[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-84]
FURTHER INQUIRY INTO MARINE CORPS POLICIES AND PROCEDURES REGARDING
NEXT-OF-KIN NOTIFICATION
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
AUGUST 2, 2007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
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MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California, Chairwoman
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
NANCY BOYDA, Kansas THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire JOE WILSON, South Carolina
Kevin Coughlin, Professional Staff Member
Jeanette James, Professional Staff Member
Joe Hicken, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2007
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, August 2, 2007, Further Inquiry into Marine Corps
Policies and Procedures Regarding Next-of-Kin Notification..... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, August 2, 2007......................................... 25
----------
THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 2007
FURTHER INQUIRY INTO MARINE CORPS POLICIES AND PROCEDURES REGARDING
NEXT-OF-KIN NOTIFICATION
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California,
Chairwoman, Military Personnel Subcommittee.................... 1
McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking
Member, Military Personnel Subcommittee........................ 2
WITNESSES
Magnus, Gen. Robert, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps,
U.S. Marine Corps.............................................. 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Davis, Hon. Susan A.......................................... 29
Magnus, Gen. Robert.......................................... 36
McHugh, Hon. John M.......................................... 33
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Questions submitted.]
FURTHER INQUIRY INTO MARINE CORPS POLICIES AND PROCEDURES REGARDING
NEXT-OF-KIN NOTIFICATION
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Military Personnel Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Thursday, August 2, 2007.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:10 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Susan Davis
(chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, CHAIRWOMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE
Ms. Davis. The meeting will come to order.
I want to thank you all for being here.
This hearing is being held today because the subcommittee
was not satisfied with the information provided to us on June
27, 2007, in our hearing on the policies and procedures
regarding the notification of next of kin of deceased service
members.
At that hearing, the Marine Corps provided testimony that
was not accurate. So, as a result of that, Ranking Member
McHugh, Dr. Snyder, myself met with Lieutenant General Ronald
Coleman, the Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs, on July 17, 2007, to discuss some of the
issues and questions that arose from that hearing.
But as a result of that particular briefing, we still
unfortunately, did not feel comfortable that the casualty
notification process that the Marine Corps had in effect was
sufficient, especially concerning those Marines who were either
wounded or killed as a result of friendly fire.
So the purpose of this hearing today is to correct any
inaccurate or incorrect information that was previously
provided to this committee and to the public, and allow the
Marine Corps to set the record straight on this issue.
I look forward to the discussion that we will have here
regarding the issue to ensure that the procedures and the
tracking system that the Marine Corps has in effect are
sufficient to ensure accurate and timely notification to our
service members and their families.
Before I introduce our witness, I just wanted to give
Congressman McHugh an opportunity for any opening remarks that
he may wish to make.
And I certainly want to welcome here General Magnus. We
welcome you. We thank you for your service to the country, and
we know that we will want to move forward with this hearing
today. Thank you.
Mr. McHugh.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Davis can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
YORK, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Let me join you in welcoming our distinguished panelist
here today. General Magnus is to be thanked by every American
for the great leadership he brings and, quite honestly, for
showing some pretty significant courage for being here today as
we look back over the history as you defined it, Madam Chair.
I would ask, Madam Chair, that my prepared statement be
entered into the record in its entirety. Let me just make a
couple of comments.
I really, when we started out here, wondered if another
hearing was necessary. But as we have gone forward, and as the
data continuously changes, including as recently as last night,
as I understand it, where we were provided yet with another
incident of--at least insofar as we are aware--unreported
incident, I just have found myself in a position of really
doubting virtually everything we have heard. And I find it
difficult to find much veracity in what we might hear. And that
is a hard thing for me to say, and it is a terrible place for
us to be.
I think we have actually come to the point--and I don't
want to pre-judge anything General Magnus says. And I am not in
any way questioning his honesty. I know the caliber of the man,
and I know he will be here today providing the best data that
he possibly can.
But given the very difficult road we traveled to this
point, I really fear that, particularly amongst the families of
those who have suffered, either wounded in action, or of course
at the extreme, killed in action, can possibly have in the
process that have supposedly assured them of how their loved
one met whichever fate they may have encountered.
And I think, Madam Chair, we may be at a point where it
would be almost impossible to avoid soliciting the help of an
outside organization, be it the GAO, Government Accountability
Office, or some other, to take a look at the entire range of
incidences, starting with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), as to how the reporting has been
done.
None of us want to see a circumstance--and I know the
Marines are right at the head of this line--none of us want to
see a circumstance where a loved one receiving notification or
not receiving a notification makes an incorrect assumption
based on a system that, for whatever reason, has not worked
well and hasn't filled its challenge.
So with that, Madam Chair, I do look forward to General
Magnus's comments. And, again, none of what I have said is in
any way intended to cast aspersions upon his outstanding record
of service--we are so lucky as a country to have individuals
such as he--but as to a system that, frankly, I think has
caused doubts in all of us.
So I will yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McHugh can be found in the
Appendix on page 33.]
Ms. Davis. Thank you, Mr. McHugh.
We are honored today to be joined by the Chairman of the
Armed Services Committee, Mr. Ike Skelton, who was previously,
quite a number of years ago, chairman of the Personnel
Committee. And he tells me every day that he wants to watch and
be sure that I handle this committee just the way he did, and I
am working to do that.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for being here, and we look
forward to your participation if you so choose. And I
appreciate your being here.
As I mentioned earlier, we have one witness today, General
Robert Magnus, assistant commandant of the United States Marine
Corps.
As I said earlier as well, we thank you very much for your
service to our country. And we know that this has been
difficult going back and trying to understand why, in fact,
some of the reporting did not occur as it should have, trying
to correct that, and to move forward.
We are concerned, as I know you are as well, with how
change of notices impact our families. The initial notice is
very difficult, but further notices make it especially hard on
them. And so we want to be certain that we have it right. And I
know that the Marine Corps is working to do that as well.
Your written comments and statements, of course, will be
made part of the hearing record, so we encourage you to
summarize your remarks if you would like.
We are going to try and keep, I think, today, Mr. McHugh,
perhaps to five minutes so people have an opportunity to go
around.
And I appreciate everybody being very patient with me
yesterday as well.
So, we will get started. General Magnus, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF GEN. ROBERT MAGNUS, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT OF THE
MARINE CORPS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Magnus. Thank you, Chairwoman Davis, Congressman
McHugh, distinguished members of the subcommittee, and Chairman
Skelton. Thank you very much for this opportunity to correct
the record on next of kin notification.
I deeply regret that information the Marine Corps officials
provided at the hearing on June 27th and the subsequent
briefing on July the 17th was inaccurate. On behalf of the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, I offer our sincerest apology
to the subcommittee.
Also, for our Marines and families, the Commandant and I
are personally and professionally distressed that we have not
always provided timely and accurate information to them, which
did not alleviate their stress or help them to come to closure.
However, the Commandant and I thank the subcommittee for
bringing this problem to light. I solemnly assure you that we
will do the right thing for our Marines, sailors, and their
families, making every effort to preclude future errors.
We previously reported that next of kin of Marines killed
by friendly fire on the 12th of April, 2004, had been notified.
That report was unintentionally inaccurate, although late
notifications have been made by general officer visits to those
families on the 20th and 23rd of July to the Marine families
that were involved.
We also incorrectly reported the number of friendly fire
incidents and casualties. That number, as we understand it
today, is 23 suspected friendly fire incidents with 19 of those
confirmed, including 6 deaths and 38 wounded due to friendly
fire.
It is important to note that we are not confident that this
is definitive because a preliminary review of our processes has
revealed inconsistencies in our record.
That preliminary review revealed deficiencies in three key
processes related to notification, processes that we now
realize are interrelated.
The first process is the command casualty reporting
process, which includes a telephonic report followed by initial
and any supplemental personnel casualty reports or PCR's. These
reports were not uniformly accurate or complete. While we
understand that this was probably due to the stresses of
intense combat on reporting commands, increased emphasis on and
possibly changes to our casualty reporting process are needed
to ensure accuracy and timeliness.
Second, the command casualty inquiry and investigation
process may not have been consistently documented, including
completion of any actions requested by higher command
endorsements to those investigations.
Third, our process for notifications to next of kin was not
always in compliance with statute or our own policies and
procedures. As a result of these deficiencies, our command
reporting information, inquiry and investigation, and casualty
notification processes have not always been consistent,
accurate, or timely. Timely delivery of accurate information to
the next of kin is our responsibility.
Although we believe investigations were conducted on all
suspected friendly fire cases, our preliminary review revealed
that the PCR's have not uniformly reported all friendly fire
investigations as required by regulations.
Although notifications were made to next of kin, in some
cases they were late and did not indicate that friendly fire
was suspected or determined.
Clearly, the three processes need improved emphasis,
training of personnel, and linkages, as well as appropriate
oversight measures.
The Inspector General (IG) of the Marine Corps has been
charged with providing recommendations to ensure that we have
definitive information in order to take effective remedial
actions. The Commandant has directed the Inspector General to
conduct a detailed and thorough investigation into our casualty
reporting and notification processes with full access to all
records and personnel.
This subcommittee will be provided a copy of the completed
investigation.
We are working with the United States Army to ensure
uniform and consistent casualty procedures. We believe that the
U.S. Army has an effective model which can be rapidly adopted
by the Marine Corps.
We are also working with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) and the Navy Secretariat to ensure compliance
with the requirements of National Defense Authorization Acts
for fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007.
We are taking action without waiting for results of the
IG's investigation. We will issue guidance to commanders,
reemphasizing the need for timely, accurate reporting,
inquiries and investigations, and the linkages to ensure proper
notifications are made.
Our duty is to ensure notification is conducted in
accordance with statute and casualty procedures. I accept
responsibility for the process failures that negatively
affected the families of our fallen and wounded warriors. On
behalf of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, I apologize for
our errors.
We thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to correct
the record. We also thank the Congress for its abiding concern
for the welfare and care of our Marines, sailors, and their
families. Caring for them is simply the right thing to do. It
is part of our ethos as Marines, and we will do it.
I am prepared to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Magnus can be found in
the Appendix on page 36.]
Ms. Davis. Thank you, General.
What I would like to do, because I think it would be for
the benefit of the members, if we could go through several of
the hearings that we have had, to try and go back a little bit
on those numbers.
On the 27th of June, when the Marine Corps testified, they
said there were only 19 friendly fire casualties from 2
incidents.
And then on the 17th of July, we were briefed that actually
there were 77 friendly fire casualties from 20 incidents.
And then, of course, yesterday we learned that, in fact,
there were actually 82 friendly fire casualties from 23
different incidents.
So I would hope that you could go back and help us out a
little here. Where did the Marine Corps get the numbers that we
received on July 17th?
General Magnus. The numbers we received from July 17th were
as a result of a first preliminary review, not by the Inspector
General, of the records that we had at Headquarters Marine
Corps of these three processes and in telephonic contact with
Marines in Marine Central Command Headquarters in California.
That preliminary review, particularly subsequent to my
review of the briefing that was conducted on the 17th of July,
led me to immediately go to the Commandant and indicate that
not only had the numbers changed between the 27th of June and
the 17th of July, but the reason why the changes gave me pause
as to the accuracy of the records that were being cross-
referenced.
And subsequent to that, a second review--not by the
Inspector General--was done, which gave us the best information
that I have, which as I have noted earlier, Madam Chairwoman, I
am not confident it is definitive. And it is based upon direct
contact between the 17th of July and the date of my letter to
the subcommittee between senior officers in Marine Corps
Central Command, Camp Pendleton, and officials at Headquarters
Marine Corps.
I will be confident in the definition of the process
deficiencies we have and in the numbers of incidents and, most
importantly of course, in the numbers of killed and wounded
casualties on completion of the Inspector General's report.
Ms. Davis. If we go beyond the 17th then, and we go to
August 1st, what is it then about the new number--where did you
look for that information then? Was that also going back to the
preliminary review?
General Magnus. Madam Chairwoman, the first review gave us
the numbers which were still not complete and correct that you
received in the briefing on the 17th of July.
A second, more in-depth review, but not by the Inspector
General, not with a methodical investigative process, revealed
updated numbers. Those numbers were provided, and when I
reviewed, subsequent to the briefing, the method by which the
numbers were derived, serious questions arose, not as to the
professionalism or intent of Marines that were providing the
numbers, but simply in the way these numbers were accounted.
And in fact, as you indicated, the number of cases of
wounded Marines increased and gave us great pause as to the
accuracy of these processes and the checks and balances that
would give us numbers. I think the numbers are, of course,
different numbers, but we will only be confident when we are
100 percent accurate and are able to change our processes in
the future.
Ms. Davis. When do you think that the IG's investigation
will be completed?
General Magnus. Within a matter of weeks.
I have spoken to the Acting Inspector General of the Marine
Corps, Mr. Holmgren. He has been given full latitude to go
through all of our major subordinate commands that have had
casualties, including our reserves. And to ensure that we have
access to all the records to be able to cross-reference all of
the documents, to ensure that we know each individual by name,
their status, the determination of whether or not there was
friendly fire, and also to determine our process for ensuring
notification.
Notifications, ma'am, are ongoing right now with some of
the wounded that were identified in the 12 April, 2004,
investigation. Lance Corporal's Zurheide and Shuder were killed
in action and that, I think, was covered in the earlier
testimony, ma'am.
Ms. Davis. Okay, thank you, General.
So that we can get around to members and have several
rounds, Mr. McHugh? Would you like to pick it up?
Mr. McHugh. Thank you very much.
I would also note, Madam Chair, in your very thorough
review, that on the 17th of July briefing, not only were the
numbers wrong, we were also misinformed that two families had
been notified of the circumstances of their loved ones' death
when, in fact, what they had received were letters that an
investigation was being done. They could receive those
investigations if they asked for it.
So there were really two layers in this information, just
to fill out the record.
General Magnus, I heard you describe in part the Marine
Corps IG's process of reviewing those cases, but tell me again:
Is he trying to coordinate the data and the information
strictly between the headquarters of the Marine Corps and
Marine Central Command? Is that the extent of his look-see?
General Magnus. No, sir. I wasn't clear----
Mr. McHugh. You probably were. I probably just didn't----
General Magnus. The Inspector General is going wherever he
needs to go. He is going, of course, to Marine Forces Central
Command, but he will go to each one of the major subordinate
commands that provided Marines since this war began.
So he will be going to all four divisions, all four wings,
all four Marines logistics groups, to ensure that we not only
have got an accounting for those commands that were deployed,
but also that we have taken the effective actions in terms of
notifications to next of kin back here, which is mainly in the
continental United States and Hawaii.
Mr. McHugh. And I appreciate that, and that is what a good
Inspector General does, but it may not take him everywhere that
perhaps we would like to see it done.
For example, after the very tragic case of Corporal Pat
Tillman, the Army really initiated a review from top to bottom
and went back to all of the battalions to direct a specific
investigation that were done at friendly fire incidences to see
if there were any inaccuracies.
Has the Marine Corps done anything like that, contemplated
anything like that? Because it seems to me that the Inspector
General is going to be subject to whatever data he may be
provided that may not be corrected back enough.
General Magnus. Again, Congressman McHugh, I must not have
been clear. We are doing precisely that. We are going back to
every single investigation.
We are also going back to all of our casualties. In other
words, this is broader than just friendly fire. This is about
the casualty notification and reporting process, a very
important part of that, of course, is regarding actual or
suspected friendly fire.
So it is the overall process that needs to be looked at and
with specific emphasis on the notification of next of kin. So
we are doing exactly what the Army is doing.
Mr. McHugh. So the place where I was a little unclear, not
that he would go to that level, but indeed every case at the
battalion level has been directly ordered to be revisited.
General Magnus. That is correct, sir.
Mr. McHugh. Okay.
Can you help us understand what it was in the system, for
example, that caused the discrepancies between the two numbers,
with respect to Headquarters Marine Corps and Marine Central
Command? I understand you had some reconciliation, some kinds
of problems in the system, but do you have any preliminary
information as to how those two numbers could have been so
disjointed?
General Magnus. Congressman, it would be speculative, and
so therefore I will go there because it is the reason why I
advised the Commandant that we needed an Inspector General's
investigation.
When I reviewed the terminology that was used in charts and
in information papers that I was provided with terminology in
statute and in our regulations and on the documents, people
were using different words to describe certain conditions. So
there is the terminology, but that doesn't account for the fact
that even when you add up the numbers, the numbers changed.
In fact, there were five of the wounded that apparently had
just not been correctly accounted for. Those five wounded in
the personnel casualty records were in Headquarters Marine
Corps.
The system for ensuring that we had a rigorous accounting
did not have the checks and balances that I know we need now.
Mr. McHugh. I just have a moment left.
When General Downs came before the committee the first time
on June 27th, I assume he was taking data from one source.
Otherwise, he would have known there was a conflict. Which
source was he deriving the data from?
General Magnus. Congressman, I can't answer what source the
general would have used.
I can tell you that the Marine Corps is in compliance with
the Department of Defense (DOD) instructions. There is one
casualty reporting and responsible section in each one of the
military services. Our casualty section is under Manpower and
Reserve Affairs.
I believe retired General Mike Downs testified before the
committee. He is the senior officer in that section. That is
the one section where these processes need to come together.
Mr. McHugh. I see my time has expired.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Davis. Thank you, Mr. McHugh.
Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General, the hearing on June 27th was my last hearing in
which I participated in as the chairman of this committee, and
all of us got really uncomfortable as the hearing proceeded
with what we were hearing. But one of them was the very strong
testimony from General Downs that there had only been two
incidents, two incidents with multiple casualties, but two
incidents.
And we challenged him on that: Has anyone ever wondered
perhaps, and given everything the Marine Corps has done since
spring of 2003, that there couldn't possibly be other
incidents? And some very firm statements were made.
Subsequent to that, I think we have gotten information that
there had been discussions prior to the hearing that perhaps
that is not accurate. Perhaps there had been more than two
incidents.
I mean, issue number one is to get this information and get
a system right that will work for these families for the Marine
Corps, but a lesser issue is this Congress, as a representative
for the American people, deserves accurate information.
And this is pretty close to a man sitting there being asked
a question, ``Did you have any uncertainty about this
information?'', and had been told before the hearing that there
was uncertainty about that information and did not pass it on
to this committee.
Have you looked into that aspect of things at all?
General Magnus. Congressman, I have not looked into that,
and that is part of the----
Dr. Snyder [continuing]. I would encourage you to do that.
General Magnus. Sir, yes, sir, and that is part of the
charter of the Inspector General. If in fact, information was
incorrectly derived, we will find out why. If, in fact, there
was any intentional violation, that will also be reported.
To the best of my understanding, sir, I believe General
Downs incorrectly understood what he was preparing for, but I
cannot account for why there was literally almost an order of
magnitude difference between the numbers.
Dr. Snyder. Well, it is also my understanding that he was
put on notice, that there may well have been----
General Magnus. Yes, sir.
Dr. Snyder [continuing]. Some problems with more junior
Marines saying, ``We think there may be more than two, and you
are about to testify before Congress very firmly there is only
two.'' And we were informed within less than 24 hours by well-
meaning Marines that they thought that they were going to need
to come and give us a briefing because their information was
incorrect.
So my second question is: We were also informed that one of
the incorrect things that we were informed was that the Marine
Corps did not investigate or have any kind of a preliminary
investigation of all deaths. And in fact, when we challenged
that a little bit because the Army does that now, probably as a
result of the Corporal Tillman case amongst others, we are told
that would be a waste of time to do that, that it would be real
clear in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) explosion of what
had occurred.
Well, it turned out, as we were subsequently told, that you
do indeed do a preliminary investigation on all deaths. Is that
correct information?
General Magnus. Neither of those, I believe, is correct,
but I will talk for the Marine Corps, sir.
The regulation does not require a preliminary inquiry in
accordance with our Judge Advocate General's manual which is
the same as Army Regulation 15-6, when on the scene it is clear
to the senior official there that a death or injury was due to
enemy fire.
When there is any doubt of the cause of any casualty
including, of course, a mishap--and in this case, we are
talking about a hostile action--a preliminary inquiry is done
to ascertain that. And then, of course, if in fact that
suspicion sustains after a preliminary inquiry, which simply
could be a commissioned officer looking at the scene and
determining that there is some doubt, then of course, a formal
investigation will be undertaken.
The regulations do not require, when there is certainty at
the scene that the casualty was caused by friendly fire, for
there to be an inquiry.
Dr. Snyder. Maybe what we have is a terminology problem
because I would perhaps argue in defense of your system that,
in fact, that was the preliminary inquiry.
General Magnus. And, Congressman, that is a great point
because we have had that discussion with our service judge
advocate, in fact, if there is in fact a questioning, an
inquiry at the site--and it is determined by competent
authority that it was enemy fire--to their certainty, then what
we have to do is document that that took place. Right now, the
only documentation of that is the line in the personnel
casualty report that indicates enemy fire.
It turns out that, subsequently, that may not be good and
sufficient documentation. We are reviewing that along with what
the Army does.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, General. I will have other questions
later.
Ms. Davis. Thank you.
Thank you, Dr. Snyder.
And I want to move to Mr. Kline. Mr. Kline, would you yield
one second?
Could you define ``preliminary inquiry'' for us? What does
that entail--reporting, telephone call? I mean, it can be a
range of things--is that correct? So it is not a written-down
report necessarily?
General Magnus. Not necessarily, and that is one of the
aspects that we are looking at because, to have checks and
balances, you have to have some kind of record or documentation
to have an audit trail.
Ms. Davis. Okay, thank you.
Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, General, for being here and sort of stepping up
to the plate, as it were, to answer the questions which in our
minds were unanswered and had risen our concern to quite high
levels and, I am sure with great confidence, yours and the
Commandant's.
I know that there are very good professionals trying to do
their very best in very tough circumstances. There is no doubt
that in my 25 years, and I am sure in your 35 years, there is
nothing harder than going and informing a next of kin that a
Marine has been killed.
And so in the process, I think that the Marine Corps has
developed in making sure that there is an officer in uniform
who shows up to do that and does that very hard job, does a
very good one, and is taken very, very seriously for many
years, certainly all the years since you and I came into the
court.
But clearly, the system had some flaws in it. You have
mentioned some of them today, and in your written testimony--I
have got it all marked up here--some of them jump out.
Obviously, the personnel casualty report, as you indicated, is
sometimes disconnected from the investigation.
And so without those two things together, well-meaning,
hard-working, serious officers and enlisted can just make a
mistake because the information is not accurately recorded onto
the PCR, for example.
So I applaud the four of you and the Commandant for getting
the IG in it, and I trust that the IG will dig far and wide and
deep as we go forward on this.
I see some of your remedies in your written testimony. One
of them says, ``We will change higher headquarters reporting
procedures.'' I am not sure what that is. I don't know if you
know what it is either, but I would like to see those very
solid, and perhaps you can tell us when this is done what those
might be.
One of your remedies is, ``We must and will ensure tight
links between the investigation and reporting processes.''
Again, I don't know what that is, but I trust those will be
written down in Marine Corps order and will be visible to you
and to us.
And then with that, you say that you are going to ensure
training is ``rigorous and effective'' and therefore, I trust,
ongoing as all training is, that it maintains from commanding
officer to commanding officer to commanding officer. Because no
matter how good the training is, if it is not done
consistently, you won't maintain those links.
And similarly, I have a little bit of a concern when your
number seven--it says, ``there will be proactive coordination
between Head Quarters Marine Corps (HQMC) and our subordinate
command elements to strengthen oversight of reporting
compliance.'' Unless that is a documented procedure, proactive
coordination often doesn't last past the Marine who is in the
office at the time.
So all this is to say that at the end of this process, I
presume, when the IG completes the investigation, Headquarters
of the Marine Corps will be writing these down and promulgating
these changes. And I would ask that this subcommittee see what
those are as we go forward. Because I know that you are
appalled by this, and the Commandant and every Marine, that
this could be so confusing, that the testimony here could be so
wrong over the period of time that the chairman has indicated,
but more importantly, that families didn't know.
And so I don't have a question except to ask that we be
allowed to see what these procedures are when the Marine Corps
promulgates them.
General Magnus. We will ensure, Congressman Kline, that the
subcommittee receives copies of all the correspondence,
including the Commandant's letter to his commanders, as well as
any changes we make in our procedures and, of course, the
changes that will be made, that are ongoing right now, and to
update the DOD instruction on casualty reporting and
notification in general, and we are----
Mr. Kline. Is there a white letter out now?
General Magnus. No, the Commandant is in Iraq right now,
and when the Commandant gets back, we will sit down and make
sure that we have a letter that does more than simply exhort
for reemphasis on the system.
Because we know that there are potential deficiencies in
these systems. So we want to make sure that the systems are
being reported and done by Marines; they are human beings like
everyone else. And so we need more than just reemphasizing the
procedures we have.
Mr. Kline. Thank you.
I yield back.
Ms. Davis. Thank you.
Ms. Shea-Porter.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
The question I have, General, is two-fold. First of all,
wouldn't it help if we had some standard operating procedure
across the branches of military? And why don't we at this
point; and would you recommend it?
General Magnus. Madam Congresswoman, the answer is yes. We
are now actively working--I literally met with the Army three
times in the past week.
We believe that the Army has a good if not outstanding
model, and we are going to make recommendations to change our
procedures. If we believe that the Army procedures need
clarification, we will recommend that to them, and we are going
to.
And I have already met this morning with the principal
deputy undersecretary for personnel and readiness, Mike
Dominguez. And he is directing the new overarching DOD
instruction so that we are consistent. And I believe that not
only uniformity, accuracy, and timeliness within the Marine
Corps, but uniformity across the four military services and
DOD, is essential.
Ms. Shea-Porter. How quickly do you think you would be able
to implement a joint policy?
General Magnus. I believe that the Army and the Marine
Corps can implement the changes within a matter of weeks. The
signing out of a DOD instruction might take a bit longer.
Ms. Shea-Porter. And the other question I had was: What
impact has this had on any of your troops at all? Can you speak
to that? Has there been an increased anxiety level? Has there
been any kind of blow-back from families? Has there been a
negative impact, basically, on Marines from within the ranks?
General Magnus. Madam Congresswoman, I am not aware of a
negative impact.
On the other hand, I am a dad. I have gone to the Intensive
Care Units (ICUs), and I have hugged the moms whose Marines
were expectant. I know that this cannot have eased their grief,
could not have calmed their uncertainty, and could not have
brought them to closure. So we are mindful of our
responsibility to take care of our troops and their families.
So I just have to take this as seriously as it is.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Have you spoken to them? Has the letter
gone out, or has there been any kind of communication with
everybody to state that yes, you know, it was wrong, it is
going to be fixed, and to reassure?
General Magnus. In the cases that were investigated
determining suspected friendly fire, in the case of Lance
Corporal Shuder's and Lance Corporal Zurheide's family, which
were the April 12, 2004, incident, that a general officer
visited the family at the time of their choosing. That happened
on the 20th and the 23rd of July.
We believe we have made contact with the family of every
Marine who has been killed in action. I spoke to Lieutenant
General Mattis, the commander of Marine Forces Central Command,
last night, and he is re-doubling efforts to go back and ensure
that we make contact with every Marine who has been seriously
injured, or is very seriously injured, as a result of wounds
received in hostile fire.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Do you think it would be helpful to
address everybody and all family members, stating that this
situation is being remedied for those who have family members
who have not been injured but wonder what would happen to them?
General Magnus. Madam Congresswoman, that will be the
purpose of the Commandant's white letter to all of his
commanders, which will be followed up by appropriate broader
distribution instructions to Marines. And we will make sure
that the communication is broad and effective. We don't want
any Marine or family to feel that we are not going to take good
care of them, and to accurately, and in a timely manner, inform
their families of the circumstances of their injury or their
death.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
I yield back.
Ms. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Madam Chairman, thank you.
And, General Magnus, it is good to see you again here in
August.
I am having lunch with--I am looking forward to seeing
Lieutentant Ilario Pantano, sir.
General, I want to thank you and the Marine Corps as well
as the services. It is a very difficult war, trying to make
sure that the families are as well-informed as they can be, and
whether that be friendly fire or killed by the enemy.
The casualty officer that goes to tell the family that the
loved one has been killed, how long does the casualty officer--
and let me tell you, this deals with the Army, and I have
already got this settled, but it has raised a lot of questions
for me at least--if a Marine is killed in action, how long does
it take before the Marine Corps can bring that case to a close?
And the reason I am asking is I have a constituent whose
son was killed five months ago. She has requested the autopsy
report. She has requested the investigation report as to--and
again, he was killed by an IED.
And I have been a little bit amazed, not disappointed,
because war is war and you just can't run to a computer and get
on a computer and say, ``This happened.''
How long, generally, should it take for a family to have
total closure, meaning that questions they might ask about the
death of that loved one, before the Marine Corps can say that
the family has received everything that they have requested and
we are now ready to close the case?
General Magnus. Congressman, thank you for the question.
Unfortunately, it varies depending upon the circumstances
of the casualty. Our instructions require that a family be
notified within hours of receipt of the casualty report at
Headquarters of the Marine Corps.
And the only caveat to that is that we go to family, the
next of kin that is identified by the Marine normally in their
record of emergency data, during the hours of 5 in the morning
and midnight, so that if we are not able to get the right kind
of people and they can't get the family members to them in the
event that they need other support.
That normally happens within hours or within one day, and
it is not a working day; it is one day. And very frequently
that happens, literally, within hours.
That information provided is the information that is as
good as in the initial personnel casualty report. The initial
casualty report in the case of hostile action may indicate
enemy fire determined by the official on the scene, or it may
indicate that it is indeterminate.
I have not seen one that indicated in the first casualty
report that it was friendly fire.
So that is provided to the family within hours.
If there is some doubt as to the circumstance of a Marine's
injury or death, the family is notified as soon as we know that
there is some doubt. And then there is an investigation process
that proceeds that is a legal process as the Judge Advocate
General's manual's determination.
And when that is finally endorsed--and for killed in
action, those go to the commander of U.S. Central Command for
his endorsement. At that point, we will then give the final
results of the investigation and its endorsements, including a
redacted copy of the investigation as appropriate to the
family.
We are required to update the family every 30 days if that
investigation has not completed within 30 days of our initial
notification. And that should be backed up by not only a
telephonic notification of the status, but backed up by a
letter.
That is all of the smaller procedures that are in these
processes I talked about, which create a series of documents
and checks and balances that we need to ensure take place.
Mr. Jones. General, thank you very much.
And, Madam Chairman, I will yield back.
Ms. Davis. Thank you.
Ms. Boyda.
Mrs. Boyda. Thank you for coming and for your testimony.
And thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I just had a question about process. Generally, and my
background is in the pharmaceutical industry, so zero tolerance
is pretty much the name of the game there.
And I was just wondering from the Marines' standpoint, when
you do something, and when you check something, who is the
person who is ultimately responsible for that process? Is it
the person who does it or the person who checks it, or do you
determine that? Is that part of your ethos?
General Magnus. Thank you, Madam Congresswoman.
Ultimately, the Commandant of the Marine Corps is
responsible for ensuring these processes come. The checks and
balances should be periodic examinations of the process, and it
is required by regulation by the Inspector General of each
service.
Mrs. Boyda. May I just ask then, is there--maybe I made an
assumption--with each one of these friendly fires, is each one
processed? And then, is it also checked by someone? Is there a
one-to-one, somebody does it, somebody checks it?
General Magnus. There should be, yes, ma'am. That is in
accordance with the regulations.
Mrs. Boyda. I am just curious, is that currently the
process?
General Magnus. That is correct.
Mrs. Boyda. Is there something that says in our procedures
or in our process--and again, in the industry that I have come
from, guess who is the one who is responsible for it? Not the
person who did it, the person who checks it. And they are the
one whose job is on the line, whose performance review is on
the line. The person who does the checking is the person who
takes it, and it is very clear to everyone whose name is on the
line what that means.
So just again, it doesn't sound like that is necessarily a
written procedure, and I just wondered if it might, in fact, be
something that is helpful or something that you have ever
considered.
General Magnus. Madam Congresswoman, I think it is in the
regulation that each service have a casualty office that is
responsible. Those responsibilities are not delineated; they
are implied. I know what they are.
But we need to make sure in the checklist of each office
that Mr. Downs represents the senior officer that is
responsible for casualty reporting, that he is also aware that
he has to be mindful of whether or not the status of a friendly
fire legal investigation is complete, and if not, why not, so
that from the personal casualty report on, we are constantly
checking the completeness of the actions we may take.
If an action is not taken at the beginning, if something is
not reported, there is no action that we can take. If an
investigation is not correctly done, then it is the
responsibility of the endorsers to challenge that.
But as each process comes to its milestones, there needs to
be someone who is checking that it has actually been done and
that we transmit that information to the families.
Mrs. Boyda. And I yield back. I don't have any other
additional questions.
Thank you.
Ms. Davis. Thank you, Ms. Boyda.
I just wanted to check, Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. I have no questions.
Ms. Davis. All right, great. Thank you.
Just going back for a second, General, if I may, I think
one of the concerns, and I am recalling the meeting that we had
also on the 17th of July, because I think we had a clear sense
then that that was kind of all there was.
And then as you mentioned earlier, going back and taking
another look I think that, from our standpoint, I think it is
appropriate to characterize that as still a work in progress
essentially, rather than something that is pretty definite as I
think the impression of those of us who were at that meeting
had. Conveying that, is that a better way to move forward?
Obviously, we want to have definite numbers, but on the
other hand, it is unsettling to come back and have different
numbers as time moves on.
General Magnus. Madam Chairwoman, it is unsettling to us,
not only in leadership positions but anyone that has been
associated with us, including the officials that are
responsible for the processing. We believe that we will have
definitive information, definitive numbers when the Inspector
General is complete with his investigation.
Hope is not a principle of war. I hope that our numbers
that we have done on our initial accountings turn out to be
definitive. I am not confident in that as I sit here. And we
will provide the subcommittee a copy of the Inspector General's
investigation.
Ms. Davis. A follow up as well, on the 17th, when the
Marine Corps stated that 24 Marines--Marine Corps Central
Command (MARCENT) had reported--that were killed from friendly
fire in the Nazaria incident. And then they stated that all 18
were included because they were killed as part of the friendly
fire incident. But then we learned that actually eight of the
18 were killed by hostile fire.
So I am wondering why the eight would be grouped with the
remaining 10 if, in fact, they were not part of the friendly
fire incident?
General Magnus. Madam Chairwoman, that incident that you
are referring to, the 23rd of March, 2003, was the 1st
Battalion, 2nd Marines. The investigation on that, which I
believe was complete, was done by CENTAF, the Air Forces'
Component Central Command.
The troops in the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines were engaged
in fierce combat with Iraqi Army forces on Nazaria. Unbeknownst
to the company that was literally behind them, they were in
front, and when the fires were authorized by their fellow
company, that company thought that they were part of the Iraqi
Army.
The Air Force was cleared in on a mission when U.S. troops
were in fierce, close contact, already receiving numerous
casualties. As a result of the fact that the A-10's then
conducted a strike on that vicinity, the Air Force then became
the suspected afflicting agency of the friendly fire and
therefore it was their responsibility, according to
regulations, to conduct a full and complete investigation.
A full and complete investigation, as you can imagine, is
quite extensive, including medical forensics.
It turns out that eight of the 18 killed in action were
determined to have been killed by the Iraqis and, in fact, the
vicinity of the A-10 attack was a casualty collection point for
that infantry company.
The other 10 of the 18 casualties were literally
``indeterminate cause'' of their death. And you can imagine the
tremendous amount of damage that was being done in fierce
close-combat, plus the ordinance that was delivered by the A-
10, made it medically impossible for the investigating officer
to determine the exact cause of death.
Likewise, that battalion also reported 17 wounded in action
that day. Of the 17, 15 were due to wounds from enemy fire; 2
seemed to be indeterminate, and I know for a fact that 1 of
them actually received wounds--this is a living, wounded
Marine--from both Iraqi fire and apparently from shrapnel
delivered by the A-10.
The actual timing of the fatal injuries and the timing of
the wounds can only be determined by the living. The wounded
can tell you when they believe they got wounded. It is very
difficult to determine the timing of deaths.
Ms. Davis. I think the question is why the eight were
listed on the friendly fire list at all, though.
General Magnus. Because they were part of a friendly fire
investigation. And in fact, because the fires were delivered in
support of and believed to be against the enemy--so the
investigation determines whether or not we can determine
whether it is friendly fire, enemy fire, or in some cases here
as I have discussed, it is indeterminate.
Ms. Davis. So in other instances where there are sizable
numbers and there is a friendly fire investigation, all the
others would come under that investigation?
General Magnus. Madam Chairwoman, in a given incidence. So
in other words, at a certain time and place, if there are a
number of casualties and friendly fire is suspected, that will
all be done in one investigation with determinations made for
each and every one of the suspected wounded or killed. If the
same unit has a separate operation going on, there would be, if
necessary, a separate investigation.
Ms. Davis. Does that designation change, though, after the
full investigation is done and it is determined that that was
not the cause? Should that change in the listing of casualties?
General Magnus. Ma'am, no. The reason for the investigation
won't change. The determination of the causal factors of the
injury of death, they will change upon final determination of
the investigating officer and the endorsers.
Ms. Davis. But when someone goes back and looks at the
lists then, they would still see not the final determination on
that list.
General Magnus. Madam Chairwoman, it depends on who makes
up the list. As I might have indicated earlier, there were 23
total suspected friendly fire incidents, only 19 of which had
actual friendly fire determinations for the casualties, 4 of
which did not.
Ms. Davis. I see. But I think still, for our viewing, when
we go back and when we look at the list that we had asked for,
those are still listed in that framework. And that is our
concern, how that gets changed so that we have that appropriate
information. Maybe we can review that.
General Magnus. Madam Chairwoman, we will review that. I
tried to correctly characterize that in my written letter
response back to the subcommittee. If there is a way we can
improve it so there is no misunderstanding; accuracy and
timeliness of a response to the families and, of course, to the
Congress, is essential.
Ms. Davis. Okay, certainly. We are just looking for the
system to essentially reflect that, and if that is what we are
given, that is what we see. And we would like to try to figure
out a way to make certain that that isn't there.
Thank you.
Mr. McHugh, did you have any more questions?
Mr. McHugh. Yes.
Of course, the comment, General,--well, he is back. I want
to associate myself with the comments of the great Marine
warrior to my left, Mr. Kline. You spoke about the Army, and
the Army, I would tend to agree with you at least in the
comparative sense, has a pretty good system. On paper, it looks
great, and they have had it in place for a number of years now.
But I think as we look at what did or didn't happen in the
Corporal Pat Tillman case where, although the regulations and
directive out of the Army required notifications to occur while
an investigation was ongoing, virtually every one of the
officers with the exception, apparently, of one, were operating
under the assumption that that wasn't the policy. They weren't
aware even though it was.
So while changing the structure and redefining it through
directives is important, as Mr. Kline said, we have got to get
that word out to the field or at least in that one case with
Corporal Tillman, it may not work.
So I just wanted to add my one and a half cents onto that.
The only other thing I want to pursue right now is just for
my own edification.
General, when you spoke about the evolving data that we
have received over the first hearing of June 27th, the briefing
of July 17th, and then last evenings letter of August 1st from
you, there was apparently--for lack of a better description--a
disconnect between MARCENT and Headquarters Marine Corps.
Did I hear that correctly?
General Magnus. Congressman, I don't necessarily have the
information that MARCENT did not correctly report. What I do
know is the records that we have at Headquarters Marine Corps
are inconsistent.
Mr. McHugh. Well, that is why I said ``disconnect.'' I am
not trying to characterize. They weren't the same for whatever
reason. That is what you are trying to determine.
General Magnus. That is correct, sir.
Mr. McHugh. When General Downs--and I agree pretty much
with Dr. Snyder's comments in the beginning about General
Downs' kind of attitude, but I don't know if that is fair, but
it is certainly the impression that many of us got.
But as I look through the transcript of that hearing, I
mean, I can at least understand the source of his certainty
when we are going through the processes, the two incidences
since OEF/OIF as query to the defense casualty system.
He was certain that his data was correct because, as he put
it, and I am reading from the comments on the transcript,
``this, the data, includes all updated reports, Ms. Davis.'' He
was responding to the Chair. ``The casualty information
processing system includes the original personnel casualty
report and any supplements that have been issued, so the
information is updated as each PCR is received.''
Where does that process, the defense casualty processing
system, fit into this continuum, if you will? Where do the
PCR's come in? Where is it then transmitted to, and where did
you look to give us the latest updated figures of the 82
casualties, comprised of 23 incidences?
General Magnus. The command reporting system that I spoke
of as the first of those three processes includes a telephonic
report normally within an hour of the command realizing a
casualty. It is followed immediately, probably within minutes
in most cases, by a digital electronic personnel casualty
report.
At the same time, data is entered by the command into
DCIPS, the Defense Casualty Information Processing System,
which also feeds into a thing called defense casualty system,
which is a registry or record that has been accumulated, I
believe, going back to at least Vietnam if not before. But
those are simply feeder systems. They are taking the data that
is originally in the PCR as it is reported, and as it is
modified by supplemental PCRs from the command.
Mr. McHugh. So it is transmitted initially from the field,
as I hear you say it, almost simultaneously to both the defense
casualty processing system, sent into that, but also into
MARCENT. True?
General Magnus. The command in the field will begin to
enter casualty information processing as the Marine is
evacuated from the battlefield, assuming he has to be
evacuated. And at each time there is a change in his casualty
information, if he goes from Al Anbar to Balad to Landstuhl,
the defense casualty information updates that status.
Now of course, if in fact, there is a fatality, that
information stops there. That then feeds into the other system
which is the defense casualty system, but each time there is a
change in status by the command, they are supposed to indicate
a supplemental personnel casualty report until the time that
that individual either becomes fatal or the injury is lowered
to the status of what is called ``not seriously injured.'' That
determination of that status is made by a competent medical
authority.
Mr. McHugh. The discrepancy, the numbers, was really
rectified at least in the moment, and I have heard you say that
you are not entirely confident, and I understand that, and you
have got an ongoing review.
But that ongoing review really deals between whatever the
two data sets are held by the Headquarters of the Marine Corps
and MARCENT, yes? What I am concerned about, and I don't know
if this is strictly the Marine Corps' duty here, but I am
concerned about the quality of data entered across the board
into the defense casualty processing system.
Is there any assurance that those data are accurate or
jibing with anything else? Did anybody look at that in your
case or not?
General Magnus. That is going to be part of the deeper
review by, basically, a professional investigator. That is what
their job is.
I think from my cursory look at this--and I know you have
emphasized, Congressman, that I am not yet confident in our
information or our numbers--my cursory review is that any error
in system has a tendency to be perpetuated inside that system.
The Judge Advocate General's investigation is about as close to
the flawless process that the congresswoman mentioned that is
similar in the pharmaceutical profession, because that is
rigorously gone over by lawyers and vetted at each chain.
But it is the casualty reporting chain that is the one that
is subject to having either incorrect information later
corrected. If it is never entered into that system, it may not
have the checks and balances to be corrected.
Mr. McHugh. I thank you, General. General, thank you for
being here today.
I yield back.
Ms. Davis. Thank you, Mr. McHugh.
Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
General, you said, I think in response to Ms. Shea-Porter,
that you thought that a DOD-wide policy is essential, was your
words, and that Secretariat Dominguez is working on putting
that together.
Now the Commandant's going to come out with a white letter
to disseminate to everyone. Is the timing of that potentially
going to be that the Commandant comes out with a white letter,
then DOD comes out with a policy, and you are going to have to
say, ``Well, our white letter is not quite consistent with DOD
policy, and we are going to have to adjust it?''
I mean, the Army is very satisfied with their procedures
now after going through some real heartache, primarily because
of Corporal Tillman's case. The Navy and the Air Force are
satisfied; they have recognized their numbers are lower than
the Army and Marine Corps.
Do we have the potential that everyone is going to have to
adjust in order to follow along this DOD-wide policy that you
think is coming?
General Magnus. Thank you, Congressman.
While I can't guarantee that we might not have a
disconnect, we are working closely with the Navy Secretariat
and OSD to ensure that their higher level guidance is
consistent with what the Army and the Marine Corps will be
doing.
And our job is going to have implementing instructions far
beyond that that is going to be in the white letter to the
commanders that will literally guide the training, the
checklists, and if necessary, any modifications to our process,
to ensure that we take note of the Army model and make
appropriate changes for the Marine Corps procedures.
Dr. Snyder. I got you.
You said earlier that it is the inflicting force that is
responsible for the investigation. Is that correct?
General Magnus. That is correct, sir.
Dr. Snyder. Is that true, then, if it is the inflicting
force that causes casualties of DOD civilians that are in Iraq
or Afghanistan?
General Magnus. That is correct, sir. The DOD instructions
cover DOD civilians and DOD contractors that were killed or
injured by hostile fire.
Dr. Snyder. And what if the inflicting force--your
responsibility would be a Marine Corps incident in which other
government agency other than DOD civilians are casualties of a
friendly fire in which the Marine Corps is inflicting force,
are you responsible for that investigation?
General Magnus. Congressman, I am not aware of any
circumstance, but of course, that potential exists particularly
in this war. A determination would be made by the appropriate
command as to who is going to do the investigation. And in the
event that it was classified--and we have done classified
investigations, I just looked at one today--that appropriate
unclassified parts of that were transmitted back into the
systems that go to track casualties.
Dr. Snyder. And then you have the potential issues of--I am
focusing now on just U.S. citizens--U.S. citizens who would get
hurt by a friendly fire incident, which may have no connection
with government. They may be missionaries, they may be business
people. That is a third potential level of investigation.
My final question is, I would assume that when these
incidents occur, they are always heart-breaking for the
soldiers and Marines that are a part of them, that there is a
learning experience that goes on at some level, perhaps
multiple levels. What could we have done different to avoid
this?
And if you had asked me before Mr. McHugh, and I, and Ms.
Davis participated in this hearing at the end of June, I would
have thought that there would have been, perhaps fairly high
level, maybe in the Commandant's office somewhere, someone
responsible for--``Yes, we have got a file on each one of these
incidents; we are looking for common links; we think it is
because, I don't know, the uniforms we were wearing; we think
it is poor communication, but there seem to be some links.''
But the fact that this has taken literally weeks of
gathering these different incidents together, I mean, it is
pretty firm evidence there is no one looking at these incidents
saying, ``Is there a commonality that we can avoid this in the
future?'' Is that a fair statement?
General Magnus. Congressman, I would say that as of today,
that is not a correct statement. There are lots of folks
looking at this.
Dr. Snyder. As of a few weeks ago, it was a fair statement.
General Magnus. Unfortunately, that is true.
Dr. Snyder. Because it would have seemed like that would
have been the first place you would have gone to is we have got
this overt colonel who is responsible for looking at all these
just like we have an office that looks at all IED--that we are
looking for ways to prevent things from occurring in the
future, but there hasn't been any of that occurring in the
Marine Corps as near as we can tell. And that is probably
unfortunate.
But thank you, General, for being here. We appreciate your
time and your service and working on this issue.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Davis. Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General, I would suspect that, following up on Dr. Snyder's
questions and remarks, if there are, over time, organizations
that look at things like this: the Center for Naval Analysis,
the folks down at Quantico who are looking at lessons learned,
and so forth.
But that is different from the sort of on-the-spot taking a
look at the casualty reports that come in and the
investigation. I don't know that to be true, but I know that
historically, it is true.
Dr. Snyder. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Kline. Oh, happy to.
Dr. Snyder. But if the official word six weeks ago was that
there had only been two incidents, that means that those groups
that you cited would have probably been only informed of two
incidents.
Mr. Kline. Entirely possible. I am not disagreeing at all.
I am just saying that as a matter of course, that sort of
after-action investigation has gone on conflict after conflict
and I am sure it would here, too. I am not excusing all the
discrepancies.
And as I said in my earlier comments, there is no doubt
that processes have to be changed, and that is what you are
moving forward with.
And I just want to get clear for our understanding, for the
record, that in the Inspector General's effort, as he looks at
everything that happened, should there be an indication that
something other than courage, honor and commitment was
demonstrated by someone involved. That there was an expectation
in this process that such person would then be moved to
administrative or legal, Uniformed Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), that there will be--if misconduct of any kind
occurred--that will be addressed as well? Is that correct?
General Magnus. Congressman, that is absolutely correct.
Mr. Kline. I thought I heard that in an earlier question. I
just wanted to make it perfectly clear that as part of this
process goes forward, you are not only looking at what happened
to an end of change in processes, but if there were misbehavior
of any sort, that will be brought to light as well. You have
answered it. Thank you.
And I yield back.
Ms. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Kline.
All right, thank you.
General, we really appreciate the fact that you have been
here and answering the questions and trying to help us clarify
a number of issues.
One of the concerns that we heard as we sat in the meeting
on the 27th centered around the term, ``suspected friendly
fire,'' and it was our understanding that the family wasn't
notified of that initially, but that that has changed. And I
just wanted to clarify that.
At what point is a family notified of a suspected friendly
fire incident?
General Magnus. A family is required to be notified of
suspected friendly fire or indeterminate cause of either a
fatality, a very serious injury, or serious injury. They are
required to be notified at the same time frames as our
preliminary personnel casualty report; in other words, within
the hours of 0500 until midnight.
If that status changes, if for good reason it was
incorrectly reported as enemy fire, subsequently determined to
be indeterminate, we are to immediately do the same thing and
then to update that family in 30 days unless there has been a
completion backing that up with a letter to let them know what
the status is.
Ms. Davis. So it is correct to say that families are
notified earlier today than they were before we started to take
a look at this incident. Is that correct? Because it was our
understanding that actually they weren't notified until after
an investigation was done, if it was indeterminate.
Are you saying that now it is that they are notified, if it
is indeterminate, early on?
General Magnus. Madam Chairwoman, that is correct. And they
should have been notified in accordance with statute and
regulation previously.
In the case of Lance Corporals Shuder and Zurheide, that
incident on the 12th of April, that was not even in accordance
with our regulations. Literally, it was over two years to the
notification.
Ms. Davis. Right, okay.
And finally, just to focus on the educational process for
those that are part of this process and are part of the
notification process. What do you see in terms of changes,
reforms, that would be taking place at the adjutant schools as
a result of changes in the white letter, which we understand
has not come out yet, and you are suggesting that it is going
to be more than a reemphasis. It is going to be more specific
in terms of the standard of procedures that follow that, which
we hope are in line with that--there is still this educational
process over here.
What changes do you foresee? And is it a matter of time
spent in trying to retrain, difference of emphasis? What do you
anticipate will be taking place?
General Magnus. Madam Chairwoman, first off, I think this
will take place quite rapidly. I actually think that our
procedures, although they need to be reviewed and there will
probably be some changes, they were more than adequate if
people understood the necessity to cross check.
But the commanding officers and the commanding generals
will be advised of not only the reemphasis, but the changes
that we want to put in place immediately and any changes that
come subsequently with the DOD instruction and changes in
Marine Corps order.
The judge advocates will be advised. And quite frankly, I
think they do their process quite well. But of the
connectivity, again, of these systems, and perhaps most
importantly, the noncommissioned officers and officers that
manned the command operational centers which do the initial and
update reporting, they need to be ensured that the procedures
they are trained by and their reports are consistent.
Quite frankly, the lynchpin on this, though, Madam
Chairman, is the casualty section itself. To be ensured that
they are aware and get the information on all three of these
processes, that they rigorously cross-check and question things
that don't match up. And, ultimately, the Inspector General's
checklist has to be modified to ensure that we periodically go
back and check this process, which can't be something that you
only check once every 12 months.
So there are other things the IG, himself, is going to do
to ensure that we have appropriate checks and balances.
Ms. Davis. What do you think is a fair amount of time for
us to allow these changes to take place, whatever training is
required, the white letter to move forward, and to bring either
you back, General, or your representative to take a look at
this and see how we are doing? Is it six months? Is it a year?
What is a fair amount of time to take a look?
General Magnus. Madam Chairwoman, after you receive the
results of the IG's investigation with our endorsements for
actions on it, I believe we will have made the necessary
changes within the Marine Corps within 30 to 60 days, to get it
promulgated across the core. Obviously, the focus will be on
the deployed and deploying combat units.
Any changes that may become from changing orders and
directives may happen later, but I think the ones that are
going to address everyone's correct concerns about the
deficiencies in these systems, they will be done within 30 to
60 days.
Ms. Davis. I appreciate that.
Can I assume that if there are some problems that arise,
that you will let us know about those so that we have an
opportunity----
General Magnus. Madam Chairwoman, we are going to provide
the committee staff copies of every single directive document,
including the Commandant's letter that occurs as a result of
this.
Ms. Davis. Okay, thank you very much, General.
Again, thank you very much for your service. Thank you for
your frankness here, today. We appreciate it.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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August 2, 2007
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