[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-61]
CHINA: RECENT SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JUNE 13, 2007
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Tenth Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina DUNCAN HUNTER, California
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas California
ADAM SMITH, Washington MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California JEFF MILLER, Florida
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia TOM COLE, Oklahoma
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam ROB BISHOP, Utah
MARK UDALL, Colorado MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
NANCY BOYDA, Kansas PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
KATHY CASTOR, Florida
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Julie Unmacht, Professional Staff Member
Aileen Alexander, Professional Staff Member
Margee Meckstroth, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2007
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, June 13, 2007, China: Recent Security Developments.... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, June 13, 2007......................................... 37
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 13, 2007
CHINA: RECENT SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Lawless, Hon. Richard P., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, Department of Defense...... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Hunter, Hon. Duncan.......................................... 41
Lawless, Hon. Richard P...................................... 48
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 59
CHINA: RECENT SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 13, 2007.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Our hearing will come to order. Before I
welcome our witnesses--we are very appreciative, of course, to
have them--I wish to inform our members I was keenly
disappointed that the testimony was not furnished to us 48
hours, per our custom and per our rule. It was furnished to us
last night at 7:30. And I am told the hangup was at Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). And I think it went well past our
witnesses that this happened.
I will make an inquiry as to why that happened, and,
frankly, it is of deep concern, because those of us on the
committee take a great interest in looking at the testimony
ahead of time. And we will make proper inquiry, and I don't
want that to happen again.
So welcome, Mr. Lawless, Major General Breedlove. We thank
you for being here today to testify on recent security
developments involving China. We look forward to your
testimony. It is a very, very important subject. It has been
for some time the critical significance of development in that
country to our national security. While our military resources
are heavily focused in Iraq, China's influence has grown in
Asia, as well as beyond.
To address this reality, we must proactively and
effectively engage with China on multiple fronts. There are
positive steps in the last year, but progress still has to be
achieved.
I am encouraged by the recent agreement between our country
and China for a defense hotline to handle security emergencies.
I am also encouraged by recent efforts by Secretary Gates,
Pacific Command (PACOM) Commander Admiral Keating, and former
Commander Bill Fallon to pursue more robust U.S-to-China
military contacts. That is a major step in the right direction.
Such contacts increase our understanding of China's strategic
intentions and capabilities, and can hopefully avoid
miscalculations between the two sides. And I share the views of
Secretary Gates and the admirals on this.
I am also glad to see Secretary Gates calling on China to
increase its security cooperation with the U.S. in areas of
common interest, ranging from counterterrorism and non-
proliferation to energy security. There are unique
opportunities for progress on these issues. This year the
preparations are accelerating for the 2008 Summer Olympics in
Beijing, and both sides want to ensure there is necessary
security for that event. In addition, China's leading the
Working Group on the Denuclearization of North Korea, and could
potentially play a constructive role with the Iranian nuclear
situation.
Moreover, China's approach to Taiwan has recently been
constructive but, given Taiwan's upcoming elections, this will
remain a significant challenge. This year's Department of
Defense (DOD) report on China's military power notes a modest
improvement in China's transparency in regards to defense
policy and spending. This is positive. Yet China is still not
adequately revealing its full defense spending, military, and
modernization efforts, or strategic intentions.
China's official defense budget for 2007 is about $45
billion. However, the real budget is between $85 to $125
billion, continuing a trend of double-digit increases. China
also conducted a successful antisatellite missile test back in
January, leaving dangerous debris in orbit for years. China
continues its missile buildup across from Taiwan, and its power
projection capabilities are steadily increasing.
I continue to believe that China's not necessarily destined
to be a threat to the United States. There are trends and
ambiguities that concern us, and hearings like today's should
help us understand where China is in terms of investing in
advanced military technology and advancing their military
doctrine as well as tactics. There are also Chinese limitations
to acknowledge, and those should be addressed today as well. We
must also recognize that China's choices may well be shaped by
our own actions.
So, gentlemen, I am interested in hearing your assessment
of most significant recent security developments involving
China.
However, before we begin our testimony, I turn to my
friend, my colleague from California, Duncan Hunter, for any
statement he may wish to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me join with
you in welcoming our witnesses.
You know, today as we look at China's military capacity,
the pace and the scope of its military modernization and
China's near- and longer-term strategic aspirations in the
region and around the world, the Pentagon's 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review report noted that China is at a strategic
crossroads with the, quote, ``Greatest potential to compete
militarily with the United States.''
So while much of our attention right now is focused on the
warfighting theaters in Iraq and Afghanistan, I want to
congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, for looking over the horizon,
because clearly China is over the horizon; that is, it is in a
period of expansion and achieving new military capabilities,
and we must be on top of this situation in terms of
understanding where China is going militarily and assuring that
we maintain American security interests while this expansion is
underway and well into the future.
You know, two events happened, Mr. Chairman, that I think
we are all aware of, that I thought were particularly important
for the American people to understand. One was the emergence of
that SHANG-class submarine. I believe it was October 26th of
last year about 80 miles east of Okinawa where the submarine
emerged, SHANG-class submarine emerged near the Kitty Hawk.
Now, it didn't represent an immediate threat to the United
States. There were several reasons, as I understand, and
without going into classified detail with respect to why it was
able to be fairly close without being observed or located by
the American naval forces, but I thought it was important for
the American people to focus on that SHANG-class submarine
emerging near the Kitty Hawk, because it showed the American
people what China is purchasing and building with American
trade dollars.
As we move several hundreds of billions of dollars more to
them each year than they move to us, they are clearly using
some of that money, some of that American cash, to buy military
equipment. They have purchased the SOVREMMENNY-class missile
destroyers from the Russians, which were designed to kill
American aircraft carriers. They now have a tactical fighter
production program. They are building and fielding between 750
and 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles each year. And so
China is moving to, in my estimation, step into the superpower
shoes that have been vacated by the Soviet Union with respect
to military power.
Now, the other event that I thought was a remarkable event,
and one which heralded a new era of military competition
between China and the United States, was the shootdown of a
satellite in January by China. Presumably nobody practices
shooting down their own satellites. So while the practice shot
was indeed at an aging weather satellite that China owned, this
heralded, in my estimation, a new competition in space, whether
we want it or not, between the United States and China. Now,
because a large portion of America's industrial base is now
moving to China, including part of the industrial base that we
rely on for security, for the American security apparatus, I
think this is a particularly crucial hearing to hold.
So Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my written statement be
accepted into the record, if you might, and I share your
concern that the United States focus appropriately on the
emergence of China's modern military capability.
And I know that our witnesses will speak to that
capability, and I look forward to the hearing. Thank you for
holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman. Very important, while we
are concentrated on Iraq and Afghanistan, to look over the
horizon. And this hearing fits that requirement. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you so much, Mr. Hunter.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
The Chairman. We welcome our witnesses. Secretary Lawless,
a special thanks to you for your service, and we wish you well
in the days ahead, sir. And General Breedlove, it is good for
you to be with us, and we look forward to your testimony.
Secretary Lawless.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD P. LAWLESS, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Secretary Lawless. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think before I
begin my oral statement I would like to take note of and
apologize for the tardy arrival of the written testimony. We
will look into it and make sure it doesn't happen again, and
get back with your staff and explain what we discovered as to
why it would have arrived so late.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for the opportunity
to appear today before this committee and speak about recent
security developments related to the People's Republic of
China. This is a very timely hearing, the substance of which
holds great significance to U.S. defense and security policy.
Last month the Department of Defense submitted its annual
report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China
to Congress. Although this report is tasked to the Department
of Defense and signed out to you and the other Members of
Congress by the Secretary of Defense, it is a product of
intensive interagency coordination. Our report, therefore,
reflects views and concerns held broadly across the United
States Government over China's rapidly expanding military
capabilities.
This year's report comes against the backdrop of an overall
U.S.-China relationship that continues to improve from the low
point of the April 2001 EP-3 incident. The President has stated
his satisfaction that the United States and China have
developed a good constructive relationship. The U.S. policy
encourages China to conduct itself as a responsible
international stakeholder by participating in multilateral
organizations, upholding international law, and supporting
economic integration and global stability. China benefits
substantially from the existing international system, and we
encourage it to take on a greater share of responsibility for
the health and success of that system.
We continue to see some positive examples of cooperation,
most notably in the Six-Party Talks, Ambassador Negroponte's
Senior Dialogue, and the Strategic Economic Dialogue led by
Secretary Paulson. We have also seen improvements in the
military-to-military relationship, where we are moving forward
with an expanded set of exchanges among senior defense
officials, naval ship visits, military academy exchanges, and
other interactions among mid-grade and junior officers.
We are also making progress, we believe, in cooperation to
address transnational and non-traditional security challenges,
including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. We have
received positive signals that the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) is now ready to move forward on the defense telephone
link, as earlier mentioned, which we first proposed in 2004. We
believe these exchanges and mechanisms have the potential to
improve mutual understanding, reduce miscalculation, and
contribute over time to the demystification of the two parties
involved.
In conducting our defense interactions, consistent with
section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000, we do nothing in our contacts that could
knowingly enhance the military capabilities of the China PLA.
Some have argued that these limitations, the congressionally
imposed limitations, should be changed or revised. We do not
believe that is the case. There are many areas in which we can
expand our exchanges with China that will not require, would
not require revisions of the existing statute. Our approach to
these defense interactions is not only a matter of law, it
makes for sound defense policy on the part of the United
States.
So overall, while we have seen some progress in China's
willingness to cooperate on international issues of concern, we
do have questions over China's commitment to these
developments. There remains more for China to do to curtail
proliferation. We remain concerned with China's efforts to
limit United States presence and influence through the
development of exclusionary regional forum and frameworks that
stand against the trend of greater regional cooperation in
Asia. China's use of its influence in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, the SCO, to call for a U.S. withdrawal from
regional bases, runs counter to our efforts on the war on
terrorism.
In the bilateral military relationship, we are troubled by
what appears to be an unwillingness to reciprocate the openness
and transparency we have shown to visiting People's Republic of
China (PRC)-PLA representatives. And while we are encouraged by
President Hu's stated interests in opening a dialogue with us
on nuclear strategy, policy, and doctrine, we are concerned by
an apparent reluctance on the part of the PRC Government to
discuss transparently these important issues. And we have been
unable to schedule a date for this dialogue.
Both the United States and China approach this relationship
realistically. Both sides are aware of the potential for
conflict, particularly in the Taiwan Strait. And as we move
forward, we remain mindful of the uncertainty inherent in
China's future. That future, to a large extent, will be
determined by choices that the Chinese leaders make. These
choices span a range of issues, not the least of which, we
would suggest, is China's growing military power.
In the Department of Defense, it is our responsibility to
monitor the development of that power. It is our job to
maintain deterrence of conflict. At present, China's ability to
sustain power at a distance remains limited. However, as the
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report notes, looking
into the future, quote, ``China has the greatest potential to
compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive
military technologies that could, over time, offset traditional
U.S. military advantages.''
Our report, this year's China Military Power Report,
attempts to present the analysis in a factual, descriptive, and
analytical way. It discusses the strides that China has made,
as well as the weaknesses we have identified in its military.
It seeks to assess China's future military potential without
exaggerating that potential. As our report shows, the Chinese
PLA is pursuing an ambitious, comprehensive, and long-term
military modernization program, emphasizing preparations to
fight and win short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along
its periphery.
The near-term focus for the PLA appears to be on preparing
for military contingencies in the Taiwan Strait. Long-term
trends, however, suggest that Beijing is generating
capabilities to employ military force for other regional
contingencies, such as conflict over resources or territory.
China's officially disclosed defense budget has steadily
increased over the past 15 years. In March, China announced
that its defense budget for 2007 would increase some 17.8
percent over the previous year, to approximately $45 billion.
However, we and others believe that significant expenditures
related to China's military are not included in that official
budget. Our best estimate is China's actual 2007 defense
expenditures could fall in the range of $85 billion to $125
billion. While there may be differences in estimative models
inside and outside the Department of Defense, the near
universal conclusion is that the official PRC military budget
significantly underreports China's military expenditures. This
discrepancy between the official budget and what China actually
spends is emblematic of our fundamental concerns over a lack of
transparency in China's military and security affairs.
The issue is often raised by PRC scholars and foreign
experts of Chinese security affairs who are inclined to explain
the PRC's sensitivities over budget transparency; that it is
for China to decide the appropriate level of disclosure and
discourse on this separate issue--on this sensitive issue.
While that may well be the case, in the absence of adequate
explanation for the capabilities which are growing
dramatically, both in pace and in scope, we, the Department of
Defense, and more broadly the United States Government, are put
in a position of having to assume the most dangerous intent a
capability offers.
With that context, I would like to summarize briefly some
of the specific and notable developments in this year's report.
We see in China at least 10 varieties of ballistic missiles
either deployed or in development. Ongoing deployments include
over 900 short-range ballistic missiles in garrison opposite
Taiwan. The PLA is establishing new missile bases outfitted
with conventional theater-range missiles that could support a
variety of contingencies across China's periphery. China has
made substantial progress in fielding the road-mobile solid-
propellant DF-31 intercontinental range ballistic missile
(ICBM) with the deployed missile force. We expect that China
will make considerable progress in fielding the longer-range
version of this missile, the DF-31A, beginning this year.
China continues to upgrade and qualitatively modernize
older versions of its ICBM-class missiles, and it continues to
modernize its sea-based deterrent with the JL-2 submarine-
launched ballistic missile for deployment aboard a new class of
ballistic submarines, the Type-094. These changes are
important. They will bring greater range, mobility, accuracy,
and survivability to China's strategic forces, capable of
striking many areas of the world, including the continental
United States.
China is building and testing second-generation nuclear-
powered submarines. In addition to the JIN-class ship,
submersible, ballistic, nuclear submarine (SSBN), the PLA Navy
is also performing sea trials on a new nuclear attack
submarine, the Type-093 or SHANG-class. China accepted delivery
last year of the first of two of an eight-hull purchase--excuse
me, I am sorry, I correct it--the final two of an eight-hull
purchase of Russian KILO-class diesel electric submarines,
bringing the total number of KILOs in the Chinese inventory to
12. China is investing in new surface combatants to improve the
PLA Navy's capacity for anti-surface and anti-air warfare.
We also see continuing interest on the part of the PLA Navy
in developing an indigenous aircraft carrier capability. Modern
aircraft, such as the Russian Su-27s and the Su-30's, and
China's own F-10 fighter make up a growing percentage of that
Air Force. Increasingly sophisticated armaments and development
of aerial refueling capability have improved China's offensive
air capabilities. China is improving also its precision strike
capability, with at least two land-attack attack cruise missile
programs underway, and the acquisition of advanced anti-ship
cruise missiles, including the Russian-made SS-N-22/SUNBURN,
SOVREMMENNYS, and the SS-N-27B/SIZZLER for its newest KILO-
class submarines, as provided by Russia.
The PLA is making significant strides in cyber warfare,
moving from solely defending PRC networks from attack to
offensive operations against adversary networks. Finally, we
are seeing China's emergence as a growing international space
power. It is investing heavily in a broad range of military and
dual-use space programs, including reconnaissance, navigation
and timing, and communications satellites, as well as its
manned space program. At the same time, as we witnessed last
January, China is developing the ability to deny others access
to space through a robust and multi-dimensional counterspace
program, featuring direct ascent anti-satellite weapons,
ground-based lasers and satellite communication jamming
systems.
Many of these developments are relevant to a Taiwan
contingency. In this context, we continue to see China's
military advances as tilting the military balance in the
Mainland's favor. However, some of these developments pose
long-term concerns well beyond the Taiwan Strait. These
concerns are not just those of the United States. Many aspects
of China's military programs lead other nations, both within
East Asia and globally, to question China's intentions and to
adjust their own behavior.
The United States, as Secretary Gates observed in his
recent presentation in Singapore, is a Pacific power. Our
interests and network of alliances and friendships constitute a
vital interest that we will defend. But the Asia-Pacific region
is not a zero-sum game. A China that is a responsible
stakeholder in the international system and an engine of
economic growth is an enormously positive prospect. China's
continued development and integration into the international
system as a responsible stakeholder has long been, and remains,
a central tenet of our China policy and a core U.S. interest.
In that context, we have submitted this year to you, in May,
our annual China Military Power Report. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Lawless can be found
in the Appendix on page 48.]
The Chairman. As I understand it, General Breedlove, you do
not have a statement. Am I correct?
General Breedlove. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. I will
join the Secretary's statement.
The Chairman. Thank you. And you will be available for
questions?
General Breedlove. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Okay. Thank you very much.
Let me ask just one question before I call on my
colleagues. You made reference, Mr. Secretary, to the military-
to-military, and as I understand it there have been some
military-to-military war college-level exchanges. Would an
increase in that or full attendance at respective war colleges
be of benefit to our country? Should we pursue that more fully?
Secretary Lawless. Sir, this has probably been one of the
most successful areas of exchanging communication. The answer
to your question is ``yes.'' In every case that offer has been
on the table, and in every case what we have attempted to do is
make absolutely sure that it wasn't a one-way street, and that
any advantage that accrues to the People's Republic of China
also accrues to us.
In other words, we would like to have not only normally
transparency, but we need to have reciprocity. So one of the
issues has been getting opportunities to attend their teaching
institutions, military teaching institutions, as we have
offered them access to ours.
The Chairman. Is there a major problem within our military,
as well as within our student body, to speak their language?
Secretary Lawless. I do not believe there is. We have some
very specific information on that, on language capabilities, to
offer to you. Heretofore, there has not been a problem. The
people attending our institutions generally come reasonably
well prepared in the English language, and I think we take
great care to make sure that the folks that we put into their
institutions have some level of Mandarin, including discussions
beforehand.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Secretary, I want to pick up on the line of what
Ranking Member Hunter was--over here, sir.
Secretary Lawless. I am sorry.
Mr. Jones. I am to the left, but on most issues I am to the
right. But anyway, the trade deficit with China seems to be
that we are every month and every year more and more in a hole
as it relates to the trade deficit.
From your comments, and I tried to listen very carefully,
it does appear that China is taking advantage of our economic
woes and our trade policies of sending more jobs overseas and
more dollars overseas. With the report you gave, it sounded
like to me that the Chinese are obviously putting major bucks
into investing in their military equipment needs.
At what point would you say--do we have 4, 5 years; do we
have 10 years; do we have less?--that China is going to be
where they are equal to this country as it relates to their
ability with their Navy and Air Force?
Secretary Lawless. I think first of all, the one
overarching concern that we have is that this is not the same
type, qualitatively or quantitatively, at this point of
challenge that we faced with the former Soviet Union. China, as
a consequence of its economic growth, is developing a very
broad, very successful, very advanced defense industrial base.
That industrial base allows them to do many things at the same
time. It not only provides a cash flow, but it provides a
capability that is multitiered, and allows them to undertake
several programs at the same time.
So a concern that exists here is that as China continues to
grow economically, it will not only have more resources to
allocate to the purchase of equipment, the underlying
industrial base will consequently become much more
sophisticated and be capable of generating the quality of
product that is required for military modernization.
Additionally, as the trade imbalance continues and the
Chinese foreign exchange reserves continue to build, they have
more cash to spend with the direct purchase of sophisticated
systems and technology. The acquisitions from Russia represent
multibillion-dollar purchases year after year. And these are
very important that we track.
Coming back, finally, to your question to us, as to when we
think we will be challenged, I believe that in some areas we
already sense that that challenge is already in front of us,
particularly in some of the capabilities we have seen to
develop.
The other issue is that we think China has done a very good
job of assessing where it can develop asymmetric capabilities.
In other words, this is not a head-to-head situation. China is
not necessarily interested in the ability to stand toe to toe
and go into a major conflict with the United States. That said,
they can obviously see that we have security commitments that
require us to be in certain locations and have certain
sustained capabilities. Against that requirement that we have
to defend our interests and the interests of our allies and
partners, they are very capable of judging where asymmetric
opportunities exist, and concentrating themselves on asymmetric
opportunities. I think this year's China Military Power Report
addresses that issue. And it is an issue that we will continue
to follow in the coming years.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, just one other point, if I have
time. Has my time expired?
The Chairman. No, you are good.
Mr. Jones. I think you are the expert, and this is where
many people, including myself--and I represent the Third
District, Camp Lejeune, Seymour Johnson Air Force Base--that
the Chinese are not going to be confronting us probably
militarily, but if they continue to grow and expand their
military power, then they can dominate Asia, Southeast Asia.
The suggestion I want to fully understand is that at some
point do you believe that this country is going to have to make
a decision that this is of such importance that we not show
military weakness, that we are going to have to really ramp up
the investments? And the reason I mention that is because we
had Secretary Wynne before this committee a few weeks ago, and
I forgot the general that was there with him, but talking about
the fact that they are having to reprioritize some of their
programs and move some up, move some around; and because of
this budget situation and this policing the world, that we
really are not giving the full commitment that maybe this
country needs to give, to say that we cannot continue to allow
China to continue to grow and expand. And we would be put at a
disadvantage that we might not be able to catch up.
Do you see--would you recommend to the Congress that
sometime, sooner rather than later, that we need to understand
that we cannot continue to fall back and become weaker in the
eyes of the Chinese?
Secretary Lawless. I think that my response would have
really two components to it. The first is I think we have done
a really good job of tracking and predicting where they are
headed capability-wise. The broader those capabilities grow,
and the more sophisticated those capabilities become vis-a-vis
the systems we have already deployed, the challenge for
predicting intent and the use of those capabilities becomes
exponentially more difficult. You just simply have a more
difficult time predicting how a given capability is going to be
used, or, for that matter, why that capability was deemed
essential by the Chinese leadership to spend money on and bring
it into their inventory. This goes to the issue of
transparency.
I think if we had a better dialogue with them, a true
dialogue of depth, coming back again to my remarks on the
strategic nuclear dialogue, where we have several times
proposed to them this is an essential area of discussion, and
really gotten quite an uneven response, if we had the quality
of dialogue that we are seeking with them we might be able to
constrain and put some of those issues of intent to bed. Not
being able to, we must plan and prepare for the worst.
I think our services, reference the comments that you just
referred to, are making an attempt to anticipate the net result
of the capabilities the Chinese are attempting to put in place.
But I think it is an area of intense concern, and we are giving
it due attention from the highest levels of the Department of
Defense and the interagency discussion.
I want to make one more point. In my oral testimony I
mentioned the fact that the China Military Power Report had
been coordinated across many elements of the United States
Government, particularly the intelligence services and other
policymaking elements of the government. There is a process now
underway to assess, not just within the Department of Defense,
but much more broadly within the entire executive branch, where
we stand with China on these security issues.
So this is something that not just the Department of
Defense is seized with, but all elements of the government,
including the White House. And so we are giving it sufficient
attention, and I believe the U.S. Government as a whole is
abreast of the problem and attempting to make decisions based
on our assessment of where this is headed.
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Before I call on Dr. Snyder, let me ask you
regarding your comments of asymmetric preparation that China is
making. You said there are special forces. Could you give us a
short, short version of what they are doing?
Secretary Lawless. Yes. I think that both of you gentlemen
have mentioned, others have mentioned the January direct ascent
anti-satellite (ASAT) test. Space and counterspace is obviously
an area in which China perceives the ability to establish
itself with an asymmetric capability. And it does so for the
simple reason that it is obvious that we are very dependent on
our space-based resources, communications, intelligence
resources that we have in space.
Again, I think that China correctly perceives that this is
an area where asymmetric capabilities will give it the ability
to disrupt and delay and frustrate our abilities to operate. It
is a major issue for us, and one that is getting a lot of
attention.
The Chairman. Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
for being here.
Mr. Secretary, I had several questions. First, with regard
to the direction that China seems to be going both economically
and militarily, they clearly are a competitor of ours,
economically, that is not going to go away. Is that a fair
statement?
Secretary Lawless. Certainly not going to go away, yes.
Dr. Snyder. They have hundreds of millions of people that
are still in poverty, that are very envious of what is going on
in their coasts. And so somehow I think if we as a Congress
think that we can present to the American people we have a
simple plan to take us back to the bygone days when China was a
weakened Third World country, those days are gone and past. And
in my lifetime I think we will see the Chinese economy pass
ours in terms of gross domestic product.
So the second part of the question I wanted to ask you, you
have a very impressive career and background. I suspect you do
this as an exercise. If you put yourself at the position of
working in the civilian side of the Chinese military, are they
doing anything that you would not recommend to the Chinese
leadership that they do? That they would be doing?
Secretary Lawless. That is a good question. To the extent
that we understand what it is that they are doing----
Dr. Snyder. Right.
Secretary Lawless [continuing]. I think that they are doing
an incredible amount of things right. And I think that comes
back to my earlier comment about the sophistication of the
strategies and the scope of the modernization and
transformation that is taking place. All too often I think we
focus too much on raw capabilities, be it an anti-satellite
ballistic missile, be it anti-access systems, when in fact we
should be focusing much more broadly. We have a situation that
is now in probably its tenth year of comprehensive
transformation of the entire national security and military
structure. That means doctrine, that means manpower levies----
Dr. Snyder. Which, as an experienced CIA and military
person, you have known for some time that they have needed
desperately to do in terms of their modernization.
Secretary Lawless. That is right. But once the reckoning
was made, what we are seeing is a very sophisticated wholesale
transformation of their military.
Dr. Snyder. Right.
I want to ask one very specific question. I quickly read
your statement here which we received this morning, and it
seems to be a very thoughtful and balanced discussion. I
appreciate the depth of thought in it. What role does the--I
think it is called the U.S. China and Economic Review--Security
and Economic Review Commission play? Are you familiar with that
body----
Secretary Lawless. We are.
Dr. Snyder [continuing]. That the Congress set up? I have
always been very skeptical. I don't think we have gotten a
presentation from them that would reflect the kind of
thoughtfulness that you have presented this morning. Do they
help shape policy for the Administration?
Secretary Lawless. Sir, I don't believe they shape policy
as much as they perhaps inform it. We have had a pretty robust
relationship with this particular body over the past several
years. I have testified in front of it. In fact, I believe this
Friday one of my China team chiefs will be testifying on the
energy issue. As you know, their mandate is much broader than
just pure security and defense issues. But I have actually been
quite impressed by the quality of the questions that are put to
us and the quality of the published material that they issue
under the imprimatur, I believe, of Congress. And that material
is actually pretty widely read, including by our Chinese
friends.
So our interaction with that particular group has been
quite positive, and we find them quite incisive in the
questions they ask us. They task us a lot.
Dr. Snyder. You have had a different experience than I
have. I want to ask about the Internet. You talked about the
need for more transparency in their military. Two aspects of
the Internet. First of all, they are abysmally not transparent
with regard to their own population in terms of the great
restrictions on the Internet. How do you see that going ahead
in the future? How can a country modernize, as you pointed out,
quite dramatically in a lot of different ways, how can they do
that and have such repressive policies with respect to access,
to things internationally?
And the second component I don't think you mentioned in
your written statement. You mentioned asymmetric attacks. You
are an Internet guy. Where do you see the Chinese capability
with regard to cyber attacks or potential?
Secretary Lawless. Thank you. Turning to the last question
first, because I think it is relevant to both pieces of what
you have asked about, whatever their internal Internet control
practices may be, they have developed a very sophisticated,
broadly based capability to degrade and attack and degrade our
computer systems and our Internet systems. I mean the fact that
computer access warfare and the things that that allows you--
disruptive things that that allows you to do to an opponent are
well appreciated by the Chinese. And they spend a lot of time
figuring out how to disrupt our networks, how to both penetrate
networks in terms of gleaning or gaining information that is
protected, as well as computer network attack programs which
would allow them to shut down critical systems at times of
contingency. So first of all, the capability is there. They are
growing it. They see it as a major component of their
asymmetric warfare capability.
Coming to the first question you asked, I believe that
while it may not be possible for them to totally control
Internet activity in China, it seems to me they are doing a
very good job. And we have not really seen that that capability
to control the Internet within China has really resulted in any
net loss of capability. If anything, their determination to
familiarize themselves and dominate to some degree the Internet
capabilities not only of China and the region, but the world,
provide them with a growing and very impressive capability that
we are very mindful of and are spending a lot of time watching.
General Breedlove. Sir, I would just add, without being
redundant, that the Secretary mentioned that they are very keen
on their asymmetric ability to address our military power. And
this is one of those areas that they talk about, specifically
in their white papers and others, when they talk about warfare
in an environment of informatization. That is a word hard for
me to pronounce, but obviously it means something to them. And
so I would see this as a key area where they would look to see
our vulnerability, since we are so netcentric in our warfare.
And it is a concern to us.
The Chairman. Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again thank you
for holding the hearing. And gentlemen, excuse me for having to
step out during a part of your opening statement.
But it is fairly clear that China is transforming their
military, Mr. Secretary, as you have just stated. In your
opinion, what should we be doing with our own military
capability to adapt to a transformed Chinese military?
Secretary Lawless. I think that our ability to plan and
adjust ourselves to that evolving capability in the first
instance results or leads us back to good intelligence. I am
concerned that perhaps we don't have the quality and the
breadth of intelligence focused on this issue that we perhaps
have had in the past. It certainly doesn't meet the standards
of what we were able to apply to the Soviet Union as it
emerged.
And I think that additionally we need, I think, to adopt a
much more comprehensive approach within the Department of
Defense concerning our management of this particular issue.
Again, this is a dynamic problem. It is a problem in which--it
is an issue where we continue to be surprised from time to time
with regard to the speed with which a given system is deployed.
And therefore, I think there is a real incumbent burden on us
to be very fast on our feet and be able to adjust to the
capabilities that we see that are being fielded.
Mr. Hunter. Let me get to some specific systems here. You
have a lot of short-range ballistic missiles being produced, an
inventory of between, as I understand, 750 and 1,000 in place.
A lot of them are across from the Taiwan Straits. Do you see
any changes we need to make or any emphasis we need to make
with respect to missile defense as a result of China's emerging
missile program?
Secretary Lawless. I think that is an ongoing calculation.
In fact, I specifically mentioned, I believe, that we can count
no fewer than ten systems either deployed or under development.
The emphasis there is on the word at least. I think that these
are challenges that are being presented to our ballistic
missile programs. I think some of those challenges were
addressed by the director of that program in some recent
testimony and interaction with Congress. It is an issue that I
defer to our Missile Defense Agency to address.
But suffice to say on the policy side of the equation, we
are doing a lot of discussion within the region with our
partners and allies about the threat that those missiles pose.
And I would suggest that this year's Military Power Report
discusses not only the threat vis-a-vis Taiwan and how we
believe that is changing the status quo and is creating a new
dynamic there, we also address the growing capabilities of the
regional--that is, the medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)
and the intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) deployments
that are being made, a subject of course that is addressed in
much greater detail in the classified annex to the report.
Mr. Hunter. Let me ask you just one last question, Mr.
Chairman. You know, China is cheating on trade right now. They
are devaluing their currency by some 40 percent. That has been
the subject of legislation by myself and Mr. Ryan and a number
of members, in fact 178 members of the House last year. They
are buying ships and planes and military equipment with
American trade dollars. And a large portion of the American
defense industrial base is moving to China. Do you see a
problem there?
Secretary Lawless. Sir, I think we see a huge issue here.
Again, some comments that were perhaps made while you were out
of the room, the underlying defense industrial capacity that
China is building gives it terrific surge capability. When you
are able to build a particular combatant not in one shipyard,
but in four or five, and you are capable of undertaking--again,
sophisticated industrial base--many programs, parallel programs
at the same time, you have great flexibility to surge that
capacity. And I think that is an issue that we are all deeply
concerned with. And this comes to the heart of the economic
modernization of China.
Mr. Hunter. And I think that the ability of the Chinese to
translate this massive commercial industrial capability,
especially the ship construction capability of China, to
translate that into a warship construction capability with
respect to surface vessels and submarines would very much
threaten our ability to maintain a Naval dominance in the
region simply in terms of platforms that they can produce, and
with the new sophistication that attends many of their
programs. I think you see the American shipbuilding programs
being quickly outstripped by China simply by translating or
transferring their domestic capabilities into a military
production capability. Do you agree with that?
Secretary Lawless. I do. As a matter of fact, we were just
in the Far East last week. One of the interesting commentaries
that was then being discussed was the fact that Japan and the
Republic of Korea, which lead the world in shipbuilding
capacity and capability, are now readjusting their projections,
believing that instead of China being a full head-to-head
competitor, top-ranked competitor vis-a-vis those two
shipbuilding powers, instead of it being 15 years out it is
more like to 5 to 6 years out. So you have the ability of China
to introduce and, frankly, deploy capabilities on the
commercial side of the equation, shipbuilding being a perfect
example, which even their competitors had heretofore
underestimated or misestimated. So I think that goes to the
heart of your question.
Mr. Hunter. Okay. And just to close, Mr. Chairman, I think
it is incumbent upon us to ensure that China stops cheating on
trade. This 40 percent devaluation is dealing a death blow to
large portions of our industrial base, and motivating many
corporations and many businesses to move their production to
China. And in the end, the United States may end up seeing
massive pieces of the U.S. industrial base turn to making
equipment that is used against us in some type of a conflict in
the future.
I think it is important for us, as Armed Services members,
to in this case really concentrate and really focus on this
problem of this transfer of the U.S. industrial base to
mainland China. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Davis.
Mrs. Davis of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary, nice to have you here. Thank you, General, as well.
I want to take perhaps the flip side of that discussion and
just bring your attention to the article in Atlantic Monthly. I
don't know if you saw that.
Secretary Lawless. I did. The James Fallows article?
Mrs. Davis of California. The ``Superiority Complex.''
actually, this one is by Keir Lieber and Daryl Press.
Secretary Lawless. Oh, I am sorry. Okay.
Mrs. Davis of California. Perhaps that is different. It's
called ``Superiority Complex,'' and it discusses why America's
growing nuclear capabilities may make war with China more
likely. According to the authors, a future conflict over Taiwan
could become the starting point of a nuclear war between China
and the U.S. And it goes on to discuss the nuclear imbalance
and a number of the steps that the U.S. has taken of late.
Perhaps if you haven't read it, then I don't want to ask you to
fairly respond to it. But it suggests that some of the
imbalance would play out across the globe as well. And I
wondered if you have any insights into China's view of this new
reality.
Secretary Lawless. Well, that is an interesting comment in
that, as I mentioned briefly, we have had on the table an offer
at the highest levels, this is a Presidential discussion, this
is a Secretary--that Secretary Rumsfeld had when he was in
China in October of 2005. We have consistently told the
People's Republic of China that we think it is appropriate that
we begin a dialogue on nuclear strategies and better understand
why they are doing what they are doing. Because what is really
happening here is, while the United States capabilities are
remaining essentially constant, we have a significant
improvement in China's ability to target the United States or
to target us regionally, but specifically the continental
United States.
This opens a whole range of issues for us. And so what we
have said to them is we really need to sit down and talk about
that. The welcome mat is out, the invitation has been made, and
here we are two-plus years later since we began this dialogue,
waiting for them to answer the mail. We are going to continue
to press at every level for this dialogue to begin for the very
reasons that you state. I think such a dialogue is critical.
This is not an arms control regime that we are attempting to
put in place, it is a discussion. Because we need to understand
why they are doing what they are doing, which creates an
inherently more or greater instability, we believe, in the
nuclear relationship between the United States and the People's
Republic of China. So again, it is a dialogue.
Mrs. Davis of California. Do you acknowledge, though, and
accept the fact that perhaps there are steps that we are taking
as well that would make them more nervous on this front?
Secretary Lawless. If that is true, they need to tell us
that. The absence of a dialogue cripples any discussion and
knocks it over to a track two or track three exchange; for
example, the types of exchanges that you are talking about in
Atlantic Monthly. We would rather have that discussion behind
closed doors, face to face with the people that are most
concerned, in this case the military strategic planners and the
military leadership of China. To date, they have not taken us
up on that invitation. If they would, I think both countries
would be far better off.
Mrs. Davis of California. General, did you want to comment?
General Breedlove. I would say this is another example of
what the Secretary talked about earlier, a place where
opaqueness doesn't help. We watched the Chinese developing
their road-mobile ICBMs. We watched them continue to upgrade
their static ICBMs. Now we see them in a sea-launch ballistic
missile program. So we see indications of intent and other
things, but we continue to try to engage, as the Secretary has
said, in dialogue at a very high level, and our offers go
unanswered.
Mrs. Davis of California. I certainly appreciate that. I
think what is important sometimes is when articles like this
are out in the public's face, it is important in some ways to
acknowledge that those issues are out there. It is a fairly, I
guess, intense article in that regard, and I was interested in
giving you that opportunity to respond. And I appreciate that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to turn, and I think my
time is about up, but perhaps someone else may speak about the
interests of Members of Congress, certainly, sending a letter
to the Chinese Government regarding the concerns and atrocities
in Darfur. And perhaps you will be able to speak about that as
well, and what in fact we are doing to try and mitigate that
situation as well, in cooperation with them. Thank you very
much.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlelady. The gentleman from
North Carolina, Mr. Hayes.
Mr. Hayes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very much
for your interest in and knowledge of the China situation. And
thank the witnesses for being here today.
Two questions in particular. General Breedlove, first a
tactical question, and then I would like to come back to you,
Secretary Lawless, for a trade follow-up.
In your testimony there is a lot of discussion about the
capabilities of the Chinese Air Force, particularly combined
with the Flanker and the Sukhoi and their own production. How
would you assess our response or our own development, given
stealth, given other capabilities? Do we need to maybe think a
little bit more--again looking at your testimony as a whole--
toward missile defense as a protection against China just in a
general sense?
General Breedlove. Sir, I will try to track two answers in
what you have asked.
Mr. Hayes. I don't see much air-to-air coming.
General Breedlove. Yes, sir. Clearly, we share the concern
that Mr. Jones talked about earlier, about the ambitious
programs to develop these capabilities such as the aircraft and
others. And another indicator along those lines is you can have
the more sophisticated weaponry, but we need to be watching
their training, because they have to train to get the
capabilities. And, unfortunately, now we do begin to see more
sophisticated training in their capabilities, which might lend
some intent to the more ambitious and the better equipment that
they are buying.
As far as missile capability, sir, I would have to defer to
what the Secretary said earlier. I am a little ill-prepared to
answer and would defer to our missile defense folks as far as
that tack goes.
Mr. Hayes. The $45 billion significant increase in the
Chinese defense budget, based on your comments you just made,
would you say that a lot of that is going into more intensive,
more extensive training, particularly for pilots and other
members of their military?
General Breedlove. Sir, I can't comment on the amount of
money that is being spent on training, but what we do see is
more sophisticated training, trying to train in a joined
environment, trying to address the kind of skills to share
information and to be more netcentric and combined in their
arms approach; and those are clearly indications of a more
sophisticated approach to training, as opposed to a very
disparate army, navy, air force-type training which has been
their past.
Mr. Hayes. Thank you.
Secretary Lawless, Congressman Hunter referred to trade
issues, and the Berry Amendment for some 42 years has been a
trade defense mechanism. Looking forward, obviously, the
Chinese are a tremendous customer of us and other folks in the
West. By the same token, we are a much larger customer of them.
Do you see this balance tipping and at what point?
You talk about the ship-building industry--it went from 15
years to 5--the dynamic changes if we allow our industrial
defense base--and you referred to the importance of theirs--to
deteriorate to the point where it generates jobs and dollars so
that we can compete financially with them. If you can comment
on that and also on how important it is again to maintain the
equity in the trade agreements, which has not been the case so
far.
Secretary Lawless. I think what I would like to do is
answer that by coming back to the issue of the industrial base.
And it is true that many of our exports to China comprise--
although while there are some components of agricultural
products or non-finished products, a huge portion of what we
sell to China is, of course, in very high-quality, finished
goods. Airliners, for example, or commercial aircraft.
China has made a decision to develop a competitive aircraft
industry. Airbus, in a recent agreement with them in return for
their agreement to buy some of the Airbus aircraft, has agreed
to establish a full production facility in Tianjin, I believe;
and that is supposed to be up cranking out A320-level aircraft
within three or four years.
Obviously, there is going to be a transfer of technology
and a transfer of that knowledge base to China as a direct
consequence of that decision by Airbus to invest that facility
in China and operate that facility in China. So I am concerned
that China, in taking a very long look and a very long
perspective on everything that is being done, has decided that
it will acquire every single piece of advanced manufacturing
and the full range and compete with us across the full range of
all products, no matter how sophisticated.
Mr. Hayes. Quick question--thank you--if I may, Mr.
Chairman.
Just speak very briefly about China's competitiveness in
the petroleum market and how that affects us in Nigeria and
other places.
Secretary Lawless. I think, in the first instance, it is
broader than just petroleum. It is the entire energy market and
China's requirement and its ability to look down the road and
recognize how incredibly dependent China will become--is
becoming already--on imported energy and on imported raw
materials.
This isn't just about oil. It is about uranium to fuel all
of the reactors that they are going to build for commercial
power. It is about access to raw materials, be it coking coal,
be it iron ore.
Mr. Hayes. Thank you very much. I don't want to impose on
the chairman's kind nature here.
The Chairman. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Secretary Lawless, General Breedlove, thank you
for coming to help us out this morning.
First off, I would like to ask, Mr. Secretary, if you can
make some folks available for us maybe next month before we go
into recess. A few of us are heading to China later August; and
if we are able to get the benefit of some of your expertise
from some of your staff before we headed over there, we would
very much appreciate that on a variety of issues.
I won't put you on the spot to answer now but certainly
want to look forward to that.
It is interesting, that point you made earlier about. I
think you said that the need for the Department of Defense--a
more comprehensive approach to the management of issues related
to China. Secretary Paulson has been assigned the strategic
economic dialogue. Secretary Negroponte for the State
Department is coordinating the diplomatic side of things; and I
have always been a little bit struck by DOD's approach to
China, which sometimes is not in contradiction but is different
than even within DOD, getting different messages as well about
China. So I would encourage you to follow up on if that was
just an idea thinking out loud about the DOD taking a more
comprehensive approach and sort of sorting out the policy.
The reason I ask and I want to--this is a prelude. Because
there are some questions that come up about missile defense and
whether or not we need to be concerned about China and missile
defense, and it is interesting. Because Secretary Gates at the
Shangri-La conference, in an answer to a question about China
missile defense and Japan and missile defense and Moscow and
Russia, was asked whether we have considered a similar offer of
cooperation of missile defense to the Chinese. He said, ``I
haven't thought about it. I think if the Chinese had expressed
an interest in it, we would take it seriously.''
That is on line--on page two of four of the transcript from
the Shangri-La conference.
And, again, I don't know if he was thinking out loud or
not. But if we are--you know, if we are headed that way or we
are open to that, it runs counter to some of the questions that
we have been asked here about missile defense in China. So it
would be nice for everyone to get on the same page on that
issue.
I think that as well trying to understand what you all
think the appropriate balance between--in this relationship,
especially the military relationship, would be important for
us; and I would like to have your opinion if you think China is
all about us, that is, China does things because of what the
U.S. does and we seem to be--we seem to take an approach here
that if China is investing in X, Y or Z then we necessarily
need to invest in X, Y or Z, and this will get to China's
intentions.
Do you think the PLA is more concerned about the U.S. any
more than they are with their own presence in the Asia Pacific
region? Do they get up in the morning and say what is the U.S.
doing and how do we counteract that? Or are they looking more
regionally and then, as a result, we need to then have a policy
that responds more to how they see their region vis-a-vis how
we see the region.
I know it is a complex question, but it seems to be very at
the crux of how we approach China on a military-to-military,
defense-to-defense relationship.
Secretary Lawless. I think I understand the nature of the
question.
You asked, is China all about us? I think China is all
about China. And that means that China is all about what it has
to do in a whole range of relationships: its relationship with
Japan, its future relationship with the Korean Peninsula, its
relationship with southeast Asia, the Strait of Malacca. These
are issues which China is dealing with and spending a lot of
time thinking about.
We have security commitments in the region. We have many
bilateral commitments, be it with Australia, be it with the
Philippines, treaty relationships. And we have partnerships. We
have strategic a framework agreement that has been put in
place, recently, with Singapore.
I think what we have to do is figure out where China is
coming from and how they are going at each of these individual
relationships, because each of these partners turns to us and
says what are we going to do about this or how are we going to
adjust ourselves to compensate for this situation that has
evolved.
One of the issues that I forgot to mention earlier, which
really underlines what we had to do----
Mr. Larsen. If I could, it seems in my mind it makes the
case then for reacting appropriately and not overreacting and
engaging China on any number of these issues.
Secretary Lawless. Yes, sir. That is correct.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Randy Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your willingness to
hold this hearing; and, gentlemen, thank you for being here
today. I only have five minutes. I have a couple of comments
and want to give you a few questions to give us an answer back
for the record in one answer today.
First of all, we know that China has a huge checkbook that
they have shown a willingness to use in the United States to
affect our policies, and they have been very effective in this.
I was glad to hear you and agree with you when you talked
about them developing asymmetric opportunities. Many of the
witnesses we have had over the last several years have ignored
the asymmetrical direction they are going. Also, your comments
about they are being competitive with us in several areas.
The one I disagree with you, though, is our ability in
tracking and predicting where their capabilities are going.
Over the years, as we have read reports from DOD and we have
had testimony, we have underestimated their capabilities and
their ultimate goals time and again. We missed them on subs; we
missed them on carriers; we missed them on blue-water navy.
When we look at negotiations, we are losing those negotiations
in intellectual property rights, human rights, currency issue,
access for our business, trade deficits. They are the number
one espionage problem we have in the country, according to the
Attorney General.
Three questions I would like to throw out for you to
respond to us at some date is this:
Given what we know with our history, what would be the
value to the United States of working with the Chinese to
develop an aircraft carrier, as Admiral Keating has previously
suggested, which would clearly extend to PRC's capabilities
beyond just regional affairs?
It baffles me. I hope with you can give us some answers on
it.
Second, the attorney general has testified on two occasions
before Congress that China represents the number one espionage
threat against the United States. As you know, Chinese military
strategy strongly emphasizes deception at the strategic,
operational, technical levels. How responsive can we really
expect the Chinese to be when we call for transparency with
regard to their military modernization?
Third thing is how rapidly and how effectively are they
using modeling and simulation to improve their training and to
bring about jointness in their operations and between their
services and also with their allies?
And then the question if you could answer for me today is
this one: We talked about their cybercapabilities. But to what
extent are the Chinese cyberwarfare units attacking computer
systems in the United States currently?
Secretary Lawless. Well, first of all, I commend you on
your overall presentation. There is not much there that I am
going to disagree with, even when you get the response to the
questions.
I would suggest, however, that in the response to the
questions you are probably going to have much more clarity on
what it was that Admiral Keating said and did not say.
Mr. Forbes. That is what we are looking for. We only see
what we get in print. We are going to meet with him. That is
why I asked--why it said.
Secretary Lawless. Past masters at spinning comments. That
is the Chinese, not Admiral Keating.
I think that what we really want to do is we would love to
have that discussion about cyberwarfare. There is a major
treatment of that issue in the classified annex this year. It
is probably an area where we, because of the nature of things
that we know and understand with some degree of detail, I would
rather defer a discussion to a classified venue. It is a very
important area, and I cannot stress how diligently we are
following this and attempting to understand what the
capabilities are and the intent is. But it is a very important
discussion, and we would love to have that with you in a
classified.
Mr. Forbes. We look forward to doing that.
The last thing I would suggest for your review in looking
at is this modeling and simulation aspect of it.
We have seen some very sophisticated programs that they are
coming out with; and, as you know, one of the weaknesses we
have seen with them has been their jointness and their ability
to bring that about. It looks like to us they may be using some
sophisticated modeling simulators the same way we have to try
to bring about that jointness and jointness with allies and
hope you can give us some feedback on that in a written form.
Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It seems certainly that dialogue with China to try to
minimize misunderstandings and misapprehensions, if there might
be any, would be appropriate; and it take two to tango. So it
seems like we have been reaching out and we have not been
getting the kind of feedback or response back that we would--
that we would like; and, meanwhile, the continued investment of
China in its military infrastructure continues to escalate.
So the question becomes what does the United States of
America do in response? And it can certainly embark--certainly
intelligence is important in our ability to respond
appropriately. But respond we must.
So I am concerned--in your statement, Secretary Lawless,
you say that, on page three, at present, China's ability to
sustain power at a distance remains limited. So I am concerned
about our--I am concerned about, you know, helping China
acquire aircraft carriers. I am concerned. I wonder why would
that be a topic of discussion? Why would we think that that
would be appropriate to do that? What kind of strategy are we--
I mean, what underlies the strategy for that proposal? I wonder
about that.
And I am also wanting to know from you a little bit more
about the aircraft carriers that China has now. I thought I saw
something in the statement and heard you say something, but I
can't find it. So if you would tell me a little bit about that,
I would appreciate it.
Secretary Lawless. Obviously, in the one request for a
written response, we will be discussing the aircraft carriers
exchange that Admiral Keating recently had. It was not a
proposal by Admiral Keating to assist them in any regard with
relation to aircraft carriers. It was an observation on his
part the way we have gone back and deconstructed it with him.
It was an observation on his part that if that is your
intention to build a blue-water navy and to have a carrier
battle group and have a carrier as the center of that battle
group, you may be underestimating by a long shot your ability
to do that and you are underestimating the complexity required
to field such a capability.
I think it was more of a suggestion that they needed to
understand what it is they were taking on and how complicated
and costly and what an actual challenge that would be to them.
That is my understanding of the dialogue.
To me, it makes absolutely no sense whatsoever to have a
discussion with the Chinese beyond that, except that if they
are going to build such a capability we would like to
understand what the intent of it is. Is the intent to project
power? Is the intent to----
Mr. Johnson. What could be the intent other than to project
power in the long range?
Secretary Lawless. There is a number of explanations for
that aircraft carrier being used or being modernized or
whatever use they put to that particular ship that has been the
focus of a lot of attention to the Viog. That was, as I
believe, it was a Kuznetsov class carrier in the Russian navy--
excuse me, in the navy of the former Soviet Union. So it was
really the peak of the Soviet Union's building program to equip
themselves with a true aircraft carrier. So there is a huge
amount of attention focused on that.
I think the Chinese could actually be looking at that ship
for purposes of developing the ability to target U.S. aircraft
carriers. It is a very reasonable and logical conclusion as to
why they are spending so much time and attention on that vessel
as they are.
As a closing comment, let me just say in every recent
interaction that our people have had, senior military leaders
and civilian officials, it is very clear that the Chinese
intend--it is their intention over the long term to build a
blue-water navy and to have at the center of that blue-water
navy a carrier battle group just as we have.
So they definitely are moving in that direction, and they
have made it pretty clear to us that is where they are going.
We need to think about that, and we need to think hard about
that.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I have a friend here with me this morning.
General Philip Breedlove is a precious, beloved friend and also
the former commander of Luke Air Force Base; and he happens to
be pretty unique in another way. I have only been in a full
360-degree loop in an F-16 one time, and he was at the
controls. So there is a just a lot of respect and admiration
for this man. I believe him to be a true champion of human
freedom; and I think as long as we have generals, officers like
him in our Air Force that there is still a lot of hope for the
future for mankind.
So I hope I have put that the right way, but I really
wanted to welcome you, General, to be here, and I can't even
begin to apologize for missing your opening comments and the
Secretary's here this morning. It was unavoidable, to say the
least.
But I, again, welcome both of you here.
I know that we have had a lot of discussion related to
China's asymmetric capability, especially some of their
adventures in ASAT in the space directions. I will tell you,
not to involve you in the interesting political machinations of
this committee, but we just came through the process of the DOD
authorization bill, and we debated here in this committee this
Space Test Bed, and, unfortunately, that has been zeroed out
for the time being, and I am very concerned about that.
And without involving you in the political machinations any
more than is necessary, given China's superior numbers and
their military computer technology or technologists, as it
were, and people that work on their military computer
capability, it seems like that could be a fairly vulnerable
area for us, and that has been suggested already here.
General, could I ask you to--I know that is a little out of
your lane, but could I ask you to address it first and then the
Secretary?
General Breedlove. Well, sir, thank you for your kind
remarks. It was as much fun for me as it was for you, I think,
the flying.
Mr. Franks. I think it was more fun for you, General.
General Breedlove. Sir, we clearly are a military, as has
been mentioned by several members, that is dependent on joint
warfare. Joint warfare means netcentric warfare sharing
information, and I believe this goes back to the discussion we
have had several times today that the Chinese look for those
asymmetric ways to dig into our capabilities and they have seen
and watched. They watched the Desert Storm. They have watched
every war we have done since that time and how our information
capability to target and to see and perceive our enemy is key
our warfighting capability.
I think it is pretty clear to know that they are going to
go after our ability to do that; and, as has been mentioned, we
see that as a unique opportunity for them to attack us
asymmetrically.
Mr. Franks. Spoken like a general of the Air Force.
Secretary, do you have anything to add to that?
Secretary Lawless. Actually, no. I am going to enlist
General Breedlove on the policy side of the equation. That was
a very comprehensive response on that.
No, not really.
Mr. Franks. This committee a year and a half or two ago was
briefed by the Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Commission; and up
until that time, a lot of us, including myself, had relegated
the EMP threat as more like an asteroid hitting the earth. It
would be really bad if it happened, but the chances of it
happening are pretty low.
But I have to tell you a lot of us, including myself,
became much more concerned as we looked at the Chinese
development of EMP, especially as it relates to protecting or
being--having an offensive capability and our inability to
protect Taiwan against such a weapon if it were deployed. It
might be something that would neutralize our fleet there pretty
dramatically.
Do you think that we are--if we can answer it in a non-
classified setting, are we addressing that in a capable way
from your position?
And, General, I direct the question to you first again.
General Breedlove. Yes, sir. I would--I am unprepared to
address specific EMP. I would just say that maybe we would need
to conduct dialogue with Taiwan as far as their internal
efforts first and their defense spending and the trend in their
defense spending and then address this specific problem with
them in those discussions.
I will defer to the Secretary further on that.
Secretary Lawless. I believe, sir--to come back to your
question, I believe that we really would be able to give you a
very comprehensive answer in a more secure venue than the one
we have here today, in a classified briefing.
That said, taking note of Taiwan's vulnerability and indeed
anyone that is dependent on an information society as we all
are, one of the things that we have stressed to the folks in
Taiwan is their requirement to harden their infrastructure and
the fact that their infrastructure or the infrastructure of any
advanced country is, obviously, very vulnerable to disruption.
So it is part of an ongoing dialogue about defensive
measures to harden and back up their infrastructure because of
the threat that we see growing very significantly to that
infrastructure.
Mr. Franks. I am sorry. We are out of time.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
The Chairman. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you very much. I want to thank the
witnesses for their helpful testimony.
I want to ask a specific question, Secretary Lawless. There
were press reports last October that the Kitty Hawk had a
surprise visitor. A Chinese submarine surfaced within firing
range, and it seemed like that would have been a pretty stiff
test of the military-to-military relationship between our two
countries in terms of whether or not there was any follow-up or
communication in the wake of that incident. And I was wondering
if you have had any comments about whether or not we can
decipher any intent also from that incident?
Secretary Lawless. A very appropriate observation and
question, I might suggest.
We have been in a process--and, again, we mentioned this in
our report again this year--a process with China, I believe,
for over 20 years attempting to have an agreement, an military
maritime consultation agreement (MMCA) agreement which really
talks about safety at sea, talks about communications
protocols, talks about how you preempt any conflict at sea or
misunderstanding at sea; and that dialogue and the desire to
reach agreement with China, as we have every other seafaring
nation in the world, has been a very frustrating experience.
The reason it has been a frustrating experience is because,
until very recently, China overlaid that dialogue with a policy
issue. That is the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
economic zone issue and different interpretations as to their
rights within their own EEZ. I will tell you this: We recently
reached agreement with China that we would take the policy
component of that out and put it to the side so that we could
actually have a discussion about MMCA and about these types of
issues.
The surfacing of that Song-class submarine in the proximity
of the Kitty Hawk underlined and reinforced our entire 20 years
of discussion with the Chinese as to why we need mechanisms to
be able to deconflict, and that very easily could have
developed into an ugly situation for the simple reason that we
didn't have those procedures in place and still don't today.
So we have an incremental improvement in the MMCA area that
is mentioned in the annual report, but we are a long way from
having the type of dialogue to prevent situations like that at
sea.
And one last point, as China reaches out and fields a blue-
water capability and surges those submarines and those other
ships out into areas where they are going to encounter large
U.S. battle groups or whatever, we are going to see that issue
repeated time and time again. So it is essential that China
understand the requirement to deconflict and have these
understandings in places. Right now, we don't have that
agreement with them.
Mr. Courtney. Any speculation about what was going on
there? Was it somebody sort of hot-dogging or was it just an
accidental coincidence?
General Breedlove. I think--I hate to interrupt, but I
think there is one positive to take away from this.
From our incident in 2001 with the EP-3 and the fighter, we
saw what some have characterized as some undisciplined actions
by the pilot which resulted in the loss of a fighter in this
instance. While I am not a naval man, in the air we have
certain rules of the road. In the water, there are also rules
of the road. And our naval folks tell us that the one positive
of the incident is that the sub commander surfaced
appropriately in accordance with peacetime signals for a
peaceful surfacing.
So at least we take away that there was responsible action
on the part of the sub commander, not addressing the military
piece but at least the rules of engagement.
Mr. Courtney. Again, I just want to actually quickly follow
up with Congresswoman Davis' question that she couldn't ask,
which is about our efforts to try and change China's policy
toward the Sudanese government regarding military transfers and
their lack of response to the terrible genocide happening in
Darfur.
Secretary Lawless. My comment would be, in the first
instance, of course, this is a State Department issue, but it
is hard to ignore the fact that obviously China places a
premium on its relationship with Sudan and obviously is trying
to develop a very, very close relationship in the area of
energy. And part and parcel of that is China's supplying Sudan
with weapons.
One of the issues that I think there is some agreement on
is they will attempt to deconflict that weapons program with
the Darfur activities. That said, I am not very sure how much
ground we have gained with the Chinese in making them
appreciate the other issues we have with Sudan, and I think it
is a very good example of China's determination--or
inclination, excuse me, to put energy as a priority in their
national component over the interests of other issues that we
might find important, particularly in the case of Sudan. It is
really the poster child for that whole issue.
The Chairman. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.
Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and, General and Mr.
Secretary, thank you very much for being here today.
I am very interested in our relationship with China and how
we are working together to combat terrorism and proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction.
On my visits to Beijing, I have actually been impressed to
find out there is a realization we have a common enemy there.
That is, terrorists who want to destroy modern civilization.
Could you tell us what progress has been made, what challenges
exist and what more can be done to work together?
Secretary Lawless. I actually think there has been progress
in this area; and I think the progress is manifested by their
eagerness to cooperate on the anti-terrorism frontier, sharing
information and whatever.
I think the sharper interest we have relates to
proliferation and particularly in our dialogue with the Chinese
related to nuclear ballistic missile proliferation and to the
extent to which China may be enabling other countries that
would perhaps fall into the category of rogue states to
proliferate and build systems that are destabilizing.
So I think while there has been some level of improvement
on the counterterrorism front, there are still other
initiatives where China has been invited to the table but has
elected not to show up, particularly the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI).
The Proliferation Security Initiative, as you know, is an
ad hoc arrangement whereby the stated purpose of it is to
cooperate, to deny or preempt the ability of people to ship
weapons of mass destruction or components or enablers thereof.
We would have liked to see China show up at PSI and
participate.
On the other side of the equation, they are involved in the
container initiative, and I think there is a pretty robust or
decent dialogue with regards to that particular initiative. So
it is a mixed message where there is room for a huge amount of
improvement.
General Breedlove. Yes, sir. I wouldn't want to alter what
the Secretary has said, but I would just like to harken back to
something he did mention before.
One of the areas we would like to see some improvement on
has sort of been the international relations piece. As he
mentioned, the Shanghai Corporation Organization did work to
block our U.S. basing in Kyrgyzstan; and that was not helpful
to our war on the terror. So there are places, as the Secretary
has said, where we have a mixed record; and we would like to
address those areas.
Mr. Wilson. I appreciate you pointing that out. Because it
would appear that we should be working together more closely,
but specifically Kyrgyzstan needed to be raised.
Additionally, I have had the extraordinary opportunity to
visit North Korea and South Korea with the Six-Party Talks. It
always has struck me that it is in China's interest of
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the stability of
the Korean Peninsula that they would benefit most, but they
also are the superior and only, virtually, benefactor of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).
How effective are they currently in the Six-Party Talks?
Secretary Lawless. That is--I think the record is mixed.
By and large, we give the Chinese due credit for enabling
the entire process, hosting the entire process, convincing the
North Koreans to show up when there is a meeting; and China has
delivered on that aspect of the program, that is, as a host or
moderator or enabler for the overall discussions.
I personally believe, having sat through every single Six-
Party session, that China needs to be a little bit more
declaratory with regard to its concerns.
And, in that regard, you are correct that China remains the
single most important, the overwhelming supplier, enabler of
North Korea. So, in that regard, one would think that China has
leverage it has not elected to use to date. And I think that is
a consensus position, and I think that is what is our--our goal
is that China becomes more active vis-a-vis North Korea, given
the inherent leverage they possess in the issue.
Mr. Wilson. In conclusion, I want to thank you for your
efforts; and I just can't reiterate enough that it seems like,
to me, mutually beneficial to China, the United States and so
on, the entire Korean Peninsula that there be a real effort to,
even without regime change, to have the countries that work
together.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Taylor, the gentleman from Mississippi.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here.
Mr. Secretary, in your remarks, you quote the 2006 QDR that
says, ``China has the greatest potential to compete militarily
with the United States; and field destructive military
technologies that could over time alter traditional U.S.
military advantages.''
Now that is a document that comes from the Bush
Administration, a report to Congress. Given that the Bush
Administration is saying this, how would you explain that the
President's remarks seem to have almost tunnel vision toward
Iran and al Qaeda? If the threat is China, why doesn't the Bush
Administration say why don't we have free trade with China
instead of focusing on Iran and al Qaeda?
To the best of my knowledge, al Qaeda doesn't have an
aircraft feet, doesn't have a naval fleet, doesn't have mass
armies, doesn't have nuclear weapons. The Chinese have all of
these things. The Bush Administration QDR is the one that says
they are the threat, and yet the President seems to be focused
over here when this document says maybe we ought to be looking
over there.
Secretary Lawless. I think the QDR, as presented, did
address the priority of combating international terrorism. The
particular portion of the QDR that we are referring to here
discusses the emergence of strategic competitors, and it
doesn't make any judgment with regard to where China will
eventually go. It simply says that we have identified China,
given the industrial base we have discussed here today and a
number of other issues, has the potential--and I think I would
underline that piece in the QDR--to field disruptive
technologies. That is a fact. The potential is there.
Similarly, in that same document, we talk about China as a
potential peer competitor; and the reason we are doing that is
we are saying that there are a number of choices in front of
the Chinese leadership that they have to make, we only have
limited control over those choices, and that it will happen
over a multi-generational process as China continues to develop
its capabilities and its economic power.
We are acknowledging China as a possible peer competitor.
It certainly is a peer competitor of the United States in many
economic fields today, and it will be in the future in more
areas, and eventually it will be a peer competitor in the field
of national security and military technology and its
capabilities.
I think in the QDR, taken as a whole, puts China in the
position of emerging peer competitor. It makes no judgments as
to whether attending that issue is more important than dealing
with al Qaeda or international terrorism; and, actually, it is
quite balanced in that it says we are not prepared to make a
judgment as to where China may end up on that spectrum of
possibilities.
So the QDR as a whole, that language is very carefully
chosen within the context of a nation state peer competitor, as
opposed to international terrorism.
I can't give you a better answer than that, other than to
say I think the QDR is very balanced.
Mr. Taylor. Walk me through something.
I have been in China maybe four hours, but Shanghai looked
a lot more modern than New York. It is my understanding it is a
secular society that actually goes out of their way to
downgrade pollution. It is a society where they have forced
abortions. Strikes me as something that is the antithesis of a
fundamentalist Muslim. How is it that they have dodged the
wrath of al Qaeda?
Secretary Lawless. It would be very difficult for me to
give you a definitive answer on that. I don't believe there is
a large Muslim population with which they have to deal. There
is a Muslim population there. They have had their problems in
the far west of the country where there is a Muslim majority.
There is actually an organization out there that I believe we
have designated that has been universally designated as a
terrorist organization, I believe.
So it isn't that they have dodged altogether the bullet. I
think that the problems they have internally with regard to
terrorism are very contained geographically and that they have
just simply found a way to manage that threat over the years.
But I don't think that they are ready to rest on their
laurels. They appear to be very concerned about the threat of
terrorism; and they have got the Olympics coming up, as you
know, where there is a venue there for international terrorism
to manifest itself.
So China has a problem. The problem is at least under
control, I believe. But they have a problem.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A couple of quick questions here.
The first thing is we have had some briefs from the Navy,
particularly as it relates to the situation with China and the
importance of network-centric warfare and that being the future
where we need to be going with our forces.
Is there any program to develop that that is parallel to
the future combat systems, parallel to that in the Army, or is
the thinking that maybe some of that software and that
communications discipline could be cross-supplied to the
Marines or the Navy as well?
General Breedlove. Sir, I will take a stab.
I think I understood your question, and let me just quickly
rephrase it to make sure I don't answer it incorrectly. Are you
asking are we taking a look at the progress they are making in
netcentric warfare and applying it to our military?
Mr. Akin. Yes. And my question was, do you have your own
parallel effort going on toward network-centric warfare in the
Navy, or are you waiting to say maybe we can cross-apply it and
just take some of the software or maybe something else?
I guess maybe my question is, what is your action to move
us into more of a network-centric force in the Navy relative to
this situation in China?
General Breedlove. Sir, I would give you my assessment. I
am an Air Force officer, so that limits my visibility into the
Navy a little bit.
I would tell you that, as an Air Force officer, especially
dealing in the aero warfare piece, the Navy is absolutely net
warfare centric, and they are lashed in completely with both
Army air defense and U.S. Air Force netcentric warfare. In
fact, the Aegis cruiser is an incredible example of netcentric
warfare and the capability to control and communicate across
nets.
So my exposure to the Navy and netcentric warfare is they
are extremely good; and my appraisal of the Chinese effort,
especially as it pertains to their army, navy, and air force,
is they are decades behind us at this point in netcentric
warfare.
If we have an asymmetric advantage, that would be the
asymmetric advantage.
Mr. Secretary, any----
Secretary Lawless. No. I agree with that comment, but I
think it is important to stress that in every instance where we
have a disadvantage China has done a very good job of assessing
exactly where they stand vis-a-vis the United States and has
embarked upon a very aggressive program of becoming that
centric, understanding it, and integrating their forces.
This is a big issue for them. They are spending a lot of
time and money on it. My prediction would be, given the
underlying strength of the telecommunications and the Internet
activity and computer technology in China, they are going to be
able to close that perhaps multi-generational gap very quickly;
and that is our concern.
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
Another aspect of what China's interest has been in doing
is, in various ways, is to deny us access to certain regions,
particularly around Taiwan, is my understanding; and they have
different techniques for doing that. One of them, of course, is
asymmetric threats just in general on computers, I suppose.
Another one is the Sunburn missile. Do we have a response to
that at this point? Is that still a significant threat or can
we stop those at this point or is that classified?
Secretary Lawless. It is classified, but just let me say
one of the elements of this year's China military power per the
unclassified version is not just a discussion of Sunburn. It is
a discussion of Sizzler as well, which is the submarine-
launched anti-ship cruise missile, plus a whole range of land-
based and aircraft-based anti-ship missile.
So this is an area in which the Chinese, as you have
observed, are spending a huge amount of effort as part of the
area of denial or access-denial programs.
I think we would be able to treat your question very
effectively in a closed session.
General Breedlove. Sir, just to add a small piece.
In the report, the unclassified report, there are clearly
depictions of not only these missiles but the air defense
missiles and all of these systems overlapping in an area of
denial, access denial mode that reaches clearly to Taiwan; and
that is concerning to us as it is, obviously, to you, sir.
Mr. Akin. And then I guess the next piece of it is the
submarine component.
I understand--I have to leave that question for another
day.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Before I ask Ms. Bordallo, Mr. Secretary, let me ask you in
general, regarding the P-3 incident, which I believe was 2001,
the USS Kitty Hawk incident on October 26th, 2006, and the
Chinese successful anti-satellite test January 11 of 2007, can
you, in your understanding and study of China, ascribe any
general intent to send any type of messages to the rest of the
world within those three incidents?
Secretary Lawless. If that was the intent, we certainly
have not found a common thread.
I would suggest, rather than carefully calculated intent,
what we saw in each of those three cases was a demonstration of
capability.
In each case--not in the EP-3 incident in which an aircraft
rammed our plane by challenging it in what was called the so-
called EEG zone of China, but particularly in the other two
areas, the Kitty Hawk incident and the direct ascent anti-
satellite missile test, what you have is a China that is
developing very impressive either anti-access in the case of
the submarine or particularly asymmetric capabilities in the
case of the anti-satellite test, developing very impressive
capabilities and being willing, if not eager, to demonstrate
those capabilities both to us and to their own people.
There is an issue here also of being confident about their
own capabilities, and the level of confidence that the Chinese
have in their growing capabilities is another issue of
significant concern to us.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank
you, Secretary Lawless. It is good to see you again. And I want
to thank you for your very important role in the transferring
of the Marines from Okinawa to Guam. And to you, General,
welcome.
The efforts on the People's Republic of China to improve
its military capabilities, particularly its ability to project
force in the Pacific, are of particular concern, naturally, to
me and my constituents. As you well know, Guam is located just
over 1,000 miles from the Chinese mainland, and the recent
report from the Department of Defense on China's military power
has attracted a significant amount of attention back home. I am
also the co-chair of the Congressional China Caucus, along with
my colleague from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, so I am very interested
in the military capabilities in China.
So my question to you, Mr. Secretary, is this. As you know,
the military buildup on Guam is moving forward, particularly
with the announcement of Japan's authorizing of $6 million in
funding for the buildup. The recent DOD report highlights the
increased military spending by the Chinese. So to what extent
does the increased Chinese military spending impact the
military buildup on Guam?
Secretary Lawless. I think that as we have discussed with
you in your office, and as we have discussed in our
interactions on Guam, and with the Governor and his people and
the Senate on Guam, the changes that we are making to Guam is
part and parcel of the process that began in 2002 with global
basing and our reassessment of our global basing requirements.
The idea of devoting much more attention to Guam, again, is
part of a reposturing that we believed was necessary in the
Western Pacific. It has to do not only with the relocation of
certain capabilities from Okinawa and a broader distribution of
those capabilities that is the Marine force, it also has to do
with some very important buildup, as you know, of U.S. Air
Force and U.S. Naval capabilities on Guam. We believe that we
need to balance our forces a little bit more carefully in the
Pacific.
That is part of the Guam buildup. But we also need--Guam is
United States territory, and it is very appropriate that if we
are going to expand our capabilities in the Western Pacific and
demonstrate to our allies, to our partners, and to other
interested parties that we are a Pacific power, and we are
determined to stay in Asia, Guam is a very good place for us to
do that from. It is U.S. territory, it is ours, and we are in
Asia to stay.
So I would suggest there is both a military aspect to the
buildup on Guam, a very necessary military aspect. There is
also a psychological issue with our commitment to Guam and
Guam's role in the greater U.S. posture in Asia and the
Pacific. So we certainly appreciate the fine hospitality and
the great relations that we enjoy with the people of Guam.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, and I do
want you to know that we are looking forward to this buildup.
The next question I have is the U.S. Navy recently
announced that the USS Buffalo, a Los Angeles-class fast attack
submarine, will be home ported in Guam. This will replace the
other one where there was an accident. There have also been
discussions about utilizing new piers at the Naval Base Guam
for maintenance and resupply of aircraft carriers. Are there
additional military capabilities that are being considered for
placement on Guam that would provide additional security to
counter the increased Chinese military buildup that you know
of?
Secretary Lawless. Yes. We are very much aware of the
dynamics of the range rings that are in that book and where
Guam sits within those range rings of different Chinese
ballistic missile capabilities. Obviously, the buildup on Guam
is multifaceted, it is a dynamic and ongoing process, and I
think we will continue to assess what the needs of Guam are in
defending our presence there and defending the people of Guam.
So you can be sure that we literally meet once every two
weeks at a steering committee within the Pentagon to decide how
the Guam buildup is moving forward and what we need to do
differently. So rest assured that we have this issue in hand
and we are very mindful of the requirements of Guam.
Ms. Bordallo. And I do have just a second part of that
question. The lack of transparency in China's accounting for
military spending. It seems that the Department of Defense is
taking a new tack in its talks with China and ramped down the
rhetoric about transparency in China's reports. Can you
elaborate on the rationale for the change in tactics?
Secretary Lawless. We really don't see that it is a
change--we don't see this as a change in tactics. I think that
the same themes that appeared and were consistent with previous
reporting, previous China Military Power Reports, are all still
there. I think this is our seventh year in generating a report,
or at least our sixth year in generating a report. Those themes
remain pretty constant. The rhetoric regarding the military
budget, frankly speaking, has become so routine, and we have
thumped that drum so much that we thought that we simply didn't
need to spend that much time in this report beating on that
drum, and that is the only thing that I can attribute it to.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Secretary.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Cummings, the gentleman from
Maryland.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Lawless, you stated in your testimony that while Beijing has
improved its non-proliferation posture by promulgating export
controls and regulations, strengthening its oversight
mechanisms, and committing to respect multilateral arms export
control lists, at the same time China has participated in the
ongoing transfer of conventional weapons to nations such as
Iran, Sudan, Burma, Zimbabwe, and Cuba. Is China fulfilling its
obligations under the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1747,
which calls for the restraint in the sale of heavy arms and
missile technology to Iran? And what are your key concerns?
Secretary Lawless. In the implementation dialogue on 1747,
I think that we are satisfied--and again, I have to be careful
here, because I am not speaking on behalf of the State
Department, and this is their lead--I think we are satisfied
that they are making a real intention--they have the intention
of following through on 1747 sanctions. The issue is not so
much the letter of the law in China, it is China's ability and
willingness to implement the law and to constrain or restrain
individual companies that in a very freewheeling way have for a
number of years dealt with proliferators and supplied them with
a wide range of components, materials, and systems, subsystems.
And the issue for us is one of getting the Chinese, let me say,
to enforce the laws that they already have on the books with a
fairly robust enforcement mechanism, which heretofore has not
really existed.
They are doing a much better job than they have done in the
past. They are trying to enforce their own laws in this regard.
But a lot of important things continue to slip through, and we
get very disturbed when important things slip through, because
it means that China is the only supplier of a given system or
subsystem that enables a proliferator such as Iran to build a
complete system.
So you can understand the frustration. The laws are on the
books. They are making a good faith attempt to put the
legislation down. The issue is their willingness and ability to
enforce the laws they already have. And I am sorry if that is--
--
Mr. Cummings. No, no.
Secretary Lawless [continuing]. A lengthy answer.
Mr. Cummings. That is fine. While Mr. Negroponte testified
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 1, 2007,
that China has a mixed record on efforts to stem the
proliferation of weapons, especially those relating to missile
technology, and this is a follow-up on what you just said,
notably China needs to implement effectively its export control
regulations and to rein in proliferation activities of its
companies.
Mr. Lawless, you also noted in your submitted testimony
that China should do more to curtail proliferation. Has China
begun to improve its export regulations as to deter private
entities from engaging in weapons proliferation? And I take it
that--does that fall under the same category that you just
stated?
Secretary Lawless. Exactly.
Mr. Cummings. In other words, the law is there, and it is
just not adhering to them? And what can we do? I mean are our
hands tied behind our backs on this?
Secretary Lawless. No, not at all. In fact, sir, I would
suggest that it is probably not so much an act of commission on
their part as it is an act of omission. When you simply don't
enforce, and either because you don't have the mechanisms in
place to catch a given shipment--you know who your
proliferators typically are, you know what companies are
involved in these activities, because only certain companies
have the ability to ship these products. I think it is a
question of the laws are on the books by and large, it is
enforcement, and in particular enforcement at a local level.
Their regulatory and enforcement authorities may be in some
regards lacking. And so perhaps we are not giving them
sufficient credit for the things they are able to do given
their situation. But they have had enough time now, and these
proliferating companies are well known to them.
And you ask if there is anything we can do. There is
something we can do, and we do it routinely. We list the
companies as proliferators, and basically ban anyone from doing
business with them. In certain cases this has resulted in a
very negative reaction from the Chinese government, because you
have no choice but to sanction a large corporation. That
corporation may have a division over here which it does not
control that is proliferating, and we have no choice but to
sanction the entire corporation, which has happened a number of
times. So this is a very sensitive issue between the two
governments. But that mechanism does exist if we choose to use
it.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Let me, before I call on Mr.
Larsen, Mr. Secretary, if I may ask you how we, our country is
engaging with China to combat terrorism as well as
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. How are we
engaging with them? What are they doing? What are we doing? If
anything?
Secretary Lawless. I actually think we are doing a lot.
There are fora and activities which China for one reason or
another have elected not to participate in, which is a
disappointment; for example, the Proliferation Security
Initiative. There are other mechanisms that have been
established by the United Nations--the gentleman has just
mentioned United Nations Resolution 1747--in which we see every
indication that China is willing to play a proactive and
aggressive role. We have a number of interactions, all
organized and led--mostly organized and led by the State
Department, or in the case of financial issues, led by
Treasury. So you know, there is a very aggressive engagement
going on with the Chinese across several areas. They get it,
particularly on the very high value issues like nuclear
materials control. In other areas, there seems to be a
reluctance or an inability to recognize the proliferation
potential of a lot of the smaller companies. And so I think
there is a lot of room for improvement, and that is all going
to be an issue of willingness on the part of the Chinese
government to step up and just do it.
So that is sort of where we are with them. A mixed record.
Getting better, but significant challenges remain, as
Ambassador Negroponte in a very carefully worded statement has
noted.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, Secretary
Lawless and General Breedlove. Secretary Lawless, earlier in
your testimony you mentioned the defense telephone link (DTL).
And your testimony in particular says U.S. and Chinese
officials will meet in September, 2007 to finalize details of
the link. I know there has been some technical issues, like
defining who would actually answer the phone in China. But I
wanted to ask what specifically is left to discuss, to finalize
the DTL?
Secretary Lawless. I think there is a lot left to finalize
it. In fact, all we really have at this point is the comments
by Lt. Gen. Zhang in Singapore at the Shanghai Forum, on I
believe it was the 2nd of June, where he said we have made a
decision to accept the U.S. proposal, or something of that
nature. It was somewhat vague. So the first question that will
be before us in the DCTs in September is we would like to hear
that across the table formally, if not before.
Mr. Larsen. You need to hear that from General Guo or
from----
Secretary Lawless. No, I think we need to hear it in a
formal session from General Zhang. And the other thing that has
to happen is we have had teams discussing this with them,
visiting with them. I think there needs to be a much more
concrete demonstration that they are willing to throw the
switch on the telephone. And the devil is in the details. But
we would intend that by the time we meet in September that this
thing be locked up with an agreement on all the specifics of
the defense telephone link. It is very important to put that in
place. We have been waiting for four years to do it.
Mr. Larsen. Last--I forget if it was December or January,
it was either late December or early January we were there, and
in a conversation with the Minister of Defense Cao we--I
actually had the opportunity to directly ask him for an
invitation as an observer to the next joint China-Russia
exercise----
Secretary Lawless. Yes.
Mr. Larsen [continuing]. Which I recall the response being
something about the weather. In other words, it just sort of
landed and we moved on. But I was curious about whether or not
that is still something we would like to ask again, if an
opportunity arose to ask again for observer status at a joint
China-Russia exercise?
Secretary Lawless. If you get observer status could you get
us observer status?
Mr. Larsen. I may have better luck? Is that it?
Secretary Lawless. I am serious, because as you know, we
have requested observer status.
Mr. Larsen. I know. I know.
Secretary Lawless. And we have been told by each party that
it is the fault of the other party not wanting us there. So it
is sort of like a double uninvite to the event.
Mr. Larsen. Right. Okay. I got it. So I will put that on my
to do list then. Related to that is generally the East Asia
Security Summit and the EAS and whether or not--do we still see
that as something that we want to try to be a part of, or after
a couple of times they have met there doesn't seem to be much
that has come out of it? Do we see that as all that important,
as important as SCO, as important as any joint exercise between
Russia and China? Where does EAS fit in all this?
Secretary Lawless. Well, I think it fits into there is a
whole matrix of regional fora, security-related fora that is
being addressed.
Mr. Larsen. The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian
Nations) Regional Forum (ARF).
Secretary Lawless. You have the ARF, and other fora, all of
which we show up at if we are invited to come. The issue for us
has been we want any fora that is created--any forum, excuse
me, that is created to be all-inclusive. China has in the past
not been helpful in this regard, in that it would actually like
to promote venues and fora that are non-inclusive, meaning that
the United States is not part of that presentation. Other
parties that are there very much would like us to be there as
well.
Mr. Larsen. Right.
Secretary Lawless. So I think we will continue to seek out
every opportunity in every fora that presents itself to be
there, either as an observer or as a full participant. We want
to be involved. And to the degree that others don't want us to
be involved, we do not believe that is helpful.
Mr. Larsen. And a final thing is one quick question, does
the Department have any plan or desire or is there a role to
cooperate with China on security matters for the 2008 Olympics
in Beijing? And if so, what specifically would you like that
plan to be or is there a plan?
Secretary Lawless. There really is no plan. And that is
mainly attributable to the fact that China has really never
requested any assistance. And in fact, when we have broached
the subject, the response has been we got it, we will let you
know if we need any help, but we are pretty confident we can
handle it, thank you very much.
Mr. Larsen. Enjoy the basketball.
Secretary Lawless. Yes.
Mr. Larsen. Just quickly, Mr. Chairman, if you haven't
picked up Rising Star by Bates Gill, I commend it to your staff
as a great airplane read.
Secretary Lawless. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen. Sure.
The Chairman. Before I thank you, let me make a reference
to the upcoming 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. My judgment is
that all the stops are being pulled for the security for those
games. You have any comment on that whatsoever?
Secretary Lawless. No. Not other than to say that we
believe that China is assigning a very prominent role to
physical security and broader security to the games. It appears
to be taken on board by them in all of their planning. At this
time they seem very confident that they have a good handle on
it. And we will continue to offer I think across the entire
breadth of the United States Government our support and our
willingness to help them. But right now it is an offer that has
not been taken by the Chinese. And frankly speaking, I don't
think they will take it up. I think they are very confident
about what they are able to do.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you very much. This has been
an excellent hearing, and I received compliments on your
testimony from other members as they were passing. We
appreciate it. And Mr. Secretary, good luck to you in your days
ahead. And General, it is good to see you.
[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
June 13, 2007
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 13, 2007
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 13, 2007
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. In the preface of the Office of Naval Intelligence
report on China's Naval Modernization, William E. Tarry, director of
ONI's Naval Analysis Directorate wrote, ``By acquiring some of the
world's most impressive naval technologies from abroad while
simultaneously building advanced indigenous submarines, combatants and
naval aircraft, China is positioning itself to play a growing role in
regional and transregional affairs.'' What would be the value to the
United States of working with the Chinese to develop an aircraft
carrier as ADM Keating has previously suggested, which would clearly
extend the PRC's capabilities beyond just regional affairs?
Secretary Lawless and General Breedlove. [The information referred
to is classified and retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Forbes. The DoD PRC Power Report states that ``China's actions
in certain areas increasingly appear inconsistent with its declaratory
policies.'' The Attorney General has testified on two separate
occasions before Congress that China represents the number one
espionage threat against the United States. As you know, Chinese
military strategy strongly emphasizes deception at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels. How responsive can we really expect
the Chinese to be when we call for transparency with regard to their
military modernization?
Secretary Lawless and General Breedlove. [The information referred
to is classified and retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Forbes. PLA (People's Liberation Army) doctrine considers
computer network operations as a force multiplier in the event of a
confrontation with the United States or any other potential adversary.
To what extent are Chinese cyberwarfare units attacking computer
systems in the United States?
Secretary Lawless and General Breedlove. [The information referred
to is classified and retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Forbes. I understand that the PLA has developed training
systems using modeling and simulation technologies, both for individual
proficiency and to increase joint capabilities. To what extent are
these training systems being used to train the PLA and how does this
factor into the DoD assessment of the PRC's military modernization?
Secretary Lawless and General Breedlove. [The information referred
to is classified and retained in the committee files.]