[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-81]
THE USE OF IN LIEU OF, AD HOC
AND AUGMENTEE FORCES IN
OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDOM
AND IRAQI FREEDOM
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 31, 2007
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
38-670 PDF WASHINGTON : 2008
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas, Chairman
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
MARK UDALL, Colorado California
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
NANCY BOYDA, Kansas FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire TOM COLE, Oklahoma
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut ROB BISHOP, Utah
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
KATHY CASTOR, Florida CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
Vicki Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Cathy Garman, Professional Staff Member
Lynn Williams, Professional Staff Member
Sarah Schaffer, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2007
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, July 31, 2007, The Use of In Lieu Of, Ad Hoc and
Augmentee Forces in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
Freedom........................................................ 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, July 31, 2007........................................... 29
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 31, 2007
THE USE OF IN LIEU OF, AD HOC AND AUGMENTEE FORCES IN OPERATIONS
ENDURING FREEDOM AND IRAQI FREEDOM
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
LoBiondo, Hon. Frank A., a Representative from New Jersey,
Readiness Subcommittee......................................... 2
Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
Readiness Subcommittee......................................... 1
WITNESSES
Egginton, Brig. Gen. Jack B., Deputy Director of Operations, U.S.
Central Command, U.S. Air Force................................ 4
Giardina, Rear Adm. Timothy M., Chief of Naval Operations,
Director, Information, Plans, and Security Division............ 6
Gibson, Brig. Gen. Marke F., Director of Current Operations and
Training, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and
Requirements, U.S. Air Force................................... 6
Halverson, Brig. Gen. David D., Director of Operations, Readiness
and Mobilization, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army.... 5
Kamiya, Maj. Gen. Jason K., Director, Joint Training and Joint
Warfighting Center, U.S. Army.................................. 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Egginton, Brig. Gen. Jack B.................................. 33
Giardina, Rear Adm. Timothy M................................ 52
Gibson, Brig. Gen. Marke F................................... 59
Halverson, Brig. Gen. David D................................ 45
Kamiya, Maj. Gen. Jason K.................................... 37
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Mr. Ortiz.................................................... 71
Mr. Taylor................................................... 88
THE USE OF IN LIEU OF, AD HOC AND AUGMENTEE FORCES IN OPERATIONS
ENDURING FREEDOM AND IRAQI FREEDOM
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Readiness Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 31, 2007.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon P. Ortiz
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Ortiz. This hearing will come to order.
I know we are few, but we have got the most important
members this morning here. [Laughter.]
I thank your distinguished witnesses for appearing before
the subcommittee today to talk about the employment of airmen
and sailors in combat and combat support roles outside their
services' traditional core missions. We also will be looking at
whether sailors and airmen are adequately trained and equipped
for these predominantly Army missions in both theaters of
operations.
Today, we will examine the impact on readiness of using
airmen and sailors in place, as individual augmentees to, or as
ad hoc replacements for soldiers and Marines. Ongoing
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have created continuing high
demand for certain combat support and combat service support
skills. Needed skills include civil affairs for post-
reconstruction teams, intelligence and counter intelligence,
medical, communications, logistics, construction, engineering,
and security forces.
Facing shortages of available personnel in some skills, the
Department of Defense (DOD) has used strategies such as
reassigning and retraining service personnel to meet the combat
commanders' requirements, especially in Central Command's areas
of responsibility. The role of the services in augmenting
emergency forces has expanded as the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan continue. Joint Forces Command has stated a fiscal
year 2008 requirement of 17,376 service in lieu of (ILO)
commitments.
In addition to support from the other services, the Army is
providing its own soldiers to fill shortage requirements
through the use of individual augmentation and changing the
mission of units. Currently, the Army estimates that there are
2,000 individual augmentee soldiers in Central Command's area
of responsibility. Fifty percent of these soldiers are mid-
grade officers, captain through lieutenant colonel.
The subcommittee will be interested in hearing about the
net effect on readiness of pulling so many mid-career officers
out of their units to support the war. The Navy began providing
sailors to augment Army forces in the summer of 2005 at the
direction of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). To date, more
than 46,000 sailors have been transferred from their normal
jobs to support joint service requirements.
In fiscal year 2004, the Air Force ILO level was 1,905.
This has grown to more than 5,300 airmen now serving in ILO
positions. Furthermore, the Air Force estimates that 19,963
airmen are needed to sustain a 2:1 dwell ratio if current
manning requirements continue.
Because our research on this issue has shown differences in
how the services approach ILO training, equipping and tracking,
the subcommittee is concerned that service members are
receiving training that is to task or limited by time versus
training to combat proficiency.
Among the questions we hope to answer today are: Who is
responsible for establishing baseline training standards? What
checks are in place to ensure that sailors and airmen are
adequately trained for the mission they will perform when
deployed? What is the feedback loop upon deployment to
determine if the sailors and airmen were fully trained for the
mission they were sent to perform?
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has pointed out that
there are issues with equipment, where ILO sailors and airmen
trained on equipment that was inconsistent with the equipment
being used by existing ground forces. The subcommittee will
need to know: How are ILOs equipped? Is the equipment identical
to what ground forces in-theater have, and if not, why not?
What methods are the services using to ensure that deploying
ILO units will have the equipment they need for pre-deployment
training and in-theater missions?
The subcommittee also is concerned about the strain on
readiness and the increased risk to national security created
by taking soldiers, sailors, and airmen out of their core
service roles. Service members could potentially miss training
and other opportunities to enhance their careers in their
parent services. Recruiting and retention could be hindered
because potential recruits or experienced personnel may not
want to retrain for missions and skills other than those they
originally planned to perform.
The chair now recognizes the distinguished friend from the
great state of New Jersey, Mr. LoBiondo.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK A. LOBIONDO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
JERSEY, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Chairman Ortiz. I appreciate very
much your holding this hearing today.
Congressman McKeon asked me to apologize to you. He had a
floor schedule on the House floor and asked me to sit in in his
place. With your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, Mr. McKeon had an
opening statement that I would like to make on his behalf.
He starts off by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this timely and important hearing on joint force sourcing
solutions. This is a very complex subject. And it is one that I
believe the subcommittees must understand in order to
adequately assess and support the readiness of our forces.
In spite of the tremendous combat capability that our
military can bring to bear, the war we are fighting today has
placed unique demands on the Department of Defense. Combatant
commanders have had to augment their traditional toolkits of
the infantry, the artillery, and the blue-water Navy. They now
have requirements for forensic teams to do post-recovery
inspections of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), security
forces with skills in detainee or convoy operations, and civil
affairs experts to support provincial reconstruction teams.
While these duties are aligned with the military missions
in the Central Command area of responsibility, they were not
readily available to the force we ended the Cold War with. In
order to meet these mission requirements, the Department of
Defense has developed an in lieu of sourcing solution. It is my
understanding that the department estimates that over 17,000
personnel will be part of the in lieu of sourcing solutions for
fiscal year 2008.
Although the services claim that over 90 percent of those
personnel will be fulfilling missions related to their core
competencies, all of these personnel will be tasked to perform
their mission outside the operating environment their
fundamental training was centered on.
Today, our military men and women face a complex battle
space. The remissioning, retraining, and joint sourcing of in
lieu of forces greatly adds to that complexity. While this
sourcing solution may not be optimum, it is necessary to meet
the emerging requirements of the war on terror.
In my view, the role of this subcommittee is to ensure that
the personnel asked to fill these in lieu of missions and
emerging assignments are properly trained and fully equipped to
accomplish their missions.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today and am
particularly interested in learning more about the in lieu of
sourcing progress, the training protocols, and the
Administration and support of personnel once they arrive in the
theater of operations.
It is extremely important that these augmentees are
properly prepared for the mission they are assigned to
undertake, and it is equally important that the gaining
commanders are well aware of the capabilities and limitations
of the augmentees assigned to their command.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for holding this hearing. I
look forward to hearing the testimony.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you for your statement.
Today, we have a panel of distinguished witnesses
representing the Central Command, Joint Forces Command, and the
services will address the use, training and equipping of in
lieu of service personnel.
Our witnesses are Brigadier General Jack B. Egginton, U.S.
Air Force, Deputy Director of Operations for the United States
Central Command; Major General Jason K. Kamiya, U.S. Army,
Director of Joint Training for United States Joint Forces
Command; Brigadier General David D. Halverson, Director of
Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Headquarters, U.S. Army; Rear Admiral
Timothy Giardina, Director of Information, Plans and Security
for the Chief of Naval Operations; and Brigadier General Marke
F. Gibson, Director of Current Operations and Training and
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements,
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force.
Without objection, the witnesses' full testimonies will be
accepted for the record.
General Egginton, if you can begin with your testimony, and
then be followed by General Kamiya, General Halverson, Admiral
Giardina, and General Gibson in that order.
So you can begin, General, whenever you are ready.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. JACK B. EGGINTON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
OPERATIONS, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Egginton. Thank you very much. Good morning,
Chairman Ortiz, honorable members of the subcommittee. Thanks
for the opportunity to meet with you today to talk about the in
lieu of forces that are supporting the Central Command
(CENTCOM) so honorably. It is a pleasure to be with you today,
and I thank you for this opportunity.
It is my understanding that you want to hear how these
forces are performing in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of
Africa. We will discuss that as we go.
Overall, CENTCOM is extremely satisfied with the
performance of the in lieu of forces that are supporting the
combatant commanders on the ground in those three areas of
responsibility (AORs). Not only do these units greatly assist
in force flow gap mitigation, but in lieu of forces have
demonstrated an exceptional level of expertise and
professionalism while performing these capabilities that are
often in short supply in the United States Army.
Additionally, in lieu of U.S. Army Reserve and National
Guard personnel bring additional knowledge and skill sets to
the fight based on their augmented experiences from their
civilian careers, which is greatly appreciated.
The bottom line requirement for CENTCOM in dealing and
working with the in lieu of trained folks is that they be
manned, equipped, trained, and certified prior to deployment
and to perform their duties when they come to the AOR. I am
happy to report that, by and large, we are very satisfied and
those forces are performing honorably when they come and
support us in CENTCOM.
Sir, I thank you for this opportunity to speak to you and
the subcommittee and I look forward to answering any questions
you may have as we proceed.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Egginton can be found in
the Appendix on page 33.]
Mr. Ortiz. General.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JASON K. KAMIYA, DIRECTOR, JOINT
TRAINING AND JOINT WARFIGHTING CENTER, U.S. ARMY
General Kamiya. Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, on behalf of General Lance Smith, the commander
of the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), I want to thank you
for allowing me to appear before you today.
The readiness of the men and women of our nation's armed
forces is our number one priority. This is a task that cannot
be overstated, and we appreciate the hard work of this
subcommittee and the U.S. Congress in this regard.
Personally, I believe that I am extremely fortunate to
serve as JFCOM's director of joint training, where I can apply
the hard lessons learned during my recent service as the
commander of an 18,000-service member U.S. and coalition joint
task force in Afghanistan from March 2005 to February 2006.
Force preparation and readiness we believe is intrinsically
linked to unit notification and stabilization. The combined
work of the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Office of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, JFCOM, our combatant commands, our
components, and the services to the global force management
process is expected to bring an increased level of
predictability, which should enhance training.
Our vision is holistic, a holistic approach that links
force generation, force management, and training. JFCOM is
committed to providing an agile, comprehensive training
environment that prepares our leaders, our units, and
individuals for the tough missions they have ahead. Your
support in Congress is essential to getting this right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for approving my
witness statement for inclusion in the record. I stand by for
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Kamiya can be found in
the Appendix on page 37.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, sir.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. DAVID D. HALVERSON, DIRECTOR OF
OPERATIONS, READINESS AND MOBILIZATION, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF,
G-3/5/7, U.S. ARMY
General Halverson. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of
the committee, thank you for my opportunity to appear before
you today and discuss how the Army supports in lieu of sourcing
and provides individual augmentation in support of the
combatant commanders' requirements.
On behalf of the secretary of the Army, Mr. Pete Geren, and
Chief of Staff of the Army General George Casey and the
approximately 1 million active, Guard and Reservists that
comprise the Army, more than 145,000 of whom are serving in
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, I welcome the
opportunity to discuss this important topic. The Army remains
committed to providing the combatant commander with the best-
trained, the best-equipped, and the best-led force in the
world.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, thank you for your
service to this committee and the considerable support you
provide the United States Army. I do look forward to answering
your questions during our time today.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Halverson can be found
in the Appendix on page 45.]
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. TIMOTHY M. GIARDINA, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION, PLANS, AND SECURITY DIVISION
Admiral Giardina. Good morning, Chairman Ortiz,
distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the training,
equipping, and employment of our sailors in combat support
roles.
As we continue to support this effort, we are maintaining
our core mission areas and level of readiness to meet our
global security requirements. While many of these missions do
not fall within our core mission areas, we continue to provide
a wide variety of sourcing solutions where shortfalls exist in
the joint force.
Utilizing our sailors' core skills and additional training
provided by the Army trainers, our sailors are performing very
well. By leveraging the Army's existing expertise in training
of personnel for combat support and combat service support
missions, Navy is provided trained personnel as part of the
total force solution.
We will continue to provide augmentees, principally to
relieve stress on those ground forces where it makes sense, and
to provide forces where emerging missions do not cleanly fall
into any service-specific core mission areas.
To be clear, we are not creating combat soldiers. We are
providing personnel to combat support and combat service
support missions, and these sailors are making significant
contributions. As testified by the vice chief of naval
operations recently, Navy's current readiness posture remains
excellent.
Congressional support has been outstanding and critical to
this success, and in this regard has resulted in Navy units and
individual augmentees to deploy combat ready, properly trained,
and properly equipped. Navy stands ready to respond to the full
spectrum of assigned missions.
I appreciate your support, and I stand ready to answer your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Giardina can be found in
the Appendix on page 52.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you.
General Gibson.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. MARKE F. GIBSON, DIRECTOR OF CURRENT
OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS,
PLANS, AND REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Gibson. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, my name is Brigadier General Marke Gibson. I am
currently the director of Air Force current ops and training.
With regards to today's topic, I served in Iraq from 2003 to
2004 as the first Air Force commander of ILO forces.
Thank you for the opportunity today to appear before you to
discuss Air Force in lieu of taskings and other programs that
are important to your Air Force and to our nation. I proudly
report that your Air Force remains fully engaged around the
world, fighting terrorism and insurgents in the global war on
terror, while fulfilling our roles as airmen in the joint team.
Simultaneously, we stand prepared for rapid deployment to
respond to any global crisis as part of our nation's strategic
reserve. We fly, fight and dominate in three warfighting
domains: air, space, and cyberspace, giving the United States
sovereign options to employ military force like no other nation
in the world.
Of the 25,453 airmen deployed to CENTCOM AOR, 6,293 are
considered to be filling ILO tasks, mostly, in lieu of Army
specialists. Since 2004, we have deployed approximately 22,000
airmen to perform ILO tasks.
Also, ILO tasks to the Air Force have been increasing 33
percent annually through this year 2007, in which the increase
was 57 percent. The U.S. Air Force also fills another 1,880
joint manned positions with Air Reserve component individual
augmentees, which has increased approximately 10 percent per
year since 2003.
These ILO tasks draw from across the board of Air Force
specialty codes to include civil affairs, public affairs, judge
advocate, chaplain, intelligence, counterintelligence, medical,
communications, logistics, engineering, security forces, and
operations. Currently, 87 percent of our ILO task airmen work
joint-sourcing solutions in line with their core competencies.
The remaining 13 percent are part of the retraining ad hoc
teams who are serving outside their core competency.
Your Air Force takes great pride in serving and defending
our great nation. We take every measure to ensure that our
airmen are organized, trained, and equipped to perform the
CENTCOM requirements and mission with competence.
However, there is a growing cost to ILO tasks to our Air
Force, especially when they fall outside our airmen's core
competencies--costs in both manpower to effect the training and
costs to the Air Force core competencies. These costs impact
overall readiness and our ability to respond to unforeseen
circumstances such as providing humanitarian assistance or
supporting other operational surges.
This concludes my remarks. I have provided a more extensive
statement and ask that it be included in the record. I will be
happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Gibson can be found in
the Appendix on page 59.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much.
I see this hearing this morning as one of the most
important hearings that I have had, at least since becoming
chairman of this committee. This is important for many reasons.
I know that if the war goes on, strategies have been changed,
actors have been changed.
General Gibson and Admiral Giardina, are the airmen and
sailors who have been killed in Iraq, are you confident that
they all received the necessary training? And that the training
they received was adequate to prepare them for the missions to
which they were assigned?
General Gibson. Sir, I will take your question first.
Yes, sir. As you alluded, this is an evolving fight, and
has been. The enemy's tactics and techniques have evolved and
continue to change, and therefore ours need to, as well, both
in our tactics and in our equipment.
But to date, I am pleased to report to you that I think as
our airmen go out in support in these in lieu of taskings, that
they are receiving the best training and equipment that our
nation has to offer.
Mr. Ortiz. Admiral.
Admiral Giardina. Mr. Chairman, the limited number of
casualties the Navy has had in response to these missions, we
believe that the training was adequate. These forces received
all scheduled training and it was conducted to standard.
Mr. Ortiz. You know, how do we know, and let me begin with
this question now. How long--because, do you change the
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) or they keep the same
MOS? What if they go from one job to another one? Do they
change MOS's or they keep the same MOS that they had prior to
being an augmentee?
General Gibson. Sir, in the case of the Air Force, they
don't change AFSCs or Air Force specialty codes, MOS if you
will, because they are filling an in lieu of tasking.
Admiral Giardina. Sir, for the Navy, it kind of depends on
what they are doing. If they are doing something that is
directly in line with their core competency, for instance an
Individual Augmentee (IA) on a staff fulfilling a mission that
they would normally do, there is no change in MOS or officer
designator or NEC, Navy enlisted classification.
For some of the specialized training that is done to track
that, the personnel command has added tracking systems to
actually change the MOS, but it is more of an additional
qualification designation as opposed to a change in their
permanent core competency.
Mr. Ortiz. Now when I was in the military, that was a long
time ago. It took us at least 16 weeks to get our MOS. How long
are you training those augmentees before they go to their
place, after you augment somebody? What is the training, and
where do they get their training?
General Gibson. Sir, in the case of the Air Force, of
course they have received their basic Air Force functional and
underlying training. They receive, as a minimum, 19 hours of
local training as refreshers in all those kinds of courses,
everything from medical support combat buddy care and those
types of things.
They then cut over to, in this case, most of our in lieu of
taskings in support of the Army, to one of their nine training
locations in which they receive an additional, I think the vast
majority of the syllabus are five weeks of additional
specialized training unique to that mission and task that they
are going to be asked to fulfill.
Mr. Ortiz. I am sorry, the training is being conducted
where?
General Gibson. Right now, across nine locations within the
Army, sir.
Mr. Ortiz. In the United States?
General Gibson. Yes, sir. There is some additional training
that is offered as required and, as permitted, within the AOR
in the sense of refresher and top-off training.
Mr. Ortiz. Admiral.
Admiral Giardina. Yes, sir. From a Navy perspective, it
kind of depends on exactly what they are doing, but at the very
minimum the training that all of the Navy folks get is about a
two-week course. All of our training, the Navy does through
agreement with the Army and is being either conducted under the
purview of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC, or
Army Forces Command.
Navy individual augmentee training course, NIACT, is
conducted at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. It is Army trainers
who actually conduct that training. The training is as
specified by the combatant commander, in this case CENTCOM, and
provides those requirements. The Navy validates that training,
and we have personnel on-site at NIACT to ensure that that
training is conducted.
Once they have completed that course of instruction, if
that is all that they are going to need because they are
working within a skill-set that they don't need additional
training, then they go in-country. And then the combatant
commander has additional training that is conducted in the
CENTCOM AOR to their specification.
Now, for Navy missions where it is an ad hoc training and
it is a different mission set, what is essentially done is we
take commensurate training that the Army would provide to Army
forces that are conducting similar missions. And again through
not just Fort Jackson, South Carolina, but a number of Army
bases, again either under the Training and Doctrine Command or
Forces Command. They conduct that training with our liaison
there, and the training conducted is exactly the same training
that they would conduct for soldiers going to do similar
missions. Then, they would also have the follow-on training in-
country.
Mr. Ortiz. I have some more questions, but let me yield to
my good friend from New Jersey for any questions that he might
have.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Some of this overlaps with what the chairman was just
asking about, but it seems to me that the training has to
accommodate varying degrees of skill or level of experience and
how that gets integrated into what is expected.
What checks are in place to ensure that the sailors and
airmen are adequately trained for the mission that they are
going to be deployed for? Is there some standard or some
checklist that somehow is out there? This is for anyone.
General Gibson. Sir, I will step up initially on that one.
From the Air Force perspective, through our chief, we have
established through our training command down to Second Air
Force at Keesler Air Force Base a team that is dedicated to
ensuring that the training is adequate, meeting Combatant
Command (COCOM) requirements, and is standardized.
When those airmen travel to one of those nine locations to
train with the Army, we have detachments forward that work in
conjunction with the Army trainers on the syllabus and course
of training and to ensure that those airmen are meeting the
same standards any other soldier or sailor would need to meet
to go forward and do that mission and task. And then it is
constantly in a feedback loop, if you will.
We evaluate their sense at court completion, at between 45
and 60 days when they have been deployed, and then upon
completion of their tour--again, continually having that
dialogue with the COCOM also to make sure that those forces are
meeting their needs.
Mr. LoBiondo. You covered what my second question was going
to be on the feedback loop, so that is something that is
constant in the beginning and throughout.
Who tracks whether the individual augmentees, not those
with a remissioned unit, are completing each of their training
requirements before they arrive in-theater? How does that work?
Anyone?
General Kamiya. Sir, the current process is that the
providing service certifies that individual's basic combat
skill competencies. The gaining service, in the case of the Air
Force and Navy, when they go to an Army training base, for
example, for additional training, the Army in that case would
certify to the parent service that that functional competency
has been trained to standard.
It remains up to the parent service to certify that
individual, or in some cases units, are certified read for
combat in accordance with the combatant commander requirements.
Hopefully, that clarifies this. So it was always the parent
service that certifies that the individual and units have met
all training requirements for deployment to the CENTCOM area of
operations.
Mr. LoBiondo. GAO has pointed out that there appear to be
some issues with equipment where in lieu of and individual
augmentees of sailors and airmen trained on equipment that was
inconsistent with equipment being used by existing ground
forces.
Is that accurate from your point of view?
Anyone?
Admiral Giardina. From a Navy perspective, the equipping of
our sailors is done by the Army and it is done to the same
standard for Army forces fulfilling similar roles and missions.
So to my knowledge, all of the equipping has been to that
standard.
Mr. LoBiondo. So the equipment that sailors and airmen are
training on is the same equipment that they are going to find
in-theater? Is that all of your understandings?
General Egginton. By and large, that is true. As they come
into theater, they may have modified or improved systems that
have not been distributed throughout the training process, but
when they come in they will get top-off training.
In Kuwait, for example, IED and counter-IED devices and
that sort of thing that are the latest developments with the
latest software upgrades and that sort of thing, so they get
hands-on training, real time prior to going forward.
Mr. LoBiondo. And last couple of questions, Mr. Chairman.
I am curious about how you would categorize the morale by
those that are affected by the in lieu of. How do you find
this?
I know that I have a dad of one of the soldiers that has
some question marks about how the soldier feels.
Can you comment from your experience on the morale aspect
of this?
General Egginton. Sir, from my perspective, speaking to
airmen and sailors and the folks that are doing things they
don't normally do in their core competencies that, by and
large, they are excited about the opportunity to serve in some
capacity in direct support to the combat operation.
Some folks in the transportation business, for example,
back home are normally either driving a truck in the local area
or working logistics issues in the office. They receive this
training, for example, Camp Bullis for the Air Force elements
that come over, on the securing convoy support role. They come
over there and they are excited about the opportunity.
I had previous commands, and many folks would come back
from their deployment beaming about their opportunity to serve
in that capacity. Commanding convoys through the combat zone, a
lieutenant logistics officer that normally would never think
when she came into the military as a second lieutenant she
would ever have the opportunity to serve in that kind of
capacity, and comes back with a bronze star for heroism for the
efforts that she did. The training she received at Camp Bullis
prepared her to do that.
We grow and we evolve and we learn new skills in the
process of doing this, and it has been a morale builder for the
most part with anybody I have ever talked to.
General Halverson. Sir, if I could just articulate a little
bit. That is a good question because I think leadership has to
stay engaged to ensure they know the task purpose and why they
are doing it. Many times, you have artillery units that are now
doing security force missions that have had to do those things.
Obviously, in high-spectrum type of things, they would want
to be shooting their howitzers or doing those aspects because
that is what they came in and that is what they picked from
their source and their commission or whatever.
So if they do that, you have to balance that out to ensure
that this is either a one-time in lieu of-type thing. Then he
can get you back into that training that you are set for. But
obviously, you have to make sure. And us in the Army,
especially as we are in not only the counterinsurgency fight
that we are in today, but if we have to be prepared for another
scenario, you have to invest in it. And that is that
degradation of readiness at times that we just have to be
cognizant of in this consistent conflict that is going on.
So good leadership in telling the task purpose and
articulating that to our junior leaders are very, very
important because they may have concerns because they are not
doing their artillery missions. But getting them in there and
working on those core competencies tasks are very important for
us. We keep a good pulse on that, but it is a great concern of
us to make sure that we stay focused on all those tasks.
Mr. LoBiondo. Admiral.
Admiral Giardina. From a Navy standpoint, I think the vast
majority of our sailors feel that they are contributing to
important missions in a wide variety of mission areas. They
look at it as an opportunity to contribute. I think when you
look at our accession numbers, readiness numbers, attrition
throughout the pipeline in the entire chain, they remain
positive.
The chief of naval operations, the vice chief, and other
senior leaders when they have testified have consistently
stated the good morale that the Navy sailors have had. My
personal observation has been the same, including individual
augmentees from my staff that have gone, and I maintain a
relationship with them, and it is very positive.
So, yes, sir, I think it is very positive morale at this
point.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. I want to thank each of you gentleman for being
here and for your service to our nation. I have to admit my
disappointment in your opening statements. I really felt like
you told us almost nothing.
One of the things that I have hopefully learned from your
counterparts over the years is the importance of training as a
unit, teamwork, getting very good at something.
What I fear is happening in the case of these augmentees is
you are losing all of that. I remember reading Stephen
Ambrose's ``Citizen Soldiers'' where he talks about the
appalling rates of casualties among the replacements that,
unlike the original teams that went in and trained for years
together, the augmentees did not have a sense of connection
with the rest of the unit. Guys didn't tend to look out for
them as much. They didn't really know what they were doing, and
they suffered a disproportionately high percentage of
casualties.
So my question is, has anyone tracked the casualties among
the IAs to see if they are suffering a disproportionately high
percentage of casualties?
General, to your point, I have been to Camp Shelby several
times. I was there about a year ago April, and I remember a
young guardsman who was getting ready to leave for Afghanistan
the following Monday--this is a Friday. I asked him if he had
trained on a jammer. What is your job? ``I am a Humvee
driver.'' Have you trained on a jammer? His answer was, ``What
is that?''
Now, this is a guy who has trained for months at Camp
Shelby before he is going to Afghanistan, so if that guy hasn't
trained on a jammer prior to deploying, what kind of a chance
does an IA have who might have been a boatswain mate one day
and is driving a truck the next day, or a sonar technician? Who
is tracking this?
I will open that up. Let's start by service, is anyone
tracking the casualties of your IAs to see if they are
suffering a disproportionately high percentage of casualties?
General Gibson. Sir, I will open for the Air Force. To
date, our best numbers are that we have had approximately 152
of our ILO-related airmen suffer casualties, various forms of
those; 13 have been killed since February 2004 when we began.
Frankly, I can't comment today on whether that is
disproportionate to our other folks that are forward or not.
Mr. Taylor. Okay, General Gibson, for the record, I would
like that figure.
General Gibson. Yes, sir. I will take that for the record.
Mr. Taylor. Of the total airmen in-theater, total IAs in-
theater, total casualties with the total force, total
casualties for the IAs.
General Gibson. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 88.]
Mr. Taylor. Admiral.
And for the record, I would like that for each of the
services that are represented today. If you have that number
off the top of your head, I would like to hear it now.
Admiral.
Admiral Giardina. Yes, Mr. Taylor. I will provide for the
record the actual numbers with a breakdown for the entire
theater.
At this point, in lieu of forces the Navy has had three
casualties. Two of those casualties were as a result of IEDs
from convoy operations, and one was in a combat fire situation
where a service member suffered smoke inhalation. Those are the
only three IA casualties that we have had to date.
I will provide that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 88.]
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, sir.
General.
General Halverson. Sir, I don't have the specific number
that you want. You know, we have had about 36 and 147
casualties in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) since the start of the war. The majority of
those are not individual augmentees because the majority of
those are on staffs or filling other things.
There have been some incidents where indirect fire and
those types of actions have actually hurt some of our
individual augmentees. But we do track it very carefully at the
combat readiness centers at Fort Benning and Fort Bliss, and
they go through and track exactly what they do.
We have a very maturing approach where they do have much
more detailed IED situational awareness, combat life saver
awareness if they are hurt, and then also their awareness on
indirect fires and all those react-to-contact and stuff--
because obviously IEDs have been the majority killer for us in-
theater.
So we have a very thorough approach. One, they do it prior,
and then a good course where they have to go through deliberate
aspects with those individual augmentees.
Then we certify that they have received the training, and
then they will not fly over until we know that they have gone
through the course and passed each of their records of the
courses or gone through the individual training, weapons
qualifications, and all those types of things. And then they
will fly over. But I will get you the specific number, because
we do have that data. I just don't have it with me today.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 88.]
Mr. Taylor. General.
General Kamiya. Sir, it is USJFCOM's responsibility, in
concert with CENTCOM, to continually look at the conditions
under which the tasks that CENTCOM has defined as theater-
specific individual readiness training tasks, are relevant to
the operational environment. I explained this to others akin
to, it is one thing to learn how to drive, but as you adjust
the conditions, it is another thing to drive in inclement
weather or in heavy density traffic.
So it is this aspect of training that I think that JFCOM
has a big set of responsibilities, again working with CENTCOM,
to ensure that the task prescribed by the combatant commander,
as those tasks are mandatory for any service member, regardless
of functional specialty, no matter where they are going to be
working in the CENTCOM AOR, to make sure that those tasks are
relevant.
But more importantly, to make sure the conditions under
which those tasks are to be executed is accurately described to
the services, so that they can look at and assess if the task
and the way they train under the Title X responsibilities are
in fact meeting CENTCOM's requirements. If not, to conduct the
assessment to see where gaps may exist and apply resources
accordingly. So this is where I believe the Joint Force Command
has a huge responsibility.
In partnership with the services, we do a lot of
circulation among all the AORs to talk to service members or
talk to unit commanders, et cetera. We provide their
assessments, their boots-on-the-ground assessments to the
services and to CENTCOM and use this information to make sure
that our training programs, joint training programs, as well as
the service programs that we help enable, remain relevant to
the force.
So there is a lot of ongoing work, sir, with ensuring that
the training continually evolves in task, in conditions, and in
standards to make sure that the way these individuals train
back here in CONUS prior to deployment is in fact the most up-
to-date as possible.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, what is a reasonable amount of time to expect those
numbers from you? Is a working week a reasonable amount of
time?
General Halverson. Yes, sir. We have that data. We just
need to pull it----
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 88.]
Mr. Taylor. Thank you again. Thank you, gentlemen, for
being here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Ms. Boyda.
Mrs. Boyda. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you again, all of you, for your service.
My question is just generally, were we to leave everything
the way that it is working right now, a year from now, are you
going to be pretty satisfied with where we will be a year from
now with regard to the ILOs and individual augmentation?
So were we to make no changes with regard to any of these
policies, how would it affect, or what do you think you will be
saying a year from now?
General Gibson. I will respond initially for the Air Force,
ma'am. I think I can speak on behalf of our chief and secretary
that we are proud to be part of this joint fight. But over
time, we would like to continue to get back into those
functions that are matched with our core competencies within
the Air Force, and make that contribution and continually try
to resolve, as the ground component grows, to get out of those
duties and tasks that are not within our core competencies.
Mrs. Boyda. Just for the record, let me be a little clearer
on this. So were that not to happen, is it just that it
wouldn't be--what do you think would actually--where do you
think you would be, the Air Force would be a year from now?
What would the consequences of no change in policy mean to you
specifically?
General Gibson. Ma'am, I am not sure I am prepared to
speculate. We have a plan now over the next 12 months I think
that will continue to pull us out of those non-core competency
contributions to the joint fight and the COCOM requirements. So
we are already on that ramp to do that. But clearly, we stand
ready to contribute.
Mrs. Boyda. I appreciate that. So you are saying the ILOs
are ready to start ramping down and everybody has agreed on a
plan that that will somewhat start to ramp the other direction
instead of ramping forward? Is that what I am hearing?
General Gibson. Yes, ma'am. We have been doing that for
some time now.
Mrs. Boyda. Excellent.
Admiral Giardina. Ma'am, from the Navy perspective, the
chief of naval operations has offered his continued support as
long as the conflict goes to where Navy can help out in the
ground-centric areas that we are currently helping. Right now,
as a percentage of the total force, the in lieu of and
augmentation-type missions are between two percent and three
percent of our forces, a fairly small contribution when taking
the whole force into account.
So from a standpoint of service readiness, the Navy will
continue to stay ready with the funding support that we need to
meet all of our obligations. I fully expect that the chief of
naval operations will continue to support these missions.
Mrs. Boyda. So, again, let me just see if I understand what
you are saying. A year from now, were it to continue this way,
it might not be the best of scenarios, but you don't think that
we need to make any adjustments? Or that, basically, that
certainly war is a time when people make their adjustments and
their sacrifices.
Do you think that we need to make any policy adjustment
between now and then that would in fact make the situation any
better?
Admiral Giardina. From a standpoint of what we are here to
discuss today from augmentation to the ground-centric missions,
we will continue to refine our training processes, as General
Kamiya has mentioned, refine the conditions and standards. We
have continual feedback loops at every phase of that process.
There will be continued growth and improvement of our readiness
and training in that area.
But from a standpoint of changing the direction, the demand
signal that we are seeing from the Central Command is pretty
much constant as far as we can see on our time horizon. It
looks like about 10,000 Navy folks for the foreseeable future.
That is what we are planning. And from a standpoint of the
readiness impact, the Navy stands fully ready to do all of our
other assigned missions.
Mrs. Boyda. Does it have any impact on recruitment or on
retention?
Admiral Giardina. The most recent retention numbers, which
I don't have here with me, indicate that we are not seeing a
significant negative change. We are meeting our overall
numbers. There are a couple of areas that we are a couple of
percentage points short of goal, but in general we have not
seen a negative impact on retention.
From recruitment, there is only a certain manpower pool out
there. It is kind of fixed and we are all competing to get our
fair share of that, if you will. We continue to struggle in
some very narrow areas that tend to be in high demand, but in
general our recruiting numbers are still pretty good.
Mrs. Boyda. Any additional comments, General, from the Air
Force's standpoint?
General Gibson. Yes, ma'am. We are continuing to meet our
retention goals as it stands now, but anecdotally, we are very
concerned. I can say that Air Force leadership----
Mrs. Boyda. I am sorry. Anecdotally you are very concerned
about----
General Gibson. In the sense that I think there are
statements out there and concerns among leadership that the ILO
task in the conflict will begin to have a negative retention
effect. To date, we have not seen that. However, I assure you
Air Force leadership is very focused on that to make sure that
we are able to walk our way through that.
Mrs. Boyda. Okay. I just want to thank you all for your
straightforward testimony during the questions. Thank you.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, first of all, thank all of you for your service and for
being here.
I want to go back to the chairman's initial question and
kind of revisit it, because I have a large military presence in
my district. I really haven't received feedback from the
families of service members complaining that they lacked the
proper training to go into theater.
I would like to ask each of you, but specifically starting
off with you, General. Are you of the opinion that you have
sent any service members into theater that were ill-prepared,
did not have the skill-sets necessary to carry out their duties
once in theater? General Kamiya.
General Kamiya. Sir, we receive constant feedback from the
services through JFCOM components on the readiness of their
forces, individuals as well as units. To date, we have not
received any indication that any individual or service member
is being deployed overseas to the CENTCOM area of operation not
prepared.
Mr. Rogers. Would you send a service member into theater
that you felt was not prepared with the skill sets necessary to
carry out their duty?
General Kamiya. Sir, I can't speak for the individual
service chiefs, but as a former commander myself, I would not
deploy someone to the combat theater of operation if they did
not meet his combat skill requirements or functional competence
requirements.
Mr. Rogers. Have you, to your knowledge, done that?
General Kamiya. No, sir. I have not.
Mr. Rogers. I would ask that question of any other member
of our panel.
General Halverson. I would just like to echo the answer
from the chief of staff and the secretary of the Army. That is
an absolute red line in the aspect. They will not deploy any
untrained soldier into harm's way. That is the checks and
balances that we have with our forces' command that train in
the readiness, and they are working with First Army, with the
reservists and stuff.
We have a very good template of those training requirements
that we do, and that is that whole certification process that
we go through with the commanders, with their leaders, to
ensure that they feel very, very comfortable about what they
are trained in and that they have the skill sets to take on
that mission.
With that, it then becomes their percentage effectiveness
they feel that they are, and where they are manning, equipping
and training and the readiness that they have. To be specific,
though, and I was the deputy commanding general for the Fourth
Infantry Division, and we just got back in mid-November. We
were a multinational division, Baghdad.
It is very true what General Kamiya said in the aspect that
we have done very rigorous hands-on training now, be it from
the basic course, basic training courses, all those courses,
the individual skill check courses, hands-on to let them know
that they are in that.
We have instituted a--where everyone is an infantryman-type
mentality to start moving toward our officers and everything
like that. But the reality as the commander when we went in
there, we knew we were at high risk that first 30 days to just
get the operational environment, because no where here in the
states can you prepare yourself mentally, physically, and all
those things for the conditions that you see either in
Afghanistan or Iraq itself because of the complexities.
So good leadership and stuff is there to make sure that you
over-watch that with your pre-combat checks and your
inspections. So we can continue to work that. What is very good
about that is that we have pre-deployments with units rotating
so they can get those lessons learned. We share those lessons
learned so they can get that operational environment and who
are the actors and who their players are. And commanders who
they are replacing and stuff have constant dialogue with the
ones that they are replacing.
So I have never seen a more cooperative cross-sharing of
information so everyone gets the environment about right, so
they can be mentally and physically prepared for combat.
Mr. Rogers. Admiral.
Admiral Giardina. To answer your specific problem, we have
not knowingly deployed anyone who didn't meet all the training
requirements as specified by the combatant commander and would
not do that. That is a clear red line for us.
We have put a very robust monitoring program in place to
ensure that the training standards are being met; the feedback
mechanisms both at the Army facilities where we are doing our
training with Navy liaison there to monitor that; doing self-
assessments; also doing surveys at various points along the
pipeline once the forces are in-theater and prior to
redeployment; and also taking continual feedback on a bi weekly
basis from the combatant commander.
I think we have a robust process in place, but I would
stress that we continue to try and improve that process. It is
never going to be perfect. We will continue to learn. We have
an enemy that is adapting over there. New tactics, techniques
and procedures (TTPs) are developed all the time, and when that
happens, we want the feedback to be very quick so that we can
respond to it and get the best possible training for our
sailors before we deploy them.
Mr. Rogers. General.
General Gibson. Sir, I know Air Force leadership would
never knowingly put any of our airmen in harm's way unless they
were properly equipped or trained. By way of anecdote, again I
was the first commander at Balad, Iraq to receive our first ILO
teams in February of 2004.
I can assure you, especially as we were carving new ground,
that that was the number-one priority I had. That we would not
put anybody out there, and it was clearly a risk to do that,
that weren't adequately trained and adequately equipped, to the
point of sharing my concerns with those Army battalion
commanders and sergeant majors to make sure that there was
immediate feedback if they felt that any of our folks were not
adequately prepared to be a member of that team.
Mr. Rogers. General.
General Egginton. Sir, from the user perspective, from
CENTCOM's perspective, I don't want to give the impression all
is rosy, because it is not all rosy. The point that Congressman
Taylor mentioned, that you will find individuals that arrive
that on occasion we have sent people home that didn't have the
right training. I am talking individuals, not units, but
individuals. We have sent them home because they didn't either,
and it was an oversight. You look commanders in the eye and
say, how did this happen? They, well, you know, ten percent
don't get the word, or five percent, but not that high,
obviously. That happens on occasion.
On the other hand, another issue that comes up and becomes
a mitigating problem for us in CENTCOM is that units spend, in
order to achieve the training level that they desire to, that
we want them to achieve, there are times when they are late
arriving in-theater because they have spent more time training,
either because of mobilization policies that prevent them from
mobilizing up to a certain point.
So now their training time is compressed. So they will say,
hey, in order to get the training you want from us, we need to
extend their training period, which means what? It means they
show up late to theater, which now we have to find a gap filler
or mitigating kind of a circumstances in theater to go.
And also, if they do show up, for example that young troop
that didn't know what a jammer was--hopefully they educated him
before he left--but before he drives a Humvee in CENTCOM's
theater of operation, he goes to the range and he drives his
vehicle down an alleyway with real IEDs, with real indicators
that obviously don't explode, but you get the smoke coming out
and they say, oops, you know. And so he will get that training.
But can you say that happens 100 percent of the time
always? No, I can't guarantee that, sir. But by and large, to
the point that we are satisfied with the training, yes. But we
wish they could cram it in a little faster so that we could get
them there on time, sometimes would be our only complaint on
that point.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this hearing.
And thank you, gentlemen, both for being here this morning
and for your service.
I want to start out by asking, because I know there are a
number of you, at least from your comments, that you have
served in Iraq and perhaps Afghanistan. As far as Iraq, can you
describe the environment for the committee? In other words,
where are the frontline and where are the rear areas? Can
anybody do that?
General Halverson. Sir, obviously, as you know, in Iraq it
is a very asymmetric threat. There is no front or is there is
no rear lines. It is common----
Mr. Reyes. Pretty much the whole country can be a combat
area, right?
General Halverson. It can be, because the enemy is in your
terrain. Obviously, because of our intelligence work and stuff,
we know where a lot of the hot spots where the enemy is
focusing his efforts, or as we look at his networks and stuff.
And so there are many places I could go in Baghdad on a daily
basis where I felt much more comfortable. But when I entered
some places, let's say Sadr City or something like that,
Amadiyah, then you clearly knew that you would have to be very
cautious.
Mr. Reyes. But generally speaking, the whole country can be
considered a combat area for--especially when we are training
individuals or we are deploying individuals whose--I don't
know, in the Army is called an MOS; I know it is different in
the Navy and perhaps the Air Force. But when their mission,
their occupation may be different than, say, a truck driver and
those kinds of jobs that have been really the big stress factor
for us particularly in Iraq.
So when we talk about training people for combat support to
go into Iraq, it is really we ought to be preparing them for
the worst possible scenario, which is combat. Am I correct?
General Halverson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Reyes. Because that is the likelihood they will run
into. I represent Fort Bliss, as I think some of you know--the
home of the 507th, who in the first weekend that the 507th
supports Patriot Battery, got into An Nasiriyah and we had nine
casualties.
And talking to some of those that survived, they reported
to us, you know, lack of training, going over the berm without
the confidence that they were prepared certainly for getting
into a situation like they got into, which was in the very
first weekend of the combat in Iraq, which, you know, I could
understand.
But the thing that concerns me, and I know the chairman and
I have been to Walter Reed and other places where we have had
soldiers tell us, ``We were trained on one type of vehicle or
one type of weapon, and when we got over there it was
completely different. We had to OJT--on-the-job training.'' And
that, frankly, is now five years after the initial first
weekend that the 507th got into that situation, and that is
very concerning.
I am assuming that is why we are having this hearing. It is
not so you guys can come in and tell us everything is going
great.
And thank you, General Egginton, for making the comment
that not everything is rosy and there still are issues and
problems. That is where we want to help, but we can't help if
we don't have a clear understanding of what the challenges are.
We know that being able to distribute supplies in the theater
is an issue. We know we don't have enough people to train, to
operate the convoys and deliver supplies because we have heard
of the shortages.
But when we have two facilities that are training people to
go over there, and then when we get the feedback from soldiers
that are wounded, that tell us, ``Listen, we were charged with
providing security for a convoy. We got hit and the convoy
drivers didn't know how to respond.''
I will admit to you, I don't know how one is supposed to
respond when it hits the fan like that. But I am imagining they
get training for that, I mean, either evasive tactics or, you
know, circle the wagons. I don't know, some kind of training
that tells each and every driver, this is what you are likely
to run into, if you get hit with IEDs, if you get ambushed, if
you get this or that, this is how you are going to respond.
We are still getting those kinds of stories. So I am hoping
that there is, as some of you mentioned, a system of where you
are taking the feedback so that we are not putting people in
jeopardy unnecessarily because either the tactics have changed
or you are not training on the same kinds of tactics. Or the
biggest fear--and you were with us when we talked to a wounded
Army soldier--was that they had Navy contractors and Air Force
drivers in this one convoy, if you remember. And he said it was
a ``cluster,'' and he used another word after that. That told
us that they had a heck of a time trying to organize a response
to the attack of that convoy.
That is why we are holding this hearing, and that is why it
is important and imperative that every one of you in your
respective roles does a better job of preparing people as they
deploy over there. Because I hear it from soldiers, both at
Fort Bliss and soldiers that have come back, anecdotally, and
have said, ``Look, we were attacked. We were providing security
for a convoy, and we just didn't have the cohesive response
that we should have had.''
So it is a big challenge. I know that you said it is an
asymmetrical threat that we are addressing, and an asymmetrical
environment. But five years into it, we ought to be doing
better than apparently we are. So any way we can help, let us
know.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you.
My good friend, Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am sorry I missed all
of this hearing. I was really looking forward to it, but as
everything happens up here, there is a conflict with another
hearing that I needed to testify.
I pretty much wanted to ask--and this can be for anyone--I
realize that when a nation is at war, things don't work like
they are supposed to when you lay it out on paper. There are
times that you have all you need, and there are times you don't
have all you need, whether it be equipment or manpower.
Recently, I read in National Review, I believe it was,
talking about the United States Army. ``Code Yellow,'' I
believe was the title. I can't remember. I don't have it before
me, but there were several comments in there by Barry
McCaffrey, who I think most of us in the Congress--as we do
you, by the way--have great respect for.
The point was that the military--and this is no deep
question, but it is a concern I have--that the military,
because when we went to Iraq, they didn't listen to the
generals who said you need more manpower. If you are going to
hold the country, you have to have more manpower.
So it seems now that what is happening is we are sending
men and women--I have Camp Lejeune down in the district I
represent. As we are sending more men and women back for the
second and the third time, we know that they are given the very
best, but they are getting tired. The mental tension, the
physical tension is really beginning to weigh.
In that article that I read, it seems to be that there is a
concern that we are now having to lower the standards, somewhat
of what they did during Vietnam. And when you start lowering
the standards, particularly when you have such a great
volunteer force that again is stressed, you are beginning now
to supplement that force with people with--a couple of the
articles I read said that they were even letting some with
felonies.
I mean, I guess there are degrees of felonies obviously,
but it sounds like to me that we are beginning to get to a
point that we are using, you know, we are trying to patch
certain situations; that if you trained me for a certain
position, but then when my time comes that we have to fill in
the slot on another position because we don't have anybody else
to fill, so you are going to take me because I have been
somewhat prepared.
This is my question, and it is probably being repetitive,
quite frankly. Are we at a point that we are close to Code
Yellow? That because of the--I know that, and I think it was
former secretary under Reagan, Lawrence Korb. He made the
statement--and I still was just shocked with that--as it
relates to the graduates of West Point. We have the lowest
percentage of those graduates in 30 years staying in the
military.
The officers--I don't know if this is captain or major--but
my rambling is leading to this. If I am being repetitive, I
apologize, but just how bad is it? I mean, is the backup so
fragile--meaning the backup of those who are going into the
military for the first time, and they are being told we are
going to train you in this. But yet we don't know what we are
going to need six months from now, and it might be what you are
being trained in, and now we are just going to have to use you
to fill the slot.
General Egginton. Sir, let me just I think provide some
context, and then I will defer to my service counterparts here.
First of all, the way the global force management process
defines in lieu of categories. First of all, if you take the
enormity of force requirements today, about eight percent of
those requirements fall under the in lieu of category. The
global force management process subdivides in lieu of force
solutions into three basic categories.
The first is a joint solution. That is, one service
provides a capability to another service, but this unit is
operating in its core competency. A good example would be a
Navy Seabee battalion operating in lieu of an Army combat heavy
engineering battalion. So these sailors will be operating
within their core competencies.
The second category, sir, is remissioning. That is when you
take a unit and have to re-train them to accomplish a mission
outside of their core competencies. A good example would be
Army logistical unit being remissioned to do convoy security.
The final category, sir, is retraining. And that is taking
individuals from a variety of potential services or units to
form a unit to provide a capability outside of their core
competencies. The reason why I say this is, again just for
context, is that within the in lieu of categories of forces,
about six percent are involved for sourcing solutions that have
service members accomplishing missions outside their core
competencies.
I will defer now to each service for additional comments.
General Halverson. Sir, I will try to answer your specific
question because I think it is more of a readiness question
overall of the force than some of the in lieu ofs.
One is from the Army's perspective. I think, even with
General Casey coming on board and Secretary Geren, you know, we
are stretched because right now our global force management
requirements are like 33 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), when you
are looking at it. And we have 20 in Iraq right now, so the
demand is high when we don't have that much structure to be
able to do that.
So when you are in Iraq, like you are right now, when you
come back you are going to take a short re-set, and then you
are going to prepare to deploy to meet the global demands of
the combatant commander at CENTCOM. So that is the reality.
Especially as you have been doing this persistent fight now for
the last seven years, be it Afghanistan and now Iraq, that it
is strained.
As you all know here in this great committee, you can
assume readiness, be it from the equipment that you pushed over
there and now is left-behind equipment, and then folks come
back here. Now it is missing equipment from the table of
organization and equipment (TO&E). Or you know, the constant
things of people, we need to continue that support from this
subcommittee, that readiness, and therefore you need to
continue to have program dollars to fix it so we can, once the
demand does drop, we can have that continual thing so we can
have an operational reserve. We can have this thing to be able
to prepare for a global fight against terrorism as we see it.
So you are right. I mean, it is pushing the forces, and
therefore we turn to the Joint Force commander to look at other
services to pick up some of those aspects that we have in the
Army. But it is going to be the continuing great work of this
committee to facilitate the funding that we do need, so not
every up-armored Humvee has to be pushed into theater. And we
can keep them in the training base to have the folks there
training so they can see what an up-armored Humvee is and what
it looks like, so it is not, you know, in Iraq when they look
at these things.
The Army is having this strategy to where we are going to
get to those things to give it to our Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) and our forces' command, those types of
equipments that we are not having to push immediately into the
force. Because of, as you know, the catastrophic loss of
equipment that we have had--the M-1 tanks, the Strykers,
helicopters--all those types of things that we have lost that
degrade readiness.
And so the Army looks forward to working with this
subcommittee as we look at the overall readiness of the Army,
as we continue this persistent conflict.
The second thing is, we are very cognizant of that, because
obviously because of this demand and the supply issue, you
know, we had to go to the 15-12 in the policy, which we know is
training on the forces. We want to get down to where we are not
at that. And we can get to the 1:1 and those types of standards
that we know, when you look at the strain on forces and stuff,
is a better model for our soldiers and their leaders.
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
important hearing.
I want to thank all the witnesses for their service to our
nation.
The global war on terror has tested the endurance and
adaptability of the United States armed forces for just about
six years now. Our forces remain strong and ready to fight any
threats. However, the methods in which we fill wartime
personnel requirements is cause for investigation.
General Kamiya, you state in your testimony the Joint
Forces Command serves as the primary joint force provider and
trainer. Does JFCOM see its role as the primary agent for
developing a baseline of standards for training service members
selected through in lieu of sourcing?
I want to ensure that the training on naval augmentees
receives for sourcing a security forces role that is typically
performed by the Army is the same training an Army security
forces unit receives before they go into an area of combat
operations.
So can you confirm that the training is identical?
General Kamiya. Ma'am, I would say that it is up to each
individual service to train in accordance with its roles and
functions. As I have said before, however, JFCOM does have a
huge role, going back to the CENTCOM area of operations, to
continue to refine and define, to make sure that the tasks and
conditions under which the combatant commander expects combat
skill and functional competencies are clearly articulated and
understood by each service.
It will then become the individual service responsibility
to conduct an assessment of whether their standard training
programs on the roles and functions meet the combatant
commander requirements and internal to the service, make the
assessment if any increase in training capability is required.
But this is where Joint Force Command's primary role is. It
is also our role for those joint tasks that require services to
operate together to make sure that they, too, are clearly
understood, down from the operational level Joint Task Force
training we do, to the individual service joint training
programs that we sponsor through a variety of our programs.
So that is JFCOM's role. I think each service, given its
own set of core competencies, should develop their own
understanding and way, if you will, to meet the combatant
commander requirements. That is not JFCOM's responsibility.
Ms. Bordallo. So your answer to that question then,
General, is that they are necessarily not identical in some
cases.
General Kamiya. That is correct, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. This is for any witness. As you know, this
committee passed legislation that increases the end-strengths
of the Army and the Marine Corps forces. Do you feel that
increases in these services' end-strength will help reduce the
reliance on in lieu of sourcing?
The second part of that question is, the ILOs are not--
those that are not volunteers, what has been the impact and the
morale and the retention among them?
Anyone can answer that.
General Halverson. Ma'am, one, obviously, reference the
chief of staff of the Army is working with the Secretary of
Defense to lay out our plan to increase the Army and the
growth. And we think obviously that is a good step forward
because if the demand is such, you are going to need these. And
we are reshaping what those are so we when we see some MOS's
some say they can use, we can put that force structure in
there.
So we think that is a good first step in the commitment
that it is going to take for us to do that. So that is the
first step.
Ms. Bordallo. So this is needed?
General Halverson. This will assist us somewhat to get into
those issues of we would call ``dwell'' and all those types of
things from a demand perspective.
Ms. Bordallo. And the second part of the question? Those
that are not volunteers, how is their morale and the retention
among them?
General Halverson. Ma'am, reference like we addressed
earlier, is one of the things that we do find out that folks
that go into the combat zone, their morale is high if they are
doing the skill-sets that we said in their training up and
stuff, and they are contributing to the fight. But it is a
constant-type thing. The leadership has to be able to ensure
that we are caring, feeding and maintaining those folks while
they are there.
And we also are monitoring that in the aspect that, but yet
we also are monitoring those, the ones that may be in lieu of,
like an artillery unit or whatever. What that does is look at
their attrition, if there was a majority that are getting out.
So it is something that the chief of staff and the secretary
are looking at to ensure that we have the right mix.
Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Chairman, I have one quick question also,
for any of the witnesses.
Has the increased use of ILOs forced the services to re-
think the current mix of forces, its basic supply and demands?
For example, if the Army requires ILOs to fill military police
positions, has the Army taken actions within its own force to
create more military police positions? Do transformation
effects like the Army's modular force take ILO sourcing into
account?
General Halverson. Ma'am, the short answer is yes, as we
look at that. That will be with the secretary of the Army and
the chief, once they finalize that, we will lay out obviously
to the Secretary of Defense to bring forward. So we are looking
at all those factors of what in lieu ofs and, as I would say,
lower density, high demand of what those are.
Ms. Bordallo. Yes. Any other comments from the other
services?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to
ask the questions.
Mr. Ortiz. Ms. Shea-Porter.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just have three short questions.
General Kamiya, this IA has been going on for how many
years, individual augmentation?
General Kamiya. Ma'am, the global force provider mission
has been with JFCOM since 2004. I am going to assume that it
has been going on since then. However, the way we track
individual augmentees or in lieu of forcing solutions has
evolved over time.
In fact, the fiscal year 2008 global force management plan
that is currently inside the Department of Defense for
continued staffing will bring even further definition and
clarity on the way we manage in lieu of solutions.
Ms. Shea-Porter. It has been going on for a long time, so
it seems like it would be appropriate for the Pentagon to
possibly plan and actually bring people into the service and
have them trained, instead of plucking them from various
disciplines. That I find very disturbing.
In the past couple of weeks, I have heard two
neoconservative advisers suggest or agree that one way that we
could increase our number of troops would be to go to countries
where people are having trouble getting green cards and offer
them green cards to fight.
Do you agree with that? Is that a place that you would
think is a good place to go?
General Kamiya. That is difficult for me to answer, ma'am.
Just know that JFCOM through its formal reporting procedures
identifies what we believe persistent shortfalls as identified
by all the services to the DOD leadership for continued
analysis.
General Halverson. Ma'am, to answer the question,
obviously, there is no one asks that it be a condition to do
that. But you know in our military, every year I have
participated with some great soldiers that enlisted in our
Army, where they became citizens of the United States while
they were in combat, in the Green Zone, and we continue to have
that.
So that is obviously, you know, first generation folks are
working very hard to become citizens of the United States, and
one of the means to do that is that they fight for this
country.
Myself personally when I was in the embassy in Baghdad, I
used to really work with my individual soldiers and found one
that was a first generation person and say, you know, talk
about his struggles of what----
Ms. Shea-Porter. I don't want to interrupt, but I
understand what you are saying, but I am not talking about
people who are already here. I am talking about bringing people
to our Nation. Is that something that you would see as a good
idea, seeing that we are running out of troops and we can't
keep using the IAs either? Have you heard talk about that?
General Halverson. I have not heard any talk.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Okay. It was interesting to me that I have
heard it a couple of times in the past few weeks, so I just
wanted to check and see if that is being kicked around as an
idea.
And then I would like to ask the admiral, I became aware of
a situation where Naval Academy graduates are being sent to
Iraq. It is not their MOS. They don't have any training at all.
Is that a concern to you, that somebody who has been, say,
trained as a pilot or whatever, is now going to be doing some
infantry, or possibly doing infantry? What do you expect the
training to be before that happens to individuals?
Admiral Giardina. Ma'am, I have no knowledge of any
individual augmentees being sent directly out of the Naval
Academy without the service-specific training as called out by
the combatant commander, although I can look into that and get
back to you.
From a standpoint of a permanent change of station (PCS)
from a change of station assignment, to my knowledge every
officer who graduates from the Naval Academy has additional
training before they get assigned, but I can look into that and
get back to you for the record.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Okay, I may follow up on that. We are
talking not directly--you know, 30 days from the academy. We
are talking, you know, one year or two years or three years. I
am being deliberately vague, but I think there have been some
cases where they have gone in without having infantry training,
and that is obviously disturbing.
And then the other question I am going to ask General
Halverson, and please tell me, is the first-time retention rate
really down seven percent?
General Halverson. Excuse me?
Ms. Shea-Porter. First-time retention rates for enlistees--
I know there has been a drop. Is it about seven percent?
General Halverson. Ma'am, I don't have a specific number. I
will have to get back with you, and I will get back with you if
there is a drop in first-time enlistments.
Ms. Shea-Porter. I would appreciate that.
I just wanted to say that I understand that you are all
under great strain, and I appreciate your being here.
Thank you.
Mr. Ortiz. You know, when I served in the Army, my primary
role was of course as an infantryman. My secondary was a
military policeman and criminal investigator. If I was selected
to be an augmentee or in lieu of, with the type of training
that you have described today--you know, nine days, two weeks--
I would be very uncomfortable--very, very uncomfortable. I
think we need to do better than that.
If you look at the wounded that we have had in this war--
25,000 plus almost 4,000 killed--even though we have raised our
end-strength by 30,000. This just shows that we have a
tremendous shortage of troops, at least this is the way I see
it. We were able to raise the end-strength by 30,000, and
25,000 have been wounded, almost 4,000 have been killed.
I think that one of the reasons why we are having to do
what we are having to do now is because of the choice that we
have. In my personal opinion, I think we are shortchanging the
troops from getting the training that they need and having to
change them from one position to another. This is creating
morale problems. I can understand that these are the conditions
that we face today, so we have to plug all these holes as much
as we can with what we have.
But you know what? This is what I stated in the beginning.
This is very serious business. And this is one of the most
important hearings that we have had. I mean, trying to send
those young men and women and change them from one position to
another, and maybe not getting them trained with the right
equipment, and not having the length of training that they
need.
We are going to have votes in a few minutes. But I know
there are some members who wanted to be here, but because this
is the last week, or we hope so, before we recess, they are
attending a lot of other committee hearings. And they might
have questions for the record that we are going to submit to
you.
But let me yield to my good friend, Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
My staff just reminded me that about two months ago, we got
a call from a constituent down in Havelock, Cherry Point Naval
Air Station. Her husband is actually in the Navy. And he is
going to be assigned to an Army attachment. She was concerned,
and he had shared, because we talked to him as well, that he is
wearing a different type of fatigues, or combat fatigues, than
the unit he is going to be assigned to.
In other words, that in itself seemed to be a--and I can
understand--a real concern of the fact that Navy is going to be
augmented with the Army, yet the fatigues are going to be like
a sore thumb and say that you are not really part of this group
because you don't wear the same type of uniform.
Does that happen often? I mean, this woman--and we did talk
to her husband, he is an officer--is very concerned that his
fatigues were not like the fatigues of the unit he is going to
be assigned to.
Admiral Giardina. Let me address that, sir, from a Navy
perspective.
The differences in the uniforms are primarily cosmetic. The
background on those, the desert camouflage versus the more
digital pattern that the Army wears, from a standpoint of
functionality and everything else, they are identical. That is
the service standard to equip in that manner.
Now, if there is any reason where the combatant commander
feels that that is a problem, they have the ability to ask the
other services who are not wearing the exact uniform of the
unit they are being assigned to, they can call for that and we
accommodate that. So it is clearly at the request of the
combatant commander.
When we have looked at instances of this, it is usually
characterized more as a different type of equipping, and we
have gotten to the point where it is all just cosmetic. It has
nothing to do with the quality of the uniform or the
functionality or the body armor or any of that kind of stuff.
So I don't think that it makes a significant difference. We
have not had any feedback where it has been a significant
morale problem or that somebody has stuck out like a sore
thumb. Again, the combatant commander has the ability to
accommodate if they think it is a problem.
Mr. Jones. Admiral, I am sure it is really not. I accept
that. You are in, and I am not, but I did kind of see the point
that was being made by this officer, that if we are supposed to
be a unit of one, that maybe it would make a difference. If it
is cosmetic, so be it, but again I remember the fight about the
beret, quite frankly, a few years back.
But anyway, thank you for your answer.
Mr. Ortiz. You know, I was a law enforcement official
before, and when you are watching for speeders, you look at the
color of the car, something that stands out--red, yellow,
Corvette. You know, and I don't think you gentlemen would be
walking the streets of Baghdad--and this is my own personal
opinion--in your uniform. I feel that because of the changing
uniform and colors, you might become a target. I could be
wrong, but I can remember when I was a rookie patrolman. I
looked for the sports car and the color of the vehicles, and I
knew that they would be speeding.
So we want to try to avoid that, but maybe you do have a
point, admiral. But I would like to see maybe if we have
another hearing, I would like to talk to the in lieu ofs, those
augmentees, the corporals, the sergeants, the specialist fourth
class's, to come and testify to us before this committee. We
would like to have them here.
We thank you for your testimony today. We have a series of
votes, and we don't want to delay you anymore. We will be
submitting some questions for the record for some of the
members who couldn't be here.
Would anybody else like to make a statement? We have about
ten minutes before the first vote begins.
Not having any more questions, the hearing stands
adjourned.
Thank you so much for your testimony.
[Whereupon, at 11:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
July 31, 2007
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 31, 2007
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 31, 2007
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ
Mr. Ortiz. Please explain the Unit Requirement Form Change process.
General Egginton. The supported combatant command (COCOM) annotates
the recommended administrative changes in Force Requirements Enhanced
Database (FRED)/Joint Force Requirements Management (JFRM) systems. The
COCOM then submits a message to the Joint Staff identifying pending
changes where concurrence is sought.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) will then
officially direct Joint Forces Command to staff these changes to all
the applicable Force Providers, acting as a clearinghouse of
information to avoid multiple, conflicting responses. The respective
force provider must access Force Requirements Enhanced Database (FRED)/
Joint Force Requirements Management (JFRM) systems to see the requested
change. Force Providers will review the requested changes and provide
input in an electronic staffing package back to Joint Forces Command.
Review from Force Providers under their purview will fall into
three categories: concur without comment, concur with comment, or non-
concur. Once that information is received from all concerned, Joint
Forces Command sends a message to the supported Combatant Command
detailing the results. At that point, the Combatant Commander is
authorized to change those Unit Requirement Forms that received full
concurrence with comments as appropriate.
Joint Forces Command updates their databases and submits approved
administrative changes to the Joint Staff to be included in the next
available Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Execute Order Modification.
Changes which did not receive concurrence, or in cases where the
Combatant Command could not accept the Force Provider comments, require
a formal Request Force Forces for continued staffing.
Mr. Ortiz. In your testimony you state that ``in some instances
Mixed-Composition units and Reserve Component units have reported to
their mobilization center with less than the required number of
personnel and with training shortfalls . . . which ultimately becomes
CENTCOM's risk to mitigate.'' How is that risk mitigated?
General Egginton. It is the Joint Force Provider's responsibility
to organize, train and equip personnel once ordered by the Secretary of
Defense. In some instances Mixed-Composition units and Reserve
Component units discover that additional training is required to get to
a level of required proficiency once the unit arrives at their
respective mobilization station. An issue of major concern arises when
a unit requires additional training time and can no longer meet the
arrival date. In these cases there are limited options to maintain
mission capabilities. Joint Forces Command in coordination with Joint
Force Providers is initially responsible for ensuring that the
requirement is met by nominating other units if available. In instances
where the delayed unit is a rotational force and there are no
additional external units available the risk is only mitigated by
either extending the current unit in theater or diverting existing
assigned personnel which compromises other missions. If the unit is
filling an emergent requirement, the component must delay or reassign
forces to execute the mission. In the event that troops are not fully
trained once they are in the theater, USCENTCOM components work to
bring them up to current requirements and familiarize them with local
Standard Operational Procedures; this training is normally conducted in
a non-hostile environment in order to reduce risk to the new forces.
Mr. Ortiz. In your testimony you state ``it would be helpful for
training of In-Lieu-Of units to be standardized prior to arrive in
theater to prepare them for the range of missions faced when performing
operations.'' To whose standards and whose responsibility is that?
General Egginton. When a Joint Force Provider nominates a unit to
fill a requested capability, US Central Command's expectation is that
the unit be manned, trained, equipped and certified to execute the
mission prior to deployment. The individual service Force Provider is
responsible for ensuring personnel are trained and proficient in
accordance with Central Command's standards, Training, Tactics and
Procedures (TTPs) and doctrine outlined in Joint Publications to meet
mission specifics.
Mr. Ortiz. In your testimony you state that ``In some cases, Joint
Force Provider interpretation of mission requirements due to a
difference between cultures and philosophies may limit the score of the
mission and the capabilities of the ILO.'' Please provide some examples
of that situation and explain the impact on unit readiness caused by
that situation. How is CENTCOM working with JFCOM and the Services to
mitigate that situation?
General Egginton. One example is the Army, Navy, and Air Force
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units are trained, manned, and
equipped differently. CENTCOM has requirements for EOD teams and
presents these requirements in the Request for Forces and Unit
Requirements Form. As a result of different service philosophies on EOD
unit manning, training, and equipping, sourcing of CENTCOM EOD
requirements may result in varying types of units. These units may be
trained in tasks and missions not required to accomplish the CENTCOM
mission, requiring CENTCOM to provide or seek additional training,
manning and equipment to perform CENTCOM missions.
Recently, USCENTCOM has encountered issues with Force Providers
pushing back on required tasks because the mission requirements could
not be completely predicted and documented during the planning stage.
Despite the fact that most tasks were well within the respective unit's
skill sets, the units hesitated to perform tasks required by the
mission because the tasks were not specifically noted in the Unit
Requirement Form.
Through the Unit Requirement Form Change Request Process, Joint
Forces Command and USCENTCOM continuously refine the mission specific
tasks and capabilities to ensure the right personnel are sourced to fit
the requirement.
Mr. Ortiz. Chemical and artillery units are being remissioned to
military police. Even with specialized training, the leadership of
remissioned units does not have experience comparable to leaders who
spent their careers in the job. This creates two net effects: core
skills atrophy without use and strategic risk increases because
remissioned troops are not qualified to do full-spectrum missions in
either their original MOS or their new MOS. Are combatant command
requirements being filled by soldiers with true capability in that
mission area or are there shortfalls in the Army's ability to fill
them?
General Egginton. In-lieu-of sourcing, by its nature, is only
considered when services lack units with the requested core capability.
When a Joint Force Provider nominates a unit to fill a requested
capability, USCENTCOM's expectation is that the unit be manned,
trained, equipped and certified to execute the mission prior to
deployment. The individual service Force Provider is responsible for
ensuring personnel are trained and proficient in accordance with US
Central Command's requested requirement, Training, Tactics and
Procedures (TTPs) and doctrine outlined in Joint Publications to meet
mission specifics. USCENTCOM reviews each sourcing solution nominated
by the Joint Force Providers to ensure that the solution is viable and
acceptable.
In the example of chemical and artillery units re-missioned to
perform security duties; this remissioning leverages the basic soldier
skills required to perform guard duty and patrols but does not require
soldiers to perform the full-spectrum skills required of trained
Military Policemen.
Mr. Ortiz. When a Request For Forces is issued, does it request a
specific number of personnel, or does it request a capability? Are
there issues where unneeded personnel are deployed simply need to meet
the Army's manning standard rather than to fulfill a true combatant
commander requirement? If so, what is being done to mitigate this over-
assignment of personnel?
General Egginton. The ultimate goal of a Request For Forces is to
request a capability that equates to a standard off-the-shelf service
unit manned with a standard number personnel. If less than or more than
a standard unit is needed, the request is tailored and annotated to
reflect the actual personnel numbers with troops to task assigned.
There are unique missions involving specialized task forces, training
teams and requirements where a specified number of personnel is
required (i.e. detainee guard missions where a desired guard to
detainee ratio is required). In all cases, USCENTCOM works with the
Joint Force providers desire to keep unit integrity to the maximum
extent possible.
Mr. Ortiz. The Air Force does not remission units and will divest
itself of interrogation and detainee operations in FY 2008. If the
Services stop doing certain missions, what is the impact on sourcing?
General Egginton. In the event that a particular Service cannot
fill a USCENTCOM requested requirement, Joint Forces Command would be
required to re-staff the sourcing requirements to other Joint Force
Providers until an appropriate sourcing capability is identified.
Mr. Ortiz. Once a Request For Forces is received, it takes time--
perhaps as much as 18 months--to train, equip and deploy to theater.
Often, the situation and the needs on the ground have changed. What is
the process for validating the currency of the Request For Forces? How
do you ensure that the mission which the sailor or airman steps into in
theater is actually the mission for which he or she was trained? How do
you prevent assigned forces from being misused or under-used because
circumstances generating the request are no longer valid?
General Kamiya. A Request for Forces (RFF) is an emergent request
for capability, submitted by a combatant command in response to a near-
term need. The process goal for combatant command submission of an RFF
is no less than 45 days before the force should arrive in theater to
answer the need. Combatant commands generally meet or exceed this goal
with RFF submissions averaging approximately two months prior to force
arrival in theater. Because of the emergent nature of the requests,
Requests for Forces reflect current, valid theater needs.
As the need for the force or capability endures into the following
year, the combatant command consolidates the force request with others
into an annual theater force requirements submission. All theater
requirements from across the globe are then consolidated to describe a
global force requirement that the Joint Force Providers will seek to
satisfy via a recommended annual Global Force Allocation Plan. It is
these annual requirement submissions (submitted at the start of a
fiscal year for the following year--October 2007 submission for arrival
in FY09) that can lead force arrival in theater by a long time (up to
18 months is conceivable).
For example: CENTCOM expresses a need for a security force to
protect a forward operating base. CENTCOM submits a Request for Force
describing the needed capability; the Joint Staff validates the
requirement and USJFCOM (as a Joint Force Provider) recommends sourcing
a Military Police company to fill the need. Ultimately, the Secretary
of Defense approves the deployment and orders are issued to transfer
operational control of the Military Police company from Commander,
USJFCOM to Commander, USCENTCOM. As time progresses USCENTCOM
determines that the need for this security force will endure through
the next year. USCENTCOM staff ensures that they capture this need in
their annual requirements submission for the following fiscal year.
USJFCOM (as Joint Force Provider) will see the requirement for the
security force in the annual submission and will develop a plan to
source the force that will relieve the original Military Police company
at the forward operating base.
During the period of several months when the next annual Global
Force Allocation Plan is being developed, there is significant
collaboration between the combatant commands, the Joint Force
Providers, the Service headquarters and the Joint Staff. This
collaboration ensures that all are kept apprised of changes to the
combatant command requirements brought about by changes in theater
operations. The combatant command staff will track, via its subordinate
headquarters, any mission accomplishments or other changes that enable
force redeployments. In these instances, the combatant command would
delete a force requirement and designate the force last filling the
requirement as available for redeployment or reassignment to another
theater mission. Any reassignment of a force to another theater mission
falls under the authority of a combatant commander ``to perform those
functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and
employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives,
and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the
mission.'' (Joint Publication 0-2, Chapter 111)
JFCOM collaborates closely with combatant commands and Service
headquarters to resolve concerns over changes of mission for forces
provided to combatant commands. Through this collaboration JFCOM has
been able to facilitate adjustments to pre-deployment training to
account for a pending mission change, or to provide different (more
appropriate) forces to meet a changing mission requirement. This
collaboration does not interfere with the combatant commander's
authority to exercise command over his forces as outlined in the
reference above.
Mr. Ortiz. The definitions for Joint Manning Document and
Individual Augmentee both refer to these as unfunded temporary duty
positions, and the Committee has been told that the Services pay for
them ``out of hide.'' Who pays for ILOs and what is source of the
funding? How are the Services reimbursed and when?
General Kamiya. In-Lieu-Of forces are made up of unit capabilities
from the Services' force inventories. Costs associated with In-Lieu-Of
sourcing are generated when different or additional equipment and
training is required to prepare the force for deployment. While each
Service is the best source for specific information on costs, funding
and reimbursement data, JFCOM believes that funding for In-Lieu-Of
forces comes from normal Service funding streams augmented by any
supplemental funds.
Mr. Ortiz. How long have the Services been providing capabilities
in mission areas outside of their traditional roles and functions and
on what scale? What is JFCOM's role in reconstituting these service
members to their core competencies?
General Kamiya. USJFCOM is aware that Services have been providing
capabilities in mission areas outside of their traditional roles and
functions since JFCOM assumed responsibility as Primary Joint Force
Provider in August 2004. Undoubtedly, the Services provided similar
capabilities earlier than that time, but JFCOM does not have data to
pinpoint when their commitments began. In terms of scale, less than 10
percent of the forces allocated to all combatant commands during the
year are serving outside their core competency (the skill each person
was trained to perform prior to OIF/OEF assignment). This includes all
those individuals taken from units to serve on Transition Teams and as
Individual Augments to Joint Task Force Headquarters staffs, though
many of these people are employed using their core competencies.
USJFCOM does not take an active role in reconstituting service
members back to their respective core competencies. The reconstitution
decision falls under the Service's Title X responsibilities. Once a
unit has completed its mission or deployment, the individual Service
will determine whether to return their members to their core competency
or to perhaps maintain them in their new role in response to a growing
demand for a specific capability.
Mr. Ortiz. Please explain how the role of Individual Augmentees is
different from service members who are serving in a joint sourcing,
remissioning or retraining role. Do IAs serve in combat roles?
General Kamiya. An Individual Augmentee (IA) by joint definition
(CJCSI 1301.01C) is an unfunded temporary duty position identified on a
Joint Task Force Joint Manning Document (JMD) by a supported Combatant
Commander to augment headquarters operations during a contingency.
Joint manning documents typically outline the personnel requirements of
a joint headquarters.
Normally the individuals requested for Individual Augmentee duty
are in the enlisted grades of E6 and above, and for officers at the
grade of O3 and above. Individual Augmentees perform routine staff
functions on the headquarters staff. These individuals may be moved by
the Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander from their assigned billet to
another billet within the headquarters JMD which is vacant and
considered more essential than the current billet in which they are
serving. JTF headquarters Individual Augmentees should not be re-
assigned to duties beyond the scope of the headquarters staff.
Individual Augmentees do not serve in combat roles. Individual
Augmentees, by definition, are provided with the specific intent of
augmenting a Joint Task Force headquarters. They are not intended to be
on the front lines in combat.
An individual involved in a joint sourcing effort, re-missioning or
retraining role is serving in a unit-based capability to meet a
combatant command requirement. These three categories constitute types
of forces substituted for standard forces when the supply of standard
forces is short. These categories have been collectively referred to as
In-Lieu-Of forces. Individuals filling these categories of forces are
not considered Individual Augmentees.
A joint sourcing capability is a unit-based capability from one
service substituting for a unit with similar capability from another
service (e.g. an Air Force security element substituting for an Army
military police unit is an example of joint sourcing).
A re-missioned unit is one that is equipped and trained to perform
a different mission (e.g., an Army artillery battery is trained and
equipped to fill a transportation company requirement).
Retraining occurs when it is necessary to form an ad-hoc unit from
a group of individuals. The individuals are trained and equipped to
deploy as a unit, but it is likely that they will be serving outside
their core competencies. The need for retraining arises most often when
the combatant command requests a tailored capability that does not
exist as such in the force inventory.
Mr. Ortiz. In your testimony you state JFCOM is building a
capability to provide predictability for individual augmentees. What is
this capability and how will it provide or improve predictability? When
will it be implemented?
General Kamiya. The capability that will enhance predictability for
individual augmentees (individuals tasked to fill a position on a Joint
Task Force Headquarters staff) results from an expansion of JFCOM's
mission, as of 1 October 2006, to include responsibility for developing
individual augmentee sourcing solutions. Following receipt of this new
duty, Joint Forces Command worked to modify the process for combatant
command submission of individual augmentee requirements so that all
known requirements are submitted at least a year in advance of the
individual's expected report date. These individual requirements are
considered, together with all known unit-based force requirements, as
USJFCOM prepares its recommended Force Allocation Plan for the
following year. For example, in September and early October 2007,
combatant commands will submit their force requirements for Fiscal Year
2009 (FY09). As the FY09 Force Allocation Plan is developed and
approved in the following months, the Services are given advance notice
of the need for unit and individual augmentees--thus providing each
Service predictability and sufficient time to facilitate deployment
preparations. While we recognize that there will be short-notice
requirements for individuals that will emerge during FY09, the majority
(historically over 90 percent) of individual augmentee requirements can
be predicted a year in advance.
Mr. Ortiz. Who tracks Individual Augmentees' completion of joint
functional training and what is the system/method for tracking?
General Kamiya. Joint functional training for individual augmentees
going to joint task force headquarters (JTF HQ) billets is provided
online through the Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) web portal. The
training consists of interactive courseware on JTF HQ fundamentals,
informational presentations, robust discussion forums on key topics,
and AOR-specific content. Completion of the interactive courseware and
informational presentations is automatically tracked by JKO's learning
management system, which also electronically delivers the content and
tracks additional metrics. The learning management system produces
periodic reports that allow USJFCOM training personnel to verify
training completion. Active participation in the discussion forums is
also a required element of the training and is monitored by subject
matter expert facilitators.
Mr. Ortiz. Combat lifesaver training is highly valued and almost
universally requested by troops in after-action reports and post-
deployment debriefs. As of June 15, Combat Lifesavers Course
certification is part of the program of instruction at Forts Jackson,
Benning and Leonard Wood. Is this a legitimate training requirement for
all augmentation service members? If so, what is being done to ensure
the training is provided to those that need it?
General Kamiya. Mission requirements are established by the
geographic combatant command. These mission requirements drive a
Service's unit/individual deployment preparation including equipping
and training. The gaining combatant command may state specific training
needs (in addition to more general mission requirements) that would
also guide a Service's preparation of deploying units/individuals.
Additionally, a Service may take the position that specific training is
required, as a minimum, before the Service will certify that the unit/
individual is prepared to deploy. In the case of combat lifesaver
training, USCENTCOM has established the requirement for one individual
per squad to be combat lifesaver trained. This training is in addition
to the first aid training required of every individual prior to theater
entry.
JFCOM's information is that CENTCOM has not evaluated combat
lifesaver training to be necessary for all augmentation service
members, nor have the Services established this training as a mandatory
pre-deployment requirement. If either organization established a
greater requirement, then pre-deployment training would be adjusted to
provide the additional training and Services would modify their
training programs to accommodate the additional throughput.
Mr. Ortiz. It is our understanding that required training occurs at
Camp Buehring and Udari Range in Kuwait prior to deployment into the
combat theater. It is unclear how training requirements are tracked
throughout the deployment process and across the Services. What checks
are in place to ensure that the sailors and airmen are adequately
trained for the mission they will perform when deployed? What is the
feedback loop upon deployment to determine if the sailors and airmen
are fully trained once they arrive on station? Who tracks whether
individual augmentees--not those with a remissioned unit--are
completing each of their training requirements before they arrive in
theater? What is the paperwork trail and what is done when training
inadequacies are identified?
Admiral Giardina.
1. What checks are in place to ensure that the sailors and airmen
are adequately trained for the mission they will perform when deployed?
US Fleet Forces (USFF) validates and establishes the training
requirements to meet the mission and coordinates with US Army Forces
Command (FORSCOM) to provide required training. First Army, Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and US Army Special Operations Command
(USASOC) all provide training coordinated through FORSCOM. This is
supportive of the Joint Sourcing Training Oversight (JSTO) process.
JSTO includes specific training requirements for specific Unit
Requirement Form/Request for Forces (URF/RFF) assignments. This
includes both skills training as well as combat skills training. Navy
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), through their subordinate
Expeditionary Combat Readiness Command (ECRC) has established Liaison
Officers (LNOs) at each of the Army training sites to ensure all Navy
AdHoc and Individual Augmentees attend scheduled training and provide
immediate feedback to USFF and the Army training command on any issues.
The Army ensures the required training is provided and remediation is
conducted as needed until students satisfactorily complete the
training.
2. What is the feedback loop upon deployment to determine if the
sailors and airmen are fully trained once they arrive on station?
There are many feed back processes in place to advise both Navy and
Army of any shortfalls in training:
- ECRC provides an initial survey the last week of Combat Skills
training to measure the participant's immediate reaction/satisfaction
to the training program. (Kirkpatrick Level 1: Reaction). These
responses are not mandatory; however, return rates from US Navy
Individual Augmentee Combat Training (NIACT) are about 90% and at other
combat skills training sites a little less. This survey has been in
place since August 2006.
- A 90-Day Boots on Ground (BOG) Survey is published on Navy
Knowledge Online (NKO) as well as emailed by ECRC to individuals that
have been deployed for at least 90 days since they completed their
combat skills training. This survey is designed to measure transfer of
behavior and actual use of the combat skills training. (Kirkpatrick
Level 3: Transfer of Behavior) This survey collection has been in place
since May 2007, therefore return rates are still being compiled.
- Many RFF missions have theater to Navy and Army feedback via
periodic Telephone Conferences (TELCONs). These include: a bi-weekly
JSTO TELCON with all trainers and USAF participating; weekly RFF 611
Counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare
(CREW) TELCONS; weekly Camp Bucca Detainee TELCONs; and weekly Counter-
Rocket Artillery Mortar (CRAM) phone conferences. Routine OEF Situation
Report (SITREPS) are provided to Commanding General, First Army and
shared with the Services. Embedded Training Teams (ETT), Military
Transition Teams (MiTT), and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) have
quarterly planning conferences to adjust training and theater support
as necessary to better adapt to the mission.
3. Who tracks whether individual augmentees--not those with a
remissioned unit--are completing each of their training requirements
before they arrive in theater?
The Navy Personnel Development Command (NPDC) and USFF coordinated
the creation of the course curriculum for NIACT and have designated the
Center for Security Forces (CSF) as the course curriculum manager to
ensure the curriculum is current and remains valid. Center for Security
Forces coordinates with TF Marshall at FT Jackson to ensure all IAs
(those assigned to a Joint Manning Document) have met all training
requirements.
ECRC LNOs at each Army training site coordinates with Army training
cadres to ensure that USFF established training is completed. Army
maintains the documentation.
4. What is the paperwork trail and what is done when training
inadequacies are identified?
Navy identifies problems through feedback from both personnel BOG
in theater and from the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC), and
documents formally through surveys listed in paragraph two above,
following up and improving the training standard when deficiencies are
identified. Navy has no visibility on internal Army documentation, but
is aware of a robust lessons learned database to document training
deficiencies. FORSCOM and First Army oversee the training, and they
follow Program of Instruction (POI) changes. Most of the inadequacies
are a function of requiring more training for specific missions as well
as additional combat skills training required to meet the mission. Most
of the inadequacies are topical areas which need to be addressed. An
example is the Afghanistan and Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRT). Theater feedback has resulted in additional inter-agency
training to better support the mission as well as language and cultural
additions.
Mr. Ortiz. It is our understanding that required training occurs at
Camp Buehring and Udari Range in Kuwait prior to deployment into the
combat theater. It is unclear how training requirements are tracked
throughout the deployment process and across the Services. What checks
are in place to ensure that the sailors and airmen are adequately
trained for the mission they will perform when deployed? What is the
feedback loop upon deployment to determine if the sailors and airmen
are fully trained once they arrive on station? Who tracks whether
individual augmentees--not those with a remissioned unit--are
completing each of their training requirements before they arrive in
theater? What is the paperwork trail and what is done when training
inadequacies are identified?
General Halverson. Validation of USN/USAF units is a Service
responsibility. FORSCOM provides documentation of the training that was
requested and the training that was provided. The Fleet Forces Command/
2AF validates the units for deployment. This validation includes
equipping, Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP), training, JOPES.
Each service has the responsibility to provide individual
augmentees (IAs) that is trained for the missions they deploy for. Each
service assesses its ability to provide this training and makes
arrangements if required to augment their training capabilities. For
example, Fleet Forces Command (FFC) has developed ICW Department of the
Army, a Navy Individual Augmentee Combat Training (NIACT) program at
Ft. Jackson, executed by TRADOC to train the minimal combat skills that
the Navy feels are required for deployment in selected positions. In
addition, the USAF has some home station training available, and
occasionally will ask FORSCOM to conduct additional training for their
individual augmentees as part of a larger group. Few USN/USAF personnel
go thru the CONUS Replacement Center (CRC). However, if they attend the
CRC training and do not perform the required tasks they are recycled
until the next week. The CRC will not deploy them without them meeting
the requirements. The Navy generally uses the Navy Individual Augmentee
Combat Training (NIACT) at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, to meet their
IA training requirement. The USAF generally uses their 19-hour training
program or asks FORSCOM to roll some of their individuals into the
combat skills training that Army is already conducting for another USAF
requirement.
Mr. Ortiz. Even if service members are performing the same mission
for another service, they may be performing the mission under very
different circumstances. For example, an airman doing flight-line
security at Ramstein AFB, German, faces different challenges when
guarding the flight line at Balad airbase in Iraq. How is training for
service members deploying from Outside the Continental United States
(OCONUS) conducted and certified?
Admiral Giardina. The responsibility for training of service
members filling requirements being satisfied by other Geographic
Combatant Commanders (GCC) is the responsibility of the sourcing GCC.
Some GCC individual AdHoc assignments support URF/RFFs which USFF is
also sourcing. These GCC nominees will attend the same training track
as individual augmentees assigned from CONUS activities. Coordination
with GCCs also notes that Sailors assigned to missions can attend
NIACT. Recently, EUCOM has sent Sailors filling intelligence billets to
NIACT instead of abbreviated Army CRC training. There also are other
agencies with Sailors assigned that support OIF and OEF. As an example,
the Defense Logistic Agency (DLA) sends Sailors enroute OIF and OEF to
NIACT training at Ft. Jackson.
Mr. Ortiz. Even if service members are performing the same mission
for another service, they may be performing the mission under very
different circumstances. For example, an airman doing flight-line
security at Ramstein AFB, German, faces different challenges when
guarding the flight line at Balad airbase in Iraq. How is training for
service members deploying from Outside the Continental United States
(OCONUS) conducted and certified?
General Gibson. All training is conducted at the state-side US Army
Power Projection Platforms (PPP) regardless of the Airmen's permanent
duty station. Once an Airman is tasked to deploy in an ILO billet, they
are scheduled to attend one of the PPPs for combat skills and
specialized skills training. This includes Airmen deploying from OCONUS
that are sourced through both Joint Service Solution and Retrained Ad
Hoc Solution methods.
To address training requirements for Joint Service Solution and
Retrained Ad Hoc Solution oversight, Second Air Force hosts a semi-
annual Training and Equipment Review Board (TERB) to review current ILO
mission training and equipment and determines relevancy, accuracy and
the core skill sets inherent with specific AFSCs. The methodology used
at the TERB to determine training requirements is as follows: The
Request For Forces identifies the Combatant Commander's (CCDR)
requirements, the minimum our Airmen must be trained to for their
deployment. The AF Career Field Managers (CFM) and Functional Area
Managers (FAM) identify the skills currently taught as part of the AFSC
awarding TT course or advanced supplemental training and ``inherent''
to their particular AFSC skill set. These skill sets are matched
against the CCDR requirements to determine the minimum training
required from the US Army at the PPPs. Finally, feedback gathered from
the field is used to determine if additional training is required to
enhance mission success at the deployed location. The CCDR
requirements, minus the inherent core Airmen skill sets, plus
additional functions identified through the feedback systems comprise
the combat skills and specialized skills training received at the Army
PPPs.
These requirements are conveyed to the Army training locations
through FORSCOM. Airmen are certified as ``fully trained'' by the
Training Battalion Commanders.
Mr. Ortiz. Even if service members are performing the same mission
for another service, they may be performing the mission under very
different circumstances. For example, an airman doing flight-line
security at Ramstein AFB, German, faces different challenges when
guarding the flight line at Balad airbase in Iraq. How is training for
service members deploying from Outside the Continental United States
(OCONUS) conducted and certified?
General Halverson. Commanders of deploying units, whether from
CONUS or OCONUS, are responsible for validating the readiness of their
unit and personnel. Critical mission requirements are specified by the
command in theater requesting support. Associated pre-deployment
training guidance/requirements are passed to units directed to provide
support. Deploying units have priority for training facilities and
training resources. To the extent practical and resourced, theater-
unique training support (e.g., mission unique training venues/
conditions/equipment) is provided to units preparing to deploy. To a
large extent, Army Centers of Excellence provide specialized training
support that unit leaders/personnel can access via the web, e.g.,
language training, lessons learned, mobile training teams and
collaboration with previously deployed leaders with the same mission.
Before deploying, unit leaders validate that the unit and their
personnel are adequately trained on mission essential tasks and
training required by theater. Units receive additional training once
they arrive in theater.
Mr. Ortiz. What service-specific facilities were built/established
for ILO training, what was the cost of these facilities, where are
they, and what is their long-term intended use?
Admiral Giardina. Navy has not invested in infrastructure to
support ILO training. NPDC has established an administrative office at
Ft. Jackson, SC using existing Army facilities for the express purpose
of IA management at NIACT, funding upgrades to the facilities. No other
infrastructure has been built for IA purposes. Similarly, Navy is using
Army facilities at all the training sites to support the administrative
support functions.
Mr. Ortiz. What service-specific facilities were built/established
for ILO training, what was the cost of these facilities, where are
they, and what is their long-term intended use?
General Halverson. There have been no service specific facilities
built or established for ILO training. There may have been minor
construction to modify existing facilities at numerous installations
that have provided this training but this would not change the
facilities long-term intended use.
Mr. Ortiz. Chemical and artillery units are being remissioned to
military police. Even with specialized training, the leadership of
remissioned units does not have experience comparable to leaders who
spent their careers in the job. This creates two net effects: core
skills atrophy without use and strategic risk increases because
remissioned troops are not qualified to do full-spectrum missions in
either their original MOS or their new MOS. What is your long-term game
plan for replacing the forces moved into non-core missions?
Admiral Giardina. Currently the Navy has no units that have been
remissioned.
Mr. Ortiz. Chemical and artillery units are being remissioned to
military police. Even with specialized training, the leadership of
remissioned units does not have experience comparable to leaders who
spent their careers in the job. This creates two net effects: core
skills atrophy without use and strategic risk increases because
remissioned troops are not qualified to do full-spectrum missions in
either their original MOS or their new MOS. What is your long-term game
plan for replacing the forces moved into non-core missions?
General Gibson. While working with the Joint Staff and Joint Forces
Command, the Air Force (AF) worked within the Global Force Management
process to reduce all non-core competency In-Lieu-Of sourcing. By
exchanging specific taskings from missions with non-core requirements
to taskings that were within core mission sets, the AF replaced many
non-core competency ILO contributions. For example, our Security Forces
(SF) support numerous Detainee Operation missions. Working through
JFCOM, SF were able to increase base defense support missions, which
are in line with AF core competencies, in exchange for Detainee
Operations missions.
Mr. Ortiz. Chemical and artillery units are being remissioned to
military police. Even with specialized training, the leadership of
remissioned units does not have experience comparable to leaders who
spent their careers in the job. This creates two net effects: core
skills atrophy without use and strategic risk increases because
remissioned troops are not qualified to do full-spectrum missions in
either their original MOS or their new MOS. What is your long-term game
plan for replacing the forces moved into non-core missions?
General Halverson. Transformation to the Army Modular Force is a
journey that is addressing our capabilities of today without degrading
tomorrow's fight. This continuous re-evaluation of the demands of
today's long war also reflects the agility of the Army's institution to
adapt its units, personnel, and systems to produce trained and ready
units. Until the Army fully achieves modular transformation across the
service, the Army will continue to use innovative techniques, such as
in-lieu-of sourcing, to fill the gaps between available force structure
and combatant commander's needs. Units selected to perform these unique
in-theater missions are identified as early as feasible in their
operational readiness cycle in order to allow commanders to task
organize and train to the theater specific mission essential tasks.
With the approved Grow the Army Plan and Army Rebalance Initiatives the
Army is mitigating capability shortfalls in military police, as well as
other Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service Support functions. As
this plan is implemented the need for in lieu of sourcing will be
further reduced.
Mr. Ortiz. Please share with us some of the lessons learned that
have been applied to training for in-lieu-of soldiers, sailors and
airmen.
Admiral Giardina. USFF directed Navy Expeditionary Combat Command
(NECC) to review the NIACT training program. The Navy has conducted
surveys of the Sailors participating in this training as well as the
gaining commands to determine if the training met the mission
requirements. The NECC review and the input from those surveys resulted
in the NIACT curriculum transitioning from a 12-day to a 17-day POI.
The revised POI includes added emphasis in first aid, communication,
and combat skills.
PRT Conferences have resulted in significant modifications to the
POI as well as more emphasis on Pre-deployment Site Surveys (PDSS) by
prospective commanding officers and executive officers. PDSS is
critical to giving Navy Officers selected to command PRTs an
understanding of the operating environment and what will be expected of
them.
CJTF HOA training has been modified for each rotation based on
better knowledge of the mission. HOA, like many other missions in
support of OIF and OEF, have evolving missions which require training
modifications.
The CRAM concept was modified from Navy and Army only CRAM
batteries to two Joint Integrated Batteries (JIB), about one half each
service, which includes better mix and performance in theater due to
Army support for the integration of Sailors in the mission.
ETT and MiTTs have been modified to tailor to specific theater
requirements.
Training for Confinment Det was moved from Ft. Leavenworth to Ft.
Sill so that units could train in a confinement facility that more
closely resembled facility in theater. Based on theater feedback, the
facility at Ft. Leavenworth was too ``high-tech''.
Training for Law & Order Det was modified to include High Risk
Personnel (HRP) training and Provost Marshall training as a result of
feedback from theater.
Mr. Ortiz. Please share with us some of the lessons learned that
have been applied to training for in-lieu-of soldiers, sailors and
airmen.
General Halverson. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has
captured lessons learned through a variety of mechanisms, such as,
interviews, mission operations with In-Lieu-Of (ILO) Units, and After
Action Reviews (AARs). Lessons learned from both the field and in
training are injected into the current training ILO as a routinized
process. 1s Army approves ILO training Program of Instructions (POI)
and Memorandum of Instructions (MOI) for post mobilization training of
all RC units. During this approval process, lessons learned are
reviewed and incorporated into planned unit training. CALL is working
with both the Joint Force Provider (JFCOM) and the Army Force Provider
(FORSCOM) to incorporate the lessons learned in future training
processes. The system is an open loop system where lessons learned are
continually captured and feedback is provided to the field. There are
procedures in place for CENTCOM to provide feedback that is then vetted
and adjudicated by the Joint Staff for current and future rotations.
Mr. Ortiz. Please share with us some of the lessons learned that
have been applied to training for in-lieu-of soldiers, sailors and
airmen.
General Gibson.
Logistics Readiness
Lessons learned are currently being gathered from two separate data
streams: survey feedback from four distinct data points and solicited/
unsolicited after action reports (AAR). Survey feedback is collected
from four distinct points during the deployment/training process:
arrival at the ILO training site, completion at the ILO training site,
after 30-45 days at the deployed location and at home station after
completing the deployment. Feedback from the survey data points is
collected, compiled, aggregated and analyzed in conjunction with the
AEF deployment cycle and briefed to the Second Air Force Commander. The
feedback results are used to create a 4-month action plan to guide
improvements to the process.
Additionally, Second Air Force has instituted a process which
brings the Functional Area Managers (FAM) and Career Field Managers
(CFM) together on a semi-annual basis to review the training and
equipment requirements for these deployments. The Training and
Equipment Review Board (TERB) provides a forum for FAMs and CFMs to
review feedback and lessons learned from the AOR and quickly make
changes to curriculum, equipment, processing, etc. Through several
TERBs already conducted, Second Air Force has been able to realize
process improvement in several areas:
Streamlined reporting instructions
Elimination of ``white space'' at training locations
Additional training requested through feedback to include:
Blue Force Tracker
Plus up of Combat Life Saver training requirements (from 10%
to 30%)
High Mobility Wheel Vehicle Egress Assistance Trainer
Survival Evasion Resistance Escape Level B
Elimination of redundant training already inherent to Air Force
specialties:
Land Navigation for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
Law Enforcement training for Security Forces
Anti-Terrorism Level 1
Additional AF required equipment based on feedback includes:
Tactical thigh drop/Modular Lightweight Load-carrying
Equipment compatible holsters
Seat belt/strap cutters
3-point weapon slings
Tactical flashlights
Army Combat Uniform patterned Individual Body Armor/Outer
Tactical Vest
Conversion kits
Tactical flame resistant gloves
Security Forces
The following narratives highlight several lessons learned for
United States Air Force (USAF) Security Forces (SF) Airmen receiving
Army training in support of in-lieu-of (ILO) missions.
1. Headquarters AF Director of Security Forces (HAF/A7S) designated
HQ USAF Security Forces Center (AFSFC) as the primary coordinator for
all SF ILO mission taskings and pre-deployment training requirements.
SF assumed deployment and training oversight for five Army ILO
missions, trained at six separate Army Power Projection Platform (PPP)
locations. SF ILO missions included: Detainee Operations trained at Ft.
Bliss and Ft. Lewis; SECFOR (Force Protection) trained at Ft. Dix and
Ft. Lewis; Protective Services Detail (PSD) trained at Ft. Leonard
Wood; Law and Order trained at Ft. Carson and Police Transition Team
(PTT) trained at Camp Shelby.
2. Army PPPs provide training for non-traditional SF core
competencies mandated by Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). HQ AFSFC
evaluated all ILO missions and compared this mission analysis to Army
horse blankets or training plans. This ensured SF personnel are
properly trained and qualified on current ILO mission tactics and
procedures in the minimum time possible.
3. HAF/A7S solicited feedback from senior AF Major Command (MAJCOM)
and US Central Command Force Protection leadership on how best to
manage and execute the ILO missions. AFSFC improved ILO training by
conducting training analyses for each ILO mission requirement, followed
by theater and PPP site visits, evaluating SF performing ILO missions.
This provided valuable insights necessary to improving the ILO
management process.
4. Redundancies occurred in AF mandated pre-deployment training
when compared to Army ILO pre-deployment training. AF SF training
either reduced or eliminated many Army pre-deployment topics, by
educating Army trainers on the skill sets that SF Airmen bring to the
fight. Another lesson learned eliminated a 14-day temporary duty
period, by conducting SFs specific training through the use of Mobile
Training Teams which travel to each of the Army PPPs. This blend of 80
hours SF training with the Army master training plan saved the AF more
than $6.7M in travel and temporary duty funds for more than 1.9K
deployed SF personnel. Elimination of ``white space'' or ineffective
training time further standardized SF training at six Army PPPs and
provided combat ready SFs sooner to the deployed location.
5. SF required training on the most current tactics, techniques and
procedures (TTPs) from the area of operations (AOR). AFSFC advised Army
PPP training staffs through use of recently deployed, combat savvy SF
airman, who highlighted the latest TTPs directly from the combat
operations theater. This greatly benefited both SF Airmen training at
the PPP and the Army cadre providing ILO training.
6. AFSFC also solicited and incorporated weekly troop commander's
situation reports into Army training plans, making rapid adjustments in
training schedules and PPP hosting arrangements for SF personnel.
7. AFSFC also eliminated Soldier Readiness Processing by providing
documentation of USAF pre-deployment or out-processing procedures
conducted at home station. This action further lessened white space in
Army training schedules.
8. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force tasked Second Air Force to
be responsible for providing oversight to all AF ILO programs. They
deployed Personnel Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO) teams to
each PPP, facilitating the processing of AF personnel and providing
constant coordination with FORSCOM and the Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) leadership.
B. The following narratives highlight several lessons learned for AF SF
Airmen supporting ILO missions, in terms of operations, logistics,
equipment, military working dog teams and other categories.
1. AFSFC provides Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to the PPPs and to
SF Airmen in training. Their expertise in training requirements is
pivotal in the development and proper application of training needs in
preparation for ILO missions. The SMEs also ensure Airmen receive the
most up to date and current TTPs from troops that have boots on ground.
2. AFSFC provides a liaison non-commissioned officer (LNO) before
and during each training session at each PPP. The LNO team provides
curriculum and technical support to the deploying team members, as well
as liaison with Second Air Force and Army PPP leadership. The LNO
relies on being able to reach back to AF MAJCOMs and SF units,
resolving issues as quickly and efficiently as possible. The LNOs also
have the capability to provide ``hip pocket training'' in the event the
schedule is changed at the PPP thus further eliminating ``white
space.''
3. AFSFC's Operations Center releases operations orders and
standardized equipment lists no later than 60 days prior to training
start date. This ensures all SF personnel pre-deployment tasks have
been completed prior to ILO training. The Ops Center also ensures
equipment and logistical shortfalls are identified in a timely manner.
4. AF Explosive Detector Dog Teams tasked for deployment in support
of ILO Army and Marine Corps missions attend canine-centric, ground
combat skills pre-deployment training at Yuma Proving Grounds, AZ.
Training is conducted under the direction of the Marine Corps and
continues to repeatedly receive extremely favorable student critiques.
Some observations were:
a. Pre-arrival home station training requires attention. Teams
must be better prepared in the area of ground combat skills before
reporting for training.
b. Canine physical fitness is generally inadequate at point of
entry to training. Training scenarios are intense, lengthy and executed
under very hot and dry climatic conditions.
c. Top physical condition is critical to success and serves to
avoid disabling injury and illness.
Civil Engineering
Civil Engineers (CE) continues to transform its training regimens
to ensure deploying airmen are properly trained and equipped to perform
the missions they're being called upon to perform around the world. Bi-
weekly, CE partner with Second Air Force (AF lead for contingency
skills training (CST)), FORSCOM, 1st Army, the training sites, and
sitting commanders in the field to update CST training requirements for
upcoming deployment taskings.
In recent forums, field commanders have reported that additional
exposure to the enemy's latest tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTPs) is far more valuable on the battlefield than refresher training.
As a result, we've amended training for EOD airmen so they receive a
more focused curriculum to study the enemy's latest TTPs, rather than
receive refresher training on skills they've successfully employed
within the past 9 months. We're now applying this same method to
specialty teams, RED HORSE Squadrons, and Engineer detachments to
ensure personnel receive focused training that builds upon the latest
lessons learned from the field.
Mr. Ortiz. How does the unit-developed theater/mission-specific
training plan take into consideration the variety of military
backgrounds, skill sets, and proficiency levels that individuals from
other services bring to the assigned mission?
General Halverson. CENTCOM has identified 25 baseline training
requirements for ILO units and assigned a training requirement to each
unit requirement form (URF). Upon notification of sourcing, units
develop theater/mission specific training plans to achieve required
employment capability levels. Training plans are based on their
assigned mission, Directed Mission Essential Task List (DMETL) and
published theater training requirements. Theater and mission specific
training is executed through a series of key training events prior to
deployment. These events include, but are not limited to mission-
focused individual, collective and robust Counter-Improvised Explosive
Device training at the unit's home station or mobilization station.
Mr. Ortiz. In the face of pressing mission needs and sourcing
requirements, how much pressure is there on unit commanders to validate
that the unit has met theater capability and mandatory training
requirements?
General Halverson. There is no external pressure on commanders to
validate that their unit has met theater capability and mandatory
training requirements. Several units latest arrival dates (LADs) have
been shifted because the commander determined that their unit did not
adequately meet the training requirements. Validation is a command
function. Validation ensures that a unit not meeting the minimum
deployability criteria is not deployed without the approval of the
supported combatant commander.
Mr. Ortiz. Your testimony states that ``direct lines of authority
[have] been granted between 2nd Air Force, Navy Fleet Forces Command,
Army Forces Command and 1st Army for the purposes of coordinating
training arrangements, arrival instructions, and other matters related
to the conduct of training.'' How does that work in practical terms?
General Halverson. JFCOM hosts a conference that has attendees from
all Services, TRADOC and FORSCOM to review training requirements
assigned by CENTCOM and document any additional training that is
required. DA publishes an EXORD that directs Army Commands to support
this training. FORSCOM publishes an order that directs its subordinate
commands to execute the training that the USAF and USN have asked the
Army provide. The training command issues a letter to the unit stating
what training was done. All training is conducted to standard and
retraining is included in the tasking.
Mr. Ortiz. What are the selected grade and MOS shortages need to
meet personnel fill rates mentioned in your testimony?
General Halverson. HRC was unable to determine what fill rates were
mentioned in the testimony. The following is a short discussion of the
critically short skills in the officer corps and the enlisted ranks.
OFFICER CORPS: The officer corps does not include the specialty
branches of JAG, Chaplain, and AMEDD. Majors and captains continue to
be the most critically short grades. This is due to large part to
structure growth and transformation of the BCTs. These shortages are
particularly acute in the specialized functional areas (FA).
For majors, the most critical include:
Information Operations, FA 30 (46%)
Information Systems Engineering, FA 24 (54%)
Foreign Area Officer, FA 48 (56%)
Strategic Intelligence, FA 34 (57%)
Force Development, FA 50 (58%)
There are a total of 15 functional area or branch skills at the
grade of major (including those 5 listed above) for which the Army can
fill at a rate of less than 70% of the structure requirements. There
are an additional 11 functional area or branch skills for which the
Army can fill at a rate of between 70-85% of the structure
requirements.
For captains, most of the critical skill shortages are in
functional areas and also due to structure growth and transformation of
the BCTs without a corresponding strategy to transfer captain inventory
away from basic branch into functional area designations. The Army's
most critical skills for captain are:
Strategic Intelligence, FA 34 (0%)
Simulations Operations, FA 57 (13%)
Operations Research, FA 49 (18%)
Information Assurance, FA 53 (20%)
Acquisition, FA 51 (26%)
There are a total of 10 functional area or branch skills at the
grade of captain (including those 5 listed above) for which the Army
can fill at a rate of less than 70% of the structure requirements.
There are an additional 4 functional area or branch skills for which
the Army can fill at a rate of between 70-90% of the structure
requirements.
Warrant Officers have very similar issues that effect inventory
shortages.
The Army's most critical warrant officer shortages are:
Air Traffic Services, MOS 150A (0%) This Air Traffic Control MOS
was taken out of the Army inventory and has now returned. Inventory is
being re-built to fill this MOS.
Armament Repair Tech, MOS 913A (59%)
Human Intel Collection Tech, MOS 351M (60%)
Counter Intel Tech, MOS 351L (65%)
Field Artillery Targeting Tech, MOS 131A (71%)
In addition to these four MOS, there are and additional 8 more for
which the Army can fill only between 70-90%.
ENLISTED RANKS: Sergeants and Staff Sergeants are the most
critically short grades in the critical skills. This is primarily due
to growth in structure and transformation of the Brigade Combat Teams.
These shortages are of great concern in the following military
occupational specialties through FY10:
% Fill of
MOS AuthorizationsSergeants09L (Translator/Interpreter) 13%
21D (Engineer) 78%
21V (Engineer) 88%
89A (Ordnance) 6%
94S (Ordnance) 57%Staff Sergeants09L (Translator/Interpreter) 0%
11B (Infantry) 95%
11C (Infantry) 93%
13D (Field Artillery) 93%
13F (Field Artillery) 96%
13R (Field Artillery) 95%
14R (Air Defense) 25%
21B (Engineer) 98%
35M (Intelligence) 52%
89D (Ordnance) 34%
94D (Ordnance) 67%
94H (Ordnance) 48%
94M (Ordnance) 75%
94S (Ordnance) 49%ENLISTED PRIORITY MOS LIST (CRITICAL SHORTAGES)13R (Field Artillery) 72%
14E (Air Defense) 90%
31E (Military Police) 87%
35F (Intelligence) 93%
89D (Explosive Spec) 78%
92R (Parachute Rigger) 92%
Mr. Ortiz. In your testimony you state that ``meeting the approved
requirements of the combatant commanders (as readiness is measured
against directed mission) may be considered of equal (or greater)
importance'' than the Army's ability to perform core missions. How does
that statement fit in the context of strategic risk to national
security?
General Halverson. The force requirements requested by Combatant
Commanders (COCOMs) are based upon their analysis of capabilities and
capacities needed to execute assigned missions, achieve theater
strategic objectives, and support national security requirements. The
Army provides modular units that are tailored and scaled and where
necessary, appropriately augmented to meet specific requirements. When
there is a shortage of required capabilities, substitutions may be
applied to form similar units to meet COCOM requirements. Units
required to train on other-than-core missions receive additional pre-
deployment training to ensure that they can meet the COCOM mission
requirements. Since training skills are inherently perishable, a degree
of core mission atrophy occurs, and consequently the unit temporarily
becomes less capable of performing its core missions. Implementing the
Army Force Generation process will improve preparedness and mitigate
the effects of atrophy on unit core mission skills.
Mr. Ortiz. In addition to meeting annual unit requirements for
personnel, the services are also sourcing teams of key officers and
other unit leaders (primarily E-6 to O-6) to support transition teams
in Iraq and embedded training teams in Afghanistan. This key leadership
comes from the same force pool of personnel pulled to man IA billets,
leaving fewer officers and other key leaders available for deploying
units. Of the 2,000 Army individual augmentees in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility, 50% of are mid-grade officers, captain through
lieutenant colonel. What is the net effect of pulling so many mid-
career officers out of their core Army mission? What impact is this
having on Army readiness? What efforts are the Army making to ensure
that additional leaders are being developed and to evaluate the
effectiveness of units that deploy without their organic leadership, or
with new leaders?
General Halverson. This has resulted in a shift in manning
priorities for all units, less transition Teams and deploying units.
This has caused units other than Transition Teams and deploying
units to have lower manning levels. We have also graduated officers
early from Professional Military Education and delayed attendance for
some Soldiers in order to meet priority commitments to train and deploy
complete teams.
The Army is ensuring that all deploying units are manned not less
than 90% of their authorized strength 90 days prior to their Mission
Rehearsal Exercise in order to allow them to train together and form
and cohesive unit. Additionally, officers who are assigned to
Transition Teams in Iraq and embedded training teams in Afghanistan
receive an intensive 60 day training regiment prior to entering
theater. In order to mitigate the shortages in the non-deploying units,
we have increased officer and enlisted accessions, inter-service
transfers and broadened the use of Reserve Component Soldiers and
Retiree Recall Soldiers to fill active component positions.
Mr. Ortiz. In your testimony you state that ``In general, all
milestones are being met but at the expense of supporting GWOT
requirements by additional deployments between sea tours without a
standard length shore assignment.'' How often does this occur and what
is the impact on readiness and retention?
Admiral Giardina. To date, Navy continues to meet all validated
missions at sea and ashore. Impacts to Fleet readiness are minimal. The
Fleet centric nature of Navy's readiness reporting systems makes
assessing readiness impact ashore more difficult. While Sailors who
remain behind are working longer and harder to make up for the absence
of Sailors forward deployed as Individual Augmentees (IA), there is
currently no measurable impact to readiness ashore. The following table
reflects the source of Navy's Active Component IA personnel:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total %
IA Type Duty Historical Historical
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONUS Shore Duty 10928 73.61%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONUS Sea Duty 3112 20.96%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overseas Remote Land-base 34 0.23%
Sea Duty
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overseas Sea Duty 107 0.72%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overseas Shore 664 4.47%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 14845
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SHORE 78.09%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEA 21.91%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data from MAR 05 to present
Approximately 80 percent of Navy IAs come from shore duty. To
alleviate the potential for increased individual personnel tempo
(ITEMPO) and decreased shore tour lengths, returning IAs are our number
one distribution priority, we are flexible in balancing the needs of
individual careers and families, and our detailers are proactively
engaging IAs in the issuance of follow-on orders. Additionally:
a. IA tours exceeding 365 days are considered equivalent to
Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF) tours, meaning that IA personnel
are being afforded the same priority for coast selection preference
and/or priority choice of follow-on duty assignments and locations.
b. IAs from sea duty will maintain existing sea duty projected
rotation dates (PRD).
c. The shore duty clock for Enlisted IAs coming from shore duty
is frozen with:
(1) 100% day-for-day credit for an IA tour served in a
hazardous duty zone.
(2) 50% day-for-day credit for an IA tour served outside a
hazardous duty zone.
(3) Reduction of prescribed sea tour (PST) for Sailors
required to return to sea (for needs of the service) prior to
completion of their adjusted shore duty time.
d. Detailers contact officer IAs coming from shore duty to
discuss options with regard to career progression, professional
development, and tour lengths, to maximize the length of a shore duty
extension while keeping the officer's career on track to achieve all
community milestones.
Navy does not track total numbers of individuals who do not
complete a prescribed shore tour due to IA assignment. Where career
timing or needs of the service dictate that a Sailor return to sea duty
without completing a standard length shore assignment, detailers are
tasked to find an equitable solution, on a case-by-case basis that
meets the needs of the individual and the Navy.
The enlisted retention environment is generally healthy and we have
not observed any indicators to suggest that IA tours are adversely
impacting enlisted retention. While reenlistment rates are down
slightly in Zones A (0 to 6 years of service) and B (6+ to 10 years of
service) it is attributable to retention returning to pre-9/11 norms,
rather than to IA assignments.
The officer retention environment is also considered to be healthy,
overall. While we have no indication that IA tours are adversely
impacting officer continuation, retention tools preclude obtaining a
clear picture of the Global War on Terrorism effect on officer
continuation.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
While current retention is within acceptable limits, Navy is
closely monitoring this situation and post IA deployment retention
behavior is currently under study by the Center for Naval Analysis.
While officer and enlisted communities are in the process of assessing
the impact of IA assignments on community health and retention across
the force, additional stress is placed on certain High Demand/Low
Density (HD/LD) communities due to the small pool of available
personnel and high demand for specific Navy skill sets. These HD/LD
communities include Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Naval Construction
Force, Navy Coastal Warfare, Fleet Marine Force Hospital Corpsmen, Navy
Expeditionary Logistics Support, Navy Special Warfare, Navy Special
Operations, Medical, Civil Engineer Corps, Engineering Duty Officers,
Supply, Information Professional, Information Warfare, Judge Advocate
General, and Intelligence.
Mr. Ortiz. The Navy is planning an eight-week expeditionary combat
skills course for all sailors assigned to the Navy Expeditionary Combat
Command. The course would focus on four aspects of ground warfare:
moving, shooting, communicating and administering first aid. The
committee understands that the Navy is looking at possible East Coast
and West Coast locations for the course, as well as at Army and Marine
Corps bases. What is the purpose of the eight-week expeditionary combat
skills course planned for all NECC sailors? Is this not a duplication
of effort and expense? How do you differentiate this training from the
Army's or Marine Corps' combat skills training?
Admiral Giardina. The Navy no longer plans to establish an eight-
week course of instruction specifically to support the NECC forces.
NECC is now planning a four week expeditionary combat skills course
designed to prepare all NECC Sailors and Officers for service in Navy
Expeditionary units. This course is important to NECC for several
reasons. First, it standardizes NECC baseline combat skills training
across the entire Force. Currently, basic combat skills are taught in
several venues by different entities (e.g. EOD, Seabees and others have
their own basic combat skill curriculums). This course helps us become
more cohesive as a force and more cost efficient in our training.
Second, it helps to increase the proficiency and war fighting
effectiveness of our expeditionary Sailors and Officers. This
professional force requires a level of training in combat skills such
as small arms, tactical communications and combat casualty care, which
is more advanced and substantially different than what the typical
Sailor assigned to a ship, squadron or submarine may need. With this
course, Navy will move toward a well-trained NECC Sailor with a greater
level of combat skills training and a focus on our core competencies,
including maritime security and force protection. Third, with an
increased number of Sailors operating in ports and harbors, on rivers
and in near-shore environments, Navy must develop Sailors and leaders
with an expeditionary mentality and combat focus.
The focus of this course is tactical movement, communications,
weapons proficiency, advanced first aid and the preparation of
individual Sailors and Officers to excel in their core competencies of
maritime and port security, explosive ordnance disposal, and maritime
construction and engineering, among others. This training is based on
traditional Navy missions' combat skills requirements.
Current plan is to pilot this course in FY08 at two existing force
training locations, Construction Battalion Center (CBC) Gulfport and
CBC Port Hueneme. The Navy Construction Force has been teaching basic
combat skills at these locations for several years. The existing
curricula are being updated, enhanced, standardized and offered to
sailors across the NECC force.
ECS training is equivalent to what is taught to other service
members assigned to combat support or combat service support units. It
is neither the aim nor intent of this course to teach offensive, ground
combat skills akin to what USMC or Army combat units receive. It is
designed to provide the basic survival skills that will be needed by
Expeditionary forces conducting the full spectrum of operations from
stability and theatre cooperation to security and counter-insurgency.
Mr. Ortiz. The Committee is aware that in some cases airmen were
provided as little as 72 hours' notification of deployment. If this is
the case, it is concerning, particularly when these airmen are being
asked to deploy as augmentees in a ground combat environment rather
than with their unit in a standard Air Expeditionary Force rotation.
JFCOM starts the process 14 months prior to the need. Why does it take
so long for the Air Force to identify and notify the selected
individual? What is being done in the Air Force to correct this lack of
timely notification?
General Gibson. Air Force policy requires Commanders to notify
Airmen of their assigned deployment opportunity window upon assignment
to the unit. Airmen remain assigned to the same deployment window for
the duration of their assignment to the unit. All Airmen are expected
to be prepared to deploy even with minimal (72-hours) notice during
their deployment window period should there be an emerging, short-
notice requirement. The Air Force sources known rotational requirements
at least 4 months prior to the date the Airman is required to be in
place at the deployed location. As a matter of course, the Air Force
sources ``on call'' units first--units in the current deployment
opportunity window who's Airmen are expected to be prepared to deploy
at anytime during that period. Reclamas can cause short-notice to
Airmen--as in cases when someone suddenly becomes non-deployable (i.e.,
broken leg). Additionally, the amount of advance notice can be reduced
when combatant commanders identify new, short-notice requirements
needed to meet their war-fighting needs. In these instances the
sourcing timeline may be shortened and Airmen could receive minimal
notice before they are required to deploy or report for pre-deployment
combat skills training. In other cases, the demand on a particular
career field--primarily to support sister Service or other outside
agency such as DoS requirements--may result in a short fall for the
current deployment window. To resolve these anomalies, the Air Force
reaches forward into the next succeeding deployment window to meet the
short fall. The air and space expeditionary force (AEF) process is
designed for quick response. It allows the Air Force agility and
versatility to adapt and meet the needs of our commanders and war-
fighters on the battlefield.
Mr. Ortiz. In your testimony you state that the effect of ILO
training, ``as measured in man-years consumed, is significant.'' How
significant in terms of man-years consumed and in terms of impact?
General Gibson. Presently, the AF has entered approximately 8,056
Airmen into ILO training. With an average training time of 42 days at
each of the Power Projection Platforms, this equates into approximately
930 man years expended in this effort.
Mr. Ortiz. Please expound on some of the other challenges within
the ILO program that are cited in your testimony and the impact those
have on Air Force readiness, including: Removing airmen from their
assigned Air Expeditionary Force rotation cycle; and Exacerbate an
already-high personnel tempo.
General Gibson. The Air Force is a full partner in filling ILO
taskings. AF ILO requirements are expected to be approximately 5,000
personnel by the end of CY07, increasing to approximately 6,000 by the
end of CY08. Current AF ILO requirements represent a select set of AF
capabilities, including logistics readiness, security forces,
engineers, intelligence, ISR, communications and medical personnel. We
are also currently providing non-core competency support after
receiving specialized training in the areas of civil affairs,
interrogators and detainee and convoy operations. However, a number of
these capabilities (security forces, Red Horse, EOD, dog teams, etc.)
are at their max wartime surge level of a 1:1 deploy/dwell ratio.
ILO requirements add significant levels of stress on deployed
Airmen as well as the rest of the AF. These tasking have a direct
effect on readiness since ILO-tasked units and deployed Airmen are no
longer available for core AF or home-station missions; and the workload
they would normally share is shifted to other Airmen both at home and
abroad. Furthermore, an Airmen's skills in AF core competencies are a
perishable item. When ILO-tasked Airmen return to their home stations
after deployment, they must be given time and additional training to
re-hone those skills.
Mr. Ortiz. The Air Force is starting the Common Battlefield Airman
Training (CBAT) Course as a five-day class with plans to expand it by
2010 to a 20-day class that would include physical fitness training,
self-defense, advanced weapons training, combat medical skills,
integrated base defense classes, land navigation, and tactical field
operations. While the Air Force initially will use an Army training
site, the Subcommittee understands that the Air Force is considering
three candidate sites for a permanent school, including Arnold Air
Force Base near Manchester, Tenn.; Moody AFB near Valdosta, Ga.; or
Barksdale AFB in Bossier City, La. What is the purpose of CBAT? Is CBAT
a duplication of effort and expense? How do you differentiate this
training from the Army's or Marine Corps' combat skills training?
General Gibson. Common Battlefield Airmen Training (CBAT) is a
training initiative that is part of the ongoing process of transforming
the Air Force culture to instill a warrior ethos and ensure each and
every Airman is relevant in light of the changing security environment
with the proper expeditionary combat skills. The current security
environment and rigors of the Global War on Terror highlighted combat
skills deficiencies among Airmen. As a result, the Air Force identified
the need for a more robust training course to provide designated Airmen
with the necessary skills to survive and operate effectively ``outside
the wire.'' CBAT is a foundational school that provides Airmen with
combat skills training (CST) to teach Airmen how to ``shoot, move, and
communicate.'' CBAT consists of tasks that are not career-field
specific but are common to the survival and success of our Airmen on
the battlefield. In addition, the Army and Marine Corps teach their
foundational skills at basic training. While the Air Force conducts a
limited amount of CST at basic training, it chose CBAT as a post-basic
training module because it focuses on those career-fields that require
CST as foundational skills.
CBAT is not a duplication of effort and expense because it provides
tailored training for Airmen limited to the necessary skills to survive
and operate effectively ``outside the wire.'' A panel of Air Force
subject matter experts scrutinized the Army's 40 Warrior Skills and 9
Battle Drills eventually pairing it down to 19 skills and 8 tasks
Airmen require proficiency in to operate in the Expeditionary Air
Force. Additionally, CBAT serves as a consolidation and standardization
of training. Currently, CBAT-like training is conducted at numerous
AETC bases, as well as at MAJCOMs and Wings, to provide some level of
CST for Airmen. CBAT will provide a single venue to standardize and
synergize efforts that already exist to ensure that we are prepared to
fight and win not only the current fight but future conflicts as well.
Finally, the Air Force's three candidate sites will utilize existing
ranges leveraging capacity currently residing in those resources.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR
Mr. Taylor. Has anyone tracked the casualties among the IAs to see
if they are suffering a disproportionately high percentage of
casualties?
General Halverson. The Army tracks casualties among Individual
Augmentees (I.A.s) and they are not suffering a disproportionately high
percentage of casualties. Since the onset of GWOT, the Army has
suffered 10 casualties that fall into the category of LA.s.
Admiral Giardina. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
General Gibson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]