    [House Hearing, 110 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                              [H.A.S.C. No. 110-9]

          EXAMINATION OF THE FORCE REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROCESS

                                   __________

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                        MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                JANUARY 30, 2007

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13

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                        MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

                         VIC SNYDER, Arkansas, Chairman
    MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts          JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
    LORETTA SANCHEZ, California          JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
    SUSAN A. DAVIS, California           THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
    NANCY BOYDA, Kansas                  WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
    PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania      JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
                   Michael Higgins, Professional Staff Member
                     John Chapla, Professional Staff Member
                       Margee Meckstroth, Staff Assistant

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                         CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
                                      2007

                                                                       Page

    Hearing:

    Tuesday, January 30, 2007, Examination of the Force Requirements
      Determination Process..........................................     1

    Appendix:

    Tuesday, January 30, 2007........................................    35
                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 2007
          EXAMINATION OF THE FORCE REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROCESS
                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking
      Member, Military Personnel Subcommittee........................     2
    Snyder, Hon. Vic, a Representative from Arkansas, Chairman,
      Military Personnel Subcommittee................................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Formica, Maj. Gen. Richard P., Director of Force Management,
      Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, Headquarters, U.S. Army; Maj. Gen.
      Stephen T. Johnson, Deputy Commanding General, Marine Corps
      Combat Development Command, U.S. Marine Corps; Michael F.
      Applegate, Director, Manpower Plans and Policy, Manpower and
      Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; Janet A. St.
      Laurent, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team,
      U.S. Government Accountability Office beginning on.............     3

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Formica, Maj. Gen. Richard P.................................    46
        Johnson, Maj. Gen. Stephen T., joint with Michael F.
          Applegate..................................................    52
        McHugh, Hon. John M..........................................    42
        Snyder, Hon. Vic.............................................    39
        St. Laurent, Janet A.........................................    65

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        Chart on the Active Component Deployment Lay-Down............    89

    Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:

        Mr. Jones....................................................    97
        Mr. Murphy...................................................    98
        Dr. Snyder...................................................    93
        Mr. Wilson...................................................    97
          EXAMINATION OF THE FORCE REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROCESS

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                               Military Personnel Subcommittee,
                             Washington, DC, Tuesday, January 30, 2007.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:02 p.m., in
    room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
          ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

        Dr. Snyder. Thank you all for being here. We are going to
    go ahead and get started.
        In the spirit of brevity, I have decided that I generally
    look smarter if I read somebody else's words, so I am going to
    read two things about why we are here today.
        One of them was written by Mr. Higgins in this very good
    document that he gave us here in which you talk about what are
    the objectives of the hearing. And he listed three: examine and
    understand the process by which the active Army and active
    Marine Corps determine their force requirements; examine the
    basis for the increase in end-strengths that accompanied the
    President's proposal to increase troop strengths in Iraq;
    understand the perspectives of an outside agency about the
    effectiveness of the force requirements determination processes
    used by the active Army and active Marine Corps.
        And the reason we are doing that--I am going to lift a
    paragraph from our Government Accountability Office (GAO) folks
    today, who, on page 15 of their written statement, say, ``In
    evaluating DOD's proposal to permanently increase active Army
    and Marine Corps personnel levels by 92,000 over the next 5
    years, Congress should carefully weigh the long-term costs and
    benefits.
        ``It is clear that Army and Marine Corps forces are
    experiencing a high pace of operations due to both the war in
    Iraq and broader demands imposed by the global war on terror
    that may provide a basis for DOD to consider permanent
    increases in military personnel levels. However, it is also
    clear that increasing personnel levels will entail significant
    costs that must be weighed against other priorities.''
        I think those two paragraphs summarize pretty much why we
    are here. We can all talk about an increase, as members of this
    committee have for several years, about why we think increases
    are necessary. There are some benefits to that. But there are
    also costs. And the purpose today is to get at how we arrived
    at those numbers.
        And, Mr. McHugh, opening statement or comments?
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the
    Appendix on page 39.]

      STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
         YORK, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

        Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to follow
    your lead with brevity. I do have a more verbose----
        Dr. Snyder. We will enter that in the record at your
    request.
        Mr. McHugh [continuing]. Written statement. Thank you. I
    appreciate that.
        And let me, first of all, restate something I tried to
    convey with probably a decided lack of eloquence in our
    organizational meeting, and that is, I wish to congratulate you
    on assumption of the chair.
        I am sorry I don't have a gavel to give you. I notice we
    are absent one. I don't know if we stole it at the time of the
    turnover or not. [Laughter.]
        Dr. Snyder. Oh, here it is.
        Mr. McHugh. Oh, there you go. But use it in good health.
        And, as I said at our previous meeting, I can't think of an
    individual who has been more involved, more concerned, and more
    proactive and productive on these matters than you. And I hope
    to be able to serve you in the role of ranking half as well as
    you served all of us in your previous stint. So I wish you the
    best.
        This is an important hearing. As you noted, Mr. Chairman,
    we have talked, and have acted actually, on this subcommittee
    and the full committee for some time on the question of end-
    strength. It cannot be an issue taken in a vacuum. There are
    costs and benefits that have to be analyzed.
        And, as much as the final number, I would like to think
    today we can talk a bit about the process that is used to try
    to determine what the proper distribution of end-strength may
    be.
        And so I commend you for calling this hearing, and I look
    forward to the input of the witnesses.
        I welcome them all, thank them for their service and for
    their presence here today.
        And with that, I would yield back to you and look forward
    to the rest of the day.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. McHugh can be found in the
    Appendix on page 42.]
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. McHugh.
        Let us get right to our witnesses.
        Our panel today is Major General Richard Formica, the
    director of Force Management and deputy chief of staff (G3) for
    the United States Army; Major General Stephen Johnson, the
    deputy commanding general of the Marine Corps Combat
    Development Command; Mr. Michael Applegate, the director of the
    Manpower Plans and Policy, Manpower and Reserve Affairs
    Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; and then, what was referred to
    as the outside agency, Ms. Janet St. Laurent, director, Defense
    Capabilities and Management Team, United States GAO.
        We appreciate you all for being here.
        Let us start with you, General Formica, with your opening
    statements.

     STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RICHARD P. FORMICA, DIRECTOR OF FORCE
    MANAGEMENT, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G3, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY;
    MAJ. GEN. STEPHEN T. JOHNSON, DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE
    CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS; MICHAEL F.
     APPLEGATE, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER PLANS AND POLICY, MANPOWER AND
    RESERVE AFFAIRS, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS; JANET A. ST.
     LAURENT, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT TEAM,
                 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

               STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RICHARD P. FORMICA

        General Formica. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of
    this subcommittee, good afternoon. As introduced, I am Major
    General Dick Formica, and I am the director of force management
    on the Army staff. As such, I am responsible for managing the
    Army's force structure and for supervising the Army's force-
    sizing process to make recommendations to our senior leaders.
        On behalf of the secretary of the Army, Dr. Francis Harvey,
    and the chief of staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, I
    welcome the opportunity to meet with you and to discuss our
    process to determine Army force requirements and to examine the
    basis for the recently proposed increase in the size of the
    Army.
        Before I begin, I would like to express the deep
    appreciation of our Army for your sustained support of our
    soldiers and civilians and their families.
        The chief of staff of the Army has testified that we are in
    a dangerous and uncertain time and that we face challenges that
    exceed the strategy that was envisioned in the Quadrennial
    Defense Review (QDR).
        Recent decisions by the President and the Secretary of
    Defense to propose growth in the armed forces would allow the
    Army to increase our capabilities to maintain the Nation's
    security and to sustain the all-volunteer force.
        The Army's force-sizing process is dictated by strategy as
    promulgated in the national security strategy and through
    various planning documents from the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, and including the QDR.
        Now, our process is also informed by current operational
    demands and lessons learned, to include rotational
    requirements, the employment of high-demand, low-density
    capabilities, and combatant commander requirements identified
    through the global force management process.
        Now, the cornerstone of our force-sizing process is called
    Total Army Analysis (TAA). And for your benefit, to my left and
    your right, at the front is a chart which describes the Total
    Army Analysis that you may be able to refer to.
        It is normally conducted every other year. And we translate
    the required capabilities into force structure across all three
    components, in the active, in the Army National Guard, and in
    the United States Army Reserve, for submission in the Army's
    Program Objective Memorandum or the POM.
        It is conducted in two phases. First, there is a force
    structure requirements determination phase, and second, a force
    structure resourcing phase.
        And the requirements phase, as I said, is determined by the
    strategy, and as a result of that strategy between the OSD and
    the services, we are given a directed number of brigade combat
    teams. And then in TAA, through modeling, we determine the
    total force structure required to support those brigade combat
    teams. The modeling is based on defense planning scenarios and
    considers requirements for smaller-scale contingencies.
        Once those force structure requirements are determined,
    then we conduct the force structure resourcing phase. In this
    phase, we compare the existing force in all three components
    against those requirements that we determined. We match
    capabilities to those requirements.
        And, in that way, we identify capabilities that we may no
    longer project to need in the future, and we identify new
    capabilities that are now required. We then identify
    opportunities to rebalance our structure to eliminate
    capability gaps.
        The result is what we call our programmed or resourced
    force and is the force structure basis, as I said, for the POM
    submission.
        Next we conduct the feasibility review. The force must be
    feasible. That is, it must be within our authorized end-
    strength. We must be able to man, equip, train, station and
    sustain that force over the program.
        In QDR 2006, the Army was required to be able to provide 18
    to 19 brigade combat teams (BCT) to meet global demands, and to
    do so, this required 70 brigade combat teams, 42 in the active
    and 28 in the Army National Guard. In TAA, we identified an
    operational force of 790,000--again, across all three
    components, active, guard and reserve--which we determined to
    be sufficient to support the 70 brigade combat teams and to
    meet global commitments.
        This past fall, the Department of Defense (DOD) reassessed
    the global strategic brigade combat team requirements needed
    for the long war and determined that the Army's enduring
    requirement would be upwards of 23 BCTs to meet global
    strategic demand. To meet that enduring requirement, we would
    need 76 brigade combat teams.
        To grow six brigade combat teams, and the requisite
    supporting forces, the Army proposes to grow by 65,000 in the
    active component and 9,000 in the reserve components. This
    growth, combined with our ongoing rebalance initiatives, will
    build strategic depth, reduce stress on the all-volunteer force
    over the long term, and meet our global strategic requirements
    for the long war.
        Again, I thank you for your support. And I look forward to
    taking your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Formica can be found in
    the Appendix on page 46.]
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you, General Formica.
        General Johnson.

               STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. STEPHEN T. JOHNSON

        General Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member McHugh, distinguished
    members of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, thank you
    for the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon to
    discuss the Marine Corps's force requirements determination
    process.
        We know that the members of this subcommittee deeply
    support our men and women in the military, and we Marines are
    grateful to you for the effective efforts that you have made on
    our behalf. Your support of our warfighters and their families
    is vital to our success and our continued readiness.
        Today is a dynamic period in the history of our country and
    of your Marine Corps. Currently, Marines are heavily engaged in
    the early battles of a long war against terrorism. Moreover, we
    believe that in the future, our Nation's security will be
    subject to a much broader range of emerging threats and
    challenges.
        Given the dynamic nature of today's times and the future
    demands on the Marines, force requirements determination claims
    a significant amount of attention and effort in the Marine
    Corps. Careful and timely planning ensures that our heavily
    committed forces are effectively organized, trained and
    equipped to meet the demands of the current warfight.
    Similarly, accurate force requirements determinations are
    extremely important to the Corps to meet the future force needs
    of the combatant commanders with ready, balanced, capable
    Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF).
        The commandant of the Marine Corps determines and manages
    his force requirements primarily through the deputy commandant
    for Combat Development and the deputy commandant for Manpower
    and Reserve Affairs. Today, senior executive Mike Applegate and
    I, representing those two deputy commandants, are prepared to
    review the Marine Corps's force requirements process with you.
        Some of the key aspects of that process I want to hit up
    front.
        First, our force requirements are derived from a top-down
    strategic guidance and also from bottom-up feed from our
    commanders who are eyeball to eyeball with Marines and missions
    in the operating forces.
        Our force requirements are balanced across the Marine Air-
    Ground Task Force, ensuring each element--air, ground,
    logistics, and command and control--are considered in every
    force requirement decision.
        Our total force structure process specifies clear
    responsibilities for planning, coordination and integration of
    our force requirements. In other words, everybody has input,
    and things are coordinated across the warfighting functions of
    the Marine Corps for our doctrine, organization, training,
    material, leadership, the facilities, and our personnel.
        Our process includes some modeling and computer analysis,
    but complements that analytical rigor with subject matter
    expert examination of our requirements--a Marine in the loop,
    if you will, to bring combat experience and operational
    judgment into the equation.
        Our process requires us to formally look at the Marine
    Corps biennially, but the system and the process is flexible
    enough to permit us to address force requirements based on
    changing guidance, commander requirements, and changing enemy
    circumstances. In reality, our process is continuous.
        I don't have to tell you that the requirements
    determination process is simply a process. But it is really
    about the people and the tools that we need in order to
    accomplish our missions.
        We are prepared to answer your questions about our people,
    their role in our process, and how we manage and care for them
    to meet the missions before us. We have submitted a statement
    for the record, and I request that it be admitted.
        Mr. Applegate and I look forward to answering your
    questions about this important business.
        Thank you.
        [The joint prepared statement of General Johnson and Mr.
    Applegate can be found in the Appendix on page 52.]
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you. All the written statements will be
    made a part of the record.
        And, Mr. Applegate, it is my understanding you don't have a
    verbal statement at this time?
        Mr. Applegate. That is right, Chairman.
        Dr. Snyder. Ms. St. Laurent.

                   STATEMENT OF JANET A. ST. LAURENT

        Ms. St. Laurent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
    committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's
    observations on (DOD) and service processes for determining
    force structure and military personnel requirements.
        The high pace of military operations in Iraq and elsewhere
    in the world have raised questions about whether the Army and
    Marine Corps are appropriately sized to meet the demands of the
    new security environment.
        My remarks today are based on a wide range of GAO studies
    and will address first the processes used by the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense and the services to assess requirements;
    second, new demands on the services resulting from the new
    security environment; and third, whether the department
    provides adequate information to support and explain military
    personnel requests.
        Now I would like to quickly summarize our observations.
        First, both OSD and the services play key roles in
    determining force structure requirements and managing
    resources. Decisions reached by OSD in the Quadrennial Defense
    Review and in budget and planning guidance often set the
    parameters within which the services can then determine their
    force requirements.
        The Army and Marine Corps have their own processes to
    assess force structure, but these generally follow the
    parameters set by OSD. For example, the 2006 QDR determined
    that the Army would have 42 active combat brigades and about
    482,000 active military personnel. These numbers are a given in
    the Army's force structure biennial review.
        A key purpose of the Army's biennial process is to
    determine the number and types of support forces and
    institutional forces, such as training units, that the Army
    needs to support its combat brigades. If total requirements
    exceed the number of authorized personnel, the Army determines
    which units to resource and where it may need to accept risk.
        Although past Army analyses identified shortfalls ranging
    from about 40,000 to 70,000 positions, the Army's most recent
    review completed in 2006 indicated that the Army's total
    requirements and available military personnel in the active and
    reserve components were about equal.
        The Marine Corps also has a process to periodically assess
    force structure needs that identifies gaps in its capabilities
    to perform new missions, make adjustments in its forces, and
    determine where to accept risk if all requirements cannot be
    fully met.
        We have not yet seen any detailed analyses supporting the
    need to increase the active Army and Marine Corps. However, we
    have discussed the proposed increases with service officials
    and obtained their perspectives on why the Secretary of Defense
    and the service chiefs are now seeking personnel increases,
    when recently completed analyses, such as the QDR, concluded
    that the Army and Marine Corps force structure was ``about
    right.''
        Based on our discussions with service officials and our
    prior work, it appears that there are a couple of key reasons
    why the services' prior analyses did not identify a significant
    mismatch between requirements and available personnel.
        First, as noted earlier, the services' prior analyses were
    completed based on guidance about end-strengths provided by the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense and combat forces, as well.
    They indicated the number of brigades, for example.
        Second, the Army and Marine Corps's earlier analyses did
    not fully consider the extent of real-world demands or the
    forces that the services are currently experiencing as a result
    of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, the Army's
    formal biennial review concluded that the Army would be able to
    provide about 18 to 19 brigades at any one time, including 14
    active and 4 to 5 national guard brigades, while the Army's
    actual global demand is currently about 23 brigades, according
    to the Army.
        Third, the Army's most recent biennial analysis did not yet
    fully consider the impact of converting from a division-based
    force consisting of 33 active brigades organized around 10
    divisions to a new force consisting of 42 active modular
    brigades. This represents a significant transformation, and our
    prior reports have questioned whether the Army would be able to
    fully staff its new modular brigades and achieve planned
    efficiencies in the institutional forces within an active end-
    strength of 482,000 personnel.
        Finally, GAO's prior work has shown that DOD has not always
    provided a clear and transparent basis for its military
    personnel requests that demonstrates how they are linked to the
    defense strategy. For example, DOD's annual reports and budget
    justification documents have not provided specific information
    to explain the basis for requested end-strength levels or
    particularly when changes are requested by the Department.
    Also, DOD's 2006 QDR report did not provide significant insight
    into the basis for its conclusion that the size of today's
    force is appropriate to meet current and projected demands.
        Looking forward, we believe it will be increasingly
    important for DOD to demonstrate a clearer link between
    military personnel requests and the military strategy,
    particularly as Congress and the Department need to weigh
    tradeoffs within the defense budget.
        Moreover, with regard to the current proposals to increase
    the Army and Marine Corps, we believe that DOD needs to be able
    to provide answers to a number of key questions, such as why
    the increase is needed to implement the defense strategy; what
    it will cost in the near-term and longer-term to pay for both
    personnel, equipment, training and facilities; and how the
    services plan to manage potential challenges in recruiting new
    personnel and equipping and training units.
        Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I will be happy to
    respond to any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. St. Laurent can be found in
    the Appendix on page 65.]
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you all for your opening comments.
        Mr. McHugh and I have sat through many hearings by this
    time that the opening statements from the chairman and ranking
    member weren't even done, so we are doing very well here today.
    [Laughter.]
        I want to formally welcome our three new members, not only
    to this subcommittee but to the Congress.
        Ms. Boyda, Mr. Murphy, and Ms. Shea-Porter, we appreciate
    you all being here with your experience and ideas, and look
    forward to working with you as time goes by.
        What I am going to do is ask questions for a few minutes.
    We will then go to Mr. McHugh. After that, we will be on the
    five-minute clock. And I would anticipate that we will go
    around more than one time here this afternoon, depending on the
    staying power of the committee members.
        I want to ask, to put in perspective, both Secretary Gates
    when he was before our committee a couple of weeks ago and then
    the President the other night used the number 92,000,
    specifically talking about a 65,000 increase in the end-
    strength for the active component of the Army and a 27,000
    increase in the active component end-strength for the Marine
    Corps.
        But in terms of where are we at today, I think when most
    Americans hear that, they think that means that the number in
    the Army and the Marine Corps today is going to go up by a
    total of 92,000 from where we are at today.
        Isn't it more accurate to say that we are, you know,
    reasonably far along with those numbers already? Where are we
    at today with regard--of those 92,000, how many are already in
    the Marine Corps and the Army on a temporary basis?
        General Formica.
        General Johnson.
        General Formica. Sir, I will respond for the Army.
        The 65,000 of growth that the President and Secretary
    referred to in the active component is measured from the
    programmed force of 482,000 that was referred to earlier, and
    that 65,000, added to the 482,000, would get you to 547,000
    active component end-strength.
        Where we are today is currently sitting at about 504,000.
    As you know, the chief of staff of the Army had requested a
    30,000 increase, and Congress had authorized that. And we have
    been able to grow the Army given that temporary increase, and
    we are currently at about 504,000 today, sir.
        Dr. Snyder. It is my understanding that means of that
    65,000, as of today, the faces in uniform, we have about 23,000
    of that 65,000 in uniform today?
        General Formica. That is correct.
        Dr. Snyder. Correct.
        General Formica. In the Army, in the active component of
    the Army. Yes, sir.
        Dr. Snyder. In the active component.
        General Johnson, my understanding is the number for you is
    about 5,400 Marines in uniform today that are going to be part
    of that 27,000. Is that the number you have?
        Mr. Applegate. Mr. Chairman, I will take that question.
        We ended fiscal year 2006 at about 180,416 end-strength,
    and we expected to end fiscal year 2007 at 181,000, before any
    talk of this end-strength increase. So our historic point is
    from the 180,000 that we ended fiscal year 2006.
        Part of the other issue is that we are only appropriated
    for 175,000, so when we see a total of a 22,000 Marine end-
    strength increase from 180,000, that we are currently at, to
    202,000, and then until the money catches up, we need the
    appropriations amount to come from the 175,000 all the way up
    finally to the 202,000, sir.
        Dr. Snyder. But just for the sake of repetition, if nothing
    else. As of today, you have a little over 5,000 of the 27,000
    Marines that Secretary Gates talked about are already in
    uniform under a temporary increase in end-strength?
        Mr. Applegate. Yes, sir.
        Dr. Snyder. Great, great.
        One of the issues that came up--Ms. St. Laurent talked
    about it and, of course, Members of Congress have talked about
    it some. I would like to hear from General Formica and General
    Johnson.
        What occurred that your approach now is different than it
    was for your respective services 12 months ago?
        Ms. St. Laurent gave some reasons why she thinks the
    numbers are different. Because this is a different picture of
    end-strength needs than we heard 12, 18, 24 months ago from
    both the Army and the Marine Corps.
        General Formica, would you start with that?
        General Formica. Yes, sir, I will.
        As was stated, we came out of the Quadrennial Defense
    Review with a recognition that the Army would need to be able
    to provide a rotational supply of 18 to 19 brigade combat teams
    on any given year. And in order to be able to do that, 70
    brigade combat teams, 42 in the active and 28 in the Army
    National Guard, would enable you to do that, with about 14 on
    any given year coming from the active component and 4 to 5 in
    the Army National Guard on a rotational basis. And 482,000
    active component soldiers and the remaining part of the
    operating force in the Army National Guard and the United
    States Army Reserve was determined by the Army to be adequate
    or sufficient to be able to support those 70 brigade combat
    teams, coming out of QDR.
        What changed is, in the fall there was a reassessment
    within DOD, initiated by the Joint Staff, as part of the global
    force management process that recognized an increased enduring
    requirement of upwards of 23 BCTs on a rotational basis for the
    Army. And that increase in BCTs required us to add or to
    propose the growth of six active component BCTs to be able to
    grow and continue rebalancing combat support brigade maneuver
    enhancement in the Army National Guard in order to be able to
    meet the requirements of the 23 BCTs.
        Dr. Snyder. And, General Johnson, if you will briefly
    answer that question, we will move to Mr. McHugh.
        General Johnson. Yes, sir.
        The Marine Corps looked this past fall--or last spring and
    summer, actually, we had a capabilities assessment session in
    which we brought a lot of folks in from across the Marine
    Corps. And we looked at what was going to be required to meet
    the threats of the future. Particularly, looking at our ability
    to balance our MAGTFs not only internally, air-ground logistics
    and command and control, but balance them across the Marine
    Corps.
        We also looked at what the combatant commanders were going
    to be facing with respect to the irregular warfare in the
    future and looked at the guidance contained in the national
    security strategy, defense strategy, and so forth, QDR, and
    looked for ways to recommend to the commandant how we could
    improve the Corps in the future.
        This fall, when the requests were made for us to identify
    what we thought we would need in the future, some of the
    findings that we had recommended to the commandant were
    available to him to draw on. We looked at primarily our role,
    our capability to provide balanced capability to the combatant
    commanders in the future and also the desire to take a look at
    the deployment to dwell ratio that we currently are
    experiencing.
        Those were the two key things that have changed and enabled
    us to go forward and make the recommendation that we did for an
    increase of 27,000.
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you, General Johnson.
        We have had several hearings so far this year already on
    the situation in Iraq and others, and I think hands-down the
    award for most insightful questions goes to my partner, Mr.
    McHugh. [Laughter.]
        So, Mr. McHugh.
        Mr. McHugh. Well, that string will probably end right here,
    Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]
        But I appreciate the comment.
        I would like to look at the QDR a little bit differently,
    and numbers are obviously important. But when we come down to
    the final analysis, the issue really is how many feet and how
    many boots do we have on the ground out there, particularly for
    you two gentlemen.
        But when the Members of Congress and, I think, the general
    public talk about QDR and defense strategy, they tend to talk
    about missions more than numbers.
        Is my recollection correct that when we talked about the
    2006 QDR the missions objective was to be able to fight an
    Operation Enduring Freedom-Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF-OIF)-
    type engagement with a near-simultaneous regime change? Is that
    correct?
        General Formica. That is correct, sir.
        Mr. McHugh. Looking at the fact that we are now engaged in
    an OEF-OIF engagement, and we are not at the present time
    engaged in a near-simultaneous regime change, how do we justify
    this new plus-up as being adequate to the QDR?
        General Formica. Sir, our assessment in the Army is that
    the requirements that we currently are required to meet and
    anticipate having to meet in the future, based on our lessons
    learned during the OIF and OEF, is that we cannot meet the
    current dwell times with the force that we have now, and the
    projected force that came out of the TAA and the 70 brigade
    combat teams that was projected in QDR to be able to meet the
    mission was inadequate.
        Mr. McHugh. Once you are through the 7,000-a-year projected
    increase to the Army and--I believe the Marine Corps is 5,000?
        General Johnson. Yes, sir.
        Mr. McHugh. Will you be able to meet the 2006 QDR and meet
    dwell times in the United States Army?
        General Formica. Sir, we believe----
        Mr. McHugh. Under current projections.
        General Formica. Under the current projection with 76
    brigade combat teams and growth in combat support brigades
    maneuver enhancements in the Army National Guard, it is our
    projection that we will be able to get dwell times approaching
    a 1:2 in the active component BCTs.
        Mr. McHugh. Approaching?
        General Formica. Yes, sir.
        Mr. McHugh. How far are we approaching it?
        General Formica. I don't have exact numbers.
        Mr. McHugh. Ballpark.
        General Formica. Just short of 1:2. Just short of.
        Mr. McHugh. Okay.
        General Johnson.
        General Johnson. We believe that the increase, if approved,
    over the course of the 5 years would enable us to reach a 1:2
    dwell time. It would give us the capability to have time for
    our forces to be able to adequately rest and also train, to be
    able to focus more on some of the missions that are not--
    training that is not being done now as a result of this
    constant flow to the counterinsurgency fight.
        And we believe that the initial--the way we would lay out
    the growth would be so that the units that are most hard-
    pressed would be the first in 2007 and 2008 to be the ones that
    we would seek to apply forces to.
        Mr. McHugh. I don't want to put words in the report or the
    mouth of Ms. St. Laurent and the work that GAO did, but I
    believe what I heard her say is that, as you go through your
    process of determining force structure and ultimately end-
    strength, the guidance from OSD is highly determinative. That
    is a reality of budget. I understand that.
        As I listened to you respond to the chairman's question
    about what changed, I almost got the impression that the
    combatant commanders all of a sudden realized something they
    didn't realize in 2006.
        In the new estimates were the combatant commanders'
    requests and projections far greater than what was
    determinative of the 7, and then 70, now 76 brigades before
    that?
        General Formica. Sir, I----
        Mr. McHugh. I am trying to understand how determinative OSD
    is, and how much the budget plays here, and how much risk we
    are buying or not buying actually, I guess.
        General Formica. Sir, I would like to start by clarifying
    my last comment----
        Mr. McHugh. Sure.
        General Formica [continuing]. And my previous answer to
    your question.
        With the addition of combat support brigades in the Army
    National Guard, we believe we will reach a 1:2 dwell for
    brigades to meet that requirement.
        Mr. McHugh. After five years.
        General Formica. And I wanted to clarify that answer.
        Mr. McHugh. Okay. Thank you, General.
        General Formica. Sir, there was a reassessment done, as I
    said, in the fall as part of the global force management
    process that identified that the enduring requirement was going
    to be 23 BCTs----
        Mr. McHugh. I don't mean to be rude, but I want to get to
    my colleagues, and I have used far too much time.
        I understand the process. Well, I am not so sure I do.
    [Laughter.]
        But I recognize the structure of the process. But I am
    interested in what the different, if any, calculations were of
    the combatant commanders that produced that change.
        General Formica. Sir, I can't speak to the assumptions of
    the combatant commanders. I can only report that in the global
    force management board there was recognition that the
    requirements on the Army for brigade combat teams was an
    enduring requirement and that assumptions that it was going to
    be reduced changed.
        Mr. McHugh. So I just want to make sure I understood you.
    You have no information as to what the combatant commander
    request was in that process.
        General Formica. Sir, I know what the total requirement was
    for the Army from the combatant commanders, but I did not
    participate in the process with----
        Mr. McHugh. Okay. Thanks.
        General Formica [continuing]. From each combatant
    commander.
        Mr. McHugh. I appreciate it.
        General.
        General Johnson. Well, the QDR results put us at an end-
    strength of 175,000. And we believed at the time that it needed
    to be a greater end-strength. And when the opportunity was
    presented this fall to come back with another assessment, I
    believe the assessment was that we could do a better job for
    the combatant commanders.
        Not that their requirements had changed, because I think
    those were fairly well understood. But as some of the 7,500
    plan evolved, as part of the emerging theater security
    cooperation planning evolved, we believed that a larger force,
    more balanced MAGTF could provide them better capability than
    we had indicated previously.
        Mr. McHugh. You Marines had a somewhat different starting
    point on that I recall, so I appreciate that. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. McHugh.
        Mr. Kline.
        Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, gentlemen and lady, for being here.
        General Johnson, it is nice to be with somebody who is a
    graduate of those fine institutions of higher education,
    Amphibious Warfare School and the Army War College, so you are
    starting at sort of a different plane here.
        I am going to get to the Army in just a second, but let me
    start with the Marine Corps.
        When you are making these plans, we are talking about, in
    the case of the Marine Corps, an increase in the end-strength
    of the active Marine Corps. How much in this force generation
    did you count on the participation of the Marine Corps Reserve?
        General Johnson. The end-strength request that we have made
    is focused on the active force, as you know.
        Mr. Kline. Right.
        General Johnson. And we are looking at the reserve now. The
    reserve end-strength is 39,600, and we are looking at it.
        We haven't made recommendations to the commandant yet about
    changing the Marine Corps Reserve. Our goal is to have a 1:5
    deployment dwell ratio with the reserve. And we feel that they
    continue to demonstrate that they reinforce and augment our
    active forces effectively.
        So I don't have an answer for you, Congressman, as far as
    where it will go. We think it is about right, but we are still
    taking a look at it.
        Mr. Kline. All right. It is a very different concept than
    what the Army uses with the Army National Guard and the Army
    Reserve so, if time allows, I may come back. But I want to turn
    to the Army now.
        When you were doing your force modeling and force
    projection and force computations, you purposely and actively
    included the Army National Guard. When you start telling us
    about how many brigade combat teams we have, we will have, we
    won't have in the active reserve, you have already factored in
    to the employment of the United States Army use of the Army
    National Guard.
        General Formica. That is correct, sir.
        Mr. Kline. Is that right? And you reached that, at one
    point it was 14 and 4, I think----
        General Formica. Yes, sir, if I may?
        Mr. Kline. Yes, please.
        General Formica. It is 14 in the active, and that is 1
    deployment and 2 turns back----
        Mr. Kline. Right.
        General Formica [continuing]. At 42 gets you the 14 per
    rotation and the Army National Guard factored at 1 deployment
    and 5 turns back gets you about 4 to 5 at 28.
        Mr. Kline. And 14 and 4, is that the model we are moving to
    or that is----
        General Formica. Sir, that was where we came out of----
        Mr. Kline. All right. So what are we going to now?
        General Formica. It would be 48 in the active component and
    28 in the Army National Guard to get your 76 brigade combat
    teams, plus we will continue the rebalance effort that we have
    in the Army National Guard with the brigade combat teams to the
    combat support brigades designed for maneuver enhancement with
    infantry units assigned. And we will grow those in the Army
    National Guard, as well.
        Mr. Kline. Okay. Thank you.
        Just as a matter of comment and opinion, I still think that
    the United States Army is relying too heavily on the reserve
    component. I think that is a trend that we have seen throughout
    Operation Iraqi Freedom certainly. And it concerns me a little
    bit that we still have what I think is a heavy reliance,
    programmed right in, to deployment of the reserve component.
        I am happy to see that it is at least a one to five, but I
    would argue that really changing the nature of the Army
    National Guard and Reserve component by this factoring in
    automatically national guard brigade combat teams as we go
    forward, as part of the force structure to be actively
    employed--I understand I am using a little mixed language here,
    but you are planning to actively employ members of the national
    guard in your mix.
        And so, back, if I could, to you, General Johnson.
        When you are computing the force structure for the Marine
    Corps, how much are you factoring in the active employment, if
    you will, of the Marine Corps Reserve, like the Army does? When
    you figure out how many MAGTFs we need, how much are you
    relying on the Marine Corps Reserve?
        General Johnson. Well, our reliance on the reserve, as you
    know, is to augment and reinforce, and the structure of the
    reserve mirrors our active structure. And so we have always had
    the capability to reinforce and augment kind of on a mirror-
    image basis.
        Mr. Kline. Right.
        General Johnson. But we have learned a lot, of course, out
    of the current fight. And we want to try to minimize some of
    the activations of reservists where we possibly can, where they
    have been unnecessary--or may have proved to have been
    unnecessary.
        But we pretty much try to stay with a mirror image of our
    active forces.
        Mr. Kline. Okay. Thank you.
        I see I am about to run out of time, Mr. Chairman.
        I think, General Johnson, maybe we can meet offline and
    talk about that. I am not sure I am getting--I am probably not
    phrasing the question accurately to understand how much the
    Marine Corps is relying on activation of the reserves.
        So, I am sorry. I yield back.
        Dr. Snyder. No, Mr. Kline. I think it is a good question,
    and we will come back to it in our next round.
        Ms. Sanchez.
        Ms. Sanchez. I do think that is a good question, by the
    way, Mr. Kline. And as somebody who is from California who has
    seen a lot of their reservists and national guard people be in
    the mix, it is an important question to our people.
        Thank you, first of all, for being before us today.
        I have a question. I am sorry because I didn't read all the
    material, and I usually do. But I am at a little disadvantage,
    and I apologize for not having done my homework ahead of time.
        Over what time period will this increase take effect, both
    from the Army and from the Marines standpoint? That is a quick
    question.
        General Formica. Yes, ma'am. We begin the growth
    immediately, as the chairman already indicated, because some of
    those soldiers are already on active duty. And then the growth
    would be programmed out through fiscal year 2012, ma'am.
        Ms. Sanchez. Okay.
        And for the Marines?
        Mr. Applegate. Yes, ma'am. The intent for the Marine Corps
    is to achieve the 202,000 on the active force by the end of
    fiscal year 2011.
        Ms. Sanchez. Okay.
        Mr. Applegate. And we want to do that by trying to hit
    184,000 at the end of fiscal year 2007, and then going up by
    increments of 5 until we top out at 202,000. So in 2008 the
    goal would be 189,000, then 194,000 in 2009, et cetera.
        Ms. Sanchez. Now, I am assuming, as you are increasing--I
    think before, when we had General Clark, retired at the time,
    come before our committee, he mentioned something of a two-to-
    one factor. Is that still true for this, so the breakdown we
    would see is a two-to-one breakdown on these? Or, what types of
    troops are you looking at?
        General Formica. Yes, ma'am. In the Army, the growth is
    predominantly in the operational force. It is the brigade
    combat teams and combat support and combat service support
    soldiers that provide necessary enablers, and then there is a
    small amount that will be about 5,000 that will go to the
    generating force or the institutional army to sustain a growing
    force, and the rest of those are accommodated in what we call
    our individuals account.
        We are going to continue to reduce our institutional Army
    and grow our operating force, but about 5,000 of this structure
    will go to the institutional Army.
        Ms. Sanchez. So what you are saying is the marginal troops
    that you are bringing in are going to be at less than the 2:1
    ratio.
        General Formica. The bulk----
        Ms. Sanchez. Two people supporting one person in the field.
        General Formica. Ma'am, the bulk of the forces we are
    bringing in are operational forces, either in the brigade
    combat teams or the combat support and combat service support
    soldiers that are in the field supporting and fighting with
    them.
        Our percentage of the operating force, the institutional
    Army, will stay about the same. It is a roughly about 25
    percent institutional Army and about 75 percent operating
    force. And that will stay about the same as we grow the force.
        Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Thank you.
        And in the Marines?
        General Johnson. The increase that we are looking at,
    ma'am, or the recommended increase that we are looking at was
    75 percent to the operating forces and 25 percent to the
    supporting establishment.
        Ms. Sanchez. If that is the indication--you just gave me a
    ratio, and you said you would bring in more operational troops
    than you would, for whatever intents and purposes, staffing
    troops or what have you, how is the existing soldier going to
    see that? What is the impact that this is going to have on the
    services received to the existing soldier?
        I mean, in other words, will medical care be affected? Will
    waits and whatever be affected, if you are actually bringing in
    more operational troops, but you are leaving, to a large
    extent, the same infrastructure, if you will, of the other
    troops?
        General Formica. Yes, ma'am. And for the Army, again, about
    5,000 of that growth will be applied to that infrastructure, as
    you refer to it, in the institutional Army. That will enable us
    to put more recruiters, trainers, drill sergeants, instructors,
    and medical personnel out in the generating force to provide
    the support that you asked for.
        Ms. Sanchez. So you think, then, an existing soldier will
    see no difference?
        General Formica. I think that we will continue to provide
    the quality supports in the institutional Army, ma'am, yes. And
    we will continue to fund military-civilian conversions in order
    to provide that quality support with both military and civilian
    personnel.
        Ms. Sanchez. What about equipping these troops? I mean,
    today in The Washington Post, ``Equipment for Added Troops is
    Lacking.'' I am sure you saw this article. This is with respect
    to the troops that we are sending out to Iraq.
        What about being able to equip them over this time period
    that you have? Or do you feel strongly that you are going to be
    able to equip them correctly?
        And given the fact that equipment used to follow the
    particular person, and now we changed to equipment is left
    behind, and new troops come in and troops are finding no
    equipment or there is a lack of equipment in places we are,
    like in Iraq, for example--and, oh, by the way, we haven't
    figured out, nor do we know the impact of what we have to
    replace yet.
        How do you all feel about having the right equipment for
    these troops if we can get them in?
        General Formica. Ma'am, of course, first of all, the Army
    is committed to deploying across the berm into Iraq and
    Afghanistan only those units that are manned, trained and
    equipped to the task for which they have been assigned.
        We currently are experiencing, as you know, equipping
    challenges that apply mostly in the units back in the training
    base, in the reset training phase of our force generation
    model. And we are doing a combination of sourcing units with
    their organic equipment, with equipment provided in theater,
    with equipment that is provided to them in the reset, and
    through some cross-balancing from other units in order for them
    to train before they deploy.
        Dr. Snyder. Mr. Wilson.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you all for being here today.
        My predecessor, the late Congressman Floyd Spence, was a
    strong supporter of greater end-strength, and so I know he
    would be pleased to see the recommendations that are coming
    forth.
        In looking at this, as to recruiting and retention, is
    there anything that we in Congress need to do to assist--and I
    have a particular interest at the recruiting school as at Fort
    Jackson for the Army. Is there anything that we need to do to
    assist in terms of recruiting and retention?
        General Formica. Sir, first, thank you for your comment and
    for your support and for the offer of continued support.
        We believe that with aggressive recruiting goals and
    retention goals that we will be able to achieve the end-
    strength that we have envisioned. As you well know, that will
    require continued support from Congress for the incentive
    packages that we would want to offer for both recruiting and
    retention. And we thank you, in advance, for that support.
        Ms. St. Laurent. I would like to also offer a comment on
    the recruiting issue, and that is, in addition to just being
    able to recruit the aggregate numbers, I think both the Army
    and the Marine Corps will potentially have some challenges in
    trying to recruit individuals with the correct skills.
        We have done some reports on recruiting and have found out
    that there are some imbalances, where the services have not
    been able to fill certain occupational specialties and have
    overfilled others.
        So I think a good management plan to manage the increase,
    if approved, would be necessary. And the services will both
    have to look at the kinds of incentives, in terms of recruiting
    and retention bonuses and incentives that they are providing.
        Mr. Applegate. Congressman Wilson, for the----
        Mr. Wilson. Yes.
        Mr. Applegate [continuing]. Marine Corps, we are looking at
    a number of things. One, we are in the process of increasing
    our recruiter force by 600 nationwide. We will need your
    continued support for access to high schools. That is going to
    be an important part of this.
        Our enlistment bonus program is going to need to be funded
    because we are greatly going to need to increase that, along
    with our advertising dollars for our recruiting command, sir.
        Mr. Wilson. And I am always impressed at the recruiting
    because it is so difficult. The number of young people who, due
    to health requirements, it is a small percentage actually of
    those who apply that can finally be fully recruited and
    trained.
        Additionally, how about the facilities? Do we have
    sufficient facilities at Fort Jackson, at Parris Island,
    Pendleton? Do we feel like the facilities for the recruits is
    sufficient?
        General Formica. Again, sir, a great question and one that
    we are--our current military construction (MILCON) program
    which, when passed, will provide increased capabilities, both
    in our operational force but also in our recruiting base. And I
    do believe that we will have adequate barrack space, not only
    at Fort Jackson, but in all of our basic training centers.
        Mr. Wilson. Right.
        Mr. Applegate. And, Congressman, for the Marine Corps, we
    are doing a DOTMILPF process, and I am not sure if you are all
    familiar with that acronym. But that looks at doctrine,
    organization, training, material, leadership, personnel and
    facilities for every aspect of the operating force and the
    supporting establishment for the end-strength increase. And for
    the recruiting command and for our instructors in our training
    command, that is all part of this.
        So we are looking at, do we need more MILCON or facilities
    equipment at the boot camps, throughout the recruiting stations
    and at the recruiting school, and those sorts of things. And
    those are all being wrapped up into our final assessment on
    what the costs are going to be and what the requirements are
    going to be, and the timelines, and where the long poles in the
    tent are for our ability to achieve the end-strength increase.
        Mr. Wilson. And I appreciate Ms. Sanchez bringing up about
    the equipment for the active duty. But there was a report
    yesterday, and I don't know if you have jurisdiction, the
    shortfalls in equipment for national guard units, particularly
    in the event of a state call-up.
        What is the status on adjusting for that?
        General Formica. Sir, I don't have jurisdiction over
    equipment. And I would prefer to take that question for the
    record and have the right folks come back and provide that
    response.
        Mr. Wilson. Fine.
        Ms. St. Laurent. I can provide some comments on that. That
    report----
        Mr. Wilson. Yes, sure.
        Ms. St. Laurent [continuing]. That you are mentioning is
    one that GAO is issuing, will be coming out today publicly.
        But we took a look at how the Department of the Army and
    the National Guard are trying to manage equipment for both
    homeland security and overseas missions, and there are some
    significant challenges. We know the Army is aware of those. But
    because the national guard has been so heavily engaged
    overseas, there are very significant shortfalls in the guard.
        The Army is trying now to identify about 300 or so items
    that will be useful for homeland security purposes, as well as
    overseas missions, and try to manage those. But it is going to
    be a long process before I think the level of equipping in the
    guard units is increased significantly. And, for the time
    being, it is a risk that needs to be considered.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
        Dr. Snyder. Ms. Shea-Porter.
        Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you very much.
        And thank you for being here today. I have a couple of
    questions.
        I am very concerned about the role of the national guard,
    the way you have projected it. Could you tell me, please, how
    many national guard troops, again, are you expecting to add in
    what timeframe?
        General Formica. Yes, ma'am. In the proposed growth, we
    would grow about 8,200 of Army National Guard, again over the
    same timeframe; about 1,500 a year.
        Ms. Shea-Porter. Okay. I am concerned about some of the
    problems that they are already facing in the civilian sector
    when they leave their jobs for extended periods of time.
        Do you have some program to address that with civilian
    employers? Because I can't imagine it would be very attractive
    to, you know, potential national guard members knowing the
    difficulties right now.
        General Formica. Ma'am, I can't speak to specific programs
    with employers in the communities, but I can tell you that, as
    you know, the Secretary of Defense has recently announced a new
    mobilization policy. The Army embraces that mobilization
    policy.
        And, first of all, we believe it will help in the long run
    to enable us with recurrent assured access to the guard and to
    the reserve. But it also establishes a 12-month mobilization
    period.
        And so, by increasing pre-mobilization training, we can
    optimize the time that they are called on to active duty and
    guarantee them a 12-months mobilization time, as opposed to the
    more extended periods that they have experienced in the past
    few years.
        Ms. Shea-Porter. I would suggest that, in order to meet
    those recruitment goals, that we are really going to have to
    coordinate better, because what I have been hearing out of my
    district is a great deal of stress and strain on the families
    and a reluctance to enroll at this point because of those
    problems that haven't been addressed.
        I also wanted to ask you about stop-loss. I know that has
    recently been changed again, and they are going to try not to
    use the stop-loss. But will that be something that you might
    have to utilize again if you don't reach those goals?
        General Formica. Ma'am, it is my understanding, first of
    all, we will, I believe, continue to rely on stop-loss in the
    near-term, as we provide trained and ready, cohesive units.
        But we did receive guidance from the Secretary of Defense
    to look at how we will reduce and eliminate stop-loss in the
    future, and the Army is assessing its stop-loss program and has
    a responsibility to go back to the Secretary some time next
    month to report how we are going to do that. So we are looking
    at that now, ma'am.
        Ms. Shea-Porter. Okay. And a couple other questions,
    please.
        Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), does it have a role?
    Are you trying to expand that to bring soldiers in?
        General Formica. We will obviously need to have increased
    accessions in ROTC. I can't speak to the specific numbers that
    we will need as part of growing the force, but increased
    accessions in the officer corps, as well as in the enlisted
    ranks, will be required in order to sustain a growth to 547,000
    in the active.
        Ms. Shea-Porter. Okay. And, once again, I am trying to
    project what will happen to these soldiers that come in and
    then eventually leave the military and become veterans. Is
    there any kind of coordination, any long-term plan looking at
    what their needs will be after they retire, in terms of the
    extra costs for the Veterans Administration (VA)?
        You know, maybe there isn't any linkage at all between the
    agencies, but I think it would be helpful because they will be
    utilizing services at the other end. And I think it would help
    people at the beginning, before they entered the military, if
    they knew that there would be a continuation of care after.
        General Formica. Ma'am, I agree. If there is a direct
    linkage that is going on right now today, I am not aware of it.
    But, of course, we do appreciate the continued support of the
    American people and the benefits that our veterans receive. But
    I do agree with you.
        Ms. Shea-Porter. I really would like to see some plan long-
    term for that, and I don't even know--I am not putting it on
    your shoulders. I just wanted to bring it up as an issue, that
    I think this is where we fall down, you know, through taking
    care of them at the end.
        And my last question is I am very concerned about the
    training time, and the stories that we are sending soldiers
    into the field unprepared. And I wanted you to address that, if
    you would, please. My understanding is they are not getting
    enough training, in particular national guard and reserve
    units, and they are being put into battle without enough
    training time.
        General Formica. Ma'am, the Army remains absolutely
    committed to sending into Iraq and Afghanistan, into any
    theater of operations, soldiers and units who are manned,
    trained and equipped for the task for which they are going to
    perform. We have got an extensive post-mobilization training
    program run by our U.S. Army Forces Command and First Army, and
    we do extensive post-mobilization training that is geared to
    the mission that the unit has been assigned.
        Ms. Shea-Porter. So you are saying that every national
    guard unit has had proper training, they have had the equipment
    to train with, before they have gone into Iraq and into any
    kind of----
        General Formica. Trained, equipped and certified before
    they deploy.
        Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
        Ms. St. Laurent. I would, if I could, make a comment on
    that issue.
        I would agree that the units going into Iraq are all
    certified and do receive training. But I think there are some
    challenges that we have seen as we have looked at the
    mobilization process, and that includes units not necessarily
    getting the equipment at the time they would like and prefer,
    so they do experience some delays. They eventually get most of
    it at the mobilization station, but sometimes they get
    additional equipment in theater and have to train there.
        So ideally one would want to make some improvements to that
    process.
        Dr. Snyder. Ms. Davis.
        Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
        Mrs. Davis of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for being here.
        I wanted to direct my questions, if I may, to you, Ms. St.
    Laurent. Am I saying that right? Because I think that some of
    the issues that you raise, I wonder if you could give us a
    little more background about.
        You mentioned the transparency and the hope, I think, that
    the process would be more transparent in the future and that it
    would be based more on reliable data as opposed to individual
    judgments.
        Could you expand on that a little bit and just give us an
    example of, in fact, where that transparency has not been
    obvious to you? And what drives that? How can we do a better
    job with that?
        Ms. St. Laurent. There are a couple of issues from my
    perspective, and I will--again with the analyses that are done
    at the DOD-wide level. One of the principle ones is the
    Quadrennial Defense Review, and we think that the study itself
    has merits. It encourages a review of the defense strategy and
    new initiatives come forward. But it also makes some decisions
    about force structure.
        Our view is that it does not necessarily provide much
    insight into how those conclusions were reached. In fact, in
    the past we have recommended that the Department consider
    providing Congress with a classified addendum or annex that
    would better explain the kinds of assumptions and scenarios
    that were used to reach the conclusions about force structure.
    And we still think that is a good idea. So there is an area
    where they could improve.
        Also, with the military personnel end-strength requests, we
    think that perhaps the Department could create a better display
    to show how they are allocating end-strength to their key
    missions, and how much of it is in combat forces, how much of
    it is in support forces, and how much is it in the
    institutional, or generating, force that includes the training
    base and other things. And then, from year to year, they could
    show how they are changing.
        The Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps are proposing
    increases, but the other services are also proposing to
    decrease.
        Mrs. Davis of California. Can I ask you, on that first
    point, is that a proposal that has been made to the Pentagon,
    to the DOD essentially? And has it gone through a process? Have
    people been able to weigh in on that? Have any of you heard of
    that, and would you have a response to that? How does that
    filter up or down?
        Ms. St. Laurent. Certainly. We generally make these
    suggestions through our reports, by including specific
    recommendations to the Secretary of Defense or to the services,
    where appropriate.
        So, in the case of our recommendation about the QDR, we
    have made a number of recommendations for improving that
    process, to include preparing a classified annex. And DOD has
    agreed, I think, in concept, but has not taken specific action
    to implement it.
        Mrs. Davis of California. So there is not a formal response
    to that.
        Ms. St. Laurent. They have to respond both to the Congress
    and to GAO in a letter responding to our report. And we then do
    follow-up to see whether they are making the changes. But, to
    date, they have not really implemented some of the
    recommendations we have made in the past.
        Mrs. Davis of California. And is that a proposal for this
    last QDR or was that proposal made in the former QDR?
        Ms. St. Laurent. It was a proposal made based on our study
    of the 2001 QDR. We are currently putting together a report
    that will be commenting on the 2006 QDR. And we will have some
    recommendations in that, as well.
        Mrs. Davis of California. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate
    that.
        I am not suggesting necessarily that all those
    recommendations should be taken. But I think part of our
    frustration is that we have been hearing from GAO recently
    that, you know, there are many proposals that are made and,
    generally speaking, they are not necessarily responded to. And
    so we end up making the same--not necessarily the same mistake,
    but we are not really responding to the real-world situations
    as best we could.
        And I wonder, any thoughts about that? Is there enough of
    that that filters to the services? And are you asked to respond
    and to weigh in on those issues at all?
        General Johnson. Well, I can't speak specifically to these
    suggestions, whether we--I don't know if we have been.
    Certainly, if we are asked, we will respond.
        I think that the request by OSD for us to look at our
    strength and come back to them with proposals recently is an
    indication that they do listen to us, and that they have opened
    up that avenue in this case.
        So, in answer to your questions, if GAO asks us for
    something, we will respond. And we think that this is an
    opportunity that we have had to do so.
        Ms. St. Laurent. And I would like to add that we have
    reviewed the Army's Total Army Analysis force structure
    development process several times, in fact, and we have made a
    number of recommendations. And the Army has been responsive on
    many of the recommendations we have made in that area.
        Mrs. Davis of California. Great. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Snyder. Mr. Jones.
        Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
        Mr. Applegate, what is the amount of the advertising budget
    for recruitment for the Marine Corps?
        Mr. Applegate. Sir, I believe the 2007 advertising budget
    is in the $120 million range, but I think we will have to get
    back with you on the specifics for that. And I am not sure how
    much more it is going to go up in the 2008 budget, sir.
        Mr. Jones. Major General, how much is the advertising
    budget for the Army?
        General Formica. Sir, I don't know. If you would permit, I
    could ask my colleague to the rear and see if he has brought
    that with him. If not, I will take the question for the record.
        Mr. Jones. Okay.
        General Formica. He reports to me that it is about $280
    million in the base budget.
        Mr. Jones. Okay. How much is the recruitment bonus for the
    Marine Corps and the Army? Is it the same, or is there a
    difference in the recruitment bonus?
        Mr. Applegate. Sir, in 2007, we have a $54 million
    enlistment bonus, and that would be going up substantially in
    2008 and out, sir.
        Mr. Jones. Okay. I guess a couple points.
        Some of my colleagues on both sides--the national guard in
    the state of North Carolina, which I have the privilege to
    serve the 3rd District, it really has been so stressed. I guess
    my question is about the recruitment, not per se about North
    Carolina.
        But I am finding more and more in the guard--and God knows,
    they really have done a great job working with the active duty
    forces, and they need to be all of them applauded, reserve,
    guard, and active duty, for the magnificent job they have done
    in Afghanistan and Iraq--but I am finding more in the guard to
    be concerned.
        And the gentlelady--and I am sorry, I didn't bring my
    glasses. I couldn't see the name. I apologize for that.
        But the point about the fact that it appears that--I know
    that we are trying to increase the end-strength. I know that is
    an ongoing process. But it seems in the short term that I am
    finding more and more guardsmen and reserve, Navy primarily,
    that are really beginning to feel the stress family-wise and
    the stress with their jobs.
        Are you beginning to feel this or to hear this or to sense
    this? That there is a stress that seems to be at a level that
    many in the guard primarily are saying, ``I don't know how much
    more of this I can take''? And it has nothing to do with the
    policy, whether they are for being in Iraq or not being in
    Iraq, but it is just the stress on the family, the individual.
        Are you all having to cope with this more now than ever
    before? I mean, I am hearing it more now.
        General Formica. Sir, if I could make a couple comments.
        First, I share your observation that we are getting
    tremendous service from the soldiers in the active, the Army
    National Guard, and the United States Army Reserve. And it is
    my observation that we are more integrated today than we have
    been during any time in my career. And so we appreciate and
    depend on the sustained participation and integration of the
    United States Army Reserve and the Army National Guard.
        I know that there is increased strain in all three
    components as we meet the demands of the global war on terror.
    And, as you suggest, I am not surprised that you would hear
    anecdotes of that in the Army National Guard in your home
    state.
        But it is encouraging that we met our recruiting and
    retention goals in the components in fiscal year 2006, and we
    anticipate continuing to meet those recruiting and retention
    goals. And so while there is obviously family and individual
    strain associated with deployments, the signs are encouraging
    that the units and the soldiers are able to weather that.
        Mr. Jones. General.
        General Johnson. I can't certainly speak for the guard, but
    I can speak to certainly the Marines. Indicators are that we
    aren't having a lot of stress on the force. Some of the key
    indicators that we would look at: abuse, divorce, things along
    those lines. Those are fairly stable, and our recruiting and
    retention remains stable.
        But we do see some signs of stress on the folks,
    particularly on the families. As the commandant gets around to
    the Marine Corps and speaks with families and Marines, there
    are stressors out there: fathers who have been deployed
    multiple times and so forth. There are stresses that are not
    necessarily visible. But we are concerned about them, and we
    are watching them very closely.
        Mr. Jones. I know recently, Mr. Chairman, I think it was
    our subcommittee, Personnel, we had the wife of a colonel and
    the wife of a gunnery sergeant, and I tell you the truth. And
    then we had a staff sergeant, I believe, in the Army who
    himself who came.
        And I will be real quick because my time is up.
        I truthfully don't think we can do enough for the quality
    of life, whether it be the reserve or active duty. And not get
    into the policy, but I continue--we had a hearing today in the
    full committee, and I think it was General Cordesman. Is that
    the way you say his name? Tony----
        Mr. Murphy. Tony Cordesman, sir----
        Mr. Jones. Thank you. I apologize for that.
        But, I mean, when you hear the fact that we are in a
    situation in Afghanistan that we are going to have to, you
    know, up-tempo, increase the numbers, that we in this country
    and we in this Congress, we have really got to really, I think,
    make the right decisions for that family because it does break
    your heart.
        Yesterday, Brian Bilbray and I went to Walter Reed, which
    every Member of Congress has done. And I never will forget a
    lady that we just happened to see sitting with her--it turned
    out to be her daughter. And for some reason, Brian and I just
    decided we wanted to go up and introduce ourselves and tell her
    how much--we didn't know about her family, but her daughter was
    having her leg amputated yesterday.
        And so my point is, Mr. Chairman, I thank this committee
    for the good that we do. I thank the Congress for what we do.
    But God bless you all. That is all I got to say.
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
        Mr. Murphy.
        Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I would like to echo Mr. Jones's comments about what
    you do for our country, and I appreciate it.
        And, Mr. Applegate, I know you are from Toms River, New
    Jersey. I was commissioned in the Army with a guy from Toms
    River, New Jersey. So thanks for your service to the Marine
    Corps, and welcome to the civilian world, like I am, as well.
        Mr. Applegate. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Murphy. I would just like to state that I don't think
    it is controversial to say that the force requirement
    determination process that we talked about today and the budget
    process is tied together. And I think one of the main themes
    that we should take away from this hearing today is that we
    should be wary of too much political influence over the
    process.
        And that brings me to my point here. That the troubling
    effect of off-budgeting and relying on supplemental
    appropriations, approaches that are overly political, hamper
    our ability to recruit and retain forces, and thus, ultimately
    hurt our ability to hit our end-strength goals.
        So my first question is given what appears to be an in-
    depth and deliberative determination about what our force goal
    should be, why are we leaving the bulk of recruitment and
    retention funding to the supplementals budgets that we have?
        General Formica. I would defer to Mr. Applegate.
        Mr. Applegate. I know in the Marine Corps we are trying to
    plow all of the funds into the baseline. I am not sure if that
    is going to be in 2008. It is definitely our goal is to get it
    in by 2009.
        But our intent is to get all the funding requirements into
    the baseline budget as early as possible. Hopefully, that will
    be 2008. If it is not, we are definitely trying to get it in
    for 2009.
        General Formica. And I would just add, sir, for the Army
    that one of the obvious advantages of this recommended
    permanent growth is that we would make permanent first that
    temporary end-strength that has been authorized by the Congress
    and enable us--and we are working this into the budget process
    with OSD--to get as much into the base budget as possible.
        Mr. Murphy. And your plan is to do that in 2008?
        General Formica. I am not sure. They are working that now
    as part of the budget process, and I am sure that that will
    become available once those decisions are made.
        Mr. Murphy. Okay. And I just need to crunch the numbers,
    and the chairman made sure that we did our homework, so. You
    are looking at the numbers. Fiscal year 2006, the Army active
    and reserve spent $4.2 billion in recruiting programs.
        And, you know, I used to do recruiting when I was a
    professor at West Point. Go down along the side for the Judge
    Advocate General (JAG) Corps. Go down at New York colleges and
    universities, and that was a proud moment. I was proud to serve
    in the military. I still am proud of it. It was the greatest
    thing I have ever done.
        But, you know, you look at overview, and, you know, our job
    now is controlling the people's purse here. And you look at,
    you know, at this point, $3.6 billion has been budgeted for
    recruiting in 2007. Clearly, the services are relying on--we
    are looking at $500 million to $700 million coming from this
    emerging supplemental, which is going to come on our plate in a
    couple months.
        And, you know, in fiscal year 2006 the Army spent $1.8
    billion on retention bonuses. But this year, in fiscal year
    2007, we are looking at $1.1 million. So a decreased amount of
    retention bonuses that we have that we are planning on.
        And, you know, I know you all are hurting, and is there a
    plan, you know, with the budget supplementals here, I mean, to
    really hit us with the retention bonuses I would assume? Or
    should we assume?
        General Formica. Mr. Murphy, I can't speak to the specifics
    of the budget requirements. I will be happy to take that
    question for the record and come back to you.
        If I may add, I would like to thank you for your service,
    and I may be so bold as to tell you that we would welcome your
    continued recruiting efforts in your current capacity.
        Mr. Murphy. I will go in any commercial you want me to be
    on. [Laughter.]
        I didn't like the fact that we changed it to an Army of
    one, but that is beside the point. That is not for this
    hearing, but----
        General Formica. Army strong.
        Mr. Murphy. Army strong. That is right. I am glad that we
    changed that.
        Mr. Applegate. Mr. Murphy.
        Mr. Murphy. Yes.
        Mr. Applegate. If I may, for the Marine Corps? I know that
    we are plowing the enlistment bonus, selective re-enlistment
    bonus into the budget, and again, our goal is to get it in
    2008.
        It is not really up to us, because we got the Department of
    the Navy and the Department of Defense who will make the call.
    But we are definitely ready to move all of those funds into the
    baseline.
        Mr. Murphy. And I think, I mean, for the record, I know
    that many members of this subcommittee and Armed Services,
    which I can't speak to, but we have showed our wishes that we
    put this back into the regular budget process just so we can do
    our responsibility of the proper oversight, what you need in
    these programs if we could help you out, as well, so.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Murphy.
        Mr. Higgins, start the clock again, and we will head back
    around on a five-minute rule.
        Folks, I want to play devil's advocate a little bit and get
    into this issue of--I want to talk about your chart. Ms. St.
    Laurent's report talks about DOD needs to provide a better
    link--their words, or the GAO's words--a better link between
    its defense strategy and military personnel requirements.
        When I look at your chart, General Formica, on the left
    side.
        General Johnson. Sir, that is our chart.
        Dr. Snyder. That is the Marine Corps chart? Total----
        General Johnson. Yes, sir.
        Dr. Snyder. Oh, there is that little--all right, I have no
    excuse. But we will talk about--see, now, I should just say I
    know, but I want General Formica to explain it. [Laughter.]
        But I am not going to do that. [Laughter.]
        General Formica. Can I take that for the record?
    [Laughter.]
        Dr. Snyder. All right. We will go right below the anchor
    there.
        You know, I have heard people, when we have looked at this
    issue over the last few weeks trying to sort this all out,
    because this issue has tremendous ramifications both for the
    military in achieving your mission, but also on long-range
    costs in our defense budget.
        And so, Ms. St. Laurent, talks about a better link. But I
    have heard this left side of it, what you call the input. And
    you have got strategy document on top of strategy document, and
    then you have op plans, and you have got commanders' requests.
        I mean, the reality is, if I took all those documents and
    put them together, I could find something in there that
    probably justified any level of troop strength for the Marine
    Corps or the Army. I could justify a 300,000 increase in the
    Army. I could justify status quo, I will bet. If you give me
    those documents, I will find stuff in there that can back up
    any level.
        And so I will give Ms. St. Laurent's comment on this. But I
    have heard that described--I describe it as it is like an
    amorphous cloud. And then I had one of the staff members say,
    ``Well, no. It is more like Jell-O.'' And using your metaphor,
    Ms. St. Laurent, it is hard to link into either Jell-O or an
    amorphous cloud. [Laughter.]
        And so, you know, we have gone one whole round here. And I
    have read all the written stuff. I still don't have a sense,
    okay. How did we get to 92,000? How did we get to 92,000?
        I think that what Mr. Kline, if I understood what he was
    saying, I think he said it very well.
        Somewhere in all that stuff on the left side, whether it is
    in General Formica's mind or General Johnson's chart, somebody
    made some assumptions that sent to you all that said, hey, you
    are going to rely on the guard for this many of the troops. You
    know, it is going to be this many, at this rotation
    requirement. Then how does that affect what comes out through
    your throughput, through your output, to the other side?
        But we are having trouble--I can't get my hands around, you
    know, how do I go back now, when we are at full committee or to
    my folks back home in Arkansas, and say I sat through this
    hearing, and I now understand the Jell-O? And here is why
    92,000 is the correct number. But I haven't heard anything here
    today that helps me understand why that is the correct number,
    other than you have assured me that you have the Total Army
    Analysis process.
        And I don't doubt your integrity on this. I am playing
    devil's advocate here. But I don't see anything to hook that
    link into. And Ms. St. Laurent, in her comments, I think, in
    her report are acknowledging that Mr. Kline and the others are
    on to something here.
        So would you respond?
        Well, let me go to Ms. St. Laurent first, and then we will
    have our two services respond.
        Ms. St. Laurent. I would like to take a stab at trying to
    explain why I think now we are seeing the Army and Marine Corps
    and the Secretary of Defense supporting a different
    requirement. And that is we have looked at force structure
    planning for probably the past 15, 20 years.
        And the scenarios that the Department uses to do its force
    structure planning have evolved considerably. And before it
    used to be, let us do a detailed analysis of a couple of major
    combat operations, and it would all be focused on offensive
    combat operations. And that was the way it was done for many,
    many years.
        Over the past ten years, the department has expanded the
    kinds of scenarios that get looked at, and that has led us to
    some different requirements. We look at major war requirements,
    but they also look at stability operations and contingency
    requirements. They are starting to look at homeland defense
    requirements.
        And there is a couple of ways of looking at this.
        The Army, based on my discussions with them, does one set
    of analysis that looks at the Army's worst day. What if we had
    to do a number of operations simultaneously, including major
    wars?
        And then, now, though, what has changed, I think, over the
    past couple of years for the Department is that all the
    services are needing to pay more attention to stability
    operations, regular warfare, and having to sustain involvement
    in contingency operations over a number of years. And that has
    required all the services to go back and take a look at their
    rotation force needs.
        What if you have to do something for four, five, six,
    seven, eight years and need to provide a constant flow of
    forces? Now, one can argue about the size of that. And I think
    one of the things we have seen is that the QDR assumptions
    about the size of those contingency operations may not be the
    same, and I don't think they are the same, as the real-world
    demands that the services are currently facing.
        So that is my take on why I think that we are now seeing
    some different requirements being articulated.
        Dr. Snyder. Generals.
        General Formica. Sir, if I may, just to Ms. St. Laurent's
    comments.
        The strategies that you talked about are translated in our
    requirements phase through the scenarios that she refers to.
    And they are OSD-approved scenarios that we then enter into our
    modeling portion, where we do analysis on the type and amount
    of forces that are required to meet those scenarios.
        The scenarios in the particular case of TAA-0813, the most
    recent TAA we did, were not directly related to Iraq and
    Afghanistan. But the scenarios that we have used in the past,
    and have adjusted since, are the scenarios that get us to the
    force that we have today.
        To assure you on the 65,000 and the linkage of the 65,000
    of growth in the active component, again, it was based on the
    need to grow six brigade combat teams in the active component,
    the combat support and combat service support, and enabling
    requirements that are needed to support those brigade combat
    teams, based on our TAA analysis and modeling, that is what--
    and then the slight increase, the 5,000, as I said, that we
    would add to the generating force, that is what gets us to
    65,000 in the active.
        Dr. Snyder. General Johnson.
        General Johnson. I can't refute what you said about it
    being a Jell-O-like process. I believe that the evolution of
    the task conditions and standards that we derive from those
    plans and from the scenario analysis, there is a great degree
    of subjectivity to it.
        But we believe that those are the kinds of capabilities
    that we need to build as a corps--we look for the capabilities
    that we need to build as a corps to be able to provide to the
    combatant commanders to meet those kinds of scenarios and to
    meet our requirements in the op plans.
        We have more gaps than we do solutions for those gaps. So
    we are constrained in a number of different ways, not only by
    end-strength, but our dollars, even by technology, in the sense
    that some things that we need don't even exist.
        But the process that we try to go through gets us the
    capabilities that we think the combatant commanders will need.
        Dr. Snyder. Mr. McHugh.
        Mr. McHugh. I need to go to LensCrafters. [Laughter.]
        My eyesight is not quite what it should be here.
        But I assume somewhere in there you are assuming a certain
    amount of risk. We can't buy all eventualities and cover all
    potentials. Is that true?
        General Johnson. That is correct.
        Mr. McHugh. How does this new force structure proposal risk
    compare to the 2006 QDR?
        General Johnson. Well, for the Marine Corps I think that we
    reduce risk by being able to build a more balanced force. We
    are able to build a more balanced MAGTF concept. Right now, we
    have two Marine expeditionary forces that are approximately the
    same size, and one that is a lesser size. And much of this
    increase will allow us to build the forces that will balance us
    across three MAGTFs.
        We also believe that we reduce the risk by being able to--
    that gives us a greater ability to provide more forces to the
    combatant commanders to enable their 7,500 planning, to enable
    their TSC--theater security cooperation planning, and also to
    be able to meet the requirements of a major combat operation.
        So we believe we reduce the risks by increasing the force
    over what we were told that we needed to be in the QDR.
        General Formica. And if I could echo General Johnson's
    comments, as we grow brigade combat teams and the combat
    support and combat service support, that would provide a
    greater balance to our force to enable us to provide strategic
    depth and reduced dwell time and to meet the needs of the
    combatant commanders in the future.
        We also, in this growth, are able to reduce risk by
    providing some key enablers and to reduce the amount of high-
    demand, low-density types of units that we have in the Army.
        Particularly, we propose growth, for instance, for two
    Patriot battalions, for increased amount of explosive ordnance
    detachment soldiers, improved maintenance for our striker
    systems, small arms maintainers, more military intelligence,
    military personnel (MP) and engineers, and in growing those
    kinds of capabilities, better enable us to provide the kind of
    force we need, not only to meet the current operational demands
    of Iraq and Afghanistan, but for the type of force that we
    think we need for the future.
        Mr. McHugh. Thank you.
        General Johnson, you heard a comment earlier, I believe it
    was in response to Ms. Sanchez's question, about the Army's
    efforts to balance its distribution of the forces amongst the
    various categories of need. The Marine Corps relies, if not
    exclusively, very heavily on Navy personnel for medical.
        General Johnson. Yes, sir.
        Mr. McHugh. The Navy is the service that is kind of going
    the other way in terms of end-strength. They are growing down.
        What calculation, if any, has been made into this request
    for--obviously, you have more Marines potentially engaged in
    more theaters of action, more casualties, more wounded. Is
    there any provision on the Navy side for medical personnel?
        General Johnson. Yes, sir. We have identified our end-
    strength growth to the Navy, and the Navy will take a look at
    our requirements for corpsmen and doctors and chaplains and
    will coordinate a commensurate--will support us in that regard.
        Mr. McHugh. But it isn't factored on a numbers basis into
    your request? This is all Marine structure.
        General Johnson. Yes, sir. The end-strength growth request
    that we have made is all Marines, active component Marines.
        Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Maybe we can go to
    somebody else before----
        Dr. Snyder. Mr. Kline.
        Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Johnson, the requirements for Marine Special
    Operations Command (MARSOC), those are completely included in
    your end-strength increase?
        General Johnson. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Kline. You talked about balancing the Marine
    Expeditionary Forces (MEF). As I recall, one of those MEFs is
    heavily concentrated overseas.
        General Johnson. That is correct.
        Mr. Kline. And are you anticipating an increase of basing
    overseas or a part of that MEF going to be state-side? I don't
    know if we are going to step into classification here, but it
    appears there wasn't a whole lot of room over there to grow
    that MEF in Okinawa and Japan, even with the addition of Guam.
        General Johnson. Yes, sir. You are correct. We have not
    gotten to the point where we are ready to say exactly where all
    these units will be. We believe that you can have a MEF in a
    number of different locations.
        Mr. Kline. Okay.
        General Johnson. So it will be spread out----
        Mr. Kline. Okay. Another time I would like to talk about
    where they might actually go.
        And then, very quickly, I can't restrain myself, try as I
    might, having been in the programming business and the
    requirements business for a long time in the Marine Corps, that
    I just offer the opinion that the requirements system is pretty
    badly broken and lags too much. And this force generation is
    just an example of it.
        It was, if I dare say, intuitively obvious to virtually
    everybody on this committee, not just this subcommittee but the
    Armed Services Committee, that we needed to grow the end-
    strength of the active Army and the active Marine Corps. We
    were putting too much stress.
        And now it is 2007, and a good four years after we were
    calling for this end-strength increase, because it seemed
    readily apparent to us that we were overusing the reserve
    component, particularly in the case of the Army Guard and
    Reserve. And now we have got a requirements process on force
    generation that kind of catches up to where we were four or
    five years ago.
        So I am not even going to ask for comment, because we have
    been called to vote, but it really concerns me that this model
    and the Army model are just lagging too badly. It bothers me
    that that has happened to us.
        So with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Dr. Snyder. Ms. Sanchez, I think, would like to yield her
    time to Mr. Murphy.
        Ms. Sanchez. That is correct.
        I just want to put in for the record that even though some
    of us thought that we were going to have to grow the end-
    strength, I mean, we, you know, we kept being told also that we
    were going to be out of Iraq by now.
        So, you know, I get very worried when we are growing the
    end-strength now because it is an indication to me that we may
    be in Iraq for an even longer time or maybe some other
    situations that we don't really want to be in. So it is a real
    concern.
        Just wanted to put that on the record, and I would like to
    yield my time.
        Dr. Snyder. Mr. Murphy, she has yielded the remainder of
    her time.
        Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
        Dr. Snyder. You have 4 minutes and 30 seconds.
        Mr. Murphy. Roger. Thank you, Chairman.
        I think one of the--during my time on the Armed Services
    Committee and the Select Intelligence Committee is that right
    now the President obviously is asking for the surge, and I am
    very skeptical on his requests with that. But I think it is
    relevant, because when you look at what the surge--I think this
    is the first of many surges. I think the reality of it is the
    majority, 75 percent, of those troops are going to Baghdad.
        Is it necessary for the Army, and particularly the Army, to
    start planning for continued surges beside just Baghdad, in
    Iraq specifically?
        General Formica. I think first will be required a
    determination from the combatant commander on the ground as to
    the length and duration of this surge. The Army, of course, is
    beginning to anticipate what happens on the back end of this
    initial surge; what kind of rotational forces will be required
    when the surge ends, and when those soldiers come back home.
        Mr. Murphy. So it is possible that the Pentagon might come
    back and ask for even more troops than the 92,000, or is that
    within the equation?
        General Formica. Sir, that is not what I said.
        The request for 65,000 in the Army, while clearly related
    to the global war on terror and enable us to engage in that
    global war on terror, is not directly linked to the surge. The
    surge is an immediate requirement in fiscal year 2007. And the
    Army will respond to that surge by providing units that are
    manned, trained and equipped.
        The growth is really about providing capacity for the Army
    and for the Marine Corps to have strategic depth for the long
    term. And, as the chief of staff has testified and as many of
    you have alluded to, this is really the continuation of the
    growth that began a few years ago by taking advantage of the
    30,000 temporary increase that the chief had asked for and that
    was authorized by Congress.
        Mr. Murphy. Even at the last hearing with General
    Schoomaker, he indicated that the continued escalation would
    cause serious doubt about the ability for our military to go to
    the 1:2 deployment ratio.
        What do you think about the current up-tempo of both the
    Army and the Marine Corps? Can you give me a percentage of what
    do you think that would be right now if we continue to----
        General Formica. I think in the near term the Army is going
    to sustain, at least in the active component, an up-tempo of
    about 1:1, and it is our intent, and obviously to grow capacity
    and to get in, as we continue to build our forces, to implement
    our Army force generation model and to take advantage of the
    recurrent assured access to the guard and reserve to improve
    dwell times in all three components.
        Mr. Murphy. And could I just follow up real quick?
        General, you say short term. How short-term? What are we
    talking about there, 12 months?
        General Formica. No. I think we will be at 1:1 in the Army
    at least for another rotation or two, if not longer, for some
    units.
        Mr. Murphy. Those units, particularly active duty units
    or----
        General Formica. Active duty brigade combat teams. When I
    talk 1:1, I am talking active component units and not to the
    guard and reserve.
        General Johnson. We have many units that are 1:1, some that
    are below 1:1, and some are running somewhere less than 1:2. We
    will do whatever is required for the surge, but that will
    exacerbate our existing ratio, and----
        Mr. Murphy. Is there a way that we can get a status on when
    you talk about some are less, some are more? Could we get a
    status of those brigade combat teams? I mean, I can tell you, I
    mean, I was in Second Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne
    Division in Iraq the first time, and they are already going--
    you know, since I have left----
        General Formica. Right.
        Mr. Murphy [continuing]. In 2004, they went to Afghanistan.
    They went home. Now they are back in Iraq. So this is the third
    deployment we are talking in less than three years, so.
        General Formica. And that is the 1:1. If you would like us
    to come back with a specific lay down of brigade combat----
        Mr. Murphy. Of the brigade combat teams. Roger.
        General Formica. We can provide that.
        Mr. Murphy. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate
    that.
        Can I get that for the Marine Corps, sir, as well?
        General Johnson. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Murphy. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that.
        Thank you, Chairman.
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Murphy.
        Folks, we have just about six minutes left or so on votes,
    so we are all going to have to vote and dash.
        I wanted to make a couple final closing comments.
        Mr. McHugh said he had no further questions.
        But first of all, General Johnson, in your written
    statement you refer on page seven and eight to, I think you
    say, ``More and more we are going to need to outthink our
    enemies and find our advantages and victories in the human
    factors. This intimate killing ground where the enemy has
    chosen to fight his wars among the people requires tactical
    cunning and intangible factors to include cultural and language
    skills, plus brilliance in the basics of small unit
    soldiering,'' which I think is a great comment to make.
        And I know at least one member of the full committee has
    great doubts about this 92,000 and thinks that we should be
    really focusing on developing those kinds of skills in a lot of
    the troops we already have. I guess it is the model of what
    somebody referred to as the Lawrence of Arabia model; that it
    is not just a numbers game, but finding those kinds of language
    skills and cultural sensitivity.
        So I appreciate you making that comment.
        I am sorry that we have to go. I would really like to
    pursue the Jell-O cloud more. [Laughter.]
        Because I don't think that we have grappled with that.
        And I am not saying that 92,000 is too high a number. I
    mean, there have been people for years that have been saying--
    you know, Norm Sisisky was talking years ago about that this
    was not going to go well for the military. And he has been long
    deceased now, a lovely man, a great member of this committee.
    But he turned out to be right.
        I mean, maybe when we got to the cloud and can sort it all
    out, the number ought to be 180,000. I mean, I don't know. But
    you need to prepare the future witnesses coming before this
    committee and the full committee.
        I think there is going to be members that are going to try
    to sort this out because this has big ramifications for both
    the military but on budget issues. And we don't have either the
    better link that Ms. St. Laurent has called for or an
    understanding of this what you all call input, General Johnson,
    I am calling the Jell-O cloud. Because it is really hard to
    justify right now, based on the information we have, a strong
    defense of those specific numbers you all are citing.
        But thank you all for your time. We are sorry we don't have
    more time to continue this discussion.
        General Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Formica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressmen.
        [Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                January 30, 2007

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                 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER

        Dr. Snyder. How much of the force requirements determination
    process is based on subjective judgments?
        General Formica. Subjective judgments occur at three key decision
    points in the Army's force generation process. Two of those decision
    points occur during the development of requirements; the third
    occurrence is when resource priorities and levels of risk are decided.
    The Army uses quantitative and qualitative analysis and the application
    of sound doctrine and approved force designs in the generation of force
    requirements. These requirements are based upon the Multi-Service Force
    Deployment (MSFD) scenarios approved by the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense (OSD) to support the Analytic Agenda. With guidance from OSD,
    to include The National Security Strategy, National Defense and
    National Military Strategies, Strategic Planning Guidance and the Joint
    Strategic Capabilities Plan, subjective judgments are made to determine
    which MSFD scenarios should be modeled to address the needs of the
    Combatant Commanders and priorities established by the Secretary of
    Defense. Additionally, the Army makes subjective judgments concerning
    the assessments of force requirements to meet Homeland Defense/Homeland
    Security missions and to resolve lessons learned from operational
    requirements that may not be addressed in the analytical modeling
    results. Finally, subjective judgment is applied in identifying the mix
    of capabilities (combat, combat support, and combat service support),
    the balance of those capabilities across the Active and Reserve
    components, as well as levels of acceptable risk within approved
    resources.
        Dr. Snyder. Have there been any initiatives to increase the role of
    data driven analyses in the requirements process and make the process
    more transparent to the Congress?
        General Formica. Quantitative and qualitative data is central to
    the Army's force generation process. A key initiative undertaken by the
    Army is the adaptation of its Total Army Analysis (TAA) process to
    respond to the Global Force Demand and to improve visibility of its
    analytical underpinnings. With input from the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense (OSD) for warfighting analysis, as well as approved
    scenarios from the Analytic Agenda, the Army continues to refine its
    analysis in generating force requirements. In particular, the
    assessment of operational requirements on force rotation demands, as
    well as the needs of Combatant Commanders, generates force capabilities
    to meet the Global Force Demand strategy. The results of these
    assessments are submitted periodically to Congress as part of the
    President's Budget and the Future Year Defense Program. Other
    publications by the Army that outline its force generation requirements
    are annual updates such as The Army Posture Statement and the Army
    Campaign Plan. Additionally, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
    conducts periodic validation reviews and publishes audit reports that
    assess the analytical basis and results of the Army's force generation
    process. The Army continues to improve on these initiatives to ensure
    timely and accurate information is available to Congress concerning its
    force generation process.
        Dr. Snyder. Has the Office of the Secretary of Defense initiated a
    review to validate the force requirements determination processes used
    in the Army and the Marine Corps?
        General Formica. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and
    Joint Staff have conducted Operational Availability (OA) studies, to
    include the work during the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2006, to
    validate the Services force requirements determination process. Using
    OSD-approved scenarios, current operational demands, and realistic
    deployment timelines, OSD validates the Army's force generation process
    during periodic program and budget review cycles. The results are
    adjudicated and adjustments are made to ensure Army force requirements
    comply with OSD strategy, the needs of the Combatant Commanders, and
    priorities established by the Secretary of Defense.
        Dr. Snyder. Do you believe the services should be required to
    include an assessment of military requirements unconstrained by DoD
    policy and fiscal guidelines?
        General Formica. Requirements generated by the Army only are
    constrained by the National Military Strategy and the Analytic Agenda
    scenarios approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The
    force generation process, based on Army doctrine and approved force
    designs, is then unconstrained in determining force capabilities needed
    to meet that strategy. Once those requirements are approved,
    constraints are addressed based on fiscal reality and resources
    available to man, equip, train, station and sustain those generated
    forces across all three components. No assessment should be necessary
    in the requirements phase as long as the strategic demands are defined.
    The assessment of risk, as currently provided by the Services in
    program and budget review cycles, addresses shortfalls in resources and
    time to adequately generate force capabilities to meet that strategy.
        Dr. Snyder. Would an unconstrained requirements process yield a
    much different result from the processes currently being used?
        General Formica. The requirements process used today is based on
    strategic guidance and policies set to support the Analytic Agenda. It
    is a disciplined approach to analyzing force requirements given
    approved scenarios and requirements of the Combatant Commanders within
    the priorities of the National Military Strategy, Strategic Planning
    Guidance and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The Multi-Service
    Force Deployment (MSFD) scenarios approved by the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense (OSD), used as the basis for determining
    requirements, do set force sizing constraints based on threat and the
    concept of operations. Changes in the timing and duration of these
    scenarios in modeling force requirements provide differing results
    while maintaining synchronization across the Services to optimize
    capabilities and to mitigate risk. Unconstrained limits in determining
    requirements could undermine that synchronization and place undue
    pressure on each Service to balance its force capabilities within
    limited resources.
        Dr. Snyder. How would the 2006 QDR been different if the services
    had been free to include an assessment of their unfunded manpower
    requirements?
        General Formica. The results of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
    (QDR) would not have changed substantially given the strategic
    environment known at the time of its publication and the level of
    resources programmed in the Army. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
    (QDR) was based on strategic guidance resulting in the Army's plan to
    resource a 1,037.4k end-strength across all three components (482.4K in
    the Active, 350K in the Army National Guard, and 205K in the U.S. Army
    Reserve). Additionally, the Army was operating under a temporary 30K
    end-strength increase to meet operational demands while transforming to
    a modular force. Given the level of Global Force Demand anticipated in
    the 2006 QDR, the Army had balanced its force capabilities and accepted
    some level of risk in its combat support and combat service support
    structure. As the strategic environment changed after the 2006 QDR
    report, the Army began to address the impacts on force capabilities
    based on the increasing levels of Global Force Demand. The Army
    provided OSD its assessment of force capability shortfalls and proposed
    an end-strength growth across all three components to meet the
    increasing operational demand. The Army will continue to adapt its
    force generation process to provide timely assessments of force
    requirements, available resources, and capability shortfalls as changes
    in the strategic environment evolve.
        Dr. Snyder. Does DoD prescribe the end-strengths that the services
    requirements process must achieve?
        General Formica. The Army's end-strength is set and approved by
    Congress. During the requirements phase of the force generation
    process, the Department of Defense (DoD) does prescribe force levels
    for each Service in the development of the Multi-Service Force
    Deployment (MSFD) scenarios for the Analytic Agenda. These approved
    scenarios are the basis for the Army's quantitative and qualitative
    analysis of force requirements. During the resourcing phase of the
    force generation process, the Army then balances force capabilities
    across all three components within the end-strength approved by
    Congress.
        Dr. Snyder. Can you give examples of other assumptions that DoD
    requires the services to consider in their requirements process and how
    they influence the outcome?
        General Formica. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and
    the Joint Staff, with support from the services, utilize an iterative
    process to develop a set of Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS) and Multi
    Service Force Deployment (MSFD) vignettes. These scenarios and
    vignettes make up the OSD Analytic Agenda. Also, DoD and the Joint
    Staff generate Operational Availability (OA) studies to determine
    demand of Service capabilities to meet combinations of the scenarios
    and vignettes over time. Additionally, the Army assesses the capability
    requirements to meet Homeland Defense/Homeland Security missions and
    the rotational requirements to sustain operational demands. The
    Analytic Agenda scenarios and vignettes, along with operational
    demands, are quantitatively transformed into the directed and support
    force structure requirements in the Army's Total Army Analysis process.
    The results are used to identify and balance force capabilities across
    the three components to meet the strategic requirements, provide
    rotational depth, and man, equip, train, station, and sustain the force
    within approved resources.
        Dr. Snyder. Both the Army and the Marine Corps have included
    assessments of unfunded manpower requirements in prior force structure
    requirements processes. Why did you not include those assessments in
    the 2006 QDR?
        General Formica. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
    strategic environment was based on a different level of demand than
    what the Army faces today. The Army generated force capabilities based
    on the war fight requirements, Homeland Defense/Homeland Security
    missions, and operational requirements of the then approved Global
    Force Demand. Additionally, the Army was operating under a temporary
    30K increase in end-strength to meet those strategic requirements while
    transforming to a modular force. Based on the 2006 QDR strategy, the
    Army did assume some risk in certain combat support and combat service
    support structure.
        Dr. Snyder. What portion of the additional end-strength increase
    will be used to fill manpower gaps in the existing modular brigades and
    how much of the additional end-strength will be used to create new
    combat capability?
        General Formica. The 74.2K of end-strength growth (65K in the
    Active, 8.2K in the Army National Guard and 1K in the U. S. Army
    Reserve) will build new capabilities, to include six additional brigade
    combat teams and thirteen multi-functional and functional support
    brigades, to meet the increasing Global Force Demand. These new
    brigades will be manned at near 100 percent in the Available and Ready
    Phases of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. Additionally, the
    Reserve Components will rebalance and right-size Institutional
    structure and Individuals Accounts to re-invest in combat capabilities
    (6K in the Army National Guard and 16K in the U.S. Army Reserve). With
    the growth, rebalance, and right-sizing initiatives, the Army's combat
    capability in its Operating Force will grow by over 80K (49.4K in the
    Active, 14.2K in the Army National Guard and 17K in the U.S. Army
    Reserve).
        Dr. Snyder. How much of the force requirements determination
    process is based on subjective judgments?
        General Johnson. It is difficult to assign a percentage of
    subjective versus objective judgments to our Total Force Structure
    Process (TFSP). The Marine Corps uses the TFSP to transform strategic
    guidance, policy constraints, and commander-generated recommendations
    into the integrated capabilities required to execute Marine Corps
    missions. This process relies on a partially subjective, yet detailed,
    integrated analysis of doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
    leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF), ensuring that no
    aspect of the enterprise is ignored when new requirements for the Corps
    are identified--either from the top-down or from the bottom-up.
        Assessments regarding small unit activations are much more
    subjective than assessments associated with the force requirement
    development necessary to support major theaters of war. The
    determination of how many Marines it takes to support two simultaneous
    Major Contingency Operations contains a great deal of analytical rigor,
    as these requirements are based upon detailed staff work and
    utilization of OSD and Joint staff approved planning scenarios and
    modeling tools.
        Dr. Snyder. Have there been any initiatives to increase the role of
    data driven analyses in the requirements process and make the process
    more transparent to the Congress?
        General Johnson. Yes, the current Defense Planning Scenarios
    development process and planned force sufficiency analyses, based on
    the new Force Planning Construct, will increase the role of data driven
    analyses.
        In addition to this, Our Commandant recently stated that deployment
    cycles must not only support training for irregular warfare, they must
    also provide sufficient time for recovery and maintenance as well as
    training for other contingency missions. Resultantly, we have begun
    work on the following initiatives:

          - Development of a predictive modeling tool that will allow us to
    determine appropriate structure and manning requirements to meet a 1:2
    deployment-to-dwell ratio for sustained combat operations across the
    operating forces.

          - Examination of our requirements for recruiters, trainers,
    infrastructure, material and equipment to both support manning at a 1:2
    deployment-to-dwell ration and training across the spectrum of warfare.

          - Assessment of the impact of a 1:5 deployment-to-dwell ratio for
    the Reserve component and how the Total Force can best be employed to
    support a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio for active forces.

        Dr. Snyder. Has the Office of the Secretary of Defense initiated a
    review to validate the force requirements determination processes used
    in the Army and the Marine Corps?
        General Johnson. Presently, the Marine Corps is not aware of any
    initiatives by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to review or
    validate the Marine Corps' requirements determination processes.
        Dr. Snyder. Do you believe the services should be required to
    include an assessment of military requirements unconstrained by DoD
    policy and fiscal guidelines?
        General Johnson. No. Fiscal and policy constraints allow the
    Services to bound the requirements, facilitate prioritization of
    requirements, and introduce the concept of risk earlier in the process,
    thereby saving valuable resources (time, money and manpower).
        Dr. Snyder. Would an unconstrained requirements process yield a
    much different result from the processes currently being used?
        General Johnson. Yes, in an unconstrained process, the force
    requirement would be much greater/costlier. In a constrained
    requirements process, a certain level of risk is assumed in determining
    requirements.
        Dr. Snyder. How would the 2006 QDR been different if the services
    had been free to include an assessment of their unfunded manpower
    requirements?
        General Johnson. All planning is based upon assumptions; a change
    in an assumption therefore leads to a change in the plan. At the time
    of the 2006 QDR, the Marine Corps considered an end-strength increase;
    however the resulting guidance stabilized USMC end-strength at 175,000
    Active Component and 39,000 Reserve Component by Fiscal Year 2011. The
    2006 QDR initial guidance approved by the Department of Defense's
    senior leadership assumed that while the size of the joint force was
    about right, the mix of capabilities within the force needed to change
    to address current and emerging national security challenges. Given
    different starting assumptions, the results of the 2006 QDR may have
    been quite different. However, without an understanding of these
    assumptions, we cannot adequately predict what those results would have
    been.
        Dr. Snyder. Does DoD prescribe the end-strengths that the services
    requirements process must achieve?
        General Johnson. No. The DoD has, in the past, provided the Marine
    Corps with end-strength constraints such as during the 2006 QDR; and
    these constraints have spurred Total Force Structure exercises such as
    the 2004 Total Force Structure Review Group or the 2006 Capabilities
    Assessment Group. However, the Marine Corps Total Force Structure
    Process cycle produces total requirements regardless of any constraints
    or force caps that result in structure recommendations.
        Dr. Snyder. Can you give examples of other assumptions that DoD
    requires the services to consider in their requirements process and how
    they influence the outcome?
        General Johnson. Force requirements are based on demands determined
    by the DoD. For the 2006 QDR and associated Operational Availability
    2006 study, these demands were provided in the Baseline Security
    Posture (BSP). The BSP specified both the frequency and duration of
    events as well as force caps for each individual event. Based on
    historical levels of commitment for Marine Corps units, the BSP
    projected lower levels of demand for theater security cooperation and
    other non-combat commitments. It also projected future force levels for
    OIF/OEF significantly below current levels. Since the force demands
    determine the projected force requirements, it is possible that the
    constraints imposed by the BSP caused the Marine Corps force
    requirements to be underestimated.
        Another example is the 2006 QDR replacement of the ``1-4-2-1''
    force planning construct. The ``1-4-2-1'' construct consisted of the
    military defending the U.S. homeland; projecting forces to deter
    conflict in four regions around the globe; swiftly defeating aggression
    in two overlapping major conflicts; and maintaining a capability for
    ``decisive victory'' in one of the two major conflicts, possibly to
    include regime change or occupation. The new guidance is a force-
    planning construct that puts increased emphasis on defending against
    terrorist threats which requires less force capacity as well as a
    different capability set.
        Dr. Snyder. Both the Army and the Marine Corps have included
    assessments of unfunded manpower requirements in prior force structure
    requirements processes. Why did you not include those assessments in
    the 2006 QDR?
        General Johnson. The QDR is a Secretary of Defense document to
    which the Services each provide manpower requirement inputs. The Office
    of the Secretary of Defense determines the final output and content of
    the Report. At the time of the 2006 QDR, the Marine Corps considered an
    end-strength increase. However, the 2006 QDR initial guidance approved
    by the Department of Defense's senior leadership assumed that while the
    size of the joint force was about right, the mix of capabilities within
    the force needed to change to address current and emerging national
    security challenges, and it included a Marine Corps force cap
    limitation of 175,000 Marines in the Active Component. All QDR analysis
    was subsequently based upon that guidance; therefore, the result was no
    identified unfunded manpower requirements.
        Dr. Snyder. What portion of the additional end-strength increase
    will be used to fill manpower gaps in existing Marine Corps units and
    how much of the additional end-strength will be used to create new
    combat capability?
        General Johnson. The growth in end-strength from 175K to 180K was
    used to fill shortfalls and to establish the Marine Special Operations
    Command (MARSOC). Additionally, we have used military to civilian
    conversion structure and other realignments to help mitigate other
    shortfalls. Some of the increase also went to increase personnel in
    critical MOSs with shortfalls such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
    and intelligence. The 202,000 end-strength will create additional units
    to reduce the deployment to dwell issue and allow for additional
    training of Marine Units in our traditional missions across the warfare
    spectrum of the MAGTF.
        The Marine Corps' 22K increase is divided into 17,000 Marines in
    the operating forces and 5,000 in the supporting establishment. The
    17,000 Marines in the operating forces all provide new unit
    capabilities while the 5,000 allocated to the supporting establishment
    provide additional recruiters (600), instructors (1,200) and transients
    (injured Marines/patients, Marines in training pipeline, Marines
    between duty stations) to support the increase. None of the growth will
    be used to fill manning shortfalls in current Marine Corps units.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON

        Mr. Wilson. I appreciate Ms. Sanchez bringing up about the
    equipment for the active duty. But there was a report yesterday, and I
    don't know if you have jurisdiction, the shortfalls in equipment for
    national guard units, particularly in the event of a state call-up.
        What is the status on adjusting for that?
        General Formica. The Army National Guard (ARNG) is in the process
    of converting from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Force. As a
    Strategic Reserve, the Army assumed risk when equipping the ARNG
    because there would be sufficient lead-time to equip the deploying
    force. We can no longer afford to take that risk. We are committed to
    fully equipping the ARNG to 100% of its requirement. In the Fiscal Year
    (FY) 2009-13 Program Objective Memorandum (POM), we are ``fencing $21
    billion as a down payment on fully equipping and modernizing the
    ARNG.'' This effort will require our attention and steadfastness for
    several years after FY 2013 to properly equip and modernize the ARNG to
    be fully interoperable and identical to active component units, having
    the ability to perform any mission in support of full spectrum
    operations.
        In the short term, we are fully committed to ensure the ARNG is
    sufficiently equipped to perform its Homeland Defense/Defense Support
    to Civil Authorities (HLD/DSCA) mission. The ARNG has identified 342
    critical dual use items of equipment that are useful for both war and
    HLD/DSCA. These items were vetted through the states and the Army and
    validated as the HLD/DSCA requirement. We, as an Army, are providing
    equipment to the hurricane prone states, just as we did last year. Some
    new equipment is being diverted to these states; some depot RESET/Recap
    equipment is being redirected; some equipment is being loaned to the
    ARNG; and the ARNG is cross-leveling some equipment among the states.
    We are taking great care to ensure that each state has equipment on
    hand to respond to state missions and are ready to move equipment into
    non-hurricane states, if required. The states have also negotiated
    Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC) to provide capabilities
    to each other if requested. Although the Army is strapped for
    equipment, in the short term, all components, working in concert, will
    support the ARNG in its mission of aiding/assisting the states in
    responding to natural disasters or other state missions.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES

        Mr. Jones. Mr. Applegate, what is the amount of the advertising
    budget for recruitment for the Marine Corps?
        Mr. Applegate. The FY07 budget includes the following funding for
    recruiting and advertising included $112.23M ($107.4M in the Operations
    and Maintenance, Marine Corps appropriation--OMMC--and $4.8M in the
    Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve appropriation--OMMCR).
        The FY08 request includes $146.67M ($141.38M in OMMC, $5.29M in
    OMMCR).
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MURPHY

        Mr. Murphy. You look at, you know, at this point, $3.6 billion has
    been budgeted for recruiting in 2007. Clearly, the services are relying
    on--we are looking at $500 million to $700 million coming from this
    emerging supplemental, which is going to come on our plate in a couple
    months.
        And, you know, in fiscal year 2006 the Army spent $1.8 billion on
    retention bonuses. But this year, in fiscal year 2007, we are looking
    at $1.1 million. So a decreased amount of retention bonuses that we
    have that we are planning on.
        And, you know, I know you all are hurting, and is there a plan, you
    know, with the budget supplementals here, I mean, to really hit us with
    the retention bonuses I would assume? Or should we assume?
        General Formica. Retention bonuses went from 1.2B in FY06 to $1B in
    FY07 including the Supplemental. Below are the details based on the
    PB08, in thousands of dollars.

                                                                 FY06         FY07          FY07 Supp (not PB08)

    From PB08
    AC SRB:                                                      736,943      181,537                       410,516
    AC CSRB:                                                           0            0                        24,850
    AC Officer:                                                        0            0                        62,000
    ARNG 3yr                                                      40,484       14,282                             0
    ARNG 6yr                                                     267,470       92,125                       153,780
    USAR AGR                                                      10,240        5,000                         7,440
    USAR REUP                                                    129,816       37,951                        49,421
    USAR AGR CSRB                                                      0        2,405                         2,410
    USAR UNIT REUP                                                44,084          425                        30,770

    Total                                                      1,229,037      333,725                       741,187

                                                                                              FY07 Total: 1,074,912

        Above data exclude retention bonuses for medical officers, which
    approximate $180 million per year.
        Mr. Murphy. Is there a way that we can get a status on when you
    talk about some are less, some are more? Could we get a status of those
    brigade combat teams?
        General Formica. The attached chart at Tab A depicts the Active
    Component Brigade Combat Teams that have been deployed or are available
    for scheduled deployments through Fiscal Year 2007. Sourcing has not
    been approved by the Secretary of Defense for Fiscal Year 2008 and
    beyond, and is not included. Of the Brigade Combat Teams listed on the
    attached chart, 15 have deployed once. Many of these brigades are new
    builds, or are fulfilling other mission requirements such as Training
    and Transition Teams. Three have never deployed: 1st Brigade, 2nd
    Infantry Division is Forward Stationed in Korea; 4th Brigade, 10th
    Mountain Division has not deployed as a Brigade Combat Team, but has
    deployed battalions; and the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division is a
    new build. Of the Brigade Combat Teams listed on the chart, seven have
    deployed with less than 12 months at home between deployments. Twenty
    seven have deployed with less than 24 months, but more than 12 months
    between deployments (average of 17.7 months). Two had greater than 24
    months between deployments, however they deployed Battalion sized
    organizations in the interim. Twenty Brigade Combat Teams are currently
    deployed.

        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
    89.]

        Mr. Murphy. Is there a way that we can get a status on when you
    talk about some are less, some are more? Could we get a status of those
    brigade combat teams?
        General Johnson. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]