and Fort Bliss, and they go through and track exactly what they do.

We have a very maturing approach where they do have much more detailed IED situational awareness, combat life saver awareness if they are hurt, and then also their awareness on indirect fires and all those react-to-contact and stuff—because obviously IEDs have been the majority killer for us in-theater.

So we have a very thorough approach. One, they do it prior, and then a good course where they have to go through deliberate aspects with those individual augmentees.

Then we certify that they have received the training, and then they will not fly over until we know that they have gone through the course and passed each of their records of the courses or gone through the individual training, weapons qualifications, and all those types of things. And then they will fly over. But I will get you the specific number, because we do have that data. I just don’t have it with me today.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 88.]

Mr. TAYLOR. General.

General KAMIYA. Sir, it is USJFCOM’s responsibility, in concert with CENTCOM, to continually look at the conditions under which the tasks that CENTCOM has defined as theater-specific individ-
ual readiness training tasks, are relevant to the operational environment. I explained this to others akin to, it is one thing to learn how to drive, but as you adjust the conditions, it is another thing to drive in inclement weather or in heavy density traffic.

So it is this aspect of training that I think that JFCOM has a big set of responsibilities, again working with CENTCOM, to ensure that the task prescribed by the combatant commander, as those tasks are mandatory for any service member, regardless of functional specialty, no matter where they are going to be working in the CENTCOM AOR, to make sure that those tasks are relevant.

But more importantly, to make sure the conditions under which those tasks are to be executed is accurately described to the services, so that they can look at and assess if the task and the way they train under the Title X responsibilities are in fact meeting CENTCOM’s requirements. If not, to conduct the assessment to see where gaps may exist and apply resources accordingly. So this is where I believe the Joint Force Command has a huge responsibility.

In partnership with the services, we do a lot of circulation among all the AORs to talk to service members or talk to unit commanders, et cetera. We provide their assessments, their boots-on-the-ground assessments to the services and to CENTCOM and use this information to make sure that our training programs, joint training programs, as well as the service programs that we help enable, remain relevant to the force.

So there is a lot of ongoing work, sir, with ensuring that the training continually evolves in task, in conditions, and in standards to make sure that the way these individuals train back here in CONUS prior to deployment is in fact the most up-to-date as possible.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, what is a reasonable amount of time to expect those numbers from you? Is a working week a reasonable amount of time?

General HALVERSON. Yes, sir. We have that data. We just need to pull it——

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 88.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you again. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ. Ms. Boyda.

Mrs. BOYDA. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you again, all of you, for your service.

My question is just generally, were we to leave everything the way that it is working right now, a year from now, are you going to be pretty satisfied with where we will be a year from now with regard to the ILOs and individual augmentation?

So were we to make no changes with regard to any of these policies, how would it affect, or what do you think you will be saying a year from now?

General GIBSON. I will respond initially for the Air Force, ma’am. I think I can speak on behalf of our chief and secretary that we are proud to be part of this joint fight. But over time, we would
like to continue to get back into those functions that are matched with our core competencies within the Air Force, and make that contribution and continually try to resolve, as the ground component grows, to get out of those duties and tasks that are not within our core competencies.

Mrs. BOYDA. Just for the record, let me be a little clearer on this. So were that not to happen, is it just that it wouldn’t be—what do you think would actually—where do you think you would be, the Air Force would be a year from now? What would the consequences of no change in policy mean to you specifically?

General GIBSON. Ma’am, I am not sure I am prepared to speculate. We have a plan now over the next 12 months I think that will continue to pull us out of those non-core competency contributions to the joint fight and the COCOM requirements. So we are already on that ramp to do that. But clearly, we stand ready to contribute.

Mrs. BOYDA. I appreciate that. So you are saying the ILOs are ready to start ramping down and everybody has agreed on a plan that that will somewhat start to ramp the other direction instead of ramping forward? Is that what I am hearing?

General GIBSON. Yes, ma’am. We have been doing that for some time now.

Mrs. BOYDA. Excellent.

Admiral GIARDINA. Ma’am, from the Navy perspective, the chief of naval operations has offered his continued support as long as the conflict goes to where Navy can help out in the ground-centric areas that we are currently helping. Right now, as a percentage of the total force, the in lieu of and augmentation-type missions are between two percent and three percent of our forces, a fairly small contribution when taking the whole force into account.

So from a standpoint of service readiness, the Navy will continue to stay ready with the funding support that we need to meet all of our obligations. I fully expect that the chief of naval operations will continue to support these missions.

Mrs. BOYDA. So, again, let me just see if I understand what you are saying. A year from now, were it to continue this way, it might not be the best of scenarios, but you don’t think that we need to make any adjustments? Or that, basically, that certainly war is a time when people make their adjustments and their sacrifices.

Do you think that we need to make any policy adjustment between now and then that would in fact make the situation any better?

Admiral GIARDINA. From a standpoint of what we are here to discuss today from augmentation to the ground-centric missions, we will continue to refine our training processes, as General Kamiya has mentioned, refine the conditions and standards. We have continual feedback loops at every phase of that process. There will be continued growth and improvement of our readiness and training in that area.

But from a standpoint of changing the direction, the demand signal that we are seeing from the Central Command is pretty much constant as far as we can see on our time horizon. It looks like about 10,000 Navy folks for the foreseeable future. That is what we are planning. And from a standpoint of the readiness impact, the Navy stands fully ready to do all of our other assigned missions.
Mrs. BOYDA. Does it have any impact on recruitment or on retention?

Admiral GIARDINA. The most recent retention numbers, which I don't have here with me, indicate that we are not seeing a significant negative change. We are meeting our overall numbers. There are a couple of areas that we are a couple of percentage points short of goal, but in general we have not seen a negative impact on retention.

From recruitment, there is only a certain manpower pool out there. It is kind of fixed and we are all competing to get our fair share of that, if you will. We continue to struggle in some very narrow areas that tend to be in high demand, but in general our recruiting numbers are still pretty good.

Mrs. BOYDA. Any additional comments, General, from the Air Force's standpoint?

General GIBSON. Yes, ma'am. We are continuing to meet our retention goals as it stands now, but anecdotally, we are very concerned. I can say that Air Force leadership——

Mrs. BOYDA. I am sorry. Anecdotally you are very concerned about——

General GIBSON. In the sense that I think there are statements out there and concerns among leadership that the ILO task in the conflict will begin to have a negative retention effect. To date, we have not seen that. However, I assure you Air Force leadership is very focused on that to make sure that we are able to walk our way through that.

Mrs. BOYDA. Okay. I just want to thank you all for your straightforward testimony during the questions. Thank you.

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, first of all, thank all of you for your service and for being here. I want to go back to the chairman's initial question and kind of revisit it, because I have a large military presence in my district. I really haven't received feedback from the families of service members complaining that they lacked the proper training to go into theater.

I would like to ask each of you, but specifically starting off with you, General. Are you of the opinion that you have sent any service members into theater that were ill-prepared, did not have the skill sets necessary to carry out their duties once in theater? General Kamiya.

General KAMIYA. Sir, we receive constant feedback from the services through JFCOM components on the readiness of their forces, individuals as well as units. To date, we have not received any indication that any individual or service member is being deployed overseas to the CENTCOM area of operation not prepared.

Mr. ROGERS. Would you send a service member into theater that you felt was not prepared with the skill sets necessary to carry out their duty?

General KAMIYA. Sir, I can't speak for the individual service chiefs, but as a former commander myself, I would not deploy someone to the combat theater of operation if they did not meet his combat skill requirements or functional competence requirements.

Mr. ROGERS. Have you, to your knowledge, done that?
General Kamiya. No, sir. I have not.

Mr. Rogers. I would ask that question of any other member of our panel.

General Halverson. I would just like to echo the answer from the chief of staff and the secretary of the Army. That is an absolute red line in the aspect. They will not deploy any untrained soldier into harm's way. That is the checks and balances that we have with our forces' command that train in the readiness, and they are working with First Army, with the reservists and stuff.

We have a very good template of those training requirements that we do, and that is that whole certification process that we go through with the commanders, with their leaders, to ensure that they feel very, very comfortable about what they are trained in and that they have the skill sets to take on that mission.

With that, it then becomes their percentage effectiveness they feel that they are, and where they are manning, equipping and training and the readiness that they have. To be specific, though, and I was the deputy commanding general for the Fourth Infantry Division, and we just got back in mid-November. We were a multinational division, Baghdad.

It is very true what General Kamiya said in the aspect that we have done very rigorous hands-on training now, be it from the basic course, basic training courses, all those courses, the individual skill check courses, hands-on to let them know that they are in that.

We have instituted a—where everyone is an infantryman-type mentality to start moving toward our officers and everything like that. But the reality as the commander when we went in there, we knew we were at high risk that first 30 days to just get the operational environment, because nowhere here in the states can you prepare yourself mentally, physically, and all those things for the conditions that you see either in Afghanistan or Iraq itself because of the complexities.

So good leadership and stuff is there to make sure that you overwatch that with your pre-combat checks and your inspections. So we can continue to work that. What is very good about that is that we have pre-deployments with units rotating so they can get those lessons learned. We share those lessons learned so they can get that operational environment and who are the actors and who their players are. And commanders who they are replacing and stuff have constant dialogue with the ones that they are replacing.

So I have never seen a more cooperative cross-sharing of information so everyone gets the environment about right, so they can be mentally and physically prepared for combat.

Mr. Rogers. Admiral.

Admiral Giardina. To answer your specific problem, we have not knowingly deployed anyone who didn’t meet all the training requirements as specified by the combatant commander and would not do that. That is a clear red line for us.

We have put a very robust monitoring program in place to ensure that the training standards are being met; the feedback mechanisms both at the Army facilities where we are doing our training with Navy liaison there to monitor that; doing self-assessments; also doing surveys at various points along the pipeline once the
forces are in-theater and prior to redeployment; and also taking continual feedback on a bi weekly basis from the combatant commander.

I think we have a robust process in place, but I would stress that we continue to try and improve that process. It is never going to be perfect. We will continue to learn. We have an enemy that is adapting over there. New tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) are developed all the time, and when that happens, we want the feedback to be very quick so that we can respond to it and get the best possible training for our sailors before we deploy them.

Mr. ROGERS. General.

General GIBSON. Sir, I know Air Force leadership would never knowingly put any of our airmen in harm’s way unless they were properly equipped or trained. By way of anecdote, again I was the first commander at Balad, Iraq to receive our first ILO teams in February of 2004.

I can assure you, especially as we were carving new ground, that that was the number-one priority I had. That we would not put anybody out there, and it was clearly a risk to do that, that weren’t adequately trained and adequately equipped, to the point of sharing my concerns with those Army battalion commanders and sergeant majors to make sure that there was immediate feedback if they felt that any of our folks were not adequately prepared to be a member of that team.

Mr. ROGERS. General.

General EGGINTON. Sir, from the user perspective, from CENTCOM’s perspective, I don’t want to give the impression all is rosy, because it is not all rosy. The point that Congressman Taylor mentioned, that you will find individuals that arrive that on occasion we have sent people home that didn’t have the right training. I am talking individuals, not units, but individuals. We have sent them home because they didn’t either, and it was an oversight. You look commanders in the eye and say, how did this happen? They, well, you know, ten percent don’t get the word, or five percent, but not that high, obviously. That happens on occasion.

On the other hand, another issue that comes up and becomes a mitigating problem for us in CENTCOM is that units spend, in order to achieve the training level that they desire to, that we want them to achieve, there are times when they are late arriving in-theater because they have spent more time training, either because of mobilization policies that prevent them from mobilizing up to a certain point.

So now their training time is compressed. So they will say, hey, in order to get the training you want from us, we need to extend their training period, which means what? It means they show up late to theater, which now we have to find a gap filler or mitigating kind of circumstances in theater to go.

And also, if they do show up, for example that young troop that didn’t know what a jammer was—hopefully they educated him before he left—but before he drives a Humvee in CENTCOM’s theater of operation, he goes to the range and he drives his vehicle down an alleyway with real IEDs, with real indicators that obviously don’t explode, but you get the smoke coming out and they say, oops, you know. And so he will get that training.
But can you say that happens 100 percent of the time always? No, I can’t guarantee that, sir. But by and large, to the point that we are satisfied with the training, yes. But we wish they could cram it in a little faster so that we could get them there on time, sometimes would be our only complaint on that point.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing.

And thank you, gentlemen, both for being here this morning and for your service.

I want to start out by asking, because I know there are a number of you, at least from your comments, that you have served in Iraq and perhaps Afghanistan. As far as Iraq, can you describe the environment for the committee? In other words, where are the frontline and where are the rear areas? Can anybody do that?

General HALVERSON. Sir, obviously, as you know, in Iraq it is a very asymmetric threat. There is no front or rear lines. It is common——

Mr. REYES. Pretty much the whole country can be a combat area, right?

General HALVERSON. It can be, because the enemy is in your terrain. Obviously, because of our intelligence work and stuff, we know where a lot of the hot spots where the enemy is focusing his efforts, or as we look at his networks and stuff. And so there are many places I could go in Baghdad on a daily basis where I felt much more comfortable. But when I entered some places, let’s say Sadr City or something like that, Amadiyah, then you clearly knew that you would have to be very cautious.

Mr. REYES. But generally speaking, the whole country can be considered a combat area for—especially when we are training individuals or we are deploying individuals whose—I don’t know, in the Army is called an MOS; I know it is different in the Navy and perhaps the Air Force. But when their mission, their occupation may be different than, say, a truck driver and those kinds of jobs that have been really the big stress factor for us particularly in Iraq.

So when we talk about training people for combat support to go into Iraq, it is really we ought to be preparing them for the worst possible scenario, which is combat. Am I correct?

General HALVERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. REYES. Because that is the likelihood they will run into. I represent Fort Bliss, as I think some of you know—the home of the 507th, who in the first weekend that the 507th supports Patriot Battery, got into An Nasiriyah and we had nine casualties.

And talking to some of those that survived, they reported to us, you know, lack of training, going over the berm without the confidence that they were prepared certainly for getting into a situation like they got into, which was in the very first weekend of the combat in Iraq, which, you know, I could understand.

But the thing that concerns me, and I know the chairman and I have been to Walter Reed and other places where we have had soldiers tell us, “We were trained on one type of vehicle or one type
of weapon, and when we got over there it was completely different. We had to OJT—on-the-job training.” And that, frankly, is now five years after the initial first weekend that the 507th got into that situation, and that is very concerning.

I am assuming that is why we are having this hearing. It is not so you guys can come in and tell us everything is going great.

And thank you, General Egginton, for making the comment that not everything is rosy and there still are issues and problems. That is where we want to help, but we can’t help if we don’t have a clear understanding of what the challenges are. We know that being able to distribute supplies in the theater is an issue. We know we don’t have enough people to train, to operate the convoys and deliver supplies because we have heard of the shortages.

But when we have two facilities that are training people to go over there, and then when we get the feedback from soldiers that are wounded, that tell us, “Listen, we were charged with providing security for a convoy. We got hit and the convoy drivers didn’t know how to respond.”

I will admit to you, I don’t know how one is supposed to respond when it hits the fan like that. But I am imagining they get training for that, I mean, either evasive tactics or, you know, circle the wagons. I don’t know, some kind of training that tells each and every driver, this is what you are likely to run into, if you get hit with IEDs, if you get ambushed, if you get this or that, this is how you are going to respond.

We are still getting those kinds of stories. So I am hoping that there is, as some of you mentioned, a system of where you are taking the feedback so that we are not putting people in jeopardy unnecessarily because either the tactics have changed or you are not training on the same kinds of tactics. Or the biggest fear—and you were with us when we talked to a wounded Army soldier—was that they had Navy contractors and Air Force drivers in this one convoy, if you remember. And he said it was a “cluster,” and he used another word after that. That told us that they had a heck of a time trying to organize a response to the attack of that convoy.

That is why we are holding this hearing, and that is why it is important and imperative that every one of you in your respective roles does a better job of preparing people as they deploy over there. Because I hear it from soldiers, both at Fort Bliss and soldiers that have come back, anecdotally, and have said, “Look, we were attacked. We were providing security for a convoy, and we just didn’t have the cohesive response that we should have had.”

So it is a big challenge. I know that you said it is an asymmetrical threat that we are addressing, and an asymmetrical environment. But five years into it, we ought to be doing better than apparently we are. So any way we can help, let us know.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ortiz. Thank you.

My good friend, Mr. Jones.

Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am sorry I missed all of this hearing. I was really looking forward to it, but as everything happens up here, there is a conflict with another hearing that I needed to testify.
I pretty much wanted to ask—and this can be for anyone—I realize that when a nation is at war, things don't work like they are supposed to when you lay it out on paper. There are times that you have all you need, and there are times you don't have all you need, whether it be equipment or manpower.

Recently, I read in National Review, I believe it was, talking about the United States Army. "Code Yellow," I believe was the title. I can't remember. I don't have it before me, but there were several comments in there by Barry McCaffrey, who I think most of us in the Congress—as we do you, by the way—have great respect for.

The point was that the military—and this is no deep question, but it is a concern I have—that the military, because when we went to Iraq, they didn't listen to the generals who said you need more manpower. If you are going to hold the country, you have to have more manpower.

So it seems now that what is happening is we are sending men and women—I have Camp Lejeune down in the district I represent. As we are sending more men and women back for the second and the third time, we know that they are given the very best, but they are getting tired. The mental tension, the physical tension is really beginning to weigh.

In that article that I read, it seems to be that there is a concern that we are now having to lower the standards, somewhat of what they did during Vietnam. And when you start lowering the standards, particularly when you have such a great volunteer force that again is stressed, you are beginning now to supplement that force with people with—a couple of the articles I read said that they were even letting some with felonies.

I mean, I guess there are degrees of felonies obviously, but it sounds like to me that we are beginning to get to a point that we are using, you know, we are trying to patch certain situations; that if you trained me for a certain position, but then when my time comes that we have to fill in the slot on another position because we don't have anybody else to fill, so you are going to take me because I have been somewhat prepared.

This is my question, and it is probably being repetitive, quite frankly. Are we at a point that we are close to Code Yellow? That because of the—I know that, and I think it was former secretary under Reagan, Lawrence Korb. He made the statement—and I still was just shocked with that—as it relates to the graduates of West Point. We have the lowest percentage of those graduates in 30 years staying in the military.

The officers—I don't know if this is captain or major—but my rambling is leading to this. If I am being repetitive, I apologize, but just how bad is it? I mean, is the backup so fragile—meaning the backup of those who are going into the military for the first time, and they are being told we are going to train you in this. But yet we don't know what we are going to need six months from now, and it might be what you are being trained in, and now we are just going to have to use you to fill the slot.

General EGGINTON. Sir, let me just I think provide some context, and then I will defer to my service counterparts here.
First of all, the way the global force management process defines in lieu of categories. First of all, if you take the enormity of force requirements today, about eight percent of those requirements fall under the in lieu of category. The global force management process subdivides in lieu of force solutions into three basic categories.

The first is a joint solution. That is, one service provides a capability to another service, but this unit is operating in its core competency. A good example would be a Navy Seabee battalion operating in lieu of an Army combat heavy engineering battalion. So these sailors will be operating within their core competencies.

The second category, sir, is remissioning. That is when you take a unit and have to re-train them to accomplish a mission outside of their core competencies. A good example would be Army logistical unit being remissioned to do convoy security.

The final category, sir, is retraining. And that is taking individuals from a variety of potential services or units to form a unit to provide a capability outside of their core competencies. The reason why I say this is, again just for context, is that within the in lieu of categories of forces, about six percent are involved for sourcing solutions that have service members accomplishing missions outside their core competencies.

I will defer now to each service for additional comments.

General HALVERSON. Sir, I will try to answer your specific question because I think it is more of a readiness question overall of the force than some of the in lieu ofs.

One is from the Army's perspective. I think, even with General Casey coming on board and Secretary Geren, you know, we are stretched because right now our global force management requirements are like 33 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), when you are looking at it. And we have 20 in Iraq right now, so the demand is high when we don't have that much structure to be able to do that.

So when you are in Iraq, like you are right now, when you come back you are going to take a short re-set, and then you are going to prepare to deploy to meet the global demands of the combatant commander at CENTCOM. So that is the reality. Especially as you have been doing this persistent fight now for the last seven years, be it Afghanistan and now Iraq, that it is strained.

As you all know here in this great committee, you can assume readiness, be it from the equipment that you pushed over there and now is left-behind equipment, and then folks come back here. Now it is missing equipment from the table of organization and equipment (TO&E). Or you know, the constant things of people, we need to continue that support from this subcommittee, that readiness, and therefore you need to continue to have program dollars to fix it so we can, once the demand does drop, we can have that continual thing so we can have an operational reserve. We can have this thing to be able to prepare for a global fight against terrorism as we see it.

So you are right. I mean, it is pushing the forces, and therefore we turn to the Joint Force commander to look at other services to pick up some of those aspects that we have in the Army. But it is going to be the continuing great work of this committee to facilitate the funding that we do need, so not every up-armored Humvee has to be pushed into theater. And we can keep them in the training
base to have the folks there training so they can see what an up-armored Humvee is and what it looks like, so it is not, you know, in Iraq when they look at these things.

The Army is having this strategy to where we are going to get to those things to give it to our Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and our forces’ command, those types of equipments that we are not having to push immediately into the force. Because of, as you know, the catastrophic loss of equipment that we have had—the M–1 tanks, the Strykers, helicopters—all those types of things that we have lost that degrade readiness.

And so the Army looks forward to working with this subcommittee as we look at the overall readiness of the Army, as we continue this persistent conflict.

The second thing is, we are very cognizant of that, because obviously because of this demand and the supply issue, you know, we had to go to the 15–12 in the policy, which we know is training on the forces. We want to get down to where we are not at that. And we can get to the 1:1 and those types of standards that we know, when you look at the strain on forces and stuff, is a better model for our soldiers and their leaders.

Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ortiz. Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing.

I want to thank all the witnesses for their service to our nation. The global war on terror has tested the endurance and adaptability of the United States armed forces for just about six years now. Our forces remain strong and ready to fight any threats. However, the methods in which we fill wartime personnel requirements is cause for investigation.

General Kamiya, you state in your testimony the Joint Forces Command serves as the primary joint force provider and trainer. Does JFCOM see its role as the primary agent for developing a baseline of standards for training service members selected through in lieu of sourcing?

I want to ensure that the training on naval augmentees receives for sourcing a security forces role that is typically performed by the Army is the same training an Army security forces unit receives before they go into an area of combat operations.

So can you confirm that the training is identical?

General Kamiya. Ma’am, I would say that it is up to each individual service to train in accordance with its roles and functions. As I have said before, however, JFCOM does have a huge role, going back to the CENTCOM area of operations, to continue to refine and define, to make sure that the tasks and conditions under which the combatant commander expects combat skill and functional competencies are clearly articulated and understood by each service.

It will then become the individual service responsibility to conduct an assessment of whether their standard training programs on the roles and functions meet the combatant commander requirements and internal to the service, make the assessment if any increase in training capability is required.
But this is where Joint Force Command’s primary role is. It is also our role for those joint tasks that require services to operate together to make sure that they, too, are clearly understood, down from the operational level Joint Task Force training we do, to the individual service joint training programs that we sponsor through a variety of our programs.

So that is JFCOM’s role. I think each service, given its own set of core competencies, should develop their own understanding and way, if you will, to meet the combatant commander requirements. That is not JFCOM’s responsibility.

Ms. Bordallo. So your answer to that question then, General, is that they are necessarily not identical in some cases.

General Kamiya. That is correct, ma’am.

Ms. Bordallo. This is for any witness. As you know, this committee passed legislation that increases the end-strengths of the Army and the Marine Corps forces. Do you feel that increases in these services’ end-strength will help reduce the reliance on in lieu of sourcing?

The second part of that question is, the ILOs are not—those that are not volunteers, what has been the impact and the morale and the retention among them?

Anyone can answer that.

General Halverson. Ma’am, one, obviously, reference the chief of staff of the Army is working with the Secretary of Defense to lay out our plan to increase the Army and the growth. And we think obviously that is a good step forward because if the demand is such, you are going to need these. And we are reshaping what those are so we when we see some MOS’s some say they can use, we can put that force structure in there.

So we think that is a good first step in the commitment that it is going to take for us to do that. So that is the first step.

Ms. Bordallo. So this is needed?

General Halverson. This will assist us somewhat to get into those issues of we would call “dwell” and all those types of things from a demand perspective.

Ms. Bordallo. And the second part of the question? Those that are not volunteers, how is their morale and the retention among them?

General Halverson. Ma’am, reference like we addressed earlier, is one of the things that we do find out that folks that go into the combat zone, their morale is high if they are doing the skill-sets that we said in their training up and stuff, and they are contributing to the fight. But it is a constant-type thing. The leadership has to be able to ensure that we are caring, feeding and maintaining those folks while they are there.

And we also are monitoring that in the aspect that, but yet we also are monitoring those, the ones that may be in lieu of, like an artillery unit or whatever. What that does is look at their attrition, if there was a majority that are getting out. So it is something that the chief of staff and the secretary are looking at to ensure that we have the right mix.

Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Chairman, I have one quick question also, for any of the witnesses.
Has the increased use of ILOs forced the services to re-think the current mix of forces, its basic supply and demands? For example, if the Army requires ILOs to fill military police positions, has the Army taken actions within its own force to create more military police positions? Do transformation effects like the Army’s modular force take ILO sourcing into account?

General HALVERSON. Ma’am, the short answer is yes, as we look at that. That will be with the secretary of the Army and the chief, once they finalize that, we will lay out obviously to the Secretary of Defense to bring forward. So we are looking at all those factors of what in lieu ofs and, as I would say, lower density, high demand of what those are.

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes. Any other comments from the other services?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to ask the questions.

Mr. ORTIZ. Ms. Shea-Porter.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just have three short questions.

General KAMIYA. Ma’am, the global force provider mission has been with JFCOM since 2004. I am going to assume that it has been going on since then. However, the way we track individual augmentees or in lieu of forcing solutions has evolved over time.

In fact, the fiscal year 2008 global force management plan that is currently inside the Department of Defense for continued staffing will bring even further definition and clarity on the way we manage in lieu of solutions.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. It has been going on for a long time, so it seems like it would be appropriate for the Pentagon to possibly plan and actually bring people into the service and have them trained, instead of plucking them from various disciplines. That I find very disturbing.

In the past couple of weeks, I have heard two neoconservative advisers suggest or agree that one way that we could increase our number of troops would be to go to countries where people are having trouble getting green cards and offer them green cards to fight.

Do you agree with that? Is that a place that you would think is a good place to go?

General KAMIYA. That is difficult for me to answer, ma’am. Just know that JFCOM through its formal reporting procedures identifies what we believe persistent shortfalls as identified by all the services to the DOD leadership for continued analysis.

General HALVERSON. Ma’am, to answer the question, obviously, there is no one asks that it be a condition to do that. But you know in our military, every year I have participated with some great soldiers that enlisted in our Army, where they became citizens of the United States while they were in combat, in the Green Zone, and we continue to have that.

So that is obviously, you know, first generation folks are working very hard to become citizens of the United States, and one of the means to do that is that they fight for this country.
Myself personally when I was in the embassy in Baghdad, I used to really work with my individual soldiers and found one that was a first generation person and say, you know, talk about his struggles of what——

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I don't want to interrupt, but I understand what you are saying, but I am not talking about people who are already here. I am talking about bringing people to our Nation. Is that something that you would see as a good idea, seeing that we are running out of troops and we can't keep using the IAs either? Have you heard talk about that?

General HALVERSON. I have not heard any talk.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. It was interesting to me that I have heard it a couple of times in the past few weeks, so I just wanted to check and see if that is being kicked around as an idea.

And then I would like to ask the admiral, I became aware of a situation where Naval Academy graduates are being sent to Iraq. It is not their MOS. They don't have any training at all.

Is that a concern to you, that somebody who has been, say, trained as a pilot or whatever, is now going to be doing some infantry, or possibly doing infantry? What do you expect the training to be before that happens to individuals?

Admiral GIARDINA. Ma'am, I have no knowledge of any individual augmentees being sent directly out of the Naval Academy without the service-specific training as called out by the combatant commander, although I can look into that and get back to you.

From a standpoint of a permanent change of station (PCS) from a change of station assignment, to my knowledge every officer who graduates from the Naval Academy has additional training before they get assigned, but I can look into that and get back to you for the record.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay, I may follow up on that. We are talking not directly—you know, 30 days from the academy. We are talking, you know, one year or two years or three years. I am being deliberately vague, but I think there have been some cases where they have gone in without having infantry training, and that is obviously disturbing.

And then the other question I am going to ask General Halverson, and please tell me, is the first-time retention rate really down seven percent?

General HALVERSON. Excuse me?

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. First-time retention rates for enlistees—I know there has been a drop. Is it about seven percent?

General HALVERSON. Ma'am, I don't have a specific number. I will have to get back with you, and I will get back with you if there is a drop in first-time enlistments.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I would appreciate that.

I just wanted to say that I understand that you are all under great strain, and I appreciate your being here.

Thank you.

Mr. ORTIZ. You know, when I served in the Army, my primary role was of course as an infantryman. My secondary was a military policeman and criminal investigator. If I was selected to be an augmentee or in lieu of, with the type of training that you have described today—you know, nine days, two weeks—I would be very
uncomfortable—very, very uncomfortable. I think we need to do better than that.

If you look at the wounded that we have had in this war—25,000 plus almost 4,000 killed—even though we have raised our end-strength by 30,000. This just shows that we have a tremendous shortage of troops, at least this is the way I see it. We were able to raise the end-strength by 30,000, and 25,000 have been wounded, almost 4,000 have been killed.

I think that one of the reasons why we are having to do what we are having to do now is because of the choice that we have. In my personal opinion, I think we are shortchanging the troops from getting the training that they need and having to change them from one position to another. This is creating morale problems. I can understand that these are the conditions that we face today, so we have to plug all these holes as much as we can with what we have.

But you know what? This is what I stated in the beginning. This is very serious business. And this is one of the most important hearings that we have had. I mean, trying to send those young men and women and change them from one position to another, and maybe not getting them trained with the right equipment, and not having the length of training that they need.

We are going to have votes in a few minutes. But I know there are some members who wanted to be here, but because this is the last week, or we hope so, before we recess, they are attending a lot of other committee hearings. And they might have questions for the record that we are going to submit to you.

But let me yield to my good friend, Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

My staff just reminded me that about two months ago, we got a call from a constituent down in Havelock, Cherry Point Naval Air Station. Her husband is actually in the Navy. And he is going to be assigned to an Army attachment. She was concerned, and he had shared, because we talked to him as well, that he is wearing a different type of fatigues, or combat fatigues, than the unit he is going to be assigned to.

In other words, that in itself seemed to be a—and I can understand—a real concern of the fact that Navy is going to be augmented with the Army, yet the fatigues are going to be like a sore thumb and say that you are not really part of this group because you don’t wear the same type of uniform.

Does that happen often? I mean, this woman—and we did talk to her husband, he is an officer—is very concerned that his fatigues were not like the fatigues of the unit he is going to be assigned to.

Admiral GIARDINA. Let me address that, sir, from a Navy perspective.

The differences in the uniforms are primarily cosmetic. The background on those, the desert camouflage versus the more digital pattern that the Army wears, from a standpoint of functionality and everything else, they are identical. That is the service standard to equip in that manner.

Now, if there is any reason where the combatant commander feels that that is a problem, they have the ability to ask the other services who are not wearing the exact uniform of the unit they are
being assigned to, they can call for that and we accommodate that. So it is clearly at the request of the combatant commander.

When we have looked at instances of this, it is usually characterized more as a different type of equipping, and we have gotten to the point where it is all just cosmetic. It has nothing to do with the quality of the uniform or the functionality or the body armor or any of that kind of stuff.

So I don’t think that it makes a significant difference. We have not had any feedback where it has been a significant morale problem or that somebody has stuck out like a sore thumb. Again, the combatant commander has the ability to accommodate if they think it is a problem.

Mr. Jones. Admiral, I am sure it is really not. I accept that. You are in, and I am not, but I did kind of see the point that was being made by this officer, that if we are supposed to be a unit of one, that maybe it would make a difference. If it is cosmetic, so be it, but again I remember the fight about the beret, quite frankly, a few years back.

But anyway, thank you for your answer.

Mr. Ortiz. You know, I was a law enforcement official before, and when you are watching for speeders, you look at the color of the car, something that stands out—red, yellow, Corvette. You know, and I don’t think you gentlemen would be walking the streets of Baghdad—and this is my own personal opinion—in your uniform. I feel that because of the changing uniform and colors, you might become a target. I could be wrong, but I can remember when I was a rookie patrolman. I looked for the sports car and the color of the vehicles, and I knew that they would be speeding.

So we want to try to avoid that, but maybe you do have a point, admiral. But I would like to see maybe if we have another hearing, I would like to talk to the in lieu ofs, those augmentees, the corporals, the sergeants, the specialist fourth class’s, to come and testify to us before this committee. We would like to have them here.

We thank you for your testimony today. We have a series of votes, and we don’t want to delay you anymore. We will be submitting some questions for the record for some of the members who couldn’t be here.

Would anybody else like to make a statement? We have about ten minutes before the first vote begins.

Not having any more questions, the hearing stands adjourned.

Thank you so much for your testimony.

[Whereupon, at 11:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

JULY 31, 2007
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 31, 2007
STATEMENT OF

BRIGADIER GENERAL EGGINTON, USAF

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS

US CENTRAL COMMAND

BEFORE THE READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

AUGMENTING THE FORCE

JULY 31, 2007
Good morning Chairman Ortiz, Congresswoman Davis and honorable members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss US Central Command’s “In-Lieu-of” personnel with you today. It is my understanding that you are interested in how these units have been performing in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa.

Overall, USCENTCOM is extremely satisfied with the forces that have been identified for In-Lieu-of sourcing. Not only do these units greatly assist in force flow gap mitigation, but In-Lieu-of units have demonstrated an exceptional level of professionalism while providing capabilities that are often in very short supply in the Army. Additionally, In-Lieu-of US Army Reserve and Army National Guard personnel bring additional knowledge and skill sets to the fight based on experiences in their civilian careers.

The bottom line hurdle for USCENTCOM to employ these In-Lieu-of units and personnel is that they must be manned, equipped, trained and certified prior to deployment to perform the mission at hand. Thus far, this requirement has been met with few challenges.

As trained and ready units strive to meet mission requirements, the lack of experience level for the specific mission does degrade their ability to perform the mission. Although, the available training time provides the necessary training, the new or different missions they ultimately perform require time for the unit to mature. In-Lieu-of sourcing puts additional strain on the pre deployment training process since units have a new mission set to train for. The new mission set training requires additional time and resources to adequately prepare a unit for re-missioning. In the event that sailors and airmen are not fully trained once they arrive on station, USCENTCOM components work with the personnel to bring them up to current
requirements and familiarize them with local Standard Operational Procedures. All In-Lieu-of units have been receptive to additional training and specifically to training in areas that they feel that they are weak in such as detainee operations and non-lethal weapons. In-Lieu-of units also need additional training on some weapons platforms they will fight with, specifically: Blue Force Tracker, communications equipment and employment of Electronic Counter Measures equipment. Overall, USCENTCOM has been successful in refining the skills of In-Lieu-Of personnel to meet our requirements.

USCENTCOM components provide feedback to Joint Force Providers through the Unit Requirement Form Change process. Recommended USCENTCOM component changes in capabilities, mission and training are forwarded through USCENTCOM for vetting and endorsement at Joint Forces Command and adjudicated by the Joint Staff by exception for current and future rotations.

Challenges:

Challenges that USCENTCOM has to overcome include working through rotation of forces and Joint Force Provider training timelines and standards.

The Air Force and Navy also have varying rotational time frames which creates a challenge when tracking rotation days for the enduring requirement; some units come in at exactly 6 months and others are between 4 to 7 months.

In some instances Mixed-Composition units and Reserve Component units have reported to their mobilization center with less than the required number of personnel and with training shortfalls which is a Joint Force Provider challenge for oversight, which ultimately becomes USCENTCOM’s risk to mitigate when requirements are not met due to a delay in force flow.

It would be helpful for training of In-Lieu-Of units to be standardized prior to arrival in theater to prepare them for the range of missions faced when performing operations. In some cases, Joint Force Provider
interpretation of mission requirements due to a difference between cultures and philosophies may limit the scope of the mission and the capabilities of the In-Lieu-of.

In closing, the bottom line for USCENTCOM is that In-Lieu-of units must be manned, equipped, trained and certified prior to deployment to perform the mission at hand. Thank you again for this opportunity to speak with you and I look forward to answering your questions.
WITNESS STATEMENT OF
MAJOR GENERAL JASON KAMIYA, USA
DIRECTOR, JOINT TRAINING AND JOINT
WARFIGHTING CENTER

BEFORE THE 110TH CONGRESS

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

31 JULY 2007
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Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of General Lance Smith, Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), thank you for allowing me to appear before you today. The readiness of the men and women of our nation’s Armed Forces is our number one priority. This task cannot be overstated and we appreciate the continued hard work of this Subcommittee and the United States Congress in this regard.

My testimony will address the adequacy of preparation of our service members to perform missions outside of their assigned Services’ roles and functions and the impact this has on Service readiness. I will first briefly review USJFCOM’s role in force sourcing and training. Second, I will review the currently accepted in-lieu of force sourcing solutions used in the Department of Defense’s Global Force Management (GFM) process. Third, I will address some of the ways in which USJFCOM, through its Service components, supports the Services’ training responsibilities. Lastly, I will provide the Service representatives with me today the opportunity to articulate in oral testimony the impact to readiness when their Services are asked to provide forces for missions outside of traditional Service roles and functions.

USJFCOM’s overall role in force sourcing and training The 2006 Unified Command Plan tasks USJFCOM to serve as the primary joint force provider. To this end, USJFCOM develops joint force sourcing solutions through a seven step GFM process to meet the requirements of the combatant commanders. This process involves collaboration with the Services (inclusive of their respective Active, Reserve, and National Guard components) and all combatant commanders on a continual basis, culminating in force allocation decisions by the Secretary of Defense.

1 Force sourcing covers a range of sourcing methodologies providing combatant commanders with requested capabilities. The intent is to provide the combatant commander with the most capable forces based on stated capability requirements, balanced against risks and global priorities.
As the Defense Department’s lead agent for training of joint forces, USJFCOM conducts and supports joint, US interagency, and multinational collective joint training and exercises to assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and Service chiefs in the preparation of their forces for joint and combined operations. These training events support a broad array of missions ranging from regional security cooperation to defense of the United States homeland.

**Currently accepted categories of in-lieu-of force sourcing solutions** When combatant commander force requirements do not match the available force inventory in terms of number or capability, Services are asked to provide capabilities in mission areas outside of their traditional roles and functions. The currently accepted Global Force Management business rules describe the following in-lieu-of force sourcing solution categories:

A. **Joint sourcing:** *Joint sourcing* is a Service providing a like-type capability in place of another Service’s core mission. An example is a Navy Mobile Construction Battalion sourced against a requirement for a combat heavy engineer battalion that is traditionally filled by the Army.

B. **Remissioning:** *Remissioning* is defined as taking an existing unit and retraining that unit for a different mission, one that is outside its core competency. An example is an Army transportation unit sourced against a requirement to serve as a security force for US and coalition convoys.

C. **Retraining:** *Retraining* is defined as taking a group of individuals and forming, training, and equipping an ad hoc unit. An example is a consolidation of sailors from many different units into a single unit to relieve an Army military police unit conducting a detainee security mission.
Individual augmentees. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1301.01C defines an individual augmentee as a service member assigned to an unfunded temporary duty position identified on a Joint Manning Document to augment a joint headquarters during contingencies. An example is a Navy Commander serving as a communications specialist on a fleet staff who is selected to become a communications officer in a deployed joint task force headquarters. USJFCOM is responsible for joint functional proficiency -- those additional functional skills required for the individual augmentee to operate on a joint task force staff. We support individual augmentees through their train up and throughout the deployment with a variety of tools. This includes putting them, the joint task force staff, and the commander through a rigorous mission rehearsal exercise that teaches the joint skills and knowledge needed to accomplish the mission. We follow this rigorous training regimen up with staff assistance visits beginning approximately 90 days after employment and remain responsive to any additional training needs the commander may require throughout the deployment. Additionally, USJFCOM’s Joint Knowledge Online (JKO), an online portal that provides the Joint Individual Augmentee Training (JIAT) Program plus an expanding array of joint, interagency, and multinational individual training, is accessible to individual augmentees from notification to redeployment.

The way ahead. USJFCOM is actively engaged in the development of the FY 08 Global Force Management Guidance now being coordinated inside the Defense Department. The purpose of this is to further define, refine, and codify the force sourcing categories to better manage resources and continue to evolve existing training and assessment models.

USJFCOM, through its components, supports the Services’ training responsibilities USJFCOM supports the Services through a variety of ways.
First, USIFCOM maintains situational awareness of the operational environment through direct interaction with our components, combatant commanders, and USIFCOM-enabled deployed joint force commanders and staffs. Our command leadership travels extensively in support of our Service components and the joint training community while seeking continuous improvement. In an era where defined lines between the tactical and operational blur, and where tactical actions have operational and strategic consequences, this has provided increased clarity to warfighter requirements at all levels. Such clarity continues to shape training programs from individual online training, to Service tactical unit training, to adaptive and dynamic mission rehearsal exercises at the operational level in support of joint task force commanders.

Second, USIFCOM delivers joint, US interagency, and multinational context to Service programs, replicating the complex and dynamic environment that service members confront while in theater. In essence, this enables our service members to train in an environment similar to that in which they will operate. In accomplishing this, we remain attuned to evolving global events and the corresponding implications to how we train our forces. For example, the Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa mission rehearsal exercise conducted last January was adjusted in real time to match unfolding events in Ethiopia and Somalia providing the joint task force commander and staff with richer, more realistic preparation.

Third, USIFCOM delivers rapidly deployable joint functional competence in such areas as joint public affairs, joint communications, joint fires integration, and joint personal recovery in support of joint force commanders worldwide. These capabilities have been employed in support of traditional Service headquarters deployed as the core of joint task forces in disaster relief operations following the Pakistan earthquake and Hurricane Katrina, as well in support of the formation of a counter-improvised explosive device task force in Afghanistan and a joint task force headquarters supporting the evacuation of US citizens from Lebanon.
Fourth, force generation, preparation and readiness are intrinsically linked to unit notification and predictability. USJFCOM's collaborative work with the Office of Secretary of Defense, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other combatant commands, our components, and the Services to refine the Global Force Management process is expected to bring an increased level of predictability that should enhance unit training. In October 2006, USJFCOM was given the responsibility to manage individual augmentees. Using a core process that has worked well for units, we are building a capability to provide predictability for individual augmentees. The responsibility for sourcing individual augmentees has driven significant collaboration with the Services, our components, and our multinational allies to assess and improve individual training and education and has informed the development of joint individual training capabilities.

Fifth, as mentioned earlier, USJFCOM provides JKO, a capability that supplements Service individual training and delivers individual joint functional training to service members. Launched on April 30th of this year, JKO is a comprehensive, distributed, online capability that brings joint training and education to our service members before, during, and after deployments. JKO activity to date can be characterized by 118 total courses available, 17,500 course enrollments, and approximately 4,600 course completions. Depending upon the joint task force headquarters duty position to which assigned, individual augmentees are required to complete joint functional training through JKO's JIAT Program. This Program currently consists of: 14 courseware modules containing subjects such as Forming the Joint Task Force Headquarters, Joint Operational Planning, and Joint Information Management; other training content such as cultural awareness and joint task force staff procedures; and robust collaboration opportunities with joint functional subject matter experts, theater principals, and incumbents. Since becoming a JKO online program in May 2007, 1,147 individuals have completed at least one module. There have also been 250 formal individual augmentee enrollments with 50 graduates to date.
By comparison, during the 19 months of the resident course that it replaced (October 2005 through April 2007), there were only 145 graduates. The Services are increasingly integrating JKO into their individual training programs by directing service members to complete specified JKO courses in preparation for deployment. The most utilized courses to date include: Introduction to Joint Combat Identification; Law of Armed Conflict; Code of Conduct; and, senior non-commissioned officer joint professional military education.

Sixth, USJFCOM works with USCENTCOM and our components to continually refine theater pre-deployment individual training requirements -- requirements that apply to all service members regardless of branch of Service, deployment location, or duties to be performed. This effort is essential if the Services are to continue to meet the combatant commander’s individual pre-deployment requirements by working within their core competencies and making adjustments, if required, to their training programs.

In conclusion, our vision is a holistic approach that links force generation, force management, and training. USJFCOM is committed to providing an agile, comprehensive training environment that prepares our leaders, units, and individuals for the tough missions they face today. We can only do this through the collaborative teamwork with our components, the Services, and combatant commanders. We thank the United States Congress for its commitment to improve the readiness of the men and women of our nation’s Armed Forces. Your support in Congress is essential to getting this right.

We stand ready to answer your questions and proudly invite you to come and see how we train.
Testimony for the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness

By

BG(P) Dave Halverson
Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7
July 31, 2007
Washington, DC

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss how the Army supports In-Lieu-Of Sourcing (ILO) and provides individual augmentation (IA) in support of Combatant Commander’s requirements. On behalf of the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Pete Geren, Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN George Casey, and the approximately one million active, Guard and Reservists that comprise the Army – more than 145,000 of whom are serving in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, I welcome the opportunity to discuss how the Army does individual augmentation, supports ILO, supports the combatant commander’s requirements for repositioning units, and the impact of these requirements have on our readiness.

We are in a dangerous, uncertain, and unpredictable time. As we execute missions worldwide and increase our commitment in the war on terror, we face challenges in providing forces to meet the global combatant commander’s requirements. Occasionally, force requirements exceed the Army’s capability to provide forces as well as comply with the restrictions implemented on rotation policy, tour length, and personnel stability. Because the U.S. Military is fighting an enduring, large-scaled, and persistent conflict, the DOD developed in-lieu-of forcing solutions.
There are three accepted categories of in-lieu-of (ILO) force sourcing solutions, Individual Augmentation (IA), remissioning, and joint sourcing (JS), but I will only address remissioning and IA. Individual augmentation is defined as an unfunded temporary duty position identified on a joint manning document (JMD) by a supported Combatant Command (COCOM) to augment headquarters operations (HQs) during contingencies. Individual augmentation is used when a specific skill, MOS, and grade is required to augment a staff or joint HQ JMD when there is no service unit capable of fulfilling the requirement. Department of Defense, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJSI) 1301.01C, Joint Publication 0-2 governs the process and provides guidance for assigning individual augmentees (IA) to meet the global combatant commanders’ (GCC) temporary duty requirements supporting approved operations.

Remissioning is defined as taking an existing unit and retraining that unit for a different mission, one that is outside its core competency. For example, we routinely remission Army transportation units against a requirement to provide a security force for US and coalition convoys.

United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) serves as the primary joint force provider. Forces Command (FORSCOM) is the United States Army’s force provider and is responsible for the best trained, equipped, and manned units to support GCC requirements. Currently, the Army provides 35% of JFCOM’s ILO sourcing requirements. The reserve component sources the majority of the Army’s ILO requirements.

The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is responsible for conducting individually focused training and the Army’s Forces Command (FORSCOM)
is responsible for conducting collective training. FORSCOM is responsible for providing trained and ready forces to JFCOM in response to GCC force requirements, as directed by the JCS. All units and individuals undergo a set of training events to ensure they are prepared to succeed in their assigned mission. Upon notification of sourcing, units develop theater/mission specific training plans to achieve required employment capability levels. Training plans are based on their assigned mission, directed mission essential Task List (DMETL) and published theater training requirements. Theater and mission specific training is executed through a series of key training events prior to deployment. These events include, but are not limited to mission-focused individual and collective training, and robust Counter-Improvised Explosive Device training at the unit’s home station or mobilization station. Training is accomplished using existing training facilities and capabilities. Units participate in a CAPSTONE training event to demonstrate proficiency in mission, combat and stability, and support operations tasks. Commanders conduct a commander’s assessment on completion of their CAPSTONE event that is codified in the units USR (PCTEF) and provide to their commander for approval.

The active (AC) validation process consists of a unit commander validating that the unit has met theater capability and mandatory training requirements and is mission capable. The commander’s assessment is documented through the unit’s USR with the commander performing a Percent Effective (PCTEF), a distinct status-level assessment against the directed mission as part of the unit’s overall USR submission. The AC chain of command/senior mission commander (SMC) reviews this assessment. This review serves as the higher level command validation of the unit capability to perform its directed mission. FORSCOM monitors this process, and addresses issues by exception.
The Reserve Component (RC) units are validated prior to deployment by the First Army commander. The RC validation process consists of a unit commander validating that the unit has met theater capability and mandatory training requirements and is mission capable through the unit's USR (with RC commanders also performing a PCTEF assessment). The First Army commander reviews and validates this assessment using a validation memo. FORSCOM monitors this process, and addresses issues by exception.

Sister-service training requirements mirror Army training requirements closely. When the Joint Staff or JFCOM tasks the United States Air Force and the United States Navy to source Army requirements, the Army agreed to coordinate Joint Source Training for units filling current OIF/OEF Army shortfalls. The required training tasks are derived from CENTCOM Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) directives, theater specific missions, service specific missions, and service-to-service agreements.

FORSCOM and TRADOC are responsible for conducting selected combat training tasks for sister-service units at Army designated power projection platforms (PPP) and training centers in order to prepare them to execute Army missions in support of OEF/OIF requirements. However, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) provide the highly technical intelligence training. Additionally, the United States Army Special Operations Command provides Civil Affairs military occupational specialty (MOS) training for United States Navy Personnel. TRADOC is responsible for joint service training (JST) at Forts Huachuca, Jackson, Rucker, Bliss, Eustis, Lee, Leonardwood, Benning, and Meade. FORSCOM is responsible for JST at Forts Gordon, Hood, Mccoy, Dix, Sill, Lewis, Bragg, Riley, Bliss, and Camps Atterbury and Shelby. Each service is
responsible for validating their personnel are trained and ready for deployment.

However, direct lines of authority has been granted between the Air Force (2d Air Force), the Navy (Fleet Forces Command), FORSCOM, and First Army for the purposes of coordinating training arrangements, arrival instructions, and other matters related to the conduct of training.

Individual augmentees receive their training at the Conus Replacement Center (CRC). The Army’s CRC, Fort Benning, is available for use by all services. However, the Navy receives Navy individual augmentee combat training at Fort Jackson. Every Soldier is required to complete pre-certifiable tasks that are available on-line. If they fail to complete these tasks prior to arriving at the CRC, they will spend time in a computer lab completing the tasks in the evenings while at CRC. Any pre-certifiable task completed on line is self certifying. Once the on-line training is complete, the system will automatically allow them to print a completion certificate. The CRC employs a seven day training schedule for the augmentees that encompass tasks such as personnel recovery, IEDs, weapons qualifications, and first-aid. Each service is responsible for validating the training for their personnel. Sister-services have an administrative command and control team that has administrative control of their personnel at FORSCOM training locations. These teams facilitate the arrival, integration, and departure of trained units/individuals. FORSCOM and the services exchange information on what personnel are present at training, training losses, and replacements to ensure a common operating picture of the readiness of the units at the training location. Training losses or issues concerning deployability are reported through the training location and
the service representative to FORSCOM, the 2d Air Force, and Fleet Forces Command for resolution.

For the units that FORSCOM trains, the Army provides the individual equipment that the service cannot provide in order to ensure that USN and USAF personnel are equipped with the same equipment as their Army counterparts. Collective equipment is categorized as theater provided equipment (TPE). If the Army provides Military Tables of Organizational Equipment (MTOE) like items, FORSCOM works with the Department of the Army to resource the equipment.

The Army equips sister-service individual augmentees with the same individual equipment that is assigned to Army personnel that perform identically assigned missions. If sister-service IAs arrive at the CRC without the correct equipment, the CRC issues the equipment to them. Equipment is issued through the Ft. Benning Central Issue Facility (CIF) on a hand receipt. Regardless of where the individual goes, the automated hand receipts will follow them to their gaining organization. However, occasionally, contractors do not return to CRC when they redeploy to clear, and their equipment is lost. Last year, 8000 individual equipment issues were not returned to the CRC. The Army was not reimbursed for the losses. The installation is responsible for the CIF and is responsible for providing the necessary loss information to the department.

The impact of filling IA requirements on the readiness of FORSCOM units is a challenge to directly quantify. Units rarely have personnel categorized as non-available due to having to fill IA requirements - may be categorized as "Deployed", but this is primarily based on portions of the unit being deployed to fill a specific theater requirement or URF. HRC manages the IA fill process and the impact of IA
requirements as part of the overall manning challenges confronting the Army. Within FORSCOM this is seen in the personnel fill rates of some units. While aggregate fill rates are generally sufficient (and meet deployment criteria established by HQDA) there are selected grade and MOS shortages.

The impact of remissioning units on Army readiness is equally hard to quantify. In general terms, the impact is on the C-level ratings because this rating measures the capabilities of units to perform core or as-designed missions. When a directed mission is significantly different than the as-designed mission of the unit, the C-level rating may be lower due to the inability of the unit to train to standard for the core mission. Conversely, the PCTEF assessment may be higher as the unit trains for the directed mission. If discussed, this should be in the context of the impact on the Army’s ability to perform core missions—keeping in mind that meeting the approved requirements of the COCOMS (as readiness is measured against directed mission) may be considered of equal (or greater) importance as annotated in Title 10.

The Army is committed to providing the best trained, led, and manned units to support GCC’s requirements. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for your service on this committee and the considerable support you provide U.S. Army. As a result, the Soldiers we have deployed are the best trained, best equipped, and best led we have ever sent into combat.
STATEMENT OF
REAR ADMIRAL LOWER HALF TIMOTHY M. GIARDINA
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
DIRECTOR, INFORMATION, PLANS AND SECURITY DIVISION
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
ON
TRAINING AND EQUIPPING OF SAILORS
IN COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT ROLES

July 31, 2007
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the adequacy of training and equipping and the employment of our Sailors in combat support roles outside their traditional operating environment, and the impact on service readiness by using these forces “in lieu of,” as individual augmentees to, or as “ad hoc” replacements for soldiers and Marines.

INTRODUCTION

This war is not about the Army or the Marine Corps, it is a joint effort that requires the contribution of all our services. While the brunt of this war is being conducted by our ground forces, the Navy continues to provide Individual Augmentees, principally to relieve those ground forces where it makes sense. The Navy’s contribution will continue as long as this effort requires it. Aside from our core mission areas, we are not creating combat/ground soldiers; however we are providing personnel to Combat Support and Combat Services Support missions who are making significant contributions. Additionally there are emerging missions that are not necessarily organic to any specific service that, with additional training, Navy accomplishes with great success.

Today, over 10,000 Navy augmentees continue to make significant contributions to the Global War on Terror. Prior to the fall of October 2004, the Navy had very few “in lieu of” / “ad hoc” missions. Most missions entailed embarked security teams for shipboard security for USNS logistics ships, called Operation Vigilant Mariner, Port Security Operations and the use of Naval Mobile Construction Battalions “in lieu of” US Army Engineers. In planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom 05-07, Army projected shortfalls in some Combat Support and Combat Services Support areas. Army addressed the majority of this shortfall through internal reassignment and cross-leveling. Navy assessed ability to fill the remaining projected shortfalls in categories based on our core competencies resulting in “existing match,” “minor modification,” “major modification,” and “new core capability.” Areas such as Medical, Engineering, Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Intelligence were assessed as “existing match” while “minor modified mission” areas include Cargo Transfer Units, Military Police Confinement Detachments and Postal Platoon Detachments. “Major mission modifications” took existing core capability and added extensive training to provide non-traditional mission areas such as Air Ambulance, Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar, Shadow Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) Platoon and Counter Improvised Explosive Device. More recently, emerging missions have Navy providing new capabilities to include Civil Affairs, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Embedded Training Teams. The Joint Staff considers a full range of sourcing solutions across all services and the Navy has supported the joint force needs with support to a wide range of mission areas. By leveraging core skills and tailored training, Navy is able to provide the Joint Staff with a range of sourcing solutions. It is worth noting, approximately 75 percent of Navy augmentees are employed using their core Navy competencies. Navy will continue to focus with near match to core skills and expects this level of support to continue assuming no new requirements.
PERSONNEL

Navy takes into account several factors when selecting members to source augmentation requirements and reserve mobilizations. Navy selects Sailors who meet required skills and skill sets identified during coordination of the joint sourcing plan for "in lieu of" and "ad-hoc" missions. Central Command (CENTCOM) identifies the required skills (MOS, experience, etc) in the Unit Request Form (URF) and/or the Request for Forces (RFF) documents that are submitted to the Joint Staff. Through Naval Personnel Development Command, Navy is able to determine which specific Navy designator/rating or Navy Enlisted Classification System code (NEC) best meets the required skills. Navy then works with Army Headquarters/Forces Command/Training Commands to identify and plan additional training required to meet the specific joint mission and the unique skill identified by the supported component commander. Most positions tasked to Navy require basic skills in supply, administration, engineering, medical or intelligence. After establishing the required skill set, volunteers are given priority and both Navy Personnel Command and Reserve Forces Command maintain a comprehensive and up-to-date volunteer list. Members must have the proper rating/designator and possess the required skill-sets, experience, clearance, and subspecialty (if required). Additionally, all requirements are filled taking into consideration the member's professional and personal circumstances and any potential readiness impact(s) on the sourcing commands.

Active Duty Personnel Specifics: The actual individuals are selected by their parent commands. US Fleet Forces is responsible for assigning appropriate tasking across all Navy commands. Budget Submitting Offices (BSO), which are Navy's most major commands are assigned requirements to fill, which are then sub-tasked to subordinate commands to identify augmentees. Each individual command first asks for volunteers and then makes assignments based on skill set requirements. Additionally, Navy Personnel Command maintains a volunteer web site and passes volunteer data to all BSOs on a weekly basis.

Reserve Personnel Specifics: For all missions, volunteer drilling Reservists who have not been previously mobilized are considered first, followed by previously identified Sailors who were deferred/delayed but are now available. After volunteers have been considered, non-volunteers assigned to supporting reserve units (if applicable) and who have not been previously mobilized are considered, then finally the applicable community managers are asked to nominate qualified Sailors. In addition to skill requirements, other factors considered when selecting a Sailor include experience, EAOS, and Mobilization Availability Status (MAS) codes. After several years of emphasis on providing a Total Force solution, using reserve force military and civilian skill sets and capabilities, our Navy Reserve along side our Active component Sailors are providing integrated operational expertise to support a full range of operations.

TRAINING

All Navy personnel, Active and Reserve, with orders to OIF/OEF receive training
designed to meet CENTCOM Combined Land Forces Component Command (CLFCC) theater specific requirements. The type of training Sailors receive is based on the requirement they have been sourced to fill as determined by CENTCOM specific mission requirements, theater generated training requirements, and service mission analysis. Simply put, training is tailored to the projected operational environment and feedback between Army, Navy and theater ensure that the prescribed training is appropriate for the mission and the threat. Further, very few of the Navy personnel have ground combat experience and self-defense is the only capability that is expected of them - Navy is not creating combat soldiers. All Sailors receive basic combat skills required to meet theater specific requirements and the Navy provides web based training to include Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection fundamentals; Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE-100), Code of Conduct in addition to health related topics. CENTCOM missions that operate “outside the wire” receive expanded Combat Skills Training focusing on self-defense in addition to a comprehensive package of “warrior skills” training and associated drills.

Personnel are trained at a variety of Army locations leveraging existing infrastructure and training expertise. Some of the theater specific training is conducted at Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Army school houses. Some medical training is conducted by the Army Medical Center and School, and other training is conducted by Forces Command’s Army Power Projection Platforms (PPP). Civil Affairs training has been conducted by the US Army Special Forces Command. All training is coordinated by US Fleet Forces. PPPs that are being used to conduct this training are Fort McCoy, Camp Atterbury, Camp Shelby, Fort Dix, Fort Bragg, Fort Riley, Fort Hood, Fort Bliss, Fort Sill, and Fort Lewis. In addition, TRADOC conducts the Navy Individual Augmentation Combat Training (NIAC) at Fort Jackson. NIAC curriculum oversight is coordinated by the Navy Personnel Development Command (NPDC) Center for Security Forces (CSF) to meet the minimum CLFCC combat skills requirements. Navy has not developed infrastructure to support Individual Augmentee and Ad Hoc Sailor training. All of this training is conducted using the same facilities that are used to train deploying Army forces.

Coordination of this training is part of the US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Joint Sourcing Training Oversight (JSTO) process which includes Army, Navy, USMC and Air Force. Initially, Navy Personnel Development Command conducts an analysis to compare Army skills to Navy ratings. This process defines Navy’s ability to source and what technical skills are necessary for the mission. Training consists of a combination of technical mission and combat skills training. The Army’s TRADOC instructors are trained and certified by TRADOC that they meet Army standards and are fully qualified to instruct the material that is required. Forces Command uses two commands to conduct training. First Infantry Division conducts training for transition teams and First Army conducts the training for all non-transition team Navy personnel. The Navy’s Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center (ECRC) provides liaison personnel on site, to oversee and confirm that all JSTO agreed to training is completed. Where required, training is assessed by Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRE). Unsuccessful completion of an MRE results in additional training. For units completely under Navy control (C-RAM Battery, Shadow TUAV platoons), Navy observes or conducts the MREs. For NIAC trained personnel, additional training in theater is provided during Reception, Staging,
Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) including additional instruction on weapons, live fire and counter IED training. This ensures all NACT trained Sailors have the most recent information on IED and tactics, techniques and procedures on weapons. Training for “ad hoc” personnel is routinely documented by a Navy Enlisted Classification Code (NEC) developed by NAVPERS.

CNO has designated US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) as the command responsible for tracking Navy requirements, and ensuring adequate support to all Sailors in the CENTCOM AOR through coordination with ECRC detachments. ECRC has established a theater presence in Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan. While the ECRC detachment acts as Sailor Advocates, they are also a direct conduit back to US Fleet Forces when training issues are identified. Detachment personnel routinely travel throughout the country to assess Sailors in augmentation requirements in terms of skills set compatibility and also combat skill adequacy. Detachment personnel liaise directly with Army in theater when necessary to provide required theater training as well as the Navy chain of command of findings requiring changes in the training process. Currently ECRC conducts post training surveys just prior to deployment and at the 90 day mark in theater. These surveys primarily focus on the assessment of received mission and combat skills training just after course completion, and again once the Sailor is acclimated to his/her final billet position. This data is collated and forwarded to Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) and US Fleet Forces for assessment of the current training packages. Army maintains an extensive lessons learned database which is routinely reviewed by Army trainers as well as direct theater feedback to incorporate any changes in training which are required. CENTCOM publishes the training requirements by mission requirements. JFCOM conducts coordination meetings and Department of the Army publishes its Execution Order to its Major Commands directing that the training be conducted. JFCOM hosts a bi-weekly teleconference which overviews all of the training ongoing with the services and ECRC. Training changes, modifications (based on new theater information) and execution status is discussed for the Services. Army Major Commands maintain documentation of the training that has been conducted and theater feedback supports the adequacy of training. The process is dynamic and each JSTO rotation overviews and modifies the training based on updated CENTCOM requirements.

**EQUIPPING**

All Navy augmentees are equipped to meet the same CFLCC requirements as all other CENTCOM ground forces. The Army equips Navy personnel with the same individual and collective gear/equipment that is issued to Army personnel assigned to similar Combat Support/Combat Service Support missions. Army combat forces receive additional gear required to support the more tactical nature of their mission. Navy augmentees are not assigned to ground combat missions, and do not receive these combat mission-specific items.

There is no difference in the level of Individual Body Armor (IBA) protection gear provided to Army and Navy personnel. Both Navy and Army personnel receive the same IBA protective plates, contained within outer coverings of the Desert Camouflage Uniform (DCU) or Army Combat Uniform (ACU) color pattern. There are slight differences, mainly in coloration, between the uniforms issues to Army and Navy
personnel. The Navy predominately wears DCUs unless specified by the theater commander and both uniforms provide the same level of protection and performance. The majority of Sailors receive a qualification and issuance of the M-16 weapon for deployment. There are a small number of requirements that receive dual weapons (M-16 and M-9) as well as a small number of billets that receive an alternate to the M-16 (i.e. M-4). All weapons assignments are based on the billet requirements designated by the Component Commander in theater and all personnel are qualified on their assigned weapons.

**IMPACTS**

Navy’s current readiness remains excellent. Congressional support has been critical in this regard and, as a result, Navy units and individual augmentees deploy combat ready – properly trained and properly equipped. Navy stands ready to respond to security and humanitarian contingencies while continuing its present support to the Global War on Terror.

The Navy believes that the current level of effort is sustainable. Currently, augmentation numbers represent approximately three percent of the Total Force and two percent of the Active Component Force. Fleet manning projections and readiness indicators are continuously assessed. Navy Personnel Command has also undertaken a series of regular surveys and assessments to monitor for potential indications that the increased deployment/workload demands may be adversely impacting retention or “health of the Force.”

In these six years of conflict the Navy has made significant strides in Sailor and Family support to ensure readiness and ability to maintain quality personnel. Under the guidance of Task Force Individual Augmentation (TFIA), a collaborative effort was undertaken within our service to improve: Individual Augmentation processing; deployment support; Sailor recognition; career development; Sailor notification time to deploy; and family support. The establishment of ECRC within NECC, enabled this command to serve as a primary interface with Individual Augmentees and their families. The Navy has implemented numerous initiatives that recognize, support, reward and provide a net positive effect for Sailors who complete assignments in hazardous combat zones. Individual Navy commands are actively involved in the selection process of each augmentee and will consult with detailers (career managers) if there is a potential negative career impact associated with an individual assignment decision process and if career milestones are not met. In general, all milestones are being met but at the expense of supporting GWOT requirements by additional deployments between sea tours without a standard length shore assignment. Officer Selection Board precepts clearly designate the value of serving in GWOT Support Assignments for both promotion and milestone screening within each community. Similarly, from an enlisted perspective, the net effect is positive as long as Navy does not divert Sailors from a career milestone to fill a requirement. Additionally, at the discretion of the operational commander, opportunity to take advancement examinations could be delayed by up to one year due to service in a combat environment, however, Sailors have the opportunity to take the exam after their deployment. To date, there have been no visible negative effects on advancement.

The Navy has initiated a number of efforts to support and sustain the members
and families of the Active and Reserve communities during this time of war. The challenge within Navy is that Reserve members are activated individually, often from middle America without a natural support network. To alleviate this, the Navy has developed three Individual Augmentation handbooks targeting the Sailor, Family and Command. Widely distributed and available online, these handbooks are excellent resources to support families and Sailors of both Active and Reserve communities. This is coupled with ongoing efforts by Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC), establishing Family support network and outreach programs. With the stand up of the ECRC, they have provided programs to include Family Support Group meetings at our Fleet Concentration Areas and a variety of web based family support information to include Family Care Lines.

Additionally, ECRC provides liaison teams to provide direct assistance to sailors at pre-deployment training sites. They provide updated information used to support augmentees and family members during training and deployment. ECRC’s Individual Augmentee Family Support Program serves as a conduit for IA Family access to information and direct support throughout the military member’s deployment. Family readiness is the key enabler to the success of our Navy.

CONCLUSION

The Navy will continue to accomplish our traditional maritime missions as well as supporting the non-traditional missions as part of a joint sourcing solution. Also, the Navy will continue efforts to enhance predictability and stability for Individual Augmentees and their families. Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude my remarks by quoting The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen, “The brunt of this war has been borne by the ground forces. I want to be very clear. We will continue the Individual Augmentation process to principally relieve those ground forces. This is a national effort. It’s not a Marine war, or an Army war.”
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

PRESENTATION TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBJECT: IN-LIEU-OF (ILO) TASKINGS

STATEMENT OF: BRIGADIER GENERAL MARKE F. GIBSON
DIRECTOR OF CURRENT OPERATIONS AND TRAINING
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND
REQUIREMENTS
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

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UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
House Armed Services Committee – In-Lieu-of Tasking (ILO)

July 31, 2007

Subject: In-Lieu-Of (ILO) Taskings

Statement of
Brig Gen Marke Gibson (AF/A3O)

I. Introduction

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Air Force In-Lieu-of Taskings and other programs that are important to your Air Force and the Nation.

Your Air Force is fully engaged around the world, fighting terrorism and insurgents in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) while fulfilling our roles as Airmen for the joint team. Simultaneously, we stand prepared for rapid response to conflict around the globe as our nation’s strategic reserve. Air forces succeed when they anticipate, and are allowed to shape, the future strategic environment and develop the capabilities for the next fight. Air forces succeed when they remain focused on their primary mission as an independent force that is part of an interdependent joint team. We fly, fight and dominate in three war fighting domains – air, space and cyberspace – giving the United States sovereign options to employ military force like no other nation.

II. We Are At War

The missions your Air Force fly today are the latest in a string of 16 continuous years of Air Force operations in the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR), beginning with our initial deployments to Operation DESERT SHIELD in August 1990 through ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Through 2 Jul 2007 your Air Force has flown over 82% of the coalition’s 369,040 sorties in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and 77% of the coalition’s 220,457 sorties in Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM. In addition to our daily operations, the Air Force has also seen several surge periods over the past 16 years, resulting in unexpected wear and tear on our people and platforms. And, like each of the other Services, we have suffered combat losses.

On an average day, the Air Force flies more than 430 sorties in support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Of this number, approximately 120 sorties are intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and strike. Of the remaining, 275 are airlift sorties (both inter- and intra-theater) and 35 are air refueling sorties.

Supporting CENTCOM is just a small part of what we do for our nation’s defense. The Air Force has responded to or has been prepared to respond across the entire spectrum of operations – from rapid humanitarian aid to major combat operations. We have flown over 47,903 sorties in support of Operation NOBLE EAGLE and over 3,468 counter drug sorties, while also supporting operations in the Horn of Africa (HOA), the Balkans, and the Pacific Rim.

World-wide, your Air Force has been flying the same number of hours as 13 years ago with older aircraft, fewer aircraft, and with fewer Airmen. It is important to note the average age of the aircraft in your Air Force fleet is at a historic high of 24.5 years old. Newer aircraft provide increased capability for the COCOMs.

III. COCOM Support

It is important to understand the level and depth of support that your Air Force provides every day to Combatant Commanders (COCOMs). The tip-of-the-iceberg analogy is very applicable. While the number of Airmen we deploy may appear low, there are actually many Airmen supporting COCOMs daily.

Airmen deployed in support of operations worldwide accounts for about 4% of our total force, however, we have 40% of the total force, approximately 213,000 Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve supporting the COCOMs daily. Among these are strategic mobility forces, both tankers
and airlifters. Also, among these are our Strategic forces that include strategic bombers, Special Operations, Combat Search & Rescue as well as Space & Missile forces, which include ICBMs, Missile Warning & Space Control, and Air Force Satellite Control Network.

Complete USAF support to COCOM must consider all USAF forces supporting daily COCOM operations, which is 213,000 airmen. You need not be deployed to be employed. We posture in our Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) pairs, 22,183 steady state-rotational Airmen, which include tactical forces, fighters, intra-theater airlift, base-level support airmen, Major Command (MAJCOM) staffs, engineers, and medical personnel. Added to that are 60,595 outside the continental United States (OCONUS) Airmen assigned to Pacific Air Force (PACAF) and US Air Forces Europe (USAFE). Additionally, 130,186 Global Support & Strategic Forces are performing those global-strategic missions, but not necessarily under direct control of COCOM commander or assigned to a particular Area of Responsibility (AOR). Those global force numbers include over 50,000 Strategic Mobility airmen, over 11,000 Strategic Bomber airmen, over 12,000 Space & Missile airmen, nearly 15,000 C4ISR airmen, over 11,000 Intelligence airmen, over 4,000 on COCOM staffs, over 14,000 Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), over 6000 on Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) over the continental United States (CONUS), and 4000 others assigned to Office of Special Investigations (OSI), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and Weather.

Currently, the approximately 26,000 airmen deployed in the battle supporting CENTCOM requirements are categorized in one of three ways: 1) Traditional AEF; 2) individual augmentees in support of joint headquarters organizations, 3) in-lieu-of (ILO) airmen.

III. ILO Taskings

ILO tasks are generated when the Joint Force Provider provides a substitute force capability to the requestor because the traditional force is not available. The Joint Staff business rules
identify ILO as a method that provides solutions when the preferred force sourcing is not an option. There are three ILO categories. The first is the Joint Sourcing Solution (JSS), which is a Service providing a like capability or competency within its core competency in place of another Service’s core mission. For example: USAF civil engineers replace Army heavy construction engineers. The second ILO category is the Remission Solution, which is when a Service remissions an existing unit to perform a mission not within its core competency. For example, an Army artillery unit is remissioned as a transportation unit. The Air Force has not provided any ILO solutions in this category. The third ILO category is Retrained Ad Hoc Solution, which forms an ad hoc unit from a group of individuals who are then trained, equipped, and deployed to support a COCOM requirement. Examples are Provisional Reconstruction Teams, Training Teams, and Civil Affairs Teams.

Of the approximately 26,000 Airmen deployed in the CENTCOM Area of responsibility (AOR), approximately 6000 or 23% are considered to be filling ILO tasks. We also fill another 1,200 joint-manned positions with Air Force individual augmentees, which have increased approximately 10% per year since 2003. Since 2004, we have deployed approximately 22,000 Airmen to perform ILO tasks. Also, ILO tasks had been increasing 33% annually until this year (2007), in which the increase was 57%. These ILO tasks draw from across the board of Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs): Public Affairs, Judge Advocate, Chaplain, Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Medical, Communications, Logistics, Engineering, Security Forces, and Operations. Currently, 87% of our ILO-tasked Airmen work Joint Sourcing Solutions. The remaining 13% are part of the Retraining Ad Hoc Teams.

We ensure Airmen receive the best training and required equipment prior to deployment. Training and equipping costs for ILO tasks are shared between the Army and the Air Force, and the Air Force portion breaks down into two parts. The first part is the responsibility of the
Airmen’s parent unit, which ensures Airmen meet their basic readiness requirements. ILO Airmen are equipped at their home station with deployment bags and mobility bags. The second part is the responsibility of Second Air Force (2 AF) coordinating with the Army’s FORSCOM and TRADOC to conduct ILO training and resolve training shortfalls. Here the Airmen receive combat skills training and skills training. Combat Skills Training is conducted by Army FORSCOM at any one of nine Army locations. Next, skills training is conducted by TRADOC at a location dependent on the specific technical training required. For example, communications training is conducted at Fort Gordon, GA, and transportation training is at Fort Eustis VA. This training meets operational requirements of the mission Airmen will support. They also receive additional equipment required specifically for their ILO mission and to defend against specific threats in theater such as IEDs. Army certified instructors provide combat skills to both our Airmen and Army Soldiers. Air Force oversight of this training for Airmen resides in 2 AF and is further scrutinized by functional Area Managers.

ILO Training and equipping is constantly updated to meet environment and mission requirements. Second Air Force hosts a Training & Equipment Review Board (TERB) to determine relevancy, accuracy, and core skill sets inherent with specific AFSCs. Results and recommendations are reviewed and implemented by FORSCOM. Feedback is collected at three distinct points: Training completion; 45-60 days at the deployed location; upon deployment return to home station. Feedback data is used to identify pre-deployment, deployment, and re-deployment shortfalls in equipment, training, medical screening, etc. Feedback data is also used to recommend solutions and resolve shortfalls prior to future training.

We review ILO taskings across AFSCs and across the AOR for consistency. When we are asked to do a specific ILO task, we determine whether or not our Airmen are performing the original task identified in the request for forces (RFF) or a different task. CENTAF reports that
97% of Airmen assigned to an ILO task are performing the original task and only 3% are not, which is due to the dynamic battlespace requirements. CENTAF executes both operational control and administrative control over ILO-tasked Airmen, thru Air Expeditionary Group commanders, who validate issues in real time and resolve Air Force-Army cultural differences. Consequently, Airmen have the competence to execute the ILO tasks that they are assigned.

The benefit of ILO takings has enhanced the professional development of our Airmen. Duty in a combat environment along side the other Services enables our Airmen to gain valuable insight and skills. Tomorrow’s Air Force leaders will need to articulate and possess these skills. In addition, deployment experience is favorably considered when reviewing an Airmen’s record. AF grants specialty knowledge test exemptions to enlisted members who work out of their AFSC for a year, which covers their next promotion cycle, so as to not place them at a disadvantage with their peers.

Since the Air Force began providing significant ILO support in Feb 2004, we have recorded 13 KIA’s, 11 of which were due to IEDs. Of the 152 WIA’s, 7 were very serious injuries, 10 were serious injuries, and 30 were non-serious injuries caused predominantly by IEDs. We were unable to assess whether or not training was a factor in any of these casualties.

To reiterate, your Air Force takes great care to ensure that our Airmen are organized, trained, and equipped to perform CENTCOM’s ILO requirements with competence. Headquarters Air Force and Air Combat Command set the tone for requirements, 2AF executes training, and CENTAF executes field command of all Airmen assigned to ILO tasks.

There are challenges within the ILO program. Extensive training is required for Airmen to perform ILO tasks and the effect of that training, as measured in man-years consumed, is significant. Deployment requirements have consumed 13,100 man-years, time in the training pipeline consumed 3,900 man-years, travel consumed 2,200 man-years, reconstitution consumed
2,200 man-years, and 2AF involvement consumed 150 man-years. For the 22,000 ILO-tasked Airmen deployed since 2004, the total cost for training has been 8,016 man-years.

Reconstitution is a critical component of the impact because Airmen core competencies are perishable skills that require additional training to hone following an ILO deployment.

ILO tasks remove our Airmen from their assigned AEF rotation cycle, which in effect requires them to exceed the rotation policy as defined in OSD Force Deployment Rules for OIF/OEF as written in USD P&R memo dated 30 Jul 04. More than 5,000 Airmen exceed the 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio for active-component airmen and the 1:5 mobilization-to-dwell ratio for reserve-component Airmen as defined in OSD Memorandum, Utilization of the Total Force, dated 19 Jan 07.

ILO taskings exacerbate an already high personnel tempo for many AFSCs, which are driving down their dwell time. Security forces, transportation, air traffic controllers, civil engineering, explosive ordnance disposal, which comprise the majority of our ILO forces, are all experiencing dwell times approaching 1:1. Home station security force units are currently using borrowed military manpower, which is a combination contractors and civilian over-hires, to meet post-911 security requirements. In addition, ISR forces and strategic mobility forces are experiencing high personnel tempos, which correspond into high operations tempos that increasingly exceed aircraft planned and budgeted use rates. The AEF construct adapts to these increasing requirements for a limited time, however, the cost to the airframes is mounting and the dwell time for personnel decreases.

IV. Closing

Your Air Force is fully engaged around the world, fighting terrorism and insurgents in the Global War on Terror. The missions we fly today are the latest in a string of 16 continuous years of Air Force operations in the CENTCOM AOR with an increasingly aging fleet of aircraft.
While the number of Airmen we deploy may appear low, there are actually many Airmen supporting COCOMs daily. Approximately 213,000 Airmen, which is about 40% of the total force, support the COCOMs everyday. Of those 213,000 Airmen, almost 130,000 support the COCOMs through strategic duty station missions. Around 60,000 are forward-based in the Pacific AOR and European AOR. And the rest are deployed in support of OPERATIONS ENDURING & IRAQI FREEDOM, of which approximately 23% are ILO tasked. Your Air Force takes great care to ensure that our Airmen are organized, trained, and equipped to perform CENTCOM’s requirements with competence. However, there is a growing cost to ILO tasks, especially when they fall outside Airmen’s core competencies.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 31, 2007
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ

Mr. ORTIZ. Please explain the Unit Requirement Form Change process.

General EGGINTON. The supported combatant command (COCOM) annotates the recommended administrative changes in Force Requirements Enhanced Database (FRED)/Joint Force Requirements Management (JFRM) systems. The COCOM then submits a message to the Joint Staff identifying pending changes where concurrence is sought.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) will then officially direct Joint Forces Command to staff these changes to all the applicable Force Providers, acting as a clearinghouse of information to avoid multiple, conflicting responses. The respective force provider must access Force Requirements Enhanced Database (FRED)/Joint Force Requirements Management (JFRM) systems to see the requested change. Force Providers will review the requested changes and provide input in an electronic staffing package back to Joint Forces Command.

Review from Force Providers under their purview will fall into three categories: concur without comment, concur with comment, or non-concur. Once that information is received from all concerned, Joint Forces Command sends a message to the supported Combatant Command detailing the results. At that point, the Combatant Commander is authorized to change those Unit Requirement Forms that received full concurrence with comments as appropriate.

Joint Forces Command updates their databases and submits approved administrative changes to the Joint Staff to be included in the next available Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Execute Order Modification.

Changes which did not receive concurrence, or in cases where the Combatant Command could not accept the Force Provider comments, require a formal RequestForce Forces for continued staffing.

Mr. ORTIZ. In your testimony you state that “in some instances Mixed-Composition units and Reserve Component units have reported to their mobilization center with less than the required number of personnel and with training shortfalls . . . which ultimately becomes CENTCOM’s risk to mitigate.” How is that risk mitigated?

General EGGINTON. It is the Joint Force Provider’s responsibility to organize, train and equip personnel once ordered by the Secretary of Defense. In some instances Mixed-Composition units and Reserve Component units discover that additional training is required to get to a level of required proficiency once the unit arrives at their respective mobilization station. An issue of major concern arises when a unit requires additional training time and can no longer meet the arrival date. In these cases there are limited options to maintain mission capabilities. Joint Forces Command in coordination with Joint Force Providers is initially responsible for ensuring that the requirement is met by nominating other units if available. In instances where the delayed unit is a rotational force and there are no additional external units available the risk is only mitigated by either extending the current unit in theater or diverting existing assigned personnel which compromises other missions. If the unit is filling an emergent requirement, the component must delay or reassign forces to execute the mission. In the event that troops are not fully trained once they are in the theater, USCENTCOM components work to bring them up to current requirements and familiarize them with local Standard Operational Procedures; this training is normally conducted in a non-hostile environment in order to reduce risk to the new forces.

Mr. ORTIZ. In your testimony you state “it would be helpful for training of In-Lieu-Of units to be standardized prior to arrive in theater to prepare them for the range of missions faced when performing operations.” To whose standards and whose responsibility is that?

General EGGINTON. When a Joint Force Provider nominates a unit to fill a requested capability, US Central Command’s expectation is that the unit be manned, trained, equipped and certified to execute the mission prior to deployment. The individual service Force Provider is responsible for ensuring personnel are trained and proficient in accordance with Central Command’s standards, Training, Tactics and
Procedures (TTPs) and doctrine outlined in Joint Publications to meet mission specifics.

Mr. ORTIZ. In your testimony you state that “In some cases, Joint Force Provider interpretation of mission requirements due to a difference between cultures and philosophies may limit the score of the mission and the capabilities of the ILO.” Please provide some examples of that situation and explain the impact on unit readiness caused by that situation. How is CENTCOM working with JFCOM and the Services to mitigate that situation?

General EGGINTON. One example is the Army, Navy, and Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units are trained, manned, and equipped differently. CENTCOM has requirements for EOD teams and presents these requirements in the Request for Forces and Unit Requirements Form. As a result of different service philosophies on EOD unit manning, training, and equipping, sourcing of CENTCOM EOD requirements may result in varying types of units. These units may be trained in tasks and missions not required to accomplish the CENTCOM mission, requiring CENTCOM to provide or seek additional training, manning and equipment to perform CENTCOM missions.

Recently, USCENTCOM has encountered issues with Force Providers pushing back on required tasks because the mission requirements could not be completely predicted and documented during the planning stage. Despite the fact that most tasks were well within the respective unit’s skill sets, the units hesitated to perform tasks required by the mission because the tasks were not specifically noted in the Unit Requirement Form.

Through the Unit Requirement Form Change Request Process, Joint Forces Command and USCENTCOM continuously refine the mission specific tasks and capabilities to ensure the right personnel are sourced to fit the requirement.

Mr. ORTIZ. Chemical and artillery units are being remissioned to military police. Even with specialized training, the leadership of remissioned units does not have experience comparable to leaders who spent their careers in the job. This creates two net effects: core skills atrophy without use and strategic risk increases because remissioned troops are not qualified to do full-spectrum missions in either their original MOS or their new MOS. Are combatant command requirements being filled by soldiers with true capability in that mission area or are there shortfalls in the Army’s ability to fill them?

General EGGINTON. In-lieu-of sourcing, by its nature, is only considered when services lack units with the requested core capability. When a Joint Force Provider nominates a unit to fill a requested capability, USCENTCOM’s expectation is that the unit be manned, trained, equipped and certified to execute the mission prior to deployment. The individual service Force Provider is responsible for ensuring personnel are trained and proficient in accordance with US Central Command’s requested requirements, Tactics and Procedures (TTPs) and doctrine outlined in Joint Publications to meet mission specifics. USCENTCOM reviews each sourcing solution nominated by the Joint Force Providers to ensure that the solution is viable and acceptable.

In the example of chemical and artillery units re-missioned to perform security duties; this remissioning leverages the basic soldier skills required to perform guard duty and patrols but does not require soldiers to perform the full-spectrum skills required of trained Military Policemen.

Mr. ORTIZ. When a Request For Forces is issued, does it request a specific number of personnel, or does it request a capability? Are there issues where unneeded personnel are deployed simply need to meet the Army’s manning standard rather than to fulfill a true combatant commander requirement? If so, what is being done to mitigate this over-assignment of personnel?

General EGGINTON. The ultimate goal of a Request For Forces is to request a capability that equates to a standard off-the-shelf service unit manned with a standard number personnel. If less than or more than a standard unit is needed, the request is tailored and annotated to reflect the actual personnel numbers with troops to task assigned. There are unique missions involving specialized task forces, training teams and requirements where a specified number of personnel is required (i.e. detainee guard missions where a desired guard to detainee ratio is required). In all cases, USCENTCOM works with the Joint Force providers desire to keep unit integrity to the maximum extent possible.

Mr. ORTIZ. The Air Force does not remission units and will divest itself of interrogation and detainee operations in FY 2008. If the Services stop doing certain missions, what is the impact on sourcing?

General EGGINTON. In the event that a particular Service cannot fill a USCENTCOM requested requirement, Joint Forces Command would be required to
re-staff the sourcing requirements to other Joint Force Providers until an appropriate sourcing capability is identified.

Mr. Ortiz. Once a Request For Forces is received, it takes time—perhaps as much as 18 months—to train, equip and deploy to theater. Often, the situation and the needs on the ground have changed. What is the process for validating the currency of the Request For Forces? How do you ensure that the mission which the sailor or airman steps into in theater is actually the mission for which he or she was trained? How do you prevent assigned forces from being misused or under-used because circumstances generating the request are no longer valid?

General Kamiya. A Request for Forces (RFF) is an emergent request for capability, submitted by a combatant command in response to a near-term need. The process goes as follows: A combatant command submission of an RFF is no less than 45 days before the force should arrive in theater to answer the need. Combatant commands generally meet or exceed this goal with RFF submissions averaging approximately two months prior to force arrival in theater. Because of the emergent nature of the requests, Request for Forces reflect current, valid theater needs.

As the need for the force or capability endures into the following year, the combatant command consolidates the force request with others into an annual theater force requirements submission. All theater requirements from across the globe are then consolidated to describe a global force requirement that the Joint Force Providers will seek to satisfy via a recommended annual Global Force Allocation Plan. It is these annual requirement submissions (submitted at the start of a fiscal year for the following year—October 2007 submission for arrival in FY09) that can lead force arrival in theater by a long time (up to 18 months is conceivable).

For example: CENTCOM expresses a need for a security force to protect a forward operating base. CENTCOM submits a Request for Force describing the needed capability; the Joint Staff validates the requirement and USJFCOM (as a Joint Force Provider) recommends sourcing a Military Police company to fill the need. Ultimately, the Secretary of Defense approves the deployment and orders are issued to transfer operational control of the Military Police company from Commander, USJFCOM to Commander, USCENTCOM. As time progresses USCENTCOM determines that the need for this security force will endure through the next year. USCENTCOM staff ensures that they capture this need in their annual requirements submission for the following fiscal year. USJFCOM (as a Joint Force Provider) will see the requirement for the security force in the annual submission and will develop a plan to source the force that will relieve the original Military Police company at the forward operating base.

During the period of several months when the next annual Global Force Allocation Plan is being developed, there is significant collaboration between the combatant commands, the Joint Force Providers, the Service headquarters and the Joint Staff. This collaboration ensures that all are kept apprised of changes to the combatant command requirements brought about by changes in theater operations. The combatant command staff will track, via its subordinate headquarters, any mission accomplishments or other changes that enable force redeployments. In these instances, the combatant command would delete a force requirement and designate the force last filling the requirement as available for redeployment or reassignment to another theater mission. Any reassignment of a force to another theater mission falls under the authority of a combatant commander “to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.” (Joint Publication 0–2, Chapter 111)

JFCOM collaborates closely with combatant commands and Service headquarters to resolve concerns over changes of mission for forces provided to combatant commands. Through this collaboration JFCOM has been able to facilitate adjustments to pre-deployment training to account for a pending mission change, or to provide different (more appropriate) forces to meet a changing mission requirement. This collaboration does not interfere with the combatant commander’s authority to exercise command over his forces as outlined in the reference above.

Mr. Ortiz. The definitions for Joint Manning Document and Individual Augmentee both refer to these as unfunded temporary duty positions, and the Committee has been told that the Services pay for them “out of hide.” Who pays for ILOs and what is source of the funding? How are the Services reimbursed and when?

General Kamiya. In-Lieu-Of forces are made up of unit capabilities from the Services’ force inventories. Costs associated with In-Lieu-Of sourcing are generated when different or additional equipment and training is required to prepare the force for deployment. While each Service is the best source for specific information on costs, funding and reimbursement data, JFCOM believes that funding for In-Lieu-Of
forces comes from normal Service funding streams augmented by any supplemental funds.

Mr. Ortiz. How long have the Services been providing capabilities in mission areas outside of their traditional roles and functions and on what scale? What is JFCOM's role in reconstituting these service members to their core competencies?

General Kamiya. USJFCOM is aware that Services have been providing capabilities in mission areas outside of their traditional roles and functions since JFCOM assumed responsibility as Primary Joint Force Provider in August 2004. Undoubtedly, the Services provided similar capabilities earlier than that time, but JFCOM does not have data to pinpoint when their commitments began. In terms of scale, less than 10 percent of the forces allocated to all combatant commands during the year are serving outside their core competency (the skill each person was trained to perform prior to OIF/OEF assignment). This includes all those individuals taken from units to serve on Transition Teams and as Individual Augments to Joint Task Force Headquarters staffs, though many of these people are employed using their core competencies.

USJFCOM does not take an active role in reconstituting service members back to their respective core competencies. The reconstitution decision falls under the Service’s Title X responsibilities. Once a unit has completed its mission or deployment, the individual Service will determine whether to return their members to their core competency or to perhaps maintain them in their new role in response to a growing demand for a specific capability.

Mr. Ortiz. Please explain how the role of Individual Augmentees is different from service members who are serving in a joint sourcing, re-missioning or retraining role. Do IAs serve in combat roles?

General Kamiya. An Individual Augmentee (IA) by joint definition (CJCSI 1301.01C) is an unfunded temporary duty position identified on a Joint Task Force Joint Manning Document (JMD) by a supported Combatant Commander to augment headquarters operations during a contingency. Joint manning documents typically outline the personnel requirements of a joint headquarters.

Normally the individuals requested for Individual Augmentee duty are in the enlisted grades of E6 and above, and for officers at the grade of O3 and above. Individual Augmentees perform routine staff functions on the headquarters staff. These individuals may be moved by the Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander from their assigned billet to another billet within the headquarters JMD which is vacant and considered more essential than the current billet in which they are serving. JTF headquarters Individual Augmentees should not be re-assigned to duties beyond the scope of the headquarters staff.

Individual Augmentees do not serve in combat roles. Individual Augmentees, by definition, are provided with the specific intent of augmenting a Joint Task Force headquarters. They are not intended to be on the front lines in combat.

An individual involved in a joint sourcing effort, re-missioning or retraining role is serving in a unit-based capability to meet a combatant command requirement. These three categories constitute types of forces substituted for standard forces when the supply of standard forces is short. These categories have been collectively referred to as In-Lieu-Of forces. Individuals filling these categories of forces are not considered Individual Augmentees.

A joint sourcing capability is a unit-based capability from one service substituting for a unit with similar capability from another service (e.g. an Air Force security element substituting for an Army military police unit is an example of joint sourcing).

A re-missioned unit is one that is equipped and trained to perform a different mission (e.g., an Army artillery battery is trained and equipped to fill a transportation company requirement).

Retraining occurs when it is necessary to form an ad-hoc unit from a group of individuals. The individuals are trained and equipped to deploy as a unit, but it is likely that they will be serving outside their core competencies. The need for retraining arises most often when the combatant command requesting or retraining requests a tailored capability that does not exist as such in the force inventory.

Mr. Ortiz. In your testimony you state JFCOM is building a capability to provide predictability for individual augmentees. What is this capability and how will it provide or improve predictability? When will it be implemented?

General Kamiya. The capability that will enhance predictability for individual augmentees (individuals tasked to fill a position on a Joint Task Force Headquarters staff) results from an expansion of JFCOM’s mission, as of 1 October 2006, to include responsibility for developing individual augmentee sourcing solutions. Following receipt of this new duty, Joint Forces Command worked to modify the process for combatant command submission of individual augmentee requirements
so that all known requirements are submitted at least a year in advance of the individual's expected report date. These individual requirements are considered, together with all known unit-based force requirements, as USJFCOM prepares its recommended Force Allocation Plan for the following year. For example, in September and early October 2007, combatant commands will submit their force requirements for Fiscal Year 2009 (FY09). As the FY09 Force Allocation Plan is developed and approved in the following months, the Services are given advance notice of the need for unit and individual augmentees—thus providing each Service predictability and sufficient time to facilitate deployment preparations. While we recognize that there will be short-notice requirements for individuals that will emerge during FY09, the majority (historically over 90 percent) of individual augmentee requirements can be predicted a year in advance.

Mr. Ortiz. Who tracks Individual Augmentees’ completion of joint functional training and what is the system/method for tracking?

General Kamiya. Joint functional training for individual augmentees going to joint task force headquarters (JTF HQ) billets is provided online through the Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) web portal. The training consists of interactive courseware on JTF HQ fundamentals, informational presentations, robust discussion forums on key topics, and AOR-specific content. Completion of the interactive courseware and informational presentations is automatically tracked by JKO's learning management system, which also electronically delivers the content and tracks additional metrics. The learning management system produces periodic reports that allow USJFCOM training personnel to verify training completion. Active participation in the discussion forums is also a required element of the training and is monitored by subject matter expert facilitators.

Mr. Ortiz. Combat lifesaver training is highly valued and almost universally requested by troops in after-action reports and post-deployment debriefs. As of June 15, Combat Lifesavers Course certification is part of the program of instruction at Forts Jackson, Benning and Leonard Wood. Is this a legitimate training requirement for all augmentation service members? If so, what is being done to ensure the training is provided to those that need it?

General Kamiya. Mission requirements are established by the geographic combatant command. These mission requirements drive a Service's unit/individual deployment preparation including equipping and training. The gaining combatant command may state specific training needs (in addition to more general mission requirements) that would also guide a Service's preparation of deploying units/individuals. Additionally, a Service may take the position that specific training is required, as a minimum, before the Service will certify that the unit/individual is prepared to deploy. In the case of combat lifesaver training, USCENTCOM has established the requirement for one individual per squad to be combat lifesaver trained. This training is in addition to the first aid training required of every individual prior to theater entry.

JFCOM's information is that CENTCOM has not evaluated combat lifesaver training to be necessary for all augmentation service members, nor have the Services established this training as a mandatory pre-deployment requirement. If either organization established a greater requirement, then pre-deployment training would be adjusted to provide the additional training and Services would modify their training programs to accommodate the additional throughput.

Mr. Ortiz. It is our understanding that required training occurs at Camp Buehring and Udari Range in Kuwait prior to deployment into the combat theater. It is unclear how training requirements are tracked throughout the deployment process and across the Services. What checks are in place to ensure that the sailors and airmen are adequately trained for the mission they will perform when deployed? What is the feedback loop upon deployment to determine if the sailors and airmen are fully trained once they arrive on station? Who tracks whether individual augmentees—not those with a remissioned unit—are completing each of their training requirements before they arrive in theater? What is the paperwork trail and what is done when training inadequacies are identified?

Admiral Giardina.

1. What checks are in place to ensure that the sailors and airmen are adequately trained to perform the mission they will perform when deployed?

US Fleet Forces (USFF) validates and establishes the training requirements to meet the mission and coordinates with US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) to provide required training. First Army, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) all provide training coordinated through FORSCOM. This is supportive of the Joint Sourcing Training Oversight (JSTO) process. JSTO includes specific training requirements for specific Unit
Requirement Form/Request for Forces (URF/RFF) assignments. This includes both skills training as well as combat skills training. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), through their subordinate Expeditionary Combat Readiness Command (ECRC) has established Liaison Officers (LNOs) at each of the Army training sites to ensure all Navy AdHoc and Individual Augmentees attend scheduled training and provide immediate feedback to USFF and the Army training command on any issues. The Army ensures the required training is provided and remediation is conducted as needed until students satisfactorily complete the training.

2. What is the feedback loop upon deployment to determine if the sailors and airmen are fully trained once they arrive on station?

There are many feedback processes in place to advise both Navy and Army of any shortfalls in training:

- ECRC provides an initial survey the last week of Combat Skills training to measure the participant’s immediate reaction/satisfaction to the training program. (Kirkpatrick Level 1: Reaction). These responses are not mandatory; however, return rates from US Navy Individual Augmentee Combat Training (NIACT) are about 90% and at other combat skills training sites a little less. This survey has been in place since August 2006.

- A 90-Day Boots on Ground (BOG) Survey is published on Navy Knowledge Online (NKO) as well as emailed by ECRC to individuals that have been deployed for at least 90 days since they completed their combat skills training. This survey is designed to measure transfer of behavior and actual use of the combat skills training. (Kirkpatrick Level 3: Transfer of Behavior) This survey collection has been in place since May 2007, therefore return rates are still being compiled.

- Many RFF missions have theater to Navy and Army feedback via periodic Telephone Conferences (TELCONS). These include: a bi-weekly JSTO TELCON with all trainers and USAF participating; weekly RFF 611 Counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (CREW) TELCONS; weekly Camp Bucca Detainee TELCONS; and weekly Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortar (CRAM) phone conferences. Routine OEF Situation Report (SITREPS) are provided to Commanding General, First Army and shared with the Services. Embedded Training Teams (ETT), Military Transition Teams (MiTT), and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) have quarterly planning conferences to adjust training and theater support as necessary to better adapt to the mission.

3. Who tracks whether individual augmentees—not those with a remissioned unit—are completing each of their training requirements before they arrive in theater?

The Navy Personnel Development Command (NPDC) and USFF coordinated the creation of the course curriculum for NIACT and have designated the Center for Security Forces (CSF) as the course curriculum manager to ensure the curriculum is current and remains valid. Center for Security Forces coordinates with TF Marshall at FT Jackson to ensure all IAs (those assigned to a Joint Manning Document) have met all training requirements.

ECRC LNOs at each Army training site coordinates with Army training cadres to ensure that USFF established training is completed. Army maintains the documentation.

4. What is the paperwork trail and what is done when training inadequacies are identified?

Navy identifies problems through feedback from both personnel BOG in theater and from the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC), and documents formally through surveys listed in paragraph two above, following up and improving the training standard when deficiencies are identified. Navy has no visibility on internal Army documentation, but is aware of a robust lessons learned database to document training deficiencies. FORSCOM and First Army oversee the training, and they follow Program of Instruction (POI) changes. Most of the inadequacies are a function of requiring more training for specific missions as well as additional combat skills training required to meet the mission. Most of the inadequacies are topical areas which need to be addressed. An example is the Afghanistan and Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). Theater feedback has resulted in additional inter-agency training to better support the mission as well as language and cultural additions.

Mr. Ortiz, It is our understanding that required training occurs at Camp Buehring and Udari Range in Kuwait prior to deployment into the combat theater. It is unclear how training requirements are tracked throughout the deployment process and across the Services. What checks are in place to ensure that the sailors and airmen are adequately trained for the mission they will perform when deployed? What is the feedback loop upon deployment to determine if the sailors and airmen are fully trained once they arrive on station? Who tracks whether individual augmentees—not those with a remissioned unit—are completing each of their train-
ing requirements before they arrive in theater? What is the paperwork trail and what is done when training inadequacies are identified?

General HALVERSON. Validation of USN/USAF units is a Service responsibility. FORSCOM provides documentation of the training that was requested and the training that was provided. The Fleet Forces Command/2AF validates the units for deployment. This validation includes equipping, Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP), training, JOPES.

Each service has the responsibility to provide individual augmentees (IAs) that are trained for the missions they deploy for. Each service assesses its ability to provide this training and makes arrangements if required to augment their training capabilities. For example, Fleet Forces Command (FFC) has developed ICW Department of the Army, a Navy Individual Augmentee Combat Training (NIACT) program at Ft. Jackson, executed by TRADOC to train the minimal combat skills that the Navy feels are required for deployment in selected positions. In addition, the USAF has some home station training available, and occasionally will ask FORSCOM to conduct additional training for their individual augmentees as part of a larger group. Few USN/USAF personnel go thru the CONUS Replacement Center (CRC). However, if they attend the CRC training and do not perform the required tasks they are recycled until the next week. The CRC will not deploy them without them meeting the requirements. The Navy generally uses the Navy Individual Augmentee Combat Training (NIACT) at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, to meet their IA training requirement. The USAF generally uses their 19-hour training program or asks FORSCOM to roll some of their individuals into the combat skills training that Army is already conducting for another USAF requirement.

Mr. ORTIZ. Even if service members are performing the same mission for another service, they may be performing the mission under very different circumstances. For example, an airman doing flight-line security at Ramstein AFB, German, faces different challenges when guarding the flight line at Balad airbase in Iraq. How is training for service members deploying from Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) conducted and certified?

Admiral GIARDINA. The responsibility for training of service members filling requirements being satisfied by other Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) is the responsibility of the sourcing GCC. Some GCC individual AdHoc assignments support URF/RFFs which USFF is also sourcing. These GCC nominees will attend the same training track as individual augmentees assigned from CONUS activities. Coordination with GCCs also notes that Sailors assigned to missions can attend NIACT. Recently, EUCOM has sent Sailors filling intelligence billets to NIACT instead of abbreviated Army CRC training. There also are other agencies with Sailors assigned that support OIF and OEF. As an example, the Defense Logistic Agency (DLA) sends Sailors enroute OIF and OEF to NIACT training at Ft. Jackson.

Mr. ORTIZ. Even if service members are performing the same mission for another service, they may be performing the mission under very different circumstances. For example, an airman doing flight-line security at Ramstein AFB, German, faces different challenges when guarding the flight line at Balad airbase in Iraq. How is training for service members deploying from Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) conducted and certified?

General GIBSON. All training is conducted at the state-side US Army Power Projection Platforms (PPP) regardless of the Airmen’s permanent duty station. Once an Airman is tasked to deploy in an ILO billet, they are scheduled to attend one of the PPPs for combat skills and specialized skills training. This includes Airmen deploying from OCONUS that are sourced through both Joint Service Solution and Retrained Ad Hoc Solution methods.

To address training requirements for Joint Service Solution and Retrained Ad Hoc Solution oversight, Second Air Force hosts a semi-annual Training and Equipment Review Board (TERB) to review current ILO mission training and equipment and determines relevancy, accuracy and the core skill sets inherent with specific AFSCs. The methodology used at the TERB to determine training requirements is as follows: The Request For Forces identifies the Combatant Commander’s (CCDR) requirements, the minimum our Airmen must be trained to for their deployment. The AF Career Field Managers (CFM) and Functional Area Managers (FAM) identify the skills currently taught as part of the AFSC awarding TT course or advanced supplemental training and “inherent” to their particular AFSC skill set. These skill sets are matched against the CCDR requirements to determine the minimum training required from the US Army at the PPPs. Finally, feedback gathered from the field is used to determine if additional training is required to enhance mission success at the deployed location. The CCDR requirements, minus the inherent core Airmen skill sets, plus additional functions identified through the feedback systems
comprise the combat skills and specialized skills training received at the Army PPPs.

These requirements are conveyed to the Army training locations through FORSCOM. Airmen are certified as “fully trained” by the Training Battalion Commanders.

Mr. ORTIZ. Even if service members are performing the same mission for another service, they may be performing the mission under very different circumstances. For example, an airman doing flight-line security at Ramstein AFB, Germany, faces different challenges when guarding the flight line at Balad airbase in Iraq. How is training for service members deploying from Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) conducted and certified?

General H ALVERSON. Commanders of deploying units, whether from CONUS or OCONUS, are responsible for validating the readiness of their unit and personnel. Critical mission requirements are specified by the command in theater requesting support. Associated pre-deployment training guidance/requirements are passed to deploying units to provide support. Deploying units have priority for training facilities and training resources. To the extent practical and resourced, theater-unique training support (e.g., mission unique training venues/conditions/equipment) is provided to units preparing to deploy. To a large extent, Army Centers of Excellence provide specialized training support that unit leaders/personnel can access via the web, e.g., language training, lessons learned, mobile training teams and collaboration with previously deployed leaders with the same mission. Before deploying, unit leaders validate that the unit and their personnel are adequately trained on mission essential tasks and training required by theater. Units receive additional training once they arrive in theater.

Mr. ORTIZ. What service-specific facilities were built/established for ILO training, what was the cost of these facilities, where are they, and what is their long-term intended use?

Admiral GIARDINA. Navy has not invested in infrastructure to support ILO training. NPDC has established an administrative office at Ft. Jackson, SC using existing Army facilities for the express purpose of IA management at NIACT, funding upgrades to the facilities. No other infrastructure has been built for IA purposes. Similarly, Navy is using Army facilities at all the training sites to support the administrative support functions.

Mr. ORTIZ. What service-specific facilities were built/established for ILO training, what was the cost of these facilities, where are they, and what is their long-term intended use?

General HALVERSON. There have been no service specific facilities built or established for ILO training. There may have been minor construction to modify existing facilities at numerous installations that have provided this training but this would not change the facilities long-term intended use.

Mr. ORTIZ. Chemical and artillery units are being remissioned to military police. Even with specialized training, the leadership of remissioned units does not have experience comparable to leaders who spent their careers in the job. This creates two net effects: core skills atrophy without use and strategic risk increases because remissioned troops are not qualified to do full-spectrum missions in either their original MOS or their new MOS. What is your long-term game plan for replacing the forces moved into non-core missions?

Admiral GIARDINA. Currently the Navy has no units that have been remissioned.

Mr. ORTIZ. Chemical and artillery units are being remissioned to military police. Even with specialized training, the leadership of remissioned units does not have experience comparable to leaders who spent their careers in the job. This creates two net effects: core skills atrophy without use and strategic risk increases because remissioned troops are not qualified to do full-spectrum missions in either their original MOS or their new MOS. What is your long-term game plan for replacing the forces moved into non-core missions?

General GIBSON. While working with the Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command, the Air Force (AF) worked within the Global Force Management process to reduce all non-core competency In-Lieu-Of sourcing. By exchanging specific taskings from missions with non-core requirements to taskings that were within core mission sets, the AF replaced many non-core competency ILO contributions. For example, our Security Forces (SF) support numerous Detainee Operation missions. Working through JFCOM, SF were able to increase base defense support missions, which are in line with AF core competencies, in exchange for Detainee Operations missions.

Mr. ORTIZ. Chemical and artillery units are being remissioned to military police. Even with specialized training, the leadership of remissioned units does not have experience comparable to leaders who spent their careers in the job. This creates two net effects: core skills atrophy without use and strategic risk increases because
remissioned troops are not qualified to do full-spectrum missions in either their original MOS or their new MOS. What is your long-term game plan for replacing the forces moved into non-core missions?

General HALVERSON. Transformation to the Army Modular Force is a journey that is addressing our capabilities of today without degrading tomorrow’s fight. This continuous re-evaluation of the demands of today’s long war also reflects the agility of the Army’s institution to adapt its units, personnel, and systems to produce trained and ready units. Until the Army fully achieves modular transformation across the service, the Army will continue to use innovative techniques, such as in-lieu-of sourcing, to fill the gaps between available force structure and combatant commander’s needs. Units selected to perform these unique in-theater missions are identified as early as feasible in their operational readiness cycle in order to allow commanders to task organize and train to the theater specific mission essential tasks. With the approved Grow the Army Plan and Army Rebalance Initiatives the Army is mitigating capability shortfalls in military police, as well as other Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service Support functions. As this plan is implemented the need for in lieu of sourcing will be further reduced.

Mr. ORTIZ. Please share with us some of the lessons learned that have been applied to training for in-lieu-of soldiers, sailors and airmen.

Admiral GIARDINA. USFF directed Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) to review the NIAC training program. The Navy has conducted surveys of the Sailors participating in this training as well as the gaining commands to determine if the training met the mission requirements. The NECC review and the input from those surveys resulted in the NIAC curriculum transitioning from a 12-day to a 17-day POI. The revised POI includes added emphasis in first aid, communication, and combat skills.

PRT Conferences have resulted in significant modifications to the POI as well as more emphasis on Pre-deployment Site Surveys (PDSS) by prospective commanding officers and executive officers. PDSS is critical to giving Navy Officers selected to command PRTs an understanding of the operating environment and what will be expected of them.

CJTF HOA training has been modified for each rotation based on better knowledge of the mission. HOA, like many other missions in support of OIF and OEF, have evolving missions which require training modifications.

The CRAM concept was modified from Navy and Army only CRAM batteries to two Joint Integrated Batteries (JIB), about one half each service, which includes better mix and performance in theater due to Army support for the integration of Sailors in the mission.

ETT and MiTTs have been modified to tailor to specific theater requirements.

Training for Confinement Det was moved from Ft. Leavenworth to Ft. Sill so that units could train in a confinement facility that more closely resembled facility in theater. Based on theater feedback, the facility at Ft. Leavenworth was too “high-tech”.

Training for Law & Order Det was modified to include High Risk Personnel (HRP) training and Provost Marshall training as a result of feedback from theater.

Mr. ORTIZ. Please share with us some of the lessons learned that have been applied to training for in-lieu-of soldiers, sailors and airmen.

General HALVERSON. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has captured lessons learned through a variety of mechanisms, such as, interviews, mission operations with In-Lieu-Of (ILO) Units, and After Action Reviews (AARs). Lessons learned from both the field and in training are injected into the current training ILO as a routinized process. As Army approves ILO training Program of Instructions (POI) and Memorandum of Instructions (MOI) for post mobilization training of all RC units. During this approval process, lessons learned are reviewed and incorporated into planed unit training. CALL is working with both the Joint Force Provider (JFCOM) and the Army Force Provider (FORSCOM) to incorporate the lessons learned in future training processes. The system is an open loop system where lessons learned are continually captured and feedback is provided to the field. There are procedures in place for CENTCOM to provide feedback that is then vetted and adjudicated by the Joint Staff for current and future rotations.

Mr. ORTIZ. Please share with us some of the lessons learned that have been applied to training for in-lieu-of soldiers, sailors and airmen.

General GIBSON.

Logistics Readiness

Lessons learned are currently being gathered from two separate data streams: survey feedback from four distinct data points and solicited/unsolicited after action reports (AAR). Survey feedback is collected from four distinct points during the de-
ployment/training process: arrival at the ILO training site, completion at the ILO training site, after 30–45 days at the deployed location and at home station after completing the deployment. Feedback from the survey data points is collected, compiled, aggregated and analyzed in conjunction with the AEF deployment cycle and briefed to the Second Air Force Commander. The feedback results are used to create a 4-month action plan to guide improvements to the process.

Additionally, Second Air Force has instituted a process which brings the Functional Area Managers (FAM) and Career Field Managers (CFM) together on a semi-annual basis to review the training and equipment requirements for these deployments. The Training and Equipment Review Board (TERB) provides a forum for FAMs and CFMs to review feedback and lessons learned from the AOR and quickly make changes to curriculum, equipment, processing, etc. Through several TERBs already conducted, Second Air Force has been able to realize process improvement in several areas:

Streamlined reporting instructions
Elimination of “white space” at training locations
Additional training requested through feedback to include:
  - Blue Force Tracker
  - Plus up of Combat Life Saver training requirements (from 10% to ~30%)
  - High Mobility Wheel Vehicle Egress Assistance Trainer
  - Survival Evasion Resistance Escape Level B
  - Elimination of redundant training already inherent to Air Force specialties:
    - Land Navigation for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
    - Law Enforcement training for Security Forces
    - Anti-Terrorism Level 1

Additional AF required equipment based on feedback includes:
  - Tactical thigh drop/Modular Lightweight Load-carrying Equipment compatible holsters
  - Seat belt/strap cutters
  - 3-point weapon slings
  - Tactical flashlights
  - Army Combat Uniform patterned Individual Body Armor/Outer Tactical Vest
  - Conversion kits
  - Tactical flame resistant gloves

Security Forces

The following narratives highlight several lessons learned for United States Air Force (USAF) Security Forces (SF) Airmen receiving Army training in support of in-lieu-of (ILO) missions.

1. Headquarters AF Director of Security Forces (HAF/A7S) designated HQ USAF Security Forces Center (AFSFC) as the primary coordinator for all SF ILO mission taskings and pre-deployment training requirements. SF assumed deployment and training oversight for five Army ILO missions, trained at six separate Army Power Projection Platform (PPP) locations. SF ILO missions included: Detainee Operations trained at Ft. Bliss and Ft. Lewis; SECFOR (Force Protection) trained at Ft. Dix and Ft. Lewis; Protective Services Detail (PSD) trained at Ft. Leonard Wood; Law and Order trained at Ft. Carson and Police Transition Team (PTT) trained at Camp Shelby.

2. Army PPPs provide training for non-traditional SF core competencies mandated by Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). HQ AFSFC evaluated all ILO missions and compared this mission analysis to Army horse blankets or training plans. This ensured SF personnel are properly trained and qualified on current ILO mission tactics and procedures in the minimum time possible.

3. HAF/A7S solicited feedback from senior AF Major Command (MAJCOM) and US Central Command Force Protection leadership on how best to manage and execute the ILO missions. AFSFC improved ILO training by conducting training analyses for each ILO mission requirement, followed by theater and PPP site visits, evaluating SF performing ILO missions. This provided valuable insights necessary to improving the ILO management process.

4. Redundancies occurred in AF mandated pre-deployment training when compared to Army ILO pre-deployment training. AF SF training either reduced or eliminated many Army pre-deployment topics, by educating Army trainers on the skill sets that SF Airmen bring to the fight. Another lesson learned eliminated a 14-day temporary duty period, by conducting SFs specific training through the use of Mobile Training Teams which travel to each of the Army PPPs. This blend of 80 hours SF training with the Army master training plan saved the AF more than $6.7M in
travel and temporary duty funds for more than 1.9K deployed SF personnel. Elimina-

tion of “white space” or ineffective training time further standardized SF training

at six Army PPPs and provided combat ready SFs sooner to the deployed location.

5. SF required training on the most current tactics, techniques and procedures 
(TTPs) from the area of operations (AOR). AFSCF advised Army PPP training staffs 
through use of recently deployed, combat savvy SF airman, who highlighted the lat-
est TTPs directly from the combat operations theater. This greatly benefited both 
SF Airman training at the PPP and the Army cadre providing ILO training.

6. AFSCF also solicited and incorporated weekly troop commander’s situation re-
ports into Army training plans, making rapid adjustments in training schedules and 
PFP hosting arrangements for SF personnel.

7. AFSCF also eliminated Soldier Readiness Processing by providing documenta-
tion of USAF pre-deployment or out-processing procedures conducted at home sta-
tion. This action further lessened white space in Army training schedules.

8. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force tasked Second Air Force to be responsible 
for programs overseeing AF ILO. They deployed Personnel Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO) teams to each PPP, facilitating the process-
ing of AF personnel and providing constant coordination with FORSCOM and the 
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) leadership.

B. The following narratives highlight several lessons learned for AF SF Airmen sup-
sorting ILO missions, in terms of operations, logistics, equipment, military working 
dog teams and other categories.

1. AFSCF provides Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to the PPPs and to SF Airmen 
in training. Their expertise in training requirements is pivotal in the development 
and proper application of training needs in preparation for ILO missions. The SMEs 
also ensure Airmen receive the most up to date and current TTPs from troops that 
have boots on ground.

2. AFSCF provides a liaison non-commissioned officer (LNO) before and during 
each training session at each PPP. The LNO team provides curriculum and tech-
nical support to the deploying team members, as well as liaison with Second Air 
Force and Army PPP leadership. The LNO relies on being able to reach back to AF 
MAJCOMs and SF units, resolving issues as quickly and efficiently as possible. The 
LNOs also have the capability to provide “hip pocket training” in the event the 
schedule is changed at the PPP thus further eliminating “white space.”

3. AFSCF’s Operations Center releases operations orders and standardized equip-
ment lists no later than 60 days prior to training start date. This ensures all SF 
personnel pre-deployment tasks have been completed prior to ILO training. The Ops 
Center also ensures equipment and logistical shortfalls are identified in a timely 
manner.

4. AF Explosive Detector Dog Teams tasked for deployment in support of ILO 
Army and Marine Corps missions attend canine-centric, ground combat skills pre-
deployment training at Yuma Proving Grounds, AZ. Training is conducted under 
the direction of the Marine Corps and continues to repeatedly receive extremely favor-
able student critiques. Some observations were:

  a. Pre-arrival home station training requires attention. Teams must be better 
prepared in the area of ground combat skills before reporting for training.

  b. Canine physical fitness is generally inadequate at point of entry to training. 
Training scenarios are intense, lengthy and executed under very hot and dry cli-
matic conditions.

  c. Top physical condition is critical to success and serves to avoid disabling in-
jury and illness.

Civil Engineering

Civil Engineers (CE) continues to transform its training regimens to ensure de-
ploying airmen are properly trained and equipped to perform the missions they’re 
being called upon to perform around the world. Bi-weekly, CE partner with Second 
Air Force (AF lead for contingency skills training (CST)), FORSCOM and the Army, the 
training sites, and sitting commanders in the field to update CST training require-
ments for upcoming deployment taskings.

In recent forums, field commanders have reported that additional exposure to the 
enemy’s latest tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) is far more valuable on the 
battlefield than refresher training. As a result, we’ve amended training for EOD air-
men so they receive a more focused curriculum to study the enemy’s latest TTPs, 
rather than receive refresher training on skills they’ve successfully employed within 
the past 9 months. We’re now applying this same method to specialty teams, RED 
HORSE Squadrons, and Engineer detachments to ensure personnel receive focused 
training that builds upon the latest lessons learned from the field.
Mr. ORTIZ. How does the unit-developed theater/mission-specific training plan take into consideration the variety of military backgrounds, skill sets, and proficiency levels that individuals from other services bring to the assigned mission?

General HALVERSON. CENTCOM has identified 25 baseline training requirements for ILO units and assigned a training requirement to each unit requirement form (URF). Upon notification of sourcing, units develop theater/mission specific training plans to achieve required employment capability levels. Training plans are based on their assigned mission, Directed Mission Essential Task List (DMETL) and published theater training requirements. Theater and mission specific training is executed through a series of key training events prior to deployment. These events include, but are not limited to mission-focused individual, collective and robust Counter-Improvised Explosive Device training at the unit’s home station or mobilization station.

Mr. ORTIZ. In the face of pressing mission needs and sourcing requirements, how much pressure is there on unit commanders to validate that the unit has met theater capability and mandatory training requirements?

General HALVERSON. There is no external pressure on commanders to validate that their unit has met theater capability and mandatory training requirements. Several units latest arrival dates (LADs) have been shifted because the commander determined that their unit did not adequately meet the training requirements. Validation is a command function. Validation ensures that a unit not meeting the minimum deployability criteria is not deployed without the approval of the supported combatant commander.

Mr. ORTIZ. Your testimony states that “direct lines of authority have been granted between 2nd Air Force, Navy Fleet Forces Command, Army Forces Command and 1st Army for the purposes of coordinating training arrangements, arrival instructions, and other matters related to the conduct of training.” How does that work in practical terms?

General HALVERSON. JFCOM hosts a conference that has attendees from all Services, TRADOC and FORSCOM to review training requirements assigned by CENTCOM and document any additional training that is required. DA publishes an EXORD that directs Army Commands to support this training. FORSCOM publishes an order that directs its subordinate commands to execute the training that the USAF and USN have asked the Army provide. The training command issues a letter to the unit stating what training was done. All training is conducted to standard and retraining is included in the tasking.

Mr. ORTIZ. What are the selected grade and MOS shortages need to meet personnel fill rates mentioned in your testimony?

General HALVERSON. HRC was unable to determine what fill rates were mentioned in the testimony. The following is a short discussion of the critically short skills in the officer corps and the enlisted ranks.

OFFICER CORPS: The officer corps does not include the specialty branches of JAG, Chaplain, and AMEDD. Majors and captains continue to be the most critically short grades. This is due to large part to structure growth and transformation of the BCTs. These shortages are particularly acute in the specialized functional areas (FA).

For majors, the most critical include:

- Information Operations, FA 30 (46%)
- Information Systems Engineering, FA 24 (54%)
- Foreign Area Officer, FA 48 (56%)
- Strategic Intelligence, FA 34 (57%)
- Force Development, FA 50 (58%)

There are a total of 15 functional area or branch skills at the grade of major (including those 5 listed above) for which the Army can fill at a rate of less than 70% of the structure requirements. There are an additional 11 functional area or branch skills for which the Army can fill at a rate of between 70–85% of the structure requirements.

For captains, most of the critical skill shortages are in functional areas and also due to structure growth and transformation of the BCTs without a corresponding strategy to transfer captain inventory away from basic branch into functional area designations. The Army’s most critical skills for captain are:

- Strategic Intelligence, FA 34 (0%)
- Simulations Operations, FA 57 (13%)
- Operations Research, FA 49 (18%)
- Information Assurance, FA 53 (20%)
- Acquisition, FA 51 (26%)
There are a total of 10 functional area or branch skills at the grade of captain (including those 5 listed above) for which the Army can fill at a rate of less than 70% of the structure requirements. There are an additional 4 functional area or branch skills for which the Army can fill at a rate of between 70–90% of the structure requirements.

Warrant Officers have very similar issues that effect inventory shortages. The Army’s most critical warrant officer shortages are:

- Air Traffic Services, MOS 150A (0%) This Air Traffic Control MOS was taken out of the Army inventory and has now returned. Inventory is being re-built to fill this MOS.
- Armament Repair Tech, MOS 913A (59%)
- Human Intel Collection Tech, MOS 351M (60%)
- Counter Intel Tech, MOS 351L (65%)
- Field Artillery Targeting Tech, MOS 131A (71%)

In addition to these four MOS, there are and additional 8 more for which the Army can fill only between 70–90%.

ENLISTED RANKS: Sergeants and Staff Sergeants are the most critically short grades in the critical skills. This is primarily due to growth in structure and transformation of the Brigade Combat Teams. These shortages are of great concern in the following military occupational specialties through FY10:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>% Fill of Authorizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09L (Translator/Interpreter)</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21D (Engineer)</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21V (Engineer)</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89A (Ordnance)</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94S (Ordnance)</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ENLISTED RANKS LIST (CRITICAL SHORTAGES)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>% Fill of Authorizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13R (Field Artillery)</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14E (Air Defense)</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31E (Military Police)</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35F (Intelligence)</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89D (Explosive Spec)</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92R (Parachute Rigger)</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mr. ORTIZ. In your testimony you state that “meeting the approved requirements of the combatant commanders (as readiness is measured against directed mission) may be considered of equal (or greater) importance” than the Army’s ability to perform core missions. How does that statement fit in the context of strategic risk to national security?

General HALVERSON. The force requirements requested by Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) are based upon their analysis of capabilities and capacities needed to execute assigned missions, achieve theater strategic objectives, and support national security requirements. The Army provides modular units that are tailored and scaled and where necessary, appropriately augmented to meet specific requirements. When there is a shortage of required capabilities, substitutions may be ap-
plied to form similar units to meet COCOM requirements. Units required to train on other-than-core missions receive additional pre-deployment training to ensure that they can meet the COCOM mission requirements. Since training skills are inherently perishable, a degree of core mission atrophy occurs, and consequently the unit temporarily becomes less capable of performing its core missions. Implementing the Army Force Generation process will improve preparedness and mitigate the effects of atrophy on unit core mission skills.

Mr. Ortiz. In addition to meeting annual unit requirements for personnel, the services are also sourcing teams of key officers and other unit leaders (primarily E-6 to O-6) to support transition teams in Iraq and embedded training teams in Afghanistan. This key leadership comes from the same force pool of personnel pulled to man IA billets, leaving fewer officers and other key leaders available for deploying units. Of the 2,000 Army individual augmentees in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, 50% of are mid-grade officers, captain through lieutenant colonel. What is the net effect of pulling so many mid-career officers out of their core Army mission? What impact is this having on Army readiness? What efforts are the Army making to ensure that additional leaders are being developed and to evaluate the effectiveness of units that deploy without their organic leadership, or with new leaders?

General Halverson. This has resulted in a shift in manning priorities for all units, less transition Teams and deploying units. This has caused units other than Transition Teams and deploying units to have lower manning levels. We have also graduated officers early from Professional Military Education and delayed attendance for some Soldiers in order to meet priority commitments to train and deploy complete teams. The Army is ensuring that all deploying units are manned not less than 90% of their authorized strength 90 days prior to their Mission Rehearsal Exercise in order to allow them to train together and form and cohesive unit. Additionally, officers who are assigned to Transition Teams in Iraq and embedded training teams in Afghanistan receive an intensive 60 day training regiment prior to entering theater. In order to mitigate the shortages in the non-deploying units, we have increased officer and enlisted accessions, inter-service transfers and broadened the use of Reserve Component Soldiers and Retiree Recall Soldiers to fill active component positions.

Mr. Ortiz. In your testimony you state that “In general, all milestones are being met but at the expense of supporting GWOT requirements by additional deployments between sea tours without a standard length shore assignment.” How often does this occur and what is the impact on readiness and retention?

Admiral Giardina. To date, Navy continues to meet all validated missions at sea and ashore. Impacts to Fleet readiness are minimal. The Fleet centric nature of Navy’s readiness reporting systems makes assessing readiness impact ashore more difficult. While Sailors who remain behind are working longer and harder to make up for the absence of Sailors forward deployed as Individual Augmentees (IA), there is currently no measurable impact to readiness ashore. The following table reflects the source of Navy’s Active Component IA personnel:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IA Type Duty</th>
<th>Total Historical</th>
<th>% Historical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONUS Shore Duty</td>
<td>10928</td>
<td>73.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS Sea Duty</td>
<td>3112</td>
<td>20.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Remote Land-base Sea Duty</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Sea Duty</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>0.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Shore</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>4.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>14845</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SHORE</th>
<th>SEA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHORE</strong></td>
<td>78.09%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SEA</strong></td>
<td>21.91%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from MAR 05 to present
Approximately 80 percent of Navy IAs come from shore duty. To alleviate the potential for increased individual personnel tempo (ITEMPO) and decreased shore tour lengths, returning IAs are our number one distribution priority, we are flexible in balancing the needs of individual careers and families, and our detailers are proactively engaging IAs in the issuance of follow-on orders. Additionally:

a. IA tours exceeding 365 days are considered equivalent to Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF) tours, meaning that IA personnel are being afforded the same priority for coast selection preference and/or priority choice of follow-on duty assignments and locations.

b. IAs from sea duty will maintain existing sea duty projected rotation dates (PRD).

c. The shore duty clock for Enlisted IAs coming from shore duty is frozen with:
   (1) 100% day-for-day credit for an IA tour served in a hazardous duty zone.
   (2) 50% day-for-day credit for an IA tour served outside a hazardous duty zone.
   (3) Reduction of prescribed sea tour (PST) for Sailors required to return to sea (for needs of the service) prior to completion of their adjusted shore duty time.

d. Detailers contact officer IAs coming from shore duty to discuss options with regard to career progression, professional development, and tour lengths, to maximize the length of a shore duty extension while keeping the officer's career on track to achieve all community milestones.

Navy does not track total numbers of individuals who do not complete a prescribed shore tour due to IA assignment. Where career timing or needs of the service dictate that a Sailor return to sea duty without completing a standard length shore assignment, detailers are tasked to find an equitable solution, on a case-by-case basis that meets the needs of the individual and the Navy.

The enlisted retention environment is generally healthy and we have not observed any indicators to suggest that IA tours are adversely impacting enlisted retention. While reenlistment rates are down slightly in Zones A (0 to 6 years of service) and B (6+ to 10 years of service) it is attributable to retention returning to pre-9/11 norms, rather than to IA assignments.

The officer retention environment is also considered to be healthy, overall. While we have no indication that IA tours are adversely impacting officer continuation, retention tools preclude obtaining a clear picture of the Global War on Terrorism effect on officer continuation.

While current retention is within acceptable limits, Navy is closely monitoring this situation and post IA deployment retention behavior is currently under study by the Center for Naval Analysis. While officer and enlisted communities are in the process of assessing the impact of IA assignments on community health and retention across the force, additional stress is placed on certain High Demand/Low Density (HD/LD) communities due to the small pool of available personnel and high demand for specific Navy skill sets. These HD/LD communities include Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Naval Construction Force, Navy Coastal Warfare, Fleet Marine Force Hospital Corpsmen, Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support, Navy Special Warfare, Navy Special Operations, Medical, Civil Engineer Corps, Engineering Duty Officers, Supply, Information Professional, Information Warfare, Judge Advocate General, and Intelligence.

Mr. ORTIZ. The Navy is planning an eight-week expeditionary combat skills course for all sailors assigned to the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command. The course would focus on four aspects of ground warfare: moving, shooting, communicating and administering first aid. The committee understands that the Navy is looking
at possible East Coast and West Coast locations for the course, as well as at Army and Marine Corps bases. What is the purpose of the eight-week expeditionary combat skills course planned for all NECC sailors? Is this not a duplication of effort and expense? How do you differentiate this training from the Army’s or Marine Corps’ combat skills training?

Admiral Giardina. The Navy no longer plans to establish an eight-week course of instruction specifically to support the NECC forces. NECC is now planning a four week expeditionary combat skills course designed to prepare all NECC Sailors and Officers for service in Navy Expeditionary units. This course is important to NECC for several reasons. First, it standardizes NECC baseline combat skills training across the entire Force. Currently, basic combat skills are taught in several venues by different entities (e.g. EOD, Seabees and others have their own basic combat skill curriculums). This course helps us become more cohesive as a force and more cost efficient in our training. Second, it helps to increase the proficiency and war fighting effectiveness of our expeditionary Sailors and Officers. This professional force requires a new level of training in combat skills such as small arms, tactical communications and combat casualty care, which is more advanced and substantially different than what the typical Sailor assigned to a ship, squadron or submarine may need. With this course, Navy will move toward a well-trained NECC Sailor with a greater level of combat skills training and a focus on our core competencies, including maritime security and force protection. Third, with an increased number of Sailors operating in ports and harbors, on rivers and in近shore environments, Navy must develop Sailors and leaders with an expeditionary mentality and combat focus.

The focus of this course is tactical movement, communications, weapons proficiency, advanced first aid and the preparation of individual Sailors and Officers to excel in their core competencies of maritime and port security, explosive ordnance disposal, and maritime construction and engineering, among others. This training is based on traditional Navy missions’ combat skills requirements.

Current plan is to pilot this course in FY08 at two existing force training locations, Construction Battalion Center (CBC) Gulfport and CBC Port Hueneme. The Navy Construction Force has been teaching basic combat skills at these locations for several years. The existing curricula are being updated, enhanced, standardized and offered to sailors across the NECC force.

ECS training is equivalent to what is taught to other service members assigned to combat support or combat service support units. It is neither the aim nor intent of this course to teach offensive, ground combat skills akin to what USMC or Army combat units receive. It is designed to provide the basic survival skills that will be needed by Expeditionary forces conducting the full spectrum of operations from stability and theatre cooperation to security and counter-insurgency.

Mr. Ortiz. The Committee is aware that in some cases airmen were provided as little as 72 hours’ notification of deployment. If this is the case, it is concerning, particularly when these airmen are being asked to deploy as augmented in a ground combat environment rather than with their unit in a standard Air Expeditionary Force rotation. JFCOM starts the process 14 months prior to the need. Why does it take so long for the Air Force to identify and notify the selected individual? What is being done in the Air Force to correct this lack of timely notification?

General Gibson. Air Force policy requires Commanders to notify Airmen of their assigned deployment opportunity window upon assignment to the unit. Airmen remain assigned to the same deployment window for the duration of their assignment to the unit. All Airmen are expected to be prepared to deploy even with minimal (72-hours) notice during their deployment window period should there be an emerging, short-notice requirement. The Air Force sources known rotational requirements at least 4 months prior to the date the Airman is required to be in place at the deployed location. As a matter of course, the Air Force sources “on call” units first—units in the current deployment opportunity window who’s Airmen are expected to be prepared to deploy at anytime during that period. Reclamas can cause short-notice to Airmen—as in cases when someone suddenly becomes non-deployable (i.e., broken leg). Additionally, the amount of advance notice can be reduced when combatant commanders identify new, short-notice requirements needed to meet their war-fighting needs. In these instances the sourcing timeline may be shortened and Airmen could receive minimal notice before they are required to deploy or report for pre-deployment combat skills training. In other cases, the demand on a particular career field—primarily to support sister Service or other outside agency such as DoS requirements—may result in a short fall for the current deployment window. To resolve these anomalies, the Air Force reaches forward into the next succeeding deployment window to meet the short fall. The air and space expeditionary force (AEF) process is designed for quick response. It allows the Air Force agility and versatility to adapt and meet the needs of our commanders and war-fighters on the battlefield.
In your testimony you state that the effect of ILO training, “as measured in man-years consumed, is significant.” How significant in terms of man-years consumed and in terms of impact?

Presently, the AF has entered approximately 8,056 Airmen into ILO training. With an average training time of 42 days at each of the Power Projection Platforms, this equates into approximately 930 man years expended in this effort.

Mr. ORTIZ. Please expound on some of the other challenges within the ILO program that are cited in your testimony and the impact those have on Air Force readiness, including: Removing airmen from their assigned Air Expeditionary Force rotation cycle; and Exacerbate an already-high personnel tempo.

The Air Force is a full partner in filling ILO taskings. AF ILO requirements are expected to be approximately 5,000 personnel by the end of CY07, increasing to approximately 6,000 by the end of CY08. Current AF ILO requirements represent a select set of AF capabilities, including logistics readiness, security forces, engineers, intelligence, ISR, communications and medical personnel. We are also currently providing non-core competency support after receiving specialized training in the areas of civil affairs, interrogators and detainee and convoy operations. However, a number of these capabilities (security forces, Red Horse, EOD, dog teams, etc.) are at their max wartime surge level of a 1:1 deploy/dwell ratio.

ILO requirements add significant levels of stress on deployed Airmen as well as the rest of the AF. These tasking have a direct effect on readiness since ILO-tasked units and deployed Airmen are no longer available for core AF or home-station missions; and the workload they would normally share is shifted to other Airmen both at home and abroad. Furthermore, an Airmen’s skills in AF core competencies are a perishable item. When ILO-tasked Airmen return to their home stations after deployment, they must be given time and additional training to re-hone those skills.

The Air Force is starting the Common Battlefield Airman Training (CBAT) Course as a five-day class with plans to expand it by 2010 to a 20-day class that would include physical fitness training, self-defense, advanced weapons training, combat medical skills, integrated base defense classes, land navigation, and tactical field operations. While the Air Force initially will use an Army training site, the Subcommittee understands that the Air Force is considering three candidate sites for a permanent school, including Arnold Air Force Base near Manchester, Tenn.; Moody AFB near Valdosta, Ga.; or Barksdale AFB in Bossier City, La. What is the purpose of CBAT? Is CBAT a duplication of effort and expense? How do you differentiate this training from the Army’s or Marine Corps’ combat skills training?

Common Battlefield Airmen Training (CBAT) is a training initiative that is part of the ongoing process of transforming the Air Force culture to instill a warrior ethos and ensure each and every Airmen is relevant in light of the changing security environment with the proper expeditionary combat skills. The current security environment and rigors of the Global War on Terror highlighted combat skills deficiencies among Airmen. As a result, the Air Force identified the need for a more robust training course to provide designated Airmen with the necessary skills to survive and operate effectively “outside the wire.” CBAT is a foundational school that provides Airmen with combat skills training (CST) to teach Airmen how to “shoot, move, and communicate.” CBAT consists of tasks that are not career-field specific but are common to the survival and success of our Airmen on the battlefield. In addition, the Army and Marine Corps teach their foundational skills at basic training. While the Air Force conducts a limited amount of CST at basic training, it chose CBAT as a post-basic training module because it focuses on those career-fields that require CST as foundational skills.

CBAT is not a duplication of effort and expense because it provides tailored training for Airmen limited to the necessary skills to survive and operate effectively “outside the wire.” A panel of Air Force subject matter experts scrutinized the Army’s 40 Warrior Skills and 9 Battle Drills eventually pairing it down to 19 skills and 8 tasks Airmen require proficiency in to operate in the Expeditionary Air Force. Additionally, CBAT serves as a consolidation and standardization of training. Currently, CBAT-like training is conducted at numerous AETC bases, as well as at MAJCOMs and Wings, to provide some level of CST for Airmen. CBAT will provide a single venue to standardize and synergize efforts that already exist to ensure that we are prepared to fight and win not only the current fight but future conflicts as well. Finally, the Air Force’s three candidate sites will utilize existing ranges leveraging capacity currently residing in those resources.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR

Mr. TAYLOR. Has anyone tracked the casualties among the IAs to see if they are suffering a disproportionately high percentage of casualties?

General HALVERSON. The Army tracks casualties among Individual Augmentees (I.A.s) and they are not suffering a disproportionately high percentage of casualties. Since the onset of GWOT, the Army has suffered 10 casualties that fall into the category of I.A.s.

Admiral GIARDINA. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

General GIBSON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]