    [House Hearing, 110 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 110-59]

                       PROCUREMENT OF NAVY BOAT BARRIERS

                                   __________

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                 SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                  JUNE 6, 2007

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13

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                 SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

                       GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi, Chairman
    NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii             ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      KEN CALVERT, California
    RICK LARSEN, Washington              TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
    MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam          JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
    BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana              J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
    JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania
                      Will Ebbs, Professional Staff Member
                     Heath Bope, Professional Staff Member
                   Jenness Simler, Professional Staff Member
                        Jason Hagadorn, Staff Assistant

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                         CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
                                      2007

                                                                       Page

    Hearing:

    Wednesday, June 6, 2007, Procurement of Navy Boat Barriers.......     1

    Appendix:

    Wednesday, June 6, 2007..........................................    27
                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, JUNE 6, 2007
                       PROCUREMENT OF NAVY BOAT BARRIERS
                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking
      Member, Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee.........     2
    Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman,
      Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee.................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Betro, Thomas, Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service
      (NCIS).........................................................     4
    Riddick-Brown, Cathy, Deputy Assistant Director for Acquisition
      and Logistics, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS).....     8
    Williams, James A., Commissioner, Federal Acquisition Service,
      General Services Administration (GSA)..........................     9

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Betro, Thomas................................................    31
        Williams, James A............................................    40

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:

        Mr. Bartlett.................................................    48
        Mr. Taylor...................................................    47
                       PROCUREMENT OF NAVY BOAT BARRRIERS

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee,
                               Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 6, 2007.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:45 p.m. in
    room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gene Taylor
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
       MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
                              SUBCOMMITTEE

        Mr. Taylor. The subcommittee will come to order.
        I would first like to make an observation to my colleagues
    that we have received a unanimous consent from the full
    committee to meet while the full committee is meeting, so in
    case anyone is questioning the legitimacy of this subcommittee
    meeting.
        Today the subcommittee will receive testimony from senior
    officials at the Naval Command Investigative Service, or NCIS,
    or the General Services Administration, GSA, on the acquisition
    of floating barriers, which, along with other measures, help
    protect Navy ships and installations from the specific threat
    of small-boat attack.
        Testifying before this committee today we have Mr. Thomas
    Betro, Director of NCIS; Ms. Cathy Riddick-Brown, Deputy
    Assistant Director for Acquisition and Logistics at NCIS; Mr.
    James Williams, Commissioner of the General Services
    Administration, GSA. On behalf of the members of the
    subcommittee, I thank you for coming and look forward to your
    testimony.
        After the tragic suicide bombing of the USS Cole in October
    of 2000, the Navy correctly recognized that additional security
    measures must be taken to protect our ships pierside and at
    anchor. The NCIS was given the task to lead the effort in this
    vital force protection initiative.
        Unfortunately that effort appears to have been beset with
    contractual irregularities which have caused significant
    additional costs to our Nation's taxpayers. Make no mistake,
    this subcommittee fully supports force protection measures.
    This subcommittee under both the chairmanship of Mr. Bartlett
    and continuing today has led the fight to up-armor Humvees,
    expedite improved body armor and helmets, and, most
    significantly, increase the rate of production of mine-
    resistant, ambush-protected vehicles, commonly known as MRAPs.
        Our main concern is with cost and schedule overruns in Navy
    and Marine Corps programs. Unfortunately, I am hard pressed to
    point to a single significant acquisition program which is
    currently progressing on budget or on schedule.
        Members of this subcommittee are determined to provide to
    our Navy and Marine Corps the best ships and equipment in
    sufficient numbers that the Nation can provide, but we will
    continue to be frustrated as program after program reports cost
    overruns and schedule delays.
        It is not the concept of installing force protection
    barriers which brings us here today. In fact, I applaud former
    Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Vern Clark with
    recognizing that our Nation has a vulnerability and moved
    quickly to solve it. I am sure he expected his organization
    would execute his orders with the proper level of
    professionalism.
        Today we on this subcommittee, with the full support of our
    full committee and Chairman Ike Skelton, are attempting to fund
    the construction of 313 ships for our United States Navy for
    our current CNO Mike Mullen. We will not be able to accomplish
    this goal if the service itself cannot adequately handle
    routine acquisition projects. Every dollar wasted is a dollar
    that cannot go to buy a ship or an aircraft or right now an
    MRAP.
        This issue is particularly troubling since our committee
    was first made aware of possible waste of taxpayers' money by
    reading on the front page of the Washington Post. I was not
    briefed, nor do I believe that any of the members of this
    subcommittee were informed by the Navy that there had been
    irregularities in contracting.
        Based on the information available to this committee, it
    appears that the acquisition program violated a number of
    standard procedures. These include the improper use of the
    governmentwide GSA services contract which was designed to
    provide IT support to government agencies; the use of multiple
    invoices to stay below contract price thresholds; and
    authorizing unnecessary contractor fees. These are serious
    irregularities, possibly criminal.
        What is of interest today are the questions: How did this
    happen, where was the oversight, why did it take two years for
    the improper practices to be revealed, and, most importantly,
    what have you done to fix the internal problem?
        Finally, I would like to remind the members of this
    subcommittee that an ongoing criminal investigation into these
    matters is in practice. It is not the intentions of this
    hearing to jeopardize that effort. I understand that the NCIS
    and the GSA have continuing efforts to resolve all issues
    relating to these contracts. I further understand that based on
    this event, the NCIS and the GSA have reorganized departments
    and have accomplished other internal changes to prevent this
    type of issue from occurring again. I look forward to the
    witnesses' testimony concerning these changes.
        I will now turn to my friend, the gentleman from Maryland,
    Ranking Member Roscoe Bartlett.

      STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
      MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
                              SUBCOMMITTEE

        Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I wish I could say we
    were here today to applaud the Navy's responsiveness to an
    urgent force protection requirement that emerged after the
    attack on the USS Cole in Yemen on October 12, 2000. This is a
    personal and important issue to me. It may seem unimaginable,
    but 2 of the 17 sailors who were killed on the USS Cole came
    from small towns in Washington County, Maryland. U.S. Navy
    Seaman Craig Wibberley from Williamsport, and Fireman
    Apprentice Patrick Roy of Keedysville were both 19.
        What I will always remember, and this was before 9/11, were
    the hundreds and thousands of people who lined the routes to
    Craig Wibberley's grave at St. Mark's Episcopal Church in
    Booneboro and Patrick Roy's grave at Antietam National
    Cemetery. The Civil War hallowed ground was reopened by the
    National Park Service at the request of Patrick's family.
        Unfortunately, the good work the Navy did do to ensure our
    sailors and marines were protected from small-boat attacks
    while they were at port or anchored have been overshadowed by
    the recent article in the press headlining the millions of
    dollars apparently wasted on this important effort. So for the
    record, let me echo Chairman Taylor's remarks and emphasize
    that in comparison to the amount of time it typically takes the
    DOD to procure a new capability, the speed of this program was
    indeed impressive. From the time of the attack, the fleets's
    requirements for barriers were identified and the funds
    provided within three months. A solution was found and tested
    within five months after that, and orders were being placed
    within five months after testing.
        By the time allegations of procurement irregularities
    surfaced two years ago, most of these systems were installed
    and protecting our men and women. That is good news. Sadly, we
    now know that this program had its share of bad news. I am
    interested in the testimony from our witnesses today because I
    believe there is more to this story than appeared in the press.
    I am hopeful that we will learn that the system responded
    appropriately and addressed any wrongdoing that may have been
    found. But whether the story represents another example of
    systemic problems with our defense acquisition system, or
    whether this is merely a case of a few bad apples, those are
    two important takeaways.
        First, Mr. Taylor is right. The first time I learned of
    this was when I read the paper a couple of weeks ago. While I
    understand that an investigation is ongoing, and it would be
    inappropriate to reveal too many details publicly, I would
    strongly encourage the Navy to keep us informed about these
    matters. It does a disservice to the good work of our
    acquisition personnel who perform every day on behalf of the
    warfighter and taxpayer for Congress to remain in reactionary
    mode in responding to incidents after they are first reported
    in the media.
        Second, we have another lesson in the need for thorough
    acquisition workforce training and understanding contractual
    issues not only within acquisition programs, but also within
    the investigative services and the prosecutor's office.
        Clearly, it is possible that a more thoroughly trained
    acquisitions staff within NCIS might have caught these issues
    earlier or better, yet kept them from happening in the first
    place. This committee is strongly supportive of keeping
    inherently government functions within the government, in part
    to avoid the cost of contractors who provide little value added
    to the procurement process. I sincerely hope the Department of
    Defense and the Congress can work together to stem the erosion
    of these critical functions within the government.
        Again thank you to our witnesses, and thank you, Mr.
    Chairman. I hope we learn from valuable lessons today.
        Mr. Taylor. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Thomas Betro.

          STATEMENT OF THOMAS BETRO, DIRECTOR, NAVAL CRIMINAL
                      INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE (NCIS)

        Mr. Betro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Bartlett. It is a pleasure to be here today to try to address
    this issue of procurement of boat barriers. I had submitted a
    statement for the record, but if it pleases the committee, I
    would like to summarize that statement orally today.
        Mr. Taylor. Mr. Betro, it is the custom of this committee
    to have a five-minute rule. It has been the custom of this
    subcommittee to allow the witness to speak as long as he would
    like as long as we don't find ourselves in a filibuster. So
    with unanimous consent, we will waive the five-minute rule and
    allow you to speak freely.
        Mr. Betro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        My name is Thomas Betro, and since January 2006 I have
    served as Director of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service.
    With me is Cathy Riddick-Brown, who is our Deputy Assistant
    Director for Acquisition and Logistics.
        We very much appreciate the subcommittee's sensitivity to
    the fact that the matter before us today remains the focus of
    an ongoing criminal investigation. There will be some
    limitations, I believe, on what we can discuss in an open
    hearing, but we understand the subcommittee's desire to receive
    information, and we will be as responsive as we can to those
    desires.
        As the element within the Department of the Navy that has
    primary responsibility for investigating procurement fraud, we
    are acutely sensitive to the fact that every time a Navy dollar
    is wasted, it means one less dollar to support our warfighters.
    As we speak today, approximately 120 NCIS personnel are
    deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa and elsewhere
    in support of the global war on terror. We understand that lost
    dollars may mean the difference in NCIS's ability to properly
    train and equip our own personnel before we send them in harm's
    way.
        I would like to start today by highlighting some of the
    things that NCIS has done relative to the reported
    improprieties associated with the boat barrier procurements.
        In June 2003, NCIS initiated a criminal investigation into
    these matters following the receipt of allegations of
    improprieties. We initially tasked the NCIS inspector general
    to look into these matters, but upon determination that there
    may be some criminal involvement, the case was transferred to
    our Washington, D.C., field office where they initiated a
    criminal investigation.
        From the outset, NCIS has included the Defense Criminal
    Investigative Service, which is the felony investigative arm of
    the Department of Defense Inspector General, in all of our
    investigative efforts. This includes interviews,
    interrogations, and even polygraph examinations of former NCIS
    employees. All 24 NCIS investigative reports associated with
    these matters have been provided to both DCIS and the GSA
    Inspector General's Office. We also sought out and received
    audit support from the Defense Contract Audit Agency. We have
    shared information fully with our partners in this joint
    criminal investigation.
        Moreover, NCIS and DCIS have jointly presented this case to
    three separate U.S. Attorneys for potential prosecution and
    civil action starting in April 2004. NCIS has been diligent in
    pursuing both prosecution and civil remedies. The case remains
    pending before the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia.
        Additionally, upon determining that these improprieties
    occurred, NCIS made major structural and process changes. In a
    moment Ms. Riddick-Brown will address procurement reforms we
    have implemented.
        I want to note that in October 2003, NCIS divested itself
    of the mission of technology validation, procurement and
    installation of physical security equipment, including the boat
    barriers in question. We have also disestablished the NCIS
    department that had been responsible for these procurements.
    Because we divested ourselves of these operations and
    disestablished this department, we have had to reconstruct many
    of the events described today from our investigative case files
    and from the recollection of those who worked in that
    department but not directly involved in the Waterside Security
    Systems. None of the individuals who were directly involved by
    those procurements are currently employed by NCIS.
        Let me turn now to the areas that the subcommittee
    specifically inquired about. First, what was the requirement
    for these barriers, and how did NCIS become the lead
    organization for their procurement? The requirement was
    identified in the aftermath of the USS Cole in October 2000.
    Within weeks of that event, each of the fleet commanders was
    tasked by the Chief of Naval Operations to identify measures to
    boost force protection. Several fleets identified the need for
    boat barriers.
        The NCIS Law Enforcement Physical Security Department, at
    the time known as NCIS Code 24, was tasked to execute the
    funding identified for these measures. At the time, Code 24 was
    responsible for program management of a number of Navy physical
    security systems stemming from additional CNO staff
    responsibilities held by the Director of NCIS, as the Special
    Assistant to the CNO for Naval Investigative Matters and
    Security.
        Prior to the Cole attack, Code 24 had the responsibility
    for DON electronic security system design and installation, as
    well as other security systems, though not boat barriers. In
    the immediate wake of the Cole bombing, Code 24 and contractor
    personnel conducted site surveys and worked to identify boat
    barrier options. In the interest of urgency, to deploy boat
    barrier capability as soon as possible, attention focused on
    commercial off-the-shelf, or COTS, solutions. The Dunlop boat
    barrier, a British system already in use by the Royal Navy in
    Scotland, was identified as the only COTS option.
        Full-scale tests of the Dunlop boat barrier system were
    conducted in San Diego in May 2001 with the help of the Naval
    Facilities Engineering Service Center. In May 2001, the Navy
    established new security standards, including requirements for
    the use of water barriers where appropriate and/or practical,
    especially for strategic assets.
        In August 2001, NCIS Code 24 was identified as the Navy
    boat barrier program manager by the CNO's staff element
    responsible for antiterrorism and force protection. From
    September 2001 to February 2003, Code 24 was involved in buying
    667 Dunlop barriers. After NCIS's original purchase of 667, 30
    more boat barriers were procured by other Navy commands.
    According to the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, NAVFAC,
    these barriers today remain in use at five CONUS and five
    OCONUS sites, with 535 deployed and 75 spares in the Navy
    inventory. Thus, some 90 percent of the barriers are still
    deployed or available for use.
        Based on the records we have, NCIS estimated that the costs
    associated with Code 24's procurement of these 667 barriers was
    $30.7 million. This is a slight downward revision from the
    estimate provided in my formal statement. Of this amount we
    estimate that some $2.6 million was applied toward contractor
    and subcontractor administrative fees.
        NCIS estimates that the cost of installing these barriers
    was some $24.1 million, including up to $2.1 million of this
    amount in similar administrative fees. I should note that we
    never have received any allegation of illegality with regard to
    the installation of the barriers.
        NCIS's Code 24 initiated boat barrier procurements in
    September 2001. It engaged GSA, which had previously supported
    NCIS security systems procurement on this acquisition. Several
    irregularities occurred thereafter. First, Code 24 sought to
    use the same GSA contract vehicle it has previously used for
    other security work. However, this contract vehicle, a small
    business set-aside Governmentwide Acquisition Contract, was
    created strictly to enable firms to provide information
    technology solutions to GSA's government customers. Code 24
    improperly sought to use this IT contract vehicle to purchase
    boat barriers, and GSA improperly agreed to this.
        Second, the boat barrier orders were improperly structured
    by Code 24 and approved by GSA so as not to exceed the $3
    million each. In this manner, those involved sought to
    circumvent competition requirements.
        Finally, a security consultant utilized by Code 24 to
    advise on boat barrier requirements, a single individual doing
    business as P-CON, was also directly responsible as a
    subcontractor for purchasing boat barriers on behalf of prime
    contractor Northern NEF. As the liaison between the vendor of
    boat barriers, Dunlop, and Northern NEF under the GSA contract,
    P-CON received a fee for each task order handled. In essence,
    P-CON both helped specify the requirements for affected
    installations and profited from the purchase of barriers slated
    for those installations. In March 2002 P-CON was removed from
    the middle of this arrangement, but P-CON had already earned a
    fee on the procurement of the first 317 of the 667 boat
    barriers ordered by Code 24.
        Code 24 initiated its last purchase of boat barriers in
    February 2003, supported by RMES, which by then had succeeded
    Northern NEF as the prime contractor. In May 2003, NCIS
    received allegations of potential illegalities associated with
    the boat barrier procurements. The NCIS IG was tasked to look
    into these matters, and at the same time NCIS was told by GSA
    that an audit had identified irregularities with these
    procurements. Upon determining that criminal violations may
    have occurred, the NCIS IG referred this matter to our
    Washington, D.C., field office in June of 2003. Also in June,
    NCIS asked DCIS to participate in the investigation and first
    briefed the assistant U.S. Attorney heading the Criminal
    Division for the District of Maryland on this matter.
        In July 2003, NCIS met with the GSA OIG to obtain
    preliminary audit findings. These findings heightened NCIS's
    concerns, and in August of 2003 the manager of the NCIS boat
    barrier program was polygraphed twice by NCIS. In September
    2003, he resigned. That same month the P-CON security
    consultant was escorted out of NCIS headquarters.
        At this time, NCIS leadership made a determination that the
    agency did not have the capacity to handle this burgeoning
    acquisition program. For context, in fiscal year 2000, Code 24
    received $4.4 million to execute physical security equipment
    responsibilities for the entire Navy. In fiscal year 2001,
    following the Cole attack, this number quadrupled to over $17
    million. The next year following 9/11, the figure grew
    astronomically to $106 million. Moreover, the new requirements
    were for equipment that was generally different from that which
    Code 24 had historically purchased.
        In August 2003, NCIS proposed divesting itself of these
    responsibilities in favor of a naval command better able to
    manage these requirements, and NCIS voluntarily transferred
    this mission to NAVFAC in October 2003.
        In sum, Mr. Chairman, it is recognized that in the interest
    of providing a rapid solution to protect Navy vessels, a small
    number of NCIS employees took improper actions. Shortcuts were
    taken to meet urgent fleet requirements, the expectation of
    Navy seniors, and fiscal deadlines. These actions were wrong. I
    neither excuse nor condone them. With adequate oversight, I do
    believe that these improper actions would not have occurred.
        Importantly, upon learning of these irregularities, NCIS
    took remedial measures. We investigated actively and realigned
    functions, and we undertook major process reforms. In the end
    the barriers that were procured were sufficient to satisfy the
    Navy's physical security requirements for ships in port. They
    have been in place for several years, and the vast majority of
    them are still in service.
        The purpose of the barriers was to deter and prevent small-
    boat attacks similar to the attack on the USS Cole. We do not
    know whether such attacks would have occurred had these
    barriers not been installed, but the barriers undoubtedly have
    provided a deterrent.
        With that, let me ask Mr. Riddick-Brown to offer some brief
    comments on our acquisition reforms. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Betro can be found in the
    Appendix on page 31.]

    STATEMENT OF CATHY RIDDICK-BROWN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR
    ACQUISITION AND LOGISTICS, NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
                                 (NCIS)

        Ms. Riddick-Brown. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bartlett and
    distinguished Members, I am Cathy Riddick-Brown. I am a GS-15
    supervisory contract specialist at NCIS. I joined the
    organization in July of 2004, and in this capacity, I serve as
    the Deputy Assistant Director for Acquisition and Logistics.
        I would like to highlight a few things that Director Betro
    shared earlier and talk about the measures that we have taken
    to improve our acquisition process.
        First of all, we did divest ourselves of the function to
    procure, to assess, and to install any equipment or processes
    in Waterside Security Systems. That now is handled by NAVFAC.
    Equally important, we disestablished Code 24 that used to
    manage that program.
        Additionally, with the creation of my department, the
    Acquisition and Logistics Department, we have put in place
    acquisition professionals with currently combined 70 years of
    procurement experience. Currently, our acquisition process, we
    manage about $30 million. Also very importantly is we have in
    the department created a training program for Contracting
    Officer's Representatives, also known as CORs, and in this
    training program the responsibility of a COR is to have the
    technical expertise on contracting matters, whatever they may
    be. This is required not only by DOD and the Department of
    Navy, but it is required for the Federal Government if you are
    going to have a contract that requires technical oversight.
    These individuals are trained and certified and recertified
    once every three years as the programs are currently managed.
        Additionally, we also ensure that we are following the
    Federal Acquisition Regulations, the FAR; we are following the
    DFARS, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement;
    and also Navy's internal process, Navy Marine Corps Acquisition
    Regulation Supplement. We follow those; our teams are trained
    in those requirements. We follow those processes.
        Also most recently, DOD and the Department of the Navy
    revised their policy from 2002 that talked about if you have
    requirements that exceed $100,000, and you plan to use non-DOD
    contracting assets, you must have what is called an acquisition
    strategy. The revision to that legislation talks not only to
    services, but it also talks to supplies. Further, any DOD
    organization that will have requirements that will exceed
    $100,000, be it a service or supply, must have an acquisition
    strategy, must go to the comptroller for review, and also a DOD
    contracting officer, and we do follow that practice.
        Mr. Chairman, I do believe had these mechanisms and
    practices been in place and adhered to before 2004 when I
    arrived, we wouldn't be here discussing this matter.
        I gladly will respond to any questions you might have
    regarding our reform and our contracting acquisitions. Thank
    you very much.
        Mr. Taylor. Mr. Williams, do you have a statement?
        Mr. Williams. Yes, I do, sir.
        Mr. Taylor. Would you like to begin?

         STATEMENT OF JAMES A. WILLIAMS, COMMISSIONER, FEDERAL
       ACQUISITION SERVICE, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (GSA)

        Mr. Williams. Good afternoon, Chairman Taylor, Ranking
    Member Bartlett and committee members. I am Jim Williams,
    Commissioner for the Federal Acquisition Service within the
    U.S. General Services Administration. I am pleased to appear
    before this subcommittee to testify on GSA's role in the 2002-
    2003 procurement of floating security barriers designed to
    protect U.S. Navy ships in port or at anchor.
        GSA is the central acquisition agency in the Federal
    Government, and its Federal Acquisition Service leverages the
    government's buying power on behalf of Federal agencies by
    acquiring products, services and solutions at best value in
    support of agency missions.
        Over the last five years, GSA set out a program to address
    and carry out significant changes in the management and
    execution of its acquisition and contract management policies,
    procedures and practices. GSA and the Federal Acquisition
    Service have made significant positive management and financial
    changes to our procurement operations over the last five years
    to ensure our customers get best value for their contracting
    requests.
        Several years ago GSA senior management reviewed our
    contracting activities, including GSA's Office of the Inspector
    General, performing audits of contracting practices throughout
    GSA. One of the serious problems found was the purchase of boat
    barriers made by GSA's then Federal Technology Service on
    behalf of NCIS, which began shortly after the terrorist attacks
    of September 11, 2001, and in the aftermath of the attack on
    the USS Cole.
        The original contract request was for floating security
    barriers designed to protect American men and women serving on
    our Navy ships. In 2003, after becoming aware of the ongoing
    GSA IG audit and the issues identified on the boat barrier
    projects, GSA terminated for the convenience of the government
    all remaining work on this matter.
        GSA recognizes serious contracting irregularities that
    occurred and moved swiftly and aggressively to fix the problem
    and prevent it from happening again. GSA made the corrective
    action in the Federal Technology Service the top priority for
    the agency. The OIG also recommended several areas that needed
    to be improved, and GSA senior management agreed with those
    audit findings and recommendations and took action to address
    them.
        GSA created an initiative entitled Get It Right to
    specifically address acquisition concerns. Our Get It Right
    initiative made GSA a better, more effective and compliant
    contracting agency. I would like to specifically highlight
    several key areas implemented under the Get It Right program
    where GSA is a better agency as a result of the hard lessons
    learned years ago.
        Strengthened management controls: GSA instituted a review
    process for preaward task orders over $1 million using contract
    review boards, which includes senior managers in that review.
    In addition, GSA has a policy that all task orders over $5
    million must be reviewed by GSA legal counsel prior to award.
    The agency also conducts procurement management reviews
    annually by a team of GSA procurement experts external to the
    area reviewed.
        Training for GSA's contracting and program officers: GSA
    has worked aggressively to provide core training in
    appropriations law, the proper use of schedules and
    governmentwide acquisition contracts, and project management
    training and certification.
        Customer relationship management: We have implemented a GSA
    working group that meets weekly to address GSA DOD acquisition
    issues and concerns from both agencies, and we have recently
    signed a joint memorandum agreement with the Department of
    Defense that further outlined our commitment to ensure a sound
    and compliant acquisition process.
        Contractual results: In December of 2006, GSA's Office of
    the Inspector General published the results of a second series
    of audits of the Federal Acquisition Service. I am proud to
    report that the OIG's findings showed GSA had significantly
    addressed weaknesses previously found in our contract
    management practices. Specifically, the OIG said that FAS was
    providing acquisition services with proper management and
    internal controls in place. We take management and internal
    controls seriously at GSA, and the time to improve our
    controls, train our employees, and develop improved customer
    relationship management has resulted in significantly improved
    contract management practices.
        In summary, GSA recognizes that we have a responsibility to
    provide sound acquisitions for our Federal customers. Our
    employees are inspired to help our customer agencies be better
    stewards of taxpayer dollars and more effective and efficient
    in meeting their missions every day by providing best value
    products services and solutions in compliance with Federal laws
    and rules.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome any questions you or the
    committee may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Williams can be found in the
    Appendix on page 40.]
        Mr. Taylor. Thank you, and I want to thank all of you for
    appearing. The motto of one of our service academies is: Deeds,
    not words. I have got to tell you after hearing your testimony,
    I think you would have failed to fulfill that. I am hearing a
    lot of strong talk, but the fact of the matter is that
    according to what I can see, NCIS made a series of blunders.
        Again, from published reports, no one was told by NCIS to
    hire P-CON Consulting of Alexandria, someone who was already
    working for NCIS. Apparently people were paid millions of
    dollars of fees for doing absolutely nothing, and
    subcontractors to them were paid additional millions of dollars
    for apparently doing nothing.
        Four years later, yes, it is great that none of our vessels
    have been attacked from the sea as the Cole was. But four years
    later I am not convinced that this was the only solution. I am
    certainly not convinced this was the most cost-effective
    solution. I did not see a sense of urgency there. The Cole was
    bombed in October. The testing was not done until the following
    May. And so if there was any sense of urgency, why the first 6-
    month delay, 8-month delay? And then apparently in a move to
    catch up, contracts were issued, it would certainly appear to
    be, through favoritism. And then a series of contracts and
    invoices are issued for slightly under the $3 million limit
    including--again, according to published reports, multiples of
    up to six on one day were issued for slightly under $3 million,
    and no one in NCIS finds this unusual? No one at GSA finds this
    unusual? This goes on for some time.
        And I have got to believe if I would have heard that
    testimony five years ago, I would have heard the same thing,
    that you have strong procedures in place to keep this from
    happening. Well, apparently you did not. And what is most
    troubling of all, apparently there has been some criminal
    wrongdoing. The taxpayers are out of a heck of a lot of money,
    and I don't see charges being levied against anyone. Your name
    is Naval Criminal Investigative Service. Why aren't you doing
    it? Again, you were the wronged party. I would think you would
    have the resources to look into this. And I would like to hear
    what you have to say to that.
        Mr. Betro. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I indicated, we
    definitely recognize there were breakdowns in oversight at NCIS
    at the time that allowed these things to occur. The small group
    of folks who were handling the procurements for that particular
    code at the time certainly were not experienced enough to be
    able to adequately carry out this large acquisition.
        Mr. Taylor. Mr. Betro, no one in the system found it
    unusual that on one day six contracts were let for slightly
    under $3 million? No one thought to think that maybe someone is
    trying to skirt the law?
        Mr. Betro. Sir----
        Mr. Taylor. No one in the whole system found that unusual?
        Mr. Betro. The only folks in the NCIS system who were
    providing any oversight to those particular statements of work
    were the individuals doing it themselves. They were--our
    processes at the time----
        Mr. Taylor. Is that a good business practice?
        Mr. Betro. It is not a good practice. It is a terrible
    business practice, one that we have corrected since then. The
    individuals who were performing the acquisitions were not even
    contract specialists. They were budget technicians who had been
    previously responsible for $800,000 worth of procurement.
        Mr. Taylor. Let's back up a little bit. Obviously you have
    looked into this. Did anyone at that time when tasked with this
    responsibility--is anyone on record of contacting anyone in the
    Navy chain of command and saying, I am not so sure we are the
    right people to be doing this?
        Mr. Betro. No, sir, not until after we noticed or were
    alerted to these improprieties.
        Mr. Taylor. At no time did someone step forward and say, we
    are not the right people, this is out of our level of
    expertise?
        Mr. Betro. No sir, at no time did we step forward prior to
    the improprieties being surfaced to senior leadership.
        Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir?
        Mr. Williams. I would just like to add that I agree with
    you, Mr. Chairman, that what was done was wrong. There were not
    proper internal controls in place. We do agree with that. I do
    believe that we did not perform this in the most cost-effective
    manner either. However, we have also instituted the reforms,
    and it was something that GSA found the problem, worked with
    our IG to identify what had gone wrong, and took quick action
    to fix it.
        Mr. Taylor. Are you prohibited by law, is NCIS prohibited
    by law from doing an internal criminal investigation?
        Mr. Betro. No, sir.
        Mr. Taylor. Since you have told me--I thought I heard you
    say we have identified wrongdoing.
        Mr. Betro. That is correct.
        Mr. Taylor. Why haven't you done so?
        Mr. Betro. Sir, we did initiate both a criminal--first an
    administrative review, which very quickly, within the first 30
    to 45 days, identified the potential for criminal wrongdoing.
    We did immediately initiate a criminal investigation into those
    matters.
        Mr. Taylor. And what became of it?
        Mr. Betro. It is still ongoing. We have presented findings
    of that investigation first to three separate U.S. Attorneys'
    offices, first in the District of Maryland in 2004. Their
    response was essentially that this was part of a larger
    investigation, and they believed it should be handled
    administratively potentially for civil remedies, and they
    suggested a new venue of Kansas City. We then took the case, we
    continued to work the case based on their review, and we did
    not go to Kansas City. At the time we believed we had proper
    venue in Virginia, the Eastern District, and we began dialogue
    almost immediately with the U.S. Attorney's Office in the
    Eastern District of Virginia pursuing both civil and/or
    criminal remedies for this investigation.
        Eventually that U.S. Attorney's office decided formally
    that another venue would be better, either Kansas City or
    Washington, D.C. We did eventually--and that is where it
    remains today--have been working with the United States
    Attorney's Office in Washington, D.C., continuing with the
    investigation, because we weren't satisfied to let it go with
    the first declination from the first U.S. Attorney's office in
    2004. We persisted in investigating and persisted in trying to
    seek justice by presenting the case to a second and now a third
    U.S. Attorney's office. We still have the potential of going
    all the way back to Kansas City to that venue if the U.S.
    Attorney's Office in Washington, D.C., also declines
    prosecution or civil remedies.
        Mr. Taylor. According to the Washington Post article, and I
    am quoting now, Northern was told by NCIS officials to hire P-
    CON Consulting of Alexandria. Who were those officials?
        Mr. Betro. Those officials were the same individuals who
    remain the focus of this criminal investigation, an individual
    who no longer works for NCIS that resigned in 2003 shortly
    after these improprieties were surfaced. There does appear to
    be a preexisting relationship. And that is, as we mentioned,
    part of the details of our criminal investigation which we
    would request that we could address in--potentially in a closed
    session.
        Ms. Riddick-Brown. Sir, if I may?
        Mr. Taylor. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Riddick-Brown. It is not uncommon for a customer to
    say, I want to go to a particular venue. But it is the
    responsibility of the contracting officer to say, what is in
    the best interest of the government? So the record shows that
    an official said, go to a particular company, but as a
    contracting officer I must ensure that what I am doing is in
    the best interest, cost-efficient, et cetera. So the client can
    make all kinds of recommendations, but the contracting officer
    bears the burden of the decision.
        Mr. Williams. The contracting officer was at GSA after the
    joint decision was made between NCIS and GSA to move this under
    the small business thresholds for competition, which was wrong.
    Then they it put it into the sole source, legitimate sole
    source. Had it been legitimate, we would have named a small
    business company to do it. It was not legitimate to split the
    orders, to put it underneath that $3 million threshold.
        Mr. Taylor. How much money do you think would have been
    saved----
        Mr. Betro. Well, Mr. Chairman----
        Mr. Taylor [continuing]. If all the barriers had been
    purchased in one purchase order rather than in a series of
    small purchases? You have got to have some experience in that
    field.
        Mr. Betro. Yes, I think, as I mentioned in my statement, we
    would look at some of the administrative fees that were charged
    or provided to the contractors and subcontractors for their
    efforts in this procurement. There are fees; that is acceptable
    to charge some level of fee. We would probably say the fees in
    this case were excessive, should not have been accepted by us
    at NCIS, but they were not mentioned in any way as being
    excessive. That was about $4 million total between the
    procurement and the installation of the barriers.
        There is no way for us to tell on the actual base cost of
    the systems themselves. At least I certainly can't, and maybe
    our colleagues from Naval Facilities Engineering Command could,
    to say what would have been the cost. They were a COTS
    solution, we were going for a COTS solution. This is the one
    found, the only one known to be available in all likelihood. I
    guess if there was a sole source done legitimately, sole-source
    contract, they may still have ended up being the provider of
    those barriers.
        But the administrative fees that I mentioned, a little over
    $4 million that we would point to somewhere in there, I would
    say would represent the excess and potentially the wasted
    expenditure of money.
        Mr. Taylor. What are the names of the NCIS officials? Who
    directed Northern to hire P-CON Consulting?
        Mr. Betro. Mr. Chairman, I would respectfully request that
    we, if possible, address that in a closed session for the
    interest of the matter being an ongoing criminal investigation.
        Mr. Taylor. I understand you saying that, but I would also
    tell you that this is not the only acquisition program going on
    in our Nation. I would sure hate for another agency being
    bilked out of money by the same people as we speak. They have
    not been convicted of anything, but they certainly are under
    some suspicion of mismanaging the citizens' money. This is not
    the only wasteful thing going on in the Navy. The Littoral
    Combat Ship (LCS) program comes to mind. And I would hope that
    one or two things comes out of this today. Number one is that
    we are sending the message that we are going to take care of
    our troops. The second part is that this is not carte blanche
    for contractors to defraud our Nation in the process.
        And after reading these articles in the Post, I certainly
    have reason to believe that we have been defrauded, and it
    looks like an inside job. And I would like the message to be
    that those people are going to be brought to justice, and that
    steps are being taken so that this won't happen again, and that
    the message being sent is that if you use your position to
    enrich yourself or your friends, you are going to pay for it
    criminally. That has not happened yet.
        Mr. Betro. No, sir. And we will endeavor and have been
    endeavoring to continue to pursue the criminal charges
    complaints against the one or two or three individuals
    involved. And like I say, we are currently in the United States
    Attorney's Office in the District awaiting a decision.
        Mr. Taylor. I would like to request for the record--it is
    my understanding that U.S. Attorneys cannot talk about ongoing
    investigations, but it is also my understanding that those
    people who have approached a U.S. attorney are free to say, I
    have approached that U.S. Attorney and asked them to look into
    this subject. And for the record, I would like the names of the
    United States attorneys that have been approached, and what
    days they were approached, and what information was given to
    them.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    beginning on page 47.]
        Mr. Taylor. The Chair yields to the gentleman from
    Maryland.
        Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
        Had this been competed on a fast-track basis, how much
    longer would it have taken?
        Ms. Riddick-Brown. Possibly, sir, three to nine months,
    depending on the venue. If we decide to stay in a sole-source
    venue, sole sources tend to go quicker than a competitive
    venue. At a minimum three to nine months.
        Mr. Bartlett. You are all familiar with the article in the
    Washington Post. Are there any errors in that article?
        Mr. Betro. Sir, I would say there are not any latent errors
    that I can speak of, just information we mentioned that was not
    included in the article because they were not aware of. It was
    information that the authors of the articles were not aware of
    that we shared today, but generally the information in the
    article is accurate.
        Mr. Williams. I would say, sir, the information is
    accurate. I don't think it noted that while things were done
    wrong, this was a different time frame. This request came to us
    to help out one week after September 11th. There certainly was
    a sense of urgency. It still does not excuse or condone the
    wrongdoing that happened, but it was a different time, and,
    frankly, it is a different time now. I believe we have fixed
    those problems so they won't happen again under my watch.
        Mr. Bartlett. If another request like this came, how would
    the procurement proceed differently?
        Ms. Riddick-Brown. One, sir, we would put together a team
    that consists of both the requirements team, the comptroller's
    team and the contracting team within, in our case, NCIS. We
    would look at all the venues within DOD. It is always better to
    use existing contracts which can save time in that venue. You
    look at within the DOD structure what is available, you look at
    what is in the marketplace. We assess what that looks like, and
    if it, in fact, does meet our needs, we then go to either an
    existing vehicle, we either can go sole source, or we can
    compete. And there are enough venues in the acquisition arena
    that we could hopefully choose the venue that best works for
    the government.
        Following that, if, in fact, we had a competition, there
    would be an evaluation of the potential offerers, those who are
    proposing. If there was even a sole source within a small
    business venue, we could actually even compete within the small
    business venue. So there are various avenues one could take be
    it small business, be it sole source, be it competitive in that
    arena.
        But the one challenge that we always have in the arena is
    putting another adequate statement of work that reflects our
    needs so we will know where to go and get the resources to make
    our purchases, be it a service or supply. The evaluated
    contractor who is a potential offerer we then make
    determinations what is the best value to the government, and we
    then make the award.
        Mr. Bartlett. Certainly there will be occasions when time
    is of the essence, which it was deemed to be here. And we need
    to proceed very rapidly. This was a fair-sized procurement. The
    regulations as they were interpreted required that these
    contracts be let in amounts of less than $3 million. There were
    a large number of those let, sometimes several in one day, a
    clear, clear attempt to skirt the requirements.
        Recognizing that there may be times when instances--when
    time is of the essence, and we need to move very quickly, and
    we really can't wait 6 to 9 months for a competition, how can
    we structure that kind of procurement to avoid the problems
    that we had here? Clearly we just ignored the rules, and you
    have got to have it real quickly, so you can't spend more than
    3 million in one contract, so we will let three contracts in
    one day, each of them less than $3 million. That is an obvious
    ruse to get around the regulation. But recognizing that there
    may be times when we need to move very quickly, how can we do
    that without the kind of problems we created here?
        Mr. Williams. I think, sir, there are legitimate ways to do
    that within the Federal Acquisition Regulation. Other shortcuts
    were taken here that shouldn't have been taken. But where you
    have in this particular case an urgent and compelling need and
    a single source, I believe it could have been easily done by
    either NCIS, or as we do at GSA--we help agencies do their
    acquisitions--it could have been done right, and it could have
    been done fast under the existing regulations.
        Mr. Bartlett. Dave Nelson from Northern said he did not
    have any idea why NCIS selected his company. He apparently did
    not feel that he had the kind of credentials which would have
    recommended him for that contract. Why do you think the company
    was selected?
        Mr. Betro. I believe, sir, that he was inappropriately
    selected because the individuals involved tried to use an
    existing vehicle that they had been using to make other
    procurements for a while. Clearly improper. And in their
    interest to expedite and to use a system that was familiar to
    them, they used an improper vehicle, and his company was an
    8(a) set-aside.
        Mr. Bartlett. What company?
        Mr. Betro. Small business.
        Mr. Bartlett. 8(a)?
        Ms. Riddick-Brown. Yes.
        Mr. Bartlett. Why was he directed to hire P-CON, which
    apparently was one man already fully employed?
        Mr. Betro. Yes, sir. P-CON, he had been an employee--P-CON
    had been a subcontractor for NEF working for NCIS as a security
    consultant before the barrier procurements ever came up, and it
    was definitely a focus of our investigation as to why an
    individual in NCIS would have further recommended that
    individual to NEF to participate in the boat barrier
    procurements.
        As mentioned before, it is not necessarily that unusual
    that a preference or a recommendation would be made. In this
    instance we believe there was potentially some irregularities
    based on prior relationships that the individuals had which is
    a focus and a subject of our criminal investigation.
        Mr. Bartlett. When you investigated this, was there any
    value added by the Navy hiring both Northern and P-CON? What
    they did couldn't the Navy buyers have done directly? Now, I
    have trouble understanding what value is added to this
    procurement process by hiring these two companies. They did not
    do anything except let contracts to somebody else, which is
    what I thought our buyers did.
        Mr. Betro. Sir, as I mentioned, the Navy could have gone
    directly through different vehicles to Dunlop, and there is no
    question that the individuals who were involved in this took
    improper action. But clearly there was another venue or vehicle
    that we could have used to go directly without using NEF or P-
    CON industries.
        Mr. Bartlett. When you say were improper, do you mean dumb
    or criminal?
        Mr. Betro. Sir, I think it could be one or the other or
    both, and I think that is what we are waiting for the U.S.
    attorney's ruling or judgment on the merits of the criminal
    investigation. Clearly the inferences there raised our concern
    that it did meet the threshold of criminal violations.
        Mr. Williams. If you don't mind, sir, I believe the
    splitting of the procurements under the competition rules was
    wrong. Then picking any company to be the prime contractor as
    Northern was with the understanding that they were not going to
    do any work was wrong. So you start with splitting the award
    was wrong, and then the GSA contracting officer agreed to that.
    That was wrong. Then picking any company, and under this
    particular 8(a) set of contracts there were 165 contractors, if
    you picked any one of them by throwing a dart at the wall and
    saying, we want you to be the prime, you don't have to do any
    work, it is just a passthrough, that was wrong.
        Mr. Bartlett. It says in the article that the auditors
    wanted to question NCIS officials about the boat barrier
    project, but NCIS officials declined to discuss it. Why would
    your people decline to discuss it with the auditors if our
    intent is to get to the truth?
        Mr. Betro. Sir, I am not aware of any NCIS officials
    declining to discuss.
        Mr. Bartlett. I thought you said the article was factual.
        Mr. Betro. I said generally I thought the article was
    accurate. That is one of the specifics that I have not been
    able to find out who might have refused. As I said, we worked
    with DCIS and GSA's OIG office almost immediately from the
    outset and have worked closely with them from that time until
    now.
        Mr. Bartlett. NCIS agents said they were conducting an
    investigation of their own and wanted to take over the case.
    GSA agreed?
        Mr. Williams. My understanding is the GSA officer and
    inspector general did agree with that.
        Mr. Bartlett. And that was four years ago?
        Mr. Williams. I believe, sir.
        Mr. Bartlett. And we still are investigating it?
        Mr. Betro. Yes, sir, still open investigation today.
        Mr. Bartlett. Seems incredible to me that that
    investigation could take more than four months let alone four
    years.
        Mr. Betro. Well, any procurement investigation does. There
    are some complexities, sir, involved with contract reviews and
    trying to find records and task orders. But we did present it
    to the first U.S. Attorney in the May time frame of 2004. So at
    that point we had investigated enough where we thought there
    was sufficient information enough for a U.S. attorney.
        We could have stopped. We could have closed our
    investigation in 2004 with that U.S. Attorney's declination,
    but we did not. We took the information they provided with what
    the weaknesses were in the case from a criminal prosecutive
    standpoint, and we continued to investigate. We continued to do
    lots more interviews, records reviews until we thought we had
    enough additional information to bring it to another U.S.
    Attorney's office, which we did.
        Likewise, that U.S. Attorney's office chose not to
    prosecute the case. We did not stop there. We could have
    stopped at that particular point in time, but we did not. We
    have continued to investigate these allegations and
    improprieties, and currently we are at a third U.S. Attorney's
    office. We also did this fully jointly with the Defense
    Criminal Investigative Service in addition to the GSA OIG. So
    it is three different investigative organizations with full
    visibility on this investigation, all sharing information and
    sharing each other's reports, jointly presenting these cases to
    the various U.S. Attorneys' offices.
        But I recognize in hindsight, now that it has come to my
    attention, there might be some things in the investigation we
    could have done more rapidly. But I do believe we have carried
    out due diligence in continuing to pursue the criminal and
    civil remedies that might be available.
        Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Chairman, I think that this case is
    instructive enough that it would be useful--I am not desirous
    of identifying specific people to be hung for this. That is not
    my goal. I am sure mistakes were made. I am sure each step--I
    hope that each step the person thought they were making the
    right decision; in hindsight they clearly did not.
        But I think this could become a textbook study on how to
    really screw up a procurement so that we wouldn't do it again.
    And I would like to see this not kind of swept under the rug
    and some people administratively disciplined or whatever. I
    would like to see this--and you can call them employee A, B and
    C if you wish, but I would like to see this exposed in the
    clear light of day, because I think there were enough things
    that went wrong here that this would be an excellent case study
    for looking at contracting in urgent situations like this so we
    did not repeat these mistakes.
        Can you get that kind of information to us so that we can
    see what we might do with that?
        Mr. Betro. Sir, we actually have an investigative time line
    that we were prepared to share if we were to go into a closed
    session and leave with the committee. It just outlined broadly
    the investigative steps and chronologies. We could make that
    available for the committee.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    beginning on page 48.]
        Mr. Bartlett. I have a couple of questions for the record.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
        Mr. Taylor. Sure. Before going to Mr. Larsen, I would be
    curious, what is the name of the CEO of Northern NEF on or
    about the date of September 28, 2001?
        Mr. Betro. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, I will try to find that
    name.
        Sir, I believe the president was Ken Dyer.
        Mr. Taylor. How do you spell the last name?
        Mr. Betro. D-Y-E-R.
        Mr. Taylor. Okay. With that, the Chair yields to Mr.
    Larsen.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Betro, the article says that the cost for the program
    was at least $100 million, I think. But you have testified that
    at least in the procurement of the boat barriers, NCIS
    estimates that the cost will be 30.7- after adjustment. Why
    that discrepancy? What is being counted in the article that you
    are not counting?
        And second, you also mentioned in terms of fees and costs,
    fees of $2.6 million and some other costs of 24.7- leaves about
    27.3 million that you have accounted for of your 30.7-. Where
    did that other 4.4 million go to? Can you address that for me?
        Mr. Betro. First, I believe that I was trying to address
    the total cost of the boat barrier program. The $100 million I
    can only surmise might have referenced our overall budget for
    Waterside Security Systems, which included several other things
    in addition to the boat barriers. So I am surmising that this
    article might have referred to that amount.
        The boat barrier program, as best we can reconstruct, is
    just under the total of $60 million, which included both base
    costs of the materials and installations. It also included
    those miscellaneous administrative fees which I referenced, I
    believe, totaled a little over $4 million.
        Mr. Larsen. And you are saying the procurement part of that
    60-plus million was 30.7 million?
        Mr. Betro. That is correct.
        Mr. Larsen. And then you talked about some of the fees
    associated with that procurement which still left, by my math,
    $4.4 million left unaccounted for, which I would like you to
    account for. Maybe you can account for the record.
        Mr. Betro. Yes, sir. I have it here in terms of where the
    4.4 or so million dollars went broken down between Northern
    NEF, P-CON. Those fees would be--I believe that P-CON received
    a total of $1.1 million in fees for participating as a
    middleman between Dunlop and Northern NEF, and that NEF
    received $1.5 million in fees associated with the procurement
    activity, and then in the installation piece was the remainder
    of the 4.4-, which is 1--I am sorry--$1 million in fees that
    went to a company called ITA, which was responsible for the
    installation of the boat barriers. So if I got this correct it
    is $1.1 million to P-CON, $2.6 million to NEF and $1 million to
    ITA, and I have a total of 4.7-.
        Mr. Larsen. So beyond the other $2.6 million for otherwise,
    that is not doing much.
        Actually, honestly, what is that, 6 million, 7 million out
    of 30.7 million for fees to procure the program--to procure the
    boat barriers?
        Mr. Betro. I believe, sir, that is out of 56.7.
        Mr. Larsen. Okay. About 12 percent or so; 12 to 15 percent.
        Some questions with regards to the attorneys' offices. I
    don't quite understand it. You said that USAO Maryland declined
    prosecution, and in your oral testimony you said it was because
    it was part of a larger investigation so they wanted to move it
    to Kansas City? Is that what I heard you say?
        Mr. Betro. It was presented jointly with a larger case of
    kickbacks--alleged kickbacks, which, when this first came up,
    some of the companies were the same, and so they were brought
    under a worn umbrella for ease of understanding who the
    companies and individuals were. We did subsequently break out
    the boat barrier one pure and simply by itself, but by that
    time the entire package, including P-CON and NEF and the boat
    barrier issue, were declined by the U.S. attorney's office in
    Maryland saying basically that the P-CON issues are deemed more
    administrative, and that the appropriate venue for that could
    be Kansas City where the GSA office which was the contracting
    office for those particular acquisitions.
        Mr. Larsen. Is that a determination that NCIS agreed with,
    or did not agree with but had to live with?
        Mr. Betro. We had to live with, but didn't agree with. That
    is why we went on to the Eastern District of Virginia believing
    that P-CON, the company that was middleman in this, was
    incorporated in Virginia, so we thought potentially that was a
    better venue.
        Mr. Larsen. And their determination--your written testimony
    says they asked you to explore other options, which is a
    different way of saying they declined prosecution.
        Mr. Betro. They did not formally decline; they recommended
    that they were not the appropriate venue and wouldn't consider
    the case any further.
        Mr. Larsen. Nobody says no in this business. So they were
    not going to pursue an investigation. Can I ask, was P-CON and
    Northern NEF part of this broader investigation that USAO
    Maryland declined, or was this a clean break, to your
    knowledge?
        Mr. Betro. For us it was a clean break. The other case
    involved, sir, grand jury and other related materials.
        Mr. Larsen. Maybe that can be discussed in a different
    venue.
        Then so now you are at DCAO, and there actually has been no
    determination from them whether or not a crime has been
    committed, whether or not there has been a determination that
    this needs to go any further; is that correct?
        Mr. Betro. That is correct. We have no kind of final
    determination, civil or criminal, from the U.S. Attorney's
    office here in D.C.
        Mr. Larsen. Is there an expectation when that would occur
    from your end?
        Mr. Betro. They did not give us a specific date. And so we
    will continue to make contact with them.
        Mr. Larsen. Can I--that is somewhat disconcerting. I am not
    an attorney, and some of us are up here, and some of us aren't,
    but it sure sounds like things happened that were extremely bad
    and extremely illegal from a layman's point of view.
        Can I just suggest--and I don't want this to sound smart-
    alecky, but I would rather hear from you the results of the
    U.S. Attorney's office of D.C. determination rather than read
    it in the Washington Post.
        Mr. Betro. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Larsen. So certainly, I don't know how we can set that
    up or if we can even do that, but it would certainly be
    appropriate.
        Mr. Betro. We can certainly be sure that happens, sir.
        Mr. Larsen. I think Mr. Bartlett asked some questions about
    this convoluted relationship between P-CON Consulting and
    Northern NEF and the other side of the security consultant
    contract within NCIS. But just one more question, Mr. Chairman.
    It does not look like you are keeping time, but I know that Ms.
    Bordallo is here.
        For Mr. Williams, on page four of your testimony, you say
    that--this is just trying to define terminology. It says
    specifically the OIGs--the FSA was providing compliant assisted
    acquisition services with proper management. What is the
    definition of ``compliant assisted acquisition services''?
        Mr. Williams. Well, assisted acquisition services means
    that when other agencies need help doing their acquisition,
    they come to GSA with a statement of work. We then do an
    acquisition plan. We may do the competition or do the award for
    them and help them with postaward management.
        What they found, the IG, when they came back to us after
    looking at it--after they initially helped us identify these
    problems, they came back and reviewed us again and said that we
    had proper internal controls, and we were doing these assisted
    acquisitions, helping other agencies with their procurements,
    in a compliant manner, compliant with the Federal Acquisition
    Regulations.
        Mr. Larsen. Okay. One more point to make, Mr. Chairman. I
    have to step out for a meeting, and I will be right back in for
    the remainder of questioning from other Members, but just a
    quick review. From what I can gather, on the $56 million or so
    in a procurement, about 12 to 14 percent or so went to fees of
    some sort, sounds like; that we don't have a determination yet
    from the U.S. Attorney's office in D.C. on whether or not there
    will be--at least from their view, there is enough there to say
    there is either a civil violation or a criminal violation took
    place. I mean, from my understanding, we are waiting to see if
    these folks get off the hook essentially. I don't know if there
    is anything else to go beyond that, unless we go to the U.S.
    Attorney's office of Peoria, Illinois, or some other venue.
        Mr. Betro. Kansas City.
        Mr. Larsen. The final point I want to make is this whole--
    this thing started in some ways because obviously there are
    individuals there who were not the folks we want in those kinds
    of positions. The second is I have seen this before, and maybe
    we could dig into this one broader issue about something we
    might call procurement migration. That is using a program that
    is not designed at all, but is available because someone sees
    it as available, so they use it for something that it was not
    designed to be used for; in other words, using a technology
    program--it has a tangential relationship with security, it is
    physical security, not technology security, but it has the word
    ``security'' in it, so let's use that to pursue this other
    program. And whether you call it procurement migration or some
    other term, there are other examples of that that we have seen
    in the past several years that don't end up with the same
    extreme result, but end up with money being wasted because we
    are using things that were not designed to be used for. And
    that may be something that warrants us looking into as well.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Taylor. I would like to thank the gentleman. If I could
    do a quick follow-up.
        Who paid P-CON the million dollars? Was it--did they get a
    check from the United States Government? Did they get a check
    from Northern? Did they get a check from Dunlop?
        Mr. Williams. It would have been made by Northern their
    prime contractor. They were a subcontractor to Northern.
        Mr. Taylor. So this is a cost of doing business that
    Northern had?
        Mr. Williams. Yes.
        Mr. Taylor. Just as a matter of curiosity, what is the time
    that a former naval uniformed person would have to wait before
    they could have gone to work for Northern under the law?
        Ms. Riddick-Brown. Well, it depends, sir. If it is $10
    million or more, then there is usually a--has to be a direct
    correlation with the program you just left than simply knowing
    about the program.
        Mr. Taylor. Are the employees or the management of Northern
    former Navy personnel.
        Mr. Betro. Not to our knowledge, sir.
        Mr. Taylor. The Chair yields to Mrs. Bordallo.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
    calling the hearing today on such an important issue.
    Unfortunately, today our full committee heard testimony about
    another force protection issue and that was on body armor, and
    the news that members of our Armed Forces in harm's way may not
    have the best body armor they need to meet the best operational
    requirements.
        And in this case today, it seems our sailors and marines in
    the wake of the USS Cole bombing had their protection
    compromised for the sake of expediency and favoritism.
        I have, Mr. Betro, I have some questions that I think
    were--some of the members here were leading up to, and I would
    like to get more information.
        How could the Navy's own inspector general and internal
    auditing units allow the prime contractors to bill one major
    contractor into many separate invoices always totaling under
    the $3 million threshold. Is this what put up the red flag?
        Mr. Betro. Ma'am, no red flags were raised internally by
    us. There was no detection of those improprieties. It wasn't
    until it was brought to our attention by the Program Integrity
    Office of the Department of Navy as one way, plus the GSA audit
    was indicating that there was some improprieties, and those
    both surfaced roughly in the spring of 2003.
        Regrettably, there was no oversight on to the actions of
    the individuals who were orchestrating.
        There were two ways this could have been caught at the
    time. Our employees certainly should have known better and
    shouldn't have done it, and certainly our next was our
    contracting officer also potentially should have advised or
    known that this shouldn't have occurred.
        So we clearly stand up and say the folks at NCIS took
    improper actions and we are trying to again further investigate
    that now.
        Ms. Bordallo. What was the time frame when you finally
    caught it?
        Mr. Betro. It was in roughly April-May of 2003.
        Mr. Williams. If you would like a little background from
    GSA, GSA's management had actually identified some problems in
    another region of GSA, and we essentially have 11 regions all
    doing similar work. They then decided we should have an audit
    done of all of the 11 regions. The original irregularities
    occurred in another GSA region, but then when they looked at
    our region out of Kansas City, that is when our Office of
    Inspector General identified the problems with the boat barrier
    project.
        Ms. Bordallo. Now on the investigation, I think Mr.
    Bartlett brought up the idea that it has been four years; is
    that correct?
        Mr. Betro. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Bordallo. The principals involved, were they
    reprimanded or put on leave, or how did you handle that?
        Mr. Betro. The government employee involved resigned in the
    immediate kind of wake of us initiating this investigation and
    beginning questioning of that individual, and some polygraphs.
        There is a subcontractor we have discussed earlier, P-CON,
    who was escorted out of the building, and his work with NCIS
    was terminated at that time.
        Those are the only kind of immediate--under our control,
    individuals that we took some action on immediately.
        Ms. Bordallo. Inasmuch as this investigation is ongoing and
    has been ongoing, and I find it very unusual for an
    investigation to be stretched out into a four-year period--and
    I don't know how much longer--is there a statute of limitation
    here? Would that kick in?
        Mr. Betro. Five years.
        Ms. Bordallo. How hard are you pushing this investigation?
        Mr. Betro. A lot harder right now.
        But honestly, there are lots of procurement cases that the
    U.S. Attorney's offices are taking. We are presenting the
    information to various U.S. Attorneys offices in hopes of
    getting--exhausting any final decisions regarding prosecution
    that we can get. We are continuing to pursue that. That is why
    we are at our third office. We know at least potentially there
    is at least one more venue that we could approach. But we have
    tried to persist in getting a determination on either the civil
    or prosecutive or criminal remedies for this particular case.
        Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Chairman, there is not much time left.
        Mr. Williams, I have a question for you. It seems that the
    Navy leadership was hasty to find a solution and they took
    advantage of the GWAC loose contracting guidelines. What steps,
    beyond additional training, has GSA taken to clarify the rules
    governing issuance of governmentwide acquisition contracts
    known as GWACs?
        Mr. Williams. We have done training in that area. We have
    also instituted management controls where we do reviews now
    that weren't done before. We did have a lack of proper
    management controls. We did take action across all of our 11
    regions to put in the training, the management controls, sign
    the agreement with DOD on how we were going to improve that. We
    monitor on a regular basis.
        I would say that we also ask our IG to come back in and
    check up on have we put those proper management controls in
    place.
        For these assisted acquisition services where we help other
    agencies, we feel like we are now on solid ground. We still do
    help all Federal agencies when they need help with their
    acquisitions. We don't want them to come to GSA thinking we
    take shortcuts to help them. We want them to come to us knowing
    we can help their mission in a compliant way.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Taylor. Mr. Williams, I find several things curious. I
    would ask for your intelligence on this.
        I was here for September the 11th. The Cole was built in my
    congressional district. It was brought back to my congressional
    district for repairs. Two of my local newspaper editors, who
    are both Vietnam veterans, brought it to my attention that they
    had gotten within 50 or so yards of the Cole on the other side
    of the Pascagoula River, undetected. Just walked up. Both
    Vietnam veterans said if we had another RPG, we could have put
    another hole in it.
        I remember at another hearing bringing that to the CNO's
    attention. But I also remember going to the home port at
    Pascagoula and the shipyard and the Coast Guard station
    adjacent to it, because after they brought it to my attention,
    I felt like I had to do something. So I go to the Coast Guard
    station. Who has got responsibility for the watershop
    application of the Cole? Well, the Navy does. So I went to the
    Naval Station. Who has got responsibility of the watershop of
    the Cole? The shipyard does. Went to the shipyard. The Coast
    Guard did.
        So about the time line that this procurement is being
    issued, September 28th of 2001, it again--it is almost a year
    since the event of the attack on the Cole, and really nothing
    has happened. And I think someone could draw the conclusion
    that it wasn't until the events of September the 11th that some
    people within the Navy said, Go do something and do something
    in a hurry.
        The reason I say all of that is, Mr. Williams, now that
    someone has lit a fire under someone at the Navy to do
    something almost a year after the attack on the Cole, if they
    had come to the GSA and said we need to do something, we need
    to do something really fast, under the normal procedures could
    GSA have been tasked to buy these barriers and how quickly
    could they have done it under the normal rules? Or are there
    expedited rules that would have gone into place?
        Mr. Williams. Well, I believe we could have done the task.
    We had people who received this request from the Navy a week
    after September 11th. They did a task but they broke the rules.
    I believe we could have done it within the rules and done it
    fast, given that, as Director Betro said, this is really a
    single source. I believe you also had an urgent and compelling
    situation and the Federal acquisition regulations allow you to
    move fast when you have both an urgent and compelling
    situation.
        Mr. Taylor. How fast?
        Mr. Williams. Maybe not as fast as we did it. But probably
    if we did everything right, I think we probably could have done
    it within a couple of weeks, or maybe a month. But we did
    this--we can do an urgent, compelling, in 30 days or less. I
    believe we could have done this, and it would have been
    appropriately justified, and we could have done it in under a
    month. And we do this to the tune of several billion dollars a
    year for all Federal agencies. We now do it right. We just did
    it wrong.
        And, again, there were people who didn't have the proper
    oversight, they probably didn't have the proper training. They
    tried to break the rules to help the Navy with their urgent
    mission. It was wrong what they did, but I believe we could
    have done this in a correct manner and we could have done it
    fast.
        Mr. Taylor. Playing devil's advocate, is there any evidence
    that the rules were broken? I realize a year has gone by since
    the Cole was first attacked. Or very close to a year. But is
    there any evidence in your--from what you can see, that the
    rules were broken to expedite the purchase? Or do you feel like
    the rules were broken to enrich someone?
        Mr. Williams. Well, let me answer both questions. The rules
    were broken to expedite the purchase.
        When the Navy came to us after having already tested the
    boat barriers in May of 2001, then they came to us in
    September. Then went to our contracting officer, decided it was
    okay to split these procurements, which was wrong.
        And whether somebody enriched themselves, I think that is
    part of the ongoing investigation. And I think Director Betro
    has already talked about what he saw in that regard.
        What came to us was, as we agreed to do this under the
    small--under the threshold for competition for an 8A, to do it
    in a sole source manner, we then got a request to go to
    northern NEF and to P-CON.
        Mr. Taylor. Mr. Betro, I am curious. As Mr. Williams
    mentioned, the tests were conducted in May. It is June, July,
    August, almost all of the month of September passes, apparently
    nothing was purchased.
        Two weeks after the events of September 11th, someone gets
    a fire lighted, probably in the proximity of their body parts,
    and decides to move. Is there any evidence between May and
    September that any movement at all took place?
        Mr. Betro. I really can't answer that. I can't say NCIS
    wasn't designated until August of 2001 as being responsible for
    the program of boat barriers. And we did not--I believe the
    report was not done until August of 2001. Which suggested that
    these barriers met the minimum requirements for the intended
    purpose.
        So it was August, about 2001, when we had a program manager
    identified NCIS; the test results came back to us saying yes,
    it met the minimum threshold of requirements, and the first
    procurement was in October.
        Mr. Taylor. But that certainly in my mind gets a little
    confusing, when in all of this time apparently there is only
    one supplier, so there really should--it is not a competition
    any longer. So it is a question of whether or not that one
    supplier made a product that was adequate. Is that what took
    this long to decide, made the determination by August?
        Mr. Betro. The combination of site surveys and examinations
    of what was available commercially did come down to Dunlop, and
    then the tests were conducted and the results of the test that
    came back in August of 2001 said even though they were the only
    manufacturer, we now had some confirmation that that
    manufacturer could meet the minimum basic requirements. It is
    about the same time as, well, that NCIS was then designated as
    the program manager.
        There were things going on but until we knew we had the
    requirement met minimally at least, we weren't going to extend
    any money to procure any technology, at least boat barriers.
        Mr. Taylor. Because the Washington Post raised the issue
    and you mentioned that about 90 percent of the barriers are
    still available, was there a significant problem with the
    barriers leaking and sinking, or was that just something that
    happened to a few of them?
        Mr. Betro. I have some colleagues from Naval Command here.
    We divested on the program back in 2003 and so we would not
    have been tracking, and I don't have information available.
        Mr. Taylor. But you started buying them in September of
    2001. I would imagine by now there is a sense of urgency. So
    those deliveries were in a month or two of that, and I would
    have hoped that you would have known early on if you had
    problems on them.
        Mr. Betro. I had no information available to us.
        Captain Samuels. I am Mark Samuels. I am the commanding
    officer of Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center, which
    is technical agent for NAVFAC. Like my other dynamic pieces of
    equipment that is maintained and that has to be done, we have
    been involved in some of this maintenance, but most of that has
    been done at the local bases. And I am not prepared right now
    to talk about any of those specific patterns or problems that
    may exist.
        Mr. Taylor. If you would, Captain, for the record, since
    you have been identified as a program officer, if there have
    been a--when I say ``substantial,'' over ten percent of them
    having problems with leaks or other quality effects that have
    lead to a premature life diminishment, I would like you to get
    back to this committee.
        Captain Samuels. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Taylor. If there is anything consistent that was
    causing this problem that could be pointed to as a
    manufacturing problem.
        Captain Samuels. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Taylor. Mr. Bartlett.
        Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. I don't have any further
    questions.
        Mr. Taylor. If I may, I think Mr. Betro has offered to give
    us a time line of what he feels are the criminal events. That
    would have to be done in closed session. And I would, if Mr.
    Betro is prepared to do that today, I would be open to doing so
    today if that fits your schedule.
        With that in mind, I am going to call this hearing to a
    close and announce a ten-minute recess, and then ask our
    panelists to come back at that time so we can receive testimony
    in closed session.
        I would also like to ask unanimous consent for Mr. Ron
    O'Rourke to attend that hearing in his capacity.
        Mr. Bartlett. So moved.
        Mr. Taylor. The hearing is adjourned.
        [Recess.]
        [Whereupon, at 4:20 the subcommittee proceeded in Closed
    Session.]
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                                A P P E N D I X

                                  June 6, 2007

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                  June 6, 2007

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                 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                  June 6, 2007

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR

        Mr. Taylor. You mentioned that about 90 percent of the barriers are
    still available, was there a significant problem with the barriers
    leaking and sinking, or was that just something that happened to a few
    of them?
        Mr. Betro. Prior to installing the Dunlop Anti-Boat Barrier (DABB)
    system, a full-scale test was performed by the Naval Facilities
    Engineering Service Center (NFESC) on the existing commercial-off-the-
    shelf (COTS) 6-foot diameter units. Testing demonstrated DABB's
    effectiveness in stopping the threat for which they were designed.
        NFESC recommended to NCIS the implementation of a larger diameter
    unit to deter the widest range of expected small boat attacks. The
    larger diameter unit required modification of the existing COTS 6-foot
    diameter design and was put into production very rapidly in the
    immediate wake of the 9/11 attacks. Operational verification testing
    was conducted in Norfolk, VA in early 2002 on initial DABB units. The
    units were found to be susceptible to leakage around and through the
    end flanges. Upon Navy notification, Dunlop pursued modifications,
    improving both lifecycle and performance capabilities. By the end of
    the production run in late 2003, leakage issues had been minimized.
        In October 2003, the Navy designated the Naval Facilities
    Engineering Command (NAVFAC) as manager of the AT/FP program. NAVFAC
    tasked NFESC to manage the Navy's Waterside Security Systems. In this
    capacity, the NFESC has established standardized maintenance,
    inspection, and operation procedures for the Dunlop barrier systems. A
    centralized storage and maintenance depot for the Dunlop barriers was
    established. This pneumatic design requires adjustment of the air
    bladder from daily thermal expansion and contraction. Depending on the
    site and range of temperature differentials this can impact regular
    maintenance actions. As early production units show leakage problems in
    the field, they are removed from service and returned to the depot for
    refurbishment. New units from the end of the production run are issued
    from the depot to replace the leaking units.
        In our experience, the maintenance requirements are typical for
    this type of structural system when operating in a marine environment.
    As noted in the NCIS testimony, roughly 90 percent of the DABB units
    purchased by the Navy remain deployed or in the NFESC depot available
    for deployment today.
        Mr. Taylor. It is my understanding that U.S. Attorneys cannot talk
    about ongoing investigations, but it is also my understanding that
    those people who have approached a U.S. attorney are free to say, I
    have approached that U.S. Attorney and asked them to look into this
    subject. And for the record, I would like the names of the United
    States attorneys that have been approached, and what days they were
    approached, and what information was given to them.
        Mr. Betro. Below is the list of all Assistant United States
    Attorneys (AUSAs) briefed and the date of declination/referral, or, in
    the case of DC, the last meeting on this topic:

                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT

        Mr. Bartlett. You mentioned that about 90 percent of the barriers
    are still available, was there a significant problem with the barriers
    leaking and sinking, or was that just something that happened to a few
    of them?
        Mr. Betro. Prior to installing the Dunlop Anti-Boat Barrier (DABB)
    system, a full-scale test was performed by the Naval Facilities
    Engineering Service Center (NFESC) on the existing commercial-off-the-
    shelf (COTS) 6-foot diameter units. Testing demonstrated DABB's
    effectiveness in stopping the threat for which they were designed.
        NFESC recommended to NCIS the implementation of a larger diameter
    unit to deter the widest range of expected small boat attacks. The
    larger diameter unit required modification of the existing COTS 6-foot
    diameter design and was put into production very rapidly in the
    immediate wake of the 9/11 attacks. Operational verification testing
    was conducted in Norfolk, VA in early 2002 on initial DABB units. The
    units were found to be susceptible to leakage around and through the
    end flanges. Upon Navy notification, Dunlop pursued modifications,
    improving both lifecycle and performance capabilities. By the end of
    the production run in late 2003, leakage issues had been minimized.
        In October 2003, the Navy designated the Naval Facilities
    Engineering Command (NAVFAC) as manager of the AT/FP program. NAVFAC
    tasked NFESC to manage the Navy's Waterside Security Systems. In this
    capacity, the NFESC has established standardized maintenance,
    inspection, and operation procedures for the Dunlop barrier systems. A
    centralized storage and maintenance depot for the Dunlop barriers was
    established. This pneumatic design requires adjustment of the air
    bladder from daily thermal expansion and contraction. Depending on the
    site and range of temperature differentials this can impact regular
    maintenance actions. As early production units show leakage problems in
    the field, they are removed from service and returned to the depot for
    refurbishment. New units from the end of the production run are issued
    from the depot to replace the leaking units.
        In our experience, the maintenance requirements are typical for
    this type of structural system when operating in a marine environment.
    As noted in the NCIS testimony, roughly 90 percent of the DABB units
    purchased by the Navy remain deployed or in the NFESC depot available
    for deployment today.
        Mr. Bartlett. It is my understanding that U.S. Attorneys cannot
    talk about ongoing investigations, but it is also my understanding that
    those people who have approached a U.S. attorney are free to say, I
    have approached that U.S. Attorney and asked them to look into this
    subject. And for the record, I would like the names of the United
    States attorneys that have been approached, and what days they were
    approached, and what information was given to them.
        Mr. Betro. Below is the list of all Assistant United States
    Attorneys (AUSAs) briefed and the date of declination/referral, or, in
    the case of DC, the last meeting on this topic: