[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-55]
CONTRACTING FOR THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 25, 2007
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OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California JEFF MILLER, Florida
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
JIM COOPER, Tennessee GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania
Greg Marchand, Professional Staff Member
Thomas Hawley, Professional Staff Member
Roger Zakheim, Professional Staff Member
Sasha Rogers, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2007
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, April 25, 2007, Contracting for the Iraqi Security
Forces......................................................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, April 25, 2007........................................ 65
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 2007
CONTRACTING FOR THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking
Member, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee.............. 3
Meehan, Hon. Marty, a Representative from Massachusetts,
Chairman, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee............ 1
WITNESSES
Avant, Dr. Deborah D., Professor, Political Science and
International Affairs, Director, Institute for Global and
International Studies, George Washington University............ 45
Brooks, Doug, President, International Peace Operations
Association.................................................... 48
Burke, Gerald F., Major, Massachusetts State Police (Ret.),
Former Senior Advisor, Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Iraqi
Police Service................................................. 51
Motsek, Gary J., Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense,
Office of Program Support, Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), U.S. Department
of Defense..................................................... 8
Patterson, Ambassador Anne W., Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
U.S. Department of State....................................... 4
Raines, Col. Anita M., Chief, Logistics Services Division, J4
Directorate, Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense........... 10
Swartz, Bruce C., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, U.S. Department of Justice........................... 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Akin, Hon. W. Todd........................................... 71
Avant, Dr. Deborah........................................... 98
Brooks, Doug................................................. 113
Burke, Gerald F.............................................. 123
Meehan, Hon. Marty........................................... 69
Motsek, Gary J., joint with Col. Anita Raines................ 94
Patterson, Ambassador Anne W................................. 74
Swartz, Bruce C.............................................. 80
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Mr. Akin..................................................... 139
Mr. Andrews.................................................. 140
Ms. Davis.................................................... 140
Dr. Gingrey.................................................. 146
Mr. Meehan................................................... 135
Dr. Snyder................................................... 139
CONTRACTING FOR THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 25, 2007.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:04 a.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Marty Meehan
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARTY MEEHAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MASSACHUSETTS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Meehan. Good morning, and welcome to our witnesses and
guests. This is the sixth session and second open hearing of
the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on the topic
of the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
In his address to the Nation on January 10th, the President
announced his intention to accelerate the transition of
security operations to the Iraqis. Reports from the theater
regarding the readiness and performance of the Iraqi army have,
however, been mixed, and news regarding the Iraqi police
services has often been very discouraging. It is my intent to
lead this subcommittee past the anecdotal evidence and to get
to the bottom of what kind of progress we are really making.
To that end, we have been pursuing this effort through a
series of briefings, hearings, and requests for information
over the past several months to examine specific aspects of the
Iraqi security forces. We have looked at training, equipment,
logistics and costs. We have talked to the leaders engaged in
the effort and have tried to talk to the more junior personnel
who work directly with the Iraqi Security Forces on a daily
basis.
Last week, you may know, our efforts to do that were
blocked at the last minute by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Legislative Affairs. Since we have Department of
Defense (DOD) witnesses with us today, I would like our record
to reflect the fact that we are unhappy about what happened
last week and, furthermore, that no one from the senior levels
of the department or the Joint Staff has called us to discuss
the situation.
I would also like to have it on our record that today this
is not a settled issue, and I would not expect the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs to
stand in the way of this committee's constitutional
responsibility to perform oversight, in pursuant to our
congressional prerogatives and policies. And it is not the
intention of this subcommittee to have the department dictate
what our policies or what our procedures ought to be.
With that said, today we turn our attention to the role of
private contractors and the role that they have played in the
mission to train, equip and sustain Iraqi Security Forces.
There were almost 127,000 contractors for the Department of
Defense alone in Iraq, as of the DOD's most recent count, in
addition to the 145,000 troops. And I want to repeat that:
There were almost 127,000 contractors for the Department of
Defense--only the Department of Defense--in Iraq, as of the
DOD's most recent count, in addition to 145,000 troops.
We must leave aside for another day the broader issue of
whether this is an appropriate way for the United States to
fight its modern wars. Today, we will focus on the role that
these contractors have played, with respect to the Iraqi
Security Forces' mission.
We will first receive testimony from a panel of the
Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of
Justice witnesses. The reason for the breadth of this panel is
that the Iraqi security forces' mission does not involve only
Iraqi military training. The Departments of State and Justice
have played a major role in training Iraqi police, advising the
Ministry of Interior, and other rule-of-law-oriented missions.
We will look forward to hearing about how the roles and
responsibilities for each agency in Iraq have evolved, as well
as the procedures for accountability, management and oversight
of contractors that have been put in place. In addition, we
expect our Department of Defense witnesses will provide us with
greater insight into the nuts and bolts of how contracting for
a mission as broad and complex as this is being done and
implemented.
Our first panel of witnesses includes Assistant Secretary
of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, Ambassador Anne Patterson; Deputy Assistant Attorney
General Bruce Swartz; Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense Gary Motsek; the Colonel Anita Raines, who is the chief
of the logistics services division of the Joint Staff.
We also welcome a second panel of witnesses today, who we
expect will provide both outside perspectives on the use of
contractors for this kind of mission, and a real-life account
of the contractor-led police development effort on the ground
in Iraq.
Our second panel includes: Dr. Deborah Avant, who is
Director for Global and International Studies at the George
Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs;
Mr. Doug Brooks, the President of the International Peace
Operations Association; and Gerald Burke, who is a retired
Major in the Massachusetts State Police and former Senior
Adviser to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Iraqi Police
Services.
To encourage discussion at today's hearing, I would like to
follow the same less-formal procedures as we have in our
previous briefings and hearings. I have talked with our
distinguished ranking member, Mr. Akin, and he has agreed to
dispense with the five-minute rule for today's hearing. And
pursuant to Rule 11(b)(2) of the rules of our committee, the
Subcommittee will dispense with the five-minute rule and allow
questioning to proceed, as subcommittees express interest
rather than strictly by seniority.
I would like to also remind everyone that, while this is an
open hearing, we have received closed briefings in which
classified information was presented, so please be mindful of
anything you might say based on what you heard in the closed
briefing.
Again, we welcome our witnesses. Thank you for being here.
And we are looking forward to your remarks. And we will take
your whole text for the record, but I would ask you to keep
your prepared remarks fairly brief so that we can get to our
questions.
And now I would like to turn to my colleague, Mr. Akin, our
ranking member, for any opening remarks that he might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Meehan can be found in the
Appendix on page 69.]
STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI,
RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our witnesses for taking time to join us.
And I think today's hearing is starting to come toward the
end of our hearing overall study of how things are going in
training the Iraqi Security Forces, and particularly the focus
today is on contractors and how the contractors help to fill
this critical mission, particularly building the Iraqi Security
Forces.
Specifically, I am interested in how we use contractors for
training the Iraq police services. And it seems to be that the
police area is one that we need to pay some particular
attention to and understand what is going on there, for no
other reason, the police, as sort of a new idea, I suppose, to
the Iraqis.
The U.S. government's reliance on contracts raises a
second, related issue that has come up indirectly a number of
times over the course of our investigation. I am referring to
the challenge of effective interagency participation in Iraq.
Today's hearing should shed light on how agencies other than
Department of Defense have and continue to contribute to the
development of the ISF, in particular, and improving the
overall situation in Iraq in general.
Winning this war requires the application of all elements
of national power; we must be able to tap into a wide-ranging
expertise resident across the U.S. Government.
It seems to me that both the State and Justice Departments
rely on contractors to carry out missions that reside within
their area of expertise, at least with respect to training
local police. I would like our witnesses to comment on the
rationale for this practice and the benefits and drawbacks of
using contractors in Iraq.
Finally, I want to comment on one specific contract matter.
Use of contractors in theater is a complicated situation. When
contractors are embedding in the U.S. police transition teams,
as in the case of the international police liaison officers, an
already complicated matter turns into a matter of concern. I am
curious about the guidance we give these contractors with
respect to command and control, personal security, and
logistical support.
I look forward to the witnesses elaborating on some of
these points. And, once again, thank you all for joining us.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the
Appendix on page 71.]
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Akin.
And I will start with our panel.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ANNE W. PATTERSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE, BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Patterson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Representative Akin, and other distinguished members of the
committee.
The Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs, or INL, is a proud participant in
our nation's effort to help make Iraq a more stable country, by
developing civilian security forces that serve the people of
Iraq. In response to the President's directive that U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) lead the development of Iraqi
Security Forces, INL strives to help the U.S. military's
commanding generals in the field and our fighting men and women
on the ground by providing personnel and contract support for
this mission.
Creating such a force in Iraq is a challenging task, and
the tragic deaths of 17 American police advisers and many other
security personnel are testament to the difficulties and risks
we face. To date, CENTCOM's Civilian Police Assistance Training
Team, or CPATT, has exceeded all its basic training goals, with
the assistance of the Departments of State, Justice and other
agencies, and international partners, but enormous challenges
remain, as the coalition and the government of Iraq continue to
develop the skills, integrity and credibility of these forces.
As demonstrated in other post-conflict police development
missions in the Balkans and elsewhere, this will be a very
lengthy process. INL has conducted post-conflict civilian
police and criminal justice missions since the early 1990's,
but Iraq marks the first time since 1994 in Haiti that we have
participated in such an effort led by the Department of
Defense.
As expected, there have been challenges, but these have
largely been resolved, as the relevant civilian organizations
understand that DOD, through CPATT in the lead, and the
military have come to appreciate the expertise our law
enforcement professionals offer.
Since taking charge of the police mission in 2004, the
Department of Defense has transferred $1.5 billion to INL to
provide a range of support, including operation and maintenance
of the Jordan International Police Training Center, with
interagency and contract help: 690 international police liaison
officers, for which we have contracted with DynCorp
International; 192 international police trainers, provided by
the Department of Justice and their contractor, through an
interagency agreement with INL; 143 border enforcement
advisers, 20 of which are provide by the Department of Justice
and their contractor through an interagency agreement, and 123
of which are provided through a task order with DynCorp.
In addition, INL provides body armor, housing, construction
of forward operating bases and camps, meals, transportation,
security, communication, and medical support to our civilian
police personnel through a contract with DynCorp. For
specialized training and advisory services to Iraqi civil
security forces, we utilize several interagency agreements with
U.S. law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Alcohol,
Tobacco, & Firearms Bureau (ATF), and the U.S. Marshals.
I might also note that even the most effective police will
not be successful if the rest of the criminal justice system is
broken. We are therefore providing substantial support to the
criminal justice sector in concert with our interagency
partners and contractors.
Today, it also my pleasure to review the steps INL has
taken to improve contract management and oversight. CPATT and
the military continue to set the overall requirements for the
mission and exercise operational control over the police
advisers and trainers that INL supplies. However, we are
responsible for managing and overseeing our contracts with
service providers and for monitoring our agreements with
interagency partners.
We have cooperated closely with the various inspectors
general and have undertaken our own assessments, asset
verifications, and audits to identify problems in management
contract oversight. Numerous remedial measures to have already
been taken, and we are constantly exploring ways to be more
effective.
In the past, the mission in Iraq has often outstripped our
staffing and oversight capabilities, both domestically and in
the field. Recognizing this, we added 64 permanent positions,
recently obtained approval from Embassy Baghdad to increase
INL's permanent staffing from 4 to 20 people--4 are from a
contract officer representatives--and created an entire
contract support division for programs in Iraq, Jordan and
Afghanistan, which consist of 15 employees. We are also
expanding our Washington-based Iraq program staff.
We continue to strengthen internal controls, as well, in
areas such as inventory oversight and performance reporting on
property management. Statements of work are now more detailed
provide contractors with specific requirements and performance
standards.
INL is improving our invoice files and significantly is
actively reconciling all past payments made since the inception
of our contracts in Iraq and Jordan, as well as Afghanistan.
This is an intensive process, which includes the review of an
estimated 2 million pages of supporting documentation, covering
roughly $2.5 billion in contracts, that will require
approximately 10 full-time staff members an estimated three
years to complete, but I assure you we will recover any
payments inconsistent with contract terms and conditions.
The Department of State and INL are committed to promoting
competition and have recently competed or are in the process of
competing several of our Iraq contracts and task orders. We
recently began the process of competing the task order for most
of the personnel and related support INL provides in Iraq.
Contractors are critical to implementing programs in Iraq
and other crisis zones, but we recognize it is our duty to
ensure that contracts are carefully monitored, as American
lives and tax dollars are at stake. We have made significant
progress in recent months, but this effort will require
constant vigilance.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Patterson can be
found in the Appendix on page 74.]
Mr. Meehan. Thank you very much.
Mr. Swartz.
STATEMENT OF BRUCE C. SWARTZ, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY
GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Swartz. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Akin, members of the
committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the role
of the Department of Justice in this development and training
of the Iraqi Security Forces.
Submitting my full statement for the record, I would like
to briefly focus this morning in my opening statement on three
topics: first, the mission of the Department of Justice's
police training office, the Office of International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program; second, how we have
fulfilled that mission in what is called ICITAP in Iraq; and,
third, what other roles the Department of Justice has played in
Iraq in an attempt to build a rule of law system within that
country.
During first to ICITAP, the Department of Justice's police
training office, ICITAP was created in 1986. And it has as its
mission the goal of advancing U.S. government's criminal
justice, national security, and foreign policy objectives, by
attempting to create foreign law enforcement counterparts and
institutions that respect democratic values, respect human
rights, and have the capacity to fight terrorism and
transnational crime.
We have programs now in 48 different countries around the
world, countries ranging from emerging democracies, such as in
the Balkans, to frontline states in the fight against
terrorism, such as Pakistan and Indonesia, and in countries
such as Iraq, that are post-conflict states.
In all of these countries, ICITAP seeks to develop the
police in the context of all of the pillars of the justice
system, that is police, corrections, and justice prosecutorial
elements of the justice system. So whenever possible, ICITAP
works collaboratively with its sister organization in the
Department of Justice, known as OPDAT, another unwieldy
acronym, but it deals with prosecutorial training and with
other Federal law enforcement agencies in the Department of
Justice, including the FBI, the Marshals service, the ATF, and
other agencies.
I should note, as well, that virtually all of ICITAP's
funding comes from programs specific funding provided by other
entities of the United States government, primarily the
Department of State and the International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Bureau, headed by Ambassador Patterson, U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID), and recently the
Millennium Challenge Corporation.
In addition, while ICITAP does and whenever possible does
send overseas senior law enforcement advisers to be resident in
our missions or embassies overseas--we have 18 such personnel
now--we also make use, particularly in larger missions such as
Iraq, of the services of the contractor, MPRI, to provide both
logistics support and, in the case of larger missions, police
trainers or others that are necessary to provide the services
that we have been asked to undertake by other elements of the
United States government.
Turning now to the mission in Iraq, the United States
Department of Justice has been involved, in terms of police
training, police development, from the very start in Iraq.
Shortly after the fall of Baghdad, in May 2003, the
Department of Justice criminal division deployed, with funding
from INL, a select team of 25 senior Federal law enforcement
officials to assess the state of the justice system in Iraq.
And the result of that assessment team was a comprehensive set
of three reports regarding the police services, the corrections
services, and the justice element of the country of Iraq.
The ICITAP portion, the police training portion of that
mission, stayed on and was critical in helping to stand up,
from the start, the Iraq police services, the border agency,
and the corrections services. And from that day until the
current time, ICITAP has been in the country of Iraq for the
Department of Justice, working in three critical areas: police
strategy, in terms of development and training; corrections,
where, too, we have helped establish the strategy for the
corrections services and implement it; and, finally, anti-
corruption, where the Department of Justice, through ICITAP,
has been extremely active in the Commission for Public
Integrity.
Our current staffing is four authorized slots for senior,
full-time employees, Federal senior law enforcement agencies,
and a number of contractor positions for each of these
missions. And in each of these areas, corrections, police,
anti-corruption, we have helped create and develop strategies;
we have helped formulate training curriculum, and provide that
training curriculum; helped established and lead academies; and
have participated under the direction of CPATT, in particular,
in the training of tens of thousands of Iraqi police and
correctional officers.
I would be remiss, however, if I did not, in my third
topic, point out that ICITAP's efforts, dramatic as they have
been and, we believe, as dedicated as they have been, are only
part of the efforts undertaken by the Department of Justice,
with regard to Iraq and the rule of law in Iraq.
There are a number of Federal law enforcement agencies from
the Department of Justice that have been involved, again, from
the start in police training and police-related activities in
Iraq. Among those are OPDAT, as mentioned, our overseas
prosecutorial development office, which has deployed a number
of assistant United States attorneys or other Federal
prosecutors to serve both in the embassy in Baghdad, as rule of
law advisers, and on the provincial reconstruction teams.
Those advisers have helped mentor and train investigative
judges and trial judges, have provided advice on both the
structure and the implementation of the prosecutorial service,
and have been instrumental throughout in building up the
counterpart to the police and correctional aspects of our work
there.
In addition, the United States Marshals service, again,
oftentimes with funding from State and INL, has provided
invaluable training, with regard to judicial security, witness
security, and related court personnel security matters, and is
now engaged in helping to establish a similar marshals service
in Iraq itself.
The ATF, our alcohol, tobacco, firearms and explosives
agency, has been involved in training, with regard to
explosives and counter-explosives, from the start. They have
also deployed a number of agents in an operational mode, in
that regard.
The FBI has been deeply involved in training, both in
connection with the work of CPATT, and has also deployed agents
throughout the country on a rotating basis through its Legat's
office, the legal attache's office, and as well with regard to
the Baghdad operations center. So, both with regard to training
and operations, they, too, have been present.
DEA has trained under the CPATT direction with regard to
intelligence activities. We, as well, have had a number of
prosecutors and agents working with the regime crimes liaison
office, to deal with the crimes of the Saddam Hussein era.
And, finally, with regard to the Major Crimes Task Force,
which was established by the Department of Justice, again, with
assistance in terms of funding, the FBI, DEA, ATF and Marshals
service have created a task force to work with the Iraqis to
deal with the most serious crimes facing Iraq at this time--
kidnapping, murder, and related activities--in order to build a
core competency to deal with this time of crime.
In sum, then, the Department of Justice has been deeply
involved from the beginning to the present day with regard to
rule of law in Iraq. And, in closing, I would simply like to
pay tribute to the courage, the dedication, and the
professionalism of the Department of Justice men and women who
have served in Iraq throughout this period.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Swartz can be found in the
Appendix on page 80.]
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Swartz.
Mr. Motsek, if you could go. And before you do, we were
just talking. Of the 127,000 contractors, DOD contractors, if
you know how many of them are American citizens----
Mr. Motsek. Seventeen percent, sir.
Mr. Meehan. Seventeen percent?
Mr. Motsek. Seventeen percent. We will have newer numbers
in May.
STATEMENT OF GARY J. MOTSEK, ASSISTANT DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PROGRAM SUPPORT, OFFICE OF THE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS),
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Motsek. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Akin, members of the
committee, I am Gary Motsek, and I am the recently appointed
Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Program Support,
within the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Prior to this position,
I was within the Army Materiel Command as their deputy G-3 for
support operations and earlier their deputy chief of staff for
ammunition.
I would like to note that I appreciate the fact that
Congress has chosen Congressman Snyder to personally supervise
me in both my present and prior assignments. You have been
there every time, sir. Good to see you again.
I have a vested interest in this hearing, as my son, Chris,
who is an explosive ordnance disposal officer, has been
deployed both to Afghanistan and Iraq in support of our ongoing
operations. I want to thank you for this opportunity to appear
before you today and to participate in today's discussion.
I intend to concentrate on DOD's support to the multi-
agency effort in the acquisition, management, oversight of the
security forces, their training, and how that fits into the
larger, theater-wide management and accountability of
contractor personnel. I would like to thank the committee for
your support and all you do to help us in our mission. It is a
team effort, including our military, civilian, coalition,
agency, industry partners. None of us could get the job done
without the others, and I continue to be impressed by the
cooperation among the partners.
Our acquisition DOD team continues to provide our
warfighter with the support they need, consistent with
responsible management and stewardship, effective acquisition
planning, timely contract execution, and responsible oversight
that provided our warfighters and the team the contract support
needed to accomplish their mission.
We recognize that our contracting processes have been and
are still being performed under very trying circumstances,
particularly within Iraq. This is a dynamic environment, and we
are constantly changing and applying lessons learned.
We normally don't think of our contracting officers as
being vulnerable, but they accept the same risk of the forces
that they support, and some have paid the ultimate price. They
also serve in harm's way, whether it be traveling on dangerous
roads to inspect construction sites, negotiating with
contractors and paying them for their work accomplished, or,
frankly, consoling Iraqi family members who have lost one of
their members while supporting us.
The support we will discuss today is part of the overall
effort, which also includes base operations, maintenance,
transportation and security. It is a huge effort and has
interests for both houses, including your parent committee. I
look forward to your suggestions on how we can improve our
contracting oversight and ensure that we are good stewards of
the nation's resources, and that the security forces are well-
equipped and trained so that the nation, the Iraqi nation can
assume full responsibility for their own security needs.
I appreciate the fact that the committee's staff has been
very understanding in recognizing that operations in theater,
including the recent impending changes of command of, keep
mission critical theater personnel from appearing before the
committee at this time.
What Colonel Raines and I cannot answer today will be taken
for the record, and we promise to respond promptly back to the
committee.
In closing, I thank you for your interest in our efforts,
and we are ready to answer any questions you might have.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Motsek and Colonel
Raines can be found in the Appendix on page 94.]
Mr. Akin. Colonel Raines, if you want to proceed, or are
you allowed to? Or is there a problem, or where are we in that?
STATEMENT OF COL. ANITA M. RAINES, CHIEF, LOGISTICS SERVICES
DIVISION, J4 DIRECTORATE, JOINT STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Colonel Raines. Good morning, sir.
Chairman Meehan, Congressman Akin, and members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss contracting issues related to the Iraqi and
Afghan security forces. To put my testimony into context, I am
speaking to you today as the chief of the logistics services
division within the J4 logistics directorate of the Joint
Staff.
As a career multifunctional logistician, I have served as
the division chief for six months and have supervisory
responsibility for the division's primary functions, which
include mortuary affairs, base camp services, and contracting.
We serve as the combatant command's advocate and integrator for
these joint functions within the Joint Staff.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for
your continued support, and I am happy to address your
questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Colonel Raines and Mr.
Motsek can be found in the Appendix on page 94.]
Mr. Akin [presiding]. The chairman stepped out for just a
minute, so I get to enjoy for a moment a chance to ask a
question or two.
And I guess I had quite a few, but, Mr. Swartz, maybe I
would start where you are. And I would like to just make
something that is an intuitive kind of thing that I have been
seeing, as we have been having hearings, and also my trip to
Iraq several times. And tell me if you think that at least I am
on to something, and how does that relate to your area of
expertise.
It is my sense is that our warfighters have been reasonably
well-organized, done a pretty good job, but when it comes to
the non-military pieces that we have to do to build a
civilization, particularly things like wire transfers of money
and banking, creating an entire judicial system, it is not just
a matter of police, which they don't really understand the
technology of police anyway, but aside from that, a judicial
system, some kind of system of law and a place to put the bad
guys and lock them up, that entire system, my sense is that we
can tell a general to go somewhere and go fight a way, but we
don't tell the Department of Justice to take a battalion over
and set up a judicial system. We don't say to Commerce, you
know, ``Go set up a banking system,'' or whatever it is.
So I guess my question is, is that true, that we are not as
well-equipped to do the non-military functions? And you said
that--you made what sounded like a great statement, all the
stuff that Justice has done and everything, but there is one
thing you said. You said we had four full-time employees--that
seemed like maybe you needed a little more than that to set up
a justice system in Iraq, if that is what I heard you saying.
So if you would comment on that. And I can cheat with this
question a little bit and say that relates, also, to the
development of the police services, but that is my overall
concern. Are we really equipped and organizationally set up to
do things other than just military? And I hate to use the word
nation-building, but anybody has a free shot at that. I have a
couple of minutes.
But you, Mr. Swartz, could proceed, if you would, sir.
Mr. Swartz. Thank you, Mr. Akin. And I am sure that my
colleagues will want to add on this.
The question you asked is certainly a complex one. The
United States has had extensive experience over the years in
working on justice systems, particularly in post-conflict
countries, in Haiti, in the Balkans, now in Iraq. And as you
suggest, it is a difficult long-term process. It cannot be
accomplished overnight. It does have, again, as you suggest, a
number of different facets, not simply building up the police,
but building up the police in conjunction with a prosecutorial
service, with an effective system of judges, with an effective
correctional system.
We have developed, I believe, over the years, the capacity
to lead such efforts, in terms of the number of personnel that
we have and the kind of expertise that we can bring to bear
with our colleagues from the State Department and the
Department of Defense. In terms of the bulk numbers, though, if
you were sneaking, as you suggest, a number of trainers, for
instance, the reserve capacity, it is the case that I do not
have quite the command and control authority that my colleagues
at the Department of Defense may have, in order to order
battalions, if I had a battalion, to do that kind of work.
So we, as a government, the United States has relied for
these large-scale operations on contractors for the day-to-day
police training work. But, again, in conjunction with
supervision by the experts, oftentimes at the Department of
Justice, whenever possible, we have sought to provide that
expertise.
So when I spoke of four senior Federal officers authorized
for Iraq, that is true. That is just the top level, with regard
to police training. And they are working with their colleagues
in CPATT, of course, who are also providing supervision, as
well as our reach back here to the Department of Justice
experts in ICITAP and related agencies.
And, as well, that does not encompass, as I suggested, the
full range of Department of Justice personnel on the ground in
Iraq. Those are the four dealing with police, corrections, but
they are working in conjunction with all of the personnel we
have there for prosecutorial work and for the investigative
work that is being done.
Mr. Akin. Just for my information, how many people would
Department of Justice have in Iraq? How many do you have at a
given time?
Mr. Swartz. I can get you for the record----
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 139.]
Mr. Akin. Are we talking dozens, hundreds, thousands?
Mr. Swartz. Well, we have, in terms of between our police
and----
Mr. Akin. I am not talking about contractors----
Mr. Swartz. Right, I am talking about--yes, I would guess
that, between police and prosecutorial, there are approximately
10 to 12 at a given time. If you begin to add in the FBI, which
are also involved in this, and the other Federal agencies, and
our various offices involved, I think we are getting up more in
the range probably of 40 to 50. I will do the math while my
colleagues address this, but we do have----
Mr. Akin. It is still a relatively small number, though. So
you are counting a lot on contractors to help do what has to be
done over there?
Mr. Swartz. In terms of the implementing the day-to-day
training, that is correct. That is an essential element of what
we do.
Mr. Akin. Anybody else want to take a quick shot at that
before my nickel runs out here?
Ambassador Patterson. Mr. Akin, let me just say that this
issue has provoked a lot of soul-searching on the part of the
Administration, and there is a special office that has been set
up in the State Department led by Ambassador John Herbst. And
he has the full support of Secretary Rice. And you might want
to ask him for a briefing directly, but he has about 30 people
working for him.
And he designing, basically, a civilian reserve corps. And
he has reached out to a number of other agencies and his
colleagues within the State Department to plan. And the idea of
this would be that it could deploy quickly in emergency
situations, that security on the ground get basic economic
services restored. And, again, I think it might be interesting
to hear from him directly. But this, as you say, is a real
issue.
Mr. Akin. So you are agreeing with me that it is an issue,
but you are also saying that we are trying to address that----
Ambassador Patterson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. And, I guess, my question is, I assume we have
run into this in other nations where we have been, but we don't
always learn by our mistakes, either. So my question is, do we
have something ready to go so that we end up getting into some
conflict and we have to do some rebuilding, do we have teams
that can go in? So you are saying he is the guy to talk to?
Ambassador Patterson. Sir, I have been in the foreign
service for almost 34 years, and I have never seen anything on
this scale. For instance, in Haiti, in 1994, it was a much
easier situation. We confronted many of the same problems you
are seeing in Iraq today, but the scale was simply a lot less,
so it was easier to take them out of the civilian agencies and
deploy them more rapidly. And, frankly, the sums involved were
a lot less, as well.
Mr. Swartz. And, Mr. Akin, if I may return to that topic,
as I think we demonstrated in Iraq with the support of our
other agencies, particularly State Department, the criminal
division of the Department of Justice and the other law
enforcement entities in the Department of Justice can deploy
almost immediately a rapid force to assess the situation and to
put in place the structure that needs to be put in place for
whatever--work is done.
And if I may supplement my answer, just doing the math----
Mr. Akin. But for all of your assurances, there really
isn't a court system in Iraq now, is there?
Mr. Swartz. Well, I cannot say that we have successfully
completed that process, but I think we have certainly--we have
made strides, in terms of the judges we have worked with. And I
think that the number of investigative judges who have shown a
great deal of courage throughout this process and worked very
closely with our Federal prosecutors over there.
And if I may just supplement my answer, it looks--just my
quick calculation--we have approximately 75 to 100 personnel,
with regard to training and operations, and that is not
counting the approximately 120 we have the regime crimes
liaison office.
Mr. Akin. Not a word from Fort Belvoir here or anything? I
am a survivor of Fort Belvoir.
Mr. Motsek. I survived Fort Belvoir. In fact, they moved my
old headquarters.
So you bring up--the question you asked from the Department
of Defense is in the larger context, which is, we made a
conscious decision in the early 1990's to size the force at a
particular size, and then we decided to focus our forces on the
pointy end of the spear, if you will. And so we took the risk
in the back end.
So we knew consciously that we were going to have to rely
on a package that was not organic to us, that was going to be
contracted. That was a conscious decision. What Ambassador
Patterson said, though, was absolutely correct. The order of
magnitude of this effort dwarfs anything we have done in the
past.
Just for a quick buzz, we constantly talk about the LOGCAP
contract, the multibillion-dollar contract that we use for
general support inside the area of responsibility (AOR). That
is multibillion dollars today. If you added up all the previous
LOGCAP contracts, summed them for all the previous
contingencies that we had, you would be somewhere in a little
bit of excess of $600 million. So that gives you a sizing issue
that we have been faced with.
And so the discussion might be appropriate as to, did we do
the right thing? Do we need to re-look consciously where the
chop lines need to be on the variety of functions? And I am
sure that the other agencies in government have a similar
function. It is exacerbated at DOD simply because of our size.
Mr. Akin. The scale of what you are dealing with.
Mr. Motsek. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Mr. Chairman, I have strayed a little bit, I
confess, from the strictly police and all, but it does connect
to the contracting. Thanks so much.
Mr. Meehan [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Akin.
My question is primarily for Ambassador Patterson, but I
would like the other panelists to comment. What is the current
status of the contracts overseen by the INL, the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and
ICITAP, the International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program, with respect to the international police
trainers and international police liaison offices that are
providing training to the Iraqi police? What is the status of
those contracts?
Ambassador Patterson. Well, the status of INL's portion
with DynCorp, the contract--we went out to our three main
contractors with a statement of objectives last week. We are in
the process of re-bidding this contract, and we hope we will be
finished by the 19th of July.
Mr. Meehan. We have heard varying reports regarding the
quality of police trainers being provided for police liaison
officers. How do you respond to our reference that they tend to
lack the management and training experience that would truly
make them useful for the mission that they were tasked with?
Ambassador Patterson. Mr. Chairman, let me describe for a
minute our recruitment process. Our contractor, DynCorp, goes
out to police organizations and recruits people with at least
five years experience. They can't have been retired from a
police office for over nine years, so they have recent
experience. They are given psychological tests. They are given
criminal background tests. They are given a reference review.
And then they are put into two weeks of INL training and a week
of DOD training.
We have a 23 percent washout rate, which suggests to me
that we are fairly rigorous in our review of this. And then
they are deployed to Iraq. And I have met many of these people.
Seventeen have died in the line of duty. Today we had an
incident where we got a report just as we were coming up, where
one of the International Police Liaisons (IPLOs) has lost two
legs in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack. So these
fellows are engaged in very dangerous activities.
And they are constantly evaluated through the process. They
are evaluated by the contractor. They are evaluated by INL
personnel on the ground. And, of course, in any organization,
you have bad performers, and mediocre performers, and good
performers, but we are confident we are getting quality
personnel.
Mr. Meehan. And all organizations have people that either
don't act properly or turn out not to be qualified. What
procedures are in place to see to it that such a person is
removed and replaced with qualified personnel?
Ambassador Patterson. Well, we have issued a directive to
the contractor. First, if you are removed from cause--again, we
have the 23 percent washout rate just in the process of the
hiring. But if you are removed from service--and I see these
reports every week, and I know that some are removed from
service every week--you cannot be hired again, or at least that
is our directive to the contractor, by the same contractor. You
cannot be hired again on another INL program, and we try and
keep track of that.
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. I am not in the queue. I came late.
Mr. Meehan. Okay.
Mr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess I am in the queue. That is appropriate today. We
have a barrister, and you are listed as a career minister, Ms.
Patterson. I feel like saying, ``Here, here. Here, here.''
Also, Secretary Patterson, I want to acknowledge your birth
state of Arkansas. We have Arkansas day here, and we appreciate
you.
I find this kind of snapshot of things just overwhelming,
just overwhelming. I mean, all four of you are obviously very
capable career people that care deeply about your country,
working hard at doing this stuff. My guess is, if anybody was
looking at this stuff, they would say, ``We have the right
people in these positions doing it.''
But none of us can be satisfied with where we are at today,
compared to where we thought we were going to be four years
ago. You know, regardless of how we all voted on--and we have a
split of opinion, and it is the parties here. I mean, we have
different views of the decision the President made, but he made
the decision. We need to do what we can to make it work.
But we can't be satisfied with where we are at, and I know
you are not satisfied, either. So then the--not the
frustration--challenge for Mr. Akin, and Mr. Meehan, this
committee, and the Congress, American people, is how we can we
be of help? I mean, how can we help sort this stuff out, not in
a combative relationship?
That is what was so discouraging about this memo a few days
ago, is this committee is not trying to be in a combat with the
Secretary of Defense's office. But we are trying to figure out
ways that we can help, because no one is satisfied with how it
is going.
So part of, it seems to me, what we try to do is to look
at, well, do we have the right people? Do we have the right
congressional oversight? Do you have the tools--or the
financing? Do you have the right tools that you need to help
you deal with wayward contractors, when someone goes awry, I
mean, all those kind of things?
Because, obviously, we don't know how to do your work. We
don't know how to do it. And it is a frustrating thing.
I wanted to ask a series of questions in that vein.
Secretary Patterson, what languages, foreign languages, do you
speak?
Ambassador Patterson. I speak decent Spanish and have had a
year of Arabic, which I don't remember very well.
Dr. Snyder. And Arkansan?
Ambassador Patterson. Yes. [Laughter.]
Dr. Snyder. What has been your experience with regard to
trying to fill these positions with contractors or State
Department personnel with regard to language skills?
Ambassador Patterson. I can speak to my INL office there. I
believe we have one person there who speaks some Arabic. We
have a 10-person office of 10 professionals that is going
increasingly up to 20. It has been an enormous challenge, and I
can't speak for the department as a whole. I know the Secretary
has addressed this in her hearings, but language capability has
been a huge challenge in all the deployments.
Dr. Snyder. Now, as somebody who has been in the business
since--I think 1973 is when your career started, and you have a
very illustrious career, we are proud of you--when September
11th occurred, the whole country was stymied by this whole
issue of, how do we get language-skilled peoples that meet the
security classification and everything?
But we are now five years later from that. Why are we still
stymied with regard to language skills in State Department
personnel? Why has there not been a successful effort so that
there would have been the kind of focus on--I assume that we
think language skills are important to do these jobs--why are
we still behind, this many years later from when the war
started and when the war in Afghanistan started?
Ambassador Patterson. Sir, I will take that question back
to our management and get an answer for you, because I have
heard the Secretary answer this in other oversight hearings.
And, frankly, I don't want to wing it.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 139.]
Dr. Snyder. We like winging it.
Ambassador Patterson. I must say that a lot of the Arabic
speakers have done service in Iraq. And then it is not as if
they are sitting in Paris. They have been to places like Yemen
or Saudi Arabia, too, where we served, my husband and I served.
So I think the system is just stressed, but I will take
that question back and get an answer for you from the director
general.
Dr. Snyder. And then one final question, if I might, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Swartz, if Ms. Patterson has a U.S. contractor--and I
have had some in my district that have served both DOD and
State Department--and it turns out that an individual turns out
to be a drug dealer, who, in the course of the drug dealing,
has shot and killed a couple of Iraqi civilians, what is your
ability--how is that person dealt with in the legal system? Who
has the authority to prosecute that person? And how many people
have we had those kinds of issues? Do we have people out there
with those kinds of challenges that are not being dealt with by
anyone's legal system?
Mr. Swartz. Sir, I think that that is a question that I
will also take back, but I can tell you that, thanks to the
work of Congress, with regard to the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act, MEJA, we have certainly had expansive and
expanded powers to deal with that type of issue, that is, to
deal with criminal actions taken in certain circumstances for
those accompanying military forces abroad.
In terms of people out there, as Ambassador Patterson has
suggested, we have, I think, all three entities here have moved
quickly to deal with any questions of misconduct, in terms of
leaving people in place. And I could give you further
information, I believe, with regard to, in general terms, any
ongoing criminal investigations, with the main focus on
contractors.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 139.]
Dr. Snyder. Well, I want to be sure what part you are
taking for the record and what part you are not. Who is going
to prosecute the person I described?
Mr. Swartz. Sir, it would depend. I would have to look at
the facts of the particular case to see whether we can fit into
one of our particular jurisdictional statutes within the
Federal criminal justice system. The Department of Defense can
address the capacity of the Iraqi government to deal with
contractors or not, in terms of what is permitted.
But in terms of our actions, of course, the criminal
division, whenever possible, seeks to prosecute any criminal
activity that is engaged in by contractors. And it would
depend, again, on whether the jurisdictional prerequisites for
our statutes were met in a particular instance.
I would believe, again, in the hypothetical you have
provided, that we would be able to find a basis of prosecution
of such an individual, probably on several different
jurisdictional bases.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you.
Mr. Gingrey.
Dr. Gingrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I think this probably would be for Colonel Raines or
Mr. Motsek, in regard to the DOD's role. I wanted to ask you--
well, first of all, what steps is DOD taking to go back and
ensure it has received appropriate value from the contractors
in Iraq, for projects such as the highly problematic Baghdad
college? If you could take that, I would appreciate it.
Either one of you would be fine.
Mr. Motsek. Let's put it in context first. Less than one
percent of the contract vehicles that we have out there have we
had a major problem with, where we have had a challenge where
we have had to go into some very unpleasant ways of dealing
with the issue. The particular construction project that you
are referring to is still under litigation, as a matter of
fact.
It is under litigation to--excuse me, it is going to
resolution of the contract, because there were changes in the
scope of the contract midstream. I don't think anyone is proud
of the production of that particular building, but I can't give
you the final outcome of that, because we are still in the
process of making the determinations of our recovery of
dollars.
It is important to note that we have had lots of numbers
jump around about dollars that have been lost or dollars that
have not been properly accounted for in contracts. But if you
look at most of the investigations, that is pre-close-out of
the contracts, and that is very important to understand.
And we are improving with time. Make no mistake about it:
When we started operations in theater, there was an attempt to
try to manage this from the outside of the theater, to minimize
the footprint of these people that had to be on the ground. And
so we were doing things in a bit of a remote means.
Over time, we have learned very, very quickly that we have
to have boots on the ground to provide the proper oversight of
these things. That is why we have the joint contracting command
physically in place in Iraq today that manage much of what we
are talking about. That is why we have strengthened the
requirement to have contractor-officer representatives and
technical representatives down there.
The Department of Defense will not let you be a COR,
contractor officer representative, right now unless you take
the course, which is available through the Defense Acquisition
University, to give you the skill sets so you can raise the
flag when you think a contractor is either non-performing or
has had some shortfalls.
Those occur because of the needs that were shown in the
theater. And so the particular construction process is a
perfect example of why we had to do that.
Dr. Gingrey. Well, who had that contract?
Mr. Motsek. I believe, sir, that was the Corps of Engineers
proper. Army Corps of Engineers was the lead agent for that
particular contract.
And, if I might, sir, because we are still undergoing this,
I will take it for the record and give you the blow-by-blow
description of where we are and when we think we will close
that out.
Dr. Gingrey. Well, Mr. Chairman, I want to continue this
same line, if you will indulge me, but, you know, we have
situations a lot of times where, in our congressional
districts, we may have a company that has a contract with the
military to do something, to produce something.
I will give you an example. In my district, we have a
manufacturer. The company is called TUG Technologies, and they
manufacture these tractors and equipment that push the planes
back so they can take off, and I saw the thing, and they pull
the planes. I mean, they do this--you see them all the time
when we are flying back and forth to our districts on the
commercial airlines.
But this is a military contract. And the contractor
probably wasn't very smart in negotiating the contract and is
really having a very difficult time now producing at the price
that was contracted for a set price, which had very little, you
know, change with inflation and that sort of thing.
The military contractors are tough. I mean, they are making
this vendor in my district toe the line, almost to the point of
bankruptcy. I mean, maybe that is appropriate.
But I tell you that, because I think what we are all
concerned with here is that all of the--we have an $8 billion-
a-month burn rate in the AOR. And a lot of it is contractor
money, and we have a lot of departments involved, Justice,
State, Defense, and all these contracts flying around. And
nonperformance or poor performance is not just dollars. It is
lives.
And so we do have some real concern. It would be very nice
if you could reassure this oversight committee that somebody is
connecting the dots on all of these people that are out there
making--you know, pretty damn--darn good profit on these
contracts that, you know, it is our money. It is our
constituents' money.
So anybody can take that question--put that in a form of a
question--and respond to it.
Mr. Motsek. I am the lead on that, primarily because it is
us. As we sit here right now, based on the latest census, there
are 1,986 major contracts operating within the----
Dr. Gingrey. Nineteen hundred----
Mr. Motsek [continuing]. One thousand nine hundred and
eighty-six supporting the Iraqi AOR. So that gives you a scope
of the number of contracts we are talking about today. And when
you talk about contract actions, which are--you know, you do a
variety of things on that--there are tens and thousands of
those. So this is clearly big, big business, in that respect.
What I can assure you and assure the committee, that we
have taken our responsibilities of being effective stewards and
supporting the force extraordinarily seriously. Again, I
alluded to the fact that we have put boots on the ground, and
our folks are in theater now doing this work. We have trained
them to be contingency contractors versus accepting the normal
contracting functions.
There are ways that you can accelerate the process. There
are ways that you can account for things differently, the
contingency operation. There are waivers, but you have to be
smart enough to exercise them, because it is not business as
usual.
All things being equal--and it goes back to your particular
contractor--generally speaking, the best contract we write is a
fixed price, best performance contract, all right? So the
contractor is forced for a particular price, and then we have
based it on best performance. So that may not be the cheapest
tug that is available on the market, but it may be the most
reliable tug. And if you base the cost differential, that
becomes very, very important.
So we take that very, very seriously. The challenge is,
because we do that, it is a decentralized process, because you
have hit the nail right on the head, sir. The guy on the ground
is the one who knows what is going on. The contracting officer
on the ground who is interfacing directly with the local
commander is the one that can make the decisions and make the
support more effective and efficient.
It does not serve us well for me to sit in the Pentagon and
try to make broad pronouncements about something as mundane as
dining facilities, because they have impacts on the ground that
are very, very real and very meaningful. So this is our
challenge.
And I gave the chairman the number of contractors out
there. That is not an easy metric to come up with, because it
is a decentralized process, and we have to pull those numbers
together. Frankly, we don't care, from a contractual
standpoint, the actual number of contractors we have on the
ground. We care from a security, force protection issue, and
our responsibilities to them to protect them and manage them.
But from a contractor on a fixed-price concept, it itself
does not matter. So you are absolutely right, sir. This has
been an extraordinary challenge, but we have matured as we go
along. You would see a different process, a different set of
oversight today than you would have seen two or three years
ago. We have taken it very seriously.
I am unaware of a contractor, either a contractor let
inside of Iraq or one that is let outside Iraq that supports
Iraq, for example, the Stryker Brigade support contract, where
contractors support the maintenance of those vehicles, where we
have had mission failure because of a contractor failed to do
that.
We have had contracts that have failed to perform, again,
less than one percent. We have had contractors who have failed
to deliver product when they assured us they would deliver a
product, again, one percent, less than one percent. But to my
knowledge, that is a pretty impressive number, frankly, and we
have not had mission failure, because--which I think is your
biggest concern.
But it is not just sitting there, waiting for this to
happen. These people are aggressively managing these contracts.
We did not have contractor technical representatives early on
in most places, but now for something, again, as mundane as a
dining facility, we have someone in there that makes the daily
assessment of the cleanliness, the quality, the servicing, you
know, the whole mundane nine yards of things that you would
come to expect to be standards for our troops and our people
that are being served there.
And that has pushed up the tape. Early on, that was not a
consideration. Get the dining facility in; get it serving; get
on with it. And so we have taken that on as we go along.
We are not at 100 percent. Don't let me, you know, paint a
completely rosy picture. We have lessons learned going on every
day. One of the things we have to do to get our hands on this
is consolidate where we can, consolidate contracts, because we
tend to just let contracts as a need arises and, as over time,
it serves and it is in our interest to start consolidating
these down to a more manageable level.
And so we are in the process of doing that, as we speak, as
well.
Dr. Gingrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you.
I would like to thank the witnesses for their testimony
this morning and each of you for your service to the country,
as well. We greatly appreciate it.
And particularly you, Mr. Motsek, please give your son our
best wishes and our thanks for his service.
Mr. Motsek used the phrase ``effective stewardship'' a few
minutes ago. And, Ms. Patterson, I want to ask you about some
concerns we have about effective stewardship at the Joint
Police Training Academy in Jordan (JIPTC).
Two months ago, the chairman led members of this
subcommittee and others to a visit to Iraq, and Jordan, and
Kuwait, Brussels. And one of the stops was at the police
training academy in Jordan, which I will call the JIPTC for
purposes of our discussion.
In your testimony, you note that more than 54,000 Iraqi
police recruits have been trained in the basic training at the
JIPTC. When we visited the JIPTC, we were told--now, let me
preface this by saying, I was very impressed by the quality of
the work by the people running by the JIPTC. They were sincere,
and they are very competent. They are very committed to their
mission. And I have no doubt that they do a very good job
training police recruits.
My concern is the quality of the recruits coming in and
what happens when they leave. We were essentially told that
referrals to the JIPTC were done by the Iraqi government
without a significant background check. Whomever they sent got
trained. There is a biometric identification process when
recruits arrive, but that process is not then matched against
any database, we were told, so that we can determine who, in
fact, is coming in the front door of the academy.
Is that so? Do we know who was coming in the front door of
the JIPTC?
Ambassador Patterson. Let me first say, Congressman, that
basically the role of the trainers and the officers at JIPTC is
not to handle recruitment, nor is it to handle deployment after
they return.
But on the recruitment side, it is CPATT that handles
recruitment, and I know they are working vigorously to improve
the recruitment process and the vetting process. But the
biometric thing that you saw there--and I have seen it myself--
is a feedback mechanism to develop databases----
Mr. Andrews. If I may, who is responsible for the
recruitment of people coming into the JIPTC?
Ambassador Patterson. CPATT, the civilian police mission
handles recruitment. Certainly in the early stages--I am not
trying to duck your question.
Mr. Andrews. Yes.
Ambassador Patterson. Certainly in the early stages there
was a problem with recruiting and with vetting. They have been
running these names against existing Iraqi criminal databases,
and one figure that sticks in my mind--and this is a better
question for DOD than for ourselves--they have gotten rid of
over 3,000 people, because they have found criminal records on
these individuals.
So this is an ongoing challenge. You bet, it is an ongoing
challenge. But there has been some improvement----
Mr. Andrews. Here is the specific question I am asking.
When a recruit walked through the front door of the JIPTC a
year ago, did we know, in fact, who that person was, or did we
have to rely upon who they said they were?
Ambassador Patterson. I don't know the answer to that.
Mr. Andrews. Could you get the answer for us?
Ambassador Patterson. We will ask CPATT to give you the
answer.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 140.]
Mr. Andrews. Okay.
Second is, when this biometric database was up and running,
against what was it checked? So if we collect someone's
biometric information, did we check it against a database that
would have identified a Shiite militia fighter or an al Qaeda
member? Did we or did we not?
Mr. Motsek. Sir, we will have to take most of that for the
record, but when you talk about those specific sub-elements,
part of the databases that are referenced--and, again, you are
only as good as your databases, as you are alluding to--are the
field interviews and the field records that are prepared by the
military side of the house. So that is included in the----
Mr. Andrews. Let me ask you this specific question. If, in
March of 2004, a suspected al Qaeda fighter is arrested and
detained in Iraq, and he or she is then biometrically
identified when they are held in Baghdad, and then they are
released for whatever reason, and then they use a different
name and enroll in the JIPTC, would we know that the person who
enrolled in JIPTC was that suspected al Qaeda fighter?
Ambassador Patterson. I think so.
Mr. Andrews. You think so. How would we know that?
Ambassador Patterson. We can't--because we have fingerprint
checks. And we will get you more definition here, but there is
a fingerprint check, and it does get checked against Iraqi
databases. So I think that would be the case. We need to get--
--
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 140.]
Mr. Andrews. That is not what we were told by the people
running the JIPTC.
Ambassador Patterson. Okay, well, we need to get you more
precision----
Mr. Andrews. What they told us 60 days ago was that a large
majority of the people who came through the front door were not
checked against any existing database. Could you clarify that
difference for me?
Ambassador Patterson. Absolutely. Absolutely.
Mr. Andrews. All right, the second question I have is about
cost. Our research indicates that, by the time the chairman led
the CODEL to the JIPTC, that the American taxpayers had spent
about $600 million, $150 million to construct the facility,
$450 million in operating costs through the time that we were
there. Is that accurate?
Ambassador Patterson. Not quite, Congressman. My figure is
$500 million.
Mr. Andrews. So you think it is $500 million?
Ambassador Patterson. Yes, and I can give you the figures
with some precision.
Mr. Andrews. So that is roughly $10,000 per recruit, right?
Ambassador Patterson. Well, I can break it down for you.
Yes, it has been very expensive.
Mr. Andrews. Well, in your testimony you say it was about
50,000 recruits; $500 million would be $10,000 a recruit for an
eight-week course. So this would be the equivalent, on a year-
long course, of about $50,000 to $60,000 a year for a recruit?
Ambassador Patterson. I suppose so.
Mr. Andrews. So you know how--what did we spend to recruit
and train police personnel in the rest of the world? Is it
anywhere near $50,000 a year on an annualized basis?
Ambassador Patterson. Oh, what do we train in other
countries? No, but it is not cheap, either. I will get you
those figures.
Mr. Andrews. Do you know about what it is?
Ambassador Patterson. In a place like Haiti, what do we
train--I guess between $25,000 and $30,000.
Mr. Andrews. But why does it cost twice as much to train
people in Jordan for the JIPTC for Iraq? Why would it cost
twice as much?
Ambassador Patterson. Well, let me sort of walk through
some of the costs--there. First, there was the construction
costs, which was about $150 million.
Mr. Andrews. Which accounts for less than 30 percent of the
$500 million.
Ambassador Patterson. And then we have our agreement with
the government of Jordan, which reimburses them for fuel and
utilities.
Mr. Andrews. It costs more for utilities in Jordan than it
does in Haiti?
Ambassador Patterson. Well, I can't answer that,
Congressman. But, yes, it is an expensive operation.
But let me go back to why this camp was set up, this
training center was set up. First of all, it was set up under
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). And it was, frankly, a
very urgent requirement to get a training center set up quickly
that would train large numbers of Iraqi police. It started
training in November of 2003.
It switched over to basically a State Department contract
in 2004. And we renegotiated the arrangement with the
government of Jordan and I think have done a pretty good job of
reducing those costs. But, yes, it is an expensive facility,
but it is also been, I think, as you know, a very effective one
in training----
Mr. Andrews. Well, let's talk about its effectiveness. What
database exists as to what the 54,000 graduates are doing
today?
Ambassador Patterson. None that I know of.
Mr. Andrews. So we don't know where these 54,000 people
are?
Ambassador Patterson. Not with any degree of precision.
Mr. Andrews. So we don't know how many are police officers,
right? We don't know how many have gone and done something
else. Do we know how many are fighting for the Shia or Sunni
militia or for al Qaeda?
Ambassador Patterson. Congressman, no, we don't. We don't
know how many are still on the job, because we are not in a
position to monitor that.
Mr. Andrews. I must say, coming back to this point of
effective stewardship, what we found exasperating on this trip
was that the academy appears to be doing a very good job of
training people how to detect an IED and how to prevent it from
exploding and killing people, how to conduct a house-to-house
search, how to identify ways that we might break the back of
the resistance.
Common sense tells me that some percentage of the 54,000
people who went through this, who we don't know anything about,
are, in fact, members of that resistance or members of those
militia or members of al Qaeda who are learning the very
techniques we are using to defend our people. I think this is
outrageous.
And I am interested in hearing from you, why don't we have
a tracking device to find out where these 54,000 people are?
Ambassador Patterson. Congressman, we will have to take
that question and bring it back to CPATT. But let me emphasize
that I know, on CPATT's behalf, that they are working very
vigorously with the Ministry of Interior to develop such a
tracking system, largely through the financial system.
Mr. Andrews. Mr. Motsek, is the Department of Defense
tracking through CPATT these trainees?
Mr. Motsek. Sir, I have to take that for the record. I
don't know the--I know about the biometrics, but I understand
what your concern is.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 140.]
Mr. Andrews. Whose responsibility within the DOD is CPATT?
Mr. Motsek. CPATT falls under MNSTC-I, which falls under
Multinational Force Iraq, which is today General Petraeus.
Mr. Andrews. But who in Washington is responsible for that?
Mr. Motsek. Sir, I don't know.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 140.]
Mr. Andrews. Well, I would like to know that.
Again, I am not an expert, Mr. Chairman, on this issue, but
here is what I know: We have been told that we have spent $500
million. We have been told that 54,000 people have gone through
this program. We have been, on site by the people running the
facility, that most of them did not have a background check, so
we don't know who they were when they came in.
And given the circumstances, it is probable that some of
them were Sunni militia, Shiite militia, or al Qaeda fighters,
who we then trained on how we are defending our people. They
then left. And we hear this morning that we do not know whether
there is--as a matter of fact, Ms. Patterson tells us the State
Department doesn't have a database, Mr. Motsek tells us he
doesn't know whether the DOD has a database as to where these
people are.
I would be astonished if it were not true that some
percentage of these graduates are out there attacking our
forces today, after we have spent $500 million on this.
The final question I have for you is----
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Andrews, just on that point, what was
interesting about it was, it seemed, in the screening process,
the only Iraqis who they screened out were Iraqis who had
already been trained prior to--in other words, they had the
fingerprints of somebody who had already gone through the
training, who would come back to the facility to be trained
again under a different name, however--for a refresher course--
under a different name. However, because of the system with the
fingerprinting, we were able, it seems, to weed those people
out, but I don't think there----
Mr. Andrews. Well, if the chairman will recall, the other
thing that we found very disconcerting is that we asked, who
was expelled and on what basis? Because we were told by the
leaders of the academy they do expel people. And the basis for
expulsion for really misbehavior during the training course. So
this means that, if an al Qaeda member was polite for eight
weeks, they stayed, and they learned all of it.
I mean, here is the final question I have for you. How many
people are being trained at the JIPTC this morning?
Ambassador Patterson. This morning?
Mr. Andrews. Yes.
Ambassador Patterson. I think we started our corrections
program at 830.
Mr. Andrews. Eight hundred and thirty people.
Ambassador Patterson. Or in the process of arriving. This
is a new course, Congressman, for corrections officials.
Mr. Andrews. How many Iraqi police are being trained at the
facility this morning?
Ambassador Patterson. None.
Mr. Andrews. None? So all the Iraqi police are now being
trained somewhere else in Iraq?
Ambassador Patterson. In Iraq.
Mr. Andrews. This is after we spent $150 million on the
facility, we are not training Iraqi police anymore? Why is
that?
Ambassador Patterson. Because they are being trained in
Iraq. And the idea is that we don't want to continue paying the
overhead on what you aptly described is a very expensive
facility, if we have no reason to use it.
Mr. Andrews. But how does it make sense, from a cost
management perspective, to incur an entirely different set of
overhead for new places in Iraq that I assume we are paying
for, as well?
Ambassador Patterson. We are not paying for them. That
function has been largely turned over to the Iraqis.
Mr. Andrews. The Iraqi government is paying for these
training facilities?
Ambassador Patterson. The Iraqi--yes, again, this is a
question more appropriately addressed to CPATT, but the
training function has been largely turned over the Iraqis.
Mr. Andrews. Mr. Motsek, are we paying any of the overhead
in those new facilities or are the Iraqis paying for all of it?
Mr. Motsek. I will never say 100 percent for anything, but
we will take it for the record. And we will get you the split,
but the ambassador is correct that the intent was to turn over
to the provincial and regional authorities the responsibilities
for this training. And that is part of the continuum to go
through it.
I take your point, that your concerned also about the
investment that is already been let in the earlier facility,
and what the hell are we going to do about that? I mean----
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 140.]
Mr. Andrews. We have $150 million facility that is training
800 corrections officers? I mean, I will tell you, there are
corrections systems around the United States that would
probably do it a lot less expensively than that.
I must say, again--and I appreciate you all inherited this
problem--but I am dismayed by the fact that we have spent
taxpayers' money to train people on how to attack our forces. I
know that wasn't your intent, but because of the sloppiness of
the way people were screened and the failure to create a
database as to where people went after they left, that is
exactly what we did.
And I eagerly await the explanation as to why it has taken
all this time to create a tracking mechanism to see where these
people have gone after we trained them, because it is
scandalous, in my opinion, we have let this happen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Akin. Mr. Chairman? I think the CPATT is under MNSTC-I,
which I think is General Dempsey. I think that is----
Mr. Andrews. With whom we met, as you recall, in Iraq.
Mr. Akin. Yes, that is the one that should know all those
answers.
Mr. Andrews. Well, I certainly hope that DOD would provide
us with those answers promptly. Thank you.
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Motsek, we seem to do a better job of
keeping track of Security Forces--in other words, when we are
training Iraqi security forces--because you see the statistics
that a certain percentage of those who are trained go home. A
certain percentage don't show up. A certain percentage, once
the paychecks are given, go home to their families, and
sometimes we don't hear from them again.
Why is it that we are able to set up this system where we
can keep track of those security forces that we train, but in
this instance of this--as Mr. Andrews has aptly described--very
expensive police training facility, did we not think to set up
a system to figure out how many of the 54,000 showed up for
work, how many become sergeants, how many are leading their
departments'?
Mr. Motsek. Sir, the--and I am going to have to give you a
general comment, because this is relatively--it is new to me--
but there is a fundamental difference between what you and I
would call the Ministry of Defense side of the house, the
military side of the house, and the police side of the house.
And the fundamental difference is--and it is just like in this
country--the bulk of the armed forces report directly, one way
or another, to the Ministry of Defense.
There is a line authority to the Ministry of Defense. If
you go to the grand state of Arkansas today, what percentage of
the law enforcement activity within the state of Arkansas
reports directly to the Federal agency, the Department of
Justice? And I would submit to you it is probably way less than
one percent.
With the law enforcement side of the house--and I hope the
ambassador can elaborate, if necessary--you have a
decentralized regionalization issue, where the police force
fundamentally is going to end up working for the provincial
governor, not for the Ministry of the Interior. So you have, in
my mind, there is a complicating factor.
The piece that I am familiar with, as Congressman Andrews
talked about, is the biometrics piece. Once I get the person in
the system, and the system is now more sophisticated than a
simple fingerprint, we can find him after the fact, if
something happens. But his concern, how are we positively
tracking him, as opposed to, you know, tracking him as an event
occurs. And I understand the difference that he is asking.
Mr. Meehan. Well, we can identify--but we can't necessarily
find him. I mean, we can identify him, right?
Mr. Motsek. If an event occurs and he is picked up again,
or something of that nature, we can, with certainty, say who
this person is now. We have a good biometrics system in place.
What Congressman Andrews was concerned about is, how do you
track him, from the time he graduates, to where he is at any
given day? And we do a relatively decent job, as you noticed,
on the military side. We can tell you, on a daily basis, X
percent of these people reported for duty, X number deployed--
--
Mr. Meehan. Right. But my question is, why can't we do it
on the police side? I understand the jurisdictional issues, but
it seems to me that--it really was stunning, not to mention--
the question I want to get at is, now they are training in
Iraq, in the Baghdad area, where violence is clearly, if you
consider where they were when this facility opened, I can't
imagine or the facilities are even close to what they are in
Jordan.
And whose decision was it to transfer the training of
Iraqis back to Baghdad? And is anybody keeping track of the
quality of the training of the police that is taking place at
these fragmented facilities around the Baghdad?
Ambassador Patterson. Could I answer your other question
first, about why this is so hard to monitor? And it goes back
to what Congressman Andrews was saying.
Mr. Meehan. Yes, but my question isn't, why is it so
difficult? I get it. I have a grasp on why it would be
difficult.
Ambassador Patterson. A thousand different police--1,000
police stations. That is the short answer, and provincial and
district control.
Mr. Meehan. I just want to know why we have been able to do
it on the security side and not on the police side.
Ambassador Patterson. Because these people are dispersed
all over the country.
Mr. Meehan. Aren't they on the security side, though? We
train----
Ambassador Patterson. They are under provincial and
district control, as Mr. Motsek was saying, just like there
would be under--they are a highly decentralized system, just
like they would be in the United States. So it is very hard to
get at--and it is very hard to get out and monitory these
stations. That has been a challenge throughout this entire
program. That is why the IPLOs, the police liaison officers,
are paired with military units to get out there and monitor
these.
But it is a highly decentralized system. And I know the way
we did this in Afghanistan was to work through the payroll
system, and I believe this is what is CPATT is doing now.
Mr. Motsek. They are trying to do now.
Mr. Meehan. So we are trying to do that now? But what about
the other question?
Ambassador Patterson. The other question, about the
training?
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Andrews said we have spent $150 million to
set up this--what I would say is--a state-of-the-art facility
in Jordan. And then somebody makes a decision. It seems to me
the Iraqi government made the decision that they preferred
training the Iraqi police force in and around Baghdad at these
facilities that, frankly, my guess is, given the tours that I
took, probably is nowhere near the quality of the facility that
we spent $150 million to construct in Baghdad.
My question is--monitoring the type of training that they
are getting in these new locations in and around Baghdad? And
do we monitor the effect, downward, I would say, in terms of
the quality of the training that the Iraqi police are not
getting outside of this facility in Jordan?
Ambassador Patterson. Again, that is a question more
appropriately directed to CPATT, but my understanding is, yes,
they intend to have people in these academies in Iraq. It was
always envisioned that we would phase out the Jordanian police
academy and revert it back to the Jordanians. That was always--
because, as Congressman Andrews has pointed out, it was very
expensive, and that the Iraqis would take this over.
But I think the answer to your question--again, we need to
take that back to CPATT and get you more precision, but they
are planning to monitor the training in the various police
academies in Iraq. It is not just in Baghdad.
Mr. Andrews. Mr. Chairman, can I just ask one more thing?
Mr. Meehan. Let me just say on that point. Here is what I
believe: I believe that, at some point, the Iraqis, who are
involved with the police, decided that they no longer wanted to
have training take place in Jordan, so they are setting up
their own training in and around Baghdad. And my belief is that
the quality of training, whether they be al Qaeda, whether they
be--regardless of who they are, the quality of their training
cannot be anywhere near what the quality of their training was
in Jordan.
And to spend that much money and then not have a sense of
what is happening to, you know, the facilities these people are
being trained in--it was clear to all of us, I think, on the
trip that we have this state-of-the-art facility in Jordan, and
somehow the decision has been made that they were going to be
trained in Baghdad and at a number of locations. Nobody can
even tell you--no one knows about a location where they would
train police in Baghdad, let alone the quality of the training.
So that is my point. After spending all this money, it is
clear to me that the training isn't even--even if we could
track people, is now much lower quality.
Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Ms. Patterson, one thing I would say, you said
it was the plan all along to phase out the JIPTC.
Ambassador Patterson. Right.
Mr. Andrews. Was there ever any discussion of recovering
some of the costs from the Jordanians, since we spent $150
million to build it? Did we have a plan that said we are going
to train people for a few years and then leave and walk away
from $150 million investment?
Ambassador Patterson. Yes, that was essentially the plan.
Mr. Andrews. Have the Jordanians pick up the cost?
Ambassador Patterson. The Jordanians are in control of half
the camp, and we are using--if I could come back to the other
point on the corrections officers--we are using the other half,
CPATT and INL and the Department of Justice, to train these
correction officers who will participate in guarding prisoners
who are picked up in the surge.
Mr. Andrews. Are the Jordanians paying us rent for using
half the camp?
Ambassador Patterson. No, it belongs to them. We had two
agreements with them. It reverts back to the Jordanian
government.
Mr. Andrews. So we gave it to them?
Ambassador Patterson. It always belonged to them.
Mr. Andrews. But we paid for it.
Ambassador Patterson. We paid for the construction.
Mr. Andrews. Okay. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Hindsight is wonderful.
The question that Dr. Snyder mentioned, are there any
American contractors held in Iraqi prisons under Iraqi judicial
authority for criminals? That is kind of what you were trying
to get to, wasn't it? Are there any Americans held by the
Iraqis? A lot of head turning.
Mr. Motsek. Sir, I will take it first. I am personally
unaware of anyone being held in an Iraqi prison, U.S.--you are
talking about U.S. citizens?
Mr. Conaway. Right.
Mr. Motsek. Being held in an Iraqi prison.
Mr. Swartz. If I may add to that, there are, I believe,
individuals who may be dual nationals or others that are held,
but not necessarily in connection with contracting----
Mr. Conaway. So there are contractors that we had put in
place that the Iraqi judicial system is now responsible for?
Mr. Motsek. No, sir. None that I am aware of. We will go
back and try to verify, but I am aware of no U.S. personnel or
U.S. contractor that is being held by the Iraqis.
Mr. Conaway. I also agree with Dr. Snyder. This is
obviously a huge subject to spend an hour and a half on to try
to even begin to start at it. Your role is obviously to come in
here and put the absolute best foot forward, your
organizations, and I understand that.
But, together, our role is to try to get it right. And
parts of my frustration is, this system, this deal doesn't
allow you to share often with us what is not working. We heard
about all the stuff that you have done, and it is positive, and
all those kinds of things, but I don't think anybody remotely
thinks that the Iraqi justice system, the Iraqi police system,
any of those Iraqi functions are working the way that we would
want to.
And to the extent that we still have a role in that, I
understand the chairman's frustration, in that sovereign
government's going to make decisions that we disagree with, but
it is their government. If they decide to move all the training
to Baghdad, and it is on their nickel, you know, that is one of
the joys of working with a partner that gets to control their
deal. They make decisions that we don't necessarily agree with.
On a second comment, I was in a hearing yesterday in which
the Department of Agriculture was complaining about not being
able to contract for stenographers, hearing reporters, and how
difficult that was for them. And they were using that as an
excuse as to why it took so long to make certain changes in the
milk program.
Last time I checked, I don't think we have had an IED or a
gunfight at any of those hearings, so figuring out how you find
contractors, and how you manage those contractors, and how you
get rid of the bad ones and keep the good ones, can you talk to
us--I am a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) by background, and
so I have a sheet in here that is labeled ``Exhibit E'' from
some place, that says somebody did some sort of an audit--they
use that phrase--$3.2 billion has been looked at.
How do you coordinate--obviously, you have three different
organizations at the table. You all have your own funding
streams. You all have your own ideas about how--how do you
coordinate between each other just the review of contractors?
Or do your contractors just work for you and you are solely
responsible for that work?
In other words, how do you manage that contractor group? Do
you ever actually fire somebody? And not these individual folks
who are actually providing the work, but I am talking about the
DynCorps and the umbrella folks, who actually you looked at
first. How do you set up a system to evaluate those guys or do
you, I guess is a better question?
Mr. Motsek. Sir, we are principally responsible for
contract execution.
Mr. Conaway. Even on the State Department side?
Mr. Motsek. Sir, it is not an easy question to answer,
because, as I said, this is a rather unique lash-up. And what
will happen is, we have two sets of overriding direction on
what we are doing. We have the Federal Acquisition Regulations
(FAR), the acquisition regulations, but then we also have the
FMR, the financial management regulations. So those are the two
big, broad contexts, big muscle moves, CPA-oriented-type
documents we have to operate under.
If you are sitting in Iraq and working and supporting
Ministry of Interior (MOI), the dollars that probably started
with an appropriation from Congress that went to DOD as part of
the supplemental, that were then shopped to state, as per the
direction, and then those dollars would then be executed on
behalf of state by the Department of Defense for a variety of
contracts.
Another portion of those dollars--for example, which may be
materiel related--may go directly to the Department of Defense.
And we will execute the materiel order, that part of it--for
example, if we have a truck issue, and the tank and automotive
command in Warren, Michigan, has to deal with it, they deal
with it directly.
So it is a fairly complex set of moving parts, but the
intent was to keep an audit trail of the dollars,
fundamentally. And then we, in the contracting side, under the
FAR and our Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFAR),
would follow behind, but it was the audit trail of dollars that
takes priority number one.
With regards to quality, I will keep on coming back to the
fact that, yes, we are extraordinarily concerned. And both
things have happened. We have released contractor personnel,
the individual. We have fired contractors for non-performance,
as well. But at this point in time, our records indicate that
is less than one percent of what is going on, because our
contracting officers are now actively engaged, I mean actively
engaged in what is going on, on the ground.
That is not to say that, as a contractor closes out, and we
go to the final table to start laying out the bills, what is a
reasonable charge, what is an unreasonable charge, that is not
to say that that is an easy process.
Mr. Conaway. Let me just make one comment. The cynics among
us could say, well, the one percent is because we are not doing
a very good job of looking at the whole picture, you know, your
threshold of failure is really low. That is not the case, is
it?
Mr. Motsek. I can only refer to--the document you were
referring to was a DOD Inspector General (IG) that specifically
was looking at the $5 billion-plus associated with this part of
the process. And it was a very favorable assessment.
I mean, we have had inspections by SGIR, the DOD IG,
Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the like, where
warts are found. You are always going to find warts. But what I
would caution us all is check to see if it is an auditable wart
or it is before the close-out process.
I mean, we are in negotiations today--it is public record--
where the Army, under their LOGCAP contract, said, ``You will
not hire security personnel under LOGCAP. We, the military,
will provide your security.'' As we dug through the process and
because you have contractors, subcontractors, sub-
subcontractors, which is the challenge to manage, it turned up
there was a $19.8 million bill inside of LOGCAP that was
attached to security. And we have thus far refused to pay that
bill, and we will not pay that bill, in all likelihood, because
they were not supposed to enter into that sort of contract.
It is extraordinarily challenging--you have hit the nail
right on the head--because we focus primarily on the major
contractor, the major contractor that we hire, because then
there is a separate set of contractual relationships between
him and his subcontractors, and that is how the system is
designed. So when I go back and start digging out and giving
you contract numbers, it is a challenge to start building that
pyramid of what is going on.
We are developing--and some of your staff have gotten a
little bit of background on it--an automated system. It is
already out there now in an early version, where I can take a
contractor's CAT card, or his I.D. card, and I can swipe it.
And I can tell you who he works for, what he works for, where
he is supposed to be, what his privileges are, what his
privileges aren't. I have a copy of his passport in the
database. I have a pretty good system from what is going on.
If he goes to a dining facility to eat, and he is not
supposed to eat there, it picks him up. I am not interested if
he is not entitled to eat there; what I am interested is
charging that contractor for that meal. I mean, that is the
important part.
So we have to get out of the stubby pencil way of doing
business, which is, frankly, what we are doing. But as I told
the chairman those numbers, that took us 45 days to develop
those numbers for him and for the rest of Congress. And it took
us another 45 days to get the latest set of numbers, which will
be available in May.
And our effort is, is to get our automated system up and
running. We have roughly 60,000 of the contractors in the
system right now. Our folks have been out there deploying this
thing very rapidly. Part of its success is tied to the passing
of the supplemental, because some of the dollars for their
material is in the supplemental.
But in the long term, it is going to be to the point, I can
assure you, where next time the chairman takes a delegation
over there you are going to be carrying one of my cards in your
pocket, because I am going to be able to prove you ate in
dining facility X, and you were manifested on an aircraft on
this particular place, because I have to know where you are. It
is not just good enough to know who your contractor was, but,
you know, there are always potential liabilities for exposure
of things in the future. I want an audit trail of where you
have been while you have been in theater.
So that is being very aggressively developed. The
Undersecretary is solidly behind it. And I have to be blunt
about it. Something that should take five, seven, nine years to
deploy, we are deploying in roughly a year. I mean, if I was
here before you a year ago, I would have said zero people were
in an automated database. Now I have 60,000 contractors in the
database, and that is making extraordinary progress.
So we aren't there yet. That is what I am trying to tell
you. We are not there yet, but we are driving in that
direction. So I am not trying to make it all through rose-
colored glasses, but we understand the sensitivity of knowing
these issues. And we have tried to develop the processes and
put them in place so that we can do it.
We have learned from not having a joint contracting command
on the ground early on. We learned. We thought we could do it
one way. It doesn't work. We are in the process of developing
the concept so we institutionalize that idea. So next time, if
there was a next one, and you took a delegation over there, you
would have a belly button to push and say, ``I want to know
about contracting in this theater,'' instead of having, you
know, to get your questions and come out of theater. You have
someone in theater now that should address that.
And, more importantly, the commander on the ground now has
a central belly button to push when he has questions about
contracting, which, quite frankly, he did not have early on. So
we have stumbled, to be sure, but we are making improvements.
The last thing I would reiterate, again, it is a
decentralized process. Heads of contracting agencies in the
states, head of contracting agency in Iraq, they all issue
contracts, and they are all individually responsible for the
quality of those contracts.
Part of my new mandate in my new office is develop a
systematic way of making assessments and audits of those
contracts. Right now, we tend to take a arithmetic approach to
it, a statistical approach to check, or, if we hear something
about a contract, we will go in there and audit it, if
something is brought up before us. We have to get more
proactive about it and come up with an analytical process where
we get in front of this thing and we just routinely and
constantly are taking over and working the analytics and the
auditing so that we are not surprised by the alleged $19.8
million loss. We have known about it before it hits the papers.
Mr. Conaway. What do you all need going forward to get to
the success level that you want? What is it that you are not
getting or that you do need from us, State, Justice, DOD?
Mr. Meehan. Either statutorily--I was going to ask the
question--statutorily, can we change a law? What do we need to
do?
Ambassador Patterson. Well, I think, as Mr. Motsek has put
so eloquently, I think one of the main issues was the sort of
overwhelming of the administrative system, certainly in both
State and DOD. And I don't think we need anything more from you
statutorily or legislatively, but I think, at least from my
operation, as I mentioned, we need to hire a lot more people to
do these invoice reviews and these contract close-outs, because
that is the only way we are going to recover for the taxpayer
what to do.
And that is going to be highly labor-intensive and not
cheap, but we are committed to doing that on all our contracts.
Mr. Swartz. And I should add, as well, the Department of
Justice, both with regard to the MPRI contract generally that
deals with support to ICITAP, and in particular with regard to
Iraq, has taken steps itself to ensure that that is properly
audited, controlled both by our Justice management division,
our criminal division administrative office, and with regard to
the individuals in Iraq, both working with CPATT and directly
through our personnel, our--personnel in Iraq, to ensure that
they are performing the tasks that have been sent to them.
Mr. Motsek. Sir, two things. One, in 2007, Congress passed
the National Defense Authorization Act, and as Section 854 in
that act, which, among other things, prescribed the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) victim for contracting, which is
me now, but we need help is giving us a chance to implement.
There are some time hacks in there, where we have to come
back to the Hill and tell you how we are doing, but we are
aggressively taking that. But I would like to be able to come
and my people would like to be able to come tell you where we
stand at any given date so you can see the progress made.
But I honestly got to tell you, you have to give us a
chance to implement it, because a lot of people are demanding a
lot of information, and a lot of sub-element pieces that we are
trying to pull together to give you a coherent package. So,
from a personal standpoint, if we can have the chance to
actually implement that, which we are aggressively doing, and I
fully support it, it is a logical thing for us to have to do.
And it was a very good piece of legislation, which we are
following as best that we can.
The second piece is just----
Mr. Meehan. Excuse me. On the first piece, does that mean
you think that, in the defense authorization bill, there should
be an adjustment in the language?
Mr. Motsek. No, sir, just give me a chance to implement
what you got, because we are pushing the envelope. But I am
more than willing to come up and let you know where we stand on
any given day as to how we are doing and implementing, and then
the warts will become obvious where I have a problem.
And the second piece of that will be that--and this is just
for your information now--it would be premature for me to ask
for your direct help, but just to be aware of it, is that the
contractor personnel issue is bigger than the Department of
Defense. You Members of Congress keep on talking about the AOR
in general. And we are backing into the control of that.
The field, the commander in the field has published fraggos
that talk about the responsibility of non-DOD contractors to
report into our automated system so we can get a feel for them.
It is very important, as I said early on, the man in the field,
I am principally interested for the numbers, for the sake of a
security and force protection. And so, at some point in time,
we may need assistance in making that a forcing function, if we
can't get it through fraggos in the field and compliance at
DFAR. So we may come back to you for some help there.
Mr. Swartz. And, Mr. Conaway and Mr. Chairman, if I may
add, as a general matter, I think that hearings that let us
explore the importance of technical assistance and
developmental work with regard to security forces and police
forces around the world are very useful to highlight, I think,
the important work that is being done by the Department of
State, the Department of Justice, and DOD. And it is seldom
recognized, but it is critical, we believe, to our national
security interests.
Mr. Meehan. Mrs. Davis.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Thank you to all of you for being here.
It is clear this is very complicated. I think, Ms.
Patterson, you probably put it best when you said that the
requirement here has outstripped our efforts, and a lot of
catching up to do. About how long has it been, then, since you
feel that you actually are moving in a direction that is going
to accomplish results? How long has it been, if at all? Where
do you think that has been, the last year----
Ambassador Patterson. For my own operation, I have been
here about a year and a half, but I would put it well before
that, about two years. We started to do a number of intensive,
internal reviews of DPCK, of our own operation, of our
contracting. We called in our own inspector general on some
questionable issues with our contractor.
Just this year, as Mr. Motsek says, the critical issue has
been getting the contracting officers out to the field. We,
too, I think made perhaps the same mistake DOD made, which was
largely to protect our personnel and try to do this sort of
back-office operations in Dubai and Jordan, and we realized
that that wouldn't work, because they didn't have the granulary
that they needed.
So I would say--and it gets better every day. I must tell
you, it gets better every day. I think that this broad invoice
review will return a lot of value to the contractor.
Ms. Davis of California. I guess we could, in some ways,
thank the Oversight Committee, because has that played a role
at all? You said getting your numbers together--and I want to
thank the chairman, because I question whether or not we would
have this information if we weren't sitting today or, you know,
in the course of time--I don't know whether you would have had
those numbers----
Ambassador Patterson. Well, certainly, and I would like to
say the inspector general for--the special inspector general
for Iraq has played a very constructive role in this entire
process. He has a lot of people in Iraq. We have worked with
him very cordially and constructively, and they have had lots
of useful suggestions.
Our own IG, the GAO, this has been subject to--certainly in
the last two years, not only to congressional oversight, GAO,
but a lot of very useful oversight. And I think we have gotten
our act together a lot better.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you.
I am going to move on, because I do have a few questions. I
appreciate--and you may want to add your responses later.
Part of the difficulty, of course, is that we have this
opportunity today, but the general public has really been
hearing stories about contractors. The Washington Post had an
article not too long ago about the Triple Canopy employees. And
at the end of that article, it referenced who really was in
charge there. And I guess the CENTCOM spokesperson said that it
wasn't a CENTCOM issue; it is whoever is running the contract.
I think we come back to how the use of contractors have
created problems, in terms of chain of command, and who really
is responsible for the contractors' actions. So which
government agency actually does own the ISF training mission?
Mr. Swartz. With regard to police, I believe that
responsibility has been delegated to CPATT in the Department of
Defense, the civilian police's training team.
Mr. Motsek. That is correct.
Ms. Davis of California. And in terms then of prosecution
of contractors, do we know how many contractors have actually
been prosecuted for illegal acts in the country?
Mr. Swartz. Congresswoman, we can get you those figures.
The Department of Justice has been working closely with Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), with regard
to any allegations of criminal conduct.
Ms. Davis of California. You don't know today how many
prosecutors have been----
Mr. Swartz. How many contractors have been prosecuted? I
would have to check to get you the exact number in that regard.
And, obviously, there would be sensitivities about ongoing
investigations, but I will discuss with my colleagues and with
SIGIR to get you the appropriate figures.
Mr. Motsek. And, ma'am, you are talking beyond CPATT? You
are talking about all contractors? I think that is the question
you are asking.
Ms. Davis of California. No, particularly contracted by
DOD.
Mr. Swartz. I am sorry, I misunderstood your question. I
thought you meant in the broadest sense.
Ms. Davis of California. Well, I am thinking about, even
the DynCorp--the Triple Canopy employees, for example.
Mr. Motsek. Yes, DOD contracts----
Ms. Davis of California. DOD contracts. Do we know how many
have been prosecuted?
Mr. Motsek. No.
Ms. Davis of California. Do we think there are any?
Mr. Swartz. Well, there have been a range of investigations
and some criminal prosecutions and some convictions coming out
of activities related to Iraq. If the question is misconduct
within the context of the contract itself or abuse of the
contracts, we would have to--I would have to get you those
figures and break it down.
But, yes, there have been a number of ongoing
investigations and cases that have related to Iraq in one way
or another that have involved contractors, not necessarily----
Ms. Davis of California [continuing]. Individuals who have
been under contract, have been prosecuted? Are there
individuals, per se?
Mr. Swartz. We will get you that number.
Ms. Davis of California. Mr. Andrews asked a number of
questions about the identification of any possible al Qaeda or
other foreign fighters who have been trained by us, perhaps, in
Jordan or otherwise in Iraq. Of those people who have been
picked up, have any of them been identified through your
biometrics that you mentioned?
Mr. Motsek. I have no numbers. That is outside my range
right now. But even with the basic fingerprinting process,
early on, people were identified, as I told the chairman, after
the fact, when there is--you were able to pick him up because
you at least had his fingerprints on file.
Under the new biometrics, you may have already seen it. You
know, it is ten fingers and a eyeball that you have to place it
on. And if you are working for the U.S. Government, it all ends
up with an access on the card, just like this, that we scan
this. It tells me who you say you are. Then, we can compare
immediately in the field that biometric.
Whether this gets deployed out, that is the next issue, but
they are in the repository record now, which sits in West
Virginia. Actually, the repository is physically in West
Virginia.
Ms. Davis of California. But how long have we had that
process in place? I am just talking about any fighters who have
been identified and picked up, whether or not we actually have
had information that they were trained.
Mr. Motsek. I mean, I believe basic fingerprinting was from
day one. The expansion of biometrics, which is out there now,
and they are doing it, but the broad expansion of them for a
variety of purposes in theater, I believe, is tied to the
supplemental right now. There are dollars in the supplemental
to force that much more aggressively into theater.
These are technologies that, in the old days, if I was an
old acquisition guy, I would tell you it is a five- to seven-
year process. And now, because of where we are and what we are
doing, we are talking in months or a year or two.
Ms. Davis of California. Are individuals who are picked up
in the field, are they--do we run their fingerprints through a
record to demonstrate whether or not they, in fact, were
trained? Are we doing that?
Ambassador Patterson. You mean, picked up in the field,
arrested?
Ms. Davis of California. Yes.
Ambassador Patterson. I don't know the answer to that.
Mr. Motsek. I could only tell you they could.
Ms. Davis of California. Pardon me?
Mr. Motsek. I could tell you they could----
Ms. Davis of California. They could be fingerprinted----
Mr. Motsek [continuing]. Because the database is available.
Ms. Davis of California. Right. But we are not sure that we
are doing that?
Mr. Meehan. Probably what we need to do is bring CPATT
before the subcommittee and speak directly with them.
Ms. Davis of California. Just a few other question, in
terms of contracts. For example, DynCorp, you mentioned that
people need five years of experience in police work in order to
train Iraqi personnel. Do we think that that is enough? And are
they bringing the skill sets that are really necessary to do
that job?
Ambassador Patterson. Congresswoman, is it enough? I think,
as I mentioned before, we have been satisfied with the quality
of the personnel. And many people, I might add, have vastly
more experience than that. Certainly some of the more senior
people out there have 20, 30 years of police experience, and
they are basically doing this as a patriotic effort to help out
the war effort.
So I wouldn't say that--that is the minimum, but I wouldn't
say it is the average. My own personal observation is that many
of these people are retired police officers, quite senior
police officers, with a lot more experience than five years.
But if we can get a precise figure, we will average them.
Ms. Davis of California. Mr. Chairman, just one other
question. I know that in our next panel one of the comments was
made that, in fact, the perception is that, when we use
contractors, it is perhaps less of a U.S. commitment than DOD
forces. What do you think? Do you think that that is a
perception? Is that real? And have you ran into that?
Ambassador Patterson. Congresswoman, no, I mean, these
people are enormously patriotic. And as I mentioned 17 of them
have died in the line of duty, and one is seriously injured
today. Most of these people--and I have talked a lot with them
when I have out there--they do this because they are patriotic.
They do this because they want to impart the skills that they
have learned. They do this because they believe in the mission,
and we try and offer an attractive financial package to attract
them.
Mr. Swartz. And if I could add, Congresswoman, with regard
to the individuals that ICITAP brings on, since we do integrate
them into an existing Federal law enforcement structure through
our Department of Justice office, I think we try and build the
team concept, with them reporting up through our career
personnel, and those career personnel working to build them
and, as a concept, working together.
Mr. Motsek. And the question cannot be and/or. We must use
contractors. They are an integral part of our force. I mean,
they are literally the fifth force provider that we have today,
under the way we are organized today and how we are structured.
So we have to use them, as we sit here right now. So we do not
have the luxury of saying, ``We are going to do it this way
instead of that other way.''
My son, again, is an EOD officer. In a perfect world,
military EOD types would teach military EOD training to the
Iraqi and Afghani counterparts. There aren't enough of them.
And so you have had to take contractors to do that. The bulk of
them are retired military, and they go on over. And has been
alluded to, they are every bit as patriotic and committed to
the mission as any of our folks are.
Ms. Davis of California. I am not questioning their
patriotism. I am just wondering about the perceptions in the
field. And, of course, there are tensions, and we know that.
And I would say that chain of command is obviously an important
one, as well.
Thank you.
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And to the panelists, I join my colleagues on both sides to
say thank you for--it sounds like an impossible job, that you
are trying to find possible--I sit here in amazement. We have a
different responsibility.
Obviously, the responsibility we have is multi-faced, but
we also have to think that, at some point in the future, there
has got to be some stabilization in Iraq. And yet I look at Mr.
Swartz--I appreciate your comments, and I have heard you when
you have said, in your comments, difficulty, long term, to
create a satisfactory, I guess, police force or justice system.
Can you give me, in a short answer, what is your definition of
long term?
Mr. Swartz. Well, sir, I think that each set of
circumstances requires its own answer, in that regard. We have
been in some of the Balkan countries, for example, for almost a
decade or more, in terms of building a justice system there.
We are talking about reconstructing in Iraq, or
constructing, if you will, almost from the ground up, a justice
system that meets the standards we would consider, not just as
U.S. standards, but international standards, of a system that
recognizes and respects human rights, affords due process.
I think we have found willing counterparts in a variety of
different parts of the justice system of Iraq. And, in
particular, I would point out that the judges have shown
remarkable courage and tenacity over the time period in working
with our prosecutors there.
But I don't know that I could give you a time estimate, in
terms of number of years. But I can say that the people we have
sent out are fully dedicated to this mission and continue to
believe that it is a mission worth trying to perform. We have a
number of Federal prosecutors, as I mentioned, who work on a
daily basis with the judges. The Department of Justice has
indicated its commitment to Ambassador Crocker to increase its
rule of law, work in Iraq, and to help formulate how we go
forward, so that this is a task, regardless of how monumental
and long term, that we are fully engaged in and wish to
continued to be engaged in, because we think it is an important
task.
Mr. Jones. Well, I think for those of us in Congress--and,
obviously, we, on the House side, have two-year contracts. And
at the end of two years, we either are renewed or not renewed.
The problem that frustrates me is that I can't say to the
people that I represent--and I have listened to the military. I
have listened to the professionals, like yourselves. And you
get to a point that this great nation is borrowing money from
other countries to pay the bills.
And I realize this is not what you are testifying on today,
but the point is that, when I, as one Member of Congress--and
that is all I am--when I listen to what you are saying--and,
Ms. Patterson, thank you for your service, your comments. And
you said this is not a Haiti. Well, you know, I understand what
you were saying and what you meant.
But the problem is, we have to show the American people--
that is why the Democrats are in the majority, and I am a
Republican. But I knew a year ago that the American people were
frustrated and dissatisfied because we were not able to
really--I think this is one of the best things that the
Democrats have done, is to step up this subcommittee, because
many of us in the Republican Party were asking the same thing,
that we never had the forum that we have here today.
And yet I know that Mr. Motsek--I hope I said that
somewhat----
Mr. Motsek. Close enough, sir.
Mr. Jones. Thank you. When you have a Jones for a last
name, you get spoiled. But, anyway, thank your son, as well,
for his service.
And I realize what you have said to the answers to my
colleagues, that you do think that, in time, you will have a
system that will be efficient, that will give us, the Congress
and the American people, what they need. But the problem--that
is why we had this supplemental. That is why we had benchmarks
in this supplemental, because for too long we have been having
people like yourselves, who I have great respect for, coming to
this Congress--and it is beginning the fifth year.
And every time someone comes up here--I remember Abizaid
and Casey. We have Petraeus today coming before the Members of
Congress. And everybody seems to say, well, you know, we are
getting this in place, and then you hear that it is not in
place.
And I guess what my rambling is leading to this: Jack
Sheehan, a Marine general, was asked to be a war czar. And I am
going to use his comment to ask my question. The very
fundamental issue is they don't know where the hell they are
going.
And this is a four-star Marine general that knows a whole
lot more about life than Walter Jones knows. But what can you
say to the Congress today to give us some hope that we can
share with the people back home? Because if they were watching
this on C-SPAN, I believe instead of those who have been
critical of me back home, that I was supporting the Democratic
position, to ask for benchmarks would probably call me up and
say, ``We agree with you. Now we understand.''
And this is not your fault. But if we have a system that it
is going to take 10 to 15 years to get the police force up so
that the police force can do their job, or the security
forces--I am not asking you personally when I make this
statement--be honest with us.
Because I would hate--I won't be here ten years from now. I
might not here be here two years from now. But I would hate to
be here ten years from now and people like yourselves making
the same presentation. And I realize you cannot predict the
future; that I understand. But you are the professionals. You
have been in environments similar to this, maybe not as
difficult as this, but you have seen things like this before.
Give us some idea of a benchmark of where things should be
a little bit better, where we would be able to say to the Iraqi
police force, ``You now can walk the streets without the
Americans with you.'' Can anybody give me any hope?
Mr. Swartz. Mr. Jones, I will start and then turn it over
to the ambassador.
I think that our experience suggests that, even in
countries in which the security situation is much more secure
than what we face in Iraq, that building a police force from
the ground up takes a long period of time. And by that, I mean
five to ten years would not be an unusual amount of time to do
something like that.
Here, we have the added complication of, of course,
insecure environment. But I think that it is important in
thinking about this, and for us, for all of us, for the United
States, to recognize that, however we go forward with Iraq, it
is important we have and we build to the extent we can
effective law enforcement partners, because we will need to
cooperate with Iraq, as we do with other countries over this
time period.
So the strategy of the Department of Justice has been, not
just in Iraq, but in other countries as well, to think in the
very long term, in terms of working with the countries. That is
why we have resident legal advisers in countries for sometimes
more than a decade, to work with them, to help build
incrementally the systems that we hope will allow them to
cooperate with us, because it is not simply a matter of
altruism.
It is very much in the interests of the United States and
its citizens to ensure that those countries have the capacity,
both to address criminal problems and terrorist problems in
their own countries, and to cooperate with us down the road. So
I think all of us in the Department of Justice are looking to
see what institutions we can focus on, in particular, things
such as the Major Crimes Task Force, investigating magistrates,
and others who will build, if you will, a legacy that we can
look to and that American citizens can look to for cooperation
in the future.
Ambassador Patterson. Congressman Jones, the State
Department has a lot of experience in this, and it takes
decades. And it is very expensive, although the costs, I think,
in a benign environment, a more peaceful environment, begin to
drop sharply.
I was ambassador to El Salvador about ten years after the
war, and there we were still working on the police force,
concentrating in two areas, which was middle management, which
is always a huge challenge in rebuilding these police forces,
and in internal affairs, because they have to have some
capacity to clean out the bad apples, internal affairs and
inspector general capacity to clean out the bad apples. So it
takes a long time. We are back in Haiti basically redoing what
we did in 1994, for a variety of reasons.
But I would certainly agree with Bruce about this, with Mr.
Swartz about this, that there is simply no other way than to go
forward with this. We have to have a police force that has the
support of the population. This has been very dramatic in Latin
America, because otherwise interest groups turn to vigilante
justice, which I think is what has happened, certainly, in
parts of Iraq, unless you have law enforcement in which the
population has confidence.
I certainly agree with Mr. Swartz. It is important for us,
and it is important for them, for our democracy agenda.
Mr. Meehan. I would like to go to Mr. Sestak now, but we
were supposed to have this panel over by 11. We are a little
over, so I want to go to Mr. Sestak.
Joe.
Mr. Sestak. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate your time. I was taken by your comment on
databases. You know, one part of the government has it, the
other doesn't, and may not have access, may not know, but that
is the interagency process, this time, unfortunately, out in
the field, not here in Washington.
But now we have complicated it with contractors, almost
become a fourth branch of government. I am really taken by
Representative Davis' question. You remember, I think they were
called the Blackwater incident in Anbar province. I remember
talking to the Marine colonel who actually went to pick up the
body parts afterwards, the three individuals, and he said,
``They would be alive today if only they had just called me. I
knew that road wasn't a safe road.''
These aren't the same contracts you are dealing with, but
Strykers, or F-18s, ENFs, as we deploy them now, must go
forward, as the V22 will, with contractors. And so much has
been talked about, about what has happened. And I appreciate,
without question, the patriotism of the individuals, what is
more important, actually, is, what is next?
What is the process by which we are, the next time,
supposed to have this be something that wasn't? It wasn't
prompt. It wasn't effective. And, by and large, it hasn't been
accountable. I mean, by and large, you expect what you inspect.
So my question is, when you talk about these terms like
accountability, what is the public image that a contractor
gives us out there? It may or may not be the soldier with the
candy bar, but everybody tells us this is not a war to be won
by the military. It is about the hearts and the minds.
And when we sit back and look at the chain of command,
there really is no command. I mean, that contractor is
responsible to a contractor. His incentive is, as much as
anything, from a financial--you said you offered money. And,
remember, the soldier next to him sometimes earns one-fourth of
what this same person is doing out there.
You also tend to have and report to MNSTC-I or also to
CPATT. So my question really comes down--every war plan has a
phase four. When we get to the next phase four, what is the
process? Not just here that we now have a single belly button,
just because a congressperson comes out. What is the overall
process that can make us prompt, effective, and accountable
from day one?
You know, what is it that we put on the shelf on our
lessons learned from this? Or has there been that?
Ambassador Patterson. Mr. Sestak, I mentioned to
Congressman Akin that the Administration is struggling with
this and that there is an office in the State Department run by
Ambassador John Herbst that is developing a concept for
basically a civilian ready reserve, that is trying to fill just
this hole that you described.
He has got about 30 people working for them. He has got a
very large interagency operation. He is developing statements
of work and position descriptions for such a ready reserve.
Again, that is not a short-term answer, but I think the
Administration--with this issue and trying to address it.
Mr. Sestak. Did we do the same thing after Bosnia in the
State Department and put lessons learned on the shelf? I mean,
I know the scale is immense, but it is just a scalable thing.
Ambassador Patterson. I don't know, but the scale is so
much smaller. I think we went into Bosnia under United Nations
(U.N.) auspices, which also provides basically a very
fundamental logistical support that we didn't have in this
situation.
Mr. Sestak. But did an office also go about and do what you
say this 30-person office is doing? I mean, do we--my take is,
is that lessons learned is something we don't do well.
Ambassador Patterson. I don't know what happened after
Bosnia, but let me assure you, we are trying to look at lessons
learned from Iraq experience. And I suggested to Mr. Akin that
he might want to get Ambassador Herbst up here for a briefing
so he could describe in more detail what is being done.
I mean, rest assured, as I say, there is a lot of soul
searching and review underway in the U.S. Government about just
the issue you raise.
Mr. Sestak. Sir?
Mr. Swartz. Admiral Sestak, as Ambassador Patterson
suggested, Ambassador Herbst is not simply looking at lessons
learned, although that is an important part of it, but thinking
through a way forward, in terms of creation of a possible
civilian reserve corps. And the Department of Justice and the
Department of Defense are working very closely with him in that
task.
Mr. Sestak. Mr. Motsek.
Mr. Motsek. Sir, I can focus your questions on the
contractor personnel issues in particular, because you were
absolutely right. And as I alluded to before, you gave us a
kick in the pants with the Section 854 language. It forces us
to build a more coherent package of what we are going to do in
the future.
A couple of challenges you talked about--you are absolutely
right. You have contractors in the battle space, and you have a
commander here, and you have the contractor officer
representative here. One of the things we have to do is we have
to institutionalize training in our senior service colleges and
service colleges so that that brigade and battalion commander
knows, from day one, he has a force protection and
accountability responsibility for the contractors in his area
of operations.
That is not to say he assigns duties to them, because we
know we have a contractor officer representative, which makes
it a bit more complex, but he has the fundamental
responsibility for the health and protection of his people in
his battle space. We have not done that very well.
You talk to a 3rd DISCOM commander, who went up with the
3rd Division at the very outset of this, the biggest surprise
that you had is he had a tail of contractors that were coming
in along with him, and he didn't know they were going to be
there. Well, we have to change that institutional process, so
we are building it into the schools.
The lessons learned are active lesson learned, but we are
trying not to put them on the shelf. We have contingency
contracting for our civilian side of the house that goes on in
the military contracting folks that is daily, literally daily,
and it is with base. So the constant lessons learned are being
applied there.
But going back to your fundamental question, what we have
not done very well is in the planning process, up front,
before. You know, you put the plan on the shelf, but the
planning process had a bunch of ``To Be Determined,'' a bunch
of holes with regard to this huge contractor plug that we knew
was eventually going to go in there. You know, it was almost
like magic was going to happen.
You understand what all the tidbits are about, the time-
phased deployment. We had all the military people arrayed out
perfectly. We knew when they were flying in there. But when 50
percent of your log structure is going to come into the
contracting process, if you don't have the equivalent, you have
a problem.
Part of our initiative is to build into--and we are
formalizing it now--we are going to have joint planners whose
sole function is to be pushed down to the combatant commands to
build those parts of the op plans, to build those parts of the
op plans, keep them current. I am going to technically own
them. We are going to pull them back into Washington on a
routine basis, force them to de-conflict their plans with the
service plans and the other agency plans, so that we don't
stumble along in the early stages, as we have in the past.
We are going to formalize the process, and that is a due
out to you, with regards to 854. We have to tell you in October
how we are doing and April how we are implementing. So that is
a due out to you.
Mr. Sestak. I have been taken by the work that you have all
done in the standing joint headquarters. It seems, even though
people have said during the Clinton Administration they didn't
want to, certain individuals, we have ended up continuing to do
nation-building, often after a crisis.
And the time, the promptness means that, you know, the Army
is ready to go. They have their standing joint force, their
headquarters now. If time is of such an essence, I understand
what you have all said, but the missing piece to me is--are you
actually going to have contract personnel identified?
I mean, if everybody had been on the ground on day one
after war, so many of these problems wouldn't be here. I mean,
where is the force that is going to do this? Or are we going to
have to gear up like a sinusoidal wave each time? Because at
the end, you can have nice plans, but someone has to go out and
now be the software and your hardware plans.
Where is that force to do the training for the police and I
imagine a myriad of other types of intergovernmental projects
that need to be done? And where is that interagency plan for
that resource?
Ambassador Patterson. Well, Congressman, that is what
Ambassador Herbst is working on, an interagency plan that would
deploy these people quickly, identify them, train them, equip
them, and deploy them to the field.
Mr. Sestak. Just not contracts, but----
Ambassador Patterson. The U.S. Government employs and, in
turn, the contractor would identify people. But let's be candid
here: This all takes money. And the sooner we get the money,
the State Department--and, unlike DOD, is it is--$2 billion
operation. I mean, we cannot do this out of O&M. It takes
contingency funds that are basically in our budget to enable us
to do that.
And on any issue like Iraq, it takes a long time to get the
money. We just sort of can't squeeze them out of hide.
Mr. Sestak. You know, I think your point, Ms. Ambassador,
is well-taken. We have talked about this--even during the
Clinton Administration, there was an NPD, or whatever they
called it back then, to do this.
The military deploys, and there is an emergency
supplemental that is now going to raise us from $8 billion a
month to $14 billion a month, just because they have asked for
it. So, to my mind, it is about the resources that are ready to
do this. And so is that going to be part of this?
Ambassador Patterson. Yes, and it has been part of it in
the past, and it has been turned down, because the Congress
doesn't like to fund a pig in a poke, a contingency fund, as it
were.
But, yes, first of all, I think the attitude up here has
changed rather dramatically, and I think there is a lot more
support, but, sure, our budget requests will be part of this.
Mr. Swartz. And if I may add, Mr. Congressman, it is, if
you will, a second-level funding problem at the Department of
Justice. We can deploy. We can't order, but we have never had
any lack of volunteers to deploy, even in the most dangerous
circumstances, both from our criminal division, from the FBI,
from our standing ICITAP and OPDAT resources, but we can only
do that if we receive funding from the Department of State or
the Department of Defense. We do not have funding to do this
kind of activity on our own.
Mr. Sestak. And the national security has really changed.
National security is not just the military any longer.
One last comment. And, as I know, we have gone over, and I
want to save the questions. I was also taken--and I was only
out there for a couple days with Senator Hagel about a week
ago--to Congressman Andrews point. You know, I raised the
question similarly out there, is what has happened to both the
military that we have trained? Because we have gotten numbers
here. They are not there, they say, including an intelligence
agency. Those numbers aren't accurate, and as for the police,
also.
And so the question I asked for both was, how many have
gone to the other side? Or how many don't show? And the answer
we got there was, we are doing a study on both. You know, and,
again, I come back to the--I was more concerned about the
threat side of it than just we have trained and wasted money.
Again, it comes--I think you said it well, sir--you know,
it is all in the planning. And this is a new world, but it is
got to have the ready resources. And if contractors are to be--
you know, I mean, I have watched 30-some years, as contractors
weren't there, and you just deploy without them anymore. And it
is a missing piece with the resources for the contingency.
Thank you.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you.
I want to thank our distinguished panel for--excuse me, Dr.
Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. May I make a final comment?
Mr. Meehan. Sure. Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. I wanted to make two quick comments, if I
could, Mr. Chairman. The first one is with regard to one of the
questions I had, and then some other members, several of you
wanted to do statements for the record, answers for the record.
And I hope you will do that in a timely way.
It is not good enough that you send it to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) or whatever and sit there in the
bowels of OMB until, you know, the eons of time. And so I hope
you will work to see that those answers come and that whatever
gets scrubbed out by OMB actually says what you intended it to
say.
The second thing I wanted to say, Mr. Chairman, if I might,
since we are doing this debate and vote on the supplemental,
the discussions about the contractors. I think there has been a
lot of misstatements about what has been in the House version
of the bill, including the version we are going to vote on
today, but there is no limit in the House bill that Ms. Pelosi
has supported, no limit on the number of U.S. citizens that can
be there, either contractors or non-military personnel, and
even more importantly there is no limit on the number of U.S.
military combat troops that can be there to protect any U.S.
citizen.
And I heard again in a report on a radio station this
morning that it starts the date for the withdrawal of all U.S.
combat troops. No, in fact, the President may decide, if he
were to sign this bill, which he says he is not going to, he
may decide, ``You know, I actually need 200,000 troops to
protect the judges and all the State Department people and the
veterinarians from Arkansas that are there.''
And no one wants to put any of these civilian contractors
at risk, and there is no limit on a number of combat troops the
President can have there to protect those folks and your
people.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Dr. Snyder.
Ranking Member Akin asked me to ask Mr. Swartz how many
active or actually houses of courts there are right now in
Iraq?
Mr. Swartz. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, how many active
courts there are?
Mr. Meehan. Courts or courthouses.
Mr. Swartz. I will have to get--I will get you that answer
for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 135.]
Mr. Meehan. Okay. Thank you.
Thanks very much to all of you, and thank you for your
service to our country. And thank you for participating with us
this morning. Thank you.
We are going to take a two- or three-minute break while the
new panel, second panel comes up. Thank you.
We would like to begin our second panel, if we can, because
we are behind. And my concern is that there is going to be a
vote somewhere around 12 o'clock, a little after. And one of
the panelists has to leave, so I am sure that we would come
back after votes.
I want to thank the panelists for appearing.
And I would ask, Dr. Avant, if you could begin with your
testimony. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DR. DEBORAH D. AVANT, PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE
AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Dr. Avant. Yes, Chairman Meehan and members of the
committee, I thank you for having me here. And I want to speak
much more generally about the use of contractors to train
security forces.
We all know that effective security forces are key to
stable government, but we are not always clear about exactly
what effective force means. A minimum condition for state
building is security forces that not only have certain
capacities--ability to shoot straight or, you know, arrest a
criminal--but also some sort of coordinated, if not
centralized, political control, and some modicum of respect for
professional military and/or law enforcement values.
As you can imagine, creating these forces is quite
difficult. Even when the training is carried out by U.S.
forces, there are several common difficulties. Often, the
training isn't right for the threat; it is hard to coordinate
civilian, military and police forces for counterinsurgency
missions; political direction from fledgling civilian
governments, host governments, is often opportunistic, aimed at
partisan rather than public goals; professional values are hard
to put in practice, particularly against irregular opposing
forces.
And the U.S. itself often has many sub-goals in a conflict,
where the pursuit of one goal might undermine the pursuit of
others. For instance, U.S. forces working with warlords in
Afghanistan to gain access to al Qaeda hideouts, one U.S. goal,
has worked against President Karzai's efforts to consolidate
control over the country by training a national Afghan army,
which is, of course, another U.S. goal.
Now, the ability to contract with private security
companies for training undoubtedly augments U.S. forces. The
use of private security companies offers a variety of other
benefits, as well, but also some risks that generally
exacerbate the difficulties with training that I just
mentioned.
So this morning, I just wanted to outline the benefits and
risks of using contractors and how they impact the general
difficulties of training foreign forces. And I will end with a
brief comment about ways in which this might be ameliorated.
First of all, the benefits. Private security companies can
draw from a deeper pool of personnel and personnel with
specific experience. We heard this morning talk about language
experience and things like that. Contractors are able to pool
from those kinds of experiences more easily.
Second, contractors can provide greater stability in
training programs. Often, troops rotate in and out, and
contractors can stay for a longer period of time.
And finally, and somewhat ironically, contractors can
actually move personnel through the field more quickly. It is
sometimes easier to mobilize contractors for a surge capability
than it is to actually redeploy U.S. forces.
There are also some risks. The first is that contractors
are--and I use a quote from many, many people in the Pentagon--
``rigid tools for fluid environments.'' The contract specifies
what has to be done and payment to be received for a specific
period of time and a specific set of tasks. Even if U.S.
priorities change, the contract enshrines the original
agreement and the exchange costly.
Second, contractor services often pose difficulties with
coordination and integration, and I will talk about that more
in a minute.
Contracted training services are more subject to political
opportunism. Contracted training is difficult to monitor and
control. And contracted training can be more costly,
particularly in risky or uncertain environments, such as Iraq.
So how do these benefits and risks affect the sort of
general training problems? First of all, in terms of getting
the right training, the private sector's ability to mobilize
personnel from a deeper pool with access to a wider variety of
skills can give them better access to the right trainers.
Contracting makes it harder, though, to asset the fit
between contracted training and force needs. Often, the
contractor is the main source of information about progress,
and the contractor may withhold information, or the contractor
may not understand U.S. goals well, or they may just be
inadequate communication channels from the contractor to U.S.
policymakers.
Second, in terms of coordinating civilian, military and
police forces, the additional risks posed by contracting loom
very large here. The very fact of contracting often divides
what should be an integrated set of policies into a number of
discrete tasks, but each one task is interdependent with the
other. And how to write contracts to ensure that communication
and coordination with a variety of different entities is often
very difficult and is particularly the case when events on the
ground change in a way that the contract has not anticipated,
which is common in experiences like Iraq.
Unlike U.S. forces, which are placed under a commander in
the field, contractors are ultimately subject to the contract
rather than the commander. In one important way, however,
contracted for training can provide some advantages in
coordination, by generating greater stability of personnel
during the training by contracting them for a longer period of
time.
Third, in terms of opportunistic political direction from
civilians. While the efforts of U.S. troops are not impervious
to this dynamic, private security companies are much more
likely to feed into opportunism. This was apparent in the
creation of the facilities protection services in Iraq, as well
as various police units.
And I think there are really two kinds of opportunism at
work in Iraq. One is very dangerous potential for a diffusion
of control over force that could result in the development of
parallel forces. And here I am talking about the police forces,
national police forces, subject to rule by the Ministry of
Interior, and stressed between the Ministry of Interior and
Ministry of Defense.
And the second is lower-level corruption, where officials
pay kickbacks to their superiors and ghost soldiers line the
pockets of politicians. And this second problem is exacerbated
by the degree to which governance is by local and tribal
religious leaders can take precedence over or is simply not
well coordinated with the Iraqi constitution and Iraqi law.
Both of these kinds of opportunism work to undermine training
efforts, and often they work together.
In terms of professional values, this obviously has been an
issue for U.S. forces in Iraq, but much more so for
contractors. Though many private security companies draw from
retired military personnel who are well socialized in
international values, because contractors are not subject to
the chain of command, the reliability of their behavior is not
reinforced, as well. Many report a rather cavalier attitude
among private security personnel in Iraq for international law.
Also, though, the U.S. contracting pattern in Iraq has
relied on some companies that have recruited much more
internationally. This has yielded a more heterogeneous set of
employees and companies that may respect different values or
less attention to the professional values that American troops
represent in training. And specifically, I would, again,
reference the U.S. contract with the Jordanians to train the
facilities protection force.
Even if professional values are modeled in training, they
also have to be reinforced with promotions and other rewards in
service. If personnel are reported for professional behavior,
the organization will yield more professionalism, but also the
reverse. But political opportunism by Iraqis has often led this
not to be the case.
There is one example I mention in my remarks where a
contractor was aware of and reported infiltration of police by
militias, but political sensitivity led the government--in this
case, the British government--not to act, and this is really a
communication and coordination problem. And then when the
police chief was fired for telling the press about the militia
infiltration, on the advice of the private security company,
the contractor felt that its efforts had been dramatically
undermined.
Finally, contractors often use a complexity of U.S. goals
to advantage the pursuit of contracts in ways that further
undermine the integrity of U.S. policy.
So what to do? There is a lot of focus that has been at a
very micro-level of trying to get accountability on individual
contracts, and that is very important. And I think a lot of the
legislation that Congress has issued already has made strides
in working on those issues, but I think it misses the bigger
point: that contracting often disaggregates a mission to the
point where it is not coordinated and integrated. So
contractors can follow the letter of the contract and still not
yield well-trained troops.
I suggest in my remarks that sometimes it is possible to
counteract this, what I think is a much more serious problem,
there is a larger umbrella that can coordinate norms and
standards for forces with enforcement tools for all actors
involved. And I reference Europe, and particularly NATO, in the
Partnership for Peace program as one example of an umbrella
like that, that has generated that kind of framework.
And I look at the private training in Croatia as an example
of a fairly effective use of private trainers, in a situation
where you might not imagine it would be all that effective.
This is mostly for the Army. Partnership of Peace does not deal
with the law enforcement side.
But I think that, in addition to sort of thinking about
getting a handle on the sort of micro-issues, of making sure
contractors are accountable, you also have to think about these
macro-issues of coordination and what kinds of tools might be
available.
Obviously, there are huge differences between conditions in
Croatia in the mid-1990's and conditions in Iraq today, and I
would say that these differences offer little optimism to me
that the same kind of framework can be devised. But some sort
of larger umbrella within which to coordinate training for
Iraqi security forces and incentives for Iraqi civilian
government would undoubtedly be helpful for steering the
overall training effort.
And this kind of umbrella should, at the very least:
specific model behavior for both civilians and military
personnel; ensure that the model and the training centralizes
rather than diffuses control; tie continued support of the
government and each contract to institutional milestones; take
advantage of regional agreements and international institutions
to nest the reinforcements for this model, and this echoes some
of the arguments made in the Iraq Study Group report; and focus
on the long term.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Avant can be found in the
Appendix on page 98.]
Mr. Meehan. Thank you.
Mr. Brooks.
STATEMENT OF DOUG BROOKS, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL PEACE
OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Brooks. Thank you very much. Thank you for the
opportunity to provide an industry perspective on the critical
issues highlighted in this hearing. The role of the private
sector is too little understood and too often treated with
suspicion.
About ourselves, the International Peace Operations
Association (IPOA) is a non-profit, non-partisan,
nongovernmental association of service companies providing
critical services to peace and stability operations worldwide.
We have more than 30 member companies providing services,
including training, logistics, security, aviation, mine action,
and medical support. We represent a demand-driven industry,
providing cost-effective services in some of the most dangerous
environments imaginable.
This testimony will provide some background information and
explain why our government utilizes these companies to enhance
policies and ways the government could be a smart client.
First, I want to be clear. The leadership, initiative and
oversight of the training effort must come from the governments
of the United States and Iraq. While some of the actual
training can be done by U.S. military and government employees,
a significant portion of the expertise, resources, and hundreds
of the experienced long-term personnel doing the hands-on
training and mentoring are necessarily going to come from the
private sector.
This is a concept where an effective public-private
partnership is simply indispensable. Indeed, it is
inconceivable that success could be achieved any other way.
Attempting reconstruction and redevelopment in the face of an
ongoing conflict is necessarily difficult, and nothing quite
like the operation in Iraq has been attempted in the past.
The closest parallel might be the Civilian Operations and
Revolutionary Development Support, the CORDS program, in
Vietnam, which did show a surprising degree of success in the
face of constant attacks by the Vietcong, but only with an
astonishing level of national commitment, which we do not have
today.
While there are a number of actions that can be taken to
improve the training process, the ultimate success of Iraq
depends on dramatic political improvements in that country, as
well. Simply put, a professional security sector is not a
replacement for a functioning government, and it is
inconceivable that a functioning government could survive long
without a reliable security sector.
The private sector has been active in the training process.
And if called upon, they will increase its role even more. In
the years since 2003, much has been done to increase and
improve the security sector training capacity. At the same
time, much has been done to address the contractual and
oversight problems that are inevitable in any operation on this
scale.
We need to get it right. The private sector is playing a
critical role and will be an essential player during and beyond
any withdrawal.
Why do we use the private sector? Well, first of all, I
think contractors are cost-effective. Contractors are veterans
and ex-cops that live side-by-side with the military personnel
in the same dangerous, rough conditions. They provide an
astonishing degree of experience and expertise. They usually
stay in the country longer than the troops, and Dr. Avant
addressed that point.
Surprisingly, they cost the government far less in the long
run. U.S. troops have some astonishing capabilities, but they
cost somewhere around $15,000 per month per soldier in Iraq.
Contractors have staying power. Military personnel have to
be rotated in and out while contractors can serve multiple
years, and the companies can establish greater continuity of
programs and doctrine. At the same time, they are remarkable
resilient. As we say, contractors are risk managers, not
morons. They can take a certain amount of risk. And we were
seeing early predictions by pundits that the private sector
could not operate in dangerous environments have been pretty
much thoroughly dispelled. Contractors do operate in dangerous
environments.
Companies are accountable. Contractors can be and sometimes
modified contracts can be and are sometimes modified, penalized
or canceled based on performance and changing conditions.
Companies must answer to government contract officers,
providing guidance and oversight and obtain government licenses
to do military and police training.
Contractors themselves can be held accountable. The
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, MEJA, allows the
U.S. Government to try individuals in Federal courts for
felonies. This law has been on the books for several years, but
the Department of Justice is only now beginning to exercise it
appropriately in Iraq. Another alternative that has been raised
is a use of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but I think
there are some problematic issues with that. I think MEJA is
the way to go, and we supported expansion of MEJA in the past.
Contractors can expand their operations. Companies are able
to tap into huge pools of expertise, and most companies have
databases of thousands of individuals with a full array of
skills, expertise, experience, languages, all of which can be
brought to bear in support of our policies.
I think there are some areas for improvement. To maximize
the value, both the Department of State and Department of
Defense must improve oversight capacities and capabilities in
general. This is a common refrain and one the industry strongly
supports. Good oversight benefits both the companies, as well
as the clients. And problems with oversight has been a number-
one client of IPOA member companies since 2003.
Contract coordination between the government departments
needs to be improved. Companies are concerned that the
Department of Defense contract officers and Department of State
contract officers do not communicate enough, nor do they
operate with the same rules, creating cost and complications
which have negatively impacted on performance.
Quality matters. Too much emphasis is placed on contract
price, when better quality companies are more effective at
achieving policy objectives. Contracts awarded with too much
emphasis on price can reward marginal companies and undermine
more experienced and professional firms. IPOA members agreed to
abide by an industry code of conduct and want some credit for
that, as well.
The means of law enforcement can be improved. Impartial
investigations into allegations of corruption and abuse benefit
the larger industry in the long run, and we fully support that
kind of oversight and accountability.
I think, in the larger picture, we have the best support
and supplied military operation in history in Iraq. And this
fact is largely due to imaginative and effective use of the
private sector. There are a lot of things that can be fixed and
improved, but we should not ignore that basic fact. Private
companies are being contracted to support and enhance
government policies around the world. There is no reason we
cannot demand that these companies live up to high professional
and ethical standards.
From an industry perspective, we fully support effective
oversight and accountability. It is good for good companies.
Getting this aspect right is something you folks can help with.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brooks can be found in the
Appendix on page 113.]
Mr. Meehan. Thank you very much.
Mr. Burke.
STATEMENT OF GERALD F. BURKE, MAJOR, MASSACHUSETTS STATE POLICE
(RET.), FORMER SENIOR ADVISOR, IRAQI MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND
IRAQI POLICE SERVICE
Mr. Burke. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
the opportunity to speak today. In May 2003, I was a member of
a six-person team of police executives sent to Baghdad, Iraq,
by the United States Departments of Justice, ICITAP in
particular, and Department of State, INL's office.
The police team was part of a larger criminal justice team,
including corrections and legal executives. My assignment in
Iraq would last until June 2004. Initially, our team conducted
a needs assessment of the Iraqi Police Service for the
Department of Justice and Department of State, and my
assignment transitioned into being the adviser to the Baghdad
police chief for the rest of my tour of duty.
In March 2005, I returned to Baghdad with the Iraq
Reconstruction Management Office as a national security adviser
to the Iraq Ministry of Interior, particularly the deputy
minister for police affairs. That assignment lasted, until
February 2006.
It is my professional opinion that the police training
program in Iraq has been a complete failure. This is despite
the best efforts of thousands of American police officers over
the last four years, and the ultimate sacrifice of 17 American
police officers.
The magnitude of the mission and the political environment
of the mission created challenges that exceeded the
organizational capabilities and capacities of the Department of
Justice and the Department of State. Many of the lessons
learned on previous police training missions were either
ignored or could not be adapted to the mission in Iraq.
The original assessment team of six members, of which I was
one, had no ability to move around the country to meet or work
with Iraq police and government officials. In fact, we were
overwhelmed with the task of simply moving around the city of
Baghdad, the city of an estimated 6 million people, with a
police department that should have been 18,000 police officers.
In fact, the generals--we have several hundred police generals
in the Iraq police service that we were dealing with.
The first additional civilian police advisers, American
police advisers and trainers, did not arrived until November
2003, six months after the original team arrived. In November,
we received our first reinforcements. In November 2003, we
received 24 members. We added 24 members to the original team.
By the time my first mission ended in June 2004, we still had
less than 100 American police trainers and advisers on the
ground in Iraq.
A similar situation existed with our equipment. We did not
receive armored vehicles until the spring of 2004, and then we
received only two. It is easy in the situations like this to
look within the agencies responsible for individuals to blame.
It is my experience, however, as a senior manager in two large
police agencies, and the former director of the New England
Institute of Law Enforcement Management, that the causes for
failure usually lie elsewhere. My experience is that such
failures usually lay in the system, policies, and procedures
used to administer the agencies involved.
By July 2003, the Department of Defense, CPA, and the
police-training mission had fallen irretrievable behind in the
key management areas of planning, organizing, staffing,
budgeting, in coordinating their efforts, and reporting back
their progress. Ever effort since then, the creation of CPATT
under military command, the creation of MNSTC-I, the military
training teams that have gone out to the police department, the
provincial reconstruction teams, the Iraqi national police
force, the 3rd Forces, it is called, of commandos and the Wolf
Brigade, and other units that have been drawn from the
sectarian militias, the disastrous year of the police in 2006,
every one of these efforts has been a desperate effort to
correct for past failures.
It is my opinion that Federal law, rules and regulations,
and policies and procedures for the hiring and contracting of
personnel and the acquisition of supplies and equipment were
serious obstacles to accomplishing the mission and
unnecessarily put peoples' lives at risk, including my own.
It is my opinion that the United States missed a brief
window of opportunity in the late spring, early summer 2003 to
work with the Iraqi Police Service to provide a more secure
environment for the reconstruction effort.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Burke can be found in the
Appendix on page 123.]
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Burke.
It is interesting. The first time I visited Iraq was in the
summer of 2003. I came back, and I said, ``We have a window of
opportunity to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people,
and that window is closing.'' It is amazing. Your testimony
just reinforces everything that I know and everything that has
been written.
The question, I guess, is, where do we go from here?
Professor Avant, in your prepared testimony, you noted that,
``With different entities training the various armed services
in Iraq, the potential for coordination difficulty obviously
goes up.''
Mr. Brooks, you note that, ``The contract coordination
between the government departments has to be improved.''
All of you, I think, had a chance to listen to the first
panel. And, Mr. Burke, you have just articulated what was going
on, on the ground and in the theater.
How was the way in which this mission has been split up
between different agencies and contractors in Iraq affected the
training of Iraqis? And what specific recommendations would you
make to improve coordination, management and oversight?
And in light of Mr. Burke's testimony, I guess the question
is, how do you undo--I mean, we missed a window, and we didn't
make adjustments. So I guess, in addition to insight that you
could give, or specific recommendations to improve coordination
and management and oversight, I guess I would be interested,
Mr. Burke, in what any other insight--the question of what we
do now.
Mr. Burke. Well, I think part of the problem is that we put
command of the police training program--and I want to
differentiate. We sometimes use the phrase ``Iraqi Security
Forces,'' and that is kind of catch-all phrase. It really
blends a military force with a civilian rule of law force.
If we want to establish civilian rule of law in the country
of Iraq, then we can't keep calling it security forces, because
the military and the police have two entirely different
missions.
Mr. Meehan. But you know why we call them security forces?
We call them security forces because, when we lump them all
together, it sounds like there is a lot more of them.
Mr. Burke. Yes. And part of the problem, I think, is we put
command of the training of the civilian rule of law police
under the military, in particular combat arms people from the
infantry, artillery and armor forces, who are trained to close
with and destroy the enemy. That is not what we do in civilian
law enforcement.
I have been in meetings with generals, two- and three-star
generals, where they talk about maneuver elements. Well, my
frame of reference is a police officer, and maneuver element is
a two-man patrol car, not a brigade of troops. So I think we
need to re-look at that.
The military still has to be involved. We need them for
protection and transportation. But the command of the police
training program should be put back under civilian
professionals.
Mr. Brooks. One of the ideas that has come up is the State
Department's S/CRS office of reconstruction and stability, and
to have all the sort of state-building reconstruction efforts
put under one single office. The State office was chosen. I
don't believe it has been funded by Congress yet, but State has
been sort of stealing money from other departments to keep it
going.
It is not being used in Iraq, to my knowledge, but it is
sort of designed for the future. And I think it is something
that we would support. I think, for the contractors, I mean,
having a single, central source for contracts and coordination,
I think, would be helpful.
Dr. Avant. Yes, I think I want to echo something that Mr.
Burke said. In even preparing and in reviewing the efforts that
the U.S. did with police training in Kosovo, one of the things
they noted was the importance of having civilian police
principles and having civilian police training that is separate
from the military.
And that was one of the lessons that they took from Bosnia,
so that goes to sort of--not necessarily folding the lessons we
have learned from past wars into the future. But I think the
idea of coming up with principles for police training and
having those principles not only train officers, but you are
also training the whole set of civilians, you know,
politicians, rule-makers, bureaucrats, and, you know, sort of
targeting that civilian sector is something that we, as a
government, the U.S. Government, does not have a coordinate
effort doing.
And I know Bob Perito, who actually was, you know, the
person who thought of using DynCorp in the first place in
Haiti, because there was no other way to get international
civilian police force to Haiti, has criticized the fact that
the U.S. Government has not sort of developed a planning agency
for doing that kind of thing in the future.
And so the fact that we outsource to DynCorp, we sort of
outsourced the ideas to DynCorp, too, and DynCorp, you know, as
a company has now developed the kind of institutional memory
that you would expect the U.S. Government to. And so I think
that a lot more could be done, in terms of that kind of ongoing
planning.
Mr. Meehan. But with the escalation of violence since 2003,
doesn't it become extraordinarily difficult to set up any kind
of--how do we get better at this, with violence going up at
such a rapid pace of a period of time? How do we deal with
that?
For example, I don't know--Mr. Burke, I assume you were
here. We were talking about the Jordan police training. I am
interested in your insight. But it is remarkable to me that, as
violence goes up, that we are now doing the training at
facilities in Baghdad. And I tried to get the tour on the last
trip that we took, those facilities in Baghdad, but we were
unable to do that.
I wonder how you accomplish legitimate police training and
legitimate policing in an environment where, obviously, the
violence is that of a civil war?
Mr. Burke. It is very difficult. The Baghdad police
academy, I think it was in August of 2004, took over 300 mortar
rounds in that one month alone. So it is very difficult to
teach in that kind of an environment, with----
Mr. Meehan. So why would they want to bring the police
academy--why would they want to train police in Baghdad rather
than Jordan, in their facility?
Mr. Burke. It came out of a sense of national pride. The
Iraqis felt offended that they had to go outside their country
to provide training. They have pride in their own educational
level. They think they are among the most educated in the
Middle East, and they felt it was demeaning to go outside the
country for training.
Mr. Brooks. It is incredibly difficult to do anything in
Baghdad. If you are working in the red zone, you are lucky to
have two meetings per day, whereas in Bosnia or--I visited
Kabul, and you could do a lot more. I mean, simply, the
security situation is so difficult in Iraq that getting
anything done, police training, rebuilding hospitals, whatever,
is just insanely difficult.
Dr. Avant. Yes, at this point, I think any police training
has to be part of a general counterinsurgency effort.
Successful counterinsurgency efforts, particularly those that
involved an intervening country, typically would involve
committees that would have civilian representatives from both
the U.S. Government and Iraqi government, also representatives
from the military of both entities, and representatives from
police of both entities.
I think, you know, sort of, if you look at the--emergency,
the attempt in CORDS, that is the sort of structure with which
you begin to operate. And so, even though you would train
police separately by different principles, presumably that are
in a same place than an unsafe place, the way that you actually
begin to get control over the country is actually integrating
the effort of civilian police and military units.
What you do with the national police force is another
question. You know, I think that that is probably--you know, I
understand why it was created, but if you sort of look at
countries emerging from transitions around the world, having a
national sort of paramilitary force is not always a good idea
for stable nation-building.
Mr. Meehan. Dr. Snyder. I don't know if you were in the
queue, but----
Dr. Snyder. The queue, that is right. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Burke, I was struck by your statement, the desperate
effort to correct past failures, which I think has been very
discouraging for the American people, for the Congress. I
remember back when during one of the hearings we had several
years ago with Ambassador Bremer, and I think it was in
response to my question when I said, ``You know, what is it
that you need?'' And he said, ``Patience.''
Well, okay, I think the American people have been very
patient, and so that is why we are kind of desperately asking
for State Department or military, whoever. What does the
Congress need to do that we haven't done to try to make this
thing work?
I think one of the issues is--I mean, the obvious issue is,
this is not like ``The Sword and the Stone,'' in King Arthur,
where somebody tries and it doesn't move, and the next person
tries and it doesn't move. It is that you don't get a second
chance at what was there last month, because this month is
different.
And we now look back to almost with, you know, halcyon eyes
of what it was like when U.S. troops first went into Baghdad
and how much we all wished that we had provided the immediate
kind of security, and not let the looting occur, and deal with
the Baathists in a different way, and how much different it
might have been, but we can't go backwards. And so we are
having to deal with the situation we are now.
I wanted to ask a specific question. I am not trying to
draw you in to the supplemental debate about timelines and all,
but I have some contractors in my district, as well as military
veterans, some contractors of both Afghanistan and Iraqi
experience. And one of them came to me not long ago and, after,
I think two tours in Iraq as a contractor, and he said--he
began by prefacing this thing by saying, ``You know, I am more
supportive of the war in Iraq that Dubya,'' you know, and that
was preface up to say that he was not being critical of the
issue to go in.
But he said, ``I, for a long time, was not supportive of
any kind of timeline and deadlines,'' but he said, at his
level--I think I am addressing this to you, Mr. Brooks and Mr.
Burke--but he said, at his level, he said, ``Not at the high
level of the President calling up Maliki or anything like
that,'' but at his level of just dealing with people out in the
community, he said the people he dealt with felt like the
Americans were a gravy train, that, you know, they were getting
paid to come and attend these conferences, and meetings, and
training sessions that he was providing.
And, you know, he said, they just look at him and--you
know, he would say, ``We have a deadline. We need to get this
to work.'' And he said they just look at him, pat him, and say,
``You Americans will never go anywhere. We know you are not
going anywhere. You are going to be here for a long, long
time.'' And he described it as a gravy train.
And so my question is, do you all have any experience--
perhaps not in Iraq, but elsewhere--is it helpful when you are
sending in contractors that they have, that they present to the
folks they are working with, ``We have a certain time period to
do this, and if you don't get it right, we are moving onto
another group of people''? Do you have any comments on that?
Mr. Burke. I think, as far as the mission and doing it over
sort of approach to it, I think we have been doing the military
mission over and over. What we haven't done is taken a good
look at the other two legs of this three-legged stool, if you
will.
One is the government side. We have not done a lot of
training with the government officials. I know at one point,
about six months ago, we had one permanent State Department
employee and two contractors working in the prime minister's
office. So we haven't really done a lot of training of the
government officials. They haven't come to the United States
for programs. Even before the government was established, we
should have been training them.
Also, the economic package. We still have about 60 percent
unemployment in Iraq, probably 20 percent underemployment on
top of that, where doctors, and dentists, and lawyers are
working as interpreters rather than their primary profession.
So I think we need to look, not just at the military solution,
which is what we always focused on--maybe because it is easier
to understand--but we have to look at the governance and the
economic package, as well.
If I could just sort of slip back to the time frame issue,
for police training, what we are looking at is a generation of
police officers. As we call back the old police officer who
worked under Saddam, you can't just put them out on the street
without a paycheck. You need them, because they could be
problems like the Iraqi army was. So we bring them back in.
We have trained them, and we want to retrain them, and
continue to retrain them, the veteran officers, as well as
bringing in new recruits. Then we retire the older officers and
we keep bringing in, over the course of a generation, new,
young officers who are trained the proper way, from the
beginning.
So I would say a generation is what we need in the police
market.
Dr. Avant. If I could just add to that, I think, in terms
of not just a timeline, but having some mechanism to punish
failure to develop is important. And in Croatia, it was very
important to be able to freeze the training funds. And so the
threat of a freeze even would often create movement, even in
Tudjman's government, in ways that would be very useful.
And so I think, even if you are not talking about a
timeline, talking about some sort of institutional milestones
and some amount of money that is tied to that, or resources
that are tied to that, is very important.
Dr. Snyder. Secretary Gates has been candid, both with
Members of Congress, but also publicly about, while he doesn't
agree with the House Democratic bill, that the debate has
helped nudged the ball down the field a little bit, and we have
a good cop-bad cop thing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being here. I am sorry I missed some of the
early testimony, but I will try and follow up and take your
comments from your written testimony.
I would like to go to the question--and I know you were
here when we discussing with the first panel--you just
mentioned a generation to train the Iraqi police. Do you
believe that, in what you thought of our trainers, five years
experience that was requested, and what kind of training do you
think they got to be trainers? And are we developing,
basically, the capacity to do that kind of training?
Mr. Burke. First, we need to divide the training concept up
into two. We have classroom trainers who are, you know,
platform instructors. And they come under the MPRI contract, I
believe, right now. It had been SAIC. And they work under
ICITAP, Department of Justice. And that is the cost-plus
contract, where they are able to set standards for the people
they want to employ, and then the contractor gets the cost of
the employee, plus a profit margin, whatever that is.
The other contract, which I think is still held by DynCorp,
is a competitive, low-bid contract, where it is in DynCorp's
interest to perhaps lower the price paid to the employees that
they are hiring. And these are the advisers who are going out
on the streets, who are running the streets of Baghdad and
Iraq. It is where the 17 of them have been killed, so I want to
be careful how I say this, but I think we could do better,
perhaps, raising the standards of the people who are going into
that advisory role, going out in the police stations.
If you are at 5 years as a police officer and you are
walking into a police station and trying to advise a 25-, 30-
year veteran, police colonel, he is going to look at you as a
5-year--you know, he knows you are obviously young, if you have
only 5 years on the job. And you are not going to have quite
the same impact if you come in with the years of experience
that the classroom instructors have. So I think we could
perhaps----
Ms. Davis of California. What about cultural training, as
well? I mean, were we really providing them with what they
needed? I am assuming that very few of them spoke out, I
expect. Were we providing them on the other end what is needed
to be able to understand the culture that they are working?
Mr. Burke. We are providing some training, but very minimal
training. I know, at the beginning, we didn't get any training.
A week at Fort Bliss, mostly some medical checkups and x-rays
and stuff like that, and then we deployed. So it was sort of,
for the original team, learning on the fly.
But, yes, we could do better. And I think if we look at
this plan that the State Department is considering, we could
build into that cultural training, cultural awareness for, you
know, whatever size this reserve corps is going to be, and have
some of them train for different parts of the world, much like
the SF, the Special Forces community in the military does,
where they have teams designed for specific theaters.
Ms. Davis of California. Is the State Department going to
you for consulting on that at all?
Mr. Brooks. To me?
Ms. Davis of California. Yes, please, go ahead.
Mr. Brooks. Well, I was just going to say, on the cultural
training, I think that is becoming a larger component. I think
it is important.
And it is interesting. For example, Blackwater actually
trains as a training course, where they do intensive Iraqi
Arabic and Iraqi customs and things for contractors, because
they see it as a valuable, I guess, mechanism for their own
people. So it is actually got some value, and I think that is
an aspect that I think contractors are going to get into much
more.
Ms. Davis of California. Yes, well, we certainly know. I
mean, we have been to Fort Riley, in terms of the embedding
with the military, and what that role will be, but I wasn't
certain whether we were developing that kind of capacity, if
you will, at our training level, when it comes to the----
Mr. Brooks. It can be put into contracts that a certain
amount of training goes into anybody who deploys. I think that
would be appropriate. I mean, to a certain extent, you don't
know where the next deployment is going to be. We already have
contractors, I think, in Somalia now, supporting the African
Union. We have contractors in Darfur. We have contractors in
Congo. So you can't train everybody for everything, but you can
either find people that have background or you can have, you
know, require within the contract a certain amount of training
in certain areas.
Ms. Davis of California. Did you want to say something, Dr.
Avant?
Dr. Avant. I was just going to point out the difference
between--I mean, the training that DynCorp employees get, that
are the police advisers, is not the kind of training that Doug
was talking about, in terms of cultural awareness.
I know that there were complaints about the training
capacities of many people, even in the Balkans. And I think, in
Iraq, it is a very different kind of environment, where you
have the degree of tribal and religious law that is operating
alongside the system of law that we are trying to create, in
terms of sort of the law enforcement.
And so the training, I would imagine, for the kinds of
police advisers that you would need would be quite a bit
greater in the Iraqi context. So, you know, that would be
another thing that would go into some sort of long-term,
strategic thinking about having a police force that was able to
train, would be not just, you know, an eight-day course or
something in how to deal with people that aren't from the
United States, but also have certain kinds of issues that
people would have to face in different parts of the world.
Ms. Davis of California. If we are going to accept the idea
that we are always going to need both contractors, as well as a
military force and a police force, perhaps, assisting in some
way, then we need to do this differently.
Dr. Avant. Right. And we don't have--I mean, with many of
the contractors in the military, you can decide. Do you want to
send people from the Army or do you want to send contractors?
But the United States doesn't have a deployable international
civilian police force, and so that--you are really are
deciding--contractors.
What would be good, if you were going to do that, is at
least have some sort of agency in the government that is in
charge of thinking about strategically, rather than using the
contractor for the strategic thinking, as well as the
deployment.
Ms. Davis of California. Is that part of the civilian
corps? You heard them mention the State Department is looking
to kind of development of civilian corps. Is that kind of----
Dr. Avant. Well, this was in Bush's State of the Union
address. And I don't think anyone knows exactly what is going
on in that office, or no one that I have talked to, so I don't
know, you know. I hope you all have him up and at least the
testimony.
Ms. Davis of California. Any other response to the
testimony that you heard, that you would like us to know about,
that was a concern to you, or you would like to emphasize?
Mr. Brooks. I think I would emphasize, actually, the aspect
of--when you use contractors, they will use as many local
employees as they are allowed to use, which is actually quite
good, in terms of redevelopment. Now, with the police, it is a
little bit different, with the police training.
But, you know, when you are doing reconstruction work, when
you are doing security, you want to use as many locals as you
can, which is good for the economy, which is training, which is
all sorts of long-term benefits.
When I was doing my academic research before IPOA, I was in
Sierra Leone, and PAE was one of the contractors there. They
had eight Americans, and I think it was 400 Sierra Leoneans
doing all the logistics and support. And everything in that
U.N. operation that was fixed, or moved, or done was being done
by these PAE employees, these Sierra Leoneans.
And it made a lot of sense. And it is a real benefit, I
think, you get from contracting.
Mr. Burke. It is a situation that only just hadn't happened
in Iraq. Most of the contractors--country nationals were coming
in from other countries to work in Iraq. Now we are starting to
hire some locals.
I think, for a while, it was a security issue, but now we
are looking at the benefit of hiring locals and putting money
into the local economy as outweighed by the risk, if you manage
the risk well.
Dr. Avant. Yes, I would just add to that, that, you know,
as you might worry about people who are being trained without
background checks that are sort of going off to fight in the
militias, when the United States leaves Iraq, it will leave
whatever capacities its imparted to local people, under the
control of whatever civilian leadership there is.
And so I think that it is--you know, I completely agree
that it is wise to use locals, but it is also wise to pay
attention to the kind of structure, the political structure
that they are operating under. And that just goes back to the
whole issue of training, you know, not only people working in
the national government in Iraq, but also local government
officials.
If you are going to have a police force that can do certain
kinds of things, and yet it is responsive to a local government
that isn't acting the way local governments act or we would
expect them to act, then you are going to have a lot of
problems.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you.
Mr. Gingrey.
Dr. Gingrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you for
this meeting, this hearing. I know we have had two panels. I
have not been able to be here for much of it, and I missed a
lot of your testimony, but thank you for being with us and
shedding some light, a lot of light on this issue.
I know Ms. Davis and I went to Fort Riley, as she was
pointing out. And we have heard testimony from the MiTT teams,
military transition teams. I think that what she was alluding
to, and I would certainly agree with this, we need something
similar to that in regard to the police force. I guess we could
call it a POT team and get away with that, but something
similar to the MiTT teams. And Representative Davis and I were
at Fort Riley, Kansas, and very impressed with what the
military is doing there.
I know that, Mr. Burke, you had said in your testimony that
you have considered the police training mission a complete
failure, and that bothers me, of course. I just would like to
know a couple of things that you might suggest--maybe you have
already done this and I missed it--but in regard to what we can
do.
And, you know, you talked about the five-year experience
level and the lack of credibility if they don't have a little
gray around the temples with the Iraqis, who have, in many
instances, a lot more experience. And I understand that, but I
would think it might be a little difficult to recruit an older,
more seasoned, near retirement, if you will, police person with
lots of experience for this very dangerous mission. You point
out 17 of them have been killed, and I can understand that.
But, you know, just how do we go about this? And I do want
to ask this question. I really should know the answer to it.
What was the police situation in the country before 2003,
March? And, of course, Baghdad is, I think, a metropolitan area
of 4 million people, is it not?
Mr. Burke. A little larger.
Dr. Gingrey. And, you know, you have one of the largest of
the cities, not that large, of course, but what did they do
before? And where are all these people now?
Mr. Burke. Well, the Iraqi Police Service actually dates
back to the 1920's, and it was created by the Brits along the
British model. And up until the 1950's, the chief constable of
the Iraqi police force was a British officer seconded to Iraq.
So they have a long tradition of, if you will, our way of
thinking toward policing.
Under Saddam, however, he created--he didn't trust the
police, so he created other security organizations that
superseded the Iraqi police service and had more authority and
more power, to the point where, by the end of the regime, the
Iraqi police service had sort of a fire department mentality.
They stayed in the police station, waiting for the alarm to
ring. They did no proactive policing, because they were afraid
of crossing paths with one of the other intelligence
operations.
There are probably 17, or 18, maybe 19 different security
organizations, if you include, for example, the Olympic
committee had a security organization that had broad powers
that would be unimaginable in a democracy. So the police were
perhaps the 16th or 17th on this hierarchy, but they yet prided
themselves on their education and their completing the police
academy.
When we went in May of 2003, when we walked through the
academy, we actually found translated documents that were FBI
law enforcement bulletins that were issued in the 1970's and
1980's that somehow managed to make their way to Iraq and be
translated into Arabic. So they did pride themselves on their
British heritage in wanting to be a democratic-style police
force.
In June and early July, we ran a management training
program for just the generals. And basically what I took is a
course that I had taught at Boston College and reduced it to 15
hours. It would have been a semester-long course--and I found
that, as I was skipping, and, you know, I am making this brief
presentation, one of the generals or one of them would raise
their hand and they would say, ``You know, but you forgot
something.''
They recognized the course I was teaching, that there were
things I was leaving out in trying to condense a long semester
course in a brief presentation. They knew what I was talking
about, but there was a gap between what they knew and what they
were allowed to practice under Saddam.
Dr. Gingrey. Well, again, I ask you the question about,
where are they now? Where are some of these people? Have they
resurfaced? I mean, it sounds like there is some real talent
there that----
Mr. Burke. There was some real talent there. The ones who
came back were probably the ones, if you will, with the
cleanest conscience, and some of them were very educated, well-
educated people, who had gone to school in Eastern Europe
before the fall of the communist countries. Some of them had
gone to school in the United Kingdom. One of the deputy
ministers had gone to school in Japan, and they prided
themselves a lot on their educational level.
The ones who came back, some of them had been killed. We
have had a few of them assassinated, some of my friends that I
worked with over there. Some of them have been forcibly
retired, because the new government doesn't want their people
with their background, if you will. Maybe it is religious
issues; I don't know. Some of them----
Dr. Gingrey. Well, let me interrupt you. In that part of
our re-Baathification benchmark that, you know, we want them to
give these people an opportunity to come back, do we not?
Mr. Burke. We do, but I don't think they will. I know one
major general who used to head up what we would consider the
rapid response police, the patrol police. He has left the
country. He is living in Egypt.
The former police chief of Baghdad, he is now living down
in Dubai, working down in Dubai. Another major general, who is
still there in a very important position, e-mails me
constantly, asking me to help him get out of the country and
come to the United States as a refugee. So there are many of
them that, you know, don't want to stay there and who want to
get out.
Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, let me just real quickly--Dr.
Avant, am I pronouncing it correctly?
Dr. Avant. Avant.
Dr. Gingrey. Avant. I am not familiar with a lot of your
publications, but I was reading your bio, and I know that it
says that you have been doing some work on how the United
States government's use of private security affects democratic
processes in the United States. Can you comment on that just a
little bit? I mean, you know, a few minutes.
Dr. Avant. Yes, I am basically gathering a lot of
information about the way in which the press covers private
security forces in Iraq versus military forces, looking to the
issue of transparency. How much do people know about these
kinds of forces?
Because, you know, as we heard earlier, you know, private
contractors have essentially doubled the size of the U.S. force
in Iraq. And, you know, the degree to which people get
information about that would be important for transparency.
I have also looked at something that we call in political
science veto points, which is essentially the role of Congress
in deciding on contracts and sort of looking at the deployment
of forces versus contracting and the degree to which it gives
power to the executive versus Congress. And there, as I think I
mentioned at the end of my prepared remarks, it tends to
advantage the executive branch relative to Congress, at this
point.
The third thing that I have done is some experiments that
look at how people react to the deaths of private security
versus military personnel in Iraq. So it is trying to look at
issues of public consent, transparency, and checks and
balances, in order to sort of understand how our government's
use of these contractors has affected the processes of
democracy in the U.S.
Dr. Gingrey. Yes, but, I mean, in regard to the use of the
private security contractors, you don't consider that somewhat
a violation of our democratic process, do you?
Dr. Avant. Well, I think that if you sort of look at the
foundation of democracy in the Western world, it came alongside
the idea of citizen armies. And so there is a very long
tradition of connecting democracy with some duty and
responsibility of citizens to both serve, but also be a check.
And the whole issue of whether contracting separates that
is actually--I am just writing a paper right now--looking at
exactly that kind of issue historically.
Dr. Gingrey. That is very, very interesting, and I thank
you for that.
Mr. Chairman, I didn't have anything else. That is great.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you.
And I want to thank the members of our second panel for
your testimony. Appreciate it very much. We would love the
opportunity to follow up with any of you, should other members
have questions. But thank you very much for appearing.
And the hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
?
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A P P E N D I X
April 25, 2007
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April 25, 2007
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=======================================================================
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 25, 2007
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MEEHAN
Mr. Meehan. What is the plan to address the poor literacy rate
among ISF personnel?
Colonel Raines. All Iraqi police forces complete a literacy
examination during the recruiting process and individuals must meet the
minimum literacy standards. For those individuals that need to improve
their literacy skills, literacy training is offered at certain police
training centers; however, there is no comprehensive nationwide program
within the Ministry of Interior.
Literacy is also a basic requirement to join the Iraqi Joint
Forces. The Iraqi Joint Headquarters is considering potential programs
to improve literacy. For example, in Al Anbar province, Coalition
forces and Iraqi leaders have recently worked with local universities
to provide focused tutoring for perspective recruits. Currently,
informal discussions are ongoing between military leaders and
university staffs to extend a literacy program to soldiers in the Army,
but no formal agreements have been reached.
Mr. Meehan. What is the plan to address the poor literacy rate
among ISF personnel?
Mr. Motsek. All Iraqi police forces complete a literacy examination
during the recruiting process and individuals must meet the minimum
literacy standards. For those individuals that need to improve their
literacy skills, literacy training is offered at certain police
training centers; however, there is no comprehensive nationwide program
within the Ministry of Interior.
Literacy is also a basic requirement to join the Iraqi Joint
Forces. The Iraqi Joint Headquarters is considering potential programs
to improve literacy. For example, in Al Anbar province, Coalition
forces and Iraqi leaders have recently worked with local universities
to provide focused tutoring for perspective recruits. Currently,
informal discussions are ongoing between military leaders and
university staffs to extend a literacy program to soldiers in the Army,
but no formal agreements have been reached.
Mr. Meehan. What is the plan to address the poor literacy among ISF
personnel?
Ambassador Patterson. National Security Presidential Directive 36
(NSPD-36) assigned the responsibility for developing Iraq's security
forces to CENTCOM. We referred this question to CENTCOM's Civilian
Police Assistance Training Team, which provided the following response:
All Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) candidates for positions
within the civil security forces must be literate at time of entry. The
MOI recruiting policy states that, ``the candidates must have graduated
from Intermediate School as a minimum requirement.'' The MOI recognizes
that illiterate individuals were hired during a period of expedient
hiring in the provinces and has ordered the provinces to develop
literacy programs to address this problem where it may exist. CPATT has
supported and implemented a pilot program for literacy at the Baghdad
Police College. This program was quite successful and it was turned
over to the Iraqi Police Service for wider implementation. Provinces
such as Ninawa (Mosul) have developed and implemented programs to
address the problem of illiteracy within the ranks.
Mr. Meehan. What is the plan to address the continuing lack of
Arabic and Kurdish linguists to serve with U.S. trainers, transition
teams and partner units four years into the war?
Colonel Raines. Multi-National Force--Iraq (MNF-I) is not aware of
any substantiated analysis, data, or recent inquiries that indicate a
formidable lack of linguists. The latest information from the 27 May
2007 Linguist Weekly Roll-up indicates that Multi-National Security
Transition Command--Iraq (MNSTCI) currently has the following linguists
per the stated requirements:
Arabic Cat 1 Local Nationals: 507 assigned/547 required (93 percent)
Kurdish Cat 1 Local Nationals: 25 assigned/26 required (96 percent)
Persian Farsi Local Nationals: 1 assigned/1 required (100 percent)
Turkish Local Nationals: 1 assigned/1 required (100 percent)
The Army addresses the requirement for Arabic and Kurdish linguists
through Soldiers, where available, and through contracting activities.
The OIF Theater Linguist Manager manages the linguist assets on the
ground to provide the greatest linguist support possible to each
element present. The majority of the linguist requirements in Iraq are
for Arabic speakers and a small percentage is for Kurdish speakers.
When Kurdish linguists are requested, the requirement is normally for
dual-language Arabic-Kurdish speakers.
The following initiatives below represent Army efforts to fill OIF
theater linguist requirements:
a. All available Soldiers with Arabic and Kurdish language skills
currently support OIF operations in accordance with their occupational
specialties and unit rotations.
b. In February 2003, the Army initiated the 09L Translator Aide
Pilot Program to bring additional Arabic language skills and cultural
expertise into the Individual Ready Reserve. The recruiting effort
later expanded to include Kurdish and other languages. In February
2006, the Pilot Program transitioned into the Military Occupational
Specialty 09L, Interpreter/Translator. Currently, some OIF theater
linguist requirements, to include the Military Transition Teams (MiTT)
in Iraq, are supported by available 09L Soldiers.
c. The bulk of the Arabic and Kurdish linguist support to the
MiTTs, U.S. trainers and Coalition partner units in Iraq comes from
Local National contract linguists. MiTTs, U.S. trainers subordinate to
the MNSTCI and partner units have a current combined linguist
requirement of 1935. The Theater Linguist Manager is focused on filling
these requirements and has maintained fill in these elements beyond the
level of many other OIF units. In February 2007, the total OIF linguist
requirement was raised to support an increase of forces. The contractor
is increasing local recruiting efforts; newspaper advertisements,
flyers, and monetary incentives are being considered to meet the higher
requirements. The Army continues to provide screening support to the
local hiring effort and is addressing local recruitment with the
contractor to improve the overall linguist fill. The Army continues to
press the current contractor to recruit and retain linguists to achieve
100 percent of the contract linguist requirements in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
d. The Defense Language Institute (DLI) has expanded its efforts
to increase linguist throughput and quality, and to increase the Arabic
and Kurdish language familiarization available to the Army. The
Emerging Languages Task Force provides instruction in low density
languages, including Kurdish. New DLI language training detachments and
distribution of Arabic Survival kits also increased the available
Arabic language training opportunities.
While mission requirements are not static and mission changes make
it unlikely that we will achieve 100 percent support for the forces in
OIF, the Army is doing all possible to provide maximum linguist
support.
Mr. Meehan. What is the plan to address the continuing lack of
Arabic and Kurdish linguists to serve with U.S. trainers, transition
teams and partner units four years into the war?
Mr. Motsek. Multi-National Forces--Iraq (MNFI) is not aware of any
substantiated analysis, data, or recent inquiries that indicate a
formidable lack of linguists. The latest information from the 27 May 07
Linguist Weekly Roll-up indicates that Multi-National Security
Transition Command--Iraq (MNSTCI) currently has the following linguists
per the stated requirements:
Arabic Cat 1 Local Nationals: 507 assigned/547 required (93%)
Kurdish Cat 1 Local Nationals: 25 assigned/26 required (96%)
Persian Farsi Local Nationals: 1 assigned/1 required (100%)
Turkish Local Nationals: 1 assigned/1 required (100%)
The Army addresses the requirement for Arabic and Kurdish linguists
through Soldiers, where available, and through contracting activities.
The OIF Theater Linguist Manager manages the linguist assets on the
ground to provide the greatest linguist support possible to each
element present. The majority of the linguist requirements in Iraq are
for Arabic speakers and a small percentage is for Kurdish speakers.
When Kurdish linguists are requested, the requirement is normally for
dual-language Arabic-Kurdish speakers.
The following initiatives below represent Army efforts to fill OIF
theater linguist requirements:
a. All available Soldiers with Arabic and Kurdish language skills
currently support OIF operations in accordance with their occupational
specialties and unit rotations.
b. In Feb. 2003, the Army initiated the 09L Translator Aide Pilot
Program to bring additional Arabic language skills and cultural
expertise into the Individual Ready Reserve. The recruiting effort
later expanded to include Kurdish and other languages. In Feb. 2006,
the Pilot Program transitioned into the Military Occupational Specialty
09L, Interpreter/Translator. Currently, some OIF theater linguist
requirements, to include the Military Transition Teams (MiTT) in Iraq,
are supported by available 09L Soldiers.
c. The bulk of the Arabic and Kurdish linguist support to the
MiTTs, U.S. trainers and coalition partner units in Iraq comes from
Local National contract linguists. MiTTs, U.S. trainers subordinate to
the Multi-National Security Transition Command--Iraq and partner units
have a current combined linguist requirement of 1935. The Theater
Linguist Manager is focused on filling these requirements and has
maintained fill in these elements beyond the level of many other OIF
units. In Feb. 2007, the total OIF linguist requirement was raised to
support an increase of forces. The contractor is increasing local
recruiting efforts; newspaper advertisements, flyers and monetary
incentives are being considered to meet the higher requirements. The
Army continues to provide screening support to the local hiring effort
and is addressing local recruitment with the contractor to improve the
overall linguist fill. The Army continues to press the current
contractor to recruit and retain linguists to achieve 100% of the
contract linguist requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
d. The Defense Language Institute (DLI) has expanded its efforts
to increase linguist throughput and quality, and to increase the Arabic
and Kurdish language familiarization available to the Army. The
Emerging Languages Task Force provides instruction in low density
languages, including Kurdish. New DLI language training detachments and
distribution of Arabic Survival kits also increased the available
Arabic language training opportunities.
While mission requirements are not static and mission changes make
it unlikely that we will achieve 100% support for the forces in OIF,
the Army is doing all possible to provide maximum linguist support.
Mr. Meehan. What is the plan to address the continuing lack of
Arabic and Kurdish linguists to serve with U.S. trainers, transition
teams and partner units four years into the war?
Ambassador Patterson. National Security Presidential Directive 36
(NSPD-36) assigned the responsibility for developing Iraq's security
forces to CENTCOM. We referred this question to CENTCOM's Civilian
Police Assistance Training Team, which provided the following response:
The Coalition Forces have addressed this issue by expanding
contracts with private companies for providing skilled linguists in
support of the mission. Linguists and translators from the United
States and the Coalition as well as local national personnel are
employed to fulfill this requirement. There are significant challenges
with the utilization of local national personnel. These individuals
face major security risks when going to and from work assignments. The
Coalition will continue to support these vital members of the mission.
Mr. Meehan. What is the status of the analysis of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice versus Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
proposal for contractors? When will this be completed?
Colonel Raines. The matter was referred to the Joint Service
Committee on Military Justice (JSC) in January 2007. The JSC has
completed its analysis. The results of the JSC review and its
recommendations regarding an appropriate course of action will soon be
presented to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense for
consideration.
Mr. Meehan. What is the status of the analysis of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice versus Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
proposal for contractors? When will this be completed?
Mr. Motsek. The matter was referred to the Joint Service Committee
on Military Justice (JSC) in January 2007. The JSC has completed its
analysis. The results of the JSC review and its recommendations
regarding an appropriate course of action will soon be presented to the
General Counsel of the Department of Defense for consideration.
Mr. Meehan. Please provide a copy of all interagency agreements (or
similar documentation), current or historical, between the Department
of Defense and the Department of State or Department of Justice with
respect to support for the Iraqi Security Forces training mission,
including provisions for funding, contract management, and oversight.
Colonel Raines. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Meehan. Please provide a copy of all interagency agreements (or
similar documentation), current or historical, between the Department
of Defense and the Department of State or Department of Justice with
respect to support for the Iraqi Security Forces training mission,
including provisions for funding, contract management, and oversight.
Mr. Motsek. The Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Program Support) has been unable to discover any interagency
agreements, or similar documentation, existing between this office, the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Material Readiness & Logistics), or
the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)
and the Departments of State and Justice with respect to support for
the Iraqi Security Forces training mission.
Mr. Meehan. Please provide a copy of all interagency agreements (or
similar documentation), current or historical, between the Department
of State and the Department of Justice or Department of Defense with
respect to support for the Iraqi Security Forces training mission,
including provisions for funding, contract management and oversight.
Ambassador Patterson. [The information referred to is retained in
the committee files and can be viewed upon request.]
Mr. Meehan. Please provide a copy of any after action report,
lessons learned, or audit documentation prepared with respect to the
contract for the training of the New Iraqi Army issued to Vinnell
Corporation on June 25, 2003 (DABK01-03-C-0001).
Colonel Raines. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Meehan. Please provide a copy of the agreement(s) with the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for ownership and operation of the
Jordanian International Police Training Center.
Ambassador Patterson. [The information referred to is retained in
the committee files and can be viewed upon request.]
Mr. Meehan. Describe the current status of all Department of State
contracts that provide support for the Iraqi Security Forces, and
provide appropriate documentation, or, at a minimum, a detailed
description of the scope of work and objectives, who the contract is
with, the type of contract, contract period, cost ceiling, costs to
date, approximate number of contract personnel in Iraq, and any plans
for recompetition or expiration of the contract.
Ambassador Patterson. There are two base contracts that provide
support for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). CPI personnel are
presently operating in Amman, Jordan at the Jordan International Police
Training Center (JIPTC). DynCorp International is the only INL prime
contractor currently performing in Iraq. The approximate number of
DynCorp contractor personnel in Iraq is 1,000 (an additional 123 Border
Enforcement Advisors provided under a separate task order with DynCorp
are in the process of deploying to Iraq).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Original Present
Contract Contractor Contract Type Status Contract Cost Cost
Period Ceiling Ceiling
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SLMAQM040030 DynCorp Combination Firm Fixed Active 2/18/04 thru $2B $25 B
International, LLC Price Indefinite 2/17/09
Quantity
Indefinite Quality,
Cost-
Plus-Fixed-Fee
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CPI contract Civilian Police Combination Firm Fixed Active 2/18/04 thru $2B $20.4B
SLMAQM040032 International, LLC Price Indefinite 2/17/09
Quantity
Indefinite Quality,
Cost-
Plus-Fixed-Fee
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A detailed description of the contract scope of work and
objectives, etc. is attached in Appendix C. Sections C-H of the base
contracts are identical for both the DynCorp and CPI contracts. The
contracts shown above are for services/supplies provided on a global
scale. ISF-specific support services, supplies and funding are provided
on a task order basis as shown below:
DynCorp--SAQMPD04F0338--IRAQ
DynCorp--SAQMPD05F1436--IRAQ (Criminal, Justice, Food)
DynCorp--SAQMPD05F2059--Iraq Ratification
DynCorp--SAQMPD04F0765--JIPTC Buildout
DynCorp--SAQMPD04FA528--JIPTC O&M
DynCorp--SAQMPD07FA515--Border Enforcement Advisors
CPI--SAQMPD04FA574/SAQMPD06FA574--JIPTC O&M
INL is currently in the early acquisition planning stages for
recompetition of the base contracts with an anticipated award in the
latter part of FY 2008. Further, INL is currently involved in competing
the $1 billion Iraq task order currently awarded to DynCorp and expects
to make an award of a new task order this summer. The task order will
include personnel (e.g., police advisors requested by CPATT) as well as
personnel support such as housing, meals, security, communications, and
medical services. INL is intent on providing every opportunity for fair
consideration between the three prime contractors for the Iraq task
order.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. AKIN
Mr. Akin. How many people would Department of Justice have in Iraq?
How many do you have at a given time? Are we talking dozens, hundreds,
thousands? Are you counting a lot on contractors to help do what has to
be done over there?
Mr. Swartz. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER
Dr. Snyder. Why are we still stymied with regard to language skills
in State Department personnel? Why has there not been a successful
effort so that there would have been the kind of focus on--I assume
that we think language skills are important to do these jobs--why are
we still behind, this many years later from when the war started and
when the war in Afghanistan started?
Ambassador Patterson. The Department's effort has in fact been very
successful, but historical funding and staffing shortfalls, coupled
with the complexity of learning a language like Arabic, present no
rapid solutions. The State Department focuses recruiting efforts on
Arabic and other critical needs language speakers, gives bonus points
in the Foreign Service hiring process to candidates with demonstrated
Arabic proficiency, and has dramatically expanded our capacity to train
students in Arabic.
For example, the Department's recruiters specifically target
schools and organizations with Arabic language programs and other
critical needs languages to increase our recruitment. Since 2004, the
Department has given bonus points in the hiring process to Foreign
Service candidates with demonstrated proficiency in languages such as
Arabic, Urdu, and Farsi, among others. These bonus points materially
increase the chance of receiving a job offer for candidates who have
passed the written examination and oral assessment. In addition, our
Diplomats in Residence and recruiters hold individual counseling
sessions with speakers of Arabic and other critical needs languages.
The Department has also increased its capacity to train in Arabic
language. State enrollments in Arabic language training at our Foreign
Service Institute (FSI) have nearly quadrupled since 2001, with roughly
450 students enrolled in various types of Arabic courses in FY 2006. We
are working to keep the trend moving in an upward direction,
predominantly by utilizing distance learning and similar delivery
methods as alternatives to traditional classroom-based training. The
Foreign Service Institute is also expanding on-line and Early Morning
Arabic programs, as well as conducting greater numbers of domestic and
overseas immersion training events.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arabic Training Enrollments * FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Employees 109 156 223 323 406 454
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Eligible Family Members 12 17 21 18 20 14
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Includes enrollments in all types of Arabic training (full-time FSI courses, Tunis field training, online
distance learning courses, early morning language courses, etc.)
In addition, we have increased the number of Arabic language-
designated positions and the required level of proficiency for already
language-designated positions, and student enrollment levels will
reflect these additional positions. The Foreign Service Institute is
also expanding on-line and Early Morning Arabic programs, as well as
greater numbers of domestic and overseas immersion training events in
Arabic-speaking areas.
On average it takes two years of full-time training in Arabic
language to attain a level of General Professional Proficiency in
speaking and reading, and that creates staffing challenges for the
Department. Employees assigned to long-term language training are not
available for other assignments. Staffing deficits created by hiring
freezes in the 1990s and increased language and other training
requirements in the post-9/11 environment have left the Department with
approximately 88 available staff for every 100 positions.
Absent a ``training float,'' the Department simply does not have
enough personnel to fill all of its critical overseas and domestic
positions and simultaneously allow for large numbers of long-term
language students. We have prioritized staffing, redefined assignments
rules, and drawn on Civil Service employees to help fill critical
overseas positions, but more resources are needed both to sustain the
Department's efforts to develop and maintain a highly-proficient cadre
of Arabic speakers and to tend to the general business of diplomacy
worldwide.
The FY 2008 State Department budget request includes an increase of
$20,821,000 to enhance the Department's ability to provide foreign
language and other developmental training, including 48 new Foreign
Service positions to improve the language proficiency of current and
incoming Foreign Service employees. The requested increase of $20.821M
would also be used to fund special programs such as Arab media
workshops and internships in the field and additional overseas
immersion training opportunities.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA
Ms. Davis. Just a few other questions, in terms of contracts. For
example, DynCorp, you mentioned that people need five years of
experience in police work in order to train Iraqi personnel. Do we
think that that is enough? And are they bringing the skill sets that
are really necessary to do that job?
Ambassador Patterson. Most have significantly more experience. The
roughly 690 International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) currently
serving in Iraq have an average of 21.6 years of law enforcement
experience. The current low is nine years and the high is 38 years.
We have made significant enhancements to our pre-deployment
orientation and screening processes to ensure the personnel we deploy
are prepared to meet mission objectives. The screening program
includes: psychological tests, physical agility tests, and joint
interviews with DynCorp and Department of State employees. IPLO
candidates that pass this screening must undergo two weeks of INL-
sponsored training before being deployed. Training includes: weapons
qualification, mission briefs, familiarization with the history and
culture of the region, first aid, convoy operations, team building, GPS
and map reading, and hostage and survival training. This effectively
screens for unqualified or unmotivated individuals, and roughly 23
percent of candidate IPLOs fail orientation training.
We are confident that the IPLOs supplied by the Department of
State's contract with DynCorp International have sufficient and
relevant law enforcement experience in order to train and mentor Iraqi
civilian security forces. We are in constant communication with CPATT
to ensure that the personnel provided by our contractor meet the
mission needs and are performing effectively as part of the MNF-I
mission in the field.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ANDREWS
Mr. Andrews. When a recruit walked through the front door of the
JIPTC a year ago, did we know, in fact, who that person was, or did we
have to rely upon who they said they were?
Mr. Motsek. All of the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification
System (AFIS) and U.S. Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) files have
been routinely sent to the Department of Defense's Biometric Fusion
Center (BFC) to be checked against previously entered BAT records
(civil and detainee records), pre-war Iraqi criminal records, 1991 Gulf
War prisoner fingerprint records, and latent fingerprints harvested
from various forensic efforts in Iraq. There is also an arrangement
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to compare these records with
FBI records and other associated biometric records collected by the
U.S. Government.
If this crosscheck identifies derogatory or negative information on
any student who is attending, or has graduated from, the Jordan
International Police Training Center (JIPTC) or other Civilian Police
Assistance Training Team (CPATT)-certified police academy inside Iraq,
those files are turned over to the National Ground Intelligence Center
(NGIC) and Iraq's Ministry of Interior Internal Affairs section. The
comparison of all biometric records (not exclusively police cadets or
graduates) up to June 2007 had resulted in more than 8,500 matches to
criminal records generated from approximately 666,500 biometric
enrollments (includes persons other than police). As of June 2007,
there were 29,691 JIPTC graduates enrolled in the system.
Mr. Andrews. Is the Department of Defense tracking through CPATT
these trainees?
Mr. Motsek. The assignment and tracking of police personnel after
academy graduation is conducted by Iraq's Ministry of Interior (MOI).
The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) monitors this
effort through its embedded ministry transition team and provides
feedback to Multi-National Security Transition Command--Iraq (MNSTC-I)
on the status of these trainees.
Mr. Andrews. Who in Washington is responsible for CPATT?
Mr. Motsek. The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) is
a subordinate entity to the Multi-National Security Transition
Command--Iraq (MNSTC-I) which is a subordinate of Multi-national Force
Iraq (MNF-I). USCENTCOM has oversight of MNF-I. Within the Department
of Defense (DOD), the Joint Staff's J-3 and J-5 are responsible for
monitoring activities within MNF-I, and therefore, CPATT.
Mr. Andrews. Are we paying any of the overhead in those new
facilities or are the Iraqis paying for all of it?
Mr. Motsek. The Multi-National Security Transition Command--Iraq
(MNSTC-I) asked for, and received, $332M in FY07 for Iraqi Ministry of
Interior infrastructure. That funding is paying for the construction of
102 police station garages, 18 medium maintenance facilities, 5
regional base facilities, 4 medium repair facilities, 18 police
stations in Baghdad, border fort refurbishment, roads to border forts,
and other smaller projects. In 2008, the Government of Iraq (GoI) will
assume total responsibility for infrastructure.
Mr. Andrews. What type of tracking for recruits was in place at the
opening of the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC)?
Colonel Raines. JIPTC opened on 29 November 2003 with a class of
485 Iraqi Police Service (IPS) recruits. Basic biographical information
for all recruits was collected.
Mr. Andrews. What type of tracking for recruits was in place at the
opening of the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC)?
Mr. Motsek. JIPTC opened on November 29, 2003 with a class of 485
Iraqi Police Service (IPS) recruits. Basic biographical information for
all recruits was collected.
Mr. Andrews. What kind of tracking for recruits was in place at the
opening of the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC)?
Ambassador Patterson. Responsibility for the recruitment, selection
and vetting of Iraqi personnel receiving training at JIPTC was the
responsibility of the Coalition Provisional Authority and is now
overseen by the U.S. Central Command's Civilian Police Assistance
Training Team (CPATT).
The Coalition Provisional Authority collected biographical
information on every recruit beginning with the first JIPTC class in
November 2003. This included home of record, family members, father's
name, place and date of birth, previous employment, education, and
medical history. Staff at JIPTC would then re-interview recruits and
take identification pictures. A system to collect biometric data was
established at JIPTC in December 2005.
Information provided by recruits was extremely difficult to verify.
No reliable database existed in Iraq to check names against for
possible criminal, militia, or terrorist ties. Because existing records
had been maintained by a despotic regime, it was not always appropriate
to use them as a basis for excluding a candidate from police training.
Moreover, the physical task of verifying information by visiting a
candidate's hometown or interviewing neighbors and acquaintances, which
had worked successfully in other post-conflict missions, was
impractical given the large number of recruits and the security
situation. This method of verification could also result in threats or
violence against police recruits and their families.
Mr. Andrews. What kind of tracking for graduates was in place at
the opening of the JIPTC?
Colonel Raines. Basic biographical information for all graduates
was passed to the Ministry of Interior.
Mr. Andrews. What kind of tracking for graduates was in place at
the opening of the JIPTC?
Mr. Motsek. Basic biographical information for all graduates was
passed to the Ministry of Interior.
Mr. Andrews. What kind of tracking for graduates was in place at
the opening of the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC)?
Ambassador Patterson. Graduates from JIPTC were transported back to
Iraq, at which point they were to report to a local police station for
service as an officer in the Iraqi Police Service. A number of factors
impeded the Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) efforts to track
graduates of police training at JIPTC and other academies within Iraq,
including: the decentralized nature of the police forces and limited
Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) role and capacity; the lack of an
international presence in many of the police stations to which
graduates were assigned, which limited CPA's ability to verify
graduates' whereabouts; and the absence of electronic database systems
(and often even the power to operate electronic systems) at both the
federal and provincial/district levels. Other factors also complicated
the effort. Police station commanders, in many cases, were not given
notice from MOI that new officers would be assigned to their stations
and commanders often did not have the resources to pay new officers.
There was also resistance on the part of some Iraqi police commanders
to accept JIPTC graduates, as they either did not accept the training
or preferred to appoint their own officers. Finally, some Iraqi
officers decided not to serve as police officers and others left due to
insurgent intimidation, threats, and attacks against new police
officers.
Mr. Andrews. What kind of biometric tracking is now in place for
recruits and graduates at the JIPTC?
Colonel Raines. Iraqi Police Service (IPS) recruits are entered
into biometric databases. Each recruit provides detailed personal
information, ten fingerprints, a front and side view photograph, a
retinal scan, and a voice print. The electronic files are sent to the
Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) compound at
Adnon Palace where all the files are checked not only through the Iraqi
AFIS system (internal to Iraq), but also through the Biometric Fusion
Center (BFC) in West Virginia. There, these files are cross-checked
with two U.S. force protection systems used by the Coalition in Iraq:
the Biometric Identification System for Access (BISA) and the Biometric
Automated Toolset (BAT). Any recruit record identified with a ``hit''
on the AFIS system (e.g., criminal record or double dipping in two
agencies), is sent to Ministry of Interior Internal Review for
investigation.
The Iraqi AFIS does not track where IPS officers are stationed or
what training they have received. Currently, this is a manual paper/
ledger process. However, a human resources system, the Iraqi Police
Data Management System (IPDMS), is currently being developed by the
Ministry of Interior. Iraqi AFIS information will populate IPDMS, but
IPDMS will not contain biometric data.
Mr. Andrews. What kind of biometric tracking is now in place for
recruits and graduates at the JIPTC?
Mr. Motsek. Iraqi Police Service (IPS) recruits are entered into
biometric databases. Each recruit provides detailed personal
information, ten fingerprints, a front and side view photograph, a
retinal scan, and a voice print. The electronic files are sent to the
Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) compound at
Adnon Palace where all the files are checked not only through the Iraqi
AFIS system (internal to Iraq), but also through the Biometric Fusion
Center (BFC) in West Virginia. There, these files are cross-checked
with two U.S. force protection systems used by the Coalition in Iraq:
the Biometric Identification System for Access (BISA) and the Biometric
Automated Toolset (BAT). Any recruit record identified with a ``hit''
on the AFIS system (e.g., criminal record or double dipping in two
agencies), is sent to Ministry of Interior Internal Review for
investigation.
The Iraqi AFIS does not track where IPS officers are stationed or
what training they have received. Currently, this is a manual paper/
ledger process. However, a human resources system, the Iraqi Police
Data Management System (IPDMS), is currently being developed by the
Ministry of Interior. Iraqi AFIS information will populate IPDMS, but
IPDMS will not contain biometric data.
Mr. Andrews. What kind of tracking for graduates is now in place
for recruits and graduates at the JIPTC?
Ambassador Patterson. National Security Presidential Directive 36
(NSPD-36) assigned the responsibility for developing Iraq's security
forces to CENTCOM. We referred this question to CENTCOM's Civilian
Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT), which provided the following
response:
All students at JIPTC and other CPATT-certified police training
academies inside Iraq are enrolled into the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (AFIS). All AFIS files are sent back to the
Department of Defense's Biometric Fusion Center (BFC) to be checked
against previously entered Iraqi civil and detainee records, pre-war
Iraqi criminal records, 1991 Gulf War fingerprint records, and latent
fingerprints harvested form various forensic efforts in Iraq. There is
also a relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other
associated biometric records collected by the U.S. Government.
The AFIS data collection program is maintained to help provide a
positive identification for all Iraqi Security Force personnel, though
it is not a human resources system that tracks personnel throughout
their career in the Iraqi police, army or the prison system.
The assignment and tracking of police personnel after academy
graduation is conducted by Iraq's Ministry of Interior (MOI). However,
the current paper-based records system used by the MOI, coupled with
the decentralized nature of the Iraqi Police Service and the ongoing
insurgency, makes tracking personnel exceedingly difficult. In the near
future, an automated system currently being installed in the MOI and
its subordinate units, with U.S. Government assistance, will make the
MOI's personnel and pay systems more transparent.
Graduates of U.S.-sponsored academy training are assigned to the
Provincial Police Directorate. The Provincial headquarters will then
make the district and station assignments. CPATT tracks the number of
graduates and the assignments to the provinces but does not have a
presence in all stations to directly verify that the graduates report
for duty. At this time, we can not guarantee that an individual reports
to duty at a specific police station; however, it is the contention of
the MOI that the vast majority of academy graduates report to their
assigned duty station.
Mr. Andrews. How long has this tracking system been in place?
Colonel Raines. Biometric screening for Iraqi Police Service
recruits began in March 2005.
Mr. Andrews. How long has this tracking system been in place?
Mr. Motsek. Biometric screening for Iraqi Police Service recruits
began in March 2005.
Mr. Andrews. How long has this tracking system been in place?
Ambassador Patterson. National Security Presidential Directive 36
(NSPD-36) assigned the responsibility for developing Iraq's security
forces to CENTCOM. We referred this question to CENTCOM's Civilian
Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT), which provided the following
response:
There is no U.S. Government system in place to track graduates of
the Jordan International Police Training Center or graduates of other
CPATT supported police training academies in Iraq. However, CPATT is
assisting Iraq's Ministry of Interior in creating an automated record
system that will make the MOI's personnel and pay systems more
transparent. The Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System,
which collects biometric data on individuals receiving training, has
been in theater since November 2005.
Mr. Andrews. Are people in U.S. military prisons and stockades in
Iraq that are suspected of or have been charged with killing or
attempting to kill Americans identified using biometrics?
Colonel Raines. Yes, if the detainee is a Coalition detainee, then
most likely the detainee was entered into Biometric Automated Toolset
and the detainee's status was checked through the Biometric Fusion
Center (BFC) in West Virginia.
If the individual was detained by Iraqi forces, some have been
entered into the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(AFIS) and checked with Iraqi AFIS and the BFC. Iraqi law states that
Iraqis are only entered into Iraqi AFIS upon sentencing by an Iraqi
judge.
Mr. Andrews. Are people in U.S. military prisons and stockades in
Iraq that are suspected of or have been charged with killing or
attempting to kill Americans identified using biometrics?
Mr. Motsek. Yes, if the detainee is a Coalition detainee, then most
likely the detainee was entered into Biometric Automated Toolset and
the detainee's status was checked through the Biometric Fusion Center
(BFC) in West Virginia.
If the individual was detained by Iraqi forces, some have been
entered into the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(AFIS) and checked with Iraqi AFIS and the BFC. Iraqi law states that
Iraqis are only entered into Iraqi AFIS upon sentencing by an Iraqi
judge.
Mr. Andrews. Are people in U.S. military prisons and stockade in
Iraq that are suspected of or have been charged with killing or
attempting to kill American identified using biometrics?
Ambassador Patterson. National Security Presidential Directive 36
(NSPD-36) assigned the responsibility for developing Iraq's security
forces to CENTCOM. We referred this question to CENTCOM's Civilian
Police Assistance Training Team, which provided the following response:
All U.S. Military prisons in Iraq use the Biometric Automated
Toolset (BAT), an identity management system used to record data and
classified attachments linked to biometrics of detainees and non-U.S.
persons of interest. The BAT system was originally designed as a
dossier system for U.S. Military Intelligence personnel. It is composed
of biometric records used to positively identify individuals
(unclassified information), and an application for entering relevant
intelligence information concerning the individual (classified
information). These two portions can be separated and routed to the
appropriate organizations for processing. BAT is interconnected with
other CENTCOM databases and databases in the continental United States.
BAT data travels back to the Biometric Fusion Center (West Virginia) to
be checked against previously entered BAT records (civil and detainee
records), pre-war Iraqi criminal records, 1991 Gulf War fingerprint
records, and latent fingerprints harvested form various forensic
efforts in Iraq. There is also a relationship with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and other associated biometric records collected by
the U.S. Government.
Mr. Andrews. Has anyone ever run a cross check between these
prisoners and graduates of the JIPTC? If so, who did so and what were
the results?
Colonel Raines. Yes, this information is cross-checked. JIPTC
graduates are entered in the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification
System (AFIS) and the Biometric Fusion Center (BFC) in West Virginia.
Those detainees held by Coalition forces are checked using the BFC.
Some Iraqi detainees have been entered into AFIS and checked with the
BFC.
Unfortunately, results of these cross-checks are not available at
this time.
Mr. Andrews. Has anyone ever run a cross check between these
prisoners and graduates of the JIPTC? If so, who did so and what were
the results?
Mr. Motsek. Yes, this information is cross-checked. JIPTC graduates
are entered in the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(AFIS) and the Biometric Fusion Center (BFC) in West Virginia.
Those detainees held by Coalition forces are checked using the BFC.
Some Iraqi detainees have been entered into AFIS and checked with the
BFC.
Unfortunately, results of these cross-checks are not available at
this time.
Mr. Andrews. Has anyone ever run a cross check between these
prisoners and graduates of the JIPTC? If so, who did so and what were
the results?
Ambassador Patterson. National Security Presidential Directive 36
(NSPD-36) assigned the responsibility for developing Iraq's security
forces to CENTCOM. We referred this question to CENTCOM's Civilian
Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT), which provided the following
response:
All of the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS)
files containing information on Iraqi police receiving U.S.-sponsored
training and U.S. Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) files containing
information on detainees are sent back to the Department of Defense's
Biometric Fusion Center (BFC) to be checked against previously entered
BAT records (civil and detainee records), pre-war Iraqi criminal
records, 1991 Gulf War fingerprint records, and latent fingerprints
harvested form various forensic efforts in Iraq. There is also a
relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other
associated biometric records collected by the U.S. Government.
If this crosscheck identifies derogatory information on any
students at, or graduate of, the Jordan International Police Training
Center (JIPTC) or other CPATT-certified police academy inside Iraq,
those files are turned over to the National Ground Intelligence Center
(NGIC) and Iraq's Ministry of Interior Internal Affairs section. The
comparison of all biometric records (not exclusively police cadets or
graduates) to date has resulted in over 8,500 matches to criminal
records generated from approximately 666,500 biometric enrollments
(includes persons other than police). There are 29,691 JIPTC graduates
enrolled in the system.
Mr. Andrews. Here is the specific question I am asking. When a
recruit walked through the front door of the JIPTC a year ago, did we
know, in fact who that person was, or did we have to rely upon who they
said they were?
Ambassador Patterson. Though we did not solely rely on the
candidates own representations, we did not know with 100 percent
certainty if an Iraqi recruit receiving training at the Jordan
International Police Training Center (JIPTC) or at any other facility
at which Iraqi police are being trained within Iraq was who they
claimed to be. JIPTC and the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team
(CPATT) in Baghdad collect biometric information on individuals
receiving training and cross-reference it with both Iraqi criminal
databases and Coalition databases to check for derogatory information.
However, the Iraqi criminal databases were largely compiled during
Saddam Hussein's regime and so it was not always appropriate to use
them as a basis for excluding a candidate from police training.
Moreover, Coalition databases had to be populated with biometric
information on Iraqis who attended U.S.-sponsored training, were
detained on the battlefield, or were imprisoned by the Government of
Iraq before they became effective tools for vetting candidates. The
system to collect biometric information on Iraqi police officers
receiving U.S.-sponsored training both at JIPTC and in Iraq was
established in December of 2005. This information is collected, in
almost every case, before candidates arrive at JIPTC. Before December
2005, biographic information was collected and stored on all
individuals receiving training at JIPTC.
Mr. Andrews. Let me ask you a specific question. If, in March of
2004, a suspected al Qaeda fighter is arrested and detained in Iraq,
and he or she is then biometrically identified when they are held in
Baghdad, and then are released for whatever reason, and then they use a
different name and enroll in the JIPTC, would we know that the person
who enrolled in JIPTC was that suspected al Qaeda fighter?
Ambassador Patterson. Since December of 2005, CENTCOM's Civilian
Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) has collected biometric
information for every individual receiving training at the Jordan
International Police Training Center (JIPTC) and other CPATT-certified
police training facilities in Iraq, and checked it against both Iraqi
criminal databases and Coalition databases. If the suspected al Qaeda
fighter's biometric data was entered into Coalition databases, as is
standard practice with individuals detained by Coalition forces, we
would be able to identify that individual if he or she attempted to
receive training at JIPTC or a CPATT-certified training facility in
Iraq.
Mr. Andrews. So you think it is $500 million?
Ambassador Patterson. We have, with Department of State funds and
funds provided by the Department of Defense, spent $434,330,060 on the
Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) between FY 2004 and
FY 2007.
Mr. Andrews. So that is roughly $10,000 per recruit, right?
Ambassador Patterson. From FY 2004 to FY 2007, the per-recruit cost
of training at JIPTC was $7,991. This figure was derived by dividing
the total cost of constructing and operating JIPTC ($434,330,060) by
the number of individuals trained (54,351).
The total cost of JIPTC includes construction; operations and
maintenance; security; international police trainers; and life support
such as meals, laundry service, etc. However, it does not include the
salaries of Iraqi police personnel receiving training, which are paid
by Iraq's Ministry of Interior, or transportation for Iraqi personnel
between Iraq and Jordan, which is provided by the Department of
Defense.
JIPTC is currently in the process of training an additional 2,500
Iraqi Corrections Service officers at a cost of approximately $21.07
million, making the projected per-recruit cost of training $8,010.
Mr. Andrews. So you know how--what did we spend to recruit and
train police personnel in the rest of the world? Is it anywhere near
$50,000 a year on an annualized basis?
Ambassador Patterson. Training at the Jordan International Police
Training Center (JIPTC) has been more costly than during other post-
conflict police development missions due to a variety of factors. The
cost of building an entirely new facility on an expedited basis to meet
an urgent requirement is chief among them. In Afghanistan, the per-
recruit cost of training is approximately $3,215 ($402.6 million total
between FY 2003 and FY 2006 divided by the roughly 125,254
individuals); however, this is not a perfect comparison. Training in
Afghanistan is conducted at Regional Training Centers which are
constructed and operated by the U.S. Government and Coalition partners,
but the Centers vary in size and security needs, mitigating the cost.
The courses also vary in length with some being as short as two weeks,
allowing for more candidates to have been trained.
Mr. Andrews. It costs more for utilities in Jordan than it does in
Haiti?
Ambassador Patterson. At the Jordan International Police Training
Center, it costs roughly $3.12 million per year for utilities and
another $780,000 for fuel. I unfortunately do not have any comparable
data for Haiti, as my Bureau does not incur similar expenses there.
Mr. Andrews. I must say, coming back to this point of effective
stewardship, what we found exasperating on this trip was that the
academy appears to be doing a very good job of training people how to
detect an IED and how to prevent it from exploding and killing people,
how to conduct a house-to-house search, how to identify ways that we
might break the back of the resistance. Common sense tells me that some
percentage of the 54,000 people who went through this, who we don't
know anything about, are, in fact, members of that resistance or
members of those militia or members of al Qaeda who are learning the
very techniques we are using to defend our people. I think this is
outrageous. And I am interested in hearing from you, why don't we have
tracking device to find out where these 54,000 people are?
Ambassador Patterson. The Administration shares your concern and is
working diligently to obtain biometric information on both academy
graduates and suspect individuals detained in Iraq to ensure that
members of militia or terrorist groups do not receive U.S.-sponsored
training. In addition, CENTCOM's Civilian Police Assistance Training
Team (CPATT) and INL are working to build the internal affairs
capacities of Iraq's Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Police Service.
This will help to identify and remove corrupt or compromised
individuals from the ranks. CPATT is also assisting the MOI in creating
an automated record system that will make the MOI's personnel and pay
systems more transparent. However, tracking graduates is exceedingly
difficult and is complicated by the current paper-based records system
used by the MOI, the decentralized nature of the Iraqi Police Service,
and the ongoing insurgency.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. GINGREY
Dr. Gingrey. What steps is DOD taking to go back and ensure it has
received appropriate value from the contractors in Iraq, for projects
such as the highly problematic Baghdad college? Who had that contract?
Mr. Motsek. The Coalition Provisional Authority awarded a contract
to Parsons Delaware to construct and renovate the Baghdad Police
College in March 2004. Upon the dissolution of the Coalition
Provisional Authority, the Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan
became the contracting agent. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf
Region Division, and the Project and Contracting Office have been
responsible for the efficient and effective execution and
administration of design-build contracts for the reconstruction of
Iraq. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR)
visited the Baghdad Police College on six separate occasions: August
22, 2006, September 4, 2006, September 21, 2006, November 10, 2006,
December 1, 2006, and December 8, 2006. The Baghdad Police College
construction and renovation project results were found not to be
consistent with the original contract and task order objectives. The
majority of the work observed did not meet the standards of the
contract and task orders. On May 31, 2006, the contract was terminated.
Details concerning this construction project can be found in SIGR PA-
06-078.2 and SIGR PA-06-079.2 reports dated January 29, 2007. Although
work was terminated in May 2006, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is
still engaged with the contractor (Parsons) for the final close-out of
this contract.