[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RADIOLOGICAL RESPONSE: ASSESSING
ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLINICAL
LABORATORY CAPABILITIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND
OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 25, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-67
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov
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______
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
MARK UDALL, Colorado LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
DAVID WU, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
NICK LAMPSON, Texas JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JERRY MCNERNEY, California JO BONNER, Alabama
LAURA RICHARDSON, California TOM FEENEY, Florida
PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
JIM MATHESON, Utah MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BARON P. HILL, Indiana PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
------
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
HON. BRAD MILLER, North Carolina, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas Wisconsin
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
BART GORDON, Tennessee RALPH M. HALL, Texas
DAN PEARSON Subcommittee Staff Director
EDITH HOLLEMAN Subcommittee Counsel
JAMES PAUL Democratic Professional Staff Member
DOUGLAS S. PASTERNAK Democratic Professional Staff Member
KEN JACOBSON Democratic Professional Staff Member
BART FORSYTH Republican Counsel
TOM HAMMOND Republican Professional Staff Member
STACEY STEEP Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
October 25, 2007
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 5
Written Statement............................................ 7
Statement by Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Ranking
Minority Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 8
Written Statement............................................ 10
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.......... 11
Witnesses:
Ms. Dana Tulis, Deputy Office Director, Office of Emergency
Management, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; accompanied
by Dr. John Griggs, Chief, Monitoring and Analytical Services
Branch, Office of Radiation and Indoor Air, National Air and
Radiation Environmental Laboratory (NAREL), U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
Oral Statement............................................... 12
Written Statement............................................ 14
Dr. Robert T. Hadley, Chair of Federal Radiological Monitoring
and Assessment Center's Laboratory, Analysis Working Group,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, U.S. Department of
Energy
Oral Statement............................................... 18
Written Statement............................................ 19
Biography.................................................... 22
Dr. Robert L. Jones, Acting Chief, Inorganic and Radiation
Analytical Toxicology Branch, Division of Laboratory Sciences,
National Center for Environmental Health, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services
Oral Statement............................................... 22
Written Statement............................................ 24
Dr. John Vitko, Director of Chemical and Biological Division,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; representing Dr. S.
Randolph Long, Chief Technical Advisor, Chemical and Biological
Division, Science & Technology Directorate, Department of
Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 27
Written Statement............................................ 29
Discussion
National Environmental Radiological Laboratory Capacity Gap
Assessment................................................... 33
How the Gap Effects Response to a Dirty Bomb................... 34
Ability to Evaluate the Damage Done By an Attack............... 34
QAP Programs................................................... 35
The Decision to Close QAP...................................... 35
EPA Preparedness to Deal With a Dirty Bomb..................... 36
Assessing a Radiological Event................................. 36
More on the Capacity Gap....................................... 36
Why Is There a Lack of Capacity?............................... 36
Why Isn't the DOE Prepared for a Radiological Emergency?....... 37
The TOPOFF Simulation.......................................... 37
DOE Executives................................................. 38
Environmental Samples.......................................... 38
What Did the Polonium-210 Poisoning Tell Us About Our Capacity? 39
CDC Using DOE Laboratories..................................... 39
Environmental Radioanalytical Laboratory Response Network...... 40
Timeline and Plans for Expanding the Current Capacity.......... 40
What Are the Next Steps to Being Better Prepared?.............. 41
RADIOLOGICAL RESPONSE: ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLINICAL LABORATORY
CAPABILITIES
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2007
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:35 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad
Miller [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Radiological Response: Assessing
Environmental and Clinical
Laboratory Capabilities
thursday, october 25, 2007
9:30 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose
Every two years the government conducts the TOPOFF series of
national counter-terrorism exercises, mandated by Congress. This year,
TOPOFF IV (T4) is taking place from October 14-24, 2007, and will focus
on National Planning Scenario #11, which envisions the detonation of a
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) or ``dirty bomb.'' In this
exercise, involving thousands of federal, state and local officials and
sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), terrorists
detonate an RDD in Guam, Portland, Oregon and Phoenix, Arizona. The
exercise will test the handling and flow of operational and time-
critical intelligence between agencies and the existing procedures and
policies for domestic incident management of a major radiological
event.
One of the key assumptions in the National Planning Scenario
developed by the White House's Homeland Security Council and being
exercised in TOPOFF IV is that all potentially exposed individuals (an
estimated 100,000 people at each site) will be tested for radiological
exposure and/or contamination and that a valid method exists for
testing these clinical specimens. Yet, validated methods to test
clinical specimens in a radiological emergency exist for only six of
the 13 highest priority radioisotopes most likely to be used in a
terrorist scenario. For those isotopes for which ``validated'' methods
do exist screening 100,000 individual clinical specimens in the wake of
a radiological attack could take more than four years to complete due
to the current shortfall in radiochemistry laboratories, personnel and
equipment. Environmental sampling could take as long as six years to
complete given the current capacity and capabilities of the U.S.
radiochemistry laboratory infrastructure.
Although not a focus of the TOPOFF IV exercise, in any real world
event the critical lack of a sufficient environmental and clinical
radiochemistry laboratory capacity will delay appropriate public health
care actions and plans, increase public panic, degrade public trust in
government officials and increase the economic losses due to delays in
assessment and cleanup. The Subcommittee hearing on radiological
response will review what steps are underway to address this critical
need, what technologies or resources would help tackle this capacity
gap and what federal agencies responsible for addressing this need have
learned from actual radiological emergencies, such as the recent
Polonium-210 poisoning in London that killed former Russian KGB agent
Alexander Litvinenko last November and the 1987 (accidental)
radiological release in Goiania, Brazil, that killed four people and
injured hundreds. It will also examine why this crucial public health
ability has received limited attention and what more needs to be done
to improve the U.S. radiochemistry laboratory infrastructure.
Witnesses
Dr. Randolph Long, Chair of the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory
Networks (ICLN) Network Coordinating Group and Chief Technical Adviser,
Chemical and Biological Division, Science and Technology Directorate,
Department of Homeland Security.
Dr. Robert L. Jones, Chief, Inorganic Toxicology and Radionuclide Labs,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. He is also the Co-Chair of
the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) Network
Coordinating Group's Radiological Laboratory Response Workgroup and
headed up the CDC's Polonium-210 response efforts last year.
Dr. Robert T. ``Robb'' Hadley, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
Department of Energy. Dr. Hadley is the current Chair of the Federal
Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center's (FRMAC) Laboratory
Analysis Working Group and was formerly the Chair of the FRMAC Health &
Safety Working Group.
Dr. John Griggs, Chief, Monitoring and Analytical Services Branch, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Radiation and Indoor Air,
National Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory (NAREL) and Co-
Chair of the ICLN Network Coordinating Group's Radiological Laboratory
Response Workgroup.
Ms. Dana Tulis, Deputy Director, Office of Emergency Management (OEM),
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Chairman Miller. Good morning. This hearing will come to
order. Today's hearing is on Radiological Response: Assessing
Environmental and Clinical Laboratory Capabilities.
If there is one punch that terrorists have clearly
telegraphed, it is the detonation of a dirty bomb in an
American city. A dirty bomb is a conventional bomb that
broadcasts, spreads radioactive material, contaminating perhaps
several city blocks. We heard years ago that Osama bin Laden
had tried to obtain radioactive materials to use in a dirty
bomb.
But the Federal Government was better prepared for Katrina
than we are now for the detonation of a dirty bomb in an
American city.
Yesterday concluded a ten-day national counterterrorism
exercise called TOPOFF that included the participation of
thousands of State, local, and federal officials. The exercise
was based on the White House's National Planning Scenario #11
that envisions the simultaneous detonation of a ``dirty bomb''
or Radiological Dispersal Device in three major urban areas.
The simulated attacks in this exercise took place in Guam,
Phoenix, Arizona, and Portland, Oregon. Perhaps one of you
could explain why Guam was included as what I had not thought
of as a major American city.
In a real radiological terrorist attack, the Environmental
Protection Agency estimates that they would need to collect,
process, and analyze more than 350,000 environmental samples in
the 12 months after the incident. The Center for Disease
Control and Prevention, the CDC, is charged with monitoring and
assessing the public's health in response to a radiological
emergency, and the CDC estimates that they would need to screen
100,000 individuals for potential radiological exposure for
internal contamination in the first days after a radiological
attack.
Yet, depending on the type of radioactive materials used in
a real-world event, the EPA predicts that given the Nation's
current radiochemistry laboratory infrastructure, it might take
them six years to analyze the 350,000 samples necessary to
conduct a thorough environmental analysis, and that is just in
one city. One of the key assumptions outlined in the national
planning documents upon which the most recent TOPOFF exercise
was based is that all potentially exposed individuals, an
estimated 100,000 people in each city, will be tested for
radiological contamination and that a valid method exists for
testing those clinical specimens.
For those isotopes for which validated methods do exist,
screening 100,000 clinical specimens in the wake of a
radiological attack could take more than four years to complete
because of the current shortfall in radiochemistry
laboratories, personnel, and equipment. That is the good news.
The CDC currently has no valid method to test clinical
specimens in a radiological emergency for seven of the 13 most-
likely radioisotopes, radioactive materials, used in a
terrorist attack, in a dirty bomb attack.
Those drastic shortfalls may have far-reaching implications
for government officials responsible for responding to and
recovering from a national radiological emergency.
Today, we will hear from representatives from the CDC, EPA,
Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security,
about the gaps that exists in their ability to respond to a
radiological emergency effectively and efficiently by conducing
rigorous and rapid analysis of radiological environmental and
clinical samples. Radiochemistry laboratories provide a vital
role in determining who has been contaminated and the nature
and dangers of their exposures providing a roadmap for
appropriate medical care.
These labs also provide assessments of environmental
contamination that affect evacuation, remediation, and
restoration decisions that have serious social, public health,
political, and economic implications for potentially millions
of people. The ability to provide policy-makers with analytical
data regarding the scale, scope, and public health implications
of potential radiological contamination quickly and accurately
is critical to making informed decisions regarding evacuation,
re-occupation, medical treatment, and environmental clean-up.
But given the Nation's current lab capacity, they can't
possibly get that information when we need it.
Last November, former Russian KGB agent Alexander
Litvinenko was murdered in London using radioactive isotope
Polonium-210. It took a long time for the British to figure out
what had happened to him, and what was wrong. Fearful that
others may have been exposed to the radiation, our CDC
identified 160 American citizens who had been in the same
hotels, the same restaurants that Litvinenko had been in at
about the same time. And in the end, none of them had anything
to fear. They did not suffer from any radiological
contamination. But in attempting to locate a laboratory to do
the clinical analysis for exposure to Polonium-210, the CDC
found that only one single U.S. private lab was qualified and
capable of doing the analysis, which really shows the massive
shortfall in our radiochemistry laboratories.
There have been some efforts to close the gap, but the
results have been slow and at times the bureaucratic response
in some agencies has been infuriating. In 2005 the Department
of Homeland Security established an Integrated Consortium of
Laboratory Networks to help establish the capacity and
capability to address this radiochemistry gap. But at the very
same time, elsewhere in DHS, DHS was terminating a major,
world-renowned radiochemistry quality assurance program at the
Environmental Measurements Laboratory in New York.
That decision has had significant effect on many State and
federal radiochemistry labs undermining their ability to
certify that the sample results they provide are accurate and
reliable.
Today, there are renewed calls for federal agencies to
establish a proficiency testing program as part of radiological
networks proposed by the CDC and the EPA to ensure that the
data radiological emergency response officials and the public
receive is dependable and trustworthy. We're going to have to
spend some money and it is going to be to establish a program
that is pretty much identical to the one that we just closed.
It is true that a radiological attack, a dirty bomb, would
probably result in relatively few deaths initially, but there
would be large-scale, low levels of exposure to a lot of people
and a lot of critically important territory perhaps in city
centers. Imagine the economic effect if we could not tell for
days whether the downtown, the bottom of Manhattan, the
financial district could be occupied again, whether we could
use those buildings, whether we could go there, whether we
needed to demolish those buildings or clean them up before we
could safely occupy those buildings again. And there would just
be tens of thousands of people who would want to know whether
they were contaminated, whether they suffered from internal
contamination, whether their health was at risk, whether their
children were affected by exposure.
Closing the capacity gap that we have as soon as possible
would be an insurance policy against much worse effects of a
dirty bomb attack.
The public expects that we do better than what we are
prepared to do now, and the government's planning documents
identify the estimated scale of the response, and it is clear
that we do not have the capacity to do what is required of us.
It seems we are likely headed for a radiological Katrina if
terrorists do succeed in detonating a dirty bomb in an American
city.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Brad Miller
If there's one punch that terrorists have clearly telegraphed, it's
the detonation of a ``dirty bomb'' in an American city. A dirty bomb is
a conventional explosion that spreads radioactive material,
contaminating perhaps several city blocks. We heard years ago that
Osama bin Laden had tried to obtain radioactive materials to use in a
dirty bomb.
But the Federal Government was better prepared for Katrina than we
are for the detonation of a dirty bomb in an American city.
Yesterday concluded a ten-day national counterterrorism exercise
called TOPOFF that included the participation of thousands of local,
State and federal officials. The exercise was based on the White
House's National Planning Scenario #11 that envisions the simultaneous
detonation of a ``dirty bomb'' or Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)
in three major urban areas. The simulated attacks in this exercise took
place in Guam, Phoenix, Arizona and Portland, Oregon.
In a real radiological terrorist attack, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that they would need to collect,
process and analyze more than 350,000 environmental samples in the 12
months following the incident. The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), charged with monitoring and assessing the public's
health in response to a radiological emergency, estimates that they
will need to screen 100,000 individuals for potential radiological
exposure in the first few days after a radiological attack.
Yet, depending on the types of radioactive material used in a real
world event, the EPA predicts that given the Nation's current
radiochemistry laboratory infrastructure it could take them as long as
six years to analyze the 350,000 samples necessary to conduct a
thorough environmental analysis--in just one city. One of the key
assumptions outlined in the national planning documents upon which the
most recent TOPOFF exercise was based is that all potentially exposed
individuals (an estimated 100,000 people) will be tested for
radiological contamination and that a valid method exists for testing
these clinical specimens.
For those isotopes for which validated methods do exist screening
100,000 clinical specimens in the wake of a radiological attack could
take more than four years to complete due to the current shortfall in
radiochemistry laboratories, personnel and equipment. And that's the
good news. The CDC currently has no valid method to test clinical
specimens in a radiological emergency for seven of the 13 highest
priority radioisotopes most likely to be used in a terrorist scenario.
These drastic shortfalls may have far-reaching implications for
government officials responsible for responding to and recovering from
a national radiological emergency. Today, we will hear from
representatives at the CDC, EPA, Department of Energy (DOE) and
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), about the massive gap that
exists in their ability to respond to a radiological emergency
effectively and efficiently by conducing rigorous and rapid analysis of
radiological environmental and clinical samples. Radiochemistry
laboratories provide a vital role in determining who's been
contaminated and the nature and dangers of their exposures providing a
roadmap for appropriate medical treatment. These labs also provide
assessments of environmental contamination that affect evacuation,
remediation and restoration decisions and have serious social, public
health, political and economic implications for potentially millions of
people. The ability to provide policy-makers with analytical data
regarding the scale, scope and public health implications of potential
radiological contamination quickly and accurately is critical to making
informed decisions regarding evacuation, re-occupation, medical
treatment and environmental clean-up. But given the Nation's current
lab capacity gap they can't possibly get that information when they
need it.
Last November, former Russian KGB agent Vladimir Litvinenko was
murdered in London with the radioactive isotope Polonium-210. Fearful
that others may have been exposed to the radiation, the CDC identified
160 U.S. citizens that were in the same hotels and restaurants as
Litvinenko around the same time. In the end, none of them had anything
to fear. They did not suffer from any radiological contamination. But
in attempting to locate a laboratory to do the clinical analysis for
exposure to Polonium-210, the CDC found only one single U.S. private
lab that was qualified and capable of doing the analysis, highlighting
the massive shortfall in U.S. radiochemistry laboratories.
There have been some efforts to close this gap, but the results
have been slow and at times the bureaucratic response in some agencies
has been infuriating. In 2005 the Department of Homeland Security
helped establish an Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN)
to help establish the capacity and capability to address this
radiochemistry gap. Inexplicably at the very same time, the very same
agency was terminating a major, world renowned radiochemistry quality
assurance program at the Environmental Measurements Laboratory in New
York. That decision has had a significant effect on many state and
federal radiochemistry labs undermining their ability to certify that
the sample results they provide are accurate and reliable. Today, there
are renewed calls from federal agencies to establish a ``proficiency
testing'' program as part of radiological networks proposed by the CDC
and EPA to ensure that the data radiological emergency response
officials and the public receive is dependable and trustworthy. We're
going to have to spend money to establish an identical program to the
one that DHS just ended a couple of years ago if we're going to have
the radiological testing capacity needed to respond to a dirty bomb.
A radiological attack is likely to result in few immediate deaths
but large scale low-levels of radioactive exposure to the vast majority
of victims. Regardless of the actual public health impact, however, a
``worried well'' of tens of thousands of individuals are likely to
demand clinical tests that can confirm they have not been contaminated
with radiation. Providing that reassurance will help maintain the
public's confidence in the government and will help stem a potential
tide of growing fear that large segments of the public may have
suffered from radiological contamination, however unfounded. Most
important, this analysis will help identify those truly contaminated so
that they can receive appropriate medical treatment as soon as
possible. Closing this capacity gap as soon as possible would be a
small insurance policy against a far larger disaster in the future. The
public expects the Federal Government to be able to respond
appropriately; the government's own planning documents identify the
estimated scale of that response; yet the government has not moved
actually to put into place the mechanisms we need to carry that
response forward. Without the ability to conduct both environmental and
clinical radiological assessments reliably and quickly it seems we may
be headed for a radiological Katrina if terrorists succeed in
detonating a dirty bomb in an American city.
Chairman Miller. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Sensenbrenner
for his opening statement.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you very much. For once I am happy
to endorse everything that the Chairman has said in his opening
statement, and let me begin by saying that the potential for
radiological accidents or attacks is a reality that we need to
prepare for. This is something that has to be a high priority.
Several years ago I took one of those infamous
Congressional oversight trips, and when I was in northern
Norway, I was advised by an environmental NGO that there were
over 100 beacons that the former Soviet Union put on their
Arctic coast powered by cesium-137 batteries and that there
were also a number of these beacons in the mountains of the
Caucasus with similar powering. They are all in very remote
areas. It would be very easy for someone to take the cesium-137
battery and to turn it into a dirty bomb without anybody
knowing that the batteries were missing. The day following this
discovery, a scientist who was on this trip and who was
temporarily on Senator Biden's staff asked the Norwegian
scientists that were studying Arctic issues how many dirty
bombs each of these batteries could make. The answer was 10 a
piece. And as a result of this, Senator Biden and I
successfully co-sponsored legislation which was signed into law
amending the Nunn-Lugar Act to allow us to buy this nuclear
material from the Russian government, like we did with other
types of nuclear material, not only from Russia but the other
independent republics of the former Soviet Union. It is my
understanding that a battery was left by somebody in Gorky Park
in Moscow to let the Russian government know that somebody had
their hands on these types of nuclear materials that shouldn't
have them. And this is truly scary because if the Chechen
rebels have these batteries, I think we can assume that there
has been a move by other terrorist organizations which target
the United States and having these batteries.
If there is a dirty bomb explosion, not only will there be
potentially tens or hundreds of thousands of people exposed to
contamination, but the panic that will set in if large parts of
major cities have to be evacuated. And I think that is one of
the reasons why the exercise that just concluded yesterday was
something that was real time and something that we have to
prepare for.
Now, in June of 2005 the Homeland Security Department
released the Technology Assessment Roadmap known as ERDAP, and
that assessment found, quote, ``tools to rapidly triage
individuals needing medical attention and to intelligently
direct medical treatment to those needing immediate care will
optimize the use of scarce resources, improve survival, and
enhance public confidence in government.'' These tools don't
exist today.
Following a radiological incident, there is a critical need
to determine who has been exposed and to what degree. Rapid
radiological dose assessment is critical for determining who
needs treatment and what treatment is needed. And as ERDAP
found, quote, ``lives may be saved if we can develop rapid dose
assessment and can implement earlier treatment.''
Despite this critical need, we are still suffering from a
clear technology gap. Validated methods of testing in a
radiological emergency exist for only six of the CDC's 13
highest priority radioisotopes most likely to be used in a
terrorist scenario. And for those isotopes where screening
methods do exist, screening the number of individuals likely to
be exposed in a terrorist attack could take years.
Real-world radiological incidents should be instructive.
The most recent example was the Polonium-210 poisoning in
London that killed former KGB agent Alexander Litvinenko. The
CDC estimated that 160 Americans were potentially exposed to
radiation as the Chairman indicated. When it attempted to test
these individuals, it found that there was only one laboratory
in the country capable of carrying out the test and it only had
the capacity to test a handful of people per day. Fortunately,
all of these tests proved negative on the Americans who were
exposed.
A radiological incident in an urban area could result in
much greater exposure. In 1987, in Goiania, Brazil, a small
source of cesium-137, which is the same isotope that I referred
to in these beacons in the former Soviet Union, was stolen from
an abandoned radiotherapy institute. By the time the material
was recognized as dangerous 15 days later, four people were
dead and hundreds were injured by internal contamination. Over
100,000 people had to be examined for radiological
contamination, topsoil had to be removed from several sites,
and several houses were demolished. Neither of these incidents
originated from an intentional effort to spread contamination.
The scale of an actual radiological attack would be likely much
greater.
In a report titled Creation of a National Radioanalytical
Laboratory Response Network, the Integrated Consortium of
Laboratory Networks workgroup found that in the case of a
radiological dispersion device, better known as a dirty bomb,
in an urban district, 350,000 environmental samples would need
to be collected over 12 months; and more than 100,000 clinical
samples would need to be collected, analyzed, and processed
within the first few days. Not only did the workgroup identify
a lack of capacity to deal with this volume, it also
highlighted a lack of competency due to a lack of laboratory
analytical methods specific for emergency response needs,
reduction in radiochemistry expertise due to retirements, lack
of formal training programs for radioanalytical labs, and
reduction in federal radiological proficiency testing programs.
We no longer have the luxury not to maintain this capacity,
and I look forward to the testimony today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sensenbrenner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
The potential for radiological accidents or attacks is a reality we
need to prepare for. In a June 2005, The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) released a Technology Assessment and Roadmap for the
Emergency Radiation Dose Assessment Program (known as ERDAP). Two years
ago, the assessment found that:
Tools to rapidly triage individuals needing medical attention
and to intelligently direct medical treatment to those needing
immediate care will optimize the use of scarce resources,
improve survival, and enhance public confidence in government.
Today, these tools still do not exist. Following a radiological
incident, there is a critical need to determine who has been affected
and to what degree. Rapid radiological dose assessment is critical for
determining who needs treatment and what treatment is needed. As ERDAP
found, ``lives may be saved if we can develop rapid dose assessment and
can implement earlier treatment.''
Despite this critical need, we are still suffering from a clear
technology gap. Validated methods for testing in a radiological
emergency exist for only six of the CDC's 13 highest priority
radioisotopes most likely to be used in a terrorist scenario. And for
those isotopes where screening methods do exist, screening the number
of individuals likely to be exposed in a terrorist attack could take
years.
Real world radiological incidents should be instructive. The most
recent example was the Polonium-210 poisoning in London that killed KGB
agent Vladimir Litvinenko. The CDC estimated that 160 Americans were
potential exposed to radiation. When it attempted to test these
individuals it found that there was only one laboratory in the country
capable of carrying out the test and it only had the capacity to test a
handful of people per day.
A radiological incident in an urban area could result in much
greater exposure. In 1987, in Goiania, Brazil, a small source of
cesium-137 was stolen from an abandoned radiotherapy institute. By the
time the material was recognized as dangerous 15 days later, four
people were dead and hundreds were injured by internal contamination.
Over 100,000 people had to be examined for radiological contamination,
topsoil had to be removed from several sites, and several houses were
demolished.
Neither of these incidents originated with an intentional effort to
spread contamination. The scale of an actual radiological attack would
likely be greater still.
In its report titled, Creation of a National Radioanalytical
Laboratory Response Network, the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory
Networks (ICLN) work group found that, in the case of a radiological
dispersion device, or dirty bomb, in an urban district, 350,000
environmental samples would need to be collected over 12 months and
more than 100,000 clinical samples would need to be collected,
analyzed, and processed within the first few days. Not only did the
work group identify a lack of capacity to deal with this volume, it
also highlighted a lack of competency due to: a lack of laboratory
analytical methods specific for emergency response needs, reduction in
radiochemistry expertise due to retirements, lack of formal training
programs for radioanalytical labs, and reduction in federal
radiological proficiency testing programs.
We no longer have the luxury to not maintain this capacity. I look
forward to hearing from today's witnesses about how these capacity and
competency gaps can be addressed.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. There will be a recession
following the hearing to celebrate Mr. Sensenbrenner's and my
agreement.
If there are any Members who wish to submit additional
opening statements which seems unlikely since no one else is
here, their statements will be added to the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the Subcommittee looking into this issue
today, as our nation's preparedness in the event of a radiological
emergency is of the utmost importance. In a post-9-11 era, constant
examination of many of our emergency response procedures is critical,
given what is at stake if a radiological attack were to take place.
A central question that must be addressed is how to better prepare
for an emergency given our current limited capacity to test for
internal radioactive exposure? The technology already exists to test
victims in the event of a radiological attack, but not enough
laboratories are equipped to handle a large volume of samples. In the
most common general scenario given, if Chicago were to be attacked and
100,000 samples were sent for testing, it would take more than four
years to see the results.
I look forward to learning more about the possibilities for
increasing laboratory capacity, working in conjunction with the CDC,
EPA and DOE.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to commend you for calling this hearing so
we can better examine our nation's preparedness level in the case of a
radiological attack. Staying prepared in the event of all types of
emergencies is an enormous task, and this hearing is a step in the
right direction.
Chairman Miller. I will now introduce the witnesses. Dr.
John Griggs is the Chief of the Monitoring and Analytical
Services Branch of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency's National Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory,
NAREL, Office of Radiation and Indoor Air. I hope you don't
have to say your whole title very often. He is the Co-Chair of
the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks, ICLN,
Radiological Laboratory Response Group. With Dr. Griggs is Ms.
Dana Tulis, Deputy Director of the Office of Emergency
Management at the Environmental Protection Agency. Ms. Tulis
will read a joint statement for herself and Dr. Griggs. Dr.
Robert Hadley is from the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory at the Department of Energy. Dr. Hadley is the
current Chair of the Federal Radiological Monitoring and
Assessment Center's, FRMAC, Laboratory Analysis Working Group
and was formerly the Chair FRMAC Health and Safety Working
Group. Dr. Robert L. Jones is the Chief of Inorganic Toxicology
and Radionuclide Labs at the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention. He is the Co-Chair of the Integrated Consortium of
Laboratory Networks, ICLN, Radiological Laboratory Response
Group, and head of the CDC's Polonium-210 response efforts last
year. And unfortunately, Dr. Randy Long who chairs the
Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks for the Department
of Homeland Security was supposed to testify today, had a
severe medical problem yesterday with a knee which presumably
is not life-threatening, although perhaps painful and annoying,
and is not able to be with us today. We hope he is up and about
soon, but Dr. John Vitko, Director of the Chemistry and
Biological Security Division at DHS has graciously agreed to
read Dr. Long's prepared testimony into the record.
As all of your know, your full written statement will be
placed in the record and your oral testimony is limited to five
minutes each. We aren't real strict with that, but try to pay
some attention when you see the red light go on. It is also the
practice of the Subcommittee to take testimony under oath. I
did not really anticipate there would be any perjured testimony
today, but it is under oath. Do any of you have any objection
to being sworn in? You also have a right to be represented by
counsel. We just ask you these questions to put you ease. Are
any of you represented by counsel today? If you would then
please stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear to tell
the truth and nothing but the truth?
Ms. Tulis, you may begin.
STATEMENT OF MS. DANA TULIS, DEPUTY OFFICE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Ms. Tulis.
Good morning. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,
I am Dana Tulis, the Deputy Office Director for the Office of
Emergency Management. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss
the status of EPA's efforts to assess environmental
radioanalytical laboratory capability and capacity for
radiological response. I would also like to share with you some
of the other activities EPA has underway to protect the Nation
in the event of an accidental or intentional release of
radiological material.
I am accompanied today by John Griggs, Chief of the
Monitoring and Analytical Services Branch for EPA's National
Air and Radiation Environmental Lab, NAREL. I will summarize my
remarks, but I do ask that my entire written testimony, as you
stated, be submitted for the record.
EPA, working with the Departments of Homeland Security,
Energy, Health and Human Services, and others, has identified a
considerable gap in national environmental radiological
laboratory capacity for responding to terrorist incidents
involving radiological contamination. In the event of such an
event fixed laboratories will serve as a critical source of
high-quality data to support incident response. Data from fixed
environmental radiological laboratories will be particularly
critical during consequence management activities such as
decontamination and clearance efforts, and restore any critical
infrastructure, such as ensuring the safety of our drinking
water.
Under the National Response Plan's, NRP, Nuclear/
Radiological Incident Annex, the Department of Energy
coordinates radiological monitoring and assessment activities
for the initial phases of a response to a radiological incident
via the FRMAC, as you know, the Federal Radiological Monitoring
and Assessment Center. After the immediate emergency condition
of an incident is stabilized as well as other criteria, the
FRMAC leadership is transferred to the Environmental Protection
Agency.
Throughout the response effort, however, EPA provides
resources for defining and delineating the environmental impact
of the radiological incident. EPA brings to bear both personnel
and equipment to this mission, including 250 on-scene
coordinators and our special teams under the National Oil and
Hazardous Substances National Contingency Plan.
EPA's NRP responsibilities include maintaining and
enhancing the Nation's most comprehensive ambient radiation
monitoring network called RadNet, which consists in part of 50
stationary and 40 portable near-real time air monitors. The
stationary real-time monitors collect a beta and gamma spectrum
of particulates on an air filter hourly, and transmit data to
the NAREL for further analysis. The portable monitors collect
ambient gamma radiation readings as well as air filters which
can also be sent to a laboratory for further specific analyses.
Under the NRP, EPA has responsibility to lead the cleanup
and recovery phase of a radiological incident for which no
other department or agency has that responsibility, and that
does include terrorist incidents such as a dirty bomb. EPA will
use the Protected Action Guides for dealing with long-term site
restoration following a major radiological release to help
State and local authorities make protective action decisions.
Through training, research, development and technical support
activities, EPA continues to increase the agency's
preparedness, and its response and recovery capabilities for
chemical, biological as well as radiological incidents.
In April 2004, the White House released Homeland Security
Presidential Directive Number 10. To fulfill our
responsibilities under HSPD-10, EPA is establishing an all-
media, such as soil, water, and air, environmental Laboratory
Response Network (eLRN) to address environmental laboratory
analytical gaps for chemical warfare, biological and
radiological agents. The eLRN is leverage existing networks and
capabilities, and will upgrade and expand additional
capabilities to ensure EPA has sufficient capability and
capacity to meet its responsibilities for an incident. EPA has
also begun a demonstration study aimed at improving
environmental radiological laboratory capacity through
enhancing State laboratories and is developing tools to enhance
the capacity of commercial laboratories as well.
However, EPA's analysis of the Nation's existing
environmental radiological laboratory capacity relative to
demand from only a single dirty bomb or radiological dispersal
device (RDD) in a major urban business district does reveal
significant laboratory gaps. As you know, the gap is based upon
the Homeland Security's Planning Scenario #11 which we
evaluated which actually was for three major urban business
districts. However, our peak shortfall for just one RDD is
approximately 7,000 to 9,000 samples per week with an average
shortfall of 3,000 samples per week. This gap will result in a
lack of timely, reliable, and interpretable data which will
delay national and local response as well as consequent
management activities. We estimate about two years for those
type of analyses.
In closing, I want to assure the Committee that EPA will
continue to work closely with our other federal agencies via
the DHS-sponsored radiological laboratory working group, and
with states to enhance national radioanalytical capability and
capacity to start to fill this environmental laboratory gap and
to maintain readiness to meet our responsibilities in the event
of an accidental or intentional release of radiological or
nuclear material.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks. Myself
and Dr. Griggs would be very pleased to answer any of your
questions that you or the Subcommittee Members may have. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Tulis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dana Tulis
Good morning. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am Dana
Tulis, Deputy Office Director for the Office of Emergency Management at
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). I appreciate the
opportunity to discuss the status of EPA's efforts to assess
environmental radioanalytical capability and capacity in radiological
response. I would also like to share with you broader activities EPA
has underway to protect the Nation in the event of an accidental or
intentional release of radiological material.
ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL RADIOANALYTICAL LABORATORIES IN RADIOLOGICAL
RESPONSE
In the event of a radiological or nuclear Incident of National
Significance (INS), fixed environmental radiological laboratories will
serve as a critical source of high quality and interpretable data to
support incident response and consequence management activities. When
EPA responds to radiological incidents, it is essential that the
environmental radiological laboratories, whether federal, State, or
commercial, that conduct analyses on environmental samples meet EPA's
standards for stringent accuracy and quality control. The fixed
laboratories must have the capability of analyzing for the broadest
possible range of radiological contaminants while achieving the most
sensitive measurements in terms of detection capabilities. Data from
fixed environmental radiological laboratories will be particularly
critical during consequence management activities such as
decontamination and clearance efforts, and will be used to make long-
term decisions to protect the public from radiological contamination,
and to restore any affected critical infrastructure and key resources,
such as ensuring the safety of our drinking water.
NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN: EPA'S RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE
RESPONSIBILITY
Under the National Response Plan's (NRP's) Nuclear/Radiological
Incident Annex, the Department of Energy (DOE) coordinates radiological
monitoring and assessment activities for the initial phases of a
response to a radiological incident. DOE coordinates federal
radiological environmental monitoring and assessment activities as the
lead technical organization in what is known as the Federal
Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center or the ``FRMAC.'' The
FRMAC is an interagency organization with representatives from various
federal, State, and local radiological response organizations. The
FRMAC provides an operational framework for coordinating all federal
radiological monitoring and assessment activities during a response to
support the Federal Coordinating Agency, State(s), local, and/or tribal
governments. In the event of a Presidentially-declared major disaster
or emergency, the FRMAC also provides its information to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Federal Coordinating Officer to
assure appropriate and adequate additional resources are available for
the State and local authorities to draw upon. The FRMAC works with the
Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center, or IMAAC, to
produce predictive plots of plume dispersion and dose rates and
collects radiological monitoring data. It develops radiation contours
showing where contamination is located and the associated radiation
levels, which are used to recommend appropriate protective actions.
FRMAC leadership responsibility, and leadership of federal
radiological environmental monitoring and assessment activities, is
transferred to EPA per the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the
NRP, at a mutually agreeable time, and after consultation with the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its coordination entities, as
well as State, local, and tribal governments. The following conditions
are intended to be met prior to transfer:
The immediate emergency condition is stabilized;
Off-site releases of radioactive material have ceased, and
there is little or no potential for further unintentional off-
site releases;
The off-site radiological conditions are characterized and
the immediate consequences are assessed;
An initial long-range monitoring plan has been developed in
conjunction with the affected State, local, and tribal
governments and appropriate federal agencies; and
EPA has received adequate assurances from the other federal
agencies that the required resources, personnel, and funds are
available for the duration of the federal response.
When the FRMAC is transferred to EPA, EPA assumes responsibility
for coordination of radiological monitoring and assessment activities.
EPA'S PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT RESOURCES
Throughout the response effort, however, EPA provides resources for
defining and delineating the environmental impact of the radiological
incident, whether under DOE leadership or EPA leadership, and uses
these resources to carry out its mission and NRP responsibilities.
These responsibilities encompass maintaining personnel and asset
readiness for radiological emergency responses, which include
participating in emergency response situations and providing technical
expertise and support. EPA brings to bear both personnel and equipment
to this mission, including 250 On-Scene Coordinators and its Special
Teams under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances National
Contingency Plan such as the National Decontamination Team (NDT), the
Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT), the Environmental Response
Team (ERT), and the National Counter Terrorism Evidence Response Team
(NCERT) which each bring specialized personnel and equipment, and the
expertise gained every day in protecting human health and the
environment. More specifically, the RERT has up to 50 people who can be
deployed to the field or a support role and the NDT has 15 people who
are available for deployment. Altogether EPA has approximately 350
personnel for emergency responses and is also building a Response
Support Corps to expand our response capability. The Agency's radiation
health and safety and detection equipment assets run the gamut from
approximately 300 personnel dosimeters to measure dose to protect
response personnel to more than 200 pieces of emergency response/
assessment equipment to detect alpha, beta, or gamma radiation,
depending on the equipment, in different environmental matrices.
Equipment also includes mobile laboratories, a scanner van, and field
based equipment that can identify specific gamma sources.
In addition to personnel and assets, EPA's NRP responsibilities
include maintaining and enhancing the Nation's most comprehensive
ambient radiation monitoring network named RadNet, which currently
consists of 50 stationary and 40 portable near-real time air monitors,
40 additional non-real time air monitors, milk collection at 37
locations, drinking water collection at 77 locations and precipitation
collection at 44 locations. The stationary near real-time monitors
collect a beta and gamma spectrum of the particulates on an air filter
hourly, and transmit data to the National Air and Radiation
Environmental Laboratory (NAREL), where radionuclide specific
determinations can be quickly made. The portable monitors collect
ambient gamma radiation readings through the use of air filters which
can be sent to a laboratory for radionuclide specific analyses.
GUIDANCE FOR RADIATION RESPONSES
EPA has worked closely with DHS and our other federal partners to
ensure that the Protective Action Guidelines, or PAGs that can be
applied to almost any radiological or nuclear incident, including
radiation dispersal devices (dirty bombs). EPA has developed PAGs,
which suggest precautions that can be taken to keep people from
receiving an amount of radiation that might be dangerous to their
health. The PAGs are decision levels to help State and local
authorities make protective action decisions during emergencies, and
should be applied using incident-specific information. Users of PAGs
may include hazardous materials teams, emergency managers, anyone
working on terrorism preparedness, and nuclear power plant communities.
The PAGs Manual, which EPA issued in 1992, presented guidance for
the early or emergency phase e.g., first four days, and intermediate
phase, e.g., source is controlled and field data become available, of a
response to primarily nuclear power plant accidents. A revision is
underway that addresses all radiological incidents such as a terrorist
use of a dirty bomb, and incorporates DHS' guidance for dealing with
long-term site restoration following a major radiological release. The
DHS guidance does not recommend pre-established numerical guidelines
for cleanup levels because of the broad range of potential impacts that
may occur.
Instead, it proposes an optimization process in which potential
actions to reduce radiation dose are evaluated, and the benefits of
each are then compared to the detriments of the action. We have also
developed guidance for Agency personnel on radiation turn-back levels.
Turn-back levels help incident responders know how far they can go into
a radiation area; they are exposure rates and dose limits which when
met require responders to turn back and seek further guidance. The
levels we developed are specific to EPA's mission and capabilities, and
we recommend that other organizations develop their own.
Under the NRP, EPA has responsibility to lead the cleanup and
recovery phase of a radiological incident for which no other department
or agency has responsibility, including terrorist incidents such as a
dirty bomb. Through training, research, development and technical
support activities, EPA continues to increase its preparedness, and its
response and recovery capabilities for chemical, biological or
radiological incidents that threaten homeland security. The Agency
continues to assemble and evaluate private sector tools and
capabilities to ensure effective response approaches can be identified
and evaluated for future first responders, decision-makers, and the
public to use. EPA continues to work with federal institutions and
other organizations through collaborative research efforts to
strengthen decontamination capabilities. EPA promotes improved response
capabilities across government and industry in areas where EPA has
unique knowledge and expertise. In the area of environmental laboratory
capabilities and capacity, EPA has begun a demonstration study aimed at
improving national radiological laboratory capacity through enhancing
State laboratories and is developing tools to enhance capacity of
commercial laboratories throughout the United States.
HIGHLIGHTS OF ``ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RADIOLOGICAL
LABORATORY CAPACITY GAP''
In April 2004, the White House released Homeland Security
Presidential Directive Number 10 (HSPD-10). This directive requires EPA
to determine the nationwide laboratory capacity required to support
environmental decontamination of chemical, biological, and
radiochemical-nuclear agents by reviewing federal, State, local, and
private laboratory capabilities specifically related to environmental
sampling and testing and to ensure evidentiary considerations. To
respond to HSPD-10 requirements, EPA is establishing an all media,
e.g., soil, air, and water, environmental Laboratory Response Network
(eLRN) to address environmental laboratory analytical gaps for chemical
warfare, biological and radiological agents. The eLRN will leverage
existing laboratory networks and capabilities, and upgrade and expand
additional capabilities to ensure that EPA has sufficient capacity and
capability to meet its responsibilities for an INS, such as a terrorist
attack involving radiological or nuclear materials. In order to
determine the national environmental radiological laboratory capacity
needs associated with an INS involving radiochemical or nuclear agents,
EPA conducted an assessment of the environmental sample demand for the
White House Homeland Security Council's Planning Scenario #11 which
involves the detonation of Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) in
three major urban business districts.
The results of the assessment of the sample demand and estimates of
the existing nationwide environmental radiological laboratory capacity
are summarized in EPA's draft document entitled Assessment of National
Environmental Radiological Laboratory Capacity Gap. The estimated
sample demand resulting from a single RDD event is approximately
360,000 samples over a one-year period. This estimate equates to an
average sample demand of approximately 7,000 to 8,000 samples per week
over 52 weeks and a peak sample demand of 13,000 to 15,000 samples per
week. These numbers do not include the quality control analyses the
laboratories will perform in conjunction with the samples which
contribute to the overall analysis demands on the laboratories'
personnel. EPA's analysis of the Nation's existing radiological
laboratory capacity relative to the estimated sample demand from the
RDD scenario reveals a significant laboratory capacity gap with an
estimated peak capacity shortfall of approximately 7,000 to 9,000
samples per week and an estimated average capacity shortfall of
approximately 3,000 samples per week. This gap will result in a lack of
timely, reliable, and interpretable data which will delay national and
local response and consequence management activities.
It should be noted that this gap is based on a single RDD event in
which the source is a single radionuclide which is among the most
straightforward to measure from a laboratory perspective. An RDD event
with a more complex source--multiple, more difficult to analyze
radionuclides, multiple RDD events as described in Planning Scenario
11, or multiple RDD events with different radiation sources would
result in an even larger capacity gap. Although EPA has not conducted a
detailed assessment, a limited analysis of an improvised nuclear device
(IND) scenario indicates a contamination area of approximately 3,000
square miles, and a laboratory capacity gap with potentially millions
of laboratory analyses required.
In addition to the capacity gap, EPA's national environmental
radiological gap assessment also revealed capability and competency
gaps. The capability gap relative to laboratory incident response is
largely due to a lack of ``tools'' like rapid radiochemical methods and
laboratory protocols specifically designed for response to radiological
or nuclear incident.
The competency gap is due to an overall national declining
infrastructure for radiological laboratories due to a number of factors
including: reduction of personnel with radiochemistry expertise without
adequate replacements; lack of formal training programs for
radiological laboratory personnel; and a reduction in federal
radiological proficiency testing (PT) programs.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION INCIDENTS
EPA works continuously with federal, State, and private sector
emergency preparedness and response communities to ensure that lessons
learned from incidents such as the 1987 Goiania incident in Brazil and
the more recent Polonium-210 murder in the United Kingdom are
integrated into the Nation's preparedness efforts. While the Goiania
and London incidents provided numerous lessons of potential relevance
to a dirty bomb response, it should be remembered that neither actually
originated as an intentional effort to spread contamination throughout
a densely populated area. In fact, environmental contamination was an
unintended consequence. Thus, the scale of these two incidents, in
particular, needs to be assessed carefully with respect to intentional
efforts to harm the Nation's people and economy by spreading
radiological contamination.
However, these and other incidents have taught us that there are a
number of critical aspects in responding to radiological contamination.
The Protective Action Guides must be accepted and understood prior to
an incident. Adequate field personnel and instruments are needed to
detect, identify and quantify the radioactive material. Extensive field
and fixed laboratory capacity and capability will be needed to analyze
the many air, water, soil and food samples that will be used to
determine public protective measures.
ROLE IN TOPOFF IV
EPA participation in the DHS-led TOPOFF IV was extensive. EPA
deployed over 250 participants to the three exercise venues--Portland,
Oregon; Mesa, Arizona; and Guam. Participants included EPA's On-Scene
Coordinators, members of our four special teams, the Radiological
Emergency Response Team (RERT), Environmental Response Team (ERT),
National Decontamination Team (NDT), and the National Counterterrorism
Evidence Response Tem (NCERT), as well as personnel from headquarters
and EPA's regional offices. We also deployed monitoring and analytical
equipment such as our mobile radiation laboratory. Additionally, the
EPA Emergency Operations Center was staffed and EPA participated in
various interagency coordination and support entities, such as the
Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST), the Incident Management
Planning Team (IMPT), and the National Response Coordination Center
(NRCC). EPA personnel filled critical positions within FRMAC, working
in support of DOE, DHS, and the affected State and local governments to
assess potential contamination. EPA staff also served as controllers
and evaluators at the various exercise venues.
At the time this testimony was submitted to the Committee on
Science and Technology, the TOPOFF IV counterterrorism exercise had
just concluded, and the federal community is still working to analyze
the exercise and develop conclusions. In addition to the functional
exercise, TOPOFF IV includes a Long-Term Recovery table top exercise,
which will occur in December 2007. During this exercise, we expect to
discuss the role of environmental laboratories in supporting the
recovery phase. DHS will publish a final report that will provide a
summary of conclusions, and we will be happy to provide you with
additional information in the future.
However, it should be noted that the primary exercise venue, in
Portland, Oregon, emphasized the initial emergency response activities
rather than the extended recovery phase during which the majority of
fixed laboratory samples will be analyzed. As noted earlier in my
testimony, the spread of radiological contamination from multiple
events such as in Portland, Phoenix and Guam would require more
laboratory analyses than the assessment of capacity and capability done
to date, which assumed a single RDD event.
CONCLUSION
We appreciate the Committee's interest in examining national
radioanalytical laboratory capability and capacity to support
radiological response and the opportunity to update you on the status
of EPA's other efforts in the area of radiological response. We
understand that radioanalytical capacity is a key component of a multi-
faceted radiological response in an environment of declining
radiochemistry infrastructure. EPA is working closely with other
federal agencies via the DHS-sponsored Radiological Laboratory Working
Group and with states to enhance national environmental radioanalytical
capacity to maintain readiness to meet our responsibilities in the
event of an accidental or intentional release of radiological or
nuclear material.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Dr. Hadley.
STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT T. HADLEY, CHAIR OF FEDERAL
RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT CENTER'S LABORATORY,
ANALYSIS WORKING GROUP, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Dr. Hadley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Subcommittee. I am honored to have the opportunity to testify
here today as a subject matter expert about radioanalytical
laboratory issues. I am a certified industrial hygienist and
health physicist from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
with over 25 years in nuclear emergency response management,
and I currently serve as the Chair of the Federal Radiological
Monitoring and Assessment Center, or FRMAC, Laboratory Analysis
Working Group.
We all recognize that a response to a radiological event
will require many highly skilled professionals ranging from
surveillance to response organizations and forensics. My
remarks today are confined to my role as part of the FRMAC.
The FRMAC is part of the Nuclear Incident Response Team
maintained by DOE can be activated by the Department of
Homeland security in response to a nuclear or radiological
incident. The purpose of the FRMAC is to provide a clear
operating picture of radiological conditions in the field to
responders for decision-making and incident action planning.
FRMAC data is critical for characterizing the exact nature and
extent of contamination which supports public health and safety
efforts. FRMAC provides verified radiation measurements and
characterization of overall radiological conditions. FRMAC
measurements are utilized by the National Atmospheric Release
Advisory Center located at Lawrence Livermore to provide an
accurate and complete picture of the radioactive footprint.
This information can help guide crop and food field sampling
teams to areas where contamination might result in an ingestion
pathway dose that exceeds health and safety limits.
FRMAC provides procedures for sample collection and
analysis to all participating agencies. We work closely with
CDC, EPA, and State and local responders. FRMAC also provides
live and web-based instructions and participate in national and
regional level exercises.
I participated as part of the FRMAC team in the recent the
TOPOFF-4 exercise, at the Portland, Oregon venue. I was the
senior radiological data controller at the event scene, and my
responsibilities included providing radiological exposure and
contamination measurements to federal, State, and local
responders and other government officials including the FBI.
During the first day, most of the radiological data involved
direct reading instruments that provide immediate results.
FRMAC capabilities arrived and began operation on Day 2 and
stayed through the end of the exercise period. FRMAC air
sampling instruments were deployed within and around the
contaminated area and collection of soil, plant, water, and air
samples began. This data was used to determine the size of the
contaminated area and provide health and safety information to
local residence. FRMAC established a liaison at the Joint Field
Office, and the FRMAC Web Portal was utilized to disseminate
information to approved users at all levels of government. The
interagency FRMAC team was well-integrated and worked together
to gather requirements and provided hazard information in a
timely manner. Unfortunately, due to the short duration and
field play, the full radioanalytical laboratory infrastructure
was not exercised. It is my understanding that remediation and
recovery requirements were in notional play during this the
final week of TOPOFF.
In June 2007, FRMAC released a draft analysis for the
emergency phase of a response, typically the first 4 to 7 days.
This is a critical period for addressing the health and safety
of the public and responders. This document focuses on the
federal resources activated to provide rapid support to the
nuclear/radiological monitoring and dose assessment activities
at the incident scene in accordance with the national response
plan and nuclear and radiological incidence. It did not attempt
to complete a comprehensive assessment of environmental and
clinical laboratory resources that would be needed for the
long-term environment remediation activities, medical response,
and human health monitoring.
All scenarios were addressed as a single event and included
a nuclear explosion, radiological dispersal devices, and
accidental or unintentional non-explosive release of
radioactive materials. For the limited scope of the study, the
document suggested that current fixed radioanalytical
laboratory infrastructure could handle short duration
environmental monitoring and dose assessment missions. These
laboratories have not been integrated into an enduring national
capability focused on the long-term analytical needs.
Although the primary mission of the FRMAC is to evaluate
environmental radiological data, FRMAC assets may also be
called on to assist the Department of Health and Human Services
with human clinical data. DOE has developed a cytogenetic
dosimetry capability at Radiation Emergency Assistance Center
Training Site in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to evaluate radiation
dose received based on blood samples collected from victims or
responders. This capability was demonstrated during TOPOFF.
This concludes my remarks, and thank you for the
opportunity to address the Committee.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hadley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert T. Hadley
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify here today as a subject matter expert about
radioanalytical laboratory issues. I am a Certified Industrial
Hygienist and Health Physicist from Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL) with over 25 years in nuclear emergency response
management and currently serve as the Chair of the Federal Radiological
Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) Laboratory Analysis Working
Group. The FRMAC was formally established in 1979 following Three Mile
Island. The FRMAC is an interagency effort and normally includes
representation from the Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Commerce, the National
Communications System, Department of Defense (DOD)/U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers and other federal agencies as needed. Response to a
radiological event will require many highly skilled professionals
ranging from surveillance to response operations and forensics.
Although LLNL's extensive scientific and technical expertise in nuclear
materials behavior is routinely called upon to support many phases of
the response activity, my remarks today are confined to my role as part
of the FRMAC.
Under the Homeland Security Act, DHS has the authority to activate
the Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT), which consists of: (1) DOE
entities that perform nuclear and/or radiological emergency support,
and (2) EPA entities that perform such support functions (including
radiological response functions) and related functions. The FRMAC is a
NIRT asset maintained by DOE that is available on request to respond to
nuclear/radiological incidents. The purpose of the FRMAC is to provide
a clear operating picture of radiological conditions in the field to
responders for decision-making and incident action planning; it
provides radiation measurements, interpretations of radiation
contamination distribution and overall characterization of the
radiological conditions. DOE maintains the Aerial Measuring System as
well as a land-based mobile laboratory that can be established at or
near the incident site to enable close coordination with DHS and other
federal, State and local response agencies.
Upon activation, the FRMAC provides an operational framework for
coordinating Federal, State, local and tribal government radiological
monitoring and assessment activities during a response to a
radiological emergency. The support the FRMAC provides includes:
Coordinating federal radiological monitoring and
assessment activities
Maintaining technical liaison with State and local
agencies with monitoring and assessment responsibilities
Maintaining a common set of all radiological
monitoring data, in an accountable, secure, and retrievable
form, and ensuring the integrity of the FRMAC data
Providing monitoring data and interpretations
including exposure rate contours, dose projections and any
other requested radiological assessments to DHS and other
federal, State and local response agencies
Providing personnel and equipment needed to perform
radiological monitoring and assessment activities.
FRMAC assist the states, local and tribal governments in their
mission to protect the health and well-being of their citizens with
verified radiation measurements, interpretations of radiation
distributions based on federal and local guidelines, and
characterization of overall radiological conditions. FRMAC data is
critical for characterizing the exact nature of the contaminant and the
extent of contamination, which, in turn, supports public health and
safety efforts. Integration of measurements of radioactive
contamination, airborne or on the ground, is particularly valuable in
the early and intermediate phases of an event.
FRMAC measurements are utilized by the National Atmospheric Release
Advisory Center (NARAC) to provide a complete picture of the
radioactive footprint. This technique can aid in helping guide crop and
food field sampling teams to areas in which contamination might result
in an ingestion pathway dose that exceeds regulatory limits.
Plans and procedures for sample collection and analysis have been
developed and made available to all participating federal, State, and
local agencies. FRMAC works closely with Center for Disease Control
(CDC), EPA, and the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
(REACS/TS) to assist in the dissemination of information pertaining to
public health emergencies, training, and exercise opportunities. FRMAC
also provides live classroom instruction and web-based training venues.
National level and regional exercises have been used to evaluate the
FRMAC response.
As an example of a National Level Exercise, I would like to explain
how sample collection and laboratory analysis was exercised during the
recent the TOPOFF-4 exercise, which was recently conducted. During this
exercise, FRMAC participated in the full field exercise at the
Portland, Oregon venue. I participated as the lead day-shift
radiological data controller at the event scene. My responsibilities
included providing radiological exposure and contamination measurements
to Fire, Hazardous Materials (Hazmat), Radiological Assistance Program
(RAP), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and all other responding
teams.
During the first day, most radiological data involved direct
reading instruments that provide immediate results. Air samples were
collected for laboratory analysis to evaluate airborne radioactivity
that responders and the public may be breathing into their bodies, and
to determine (using spectral data) the particular radioisotopes that
were present. The spectral data received initial evaluation from
locally deployed DOE Radiological Assistance Teams and/or local HAZMAT
responders. Spectral data was also sent to DOE laboratories (usually
LLNL, LANL or SNL) for confirmatory analysis. Air samples were sent to
local environmental analysis laboratories (e.g., University of Oregon)
for evaluation. Victims and casualties were evaluated for external
contamination with direct reading instruments and then sent to
hospitals for treatment and further clinical evaluation.
FRMAC capability arrived and became operational at TOPOFF-4 on Day
2 and stayed operational through the end of the exercise period.
Additional air sampling instrumentation was deployed within and around
the contaminated area and the collection of soil, water, and vegetation
samples began. This data was used to determine the size of the
contaminated area, whether occupants could return to their homes, and
began addressing issues such as the safety of drinking water and local
produce. FRMAC established a liaison at the Joint Field Office and
products were provided to Oregon Emergency Managers and Incident
Commanders, as well as Mayor of Portland and the city's incident
commander. The FRMAC Web Portal was utilized to disseminate information
to approved users at all levels of government, including DHS and DOE
headquarters. The interagency FRMAC team was well-integrated and worked
together to gather requirements and provide hazard information in a
timely manner. Due to the short duration and field play for TOPOFF-4,
only the mobile EPA laboratory from Las Vegas responded and the
national radioanalytical laboratory infrastructure was not exercised.
It is my understanding that remediation and recovery requirements were
in notional play during the final week, including the hand-off of FRMAC
leadership from DOE to EPA.
In June 2007, the FRMAC released a draft document titled ``Mission
Analysis--Emergency Phase, An Interagency Document for Implementing the
National Response Plan Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex.'' The
purpose of this document was to define the overall federal radiological
monitoring and dose assessment response to a nuclear or radiological
incident as defined in the Nuclear Incident Annex to the National
Response Plan in the ``Emergency Phase,'' typically the first three to
seven days after the event. This is a critical period for addressing
the health and safety of the public and responders.
This document focused on the federal resources activated to provide
rapid support to the nuclear/radiological monitoring and dose
assessment activities at an incident site. While the report provided an
initial compilation of personnel and equipment requirements for the
environmental and dose assessment component of the emergency response,
it did not attempt to complete a comprehensive assessment of
environmental and clinical laboratory capabilities required for medical
response and long-term environmental restoration activities.
All scenarios were addressed as a single event. The following
scenarios were considered:
Domestic Nuclear Explosion (DNE)--A low technology,
low yield nuclear device detonated near ground level in a major
U.S. metropolitan area.
Nuclear Power Plant Incident or Event Involving a
Significant Release
Alpha Radiological Dispersal Device/Failed Improvised
Nuclear Device (IND)
Beta Gamma Radiological Dispersal Device
Scenarios not included in this document, but identified for future
consideration include multiple simultaneous events, combined radiation/
chemical events, and combined radiation/biological events.
The key findings included:
Improved processes for electronic data processing
Standardized internal communications (voice & data)
Established guidelines for public monitoring support
and medical registry
Additional personnel and equipment resources to
address the DNE scenario
For the limited scope of this study, the document implies that
current fixed radioanalytical laboratory infrastructure could handle
short duration environmental monitoring and dose assessment missions,
but these laboratories have not been integrated into an enduring
national capability focused on the radiological contaminants.
In addition, mobile radioanalytical laboratories belonging to DOE,
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Defense
(DOD), and the States also respond as part of the FRMAC to evaluate
priority samples in support of decision-making. These laboratories must
be driven or flown to the incident site and often arrive a couple of
days into the response. Plans and procedures have been developed for
mobile response coordination. This planning and coordination was
evaluated during the FRMAC Southern Crossing Exercise conducted in
August 2006 in Dothan, Alabama.
Although the primary mission of the FRMAC is to evaluate
environmental radiological data, FRMAC assets may be called on to
assist the Department of Health and Human Services with human clinical
data. Specifically, DOE has developed a cytogenetic dosimetry
capability at REAC/TS in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to evaluate the
radiation dose received based on blood samples collected from victims
or responders. This capability was demonstrated at the TOPOFF-4
Exercise. Similar capability exists in only a few other locations such
as the Armed Force Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) and sites in
Canada and in France. The number of evaluations that can be
simultaneously processed is limited. DOE maintains at its various sites
the capability to evaluate internal ingestion or inhalation of
radioisotopes using whole body counting, lung counting, and body fluid
analyses. This capability is designed to handle situations involving
DOE site activities and only a few individuals--not large public
emergencies.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to address this committee.
Biography for Robert T. Hadley
M.S., Biophysics and Computing, University of Utah, 1980
B.S., Life Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1975
Mr. Robb Hadley is a Certified Industrial Hygienist (CIH) and
Health Physicist at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in
Livermore, California with over 25 years experience as a Nuclear
Emergency Response Manager. Mr. Hadley currently serves as the Chair of
the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC)
Laboratory Analysis Working Group.
Before joining the Nuclear Incident Response Program in 1999, Mr.
Hadley managed the LLNL Industrial Hygiene Group where he was
responsible for a staff of 25 health and safety professionals.
Mr. Hadley has participated in numerous national level exercises.
He was the Lead Planner and control for the Diablo Bravo and Comanche
Warrior exercises involving radiological incidents. He recently
completed the TOPOFF-4 exercise as the Radiological Data Controller at
the event scene. In this capacity his responsibilities included
providing radiological exposure and contamination measurements to local
responders, the Radiological Assistance Program, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and other responding teams.
Mr. Hadley has authored several DOE Site emergency and responder
handbooks, guides and procedures. He is a regular participant in
several emergency response technical working groups, including DOD/DOE
Nuclear Weapons Accident Response Technical Working Group, the multi-
agency Population Monitoring Working Group, the Accident Response (ARG)
Capability Coordinating Committee, the consequence Management
Operations Working Group and the ARG Health and Safety Working Group.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Dr. Jones.
STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT L. JONES, ACTING CHIEF, INORGANIC AND
RADIATION ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY BRANCH, DIVISION OF LABORATORY
SCIENCES, NATIONAL CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
Dr. Jones. Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Subcommittee. My name is Dr. Robert Jones, Acting Chief of the
Inorganic Radiation and Analytical Toxicology Branch in the
Division of Laboratory at CDC.
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the role of
clinical laboratories, and in particular, the role of CDC's
radiation lab, in protecting the health of the American people
in response to a radiological event.
My testimony will address three issues. First, the
essential laboratory information needed to respond to an event;
second, the national laboratory capability for such a response;
and third the potential methods to improve our ability to
respond
Following an event with uncontrolled radioactive material,
such as a dirty bomb or terrorist nuclear attack, public health
officials will need to answer four questions to guide their
response: what were people exposed to or contaminated with, who
was exposed, how much exposure or contamination did each person
have, and did it enter the body? Contamination with
radionuclides can be primarily internal, that is inside the
body, primarily external, outside the body such as on clothing
or hair, or contamination of both. The decision to medically
treat people will depend on our ability to rapidly and
accurately identify and quantify internal contamination. To
direct appropriate medical treatment to the truly affected, we
need new methods to rapidly and accurately assess internal
contamination for a broad array of radionuclides.
Nationwide the current laboratory capacity for measuring
radionuclides in people in response to emergency is limited.
Methods to measure radionuclides in urine must have four
characteristics. First, they must be fast, with results
available in a day or so; second, they must be able to process
large numbers of samples per day to handle urine samples from
many people involved; third, they will need to use a small
amount of urine available from collecting a sample at a point
in time; fourth, they must be able to identify and quantify
different radionuclides likely to be used by terrorists. A few
years ago, CDC recognized the gaps in current lab capacity for
measuring radionuclides in an emergency event and took steps to
begin developing a state-of-the-art urine radionuclide screen.
To date, CDC has developed the scientific approach for the
urine radionuclide screen using a combination of alpha, beta,
and gamma radiation detection instruments and a specialized
technique in mass spectrometry. Currently CDC has some limited
capacity to measure six radionuclides in urine. Although our
scientific approach is working well, considerable applied
method development remains to be done.
CDC's efforts to improve lab capacity to respond to a
radiological event include a validated urine radionuclide
screen, which is currently in development, which would provide
results within 24 hours of receiving the sample. The CDC urine
radionuclide screen would require only a point-in-time, small-
volume urine sample, no need for 24-hour collections, and the
screen would identify and quantify 13 different priority
radionuclides. When the urine radionuclide screen is ready for
distribution, the CDC will consider how to build on the
existing Laboratory Response Network, the LRN, a national
network of local, State and federal public laboratories that
provide the infrastructure and capacity to respond to public
health emergencies, to establish surge capacity in public
health laboratories for measuring people's exposure to a
variety of radionuclides.
The recent incident in London involving the death of a
former Russian KGB agent from exposure to Polonium-210
underscores the importance of having laboratory capability that
can provide human exposure information.
We found that only one laboratory, a commercial laboratory,
that could analyze Polonium-210 in urine. This laboratory
needed a 24-hour sample and typically required 30 days for
analysis. For this emergency, the laboratory did the analyses
in seven days. In summary, the Nation has a limited laboratory
capability necessary to identify people who may be exposed to
an event involving radioactive materials. This leads to a
limited capability to provide patients, their doctors, and
health departments with exposure information. Completing the
radionuclide screen, developing the LRNR, and transferring the
urine radionuclide screen to the LRNR laboratories are options
to close these gaps.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would
be happy to respond to any questions that you or the Members of
the Subcommittee may have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Jones follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert L. Jones
Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee.
My name is Dr. Robert Jones, and I am Acting Chief of the Inorganic
Radiation and Analytical Toxicology Branch in the Division of
Laboratory Sciences of the National Center for Environmental Health at
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the role
of clinical laboratories, and in particular, the role of CDC's
radiation laboratory, in protecting the health of the American people
in response to an event involving radioactive materials.
I will first discuss the essential laboratory information that is
needed to respond to these events, focusing on the assessment of
internal contamination with radioactive materials. Then I will describe
the current estimate of the national laboratory capability for such a
response and potential methods to improve our ability across the Nation
to respond to an event. I also will address CDC's efforts to monitor
and assess the potential exposure of U.S. citizens during an incident
in the United Kingdom that resulted in the death of a former Russian
KGB agent from Polonium-210. I also will describe briefly CDC's
capabilities and readiness to meet emergency response needs under the
Nuclear/Radiological Annex of the National Response Plan; and finally,
I will touch briefly on our laboratory's role in the just-completed
TOPOFF-4 counterterrorism exercise.
Laboratory Public Health Response
Information Needed Following a Radiation Event: Following an event
with uncontrolled radioactive material, such as a dirty bomb or
terrorist nuclear attack, public health officials need to answer three
questions to guide their response: what were people exposed to or
contaminated with, who was exposed or contaminated, how much exposure
or contamination did each person have, and did it enter the body?
Contamination can be primarily internal (that is, inside the body),
primarily external (outside the body), or a combination of both. Hand-
held radiation detectors, like Geiger counters, generally are used for
assessing externally deposited contamination by certain radioactive
materials and are useful for prioritizing people for external
decontamination. These detectors can be used to assess internal
contamination in some specific cases.
Internal contamination cannot be reliably quantified by clinical
assessment of early symptoms. The decision to medically treat people
will depend on our ability to rapidly and accurately identify and
quantify internal contamination. To direct appropriate medical
treatment to the truly affected, we need a method to rapidly and
accurately assess internal contamination for a broad array of
radionuclides. The new methods for measurement of radionuclides in
urine are being developed to meet this need for internal contamination
and dose assessment.
Current Laboratory Capabilities for Internal Contamination: In the
event of a radiological incident, our ability to effectively respond to
the health needs of our citizens will depend on the methods we have in
place to measure radionuclides in urine. These methods must have four
essential characteristics: first, they must be fast, with results
available in a day or so; second, they must be able to process large
numbers of samples per day to handle urine samples from the many people
involved; third, they need to use a small amount of urine available
from collecting a sample at one point in time; and fourth, they must be
able to identify and quantify the various radionuclides likely to be
used by terrorists.
Nationwide, the current laboratory capability for measuring
radionuclides in people in response to an emergency is limited.
Currently available methods for measuring radionuclides in urine, and
our national capacity to do so, are limited. Right now, the methods are
slow; it typically takes five to 30 days to obtain a urine radionuclide
measurement. The number of samples that can be processed per day is
low--the few labs that can measure urinary radionuclides typically
process fewer than 20 samples per day. Urine volume requirements are
high--about half a gallon of urine, usually comprising a patient's
entire urine output for a 24-hour period. Finally, we currently have
validated analytic methods to measure only a few of the radionuclides
of concern.
CDC recognized this gap a few years ago and took steps to begin
developing a state-of-the-art Urine Radionuclide Screen. To date, CDC
has developed the scientific approach for the Urine Radionuclide Screen
using a combination of radiation-detection instruments that detect the
three types of radiation, alpha, beta, and gamma, and a specialized
technique in mass spectrometry. CDC currently has some limited capacity
to measure five radionuclides in urine. Although our scientific
approach is working well, considerable applied method development
remains to be done.
A radiological event is one of many threats for which the Nation
must prepare. At CDC, our all hazards approach to preparedness also
includes preparation for chemical and biological events, as well as
natural disasters. The challenges I have cited in our current lab
capacity to respond to a radiological event must be balanced with the
need to prepare for other public health emergencies.
Efforts to Improve Capabilities for Internal Dose Assessment: CDC
efforts to improve lab capacity to respond to a radiological event
include:
1) The development of a validated Urine Radionuclide Screen,
which would provide results within 24 hours of receiving the
sample. The CDC Urine Radionuclide Screen, which is currently
under development, would require only a point-in-time, small-
volume urine sample--no need for 24-hour collections--and the
Screen would identify and quantify 13 different priority
radionuclides.
2) When the Urine Radionuclide Screen is ready for
distribution, the CDC will consider how to build on the
existing Laboratory Response Network (LRN), a national network
of local, State and federal public health laboratories that
provide the infrastructure and capacity to respond to public
health emergencies, to establish surge capacity in public
health laboratories for measuring people's exposure to a
variety of radionuclides.
Lessons Learned from UK Polonium-210 Event
The recent incident in London involving the death of a former
Russian KGB agent from exposure to Polonium-210 underscores the
importance of having laboratory capability that can provide human
exposure information.
Shortly after the incident, CDC became the U.S. Public Health Point
of Contact for the U.K. Health Protection Agency. The CDC radiation
laboratory was asked to identify laboratories in the United States that
could analyze Polonium-210 in urine because it was thought that some
U.S. citizens had been exposed to the radionuclide during the incident.
We contacted more than 12 federal or commercial laboratories in the
United States to determine which could do the analysis. We found that
only one laboratory--a commercial laboratory--could analyze Polonium-
210 and had certification under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments (CLIA-certified). This laboratory needed 24-hour urine
samples, and its usual time for sample analysis is 30 days. For this
emergency, the laboratory completed the analyses in seven days.
In an effort to identify U.S. citizens who may have been exposed to
Polonium-210, CDC began contacting these citizens directly by
telephone, e-mail, or letter. In a few cases, CDC contacted the State
or local health department and provided lists of citizens within their
jurisdiction to contact. CDC provided State and local health
departments with telephone interview scripts for this process. If the
individuals or their physicians who were contacted wished to have urine
testing performed, CDC referred them to a private laboratory capable of
performing this analysis.
Thirty-one individuals who were tested requested that their
laboratory urine results be interpreted by CDC. CDC's Health Physics
staff calculated individual dose assessments based on internationally
recognized and accepted methods similar to dose assessments that were
used by the UK Health Protection Agency and communicated these results
to the individuals or their physicians.
Communication played a key role in CDC's efforts to monitor U.S.
citizens potentially exposed to Polonium-210. CDC provided citizens,
their private physicians, and the State and local health department
with communication and educational materials about the incident and
laboratory testing. Direct communication via telephone and mail were
the primary channels for communicating with the citizens and physicians
involved; however, CDC also used its public web site and secure network
notification systems to communicate information and updates.
During the response, contact with citizens initially was delayed in
large part by a lack of complete contact information for U.S. citizens.
At the outset, CDC had to rely on contact information provided by the
UK Health Protection Agency, which obtained telephone and address
information obtained from hotel registers or credit card receipts in
places of interest. Therefore, neither CDC nor the UK Health Protection
Agency can be certain that all potentially exposed people were
contacted or whether other people who may have been exposed (e.g.,
those paying bills in cash) will ever be identified.
Communications with State and local health agencies were hampered
because of limited awareness or understanding about the State and local
health department responsibilities in an event involving radioactive
materials. In some cases, State and local health departments did not
know their Radiation Control Program contact even when this contact
resided in their own organizational structure. CDC did provide this
information to the requesting health departments but cannot be certain
that other health departments made the correct connections to their
local Radiation Control Program.
Finally, the private laboratory conducting the testing did not
provide results of analyses directly to CDC, citing privacy issues. In
all cases, the private laboratory would not provide results directly to
CDC without the express permission of their clients. Therefore, CDC
cannot be sure that it has received the results of all of the analyses
conducted for U.S. citizens.
The Nation has a limited laboratory capability necessary to
identify people who were exposed occurring during an event involving
radioactive materials. This leads to a limited capability to provide
patients, their doctors, and health departments with exposure
information.
The Nuclear/Radiological Annex of the National Response Plan tasks
the Department of Health and Human Services with coordinating federal
assistance for performing population-monitoring activities. Population
monitoring is a process that begins soon after a radiation incident is
reported and continues until all potentially affected people have been
monitored and evaluated for the following:
Needed medical treatment
The presence of radioactive contamination on the body
or clothing
The intake of radioactive materials into the body
The removal of external or internal contamination
(decontamination)
The radiation dose received and the resulting health
risk from the internal and external exposure
Long-term health effects
Assessment of the first five items listed above, and the whole body
external dose, should be accomplished as soon as possible following an
incident. Long-term health effects are usually determined through a
population registry and an epidemiologic investigation that will likely
span several decades.
Under the Nuclear/Radiological Annex of the National Response Plan,
population monitoring is the responsibility of State, local, and tribal
authorities, assisted and supported by HHS. However, it is likely that
in a mass casualty event involving radioactive materials State, local,
and tribal authorities will very quickly request assistance from the
Federal Government.
In the United States, 31 states have operating nuclear power
plants. These states already have local plans for responding to an
incident at the nuclear power plant in their own state or at one in a
neighboring state. These plans include requirements related to
population monitoring. However, effective response to a radiological or
nuclear terrorism incident requires a broader scope of planning and
most likely a different mode of response than those described in these
current plans.
Plans need to account for several factors: first, the suddenness of
an incident (as opposed to a nuclear power plant failure that would
likely unfold over a 24- to 72-hour period); second, the likelihood
that the incident would be large in scale, involving a much larger
urban population; and third, the unknown aspect of the radionuclide(s)
involved. However, the plans and expertise already developed can be
assets in preparing for a radiological or nuclear terrorism incident
with mass casualties in these states.
CDC, working with technical staff from a number of other federal
agencies, has developed a planning guide on population monitoring in
radiation emergencies for public health officials and emergency
preparedness planners at the State, local, and tribal levels. CDC is
also developing materials to assist these officials in training
personnel to initiate the population- monitoring process before any
federal assets can arrive to assist. However, although most State,
local, and tribal authorities have some limited ability to perform
external population monitoring and decontamination, their ability to
perform internal monitoring and decontamination is much more limited.
For the lab results to be used effectively in managing a radiation
event, personnel who are radiation experts in converting radionuclide
analyses into dose and risk are required. They can then communicate
health risk information to health care providers and decision-makers.
In every level of government, the Nation has a limited supply of the
radiation health experts who provide these interpretations. CDC plans
to leverage the expertise of the radiation protection experts within
the Department of Energy and other federal partners. During a national
emergency, these experts could be used to help CDC with the surge in
needs.
TOPOFF Update
The recent TOPOFF-4 exercise represented the first mass-casualty
exercise that included population monitoring as a significant exercise
objective. In preparation for TOPOFF-4, I oversaw plans that would
exercise CDC's clinical laboratory capabilities. These included sample
acquisition, packaging and shipping, sample logistics, analysis, risk
assessment, and reporting of final results to State officials. Before
the exercise, CDC collaborated with the State public health laboratory
in Oregon to pre-position 100 urine samples in Portland.
As the Nation's premier terrorism preparedness exercise, TOPOFF-4
highlighted the essential functions and challenges involved in
responding to a national incident involving radioactive materials. It
is clear that we have challenges in our laboratory capacity to respond
to a radiological event. We are working to complete the Urine
Radionuclide Screen and consider plans to transfer the Urine
Radionuclide Screen to public health laboratories in the future. At the
same time, we are supporting improvements in preparedness for
biological and chemical events as well, at both the federal and State
levels. We continue to strive to maintain a balanced effort across all
high priority threats and improve overall public health preparedness.
Closing Remarks
CDC is addressing existing gaps by systematically identifying
priorities and working to alleviate these concerns. We have developed a
series of goals to guide capacity improvements in preparedness and
other areas. CDC wants to make sure the investments the American people
make in public health are having impact.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to respond to any questions that you or Members of the
Subcommittee may have.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. And now Dr. John Vitko will
read the prepared testimony of Dr. Randy Long who cannot be
with us.
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN VITKO, DIRECTOR OF CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;
REPRESENTING DR. S. RANDOLPH LONG, CHIEF TECHNICAL ADVISOR,
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DIVISION, SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Dr. Vitko. Good morning Chairman Miller, Ranking Member
Sensenbrenner, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee.
As noted, I am John Vitko. I am the head of the Chemical and
Biological Division in the Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate. And Randy Long is one of my
senior advisors and also the Chair of the Network Coordinating
Group for the ICLN. He expresses his regrets for not being
here. He developed extreme pain in his knee last night, could
barely hobble out of the office, and is seeking some emergency
care probably as we speak, so please accept his regrets.
With that I will read his statements and it is that I am
pleased to appear before you today with this panel to discuss
the Nation's radiological laboratory capabilities and
capacities to respond to an accidental or intentional release
of radiological material. Insofar as the panel assembled here
has the technical depth and responsibility for addressing the
functional needs, I will restrict my comments to the ICLN and
the role it plays in highlighting and supporting laboratory
analytical requirements across the all-hazards landscape.
Assessment of contamination due to any hazard in the
chemical, biological, or radiological realm requires highly
technical laboratory services. Expeditious decisions that may
affect large numbers of people and key assets of commerce or
government critically depend on a system of quality laboratory
service that is both sufficiently robust and provides the data
needs for such decisions. The need to develop such a system of
quality laboratory service across all hazards provided the
impetus for the establishment of the ICLN.
Upon establishment, one major charge to the ICLN relevant
to the subject of this hearing was the assignment of
responsible federal agencies across the chem-bioradiological
laboratory response spectrum.
The principal analytical matrices that would be encountered
include clinical, environmental, food, drinking water, animal,
and plant samples. Phases of response common to each hazard
include monitoring and surveillance, incident response,
remediation, and forensics. The assignment of responsible
federal agencies for each matrix and phase gave consideration
to existing department obligations and authorities, a history
of already working toward or having established capability, and
applicable executive branch directives.
In the areas of response and remediation to radiological
contamination, HHS, DOE, and EPA are considered the major
players. When the ICLN Network Coordinated Group considered in
2006 the establishment of a radiological working group to
consider laboratory needs and gaps, it charged HHS and EPA with
co-chairmanship with DOE being a key member of the group.
Another major objective of the ICLN has accomplished is a
first assessment of the Nation's laboratory capabilities across
the chem-bio-radiological spectrum. This study initiated in
early 2006 and was finalized as a For Official Use Only report
in April of 2007. The study is considered a first-order
analysis of the ICLN laboratory networks in response to nine
selected homeland security scenarios. These scenarios explored
chemical, biological, and radiological hazards across a variety
of targets, human, animal, and plants. It is functionally a
self-assessment and provides a reasonable estimate of gaps that
may exist between estimated analytical requirements and
estimated existing capabilities.
An exceedingly important caveat is that the assessment is
based on agent-specific scenarios. Changes in agent or other
key scenario parameters could substantially alter conclusions
found in the report. Specifically for the scenario involving
radiological agent dispersal, the study results indicate
``major shortfalls'' in environmental and clinical laboratory
capability in the response to and remediation of such an event.
We can infer from the assessment that without the benefit of an
organized framework and some expansion of quantitative
analytical capabilities, decisions based on analysis of both
clinical and environmental samples for a radiological dispersal
event may be compromised.
The ICLN Coordinating Network Group discharged the
Radiological Lab Response Working Group to consider the logical
steps to be taken to close the analytical gap in this area.
This group has outlined the measured approach based on building
prototype capabilities consistent with best practices
recommended by the ICLN which can be expanded as adjustments in
funding priorities become favorable. It is our expectation that
the recently concluded TOPOFF-4 exercise and the follow-on,
long-term recovery tabletop exercise will substantially inform
this need. The interagency laboratory response community is
constituted in the ICLN Network Coordinating Group, supports
forward movement in the establishment of effective radiological
laboratory response capability, and very much appreciates the
Subcommittee's interest in this need.
Again, I thank you for the opportunity to address this
committee.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Long follows:]
Prepared Statement of S. Randolph Long
INTRODUCTION
Good morning, Chairman Miller and distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the
Nation's critical need for improved radiological laboratory
capabilities and capacities to respond to an accidental or intentional
release of radiological material. Insofar as the panel assembled here
has the technical depth and responsibility for addressing the
functional needs, I will restrict my comments to the Integrated
Consortium of Laboratory Networks and the role it plays in highlighting
and supporting laboratory analytical requirement across the all-hazards
landscape.
THE ROLE OF LABORATORIES IN RESPONSE TO A RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENT
Assessment of contamination due to any hazard in the chemical,
biological, or radiological realm requires the services of highly
technical laboratory services. These services support both the
determination of exposures to population, to determine who has been
exposed to how much of the hazard, and the determination of the
environment or physical space that remains a hazard until remediation
and restoration has occurred. In both cases, decisions affecting
application of medical countermeasures and evacuation from potentially
contaminated spaces are effectively determined through risk assessments
that rely upon quality information from laboratory systems. Expeditious
decisions that may affect large numbers of people and key assets of
commerce or government critically depend on a system of quality
laboratory service that is sufficiently robust to provide the data
needs for such decisions.
The need to develop such a system of quality laboratory service
across all hazards provided the impetus for the establishment of the
Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks.
INTEGRATED CONSORTIUM OF LABORATORY NETWORKS (ICLN)
In response to the threat posed by terrorist use of WMD threat
agents, a number of laboratory networks have been established over the
past several years to provide the Nation the capability to
characterize, contain, and recover from such attacks on our people and
our essential commodities. During the fall of 2004, the Homeland
Security Council and multiple Agency stakeholders worked together to
develop an organizational framework that links existing and future
laboratory networks under a single interagency umbrella. The goal of
the effort is to create the basis for a system of laboratory networks
capable of integrated and coordinated response and consequence
management of acts of terrorism and other major incidents requiring
laboratory response. Establishing a laboratory network system to
strengthen early detection and consequence management is consistent
with Homeland Security Presidential Directives 9 and 10.
The Memorandum of Agreement establishing the Integrated Consortium
of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) was signed in June of 2005. Senior
officials of agencies with primary responsibility for current and
emerging networks as well as those with a strong supporting role joined
together to endorse the laboratory organizational framework. Signatory
agencies to this agreement include the Department of Agriculture (Food
Safety Inspection Service [FSIS], Cooperative State Research,
Education, and Extension Service [CSREES], and Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service [APHIS]), Department of Commerce, Department of
Energy, Department of Health and Human Services (Food and Drug
Administration [FDA], and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
[CDC]), Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security,
Department of Interior, Department of Justice (Federal Bureau
Investigation), Department of State, and the Environmental Protection
Agency.
As outlined by the MOA, the primary functions and motivations of
the ICLN include:
Agreement by signatories to work cooperatively to
optimize national laboratory preparedness by improving
coordination of laboratory response to incidents;
Recognizing Responsible Federal Agencies' role in
assuring capability of networks;
Promoting common standards of performance across all
lab response assets to ensure data supporting homeland security
decisions is best quality and defensible;
Assessing and filling gaps in coverage across
multiple sample types, potential victim groups (human, animal,
plant), all WMD weapons, and all response phases;
Rationalizing and enhancing relevant interagency
budgets.
Established networks included in the ICLN are the Laboratory
Response Network (LRN), Food Emergency Response Network (FERN),
National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN), and National Plant
Diagnostic Network (NPDN). A network under development in the
consortium is EPA's Environmental Laboratory Response Network (eLRN).
The managers of the networks mentioned above, along with designated
representatives of other signatory agencies, comprise the Network
Coordinating Group (NCG) of the ICLN, which meets on a monthly basis. A
senior-level oversight group, the Joint Leadership Council, oversees
their work. DHS serves to coordinate activities through chairmanship of
the JLC and the NCG.
To support the efforts of the primary representatives of the NCG,
the NCG established a number of technical sub-groups, addressing issues
of Scenarios and Threat Prioritization, Methods Development, Quality
Assurance, Training, and Information Technology and Communications. In
addition, three technical working groups address specific areas of
concern. These include the Environmental Anthrax Sampling Validation
Working Group, the Environmental Chemical Laboratory Response Working
Group, and the Radiological Laboratory Response Working Group.
In its short history, the ICLN has accomplished two major
objectives relevant to the subject of this hearing: the assignment of
Responsible Federal Agencies across the CBR response spectrum, and a
first assessment of the Nation's laboratory capability across this same
spectrum.
Assignment of Responsible Federal Agencies
In order to ensure a basis for organization and maintenance of the
Nation's laboratory response infrastructure against chemical,
biological, and radiological, the ICLN first considered the types of
samples which might require analysis and the phase of response during
which such analysis would be required. The principal analytical
matrices that would be encountered include human clinical,
environmental, food, drinking water, animal, and plant samples. Phases
of response common to each hazard area include monitoring and
surveillance, incident response, remediation, and forensics. The
assignment of Responsible Federal Agencies gave consideration to
existing Department obligations and authorities, a history of already
working toward or having established capability, and applicable
Executive Branch directives or logical extensions thereof.
These assignments are not ratified among the signatory agencies by
a separate formal Memorandum of Agreement, but rather serve as a basis
for development and sustainment of an effective all-hazards laboratory
response capability. Accordingly, if prevailing guidance or
organizational environment shifts, the assignments could, in principle,
change. Separate MOAs do need to be developed to outline the shift in
operational responsibility from one agency to another during response
to a crisis to enhance overall orderly process. Finally, the level of
attention given to a specific analytical area is expected to be guided
by consideration of risk relative to other requirements.
It will be noted that, in the areas of response and remediation to
radiological contamination, EPA, DOE, and HHS are the major players.
When the ICLN NCG considered in 2006 the establishment of a
radiological working group to consider laboratory needs and gaps, it
charged EPA and HHS with co-chairmanship.
ICLN Capability Assessment Key Findings
The assessment and addressing of gaps in the Nation's laboratory
response infrastructure is a key charge to the ICLN under its MOA. The
ICLN addressed this charge through a study initiated in early 2006 and
finalized as an FOUO report in April 2007. The study considered nine
scenarios, generally inspired by the National Planning Scenarios, which
explored chemical, biological, and radiological hazards across a
variety of targets (i.e., humans, animals, and plants). The Homeland
Security Institute mediated the study and assimilated the report,
relying heavily on modeling support and sample throughput data from
technicians within the National laboratory response system.
The study is considered a first-order analysis of capabilities,
capacities, protocols, and policies of the ICLN laboratory networks in
response to the selected homeland security scenarios. It is
functionally a self-assessment of the ``as-is'' operational context of
the member networks and provides an ``order of magnitude'' estimate of
gaps that may exist between analytical requirements and existing
capability.
In order to assure parity across the range of scenarios and
networks examined, certain bounding conditions were set: Funding,
reagents, and consumable materials were not considered to be limiting
factors. Normal rates of laboratory staffing were assumed. Industry and
private laboratories outside Federal oversight were excluded, but
laboratories within other Federal agencies were included as analytical
assets to the extent they could be accessed. In addition to projected
actual sick or injured, ``worried well'' were included. No assumptions
related to policies that might mitigate analytical requirements were
made, but prevailing policy was certainly considered. All qualified
laboratories within established networks were considered to be
accessible analytical resources, regardless of state and local
boundaries. An additional exceedingly important reminder is that the
assessment is based on agent-specific scenarios. Changes in agent or
other key scenario parameters could substantially alter conclusions
found in the report.
Specifically for the scenario involving radiological agent
dispersal, the study results demonstrate ``major shortfalls'' in
environmental and clinical laboratory capability in the response to and
remediation of such an event.
For the specific agent used in the RDD scenario, various sources of
data were used to identify laboratories with adequate characteristics
to contribute materially to the environmental sampling needs that would
support on-the-ground hazard mapping and decontamination. Against the
scenario estimate of a large number of environmental samples required
during the remediation process, a backlog of samples awaiting analysis
would extend some 50 to 100 weeks beyond the event and substantially
affect decisions regarding the remediation activity. Similarly, the
scenario estimate of clinical samples requiring analysis significantly
exceeds the modeled capability for such samples.
The study did not take into consideration the positive benefits of
streamlined sampling and analysis, for example, the pooling of samples
from multiple sites or individuals that may decrease the overall
analytical burden. As such methods are developed and validated, an
improvement in our analytical posture may be expected. However, without
the benefit of an organized framework and adequate quantitative
analytical capability, it seems clear that decisions based on the
analysis of both clinical and environmental samples for a substantial
RDD event would be compromised.
The testimonies of CDC and EPA will address the clinical and
environmental analytical gaps and their implications on response and
recovery.
STEPS TAKEN TO BUILD AN EFFECTIVE RADIOLOGICAL ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY
As noted earlier, the ICLN established a Radiological Lab Response
Working Group in 2006 to begin to consider the radiological testing gap
and what needs to be accomplished to close this gap. EPA and CDC were
charged with co-chairing the group, which includes participation also
from DOE, DHS, FDA, USDA, National Institute for Standards and
Technology, U.S. Geological Survey, and Association of Public Health
Laboratories.
An effective radiological lab response network would address
capability gaps by establishing acceptance criteria for membership;
identifying and enhancing select federal and State laboratories that
have attributes closest to those required to meet acceptance criteria;
providing those laboratories with the appropriate tools, resources, and
analytical methods; establishing and exercising proficiency testing to
ensure readiness and quality; and establishing data management and
communication protocols.
The NCG advised the group that, given prevailing funding
priorities, a measured approach designed to explore the relationship
between analytical power and cost would be the most logical means to
establish initial capability while describing the total cost associated
with establishing a capability that might be considered ``adequate'' to
meet the needs of an incident of substantial scope.
The initial vision of the Radiological Lab Response Working Group
incorporates three ``sub-networks,'' each covering environmental,
clinical, and food samples, under the sponsorship of EPA, CDC, and FDA,
respectively. Pilot programs have been formulated or proposed within
each agency to serve as the genesis of a national radiological
capability.
The effort has just begun, with the bulk of the work required to
establish an effective radiological analytical capability still ahead.
TOP OFFICIALS 4 EXERCISE
This hearing occurs shortly after the end of the TOPOFF-4 exercise.
Our information indicates varying levels of play by analytical
resources of several government agencies (e.g., DOE, EPA, FBI) in the
exercise. The exercise will explore, in various venues, gaps and
deficiencies related to short-term medical monitoring, long-term health
issues, effects on consumables such as food and water, decontamination,
and waste disposal. Laboratory analytical information is a key
component to addressing these issues. The actual exercise and
associated table-top exercises, to include the Long-Term Recovery
Table-top Exercise scheduled for early December, offer valuable fora
for the consideration of gaps related to radiological laboratory
infrastructure.
CONCLUSION
The ICLN exists to design, develop, and promote the use of best
practices across the Nation's laboratory response infrastructure to
inform critical decisions in the response and recovery from incidents
involving chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. We have
assessed a significant gap in our radiological laboratory response
capability which may compromise important decisions regarding health
and environment in key scenarios. We will continue to promote the need
to fill this gap among the agencies identified as Responsible Federal
Agencies and their partners, and appreciate very much the interest of
this Subcommittee in radiological laboratory matters.
Discussion
Chairman Miller. Thank you. The bell that you heard was our
being called to a vote. It appears that there is some grievance
that the Minority has, and we will have a series of protest
votes, temper tantrum votes. Someone has moved to adjourn, and
I will need to go over and Mr. Baird will need to go over to
vote against adjourning and probably pretty much as soon as we
get back, someone will move again to adjourn. So we will do the
best we can in trying to proceed with questions, but we will be
doing kind of a middle-aged equivalent of wind sprints between
here and the Capitol. Why don't we adjourn now, all go vote. We
will ask over there whether another vote is coming immediately
or not and try to come back and try to make some sense of
today's hearing.
Mr. Baird. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Miller. Yes.
Mr. Baird. Is the middle age in reference to our age or the
epoch?
Chairman Miller. I suppose it could be either. I hope that
this is a middle. Thank you. We will be back. Sometime. Thank
you.
[Recess]
Chairman Miller. There is no telling what the day will look
like. Probably the third or fourth time I have to run back and
forth like that I am probably going to be pretty cranky, so you
may not want to take questions from me after that point. And
this is not the kind of hearing in any case when we think
witnesses are being less than forthcoming. Those kinds of
hearings are a great deal more fun to conduct, but there will
not be any high, hard, inside pitches here. We do fundamentally
think that what you're telling us is true. And our questions
will simply be to call upon you to reiterate or elaborate upon
some portions of your testimony. So if we can't really complete
any kind of coherent period of questioning, I am not sure that
the loss will be that great. I think we have already
accomplished what we needed to accomplish by your testimony
already, your oral testimony and that which you have submitted
in writing.
National Environmental Radiological Laboratory Capacity Gap
Assessment
With that said, I now recognize myself for five minutes of
questioning. Dr. Griggs, you had a report prepared or a report
was prepared for you earlier this year that assessed the
national environmental radiological laboratory capacity gap.
Tell us what the report found and what the findings tell us
about our ability to respond to a dirty bomb if it were
detonated in an American city. I think that is probably not
dissimilar to what you have already testified about, but go on.
Dr. Griggs. Mr. Chairman, we looked at really one RDD event
in a single city, and we estimated the environmental sample
demand from that event. We then compared that to our assessment
of the national lab capacity, and we looked at laboratories
from two major aspects, one would be their capacity, their
infrastructure in terms of personnel, equipment, and the
ability to process samples. But we did also look at their
competency, and to do that we had reviewed historically how
well they had done on proficiency test samples from like the
Quality Assessment Program (QAP) and other programs that send
samples to laboratories and have them report back results. And
what we found is that when you look at the national
environmental lab capacity versus the sample demand, 360,000
samples over a year, there was a significant gap in the ability
to analyze samples promptly and report the results.
And the numbers that we talked about averaging about 3,000
samples per week was the average capacity gap with peak
capacity gap 7,000 to 9,000 samples per week. These numbers
indicate a pretty serious gap in terms of environmental
analysis capability in the country. When we look at absent in
an increase in that national capacity that it would take a
little over 100 weeks, or two years, to analyze the samples
that would have been collected in a single RDD event, and I
think as you have noted and Ms. Tulis noted the scenario 11 is
actually three RDD event. So if we compare it back to that
scenario, you can take that gap and multiply it times three and
the timeframes times three as well. So it is indicative of a
very significant gap, and that is going to be a delay in data
to decision-makers, action to protect home health and cleanup
and contamination. Our major focus is on the critical recovery
phase as Dr. Hadley talked about in the kind of early phase.
But we are looking at the clean-up phase, recovery phase, and
that is where the bulk of the laboratory samples are going to
be generated, and that is where our numbers actually came from.
How the Gap Effects Response to a Dirty Bomb
Chairman Miller. What would be the real-world consequences
of that gap? How would it affect our ability to respond to the
detonation of a dirty bomb in American cities?
Dr. Griggs. I will let Dana elaborate more, but essentially
laboratory data provides decision-makers the information that
they need to make decisions about is it safe to reoccupy
buildings. Have the decontamination efforts been successful?
Because there will be a tendency to decontaminate what can be
contaminated, potential public health impacts because of the
data we fed into CDC and they would likely use our data for
their kind of estimates for example. So basically all the
conscious management decisions that go into the recovery effort
are predicated on accurate, timely data; and with this gap
there is going to be deficiency of accurate and timely data. So
the decision-makers will be faced with issues of either having
to make decisions without the adequate data or having to delay
their decisions, and that could result as you noted in your
testimony in increased economic losses because of the lack of
ability to go back to reoccupy the city, potential additional
health impacts if the data were insufficient and incorrect
decisions were made based on that data. So it creates a whole
host of problems as you can imagine when you simply don't have
information you need to evaluate the status of the extent of
the contamination, the degree of the contamination, and likely
impacts to the public health.
Chairman Miller. Ms. Tulis, would you like----
Ms. Tulis. There is just one thing I wanted to note just to
be clear. We do have field tools to be able to detect radiation
very early on, and so for those critical decisions, sheltering
and place, evacuation, we would be able to still make those
decisions. This is more for the long-term remediation and
consequence management stage.
Ability to Evaluate the Damage Done By an Attack
Chairman Miller. The whole premise of terrorism is to
create terror among a civilian population by attacking not
combatants but non-combatants, attacking a civilian population,
innocents, and not having the violence appear random, unrelated
to anything that non-combatants had done to create terror among
the population. What will be the effect on the population of an
inability to know exactly what damage had resulted, what the
level of contamination was, and what health effects there might
be, Dr. Griggs?
Dr. Griggs. Well, certainly as you indicated there is going
to be great panic and concern because one of the issues in
addition to the impacted urban environment of the city is that
as people leave the city from that area, potentially they could
be taking material home with them, and their homes could be
contaminated. You get kind of transport, people moving about in
that city; and I think radiation in general for a lot of people
is a very fearful type of a threat. So the lack of data I think
is just going to result in heightened public concern and panic
and frankly a demand for answers for what risks are they at,
what can be done to protect them and their families and those
kinds of things. I think the longer it goes without sufficient
data, the greater those concerns are going to be.
QAP Programs
Chairman Miller. Anyone else wish to respond to that
question or both questions? Dr. Griggs, you mentioned QAP which
is not Elmer Fudd using a mild profanity, it is an acronym for
Quality Assurance Program, a program the Environmental
Measurement Lab, a government-owned and managed lab in New York
which dates back to the Manhattan Project. And the Department
of Homeland Security closed that lab a couple of years ago. How
do the programs of QAP compare to the kind of proficiency
testing that you had said is needed?
Dr. Griggs. Mr. Chairman, one of the things that we did
when we did our evaluations of laboratories for our assessment
of the national capacity is that we actually went back and
looked at historical data from the QAP program and also for
another acronym, the MAPEP program which is a Dewey Laboratory
out of Idaho. And the data from both of those assessment
programs was really critical in our evaluation of laboratories
for their capability and their competency. It allowed us to
look at select radionuclides that are likely to be very
important in an RDD event and to see how well those labs have
performed over the years in key environmental matrices like air
filters, water, and vegetation. So it's a critical data set as
we evaluate those laboratories and they help us to select which
laboratories we could turn to.
Now, from the laboratory perspective, in addition to those
that assess the laboratories, from the laboratory perspective
these samples are invaluable in that they allow the laboratory
to analyze externally prepared samples of known concentration
that are traceable back to a national standard, general NIST,
the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and it
allows them to adjust, augment their measurement systems to
make sure that they have the necessary accuracy and precision
that they need. So these programs are invaluable to both those
that assess laboratories and to the laboratories themselves.
The Decision to Close QAP
Chairman Miller. On a stupidity scale of one to 10, one
being Einsteinesque and 10 being stupider than dirt, dumber
than dirt, how would you assess the decision to close QAP?
Dr. Griggs. Mr. Chairman, I don't know that I am in a
position to answer that because I don't know the factors or
considerations that DHS faced when they made that decision. All
I can say is the data from those programs is a valuable data
set.
EPA Preparedness to Deal With a Dirty Bomb
Chairman Miller. Ms. Tulis, EPA's role at the World Trade
Center has been severely criticized, being unable to tell
exactly what the environmental risks were coming out of that.
Is EPA better prepared now in dealing with a radiological
emergency, a dirty bomb detonation, than it was to deal with
the World Trade Center?
Ms. Tulis. The EPA is certainly better prepared to respond
to any sort of national incident such as we had for the World
Trade Center. We spent the last six years becoming more
prepared, hiring more people, reorganizing, getting the right
resources, having 50 additional people added to our
environmental response team, creating the Office of Emergency
Management, and establishing our Office of Homeland Security as
well as working on various preparedness and response
procedures. So we have been taking great strides to overcome
some of the issues we had during that large response, although
we do feel as though we did handle the response well, but we
always have lessons learned and we continue to apply those to
the way that we operate.
Assessing a Radiological Event
Chairman Miller. How would the difficulty of assessing a
radiological event compare to the difficulty of assessing the
environmental consequences of the collapse of the World Trade
Center, the towers?
Ms. Tulis. I mean, they are very different incidents, and
we basically approach incidents from a site-specific basis. The
World Trade Center large collapse, the impact, and the analyses
would be quite different than an RDD event where it is very
specific type of analyses that we would be looking at.
More on the Capacity Gap
Chairman Miller. Is the gap that we have heard about, the
capability gap, is it simply a funding issue or is there
something beyond that other than that?
Ms. Tulis. I think for radiological laboratories, because
the community is actually doing a good job of cleaning up the
existing problems we have had, we just have an economic issue
going on when we had the actual radiation laboratories from a
commercial perspective. The businesses are just not being able
to support, there is just not enough work out there to support
this type of work anymore. It is very hard to expect a
commercial laboratory to build up capacity for something that
may or may not happen, and so we have almost an irony going on
here where because we have been efficient to cleaning up some
of our past problems, we are losing that very lab community
that we would need in the event of a future large-scale
incident.
Why Is There a Lack of Capacity?
Chairman Miller. Anyone else on that issue? What is the
reason for the lack of capacity? Is it simply funding? Dr.
Hadley?
Dr. Hadley. I agree with Ms. Tulis that there is not as
much of demand for the radiological community for that type of
sampling as we have had in the past. We are using less
materials, we have had nuclear reactors shut down, we have
cleaned up places, within the weapons complex we have less
weapons, less production. So there is not as much radioactive
environmental or clinical analytical activity needed. And so
these places have been shutting down and closing up, and only
those that really need to be there, they are viable
economically, are the ones that are staying open.
Why Isn't the DOE Prepared for a Radiological Emergency?
Chairman Miller. You would agree that preparedness is more
effective if it is done in advance?
Dr. Hadley. It would be very nice. That is why we are here
today to work on this. I agree completely, but I think that is
what is contributing to it.
Chairman Miller. Dr. Hadley, DOE does have a significant
radiochemistry infrastructure but it apparently is not
certified in the way the Congress I think has specified. What
prevents the DOE from being prepared to do more to analyze
environmental clinical samples in the kind of emergency we are
talking about?
Dr. Hadley. Yes, I understand. DOE has developed their own
clinical capability to handle its own people, its workers and
its contractors that are busy working on tasks and operations
for the Department of Energy. They have been sized to handle
that situation. Many of the procedures that were developed were
developed years ago. We have many special procedures where we
will handle different isotopes than anyone else will because of
the types of work that we do. Because of some of that--and the
other thing is we are not available for outside--we are not a
commercial lab, we do not do outside business. We keep it
within-house, and we do have QA programs. We have always had QA
programs. They are just not always the same one as they use for
outside laboratories. So we have capabilities that are
capabilities really to handle our own upsets and tasks, and so
the level of capacity meets that but it is not very much more.
The TOPOFF Simulation
Chairman Miller. In your testimony you said that the
national radioanalytical laboratory infrastructure was not
exercised in the TOPOFF simulation. What did you mean by that?
Dr. Hadley. I participated and I was in the area where I
was watching samples being collected and what was being done
with them, and really there was nothing being sent to very much
of a laboratory. There was one EPA mobile laboratory who had
prepared 50 samples, and so they were there and they were
processing samples, but that was it. That is all that I saw
from my standpoint. There were a few clinical samples. I
mentioned that REAC/TS DOE, a medical-type group who advise on
radiation issues, they collected three blood samples, sent them
off to Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and were processed through their
cytogenetic laboratory to see what type of radiation dose we
would expect. But other than that, that was all of the
laboratory capability I saw utilized.
One of the issues I should mention to you so that you might
understand this is in the first few days of an event, the
environmental laboratory needs are not as big. The first few
days of an event you are most worried about evacuation,
sheltering in place, where is the radiation or contamination on
the ground, and much of the information can be given by direct
reading instruments and by models. Also it takes time for
laboratories to arrive and people to arrive to handle
laboratory samples and collect those samples. So normally
laboratories get involved a little bit later from an
environmental standpoint. From a clinical standpoint, they will
get involved early and that will come through local hospitals
and others. But the FRMAC and DOE have been most concerned with
the environmental ones, and even during TOPOFF we saw that
because of the short duration of the TOPOFF exercise, by the
time that you would start to see a significant number of
laboratory samples, it was indexed and the exercise was over.
DOE Executives
Chairman Miller. Dr. Hadley, how much attention are these
issues receiving from those further up the ladder of the DOE at
the top levels, Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or Assistant
Secretary?
Dr. Hadley. We had had mobile laboratory resources mainly
for our weapons program for many years. So we had had that,
they know it is important. There have been emergency resources
but they have been limiting in scope, not real large, not
handle a large population. And beyond that I really don't know.
We would like to do more in this area. We would like to
exercise more and work with the other agencies in developing
these networks because we see there is a need.
Environmental Samples
Chairman Miller. For any of you who want to answer it, in
the materials I read in preparation for this hearing, some
apparently believe that the estimate of 350,000 environmental
samples in a year is far too modest of what will actually be
needed. In what I read, and apparently some of the other
scenarios besides scenario #11 but the exercise that was built
around assumes a million. Is that your understanding as well?
Dr. Griggs?
Dr. Griggs. Mr. Chairman, I think the million could be a
result of that the 350,000 is based on a single RDD event in
one city, and the scenario 11 is based on three identical
cities; and I think the million is probably the result of the
that times three effectively. So if you look at the full
scenario 11, you're looking at a little over a million samples.
Chairman Miller. But there are some who think the 350 for
an event is conservative?
Dr. Griggs. There is a reason to think conservative is
true.
Chairman Miller. Anyone else? Dr. Hadley? Dr. Jones?
Dr. Hadley. Coming up with those numbers is extremely
difficult because we have not had the event, we have looked at
the Guyana event and I think that the one thing that we have
learned from the Guyana, Brazil event, is they very much
underestimated what they were going to have to deal with. So we
have come up with our best guess, what those numbers are. They
may be much higher depending on what happens.
Dr. Jones. The CDC has not been involved with the
estimation of environmental sample analysis, so we are not able
to comment on those numbers.
What Did the Polonium-210 Poisoning Tell Us About Our Capacity?
Chairman Miller. You were involved with--and yes, I
understand that CDC has a different piece of the puzzle. The
testing for internal contamination on the people who are
exposed to radiation, what did the response to the Polonium-210
poisoning in London tell you about our capacity?
Dr. Jones. It told us that we have a gap in our national
capacity to respond to a radiological event. Because of the
fact that we could only identify one later, a second laboratory
much further down the road that could assist us in identifying
the people that were potentially exposed and evaluating their
internal exposure from the Polonium-210.
CDC Using DOE Laboratories
Chairman Miller. I am not trying to start a fight between
you and Dr. Hadley, but why did CDC turn down DOE's offer to
conduct assessment with their labs?
Dr. Jones. In my initial evaluation discussions with the
Department of Energy, it was actually the Department of Energy
who pointed me toward the laboratory that we finally utilized.
Their contract with one of the contract labs was the second
laboratory that was utilized, or was potentially utilized, and
we looked at some of the Department of Energy's bioassay
laboratories, and as Dr. Hadley alluded to, the DOE
laboratories are more for occupational exposure assessment. If
you remember from the testimony that we gave earlier, our needs
for an emergency response, the data needs and the sample size
needs, are much different than the traditional DOE bioassay
laboratories. And because those bioassay laboratories were not
routinely measuring Polonium-210 in people at the time, we felt
that it would be a much more prudent fact to look at and
utilize a laboratory that was currently measuring Polonium-210
in occupational exposed individuals.
Chairman Miller. Of course, if there were more than 31
people to test, you would have a bigger problem. What can be
done for CDC to make use of the Department of Energy's capacity
or can you find a way to make use of the capacity if you have
more than 31 people to test?
Dr. Jones. We have already been in discussion with the
Department of Energy, and we are looking at evaluating how we
can utilize their laboratories, utilize their instrumentation
and personnel, to apply the methods that we are trying to
develop at CDC to be a surge capacity in the future, utilizing
the parameters of the data needs that we have. So we have hopes
that we can in the future work together to utilize their
infrastructure.
Chairman Miller. As tedious as it is for me and for you, I
need to leave and go vote; and I will come back. I think we
have just a few more questions I really do want to get in. So I
am not apologizing for something I did not do. I am not going
and having a temper tantrum, but I will be back in just a few
minutes.
[Recess.]
Chairman Miller. I have to run back and forth from the
Capitol, but you don't have to sit and wait for him to come
back anymore.
Environmental Radioanalytical Laboratory Response Network
Dr. Griggs, I understand that you have proposed creating an
environmental radioanalytical laboratory response network to
close the capacity gap. That you have described in your
testimony. What is the status of that network, has it received
funding, is it established already, what needs to be done to
make it happen?
Dr. Griggs. Mr. Chairman, let me first say kind of what is
underway. We have what we call a pilot initiative for this
network, and it is in the form of two agreements that are going
to be provided to two State and local laboratories. We are
receiving applications now from those laboratories and expect
to award these two agreements in possibly three months. The
recipient laboratories will receive equipment for counting
environmental samples, they will receive training, they will
receive funding to buy supplies and standards and even
personnel costs. It is called a demonstration project, but the
laboratories will take this equipment and training and enhance
their capacity and capability of analyzing environmental
samples. So it is really in our view the pilot of this larger
network that you referred to.
To give this a better sense of, you know, is this approach
the right approach, are some of our budget numbers correct, are
the estimates good and to kind of see the kind of results that
we are going to get from providing this equipment, training,
and funding to these two State and local laboratories. We are
in kind of the pilot phase of this particular network. I would
like to add that this radiological environment laboratory
network would be a component of the ERN that Mrs. Tulis has
previously addressed. And I defer to Dana, Ms. Tulis, for any
comments on that?
Ms. Tulis. Yes, I mean, that is an estimate as Dr. Griggs
indicated, and until we get further along, we are not going to
have a better idea of exact cost. We also, as part of the
overall eLRN, we are working collaboratively on funding this
process as well as on working at looking at the future years as
well. But it is part of our overall budget thinking and
processing we are working on right now.
Timeline and Plans for Expanding the Current Capacity
Chairman Miller. That answer didn't quite suggest the
urgency that I feel. We have known for at least six years that
Osama bin Laden tried to buy, has tried to acquire radioactive
materials for a dirty bomb. How long is this pilot going to go
on before you try to take it to the scale necessary to be
prepared to respond to the kind of scenarios that the TOPOFF
exercise just dealt with?
Dr. Griggs. I think the plan is we start with the two and
we would add more, so it would be a phased approach as we add
additional labs and----
Chairman Miller. How long are these phases?
Dr. Griggs. They had projected in the proposal five years.
Chairman Miller. And at the end of the five years, will
there be the capacity to deal with the scenario #11?
Dr. Griggs. Well, this particular proposal really is
addressed at the capacity of one RDD event, and 11 involves
three, but we felt like this was initially to get positioned so
that we could respond to a single RDD event. So that was the
basis of this particular proposal.
Chairman Miller. Maybe in five years we will have the
capacity to respond to one-third of the need that we just
conducted an exercise to try to assess our preparedness for?
Dr. Griggs. In addition to this particular proposal, which
is primarily geared for State and local type laboratories, we
are developing tools for the commercial sector. We are
developing varying rapid methods, for example. We are
developing guidance documents for the commercial laboratories
that are really aimed at increasing their efficiency and their
utilization of their existing infrastructure. We have initiated
training, for example. We developed a training course we
presented last month at our laboratory, the NAREL laboratory.
So there are other activities in addition to this that are
ongoing where the focus is trying to enhance the existent
commercial capacity. That will put us in a better position to
respond to such an event as well.
Chairman Miller. Dr. Jones? I hope you feel great urgency.
I know that you have proposed a radiochemistry laboratory
network similar to what the EPA has proposed. That seems to be
a critical need to prepare for a dirty bomb attack which could
happen at any time because as Mr. Sensenbrenner has pointed out
in his opening statement, the material is out there. It is not
secure. It could happen tomorrow, it could happen this
afternoon; and being ready maybe in five years, depending on
how the pilot projects go, does not give me the reassuring
sense that you feel the sense of urgency about this that feel
and that Mr. Sensenbrenner feels. Where does your proposal
stand? Is it a pilot or are you going to ask for funding for
it? Have you received funding for it? What needs to be done to
make it happen?
Dr. Jones. We have started the CDC process of requesting
funding for proposals like this, and at CDC there is obviously
the Polonium-210 event as well as the TOPOFF-4 exercise,
awareness that this is a very important issue. It is in the
process right now at this year's budgetary allocations, and I
am not in a position at this time to know where we stand in
that process.
What Are the Next Steps to Being Better Prepared?
Chairman Miller. Well, to all of you, what are the steps
that you think need to happen? What can we do as Congress? We
are now finding out for an oversight hearing that we are not as
prepared as I had assumed we were. We are woefully short of the
level of preparation that I assumed we would have given how
clearly this threat has been communicated. I mean, if there is
one threat, if there is one possible terrorist tactic we know
Al Qaida is considering is the detonation of a dirty bomb on an
American city or several American cities. They like to do
things in a big way, so if they do one in Washington, they
might very well try to do one in Chicago, and I'm not really
sure they are thinking about Guam but they might do them in
several places. What do we need to do to be ready, to
strengthen our radiological emergency response capacities to be
able to know whether we can use the buildings that have been
contaminated; whether they need to be demolished; whether they
need to be remediated, cleaned up, before anyone can go back
in; whether we can conduct economic activity in what might be
critical areas; whether hundreds of thousands of people are
going to be told that we will test your children for whether
they have internal contamination, in a couple more years we
will be able to test them but let us know if their hair starts
falling out, maybe we can move them up in line. What do we need
to do to be better prepared than we are? I am not really happy
with pilot programs at this point. Dr. Griggs.
Dr. Griggs. I am going to refer this question to Ms. Tulis.
Ms. Tulis. When you say pilot, it may give a misimpression
as to what we are actually doing. I mean, the concept is to be
building capacity, getting additional equipment in there, and
making sure that we have the performance testing that we need
to incur. So it made it sound not as proactive as it is. The
concept is to start to build capacity and provide the funds to
do that, to learn as we are doing it, and then to continue to
expand the program. So I do have a concern that it may sound
like the pilot isn't a proactive enough approach. It is a way
of getting out there and starting to build capacity at this
point, but we don't want to just give everything out without
having a good idea of how to approach this process, and so we
are starting with the two and we do intend to expand.
Chairman Miller. Dr. Hadley?
Dr. Hadley. I think this hearing has been very useful. We
appreciate being part of it and being able to bring this to the
attention of the country and particularly our bosses. I think
now that this has been held, this will get their attention a
little bit more and funding may become a little easier. That is
always an issue. But there are a lot of issues in this. There
are a lot of things that need to be done.
Chairman Miller. One of the images of Congressional
Oversight hearings is that top administration officials get to
hear about what is going on within their administration. Dr.
Jones?
Dr. Jones. Again, CDC feels and has realized for some time
now that this is a gap, and we have worked very hard at
developing the science behind how would we prepare to respond
to a radiological event. I believe the current issues have
raised the awareness within CDC, and we are trying to act on it
as best we can.
Chairman Miller. Dr. Vitko, I know that you were here to
read prepared testimony, but this is something you probably can
respond to.
Dr. Vitko. I hope I can. First of all, I agree this has
highlighted the urgency. I think that the ICLN as a group has
an action item from this hearing to figure out how they can
meet that capacity need within five years and come up with a
concrete plan. I also think the question you raised earlier
about the significance of the gaps and what do we do if the
gaps are not filled is one that we could put more attention on.
Again, there is a question of the number of measurements versus
the confidence level you place in those, and there may be other
strategies to look at; and I think we owe answers on both of
those in a timely way.
Chairman Miller. Well, I have the important work to do of
trotting back and forth to the Floor to vote not to adjourn,
and I am sure that you all have things to do as well. So I
think without further business, the hearing is adjourned. Thank
you for being here.
[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]