TRAINING OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES (ISF) AND EMPLOYMENT OF TRANSITION TEAMS

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OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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TRAINING OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES (ISF) AND EMPLOYMENT OF TRANSITION TEAMS

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(III)
TRAINING OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES (ISF) AND
EMPLOYMENT OF TRANSITION TEAMS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:07 a.m. in room 2119, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Marty Meehan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARTY MEEHAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. MEEHAN. The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations will come to order. I want to welcome our witnesses.

Today we are going to continue our examination of the most pressing issue facing the country: the war in Iraq. In the past few weeks the subcommittee has looked into the manning, training and equipping of the Iraqi Security Forces and the United States military and police transition teams.

In today's hearing we will receive testimony from witnesses on the command relationships and responsibilities of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Iraqi Assistance Group. Specifically we will discuss employment and transition teams with the Iraqi Security Forces. Additionally, we will hear about the Multi-National Security Assistance Team in Iraq called Multi-National Security Transition Command (MNSTC–I) and its Civilian Police Advisory and Training Team called CPATT. They are charged with the training and equipping of the Iraqi Police Service and managing training teams for the Ministries of Defense and Interior. CPATT also supervises the contractors who are international police liaison officers and international police trainers working with the Iraqi local police.

Other issues we want to address include the role that military and police unit readiness reporting plays in assessing the performance of Iraqi Security Forces. It is vitally and critically important to understand how this interaction and reporting plays in how the assessments are made as to how we are doing relative to the Iraqi Security Forces.

More importantly, we want to hear about the actions generated by these assessments and how feedback is provided to Iraqi leaders. We want to hear our guests' frank appraisals of how the current structure for transition teams were developed and how future requirements are being determined and then communicated to the services as force providers.
Part of the reason for this hearing is the inability of the sub-committee to get documents and informed answers from witnesses in past hearings on the Civilian Police Advisory and Assistant Training Team in particular, and the details of the command relationships in general. Many of you may be aware that previous witnesses and briefers have had to take numerous committee questions for the record. In other words, we seem to have a string of witnesses that can’t answer questions and have to take questions for the record, at which time we wait for responses.

You may not be aware that responses to questions on the record have been very slow at getting back to us, and in many instances there have been no responses to on-the-record questions. I hope that we don’t have that problem today.

Our members and the public should know, without any disrespect intended toward the witnesses we have today, that these were not the witnesses that we had asked the Department of Defense to hear from today. Because some of our efforts have been delayed or blocked, we finally requested access to commanders whose plans, policies, and assessment of progress are crucial and critical to our understanding of the effort to transition security responsibilities to the Iraqi Security Forces. They were not made available, so we asked for their deputies or any knowledgeable staff officer. None were made available and no alternatives were suggested.

Then we asked knowledgeable staff officers from Central Command Headquarters in Tampa. We were told none were capable of providing testimony. Instead we were offered a possible CODEL for eight members in June, which we appreciate, but unfortunately we are on a time deadline here, where we would like to have a report by the end of June.

I would also remind the committee that a staff delegation was arranged in mid-April and was then canceled.

I just want to comment that in both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, military/civilian uniformed leaders have been asked by Congress to explain the decisions about troop deployments, economic reconstruction, friendly-fire casualties, the training of Iraqi and Afghan forces, and in fulfilling their responsibility to oversee the military. We as Members of Congress need to assess the views of anyone in uniform, not just high-level officers. This new idea of limiting Congress’ ability to get testimony from a wide range of service members and civilian Pentagon employees I think undermines our effort.

We have been offered access to Lieutenant General Dempsey when he returns in mid-June, which we appreciate, but which doesn’t fulfill our requirements. So for all of our sakes’ I hope that the two witnesses today, I hope that you can help us with some specific questions about the contents of a critical document that this subcommittee has not been able to obtain, the Joint Campaign Plan assigned by the Commander of the Multi-National Forces-Iraq and the Embassy as it pertains to developing the Iraqi Security Forces.

MNSTC–I has an unclassified campaign plan for developing the ISF, and that has been provided—not been provided to us either.

Today’s hearing will begin with testimony from Mr. Peter Velz who is from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs for the Middle East. He will be followed by General Michael Jones from the Joint Staff. He is Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs for the Middle East.

To encourage discussion, I would like to follow the same less formal procedures today as we have in our previous sessions. I have talked to the Ranking Member and he has agreed again to dispense with the five-minute rule during today's hearing, and I would ask my colleagues to be sensitive and not to monopolize witnesses. I would also like to remind members of the subcommittee that this is an open hearing so no classified information will be discussed. If necessary, when we are finished here, we can move to a separate room for a classified discussion.

Again, I welcome our witnesses. We are looking forward to your remarks and we will take your whole text for the record. We would ask you to prepare remarks fairly briefly so we can get to our questions.

With that, I would like to turn to my colleague Mr. Akin, our Ranking Member, for any opening remarks that he may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Meehan can be found in the Appendix on page 33.]

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your remarks and your able leadership, and I also want to thank our witnesses for joining us today as well.

Today we continue to build the public record of our investigation of the Iraqi Security Forces. The purpose of today's hearing is to look at the command responsibility of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Iraq Assistance Group, IAG, in employing transition teams in the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq for training and equipping the ISF.

I am particularly interested in how the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team train and equip the Iraqi Police Services. These are organizations that own the ISF mission. Their day-to-day work executes the mission of building an indigenous Iraqi force that we expect will stabilize Iraq and will ensure that Iraq has a chance to overcome its sectarian and ethnic divisions.

Mr. Chairman, as we complete this investigation of ISF we need to return to the core issues of this investigation and answer some fundamental questions. First, are the Iraqi Security Forces we have trained ready to take the lead? We know how many soldiers and police we have trained, but we are less clear on how they are performing. Besides making the ISF logistically independent and improving ministerial capacity, what challenges remain for the ISF that the U.S. forces can help solve?

On the strategic level we need to revisit whether the ISF are really the linchpin to securing the country. While I am convinced that having a competent Iraq Security Force is a necessary condition for stabilizing Iraq, it is certainly not the only condition. The political dimension is absolutely vital too.
The Baghdad security plan may be a key metric for evaluating whether we are using ISF in a strategically sound way and if the ISF are performing effectively at the tactical level.

I am interested in our witnesses' views on these critical questions and thank you again for joining us this morning. I yield back.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Akin.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

Mr. MEEHAN. I don't think that we have any testimony that has been provided, written testimony, to the committee. Is that correct?

Mr. VELZ. That is correct, sir. Yes, sir, that is correct. But I have a very brief statement.

Mr. MEEHAN. Okay.

STATEMENT OF PETER VELZ, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (MIDDLE EAST), OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. VELZ. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Akin, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today. The most appropriate witness for the hearing today, as you mentioned, is Lieutenant General Dempsey, Commander of MNSTC-I, but he is not in Washington. I understand our Office of Legislative Affairs is working with your subcommittee to ensure that General Dempsey appears before your subcommittee on June 12th. Brigadier General Jones——

Mr. MEEHAN. Can I just—I just want to make sure—Legislative Affairs has been communicating with us, I wouldn't say that it hasn't been—I wouldn't say it has been a cooperative effort. I have sent ten official—I have never ever seen such a lack of responsiveness in terms of working with a committee. We have subpoena power, and we are going to get there, I suppose, but I don't want you to think that this has been a cooperative effort. It has been most unpleasant.

Mr. VELZ. Okay, sir. General Jones and I will answer your questions to the best of our ability and take questions for the record as appropriate.

Mr. MEEHAN. Is that your opening statement?

Mr. VELZ. That is it, sir.

Mr. MEEHAN. General Jones.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. MICHAEL JONES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS (MIDDLE EAST), JOINT STAFF

General Jones, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Akin, it is a pleasure to be here. Thank you for the opportunity to talk to you about what I believe is a very, very important issue. I apologize because of time, I didn't have enough time to submit a written statement for the record, opening remarks. However, I would like to thank you for your and the rest of the subcommittee's continued support of men and women in uniform and also look forward to your questions and I will do my very best to answer especially those issues that both of you raised in your opening remarks. Thanks, sir.
Mr. MEEHAN. I assume, General, you probably weren’t notified that you would be testifying until probably recently, my guess would be, right?

General JONES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MEEHAN. I am shocked.

I would like to start with one question, then reserve time for later—for both witnesses. How do you tell progress is being made on the development of the Iraqi Security Forces?

It seems that we measure trained and equipped, but that really doesn’t tell us whether they are on duty or whether they are capable, or if there are really insurgents or terrorists or sectarian militia. It also seems that we measure in the lead or operating independently, which apparently doesn’t mean what we think it does, but it doesn’t seem to me that any U.S. troops can be redeployed or refocused or that the overall violence in Iraq is going down.

So we are really interested in are you responsible in any way for keeping track of how this effort is going? How do we measure this? What is the process? If so, how do you do that and to whom are you responsible? How do you make adjustments based on your assessments of how things are going, the progress that is being made, and how do you keep track of it, and why?

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, you have highlighted a couple of the ways that we track and we monitor. The first, of course, is the basic information about trained and equipped, and that is forces as they go through the fundamental training or the basic training graduate from either academies or basic training units and then are provided as individually equipped soldiers or policemen to their units. That is kind of the manufacture, the building blocks, so to speak, of effectiveness.

The second element is, as you mentioned, the Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) information that actually assesses unit capacity to perform. These ratings in terms of what the capacity of the unit is vary from when the unit is being formed until the time when they are independent. I will mention the definition may be unclear for some folks; the judgment as to whether a unit is independent, able to be in the lead, or requires coalition support is in terms of what that unit is designed to do. If it is an infantry battalion, an infantry battalion is designed to operate to do certain critical tasks and it has internal capacity to do certain things. If that unit is not capable of doing all those internal things, then we assess it as a unit that needs coalition support in order to function.

If, in fact, they can do most of those internal things but there are parts inside that unit that are missing—for instance, they might not have internal medical capacity or some other aspect—then they can be in the lead but not independent.

Finally, an independent unit is one that for everything it is designed to do, it is capable of doing without coalition support. So we track that, and that is done primarily based on the assessment of these embedded teams, either mid-teams, police transition teams, special police transition teams, military transition teams that are embedded. That is what generates that TRA data. In addition to that——

Mr. MEEHAN. These embedded teams, do they report to you? Who do they specifically report to?
General JONES. Their information goes up to the C3 of Multi-National Corps, which is where that information is collated into the overall TRA assessment information. So their operational chain of command runs from the more senior teams, which are located in brigade or the division level, that goes up to Multi-National Corps and is collated there by the C3, which is the operations section of Multi-National Corps.

In addition to that, each of these Iraqi units has a partner unit, and that is a coalition unit that partners with them, so that you have a parallel organization that provides mentoring and coaching in support to that unit. So in terms of their operation they are also informally being looked at just by virtue of operating together, and that also is a topic of discussion.

There is a lot of communication that goes on, obviously, between the transition teams and the commanders of the partnered units. And so that exchange of information is also helpful in terms of the analysis of the effectiveness.

Besides that raw data, what I would add is that there is operational information, and that is as you either work with a unit or you observe them in the fight, you do some analysis to determine what is their level of effectiveness based on their assigned missions, and you can see them out operating. Because these embedded teams are out operating with the unit, watching an operation, that is partially recorded in the TRA information. But also the Corps commander and his subordinate division commanders that are working with these Iraqi units also see the effects of their operations, and that can be anything from how they perform in a fight, to the number of intelligence-based operations they are conducting successfully and other kinds of indicators that tell you that that unit is either being more or less effective.

Mr. MEEHAN. What specific adjustments have been made over a period of years as we have gotten data or information? What types of changes have we implemented as a result of—obviously training the Iraqi Security Forces hasn't gone as well as anyone anticipated that it would in the beginning.

I find it very difficult to, number one—other than going to Iraq and talking to people who are there, we have had a difficult time getting people before this committee, Oversight and Investigations, to talk to us about how this process really works and what adjustments are made as a result.

I appreciate, General, your testimony or your answer to the question. Those answers are in most of the books that we get here, most of the briefings. But I am wondering what adjustments are actually made in terms of real life?

General JONES. I can start quite a while back. When I arrived in March of 2004 one of the first big adjustments that we made was the concept of embedded teams. We started off with the Iraqi Army Forces having what I would call part-time advisors, and that is people who would go through as mobile training teams, which is a very effective way to train U.S. forces.

However, what we discovered, beginning with the April 2004 operations that went on where we saw the Iraqi forces weren't progressing like we thought they would, what we saw was that was not a very effective method of training Iraqis.
So that is when we began to make the transition to embedded teams that work with the same unit, they live with the unit, they eat with the unit, they stay with them all the time and go out on operations with them; that was the first fundamental change.

Some other changes that have been made along the way include we discovered that there was with the transition teams some difficulty in having the transition teams working for MNSTC–I but operating with the unit that was in the operational area of the Corps. That is one of the reasons why the Iraq Assistance Group was formed, is so that inside the Corps you have an organization who are the owners of the transition teams, and that way the operational chain of command has responsibility for the transition teams and they work inside the operational context that is going on, not MNSTC–I, which is a separate command.

Mr. MEEHAN. General, is anyone at the Pentagon accountable for the oversight of this effort?

General JONES. In terms of the training and equipping effort?

Mr. MEEHAN. In terms of just oversight of the entire effort. Is there someone at the Pentagon who is accountable?

General JONES. Obviously, the Secretary is accountable for everything. And then in terms of the specific elements, there are certain aspects accountable by different people. In terms of the spending of money, obviously, the comptroller is responsible for monitoring that.

Mr. MEEHAN. What I am trying to get at is we presumably have this process that we are using over a long period of time. I am just wondering if there is someone at the Pentagon responsible for the oversight of the entire operation. I understand the Secretary of Defense is.

General JONES. Sir, it is essentially, like most other things, the staff obviously provides information to the leadership in the Pentagon, but the chain of command runs from the Secretary to the combatant commander to General Petraeus. And so clearly the chain of command is responsible for it. It is monitored by a variety of people based on the function that you are looking at, whether it is money, whether it is the manning of the units in order to provide the support, whether it is the operational effectiveness of the units.

Mr. MEEHAN. Okay. If the TRA’s go to MNC, why is General Dempsey, for example—why would he be the best witness that they think would be the best person to come before the committee? Wouldn’t General Odierno?

General JONES. General Odierno is the Corps commander. I will have to defer to the Office of the Secretary of Defense colleague but——

Mr. MEEHAN. I am just curious why General Dempsey would be the witness that the Pentagon would think would be the best.

Mr. VELZ. Mr. Chairman, Lieutenant General Dempsey is also responsible for the development of the Ministry of Defense and Interior, which has command and control over the Iraqi forces. So he would have the best overall perspective on what the overall requirements would be for any adjustments that needed to be made.

Certainly General Odierno as the operational commander would have the best visibility over the operational situation. But it is just like in the U.S. military, when you are trying to figure out what
to do about the force, you generally look to the higher head-
quarters, the services, if you will, or the Joint Staff to make the
recommendations on that.

Mr. MEEHAN. As Members of Congress, one of the reasons why
we go to Iraq on a regular basis is to actually talk to the men and
women who are on the front lines, because often times we get a
better perspective. Sometimes we hear that they are not getting
equipment that they need; or we are hearing that there are prob-
lems with communication that result in not having up-armored
Kevlar vests, for example; not getting water, those types of things.

That is why the committee likes to try to get, in addition to able,
articulate people like yourselves, to get some people who are really
more operational.

Mr. Akin.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If you were to change hats
with us and be Congressmen—I know that might seem like a
nightmare to some degree—but when we go to Iraq, depending who
you talk to, you get valuable information depending on what level
you are. Sometimes if you are talking to a sergeant you get some
very specific information on a point topic.

I think my favorite people to talk to were lieutenant colonels,
just because it seemed like they had responsibility for something
and they would say, look, I don’t know anything else about what
is going on but this area; this is my deal and I can tell you about
it.

We got some very valuable help. We calibrate what we are ask-
ing questions about and sometimes we get the top commanders
talking to us. Everything was generalities but nothing to flesh the
picture out. And I think that is what the Chairman was making
reference to.

General Jones, you started to develop a little bit of the transition
of how we are working with the training. You said initially we run
a team of people through the way we treat the U.S. troops, and it
seems to work okay for the U.S. troops but it wasn’t working in
Iraq. So, instead, the concept was to take the team and just lit-
erally leave them with the unit for a period of time.

Is that partly because they didn’t have the same assumptions
that our troops do, and so you have to—it takes longer to build
that? And what were the transitions, if you would just kind of
speed up your answer, from when you were there in April of 2004,
what were those changes and how did we learn and develop how
we were doing the training?

General JONES. If I can answer the second part first. We
transitioned to this embedding concept. Another adjustment that
we made was, in fact, beginning to collect readiness information
because the Iraqis had no system for doing that. The next major shift
was the establishment of partnering units. That was an item that
was done a little bit more than a year ago.

So it has been a series of adjustments made, based on what we
thought was best as the situation developed. In terms——

Mr. AKIN. Were some of those things, with 20–20 hindsight,
things you would have done five years ago, or were some of those
things also because the Iraq situation was moving as well?
General JONES. Congressman, I think both. I think many of those things, had you known more about the Iraqis, some of their limitations, their culture, a lot of factors about them, you might have done some of them earlier. In some cases the situation has obviously changed. Since when we first began doing this level of violence, a lot of other factor have changed.

Sir, in answer to the second question, why some things don't work, the Iraqi culture is just different. I call it the Inshallah Factor; and that is, in the U.S. we understand there is a very clear cause-and-effect relationship between what you do and the results that you get. For instance, at the lowest level, firing a weapon. I know if I train somebody, that if I teach them the seven steady hold factors, how to aim the weapon properly and so forth, that they will hit the target with the bullet. But because of the religious and cultural background of most Iraqis, they are very fatalistic and they believe that things are all based on the will of God; if God wants the bullet to hit the target, it will hit the target and what I do does not affect the outcome.

And so you have to establish a level of trust in a relationship with Iraqis in order to then persuade them to change their behavior in a way that then allows them to start performing at a higher trained level.

So those are things that, flat out, I didn't know when I first went to Iraq; that it took me a while to learn about Iraqis.

Mr. AKIN. What I hear you say is you take an American soldier and say, look, if you hold the weapon this way and you make sure that you are using this particular eye when you are lining up the site picture, you are going to hit the target more. And they go, oh, thanks for the tip. And they may shoot a little bit better.

You are saying with the Iraqi, you have got to develop that personal relationship and it is a longer sort of process to try to effect a change.

General JONES. That is correct.

Mr. AKIN. It is just a method of thinking and all.

Mr. VELZ. Sir, can I add a point?

Mr. AKIN. I was going to let you finish, because the transition was we sent some people through, and that wasn't working too well, and then we embedded some people. Is that where we are, embedding units?

General JONES. We have increased the number of embedded teams markedly. We are embedding not just in the military units but also police units. We then established a partnership, because our embeds are generally junior to the unit that they are advising. That is pretty normal in terms of how we do advisory duties, whether it is Special Operations forces or conventional forces.

So while you might have a major who is the advisor for a battalion normally commanded by a lieutenant colonel, by partnering a unit you have a peer who is able to coach and mentor that battalion commander at things that it takes a little bit more experience at that command level to do. So you have that kind of parallel partnership activity going on.

But those are some of the adjustments that we have made in order to try to adapt. We are now doing things like the re-bluing of the national police. One of the problems trying to build a force
in the middle of conflict is that these units are engaged every day in security operations. And so, for instance, the national police re-bluing, we are actually taking units out of the line, we are going through a revetting procedure to get rid of some of the folks that we don’t want to have in those organizations, or doing some re-training where they are not engaged in operations but they are separated out in a training environment before they go back in and conduct operations again.

So there are a lot of other adjustments that I could spend a lot of time talking about, but things that have evolved over time based on how we have learned.

Mr. AKIN. Mr. Velz.

Mr. VELZ. Yes, I was just going to add, three years ago at this time in the spring of 2004, there were basically four battalions of the Iraqi Army and they were basically in collapse after the first battle of Fallujah. General Jones had maybe a few battalions of what was called the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, which were just local militia that had minimal training. There weren’t any units to advise at that point.

Very quickly, though, over the next six to nine months, large numbers of battalions got stood up by MNSTC–I. And so by the end of 2004, beginning of 2005, we were seriously looking at how to do an advisory mission with embeds. And that is basically because the quantity of units that was being stood up was growing so rapidly. At the same time, of course, as General Jones mentioned, the conditions on the insurgency also required a more intense focus on this as well.

But it was largely as a result of the very quick buildup of the Iraqi Army units beginning at the second half of 2004, that is when we really started to look seriously as how to do the embed mission in Iraq.

Mr. AKIN. I just wanted to conclude because I don’t want to hog the microphone here, but I wanted to thank you, General Jones, for working with us and getting the TRAs to us. I know you put a lot of work into that, trying to speed that paperwork flow so we have a chance to see some of that data. Thank you for your work on that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MEEHAN. Before we go to Dr. Snyder, General, you mentioned re-bluing efforts. The Washington Post reported that the plan to reform the National Police by re-bluing and firing corrupt leaders is in trouble. General Pittard apparently was angry, saying that the Maliki government was actually firing the good leaders.

Are you familiar with any of this, and what is your explanation or response to that?

General JONES. I am familiar with the article and I did not—I did not take from the article that General Pittard was talking about the re-bluing effort. The re-bluing effort, to the best of my knowledge, those leaders that have been replaced in the re-bluing effort have not been replaced as a result of any influence out of the national government, it is inside the Ministry of Interior. And I believe that all of the leaders I have talked to in Iraq have been very pleased with the way they went about eliminating bad leaders inside those forces.
Mr. MEEHAN. So no one at the Pentagon or, General Pittard, or the military hasn’t been concerned that the Maliki government was actually firing some of the good leaders.

General JONES. That is incorrect. I think that what you are talking about is the re-bluing effort. I think that has actually gone on well. Of course, we are all concerned about any time——

Mr. MEEHAN. How about the effort to fire corrupt leaders?

General JONES. The effort to fire corrupt leaders inside the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense, we have seen a large improvement in that. I wouldn’t tell you it is completely successful. It is an ongoing process. We are in fact concerned that there are leaders that may be being fired or replaced because of sectarian differences, and we are watching that very closely.

There have been cases where that has been done, that we have gone back to the government and said this is wrong and it should not happen. So it is not an area that we are satisfied with. We are continuing to watch it closely. We have seen a significant improvement, but it is not where it needs to be.

Mr. MEEHAN. So there has been a problem inside the two ministries that you have mentioned, but they are having problems outside those two ministries.

General JONES. I believe that in general the nature of how the Iraqi Government works is they have a long tradition of—not merit-based promotion or selection, but what I guess we would call either cronyism or some other method, but not being merit-based. We have been encouraging them to become merit-based. We have seen a significant amount of progress. But in the two security ministries I think they are reflective of some of the problems they probably have in other ministries as well.

Mr. MEEHAN. Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I hope you took the spirit of Chairman Meehan’s comments at the beginning; we really do appreciate you being here. I, in fact, probably doubly appreciate you being here. I figure you come over here having drawn the short straw. I don’t know what is going on in the Pentagon these days in regard to this committee, but I think it is symptomatic of bigger problems within the Administration and within the Pentagon.

General Jones, your bio says you are accompanied by your wife Pat. Is she here today with you?

General JONES. She is not here today.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I hope you took the spirit of Chairman Meehan’s comments at the beginning; we really do appreciate you being here. I, in fact, probably doubly appreciate you being here. I figure you come over here having drawn the short straw. I don’t know what is going on in the Pentagon these days in regard to this committee, but I think it is symptomatic of bigger problems within the Administration and within the Pentagon.

General Jones, your bio says you are accompanied by your wife Pat. Is she here today with you?

General JONES. She is not here today.

Dr. SNYDER. I figured that was a more generic sense. I was going to recognize her if she was. I will recognize that she is not here. I know you appreciate the support that she has given you.

One of the frustrating things about what has happened in the last few months is it has taken a long time to establish this subcommittee, and this subcommittee has a record of working in a bipartisan manner. In the past on the House side, and you are on the joint command, the Joint Staff, the Goldwater-Nichols work that we talked about came out of the old ONI Subcommittee on the House side. Chairman Skelton was a member of that subcommittee at the time.

There are a lot of good things that can come out of this committee in the spirit of us all getting on the same page and working
together, and that is where we really are not sure what is happen-
ing with regard to the timeliness and appropriateness of getting
the information to the people over here to this subcommittee.

So my question for you, General Jones, is—Mr. Meehan is leav-
ing, he is going to be effectively out of here July 1. He has got a
new life as president at the University of Massachusetts at Lowell.
So what has he done wrong? Has he been too polite, has he been
too thoughtful, too bipartisan? What has he done wrong that your
seniors in the Pentagon do not want to provide him the kind of wit-
tesses and information that he and Mr. Akin, pulling hardest to-
gether in a very bipartisan way, that they don't seem to be forth-
coming with that information? What advice do you have for whoever
the future chairman of the subcommittee is going to be?

General Jones. Sir, I would just—I can't speak for some of the
folks you may be talking about, frankly, because I have never had
that discussion with them. I certainly think—I do not think it
would be a fault to be too polite or too bipartisan or too courteous.
I wouldn't view those as faults; I think those are good traits.

I am a professional military officer and I do the best I can to pro-
vide the information that I am asked to provide in a way that is
meaningful.

Dr. Snyder. I have read your resume, you have a good reputa-
tion; it is just we are trying to figure out where to go from here.
It is getting frustrating. A lot of what this kind of subcommittee
is about is ultimately looking at things we have done wrong or can
do better. There is a lot of splash that comes from hearings that
have dramatic witnesses and lots of cameras and all that kind of
stuff. A lot of times those kinds of hearings don't lead to any
change in legislation.

I think a lot of Mr. Meehan. One of the questions he was asking
before he agreed to take his chairmanship is, what can we do con-
structively? For example, ultimately if you have a shortage of
equipment for your Iraqi troops or for our troops, it is our problem.
We haven't bought enough, haven't given you enough money in a
timely way. If you don't have enough foreign language speakers,
whether it is Farsi or Arabic or whatever it is, it is ultimately our
problem. We are not allocating enough resources and giving you
the kind of people and incentives to get people in the kind of skills
that you need. If we have a problem with contractors not perform-
ing, ultimately it is our problem because we haven't given enough
tools to do the oversight.

So we have been struggling with this. I can remember sitting
down there when Mr. Bremer was sitting where you are, General
Jones—I think it was a closed session, I don't think it was classi-
fied—sitting right in the front row, and I asked him what do you
need from Congress, and the answer was patience. That was his
only answer, patience.

You see where that has got us. We were assured for, I don't
know, a year or two or three, everything was going just great with
the training of these Iraqi troops.

So that is the frustration, whether you are talking about the Iraq
Study Group or the President's plan or Secretary Rumsfeld, Sec-
retary Gates' plan, ultimately this is going to depend on can Iraqi
troops and the police stand on their own. And so we are here trying
to figure out what we need to be doing to help with that effort that has been struggling for the last several years, and so it is very frustrating with regard to lack of the spirit of cooperation. Maybe I will put it that way.

General Jones, do you know Congressman Shimkus, one of our Republican colleagues from Illinois, West Point graduate? John puts together every year this training program for the young officers, and Ms. Tauscher and I participate. I don’t know if Ms. Davis has. It is a videotape thing, and we pretend we are Members of Congress—which we are pretty good at pretending at—and they pretend, these young officers, that they are testifying before a congressional committee, and I think they are majors or lieutenant colonels, folks who are identified they are going to go on up.

So we have scenarios, and there are bad things going on in the world. But it is wonderful experience for me because I learned where you all are trained how to answer the questions. One of my favorite phrases is “Well, Congressman, that is a great question.” I am thinking I heard that, I think—how many times have we heard that? You were trained to say that. You are trained to say that.

That is all okay; my concern is that somehow there is this ethic within the Pentagon that part of that training is obfuscation. If you can go into the committee room and get out in an hour and a half and haven’t done much to tip the boat either way, it has been a great day; rather than in the spirit of coming in and saying here is where are our problems are, here is where we have screwed up, here is where we think you have screwed up and here are things we don’t have any idea what is going on.

Maybe that is expecting too much, but it is in the spirit of trying to make things better so that you all can do the kind of job that you want to. I hope that you and whoever you all have these discussions with about how you got up this morning. I understand how deep the concern is with the House Armed Services Committee, about the Pentagon attitude toward this subcommittee. We don’t understand it. It is probably more than any other subcommittee in the Congress working in a bipartisan manner. And it is not going to go away. Mr. Meehan may be going away, but this subcommittee isn’t going to go away.

Mr. MEEHAN. Congressman Snyder, those are great comments. Congressman Jones.

Mr. JONES OF NORTH CAROLINA. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am not going to beat up or pontificate, but I must say I sit here in total dismay, not with you two gentlemen, but we are talking about over 3,000 dead men and women. We are talking about 20,000-plus wounded, paralyzed, IEDs, hit in the head. And my frustration is not with you gentlemen, the frustration in my opinion is the arrogance of this Administration.

They have wanted to stay the course for five years. We stayed the course. And I sat here for five years and have heard how well the training is going. The newspapers say no, it is not going well. Again, not you two gentlemen, but those who have been at the table, things are getting better.

But tell the American people why this country is going broke and spending $9.2 billion a month in Iraq, and Senator McCain is on
Meet the Press and Tim Russert says: Senator, it has been reported that we only have—and I don’t know if it is 6,000 or 8,000, but it is not many, let’s say 6,000—Iraqi military that can go out on patrol on their own, without having somebody from the military of America or the coalition walking with them.

And I think it is disgusting. I will be honest with you. I couldn’t quite figure out when General Jack Sheehan turned down the position as war czar, and his comment in the Washington Post was, “They don’t know where in the hell they are going.”

And I sit here, Mr. Chairman, and I am frustrated as a Republican that those in the Pentagon, and not these two gentlemen, have turned their nose up to the Congress; not just the Oversight Committee, but to the Congress.

The American people changed the majority in November of this year because my party would not do what we are trying to do today. The American people have a right, whether they agree with the policy in Iraq or do not agree with the policy in Iraq, to know what is happening. And I think it is so discouraging for the American people, not for us, not for us, but discouraging for the American people that a Congress, a subcommittee under Armed Services, cannot get the straight answer. Again, not from you two gentlemen; you are here because you were chosen, or, as Mr. Snyder said, or Mr. Meehan, you got the short straw.

But I will tell you that the American people are fed up and I am frustrated and fed up, and I hear General Jones, and we do claim kin if you want to, maybe not when I finish, but this is not toward you personally, there is a cultural difference.

Well, I would like to suggest, Mr. Chairman, that maybe we give Paul Wolfowitz a new job and send him over there as mayor of Iraq since the neocons got us in over there, and maybe Mr. Perle can be co-mayor or co-chairman.

Trust. You cannot—people who have hated each other for 1,400 years—and it is so unfair to put our military there to be policemen, to be negotiators, to try to make these people work together, the Shi‘ias and the Sunnis.

I, with a couple of Democrats and two other Republicans two weeks ago, met with a gentleman from the Parliament in Iraq in Wayne Gilchrest’s office. The man says, I am a Shiite, I am married to a Sunni. He talked about how corrupt the Maliki government is. This is one man’s opinion. He had an interpreter. I don’t know.

But the issue is that what we are trying to do is to get to the facts of where are we going. Is there a possibility for a victory, is there a possibility for an end point to the strategy, or does it just go on and on and on? And I heard General Jones and the Secretary—I mean you are right, it is adjustments, adjustments. It is trust, it is their culture.

God knows, when you go to Walter Reed, and all of us do, and you go to Bethesda—and I never will forget two years ago I went with Gene Taylor to Walter Reed and we go in the room and there is a mom and a dad, and the mom has got tears coming down her eyes, and we speak to her, then we go to the bed and there is an army sergeant, he has got his attractive fiance down at the foot of the bed.
We speak to him, and before we get ready to leave, and by that time we know that he has lost both legs. Been amputated. He had been to Iraq twice. He said, Congressman, I know my opinion does not matter because I am just a sergeant, but we assured him his opinion did matter, I want to make that clear to the committee. He said, You cannot make these people love or like each other.

So, Mr. Chairman, I want to say this committee does have subpoena power, and I hope—I hate to see you leave, but if not used before, then the new chairman, whomever he or she might be, I think should say that we are going to bring in the people who are going to make these decisions, I know you are decision makers, don't get me wrong, you are decision makers, and I respect you both. I don't know you, but I respect you both, but I want somebody to answer to the American people. And if they have got to be sworn in in a closed hearing, get the press out, fine. But this Congress has been sold a bill of goods for five years. And it is not the Congress, it is the dead, it is their families, it is the wounded and their families that have a right to know the answers; it is not us.

And I will close on this, Mr. Chairman. I will never forget a kid five months ago down at Johnson Elementary School, Camp LeJeune, which is in my district, and I was asked to read a book, Doctor Seuss, to the kids, ten kids, Hispanic, black and white, six years of age. And before I finished one kid, I am sitting in a rocking chair—where I probably belong at this stage of life—sitting in a rocking chair and the last kid I called on to ask me a question said—I want to say it very slowly and clearly—my daddy is not dead yet.

We have a right to get the answers, the honest answers about training of the Iraqis. We have a right and an obligation to the Constitution of the United States of America. And if we cannot get the answers, then democracy is in trouble because it will crumble and it will fall.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Jones.

And Mr. Jones, I want to assure you, in fulfilling our responsibility to oversee the military, we will get the access to anyone in uniform, not just high-level officers. These new guidelines that limit Congress’s freedom to get testimony from a wide range of service members and civilian Pentagon employees—I have a meeting with Mr. Skelton later on today. We are going to meet with the Secretary of the Defense Gates—but as far as I am concerned, we will subpoena people. The Department of Defense does not have the right to bar enlisted personnel or career bureaucrats or any officers from testifying before this committee. So we are moving forward with a meeting with the Secretary Gates.

Mrs. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to all of you. I am sure you didn't expect the morning to be quite like this, but we welcome you here and thank you for being here. I wonder if you could perhaps respond a little bit, what questions do you think we should be asking that would give us the greatest insight? One of my concerns is we are talking a lot about numbers, how many people are trained; how many people are capable of performing independently? But I am also impressed that
what has been called the kind of open source decentralization of
the insurgency, of the warlords, militias, that we should be talking
more about what we are learning from what they are doing, and
how we are responding, and how we are in fact training the Iraqis,
along with ourselves, to adapt better. Is that something that we
ought to be focusing on more than on numbers? Because if we don’t
get what is going on out there, if we don’t know our enemy, then
how in the heck are we going to be able to be successful at what
we are doing? And so I am just, you know, is that appropriate from
your points of view? Is it only numbers? What are we missing?

General Jones. Ma’am, I would say in fact it is a whole lot more
than numbers. You know, it is nice to have quantifiable things to
analyze. And quantifiable things are very important, but there are
some things that aren’t as easily quantifiable that are also very im-
portant as well. In terms of adaptation for the security forces in
Iraq, I think that is probably not a well understood, but very im-
portant, aspect of all of this. And the more you understand about
the adaptations we are trying to have, I think the more you recog-
nize the level of difficulty of the task.

Ms. Davis of California. Can you identify what is the greatest
frustration in trying to do that and trying to ascertain that then?
And again, what is it? Do we need more resources? What would
make a difference?

General Jones. Part of it is time. You know, we have institutions
in Iraq that have at least 35 years, but probably more than that,
of institutional culture that we are trying to change. Under the
Saddam era, the security forces were focused pretty much on a sin-
gle thing, and that is keeping an individual in power. The idea of
having an institution whose job it was to serve the Nation or the
people of the Nation is a marked change in the institutional culture
that, you know, that we are working with. And we have made con-
siderable progress in doing that, but it is an extremely difficult
task. We are trying to create security forces that can deal with an
insurgent environment. The traditional Iraqi Army forces were
trained to deal with conventional threats, other armies. They had
no doctrine, no concept of how to do intelligence-based operations
to deal with an insurgency. So we have started to work that basi-
cally from the ground up to include the training of all Iraqi leaders
who, none of them had really any experience or any background
that would make it easy for them to make that transition as well.
So, I mean, there are a lot of things like that that are not quantifi-
able things but that are part of this whole rubric.

Ms. Davis of California. How are we going to use that then to
try and move forward, understanding it is not all quantifiable, but
I guess what I am looking for is something that I am not just read-
ing in the papers, that we could be doing that is specific. And
maybe, you know, getting moving away from this little bit, if you
could talk about, we are obviously involved in a surge. Has that
taken folks away from the embedding and the training to your
knowledge?

General Jones. The answer is no. This plus-up of forces is in ad-
dition to the forces that were there and the transition teams that
are embedded. So in fact it hasn’t taken away from the transition
teams. What has happened is the number of forces that are
partnered with Iraqi forces have increased, especially in Baghdad and to some degree in al-Anbar. So it hasn’t had a negative effect. I would argue that it is having a positive effect early on here.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Are there—is the revenues that are being provided, the money that is being provided to train and to work to develop an infrastructure in the service, in the Iraqi service, is that something—do you have that? Are you relying on supplementals for that? Can you talk about what percentage of those dollars come from that? Have the estimates changed for what is needed?

General JONES. In terms of infrastructure for the security forces, that has been part of the program that has been partially coalition funded, partially Iraqi funded. Initially, it was predominantly U.S. funds. Iraqis are funding larger and larger portions of this over time. Currently, right now, the—obviously, there is a supplemental that is being worked on here that has funds in it to continue to do the training, equip the mission. There is funding in next year’s budget as well to continue to do that.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Do you have an estimate for that?

General JONES. I apologize, I didn’t bring budget numbers with me. Maybe——

Mr. VELZ. Congresswoman, are you referring to just the surge-related costs or the 2000——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. The training—

Mr. VELZ [continuing]. For 2007 and 2008?

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. The training costs and how that develops.

Mr. VELZ. Okay.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Yes, for U.S. versus Iraqi.

Mr. VELZ. The way we look at this, we look at this as a total cost of security that we are funding and the Iraqis are funding, and then we have different programs under that that are implemented. Some of it may be training. Some is buying equipment. Some is building infrastructure. But a lot of it is just keeping the Iraqi forces operational, buying fuel, buying ammunition, bullets, food, life support and so forth. So we basically, for 2007, the Iraqi government has budgeted about $7.3 billion for this for both the Ministries of Defense and Interior. And from our supplementals and from our main budget, we are spending about $5.5 billion. So they are paying the majority of the total cost. Total cost is about $13 billion. It is about a 7 to 5 split. For 2008, we have requested $2 billion so far for the 2008 request. And we expect the Iraqi government to pay somewhat in excess of what they are paying this year. So they are paying this year over $7 billion. They will pay more than that next year. And that is where we are at the moment. Most of this is—most of the U.S. funding is to build the capacity of the Ministries of Defense and Interior to keep their forces in the fight, to sustain their forces, building logistics capacity, building warehousing and supply chains and so forth, which right now is one of their critical shortcomings. So it is admittedly a fair amount of money, but it is—to basically address a, what we have identified as a significant requirement to, if you will, take the Iraqi capabilities to the next level.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I would certainly have other questions in how that is going in terms of logistics training, because we know that, even culturally, as you mentioned, some of the ideas that we take for granted aren’t necessarily part of the way in which the Iraqis would approach the task of logistics. And so how—can you give us a rough estimate? I mean, do you feel that that is moving or so slow that you anticipate that we would be two years behind in the training that you would have anticipated? Where is that?

Mr. Velz. Well, a lot of the operational and tactical level units have been built and are functioning at various levels. What really needs to be focused on the most, and that is what we are focusing on, is the ministerial level, if you will, the equivalent of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) type of function. The equivalent of the OSD personnel and readiness function. Those are the things that we are focusing on in terms of capacity development.

Ms. Davis of California. Could you give it a grade today?

Mr. Velz. Well, MNSTC–I gives them grades. I would have to defer to General Jones on what his assessment is of that. I will say that from the standpoint of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)—let’s just take the Ministry of Defense logistics system, you mentioned the Iraqis perhaps have a different concept. I think we are at the point now where there is a fair degree of consensus between the coalition and the Iraqis on what the concept is. And we have been basically building it for the last year-and-a-half or so. There was a lot of discussion in 2004, early 2005 about what it should look like, but I think that has largely been resolved now. And you know, the flow chart, if you will, for the system is agreed on. And if you look at the supplemental request, you can see in there the building blocks that we are funding in that.

Ms. Davis of California. General Jones, did you want to give an assessment, a quick grade, if you will?

General Jones. I would say that it is a work in progress. If you look at, we have had some significant success I think in the Taji National Depot, where they are doing fairly high-level maintenance procedures for equipment. As you go through the motor transport regiments and the logistics support units, you have some that are stood up that are operating with our support. You have some that are still being formed. So that is occurring this year. But it will still take a while to get them to where they are really operating at capacity; into next year at a minimum, I think.

You have alluded to the fact that it is—there are some issues in this region as a general rule on the logistics side in terms of having the level of logistics effort and sophistication that we have. So there is a considerable amount of work to be done. Finally, in the ministries, we have seen some progress, but they still have major challenges in terms of budget execution. To that end, we are helping with budget execution on an interim basis by working with them on foreign military sales. We have got $1.9 billion of Iraqi funds that have been deposited into an account for foreign military sales, where we can assist them in spending that money to buy equipment for their forces. So we are helping them in those places that are most critical, but at the ministerial level, there is a signifi-
cant amount of work to be done to get all of those systems in place that would really give them a fully functioning system.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Velz, you mentioned a logistics concept. We asked for a copy of the logistics concept on March 20th. On March 20th. We can't get a copy of it. We would love to have a discussion about the logistics concept. I can't imagine why the Pentagon would want to keep the logistics concept secret from the subcommittee, but they haven't responded to us. And there are so many things that we could have a dialogue about and really try to find consensus. But you mentioned logistics concept. March 20th we asked for it, still haven't been given it.

Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the witnesses for their service to the country. I appreciate them being here today. As of May the 9th, the research indicates that we have trained 337,200 Iraqi security and Iraqi police. And I know that that is a much higher number than was originally anticipated. Ambassador Bremer’s initial plan I think called for a new Iraqi Army of 40,000 people. There was some other kind of corps that was going to be maybe 15,000 people. The numbers have just grown and grown and grown. Something else that has grown with it, though, is the number of attacks being waged in Iraq. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has done an analysis of this. And approximately 500 attacks in the month of June of 2003; 1,800 attacks in the month of June of 2004. In the month of June of 2005, 2,000 attacks. In the month of June of 2006, 3,500 attacks. So the number of attacks, as defined by the GAO, has gone up significantly at the same time that the number of trained Iraqi security and police have gone up. By December of 2006, the GAO analysis indicates that we had 5,000 attacks.

I assume it would be Mr. Velz who would answer this question. For the last month for which you have available data, how many attacks were launched by the resistance or counterinsurgency in Iraq?

Mr. VELZ. Sir, I don't have that data with me, but we can provide it for you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 43.]

Mr. ANDREWS. It is correct you will provide it? Because I will tell you when I asked for this information through the Department, I was told I would have to file a Freedom of Information Act request. Is that correct?

Mr. VELZ. We, in our quarterly report, we report attack trends.

Mr. ANDREWS. When you say attack trends, the GAO again produced what was previously classified—it was unclassified a few months ago, from which I am reading—an actual month by month account of attacks launched, breaking it down by the target of the attacks, whether it is coalition forces, Iraqi forces or Iraqi civilians. Is that information publicly available now?

General JONES. Sir, that information is classified in terms of the breakout of specifically what is being attacked, you know, by numbers. I think that what we have done is declassified attack trend information that shows you overall numbers of attacks. But it is
the assessment of commanders in the theater that providing detailed information about what is being attacked by whom would not be appropriate in terms of protecting their forces.

Mr. ANDREWS. The first point that I would like to make, just to reiterate, Mr. Velz, I think, told me that attack trends information is publicly available. I hope that will be provided to members of the committee without filing a Freedom of Information Act request. Can I count on that?

Mr. VELZ. In the March 2007 quarterly report, we have a chart on average weekly attacks from April 2004 to February 2007.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have data older than February of 2007?

Mr. VELZ. This is in the March 2007 quarterly report.

Mr. ANDREWS. So the next quarterly report will be due at the end of June?

Mr. VELZ. That is correct. At the beginning of June.

Mr. ANDREWS. Now let me explore, obviously if in your judgment the target of the attacks should be classified, I wouldn’t expect you to answer the question. On what basis are we classifying that information? My understanding is the purpose of classifying information would be to protect the lives of the people that are defending our country, to subject them to no undue risk or to avoid giving the enemy any sort of tactical advantage.

You need to understand, though, that there is a political discussion going on in the country about whether or not Iraq is in a civil war. It is a very important question. It is not just a semantic one. And as the number of attacks against Iraqi civilians rise, so does the evidence that Iraq is in a civil war. What is the basis for classifying that number? Why can’t the American people know that number?

General JONES. Again, Congressman, I think that in terms of summarizing overall trend information in terms of the attacks, that that information is in a variety of open sources, to include the 9010 report that gets issued once a quarter or sent over to the Congress. The specifics of either the numbers of attacks against specific types of targets, the effects of those attacks, the casualties that are suffered because of those attacks we think provide the types of enemies that we have, that do not have complete information about what is going on, an advantage that puts our troops at risk.

Mr. ANDREWS. I would never want in any way to suggest that we should do that. And I respect your judgment very, very much. But I think the committee needs to take into account the context in which these questions are being asked. The President said in January that we should give his surge idea a chance to work. And I believe there were comments from the President and the White House that, by July or August, we would know if the surge was working. The term “working” has to be attached to some quantitative and qualitative benchmark, to use a word that is going around here a lot. And although I would by no means say that the number of attacks should be the exclusive benchmark or that it tells the entire story, for those of us who frankly have come to the conclusion that we are now refereeing a civil war, knowing the number of attacks that are being launched against Iraqi civilians is a very significant number.
And Mr. Chairman, I would just suggest that, in your discussion with the Secretary of Defense, that you raise this issue as to the what I view as an overclassification of information. Again, I deeply respect the judgment of the uniform personnel, in particular that if there is a need to protect information, protect our troops, I am for it. But if this is a political decision that is being made to cloud the discussion in the country as to whether the surge is working or not, that is indefensible. And I would hope that, in your discussions with the Secretary, you would make some of our views—I think it is yours as well—known. That is my strong sense here, is that we are overclassifying this information on political grounds rather than strategic ones. Thank you.

General Jones. Mr. Chairman, if I could just elaborate.

Mr. Meehan. General.

General Jones. First of all, clearly, you know, we want to inform the committee and the members of what the information is. There is a classified annex to that 9010 report that does in fact have more detailed and classified information. However, in the unclassified portion there is some information about some of the subjects that you discussed. The numbers of attacks are in fact in the unclassified portion. I believe the attacks against civilians is also cumulatively a number that is in that unclassified portion of the report. So I think that most of the things that you mentioned in the aggregate, you know, by month are in the report. What I was talking about needing to stay classified is within a category of total number of attacks, Iraqi security force attacks versus coalition versus police versus other small sub-elements of that numbers of attacks.

Mr. Andrews. How many attacks were there in April of 2007?

General Jones. I don’t have that number off the top of my head, but I——

Mr. Andrews. Would you supply it for the record?

General Jones [continuing]. I can supply it for the record. I can get that for you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 43.]

Mr. Andrews. And could you give the committee a classified document that breaks the attacks down by the target of the attacks?

General Jones. And I believe it will actually be in the report, but I will gladly provide that separately.

Mr. Andrews. Thank you very much.

Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Andrews. And I can assure you and the Chairman, in my meeting with the Secretary of Defense, we will bring these matters to attention. Oftentimes what happens to Members of Congress is we end up relying on what the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal are writing about numbers, because let’s face it, these numbers leak out to media sources. And we get the information through the media rather than from the Pentagon. But I do want to distinguish between what is classified and what isn’t classified to what has happened before this committee. The Department of Defense is reserving the right here to bar enlisted personnel, career bureaucrats and any officers below the rank of colonel from testifying to this oversight committee or to having their statements transcribed. And according to the guidelines from the Department of Defense, junior officers, non-commis-
sioned officers deemed appropriate by the Department of Defense may only provide some briefings, but shall not be asked to have their names entered into the record or have it be part of the record. These are all rules, in my view, that are designed to keep from the committee doing its work. And it is plain, and it is simple. Whether that is political, whether that is embarrassment of how poorly things are going in Iraq, whether it is because they don’t want to have to defend the years—we have spent $1.2 trillion. We will spend in defense spending this year, if you count the regular defense budget, the supplementals, approximately $1.2 trillion; 9.2 billion per month. So whatever the reasons are, we will get to the bottom. And hopefully, we won’t have to resort to subpoenas. But we will if we have to.

Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you for your testimony. I am right here. Good morning, sir. What I ask you may be a bit redundant, but I want to kind of wrap it up as the cleanup hitter. And it particularly relates to the size of the Iraqi Defense Forces. As I understand it, we have set out to train 135 battalions. Is that the objective number? Infantry battalions?

General JONES. I believe that is a cumulative number, sir.

Mr. SPRATT. How is that, sir?

General JONES. That is not just infantry battalions. That includes national police battalions. It includes all police battalions.

Mr. SPRATT. Oh, it does. Okay. So 114 are now trained, deemed to be capable of planning an attack, coordinating an attack with other units and executing the attack?

General JONES. Sir, if I could defer to—I can give you precise numbers in terms of what level they are in a closed session.

Mr. SPRATT. Okay.

General JONES. The exact readiness rating is classified. But we can either provide that classified——

Mr. SPRATT. I was reading the memo for this hearing, and it had some of that information in it. Is the number 337,200 a classified number?

General JONES. No, sir. What we have done, in order to provide information that is unclassified, what we have done is grouped some categories together. In the unclassified mode, we can say that there are 119 battalions between Iraqi National Police battalions and Iraqi Army battalions that are either operating as in the lead or independent categories of readiness.

Mr. SPRATT. I have got a page here, attachment number two. Do you have access to that? It has got a DOD seal on it and also says unclassified.

General JONES. I don’t have a copy of that, sir.

Mr. SPRATT. We will get you a copy.

General JONES. Okay.

Mr. SPRATT. I thought he was handing him a copy. Looking at this chart, if you would—would you also hand him attachment number three, please, sir? Looking at this chart, it indicates that the objective Ministry of Defense forces are 143,000? Including the Air Force and Navy?

General JONES. Yes, sir.
Mr. SPRATT. As I take it, you can’t tell us how close we are to that number yet?

General JONES. That is approximately right within somewhere——

Mr. SPRATT. About where we are?

General JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPRATT. And on the side of Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces is 194,200. And one category listed as other MOI forces. What are they?

General JONES. Those are everything from the forensics units, major crime units, highway patrol. The way the Ministry of Interior is organized, you have station police, which are what is out in precincts and normal what we would think of as police stations. You have national police, which is a kind of gendarme-like organization, kind of a paramilitary, high-end security set of organizations. And those are organized in battalions. And so they have a quasi-military sort of organization. The other MOI forces are all the other kinds of things that you need in the police establishment. A lot of those in the United States would be decentralized to local, more local areas like State highway patrols, traffic police, you know, other kinds of police functions, and also the headquarters, everything from provincial headquarters to district headquarters and those kinds of forces.

Mr. SPRATT. Now, looking at we have 337,200 troops between the MOI and MOD, and 150,000 to 160,000 coalition troops. Do we have an estimate of what it is going to take to subdue the country and placate the country and bring it to some reasonable level of stability? What size force, indigenous force will it require and what augmentation is required of us?

General JONES. The current plan for the force—I have to kind of caveat this with, to kind of reemphasize a point that we make; and that is, while the security forces are an essential element, forces in and of themselves are necessary, but not completely adequate for bringing the country to a state of peace.

Mr. SPRATT. I understand that. That is a point I am glad you made. But to the extent we need security forces, police and armed forces to back them up and to establish a rule of order, is 337,000 sufficient?

General JONES. No, sir. The current plan is to bring that force level by the end of the year, up to something in excess of about 350,000. I will tell you that that force structure is under review by the Iraqi government, with us in an advisory mode to talk to them about their force needs and whether or not that number is the right number and if they need to make any other adjustments. So I would tell you that right now the prime minister and his government are looking at their force structure. But right now in order to get to what they think they need, it is a little bit in excess of 350. I believe the number is 365,000 total.

Mr. SPRATT. If you look at attachment number three, I infer from that that more than about two-thirds of the country has now been assigned to these trained battalions as their respective areas of operation.

General JONES. Right.
Mr. SPRATT. So except for a little piece down in Basra and what looks like most of al-Anbar province, the country has designated indigenous forces assigned to areas of operation that cover most of the country today.

General JONES. Right. This chart represents Iraqi forces that have been given sector control. And that is they are responsible for an area of operations. Again, this goes back to kind of the history when we started off and with Iraqi forces that are not very capable. Typically, coalition forces have been responsible for sector control, and they generally had operational control of Iraqi forces that operated under the tactical guidance of that coalition commander. What the green areas represent on this chart is where we have transitioned where an Iraqi unit has been designated as being responsible for an actual sector. Now, in order to do that, typically they are at one of the two highest levels of readiness.

TRA level one is where they are independent, and that is, they don't need additional support to be able to do their mission. Level two is where, although they may be responsible for sector control and be in the lead of operations, they still need coalition support in order to be effective. So although we have been very successful in turning over sector control to Iraqi forces, in a lot of this green area, it does represent units that still are at level two, and that is, they still need coalition support in order to be effective.

Mr. SPRATT. It looks like the city of Baghdad is about half covered by areas of operation. As I recall, five brigades were to be part of the surge. How many have actually been deployed?

General JONES. Sir, four of those have been deployed. The fourth one just arrived and started doing operations a couple days ago. And the fifth one is designated to deploy in June.

Mr. SPRATT. I am talking indigenous.

General JONES. You are talking about Iraqi brigades, sir?

Mr. SPRATT. Yes.

General JONES. The Iraqi brigades to be deployed, they came down in January and February. By the end of February, those additional three brigades were deployed. Two of those brigades, they originally were going to go for a 90-day period. Two of those brigades have been extended. The third brigade, there is a force that has been designated to replace them. The exact time of that replacement hasn't been determined yet to the best of my knowledge. But what we expect is one of those brigades will change out; the other two will remain in place.

Mr. SPRATT. Now, are these brigades Kurdish, or is there a way to characterize their composition, where they come from?

General JONES. I would characterize two of them as being predominantly Kurdish.

Mr. SPRATT. Is this because it was difficult to get Iraqi units from the other parts of the country to come to Baghdad and participate?

General JONES. No, sir. I believe the judgment was made based upon where forces could be moved from that would have the lowest risk in terms of the current security environment that they were responsible for. So, in this case, because of the relatively low level of violence, it was seen that you could take some of the forces and move them to Baghdad in a reinforcing mode and have the least
amount of risk of security situation changing where they came from.

Mr. SPRATT. Now, is our plan to eventually clear up those beige areas and have them turned green, with areas of operation assigned to Iraqi units so that we can withdraw and leave the Iraqi units we have trained and work with in charge of that area of operation around Baghdad?

General JONES. Clearly over time what we would like to do is continue to turn over more responsibility to the Iraqi units to where they are responsible for all the sectors in Baghdad, to then continue to reduce the amount of assistance that they need from coalition forces, understanding they will still need their embedded training teams with them for connectivity to those things that are outside the normal structure of those kinds of units, for instance, air support or other things that they may not have yet.

Mr. SPRATT. Did I understand you to say that the Iraqi units are staying about 90 days, rotating in and out on 90-day intervals?

General JONES. The initial deployment order for the three Iraqi brigades was to deploy for a period of 90 days. Then the decision was made to extend two of the three brigades and just keep them beyond their 90-day rotation. The third brigade, they have identified another force to be able to replace it, to allow it to rotate back to its originating area. But all—but they will sustain the force levels that the Iraqis have committed to in order to have one of the Iraqi army brigades in each of the districts in Baghdad.

Mr. SPRATT. In order for us eventually to stand down our troops as they stand up their troops, doesn’t it appear they are going to need more troops?

General JONES. That is under consideration right now. It is one of the reasons they are re-looking at their force structure. I don’t think there is a decision been reached—I know, as of a couple days ago, there had not been a decision reached or even a recommendation made to the prime minister yet for him to make a decision. But they are re-looking at their structure and whether or not the current program force is going to be adequate for their needs in order to allow us to withdraw. There are a couple factors in terms of what their needs are. One is the level of violence, which is a little hard to predict. But there are a number of factors that can change that. As we mentioned before, obviously political reconciliation is an essential factor that can change the dynamic pretty dramatically in terms of the security requirements. So, I mean, that is one example of other factors that could change that would cause them to either need less or more forces. But I think that, right now, they are doing this review based on their best estimates of what they think the security environment will need and how fast they can produce capability to replace the requirement for coalition forces.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Spratt. We would like to ask the staff if they have some questions and would like to, or if any of the members have follow-ups. But I would like to ask to Dr. Lorry Fenner, our subcommittee staff lead, if she has questions.

Dr. FENNER. Just briefly. General, Mr. Velz, thank you for being here today. We have several iterations of the strategy, the National
Strategy for Victory in Iraq and the New Way Forward. Can you tell us what is the priority of the development of the Iraqi security forces among those strategies?

General Jones. I am sorry, could you restate the question again?

Dr. Fenn. Sure. The development of the Iraqi security forces is a key, I think you would agree, in the versions of the strategy that have been made public. What priority is that at now? The reason I am asking the question is that, again, the Members are learning some things from the press, but we would like to get the Department’s view rather than the view from the press to make sure we have the accurate one. There have been articles over time that this priority of development of the Iraqi security forces has shifted. At one point, we thought it was the number one priority. Then it seemed that that changed to be a subsidiary priority to establishing security. And now, in the paper again today, it looks like it may raise in priority again. And if there are documents that reflect this change in the priority of the ISF development, the subcommittee would probably value having that.

General Jones. Okay. Thanks for clarifying. Sorry I didn’t understand it first. I want to approach in terms of the overall strategy, just approach it in terms of military tasks. There was a signal change in terms of how we approach the military tasks prior to the strategy review that occurred last fall and winter. The main military tasks were to defeat the terrorists, to neutralize the insurgency, and to transition to Iraqi security self-reliance. We introduced a fourth military task as a result of the strategic review, and that is to assist the Iraqis in establishing population control. That military task is one of the reasons why the additional forces were required, to be able to do this additional task.

So in terms of priority, right now, I believe in terms of General Petraeus’s priority, assisting the Iraqis in establishing population control, especially in Baghdad, was the number one priority. And the reason for that is because the level of sectarian violence in our judgment had gotten to the point where it made the political and economic accommodation that needed to be reached to get toward national reconciliation impossible. So, militarily, we needed to assist the Iraqis in stopping this cycle of sectarian violence, which had in our view become self-sustaining. As that level of sectarian violence comes down and allows political accommodation to occur, we can then see a change in the security situation.

To say, in terms of priority, although we made population security a priority, it did not diminish the training effort. And the reason it didn’t is because the additional forces that were requested and provided to the multinational force allowed them to take on this military task, but at the same time continued to man the transition teams, continued to do the training and equip mission that MNSTC–I is responsible for.

Dr. Fenn. Thank you.

Mr. Meehan. And now, Roger Zakheim.

Roger, did you have any questions?

Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just if you would clarify how the Baghdad security plan, if at all, has demonstrated the importance of the Iraq police services and what we have learned about them through the new operation and
new strategy. To what extent are we capitalizing on the Iraqi police services and the transition teams to effect security in Baghdad? And do we anticipate replicating that in other places? There has been little to no mention of the IPS today. Thank you.

General Jones. The Iraqi police are an important part of the Baghdad security plan. And in fact, I believe the execution of the Baghdad plan is having a positive effect on the police. This is an Iraqi plan that is a little bit unique in that it is a joint MOI–MOD plan. The Prime Minister appointed a single person to be in charge of the Baghdad—this Baghdad operational command, that has inside it both Minister of Interior and Minister of Defense Forces. And that is commanded by Lieutenant General Abud. He designated commanders, one on the east side of the Tigris, one on the west side, one of which is an MOI major general, the other one is an MOD, a defense major general. Each of those has a deputy of the opposite ministry. They established joint security stations, where the Iraqi Army units and the police forces are co-located with their headquarters, where they plan and prepare to conduct operations in that Baghdad district that have caused a level of cooperation and working together between the police and the army that, at least in my experience, we have not seen before. It is kind of unprecedented, and probably not just since we have been there, but probably in the history of the country.

So we have seen this cooperative effort between the two types of forces. And I think that what has happened, we know that the Iraqi army forces are more advanced in terms of their maturity than the police forces as a whole. And I think the joint operations of these two have actually caused an improvement in the conduct of the police out on the streets of Baghdad. So I think it has been beneficial, and I think we are seeing some positive results.

The last thing is the rebluing effort of these national police units that are deployed into Baghdad, is we have taken those units out, done some retraining with them, and then, replacing the leadership and putting them back into the fight. For those units that have been through that process, the feedback that we have gotten is very positive. Their conduct, their reliability is much improved.

Mr. Zakheim. Thank you.

Mr. Meehan. Do any members have any other follow-up questions?

Ms. Davis of California. Mr. Chairman? Could you just give us a general, maybe this is a ballpark number, but if our mission were solely to train the Iraqis and to provide backup support, what would that number be? Generally speaking?

General Jones. Ma’am, I am sorry that I don’t know. I have never broken it out that way because of the difficulty of trying to. You know, partnering units are also doing several things simultaneously. So all the units that are deployed doing security operations are also partnered with Iraqi units. And if you were going to have the same approach and you took out their other tactical requirements, maybe you could increase the number of units that a U.S. unit was partnered with or something that would change the numbers. But frankly, I haven’t ever analyzed it from that perspective.

Ms. Davis of California. Have you all done that in any way?
General Jones. I am not aware that anybody has done that, mostly because I don’t think that, given the security environment, anybody has looked at that as being a viable course of action. That for right now, in order for the Iraqi units to continue to develop to where they can become self-reliant, we have to help them with forces doing operations to have a secure enough environment that they can continue to mature.

Ms. Davis of California. Thank you.

Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mrs. Davis. I want to thank both Mr. Velz and General Jones for your testimony and cooperation here today. I guess you got a little bit caught in crossfire between disagreements that we have between the Department of Defense, but I really appreciate both of you being here. General Jones, in particular, I want to thank you and congratulate you for your outstanding service to our country and very much appreciate you being here.

In answer to Dr. Snyder's question of whether I have been too courteous, too kind or too cooperative, my mother would agree that one could never be too courteous, too kind or too cooperative, but I appreciate you both being here. We said we would get you out, General, by 12. You are going to have an extra hour on your hands.

But I want to remind committee members, we are going to have another subcommittee meeting on Thursday. The hearing will be in room 2212. We will hear from the Department of Defense and members of the police transition teams. So again, thank you, both of you.

Mr. Akin. Mr. Chairman, just to mention Col. Reeves, we understand you have been also very helpful in providing us with some information. We want to thank you and General Jones for helping us with some of these different reports. It makes a difference. Thank you.

Mr. Meehan. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 10:52 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MAY 22, 2007
Opening Statement of  
Chairman Martin Meehan  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations  

Hearing on Training of Iraqi Security Forces and Employment of Transition Teams.  

May 22, 2007  

Good morning, and welcome to this hearing of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.  

Today, we continue our examination of the most pressing issue facing the country: the war in Iraq. In past weeks, the subcommittee has looked into the manning, training, and equipping of the Iraqi Security Forces and the U.S. military and police transition teams.  

In today’s hearing we will receive testimony from witnesses on the command relationships and responsibilities of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq – called MNCF – and the Iraq Assistance Group – called the IAG. Specifically, they will discuss the employment of Transition Teams with Iraqi Security Forces. Additionally, we will hear about the Multi-National Security Assistance Team-Iraq – called MNSTC-I – and its Civilian Police Advisory and Training Team – called CPATT. They are charged with training and equipping the Iraqi Police Service and managing training teams for the Ministries of Defense and Interior. CPATT also supervises the contractors who are International Police Liaison Officers and International Police Trainers working with the Iraqi local police.  

Other issues we want to address include the role that military and police unit readiness reporting plays in assessing the performance of Iraqi Security Forces. More importantly, we want to hear about the actions generated by these assessments, and how feedback is provided to Iraqi leaders. We want to hear our guests’ frank appraisals of how the current structure for Transition Teams was developed and how future requirements are being determined and then communicated to the Services as force providers.  

Part of the reason for this hearing is the inability of the subcommittee to get documents and informed answers from witnesses in past hearings on Civilian Police Advisory and Assistance Training Team in particular, and the details on the command relationships in general. You may be aware that previous witnesses and briefers have had to take numerous committee questions for the record. You may not be aware than responses to questions for the record have been slow in coming or non-existent to date. I hope we do not have the same problem today.  

Our Members and the public should know, without disrespect intended towards these witnesses, that these were not the witnesses that we had hoped to hear from
today. Because some of our other efforts have been delayed or blocked, we finally requested access to commanders whose plans, policies and assessment of progress are crucial to our understanding of the effort to transition security responsibilities to the Iraqi Security Forces. They were not made available, so we asked for their deputies or any knowledgeable staff officer. None were made available and no alternatives were suggested. Then we asked for knowledgeable staff officers from Central Command Headquarters in Tampa. We were told none was capable of providing testimony. We were offered instead a possible CDE for eight Members late in June, which we will appreciate but is really much delayed in contributing to important debates in this House. And I would remind the committee that a staff delegation arranged for mid April was cancelled. We were also offered access to Lieutenant General Dempsey when he returns in mid-June, which we will also appreciate but which also doesn’t fulfill our requirements.

So gentleman, I hope for all our sakes’ that you are able to answer our questions today. Among them will be specific questions about the contents of a critical document that this subcommittee has not been able to obtain, the Joint Campaign Plan signed by the Commander of the Multinational Forces Iraq and the Embassy as it pertains to developing the Iraqi Security Forces. MNSTC-I also has an unclassified Campaign Plan for developing the ISF and that has not been provided to us either.

Today’s hearing will begin with testimony from Mr. Peter Velez who is from the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for the Middle East. He will be followed by Brigadier General Michael Jones from the Joint Staff. He is the Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs for the Middle East.

To encourage discussion, I would like to follow the same less-formal procedures today as we have in our previous sessions. I have talked with our distinguished Ranking Member, and he has agreed to dispense with the 5-minute rule during today’s hearing, but I would ask my colleagues not to monopolize the witnesses. I will try to alternate in recognizing members between the Majority and Minority.

I would like to remind everyone that this is an open hearing so no classified information will be discussed. However, if necessary, when we are finished here we can retire to a separate room for a classified discussion for just members and cleared staff.

Welcome again to our witnesses. We’re looking forward to your remarks. We will take your whole text for the record, but I ask that you keep your prepared remarks fairly brief so we can get to our questions.

Now, I would like to turn to my colleague, Mr. Akin, our ranking member, for any opening remarks he might have.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our witnesses for being here today—I look forward to hearing your statements.

Today we continue to build the public record of our investigation of the Iraqi Security Forces. The purpose of today’s hearing is to look at the command responsibilities of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) and the Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG) in employing transition teams, and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) for training and equipping the ISF. I’m particularly interested in how the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team (CPATT) train and equip the Iraq Police Services.

These are the organizations that own the ISF mission. Their day to day work executes the mission of building an indigenous Iraqi force that we
expect will stabilize Iraq, and will ensure that Iraq has a chance to overcome its sectarian and ethnic divisions.

Mr. Chairman, as we complete this investigation of the ISF we need to return to the core issues of this investigation and answer some fundamental questions:

- First, are the Iraqi Security Forces we’ve trained ready to take the lead? We know how many soldiers and police we have trained, but we are less clear on how they performing. Besides making the ISF logistically independent and improving ministerial capacity, what challenges remain for the ISF that U.S. forces can help solve?

- On the strategic level, we need to revisit whether the ISF are really the linchpin to securing the country. While I am convinced that having a competent Iraqi Security Force is a necessary condition for stabilizing Iraq, it certainly is not the only necessary condition. The political dimension is absolutely vital too. The Baghdad Security Plan may be a key metric for evaluating whether we are using the ISF in a strategically sound
way, and if the ISF are performing effectively at the tactical level.

I’m interested in our witnesses views on these critical questions.

Again, thank you to all the witnesses for being here today.

[Yield Back to Chairman Meehan]
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MAY 22, 2007
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MEEHAN

Mr. MEEHAN. Please provide the classified casualty data collected by MNF–I.

General JONES and Mr. Velz. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Please provide the names, ranks, titles, and contact information for any person within CENTCOM and the Pentagon who is directly responsible for establishing policy, planning for, coordinating, monitoring, and reporting to the Chairman or Secretary on the following activities that fall within the purview of MNF–I (to include all subordinate organizations): a. Transition teams (all kinds, i.e. MiTTs, PTTs, NPTTs, BTTs, etc.) b. ISF development c. MOI and MOD progress.

General JONES. The Commander of US Central Command, Admiral William J. Fallon, is responsible for establishing policy, planning for, coordinating, monitoring, and reporting to the Secretary of Defense on the issues listed above.

Mr. MEEHAN. Please provide the names, ranks, titles, and contact information for any person within CENTCOM and the Pentagon who is directly responsible for establishing policy, planning for, coordinating, monitoring, and reporting to the Chairman or Secretary on the following activities that fall within the purview of MNF–I (to include all subordinate organizations): a. Transition teams (all kinds, i.e. MiTTs, PTTs, NPTTs, BTTs, etc.) b. ISF development c. MOI and MOD progress.

Mr. VELZ.

• There are a considerable number of responsible parties that deal with the activities mentioned in the question. Many of these individuals change on a regular basis within the organizations listed below.
  • The Department of Defense is always pleased to respond to direct specific question to the appropriate office in response to a Congressional inquiry.
  • The Government of Iraq (GOI), through the Ministries of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI) and in consultation with the Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) through the Commanding General, Multi-National Forces, Iraq (MNF–I) and the Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command, Iraq (MNSTC–I), establishes policy and planning for the requirements for manpower and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
  • The Secretary of Defense evaluates the GOI established requirements and is responsible for development of policy, in consultation with the Department of State, to determine which GOI requirements the USG will support. Recommendations are solicited from MNSTC–I through MNF–I and CENTCOM. Within DoD, policy development is accomplished by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, International Security Affairs, Middle East.
  • The Department of Defense, through the Commander, U.S. Central Command is tasked under National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36 with the responsibility to assist the GOI to man, train, and equip the Iraqi Security Forces in both the MOD and MOI. Responsibility for determining equipment and manpower requirements for execution of these tasks, including the size, composition and location of assignment, falls to the Commanding General, Multi-National Corps, Iraq (MNC–I), through MNF–I and CENTCOM, and is then adjudicated by the Joint Staff and the force providers. Once in the field, MNC–I coordinates transition team employment, and monitors and reports on the effectiveness of transition teams.
  • ISF development is the responsibility of the GOI in consultation with MNSTC–I through MNF–I and CENTCOM. MNC–I feedback provides a resource to MNSTC–I to assist the GOI in identifying weakness in ISF training and equipping that can be considered as part of the future resourcing process.
  • Development of capacity of the MOD and MOI to sustain forces in the field falls to MNSTC–I. Capacity assessment is provided as part of the MNSTC–I monthly collective assessment.

Mr. MEEHAN. Please outline what the planning process was for the development of the ISF, identifying specific planning documents, and indicate if this plan is still in effect.
Mr. MEENAN. Please outline what the planning process was for the development of the ISF, identifying specific planning documents, and indicate if this plan is still in effect.

Mr. VELZ. The “plan” for the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)—comprised of the Iraqi military and police forces—has undergone several evolutions. The main factors that have driven these revisions include changes in the threat conditions in Iraq, changes in assigned responsibilities for developing the ISF, and the ability and desire of the Iraqi government to determine end-state force structures. The current force structure plans, particularly for the Iraqi Army, reflect a substantial increase from the original plan.

In 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was responsible for funding the development of the police and military forces and for acting as the de facto command over these forces. It promulgated CPA Order 22, “Creation of the New Iraqi Army” to establish a new army for the defense of a free Iraq.

Combined Joint Task Force-Seven (CJTF–7) units established a separate force, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), pursuant to CPA Order 28 in September 2003, as a temporary institution to counter the continued attacks and acts of sabotage by Ba’athist remnants and terrorists intent on undermining security in Iraq. The end state number of ICDC battalions grew as CJTF–7 units’ requirement for local security forces to assist with basic local security tasks grew.

In early 2004, an assessment team recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the responsibility for training and equipping be unified under USCENTCOM. By June 2004, Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq (MNSTC–I) was established to unify these activities, a function it maintains today.

After the dissolution of the CPA, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD–36, May 2004, delineated responsibility for training and equipping Iraqi forces. NSPD–36 assigns continued responsibility for Iraqi military and police forces to USCENTCOM and specifies that the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State shall determine when to transition to traditional arrangements. MNSTC–I assumed this mission under USCENTCOM. Mergers of some forces and emergence of other forces have occurred since 2003, and the end state force structures have grown substantially.

**Police Forces**

Initial plans for the numbers of Iraqi police were based on a CPA assessment done in 2003. Based on input from Major Subordinate Commands under CJTF–7, force levels required to help maintain local control were developed. At the end of 2003, the target number of Iraqi police increased from about 25,000 to about 60,000.

In early 2004, the CPA estimated that 90,000 police would be necessary (based upon 27 million Iraqi citizens). It was subsequently determined that more police were necessary; MNSTC–I and Iraqi leaders agreed on a nationwide target of 1 police for every 200 citizens, resulting in an Objective Civil Security Force that included 135,000 police.

In late 2004, the MoI established the Police Commandos under the command and control of the Minister of Interior to conduct paramilitary counterinsurgency operations as the threat environment intensified. Initially, there was no MNSTC–I involvement with this force. However, once there were indications that the Police Commandos were having some early success in fighting insurgents, MNSTC–I became involved in training and equipping them and in working with the MoI on force planning.

In 2006, the Commandos were re-designated as the National Police, and a program of re-training and re-vetting was undertaken in late 2006 to reform them due to their growing reputation for human rights violations. This program is ongoing, and some top commanders have been replaced.

**Military Forces**

In May 2003, CPA Order 2, “Dissolution of Entities,” abolished the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, all related national security ministries and offices, and all military formations, including the Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard, Ba’ath Party Militia, and the Fedayeen Saddam. CPA advisors then began to plan the new Ministry of Defense and the New Iraqi Army. Consultations with tribal leaders were held to begin to recruit new volunteers, and surveys of destroyed Iraqi Army bases were undertaken to identify basing locations. The New Iraqi Army force structure was envisioned as a three-division Army focused on territorial defense with its logistics support coming from other ministries in the Iraqi government.
At the same time, CJTF–7 determined it required one battalion of local forces per province to help deal with internal security threats, resulting in establishment of the ICDC. Over the next year, a series of adjustments resulted in the ICDC end-strength culminating in a strategic review undertaken in mid-2004 by the CG, MNSTC–I and U.S. Chief of Mission that expanded the end-strength to 62 battalions. The Ministry of Defense redesignated the ICDC as the Iraqi National Guard (ING). The strategic review resulted in shifting $1.8 billion in Iraq Reconstruction and Relief Funds from water and sanitation and other reconstruction projects into the security sector to fund this force structure growth. Additionally, several brigades were added to the Army force structure as a result of Iraqi government initiatives.

In early 2005, the Iraqi government decided to merge the ING into the Iraqi Army and changed the Army end state to nine light infantry divisions and one mechanized division. Upon completion of training of the basic combat force structure in December 2006, MNSTC–I transitioned basic recruit training to the Iraqis and shifted focus to development of enablers required to sustain the Iraqi force.

In 2006, Prime Minister Maliki decided to increase the size of the Army from ten to twelve divisions, mainly by cross-leveling among divisions and implementing of a replenishment program to replace forces no longer in the force due to combat losses or other departures from the service. The plan also included increasing manning authorizations 10 percent for all ten divisions, to boost present-for-duty unit strength.

In 2007, Prime Minister Maliki decided to increase the authorized strength of divisions so that authorized strength is now 120 percent of what it was at the beginning of 2006.

Currently, a rapid expansion of the Iraqi Army training capacity is in progress to meet future growth required to build a more robust national armed force from 2008 through 2010. The training base will expand rapidly at three locations to increase capacity. Divisions will grow quantitatively, and additional force structure is being added to support them.

The Iraq Navy (IqN) has a current force structure of 212 officers and 1,050 enlisted sailors including a small naval infantry unit. The current force structure is derived from naval base reconstruction limitations at Umm Qasr, embryonic fleet development, and the small operational requirements. “Right sizing” the force is dependent on new ship procurement, infrastructure improvements, increasing operational capability, and threat analysis. IqN is projected to grow to roughly 2,400 personnel by 2011. Larger recruitment increases are expected when new ship deliveries and barracks construction at Umm Qasr are complete.

The Iraqi Air Force consists of small reconnaissance aircraft and retired C–130 aircraft transferred from the U.S. Air Force. Additionally, helicopters have been donated by Jordan, and the United States is considering the transfer of additional helicopters. A long-range plan has been developed by the GOI, assisted by MNSTC–I.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ANDREWS

Mr. ANDREWS. For the last month for which you have available data, how many attacks were launched by the resistance or counterinsurgency in Iraq?

Mr. VEILZ. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ANDREWS. How many attacks were there in April of 2007?

General JONES. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ANDREWS. Could you give the committee a classified document that breaks the attacks down by the target of the attacks?

General JONES. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]