[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE TRANSITION FROM THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION TO CONTRACTOR-
OPERATED FLIGHT SERVICE STATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
=======================================================================
(110-76)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AVIATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 10, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
38-249 WASHINGTON : 2008
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, JOHN L. MICA, Florida
Vice Chair DON YOUNG, Alaska
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
Columbia WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
JERROLD NADLER, New York VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
CORRINE BROWN, Florida STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
BOB FILNER, California RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi JERRY MORAN, Kansas
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland GARY G. MILLER, California
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania Carolina
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
RICK LARSEN, Washington TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts SAM GRAVES, Missouri
JULIA CARSON, Indiana BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York Virginia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois TED POE, Texas
DORIS O. MATSUI, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
NICK LAMPSON, Texas CONNIE MACK, Florida
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii York
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr.,
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota Louisiana
HEATH SHULER, North Carolina JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
MICHAEL A. ACURI, New York CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona THELMA D. DRAKE, Virginia
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOHN J. HALL, New York VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
JERRY McNERNEY, California
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California
(ii)
Subcommittee on Aviation
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois, Chairman
BOB FILNER, California THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
NICK LAMPSON, Texas JERRY MORAN, Kansas
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa SAM GRAVES, Missouri
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
JOHN J. HALL, New York, Vice Chair SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin Virginia
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of TED POE, Texas
Columbia DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
CORRINE BROWN, Florida CONNIE MACK, Florida
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California York
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
DORIS O. MATSUI, California VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii JOHN L. MICA, Florida
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California (Ex Officio)
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vi
TESTIMONY
Belger, Monte R., Vice President of Transportation Systems
Solutions, Lockheed Martin Air Traffic Management.............. 25
Boyer, Phil, President, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association... 25
Cipriano, Joseph R., President, Lockheed Martin Business Process
Solutions...................................................... 25
Scovel, III, Hon. Calvin L., Inspector General, U.S. Department
of Transportation.............................................. 4
Staples, John, Director, Office of Flight Services Program
Operations, Federal Aviation Administration.................... 4
Washington, James H., Vice President for Acquisition and Business
Services, Air Traffic Organization, Federal Aviation
Administration................................................. 4
Zuccaro, Matt, President, Helicopter Association International... 25
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois............................. 40
Mica, Hon. John L., of Florida................................... 48
Mitchell, Hon. Harry E., of Arizona.............................. 54
Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota............................ 57
Petri, Hon. Thomas E., of Wisconsin.............................. 60
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Boyer, Phil...................................................... 65
Cipriano, Joseph R............................................... 77
Scovel, III, Hon. Calvin L....................................... 83
Washington, James H.............................................. 100
Zuccaro, Matthew................................................. 110
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Costello, Hon. Jerry F., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Illinois, letter to Hon. Mary E. Peters, Secretary of
U.S. Department of Transportation.............................. 47
ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD
Anonymous letter to the Committee................................ 113
Holodick, Daniel, letter to the Committee........................ 114
Venable, Robert M., letter to the Committee...................... 118
Wade, Jay, letter to the Committee............................... 119
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.010
OVERSIGHT HEARING ON THE TRANSITION FROM FAA TO CONTRACTOR-OPERATED
FLIGHT SERVICE STATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
----------
Wednesday, October 10, 2007
House of Representatives,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Aviation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Jerry
F. Costello [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. Costello. The Subcommittee will come to order.
The Chair will ask all Members, staff and everyone to turn
electronic devices off or on vibrate.
The Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the
Transition from FAA to Contractor-Operated Flight Service
Stations: Lessons Learned.
Before we begin, I would ask unanimous consent to allow a
new Member of our Committee, Ms. Laura Richardson, to
participate in the Subcommittee hearing today. Hearing no
objection, so ordered.
I am prepared to give my opening statement and recognize
the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, for his opening statement or
remarks, and then we will go directly to our first panel of
witnesses.
I want to welcome everyone to our Aviation Subcommittee
hearing on the Transition from FAA to Contractor-Operated
Flight Service Stations: Lessons Learned.
The FAA awarded Lockheed Martin a $1.8 billion
privatization contract to consolidate 58 flight service
stations nationwide into 18 including 3 new hubs and maintain
and manage the system. It was during this consolidation that
pilots started reporting problems: long wait times, dropped
calls, missing flight plans and specialists ill prepared to
brief pilots on requested routes.
An incident this past Sunday illustrates how important it
is for the FSS to work properly. This past Sunday, October 7th,
there were several pilots who violated the temporary flight
restriction over Emmitsburg, Maryland. President Bush was there
for a firefighters' event and flew from Camp David. There were
a dozen pilots who violated this restriction, many because of
incomplete information from an FSS. This is one example of how
the flaws in the FSS system can adversely affect pilots.
I will include a firsthand report from one of the pilots
from this last Sunday's incident into the record, but I will
briefly summarize:
A pilot attempted to call an FSS three times before being
connected. Once connected, the briefer gave incorrect
information, saying he checked the route and the member would
not encounter any special use airspace or TFRs. Soon after, the
pilot was diverted to Hagerstown, Maryland, and interviewed by
the Secret Service. This situation became worse when the pilot
contacted an FSS to leave Hagerstown.
Stories like this one are all too common under the
contract-out FSS system. We must and we can do better. I
believe that the FAA needs to do more aggressive oversight of
this contract.
After numerous letters and conversations with the former
Administrator, Marion Blakey, in May of 2007, I am pleased to
see that the FAA has stepped up its effort to make sure that
Lockheed Martin is meeting its performance goals required by
the contract.
The FAA embarked on this consolidation effort because it
believed that Lockheed Martin's FS21 would deliver flight
services with greater efficiency while continuing to provide a
high level of safety at a reduced cost. Costs continue to
increase on this contract because of delays and adjustments
wanted by Lockheed Martin which will reduce the expected cost
savings. I am interested in hearing from the FAA and the DOT's
IG whether the expected cost savings anticipated in this
contract by the FAA are being achieved.
The DOT IG also released a report of the controls over FSS
contracts and made a number of recommendations. I am interested
in hearing from both the FAA and the DOT IG whether these
recommendations were implemented and what we have learned in
this process.
I am also interested in hearing from Mr. Boyer and others
who represent the users of the FSS. They are here today with
us, and I hope that they will provide some feedback for us so
that we can learn what we can continue to do to ensure pilots
get safety critical services they expect and need.
Ultimately, regardless of who has the contract for this
service, the FAA is responsible for ensuring that the users get
everything they need from the system which includes quality
customer service and safety. I want to learn more about what
the FAA is doing to achieve those goals because the lessons
from this contract will have a huge effect on how we deal with
contracting out the ADS-B system.
With that, I again welcome all of our witnesses today, and
I look forward to hearing their testimony.
Before I recognize the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee,
Mr. Petri, for his opening statement or comments, I ask
unanimous consent to allow two weeks for all Members to revise
and extend their remarks and to permit the submission of
additional statements and materials by Members and witnesses.
Without objection, so ordered.
At this time, the Chair would recognize the distinguished
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Petri.
Mr. Petri. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
This past summer, Lockheed Martin and the FAA finalized the
transition of flight service station services from the
antiquated legacy system to a modernized network integrated
system. This process was the result of a nearly two year
transition effort during which 58 facilities were consolidated
down, as you point out, to 18 modernized facilities providing
roughly 90,000 briefings per week at an estimated cost savings
to the Government of roughly $2.2 billion over the life of the
contract.
However, as with nearly any transition of this size and
complexity, problems arose including lost flight plans, long
hold times and system outages. My office heard complaints in
this area as yours did. Compounding these problems was the high
call volume during the busy summertime flying season.
While this Subcommittee should certainly look into the
problems that have arisen during the transition period, we
should also remind ourselves about how quickly the problems or
most of them have been solved. For instance, there were
problems with Lockheed Martin's FS21 automated system
interfacing with FAA legacy systems. Yet, workarounds were
quickly developed by Lockheed Martin to bring the system back
online.
Proper agency oversight of the contract is clearly
critical. In the case of this contract, the FAA has mechanisms
built into the contract that incentivize good service and
penalize poor service. The contract has 21 performance measures
called Acceptable Performance Metrics and based on these
metrics, Lockheed Martin is eligible for rewards or for
penalties.
Additionally, under the contract, any contract under-run or
savings is returned to the Government if any one of the
Acceptable Performance Metrics is not met. Because
understaffing could lead to missing an APL and thus losing all
savings, the contract disincentivizes understaffing.
I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses on these
and other controls within the contract that ensure quality
service for the users.
As with any transition, flight service station briefings
have changed. Pilots who may have talked to the same briefer
for 15 years are probably surprised now when they talk to
someone new. While it may be a little different experience, the
quality of the briefing is what is most important. Our aviation
system is modernizing and flight service stations must do so as
well.
While the transition to Lockheed Martin's enhanced system
has been a challenge, surveys from the user community have
shown satisfaction with how Lockheed Martin has responded to
the issues that have arisen during the transition and show
steadily improving grades on the quality of service.
Now that the busy summer season is wrapping up, I look
forward to hearing what Lockheed Martin is doing to ensure a
seamless flying system in 2008.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and yield back
any time remaining. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman and, before we
introduce the first panel, would recognize my friend from North
Carolina, Mr. Hayes, for brief remarks.
Mr. Hayes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this hearing today.
I think it is important to note that the concept is very
sound. It started off very strongly. We developed a series of
problems that have been pointed out by a number of users and
user groups. I think Lockheed Martin, hopefully, will move as
aggressively as possible to correct these problems, to put a
sound system on a sound footing.
I thank you for giving us a chance to take a look at some
of these issues. I yield back.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman and at this
time would introduce and recognize our first panel.
First, we have the Honorable Calvin Scovel who is the
Inspector General with the U.S. Department of Transportation;
Mr. James Washington, the Vice President for Acquisition and
Business Services, Air Traffic Organization, FAA; and Mr. John
Staples who is the Director of the Office of Flight Services
Program Operations for the FAA.
Gentlemen, your full statement will be entered into the
record, and we would ask you to summarize your statement.
Mr. Scovel, you are recognized for five minutes.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE CALVIN L. SCOVEL, III, INSPECTOR
GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; JAMES H.
WASHINGTON, VICE PRESIDENT FOR ACQUISITION AND BUSINESS
SERVICES, AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION, FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION; JOHN STAPLES, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FLIGHT
SERVICES PROGRAM OPERATIONS, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Scovel. Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri and
Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to
testify today regarding the conversion of FAA's flight service
stations to contract operations.
On February 1st, 2005, FAA awarded a 10 year contract to
Lockheed Martin to operate the Agency's flight service stations
in the continental United States, Puerto Rico and Hawaii.
FAA anticipates that it will save $1.7 billion by
contracting out flight service facilities over the 10 year life
of the agreement. These savings are based on consolidating the
58 FAA-operated flight service stations into 18 sites,
deploying FS21, Lockheed Martin's new flight services operating
system, and reducing flight service specialist staffing levels,
approximately 1,900 to 1,000 specialists.
At this point, the consolidation is nearly complete, and
FS21 is operational. The transition was not an easy one.
Hindsight is 20-20 but, clearly, deploying a new operating
system and debugging it during live operations while
consolidating 58 locations down to 18 and acclimating an entire
workforce to a new system all within a 6 month period was a
very ambitious undertaking. Significant problems in providing
services to users occurred during the transition including long
wait times, dropped phone calls, lost flight plans and poor
briefings.
In May, we issued an interim report on this outsourcing
effort. Our testimony today is based on that audit work and
ongoing work to monitor the transition. Today, we would like to
discuss three issues regarding this undertaking.
First, we found that FAA established a series of effective
management controls over the initial transition from FAA to
contract operations. For example, FAA used a contract
mechanism, fixed price plus incentive fee, that allows for
careful monitoring of the contractor's performance.
FAA also implemented a series of internal controls to
enforce the contract. For example, at the onset of the
contract, FAA realigned its existing headquarters flight
services office to oversee the transitional, operational and
financial aspects of the flight services contract.
FAA maintained an evaluation group to conduct operational
reviews of flight service stations, and FAA included 21
performance measures in the contract against which Lockheed
Martin is evaluated. Lockheed can earn up to $10 million
annually in bonuses for meeting those measures but can also be
financially penalized for not meeting them.
In our opinion, these controls are important mechanisms to
manage the contract going forward.
Second, while the Agency implemented effective management
controls over the initial transition, Lockheed Martin
experienced significant problems during the consolidation phase
of the outsourcing effort. Lockheed experienced a 10 month
delay in developing FS21 which led to a very aggressive
consolidation schedule during the busy summer flying season.
In addition, because of the delay in development, Lockheed
began installing and using the system in live operations with
known deficiencies. As a result, significant problems occurred
in providing services to users. It appears that many of those
problems have now been resolved.
However, for future undertakings of a similar nature,
several lessons learned can be gleaned from this experience.
They include ensuring that new systems are fully developed
before being deployed, paying sufficient attention to human
factor issues such as acclimating a workforce to new systems,
and taking swift and decisive intervention actions when
outcomes, even intermediate ones, fail to meet requirements.
Third, key watch items going forward. With the
consolidation now behind us, Lockheed and FAA must focus on
three key issues:
One, meeting acceptable levels of performance over the next
several months. Currently, Lockheed is not meeting 13 of 21
performance measures. It is important to recognize, however,
that most of the problems occurred in the second and third
quarters of fiscal year 2007 while the transition was ongoing.
With the transition ending, we would expect performance to
improve.
An important point, Mr. Chairman, is that if the
contractor's performance does not improve over the next several
months, it could indicate fundamental problems with how
Lockheed Martin operates flight services. FAA must closely
monitor the contractor's performance in terms of the APLs.
Two, achieving the anticipated savings. Ensuring that
savings estimates are being met each year is critical because
most of the anticipated savings are expected to be achieved in
the out years of the contract.
Three, maintaining adequate staffing levels and providing
sufficient training of flight service specialists to meet
users' needs. A significant concern is that Lockheed expected
to have 1,000 specialists on board at the end of the
transition. As of September 1st, 2007, they had only 842
specialists.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be
pleased to answer any questions you or Members of the
Subcommittee may have.
Mr. Costello. Thank you, Mr. Scovel.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Washington.
Mr. Washington. Good morning, Chairman Costello,
Congressman Petri and Members of the Subcommittee. I welcome
the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the FAA's
transfer of automated flight service stations to a contractor-
operated system.
My name is Jim Washington. I am the Vice President for
Acquisition and Business Services. I also serve as the
Acquisition Executive for the FAA and accompanying me is John
Staples who is our Director of Flight Service Program
Operations.
As we plan for the transition to the next generation of air
traffic control, we continue to manage to the FAA's first
priority which is safety. As the flight service program
proceeds, we and our contract partner, Lockheed Martin,
continue to ensure that this responsibility is not compromised.
Let me take a moment to quickly review the history of the
automated flight service contract. On February 1st, 2005, the
FAA awarded a performance-based contract to Lockheed Martin to
provide flight services to general aviation pilots. The
contract was awarded following a 15 month feasibility study
which we began in 2003.
The total cost of the award was $1.8 billion covering an
initial performance period of 5 years with consecutive options
for a total of a 10 year contract term. FAA expects to save
$2.2 billion in capital and labor over 13 years.
The contract contains 21 metrics known as Acceptable
Performance Levels. Those performance metrics allow the
Government to measure contract performance and quality of
service to the customer.
On February 22nd, 2007, Lockheed Martin began the process
of implementing their FS21 program. The end state configuration
for the automated flight service stations in the continental
United States including Hawaii and Puerto Rico will ultimately
be 18 facilities.
As is typical with the deployment of a new system, issues
developed. Many of these were anticipated and mitigations put
in place prior to the start of the transition. However, some
system impacts were more significant than anticipated.
Pilots began reporting excessive call wait times, dropped
calls, lost flight plans and specialists who were unfamiliar
with the expanded area of knowledge. Additionally, reports of
problems with issuing, disseminating and coordinating notices
to airmen were reported.
FAA has taken timely action in response to these problems.
We are holding Lockheed Martin accountable for meeting the
requirements of the contract. Lockheed continues execution of a
corrective action plan outlining the steps to be taken in each
of the deficient areas that have been identified.
At the FAA, we review recordings of air to ground radio and
telephone communications between pilots and Lockheed flight
service personnel to validate their performance data. FAA
performs facility inspections at Lockheed Martin flight service
stations. This includes over 2,100 quality assurance calls
placed to Lockheed facilities.
The National Weather Service also examines Lockheed weather
briefers and provides results of those examinations to the FAA.
Call hold times and abandoned calls have decreased over the
past several weeks. While pilots may still experience longer
wait times during peak periods, the average call wait time is
now consistently below 45 seconds, down from the 8 minute hold
times experienced in mid-May.
Ongoing analysis and oversight continues in order to
determine if additional corrective actions by Lockheed Martin
are necessary.
Contingent upon Lockheed's meeting the specified
performance levels, the contract allows for either a financial
incentive from the FAA or a penalty against Lockheed Martin for
failure to meet an Acceptable Performance Level. A penalty is
charged unless Lockheed Martin's corrective action plan is
accepted by the FAA. Quarterly and more frequent executive
level meetings provide the venue for performance discussions
between Lockheed and the FAA.
To date, FAA has levied approximately $12.2 million in
financial penalties to Lockheed Martin in cases where
performance levels were not met. Where Lockheed met or exceeded
the performance levels, awards totaling $6 million were paid by
the FAA.
Actions taken by the FAA and Lockheed Martin are showing
results. We continue to monitor Lockheed Martin's operational
performance by conducting internal evaluations and requesting
feedback from users such as the Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association as well as results of evaluations conducted by the
Office of the Inspector General.
Congress provided the FAA with the authority to establish
the Air Traffic Organization as a performance-based
organization. FAA is committed to meeting our responsibility by
providing appropriate oversight and management of this
performance-based contract for flight services. We continue to
be responsive to our customers, and we continue to work with
Lockheed Martin to provide the level of service which our
customers expect.
I thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to discuss
this important issue. This concludes my testimony, and I would
be glad to answer any questions.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you and recognizes Mr.
Staples at this time.
Mr. Staples. I have no formal statement at this time, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Costello. Very good.
Mr. Scovel, let me ask you just a few questions. Obviously,
in your testimony, both your written testimony and your summary
this morning, clearly you had questions as to the effectiveness
of the FAA managing the transition.
What have we learned from this as we move forward with
another outsource contract on ADS-B? What are the lessons
learned here in the transition?
Mr. Scovel. Good morning again, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by noting that FAA is justifiably proud of its
role in the department as one of the components that actually
operates things as opposed to other modes which serve as a
conduit for funds and grants and which have some limited
oversight responsibility. FAA is proud of its role as an
operator.
However, when it undertakes an effort like this or in the
upcoming ADS-B effort, it must change its role from one of
being an operator to one of being an overseer, engaging in
oversight. The formula for oversight is pretty simple: monitor
performance, evaluate effectiveness, implement lessons learned.
We believe that using this as a case study, FAA initially
implemented this contract effectively but going forward its
execution was lacking, and let me draw a couple of key
examples.
First, in this one, we knew that FS21 was a key to the
consolidation effort, yet that system was not entirely debugged
before it was put into operation. It was debugged during live
operations, in fact, and that was a key part of many of the
complaints by private pilots as they tried to engage flight
services.
Second, attention to human factor issues, in this case, we
had a consolidation effort that required a workforce being
relocated from outlying facilities to some hub facilities and
other consolidated locations. They were undergoing training in
new geographic locations and a new operating system at the same
time. We think that perhaps oversight of that aspect was
lacking.
Third and perhaps most telling, we think that swift and
decisive and early intervention was lacking on FAA's part once
severe problems were noted during the early spring and summer
flying season, and a flood of complaints and calls began to
reach FAA from disgruntled private pilots.
That leads to me one final point, and that is getting input
from users, sir. We think that while AOPA and other users had
some input at the beginning of the process, clearly as the
contract was moving forward, FAA's approach, we believe, was
one of we will hold them. We will hold Lockheed to the terms of
the contract.
They were slow in responding to complaints from the users,
and we think had they paid key attention earlier, that would
have given FAA a much stronger role in overseeing the
implementation of the contract.
Mr. Costello. You talked a little bit in your testimony
about the staffing levels. You mentioned the key points that we
have to move forward on, and the third point was staffing.
It is apparent to me and I would just ask you the question
in reviewing and preparing for this hearing. The fact that
Lockheed only had 800 specialists on staff, it is pretty clear
that they did not have the manpower to adequately respond to
the number of inquiries and the services that were required by
the users. Would you agree?
Mr. Scovel. Manpower is key. In fact, in our May report, we
identified staffing as a key concern of ours, and we
recommended at that time that FAA undertake a more detailed
examination of Lockheed's staffing effort. FAA initially
disagreed with that recommendation.
However, in early September, it too recognized the severity
of the staffing problem because at that point, as of September
1st, staffing which was supposed to be at 1,000 had fallen to
842. On September 7th, FAA sent a letter to Lockheed,
requesting a plan of action and milestones so that FAA could
better monitor Lockheed's implementation of the staffing
requirements.
Mr. Costello. Based upon what we know today, do you believe
that the FAA will achieve the $1.7 billion in savings that was
promised under this contract?
Mr. Scovel. We believe $1.7 billion is achievable. However,
it is too early at this point to say whether it will actually
be reached. Keep in mind, please, sir, that we are talking
about a 10 year contract. We are in the very early years of it.
Many of the savings, the great bulk of the savings are
estimated to be achieved in the out years of the contract. For
instance, the first two years of the contract, savings of $5.3
million have been estimated. In the last two years of the
contract, savings of $434 million are estimated.
There is a lot of time between now and then, and there is a
lot of time for extra expenses and costs to eat into the
estimated savings that will hopefully be achieved in the last
years of the contract. It will require detailed examination and
oversight by FAA throughout the entire contract in order to
achieve that whole $1.7 billion in savings.
Mr. Costello. Well, that is one of the issues that concerns
me about ADS-B and the contract, aggressive oversight.
Let me move on to Mr. Washington.
Mr. Washington, Lockheed Martin has requested, I think,
close to $150 million in adjustments to the contract based
upon, I think, significantly higher wages than what the FAA
instructed the bidders that the wages would be.
I would like you to comment on the labor rates that the FAA
gave to the bidders at the time that they were bidding. Was
there a difference or a misunderstanding on wage rates?
Mr. Washington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Yes, we are in receipt of a formal claim from Lockheed
Martin for just over $100 million, and the central issue there
is about the wage determination associated with the salaries
for specialists in the operating flight service stations.
The initial award of the contract was based on a formal
wage determination that was established by the Department of
Labor in addition to the actual salary payments to flight
service specialists at the time they were still employed by the
FAA.
A combination of the Department of Labor information as
well as the actual salary payments to the workforce that was
available to Lockheed Martin at the time we initiated the
contract award provided the overall set of information related
to the projected costs of paying the salaries for flight
service operators.
There is some discussion about the extent to which there
was either misunderstanding or misinformation provided in the
formal contract communications between the FAA and Lockheed
Martin. So we fully intend to resolve that difference.
Mr. Costello. Is the adjustment somewhere in the
neighborhood of $100 million to $150 million that Lockheed is
requesting?
Mr. Washington. I believe it is, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Costello. What point do you expect that you will
resolve that issue?
Mr. Washington. We are in the process of conducting
discussions with our counsel at the FAA and intend to address a
schedule for resolution of that claim in the next weeks.
Mr. Costello. You heard, Mr. Washington, the Inspector
General testify that in certain aspects of the contract, that
the FAA has not provided proper oversight. I want your comment.
Would you agree with that?
Are there areas that if you could go back and do it over
again, specifically, what would you do better regarding
oversight?
Mr. Washington. Yes, Mr. Chairman, in the context of
lessons learned, we have absolutely stepped into a very complex
oversight responsibility which, I might add, combines the fact
that FAA retains ultimate responsibility for assurance of
safety in the system. The difference here is that we rely on
the service provider and Lockheed Martin who actually owns and
operates that system to provide both the equipment and the
appropriate trained expertise in terms of people to provide
that quality of service which the customers expect.
In our oversight experience, we have discovered some
lessons learned in two particular categories, and one of those
happens to be the testing routines that lead up to the actual
implementation or the operational use of new automation which
is relied on by specialists in order to provide briefings to
pilots. The level of detail that is associated with that
testing routine prior to operational use is what the FAA would
apply a greater level of rigor around than what occurred in the
recent transition.
Another specific area of lessons learned is related to
staffing. In that discussion, I would suggest that it is a
combination of the total number of operational staff
specialists who are available in the system in addition to the
availability by a facility to address specific demands on the
system and address the more complex airspace situations around
the national airspace.
So the availability of specialists while training is going
on on a new automation platform is where we would apply greater
oversight and advice than what may have been exchanged between
the FAA and Lockheed Martin.
I would also add that we increased our level of
surveillance and executive level of contract oversight when it
became apparent that problems were arising in the system which
exceeded the expectations of both Lockheed and the FAA.
Lockheed had presented a plan to us that essentially
provided for procedural workarounds in the event that some of
the capabilities of the automation, which was planned to occur
in future time frames, was not available. So FAA accepted their
transition plan based on the workarounds that were presented to
us. In specific cases, those workarounds were insufficient to
meet the demand without significant call wait times and lost
calls and other concerns that you have heard addressed in this
discussion this morning.
Mr. Costello. Based upon lessons learned here in the early
stages and the issue concerning wages regardless of if it was a
miscommunication or whatever it may have been, do you
anticipate that the Government and the taxpayers will achieve
the $1.7 billion in savings that the FAA told us that they
would achieve?
Mr. Washington. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I am confident that our
projected savings will meet that target over the lifetime of
the contract.
We have already experienced significant savings. In fact,
we were more than $50 million ahead of our budget target for
the very first year of this contract award. In fiscal year
2007, we are making significant progress as well in terms of
the actual costs of the contract as compared to our
projections.
So we are off to an encouraging start, and certainly these
future adjustments that are required will have some impact on
the total cost of the contract, but we do not expect that to
have a significant impact on our projected total savings.
Mr. Costello. We are obviously concerned about savings, but
we are more concerned about safety and making certain that the
pilots get the information that they need when they need it and
that the services are provided either by the contractor or, as
I pointed out in my opening statement and as you pointed out,
the FAA has the ultimate responsibility regardless of who is
holding the contract.
At this time, the Chair recognizes the distinguished
Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, for questions.
Mr. Petri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am interested if anyone on the panel really would
comment. Mr. Scovel mentioned that the FAA has been an
operating agency, and this is a major contract with contract
oversight responsibility over a period of years which is
probably not going to be unique as we go forward with the new
technology and a pretty sophisticated series of technologies
for the new satellite-based system.
Do you feel that FAA either in-house has adequate expertise
to manage this process or the ability to contract out with
people who can inform them as to things that they need to know
to manage the process, or are there any changes we should be
making or thinking about making in the legally authorized tools
that the Agency could have to make sure that people from the
user community and the catering community making all this
equipment and understanding the technologies help inform the
Country as how to do it best by advising the FAA or working
with them?
Do you have any comment on any of that?
Are we okay? Is the Government able to manage these
multibillion dollar projects without any risk that they will
lose control of the process?
Mr. Scovel. Thank you, Mr. Petri.
I think there is always risk, naturally. However, I would
think that, using this again as a case study, I would note that
in our opinion FAA did a good job in the initial phases of the
contract in structuring it, in identifying performance measures
and through at least the first fiscal year in monitoring the
execution.
It was only later, after the delay in the implementation of
the development of the operating system and then the rushed
consolidation schedule, that FAA began to run into problems. We
attribute that more to a mind set, to an attitude, if you will,
rather than to a deficiency in any expertise, technical
expertise or in manpower on the part of the Agency.
We are confident that the Agency, of course, can learn from
experiences like this and apply it, hopefully, to upcoming
projects like ADS-B, but it will require dedicated attention
from top level leadership at FAA in order to drive these
lessons home.
Mr. Petri. Another area that I wonder if you could comment
on, a lot of Members of the Committee have been hearing there
were some 1,600 people who had to go through this transition. I
guess there was an indication that there would be every effort
made to find other assignments for people within the FAA and
manage this transition, but there are evidently some 300 or
more people who have not found another assignment.
I just wonder if either of you could comment on this or
what, if there is something, that still remains to be done that
we can be helpful with or what lessons have been learned from
handling the individuals involved in this whole situation.
Mr. Scovel. Mr. Petri, I will defer to FAA here in a
moment, but I will note that in any transition like this from a
Government-operated system to a contractor system, there will
be dislocations. I know that is an unfortunate sounding
antiseptic term when we are talking about the impact on people.
I will note too, and I think it is included in my
statement, that Congress made the policy determination to
protect FAA employees who were within two years of retirement
at the time this outsourcing was first initiated by providing
that those employees within two years of retirement, Government
retirement, could continue as FAA employees. Any time a line
like that is drawn, some will fall outside the line and some,
regrettably, will be very, very close to qualifying and being
included in that line.
My office hasn't had an opportunity to study in detail the
impact on individuals and the decision making process that went
into that part of the contract, but we do note that the
Congress did do what we believe was certainly its best at the
time.
Mr. Petri. Excuse me. Go ahead.
Mr. Washington. Thank you, Mr. Petri.
Let me address the complexity of this contract arrangement
because the FAA Administrator, Marion Blakey, at the time and
those of us in senior positions of responsibility did not
approach this anticipated competition lightly. We understood
that the single most significant challenge in this outsourcing
process would be the impact to the people and their careers and
lives in the process of awarding an outsourced contract.
So, at the time that we announced the competitive process
back in July of 2005, we had some 2,300 specialists on board,
currently FAA employees. We extended early retirement
opportunities to that workforce in the hopes of allowing people
an opportunity to exercise an additional option that would not
have otherwise been available to them, stepping into a
reduction in force process in October of that year.
Out of those 2,300, more than 1,200 employees ended up
retiring from that affected workforce. We were successful in
achieving reassignments to other FAA positions for some 456 of
those affected employees, and that was directly related to the
FAA Administrator's special policy that was put in place,
offering these affected employees special placement
opportunities.
In addition to that, in their wisdom, the opportunity that
Congress extended to the FAA, which I believe is unprecedented,
which Mr. Scovel referenced a minute ago, allowed some 99
individuals an opportunity to be re-employed with the FAA, most
of which had taken on positions with Lockheed Martin in order
to reach their retirement eligibility.
I think that is a very significant step which adds to the
measures which FAA was able to initiate within our own
authority and control. That also allowed us to reduce the
impact on more than 500 individuals that actually experienced a
reduction in force.
Now, keep in mind that at the time we initiated this RIF
process in October, 2005, the Lockheed Martin extended
employment opportunities to 100 percent of the operating
specialists, administrative personnel, secretaries and managers
that were currently on board at flight service stations. So
there was an opportunity for all of those individuals to choose
to take on employment with Lockheed Martin with the receipt of
a recruitment bonus in addition to the potential for future
benefits related to health and 401(k) retirement savings
opportunity as well.
What I am suggesting is that between the FAA and Lockheed
Martin, that there was a combination of factors that provided
for some mitigation of the impact to those personnel as we
stepped into this outsourcing event which we understand had
significant impact on the lives of those individuals.
Mr. Petri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think others may have questions on this process and other
aspects. I yield back.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now
recognizes Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The first question is for Mr. Washington. I thought it
might be appropriate to ask you since your last name is
Washington. I am from Washington, and the question is about
Washington.
In talking to the pilots in my area, one of the more
unusual complaints but relatively common for them is that the
voice recognition system that is being used for some reason
does not adequately identify or adequately hear Washington when
they call in and they are asked what State are they from. I
don't know if it is because of Washington State versus
Washington, D.C., and so they end up in this voice mail hell
that a lot of us get into.
I am curious if you have heard that complaint and if
something is being done or can be done about that.
Mr. Washington. Thank you, Congressman.
I have not heard about that specific complaint in the
system, and I would respectfully request that you may pose that
question to Lockheed Martin in the following panel.
We follow up on specific complaints about problems in the
system, and we have a very dynamic process between the FAA and
Lockheed Martin to ensure timely resolution of the complaints
once they are validated. This particular one, however, I am not
familiar with.
Mr. Larsen. It is fairly usual and probably isolated to
Washington.
What steps are you taking to reduce or eliminate the
problems, specifically, call wait times and dropped flight
plans?
Mr. Washington. There have been a number of significant
improvements in the automation system that Lockheed Martin has
brought into use at all the flight service stations, and so
that is the primary improvement factor that has allowed us to
experience fewer complaints overall and specifically
significant improvement in call wait times and lost calls over
the duration of this contract.
So it is a combination of the automation improvement and
introducing specific new capabilities to the automation
platform which have been done in several sequences, and there
are two or three additional system improvements that are
scheduled to be installed by Lockheed Martin which will add
corrections to the system that don't presently exist.
Mr. Larsen. What are those improvements?
Mr. Washington. I will ask Mr. Staples to pitch in here, if
I may.
Mr. Larsen. Fine.
Mr. Staples. There have been a series of software drops to
the FS21, and four of those remain to be implemented. The call
wait time that you referred to, specifically, has gone down
significantly and continues to drop to less than about 40
seconds average wait time across the system at this point.
I think that in the longer term, looking toward this, the
major improvements will be incremental in terms of more
specialists being trained, the end of the training on the FS21
system, increased proficiency on the use of the FS21 system
which will lower the briefing times, now at approximately five
minutes to something less than four. At least that is what we
believe is going to occur, and that is what Lockheed is trying
to make happen.
So, technological improvements have largely made the
difference so far, but in the longer term this is really an
operational air traffic kind of environment that needs to work
on these kinds of problems, not only on the hold time but on
the local area knowledge, efficiency of the system, utilization
and the correct employment of staffing across the multiple
flight areas that Lockheed Martin is operating.
Mr. Larsen. With regards to staffing and local area
knowledge, there are a couple of major events, probably several
major events that happen in the U.S. One of them is in my
district as well. It is the Experimental Aircraft Association
Fly-In, the third largest in North America behind Wisconsin's
and I think maybe Hattiesburg's if I am not mistaken.
We had some problems over the last two years. In talking
with the director of the fly-in, I think she is still trying to
sort out who is she supposed to be talking to, whether it is
FAA in planning for this or if it is Lockheed in planning for
this fly-in which takes place in July every year.
I will grant that perhaps with the transition taking place
at the most inopportune time of the year, during the springtime
when the flying season really begins, certainly in the
Northwest when it begins, that there was some major hiccups the
first time around. But the second time around, this last year,
they continued to have problems in who they were supposed to
speak to.
Can you speak to, in planning for large-scale planning
events like this, who are folks supposed to be speaking with
and planning with? Is it the contractor or is it FAA?
Mr. Staples. Congressman Larsen, the FAA is the initial
contact for this kind of request, and you can send those
requests. Just have your director contact my office of Flight
Service Program Operations in Washington, D.C., and we will
take them through the process.
This is a special service kind of piece of the contract.
Lockheed has paid separately for each one of these events. The
FAA approves them. There is essentially a contract negotiation
that takes place with Lockheed Martin, and then Lockheed Martin
executes. That is a separate piece to the contract.
Mr. Larsen. So the FAA approves the contractor, approves
the step that the contractor will take to manage the activities
for that particular event, but it goes through the FAA first?
Mr. Staples. Yes, Mr. Congressman, it starts with the FAA.
If it is not on a list that we have already told Lockheed that
they have to do like the Albuquerque Balloon Festival, the
Oshkosh Fly-In, those kinds of things, the request comes to us.
We approve it and pay for it. Essentially, that is the
individual contract for that event.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. I see my time is up, Mr. Chairman. I
would just make one more comment about local knowledge. It is
important.
We have a specific weather pattern in the Northwest called
the convergence zone, the Pacific Northwest Convergence Zone,
that nobody in Phoenix or Denver knows about. But when my
pilots call and get transferred over to Phoenix and Denver and
have to try to get weather briefings from them, they are
talking to the wrong people.
So I think it is important that, and we will talk to
Lockheed about this too as well, certainly about improving
local knowledge wherever that person who takes a call is
sitting because this is a particular weather event that really
does wreak havoc at certain times of the year including major
fly-in times of the year. That is very important for our folks
for flying to be able to access weather information on.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman from
Washington and recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina,
Mr. Hayes.
Mr. Hayes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Staples, if I could zero in on your for a minute, Mr.
Larsen spoke about a problem that has been consistent
throughout and that is quality of briefing as it relates to
local area and general knowledge. What is the relationship that
you and the FAA have between yourselves and Lockheed to solve
the problem of local knowledge on the part of the briefer and
quality of that briefing?
In other words, you know the problem. How do you go at it
since Lockheed holds the contract? What is the process?
Mr. Staples. Congressman Hayes, we have no specific metric
associated with that, but it is a recognized problem. So the
way we would deal with it is by collecting complaints from the
user community.
This, of course, is a well known problem that was pointed
out by AOPA early on and one that has been exacerbated by the
fact that when Lockheed consolidates, in many cases, flight
station specialists that were in a given area don't transition
to the hubs, especially if the facility is a closing one and is
not a continuing facility. So this causes an immediate shortage
in local area knowledge for the area that was operated by that
flight service station.
This is one that we monitor and will continue to monitor in
our staffing oversight initiative that we just started
recently. This is a thing that we had not expected to have to
do, but it is clear to us that we are going to have to step
into this area and make sure that on a flight plan area by
flight plan area basis, that Lockheed is providing enough
trained specialists. So that is going forward, what we intend
to do.
What has past, in my belief, created this situation or
exacerbated it was when they consolidated into larger hubs and
closed many of the facilities.
Mr. Hayes. What sort of training program does Lockheed have
in place to correct those deficiencies and how are you
following up with that?
Mr. Staples. The Lockheed Martin training program thus far
has been focused on bringing people into general familiarity of
the FS21 system and bringing new specialists into the flight
service workforce. I think it is approximately 100 people that
they have brought into that area now.
Their local area training that you specifically asked about
is not encountered until they go to the area where they are
being assigned and, at that point in time, start to learn the
anomalies of the specific conditions associated with that
flight plan area.
We will monitor it by looking at the amount of people that
they have trained in any given flight plan area.
Another thing that contributes or has contributed to this
problem in the past, which Lockheed seems to have made pretty
good strides in fixing, is getting a pilot caller to the right
specialist. They are reporting to us that they are between 86
and 88 percent in that area now.
In other words, if a pilot wanted the Raleigh area, he
would get that 86 or 88 percent of the time. If the hold time
for that specific area looked like it was going to be too long,
the pilot can opt to just take the first briefer that is
available in the system. So I think that technology piece has
been helping.
I think the longer term is a training issue, specifically,
and it is a focus area that Lockheed Martin has to continue to
flesh out.
Mr. Hayes. I would encourage you to encourage them to be
very aggressive in stepping that process up. It is interesting
to note how much technology is available now.
Again, speaking to Mr. Larsen's issue, there are a number
of things that no matter where you are, the same person can be
looking at the same information but the local knowledge issue,
because of the needs of that specific pilot, are very
important.
Last but certainly not least, what is the aggressive plan,
Mr. Washington and then Mr. Staples, that the FAA has to use
this particular process to transition into Next Generation and
ADS-B, lessons learned, so that transition can be as smooth as
possible and again the FAA can help people understand that
equipping is good for them and good for the system?
Mr. Washington. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.
We are certainly aware of the challenges as we step into
NextGen transition on a larger scale and have applied those
lessons in the dynamic process of awarding new contracts
including the most recent action related to ADS-B. We are
constantly sharing lessons learned within the program
management workforce at the FAA and looking at the planning and
the implementation details that are appropriate to apply to the
next challenges.
I would also suggest that each of these initiatives takes
on a unique set of concerns and issues, and so while we have
one set of complexities associated with this particular flight
service outsourcing, that this is quite unique to what we are
addressing in the set of challenges in front of us for ADS-B. I
anticipate we will have a much more detailed discussion on that
subject here later this month.
Mr. Hayes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I might ask unanimous consent to enter Mr. Mica's statement
into the record.
Mr. Costello. Without objection.
Mr. Hayes. One other request for Mr. Washington and the
FAA, would you just give the Committee the aviation side, a one
pager with a proposal going forward? Okay, this is what we have
learned, and this is how we are going to apply it successfully
to help ADS-B and have people understand there are more
opportunities than there are challenges. We are going to be
different in the way we do this.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now
recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Kagen.
Mr. Kagen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
It is a pleasure for me to be here and nearly represent
Oshkosh, Wisconsin. It is just out of my range, but my dear
colleague, Tim Petri, represents them very well.
I just have a few questions. Which one of the three of you
are responsible for overseeing this privatization effort and
privatization contract with Lockheed Martin?
Mr. Staples. Mr. Congressman, I am responsible for that as
the Director of Flight Services Program Operations.
Mr. Kagen. Very good. So you are responsible for examining
not just the contract but its execution?
Mr. Staples. That is correct.
Mr. Kagen. Okay. In the report offered by Mr. Scovel, in
the exhibit which I have here, there are test scores,
measurements of how the contractor is doing. If I read it
correctly, 13 out of 20 measurements have the score of failed.
How are they really doing if they failed in 13 out of 20
and what are the 3 most critical failures that you would
identify that would be important for this Congress to
understand with regard to the traveling public's safety and
also the aircraft owners? What are the three greatest failures
that have occurred so far?
Mr. Staples. As the Director of Flight Services Program
Operations, my focus has always and will continue to be on
safety. So anytime we are failing, the operational error, the
operational deviation kind of Acceptable Performance Level,
then that is something that we need to focus on first.
I understand that long wait times are inconvenient and they
have an economic impact, but the safety ramifications for
errors in the system is of the greatest concern.
Now I have to say that Lockheed Martin has been operating
the system for seven fiscal quarters now, and for the first
sixteen months they did extremely well. Most of those
Acceptable Performance Levels, I believe, they only failed
three in the first quarter of this past year.
It wasn't until the transition to the FS21 system and the
aggressive nature of that where they really started
encountering many more problems than we had expected. We knew
that there were going to be some difficulties with the
workaround, but this far exceeded what we expected to happen.
I guess I provided you the answer with the first two. I
guess I am not sure I can answer the third one off the top of
my head, but there are some.
Anything that is associated with safety and their safety
evaluations, in particular, are done by our FAA safety
oversight organization which is independent from my
organization.
The quality of briefings that the pilots receive, that is
measured by my office which is listed on the sheet that you
showed as Acceptable Performance Level 2A. That is the most
heavily weighted aspect of the performance measures. They are
not all equal.
So after the safety evaluations, I would say the facility
evaluations and our evaluations of the pilot briefing.
Mr. Kagen. Let me ask you about one issue I take rather
personally. I can recall when I was flying into an airport in
my district and, when we came in, suddenly there was a
construction truck pulling across the runway. We did a Sky King
maneuver and avoided impact, but airport managers reported that
they couldn't file notices to airmen to alert pilots about
runway closures or lighting outages.
What, specifically, has taken place by you or Lockheed
Martin to correct this?
Mr. Staples. The processing of aeronautical information,
specifically notices to airmen that you talk about, has been a
problem for several weeks now. This, although it is not
specifically measured by the metrics, falls into one of the
areas of where we had to change and make more aggressive our
kind of oversight.
This is an area where we had to specifically contact
Lockheed Martin and ask for a corrective action plan in this
area because of the communication, we believe it is
communications internal to the Lockheed Martin system and the
way that they were handling those communications that created
the initial NOTAM problem.
In the last three or four weeks, we have been getting
reports of improvements in that area. So I think what they have
done in terms of some of the technological routing of their
calls, which was the primary thing that they did, and also
establishing a process for talking to the FAA as one of the
primary sources of getting this aeronautical information to the
system by the air traffic control.
Mr. Kagen. You are working hard to improve communications.
Mr. Staples. We are, absolutely.
Mr. Kagen. I realize my time has expired, but if I may ask
the Chairman just if I could inquire because I haven't read the
contract. Are there any economic or punitive damages that take
places in this contract if they don't execute it properly?
Does it cost them money? Do we get any taxpayer money back?
Mr. Staples. Yes, we absolutely do. The first seven
quarters, we have assessed them what we call credits which is
financial penalty, something over the order of $12 million.
Mr. Kagen. Thank you very much and I yield back my time.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes
gentlelady from California, Ms. Richardson.
Ms. Richardson. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My questions are actually going pretty much on the line of
my colleague who just started here. When you say--excuse me,
sir, Mr. Staples, over here.
When you say, $12 million in credits, when I look at a
contract that was supposed to achieve savings of $1.7 billion,
$12 million really doesn't sound like a lot of money. I think
this Committee probably would be appropriate to know in line
what percentage of those credits are in line of what is
actually being paid because my guess would be that is a pretty
low percentage.
A couple questions in addition to that that I would have:
Originally with this contract, how many contractors responded
and how close were they in terms of the bid? Was it a decision
of expense? Was it a decision of capabilities? What was that
decision?
Mr. Staples. Congresswoman Richardson, I would like to
answer the second half of that first. I can't. I don't really
have any knowledge.
There were five bidders--one of them was the Government--
for this service. I wasn't part of that, so I can't really
answer that question. I will have to answer that for the
record, I believe.
In regards to your first point, the Acceptable Performance
Levels and the metrics and the financial penalties associated
with that are a percentage of the target profit that Lockheed
Martin has on this contract. For example, if they had 10
percent of the contract value for a year was their target
profit, the Acceptable Performance Levels are taken against
that amount.
I think that might put it in context in terms of your
question. At least, I hope so.
Ms. Richardson. Well, I think it would be appropriate, if
the Chairman would allow, that you would provide this Committee
with what those details are.
I would venture to say that it shouldn't be based upon
profit. It should be based upon the work that was performed
which based on the testimony and the reports that we have, that
was inadequate.
My next question is Lockheed Martin was entitled, in turn,
to earn $10 million annually in terms of bonuses. Were those
provided last year and also is it projected to be supplied this
year?
Mr. Staples. Ten million dollars is the maximum amount that
they can earn in any year for exceeding performance levels. Of
that $10 million, in their first year of operation where
reportedly they received a B plus from the user community in
terms of their operation, they were awarded $6 million in
awards.
That amount for the fiscal year 2007 won't be calculated
until next March, and that is directly related to the
Acceptable Performance Levels that they exceed and those which
they fail.
Ms. Richardson. So you mean to tell me that based upon the
reports that we have in addition to the amount that Lockheed
Martin was paid for the contract, they received an additional
bonus of $6 million?
Mr. Staples. That is correct.
Ms. Richardson. Have you been required to provide
additional oversight based upon some of the problems that have
occurred with this contract?
Mr. Staples. We have absolutely had to change our
oversight. The concept of putting measures in place and
monitoring those and taking action as a result of those
failures, inadequate in some areas, are an operational kind of
situation. This included not only system development but
operation of the system, and we had to have some management
indicators that are much more real time.
Ms. Richardson. Has that been billed back to the
contractor?
Mr. Staples. I am sorry?
Ms. Richardson. Have those expenses been billed back to the
contractor?
Mr. Staples. This is really a redirection of my workforce
and has minimal financial impact, but no. The answer to your
question is no, we have not billed them for that. We do that
internally.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and
recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess my question really would probably be best directed
to our friends at FAA. How many outages of service occurred in
2005 while FAA managed the flight service stations and did the
Government keep records on that. If so, how do these outages
compare to those experienced by Lockheed Martin?
Mr. Staples. I actually don't have the information for
2005. We would like to take that for the record if we could.
Mr. Dent. If you would be kind enough to provide that
information to the Committee, it would appreciated.
I yield back.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes
the distinguished Chairman of the Full Committee, Chairman
Oberstar.
Mr. Oberstar. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Petri,
for joining together to hold this hearing. It has been a long
time in the coming.
We have waited patiently while FAA moved ahead with the
privatization scheme, get an opportunity to put it in place and
see what the effect is, all the while being besieged by the
general aviation community about the problems with the startup.
Of course, they were holdover problems from the previous system
that was not operating well.
The stories that we have heard of pilots being put on waits
for as long as 15 minutes, in some cases, longer and then
hanging up, flying without the weather information, not getting
NOTAMs, not being to get route of flight briefings and filing
their flight plans and then finding that they were lost or they
weren't received or they were improperly entered. There are all
sorts of these problems that you can expect with a startup but
not in aviation, not when service is so crucial.
I remember the era of consolidation from the hundreds, 330
or so flight service stations. That was, if you can believe it,
an era before Phil Boyer. It is hard for many to believe there
was a general aviation before Phil Boyer, but there was, even
before Monte Belger came to his ascendence within the FAA.
There was just calamity through the general aviation
community. Oh, my God, this is going to be terrible. It is not
going to work. We will be up there in the sky, and we won't get
the information.
In fact, I won't mention his name but a pilot with whom I
flew as a contract service, said, this is just going to be
terrible in Minnesota, and I am going to show you. We are
flying from Ely to Duluth, and a line of thunderstorms is out
there on the horizon.
He kept flying toward it and saying, now when this new
system goes in and I call for information about that weather
system out there and I don't get it, we are going to be in the
soup and I am going to show you.
I said, Eddie, cut the BS out. Turn the God damn plane
around and miss that storm.
Now, just as Mr. Larsen pointed out a little while ago,
there are many places in the Country and northern Minnesota
being one of them, Washington being another, where there are
unique local weather systems that the local observers
understood, and they were very good at warning pilots. They
didn't have the fast-moving technology and the equipment that
they needed to stay on top, stay ahead of fast-moving weather
systems, but they knew the locality and they gave people right
information.
If you are up in Washington and you call in--and that was
the fear early on in this conversion to automated flight
service stations--and you get somebody from Phoenix, they don't
know what the weather is in Washington and you get bad
information. So that transition was long and painful.
But in its early stage, the consolidation, in Minnesota, I
went from Minnesota to, oh, at least a dozen other States as
the Chair then of the Aviation Subcommittee and found pretty
much the same thing. It was like the neutron bomb had gone off.
The facility was built. The equipment was installed, but there
were no people.
Eventually, we got the people trained. Air traffic
controllers, weather specialists put in place, and then the
equipment was outdated. The FAA simply wasn't making the
investment, wasn't making the budget requests. They weren't
keeping up with what needed to be done to keep those facilities
at the cutting edge of state of the art.
I plugged in at several places and listened to controllers.
A DC-10 overhead, calling in, asking for weather information
and the poor, harried controller saying, look, I don't have
time to deal with you. Call in to the en route center. Here is
their number. Get the information. I am overloaded here--and
they were.
But at the start of this new contract system, you had 2,200
controllers. They went down to 850, and Lockheed says they need
to grow to 1,100.
I want to get back. Mr. Scovel and Mr. Washington. What
were the specific assumptions upon which FAA based its decision
to privatize?
The next question, you know, is going to be have they met
those assumptions?
Mr. Washington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is a
pleasure to see you again. I recall the remarks that you shared
with our ATO leadership summit here in town recently, and a lot
of the discussion there was associated with improvements that
are needed in the system which we all care about very much.
I would suggest that this was an outsourcing action which
is distinct from privatization in one very significant way,
which is that the FAA and the Federal Government continue to
have the ultimate responsibility to ensure that the quality of
service is what the customers expect.
We have not turned this over lock, stock and barrel to a
private entity to own, operate and run on their own. This is
very clearly an oversight responsibility the FAA continues to
have, and so we take that responsibility very seriously.
As you indicated a moment ago, Mr. Belger and Mr. Boyer are
two of the folks who have had a significant part in addressing
the multiple concerns as we stepped into this plan for an
outsourcing award, and so the competition resulted in the FAA
making a best value determination.
That is to say the proposal which we received from Lockheed
Martin and which the FAA accepted resulted in the best
combination of a technical concept to provide services as
distinct from FAA continuing to own and operate the system in
addition to the total cost of providing that service over and
over again.
Mr. Oberstar. It was cost and service, but the cost part of
it was driven by the budget reality that OMB wasn't giving FAA
the funds it needed, or DOT, or FAA wasn't asking for the funds
that they needed to upgrade the technology of the automated
system, isn't that correct?
Mr. Washington. That is absolutely correct, Mr. Chairman.
That is a significant factor that contributed to a feasibility
decision which the FAA Administrator reached.
I would suggest there was another significant factor which
is that in addition to our inability to keep modern technology
and tools available for specialists to use, that we were simply
unable to make fast enough changes in terms of the service
improvements. So the service improvements that we anticipate
achieving as a result of this contract, ultimately for the
users of the system, will really be the greatest value as a
result of that contract award.
The FAA allowed for a three year transition period from the
time of contract award to achieving the end state configuration
of Lockheed Martin's new system. What Lockheed has done is to
accelerate their schedule with the hopes of delivering improved
services to the users more quickly than that three year
schedule.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Scovel, do you agree with that
assessment?
Mr. Scovel. Somewhat, sir, if I can address this perhaps
from a different angle.
You asked about assumptions. Rather than addressing the
political reality that perhaps drove the decision, which I
fully acknowledge is beyond my purview, looking rather at the
operational assumptions, I think first of those would have been
the need for a new operating system, FS21, in this case, which
it was further assumed if implemented on a national basis would
permit consolidation and eliminate the need and expense for
many of the local facilities that you mentioned earlier.
The second operational assumption would be sufficient
staffing, properly trained, to take full advantage of that
operating system and provide the desired level of service to
the user.
I think experience has shown us that there have been gaps,
deficiencies in both of those assumptions over the last two
years.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Washington, you are right. I wrote in my
notes, decision to privatize by outsourcing. The saving grace
is that FAA does hold ultimate responsibility.
What I want to know now is has Lockheed Martin made the
investments in technology, in the equipment to upgrade the
service from what FAA had in place previously?
Secondly, then, what authority do you have over Lockheed
Martin to prod them to keep upgrading, to keep investing if
that is the principle of outsourcing?
Mr. Washington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Yes, Lockheed has been quite responsive to our concerns
that we have identified, in many cases, in advance of
operational issues showing up. We have conducted executive
level conversations on a frequent basis in addition to sending
formal contract communications to Lockheed that require them to
identify corrective actions, and indeed they have been
responsive in each of those cases.
We are in constant dialogue, and there is a continuous
process that involves the partnership that FAA and Lockheed
have for ensuring this quality of service factor is actually
delivered.
Now, yes, there have been gaps as Mr. Scovel and others
have identified, and we acknowledge that the operational
impacts exceeded what we expected to occur during the actual
transition period that began last spring. We redoubled our
efforts in the oversight responsibility that Mr. Staples leads
for the FAA, and we believe we have been more timely as a
result of doubling those efforts and specific oversight steps.
Lockheed has been responsive by making specific technology
corrections in addition to procedural steps which I believe
they are prepared to discuss in more detail later this morning.
Mr. Oberstar. Lockheed says that they have handled some six
million calls in their testimony later on. That is about what
the AFSS were doing in 2005 and 2006. What are the savings?
On the savings side of this outsourcing, how much do you
attribute to cost savings to FAA in equipment acquisition and
how much in cost savings on personnel not having these people
on the public payroll?
Mr. Staples. Mr. Chairman, I can answer that specifically
for you for the record, but in general I would like to say that
the vast majority of savings associated with this contract are
the cost avoidance associated with staffing reductions. My
guess is approximately $150 million of that savings would be
associated with capital investment that we didn't have to make,
that we were in the process of making.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Scovel, have you validated these cost
savings on equipment side and on personnel side?
Mr. Scovel. I don't believe my staff has, sir. I would need
to check with them in order to get back with you on the record.
Mr. Oberstar. I would ask you to do that, to provide that
information for the Committee. I think it is very important for
our understanding.
FAA, as you observed in your opening remarks, is an
operating agency and one of relatively few that we have in the
Federal Government. There are many other opportunities for
outsourcing that would trouble me and to which I would take
great objection.
Unfortunately, I have to say that over a long period of
time, the flight service activity has been sort of a stepchild
of the Agency. It has not been given the status and the
standing that it deserves. We have the most robust general
aviation system in the world.
There are some scattered ones elsewhere. China, with its
great opportunity for growth and growth in commercial aviation
that it is now experiencing, still has not developed a general
aviation concept.
In fact, there is a great story. As far as a great story, I
don't know. It is an astonishing story of a flight attendant
for a Chinese airline company--I don't need to mention which
one--who worked 20 years, saved her money and then retired.
Stayed in the U.S. Went to flight training school. Got her
pilot's certificate. Bought an aircraft. Bought a single engine
general aviation aircraft. I won't say which company.
Crated it up and shipped it to China where it still remains
in a crate because she can't get permission to fly because the
flight service management, their equivalent of FAA, is run by
the military and they don't know what to do with general
aviation. Even though it is a very different regime than
Europe, they don't have a fraction of the GA operations we have
in the United States.
So we are going to watch this very, very carefully.
Our newest Member suggested having a report by FAA to the
Congress. We will hold hearings every three months if we have
to and have you come back and personally report to us to
monitor the progress, but we are going to stay on top of this
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks Chairman Oberstar and let me
thank our witnesses from the first panel today.
Let me say to Mr. Scovel, Mr. Washington and Mr. Staples
that we intend to aggressively provide oversight to the Agency
and to make certain that you are providing oversight over the
contract with Lockheed Martin.
I can assure you that we intend to follow up with
additional hearings concerning this contract to make certain
that Lockheed is performing as they should and that the Agency
is enforcing the contract and when there are incidents where
they are not performing, that we in fact penalize Lockheed and
do as you have done in assessing over $12 million in penalties
or whatever the term is you call it.
We thank you, and at this time we would dismiss the first
panel and ask the second panel to come forward. As you are
coming forward, I will introduce the witnesses on the second
panel.
Mr. Phil Boyer who is the President of the Aircraft Owners
and Pilots Association, who has testified before this
Subcommittee many times; Mr. Matt Zuccaro who is the President
of the Helicopter Association International; Mr. Joseph
Cipriano, the President of Lockheed Martin Business Process
Solutions; and Mr. Monte Belger who is the Vice President of
Transportation Systems Solutions for Lockheed Martin Air
Traffic Management.
With that, gentlemen, as you are coming forward and taking
your chairs, as you get ready to testify, let me say that your
entire statement will be included in the record. We would ask
you to summarize your statement in five minutes.
With that, the Chair recognizes, for five minutes, Mr.
Boyer.
TESTIMONY OF PHIL BOYER, PRESIDENT, AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOTS
ASSOCIATION; MATT ZUCCARO, PRESIDENT, HELICOPTER ASSOCIATION
INTERNATIONAL; JOSEPH R. CIPRIANO, PRESIDENT, LOCKHEED MARTIN
BUSINESS PROCESS SOLUTIONS; MONTE R. BELGER, VICE PRESIDENT OF
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS SOLUTIONS, LOCKHEED MARTIN AIR TRAFFIC
MANAGEMENT
Mr. Boyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My gosh, Chairman Oberstar, I can't imagine a Country
without general aviation. Who would the airlines have to blame
for not paying their fair share, clogging the system,
congesting the major airports and everything else? They need
general aviation over there.
I am here to talk about what you mentioned as a matter of
fact, the flight service system changes that were needed. We
feel it was the right thing to do and the right time to do it.
We had a very antiquated system, as you said, and while I
wasn't in the seat at AOPA when we consolidated from 317
stations to 61, I was a pilot then.
Prior to the change of the decade, we produced the largest
book we have ever put together, and it is called AOPA's Roadmap
to Flight Information Services for the Future. We never showed
it to anyone other than the Inspector General of the DOT, and
we are waiting to figure out. Here is a service that is
primarily used by general aviation.
As a matter of fact, the consultant we used for the book
wrote this quote: ``Never before has AOPA or any organization
undertaken a study such as this.''
We came up with seven different scenarios on how flight
service may be modernized for the future. We live in a world of
the Weather Channel, radar in the airplane, all kinds of
changes, and were still well aware we had an antiquated system
with years and years of trying to upgrade it.
Well, along came this process called the A76, and that is
what created a catalyst for us to turn to this book and say we
should support this, once again, not privatization, the
outsourcing. We started educating our members long before the
FAA even put out bids for contracts, saying, look, it is time.
We have to change. We tried this within Government. It isn't
working.
Lockheed Martin was selected for this process. You know
what? Our role changed. Our role changed from supporter to
watchdog.
Yes, we supported Lockheed Martin. It is a company with a
proven air traffic record. They run oceanic services. This is
kindergarten compared to what we face in ADS-B and other things
which are graduate school.
We gave them all the feedback we had gotten over the last
few years, this book and others, in terms of what could be done
with the system, and we emphasized from the first meeting on
local knowledge was going to be the key. Yes, you could
consolidate down, but you still have to take care of those
unique weather patterns.
Well, the transition began. You know what? I have to
compliment them. They took over an existing system, and we got
through Katrina better than we would have under the old system,
but the transition really began in April when they started
switching over to their own new equipment.
It was probably too aggressive on consolidation, but I will
let them speak to that. Too aggressive, I know from the users
of the system.
There is a promised web portal coming where you can go and
get information. We are still waiting on that. I got a, thank
goodness--and you do remember back to here, Mr. Chairman--
DUATs, the Direct Users Access Terminal where you can brief by
computer. The DUATs numbers have soared because people had
problems with the flight service station system.
Well, FAA oversight, that is what we have been talking
about today. FAA announced the contract. Well, we are done with
flight service now. We don't have to worry about it any
longer--and literally walked away.
I applaud you for this because finally we are beginning to
see them coming back. I will never forget a call on Sunday
after your letter to Marion Blakey about this. Phil, what is
going on here? Why haven't you called me sooner on this?
Marion, we have been telling your people including your
deputy for weeks, there is a problem.
Well, you are just doing this to posture because the FAA
financing bill.
I said, I am not. My members hate this. Over 400,000
members, and you know what? They are mad as hell at me for
supporting this change and then getting them into the system
they are today.
Don't believe me. These are quotes from 10 days ago on the
screen right now. If you see, these are members. They are in
your district, Congressman Larsen, at least I know for the
Arlington Show and others.
These are 10 day old quotes: I cannot trust the briefers.
They don't have the background or aviation knowledge that we
need. FSS briefing is a thing of the past.
A recent AOPA survey, we just did this about 10 days ago,
of the customer. Is the customer the FAA or is the customer the
pilots for Lockheed Martin?
In a brief survey of the customers, 64 percent were
satisfied or very satisfied with the service. Gee, in the IG
statement, they show 84 percent as an acceptable level of
performance, and yet they have not done that yet because they
are still putting together the survey.
Under FAA standards, if you were to take a written test at
the FAA, 70 percent is a passing grade. Below that is failure.
Where do we go now? Well, you have heard from the FAA.
I believe they should give you maybe not a hearing every 90
days but at least a report to this Committee and remember the
words, Chairman Oberstar, equal or better. We heard those in
the eighties as the transition went. Until we get equal or
better service because if we keep getting less service,
eventually there will be no flight service.
The FAA must demonstrate stricter oversight. Let's look at
these performance metrics. You set those in cement early. Are
they the right ones? Are these 21 the right ones and shouldn't
we relook at those? Let's seek more aggressive feedback from
our pilot community.
Where do we go now with Lockheed Martin? Well, continued
service improvements, briefer local area knowledge, you have
heard it here. That has to be improved. Measure the quality of
the briefing, not just the phone metrics, not how fast the
phone is answered. You could wait five, ten minutes if you want
a briefer from Minnesota or you can wait twenty seconds so they
make the metric and get anyone, anywhere.
Fulfill the promise of this web portal that they put out
there and let's get more pertinent information on their own web
site right now, not just the successes they have had.
We are a part of this. We were a part of making it happen.
We weren't a part of selecting Lockheed Martin or a part of the
A76 process, but you know we are a part of this. We tried to
educate ahead of time. We tried to keep our head up high during
this process.
Next month, in 500,000 copies of our magazine will go a
card that indicates to pilots how to brief under the new
system. There are changes. Congressman, there is a number your
pilots can punch in instead of speaking the word, Washington,
but they don't have the information. So that will be here.
We have an online course at significant expense. It is in
the works now. It will be up and ready at the end of the year,
20 minutes online web, how to brief under the new flight
service station system.
We have been sharing and will continue to share our pilot
surveys with Lockheed Martin and the FAA, but we will keep
wearing our hard hats until ``equal or better'' service is
really put out there.
Thank you.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Boyer.
At this time, the Chair recognizes Mr. Zuccaro.
Mr. Zuccaro. Good morning, Chairman Costello, Congressman
Petri, Chairman Oberstar and the rest of the Members of the
Committee.
My name is Matt Zuccaro, and I am President of the
Helicopter Association International. We are a professional
trade association whose members operate over 5,500 helicopters
flying in excess of 2.3 million flight hours each year across a
wide spectrum of uses.
Obviously, we are here this morning to discuss the FAA
transition to the contractor-operated flight service stations
and hopefully to draw valuable lessons to be applied to similar
FAA initiatives such as the recently awarded Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast or ADS-B contract.
As Members of this Committee are aware, helicopters play a
critical role in the Gulf of Mexico energy exploration and
production process, transporting supplies and employees to and
from over 5,000 oil platforms within an area that extends 500
miles along the Gulf shoreline and 200 miles out over the
water.
The helicopter activity and operational complexity of these
operations is comparative to some of the most congested
airspace in the Country. Each year, nearly three million
passengers are transported and over 4,000 flight hours are
flown by helicopters. Each day, an average of 650 plus
helicopters conduct over 5,000 flights, transporting
approximately 10,000 passengers at altitudes normally below
5,000 feet.
Currently, within this operating environment, the FAA air
traffic control system cannot see and cannot communicate with
the helicopters operating in the offshore environment.
Accordingly, with ever changing weather that occurs in the Gulf
area and the critical nature of the mission, reliable, timely
and accurate communications with the flight service stations
are critical to flight safety and operational efficiency.
Earlier this year, helicopter traffic in the Gulf Region
was negatively impacted when transition to contractor-operated
flight service stations resulted in the closure of several
flight service stations in the Gulf Region. The flight service
contractor, apparently unfamiliar with the unique aspects of
the offshore environment, underestimated the negative impact
that these closures would have on our industry.
As a result, helicopter pilots immediately experienced
delays of 30 to 45 minutes when filing flight plans, resulting
in excessive hold times. Furthermore, even when the flight
plans were filed, they were lost by the contractor or missing
when the pilot made a call for the clearance.
The contractor personnel manning the flight service
operation centers were unfamiliar with the particular flight
protocols for the Gulf of Mexico and appeared to lack knowledge
of the special instrument flight bridge structure for the
helicopter flight plans in the Gulf. In some instances, the
operators were connected with flight service personnel located
thousands of miles away from the local area.
The situation resulted in significant delays, loss of
operational efficiency and a potential negative safety of
flight impact, especially when one considers how this situation
could have affected thousands of offshore workers on the rigs
had the 2007 hurricane season brought forth a major storm to
the area.
To accomplish the mission that the helicopter pilots are
tasked with each day, it is essential that seamless and
uninterrupted service be provided by the vendor. Flight delays
and cancellations cost the energy industry lost production and
millions of dollars. Simply stated, the Gulf of Mexico is
indeed unique and requires special procedures along with
dedicated and knowledgeable personnel staffing the flight
service stations.
Unfortunately, during the transition to the contractor-
operated flight service stations, tremendous FAA institutional
knowledge regarding helicopter operations in the Gulf of Mexico
was lost, and the plea of our members fell on deaf ears.
Only after direct intervention by the FAA senior management
and Members of this Committee did Lockheed Martin sit down with
our industry in Houston to address the concerns, develop
procedures and processes to meet the needs of the members,
familiarize themselves with the operations in the Gulf and,
most importantly, to ensure safety of operations from the
Panhandle of Florida down to Corpus Christi, Texas.
I am happy to inform the Committee of the positive results
of that meeting. Local Gulf of Mexico operating procedures have
indeed now been written and a dedicated direct phone line with
calls restricted to Gulf of Mexico operators has been
established by Lockheed Martin. It eased the operator and pilot
difficulties when contacting the flight service station.
Additionally, the personnel staffing the flight service station
now appear to be more knowledgeable of the local operations and
requirements and the environmental protocols within the Gulf of
Mexico.
Our concerns are now focused on the recently awarded ADS-B
contract which is similar in scope and concept to the flight
service program. As part of the NextGen initiative, ADS-B will
usher in a new system that will dramatically change how air
traffic is controlled.
Under the ADS-B initiative, the prime contractor, ITT, not
the FAA, will build the ADS-B ground stations, own and operate
the equipment with the FAA paying a subscription charge for the
broadcast service transmitted to the properly equipped aircraft
and air traffic control facilities.
As many on the Committee know, HAI has partnered with the
FAA in the form of a memorandum of agreement to facilitate
Phase I implementation of the national ADS-B initiative in the
Gulf of Mexico which also includes low altitude weather and
communications capabilities. The helicopter industry has made a
significant commitment to assist the FAA with Phase I by
providing in kind services valued in excess of $100 million
over the life of the project.
To date, the approach of the FAA's taking and laying out
this program with ADS-B Phase I, we consider to be
unprecedented. The Agency is, in fact, listening and working
closely with the helicopter industry as this initiative moves
forward.
Now that the vendor for the ADS-B project has been
selected, we look forward to working with them on a most
exciting endeavor. I sincerely hope that as we move forward
with ADS-B and the serious work gets underway that I will not
have to return to your doorstep, seeking assistance again. I am
optimistic that initiatives such as this hearing will avert
such a situation with regard to the implementation of ADS-B
technology, the first phase of the NextGen system.
I thank you for providing me the opportunity to speak with
you this morning.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Zuccaro, and the
Chair now recognizes Mr. Cipriano.
Mr. Cipriano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Costello,
Ranking Member Petri, Members of the Committee, my name is Joe
Cipriano. I am President of Lockheed Martin Business Process
Solutions. I am joined by my colleague, Monte Belger, Vice
President of Lockheed Martin Transportation Security Solutions.
Monte represents the technology elements of our AFSS
program, and I represent the business, process and people
elements of the program. We both thank you for the opportunity
to share the progress we have achieved in this unprecedented
competitively-sourced program.
Flight services are intended to help promote safe flight
operations, and safety is our highest priority. Many general
aviation pilots rely on the knowledge and skills of flight
service personnel. These personnel provide pilots with
information such as pre-and in-flight weather briefings, flight
planning assistance and aeronautical notices. They can also
provide in-flight support to pilots who are lost or in need of
assistance.
In February of 2005, the FAA awarded Lockheed Martin the
contract to consolidate 58 legacy sites in the continental
United States, Puerto Rico and Hawaii into 18 upgraded
automated flight service stations with estimated savings to the
taxpayers of $2.2 billion over 13 years.
In October of 2005, Lockheed Martin took over the operation
of the existing flight service stations and began the process
of modernizing the facilities and equipment, relocating over
400 flight specialists, training over 1,000 flight specialists
and introducing new services to the pilot community.
Since February of this year. Lockheed Martin flight
services has provided six million flight services. We have
handled approximately 80,000 preflight calls per day with wait
times averaging less than 45 seconds. In-flight calls have
virtually no wait time.
During the early phases of transition, we experienced
unacceptable service problems. These problems resulted in call
waiting times that were too long and flight plans that
sometimes became lost in the automated system. We also received
an unacceptable number of complaints that flight service
personnel were not sufficiently familiar with local areas they
were briefing.
We have given high priority to addressing these issues and
have seen the results in improved services. Pilot complaints
have decreased to less than one tenth of 1 percent. Each
complaint is carefully analyzed and the pilot filing the
complaint contacted within 72 hours. Problems are addressed
through equipment upgrades, procedures changes and training.
I would like to now briefly share some of the lessons
learned over the course of this transition.
First, a baseline review of legacy system documentation
should be accomplished prior to establishing program schedules.
A significant early challenge we faced was acquiring
documentation for interfaces with the national airspace.
Documentation was inadequate to support systems engineering
efforts and ultimately had to be developed by the program team.
The team's time spent to complete this work decreased the
time available for systems transition and shifted the
transition period into a time of high demand for flight
services.
Second was overstaffing during transition. In spite of
making job offers to all the legacy FAA flight specialists
including incentives, our initial workforce was significantly
smaller than expected. The lower than expected number of
trained legacy staff proved insufficient to support transition
during a high workload period.
Ultimately, adjustments to the transition schedule,
accelerated hiring and rehiring retirees allowed staffing to
catch up with the workload. We learned that overstaffing during
major transitions is a good investment.
Third, regularly communicate with all stakeholders and
assure that effective outreach programs are in place to capture
local area knowledge. The universe of interested people is
large, and we need to set appropriate expectations with each
group as well as keep everyone advised of progress.
In response to what we have learned during transition, we
have made improvements to respond to local requirements. For
example, we have created dedicated phone service for pilots
flying within the Washington, D.C. restricted flight area, Gulf
of Mexico helicopter pilots and medical emergency flights. In
short, we learned to architect nationally but to implement
locally.
Fourth, the FAA and Lockheed Martin must work together in
partnership. Integrating the nationally-architected FS21 system
with a regional legacy system flushed out a number of issues.
To address concerns as they arise, we have now established
weekly joint operations review meetings to ensure a smooth
working interface between Lockheed Martin's services and FAA
air traffic operations.
In conclusion, today the transition is nearing complete,
but we are not slowing down improvements in process, training
or technology. We continually work with the FAA and
stakeholders to improve services to general aviation pilots,
and we will apply best practices from lessons learned.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today, and
we are pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Costello. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Belger.
Let me announce to everyone that we have four votes pending
on the floor of the House. We have about five minutes. So we
will hear Mr. Belger's testimony, recess and come back after
the last vote which I would expect we would ask everyone to be
back around 12:30.
Mr. Belger. Thank you, sir. I have no additional statement.
Mr. Costello. Well, the Chair then would take a few minutes
to ask a few questions at this time.
Mr. Boyer, you state in your written testimony that the FAA
should have focused more on a qualitative performance
assessment as opposed to the metrics system that they used. I
wonder if you might elaborate more on that.
Mr. Boyer. Well, I think you can work hard to use a call
director and the metrics that come off of abandon rate, time to
answer, et cetera. But, once again, what is the quality of the
briefing?
The best way you are going to find that out is by talking
to customers of the service through some kind of satisfaction
rating and to listen to them and their arguments as you have
heard in your districts for members, I am sure, who are pilots.
We need to put some subjective evaluations to this besides just
the quantitative ones.
Mr. Costello. I am going to go to Mr. Cipriano at this
time.
We all have concerns, because of the experience with this
contract, about ADS-B. You heard that from Mr. Boyer, Mr.
Zuccaro, the Chairman of the Full Committee and many others.
You have talked about lessons learned in your written
testimony.
I wonder if you might tell us why Lockheed had such an
aggressive schedule in April of this year, moving forward with
the site consolidations schedule before you fully developed and
worked out all of the kinks and errors, to correct them, and
why you chose to undertake the task during the busiest time of
year, during the summer.
Mr. Cipriano. Yes, sir, I will try to answer that question.
Certainly, we would have rather not have done the transition
during the busiest flying time, but we had two things that were
driving.
One, there was a need. There were facility leases that the
FAA owned that were expiring on the 1st of October and
equipment leases as well. We needed to be able to get out of
those facilities and turn them back to the FAA. So we had that
deadline facing us.
Secondly, and this is probably the biggest issue, the
workforce that we had was attrited. The workforce, when we
acquired it, first of all, we started out with less people than
we would have liked to have had. Then as the schedule slipped,
the people had made plans to retire, to move on, to do other
things, and we were losing folks.
We could not operate the system with the number of people
we were having. The FS21 allowed us to operate the system with
half as many people. So the faster we could get to the FS21
system, the easier it would be to deal with this personnel
problem.
We were also hiring people and training them as quickly as
we could and took other measures to deal with the workforce
issue, but the problem was we had a diminishing workforce. The
best way to address that was with a system that took less
people.
Mr. Costello. A couple of other quick questions and I would
ask you to be brief in your answer.
On September 22nd, the system crashed. The FS21 system
crashed on September 22nd, and it went down for a four hour
period nationwide. I wonder if you could tell us the cause and,
number two, what is the backup system when a crash like this
happens.
Mr. Cipriano. Yes, we do have a backup system, AISR, which
is used, and we can do weather briefings and file flight plans
when the system is down.
September 22nd, I don't recall a crash of the system on
September 22nd.
Mr. Costello. You don't recall?
Mr. Belger. August 9th, we had a relatively significant
outage. We had a communication outage a couple weeks ago.
Mr. Cipriano. September 22nd doesn't ring a bell with me.
If it did occur, we can certainly give you for the record the
details.
Mr. Costello. I would ask you to submit that for the
record.
Also, you heard in my opening statement what took place
this past Sunday. Do you have any information to share with us
as to the cause of the lack of information on the part that the
pilots received?
Mr. Cipriano. Well, we don't have all the details yet. We
are reviewing the tapes of all of the pilots that we talked to.
The FAA has an investigation, as you know, underway. Regarding
the pilots, we are cooperating with the FAA.
At this point, we think we talked to four of the pilots at
least, and we are reviewing the tapes and the information. When
those details are known, I mean they will be known.
Mr. Costello. Last question before we have to break, Mr.
Cipriano, you talked about lessons learned. Tell us about what
you have learned and what you would do differently if you had
to do it over again.
Mr. Cipriano. I think the biggest thing we would do
differently if we were to do this over again would be to work
the people problem. In other words, try and expand the
workforce before we started the transition process, so we would
have a sufficient number of people to operate the existing
system while we were training for the new system. That caused a
great deal of our problems, the lack of trained workforce.
Mr. Costello. Let me say before we have to break here and
take a short recess, I said to the first panel and I will say
to you and I want Lockheed to know this. The FAA heard it, and
I want you to hear it.
This is not going to be the last hearing that we are going
to hold on this subject, and we want to make certain that
Lockheed performs to the best of its ability under the terms of
the contract and that the FAA is doing their job to enforce the
contract. We find the best way of making certain that those
things happen is to continue to hold people accountable, and
that is what we intend to do. That is the purpose of this
hearing, to learn information, find out what needs to be done
in order to provide the services that the users are entitled
to.
With that, the Chair will call a recess. When we return,
the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, or his designee will be
recognized to ask questions.
The Chair will recess until 12:30. We stand in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Larsen. [Presiding.] I will call the Committee back to
order. Where we left off was with questions from Mr. Petri.
Mr. Petri. Thank you very much.
Thank you all for your testimony. I had one really not
particularly formal question, just sort of an information
question for Mr. Boyer.
I am not a licensed pilot. I have, obviously, as everyone
else, a lot of friends who are.
People in our part of the world do a lot of sailing and do
all over the Country too. There are always wonderful aids now
that people buy, services on their BlackBerry or various other
types of arrangements, weather channels and so on and so forth.
I am just curious to know how all this fits in with that.
We have this Government system. People are required
evidently to check in and to get updates.
But in the real world, people have now a number of
different sources, and they probably often will check them, put
in their flight plan. There may even be services that will give
them, through some sort of weather channel or some other type
of source of information, peril information. Sometimes it will
agree. Sometimes it will be different but satellite-based and
other information.
Can you comment on all of that and if we maybe should be
looking at trying to take advantage of some of these open
source type things that exist or if it is not invented here and
not done by the Government, then it is not right or whatever?
Mr. Boyer. No. It is a very good comment, and I probably
glossed over it when I said times are changing. That is one of
the prime reasons we supported this and did our own study.
When we set up the existing antiquated flight service
station system in the eighties that the Chairman was mentioning
before, there weren't all those things there.
You just talked about some enhancements. There are now
boxes for $2,400. Put it on the plane or on your boat, and you
can see the radar picture. You can tell if you are going into
those storms that Chairman Oberstar was talking about.
I think it is one of the reasons that we shouldn't be too
alarmed about staff reductions to a certain level because in a
modern system you are not going to need all the same
explanations.
The portal that we asked that we finally get up and running
is going to allow the pilot to be looking at their computer
screen--we didn't have that back in the seventies with the
original system--and the briefer to be looking at the screen
and talking about the picture they are both seeing. So today's
system, what Lockheed has put in place and what we have
endorsed as far as an overall system is taking advantage of
those things.
Nothing, however, beats an official briefing sanctioned by
the FAA. Some of these things like the electronic system called
DUATs are official briefings, but watching the weather channel
does not give you that the President is going to be in
Emmitsburg on Sunday and that there will be a restricted piece
of airspace. So you do need that phone call, and you do need to
talk to a briefer on certain pieces of information.
Mr. Petri. But the underlying technology is basically the
same, the satellite system that everyone is plugging into. The
idea of having the requirement that people check with the FAA
or the now contracted out system is so to get specific
information for that flight and also to get a more professional
read on that weather information.
Mr. Boyer. I was looking at our survey earlier, and that is
exactly right. It is basically the same information. There are
some things in the flight service station system that really
only they have. Some of the NOTAMs, they are able to interpret
their gobbledygook to the average person who gets it on a
little PDA because a lot of it is encoded.
I was noticing that a lot of the use of the system is the
private pilot, the less sophisticated pilots. It is people
flying VFR. It is a large amount of student pilots. These are
the people who really need some assistance in getting a
briefing, and these certified briefers do provide that
assistance.
Mr. Petri. But we don't require this for people who are
piloting boats. I guess they are on their own, but people
piloting planes get this service from the Government.
Mr. Boyer. Well, I think piloting a plane gives you that
added dimension of you are not on the water, the same as you
are not driving a car. You can't pull off the side, pull up to
the shore and wait out a thunderstorm. You better darn well
know where you are, and you are obviously dealing with that
dimension which is extremely important.
Mr. Petri. Thank you.
I really would like to get the take from our panelists from
Lockheed Martin on the questions to the previous panel on the
personnel situation and your sense as to how it was handled and
what lessons were learned and what maybe improvements could be
made. There are a number of unhappy folks out there who don't
feel the system worked for them, and I wonder if you could
comment on that.
Mr. Cipriano. I know there are some folks that feel like
they may have been impacted. All I can do is answer for what we
did.
What we did was match the benefit program and match the
401(k) program that the Government had for their employees, and
we offered that package to 100 percent of those people that
were impacted by the outsourcing. We also offered relocation
packages. We offered employment bonuses, retention bonuses, all
sorts of things to try to make that transition to the private
sector as easy as possible.
I can't talk to what the Government did or didn't do
relative to the Government retirement piece of it.
Mr. Petri. Finally, and I suspect Mr. Larsen will want to
add something, could you comment on what you are doing--I guess
it is a training curve for many of your people with fewer
centers and with new personnel in many cases--about the local
knowledge question and interpreting the data to be most useful
and relative for pilots in different parts of the Country?
Mr. Cipriano. Correct. To the extent that local knowledge
was documented in a notebook or something, we captured that
during our due diligence phase and made that information
available on the computer to people that are briefing that
particular area.
But a lot of the local knowledge is in the heads of the
briefers, and that is why we offered jobs to them and we tried
to capture those people. Even though they might be briefing
helicopters in the Gulf from Dallas-Fort Worth, they are people
that we hired from Louisiana that were doing that same thing,
that same job.
Now we lost some of them because some of them didn't want
to move to Dallas-Fort Worth or were ready to retire and so
forth. So there was a decrease in the number of those folks
that resulted in some of the problems we saw in the reduction
in local knowledge. But we captured that knowledge, and we
incorporated it in training courses.
We certify our specialists to be specialists in a
particular local, area of operation, and we incentivize them to
get certified. They have to be certified in at least one area,
and we give them incentives to be certified in multiple areas
with increased pay.
Mr. Petri. One last question, I am kind of curious on this.
If it is working off of a common platform, and I know my travel
agent works from home and interacts. Is there a reason why
people have to be in a particular center if they have access to
all the same knowledge?
Then you can have call forwarding and do all kinds of
things. Maybe you could have kept some of these people by
letting them do this sort of thing.
Mr. Cipriano. That is why we kept open the 20 locations
instead of closing down to 1 or 2 because from a technical
standpoint, you could have supported all the operations out of
1 large place. And so, we picked the places that we retained
open in order to retain as many people as possible at the
locations that had large numbers of people and that were in
areas where people like to live where it was easy to recruit,
good cost of living and so forth.
But you are right, it could have been done. We could have
done this and not closed any of the stations and retained all
those people, but the costs would have been higher. We were in
competition for a solution, and the solution we came up with,
we believe, was the right compromise between all the different
factors involved.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Unless another Member shows up, this will be the last set
of questions unless Mr. Petri would like to do some follow-up.
With regard to some staffing issues, I am assuming still
your desire and your stated goal is to get to about 1,000
staff, and you are at about 850 or so. Is that about right?
Mr. Cipriano. We are actually at 912 right now, and we have
another 60 or so in training. So we are well on the way to get
to 1,000, but we are not staffing to a number. We are staffing
to performance, and so we will add staff as necessary the meet
those performance measures.
Mr. Larsen. This then gets to another set of questions.
With the transition over the last couple of years, you
mentioned there were some folks who were close to retirement or
at retirement, so they took retirement.
Do you have demographics on your current workforce then to
indicate how many folks do you anticipate might be leaving
within the life of the first five years of the contract and
what is your plan to do further recruitment to replace those
folks?
Mr. Cipriano. We expect that we are going to continue to
have significant attrition over the next several years because
although we have added people.
Mr. Larsen. How would you define significant attrition?
Mr. Cipriano. I would say greater than 15 percent a year.
Mr. Larsen. Fifteen; one, five?
Mr. Cipriano. Yes.
Mr. Larsen. Okay.
Mr. Cipriano. Because the average experienced age of our
workforce is still 20 years even though we have been adding new
people out of school, but we have created relationships and
created a training academy to deal with this issue. We have
classes going on all the time, and we also have arrangements
with Embry-Riddle and other universities that graduate students
that have the basic knowledge necessary to go in this kind of
work.
We hire them, put them into our training academy and then
we are flowing them as quickly as we can into the workforce to
try to get ahead of this retirement wave.
Mr. Larsen. Just to summarize, paraphrase, that is, what I
heard is you are going to staff up to a number. It is going to
be around 1,000, but it will be more focused on the performance
level required.
Your attrition rate is about 150 folks per year. You are
anticipating about 150 folks per year based on an 1,000 base.
Mr. Cipriano. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Your plan then is to use the training academies
and the training courses to fill those spots as you move
forward.
Mr. Cipriano. That is correct.
Mr. Larsen. Mr. Belger, good to see you again and maybe you
can answer a question about the internet portal. When do you
anticipate that being operational and available?
Mr. Belger. Our plan is to put it out for initial use in
December of this year. We want to get some real world
experience with pilots. AOPA has offered graciously to help us
get some pilots throughout the Country to have hands-on
experience with it.
We will learn from that experience, and we hope to have it
out in the field next year after we go through this hands-on
exposure later this year.
Mr. Larsen. So you will do a beta test not just on a region
but as best you can an objective sample of pilots throughout
the Country with AOPA?
Mr. Belger. Yes, sir. We would like to get a very objective
sample of different types of pilots, pilots who use it in
different ways, different parts of the Country, different times
of day, different types of flight plans and really stress it
before we put it out for the general use.
Mr. Larsen. Mr. Boyer, any thoughts on that?
Mr. Boyer. I think it is a good idea. We all do that when
we have a new site, and it can't come fast enough.
We offered the best of our best. Actually, our air safety
foundation, because this is such a safety of flight issue, is
going to be using some of their contacts to supply whatever
number of names they need.
Mr. Larsen. Great. Have the problems in quickly issuing
NOTAMs been corrected?
Mr. Cipriano. Yes, sir, we believe they have. The reports
we are getting back is there is a much, much improved
situation.
Mr. Larsen. You mentioned the incentives that you providing
to briefers. Can you talk through with us what the incentives
specifically are with regards to local knowledge?
Mr. Cipriano. Yes. I will have to get back to you on the
record with the exact amount, but if you are certified in more
than one region in terms of local knowledge, it means you
passed the test and your supervisor certifies you. Then you get
more pay.
I don't know exactly what the amount is, but it is enough
to encourage people to do that so that we have a bigger pool of
people that are certified in local knowledge to route a call to
in the busier areas.
Mr. Larsen. Is that the plan or is that happening? Are you
seeing more people, more of your employees trying to get that
second certification?
Mr. Cipriano. Yes, we are. I believe as they become more
familiar with the new FS21 system and are more comfortable with
it, then we will see even more people participate in that.
Mr. Larsen. When a pilot calls in and is routed to the next
available specialist, if that specialist is in a distant
geographical location from where the pilot is, it seems to me
we can't be guaranteed that that person is certified for the
area. Is that right?
Mr. Cipriano. That is correct. If you select next available
specialist, then it is possible, about 12 percent of the time
right now, you would get somebody that was not trained in the
area that you are interested in. You can select a particular
area, and you will talk to someone from that area that has a
certification.
Mr. Larsen. But you will be in line, in the queue, until
such time that person is available.
Mr. Cipriano. Correct, but those queue times are coming
down and, like I say, they are averaging 45 seconds.
Mr. Larsen. On the average of 45 seconds, is that on the
initial call or is that on any call from beginning to when the
pilot hangs up? That is does it include the transfer or just
include the pickup in the first location?
Mr. Cipriano. It includes from the time the pilot calls in
until he is connected with a specialist.
Mr. Larsen. Okay, alright.
Mr. Boyer, I think in your testimony you had some thoughts
about changes in the geographical location. It is better to
hold on, be on hold for X number of minutes and get your answer
versus 45 seconds and not get your answer?
Mr. Boyer. I think there has to be some education to that,
so the pilot has a selection. There are a lot of things a pilot
needs to do.
Mr. Petri, you mentioned it. There are a lot of just
transactional things that don't need that, that knowledge. They
don't need that knowledge of, let's say, Puget Sound where
there are different weather patterns and just different areas
of the Sound. And so, you can make that selection yourself.
I know things have probably been, shame on us. I think our
card will help with that, to get out that fact.
I think the Achilles' heel in this whole thing from the
very start has been local knowledge. I was talking when you
were out on the break. We have to look at how you impart that.
I mean just consider yourself right here in Washington.
Local knowledge: restaurants to go to, who is open when, what
parking lots close at what time. That is local knowledge that
is here in the head.
The same thing goes to weather patterns, where those
thunderstorms exist over, let's say, the Blue Ridge Mountains
or this or that. There has to be a better way to take that and
translate it and then train pilots on it because I don't know
at the moment somebody who has been through the certification
course--and we have them and we get them--that they always have
what we really look at as pilots as the local knowledge that we
need.
Mr. Larsen. In my initial round of questions earlier, I
brought up some issues specific to Washington State, and I can
do some follow-up with you all after the hearing on that
specifically. But there is an additional issue, and I am
wondering who we are going to handle that.
The 2010 Winter Olympics are in Vancouver, British
Columbia, in February and then followed up by the Paralympics
in March. With any Olympics, there are a lot of issues, a lot
of issues on the ground obviously with border crossings, and
much of the U.S. traffic is anticipated to fly into, say,
SeaTac or maybe into Bellingham and then drive across.
That being said, in that same area, there are 33 to 40
individual airstrips or airports. You will have a lot of people
flying around. The security shed during the Olympics is going
to have an impact not just on the B.C. side of the border but
certainly on the Washington State side.
Are you anticipating that? Are you making plans for that
with the FAA in terms of how to address the specific issues
that will be involved with presumably flight restrictions in
that area during that period of time?
Mr. Cipriano. At this time, I don't think we have started
those discussions, but we certainly will in sufficient time to
deal with it. There are a number of things that happen during
the course of a year, airshows, even holidays when the traffic
patterns change dramatically. I expect the campaign season that
is going to come up is going to increase the number of
restricted zones and so forth.
We are always working those with the FAA to determine what
the appropriate response and the appropriate staffing is, so we
can get the right number of people dedicated to support those
special situations.
Mr. LaTourette. It seems to me that folks in the flight
stations will have to be trained specifically to the specific
conditions surrounding this three to four weeks in February and
two to three weeks in March of 2010. Based on my experience so
far as a co-chair of our own Governor's task force on the
Olympics, starting today is about three years late in planning
for this. I would just encourage you to that, and we have been
encouraging FAA as well as all the other Federal Agencies to
keep this on the radar.
Mr. Cipriano. I have it noted, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. All right, thanks. Those are all the
questions I have.
Mr. Petri?
With that, I want to thank the panelists on panel two and,
of course, panel one as well, and this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.091
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.092
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.093
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.094
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.095
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.096
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.097
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.024
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.025
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.027
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.029
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.031
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.032
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.033
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.034
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.036
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.037
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.038
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.039
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.040
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.041
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.042
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.043
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.044
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.045
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.046
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.047
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.048
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.049
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.050
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.051
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.052
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.053
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.054
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.055
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.056
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.057
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.058
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.059
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.060
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.061
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.062
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.063
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.064
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.065
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.066
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.067
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.068
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.069
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.070
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.071
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.072
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.073
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.074
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.075
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.076
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.077
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.078
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.079
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.080
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.081
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.082
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.083
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.084
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.085
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.086
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.087
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.088
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.089
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8249.090