[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
POISONED PATRIOTS: CONTAMINATED DRINKING WATER AT CAMP LEJUENE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 12, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-56
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, Chairman
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California JOE BARTON, Texas
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts Ranking Member
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey FRED UPTON, Michigan
BART GORDON, Tennessee CLIFF STEARNS, Florida
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois NATHAN DEAL, Georgia
ANNA G. ESHOO, California ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
BART STUPAK, Michigan BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico
GENE GREEN, Texas JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING,
Vice Chairman Mississippi
LOIS CAPPS, California VITO FOSSELLA, New York
MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania STEVE BUYER, Indiana
JANE HARMAN, California GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
TOM ALLEN, Maine JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois MARY BONO, California
HILDA L. SOLIS, California GREG WALDEN, Oregon
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas LEE TERRY, Nebraska
JAY INSLEE, Washington MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin MIKE ROGERS, Michigan
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
JIM MATHESON, Utah MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
JOHN BARROW, Georgia
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
______
Professional Staff
Dennis B. Fitzgibbons, Chief of Staff
Gregg A. Rothschild, Chief Counsel
Sharon E. Davis, Chief Clerk
Bud Albright, Minority Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
BART STUPAK, Michigan, Chairman
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana Ranking Member
Vice Chairman GREG WALDEN, Oregon
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey
GENE GREEN, Texas TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAY INSLEE, Washington JOE BARTON, Texas (ex officio)
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan (ex
officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hon. Bart Stupak, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Michigan, opening statement.................................... 1
Hon. Ed Whitfield, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, opening statement.................... 4
Hon. Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Texas, prepared statement...................................... 5
Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Texas, prepared statement...................................... 6
Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Michigan, prepared statement................................ 30
Witnesses
Jeff Byron....................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Mike Gros, M.D,.................................................. 12
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Jerome Ensminger................................................. 17
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Major General Robert Dickerson, Jr., Commanding General, Camp
Lejeune, NC.................................................... 44
Prepared statement........................................... 46
Kelly Dreyer, Environmental Restoration Program Manager, U.S.
Marine Corps Headquarters...................................... 45
Prepared statement........................................... 46
Pat Leonard, Director, Office of the Judge Advocate General,
Claims, Investigations, and Tort Litigation.................... 48
Prepared statement........................................... 48
Thomas Sinks, deputy director, National center of Environmental
Health, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry,
ATSDR, accompanied by Frank Bove, senior epidemiologist, ATSDR,
and Morris Maslia, environmental engineer, ATSDR............... 49
Prepared statement........................................... 51
Answers to submitted questions............................... 54
ATSDR handout................................................ 157
Peter J. Murtha, Director, Office of Criminal Enforcement,
Forensics and Training, Office of Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency................ 79
Prepared statement........................................... 82
Marcia D. Crosse, Director, Public Health and Military Health
Care Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office............. 89
Prepared statement........................................... 91
Franklin Hill, director, Superfund Division, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Region 4.................................... 128
Prepared statement........................................... 131
Answers to submitted questions............................... 144
Submitted Material
Letter of June 6, 2007 to Dr. Howard Frumpkin, from Messrs.
Barton and Whitfield........................................... 147
Preliminary response to the letter........................... 151
Notice to Residents of Tarawa Terrace, April 1985, from Major
General L.H. Buehl............................................. 176
Letter of June 11, 2007 from Granta Y. Nakayama, Assistant
Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, EPA, to
Chairman Dingell............................................... 178
TCE Levels in Drinking Water, chart, submitted by Mr. Stupak..... 180
Inaccuracies in ATSDR's HazDat Database, submitted by Mr. Walden. 181
Miscellaneous exhibits........................................... 182
POISONED PATRIOTS: CONTAMINATED DRINKING WATER AT CAMP LEJUENE
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TUESDAY, JUNE 12, 2007
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bart Stupak
(chairman) presiding.
Present: Representatives Inslee, Solis, Dingell, Whitfield,
Walden, and Burgess.
Staff present: John Sopko, John Arlington, Joanne Royce,
Scott Schloegel, Kyle Chapman, Alan Slobodin, Dwight Cates, and
Matthew Johnson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BART STUPAK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Stupak. The subcommittee will come to order.
Today we have a hearing entitled ``Poisoned Patriots:
Contaminated Drinking Water At Camp Lejeune.'' Each Member will
be recognized for a 5-minute opening statement. I will begin.
This is the first in a series of hearings this committee
will be holding to examine whether the Pentagon is adequately
protecting the American people, including military personnel
and their families, from risks associated with environmental
contamination at its facilities. In this hearing we will
explore the tragic narrative of why tens of thousands of
Marines and their families were exposed to highly contaminated
drinking water at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune for nearly 30
years.
Three years ago this committee heard testimony from Jerry
Ensminger, a 24-year-old Marine Corps veteran, who raised
serious questions about why both the Department of the Navy and
the Marine Corps waited 5 years before notifying Camp Lejeune
residents that the drinking water was highly contaminated. Mr.
Ensminger also raised questions about whether the Navy and
Marine Corps were cooperating with the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry, ATSDR, which has been engaged
for the last 8 years in studying the connection between
exposure to contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune and the
increased instance of cancer and birth defects of children at
the base.
Over 20 years after the Marine Corps finally took the
contaminated wells out of service, these and countless other
questions remain unanswered or inadequately addressed.
The purpose of this hearing today is to get some answers.
When did the Marine Corps learn that the drinking water at
Camp Lejeune, a military base, nearly 100,000 residents were
contaminated with dangerous chemicals?
If the contamination was first discovered in 1980, why did
the Marine Corps wait until 1985 before it closed its wells?
Why were the closed wells not immediately capped and
abandoned, but continued to be used to supply water at various
times up to and through 1987?
When and how were the residents told about the
contamination?
Was the notification adequate?
Did exposure to drinking water cause cancer and birth
defects in children conceived at the base? What about adults
who drank the water?
How has the Marine Corps responded to those affected? Has
it taken care of its own? Has the Marine Corps continued with
Semper Fidelis, or always faithful?
Why is the ATSDR study taking so long? Will the study be
published as scheduled by December 2007? Has the military
intentionally delayed the study?
Today we welcome back Mr. Ensminger who knows firsthand the
horrible consequences of the military's failure to detect and
clean up the toxic drinking water at Camp Lejeune. His daughter
Jane was born in 1976 at Camp Lejeune; 6\1/2\ years later she
was diagnosed with leukemia. Jane died when she was 9 years old
in 1985, the same year that the poisoned wells were first shut
down.
Mr. Ensminger is joined on the first panel by Michael Gros
and Jeff Byron who likewise painfully know only too well the
devastation caused by exposure to the poisoned drinking water
at Camp Lejeune.
Jeff Byron, a former air traffic controller, moved his
family into base housing at Camp Lejeune in 1982, 3 months
after his first daughter Andrea was born, and 2 years before
Rachel was born. Rachel is developmentally disabled, has spina
bifida, and was born with a cleft palate. Andrea has a rare
bone disease known as aplastic anemia.
Dr. Michael Gros, a Navy obstetrician at the time at Camp
Lejeune, contracted T-cell lymphoma and can no longer practice
medicine. Dr. Gros spent his entire time in the Marine Corps at
Camp Lejeune and he and his family lived in base housing.
We are deeply grateful to these three witnesses for coming
forward to share their painful stories with our committee.
We will also hear from officials at the Agency for Toxic
Substance and Disease Registry, ATSDR, about the study
initiated in 1999 which examines whether individuals born
between 1968 and 1985 to mothers who drank contaminated water
while they were pregnant and living at Camp Lejeune are at
increased risk of developing certain childhood cancers and/or
birth defects. We will hear whether the Department of the Navy
and the Marine Corps have been forthcoming in their efforts to
assist ATSDR in this critical study. We also hope to learn why
the Department of the Navy was resistant to funding the ATSDR
study despite a Federal statute requiring that it do so. Why
did DoD refuse to fund ATSDR activities at Camp Lejeune for 3-4
years from 1998 through 2000? Did military obstruction and lack
of funding delay completion of the study? More importantly,
does ATSDR have accurate information on which to base its
study? Why aren't all the Marines and their families who were
exposed to this contaminated water included in the study?
The principal contaminant of the drinking water at Camp
Lejeune was a volatile organic compound referred to as TCE, or
trichloroethylene. TCE, a volatile organic compound, is an
industrial cleaning solvent widely used in defense and
commercial and industrial applications. TCE is the most
widespread water contaminant in the Nation, and almost every
major military base has a Superfund site with TCE
contamination.
TCE was also the main contaminant at the Woburn,
Massachusetts Superfund site made famous by the best selling
book, A Civil Action. That book and the movie based on it
illustrated very well the horrible toll that TCE can take on
the human body. But here is an important frame of reference. As
bad as the contamination was at Woburn, the concentrations of
TCE at Camp Lejeune were as much as 10 to 15 times higher.
We have a chart. Here is what EPA has proposed. There is a
current standard, 5 parts per billion; Woburn is 267; Hadnot,
which is one of the wells, was 3,400. In Hadnot on February 7,
1985, over 18,000 parts per billion in the water.
In 2001, EPA attempted to issue a risk assessment that
found TCE to be at least twice as carcinogenic as originally
thought, and possibly 40 times as carcinogenic. The Defense
Department aggressively opposed the EPA's finding, labeling it
``junk science'' and sided with the White House to derail
issuance of the tough new TCE standard. Instead, the issue was
referred for study by the National Academy of Sciences,
delaying for years any conclusions about whether millions of
Americans, including the residents at Camp Lejeune, were
contaminated by TCE. The EPA standard was vindicated and
accepted a year ago by the National Academy of Sciences.
Nevertheless, this obstruction of environmental prerogative
has been the modus operandi of the Defense Department for years
now, since at least 2001. The Pentagon has sidetracked
environmental regulations, opposed EPA efforts to set strict
reclusion limits, stalled and underfunded cleanups and ignored
Federal and State environmental regulators. Moreover, every
year, right up through 2006, the Defense Department has sought
to exempt itself from environmental laws.
Those days are over. Nearly 1 out of 10 Americans live
within 10 miles of a military site listed on the Superfund
National Priority List for hazardous waste cleanup. The
American people, military and civilian alike, deserve to work
and live in communities where drinking water is safe and the
air they are breathing does not threaten their lives.
I next turn to my friend from Kentucky, Ranking Member of
the subcommittee, Mr. Whitfield, for an opening statement,
please.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ED WHITFIELD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Mr. Whitfield. Chairman Stupak, thank you very much. And we
thank you for holding this important hearing. For many years,
Congress has demanded answers about drinking water
contamination at Camp Lejeune, and today we will get an update
on what we've learned in that study. In particular, we look
forward to the testimony from the Government Accountability
Office that will detail the findings of its May 2007 report on
Camp Lejeune. Congress mandated this study in the 2005 Defense
Authorization Act.
Just last year Congress passed several legislative
provisions relating to Camp Lejeune. Section 318 of the 207
Defense Authorization Act requires the National Academy of
Sciences to conduct a comprehensive review and evaluation of
the available scientific and medical evidence regarding
associations between prenatal, child, and adult exposure to
drinking water contaminated with trichloroethylene, TCE, and
PCE, perchloroethylene at Camp Lejeune. This comprehensive
study will expand on the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry's ongoing study at Camp Lejeune.
The 2007 defense bill also requires the Marine Corps to
notify Camp Lejeune residents and employees who may have been
exposed to contaminated drinking water of the results of the
ATSDR study. Congress wants to know the facts and we want to
provide that information to our service members and their
families.
Last week, Ranking Member Barton and I sent a letter to
ATSDR requesting information on exposures to contaminated
drinking water at 22 other military facilities. Committee staff
identified these facilities based on a search of contamination
records in ATSDR databases. At several facilities the level of
TCE contamination in drinking water is comparable to levels
found at Camp Lejeune. For instance, McClellan Air Force Base
in California and the Wurtsmith Air Force Base in Michigan each
had extensive TCE contamination in drinking water at levels of
public health concern. In its public health assessment of the
Wurtsmith Air Force Base, ATSDR concluded past exposure to
groundwater may have posed an increased risk of developing
adverse health effects. ATSDR assumes tap water was
contaminated with TCE at 1,100 parts per billion between 1962
and 1977. Unfortunately, no one has investigated this matter,
and we don't know the real extent of exposure or whether any
adverse health effects occurred. We need to have these
questions answered.
In response to our letter, ATSDR has provided a list of
nine military bases where past exposures to TCE and PCE were
considered a public health hazard. Mr. Chairman, I hope that we
can use this list as a starting point to conduct more oversight
at these facilities. The military personnel at these sites
deserve to know if they were exposed to contaminated drinking
water and what the potential public health implications are for
them and their families.
Drinking water contaminated with TCE and other volatile
organic compounds is not just a problem at military facilities.
In my own district, the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant has
extensive groundwater contamination, including several
contaminated residential drinking water wells. Fortunately,
relatively few residents were exposed to the contaminated
drinking water and detailed information on health impacts is
available from independent research conducted by the University
of Cincinnati.
Today we are also releasing information regarding TCE
contamination at several municipal and private sites. According
to ATSDR the Sol Lynn Industrial Transformer Site in Houston,
Texas, had tap water with TCE concentrations of 953,000 parts
per billion. The Barnhart site in Illinois had tap water with
TCE concentrations of 730 parts per billion. Further, the San
Fernando Valley aquifer in North Hollywood, California, had TCE
concentrations as high as 18,000 parts per billion.
Unfortunately, little is known about the possible health
impacts of the 800,000 residents of Los Angeles, Burbank, and
Glendale who drank water from this contaminated aquifer for
years. These sites also deserve our attention.
Mr. Chairman, the more we learn about this problem, the
more we believe we may actually need to craft legislation to
ensure that professional public health officials can help find
the answers to these concerns. And I know I look forward to
working with you on whether or not we need to identify whether
ATSDR and other health agencies need more authority and more
funding to investigate past exposures to TCE and other volatile
organic compounds.
And, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that an opening
statement of the ranking member, Mr. Barton, be inserted into
the record. He is unable to be with us. And then also the
letter that I referred to that we wrote to ATSDR about these
other sites, and the records that they provided to us about the
contamination at the other sites. I would ask consent that we
will enter those into the record.
Mr. Stupak. without objection, the opening statement of
Ranking Member Joe Barton will be entered into the record, and
also the June 6, 2007 letter to you and Mr. Barton with
attachments will also be part of the record as well as any
other statements by members for the record.
[The prepared statements of Mr. Barton and Mr. Green
follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas
I thank the chairman for holding this hearing. This problem
at Camp Lejeune is hardly a new one, but it is important that
we get to the bottom of why military personnel there were
exposed to contaminated drinking water for so long. As early as
1980, significant contamination was discovered in the drinking
water, but 5 years passed before the Navy finally identified
the contaminated wells and shut them down.
I am not persuaded by the Navy's justification that they
did not know the contamination was significant in 1980, or that
the drinking water met regulatory requirements in place at that
time. The fact is the contaminated wells should have been
identified and shut down immediately. This is a simple matter
of right and wrong. The delay may not have been criminal, but
it was unmistakably immoral.
Stories conflict on why it took so long, and they involve
a complicated series of events. Unfortunately, the committee
staff has not had enough time to thoroughly investigate. The
minority staff first learned of this hearing just 4 weeks ago,
and the first briefing from the Navy occurred just 3 weeks ago.
On important matters such as this, 3 weeks is simply not enough
time to conduct serious, thoughtful oversight.
Fortunately for the subcommittee, several Federal agencies
have devoted the time and energy necessary to fully review
drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune. Today we will
hear from the Environmental Protection Agency, the Government
Accountability Office, and the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry on their extensive research.
Camp Lejeune is the poster boy for contaminated drinking
water on a military base, but it certainly is not the only one.
I think we can anticipate learning of even worse problems at
other bases. Last week, Representative Whitfield and I sent a
letter to ATSDR to obtain information regarding extensive
drinking water contamination at nearly two dozen military
facilities.
Based on the data we have uncovered, some of these
facilities likely had exposures in excess of what we know
occurred at Camp Lejeune. Past contamination is also a problem
at civilian municipal facilities, and we need answers on those
facilities as well.
Mr. Chairman, we are prepared to dig into these issues. We
have laid the groundwork for a serious investigation of
drinking water contamination at military and civilian
facilities. I hope that we can work on a bipartisan basis.
There is no reason why we shouldn't.
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on
contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune.
This hearing is the first in a series of hearings on
contaminated drinking water on our military bases.
We ask our military personnel to protect and defend our
country. It is my belief that we have a responsibility and an
obligation to protect our military personnel and their families
when they are living on military bases.
We know the chemicals TCE and PCE were contaminating at
least eight sights in the water system in and around Camp
Lejeune.
The exact date of contamination is unknown, but it seems
that Camp Lejeune officials may have known about the TCE and
PCE in the wells as early as 1980. They did not close the
contaminated wells until 1985 and even reopened the wells
periodically from 1985 until 1987.
TCE and PCE are clear and have no odor. For 7 years the
military personnel and their families at Camp Lejeune were
unknowingly bathing, drinking, and cooking with this
contaminated water.
The EPA recommends contamination levels for TCE and PCE in
drinking water at 5 parts per billion. Those living at Camp
Lejeune were in some cases exposed to TCE and PCE levels over
1,000 parts per billion.
Camp Lejeune was declared a Superfund in 1989 and the DoD's
remediation process has been ongoing since that time. The EPA
expects the cleanup to be completed in 2011.
Currently, our office is wading through the process of
having a toxic waste site in our district declared a Superfund.
We are just beginning the process, but I certainly hope that it
would not take some 18 years to clean up our site.
There are many unanswered questions surrounding the
contaminated water at Camp Lejeune. I know many of us on the
committee want to know why military personnel who may have been
exposed to TCE and PCE while living at Camp Lejeune still have
not been notified of their potential health risks.It seems to
me that Camp Lejeune is an example of how we failed to
responsibly protect our troops and their families. This hearing
is an opportunity to shed some light on the unresolved issues
at Camp Lejeune.
Thank you Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
----------
Mr. Whitfield. I think you and your staff were given copies
of those, and thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My time has
expired.
Mr. Stupak. I know there's a Health Subcommittee going on
so, Mr. Walden, you will be next then.
Mr. Walden. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. I am going to
waive an opening statement. I would like to hear from the
witnesses. I will have comments to make during expanded Q&A.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Burgess, you are welcome to make an opening
statement.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too will waive an
opening statement. I would just respectfully suggest there's
probably more sites than the one we have under discussion
today, and perhaps this committee could gently urge the
Department of Defense to use the money appropriated to clean up
the sites around the country for which cleanup has already been
authorized.
I will yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Stupak. Very good. That concludes all the opening
statements of members. Other members may be coming. We will
allow them an opening statement if they so choose at the
appropriate time. As I said there's a couple other hearings
going on of the Energy and Commerce Committee. So that
concludes the opening statements by members of the
subcommittee.
I will call our first panel of witnesses to come forward.
They are already here. Mr. Ensminger, Dr. Gros, and Mr. Byron.
Gentlemen, it's the policy of this subcommittee to take all
testimony under oath. Please be advised that witnesses have the
right to counsel to be present while they testify and be
advised by counsel during testimony.
Do any of you wish to be represented by counsel today? No
one indicating they are, so I will take that as a ``no.'' and
I'm going to ask you, would you please rise and raise your
right hand to take the oath.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Stupak. let the record reflect the witnesses replied in
the affirmative. You are now under oath. We will now go with
opening statements from our witnesses. Let's start on my right.
Mr. Byron, if you would, please, sir, if you press that
button in front of you to turn on your mike.
STATEMENT OF JEFF BYRON
Mr. Byron. Thank you. Good morning, my name is Jeff Byron.
I served my country honorably in the United States Marine Corps
from June 1981 to June 1985. I have been invited to give
testimony here today on the events surrounding the toxic water
contamination that occurred at Camp Lejeune Marine Corps Base.
The contamination took place between the years 1957 through
1987. I am here to tell you of the negative impact that
exposure to VOCs has had on my family's medical history, past
and present.
After boot camp and air traffic controller school, I was
assigned a permanent duty station at Marine Corps Air Station,
New River, Jacksonville, North Carolina. The Air Station
provides air support for Camp Lejeune. When we arrived in
Jacksonville, I applied for base housing. None was available.
It would be a 6-month wait, and therefore we lived out in town.
My oldest child Andrea was born in June 1982. Two months
later our family moved to Midway Park base housing complex.
Midway Park is directly across from the main gate at Camp
Lejeune. In August 1983, renovation of Midway Park forced our
family to move to other base housing. We were assigned quarters
at 3114 Bougainville Drive and Tarawa Terrace base housing
complex. During our stay in base housing, my daughter Andrea
was seen by doctors at the Naval Hospital on Camp Lejeune 57
times in 30 months for such illnesses as rashes, urinary tract
infections, yeast infections, and unexplained fevers. Most of
the time the medical personnel on base did not have an
explanation for her symptoms. We were told to give her tepid
baths and children's Tylenol to reduce the fevers.
During this time my wife and I conceived our second child,
Rachel. She was born April 27, 1985, 6 weeks prior to my
discharge from active duty. On her initial newborn profile from
Onslow Memorial Hospital, there were no abnormalities listed.
But when we took her to the base hospital for her first newborn
checkup, the hospital officials noted the following medical
concerns: She had slow weight gain, a heart murmur, a double
ear infection, umbilical hernia, brachial dimples and
posteriorly rotated ears, a large hemangioma--which is a
birthmark--on her lower back, and what they listed as ASD. I'm
not sure what that is.
It was also noted to speak to a pediatrician as soon as we
arrive home and shows that the patient is leaving in 4 days and
may need an EKG, a CRR, and a cardiac referral. She had to be
fed in an infant seat because of projectile vomiting. She was
labeled ``a failure to thrive baby.'' Two weeks later, June 25,
1985, I was discharged from Active Duty service from the United
States Marine Corps.
Six months after being discharged from the Marine Corps,
Andrea, our first born, was diagnosed with a rare bone marrow
disorder called aplastic anemia. Andrea was treated at
Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center, which at the
time was considered the No. 2 hematology department in the
country. The head of the hematology department asked us: What
chemicals have you been exposed to? Our answer was none. They
asked us for all the names of cleaning and hygiene products
that we used. All of the products were ruled out. Andrea was in
the hospital under quarantine for 30 days. Andrea was given
blood and platelet transfusions. She was treated at Children's
Hospital until she was 12 years old.
Can you imagine, I had my oldest daughter in the hospital
with a bone marrow disease, under quarantine, while my youngest
daughter was seeing multiple medical specialists for birth
defects, and my wife, 6 months pregnant with twin boys. I don't
know how we did it.
Andrea's aplastic anemia is in remission now, but her
doctors have told her there is a 50 percent chance the disease
could return if Andrea decides to have children of her own.
It was 15 years after my discharge, May 27, 2000, when we
received a letter from the National Opinion Research Center,
who was contracted on behalf of the Department of Health and
Human Services to do the survey and contact people that lived
at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune. They were requesting that
our family participate in a survey concerning toxic water
contamination, specifically those children who were in utero
and born while residing in base housing, Tarawa Terrace, Hadnot
Point. They requested that our youngest daughter Rachel
participate in a survey.
When the survey results came out, we were shocked to find
out our daughter was not identified as a study participant
since her documented medical records confirmed that she had two
of the births defects of interest: cleft palate and spina
bifida.
After we confronted ATSDR officials about her medical
records which we had provided previously to them, they agreed
that she had one of the birth defects of interest and therefore
qualified as a study participant. It was quite clear to me
after reading questions that were part of the survey that the
Marine Corps had been aware of this situation for a very long
time. From documents we obtained through the Freedom of
Information Act request, we were able to determine that Marine
Corps/DoD environmental personnel on base were well aware of
the VOC contamination before our family moved into base
housing, and therefore could have intervened and prevented the
adverse health effects suffered by my family as well as other
families whose medical history is similar to my own.
It was supposedly a notice to the residents of Tarawa
Terrace that was distributed by the base commander in April
1985 that showed the base officials were more concerned with
water usage than informing the residents of the risk of
drinking, bathing, and cooking with contaminated water. The GAO
report on page 29 does not reflect this point because they have
not presented the document in its entirety.
The Marine Corps was morally responsible for providing
clean, potable water, no matter who the contaminator was,
especially after the contamination was discovered. According to
the GAO report, GAO repeats over and over that Headquarters
Marine Corps, DoD, and Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune officials
took no action.
Our family had already scheduled a vacation in North
Carolina in 2000. We wanted to show our daughters where they
were born. While we were in Jacksonville we went to Onslow
Memorial Hospital to request copies of our daughters' birth
records. We were very surprised to find out that all records
were destroyed after 7 years. We then went to ABC 1-hour dry
cleaners, which was a primary source of contamination from PCE
at Tarawa Terrace base housing.
I took my 35 millimeter camera and took pictures of the
facility that cost taxpayers $4.3 million to clean up. After
the film had been developed, it was apparent that safe
operating procedures were not in place. There was also a Marine
Corps warehouse across the street and base housing that had
several blue barrels surrounding the brick structure. On
subsequent visits to Camp Lejeune, these barrels were no longer
visible.
I would like to thank the Oversight and Investigation
Subcommittee personnel for inviting me to give testimony here
today. And I would like to thank the members of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee for hearing my testimony. I would
like to especially thank the former residents of Marine Corps
Base Camp Lejeune for being here.
Thank you very much. That's my statement.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you Mr. Byron.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Byron follows:]
Statement of Jeff Byron
Good morning. My name is Jeff Byron. I served my country
honorably in the United States Marine Corps from June 1981
through June 1985. I have been invited to give testimony here
today on the events surrounding the toxic water contamination
that occurred at Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune. The
contamination took place between the years 1957 through 1987. I
am here to tell you of the negative impact that exposure to
VOCs has had on my family's medical history, past and present.
After boot camp and Air Traffic Controller school I was
assigned a permanent duty station at Marine Corps Air Station,
New River, Jacksonville, North Carolina. The Air Station
provides air support for Camp Lejeune. When we arrived in
Jacksonville I applied for base housing. None was available, it
would be a 6-month wait, and therefore we lived out in town. My
oldest child, Andrea, was born in June of 1982. Two months
later our family moved to Midway Park base housing complex.
Midway Park is directly across from the main gate of Camp
Lejeune. In August of 1983 renovation of Midway Park forced our
family to move to other base housing. We were assigned quarters
at 3114 Bougainville Drive in Tarawa Terrace base housing
complex. During our stay in base housing my daughter, Andrea,
was seen by doctors at the Naval Hospital on Camp Lejeune 57
times in 30 months for such illnesses as rashes, urinary tract
infections, yeast infections and unexplained fevers. Most of
the time the medical personnel on base did not have an
explanation for her
symptoms. We were told to give her tepid baths and
children's Tylenol to reduce the fevers. During this time my
wife and I conceived our second child, Rachel. She was born
April 27, 1985, 6 weeks prior to my discharge from active duty.
On her initial newborn profile from Onslow Memorial
Hospital there were no abnormalities listed. But when we took
her to the base hospital for her first new-born check, up the
hospital officials noted the following medical concerns:
Slow weight gain
A heart murmur
Double ear infection
Umbilical hernia
Brachial dimples and posteriorly rotated ears
A large hemangioma (raised birthmark) on her
lower back
ASD
It was noted ``Speak to pediatrician as soon as arrive
home-are leaving in 4 days-may need EKG, CRR & cardiac
referral''. She had to be fed in an infant seat because of
projectile vomiting. She was labeled ``a failure to thrive
baby''. Two weeks later, June 25, 1985, I was discharged from
active duty service from the Marine Corps.
Six months after being discharged from the Corps, Andrea,
our first born, was diagnosed with a rare bone marrow disorder
called aplastic anemia. Andrea
was treated at CCHMC (Cincinnati Children's Hospital
Medical Center), which at that time was considered the #2
hematology department in the country. The head of the
hematology department asked us what chemicals we had been
exposed to, our answer, none. They asked us for all of the
names of cleaning and hygiene products that we were using. All
of the products were ruled out. Andrea was in the hospital
under quarantine for 30 days. Andrea was given blood and
platelet transfusions. She was treated at Children's Hospital
until she was 12 years old. Can you imagine, I had my oldest
daughter in the hospital with a bone marrow disease, under
quarantine. While my youngest daughter was seeing multiple
medical specialist for birth defects, and my wife 6 months
pregnant with twin boys. I don't know how we did it. Andrea's
aplastic anemia is in remission now, but her doctor has told
her that there is a 50 percent chance the disease could return,
if Andrea decides to have children of her own and becomes
pregnant.
It was 15 years after my discharge, May 27, 2000 we
received a letter from The National Opinion Research Center who
was contracted on behalf of the Department of Health and Human
Services to do a survey and contact people that lived at Marine
Corps Base Camp Lejeune. They were requesting that our family
participate in a survey concerning toxic water contamination,
specifically those children who were in utero and born while
residing in base housing, (Tarawa Terrace, Hadnot Point). They
requested that our youngest daughter, Rachel, participate in
the survey. When the survey results came out we were shocked to
find out that our daughter was not identified as a study
participant, since her documented medical records confirmed
that she had two of the birth defects of interest, cleft
pallet, and spina-bifida. After we confronted ATSDR officials
with her medical records, which we had previously provided to
them, they agreed that she had one birth defect of interest,
and therefore qualified as a study participant. It was quite
clear to me after reading questions that were part of the
survey, that the Marine Corps had been aware of this situation
for a very long time. From documents that we obtained through
the Freedom of Information Act requests, we were able to
determine that the Marine Corps/DoD environmental personnel on
base were well aware of the VOC contamination before our family
moved into base housing. And therefore could have intervened
and prevented the adverse health effects suffered by my family
as well as other families, whose medical history is very
similar to my own.
There was supposedly a Notice to the Residents of Tarawa
Terrace, that was distributed by the base commander in April of
1985. That showed that base officials were more concerned with
water usage than informing the residents of the risk of
drinking, bathing, and cooking with contaminated water. (The
GAO report page 29, does not reflect this point because they
have not presented the document in its entirety) The Marine
Corps was morally responsible for providing clean potable
water, no matter who the contaminator was, especially after the
contamination was discovered. According to the GAO report, GAO
repeats over and over that Head Quarters Marine Corps/DoD, and
MCBCL officials took no action .
Our family had already scheduled a vacation to North
Carolina in 2000. We wanted to show our daughters where they
were born. While we were in Jacksonville, we went to Onslow
Memorial Hospital to request copies of our daughters' birth
records; we were very surprised to find out that all records
were destroyed after seven years. We then went by ABC 1 hour
dry cleaner, which was the primary source of contamination from
PCE at Tarawa Terrace base housing. I took my 35mm camera and
took pictures of the facility that cost tax payers 4.3 million
dollars to clean up. After the film had been developed it was
apparent that safe operating procedures were not in place.
There was also a Marine Corps well house across the street in
base housing that had several blue barrels surrounding the
brick structure. On subsequent visits to Camp Lejeune, these
barrels were no longer visible.
To me it was apparent that the Marine Corps had known for
20 years, before they had decided to tell my family of the
exposure. I felt that they had wronged my family and others
that had served this country as patriots. It was quite obvious
that ``Semper Fi'', always faithful, did not apply to us. I was
raised to believe that to get something done you had to do it
yourself. That is what I and others are doing. Those of us that
have become activists want to ensure that this American tragedy
never happens again. I have attended all of the ATSDR meetings
concerning Camp Lejeune with the exception of the Water
Modeling Scientific Panel. I am a sitting member of the
Community Assistance Panel with the ATSDR, tasked with
evaluating the possibilities of doing further studies on
children and adults exposed at Camp Lejeune. I accompanied
Jerry Ensminger to the hill when he gave testimony to a
subcommittee hearing for Energy & Commerce concerning DoD's
request to obtain exemptions from environmental law. I am happy
to say that with Jerry's testimony, DoD was denied exemption. I
attended the Commandant's fact finding panel in Jacksonville,
NC. where according to the GAO report (page 46) the panel made
several finding criticizing Camp Lejeune and Department of the
Navy. One said, ``Communications to Camp Lejeune residents
regarding drinking water contamination was not detailed enough
to completely characterize the contamination found at the time
of the well closures'' Notice to Residents of Tarawa Terrace--
from the base commander. In my opinion, misleading at best. We
started a web site, The Few, The Proud, The Forgotten,
www.tftptf.com, in an attempt to provide documented history to
the former residents so that they can make informed decisions
regarding their future. To educate the public and government
officials, to the events surrounding toxic water exposures at
Camp Lejeune.
Because of my involvement with ATSDR as a cap member the
Government Accountability Office allowed me and others to read,
and comment on a copy of their draft report, ``Defense Health
Care Activities Related to Past Drinking Water Contamination at
Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune''. After reading the draft
report I have come to the conclusion that the GAO had not done
its homework and it had depended upon the Marine Corps
Headquarter explanation of documentation, and did not check
their source. A Marine Corps document providing the sampling
result stated that ND meant ``none detected.'' (page 28 1st
note of the GAO report) The document that is being referred to,
GAO has removed the column that shows the instrument's
detection limit. On this same document a zero at the end of one
PCE reading was missing, miss leading the reader to think that
the meter read 158 parts per billion, in reality the reading
was 1580 parts per billion. This is just one deception that I
have uncovered in the GAO report.
While ATSDR did not always receive requested funding and
experienced delays in receiving information from DoD for its
Camp Lejeune related work, ATSDR officials said this has not
significantly delayed their work. This was stated no less than
5 times in the GAO report. When something is overstated, it
tends not to be true. I was also shocked to find out that ATSDR
had come up with 548 Comparison Individuals for the in-utero
study group, from the same base! Even after ATSDR officials
repeatedly told CAP members that to do a credible study they
did not need to use individuals from Camp Lejeune. Since I am a
member of the CAP I thought it might be important for me to
know about this group. What happened to trust and transparency?
I provided GAO with documents to refute many of their
statements. When the final draft came out I was surprised to
see that they had not listened to very much of what I had to
say. They had written a biased report in defense of the DoD and
Marine Corps. I will be happy to dispel the rest of the GAO
report with Congress at the upcoming hearing.
----------
Mr. Stupak. Dr. Gros.
STATEMENT OF MIKE GROS, M.D.
Dr. Gros. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen
of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to speak before you
regarding the unfortunate water contamination issue which we
have all heard about. My name is Michael L. Gros, M.D.
My involvement with this event spans the time period from
July 1980 to July 1983 when I lived at H-57 MOQ and worked at
the Naval Hospital as a staff Ob/Gyn physician. I provided in
my written testimony a chronology of my dates of education and
my qualifications.
I come before you as a representative of many individuals
and families who were adversely affected over a 40-or-more-year
time frame by contaminated water at Camp Lejeune. I am,
unfortunately, well qualified by virtue of a harrowing and
life-altering experience with non-Hodgkins lymphoma and its
treatment involving a bone marrow transplant and the
development of severe chronic graft versus host disease, from
which I now suffer continuously.
My family and I moved to Camp Lejeune in July 1980 after
finishing a Navy internship and residency at Naval Regional
Medical Center in Portsmouth, Virginia. Ironically, we desired
Camp Lejeune as a duty station, since it was stateside and, at
the time, seemed safe for my family. Little did we know that
quite the opposite was true. Unknown to us, Camp Lejeune had
groundwater contamination, which we've discussed, with various
organic chemicals such as trichloroethylene and
perchloroethylene, among other chemicals, that may have
originated as early as the 1950's. This was due to improper
disposal of these agents used in machinery overhaul and
improper location of wells in areas affected by seepage into
the water table.
Our house at H-57 MOQ was supplied by the Hadnot Point
water system. As noted in the table, acceptable levels of TCE
are less than 5 parts per billion. Our house had 1,400 parts
per billion and one well providing our water, and one well,
number 651, had an astounding 18,900 parts per billion TCE when
it was finally taken offline in 1985, 2 years after we left.
So, for all of our 3 years living at H-57, we were
ingesting and inhaling this poisonous water and its vapor from
showering and bathing. It's noted that the poisoning is even
worse if the water is heated up because the materials
volatilize easier than water boils. Our food and the baby
formula and toddlers' Kool-Aid were mixed with the seemingly
clean water.
This poisoning has no taste, it has no smell, and so it's
undetectable by usual means. The cancerous effects do not
appear until 10 to 15 years post-exposure, the so-called
latency period which is noted in ATSDR's own documents. From
1980 onwards, Camp Lejeune's own documents revealed that
routine water tests typically performed on chlorinated water
systems looking for substances called trihalomethanes showed
the presence of major contamination with other organic
chemicals which required further action. Levels of these
contaminants were so high so as to preclude THM testing. No
records of any further action on Camp Lejeune's part exist. In
fact, this THM testing was simply again repeated in intervals
with similar results and, again, a shocking lack of further
clarification.
Where was Camp Lejeune's concern for the safety of its
residents? The technology involved in finding these poisons was
readily available, but was either neglected due to incompetence
or deliberately not done for unknown reasons. It is
incomprehensible that this happened. Who made such bad
decisions? Why was this ghoulish experiment performed on our
military volunteers and their families? Such a failure to
follow up on abnormal tests in my profession would have caused
me to lose my medical license and, at best, face a malpractice
suit I was sure to lose.
I'm sorry that I think like a doctor, but I feel people in
charge of the welfare of others, such as managers of public
water systems, should be held to standards of conduct
commensurate with the serious nature of their jobs.
In spite of multiple handwritten warning notes on repeated
test reports over several years' period of time, the advice of
the base's outside water consultants to further identify and
quantitate the poisoning chemicals was repeatedly ignored.
Amazingly, no tests were ever done in follow-up to identify the
nature of these compounds or their sources.
Even more incredible was the Marine Corps's attempt to
later justify this gross neglect with the tack that no law
existed requiring them to exercise the normal good judgment and
caring that any other contemporary water supplier would have
had for its customers. For example, the well 651 was not taken
offline until 1985, 2 years after we left Camp Lejeune. Were we
all unwitting lab rats? Such chemicals such as TCE and PCE are
undetectable by usual taste and smell. So when we left active
duty for Houston, Texas, in 1983, I was completely unaware that
we had been systematically, unethically, and heartlessly
poisoned during 3 years of living at Camp Lejeune.
I began a private practice of Ob/Gyn in Houston, Texas.
Although I felt well, I began to show subtle lab abnormalities
as early as 1993 and 1994. Definitely by 1997 these lab tests
showed a marked shift in my complete blood count with an
elevation of a lymphocyte fraction. To make a long story short,
from 10 to 15 years removed from living at Camp Lejeune I had
developed a slowly progressive and untreatable non-Hodgkins
lymphoma called cutaneous T-cell lymphoma. My only treatment
option would eventually be a bone marrow transplant when the
disease reached such a point that my resistance to infection
would be so low I could no longer see patients.
As I was seeing patients one day in November 1999, I was
contacted out of the blue by Marie Sochia from the Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. She informed me that my
younger son, Tom, conceived and born at Camp Lejeune, was to be
studied as part of an in utero study due to his chemical
exposure. This was my first knowledge of any toxic water in my
former base. It was then that I made the connection between my
disease and the TCE and PCE exposure which I had suffered
during 3 years of continuous exposure at Camp Lejeune. My son
seemed fine. However, I had progressive lymphoma.
I was happy to know that an infant study was to be done,
but I was shocked to learn that there were no studies planned
and no studies were felt to be warranted on the thousands of
adults who were similarly exposed. I vigorously dispute this
conclusion.
In May 2002, my disease had progressed to the point where I
had dangerously low immunity and the lymphoma was replacing 50
percent of my bone marrow. I had to abruptly abandon my
practice and be admitted for the only remaining chance of a
cure, which was a bone marrow transplant. As many of you know,
this is not a walk in the park. BMT carries a significant
mortality risk related to acute and long-term complications.
Thankfully, the procedures rather quickly put the lymphoma in
remission, but unfortunately has left me with severe chronic
graft versus host disease. The quality of my life has really
degenerated as a result. Most of my ability to recreate and
travel has been largely destroyed, and I can no longer tolerate
much sun exposure or outside activity. But at least I'm still
alive and kicking, and am finally here at long last to present
this story to you all.
I have enclosed a list of most of the medical setbacks I
have had over the last 5 years in the written testimony. My
battle to stay healthy and out of the hospital has easily
exceeded $4.5 million at this point in time. No telling what my
total medical bills will amount to, but while I lay in bed in
the aphaeresis unit for 4 hours at a time, getting my blood
circulated in the photophaeresis apparatus, I have plenty of
time to worry about how I'm going to stay alive and still avoid
bankruptcy.
I was awarded 100 percent service-connected disability for
my disease, but have found funding for anything other than
pharmacy items to be very difficult to access at the VA
hospital in Houston, Texas. I was forced to give away my
practice at a great financial loss. Because of my need for
chronic immune suppression, I will probably never be able to
see patients again. All of the dedication and years of training
I invested from the seventh grade onward have been wasted by a
career cut short in its prime by this debacle.
My wife and I now have two new full-time careers, just
staying alive and figuring out how to pay for it all.
I am here today to urge you to compel ATSDR, or preferably
another truly impartial agency, to investigate the fates of
those adults exposed as I was. I continue to receive phone
calls from adults similarly exposed, suffering from lymphomas,
who are just now finding out about this event. I am certain
most of the hapless victims of this silent disaster are either
dead or unaware that they are sick at an early age with cancer.
They need help with their medical expenses and monitoring for
future medical and possible developmental problems in their
progeny.
This is not a faceless disaster. There are many people
undoubtedly involved in the initial mismanagement and
subsequent coverup of this entire event. There certainly has to
be some credible explanation for at least the period in which
my family was involved from 1980 to 1983.
There is a chain of command in the Navy and Marine Corps.
Decisions surrounding management of the public water system on
a Marine base are not made in a vacuum. A complete
investigation needs to be initiated, with congressional
oversight and congressional subpoena power as needed. Some
victims even feel that possible criminal activity may have been
involved.
The criminal investigation begun several years ago at the
request of a number of victims and their families needs to be
reopened. We also need to make sure this is not something akin
to a version of the infamous Tuskegee experiment.
Members of the committee, I thank you for allowing me to
speak before you today and I would be happy to answer any
questions you might have.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gros follows:]
Testimony of Michael L. Gros M.D.
Good morning ladies and gentlemen of the committee, and
thank you for inviting me to speak before you regarding the
unfortunate water contamination issue involving the Marine base
at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
My name is Michael L. Gros, M. D.
My involvement with this event spans the time period from
July 1980, to July 1983, when I lived at H-57, MOQ and worked
at the Naval Hospital as a staff Ob/Gyn. A brief chronology of
my service dates is provided below:
B. A. 1974, Trinity University, San Antonio, TX
M.D. 1976, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston,
TX, Navy Scholarship
Internship and Residency in Ob/Gyn, 1976-1980,
NRMC, Portsmouth, VA.
Staff Ob/Gyn, July 1980-July1983, Camp Lejeune,
N. C., LCDR, MC, USNR
Private practice Ob/Gyn, 1983 to 2002, Houston,
TX.
Medically retired May 2002 to present due to Non-
Hodgkins Lymphoma
I come before you as a representative of many individuals
and families who were adversely affected over a forty or more
year time frame by contaminated water at Camp Lejeune. I am
unfortunately well qualified by virtue of a harrowing and life
altering experience with Non-Hodgkins lymphoma and its
treatment involving a bone marrow transplant (BMT) and the
unfortunate development of severe chronic graft vs. host
disease (GVHD) from which I now suffer, continuously.
My family and I moved to Camp Lejeune in July 1980, after
I finished my U.S. Navy internship and residency in Ob/Gyn at
NRMC, Portsmouth, VA. Ironically, we desired Camp Lejeune as a
duty station since it was stateside and, at the time, seemed
safe for the family. Little did we know that quite the opposite
was true.
Unknown to us, Camp Lejeune had ground water and well
water contamination with various volatile organic compounds
such as trichloroethylene (TCE) and perchloroethylene (PCE),
among other chemicals, that may have originated as early as the
1950's. This was due to improper disposal of these agents used
in machinery overhaul and improper location of wells in areas
affected by seepage into the water table. Our house at H-57 MOQ
was supplied by the Hadnot Point water system. Acceptable
levels of TCE are <5ppb. Our house had at least 1,400 ppb TCE
(maybe higher), and one well, No. 651 in the Hadnot Point field
had an astounding 18,900 ppb TCE when finally taken off line
1985, two years after we left.
So for all of our three years living on base at H-57 MOQ
we were ingesting and inhaling this poisonous water and its
vapor from showering and bathing (worse when heated up). Our
food and the baby's formula and toddler's Kool Aid were mixed
with this seemingly clean water. This poisoning has no taste
and no smell and so is undetectable by usual means. The
cancerous effects do not appear until 10-15 years post exposure
(latency period noted in ATSDR documents).
From 1980 onwards, Camp Lejeune's own documents reveal
that routine water tests typically performed on chlorinated
water systems (trihalomethanes, THM) showed the presence of
major contamination from other organic compounds requiring
further action. Levels of these contaminants were so high as to
preclude THM testing. No records of any further action on Camp
Lejeune's part exist. In fact, this THM testing was simply
again repeated at intervals with similar results and again a
shocking lack of further clarification. Where was CLNC's
concern for the safety of its residents?
The technology involved in finding these poisons was
readily available, but was either neglected due to incompetence
or deliberately not done for unknown reasons. It is
incomprehensible that this happened. Who made such bad
decisions? Why was this ghoulish experiment performed on our
military volunteers and their families?
Such a failure to follow up on abnormal tests in my
profession would have caused me to lose my medical license or
at best, face a malpractice suit I was sure to lose. I am sorry
that I think from a doctor's perspective, but I feel people in
charge of the welfare of others, such as managers of public
water systems, should be held to standards of conduct
commensurate with the serious nature of their jobs.
In spite of multiple handwritten warning notes on repeated
test reports over several years period of time, the advice of
the base's own outside water consultants to further identify
and quantitate the poisoning chemicals was repeatedly ignored.
Amazingly, no follow up tests were ever done to even identify
the nature of the interfering chemicals or their sources. Even
more incredible was the Marine Corp's attempt to later justify
this gross neglect with the tact that no ``law'' existed
requiring them to exercise the good judgment and caring that
any other contemporary water supplier would have had for its
customers. For example, the horribly polluted well, No. 651,
(drilled next to the dump!) was not taken off line until 1985,
two years after we left Camp Lejeune. Were we all unwitting lab
rats?
Since chemicals such as trichloroethylene and
perchloroethylene are undetectable by the usual modes of taste
and smell, when I left active duty to move to Houston, Texas, I
was completely unaware that we had been systematically,
unethically, and heartlessly poisoned during our 3 years at
Camp Lejeune.
I began a private practice in Ob/Gyn in Houston, TX.
Although I felt well, I began to show subtle lab abnormalities
as early as 1993 and 1994, and definitely by 1997, these lab
tests showed a marked shift in my complete blood count with an
elevation of lymphocytes. To make a long story short, from 10-
15 years removed from living at Camp Lejeune, I had developed a
slowly progressive and untreatable Non-Hodgkins lymphoma called
Cutaneous T-Cell lymphoma (CTCL), otherwise known as mycosis
fungoides.
My only treatment option would eventually be a bone marrow
transplant when the disease reached such a point that my
resistance to infection would be so low that I could no longer
see patients.
As I was a seeing patients one day in November 1999, I was
contacted out of the blue by Marie Sochia from the Agency for
the Toxic Substance and Disease Registry (ATSDR). She informed
me that my younger son, Tom, conceived and born at Camp
Lejeune, was to be studied as part of an ``in utero'' study,
due to his chemical exposure at Camp Lejeune. This was my first
knowledge of any toxic water at my former base.
It was then that I made the connection between my disease
and TCE and PCE exposure, which I had suffered during three
years of continuous exposure at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
My son seemed fine. However, I had progressive lymphoma. I was
happy to know that an infant study was to be done, but I was
shocked to learn that no studies were felt by ATSDR to be
warranted on the thousands of exposed adults. I vigorously
dispute this conclusion.
In May 2002, my disease had progressed to the point where
I had dangerously low immunity with the lymphoma replacing
fifty percent of my bone marrow. I had to abruptly abandon my
practice and be admitted for my only remaining chance at a
cure, a bone marrow transplant (BMT).
As many of you know, this is not a walk in the park. BMT
carries a significant mortality risk related to acute and long-
term complications. Thankfully, the procedure rather quickly
put the lymphoma in remission, but, unfortunately, has left me
with severe chronic graft versus host disease. The quality of
my life has really degenerated as a result. Most of my ability
to recreate and travel has been largely destroyed. I can no
longer tolerate much sun exposure or outside activity. But at
least I am still alive and kicking and am finally here at long
last to present this story to you all.
Here is a list of most of the major medical setbacks I
have endured over the last 5 years:
Graft versus host disease of liver, lungs, skin,
eyes, gastrointestinal tract
Pneumonia-bacterial
Pneumonia-Pneumocystis carinii
Cellulitis
Acute and chronic renal failure
Cataracts--both eyes
Diabetes
Heart failure
Gastroenteritis
Toxoplasmosis of the brain
Squamous cell carcinoma of the skin
Osteopenia
Baldness
Depression
Hearing loss secondary to medications
Anemia
Fatigue
Septicemia from a central line
My battle to stay healthy and out of the hospital has
easily exceeded $4\1/2\ million at this point in time. No
telling what my total medical bills will amount to, but while I
lay in bed in the aphaeresis unit for 4 hours getting my blood
circulated in the photophaeresis apparatus, I have plenty of
time to worry about how I am going to stay alive and still
avoid bankruptcy.
I was awarded 100 percent service connected disability for
my disease, but have found funding help for anything other than
pharmacy items to be very difficult to access at the V.A.
hospital in Houston, TX.
I was forced to give away my practice at a great financial
loss. Because of my need for chronic immune suppression, I will
probably never be able to see patients again. All of the
dedication and years of training I invested from the seventh
grade onward have been wasted by a career cut short in its
prime by this debacle.
My wife and I now have new full time careers--just staying
alive and figuring out how to pay for it all.
I am here today to urge you to compel ATSDR, or preferably
another truly impartial agency, to investigate the fates of
those adults exposed as I was. I continually receive phone
calls from adults similarly exposed, suffering from lymphomas,
yet just now finding out about this event. I am certain most of
the hapless victims of this silent disaster are either dead or
unaware why they are sick at an early age with cancer. They
need help with their medical expenses and monitoring for future
medical and possible developmental problems in their progeny.
In my opinion, there is an ongoing coverup involving this
disaster, and ATSDR may well be ``running the point'' for the
responsible governmental agencies or chemical manufacturers.
The absence of relevant documents showing any reasonable chain
of responsibility, combined with the trumped up and utterly
unbelievable attempts at public relations put out by the Marine
Corps, are very telling in this regard. Instead of wisely
spending the tax payors money finding and assisting all those
exposed to this chemical cocktail, the Marine Corp has seen fit
to hire a public relations and strategy firm (Booze Allen
Hamilton) to arrange misleading town meetings, whose
predetermined exculpatory findings insult our intelligence. It
seems no one is responsible for any of this man-made disaster.
Ladies and gentlemen, I do not believe any of this rubbish.
This is not a faceless disaster. There were many people
undoubtedly involved in the initial mismanagement and
subsequent cover up of this entire event. There certainly has
to be some creditable explanation for at least the period in
which my family was involved from 1980 to 1983. There is a
chain of command in the Navy and Marine Corps. Decisions
surrounding management of a public water system on a Marine
base are not made in a vacuum.
A complete investigation needs to be initiated with
congressional oversight and congressional subpoena power as
needed. Some victims even feel that possible criminal activity
may have been involved. The criminal investigation begun
several years ago at the request of a number of the victims and
their families needs to be reopened. We also need to make sure
this is not something akin to a version of the infamous
Tuskegee experiment.
Members of the committee, I thank you for allowing me to
speak before you today.
I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.
----------
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Ensminger, your opening statement, please,
sir.
STATEMENT OF JEROME ENSMINGER
Mr. Ensminger. Good morning. My name is Jerry Ensminger,
and I served my country faithfully for 24\1/2\ years in the
United States Marine Corps.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the
chairman, the committee members and their staffs for all the
hard work that went into making these hearings possible.
I must say that it has been inspiring for me to have tuned
in to C-SPAN these last several months and witnessed our
Congress doing what our Founding Fathers intended. You have
been taking on the tough issues that matter to the majority of
our citizens, not just the issues that affect special interest
groups and big business. And I am quite sure most Americans
applaud you for your efforts.
I am appearing here today as one spokesperson for the
hundreds of thousands of Marines, sailors, their families, and
the loyal civilian employees who were unknowingly exposed to
horrendous levels of toxins through their drinking water at
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
Camp Lejeune is quite possibly one of, if not the worst,
water contamination incidents in history. I can confidently
make this claim based on the potential numbers of people who
were exposed and the documented levels of contaminants that
were present in the finished drinking water at this base.
Ironically, most of these people still do not have any idea
that they were exposed to these contaminants at Camp Lejeune.
They have not been notified, and the United States Marine Corps
has to date refused to institute any type of legitimate
notification plan or policy.
I can assure you that there are many more individuals and
families who are now literally spread out all over this
country, if not this world, that are wondering, what happened
to me, ``What happened to my family member?'' these people
deserve an answer. It is time for the United States Marine
Corps to live up to our motto, which is Semper Fidelis, which
is Latin for ``always faithful.''
My daughter Janey was conceived while her mother and I
lived in one of the base family housing units that was affected
by the contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune. Just like
our other children, Janey was born seemingly normal; that is,
until she was diagnosed with acute lymphocytic leukemia at the
age of 6.
In 1997, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry, or ATSDR, proposed a childhood leukemia/non-Hodgkins
lymphoma study for children exposed to VOCs in utero while
their parents lived at Camp Lejeune between the years of 1968
and 1985. The proposal, which was sent to the Secretary of the
Navy, stated that the expected occurrences of these illnesses
in a group of 10,000 to 12,000 births for that same time period
was 7.2 cases. ATSDR has now already confirmed 14 cases of
leukemia and two cases of childhood non-Hodgkins lymphoma out
of 12,598 respondents to their survey. This is more than a 100
percent increase in the instances of these childhood cancers.
Mr. Chairman, the bottom line is this: DoD officials had
been repeatedly notified by three different analytical
laboratories over a span of 4.5 years about the existence of
these chemicals in Camp Lejeune's finished drinking water. One
laboratory wrote a letter on August 10, 1982, to Camp Lejeune's
commanding general, telling him that the high levels of
chemicals that they had found in their water were more
important from a health standpoint than what they had sent
their water to be tested for in the first place, which was
TTHMs.
DoD authorities took no action to identify the source of
these chemicals in their water for 4.5 years following their
discovery. We have discovered documents where DoD
representatives have admitted that the ATSDR had incorrect
water system data for Camp Lejeune.
Ms. Kelly Dreyer of Headquarters Marine Corps wrote a 16
November 2000 e-mail to a Mr. Neil Paul at Camp Lejeune's
Environmental Management Department citing the incorrect data
and directing its correction. Ms. Dreyer wrote in her e-mail
that it was important that we set the record straight. She
asked Mr. Paul to prepare a memorandum to the ATSDR with all of
the correct information, and placed a 1 December 2000 deadline
for its completion. Then I discover another e-mail from Ms.
Dreyer, dated 16 March 2001, 4 months later; this time to a Mr.
Rick Raines, a subordinate of Mr. Paul's at Camp Lejeune,
repeating the very same request.
This information was related to the incorrect water system
data which caused the ATSDR to overlook more than 1,500 babies
in an earlier study. We now know that the memorandum never got
written. ATSDR never found out that they had been provided
incorrect water system data for Camp Lejeune until I informed
Dr. Frank Bove in a telephone conversation in 2002.
The credit for the discovery of the incorrect water system
data belongs to Major Tom Townsend, United States Marine Corps
(retired). He now lives in Moscow, Idaho. It was through Major
Townsend's diligent and aggressive letter writing and Freedom
of Information Act request campaign that much of the factual
information about Camp Lejeune was uncovered. Major Townsend
lost an infant son and, more recently, his wife of more than 50
years to this contamination.
Over the nearly 10 years that I have been involved in this
situation, I have had much interaction with the various DoD
personnel who have been involved in this situation. While some
have been understanding, others have been just as, if not more,
hurtful and arrogant.
During the 1990's and early 2000's, there have been, in my
estimation, multiple violations of the CRCLA and RCRA laws in
regards to Camp Lejeune. It is suspected that 6 years ago the
United States Environmental Protection Agency granted our
Department of Defense the authority not to list anymore of
their contamination sites on the national priority list. I must
also assume that this was executed with the full blessing of
the Bush administration, or else the EPA's decision would have
been overturned.
There is something that a lot of Americans do not
understand. The United States Department of Defense is our
Nation's largest polluter. Prior to the EPA granting authority,
DoD had 172 highly contaminated sites on the national priority
list. I realize that it is of the utmost importance that we
maintain a strong defense. I also understand firsthand what
happens if we do not maintain our environment at the same time.
What will we have left to defend? A toxic waste dump.
Yes, our Department of Defense should be held to the same
standards as every other industry in our Nation. The Department
of Defense would not tell the truth about their own accidental
killing of our own soldiers in a combat zone; i.e., Pat
Tillman. What makes anyone believe that they would not lie
about the contamination on their installations right here in
the United States?
My daughter Janey lost her battle against her malignancy
nearly 2\1/2\ years after it started. Janey went through hell,
and all of us who loved her, we went through hell with her.
Janey died at 3:35 p.m. on 24 September 1985. She was only 9
years old.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to share with the committee the
dialog of a telephone conversation I had recently with someone
from headquarters Marine Corps.
Mr. Stupak. Go ahead.
Mr. Ensminger. On the 10th of April I called Headquarters
Marine Corps to find out what happened to the funding for the
National Academy of Sciences review, funding that was
authorized by the defense authorization bill, and I got Ms.
Kelly Dreyer on the phone, and we were discussing this and
several other issues. And Ms. Dreyer accused me of having a lot
of pent-up anger. I couldn't believe that she said that.
But I recounted to Ms. Dreyer, and the fact that she's a
mother, what I went through as a parent through the illness of
my daughter. I informed her of the shock that happens to a
parent when their child's diagnosed with one of these
catastrophic illnesses. I had to have letters written so that I
could attain a humanitarian transfer so my daughter could be
transferred to Penn State University Medical Center where my
home's at, where my family was for support. And one of the
doctors wrote a letter and I read it, and it said at her
diagnosis, her white blood count was over 150,000, which put
her in a high-risk category and limited the ability or the
chances that she would have long-term survival.
I lived that nightmare every day from the time I saw that
letter. Every day that entered my mind. And then I reminded Ms.
Dreyer about what she went through in the treatment rooms.
Every time she got stuck with a needle, I was there holding
her. She was screaming in my ear. Every time they stuck a
needle through her bone in her hip to pull out bone marrow, I
held her and she screamed in my ear, ``Daddy, ``Daddy, don't
let them hurt me.'' And the only thing that I could say to her
was, ``Honey, the only reason they're hurting you is they're
trying to help you.''
And then I reminded Ms. Dreyer about every time Janey got
hit with chemotherapy, and she was heaving her guts out, and
all I could do was stand and rub her back and soothe her.
And then when Janey came home from school, when she could
finally go back to school, crying because the other kids at
school picked on her because her treatments made her look like
a freak.
And then on the day of her death, I started crying. I
hadn't cried in front of Janey before that time because she was
pulling her strength from me. And I had to be strong for her.
If I had to cry, I went somewhere else. But that day I started
crying, and she looked up at me, and she had pneumonia that bad
she could hardly talk, but she said, ``Stop it.'' and I said,
``Stop what?'' she said, ``Stop crying, Daddy. I love you.''
That was the last words my daughter said to me. She went
into a coma. Thirty-five minutes later, she took her last
breath, and I since that conversation with Ms. Dreyer I have
thought about that statement she made to me. And you know what?
Through these people's misconduct and their deceit, they
haven't filled me with a lot of pent-up anger. What they have
filled me with is a terrible resolve to expose their
misconduct, their arrogance, and their incompetence. And I want
to expose the truth.
Thank you.
Mr. Stupak. thank you for your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ensminger follows:]
Testimony of Jerome M. Ensminger
Good morning, my name is Jerry Ensminger and I served my
country faithfully for 24\1/2\ years in the United States
Marine Corps. I would like to take this opportunity to thank
the chairman, the committee members, and their staffs for all
of the hard work that went into making these hearings possible.
I must say that it has been inspiring for me to have tuned into
C-SPAN these last several months and witnessed our congress
doing what our founding fathers intended. You have been taking
on the tough issues that matter to the majority of our
citizens, not just the issues that affect special interest
groups and big business. I, and I am quite sure most Americans,
applaud you for your efforts.
I am appearing here today as one spokes person for the
hundreds of thousands of Marines, Sailors, their families, and
the loyal civilian employees who were unknowingly exposed to
horrendous levels of toxins through their drinking water at
Camp Lejeune, N.C. Camp Lejeune is, quite possibly, one of , if
not the worst, water contamination incidents in history. I can
confidently make this claim based on the potential numbers of
people who were exposed and the documented levels of
contaminants that were present in the finished drinking water
at the base. Ironically, most of these people still do not have
any idea that they were exposed to these contaminates at Camp
Lejeune. They have not been notified and the United States
Marine Corps has to date refused to institute any type of
legitimate notification plan/policy. I can assure you that
there are many more individuals and families who are now
literally spread out all over the country that are wondering,
``What happened to me?'' ``What happened to my family member?''
These people deserve an answer. It is time for the United
States Marine Corps to live up to their motto ``Semper
Fidelis'' which is Latin for ``Always Faithful.''
My daughter Janey was conceived while her mother and I
lived in one of the base family housing units that was affected
by the contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune. Just like
our other children, Janey was born seemingly normal, that is
until she was diagnosed with Acute Lymphosytic Leukemia at the
age of six. In 1997, the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry (ATSDR) proposed a childhood Leukemia /Non-
Hodgkins Lyphoma study for children exposed to VOCs in-utero
while their parents lived at Camp Lejeune between the years
1968-1985. The proposal (CLW 2815-2832) which was sent to the
Secretary of the Navy, stated that the expected occurrences of
these illnesses in a group of 10,000-12,000 births for that
time period was 7.2 cases. ATSDR has now confirmed 14 cases of
leukemia and two non-hodgkins lymphoma out of 12,598
respondents to their survey. This is more than a 100 percent
increase in the incidence of these childhood cancers.
On October 1, 1980, representatives from Navy Facilities
Engineering Command, Atlantic Division from Norfolk, VA. Came
to Camp Lejeune. They took a composite water sample of all
eight water systems that were operating on Camp Lejeune at that
time. The results of this composite sample (CLW 0430) showed
VOC contamination that exceeded today's Maximum Contaminate
Level (MCL) of 5ppb. We must remember that this was composite
(combined) sample of which 6 of the contributing water systems
were not deemed to be contaminated. Ms. Elizabeth Betz,
Supervising Chemist at Camp Lejeune's Quality Control
Laboratory wrote a memorandum (CLW 0613) dated 31 August 1982
that specifically addressed the 1 October 1980 sampling event.
First and foremost, the analytical results for this sample were
not provided to Camp Lejeune until 12 August 1982 and Ms. Betz
points out errors that were committed during the sample
collection process. Also, during October of 1980 the United
States Army Environmental Hygiene Team from Fort McPhearson,
GA. Began testing certain water systems aboard Camp Lejeune for
total Trihalomethanes (TTHMs). Their analysis of the 30 October
1980 water samples taken form the Hadnot Point Water
Distribution System had the following hand written remark:
``Water is highly contaminated with low molecular weight
halogenated hydrocarbons.'' (CLW 0436) On 29 December 1980
another sample was taken from the Hadnot Point system and again
the U.S. Army laboratory wrote a note on the analytical form,
Heavy organic interference at CHCL2BR. You need to analyze for
chlorinated organics by GC/MS. (CLW 0438) Once again samples
were taken of the same system on 30 January 1981 and the U.S.
Army laboratory wrote on the analytical result form You need to
analyze for chlorinated organics by GC/MS (GC/MS is an
abbreviation for Gas Chromatograph / Mass Spectrometer.)
Finally, on 9 March 1981 more samples of Hadnot Point water
system were collected and analyzed. The U.S. Army laboratory
once again wrote a note at the bottom of the analytical result
form Water highly contaminated with other chlorinated
hydrocarbons (solvents)! (CLW 0443) These analytical result
forms were being sent by the U.S. Army directly to the Navy
Facilities Engineering Command, Atlantic Division, Norfolk, VA.
No action was taken. In fact, officials at Camp Lejeune were
unaware of the U.S. Army's finding until the Summer of 1982.
When the EPA's MCLs for TTHMs went into effect in 1982, Camp
Lejeune was required to use a North Carolina state certified
laboratory for the analysis of their water. Grainger
Laboratories of Raleigh, N.C. was contracted by Camp Lejeune to
analyze their water samples. In May 1982, a Grainger laboratory
representative phoned Ms. Betz of Camp Lejeune and informed her
that they had found high levels of Volatile Organic Chemicals
(VOCs) during their analysis of the Hadnot Point and Tarawa
Terrace water systems. They had a problem with some of the
sample bottles and they requested that Camp Lejeune take new
samples. On 10 August 1982, Mr. Bruce A. Babson, a chemist with
Grainger laboratories, wrote a letter to the Commanding General
of Camp Lejeune. (CLW 0592,0593) In his letter Mr. Babson
stated ``Interferences which were thought to be chlorinated
hydrocarbons hindered the quantitation of certain
trihalomethanes. These appeared to be at high levels and hence
more important from a health standpoint than the total
Trihalomethane content. For these reasons we called the
situation to the attention of Camp Lejeune personnel.'' Mr.
Babson went on in his letter to describe the levels of the
chemicals they had found in the samples. Tetrachloroethylene
(PCE) 104 ppb in the Tarawa Terrace (TT) sample and
Trichloroethylene (TCE) 1,400 ppb in the Hadnot Point sample.
There was absolutely no action taken by Camp Lejeune officials
after they received this warning. On 19 August 1982, Ms. Betz
wrote another memorandum (CLW 0606-0607) to Mr. Sharpe,
Supervisory Ecologist, Environment Section. In her memorandum
Ms. Betz outlines the Grainger laboratory results and she also
discusses the EPA suggested no adverse response levels (SNARLS)
for the chemicals found in Camp Lejeune finished drinking
water. In paragraph 8 of her memo Ms. Betz writes that the
levels of PCE for the Terawa Terrace system exceed the EPA's
guidance. In fact, they were more than doubled. Grainger
laboratories continued to test Camp Lejeune's finished drinking
water for TTHMs throughout 1982-1983 and each time they
detected high levels of VOCs. They contacted Camp Lejeune and
they annotated it on their analytical result form. (CLW 0693,
0953) No action was taken!
In 1982 the U.S. Navy began their Navy Assessment and
Control of Installation Pollutants (NACIP) Initial assessment
study (IAS) of Camp Lejeune. This program was started in 1980
by the U.S. Navy to identify any possible ``Love Canals'' at
any Naval shore installations (CLW 4994). The NACIP IAS was
completed for Camp Lejeune and they issued their report in
April 1983. The general finding of the NACIP IAS report stated
in paragraph 2.2.2 ``Seventy six waste disposal sites have been
identified; however, most (54) do not contain hazardous waste
or do not pose a significant threat to human health or the
environment.' and 2.2.4 ``No industrial or municipal wastes
were found to be migrating onto base property.'' I would like
to know how these ``experts'' came to this conclusion. Did they
take water samples from the groundwater aquifers or did they
make this assumption from a quick drive around the boundary of
the base? Camp Lejeune officials, quick to seize on this IAS
report, wrote a letter to the State of North Carolina, Division
of Health Services, Solid and Hazardous Waste Management Branch
(CLW 0948). In their letter to the state, a Camp Lejeune
official wrote ``The study concludes that none of the 76 sites
pose an immediate threat to human health or the environment,''
There is quite a big difference in the definition of the words
``most'' and ``none'' , especially when they are used in
reference to hazardous waste sites and human health! There are
some very pertinent questions about the NACIP IAS that remain
unanswered. Did Camp Lejeune inform the NACIP IAS team that
VOCs had already been detected in their finished drinking
water? Did the NACIP IAS team ask for existing analytical
results of Camp Lejeune drinking water when they inspected the
water treatment plant? The NACIP IAS was on-going when Camp
Lejeune received the 10 August 1982 letter (CLW 0592) from
Grainger Laboratories. Did Camp Lejeune provide this letter to
the NACIP/IAS team? It would be my guess that none of this
information was shared with the NACIP IAS team. I make this
assertion based on a letter dated October 25, 1985 from the
State of North Carolina to Mr. Larry Fitzpatrick. The
attachment to this letter was an assessment written by Mr. Rick
Schiver of N.C.s Department of Environmental Management
concerning the groundwater contamination at Camp Lejeune. In
his assessment, Mr. Schiver wrote ``During July 1984,
confirmation studies were begun at eighteen (18) priority
sites. The results of these groundwater studies were documented
in a report provided to the Marine Corps in February 1985: as
the Marine Corps disagrees with the conclusion in this report,
it will not release a copy of it to any outside agency. It is
my estimation that when the NACIP team came back to Camp
Lejeune in July 1985, officials at the base, realizing that the
NACIP confirmation study would reveal the existing groundwater
contamination, they informed them of the existing analytical
results. It is my opinion that the NACIP team was both
professionally embarrassed and appalled by the fact that this
information had been available during their IAS of the base in
1982. They had neither asked for it and worse, Camp Lejeune
officials concealed the information from them. I suspect that
the NACIP team wrote a scathing confirmtion study report about
Camp Lejeune. No one with whom I have personally spoken, has
seen this report. It is imperative that Congress obtain a copy
of this original report. I believe that it is the smoking gun
in relation to the drinking water contamination at Camp
Lejeune.
As stated previously, the NACIP Confirmation study began
in July 1984 (Note: The U.S.E.P.A. issued RMCLs for VOCs in
June 1984) and they began testing the individual water supply
wells in October. The results of these samples began to trickle
back in during November and December of that year. It was more
than 4 years after the initial discovery of VOCs in Camp
Lejeune's finished drinking water before they took any action
to remedy the situation. During the months of November and
December of 1984, Camp Lejeune removed (7) contaminated water
supply wells from service in the Hadnot Point system. In
January 1985, the Chief of Staff's wife smelled fuel in the tap
water at their quarters on Paradise Point officers' housing
area. This housing area was served by the Holcomb Blvd. water
treatment plant since August 1973. (Note: Remember this water
system and date; it becomes very important later in time) Camp
Lejeune maintenance workers discover that an emergency back-up
generator fuel line had burst, allowing fuel to enter the water
system. The Holcomb Boulevard plant was immediately taken off
line and this area was provided Hadnot Point water via an
existing inter-tie between the two systems. Camp Lejeune
officials notified N.C. state health and environmental
authorities of the accidental contamination. After thoroughly
flushing the Holcomb Boulevard system with Hadnot Point water,
military and N.C. state authorities began testing the water to
ensure that the fuel had been sufficiently flushed out of the
system. What they found was worse! At the Berkley Manor
Elementary School they found Trichloroethylene (TCE) at 1,148.4
ppb and Dichloroethylene (DCE) at 406.6 ppb. (CLW 2254) This is
when well No. 651 of Hadnot Point water system was discovered.
This well was located at the back corner of Lot No. 203, the
Defense Revitalization Management Office yard; (The base junk
yard!) (Note: Well No. 651 was constructed in 1971, 30 years
after operations began at Lot No. 203). This well tested at
18,900 ppb of Trichloroethylene (TCE) and 655 ppb of Vinyl
Chloride during early February 1985 testing. It should be
pointed out that well No. 651 was the only contaminated well
that was still pumping during the January, February 1985 time
frame. This one contaminated well caused finished drinking
water samples to exceed the 1,000 ppb for TCE alone. One can
only imagine what the levels of contaminates were prior to the
November/December 1984 time frame when several of these
contaminated wells would have been pumping at the same time.
Hopefully, the ATSDR's on-going computerized water modeling
will answer that question. During this same time frame, the
water system for the Tarawa Terrace (TT) base family housing
area was found to be contaminated with high levels of
Tetrachloroethylene (PCE). It should be pointed out at this
time that the highest contaminated water supply well for TT
(TT--26 @ 1,580 ppb PCE) was constructed at the property line.
TT's well field was constructed down gradient and directly
across the street from a dry cleaning establishments, gasoline
stations, automotive repair facilities, and known septic sewage
ground absorption systems.
On 11 March 1985, Mr. Julian Wooten, Director of Camp
Lejeune's Natural Resources and Environmental Affairs Division
wrote what I can only describe as a C.Y.A. letter. (CLW 1179-
1180) In his letter, Mr. Wooten explained, in remarkable
detail, the recommendations of, and the sources contacted (and
not) by Mr. Hubbell. My only regret about this letter is that
Mr. Wooten concurred with Mr. Hubbell's recommendations. (See
paragraph No. 3, CLW 1180) Mr. Wooten was a personal friend of
mine. When I discovered this letter, I was greatly disheartened
and disillusioned by his actions (or lack there of). I lost a
lot of respect for this man. It is quite obvious that these
authorities were playing a selective game of Ostrich; put your
head in the sand and do not look back where you know the
damming Information lies. That way if all of this comes up
later, they can say, ``We did not know any better.'' This is
the exact tactic that has been employed by the D.O.N. and the
USMC ever since this situation truly became public in 1997. Mr.
Wooten retired in the 1990s; Mr. Hubbell holds a flag rank
civilian Position at HQMC. His biography can be viewed on the
USMC's official Web site www.usmc.mil General officer
biographies.
On October 4, 1989, (CLW 4976) Camp Lejeune was placed on
the National Priority List (NPL) for contamination sites. This
appointment automatically required the ATSDR to execute their
Congressionally mandated mission and perform an assessment at
Camp Lejeune for human exposures to the contamination.
Initially, the USMC provided information to the ATSDR (see PHA
for Camp Lejuene) and the public about the Tarawa Terrace
Hadnot Point and Holcomb Blvd. service areas that was incorrect
and blatantly untrue! When the ATSDR began their assessment of
the contamination at Camp Lejeune, there were several letters
written requesting data on the water systems and the
contamination sites on the base. On February 23, 1993, Ms.
Nancy L. Sonnenfeld of the ATSDR's Epidemiology and
Surveillance Branch Wrote a letter to Mr. Neal Paul of CLNC,
Environmental Management Department (CLW 2245, 2246). In her
letter, Ms. Sonnenfeld explained exactly what information /
data the ATSDR was looking for, drinking water distribution
systems data. I would like to point out the statement made by
this scientist at the beginning of paragraph No. 3 in this
letter. It is my opinion that statements such as these are
considered pandering and gives the impression that the ATSDR is
willing to play on both sides of the fence! While I did obtain
this letter, none of the enclosures have ever been made public.
A letter written to CLNC on March 5, 1993 (CLW 2247) ATSDR
environmental engineers were requesting copies of site related
materials appropriate for the preparation of public health
assessments. The author of this letter, Mr. Stephen S. Aoyama,
P.E. was very thorough in his request. Please note the hand-
written comments that were made on the letter at CLNC. ``Final
Reports Only--Send 2 or 3 Final R1/FS.'' This was not what
ATSDR asked for; this was a deliberate stalling / harassment
tactic. Then, on September 2, 1994 (Note: 6 days prior to their
initial release of the Camp Lejeune PHA) the ATSDR's Office of
Assistant Administrator wrote a letter to the Engineering
Support Department, Navy Environmental Health Center (NEHC),
Norfolk, VA. (CLW 2407) This letter states ``We have sent MCB,
Camp Lejeune several requests for information and, in most
cases, the responses were inadequate and not supporting
documentation was forwarded.'' (Note: All of the handwritten
notes were on this letter when it appeared on the PDF file.
(Please note the ``knee jerk'' comment at the lower left.) Then
I find a letter from the Commanding Officer of the NEHC (CLW
2406) a subordinate command to CLNC ``recommending'' that they
cooperate with the ATSDR and provide them with the requested
data. Please note that higher headquarters was copied on this
letter and the enclosure. I have found no documented
involvement from higher headquarters where they chastised CLNC
authorities for their lack of cooperation with the ATSDR. The
fact that there is no documented corrective action from any of
the higher headquarters is a clear signal that they complied
with and were party to the tactics being employed by CLNC in
this situation. I have found many data requests (in writing)
from the ATSDR. I have never found any written submissions of
data to the ATSDR from CLNC, not one! We have submitted Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the ATSDR and the USMC
for any and all documents pertaining to data submissions from
CLNC to the ATSDR. None of these FOIAs have ever been
fulfilled. In fact, the Director of the ATSDR sent me a letter
dated 4 May 2007 that his agency can not produce the supporting
documents for their 4 August 1997, PHA of Camp Lejeune. Dr.
Frumkin stated that all of these reference documents had been
``mistakenly'' destroyed by a private contractor? It would be
interesting to find out how many other N.P.L. sites P.H.A.
supporting Documents have been lost or destroyed by this agency
or is it only the Camp Lejeune documents?
At the same time the ATSDR was conducting the PHA for Camp
Lejeune, (1992-97) the ATSDR proposed an adverse pregnancy
outcome study for the years 1968-1985. (CLW 2528-2529) This
study was conducted and it became the basis for the Camp
Lejeune Health Survey (1999-2003) and the epidemiological study
that is still in progress. There is a problem with the findings
of this initial study. Camp Lejeune officials provided the
ATSDR with incorrect water system/distribution data for the
Holcomb Blvd. and Tarawa Terrace service areas. The ATSDR had
been led to believe that the Holcomb Blvd. water service area
had received their drinking water from the Holcomb Blvd. water
treatment / distribution plant. This water treatment plant was
not constructed until 1972 and the Camp Lejeune Plant Account
records show it as becoming operational in August 1973. (CLW
3238) Prior to 1973, the base family housing in this area,
Berkley Manor, Paradise Point, and Midway Park, received their
water from the presumed contaminated Hadnot Point system.
Furthermore, CLNC officials misled the ATSDR and the public to
believe that when the 2 wells in the Tarawa Terrace (TT) system
had been taken off line because of contamination, they shut the
entire TT water distribution system off. They proclaim in many
documents (CLW 3075, 3076, 3077, 3161) that without the
production from those two contaminated wells, the TT plant
could not meet the water demand. Since 1985 TT received their
water from the Holcomb Blvd. system. We know that this was not
the truth, the Tarawa Terrace water system stayed in production
and on-line until March 1997. Because of the incorrect
information for the Holcomb Blvd. service area an estimated
1,500 pregnancies were overlooked in the 1968-1985 ``Adverse
Pregnancy Outcome'' study. I have no idea how many babies were
excluded because of the erroneous data on TT. We also know from
internal USMC documents that Camp Lejeune officials turned on
one of the known contaminated TT wells to meet water demand
during peak demand periods. (CLW 1132) An action bried (CLW
1129--1131) written by the Assistant Chief of Staff Facilities
on 1 March 1985 outlined the alternatives for providing water
to the Tarawa Terrace (TT) base housing area. The USMC
constantly states that their highest priority is the Health and
welfare of their Marines, Sailors, their families, and the
civilian employees on their bases. I can assure you that this
document, and the alternatives that we now know were chosen, do
not support those claims. According to the alternatives that we
now know were selected from this document, health and welfare
took a back seat to money and favors. In 1999, Major Tom
Townsend, USMC (Retired) began a very aggressive letter writing
/ FOIA campaign. His intent was to procure as much information
pertaining to the situation as he could. It was Tom Townsend
who, in 2000, discovered the incorrect water system data for
the Holcomb Blvd. service area for the years of 1968-1973. He
immediately notified USMC officials (in writing) of the error.
On 16 November 2000, Ms. Kelly Dreyer, Project Officer, Camp
Lejeune Water Contamination, Installations and Logistics
Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) sent an e-mail to Neal
Paul at CLNC, EMD. In her email Ms. Dreyer outlined the
incorrect water system data situation to Mr. Paul. She told him
that it was ``important to set the record straight'' and she
wanted him to write a memorandum to ATSDR with the correct
information. Ms. Dreyer went on to spell out in detail what
information she wanted on the memo and gave him a ``by date''
for completion and signature of 1 December 2000. She also
directed that the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the NEHC
be copied. Four months later, March 16, 2001, Ms. Dreyer sends
another e-mail to CLNC, EMD requesting the very same
information. (CLW 3307) The only difference is that this time
she addresses her request to Mr. Rick Raines, a subordinate of
Mr. Neal Paul who received the first directive. Needless to
say, this memorandum was never written. The ATSDR never knew
they had incorrect water system data until I told Dr. Frank
Bove During a telephone conversation in 2002. The USMC had
corrected their error by placing a new entry on their
chronology which is located on their official Web site. The
USMC never informed the ATSDR that their ``Adverse Pregnancy
Outcome'' study had been skewed by the incorrect water system
data. What is just as appalling is the fact that the USMC did
not correct this error knowing full well that the ATSDR was
well into their Childhood Cancer and Birth Defects study. Had
it not been for Tom Townsend's diligence, this lie may never
have been uncovered. The lies about the Tarawa Terrace water
system were never rectified. It is unknown how many babies that
were exposed to these contaminates have been overlooked by the
ATSDR's studies.
When the ATSDR announced their proposal for a Childhood
Cancer study on June 23, 1997 (CLW 2815) it caused a firestorm
of lies and deceit amongst the USMC and DoN spin doctors. When
any press interviews or press releases were issued concerning
the Camp Lejeune water contamination, they always pointed to
the Tarawa Terrace base housing area. This was because they had
an off-base scapegoat on which to focus the attention of the
media and the public. When the ATSDR went to the Secretary of
the Navy to acquire funding for their proposed Childhood Cancer
study in 1997, Ms. Elsie Munsell wrote a letter to the ATSDR.
(CLW 2917) In her letter, Ms. Munsell wrote ``the volatile
organic chemicals found in the water supply under investigation
came from an off base source, ABC One Hour Cleaners. According
to our investigation, this off site source of contamination is
a National Priorities Listed Site under the jurisdiction of the
EPA. Therefore, in accordance with CERCLA 107(a), it is more
appropriate for you to seek funding for the study from the
responsible party.'' The USMC /DoN's incorrect water system
data had worked wonders for them thus far. They had the ATSDR
believing that the only one small housing area, the 21 housing
units at Hospital Point, were exposed to contamination caused
by the military. In reality, it was 1,929 units for the years
of 1968-1973. They had the Secretary of the Navy's Office
baffled as well and they got away with not funding the ATSDR's
study because of it. The ATSDR then proceeded to pursue the
funding from the White House Office of Management and Budget
(OMB); they succeeded. OMB authorized the funding based upon
III phases; if the 1st phase (the survey) showed enough data
(cases), then it would proceed to the 2nd phase (verification
of reported ailments). If the 2nd phase showed enough medically
verified cases, then it would proceed into the 3rd and final
phase, the epidemiological study of the confirmed cases. It is
my opinion that the DoD agencies involved in the process did
everything possible to kill this study in the 1st phase. They
held the keys to all of the data that The ATSDR needed. To
ensure the validity of the 1st phase of this study, 80 percent
of the estimated 16,500 Pregnancies that occurred at Camp
Lejeune between the years of 1968-1985 need to be contacted.
DoD agencies initially pledged their support of these efforts,
but it quickly degraded into stonewalling and delaying tactics.
What better way to kill this study than by ensuring that the
ATSDR did not contact the 80 percent of pregnancies required by
OMB to validate the 1st phase? This very scenario was alluded
to by Ms. Kathy Skipper of the ATSDR, Public Affairs Office in
an e-mail to Ms. Kelly Dreyer of HQMC (CLW 3130).
Upon OMB approval of the ATSDR funding, ATSDR personnel
proceeded with the writing and peer review for the protocol of
their proposed study. Once all of this was accomplished, it was
time to start mailing out the questionnaires to the small
number of subjects that had thus far been identified. The
Survey (Phase No. 1) was supposed to begin in January 1999;
this did not happen because of an objection by DoN and USMC
authorities in October 1998. Their objection was based on the
release of the Hollywood movie A Civil Action! (CLW 2996--2999)
It would appear (CLW 2995) that they had partial success in
their efforts when they got the beginning of the survey kicked
back by one month. In reality, the survey never started until
October of 1999 when the USMC posted the ``Camp Lejeune Area
Water Survey'' information sheet on their official USMC Web
site. (CLW 3161) This document which cited the dates 1968-1985
carried on the lies; it only referred to Tarawa Terrace and
Hospital Point housing areas as being affected by the
contamination. It also continued the lie about Tarawa Terrace
base family housing area being provided drinking water from the
Holcomb Blvd. system since 1985. These people delayed the very
mechanism (the study) that I was looking to for an answer to a
question that had nagged at me for 15 years by this point. I
wanted to know what caused my daughter's illness and her
subsequent death. I still do not have that answer, but I do
have a very good idea. To have discovered that this answer got
delayed for another 9 months because of the release of a
Hollywood movie was, to say the least, infuriating! DoD
agencies never fully cooperated with the ATSDR's study efforts
until the September/October 2000 time frame. This is when the
ATSDR announced that they were going to execute a nationwide
media blitz to locate enough (80 percent) of the estimated
16,500 pregnancies in order to validate Phase No. 1 of their
study. It was at this point that the USMC finally somewhat
relented. They (USMC) did not want the ATSDR to pursue this
media campaign without their involvement. (It would make the
USMC look bad.) On 1 November 2000, a joint Pentagon Press
conference took place which included Marine Corps and ATSDR
representatives. It is quite obvious by reviewing the packet of
documents that I printed from the Internet in November 2000,
that the USMC was starting to correct some of their lies, but
it is quite obvious from the conflicting information on
different documents that they (USMC) were having a difficult
time conveying the truth. CLW 1194 Procedures for operating the
new well at Tarawa Terrace really makes me wonder if these
people (USMC) ever really did stop using this well.
Mysteriously, most of the water treatment plant log book
entries concerning water levels and booster pump operation for
Tarawa Terrace ceased in May 1985. It is my suspicion that the
contaminated TT new well (TT-23) continued to be operated until
March 1987 when the Tarawa Terrace water treatment plant was
closed. What other explanation is there for this document (CLW
1194) to have been generated?
There have been numerous federal agencies who have looked
into the Camp Lejeune water contamination incident and they
have issued reports, the most recent being the GAO. In February
2004, The Commandant of the Marine Corps named his Blue Ribbon
panel to look into the issues surrounding the Camp Lejeune
water contamination incident. This panel was appointed by the
Commandant as a damage control tactic following the January
2004 Washington Post article concerning the contamination. When
they (USMC) named the members of this panel, I knew that this
was going to be one more white wash attempt. Senator Elizabeth
Dole (R,N.C.) even called the Marine Corps selection of panel
members absurd. They named former Congressman Ronald Packard
(R,CA.) as the chairman; it did not take me long to figure out
Mr. Packard's connection to this situation. He had previously
represented southern California 48th district whose largest
industry was Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton. It just so
happened that Camp Pendleton was where the Commandant (General
Hagee) had done the majority of his command time as a General
Officer. Secondly, he chose retired General Hearney, the former
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC) for the years
of 1994-96. I am quite certain that General Hearney had
Attended briefings during his tenure as (ACMC) concerning the
CLNC water situation. Thirdly, he appointed Mr. Robert Piere,
the former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations
and Environment. It was this man's office who turned down the
ATSDR's request for funding of the Camp Lejeune Childhood
Cancer study in October 1997! When these panel members were
named, there was such an overwhelming outcry of foul that the
Marine Corps was forced to name (2) additional independent
members to this panel. They appointed Dr. Robert Tardiff and
Dr. William Glaze to the panel. I quickly vetted both of these
new additions and found the following. Dr. Robert Tardiff was
the President /CEO of the Sapphire Group. This company was
nothing more than environmental hired guns; they performed risk
assessments on chemicals and products for the highest bidder.
Dr. William Blaze was the only member of this panel that could
truly be considered objective and non-biased. The first meeting
of this panel took place at Camp Lejeune in April / May time
frame. After their meeting aboard the base, the panel members
attended a press conference / meeting at the Jacksonville, N.C.
U.S.O. This took place on a Friday and Dr. Glaze did not appear
at the press interview the following Monday. His resignation
from the panel was announced by the Chairman, Ron Packard. Mr.
Packard stated that because Dr. Glaze was on the E.P.A.'s
science advisory board, he (Dr. Glaze) feared that those duties
might be a conflict of interest if they (EPA Science Advisory
Board) were called upon to review the findings of the
Commandant's Panel! No, Dr. Glaze who cherished his position in
the world of academia saw the handwriting on the wall after he
attended the first meeting at Camp Lejeune. If he wanted to
retain his high standing that he had attained in academia and
the scientific Community, he needed to distance himself from
this fiasco. Then when the Commandant revealed his charter for
this panel, I knew that is was a hoax. The charter charged the
panel to review only the circumstances surrounding this
situation from 1980-85. I knew right then that his entire panel
was nothing more than a farce. It was akin to placing a band-
aid over a sucking chest wound; too little, too late! This
panel completed their charter and filed their report and while
they found some fault with the actions of some departments the
end result was no harm, no foul. This was what I predicted;
this is what we got.
The EPA Inspector General's office did a small
investigation into some of the complaints pertaining to this
situation. It was very small; they interviewed me once in
person and then they issued their report. I was not even aware
that they had issued a report until it was cited by the GAO.
The EPA Criminal Investigation Division conducted a
criminal investigation into the circumstances surrounding the
Camp Lejeune water contamination. I went to a briefing on the
findings of this investigation on 25 August 2005 at the
Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. At the briefing, it
was stated that there were no crimes committed by DoD personnel
or their representatives. In a recent telephone conversation
with Special Agent Tyler Amon, the agent in charge of the Camp
Lejeune investigation, he stated that he had recommended
charges against personnel involved in this investigation. It
was the judgment of the Department of Justice prosecutors that
they could not successfully prosecute those charges in Federal
Court. The GAO cited the EPA, CID investigation in their
report. They wrote that the EPA, CID investigator reported that
the Marine Corps admitted that if failed to adequately address
concerns and data requests from the public and ATSDR. Failed to
address data requests from the ATSDR? Is this not a violation
of federal law? The fact that Marine Corps officials knew that
the ATSDR had incorrect water system data for Camp Lejeune
(provided by them) and they did nothing to correct it; is this
not a violation of federal law? The fact that Marine Corps
officials changed the answers to an interview for the media
from the truth to a lie; is that not a violation of federal
laws? I can assure you that had I pulled some of these very
same stunts while on active duty, I would probably still be in
Fort Leavenworth Federal prison. The fact that Mr. Townsend and
I were only provided an abbreviated version of the
investigation report, we still have some very valid questions
that have not been answered. Was the DoD main-frame computers
and servers searched for all e-mails pertaining to this matter?
I can assure you, the number of e-mails that we now possess are
only a fraction of the ones that were generated on this
subject. The e-mails that currently exist were captured from
personal computers or files that someone had printed off. If we
are ever going to find the truth in this situation, it is my
belief that it is lying in the servers of DoD and the CDC.
Most recently, (May 2007) the GAO published a report on a
study that they had conducted on the circumstances surrounding
the Camp Lejeune water contamination incident. First, I would
like to point out that since the beginning of the GAO's efforts
related to this situation, their principle investigator changed
no less than (4) times. When this study began, Mr. John Oh was
the principle. He left and his responsibilities were assumed by
a Ms. Bonnie Anderson. When Ms. Anderson left a Ms. Danielle
Organek took over and then she was finally replaced by a Ms.
Karen Doran. It is no wonder that this report is so full of
errors, omissions, and half-truths. How do you conduct a valid
study into a situation that spans nearly thirty years and is as
sorted and twisted as the Camp Lejeune situation without at
least maintaining continuity? Furthermore, this report was
written n consolatory language that wreaks of cover-up. There
are too many areas in this report that are erroneous for me to
list in this testimony. I am, instead, providing you with my
own copy of the GAO report which I have thoroughly highlighted
and annotated.
The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(ATSDR) has been a bitter sweet experience for me. It is my
opinion that the ATSDR's Department of Health Assessments and
Consultations (DEHAC) has become an excuse mechanism for
polluters and the chemical production industry. All anyone need
do is review several of their Public Health Assessments and you
will notice the trend. While they have become very skilled at
changing their wording, the end result is always the same. No
harm, no foul! They constantly state that there are too few
studies available for them to draw any firm conclusions from.
Then they recommend that no further studies are required for
these exposures! How are they ever going to increase the
scientific knowledge on the effects these chemicals have on
humans if they do not recommend studies? The only reason that a
further study was recommended at Camp Lejeune was Nancy
Sonnenfeld who was working with the ATSDR while pursuing her
PHD performed the Small for Gestatonal Age and Adverse
Pregnancy Outcome study as her dissertation and her findings
were apparently very profound. This is when the ATSDR
recommended the Childhood Cancer / Birth Defects in utero study
at Camp Lejeune. This all mainly happened because of a
dissertation! It really makes me wonder how many other N.P.L.
sites that have been played down by one of ATSDR's Public
Health Assessments (PHA) that truly deserved further studies.
The recent GAO report cites ATSDR officials as saying that
their work at Camp Lejeune has not been delayed because of
either a lack of cooperation from DoD entities or funding. If
this is true, why is it that the exposure information in the
Camp Lejeune final PHA is incorrect? If the DoD representatives
who provided ATSDR this data were not at fault, I would assume
that ATSDR staff incompetency was responsible. The fact is that
the adverse pregnancy study overlooked 1,500 plus births in the
Holcomb Blvd. service area. There is an unknown number of
births at Tarawa Terrace that have been overlooked. Was this
not because DoD representatives provided ATSDR staff with
erroneous data? If it was not DoD's fault, then it must again
be related to the incompetency of ATSDR staff. We know that the
survey (Phase 1) was scheduled to start in January 1999, but it
never started until late September of that year. We have also
seen the e-mails recommending the delay of that survey because
of the release of the movie A Civil Action. This delay was not
requested by DoD entities? We know that the study covered the
years of 1968-1985 and we now know that the Tarawa Terrace
water system continued to operate until March 1987. Previously,
we were told that it ceased operation in 1985. The ATSDR missed
fifteen months worth of births at this base housing area. Since
DoD entities have not done anything to hinder ATSDR's efforts
at Camp Lejeune, then once again, this can only be attributed
to the incompetence of ATSDR staff. How does the ATSDR explain
all of the letters that have been written by them complaining
about the lack of cooperation of DoD entities in the Camp
Lejeune situation? They were cooperating, but the ATSDR just
decided to write letters of complaint? The Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry is, in my opinion, seriously
deficient of an extremely important requirement, Intestinal
Fortitude (GUTS). I realize that there is a need for
cooperation between Federal agencies and departments. I also
understand that every precaution should be taken to nurture and
preserve a good working relationship between one another. The
ATSDR needs to understand that respect is a two way street;
there should be a limit to the evident lack of respect and
cooperation that the ATSDR accepts from the DoD! I travel
through rural North Carolina every day. During my travels, I
pass through many poor, underprivileged, and under educated
neighborhoods. Many of these people do not even have a grasp of
the English language. God forbid that something like what
happened at Camp Lejeune would happen to one of these
neighborhoods. Who would be their champion? Who would stand up
and fight for them? The ATSDR? They will not even make a stand
to defend themselves! Would our EPA be there to defend these
people? Evidently not. We had a panel of expert scientists
recommend in their report last summer that our EPA should lower
the protective standard for trichloroethylene (TCE) in drinking
water without any further delay. It has been almost a year
since that report was released. We still do not have a new
standard. No, I am afraid that if an incident such as the
contaminated water at Camp Lejeune happened in one of the afore
mentioned neighborhoods, it would be dead and buried along with
their family members. It is my honest opinion that the citizens
of our country would be better served if our Congress dissolved
the ATSDR. Why pay for the up-keep of an agency that is quite
obviously not accomplishing the mission for which they were
created? I believe that our citizens and our environment would
be better served if we contracted universities to perform the
assessments at our NPL sites. I truly believe that we would get
a more honest and thorough assessment than what we are getting
now! Lastly, the ATSDR can not even produce the references
(supporting documents) for their PHA of Camp Lejeune. (See my
letter of April 16, 20007 to ATSDR and their response dated May
4, 2007.) The ATSDR stated in their 4 May 2007 letter to me
that the references for the Camp Lejeune PHA had been destroyed
by a private contractor. I would like to remind you that the
GAO cited the EPA, CID investigation report which stated the
documents had not been destroyed. It would appear Mr. Chairman
that we have several Federal agencies involved in this fiasco
who can not seem to get their answers straight!
In closing, I would like to say that the last 10 years have
been a real experience for me. For an organization that
supposedly prides itself on honor and integrity, the United
States Marine Corps has certainly turned a blind eye to the
documented misconduct and incompetence exhibited by their
civilian employees and officers in this situation. The fact
that these people are still on their payroll or in their ranks
is a silent nod of approval of their actions by headquarters.
In fact, most of these individuals, with the exception of one,
have been promoted and given more responsibility and authority.
This is a scary scenerio; do you not agree?
My daughter, Janey, fought valiantly against her illness,
but the malignancy was too strong. Janey succumbed to her
disease at 3:35pm, Tuesday, 24 September 1985. She was only 9
years old.
----------
Mr. Stupak. With consent of the committee, I'm going to ask
Mr. Dingell, would you like to make an opening statement? Mr.
Dingell is chairman of the full committee.
Chairman Dingell. Mr. Chairman, the opening statement I
have is an excellent one. I would like to have it inserted in
the record, please.
Mr. Stupak. without objection.
Chairman Dingell. Mr. Chairman, thank you for providing
accommodations for this hearing. Mr. Ensminger, welcome. I am
pleased we are seeing you again. How long ago was it that we
first met, you and I?
Mr. Ensminger. Spring of 2004, sir.
Chairman Dingell. Well, I told you at that time we would
approach this matter, and we will. I want to say that we will
pursue it, not only for you and your loved ones but also for
all of the others.
I find myself somewhat troubled that the military--and I
was an infantry man in World War II--doesn't adhere to the
maxim that the Marine Corps has, and that is that the Marines
take care of their own. When I was in the infantry we also
tried to take care of our own, too.
I would make the observation that we're not only going to
pursue the situation with regard to the Defense Department, but
we're also going to pursue the situation with regard now to EPA
where there is some curious behavior going on which involves
lack of enthusiasm for pursuing this matter.
CID agents being used as drivers and personal bodyguards
for the Administrator rather than investigating important
environmental crimes, which they would do, interestingly
enough, under legislation that came out of this committee, of
which I was one of the principal authors.
I want to say, we will find out why the Navy balked at
funding health impact studies, why the Marine Corps delayed in
initiating these studies, and why the Marine Corps has failed
to properly produce documents on many occasions necessary for
health impact studies. And also why the Navy failed for years
to close down a contaminated drinking water system despite
knowledge of such contamination and the risk that it imposed to
our military personnel.
Bad enough to have our people shot at over there in Iraq
without having the Department for which they work engage in the
kind of practices which we see here, which have the kind of
brutal impact upon military personnel and patriotic Americans
and their families who are trying to serve their country.
So, Mr. Chairman, I commend you for what you are doing. I
welcome our witnesses, and I would just make the observation,
we've had some comments from some of the departments,
particularly the EPA. They might not be as cooperative as we
would like, and I'm going to remind them, Mr. Chairman, as we
always choose to, that they can cooperate two ways: One is
pleasantly, and one is painfully. And we're going to leave the
choice to them, and I would urge them to take the more pleasant
choice.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dingell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Michigan
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this critically
important hearing. The sorry treatment of the wounded at Walter
Reed Hospital was a national scandal and so is the treatment of
the Marine casualties of Camp Lejeune's poisoned water.
Although the drinking water contamination, which is the
subject of this hearing, happened decades ago--the victims of
that contamination continue to suffer both physically and
emotionally.
They suffer the ill effects of exposure to the toxic
water; they suffer watching their babies get sick and die; they
suffer waiting decades for scientific studies; and they suffer
from the apparent mean spirit, penny-pinching, and indifference
of their formerly revered commands, the U.S. Marine Corps and
Department of Navy.
It is hard to believe, also, that to this day, former
Marines and their families have not been notified that the
water they drank at Camp Lejeune was carcinogenic--a fact that
our Government has known for decades.
Indeed, the members of our first panel--retired Master
Gunnery Sergeant Jerry Ensminger, Dr. Michael Gros, and Mr.
Jeff Byron--each served at Camp Lejeune and, along with their
families, consumed the poisoned water for years, but they did
not learn of the contamination until 1997, 1999, and 2000,
respectively. Each has a story of tragedy and courage to share
with us, and I deeply appreciate their appearance before us
today.
I welcome also agency representatives from the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry who will help answer some of
the tough questions about what may be one of the largest
contaminated water cases in our country's history.
In particular, I want to welcome Special Agent Tyler Amon
of the EPA's Criminal Investigations Division who single-
handedly conducted an extensive criminal investigation of this
matter. His work offers insight into this tragedy and
exemplifies the excellent work CID can do if allowed to do its
job.
Almost 20 years ago, I sponsored the legislation that
provided EPA criminal investigators with law enforcement powers
so they could more effectively carry out their duties.
Unfortunately, in the course of conducting our inquiry, we have
learned that CID may not have the resources or leadership to do
its job. As you recall, the Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990
required a dramatic increase in the number of EPA agents
assigned to CID. A dozen years after this requirement took
effect; EPA still has not met this requirement.
In addition, I am concerned that of those CID agents who
are supposed to be conducting important environmental crimes
investigations, a large number of them are being used as
drivers and personal bodyguards for the Administrator or
assigned to do homeland security work that appears duplicative
of what the FBI is already doing.
These are but a few of the things we are hearing, Mr.
Chairman, and I hope you will consider looking further into
this matter. Otherwise, this may be the last time we see such
excellent work coming from agents such as Mr. Amon.
Finally, I welcome our distinguished Department of Navy
and Marine Corps officials. I sincerely hope these officials
can explain some of the very troubling evidence that this
committee has reviewed:
Evidence that the Navy balked at funding health
impact studies--despite statutory requirements that Department
of Defense fund such studies;
Evidence that the Marine Corps delayed initiating
these studies over concerns about bad publicity;
Evidence that the Marine Corps repeatedly failed
to produce documents necessary for the health impact studies;
and
Evidence that the Navy failed for years to close
down a contaminated drinking water system despite knowledge of
contamination.
The Marine Corps takes great pride in its maxim, ``Marines
take care of their own.'' But if this principle is to be
anything but an empty slogan, the Corps needs to do more to
notify all former Lejeune residents of their possible exposure
and provide prompt and adequate medical coverage to them and
their families.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your recognition.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Dingell. Ms. Solis, opening
statement.
Ms. Solis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the
opportunity to be here with you. I want to commend you for
having this hearing. I recall very vividly the last time we had
our witnesses that are here today speak to us. And at that
time, I felt it was a very compelling argument for us as a
committee to delve into why it is that DoD and EPA have not
really been held accountable and been more transparent in their
deliberations. And thank goodness that we have a new direction
now, and we are trying to take hold of this discussion and
debate and trying to get to the real facts about what is
happening.
I have a bill that's looking at perchlorate water
contamination, which is due to rocket fuel, a little different
from what you are discussing here today, but nevertheless again
the DoD has failed to work in cooperation with EPA to really
get at why this is happening, to provide cleanup funds, and to
make sure that families, first and foremost, are taken care of.
I know that you have very compelling information that we have
heard before and that you have restated here, and I just thank
you for being here. And as our chairman of our committee says,
Mr. Dingell, we will get to the bottom of this. So thank you.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Inslee, I take it you are waiving your
open?
Mr. Inslee. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stupak. I thank all members, and I realize we will go
back and forth. We will begin questioning of 5 minutes each. I
will begin the questioning. Mr. Ensminger, in your written
testimony, you state that a Special Agent Tyler Amon informed
you that he had recommended charges against certain individuals
based on the EPA's criminal investigation regarding water
contamination at Camp Lejeune. Can you elaborate further on
that?
Mr. Ensminger. It was during a telephone conversation with
the agent several weeks ago. And I asked him about these
certain instances that we have discovered in these documents
where either these people had identified the fact that ATSDR
had been provided this incorrect data and had never done
anything to correct it. If this had been an accident, I asked
him, then why didn't they voluntarily correct it? Why did they
continue to just allow this to go on? What these people did,
the Marine Corps, they have a Web site, and they have a
chronology on that Web site. What they did was very quietly
make a new entry on their chronology which corrected the error
and never notified the investigating agency, which was ATSDR.
And I asked the agent about that. And then I found e-mails from
1999, where a local media outlet in eastern North Carolina,
channel 12, was doing a story, a three-part story covering the
water contamination on the base.
The public affairs officer, a Major Scott Jack, made the
reporter submit his questions in writing. There was five of
them. And then the major worked up answers for those questions
and then he shotgunned them around to several different people
aboard the base that were involved in this. One of them was a
Mr. Scott Brewer, who worked at Camp Lejeune's environmental
management department. The major sent these questions with his
answers around at 7:09 a.m. in the morning. By 12-something
p.m. he received an e-mail back from Mr. Scott Brewer, which
took the answer to question No. 3 which the public affairs
officer had the truthful answer to, where he stated that the
Tarawa Terrace water system remained in operation until March
1987. Mr. Brewer completely changed his answer and said that
two contaminated wells at Tarawa Terrace were taken off line,
and since that time, Tarawa Terrace has been provided their
drinking water from the Holcomb Boulevard water system.
And I asked the agent, I said this was no accident. I said
this was deliberate. This man took the truth and turned it into
a lie. I said and that's not a crime? And he said, hey, Jerry,
he said, I didn't say I didn't recommend any criminal charges.
And he said but it was deemed by the Department of Justice that
the charges that I did recommend could not be successfully
prosecuted in Federal court, so they were dropped.
Mr. Stupak. Did you ever receive any notification from the
Marine Corps about the water at Tarawa Terrace? That is where
you were living, right?
Mr. Ensminger. Sir?
Mr. Stupak. You were living at Tarawa Terrace?
Mr. Ensminger. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. I think Dr. Gros said 1999, Mr. Byron said
2000. Did you ever receive any notification?
Mr. Ensminger. No, sir. I was not there at that time. I was
gone.
Mr. Stupak. But after that, they didn't follow you? You
were in the Marine Corps for 24 years, Right?
Mr. Ensminger. Yes, sir. No. I never got anything.
Dr. Gros. I don't recall ever receiving anything.
Mr. Stupak. You never received anything? Your son was part
of a study in 1999?
Dr. Gros. I was notified in 1999, but we lived there from
'88 through, yes.
Mr. Stupak. Notified of your son being the subject of the
study?
Dr. Gros. Correct.
Mr. Stupak. No information that place you lived in at Camp
Lejeune was being investigated for contamination?
Dr. Gros. That was the first time I heard of that.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Byron, yours was 2000?
Mr. Byron. Sir, I was there until June 1985, and supposedly
a letter had come out from the base commander----
Mr. Stupak. In 1985?
Mr. Byron. Yes, sir, to the residents of Tarawa Terrace.
But my daughter was being born with multiple birth defects at
the exact same time, so I don't remember getting that. The way
I found out about that document was through the Freedom of
Information Act. And that was after 2000. That is the first
time.
Mr. Stupak. So 2000?
Mr. Byron. 2000 was the first time.
Mr. Stupak. Dr. Gros, your disability is based upon your
service to the military?
Dr. Gros. Based upon my military service and my disease.
Mr. Stupak. But yet you are not included in any study?
Dr. Gros. No.
Mr. Stupak. So that they will put you on a disability based
upon drinking the water at Camp Lejeune, but they won't include
you in the study determining the health effects of the water at
Camp Lejeune?
Dr. Gros. That seems correct.
Mr. Stupak. OK. My time is up. We may come back for another
round of questioning. I turn to Mr. Whitfield for questioning.
Mr. Whitfield. I want to thank all three of you for taking
time to be with us today on this important issue. And your
testimony was certainly quite moving. And I noticed that in the
2003 report, the ATSDR stated that they determined that
exposure to volatile organic compounds in on-base drinking
water was unlikely to result in cancer and non-cancer health
effects in adults. Now Dr. Gros, of course you went to medical
school. And are you familiar with that 2003 report of ATSDR?
Dr. Gros. I recall reading that, and at the time I could
not believe that when I read that sentence.
Mr. Whitfield. And Mr. Byron, had you read that report?
Mr. Byron. Yes, I have read that report, sir.
Mr. Whitfield. And Mr. Ensminger, you read that as well?
Mr. Ensminger. Yes, sir. ATSDR, the people at the
Department of Health Assessments and Consultations, if the
committee would just take some time and pull a bunch of the
Public Health Assessments that have been done by ATSDR where
these very same chemicals were identified, it is the same
wording every time. Only it is changed around, modified a
little bit. But it always has the same meaning. No harm, no
foul. And the way these people act, you would think they would
be serving this stuff on the drink bar at McDonald's.
Mr. Whitfield. Yes. Mr. Ensminger, in your testimony you
had mentioned specifically that DoD had been notified by three
separate laboratories of the problems with the drinking water
at Camp Lejeune. Do you remember the time frame of those lab
reports that were given to DoD?
Mr. Ensminger. LANTDIV, which is the Atlantic Division of
the Naval Facilities Engineers out of Norfolk, came down and
did a composite water sample on 1 October 1980. The composite
water sample was water from eight different systems combined
into one sample. And they sent that off to an analytical
laboratory. The results of those samples, with six clean
systems included in it, exceeded the standards for today for
some of the VOCs. That was one. Second, the U.S. Army's
Environmental Hygiene Team had been brought to Camp Lejeune to
start testing the water for the TTHMs, which had come into
effect, the standards for them.
They identified multiple times and told Camp Lejeune how to
test for this stuff, which was with the gas chronometer, mass
spectrometer system, the GCMS, told them repeatedly they needed
to test for organic hydrocarbons, chlorinated hydrocarbons.
Finally, the laboratory chief wrote it in parentheses,
solvents, with exclamation points. And then in 1982 Grainger
Laboratories from Raleigh, North Carolina, a State-certified
laboratory, the very same people that wrote the letter on 10
August 1982 to the commanding general, stating that this stuff
was more important from a health standpoint than what they had
sent the water in to be tested for. They did nothing. And on
the Marine Corps chronology these people say, well, we knew we
had NACIP, which was a program to identify contaminants. They
said, well, since we knew they were coming, we pondered this
thing for a year-and-a-half, mind you, how we were going to
take care of this.
Mr. Whitfield. OK. So it has been documented that there
were at least three labs that gave them specific information
about a problem with the drinking water. And the first one was
October 1, 1980, and then the last was 1982, and then somewhere
in-between?
Mr. Ensminger. Well, the Grainger Laboratory, there are
multiple analytical results after 1982 all the way through, up
through 1984 that identify these chemicals and the presence in
the water, and each time they found them they annotated it.
Mr. Whitfield. My point is as early as 1980 they were aware
or should have been aware.
Mr. Ensminger. Yes, sir.
Mr. Whitfield. And what years did you live at Camp Lejeune.
Mr. Ensminger. I lived at Camp Lejeune multiple times, sir.
Mr. Whitfield. When Janey was born.
Mr. Ensminger. From 1973 through 1975 my wife spent her
first trimester of the pregnancy with Janey at Tarawa Terrace.
And then I was at the time in drill instructor school at Parris
Island. When I finished DI School, I was transferred, and we
left there December 20, 1975.
Mr. Whitfield. And Dr. Gros, what years were you there?
Dr. Gros. July 1980 to July 1983.
Mr. Whitfield. And Mr. Byron?
Mr. Byron. I was there approximately February 1982 to June
1985.
Mr. Whitfield. OK. And you had mentioned, Mr. Byron, in
your testimony that, at page 29, that the GAO did not present
the document in its entirety.
Mr. Byron. Yes, sir. I have the document right here.
Mr. Whitfield. Which document is that?
Mr. Byron. That is the notice to residents of Tarawa
Terrace. It is kind of fuzzy, but it is definitely dated April
1985. It looks like April 30. My daughter was born April 27,
with birth defects, that same year.
Mr. Whitfield. OK. And what was lacking in this
notification?
Mr. Byron. The actual what was missing was the body of the
information that should have been provided to the residents.
And what they were more concerned with, like I said, I can read
it to you. It says, until, however, daily use consumption must
be reduced significantly. You are the only ones who can make
this happen.
I solicit your cooperation and assistance and
implementation of the following water use restrictions. Reduce
domestic water use. Don't let water run while washing, shaving,
brushing teeth, et cetera. Wash clothes only when you have a
full load. Flush toilets only for sanitation purposes. And this
is the one that I really am concerned with, store cold water in
refrigeration or for drinking. So they want me to store
poisoned water for my children to drink. But they don't spell
out that--No. 1, it says that these are--they found minute
trace amounts of several organic chemicals. 1,580 parts per
billion is not minute or trace.
I take offense to that personally, because I lived there
at the time, and GAO tried to represent that it's 158 parts per
billion versus 1,580. And once I corrected that they also put
that in their appendix still at 158 parts per billion. They
didn't do their homework.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Byron, if I may, I am going to have one of
our clerks grab that document from you, and we will make a copy
so we have it for our committee.
Mr. Whitfield. And my time has expired. Thank you.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Inslee for questions?
Mr. Inslee. Thank you. Mr. Byron, what was the document,
what was the date of the document you were just reading?
Mr. Byron. The document it looked to me----
The Clerk. April 30, 1985.
Mr. Stupak. April 30, 1985.
Mr. Inslee. In your view, speaking from your position, what
would you suggest should be a requirement for notification for
people in those circumstances? Now you have told us essentially
they described this as quote, trace amounts, in the document
they gave a resident.
Mr. Byron. Yes, sir. They also called it organic chemicals
instead of saying volatile organic chemicals. The word volatile
would have clued me in immediately if that document had showed
up at my home. And it probably would have clued me anyway, just
the fact that it said chemicals.
Mr. Inslee. So what do you think should be our standards
either in the Marine Corps or Environmental Protection Agency
or any other----
Mr. Byron. The standard at present is 5 parts per billion.
So if it exceeds 5 parts per billion, I believe governmental
officials, military and civilian, should be held responsible
for not notifying individuals. They went 15 years before a
letter came to my house, which looked like junk mail by the
way. I have it here. The front of this letter, this document it
says nothing official from the Government on it.
Mr. Inslee. What does it say?
Mr. Byron. It says NORC, University of Chicago National
Opinion Research Center, 3050 Finley Road, Downers Grove, IL,
60515. Please forward. Address correction requested.
I only lived two places the whole time. It doesn't say
anything about being an official document from the Government.
Mr. Inslee. It seems to me that under these circumstances,
the Government ought to have some protocol of language it uses
so that a person will understand that there is an enhanced
health risk associated with this, something like either a
higher health risk or danger or toxic information enclosed or
something to that effect.
Mr. Byron. That would have helped.
Mr. Inslee. Would that make sense to you?
Mr. Byron. Yes, sir, it does. And that would have helped.
Mr. Inslee. I hope that we are going to try to find the
right mechanism of doing that to have this not happen again. I
have to tell you this is so disturbing, after the Tillman
incident to have this continued failure is very disturbing.
Yes.
Mr. Ensminger. Yes, Congressman, I have found discussions,
internal e-mails at Camp Lejeune between Camp Lejeune and
Headquarters Marine Corps where they systematically changed the
wording about these chemicals to volatile organic compounds to
make it sound better. They have been playing a game. I mean it
was a game of minimization.
Mr. Inslee. Dr. Gros, you said that your disability is
associated with this, but you are not included in any of the
studies. I just can't comprehend how that could happen. Do you
have any explanation for it? Is it a glitch or is this
programmatic failure or what?
Dr. Gros. Well, when we were facing the enormity, the
financial enormity of the transplant, losing my practice, we
were looking at every possible source of help we could find. I
visited with my representative, Representative Kevin Brady at
the time, and went with a toxicologist and my wife. And we had
prepared a dossier and gave a presentation of what had
happened. And he was impressed that this was a problem. He also
saw the ATSDR documents, which had shown that they were
admitting that the water was highly contaminated. And he
immediately expedited my trip to the VA in Houston. And after
that, I was declared 100 percent service-connected disabled. I
don't know how that process comes about. But I was certainly
happy to have some help. And it has been very useful for
pharmacy items. However, some of the more expensive things, the
bone marrow transplant was refused by the VA. And some of the
more expensive items like photopheresis and hemodialysis, I had
to be dialized for 6 months for temporary renal failure, and I
still have chronic renal failure. That funding for that has
been very difficult to obtain. There is a real problem over
there with----
Mr. Inslee. But with a medical background, how could you
explain not being included in any of the screens, any of these
studies?
Dr. Gros. That is a good question, Congressman. That's why
I said when I saw that initial document, the health assessment
in 1997, I just said oh, come on. I said this is a joke. I said
just because you have thousands of people here that are going
to be a little hard to find doesn't mean they shouldn't be
studied.
Mr. Inslee. I saw in one of your testimonies I was reading
you made reference to a movie, A Civil Action, another one was
Erin Brockovich, that came out about some similarities to this
situation.
Dr. Gros. Right.
Mr. Inslee. Do you have a concern that a concern about
claims has led to some poor judgments here along the way by the
various Government agencies or not?
Dr. Gros. Well, I definitely think so. It would seem that
way. When you inquire about this, apparently there is a lot of
defensiveness. I know Jerry has done a lot more of this inquiry
than I have. I have been busy being sick and trying to get
well. I don't have any time to work on the Base Commission at
Camp Lejeune, and I don't live there, so Jerry could probably
answer that question better than I can.
Mr. Ensminger. There are several e-mails, internal e-mails
where they are discussing liability. And it was if not the No.
1 driving force behind the deceit----
Mr. Inslee. We just hope these agencies will be more
concerned about your health than the claims prospects. We hope
that will start. And we will try to do what we can. Gentlemen,
thank you for your continued service to the country. You are
doing it today. And we thank you for your many years of
service. Thank you.
Mr. Stupak. Thank the gentleman. Do you have that chart
back up there, Jerry? Mr. Inslee, I don't know if you were here
when we introduced it earlier in the opening testimony there.
It shows the different levels. You mentioned Woburn and Erin
Brockovich. It is 267. It is 18,000 at some point at Camp----
Mr. Byron. May I make a statement there?
Mr. Stupak. Sure.
Mr. Byron. According to the GAO report, on table 3, where
they are listing the levels of toxicity at Hadnot Point, I
don't see 18,000 there. And that says February 7. And these
readings are from the 4th and the 8th of February of the same
year.
So I can't understand why GAO is reluctantly--by the way,
this is the same table that they had 1,580 parts was listed at
158 during the draft report. So I gave them a copy of the
document that shows the levels of toxicity, and 18,000 is not
on there I see. And here is another thing concerning the GAO
report. I don't understand why it wasn't possible to scan the
original documents and show them in their true form so that
members of Congress can make their own judgment, instead of
having GAO try to convince them that there was some low levels
of toxicity.
There are several places where footnotes are stated that
the detection limit for the instrument used to analyze the
samples was 10 parts per billion. Well, sir, that is not on
that document. And every table that they show says that. And I
challenge them to show me, other than one document, the
Jennings document, which by the way they took out the detection
limit column to where you could tell whether or not on your own
and didn't need them to tell you how to read it, but this
concerns me that they did not show the original documents in
their original form.
And all these documents that I have in front of me were
from Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune and indicate high levels of
toxicity. Yet when GAO shows their report, they are only
interested in showing you those documents that show lower
levels. And they even have levels of toxicity missing in their
tables. So my personal opinion is that the Marine Corps
Headquarters, whoever gave them the information, has tried to
perpetrate a fraud here. And that, in my estimation, is
criminal, because the American taxpayer is paying for the money
for this report to Congress, and it should be accurate and
concise, and not full of conjecture with legal ramblings on it
looks to me to be a document that they might present in a legal
matter later. And that is how it has been presented.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Byron, if I may, the document we noticed to
residents of Tarawa Terrace----
Mr. Byron. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. On the bottom there is handwriting. We want to
put it in as hard part of the record. But at the bottom here,
there is handwriting that says ``suggested no adverse effect.
Recommended levels.'' is that your handwriting?
Mr. Byron. No, sir, that is not, but I do have a document
that refers to that.
Mr. Stupak. I know. I just wanted to know if it was your
handwriting.
Mr. Byron. That is not my handwriting, sir.
Mr. Stupak. Without objection, we will have this document
of April 30th, 1985, be made part of the record. Thank you. I
have to go to Mr. Walden here, and we can come back. Mr. Walden
for questions.
Mr. Walden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman I want to thank our
witnesses today, and all of you for coming forward. I know it
is difficult from every perspective. I can't imagine, begin to
imagine what you all have been through. But it is our job to
make sure it doesn't happen again to anybody else. And those
who are going through this elsewhere we need to help as well.
My understanding, Mr. Byron, and we will get at this issue you
have raised, because I have some datapoint issues of my own, is
that the Marines did give the GAO all the information. Whether
GAO chose to use it or not is a question we are going to get
to. And that that 18,000 figure actually was apparently a
sample taken after the well was closed. So we will get into all
that, because I am concerned about some of the data as well.
Our staff followed up on some of the lists, and maybe we
can put that chart up for a moment. There is an attachment that
goes through various readings at the various facilities over
the years. And when we probed to find out which were the worst
cases we got this response back, indicating that of the top
five that we were looking at. We came back and said, well,
actually three of the datapoint sets were wrong for various
reasons and two are correct. So it brings into, at least for
this member of Congress, that the ATSDR's database may have
bigger flaws than what we were looking at originally. I am
concerned, too. They are doing a epidemiological study here,
right? What happened at Camp Lejeune?
Dr. Gros. Just in utero.
Mr. Byron. Children in utero.
Mr. Walden. OK. And in stereo apparently there. And I guess
the question I am going to have for the military later is given
the extraordinary and awful circumstances you all have been
through with yourselves and your children, are they doing
epidemiological studies elsewhere?
Mr. Ensminger. Where?
Mr. Walden. At sites with contamination?
Mr. Ensminger. You mean at other sites?
Mr. Walden. Yes.
Mr. Ensminger. Not on adults, sir.
Mr. Walden. Adults or children. On anybody. Do any of you
know?
Mr. Ensminger. As far as I know, and like I said before,
every Public Health Assessment that I have seen come out of the
Department of Health Assessments and Consultations at ATSDR,
the wording is different, but it always means the same. No
harm, no foul.
They don't hurt adults.
Mr. Walden. They do the health assessments, but I am
talking about the epidemiological.
Mr. Ensminger. Sir, if DHAC kills the thing in the Public
Health Assessment no studies get done. It is a dead issue at
that point.
Mr. Walden. Literally.
Mr. Ensminger. Literally.
Mr. Walden. How does that make you feel?
Mr. Ensminger. Well, they constantly make the claim in
there that there is not enough studies to relate to--based on
exposures to these chemicals, but then in the next sentence
they say, well, we don't recommend any study on this exposure
either.
Mr. Walden. Dr. Gros?
Dr. Gros. Congressman, if I can make a statement, I am not
an epidemiologist, but it would seem to me that with the number
of people involved in this one incident that we could probably
do a pretty darn good study if the will is there to do it. But
that is the problem. As you had this incredible number of
people that have been exposed over these years, they dispersed
because of the nature of military personnel. When they retired
they leave, they go all over the country and the world. But
they still have Social Security numbers, they still pay taxes,
I assume. They still are as findable as I was. When they wanted
to do the in-utero study on my child they had no problem
finding me. I was a phone call out of the blue. I was amazed.
So they have a way of finding you.
Mr. Walden. Sure they do.
Dr. Gros. So I don't buy the argument that these people
cannot be found to do a look back study or to examine.
Mr. Walden. You think a look back given your professional.
Dr. Gros. At least to get some sort of information
certainly.
Mr. Walden. One of the things that deeply concerns me is
that at Wurtsmith Air Force Base in October 1977, they first
detected TCE in the drinking water. And I am told that
officials immediately took steps to identify the contaminated
wells, and within 1 month began closing the contaminated wells.
So by November 1977, they were closing the wells. Now contrast
that with Camp Lejeune, where significant drinking water
contamination was discovered in 1980 and 1982, but officials
waited years before they identified the contaminated wells, and
then closed them down in 1985.
Any of you, in all of your research, and obviously Mr.
Ensminger, you have done incredible research, and we appreciate
you bringing that to us and to the public, can you explain why
the Air Force acted in a matter of a month and the Navy----
Mr. Ensminger. Sir, even the Department of the Navy did the
same thing at another site. There was Warminster Naval Air
Development Center outside of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 1979
they identified these same chemicals in water supply wells at
that facility. They took them off line immediately. But we must
have two different Departments of Navy and two different
standards somewhere in the mix here.
Mr. Walden. What was the EPA standard at that time for
these chemicals in drinking water? What did they say was safe
or unsafe?
Mr. Ensminger. They had SNARL, sir.
Mr. Walden. Which means----
Mr. Ensminger. The GAO report stated that Camp Lejeune
officials stated that the contaminant levels in the drinking
water at the main part of the base had not exceeded the SNARLs
at that time. They did, however, exceed the SNARLs at Tarawa
Terrace for PCE. The GAO said they never exceeded the SNARLs. I
have a memorandum written in August 1982 by the base quality
control chemist, Ms. Elizabeth Betz, that states right there in
paragraph 8.
Mr. Walden. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ensminger. Well 651 tested 3,400 parts per billion of
TCE in the samples that were pulled on 16 January 1985. They
didn't get them back until 4 February. And the 4 February
sample--when they closed the well on the 4th of February, they
pulled another sample that day, and the well was running, and
it tested--they got the results back for that on the 7th of
February. And it was 18,900 parts per billion of TCE, 8,070 per
billion of DCE, 400 parts per billion of PCE, and 633 parts per
billion of vinyl chloride. And, sir, this one well caused the
levels of finished drinking water on that base, where they were
pulling samples because of the fuel that had gotten in there,
to exceed 1,000 parts per billion at the tap at an elementary
school. One well. They had already pulled seven wells off line
previously.
Only God knows what levels were in that water when three or
four of these contaminated wells were pumping at the same time
in conjunction with well 651. The highest recorded levels that
had been found were 1,400 parts per billion.
Mr. Byron. May I make a statement? I have the document that
Jerry has alluded to, August, 1982. And on paragraph 5 if says
tetrachloroethylene at high doses----
Mr. Stupak. Exhibit No. 6 in that book, if anyone cares to
look. It is exhibit No. 6.
Mr. Byron. Tetrachloroethylene in high doses has been
reported to produce liver and kidney damage and central nervous
system disturbances in human beings. EPA SNARLs for
tetrachloroethylene is 2,300 parts per billion for one day, 175
parts per billion for 10 days, and 20 parts per billion for
long-term exposure. Where I was living was 1,580 parts per
billion PCE exposure at the time. And they tried to say through
the GAO report that the individuals and environmental
department at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune were not educated
enough and were not informed enough by LANTDIV and NACIP. And I
consider this a fraud. I don't believe that. I believe they
were well notified. This document from the chemist at Marine
Corps Base Camp Lejeune shows that they were well notified. And
I think the GAO, like I said, is biased.
Mr. Stupak. No other questions?
Mr. Walden. My time has expired.
Mr. Stupak. Your time has expired, but go ahead.
Mr. Ensminger. You had asked earlier about standards and
different standards. Sir, I found the BMID instruction, which
is dated 25 August, 1972. And the subject is standards for
potable water. I would like to point out to the Congressman
subparagraph E of paragraph 5, where it outlines pollution. Now
this is the Navy's own standard. As pollution as used in these
standards means the presence of any foreign substance. And then
in parentheses it says organic, inorganic, radiological or
biological in water which tends to degrade its quality so as to
constitute a hazard or impair the usefulness of the water. That
was in 1972.
Mr. Stupak. That is document No. 20 in the book, Mr. Gros,
if you are looking for it. Let me ask this question, if I may.
Mr. Byron, any of your children apply for disability?
Mr. Byron. Through the VA, sir?
Mr. Stupak. Yes.
Mr. Byron. No, sir.
Mr. Stupak. Any suggestions----
Mr. Byron. On previous trips to Washington I have been to
the Veterans Administration and spoke to Assistant Director
Mark Brown, and he had advised me that before the Veterans
Administration could get involved that it would have to go
through the Armed Services Committee, and be basically giving
them permission to take care of these individuals. And I am
aware of no legislation at present that allows for that.
Mr. Stupak. There are 853 claims, I believe, being made.
Are your children involved in any of those claims?
Mr. Byron. My children are involved in those claims, yes,
sir.
Mr. Stupak. They are?
Mr. Byron. Yes, sir. Because I feel that the Marine Corps
is negligent and responsible.
Mr. Stupak. OK. You said in your testimony, your daughter
went to 57 visits in 30 months?
Mr. Byron. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. Did they ever refer her off base to a
children's hospital or----
Mr. Byron. No, sir, they didn't, but they did take blood
tests. And after I was identified as a family--my one child to
be part of the study--we got our medical records. And I had to
ask for copies of my medical records before I left the Marine
Corps, because my one daughter had been seen so many times.
So I am a very fortunate one of very few that has their
medical records, because the base has said that many of those
records were destroyed in storage somehow. But she was seen 57
times, and we were never recommended outside of base. But
levels of her hemoglobin or whatever they check for were below
the levels that were listed on the form. And no one notified us
and no one took action. And 6 months later she came down with
this bone marrow disease called aplastic anemia, which is the
opposite of what Jerry's daughter has, but also to cure it
requires a bone marrow transplant. Now she went into remission,
so she never did require that, but our daughters also went
through the bone testing that he is familiar with and that his
daughter was crying in his ear about. And ours also experienced
the same thing, where they took bone marrow samples from her
hip.
Mr. Stupak. When you say your daughter was below the level,
you mean indicative of a problem?
Mr. Byron. Of a problem, yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. Not within the normal range.
Mr. Byron. Not within the normal range, yes.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Gros, you were a doctor there at the base.
In looking back now, was there any increased number of
miscarriages or anything that you noticed?
Dr. Gros. That is a frequent question. But I don't know how
to answer it, because we didn't have the big picture. We
basically were working in the forest, surrounded with the
trees. 240 deliveries a month, busy, busy clinic. We didn't
have any inkling at the time that there may have been that type
of a problem. I don't think that anyone ever brought that up as
an issue. The pediatrics department certainly didn't alert us.
Mr. Stupak. All the women there are basically child bearing
years, right?
Dr. Gros. Well, it is a very large population of young
women, that is correct.
Mr. Stupak. And generally a healthy population.
Dr. Gros. Very healthy population. I would say that the
incidence of abnormalities that you would frequently see with
older moms, moms over the age of 35--they don't like to be
called older moms anymore--but how should we say the more
experienced mothers that have more kids, they tend to have a
greater instance of genetic abnormalities. And we didn't see
much of that in our population. I really don't think that it
came out at the time. I think the pediatrics statistics would
probably be more telling than what we saw as obstetricians.
Mr. Stupak. But your medical records for these patients
would document it if there was a miscarriage, would it not?
Dr. Gros. Correct. There is a log kept. In labor and
delivery, usually most of the patients would have a D&C under
sedation, and just to make sure there weren't any
complications, and then there was a record kept of that. So we
should have that record. I would think so anyway.
Mr. Stupak. One would hope so.
Dr. Gros. Yes.
Mr. Stupak. You had a question, Mr. Walden?
Mr. Walden. No.
Mr. Stupak. If not, I would like to thank this panel for
their testimony. I know at times it has been very difficult.
But without you, I don't think the story could get out about
what we are trying to do here, not just Camp Lejeune, but any
places throughout this country--DoD properties that have to be
cleaned up. Mr. Ensminger?
Mr. Ensminger. I would like to inform you of one other
issue. Well 651, which was the highest contaminated well at
Hadnot Point, was constructed in 1971 at the back corner of the
base disposal yard. The back corner of the junk yard. And the
Navy facilities engineers people did the site survey for the
location and the construction of that well. And that lot had
been in operation for some odd 30 years by that point.
Mr. Byron. Sir, may I make one last comment also?
Mr. Stupak. Sure.
Mr. Byron. I was quite concerned by reading the GAO report
to find out that for the in-utero study for the Agency for
Toxic Substances Disease Registry they had found a comparison
group of individuals at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune of 548
children. It is my contention, and I believe everyone here,
that those individuals were more than likely exposed because of
their connection to the base. If they lived around the base and
were military personnel, they went on base. If the women were
pregnant at the time and drank from the water fountain, they
were exposed in the first trimester. So birth defects and so
forth might show up.
What disturbs me is that after being on the Citizens
Advisory Panel of the Agency for Toxic Substances for 2 years
that I had no idea that they had a comparison group until I
read the GAO report. I don't know why that has occurred, and I
think that should be a question asked by individuals of the
ATSDR. But it does not lend itself to transparency. And in this
case that is the most important thing, that we be able to
determine that what is being told to us is the truth. And the
reason that we are here is to stop this from happening at any
other bases in the future. So thank you very much.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you. This panel is dismissed. Thank you,
gentlemen.
I will call up our next panel, Major General Robert
Dickerson, Jr., Commanding General at Camp Lejeune; Ms. Kelly
Dreyer, Environmental Restoration Program Manager at the U.S.
Marine Corps Headquarters; Ms. Pat Leonard, Director of the
Office of Judge Advocate General, Claims Investigation and Tort
Litigation; Mr. Thomas Sinks, Deputy Director of the National
Center of Environmental Health, Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry, ATSDR; and Frank Bove, senior epidemiologist
at ATSDR; and Morris Maslia, environmental engineer at ATSDR.
Would you all come forward, please?
As you know, it is the policy of the subcommittee to take
all testimony under oath. Please be advised that witnesses have
the right to be, under the rules of the House, to be advised by
counsel during their testimony. Do any of you wish to be
represented by counsel? If so, we need the name of your
counsel. General? Anyone? No? Everyone's indicating no. So
while you rise, I ask you to raise your right-hand, please.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Stupak. Let the record reflect everyone has answered
affirmatively as to the oath. They are now under oath. And we
will begin with opening statements. We will start to my left.
General Dickerson, please.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT DICKERSON, JR., COMMANDING
GENERAL, CAMP LEJEUNE
General Dickerson. Mr. Stupak and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you and participate in this hearing regarding past
contamination of two of Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune's
drinking water systems. We are here today because the health
and welfare of our Marines and their families remains a top
priority. We continue to support and fully cooperate with the
Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry to determine if
contaminated water aboard our installation harmed Marines and
their families. In 1982 and 1983, two of Camp Lejeune's eight
public drinking water systems were determined to be
contaminated by two chemicals, trichloroethylene, TCE, and
perchloroethylene, PCE, also known as tetrachloroethylene,
commonly found in degreasing agents and dry cleaning solvents.
At the time, no environmental standards or regulations in
regard to the use and disposal of TCE or PCE were in place. In
fact, initial regulation of these volatile organic compounds
under the Safe Drinking Water Act began in 1987 and 1991,
respectively. Volatile organic compounds were first discovered
in the Camp Lejeune drinking water in 1980, while a Navy
contractor was conducting tests for trihalomethanes. It was
determined that an interference chemical was present in the
water at the treatment plant and tap. However, the type of
chemical or source was unknown.
Base personnel continued to sample the water over the next
several years, utilizing various laboratories. Sampling results
varied, calling into question the validity of the test. In
1982, TCE and PCE were determined to be the interference
chemicals, and in late 1984, the groundwater was determined to
be the source. As data on individual wells was received,
impacted wells were removed from service. In total, 10 drinking
water wells aboard the installation were immediately removed
from service. Subsequent investigation by the State of North
Carolina revealed leaks from an off base dry cleaner had
contaminated the wells near the Tarawa Terrace housing area,
while on base sources contributed to the contamination of the
Hadnot Point water systems. This unfortunate situation happened
over 20 years ago. And while there are still large gaps of
knowledge on potential health implications due to exposure to
TCE or PCE today, these gaps were even greater back in the
1980's. What the Nation accepted as environmental standards and
regulations 20 years ago has drastically changed as a result of
scientific knowledge and awareness. Camp Lejeune has been
investigated by the Environmental Protection Agency's Criminal
Investigative Division and the General Accountability Office.
Both investigating agencies reported that Camp Lejeune's
response to the contamination was appropriate at that time and
consistent with existing environmental standards and
regulations. Additionally, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
chartered his own expert panel to look at past activities,
which also concluded appropriate actions were taken based upon
the guidance and information provided by Federal agencies. We
have relied on the expertise of ATSDR to determine whether or
not the past contaminated water on our installation harmed our
Marines and their families.
Although we are not part of the design or implementation of
the ATSDR survey or study, we remain committed and fully
support their efforts. Full access to personnel,
infrastructure, installations and requested documentation was
granted to ATSDR from the start and will be available for the
duration of their study. Additionally, we act as a liaison with
Federal and State agencies to insure ATSDR obtains all
resources necessary to move forward with their work, ultimately
bringing us one step closer to an answer.
In order to educate and communicate with family members and
Marines that may have been exposed to the contaminated water, a
robust communications campaign was initiated to encourage
participation in the ATSDR survey. An official Web site
regarding the Camp Lejeune water was developed with frequently
asked questions, maps, press releases and advisories, as well
as contact numbers and links for additional information. This
Web site is currently in the process of being updated. To help
better understand public exposure to TCE and PCE from drinking
water and any potential health effects, the Marine Corps is
funding a new effort by the National Academy of Sciences to
conduct a comprehensive review and evaluation of all medical
and scientific information available on the link between TCE
and PCE exposure via drinking water and adverse health effects.
Ultimately, everyone is here today for the same reason, to
determine whether or not our Marines and their families were
harmed in any way by contaminated water. We fully complied with
environmental laws and regulations, and we remain committed to
working with ATSDR and other Federal agencies involved with the
study. We must rely on the experts for the answers. We are
pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, General. Ms. Dreyer.
STATEMENT OF KELLY DREYER, ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROGRAM
MANAGER, U.S. MARINE CORPS HEADQUARTERS
Ms. Dreyer. Chairman Stupak, Congressman Whitfield,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you and participate in this
hearing regarding past contamination in two of Marine Corps
Base Camp Lejeune's drinking water systems. My name is Kelly
Dreyer, and I am an environmental engineer, and the
Installation Restoration Program Manager At Headquarters Marine
Corps. As the Installation Restoration Program Manager, my job
is to establish Marine Corps policy and guidance on cleanup
issues across the Marine Corps. In addition, I serve as a
liaison between the Marine Corps and the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command, which executes the cleanup program for the
Navy and the Marine Corps, as well as other agencies involved
in the cleanup program, particularly when issues cannot be
resolved at an installation level. As General Dickerson stated,
the health and welfare of our Marines and their families is
very important to the Marine Corps. As part of the cleanup
program, all military installations on the National Priorities
List of Hazardous Waste Sites, including Camp Lejeune, which
was listed in 1989, undergo a Public Health Assessment
conducted by the Agency For Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry, ATSDR, to determine if there are any current or past
health concerns resulting from past practices.
My significant involvement in the Camp Lejeune past water
issue began in 1997, when the Public Health Assessment for Camp
Lejeune was being completed by ATSDR. The Public Health
Assessment concluded that adverse health effects as a result of
the impacted water were unlikely in adults, but recommended a
follow on study of children in the womb, the most susceptible
population to the potential chemical impacts. At that time I
participated in meetings between health scientists and the
Department of Navy and ATSDR about how such a study might be
designed. In 1999, the health study began as a survey to
determine whether or not a statistically significant study
population could be reached for a case control study.
In 2000, ATSDR requested assistance from the Marine Corps
to reach additional participants for the survey. At that time,
the number of participants was approximately 6,500. ATSDR
needed over 12,000 for a statistically valid study. Over the
next year, I worked with our Headquarters Marine Corps and
Department of Defense offices to develop and implement a
communications strategy, which included two administrative
messages to all Marines, press releases to over 3,500 media
outlets, searches of Marine Corps databases, and working with
the Department of Defense Privacy Office to enable the release
of manpower information to ATSDR. As a result of this effort,
ATSDR closed the survey in January 2002, after reaching 12,598
participants. Since that time, I have been working with Marine
Corps Base Camp Lejeune to provide information requested by
ATSDR for their water model and study activities. Although
ATSDR has had full access to all information, sometimes such
information is difficult to locate due to the fact that the
records requested are over 20 years old and may have been
destroyed or because offices have moved around the base.
The Marine Corps recently hired a contractor to perform a
comprehensive search of Camp Lejeune to provide a better
confidence level that all relevant documents have been found.
ATSDR has been provided access to all documents that were found
during this search. In addition, we have been working with
agencies outside of the Marine Corps to ask them to provide
information that is under their control. I have personally
spoken with numerous people who feel they may have been harmed
by the impacted water. Their stories are emotionally
compelling. That is one of the reasons why we continue to
support and fully cooperate with ATSDR. We have funded the
National Academies of Sciences study because we all have a
common goal, to determine if the Camp Lejeune drinking water
harmed any of our Marines or their families. I am also pleased
to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of General Dickerson and Ms. Dreyer
follows:]
Statement of Major General Robert Dickerson and Kelly Dreyer
Chairman Stupak, Congressman Whitfield, distinguished
members of the subcommittee; thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you and participate in this hearing regarding
past contamination of two of Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune's
drinking water systems. We are here today because the health
and welfare of our Marines and their families remains a top
priority. We continue to support and fully cooperate with the
Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry to determine if
contaminated water aboard our installation harmed Marines and
our families.
In 1982 and 1983, two of Camp Lejeune's eight public
drinking water systems were determined to be contaminated by
two chemicals--trichloroethylene (TCE) and perchlorethylene
(PCE; also known as tetrachloroethylene)--commonly found in
degreasing agents and dry cleaning solvents. At the time, no
environmental standards or regulations in regards to the use
and disposal of TCE or PCE were in place. In fact, initial
regulation of these volatile organic compounds under the Safe
Drinking Water Act began in 1987 and 1991 respectively.
Volatile Organic Compounds were first discovered in the
Camp Lejeune drinking water in 1980, while a Navy contractor
was conducting tests for trihalomethanes. It was determined
that an interference chemical was present in the water at the
treatment plant and tap; however, the type of chemical or
source was unknown. Base personnel continued to sample the
water over the next several years, utilizing various
laboratories; sampling results varied, calling into question
the validity of the tests. In 1982, TCE and PCE were determined
to be the interference chemicals, and in late 1984, the
groundwater was determined to be the source. As data on
individual wells was received, impacted wells were removed from
service. In total, 10 drinking water wells aboard the
installation were immediately removed from service. Subsequent
investigation by the State of North Carolina revealed leaks
from an off-base dry cleaner had contaminated the wells near
the Tarawa Terrace housing area, while on-base sources
contributed to contamination of the Hadnot Point water system.
This unfortunate situation happened over 20 years ago and
while there are still large gaps of knowledge on potential
health implications due to exposure to TCE or PCE today, these
gaps were even greater back in the 1980s. What the Nation
accepted as environmental standards and regulations 20 years
ago has drastically changed as a result of scientific knowledge
and awareness.
Camp Lejeune has been investigated by the Environmental
Protection Agency's Criminal Investigation Division and the
General Accountability Office. Both investigating agencies
reported that Camp Lejeune's response to the contamination was
appropriate at that time and consistent with existing
environmental standards and regulations. Additionally, the
Commandant of the Marine Corps chartered his own expert panel
to look at past activities which also concluded appropriate
actions were taken based on the guidance and information
provided by Federal agencies.
We have relied on the expertise of ATSDR to determine
whether or not the past contaminated water on our installation
harmed our Marines and their families. Although we are not part
of the design or implementation of the ATSDR survey or study,
we remain committed and fully support their efforts. Full
access to personnel, infrastructure, installations and
requested documentation was granted to ATSDR from the start and
will be available for the duration of their study.
Additionally, we act as a liaison with Federal and state
agencies to ensure ATSDR obtains all resources necessary to
move forward with their work, ultimately bringing us one step
closer to an answer.
In order to educate and communicate with family members and
Marines that may have been exposed to the contaminated water, a
robust communications campaign was initiated to encourage
participation in the ATSDR survey. An official Web site
regarding the Camp Lejeune Water was developed with frequently
asked questions, maps, press releases and advisories, as well
as contact numbers and links for additional information. This
Web site is currently in the process of being updated.
To help better understand public exposure to TCE and PCE
from drinking water and any potential health effects, the
Marine Corps is funding a new effort by the National Academy of
Sciences to conduct a comprehensive review and evaluation of
all medical and scientific information available on the link
between TCE/PCE exposure via drinking water and adverse health
effects.
Ultimately, everyone is here today for the same reason: to
determine whether or not our Marines and their families were
harmed in any way by contaminated water. We fully comply with
environmental laws and regulations and we remain committed to
working with ATSDR and other Federal agencies involved with the
study. We must all rely on the experts for the answers.
We are pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Ms. Dreyer, I didn't think you were going
to do an opening because you never submitted it to this
committee. That is fine, but I would like your opening
statement. And I want to make copies, so we have a chance to
look at it, because I am glad you did make an opening, because
we have many questions for you.
Ms. Leonard, you want to give your opening statement?
STATEMENT OF PAT LEONARD, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL, CLAIMS, INVESTIGATION, AND TORT LITIGATION
Ms. Leonard. Good morning. I am Pat Leonard, and I am the
director of the Claims and Tort Litigation Division at the
Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy. I am here to
answer your questions about the administrative claims process
under the Federal Tort Claims Act and how it relates to these
claims. I know you have a copy of my statement. I am not going
to read that to you, but I would like to offer some additional
information for your consideration. As of this date, we have
received a total of 853 claims that allege either personal
injury or death as a result of exposure to contaminated
drinking water while living or working on board Marine Corps
Base Camp Lejeune. The majority of the claims are from family
members of former service members stationed at Camp Lejeune.
Included in that total number are 115 claims from civilian
employees who worked on board the base. My written statement
describes the administrative claims process in more detail, but
I would just like to add that these claims involve some very
complex scientific and medical issues. It is the Navy's
intention to wait for the ATSDR study to be completed in order
to insure that we have the best scientific research available
so we may thoroughly evaluate each and every claim on its own
merits. We truly believe this approach is in the best interests
of both the claimants and the Department of the Navy.
Mr. Stupak. That is your conclusion? OK.
Ms. Leonard. Yes, sir.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Leonard follows:]
Statement of Pat Leonard
The Department of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate
General, Claims and Tort Litigation Division (OJAG Code 15),
has been designated by the Secretary of the Navy as the office
responsible for the adjudication of claims against the Navy and
Marine Corps filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), as
well as various other claims statutes. OJAG Code 15 also
provides support to the Department of Justice (DoJ) and United
States Attorneys for claims that result in litigation.
All claims alleging personal injury or death caused by
contaminated drinking water at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune
must be evaluated under the legal requirements of the FTCA. The
FTCA is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for claims
against the Federal Government for personal injury, property
damage, or death caused by the negligence of a Federal employee
acting within the scope of his or her employment.
Administratively, the FTCA requires that a claimant first
present a claim to the Federal agency alleged to have caused
the injury before he or she may file a lawsuit against the
United States.
The claim must be presented in writing within 2
years after the claim ``accrues'' (i.e., knew or should
reasonably have known they were injured as a result of
government negligence) or the claim is forever barred.
The claimant must allow the Federal agency at
least six months to adjudicate the claim.
If the Federal agency does not pay or deny the
claim within six months, the claimant may file suit against the
United States. Alternatively, the claimant may also choose not
to file suit and wait for the Federal agency to adjudicate the
claim.
If the claim is denied by the Federal agency, the
claimant must file suit within 6 months after the date of
denial, or the suit is forever barred.
The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(ATSDR), part of the Public Health Service, performed a Public
Health Assessment pursuant to the requirements of CERCLA in
1997. ATSDR also conducted an Adverse Pregnancy Outcome Health
Study in 1998. Although this research indicated that no health
problems would be expected for adults, ATSDR could not rule out
the possibility of an association between exposure to volatile
organic compounds (VOCs) in drinking water at Camp Lejeune and
adverse pregnancy outcomes. ATSDR has continued its study of
former Camp Lejeune residents and is currently conducting an
epidemiological study of children focusing on childhood cancer
and birth defects. We have been informed this study is on-track
to be completed in 2008.
To fairly adjudicate all claims based on available and
appropriate objective information, we have decided not to
adjudicate the claims until the ATSDR completes its study. Once
completed, each claim will be independently adjudicated under
the legal requirements of the FTCA to determine its merit.
In the meantime, while the scientific study is being
conducted, we have been compiling information as claims are
submitted. Each claimant receives a letter requesting specific
information, including their medical records, as well as a
survey to help ensure that we have all the information
necessary for final adjudication.
The Navy's FTCA settlement authority is $200,000 per
claim. However, when there are multiple claims arising from a
single incident and payment will likely exceed the Navy's
settlement authority of $200,000 in the aggregate, the
Department of Justice must approve all settlements arising from
the single incident. Therefore, once the claims are
adjudicated, the DoJ must approve any payment if recommended by
the Navy.
Again, it is very important to us, as well as the
claimants, that we thoroughly analyze each and every claim
utilizing the best scientific research available in order to
fairly adjudicate them.
Mr. Stupak. Dr. Sinks, your opening statement, please.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS SINKS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CENTER OF
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE
REGISTRY, ATSDR, ACCOMPANIED BY FRANK BOVE, SENIOR
EPIDEMIOLOGIST, ATSDR, AND MORRIS MASLIA, ENVIRONMENTAL
ENGINEER, ATSDR
Mr. Sinks. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
subcommittee. I am Tom Sinks, Deputy Director of the Agency For
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, or ATSDR. Dr. Frank
Bove, our senior epidemiologist on the Camp Lejeune
investigation, is sitting text to me. And next to him is Morris
Maslia, our senior water system modeler. As a father of three
young children, even though I am 56, I have a 13-year old and
11-year old and a 4-year old, I just wanted to comment on the
moving and compelling testimony of the earlier panel. And as
someone who has seen their own daughter go through medical
procedures, I certainly understand some of the pain and
powerlessness you feel when your child is affected. Our current
work at Camp Lejeune concerns selected birth defects and
childhood cancers, and we are also exploring the feasibility of
additional studies, including adults.
Effective today, former Camp Lejeune Marines and their
families can find out their exposure levels to PCE by visiting
the ATSDR Web site and entering the dates they lived in Tarawa
Terrace housing. ATSDR is examining two Camp Lejeune drinking
water systems that served family housing and were contaminated
with PCE or TCE between 1968 and 1985. A third system was not
contaminated. The contaminated wells were shut down by 1985,
several years before the current EPA maximum contaminant levels
were established. Dr. Maslia's models--from his models we are
confident that finished water from the Tarawa Terrace system
was contaminated with PCE for roughly 30 years, beginning in
1957 and into 1987. The maximum simulated PCE concentrations in
finished water exceeded 180 parts per billion, or 36 times the
1992 MCL established by EPA.
There were approximately 83,000 people exposed to this
water from 1958 through 1985. Dr. Maslia has not finished his
work on the Hadnot Point system, which was contaminated
primarily with TCE. One tap water sample there measured 1,400
parts per billion, but we know that levels in finished water
ranged substantially. There were approximately a thousand
people exposed to Hadnot Point water from 1958 through 1985 who
lived there. The third system supplied uncontaminated drinking
water to families living at Holcomb Boulevard. We now know that
housing in Holcomb Boulevard was built several years before the
Holcomb Boulevard water system came on line in June 1972.
As a result, approximately one-fifth of the 56,000 people
living in Holcomb Boulevard from 1968 through 1985 were likely
exposed to TCE from Hadnot Point water. This discovery will
not, and I repeat, not, adversely impact the current study, nor
will it cause us to fail to include in the study any of the
families or children who we collected information on. It does
require us to reanalyze the completed study that has previously
been published on adverse reproductive outcomes. That
reanalysis will not begin until the current study is completed.
In the meantime, we have placed an erratum notice on the ATSDR
Web site and notified the journal that published the study of
the error.
Camp Lejeune is unique for conducting a epidemiologic study
of this type. The concentrations of TCE and PCE in the finished
drinking water are extremely high. Thousands of people living
in family housing were exposed to high levels of TCE or PCE.
And importantly, thousands of others were unexposed. Our
studies were intended to focus on the most vulnerable
population, the unborn child. And we also had computerized
birth certificates of over 12,000 live births on base. Finally,
housing records were available that linked each family to TCE
or PCE. We have contacted the parents of over 12,000 children
who reported if their child was born with a birth defect or
developed a childhood cancer of interest. Our team has
confirmed the diagnosis of 57 of the 106 children who reported
to us with conditions of interest. 42 additional children were
either confirmed not to have the condition, parents refused to
participate, or no medical records were available. This work is
difficult. We are trying to accurately reconstruct systems and
events as far back as 39 years ago. Nobody involved at the time
could have foreseen the work we are doing today. Our work
requires close collaboration with the affected families and
individuals and agencies across DoD. I believe there is a
shared commitment to accomplish this difficult task. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sinks follows:]
Statement of Thomas Sinks
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased
to provide testimony on behalf of the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) regarding our
activities at U.S. Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune (Camp
Lejeune) in North Carolina. I am Dr. Thomas Sinks, Deputy
Director of ATSDR and of the National Center for Environmental
Health (NCEH) at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC).
I will briefly summarize ATSDR's mission and general
experience in addressing trichloroethylene (TCE) and
tetrachloroethylene (PCE) at Superfund sites, including
contamination of drinking water sources and supplies. I then
will focus on ATSDR's scientific activities in evaluating
potential health effects of exposures to PCE and TCE
contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune, including
conducting health assessments and epidemiologic research, and
convening panels to obtain input from experts outside the
Agency and from other persons concerned about potential health
effects of exposures at Camp Lejeune.
I must preface my remarks with an important point: Since
ATSDR has not completed its current epidemiologic study, we
have not yet determined whether there is an association between
exposure to contaminated water and certain birth defects and
cancers among children born between 1968 and 1985 to women who
lived at Camp Lejeune during some portion of their pregnancy.
However, I will discuss findings that were released earlier
today concerning contamination of the drinking water supply at
one of the three areas of family housing at the Base.
Background
ATSDR is a statutorily created Operating Division within
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Created by
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), more commonly known as
Superfund, ATSDR's role complements those of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and other Federal agencies under
Superfund, by focusing on the health of people and the
communities in which they live. Our work is framed into four
functional areas: protecting the public from hazardous
exposures, increasing knowledge about toxic chemicals,
delivering health education about toxic chemicals, and
maintaining health registries.
ATSDR is required by law to conduct a public health
assessment (PHA) or its equivalent at each site proposed or
listed on EPA's National Priorities List of hazardous waste
sites. In a PHA, ATSDR evaluates releases of hazardous
substances into the environment to determine if people are
being or have been exposed to hazardous substances and, if they
are being exposed, whether those exposures are at levels likely
to be a health hazard. The PHAs also provide recommendations
for eliminating or reducing harmful exposures. A PHA may also
identify factual or scientific data gaps and make
recommendations for additional actions such as health
education, epidemiological health studies, disease registries,
surveillance studies, or research on specific hazardous
substances.
Under the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act, HHS and the Department of Defense (DoD) are required to
enter into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding the
manner in which ATSDR will carry out its responsibilities at
DoD sites, and to establish a manner to transfer funds from DoD
to ATSDR to fund these activities. Under the MOU, ATSDR sends
an Annual Plan of Work to DoD each year, identifying planned
work and funding needed for that work for the coming year.
ATSDR's primary health concern at Camp Lejeune involves
potential exposure to drinking-water supplies contaminated with
two common volatile organic compounds (VOCs): TCE and PCE. TCE
is a colorless liquid which is used as a solvent for cleaning
metal parts. Occupational exposure to TCE may cause nervous
system effects, kidney, liver and lung damage, abnormal
heartbeat, coma, and possibly death. Occupational exposure to
TCE also has been associated with adult cancers such as kidney
cancer, liver and biliary cancer, and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
TCE in drinking water has been associated with childhood
leukemia in two studies and with specific birth defects such as
neural tube defects and oral clefts in one study.
PCE is a manufactured chemical used for dry cleaning and
metal degreasing. Occupational exposure to PCE can cause
dizziness, headaches, sleepiness, confusion, nausea, difficulty
in speaking and walking, unconsciousness, and death. Exposure
to PCE-contaminated drinking water has been linked with adult
cancers such as non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, leukemia, bladder
cancer, and breast cancer.
Inhalation and ingestion are important routes of exposure
for both TCE and PCE. Both chemicals are listed in the 11th
Report on Carcinogens from the National Toxicology Program as
reasonably anticipated to be human carcinogens. The United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established
Maximum Contaminant Levels for drinking water of 5 parts per
billion (ppb) for PCE in 1991 and for TCE in 1987.
ATSDR has extensive experience related to TCE and PCE. The
Agency has published Toxicological Profiles on both chemicals,
and our Profile on TCE is included in our Case Studies for
Environmental Medicine, a series of self-instructional
publications designed to increase primary care providers--
knowledge of hazardous substances in the environment and to aid
in the evaluation of potentially exposed patients.
Camp Lejeune
Public Health Assessments: In 1989, the EPA placed U.S.
Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune and ABC One-Hour Cleaners, which
is located very close to the Base, on its National Priorities
List. Releases of chemicals from both the ABC One-Hour Cleaners
and activities at Camp Lejeune contributed to contamination of
the water supply system serving certain areas of housing at the
Base. In August 1990, ATSDR completed a PHA addressing
contamination from the ABC One-Hour Cleaners. This assessment
found that PCE, detected in on-site and off-site wells, was the
primary contaminant of concern. In 1997, ATSDR completed a PHA
for contamination from the Camp Lejeune Base.
In these PHAs ATSDR determined that current conditions at
the site did not present a current health hazard because the
contaminated wells were no longer in use. However, ATSDR did
identify three past public health hazards. Of those, the one we
are focused on currently is the contamination of drinking water
systems serving several areas of family housing on Base,
referred to as Tarawa Terrace, Hadnot Point, and Holcomb
Boulevard. Tarawa Terrace was contaminated primarily by PCE and
Hadnot Point was contaminated primarily by TCE. ATSDR also
reported that Holcomb Boulevard, the third major system, was
not contaminated, except for during a two-week period in late
January and early February 1985 when the Holcomb Boulevard
system was down for repairs and the area was served by the
Hadnot Point system.
In 1997, ATSDR concluded that likely exposures to PCE and
TCE were significantly below levels shown to cause adverse
health effects in animal and adult human studies and therefore
not expected to result in cancer or other health effects in
adults. However, because scientific data relating to the
harmful effects of VOCs on a child or a fetus were limited,
ATSDR recommended conducting an epidemiological study to assess
risk to infants and children from maternal exposure during
pregnancy to the VOC-contaminated drinking water.
Health Studies: Following up on the recommendations in the
PHA, ATSDR has undertaken two related epidemiologic studies,
both of which focused on the health of children born from 1968
through 1985 whose mothers were exposed to contaminated
drinking water at Camp Lejeune during their pregnancies. These
dates were selected because 1968 is the first year for which
computerized birth certificates from North Carolina are
available, and in early 1985 contaminated water-supply wells
were removed from regular and continuous service.
First Study: ATSDR's first study, completed in 1998, was
based on information collected from the birth certificates of
12,493 live births on base. Housing records for families who
lived on base were used to determine mother's residence during
pregnancy and to assign VOC exposure categories based on our
knowledge of contamination across the three drinking water
systems. We identified an association between women who drank
PCE-contaminated drinking water from Tarawa Terrace during
pregnancy and their babies being born small for gestational
age. This association was limited to those mothers older than
35 years of age or who had experienced two or more fetal
losses. An additional finding was that baby boys born to
mothers who drank TCE-contaminated water from Hadnot Point were
also more likely than unexposed babies to be born small for
gestational age.
Second Study: In its PHA ATSDR also identified as a
priority the need to study the relationship between maternal
exposures to TCE and PCE and the occurrence of several birth
defects and childhood cancers, which would require information
beyond that available in birth certificates. The current study
began in the late 1990's and is ongoing. The study protocol for
the study has been subjected to peer review by scientific
experts outside of the Agency. The two primary components of
the current study are to identify and confirm particular birth
defects and cancers and to conduct water modeling to determine
which housing units received contaminated water during what
time period and the level or concentration of the contaminated
water.
The study initially focused on neural tube defects (i.e.,
spina bifida and anencephaly), cleft lip and cleft palate,
major heart defects, choanal atresia, and two forms of
childhood cancers (all leukemias and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma).
ATSDR contacted the parents of 12,598 children born during the
period 1968-1985 to mothers who resided at the base anytime
during their pregnancy to confirm mother's residence and
determine if the child had one of the health conditions that
are focused on in the study. Parents reported 35 children with
neural tube defects, 42 with cleft lip and/or palate, 29 with
leukemia or lymphoma, no children with choanal atresia, and 3
with a major heart defect (this condition was dropped because
of the small number of possible case-children).
Since the initial phone interview, ATSDR has collected
medical records to confirm the diagnoses of the reported cases.
Fifty-seven children confirmed as having a condition of
interest include 17 children with a neural tube defect, 24
children with a cleft lip or palate, and 16 children with
leukemia or non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. An additional 42 possible
case children were either confirmed not to have the
condition,--refused to participate, or had no available medical
records. The status for an--additional 7 children is still
pending. As noted earlier, the information on birth defects and
cancer does not, by itself, tell us whether these conditions
are associated with exposure to contaminated water.
To obtain estimates of historical concentrations of PCE at
Tarawa Terrace and TCE at Hadnot Point, ATSDR is using water-
modeling techniques and the process referred to as historical
reconstruction. ATSDR began these analyses in 2003. The
historical reconstruction process for Tarawa Terrace is
complete. Water modeling activities for the other water system,
the Hadnot Point system, are expected to be completed later
this year.
ATSDR's goal is to estimate monthly levels of contaminants
in these drinking water systems from the early 1950's until the
contaminated wells were shut down in 1985. The effort involves
extensive information gathering (e.g., geohydrology, sources of
contamination, drinking water well locations and pumping rates,
contaminant transport and degradation byproducts, and water
distribution system). The modeling effort also requires
simulating the fate and transport of the contaminants from the
pollution sources through the soil and into the ground water,
to the drinking water wells, and finally to the water treatment
plant and water distribution system that provides the water to
the family housing units. After the historical reconstruction
of both water systems is complete, the information on birth
defects and cancers will be linked to the information
concerning which housing units received contaminated water
during what timeframes.
The historical reconstruction of the Tarawa Terrace system
is summarized in an Executive Summary report we released
earlier today. The results indicate that PCE-contaminated
drinking water distributed to family housing units at Tarawa
Terrace exceeded 5ppb, which in 1991 was established as the
Maximum Contaminant Level, for the first time during the period
October 1957-August 1958, with the most likely date of first
exceedance being November 1957. The maximum PCE concentration
in drinking water delivered to family housing units was
estimated at 183 ppb in March 1984. During the period November
1957-January 1985, PCE levels in the finished water at the
water treatment plant exceeded 5 ppb for every month except
when the most contaminated well was off-line twice for repairs
(a total of 4 months). The contaminated wells were removed from
regular service in February 1985. Effective today, former Camp
Lejeune Marines and their families can find out their estimated
exposure levels to PCE and PCE degradation by-products,
calculated through modeling, by visiting the ATSDR Web site
www.atsdr.cdc.gov/sites/lejeune and entering the dates they
lived in Tarawa Terrace housing. The executive summary of the
analyses also is available at this Web site.
Once the historical reconstruction of both the Tarawa
Terrace system and the Hadnot Point system have been completed,
the monthly quantitative estimates of contaminant
concentrations in each of these drinking water systems will be
linked with the case-control interview data on birth defects
and childhood cancers. ATSDR will analyze the data to determine
if exposures to the drinking water contaminants are associated
with neural tube defects, cleft lip/cleft palate, or childhood
leukemia/non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Update of First Study: During the work conducted for the
historical exposure reconstruction, ATSDR discovered an error
in the exposure classifications used in its first Camp Lejeune
study, the 1998 study of adverse birth outcomes. This may have
affected the results of this study. The error was the result of
a lack of information on the date the Holcomb Boulevard
Treatment Plant began operation. The study assumed that the
plant was operating during the entire period of the study,
1968-1985. However, as a result of the historical exposure
reconstruction, the Agency has learned that the Holcomb
Boulevard Treatment Plant did not begin operation until June
1972. Prior to June 1972, the Hadnot Point system provided
drinking water to the Holcomb Boulevard service area. This
means that many of the births during the period, January 1968-
May 1972 that were classified as unexposed in the 1998 study
were actually exposed in utero to drinking water contaminated
with TCE and other solvents. ATSDR regrets the error that was
made in the 1998 study, and plans to reanalyze the 1998 study
using the monthly contaminant estimates from the historical
exposure reconstruction. Utilizing the more detailed estimates
will considerably improve the quality of the 1998 study.
Community and Expert Input: In response to public concerns
that ATSDR's study was too narrowly focused since drinking
water contamination may have caused adult cancers as well as
non-cancer diseases among children and adults, ATSDR convened a
scientific panel in February, 2005, to provide advice on
whether additional epidemiological studies on the health
effects of exposures to contaminated water at Camp Lejeune
should be conducted. ATSDR accepted panel recommendations,
including recommendations to establish a Community Assistance
Panel for Camp Lejeune, and to assess the feasibility of
conducting a mortality and cancer incidence study and
additional potential studies by evaluating DoD databases.
ATSDR also convened a panel on its approach to historical
reconstruction of groundwater and finished water contamination
at the Base. On March 28-29, 2005, ATSDR held an ``Expert Peer
Review Panel on Water Modeling'' to assess and review water
modeling approaches and activities at Tarawa Terrace, Hadnot
Point, and Holcomb Boulevard. Panel members approved ATSDR's
approach but made additional recommendations, which we adopted.
They were unanimous in their recommendation that ATSDR conduct
additional extensive data discovery to obtain all the
information necessary to fully understand the historical
operations of the water-supply systems. Panel members also
recommended that the Agency undertake a rigorous uncertainty or
probabilistic analysis and consider modeling PCE degradation
by-products. Lastly, the panel recommended that a more
simplified approach to water-distribution system modeling could
be used (i.e., simple mixing model), unless we could
definitively prove--using historical information and data--that
there were lengthy periods (exceeding several months) when the
Tarawa Terrace water-distribution system was interconnected
with the Holcomb Boulevard water-distribution system. These
recommendations were accepted by the Agency and were
implemented.
Conclusion
In summary, ATSDR has an essential role in providing public
health support to people and communities impacted by hazardous
substances. ATSDR expects the study on the association between
health effects and exposure to the drinking water contaminants
to be completed in 2008. Our assessment of the feasibility of
additional work is expected to be completed this year. On a
personal note, my staff and I have truly enjoyed interacting
with the former Marines who lived at Camp Lejeune. As an
Agency, we take very seriously the trust placed in our
organization by members of the public like these former
Marines.
At this time, I am happy to answer any questions you may
have.
Answers to Submitted Questions by Mr. Green
Question: Mr. Sinks, in your testimony, it states that the
Agency for Toxic Substances Disease Registry (ATSDR) has
conducted studies on children that may have been exposed to
trichloroethylene (TCE) and tetrachloroethylene (PCE) at Camp
Lejeune. Has ATSDR considered studying adults who may have been
exposed to TCE and PCE at Camp Lejeune?
Answer: ATSDR's current and previous epidemiological
studies at U.S. Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune have focused on
the health effects to the fetus and child from maternal
exposures to drinking water contamination because the fetus is
the most vulnerable to these exposures and because there are
only a very few studies that have evaluated the effects on the
fetus of trichloroethylene (TCE) and tetrachloroethylene (PCE)
exposures. Because of this gap in our scientific knowledge, and
because the fetus is the most vulnerable to these exposures,
ATSDR studied specific health effects in children that may be
associated with maternal exposures to these drinking water
contaminants. ATSDR is currently evaluating the feasibility of
conducting a study of adult mortality and cancers among a
cohort of Marines who were stationed at the base during the
period when the drinking water was contaminated with TCE and
PCE. The assessment of the feasibility of such a study will be
completed by the end of 2007.
Question: In the studies that ATSDR has conducted, you have
contacted the parents of children that have been exposed to TCE
and PCE at Camp Lejeune. If you can contact those people to ask
them to participate in a study and create a registry, then why
not notify everyone who may have been exposed to water
contamination at Camp Lejeune?
Answer: ATSDR does not have access to data on everyone who
may have been exposed to water contamination at Camp Lejeune.
The Department of Defense is the agency that may have data on
this population. For the study ATSDR is conducting, we have
been able to contact many of the parents of children whose
mothers were on base during pregnancy. This sub-population does
not cover the entire population of those who may have been
exposed, but ATSDR does plan to provide study participants with
the results of our findings.
Another aspect of the agency's work is conducting water
modeling to determine which housing units at Camp Lejeune
received contaminated water during what time period and the
level or concentration of the contaminated water. ATSDR has
posted to its Web site a summary of the findings from its
historical exposure reconstruction work and also the full
technical findings. These are available at www.atsdr.cdc.gov/
sites/lejeune/watermodeling.html
We have publicized the availability of these data by
issuing a press release, and we are working closely with the
Community Assistance Panel to identify other methods of
effective outreach to the affected community concerning ATSDR
work. Similar outreach efforts will be undertaken for the study
results when they are available.
Mr. Stupak. Dr. Bove, were you going to have an opening
statement? Dr. Maslia?
Mr. Maslia. No.
Mr. Stupak. All right. Then we are going to move to 10-
minute questions then. On this panel, we are going to do 10
minutes. I will begin. Dr. Sinks, did you say you are going to
do an adult study? That's in the planning works for Camp
Lejeune?
Mr. Sinks. Yes. Thank you. We have not committed to do an
adult study. A decision was made to do the childhood study
because the data gaps were greatest in that area. We wanted to
look more closely at the most vulnerable population, and we had
records to do that.
Mr. Stupak. I thought you said in your opening----
Mr. Sinks. We are doing a feasibility study right now.
Mr. Stupak. Feasibility study to do determine if there
should be a study?
Mr. Sinks. To determine if we should or should not move
ahead to do a study of adults. That is correct.
Mr. Stupak. And when you do your studies areas you are
looking at what? From what year, 1968 to 1985?
Mr. Sinks. We define the study beginning date as 1968. Now
that is for the children. And that was decided on the basis of
the availability of computerized birth certificate records, so
we wouldn't have to go back and contact all of the families
before 1968 in order to determine who there might have been.
We cut the study off in 1985 because the information we
had at that time was exposure had stopped in 1985.
Mr. Stupak. You are aware that these wells were used
through 1987?
Mr. Sinks. Dr. Maslia's work with Tarawa Terrace shows us
that there may have been some much lower contamination in the
finished water from 1985 through 1987. I think you have a chart
that shows that. It may be a little difficult to read, but the
levels are significantly lower. These are not sampled.
Mr. Stupak. More than 5 parts per billion?
Mr. Sinks. A little more than 5. Possibly somewhere between
5 and 10, but certainly nowhere approaching the levels of 180
which we saw prior to 1985.
Mr. Stupak. So you don't dispute the fact that the wells
were used up through 1987? But you are cutting the study off in
1987.
Mr. Sinks. Well I am not an expert. There were some wells
used. The two primarily contaminated wells were shut off. I
think one of them may have been used in a mixture for a short
period of time.
Morris, if you want to answer that.
Mr. Maslia. Yes. The two primary contaminated wells known
as TT-26 and TT-23 were shut down from continuous use.
Mr. Stupak. But used periodically after----
Mr. Maslia. If they have to obtain a water sample, you have
to turn the wells on, so they would turn them on. There was a
period in April that they turned TT-23 on for 7 hours, for 7
different hours but they were not used continuously. Those two
wells were not used continuously. All the wells were shut down
when the treatment plant was shut down in March 1987.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Dr. Sinks, I asked Dr. Gros about
miscarriages. Have you looked at miscarriages during that
period of time from 1968 to 1985?
Mr. Sinks. We did use adverse reproductive outcomes using
birth certificates, so we limited that first study to a study
using available vital statistics.
Mr. Stupak. So the answer is no, you didn't look at
miscarriages?
Mr. Bove. We did look at fetal deaths. Using fetal death
certificates we found 83 fetal deaths during that period. We
expected, based on the ratio of fetal deaths to live births,
about three times more than that. So the fetal death
certificates from North Carolina were seriously underestimating
or under-ascertaining the fetal deaths occurring in that
population. I don't know why that was the case. That would be
something for North Carolina to answer.
Mr. Stupak. How many fetal deaths versus how many women did
you look at?
Mr. Bove. We decided not to pursue the fetal deaths because
we saw that we were under-ascertaining them by a factor of I
think 3. We didn't know why we were seeing so few fetal deaths
in this population, OK, so if we did a study we would have to
figure out why, for example, the fetal death rate was so slow.
Mr. Sinks. Based on a proportion of live births?
Mr. Bove. That is based on a proportion of fetal deaths to
live births. You expect a certain portion of fetal deaths given
the number of live births in a population.
Mr. Stupak. Looking for a number of fetal births compared
to the rest of the country, not necessarily when you have a
large concentration in a population, why wouldn't you look at
another part of the country?
Mr. Bove. In the study, they look at adverse reproductive
outcomes, and in the current study too. They are looking at
comparing those exposed at the base to those unexposed at the
base. That's the idea. We want to see if contamination levels
are associated with these outcomes. So if you compare it to
some other base, we'd have to get birth certificates and fetal
deaths from another base. It's not clear--we would have to
figure out whether there were exposures occurring at another
base. It made sense to limit the studies to Camp Lejeune.
Mr. Stupak. How about the 12,598 children that were born
between 1968 and 1985? Did you take into consideration if those
children died?
Mr. Bove. Did we take into consideration the children died?
Mr. Stupak. Right. You said you looked for birth defects
and that, from 1968 to 1985.
Mr. Bove. Right. Some of those children did die.
Mr. Stupak. What percentage?
Mr. Bove. I will have to get back to you on that one.
Mr. Stupak. More than the national standard?
Mr. Bove. No. We didn't look at that.
Mr. Stupak. In your study when you make these comparisons,
these conclusions, you are comparing against different DoD
bases?
Mr. Bove. No. We're comparing exposed--mothers exposed at
Camp Lejeune to mothers unexposed at Camp Lejeune. What you
want to do in an epidemiologic study is to have two comparable
groups, an exposed and an unexposed, so they are similar in all
respects, if you can, except for the exposure.
Mr. Stupak. The only way you determine whether exposed or
unexposed is whether they had water from these wells.
Mr. Bove. Right.
Mr. Stupak. So if they are swimming at the Tarawa Terrace
swimming pool but they didn't drink the water there, then you
are unexposed?
Mr. Bove. Right.
Mr. Stupak. But if you are a pregnant lady, you certainly
could be exposing your child while you are in that swimming
pool, is that right?
Mr. Bove. There are other exposures too. You pump gas.
There are all kinds of exposures. What you try to do is compare
two populations that are similar, OK, and the population in
Tarawa Terrace and the population of Holcomb Boulevard----
Mr. Stupak. Why don't you just----
Mr. Bove. Can I finish?
Mr. Stupak. Sure. But you don't get 10 minutes to answer
because that's all I have to question.
Mr. Bove. One second. The populations there are similar, we
hope. And this is how epidemiologic studies are done. We hope
they are similar in all other risk factors except for the
exposure of interest.
Mr. Stupak. What's the percentage of birth defects at Camp
Lejeune of those 12,598 compared to the rest of the country?
Mr. Bove. We don't have the data on all birth defects at
Camp Lejeune. We just focused on those birth defects we were
interested in based on previous studies.
Mr. Stupak. So if someone says birth defects are 15 times
greater than the rest of the Nation, you have no way to dispute
that.
Mr. Sinks. May I just interject here on a couple of things?
We do have information on the numbers of children who reported
to us with birth defects from those 12,000, because in fact we
went out and interviewed all of those parents. We collected
that information. We did have priorities in terms of which were
the conditions we were most interested in because of previously
published scientific studies. Those were the ones we focused
on.
We did find there were a couple conditions we were
interested in where we had insufficient numbers of children who
were born with those birth defects; and in fact, one of those
conditions we actually saw less than we would have expected
based on national data.
What Frank was saying regarding fetal deaths as a
proportion of total live births is not a comparison internal to
Camp Lejeune. That's a comparison based on what nationally----
Mr. Stupak. I realize that. I guess what I'm trying to say,
if you are at Camp Lejeune, how can you sit here and say this
person was exposed, this person was not exposed? They go over
to someone's house and not have a drink of water?
Mr. Sinks. Let me just say this. There is no question that
there are other folks at Camp Lejeune we're not studying who
were exposed. And if your question is essentially one of have
we included in our studies everybody who was potentially
exposed, the answer is no.
But part of that answer has to do with how do we do
epidemiologic studies? How do we do it in a timely way? Because
I don't think you want us to be here in 5 years and----
Mr. Stupak. You are telling us you won't have that report
done until next year now, right?
Mr. Sinks. We will probably have it done, I'm hoping, early
2008. It is a difficult thing to do. The water modeling is a
particularly difficult thing to do, and the Hadnot Point system
is what we have to do.
Mr. Stupak. Of these 12,598 children born between 1968 and
1985, you've talked to all these parents?
Mr. Sinks. Well, I haven't personally. But the people
working for us have interviewed--was it the total? Was that
12,000?
Mr. Stupak. So someone talked to Mr. Gros, then, who was in
the first panel?
Mr. Sinks. I believe all three of them had been contacted
by us. Let me just point out, that's why they found out about
the issue.
Mr. Stupak. All right.
General Dickerson, I assume your opening statement that DoD
refused to fund between 1998 and 2000, that's our activities at
Camp Lejeune. Why was that, do you know? You have to use your
mike, please, sir.
General Dickerson. I'm sorry sir. The 1998 funding for
ATSDR activity provided by the Department of the Navy was
handled by the Navy because it goes to the Secretariat level
for the defense environmental restoration program moneys. After
that was not funded--and the Marine Corps has stepped up and
it's funded it out of our accounts right now--we are not at the
Secretarial level.
Mr. Stupak. So you have no idea what happened between 1998
and 2000?
General Dickerson. No, sir. I do not.
Mr. Stupak. Do we have to get the Secretary of the Navy in
here to answer that question then?
General Dickerson. His staff has the background on how that
was appropriated. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. OK, we can do that. My time has expired.
Mr. Whitfield for 10 minutes. I think we'll be coming back.
Mr. Whitfield. Well, thank you for your testimony.
Dr. Sinks or Ms. Leonard, either one. On the earlier panel
I referred to the 2003 study of ATSDR in which it said that
ATSDR has determined that exposures to volatile organic
compounds in on-base drinking water is unlikely to result in
cancer and noncancer health effects in adults.
Now, how do you all come to that conclusion?
Mr. Sinks. I think this one's for me. This was the 1997
health consultation that we published on Camp Lejeune, and it
basically characterized what our health assessors saw in terms
of exposure levels, potential pathways, and tried to look at
the duration of exposure, the concentration of exposure, and
compare that with existing scientific literature that was out
there. Those individuals who were doing that made a conclusion
that they did not expect to see cancers in adults.
However, I will tell you that as a carcinogen, there is no
threshold dose to where we would or wouldn't know a cancer had
occurred. And we wouldn't conclude that no cancers would have
occurred on the basis of that.
I'm sorry. I kind of lost my train of thought there. But we
did make the decision to go ahead and study it in adults
because we had previously--you showed some data on Woburn--that
was a study that we were involved in, and that did indicate
some risks to childhood cancers, and we wanted to follow up
with that, and we felt that this was the proper place to do
that.
Mr. Whitfield. It's a little bit surprising, I guess, to
hear that sort of determination, saying that it is unlikely to
result in cancer, particularly since these wells--and water was
coming from these wells from 1968.
Mr. Sinks. Mr. Whitfield, let me say that what hasn't been
mentioned is that the health consultation does indicate that a
past public health hazard had occurred, and that we clearly
stated this was a past public health hazard. Now the
individuals were looking, then, at would we have expected to
see certain health outcomes, and they made the conclusion they
didn't expect to. But they clearly did indicate that there was
a past public health hazard presented by this exposure.
Mr. Whitfield. OK. You are saying there was a health
hazard. But it's unlikely that it would have caused cancer?
Mr. Sinks. That was their conclusion at the time. But I
will say that as a carcinogen with no threshold dose, we
probably should be cautious about concluding that no cancers
did occur. There may have been some cancers. I can't tell you
if there were or there were not. But I'd also tell you that
epidemiology would not be able to tell you if any individual's
cancer was due to this----
Mr. Whitfield. If I'm a plaintiff's lawyer, I'm sure that I
can come forth with scientific evidence and would make the
argument that it did cause cancer. I mean that wouldn't be
surprising to you that we would be able to find evidence to
that effect, would it?
Mr. Sinks. Well, I think these chemicals are reasonably
anticipated to be human carcinogens. That's well documented.
The issue becomes one of duration and dose, and at what dose we
see that. And I think the human epidemiology at the time was
mostly focused on adults in occupational settings where their
exposures are much greater.
Mr. Whitfield. We were talking about 2003, and you made the
statement that in 2003 there was a position, and you've sort of
made me think that maybe you are rethinking that. But in this
report that was issued today, the Executive Summary, it says on
page ES-3, thus ATSDR determined that exposure to VOCs in on-
base drinking water was unlikely to result in cancer and
noncancer health effects in adults.
Mr. Sinks. Well, that's quoting our 1997 public health
hazard. Those were the conclusions of the people doing that
health assessment. And again I want to repeat, while we use the
word ``unlikely,'' which is low probability, it doesn't mean
they would not could not have occurred. We would not be able to
exclude that possibility.
Mr. Whitfield. Well, Ms. Leonard, you are in charge of
administering the 850-some claims filed by personnel at Camp
Lejeune who are seeking damages, and in your testimony you
state you are waiting for ATSDR to complete its study before
you take action on the claims.
Ms. Leonard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Whitfield. It seems to me they're taking the position
here that there's no correlation here. Is that what you think?
Ms. Leonard. Are you speaking only about the adults?
Mr. Whitfield. Yes.
Ms. Leonard. Yes. It does sound like that. We are waiting
particularly for the water modeling part of the scientific
study so that we can figure out what doses, during what time
periods, at what housing areas, what levels, and when the
medical piece comes through, we'll draw the correlation between
specific illnesses or injuries at that point.
Mr. Whitfield. Have you filed any medical claims on behalf
of children?
Ms. Leonard. We have not at this point.
Mr. Whitfield. When do you expect that some decisions will
be made on children's issues?
Ms. Leonard. As soon as we get the water modeling. I
believe part of that was just released. I have not seen that
nor have I been briefed on it. When the entire modeling is
released and then the medical evidence tying particular
illnesses or injuries to those levels of exposure, at that time
we will adjudicate that group of claimants that are claiming
about those particular illnesses.
Mr. Whitfield. What would you say of the time line on all
of this would be? Or maybe Dr. Sinks could help or someone
could help.
Mr. Sinks. The Tarawa Terrace study is complete and it's
out today. The Hadnot Point piece is not completed. Mr. Maslia
believes it will be done later this summer or in the fall, and
the ``epi'' study which will be connecting the childhood
conditions with these exposures would be sometime I hope in the
spring.
Mr. Whitfield. Now these are being followed under the
Federal Tort Claims Act?
Ms. Leonard. Yes, sir, they are.
Mr. Whitfield. And you all make the initial administrative
decision?
Ms. Leonard. Yes, sir. Once a claim is filed, the law
requires that the claimant allow the agency 6 months to
adjudicate the claim. And when the 6-month time period expires,
at that time they are able to go into Federal District Court to
go sue the United States of America.
Mr. Whitfield. So you would make a decision then, and they
would go to Federal court and contest that decision?
Ms. Leonard. They could go now if they wanted to, because
the 6 months has expired since the claims were filed, the
majority of them. So they could go now if they wanted to. The
claimant always has the right to allow the agency more time to
adjudicate the claim, as in this case, it's been more than 6
months. It's been years on many of them. So we are waiting for
the further evidence to adjudicate those claims.
Mr. Whitfield. All right. Dr. Sinks, not too long ago,
Ranking Member Barton and I sent a letter to you all talking
about other military bases. And in some of the data that you
provided back to us as answers--could you all put on the
monitor this table regarding the HazDat Databases on Nebraska
Ordnance Plant, Mather Air Force Base. It's hard to read that.
But tab 21.
Mr. Sinks. This is what we sent you yesterday.
Mr. Whitfield. Yes. On tab 21, we specifically talked about
five bases: Nebraska Ordnance Plant, the Mather Air Force Base,
the Air Force plant No. 4, McClellan Air Force Base, and
Wurtsmith Air Force Base. And your response, according to the
documentation that we have, was wrong in three out of five of
those facilities. The data in the HazDat Database was wrong in
three out of five. Were you aware of that?
Mr. Sinks. We spoke with your staff yesterday about this.
Let me say that your request came to us late Friday afternoon.
It was a list of many bases, and asking us to respond to you in
detail, I believe, around the 26th. We were asked to look at
the five specific bases, and we did find that some of the
numbers in there may not have fit a category that certainly I
would have expected them to fit. I will not tell you that means
they are necessarily wrong.
The system that you are describing, HazDat, was a system
designed in 1991. It was specifically designed not for us to
use to identify places where we would do human health research,
but it was designed as a tool to provide individuals and
communities information that they might readily access through
the Internet about a site of interest. What we have is a list
that you've come up with of several bases. I don't know how
many--20, 30.
Mr. Whitfield. Well I think we want to get with you after
this hearing, because the evidence shows quite clearly that the
response was wrong, your response was wrong.
Mr. Sinks. Let me say there very well may be some errors in
some of the data in HazDat, which contains hundreds of
thousands of data bits and thousands of sites over 20 years of
ATSDR involvement. The issue of how do we identify those sites
where TCE is exposing large numbers of people where we might
want to do health studies is not one where we would necessarily
rely on using that interbase tool.
So yes, there are things we should be doing with HazDat to
correct it. We have been trying to put it on a new platform and
to correct some of those things. But it does not surprise me
that we could find one or two errors in there, or more, or the
interpretation of them.
Mr. Whitfield. Well, I think the thing is, we're focusing
on Camp Lejeune today. But we know that there are at least 22
other military bases around the country with some contaminated
water. And in this--just taking the Nebraska ordnance plant, it
says 630,000 parts per billion of TCE in municipal public
groundwater contamination. And in the response it says that
there was less than 700 parts per billion.
Mr. Sinks. Well let's split the difference here between
what may be inaccurate with HazDat and how we can identify
other places to do research on TCE. There are two different
issues. Let me say we have done human epidemiologic research on
other areas involving TCE, several of them non-DoD sites. So
the work that was done in Woburn involved that. We've been
involved in any number of human health studies. This particular
error that you are looking at was apparently a transpositional
error by an abstracter who looked at a value of PCBs--no TNT in
soil at this ordnance plant and somehow put it in as TCE.
Mr. Whitfield. Well, I mean, you all are called to a high
duty of responsibility and accuracy here, because when we have
military men and women serving our country and they have their
families with them, they expect, certainly, safe water to
drink. And I think what's happened at Camp Lejeune is a real
blight on all of us, and the fact that 22 other military bases
have been identified with problems as well calls this to a very
high standard. And I think that's what these hearings are all
about.
And I want to commend the Chairman once again for holding
the hearing and it's something we will continue to look at. And
I think my time has expired.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Walden, please.
Mr. Walden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to yield 2
minutes to my colleague from Texas who has some specific
questions involving Texas, and then I will have some questions.
Mr. Burgess. I thank my friend for yielding. I apologize
for having missed part of this hearing. We have several
hearings going on at the same time.
Dr. Sinks, on the list of 20 that Ranking Member Whitfield
was just referring to, the top of that list is the General
Dynamics plant in Fort Worth, Texas, with a reported
contamination with trichloroethylene of 11,000 micrograms per
liter. If I do the math right, that's 11 milligrams per liter.
That's a strikingly large amount. Can I just ask what is being
done currently? Is this the current situation that exists at
these other installations?
Mr. Sinks. That report, I believe, particularly identified
that level, but not at tap water where people were drinking. I
believe that we did not indicate a public health hazard from
TCE exposures at that site. Most of these sites I think, were
involved where these levels exist. There is not ongoing
exposure because they've documented the exposure and they've
taken corrective action.
Mr. Burgess. Not to interrupt, but that's my biggest
concern. We're doing something presently to keep ongoing
exposure from happening, particularly at these wells or these
sites that seem to have alarmingly astonishingly high levels.
Mr. Sinks. Absolutely.
Mr. Burgess. And are we also in the process of notification
of individuals who might have been exposed? Because this is
likely something that's been going on for some time.
Mr. Sinks. Our agency makes it a very specific practice to
make sure our information is available. When we have a
community that is currently there, we work very directly with
the community to educate them on what we've found and provide
them that information. We would have difficulty having to go
back to people who were essentially in a military base and then
left that base in terms of tracking them down and providing
them that information on a one-by-one basis. We do make our
information readily available publicly, but it's on the Web and
that type of----
Mr. Burgess. General Dickerson, I realize this is the Air
Force and not the Marine Corps. But would the military have the
ability to access those records and be able to participate in
information dissemination if that appeared to be necessary?
General Dickerson. Sir, I couldn't answer for the Air
Force. But I would hope that OSD and the other services have
these records available for review, but I cannot testify to
this committee that those records are available.
Mr. Burgess. Well, Dr. Sinks, I will just echo what Mr.
Whitfield said. I encourage you to get that information to the
committee so we can make an informed judgment about that. And I
thank Mr. Walden for yielding. I will yield back my time.
Mr. Walden. Thank you, Dr. Burgess. I appreciate your
participation in the committee.
Dr. Sinks, I want to ask you, if you had been on these
bases, especially Camp Lejeune, at the time that these other
gentlemen were there, would you have felt--and known about the
contamination--would you have felt comfortable drinking that
water?
Mr. Sinks. Well, I think that I personally would have been
using different water and I think that I would have been
recommending that an alternative water source was used at that
time.
Mr. Walden. And I think most of us--all of us--I don't know
anybody that would say the opposite of that. The question then
becomes: Where the database indicates that there were similar
higher levels or different levels around the country and that
we had men and women in uniform on bases consuming that water,
doesn't it make sense then to look at those folks and do an
epidemiological study?
Mr. Sinks. Thank you for the question. For us to do an
epidemiologic study there needs to be a number of things
available to us. One, we wouldn't do an epidemiologic study
unless we were convinced there was a completed pathway of
exposure and there were people actually exposed. Usually in
environmental epidemiology this issue of trying to determine
who was exposed, who wasn't exposed, is, frankly, the most
difficult thing to determine.
Mr. Walden. If I can just interrupt you a second, because I
don't do what you do.
Mr. Sinks. And I don't do what you do.
Mr. Walden. Well, you may be better off then. In Fort
Riley, there are 2,550 people that have been identified,
estimated exposed population at 330 parts per billion BCE and
96 parts per billion of TCE. Does anybody know who those 2,550
people are?
Mr. Sinks. I would not know.
Mr. Walden. Does anybody in your agency know?
Mr. Sinks. We would not generally collect personal
identifying information unless we were going ahead to do an
epidemiologic study, and then we have a burden to very closely
protect that information in confidentiality.
Mr. Walden. I understand. I guess what I'm trying to get
at, how do we take care of the people who may have been
exposed? How do we determine if there's a connection here and
how do we get them help if there is? And it sounds like you
can't do that. Is that correct?
Mr. Sinks. There are things that I can do.
Mr. Walden. What can you do?
Mr. Sinks. I can do a health consultation and determine if
there was a completed pathway.
Mr. Walden. What does that mean, completed pathway?
Mr. Sinks. Well, that simply is reviewing the available
information to determine if a contaminant in air, water, soil,
food, was at a level that would have constituted a health risk
and people actually consumed it or inhaled it.
Mr. Walden. Sure. And I understand that. But at 330 parts
per billion of BCE, does that constitute that pathway if one of
these----
Mr. Sinks. It would if it's in our drinking water at the
tap. Now, let me point out that there are other issues for when
you would do a study. You would do a study if you had
sufficient numbers to study and you know who they are, and you
have the ability to track them, and you can identify specific
health outcomes that they may have had. And that can be a very
difficult thing when we're going back 10, 20 years to try to
reconstruct that history.
Mr. Walden. All right. I'm sure it is.
Mr. Sinks. Let me give you one example. If we did find a
very high level in a well off base that was exposing a family,
our recommendation would be to get them alternative water.
Mr. Walden. Right.
Mr. Sinks. Our recommendation would not be to do an
epidemiologic study. We would not do a study of a single
family, or even 20 families, because we wouldn't have enough
people to study.
Mr. Walden. OK. With 2,550 families or individuals?
Mr. Sinks. It could be, if we also had an appropriate
control group who were unexposed and we were able to identify
who those people were, and we knew what the health outcomes we
were looking for were, and we had the availability to get
information on that.
Mr. Walden. I guess what I'm struggling with--and I'm
probably not alone--it seems like we would err on the side of
the men and women in uniform, that we would be doing everything
possible to contact every person who was on these bases and to
find out if there is this connection.
And I may be not hearing you correctly, but I get the sense
that we're not making that effort; that there aren't enough
people, there aren't enough people sick, we don't know about a
pathway yet. We have this database that shows pretty high
levels of concentration of these chemicals in the water. Am I
missing something here?
Mr. Sinks. Let me separate out this issue of why you are
wanting to go back and contact those individuals.
Mr. Walden. Right.
Mr. Sinks. For a specific reason.
Mr. Walden. Right.
Mr. Sinks. Versus needing to do an epidemiologic study. The
study we're doing at Camp Lejeune right now looking at these
birth defects should be very sufficient to tell us whether or
not levels of exposure in this range are associated with risk,
with these conditions, and we wouldn't make a recommendation to
go out and look at every single instance when that occurs. We
want to inform the science. We want to learn from it.
Mr. Walden. So you would use the science from that study
and apply it across----
Mr. Sinks. Right.
Mr. Walden. Are there already epidemiologic studies,
already done outside of the military application, involving
these chemicals in drinking water?
Mr. Sinks. Yes, there are.
Mr. Walden. What did they show?
Mr. Sinks. Actually, let me ask Frank to talk about Woburn
and the other studies that he's done.
Mr. Walden. Did they show a connection and the pathway that
Dr. Sinks----
Mr. Bove. There have been two studies that looked at
childhood leukemia and these chemicals specifically: Woburn,
which we funded; and a northern New Jersey study which I
participated in, and was funded also by ATSDR. In both studies,
trichloroethylene was associated with childhood leukemia. The
only wrinkle here is that in Woburn most of the cases were
males, and in the New Jersey study, the excess was--it was
entirely in females. So we don't understand what that is all
about.
But there's also been a study done of birth defects and TCE
and PCE. That's a study I did in northern New Jersey. That was
also funded by ATSDR and I found associations there between
trichloroethylene and neural--two defects and oral clefts.
That's why we're studying them at Camp Lejeune. As for PCE, it
was much fuzzier and not clear, but there seemed to be an
association with oral clefts, cleft lip and cleft palates, so
that's another reason we are looking at those end points there.
Mr. Walden. So from the studies you've done or the science
you've studied, the information you've seen from perhaps other
studies, would it be reasonable for somebody like me to
conclude that if there are certain levels of these chemicals in
the water that was consumed by men and women in uniform, or
anybody anywhere, that that's a likelihood they could come down
with the diseases, or their kids could, that we heard about
from the first panel?
Mr. Bove. The problem here is that both the New Jersey
study that I worked on, both studies, and the Woburn study are
still in dispute of what they show. There are, of course,
industry people that will say that they are not sufficient to
show anything. So there is this dispute and controversy in the
scientific community.
Mr. Walden. Should there be other studies done?
Mr. Bove. Absolutely.
Mr. Walden. Would you recommend that studies be done on
people from these other bases?
Mr. Bove. We want to do credible studies, though, because
if we don't do a credible study, a strong study, they won't
provide the evidence we want. We have to pick exposure, those
situations where there's good exposure data, and there also has
to be a large enough number.
Now, if you remember, there are 12,000 or so births we
looked at at Camp Lejeune. And at the end of the day, we have
relatively small numbers of cancers and birth defects to look
at, and that's because these are rare outcomes. So if we want
to do more of these kinds of studies--in northern New Jersey, I
looked at 80,000 births. I still had small outcomes at the end.
So that's how difficult these studies are.
You cannot recommend doing these studies anywhere and
everywhere. You have to have good outcome data. You have to
have good exposure data. You have to have large numbers of
people in order to have a strong enough study to make a dent in
the controversies around these chemicals.
Mr. Walden. All right. So then are you suggesting that,
given the testimony we heard in the first panel and the data on
water quality we've seen, that there isn't enough there to do
more studies?
Mr. Bove. No. I'm always looking for an opportunity to do a
study. My frustration has always been that the States
oftentimes do not have this kind of data available in the
drinking water in their municipalities so we could do studies.
I would love to repeat the New Jersey studies I did back in the
early 1990's. I would love to do that all across the country.
The problem appears to be that there's not enough data on
drinking water contamination in this country to be able to do
these studies. The other side also is that you need good
registries, you need cancer registries, you need birth defect
registries. In North Carolina they didn't have a birth defect
registry until 1996, and a statewide cancer registry until
1990.
Other States are in somewhat similar state. New Jersey was
fortunate. We had both in place early enough and good drinking
water data so I could do these studies.
Mr. Walden. Weren't there medical records on the base that
you would be able to search back through, or the individual
service members' records.
Mr. Bove. We were able to use the medical records to verify
the cases in the current study, although we have some cases
where there are no medical records available. Medical records
do not stay at the Naval Hospital. They get shipped to another
location for storage. I'm not sure exactly when I can get back
to you on that. But they are stored. They're not destroyed.
Mr. Walden. So they do exist?
Mr. Bove. But they're not easy to access and they are not
filed in any way that would be very easy to link the population
with the outcome.
Mr. Walden. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stupak. We're going to go another round. I will let you
go over because I know you gave some time to Mr. Burgess.
After you do your study, and Ms. Leonard, you are going to
pay your claims based upon the study; right?
Ms. Leonard. Yes, sir. When we have the information, we
will adjudicate the cases at that time, yes.
Mr. Stupak. So if their study shows there's a connection
between childhood birth defects, you are just going to pay
these claims for the childhood defects?
Ms. Leonard. Well, there's a little more that goes into it
besides that. We have to take all of the information and
analyze each case on a case-by-case basis, the facts.
Mr. Stupak. Even if they do their study, you are still
going to look at this case by case? You may not do anything
with these claims?
Ms. Leonard. Absolutely. We have to adjudicate each case on
its own merits.
Mr. Stupak. Why are we spending all this money on studies?
It seems like we're just delaying here. Delay, delay, delay.
Mr. Sinks. The reason that we do the studies is to add to
the science base to inform groups like----
Mr. Stupak. I understand that. But I want to know about the
victims at Camp Lejeune. How are these studies helping them?
Because it doesn't look like it's helped them at all.
I will take that back. You did point out today that through
your investigation based on this report, you did today on page
ES-10 from 19 January 1955--I will take it back--first exceeded
the minimum content level was October 1957. So the pollution at
Tarawa Terrace has been going on since 1957. Your study has
only gone on from 1968 forward. Can you go back to 1957 and
take a look at this? If you take a look at it from 1957 on,
according to your chart, you are way above the minimum content
level.
Mr. Sinks. Let me point out that the purpose of our study
is not to identify individuals who were affected for
compensation. That is not the purpose of our study. The purpose
of our study is to do the most credible work we can do from a
scientific point of view.
Mr. Stupak. On TCE and PCEs, right?
Mr. Sinks. TCE and PCE contamination at Camp Lejeune. We
made a decision to start in 1968, not because that's when
pollution started, but because that's when we could identify
the cohort of births that we wanted to look at in order to do
our study.
It was really an issue of efficiency.
Mr. Stupak. So you are saying the information is not
available between 1957 and 1968 for the births?
Mr. Sinks. It may be available. We do not have it.
Mr. Stupak. Wouldn't you want to go back to 1957 now and
move forward?
Mr. Sinks. I don't think so. We have more than 12,000
births. We have terrific information, particularly on Tarawa
Terrace on the exposure, and we believe that the size of the
group we've collected will be sufficient to answer the
questions that we've posed. The issue of going back has to do
with whether or not our study is sufficient to answer those
questions.
Mr. Stupak. All right.
Mr. Sinks. Now, I will also say that, unfortunately,
epidemiology is not the right tool to identify whether an
individual has developed a disease from a specific cause.
Mr. Stupak. I agree. That's where Ms. Leonard can still
dispute it, right?
Mr. Sinks. Well, Ms. Leonard will have to decide what she
decides. That's not in our court.
Mr. Stupak. Ms. Leonard, this committee has asked for the
litigation report. I understand it's 400-and-some pages. When
can we expect that report?
Ms. Leonard. Sir, I turned that over to the legislative
counsel at DoD yesterday, and they will be responding to your
request. I'm not the person that would be producing that.
Mr. Stupak. When?
Ms. Leonard. I don't have that information. There is a
legal review ongoing right now.
Mr. Stupak. All right. I still get the impression from the
first panel----
And General Dickerson, let me ask you this. Why has DoD not
notified those residents at Camp Lejeune who were there during
the time these wells were in use, that they may have been
exposed to TCE or PCE?
General Dickerson. Sir, there have been numerous
communications from the commanding general at the time, from
Headquarters Marine Corps, through media surveys, contacted
over 3,500 media outlets, whether that be weekly publications,
daily publications.
Mr. Stupak. I realize that. The people who were there, you
can't tell me the Marine Corps doesn't know who was at Camp
Lejeune from 1965 to 2007.
General Dickerson. We could probably get the data who was
stationed at Camp Lejeune. Would it be 100 percent complete?
I'm not sure. We've made every attempt to get the information
out and work with ATSDR to make sure----
Mr. Stupak. Right. I mean military--don't you think you
have a responsibility to let these people know they may have
been exposed?
General Dickerson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. Why don't you do it?
General Dickerson. We are doing everything we possibly can
to get the media out.
Mr. Stupak. Not the media.
General Dickerson. Message.
Mr. Stupak. Not the media, not the message. I'm talking
about notice those individuals who lived there. Why not contact
them?
General Dickerson. Some people, we haven't got an address
to get to. Some of the records are not complete on everybody
that was stationed there.
Mr. Stupak. Have you made an effort?
General Dickerson. We have made every effort to get the
word out. That is why the Web site was set up.
Mr. Stupak. No no, not the word out. Notice directly these
people. If you can track down Dr. Gros who is down in Beaumont,
Texas, for his son, I would think the military could do it if
they wanted to; don't you think?
General Dickerson. We have a media campaign to go out,
based on the study----
Mr. Stupak. As an officer, wouldn't you expect your Marine
Corps would tell you? Were you at Camp Lejeune during this
time?
General Dickerson. The Marine Corps, sir, has tried----
Mr. Stupak. Were you at Camp Lejeune during this time?
General Dickerson. Yes, sir, I was. I was stationed there
from 1974 to 1978, from 1983 to 1986.
Mr. Stupak. Would you expect to be notified?
General Dickerson. I was. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. How would you notified?
General Dickerson. By letter, by communications, and base
papers.
Mr. Stupak. Don't you think everybody, then, should get a
letter?
General Dickerson. Yes, sir. To my knowledge, everybody who
was in affected areas had a letter.
Mr. Stupak. That's not what the first panel said.
General Dickerson. I understand what the first panel said.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. Dr. Sinks, have you been told by DoD why they
didn't fund your study from 1998 to 2000? Have you been told?
Mr. Sinks. No, I have not. I was not with ATSDR at that
time.
Mr. Stupak. Do you have any reason? Have you drawn any
conclusions why they did not fund you?
Mr. Sinks. I can't draw any conclusions about that. I can
tell you that we did not stop our work and that we went ahead
and funded it with our CERCLA dollars to ramp up to begin the
study.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Has the Marine Corps promptly and fully
disclosed to you all information pertaining to the
contamination so that accurate studies of adverse health
effects could be conducted?
Mr. Sinks. Since I have been involved in this, which is
about the past 3 years, every time I have made a request they
have made the information available, and most of this
information Mr. Maslia has been involved with, and I believe
he's gotten very good cooperation.
Morris, do you want to add anything?
Mr. Maslia. Yes, sir. We have received the information that
we have requested. Some of the issues involved is identifying
who may have the information, and in our vernacular or our
jargon, from a modeling standpoint, an epidemiologist
identifying it so the people on base understand exactly the
type of information we're looking for.
Mr. Stupak. OK.
Dr. Sinks, of these 57 children with confirmed illnesses or
children of interest, as you call them, how many of these 57
are still alive?
Mr. Sinks. I'm going to defer that to Dr. Bove. He may know
that. I don't have the information.
Mr. Bove. I don't have the information in front of me. I
will have to get back to you.
Let me say one thing though; that the neural tube defects,
including in particular anencephaly, they die pretty much right
after birth, so those would definitely be dead. Some of the
spina bifida cases would be dead because the leukemias would be
dead. So I would--but I will get back to you.
Mr. Stupak. It doesn't sound like very many would be alive,
then.
Mr. Bove. The majority are still alive, as of the survey
which is the last time we checked on their vital status. The
majority are alive, but I don't have the exact number, and I'll
get back to you with it. But whether they're alive or dead,
they were in our study, and they stay in our study.
Mr. Stupak. OK.
Dr. Sinks, do you want to say something?
Mr. Sinks. I was just going to add that most of the clefts,
cleft palate, cleft lip, would not be fatal. We've had a
tremendous success in treating childhood cancers over the past
15-20 years, so I would think that a significant number of the
kids with leukemia would have survived. And the neural tube
defects, most of the spina bifidas, probably would still be
alive.
Mr. Stupak. If the Marine Corps provided you all the names
of all the people who are living in Tarawa Terrace from; 1957
until 1997, would that help you?
Mr. Sinks. In terms of this childhood study or additional
studies?
Mr. Stupak. The information you need.
Mr. Sinks. Well, we have the information we need.
Mr. Stupak. I get the feeling you would study this thing to
death if we let you. I am trying to bring this to some kind of
end here.
Mr. Sinks. We would be pleased with the opportunity to use
our skills in environmental measurements in epidemiology to do
more work. There's no question about it.
Mr. Stupak. My time's just about up. You keep talking about
water modeling, OK. That's TCE, PCEs, in the water, how much at
certain times; like that, right?
Mr. Sinks. It's more detailed than that. We have just a few
data points that were collected between 1982 and 1985.
Mr. Stupak. But there's no doubt in this area we're talking
about Tarawa Terrace, Hadnot Point, people were exposed to TCE
and PCE.
Mr. Sinks. Well, certainly our water modeling----
Mr. Stupak. You don't know if it's one glass of water that
would trigger childhood leukemia or if it's 3 years of drinking
the water, do you?
Mr. Sinks. I wouldn't know how much it is.
Mr. Stupak. Right. So why is water modeling so important
when you have statistics like you show here, off the charts?
Mr. Sinks. Because we don't rely simply on saying there's
an association because somebody drank one glass and someone
drank no glasses.
Mr. Stupak. That's right. And you don't ask them how many
glasses they drank. From a scientific point, they're exposed or
they're not exposed.
Mr. Sinks. No, that's not the point. The point is the risk
increases with the amount somebody took. We do look for a dose
response. It's very important for looking at causal
relationships, and without it----
Mr. Stupak. So what's the minimum you look for for exposure
here at Camp Lejeune?
Mr. Sinks. What do you mean by ``minimum?''
Mr. Stupak. What's minimum exposure?
Mr. Sinks. Minimum concentration?
Mr. Stupak. No. What's the exposure? How many days do I
have to be exposed before I would be included in your study?
The question is, is are we categorizing people in an exposed
category for having been in this area 1 day, 30 days, 60 days?
Mr. Bove. We do everything on the month, not by the day.
Mr. Stupak. How many months do I have to be exposed?
Mr. Bove. For neural tube defects and for oral clefts, the
timing of the dose would be first trimester. After the first
trimester, no matter what you are exposed to, will not cause
those outcomes. OK? They are caused early in the pregnancies.
It's part of the difficulty of studying them. For the neural
tube, it's day 20 of gestation to day 27.
Mr. Stupak. So a 3-month period.
Mr. Bove. Well, in that case, the third to fourth week of
pregnancy, when the person doesn't even know they're pregnant
oftentimes, is when the dose would cause that neural tube
defect. OK. So it depends on the outcome. For childhood
leukemia from the Woburn study, we get the idea that the
exposures during pregnancy are more important--the exposures
during gestation are more important than the exposures after
birth, although there's still some controversy about that in
the literature.
Mr. Stupak. How long did it take you to do the Woburn
study?
Mr. Bove. There were two Woburn studies.
Mr. Stupak. How long did it take to do two of them? Because
we're on 10 years here.
Mr. Bove. The first Woburn study started in 1982 and
finished in 1987.
Mr. Stupak. Five years.
Mr. Bove. The second one started in the early 1990's and
didn't finish until the late 1990's. The difference between
Woburn and the Camp Lejeune study, there are several. First,
they did not do groundwater transport. They just used the one
sample they had, 267 parts per billion, and modeled the
drinking water system.
We're doing much more than that in terms of modeling. In
order to determine when the contamination started, we don't
know that without the modeling. The 1957 day you keep
mentioning, we would have no idea without the modeling. We
would have no idea what the levels were before 1980 because
there are no data before 1980. In fact, we wouldn't know the
levels pretty much until 1982 when we start getting some
specific numbers for the particular VOCs.
But we know that the exposures happened before that. The
only way to know that is through modeling. There's no other way
to do it. It takes a long time to do this kind of modeling.
This is cutting-edge technology here we're talking about.
There's no other study that's done this. I just want to get
that across.
Mr. Stupak. It would be a lot more--I won't even go there.
Any other questions from this side?
Mr. Whitfield. Just one more.
General Dickerson, I would like to ask you a question. TCE
was first detected in drinking water at the Wurtsmith Air Base
up in Michigan in October 1977. And the Air Force officials
immediately took steps to identify those wells, and within 1
month they basically closed those wells down. Now, you were not
the commanding general certainly at Wurtsmith which is an Air
Force Base, and you were not commanding general at Lejeune. But
in Lejeune, the first notice was in 1980 and then in 1982, and
they didn't close these wells down until 1985. So a period of 3
to 5 years at Lejeune for them to make that decision. From your
personal knowledge or your discussion with other people
involved, what was the difference in the speed of closing down
Wurtsmith and Lejeune? Why was there that kind of discrepancy?
General Dickerson. Sir, I can't speak for the Air Force on
what they did. But I can say everybody at Camp Lejeune reached
out to the State environmental, to the EPA, to everybody, to
find out what was the causes of the VOCs in the water at the
time, to find out what the impact was. They did not know. They
didn't find out the source of the contamination until 1984 when
they found the contaminated wells; and as soon as they found
they were contaminated, they shut them down.
There were no standards. That's part of the complicating
factor here on what to expect. There were snarls that had been
put out, but there was never any consistent data when they did
sample the water. Now, I'm talking finished water to come up
with the conclusion of what the impact was going to be on the
consumption, once it was discovered that the wells were
contaminated they shut the wells down.
Mr. Stupak. Can I jump in?
Mr. Whitfield. Sure.
Mr. Stupak. The big black binder there, go to exhibit No.
20, General. Because, man, when I read it as early as 1972, the
Navy regulations regulated your water, what contaminants could
be in. What could that be in, 1972? So all this stuff about
standards in the 1980's doesn't make sense.
When you look at exhibit No. 20, it says Navy regulations
required regular drinking water testing, and although TCE and
PCE are not specifically mentioned, these regulations set
limits for chlorinated hydrocarbons at 3 parts per billion.
That's lower than the 5 parts per billion EPA has right now.
That's 1972.
So in answer to Mr. Whitfield's question, I don't think
that would be quite right, according to the exhibit from the
Navy.
General Dickerson. Sir, I am not familiar with this
BUMEDINST description. But I can say the water was tested. All
finished products were tested.
Mr. Stupak. Based upon 1972 standards, right, sir?
General Dickerson. I can't say that.
Mr. Stupak. Read it. It says right there, 1972.
General Dickerson. I see this. Yes sir.
Mr. Stupak. So it's 1972, right? You see that?
General Dickerson. I would hope it was by this instruction.
Mr. Stupak. OK. So there was a standard as early as 1972.
So your answer to Mr. Whitfield would not be responsive or
accurate.
General Dickerson. It was tested, but I cannot say
specifically if these standards were employed at that time.
Mr. Stupak. Well, Marine Corps was required to follow Navy
regulations, were they not?
General Dickerson. Marine Corps does follow Navy
regulations.
Mr. Stupak. Is it a violation of your military code if you
ignore the regulations?
General Dickerson. No, sir. We do not ignore any
regulations. We hold ourselves to the highest standard.
Mr. Stupak. So then, 1972 for hydrocarbons, 3 parts per
billion.
General Dickerson. If that's what this instruction says,
yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. Exactly what it says. So you had a standard in
the 1980's. Someone chose to ignore it.
Ms. Dreyer. Sir, if I can add a little to this. Also
suggested no adverse response level values which ranged from
2,000, 2,300 down to----
Mr. Stupak. That's not what the document says. Navy
regulations says 3 parts per billion. You are required to
follow Navy regulations if you are in the military, and Camp
Lejeune would be one of those installations under Navy control.
Therefore you would expect they would follow 3 parts per
billion, would you not?
Ms. Dreyer. I'm not familiar with that document either, but
you would expect it. Let me also say that the source of the
chemicals, the TCE and PCE was in the well water. When Camp
Lejeune figured out that the well water was the source of these
chemicals, the day they sampled that well, they shut the well
down. Yes, it did take a long time between 1982 and 1984 when
they actually sampled the well. This is during the time when
there were concerns about asbestos-coated piping as well. And
they did do some research to try to determine what was the
cause of these chemicals. Ultimately it was determined to be
the wells.
So it didn't take a month, once the well was sampled and
the chemicals were identified. It was more in terms of days.
Mr. Stupak. Are you telling me the military's response is--
even though we know we are extremely higher than 3 parts per
billion, way over our Navy regulations, we would continue to
expose people because we can't find the source? That's
ludicrous. If you are concerned about the health and safety of
the people you are dealing with, if they're being exposed to
it, you would bring in potable water, you would take other
action. Your CID, Criminal Investigation Division, basically
the investigation found that they were not forthcoming in
questions, were not diligent in providing expertise, coached in
their answers, steered away from admitting knowledge of organic
interference from solvents.
It's been there since 1972. Your people were exposed to it,
and you didn't do anything.
General Dickerson. I wouldn't say that the Marine Corps,
that Camp Lejeune didn't do anything at that time. I will say
that they did work closely with the State of North Carolina
environmental to detect and find out what was contaminating the
water, see what the level of contaminants were and what the
impact was. They didn't know. There were no standards for these
contaminants at that point in time. I understand the view of
what you have pointed out to us today.
Mr. Stupak. I yield back. Sorry.
Mr. Whitfield. Ms. Dreyer, you are responsible today for
the environmental restoration program for the Marine Corps; is
that correct?
Ms. Dreyer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. So all of the bases around the U.S.?
Ms. Dreyer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. And are there other bases that are being
operated today that have water problems, water quality
problems?
Ms. Dreyer. We have other bases across the Marine Corps
that have these chemicals in the soil and groundwater. But I'm
not aware that any of these chemicals have entered into the
drinking water system or have impacted drinking water, no.
Mr. Whitfield. OK. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Walden, any questions?
Mr. Walden. I just want to go back to this document, see if
I understand what you are saying here. This is the one on tab
20 that deals--25 August, 1972, the BUMEDINST 6240.3C, where it
limits the chlorinated hydrocarbons. First, I am not a chemist.
Did these two chemicals that we are referencing today fall
under this category of chlorinated hydrocarbons?
General Dickerson. I would defer that to----
Ms. Dreyer. I believe they did, yes.
Mr. Walden. That is a yes then?
General Dickerson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Walden. OK. So then the level that is referenced here
on page six of that document, the 0.003 to 0.1 concentrations
in milligrams per million, that would have been way below what
you were reading coming out of the tap; right?
General Dickerson. Yes, sir.
Ms. Dreyer. Yes, that is correct. Generally, at that time
period, the method detection limit or the laboratory's
capability of detecting chemicals in water was generally about
10. If Camp Lejeune officials during that time got a reading of
10, it could be reported as nondetect or otherwise not present
in the sample. That is correct.
Mr. Walden. And at that time, what were their readings?
Ms. Dreyer. They varied. That was part of the problem. In
many instances they would have nondetect. We have seen as high
as 1,400 in tap water. I will point out that 18,000 figure is
from a well sample. And that well would not have been provided
directly to anybody to drink. It would have been transported to
the water treatment plant and mixed with other wells that were
pumping at that time. So the highest reading that I am aware of
right now at the Hadnot Point system is 1,400 parts per
million, which is well above today's standard.
Mr. Walden. Was it above this standard from the 1972
document?
Ms. Dreyer. It would be, because this is three, and that
would be five, and the only question I would have--and I am not
a laboratory analyst, so I don't know what the method detection
limit was. It could have been 5; it could have been 10. It
varied depending upon the laboratory and their credentials.
Mr. Walden. And who was in charge then at Camp Lejeune to
make sure that these levels were being followed?
General Dickerson. All of the officials, sir. All of the
officials at Camp Lejeune would have been in charge, just like
they are today, monitoring this, trying to detect what the
levels of the particles are per----
Mr. Walden. And General, have you gone back and looked to
see if anybody who was in charge over the last 20 years did
anything when a detection level exceeded the one listed here
occurred? Is there any documentation that would indicate
somebody said, wait a minute, we are over the limit?
General Dickerson. I can say that there has been an EPA
Criminal Investigative Division investigation, there has been a
GAO investigation, and six separate studies, to include the
Commandant's panel looking into the past to find if there was
any wrongdoing. And everybody has come back and said there were
no criminal intentions. Everybody did the best with the
information they had at the time. Unfortunately, some of the
levels on a day-to-day basis were above the acceptable levels
for drinking water.
Ms. Dreyer. If I can add to that, the base chemist at Camp
Lejeune during the early 1980's did make handwritten notes on
some analytical data suggesting that it was highly
contaminated, and that is in the record. I will also note that
the Navy, the chairman mentioned a quote about LANTDIV. LANTDIV
is the Atlantic Field Division of the Navy Facilities
Engineering Command. And during the early 1980's, I don't know
when it transitioned to Camp Lejeune, but during the early
1980's and possibly before that, the Navy was supporting the
Marine Corps with some engineering services, including this
water sampling. And that is part of trying to reconstruct the
history and figure out, when did Camp Lejeune know? It is
unclear to us even today. But we do have the information that,
in the 1980's, we had interferences, and we do have analytical
data in 1982.
Mr. Walden. So then I just want to make sure I understand
what you are saying, what did you say, the LAN----
Ms. Dreyer. The Navy, one of the field divisions of the
Navy.
Mr. Walden. So they were maybe responsible for ensuring
that these regulations were followed, water was----
Ms. Dreyer. They were conducting the water sampling and
analysis. And at that time, they were trying to comply with the
future regulation of the disinfection byproduct process, TTHMs.
And that is when this all came about, when they were gearing up
to find out if those chemicals were in the water. And they were
masked by these other chemicals when those came to light.
Mr. Walden. I see. I guess what I am struggling with, and I
imagine some of my colleagues are, is, if you were seeing this
pollutant in the tap water, wouldn't it have made sense in less
time than 4 years to go to the sources and see where it was
coming from?
Ms. Dreyer. Yes, it does.
Mr. Walden. We are looking back, so we have got 20/20
vision.
Ms. Dreyer. That is correct. And through my research,
through everyone's research, including the first panel, the
second, all three panels, we have all been trying to figure out
what happened. We are looking back 20 years, trying to put it
into context, trying to figure out, could we have done things
better? Should we do things better? But trying to reconstruct
that is very, very difficult.
Mr. Walden. Right. I am not trying to pit one branch
against the other. My understanding is the Air Force took that
action in a matter of what, a month's time or something when
they discovered at Wurtsmith that the tap water was bad. They
went right to the wells.
Ms. Dreyer. Right.
Mr. Walden. So why wouldn't that have occurred?
Ms. Dreyer. I am not familiar with their water distribution
systems. I really think it would be more appropriate if they
were in the room to answer. But we could have different
systems. I am not sure.
Mr. Walden. General, did you have something?
General Dickerson. Sir, I would just add, if this was to
occur today and there were no levels that had been determined
by the EPA, the water would be shut down until they could find
the ingredient that is being introduced into the water. We have
learned a lot from what happened back in the early 1980's.
Mr. Walden. Yes.
General Dickerson. We had to rely upon the science, the
data that is coming out of ATSDR to find out what was the
impact.
Mr. Walden. And I hope you understand where we are coming
from. We want to make sure it never happens again first. And
that is our job on the oversight committee all the time is to
figure out, what went wrong; why did it go wrong; and how do we
prevent it from going wrong again on all these topics we take
up. But second is, I think you hear the passion in our voices
about taking care of those especially who have worn our
Nation's uniform, who have been injured by this. And I realize
you are doing the studies and all that, but these people are
sick and dying along the way and fighting for benefits and help
for illnesses that it looks to me like there is a pretty good
relationship here. But I am not a scientist. But we need to
take care of those people.
General Dickerson. Our most precious resources are our
Marines and families, and we are going to do everything
possible to take care of them.
Mr. Walden. I am sorry to interrupt you. I am going to run
out of time here. I want to go to one other point you said,
because you talked about, you got a letter notifying you of
potential health risks from Camp Lejeune.
General Dickerson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Walden. Do you know how many of those letters went out?
General Dickerson. It was my information and knowledge that
everybody living on the base got one of those official letters.
Now whether they were received or not I cannot testify to this
committee.
Mr. Walden. I understand, but this is everybody living on
the base at the time you were living on the base?
General Dickerson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Walden. Not that they tracked down those who had lived
on the base.
General Dickerson. No, sir, at that point in time, from the
commanding general, it was those who were living on the base.
Mr. Walden. At that time?
General Dickerson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Walden. This would explain why some people in the room
say I didn't get a letter, because they may have not been
living on the base at that time. Is that correct?
General Dickerson. To my knowledge, that is correct, yes,
sir.
Mr. Walden. So I think the other piece we are after here
is, what would it take to reach out to anybody who had lived on
the base? I am assuming somewhere in their military files that
OSD has, or somebody, there is a chronology of where everybody
was at any time, or Camp Lejeune probably has records that
would indicate who lived there and who didn't. Is that correct?
Ms. Dreyer. There is a lot of information out there about
that. I will say that, upon conclusion of the ATSDR study, the
Marine Corps is going to conduct full notification in
conjunction with ATSDR to get the result, not only the
potential exposure but the effects of that. What does it mean?
Mr. Walden. Sure.
Ms. Dreyer. Right now, the Marine Corps, ATSDR has just
completed their water modeling, so they have their estimations
of how much people may have been exposed to. They mentioned
also that they have not yet completed the Hadnot Point water
modeling system. So those people still don't have answers to
these important questions. The third thing that they don't have
yet is, what does this mean? And I think you are getting at
that here. We know that people were exposed. We know there were
chemicals in the water. What does that mean? A lot of people
want to know that same question. I know ATSDR does. That is why
we need to have the study completed. But one other thing, it is
not as easy to contact people individually, especially prior to
the early 1970's, when people did not have Social Security
numbers, and they had service ID numbers in the military. So
that would be a very difficult and laborious task. We could
try. But I could never commit to finding 100 percent of people
who may have been exposed that. It would be very difficult. The
best way to reach them is probably through mass media and every
alternative possible, being as broad as possible.
Mr. Walden. We just don't want to leave anybody behind.
Ms. Dreyer. I agree, sir.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to make a
comment. All of us have the highest respect and admiration for
our men and women serving in the military, and those who have
served, but I think the bottom line of this incident at Camp
Lejeune can be summarized in just a few comments from the EPA
Criminal Investigation Division of the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command Atlantic Division on this incident. And
they said, in a number of different places, this investigation
found the staff of the LANTDIV was not forthcoming when
questioned about these issues. This investigation found that
LANTDIV as a technical advisory organization to Camp Lejeune
was not diligent in providing the technical expertise on this
issue. LANTDIV personnel consistently steered away from
admitting any knowledge of organic interference from solvents.
The biggest area of concern were the seemingly rehearsed
statements provided by the personnel of LANTDIV. The greatest
concern lay in the fact that investigators found LANTDIV
personnel to have been coached. Something I think there may not
have been any criminal charges, but I think it is a sad day
that the investigation shows quite clearly that people were not
forthcoming. And like I said, we are very proud of our
military, but I think, in this incident, the military
leadership failed the men and women who serve this country and
their families.
General Dickerson. Sir, if I could comment on that, it
would be beneficial if you could get representatives from
LANTDIV to answer that question directly.
Mr. Stupak. We plan on having them in. I just don't do one
hearing and stop it. This thing is going to go on. LANTDIV is
the Naval Facilities Engineering Command Atlantic Division. So
the military certainly knew about it. And as Mr. Whitfield
didn't say, he didn't go on and talk about even far more, that
it wasn't until 1984 that the Natural Resources Environment
Affairs Division at Camp Lejeune personnel ever sampled
individual wells, as opposed to finished drinking water at the
water treatment plants. Self-admittedly, this was the most
significant lapse in judgment. Not only didn't do it until
1984, but you actually had your Naval regulations in 1972, so
for 12 years they did nothing because your Naval regulations
under tab number 20 is very clear, the presence of the
following substances in excess of the concentrations listed
shall constitute grounds for rejection of supply--rejection of
the water supply; 3 parts per billion. You were way over that.
Way over that. Your own rules said you should have rejected it.
And you didn't do anything. So that is why we are here.
This, also, lack of notice; you can't notify people. When
you take a look at the report, whether it is GAO, they tell you
how many people were on base, how many people came on base. I
can't believe the military cannot provide that information to
either, whether it is Dr. Sinks' group or whatever, or they
could get a letter, like you indicated. My chief of staff here
sits here and says, man, I moved three times in the last few
years, but still I get a recall notice on a car that I owned
three moves ago. And if a private company can still notify you
about your clunker, which is probably already no longer on the
road, but can give you recall notices, I would think the
military could contact people who were exposed. And I would go
from 1957 until 1987, that 30-year period. I just can't believe
you can't do that. That's inconceivable to me.
Any further questions? We will dismiss this panel. Thank
you.
Dr. Sinks, you had something you wanted to add?
Mr. Sinks. Yes, just to remind you that we are involved in
the feasibility study. The feasibility study is looking at
adults. It would look at cancer incidence and total mortality.
We are working with the Department of Defense to identify
records of individuals who were at Camp Lejeune during that
time period. And we have had a good amount of cooperation from
them to determine if we can get access to those records and
construct the cohort of individuals you are suggesting.
Mr. Stupak. I am sure if you are wanting all these studies
done, I am sure if you just reach out to those people who were
exposed to TCEs and PCEs from 1957 to 1987 in Camp Lejeune,
sent them a letter and put it in their hot little hand, so
there is no dispute whether or not they got notice, I am sure
they would give you a waiver so you could get all the medical
records you wanted. But until they get that letter, they have
got to rely on media. And even though we have a little coverage
of this hearing today, 99 percent of them will never hear about
this hearing we had today. That's why it is so important to
have direct contact with those individuals. And those people
who were off base but worked on base, they certainly drank that
water, too. Thank you.
Mr. Stupak. All right. Our next panel, a third panel, as
this panel vacates, I will ask the following witnesses to come
forward for our third panel: Dr. Peter Murtha, Director of
EPA's Office of Criminal Enforcement; Mr. Tyler Amon, Special
Agent for EPA's Criminal Investigation Division; Mr. Frank
Hill, Director of Superfund Division at EPA's Region 4 Office;
and Dr. Marcia Crosse, Director of Public Health and Military
Health Care issues in the Government Accountability Office,
GAO.
Mr. Amon, are you going to testify? OK. We got everybody at
the table.
As you know, it is the policy of this committee to take
testimony under oath. Please be advised that, under the rules
of the House, you have the right to be advised by counsel
during your testimony.
Any of you wish to be advised by counsel during your
testimony? There are no indications. I think everyone does not
wish to be represented by counsel. I am going to ask you to
rise and raise your right-hand, please.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Stupak. I would like the record to reflect all
witnesses answered in the affirmative. We will now begin with
our 5-minute opening statements from our witnesses. We will
start on the righthand side.
Mr. Murtha.
STATEMENT OF PETER J. MURTHA, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CRIMINAL
ENFORCEMENT, FORENSICS AND TRAINING, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND
COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Mr. Murtha. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, I am Peter J. Murtha, and have been Director of
the Office of Criminal Enforcement, Forensics and Training, at
U.S. EPA since November 2003. Previously, I spent over 16 years
as a Federal prosecutor. Thank you for inviting me to appear
today to discuss the agency's criminal investigation relating
to contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune and the decision
not to proceed with Federal criminal charges. Mr. Chairman and
members of the subcommittee, EPA respects your oversight
interests.
I would like to acknowledge that Special Agent Amon is
present here today at the committee's request. However, I would
like to note for the record that EPA has objected to the
subcommittee seeking the testimony of a field agent such as
Special Agent Amon. We have outlined our reasons and offer of
accommodation in a letter that we sent to the subcommittee.
Nonetheless, given the unique and compelling circumstances
surrounding this hearing, Special Agent Amon is available to
testify if the subcommittee finds that necessary.
In bringing this investigation, we were acutely aware of
the anguish and deeply held feelings of the former military and
civilian residents of Camp Lejeune who brought the allegations.
And I can say that we were especially careful to conduct this
investigation as comprehensively as possible. The criminal
investigation was opened in October 2003. The investigation was
conducted by a senior criminal investigator out of the CID's
division in Charlotte, North Carolina. I have conferred
extensively with that investigator for my testimony here today.
The investigation was also closely monitored by CID
headquarters in Washington. Close and ongoing consultation was
maintained with both DoJ's Environmental Crimes Section and the
U.S. Attorney's Office in Raleigh, North Carolina.
Investigators examined events surrounding the generation of the
1980 through 1982 water sampling results provided by the U.S.
Army Environmental Hygiene Agency and by the Grainger
Laboratory. The latter report definitively identified the
presence of TCE and PCE in Camp Lejeune's drinking water in
1982.
The initial reaction to and decisions made by the military
after having received these two sets of data was important
background information for the investigation. CID investigators
interviewed 26 individuals, including personnel from Camp
Lejeune and the Navy Facilities Engineering Command Atlantic
Division, or LANTDIV, which had oversight responsibility for
environmental conditions at the base during this period;
consulted extensively with an expert in public health and
drinking water regulation; and reviewed thousands of pages of
relevant documents during the course of this investigation.
After about 18 months of investigation, and a thorough review
of all the pertinent evidence, the agency and DoJ mutually
agreed that criminal charges should not be sought in this
matter. That decision was primarily based on the following
findings.
First, the Safe Drinking Water Act provided no enforceable
limits on TCE and PCE at the time that military officials
became aware of the presence of these chemicals in the water
supply at the base. EPA did not pass enforceable regulations
relating to these chemicals until 1989 and 1991, respectively.
I should also mention, parenthetically, even if those
standards had been in place, the Safe Drinking Water Act does
not provide criminal penalties for knowingly providing drinking
water which violates standards. Rather, the act only provides
criminal penalties for introducing contaminants with specific
intent to harm.
Second, the statute of limitations for all substantive
Federal crimes is 5 years. Thus, even had there been criminal
conduct committed in the 1980's, it would not have been
prosecutable in 2005 unless it formed a part of a criminal
conspiracy that continued to a point within the limitations
period. The investigation found no such ongoing conspiracy by
any persons with a role providing drinking water at Camp
Lejeune. The investigation concluded that there was no
conspiracy to conceal records and prevent persons from talking
with ATSDR regarding the congressionally mandated health study
or to conceal FOIA records from the public. The investigation
further determined that the Marine Corps did not make false
statements to Federal investigators and that there was no basis
on which to prosecute LANTDIV personnel for false statements or
obstruction of the investigation.
Finally, with regard to the allegations regarding the
ATSDR, the investigation did not substantiate allegations of a
conspiracy to improperly administer its health study or destroy
ATSDR records.
In summary, DoJ and EPA concluded that when all the
available evidence was considered under the environmental
requirements applicable at the time of the relevant activities
in this case, the evidence did not support the bringing of
Federal criminal charges. Harm occurred at Camp Lejeune and
individuals suffered. However, after a thorough investigation,
it was determined that the criminal enforcement process was not
a viable means of addressing those wrongs. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify here today, and I would be glad to
answer any questions from the subcommittee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Murtha follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Stupak. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Amon, you wish to say anything?
Mr. Amon. I have no opening remarks.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Dr. Crosse?
STATEMENT OF MARCIA G. CROSSE, DIRECTOR, PUBLIC HEALTH AND
MILITARY HEALTH CARE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Ms. Crosse. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I
am pleased to be here today as you examine issues relating to
drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune. My remarks today
are based on GAO's recent report on efforts to identify and
address the past contamination; the provision of funding and
information from DoD to ATSDR for its work; and an assessment
by an independent panel of experts of the design of the current
ATSDR health study.
Efforts to identify and address past drinking water
contamination at Camp Lejeune began when the Navy started water
testing to prepare for upcoming drinking water regulations. In
1980, volatile organic compounds, VOCs, were first detected
during an analysis that combined treated water from all base
water systems. During the same year, the Navy began monitoring
Camp Lejeune's treated water for total trihalomethanes, TTHMs,
contaminants that are a byproduct of the water treatment
process. These tests reported interference from unidentified
chemicals. In 1982 and 1983, additional testing identified two
VOCs, trichloroethylene, TCE, a metal degreaser, and
tetrachloroethylene, PCE, a dry cleaning solvent in the Hadnot
Point and Tarawa Terrace water systems. Sampling results
indicated that the levels of TCE and PCE found in the treated
water varied.
Former Camp Lejeune environmental officials told us that
they did not take action to address the contamination because,
at that time, they had little knowledge about TCE and PCE, and
there were no drinking water regulations that gave enforceable
limits for these chemicals. In addition, the variation in water
testing results raised questions about the validity of the
tests. Camp Lejeune officials told us that, in retrospect, it
was likely that rotation of wells in these water systems
contributed to the variation in results.
Also, in 1982, a Navy environmental program began
investigating potentially contaminated sites at many Marine
Corps and Navy bases, including Camp Lejeune. Testing initiated
under that program in 1984 and 1985 identified individual wells
in the Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace water systems that were
contaminated with TCE, PCE and other VOCs. Ten wells were
subsequently removed from service in late 1984 and early 1985.
Since 1991, ATSDR has been examining whether individuals
who were exposed to the contaminated drinking water are likely
to have adverse health effects. DoD is required to provide
funding and data as necessary for ATSDR to carry out certain
health-related activities, including Public Health Assessments.
In conducting its Camp Lejeune related work, ATSDR has not
always received requested DoD funding and has experienced
delays in receiving information from DoD. For example, for 3
out of the 16 fiscal years, no funding was provided by any DoD
entity to ATSDR for its Camp Lejeune related work because the
agencies could not reach agreement about the funding. ATSDR
also had difficulties getting documents needed from Camp
Lejeune while it was conducting a Public Health Assessment for
the base. However, ATSDR officials told us that, while funding
and access to records were probably slowed down and made more
expensive by DoD, this did not significantly impede ATSDR's
efforts. These officials also stated that situations such as
limitations in access to data are normal during the course of a
study.
ATSDR's current study is examining whether individuals who
were exposed in utero are more likely to have developed certain
childhood cancers or birth defects. To review the design of
this study, we contracted with the National Academy of Sciences
to convene an expert panel. Panel members generally agreed that
many parameters of the current study are appropriate, including
the study population, the exposure time frame and the selected
health effects. Some panel experts said that the projected
December 2007 completion date appeared to be reasonable, while
others said that the date might be optimistic.
Finally, these experts said that the ATSDR study could be
strengthened by expanding it to include an additional
comparison population of individuals who were not exposed to
the contamination but that this would likely extend the time
needed to complete the study. They also noted that while the in
utero population being studied was the most vulnerable to the
contamination, other health conditions, such as adverse
neurological or behavioral effects and pregnancy loss, could be
related to this exposure.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would
be happy to respond to questions that you or other members of
the subcommittee may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Crosse follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Stupak. Thank you.
Mr. Hill, you opening statement, please?
STATEMENT OF FRANKLIN HILL, DIRECTOR, SUPERFUND DIVISION, U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 4
Mr. Hill. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I
am Franklin Hill, Director of the Superfund Division for the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in region 4 in Atlanta.
The Superfund Division oversees cleanups of private and
public property that is on the National Priorities List, a list
of the country's most polluted sites. And we do that with a
goal of protecting human health and the environment.
Currently, there are 165 private sites and 19 Federal sites
on the NPL in region 4. I appreciate the opportunity to provide
you with an overview of EPA's involvement in the Superfund
cleanup activities at Camp Lejeune Military Reservation and
Marine Corps Base. During the 18 years that EPA has been
involved in cleanup at Camp Lejeune, we have made significant
progress in cleaning up contaminated soil and groundwater. To
date, we have selected remedies at 30 sites within Camp Lejeune
and anticipate selection of the last remedy in the year of
2011. EPA region 4 received a letter dated April 25, 1986, from
the Department of the Navy which provided sampling data from
water samples taken from groundwater monitoring and drinking
water wells at Camp Lejeune. The letter informed EPA that the
Navy had shut down 10 drinking water wells at Camp Lejeune
because 1985 sampling results showed contamination in those
wells. The State of North Carolina, in a separate
investigation, concluded that the likely source of
contamination found in two of those wells was the ABC One-Hour
Cleaners, a private business located outside the boundaries of
Camp Lejeune. Subsequent investigations have revealed
additional sources of groundwater contamination.
The ABC One-Hour Cleaners: the ABC Cleaners site is located
at 2127 Lejeune Boulevard Jacksonville, Onslow County, NC and
encompasses an area of approximately 1 acre. In 1984, as part
of a routine water quality evaluation, the Navy collected
groundwater samples and determined that volatile organic
compounds, including dichloroethylene, trichloroethylene and
tetrachloroethylene, were present in 10 of 40 well samples. Two
of the 10 wells were located within the Camp Lejeune Tarawa
Terrace well field in the vicinity of the ABC Cleaners.
In 1985, the Wilmington Regional Office of the Division of
Environmental Management, North Carolina Department of Natural
Resources and Community Development, conducted a groundwater
pollution study to find the source of PCE in wells within the
Tarawa Terrace well field. The study concluded that most likely
the source of groundwater contamination was ABC Cleaners. The
ABC One-Hour Cleaners was proposed to the National Priorities
List by EPA on June 24, 1988, which became final on March 31,
1989.
A record of decision, as we refer to as a ROD, for
contaminated groundwater was signed in 1993 and required
remediation of VOC-contaminated groundwater by a treatment
system. A second ROD was signed in 1994 to address soil
contamination using soil vapor extraction. The SVE system has
been operating since August 2000 to remove a source of
groundwater contamination. ABC Cleaners site is a private
Superfund lead site and is not part of the Camp Lejeune
military base. However, contaminated groundwater from ABC
Cleaners has migrated onto the base.
The responsible parties have been identified by EPA as the
ABC Cleaners owners and operators. On July 17, 2000, EPA
entered into an Administrative Order of Consent with ABC
Cleaners and its owners and operators for settlement. The AOC
required that, if settling parties ever receive payment on an
insurance claim, then 50 percent of any insurance proceeds must
be paid to EPA. At this time, the terms of the settlement have
been completed, and there is no evidence that the parties
collected insurance money.
Camp Lejeune: Under CERCLA, section 120, the EPA has
evaluated releases at this Federal facility using its Hazard
Ranking System criteria. The EPA conducted an initial
investigation in 1988 and proposed Camp Lejeune for the NPL on
June 24, 1988, which became final on October 4, 1989. The basis
for the listing of Camp Lejeune on the NPL was pesticide-
contaminated soil at an area on the base where pesticides were
mixed and application equipment were cleaned.
Pursuant to CERCLA 120(e)(2), an interagency agreement,
referred to as a Federal Facilities Agreement, was signed by
EPA and the Navy and the State of North Carolina in February
1991. The FFA requires, among other things, that the facility
prepare a Site Management Plan for EPA approval that identifies
all of the sites and operating units that require further
investigation and/or response action by the Navy. The Navy's
Installation Restoration Program is responsible for
implementation of the CERCLA cleanup under the FFA. The Site
Management Plan also includes a list of enforceable milestones
related to CERCLA that are enforceable by EPA.
Additional activities: 46 sites have been identified for
cleanup at Camp Lejeune. The Navy and EPA have selected
remedies for 30 of those sites, and the remaining 16 are under
active investigation. The first ROD was signed in September
1992 and addressed contamination of groundwater in the Hadnot
Point area. Remedies to address groundwater contamination
include groundwater pump and treatment systems, in situ
chemical oxidation, and monitoring natural attenuation. Six
pilot studies are under way to evaluate treatment options for
remaining VOC-contaminated groundwater areas at Camp Lejeune.
EPA prepared 5-year review reports in November 1999 and
February 2005, which evaluated the protectiveness of selected
remedies. Below is a summary of the cleanup. Eleven pilot
studies have been completed or are under way to evaluate
remediation techniques for volatile organic compounds. Removal
actions have been completed at two sites, which resulted in
disposal of 696 tons of PCB-contaminated soil and source
treatment of 7,500 cubic yards of dense nonaqueous phase
liquids. A removal action is under way to treat VOC-
contaminated groundwater of depths of 20 to 47 feet below
ground surface. Two RODs were signed in 2006. One ROD required
treatment of contaminated groundwater underneath a half acre of
the base. This remedy is underway.
The other ROD determined that no action was necessary. One
Operable Unit has met its remediation goals and achieved site
closure. Three sites have undergone site investigations, with
two requiring no further action, and the remaining site
requiring a soil removal. At this point in time, Camp Lejeune
is scheduled to have the last remedy selected by 2011 and all
remedies in place by 2014.
In conclusion, in the 18 years since EPA listed Camp
Lejeune on the NPL, 46 sites have been investigated. To date,
there are 19 signed RODs, encompassing 30 sites at the Camp
Lejeune base, which reflect a remedy selection rate greater
than one ROD per year. The remaining 16 sites are undergoing
active investigation. EPA anticipates that the last remedy will
be in place by 2015. Thank you for this opportunity, and I am
available to answer questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hill follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Stupak. Thank you.
We will begin questioning. Mr. Hill, if I may start with
you, you said you are going to finish in up by 2015?
Mr. Hill. Well, in the Site Management Plan, that is the
schedule to address getting the remedies in place. Now what I
will tell you is that those remedies will go on for years after
2015. Pump and treat is a complicated technology.
Mr. Stupak. I am familiar with it.
Mr. Hill. And it takes quite some time to get there.
Mr. Stupak. Camp Lejeune was listed in 1989. That was when
it was final, you said. Here we are 18 years later, and nothing
has been cleaned up; has it?
Mr. Hill. Well, we have a couple of sites that we have
removed, or we have decided that they have reached their
remedial goals. We have had some soil----
Mr. Stupak. You are close?
Mr. Hill. We have had a number of cleanups on the site. So
the answer to your question, sir, is yes, there have been some
cleanups.
Mr. Stupak. Of the 46 sites, how many have been cleaned up?
Mr. Hill. That is a good question. I don't want to guess at
that, but I know that there are several removals that have been
completed.
Mr. Stupak. OK.
Mr. Hill. I can get you those specifics, but I don't have
the specific numbers.
Mr. Stupak. You won't even get to your last ROD, I think
your testimony said, until, what, 2014?
Mr. Hill. Right.
Mr. Stupak. Your Record of Decision; so that is 25 years
after Camp Lejeune was named a Superfund site. What is causing
the delay? Lack of money? Lack of resources? Why delay? Why 25
years?
Mr. Hill. Well, I think it is a combination of things. I
think it is, resources, clearly, is one option or one issue.
Mr. Stupak. Who should be providing the resources for this?
EPA? DoD? Who should be providing the resources to clean up
Camp Lejeune?
Mr. Hill. DoD should be providing those resources.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Has DoD been forthcoming in bringing
resources to the table to help clean up Camp Lejeune?
Mr. Hill. They have been. Of course, as all budgets, we are
seeing those budgets start to diminish.
Mr. Stupak. But the pollution at Camp Lejeune is not
diminishing.
Mr. Hill. I would say that it is. Based upon some of the
monitoring data, those numbers are going down.
Mr. Stupak. Based upon migrating over somewhere else or
where?
Mr. Hill. No. Actually, we have three pump and treat
systems in place right now at the Hadnot Point area. And we can
demonstrate from the monitoring data that those concentrations
that were listed in the GAO report are now going down.
Mr. Stupak. The part that bothers me a little bit, you
mentioned ABC Cleaners, which is just on the outside of Camp
Lejeune. The ROD was what, 1989, and it was cleaned up in 1994?
It took about 5 years to do that. That is on an acre. And that
was the contamination that drifted over to Tarawa Terrace. How
come you got that one cleaned up in like 5 years, and yet we
are 25 years and not even getting cleaned up?
Mr. Hill. Chairman, let me correct you. First of all, ABC
Cleaners is not cleaned up. We have a remedy in place, and it
is construction complete. We have built a groundwater pump and
treat system, and we have an SVE system addressing soils on-
site.
Mr. Stupak. So it is still going?
Mr. Hill. It is still going.
Mr. Stupak. So the ROD was 5 years.
Mr. Hill. Right.
Mr. Stupak. And your last ROD still isn't done for Camp
Lejeune. So there is a pumping station. How long will that go
on, that pumping station at ABC Cleaners?
Mr. Hill. It will go on until we achieve the remedial goals
for that site. And right now, we are looking at North Carolina
standards, which is about 2.8 parts per billion for TCE. So
that is quite a conservative number. And it will take us some
time to achieve that.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Amon, were you here for the first panel testifying?
Were you in the room?
Mr. Amon. Sir, I believe I walked in towards the end of
that testimony.
Mr. Stupak. All right. Are you familiar with Mr. Ensminger?
Mr. Amon. I am.
Mr. Stupak. OK. In his written testimony, he states you
told him you recommended criminal charges against certain
subjects. That was part of your investigation. Is that correct?
Mr. Amon. That is not correct.
Mr. Stupak. OK. You didn't make any recommendations?
Mr. Amon. I just collect the facts, the evidence, and
present that to my supervisors, and then, in this case, the
Department of Justice, for consideration.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Do you present that in writing or orally?
Mr. Amon. Both.
Mr. Stupak. OK. And you made no recommendations of any
charges?
Mr. Amon. That is correct.
Mr. Stupak. OK. And why did you recommend no criminal
charges?
Mr. Amon. In this matter, based upon the evidence in all
forms that I was able to review, I presented that to the
Department of Justice, I presented that to my supervisors, and
based upon that analysis, a determination was made that the
statute did not call for Federal charges. And I concurred with
that analysis.
Mr. Stupak. OK. I realize, and testimony has been clear,
that Justice Department decided not to prosecute because of a
lack of EPA standards on TCE and PCE in drinking water in the
early 1980's. But given the report that we reviewed, and I
believe it is your report, that the evidence of witness
coaching and witnesses not being forthcoming, shouldn't you
have at least thought about obstruction of justice charges?
Mr. Amon. And those charges were considered.
Mr. Stupak. So criminal charges were considered on
obstructing justice?
Mr. Amon. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Stupak. OK. And then who determined not to bring forth
the charges?
Mr. Amon. The Department of Justice ultimately makes
decisions on what is charged.
Mr. Stupak. Did you recommend that there would be
obstruction of justice charges brought forth? Did you
recommend?
Mr. Amon. Did I personally, Tyler Amon?
Mr. Stupak. Yes.
Mr. Amon. In this matter, specifically as it pertains to
the obstruction charges that you are indicating from, I
believe, a report that I generated during the course of this
case, I concurred with the Department of Justice's decision not
to proceed with charges.
Mr. Stupak. OK. But I am trying to ask you, did you
recommend that obstruction charges be brought? Obstruction of
justice charges.
Mr. Amon. As a field agent, recommend is an action that is
not----
Mr. Stupak. OK. When you do your investigation, you send it
to the prosecutor for action; right?
Mr. Amon. That is correct.
Mr. Stupak. And you indicated you submitted that written
and orally; correct?
Mr. Amon. That is correct.
Mr. Stupak. So, in your oral discussions with Justice
Department, did you ask for, did you seek obstruction of
justice charges?
Mr. Amon. In my report, which would be written, I do
identify areas of concern related to obstruction of justice;
that is correct.
Mr. Stupak. Correct. OK. So did you ask for a warrant? Let
me put it bluntly.
Mr. Amon. No, I did not.
Mr. Stupak. OK. How about the doctor who destroyed the
records as to the telephone logs? Did you ask for obstruction
of justice there?
Mr. Amon. I am sorry, refresh my memory.
Mr. Stupak. Page 56 of your report, if you have it there in
front of you, unredacted report. You must have it with you
there; right? It is on page 56.
Mr. Amon. That is correct. I see that here. Could you
repeat the question, please?
Mr. Stupak. Sure. And if you go down there, that report,
about third paragraph says, while it is not clear blank gave a
direct order to destroy the records, it is clear that blank
fully expected and specifically advised blank not to take any
Camp Lejeune records from the Division of Health Studies. And
you go down that those records never made it to the records,
and they were destroyed. Did you recommend obstruction of
justice charges there?
Mr. Amon. Sir, in regard to the ATSDR records, those
records actually never were destroyed.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Not the ATSDR, but the individual's notes.
And those notes are important because it identifies names,
numbers and medical information that this individual had
conducted over a year in their capacity. And those personal
records were destroyed; not ATSDR, but those personal records,
which would be useful, as you indicate, in this investigation.
Mr. Amon. Sir, the records that you speak of that pertain
to a doctor who was involved in the Camp Lejeune matter on
behalf of ATSDR, had records that were kept in the course of
that doctor's work at ATSDR. But I think, fairly, as you are
indicating, they were records that were taken in booklets and
whatnot that that doctor retained. I actually seized those
records from that doctor and retained those in evidence in the
criminal investigations file in Charlotte, North Carolina,
until the conclusion of this case.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Where are they now then?
Mr. Amon. They are now at ATSDR.
Mr. Stupak. OK. You indicate in your criminal investigation
that the biggest area of concern were the seemingly rehearsed
statements provided by personnel at LANTDIV. That is on page
29. And you go on to page 30, greatest concern lay in the fact
that investigators found LANTDIV personnel--that's Naval
Facilities Engineering Command personnel--to have been coached.
Is that true?
Mr. Amon. That is correct.
Mr. Stupak. And there were no violations of any laws there,
obstruction of justice, there in all the coaching?
Mr. Amon. Again, I provided those to the Department of
Justice in my hierarchy for consideration. Those statements,
those statements you see there in the report were a summary of
what the evidence in this case, referring to both documentary
and testimony evidence, that I was able to review. And based
upon that, I wrote how I saw it.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Whitfield for questions.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha referred to a letter that he wrote to Mr.
Dingell regarding this hearing. And if there is not any
objection, we would just like to enter that into the record. I
think you all have a copy of it as well.
Mr. Stupak. Without objection, the letter of June 11, 2007,
is entered in the record. And we should enter in the record my
response is, Mr. Amon will be here and will testify.
Mr. Whitfield. Great. Thank you. Now, Mr. Hill, ABC
Cleaners, that was one of the primary sources of this
contamination. Who was the owner of ABC Cleaners?
Mr. Hill. I don't have the name. I just have a reference to
the owner and operators.
Mr. Whitfield. But, at that time, there was not any
criminal activity or any criminal charges that could be brought
against ABC Cleaners?
Mr. Hill. No, sir.
Mr. Whitfield. Because there were no laws on the books
relating to contaminating groundwater and so forth?
Mr. Hill. I wouldn't say that there were no laws on the
books, that if there was criminal activity.
Mr. Whitfield. It was probably negligent activity.
Mr. Hill. I would possibly agree with that. But it was
never investigated as a criminal act.
Mr. Whitfield. So it was never investigated as a criminal
act. Now, do you have any idea of what the dollar cost will be
for the cleanup of Camp Lejeune, the total cleanup?
Mr. Hill. I don't. And we were trying to get to some final
dollar figures. We have estimated that we have already spent
upwards of $100 million, but I don't have the detailed dollar
amounts.
Mr. Whitfield. $100 million has already been spent?
Mr. Hill. That is an estimate on my part, just based upon
some discussions I had this morning. We would have to talk to
DoD to get those figures.
Mr. Whitfield. And since there hasn't been very much of a
cleanup, I am assuming that we can multiply that by a
relatively large number.
Mr. Hill. Well, again, we make reference that there has not
been much of a cleanup. I just want to go back and reassure you
that there has been a tremendous amount of work.
Mr. Whitfield. OK.
Mr. Hill. A lot of aggressive soil surface excavation work
has been done. Groundwater pump and treatment systems are in
place. Treatability studies in the field. So a lot of work has
been done here.
Mr. Whitfield. But the ultimate costs, would it be equal to
a billion dollars? Would you say that is possible?
Mr. Hill. I would hate to speculate on the costs, but I can
get back with you on an estimate.
Mr. Whitfield. OK. Of course, the dollar cost is very small
considering the health costs that have been incurred and the
deaths that have been incurred. But ultimately the taxpayers
will be paying for this. Is that correct?
Mr. Hill. Yes.
Mr. Whitfield. You did indicate that you had reached an
agreement or a settlement with ABC Cleaners. But I assume the
only dollar amount you would get from them was from the
insurance policy, and they never received any compensation. Is
that correct?
Mr. Hill. We actually have an ability-to-pay process where
we looked at the owners and operators' capability to pay, and
there was an amount that they were able to pay. And they came
forward with that amount.
Mr. Whitfield. They did?
Mr. Hill. Yes.
Mr. Whitfield. So they did pay something?
Mr. Hill. They did pay something.
Mr. Whitfield. And they are no longer in business?
Mr. Hill. The individuals at that time I am not sure are
still operating the business, but it is my understanding that
it is now still a drop-off cleaners operation.
Mr. Whitfield. Oh, it is? OK.
Mr. Amon, do you work for the Department of Justice or EPA?
Mr. Amon. I work for the Environmental Protection Agency.
Mr. Whitfield. And you report to Mr. Murtha?
Mr. Amon. Through a series of a hierarchy, yes.
Mr. Whitfield. OK. But when you do criminal investigations
for EPA, the Department of Justice, they actually bring any
charges through their U.S. Attorneys if there are charges. Is
that correct? Or do you all have the authority to bring charges
as well?
Mr. Murtha. No, sir, we work through the Department of
Justice, both the U.S. Attorney's Offices and the Environmental
Crimes Section of main Justice. Both were involved in this
particular investigation.
Mr. Whitfield. I know that--I am sure, Mr. Murtha, that you
and Mr. Amon both sat in with the Department of Justice when
you were considering the criminal charges in this case. And I
am not defending Mr. Libby at all, Vice President Cheney's
chief of staff who is now in prison for divulging--he is not in
prison yet. He has been convicted. He has been sentenced. But
for divulging the name of an undercover agent. And in this
instance, we have many people who have died. We have had many
people who have suffered significant health problems. We have
huge environmental costs involving cleanup. And some of the
phrases used regarding the Navy Engineering's testimony and how
they were not forthcoming, how they had been coached, how they
seemed to be concealing, and it seems sort of puzzling that
there were not some sort of obstruction of justice charges
levied in that case.
Mr. Murtha. Sir, if I may respond to that?
Mr. Whitfield. Yes.
Mr. Murtha. I was not in fact involved in any of the
discussions concerning whether or not charges would be brought
in this case. I felt a lot of comfort in knowing that both the
U.S. Attorney's Office and Environmental Crimes Section had
assigned very experienced and talented prosecutors to this case
to work along with Special Agent Amon. And I really felt that a
very strong team had been put together in that connection and
that they would be closest to the evidence and would be in the
best position to assess whether or not charges would be
advisable.
I think one also has to bear in mind, although clearly
there is some derogatory information in the investigation that
we put together, that it is really a higher bar to bring
criminal charges. Under the principles of Federal prosecution,
the Department of Justice prosecutors need to make sure that
they have a reasonable probability of succeeding on the charges
that they bring. And I think the feeling must have been here
that, even though there was evidence of not being forthcoming,
that that evidence didn't quite reach the level where there
could be a reasonable probability that convictions would be
obtained.
Mr. Whitfield. OK. Thank you.
Ms. Crosse, the GAO spent a lot of time investigating this
drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune. And I would ask
you, we know that there are some other military bases with
similar problems, and would you have any recommendations on how
the committee should proceed with a review of contamination at
other military bases?
Ms. Crosse. Sir, I'm not familiar with the circumstances of
contamination at other installations. We were mandated by
Congress in the Defense Authorization Act to undertake this
review. I just don't have information to know about the level
of documentation or the kinds of circumstances involved.
Certainly GAO is available to review cases, individual cases,
or to take a broader look at environmental contamination on
military installations around the country.
Mr. Whitfield. OK.
Mr. Chairman, I don't have any other questions.
Mr. Stupak. Just a few, if I may.
Mr. Hill, where's the water source now for Camp Lejeune?
Are they getting it from nearby cities? Have they drilled other
wells?
Mr. Hill. They're getting it from the Castle Hayne aquifer
on the base.
Mr. Stupak. Still wells then?
Mr. Hill. Yes.
Mr. Stupak. Are you monitoring at all to see if there's
going to be migration of these contaminants into the other
wells on the base?
Mr. Hill. We do have monitoring wells throughout the base,
and also the Drinking Water Program is monitoring the
distribution of the drinking water for Camp Lejeune.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Thanks.
Mr. Amon, if I may, Mr. Whitfield asked some good questions
about, whatever happened or why weren't obstruction of justice
charges brought forth on this? When you did your report, who
would you have had to have briefed within your own agency at
EPA then in seeking these charges? Who would you brief?
Mr. Amon. The special agent in charge. In this case that
would have been the SAC in Atlanta, Georgia, that has coverage
over multiple States, including North Carolina.
Mr. Stupak. So that's special agent in charge or something?
Mr. Amon. That's correct.
Mr. Stupak. Who would that be?
Mr. Amon. Fred Burnside.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Did you ever deal directly with Department
of Justice then? U.S. attorney?
Mr. Amon. I did.
Mr. Stupak. Who did you deal with there?
Mr. Amon. I dealt primarily with two line prosecutors. In
this case, there was one assigned by the United States
Attorney's Office in Raleigh, NC, which falls in the eastern
district of North Carolina. And the second was, as the director
referenced before, main Justice has a Special Environmental
Section. In that case, that was a trial attorney named Stacey
Mitchell.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Who was the gentleman out of North
Carolina?
Mr. Amon. Banu Rangarajan. She is female
Mr. Stupak. OK. Anything else? Nothing further for this
panel. You are dismissed. Thank you again.
Mr. Whitfield, without objection, I would like to put the
full binder into the record, and your June 11 record is also in
there, that one document. No objections.
The record will remain open for 30 days for further
statements, opening statements of members or any other
documents which the committee has requested. If people would
get them into us, they will be made part of the record. That
concludes all of our questions. We will dismiss this panel, and
that concludes our hearing.
Without objection, this subcommittee meeting is adjourned.
Thank you all.
[Whereupon, at 2:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Exhibit 22
Municipal/Public Tap Water Contaminated with TCE at Concentrations
Above EPA MCL 5 ppb
DOORMA DOOR CONTROLS INC HSCA PAD002295376 17 parts per
billion (ppb)
FORMER HULETT LAGOON MOSFN0703530 23.7 parts per billion
(ppb)
GEAUGA INDUSTRIES OHD061722575 30 parts per billion (ppb)
GRAFTON WISCONSIN RESIDENTIAL WELL WI0001906981 200parts
per billion (ppb)
BOHN HEAT A-C&R DV ILD065243172 730 parts per billion (ppb)
HAWTHORNE MUNICIPAL WELLS NJD980771679 48.6 parts per
billion (ppb)
ICELAND COIN LAUNDRY AREA GW PLUME NJ0001360882 41.7 parts
per billion (ppb)
LEE CHEMICAL MOD980853519 36 parts per billion (ppb)
NEWTON COUNTY WELLS MOD985798339 190 parts per billion
(ppb)
SOL LYNN/INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMERS TXD980873327 953,000 (ppb)
VEGA ALTA PUBLIC SUPPLY WELLS PRD980763775 42 parts per
billion (ppb)
Groundwater Used as Municipal/Public Drinking Water
Contaminated with TCE at Concentrations Above EPA MCL 5ppb
ARIVEC CHEMICALS INC GAD990740714 39000 parts per billion
(ppb)
AVCO LYCOMING (WILLIAMSPORT) PAD003053709 250 parts per
billion (ppb)
BALLY GROUND WATER PAD061105128 1127 parts per billion
(ppb)
BREWSTER WELL FIELD NYD980652275 77parts per billion (ppb)
CARRIER AIR CONDITIONING CO. TND044062222 8.8 parts per
billion (ppb)
CHARLEVOIX MUNICIPAL WELL MID980794390 100 parts per
billion (ppb)
CLARE WATER SUPPLY MID980002273 1400 parts per billion
(ppb)
CROSSLEY FARM PAD981740061 20000 parts per billion (ppb)
CSX/LEWISBURG DERAILMENT TND987775566 45300 parts per
billion (ppb)
DELAVAN MUNICIPAL WELL #4 WID980820062 1300 parts per
billion (ppb)
FARIBAULT MUNI WELL FIELD MND982074569 180 parts per
billion (ppb)
FRIDLEY COMMONS PARK WELL MND985701309 79 parts per billion
(ppb)
FULTON AVENUE NY0000110247 1000 parts per billion (ppb)
GEIGY CHEMICAL CORP. (ABERDEEN) NCD981927502 330 parts per
billion (ppb)
GROVELAND WELLS MAD980732317 118.8 parts per billion (ppb)
HAWTHORNE MUNICIPAL WELLS NJD980771679 572 parts per
billion (ppb)
HOOKER CHEMICAL & PLASTICS CORP NYD002920312 87 parts per
billion (ppb)
INDIAN BEND WASH AREA AZD980695969 1400 parts per billion
(ppb)
INDUSTRIAL LATEX CORP. NJD981178411 89 parts per billion
(ppb)
INDUSTRIAL WASTE PROCESSING CAD980736284 390 parts per
billion (ppb)
JACKSON STEEL NYD001344456 250 parts per billion (ppb)
KELLOGG-DEERING WELL FIELD CTD980670814 600 parts per
billion (ppb)
KENTUCKY AVENUE WELL FIELD NYD980650667 130 parts per
billion (ppb)
LASALLE ELECTRIC UTILITIES ILD980794333 5 parts per billion
(ppb)
LIBERTY INDUSTRIAL FINISHING NYD000337295 16 parts per
billion (ppb)
LODI MUNICIPAL WELL NJD980769301 324.0 parts per billion
(ppb)
MAYWOOD CHEMICAL CO. NJD980529762 324.0 parts per billion
(ppb)
METALTEC/AEROSYSTEMS NJD002517472 5140 parts per billion
(ppb)
MOSES LAKE WELLFIELD WAD988466355 32.2 parts per billion
(ppb)
NORTH PENN - AREA 7 PAD002498632 190 parts per billion
(ppb)
NORTH RAILROAD AVENUE PLUME NMD986670156 8.3 parts per
billion (ppb)
OAK GROVE VILLAGE WELL MOD981717036 70.8 parts per billion
(ppb)
OGALLALA GROUND WATER NED986369247 220 parts per billion
(ppb)
OLD ROOSEVELT FIELD NYSFN0204234 170 parts per billion
(ppb)
PALERMO WELL FIELD WA0000026534 15.0 parts per billion
(ppb)
PASLEY SOLVENTS & CHEMICALS, INC NYD991292004 145 parts per
billion (ppb)
PETOSKEY MUNICIPAL WELL FIELD MID006013049 1000 parts per
billion (ppb)
PINE STREET DUMP MND985739051 48 parts per billion (ppb)
POTTER CO. MSD056029648 848 parts per billion (ppb)
RAILROAD AVENUE GROUNDWATER IA0001610963 6.8 parts per
billion (ppb)
REICH FARMS NJD980529713 33 parts per billion (ppb)
ROCKY HILL MUNICIPAL WELL NJD980654156 650 parts per
billion (ppb)
ROCKAWAY TOWNSHIP WELLS NJD980654214 362 parts per billion
(ppb)
RODALE MANUFACTURING CO. PAD981033285 150 parts per billion
(ppb)
SAEGERTOWN INDUSTRIAL AREA PAD980692487 310 parts per
billion (ppb)
SAN GABRIEL VALLEY (AREA 1,2,3,4) CAD980818512 1800parts
per billion (ppb)
SAN FERNANDO VALLEY (AREA 1) CAD980894893 18000 parts per
billion (ppb)
SAVAGE MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLY NHD980671002 244 parts per
billion (ppb)
SOLID STATE CIRCUITS, INC. MOD980854111 290 parts per
billion (ppb)
SOUTH MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLY NHD980671069 25 parts per
billion (ppb)
SPACE ORDNANCE SYSTEMS SAND CYN 511 parts per billion
STURGIS MUNICIPAL WELLS MID980703011 152 parts per billion
(ppb)
TOWN GARAGE/RADIO BEACON NHD981063860 148.4 parts per
billion (ppb)
TUCSON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AZD980737530 2200 parts per
billion (ppb)
TUTU WELLFIELD VID982272569 711 parts per billion (ppb)
VALLEY PARK TCE MOD980968341 600 parts per billion (ppb)
VEGA ALTA PUBLIC SUPPLY WELLS PRD980763775 574 parts per
billion (ppb)
VESTAL WATER SUPPLY WELL 4-2 NYD980652267 974 parts per
billion (ppb)
WAITE PARK WELLS MND981002249 5100 parts per billion (ppb)
WELLS G&H MAD980732168 267.40000 parts per billion (ppb)
WHITEHALL MUNICIPAL WELLS MID980701254 68 parts per billion
(ppb)
ZANESVILLE WELL FIELD OHD980794598 330 parts per billion
(ppb)
Source of information: ATSDR HazDat Database