[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
------
CHALLENGES FACING THE COAST GUARD'S MARINE SAFETY PROGRAM
=======================================================================
(110-65)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
----------
AUGUST 2, 2007
----------
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
CHALLENGES FACING THE COAST GUARD'S MARINE SAFETY PROGRAM
CHALLENGES FACING THE COAST GUARD'S MARINE SAFETY PROGRAM
CHALLENGES FACING THE COAST GUARD'S MARINE SAFETY PROGRAM
CHALLENGES FACING THE COAST GUARD'S MARINE SAFETY PROGRAM
CHALLENGES FACING THE COAST GUARD'S MARINE SAFETY PROGRAM
CHALLENGES FACING THE COAST GUARD'S MARINE SAFETY PROGRAM
CHALLENGES FACING THE COAST GUARD'S MARINE SAFETY PROGRAM
=======================================================================
(110-65)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
AUGUST 2, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
37-368 WASHINGTON : 2008
_____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, JOHN L. MICA, Florida
Vice Chair DON YOUNG, Alaska
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
Columbia WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
JERROLD NADLER, New York VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
CORRINE BROWN, Florida STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
BOB FILNER, California RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi JERRY MORAN, Kansas
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland GARY G. MILLER, California
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania Carolina
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
RICK LARSEN, Washington TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts SAM GRAVES, Missouri
JULIA CARSON, Indiana BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York Virginia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois TED POE, Texas
DORIS O. MATSUI, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
NICK LAMPSON, Texas CONNIE MACK, Florida
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii York
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr.,
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota Louisiana
HEATH SHULER, North Carolina JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
MICHAEL A. ACURI, New York CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona THELMA D. DRAKE, Virginia
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOHN J. HALL, New York VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
JERRY McNERNEY, California
VACANCY
(ii)
?
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Chairman
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington DON YOUNG, Alaska
CORRINE BROWN, Florida HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York, Vice TED POE, Texas
Chair JOHN L. MICA, Florida
VACANCY (Ex Officio)
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vii
TESTIMONY
Allegretti, Thomas, President, American Waterways Operators...... 53
Allen, Admiral Thad, Commandant, United States Coast Guard....... 7
Block, Richard, Secretary Gulf Coast Mariners Association........ 38
Cox, Joseph, President, U.S. Chamber of Shipping................. 53
Doyle, William, Director of Government Affairs and Deputy General
Counsel, Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association.............. 38
Lauridsen, Peter, Passenger Vessel Association................... 53
Quick, George, Vice President, International Organization of
Masters, Mates and Pilots...................................... 38
Thompson, B.W. Tom, Executive Director, U.S. Marine Safety
Association.................................................... 53
Weakley, Jim, President, Lake Carriers Association............... 53
Wells, Ken, President, Offshore Marine Services Association...... 53
PREPARED STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Mitchell, Hon. Harry E., of Arizona.............................. 67
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Allegretti, Thomas A............................................. 71
Allen, Admiral Thad W............................................ 78
Block, Richard A................................................. 247
Brown, Timothy A................................................. 281
Cox, Joseph J.................................................... 287
Doyle, William P................................................. 292
Lauridsen, Peter................................................. 297
Thompson, Burt W................................................. 302
Weakley, James H.I............................................... 307
Wells, Ken....................................................... 312
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Allen, Admiral Thad, Commandant, United States Coast Guard:
Response to question from Rep. Cummings........................ 14
Response to question from Rep. Cummings........................ 16
Response to question from Rep. Cummings........................ 18
Response to question from Rep. Cummings........................ 20
Response to question from Rep. Cummings........................ 22
Response to question from Rep. LaTourette...................... 24
``Explosive Handling Team Supervisor,'' Performace
Qualification Standard....................................... 95
``Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Examiner (CFVE),''
Performance Qualification Standard........................... 110
``Container Inspector,'' Performance Qualification Standard.... 140
``Federal On Scene Coordinator Representative,'' Performace
Qualification Standard....................................... 162
``Maritime Enforcement Investigator,'' Performance
Qualification Standard....................................... 179
``Pollution Investigator,'' Performace Qualification Standard.. 196
``Suspension and Revocation Investigator,'' Performace
Qualification Standard....................................... 217
``Waterways Management Representative,'' Performance
Qualification Standard....................................... 232
ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD
A Mariner Reponse to the August 2, 2007 Subcommittee on Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation Hearing, Captain Murray R.
Rogers, U.S.M.M., written statement............................ 319
Marine Safety Advocate, Ronald G. Sinn, written statement........ 324
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HEARING ON CHALLENGES FACING THE COAST GUARD'S MARINE SAFETY PROGRAM
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Thursday, August 2, 2007
House of Representatives,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Elijah
E. Cummings [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. Cummings. Good afternoon.
Earlier this week, the Subcommittee examined the management
of the Coast Guard's administrative law system which
adjudicates allegations of misconduct or negligence brought
against mariners by Coast Guard investigating officers. We
heard testimony that was, frankly, deeply concerning and
disturbing. Two former administrative law judges suggested that
during their tenure they worked in an atmosphere that did not
support the exercise of judicial independence in the
consideration of cases.
The Subcommittee's examination of the allegations raised in
that hearing is not finished. However, any administrative law
system must not only ensure that there is no impropriety in the
conduct of administrative proceedings but that there is not
even the appearance of unfairness in the system.
What we learned during our hearing on Tuesday has led me
and I believe Ranking Member LaTourette to conclude that the
administrative law system that examines allegations made
against mariners should be separated from the Coast Guard as a
safeguard against the appearance of unfairness.
Our hearing today builds on Tuesday's hearing by giving the
Subcommittee the opportunity to take a comprehensive look at
the Coast Guard's entire marine safety program to assess
whether the Coast Guard has the experience, the expertise and
the resources it needs to effectively and efficiently implement
this crucial program. In addition to investigating allegations
of misconduct raised against mariners, the marine safety
program is responsible for investigating accidents, inspecting
vessels and issuing credentials to mariners.
In short, the marine safety program is intended to ensure
that all aspects of marine transportation are as safe as they
can be and that our natural resources are protected against
risks associated with the movement of goods and people on the
water.
I want to thank Chairman Oberstar for his extraordinary
leadership in the area of marine safety, and I thank him for
urging us to hold this hearing today.
I also thank Ranking Member Mica and the Ranking Member of
our Subcommittee, Mr. LaTourette, for their leadership on this
Committee and for their cooperation.
Congress has been involved with maritime safety since the
first Congress created the lighthouse service on August 7th,
1789. Congress has repeatedly expanded maritime safety programs
over the past 200 years as ships and shipping practices have
evolved.
Unfortunately, over the years, Congress' actions to enhance
marine safety have usually been spurred by major catastrophes
such as the grounding of Exxon Valdez which led to the
enactment of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
Our goal is to examine the state of the marine safety
program to assess whether action needs to be taken now to
strengthen this program and to ensure it is prepared to
effectively and efficiently regulate the 21st Century maritime
industry before any new catastrophe takes place.
Since I became Chairman of the Subcommittee, I have heard
repeatedly from ship owners and operators, port authorities
including the Port of Baltimore and mariners regarding their
concerns with the Coast Guard's marine safety program. Mariners
are concerned about the delays they encounter in obtaining the
documents they need to work while ship owners have expressed
serious concerns about the ability of Coast Guard personnel to
maintain their expertise in technical aspects of vessel safety,
given their increasing focus on implementing security measures.
The suggestion that the Coast Guard's lack of technical
expertise may have contributed to fatal accidents is extremely
troubling. We will examine the issue in depth as we examine the
Coast Guard's response to several recent accidents including
the capsizing of the Lady D pontoon boat in Baltimore's Inner
Harbor in March, 2004, that resulted in the deaths of five
passengers.
During its investigation of this very tragic accident, the
National Transportation Safety Board found that the Lady D was
``erroneously granted sister status by the United States Coast
Guard to a pontoon vessel with different design
characteristics.''
The NTSB then recommended that the Coast Guard promulgate
revised passenger weight standards for passenger vessels.
Unlike the FAA, which quickly adopted new weight standards in
less than a year after a commuter aircraft casualty in January,
2003, the Coast Guard has now issued interim weight guidelines
and revised operating standards, but some three years later
after the Lady D tragedy has not yet finalized new weight
standards for all passenger vessels.
The testimony submitted by Admiral Allen today indicates
that, in fact, the Coast Guard has 85 rulemaking processes
including some mandated by Congress that have not yet been
concluded including those involving ballast water, dry cargo
residue, salvage, towing vessel inspections, the use of
automatic identification systems, transponders, and the use of
electronic charts that were required by law to be in vessels by
January 1st of this year.
In advance of today's hearing, we asked the Coast Guard,
mariner representatives, vessel operators, lifesaving equipment
manufacturers and related service facilities to tell us how the
marine safety program is working. The industry witnesses, we
will hear from today, have all expressed concern about the
Coast Guard's appropriate posture towards mariners and the
industry, the Coast Guard's level of technical expertise, the
oversight of lifesaving equipment and the rotation of personnel
in the marine safety program.
While I look forward to the testimony of all who are
joining us today, I also want to note for the record that there
were many in the maritime industry who expressed concerns to
this Subcommittee but who were frankly, and this alarms me
greatly and it should alarm all 435 Members of this Congress
and all 100 Senators and certainly to the Admiral.
Let me say that again. They were concerned and basically
afraid to testify for fear of retribution from the Coast Guard,
and that is very, very troubling. Such a situation is simply
intolerable, and I hope that Admiral Allen will take away from
today's hearing an understanding of what the Service needs to
do to improve its relationship to our Nation's maritime
industry.
The American public believes the Coast Guard is keeping
vessels safe and protecting the marine environment. Today, we
will determine whether these expectations are indeed being met,
and I look forward to working with Chairman Oberstar, Ranking
Member Mica and Ranking Member LaTourette as we explore the
future of this important program.
With that, I am very pleased to again yield to my good
friend and one who, as I said to him the other day, we are just
so proud of what we were able to do with regard to Deepwater to
be able to get a unanimous vote, 424 to nothing, but we could
not have done it without the cooperation of my distinguished
colleague, the Ranking Member, Mr. LaTourette.
I yield to you.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
those words, our continued excellent partnership and for
conducting today's hearing.
The Coast Guard is a multi-mission agency with technical
program expertise, extensive law enforcement authority and the
operational assets needed to carry out that authority. However,
none of these missions are as important as its marine safety
function. The Coast Guard's marine safety function includes the
inspection of vehicles and credentialing of seaman. These jobs
carry out the Service's primary duties under Title 14 to
enforce and administer Federal laws and promulgate regulations
for the promotion of safety of life and property at sea.
Internationally, the U.S. is party to the International
Maritime Organization Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea.
The Coast Guard is the head of the U.S. delegation to IMO. The
Coast Guard implements its marine safety authorities by setting
and enforcing standards for the construction and operation of
U.S. vessels and the competence and reliability of the U.S.
seamen.
It also exerts U.S. port control by examining foreign
vessels and seamen to ensure that those vessels and seamen meet
international standards. The Service has broad powers to
enforce its marine safety mandates including the ability to
prevent a ship from entering or leaving a port and the
suspension and revocation of the merchant mariners'
credentials.
Public concern and current events have always dictated
which of the Service's missions receive additional attention
and emphasis in the form of increased mission personnel,
operating hours and resources. In fact, over the Coast Guard's
history, the Service's missions have changed many times to meet
the pressing needs of the Nation.
In the early days of the Republic, the need for fiscal
stability led to the establishment of the revenue cutter
service, the earliest precursor of today's Coast Guard in the
18th Century. The spectacular loss of steamboats, their
passengers, crew and cargos during the 19th Century led to the
establishment of the Steamboat Inspection Service.
In the last two decades of the 20th Century, drug
interdiction was the focus in the late 1980s. Marine safety and
environmental protection were prominent after the Exxon Valdez
accident in 1990, and migrant interdiction captured the
public's attention after the Mariel Boatlift. Clearly, in the
21st Century, increased attention has been paid to the Coast
Guard's homeland security missions.
These shifting priorities have shown that having a single
maritime law enforcement response agency with broad subject
matter expertise, comprehensive enforcement authorities and
operational assets works well and provides the necessary
flexibility to meet changing needs. Of course, the recent surge
in homeland security missions has led some to express concerns
that marine safety is getting shortchanged.
I look forward to the witnesses' testimony today about how
we can assure that marine safety gets the attention it deserves
within a multi-mission Coast Guard. I am particularly
interested in hearing about the ways to create and preserve
sufficient technical expertise within the Service to carry out
ship inspections and mariner credential reviews efficiently and
effectively.
Again, Mr. Chairman, my personal thanks to you for calling
today's hearing.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Bishop, who, just so the world will know, was just
named the Vice Chairman of this Subcommittee, I yield to you.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I am
honored to have the opportunity to work with you in this
Committee.
Let me start by commending all of the first responders and
the volunteers who are now working tirelessly to help those
affected by the collapse of the bridge at Interstate 35W.
Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for holding this hearing and
inviting these witnesses to participate in this important
discussion. This discussion between the Congress and the Coast
Guard and the representatives of the maritime transportation
sector is both necessary and important given the requirements
of protecting America in a post-9/11 world.
Once again, I must commend the United States Coast Guard
for their hard work and constant vigilance in the waters off
our shores. At every opportunity, I want to make sure that the
men and women who serve in this top-notch institution receive
the gratitude and recognition they deserve. Whether it is
through search and rescue or policing of our waters, they do a
great job.
However, the issues and concerns which occasion this
hearing are real and require careful scrutiny. The Coast Guard
has a tremendous array of responsibilities requiring a wide
range of expertise. These responsibilities include coastal and
waterway security, drug interdiction, migrant interdiction,
defense readiness, maritime safety, search and rescue, marine
resource protection, environmental protection, maintaining
navigation aids and ICE operations. This is, to say the least,
a tremendous undertaking.
In my own district, I remain very concerned about the
additional burdens that will be placed on the Coast Guard to
protect and secure a proposed LNG facility. The Captain of the
Port has outlined the manpower and equipment resources that
will be required, but there has been no determination as to how
these resources will be acquired or funded.
The situation is my district is but a fraction of a much
larger national problem as more than 40 LNG facilities are
proposed for construction, and the Coast Guard will have
responsibilities for all of them.
The United States Coast Guard is a first-rate organization
and does outstanding work. It is my hope that through an open
process and full debate, we can determine what the needs are
and what the Coast Guard's responsibilities should be to
protect America and preserve our waterways.
I look forward to the perspectives of our panelists, and I
yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
Mr. Coble.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for conducting this
hearing, you and the gentleman from Ohio.
Each of us, I believe, Mr. Chairman, holds the Coast Guard
and its distinguished service to our Nation in the highest
regard. I will admit I am somewhat subjective. As a former
member of the Coast Guard and the Coast Guard Reserve, I am
very proud of America's oldest continuous seagoing service.
For this reason, I appreciate the Chairman calling this
hearing because despite each of our best efforts, there is
always room for improvement.
It is my opinion, Mr. Chairman, that the Coast Guard is
unique, among other reasons, because of its structure and
flexibility. On a daily basis, Coast Guard men and women focus
upon drug interdiction, environmental protection, migrant
interdiction, port security, search and rescue, homeland
security and maritime safety.
In fact, we would be remiss if we did not recognize that
this coming Saturday, the Coast Guard's birthday, by the way,
there will be a ceremony held to recognize that the Coast Guard
has been involved in rescuing more than one million persons
since its inception in 1790.
Because of this tradition and storied history, I believe it
is important that we tread lightly with regards to today's
hearing topic. If the result of this hearing is an effort to
compromise the multifaceted nature of the Coast Guard, Mr.
Chairman, this causes me some concern.
Instead, I hope it will provide an opportunity for all
stakeholders to voice their respective concerns, provide
constructive feedback and work together to improve the marine
safety aspect of the Coast Guard.
It is my firm belief, Mr. Chairman, that we are blessed
with the world's best Coast Guard. I don't believe a good
purpose would be served in attempting to create or invent a
second Coast Guard.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Coble, before I call on Mr. Young, let me
just say this, that there is nothing that you just said that I
disagree with. I think that any person or any entity that is
not constantly self-examining is bound to run into trouble.
We just want to make sure we take a look at what we are
doing and take a look at how effectively and how efficiently we
are doing it so that we can continue, so that when you and I
are dancing with the angels, we will still have the great
organization that we have in the Coast Guard.
With that, Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do appreciate
your comments as well as those of the gentleman who spoke
before me.
A little history about the Coast Guard in the sense of new
history: We created the Department of Homeland Security, and I
was Chairman of this Committee. We were down at the President's
office with all the other cabinet members and Members of the
body.
I spoke then and I said I prefer the Service remain with
the Department of Transportation. Then they showed me the flow
chart and they had the Coast Guard under Border Patrol.
Very frankly, with the help of Mr. Oberstar, the Chairman
now, we said you won't have a bill if you try to dismantle the
Coast Guard.
I am interested in this hearing. I do think the one problem
the Coast Guard may be having in this marine safety regulatory
arena is the lack of resources. I have had the privilege of
serving in this House for 35 years, and I have watched us put
additional burdens on the Coast Guard without really funding
them as they should be funded.
I think it is our responsibility if we find that the marine
safety regulatory functions are not adequately done, let us
find out why and let us fix that problem because you don't fix
a problem by transferring the problem into another agency.
To weaken this agency, the Coast Guard, by dismantling it
or attempting to dismantle it would discredit what we did when
we created Homeland Security because if you look at that flow
chart now, right straight across, Secretary, Coast Guard. The
Admiral is right next to it, and that gives them the ability to
fulfill their missions.
If I sound a little bit interested in this, as Mr. Coble
has mentioned, we have the most active Coast Guard unit, I
believe, in the United States in Alaska. We deeply relish your
participation, Admiral, search and rescue primarily and all the
other things you do for the State of Alaska.
And so, I am here today to hear and to hope if there is a
problem that we address it and solve it within the House which
we represent.
With that, I yield back the balance.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Congressman Young.
Admiral Allen, welcome.
Mr. Baird, did you have an opening statement? Thank you.
Admiral Allen, it is good to see you back. You have been
very busy. It is good to have you back, and we will now hear
from you.
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL THAD ALLEN, COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES
COAST GUARD
Admiral Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative
LaTourette, Members of the Committee. I want to thank you for
the opportunity to testify here today, and I am pleased to
discuss the Coast Guard's marine safety programs and
responsibilities.
Mr. Chairman, this is the right hearing at the right time.
Let me compliment your staff on the detailed background paper
prepared for this hearing. The paper raises important issues,
and with your permission I will provide detailed responses for
the record.
Let me acknowledge up-front that catastrophic events such
as the Marine Electric, El Toro II, Miss Majestic and the Lady
D have identified key points of system, organizational and
personnel failures in both industry and in government, and we
need to learn from that.
We should also acknowledge that there has been a
significant increase in the overall safety performance of the
maritime transportation system in the last two decades, many of
it due to legislation passed by this Congress such as the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990.
While maritime safety is the focus of today's hearing,
resource has been mentioned repeatedly, and this is a program
area that highlights an enduring challenge for the Coast Guard.
The challenge is the ability for the Coast Guard, or any
Federal agency for that matter, to adapt statutory authorities
accumulated over a long period of time to a changing external
environment that changes agency governance structures,
operating procedures and human resource development.
Moreover, this adaptation is taking place in the context of
globalization, rapid changes in technology and maritime
transportation--LNG would be an example of that--and increasing
public transparency and accountability. This hearing is
intended to do that today, and I congratulate you on it.
My testimony for the record contains a more detailed
discussion of our maritime safety program, its history and
current issues, and I ask that it be submitted for the record.
Mr. Cummings. It is ordered.
Admiral Allen. I will address a few key points and will be
happy to answer any questions you have for me.
Let me start by saying I believe there is a general
agreement on the current issues facing the Coast Guard. I have
talked to my industry counterparts. Mr. Chairman, we have
discussed this and have proposed that developing a consensus on
a way forward should be our mutual goal.
The Coast Guard is addressing a number of challenges in
executing our marine safety mission, but the most important in
my view are the capacity and the competency of our workforce at
a time when demand for our maritime safety services has never
been higher.
As Commandant, I am most concerned about the following:
marine inspector training, qualification and staffing; merchant
mariner licensing and documentation; and Coast Guard
rulemaking. Before discussing these challenges, let me just
take a moment to provide some context.
The Coast Guard's maritime safety program has been informed
by more than two centuries of maritime experience. The Coast
Guard formally assumed maritime safety duties in 1946.
Since then, we have conducted more than 1.7 million
domestic vessel inspections and credentialed more than 7.5
million merchant marines. We have also conducted more than
280,000 examinations on foreign vessels since the start of our
Port State Control Program in 1994.
Because of this, we benefit from the largest, safest and
most efficient maritime transportation system in the world, one
that has grown by some 18 percent over the last 10 years and
will only continue to grow. We are committed more than ever to
meeting our obligations and responsibilities to the maritime
industry.
Our services at the port level are primarily focused on our
marine inspection program. However, we do have centralized
vessel documentation and plan review and are in the process of
centralizing merchant mariner licensing and documentation. We
also maintain a cadre of highly experienced traveling
inspectors who perform specialized inspection duties worldwide
and serve as a center of excellence for our inspection program.
Rulemaking is a headquarters function.
We recently unified all port operations into sector
commands. As the Coast Guard senior officer at the port level
within their respective geographics areas, sector commanders
are charged by statute and regulation as the Captain of the
Port, officer in charge of marine inspection, Federal on-scene
coordinator for oil and hazardous material spill response,
Federal maritime security coordinator and search and rescue
mission coordinator.
This unification of command and control at the port level
was driven primarily by industry needs. Our sector commanders
provide a single voice to address all matters of interest to
the maritime industry, a one-stop shop. They also play a vital
role in coordinating and integrating maritime activities and
interests among the Federal, State and local partners.
The Coast Guard listened to our stakeholders, and we
responded. Sectors unify all Coast Guard competencies under one
roof and one leader. This operational model allows the most
rapid and effective response to maritime incidents and
facilitates the closest coordination among preparedness,
prevention and response activities.
Let me talk about inspections. In my first year as
Commandant, I visited every district in the Coast Guard. I
spoke with thousands of Coast Guard personnel. The single most
recurring theme at the port level was concern for the level of
staffing, qualifications and tour length for our marine
inspectors, and I have taken this for action.
In the last year, I have directed significant changes and
improvements in the training and qualifications of our
inspectors to keep pace with the technological advancements and
growth in maritime industry. We have made changes to our
warrant officer selection system to bring more talented and
experienced enlisted personnel into the maritime safety
specialty.
We have learned valuable lessons from joint military and
civilian staffing of our sector command centers and our vessel
traffic services. These are areas where we used to have Coast
Guard personnel only staffing. We now have brought civilian
personnel in to provide continuity, corporate memory and way to
bridge during the transfer season, so we get the best of
training for our people in uniform by maintaining continuity of
services.
I am committed to the establishment of more civilian
positions in the marine inspection field. We need people with
critical job skills. We need to maintain continuity while
providing our military members access to this type of
experience. We must leverage and expand this dual staffing
model.
Getting the inspection program right in terms of training,
qualifications and staffing is my highest maritime safety
priority.
Let me discuss rulemaking very quickly. The Coast Guard
currently has sufficient legal authority, subject matter
experts, legal staff and extensive experience with the
Administrative Procedures Act to develop and issue necessary
regulations. We lack capacity.
Legislative mandates have increased our rulemaking backlog
substantially since 9/11. Additionally, many of our rulemakings
require extensive economic, environmental and policy analysis
to meet current legal and administrative requirements. The
result has been a backlog that is unacceptable to me, our
stakeholders and our overseers.
This is purely a resource issue, and I have directed my
staff to do an analysis of the resources required and any
policy changes needed to significantly improve our throughput.
Let me discuss merchant mariner licensing and
documentation. The Coast Guard has taken aggressive steps to
improve merchant mariner licensing and documentation.
Centralization of application processing will provide greater
opportunity to focus on our efforts and gain economies of scale
while reducing backlogs, ensuring credentials are only issued
to qualified persons and ensuring uniformity in interpretation
of the regulations.
Transferring these functions from the field regional exam
centers throughout the Country will take place over the next
two years. The implementation of the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential and continued growth and demand for
merchant mariner credentials presents a challenge to the
program.
The timing of the National Maritime Center restructuring,
however, introduces opportunities to ensure that the TWIC and
MLD programs work in concert with each other. We are working
very closely with our partners in the Transportation Security
Agency to assure that end is met.
What we must improve is our customer service at the port.
Automation will improve efficiencies, but mariners must have a
responsive face to deal with when needed especially during the
transition period.
Let me discuss leadership and industry relations. I have
always believed that unit performance starts and ends with
leadership. Leadership at the port level, at the district level
and at headquarters necessarily includes communication with
stakeholders and the development of shared goals that further
the safety and security of the maritime transportation system.
This enhances mission performance and facilitates commerce.
Near-term demands of maritime security issues have
appropriately dominated national and port level agendas since
the attacks of 9/11. I believe now is the time to reassess our
performance to ensure we remain focused on maritime safety as
well. I have communicated this intent directly to my field
commanders.
I have consulted with numerous former Coast Guard maritime
safety experts and industry leaders. I believe their
experiences and perspectives will be critical to guiding us as
we move forward. The Committee's leadership has been helpful as
well.
To better serve me and the maritime industry, I am
establishing an Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety,
Security and Stewardship at Coast Guard Headquarters, who will
serve as my direct contact with industry. That individual will
be Rear Admiral Brian Salerno, a well known expert in maritime
safety in the Coast Guard.
One of his first duties will be to take a holistic look at
our maritime safety program, specifically those challenges we
are discussing here today. He will ensure that the Service will
provide the maritime industry effective, consistent,
professional service.
Whether it was by strategic intent, foresight or reaction
to catastrophic events, the Coast Guard was created and evolved
to integrate Federal roles at the port level. We have the right
operational model. There is not a better one in the world. But
we must become more adaptable to the needs of the Nation and
our maritime commerce.
As I said earlier, I believe we agree on the major issues.
I roger the message the Committee and industry are sending, and
we are on task.
In closing, I would caution: Changes in functional
responsibilities do not solve shortfalls in resources and more
likely create greater needs.
The issues to be discussed here today as they relate to the
Coast Guard tasking and performance evolved in the Departments
of Treasury, Transportation and now Homeland Security over time
and under the oversight of Congress.
The time is right to affirm the Coast Guard critical role
in maritime safety with an honest assessment of the resources
required. I look forward to that dialogue, and I would be happy
to take your questions.
Mr. Cummings. I thank you, Admiral, very much for your
statements. As you were talking, I just could not help but
think about something that Mr. Young said. I want to make it
very clear, and I think Mr. Coble alluded to it also.
First of all, let me thank you for agreeing that we need to
hold this hearing, but I want to make sure that we understand
that what we are doing is just trying to look at what we have.
It is like looking in the mirror.
I remember when my 26 year old was 3, she would say, daddy,
let us play hide and go seek. Then she would stand in front of
me, Admiral, and she would put her hand up in front of her face
and say, you can't find me.
That is okay for a three year old but not for us. We have
got to look ourselves in the mirror and figure out exactly what
it is and be honest with ourselves to do what we need to do.
This is not an attack on anybody. This is trying to figure
out where we are. I think you know me well enough to know that.
Admiral Allen. It is not interpreted as that, Mr. Chairman.
We are aligned.
Mr. Cummings. Now let me ask you this. I listened to what
you just said, and I agree with you. You have heard me say this
many times. Particularly after 9/11, we saw the Coast Guard's
responsibilities and duties get stretched, stretched,
stretched, but we didn't see the money and the resources
getting stretched.
I often use the idea of the rubber band. You can stretch,
stretch, stretch and at some point you are going to break.
I want you to just help us succinctly. I know you just gave
your presentation. You made some decisions, as you just went
through, to address various issues.
As I look at this group of books here, and these are the
volumes of the Marine Safety Manual and the code of federal
regulations dealing with marine safety, I am just wondering
taking into account what you just talked about and I want to
see how it fits in.
How can the Coast Guard personnel who rotate into and out
of marine safety have the same level of expertise as an FAA
inspector who spends his whole career inspecting aircraft? Help
me with how you will plan to deal with that and if there are
resources that are necessary, what would you need?
Are you following what I am saying?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir, I am. Yes, sir, good question.
If I could divide it up into what I call capacity and the
makeup of the workforce, in other words, the human resources
part of this. Until we get a civilian Commandant, you are
always going to need people in blue suits that have knowledge
of these issues, that have worked in them, can deal in policy
rulemaking, budgetary requests and testify like I am here
today.
So we need a blend of workforce that has the right
competency, the right experience and continuity to provide
predictability in the service we provide to the maritime
community, but we also need to be able to bring officers in and
give them that experience. In my view, that takes a blended
workforce, and I alluded to it in my statement.
But the components of that right now are we have enlisted
people that gain technical skills over their careers, that
access to warrant officer that make very excellent inspectors.
They are the ones that are down there, who spend years doing
this as their enlisted ratings, and then we access these
warrant officers to lieutenants and lieutenant commanders. That
is a very, very core bench strength that we have.
We also need to take a look at where we need to civilianize
billets. As you know, and the statements allude to this,
following the merger or movement of the Bureau of Marine
Inspection and Navigation, we actually had these guys called
219ers that we brought actually out of the merchant mariner
community, brought them into the Coast Guard and brought their
skills.
They then trained a generation of inspectors who are now
retiring. I have actually presided at their retirements. We
need a way to replace that continuity, that corporate memory,
that skill that retains at the unit while we back that up with
the warrant officers who have an enlisted background and then
officers we access from the merchant marine academies and the
Coast Guard Academy.
It is a matter of how you blend that to achieve both the
competency you have to build in your workforce but maintain
that continuity of service and that corporate memory and the
ability to deal with that body of knowledge, sir.
Mr. Cummings. I am going to just use this Empress of the
North example to try to get to some of the bottom line issues
and how you see. It sounds like you have looked at this pretty
carefully, and I guess you are self-examining every day almost,
trying to figure out exactly how to be more effective and
efficient.
But I want to use this just to kind of see how your plans
would work with us, okay. So just bear with me.
On May 14th, the passenger vessel, Empress of the North
grounded near Juneau, Alaska. As you know, over 200 passengers
were safely evacuated. However, the NTSB reported that the
Empress of the North was equipped with 22 inflatable life rafts
and 2 inflatable slides.
Safety Board investigators were informed that about half
the launching mechanisms in the life rafts did not operate
properly. Investigators also learned that while the crew
attempted to launch the vessel's evacuation slides, they
inflated upside-down. This resulted in the slides having to be
manually turned over by crew members.
So either the Coast Guard did not adequately supervise the
servicing of these rafts or it didn't adequately oversee the
installation of the rafts when they were returned to the
vessel.
This is what I want to get to: Admiral, was it a lack of
oversight by the Coast Guard at the service facility that
serviced the rafts or the lack of knowledge by the Coast Guard
inspector who inspected the vessel in February of this year
that caused the lifesaving equipment on the Empress of the
North to malfunction?
Do Coast Guard inspectors have the training and expertise
to determine if an evacuation slide is installed upside-down on
a vessel?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. Let me give you the basic
structure by which this equipment is inspected, and there was a
change in this. I believe it was in 1997. We issued a Federal
Notice Register that changed our program somewhat.
What we do is we actually go to the manufacturers and we
inspect first in class or we do type examinations. So if there
is going to be a production line of a life raft or something
like that, our inspector would go make sure the production line
is producing the articles that meet the required safety
specifications.
After that, we do spot checks and we also use third party,
like underwriter labs or third party verification for the
actual production.
The one exception to that are life boats. A life boat is a
constructed boat not a raft, and we do inspect those at the
manufacturer facilities ourselves.
As part of the periodic inspections of these vessels, our
boarding teams, our inspectors take a look at the various
safety apparatuses and so forth.
Regarding the specific slides that are in question, I would
be happy to answer for the record whether or not that was
actually checked in the process of that inspection, but we
normally inspect safety equipment and we have a standard
checklist that we go through.
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Admiral Allen. So the way the rafts were packed, installed
and inverted, a couple of issues there, one related to the
servicing of the equipment themselves, whether or not that
might have been found in an inspection, and I would be glad to
give you a detailed answer for the record on the inspection.
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7368.013
Mr. Cummings. That is fine, but what I am trying to get to
is I assume we learned something from that. The Coast Guard
learned?
Admiral Allen. We did.
Mr. Cummings. I guess what I am trying to get to is that
taking into account all of what you said in your opening, fit
that problem into making sure that, say, lifesaving equipment
is correctly serviced and installed.
What I am trying to get to is how does what you just said
help to address this and do you think it would adequately
address it? I guess that is what it is.
We will go on to Mr. LaTourette.
Admiral Allen. Let me give you an overview of what has been
done in the last six months, then offer to give you some
detailed information for the record.
Mr. Cummings. That will be fine.
Admiral Allen. Following the establishment of sectors, we
thought it was important to make sure that the subject matter
expertise related to marine inspection, port security and
environmental response were maintained because we were
integrating different commands into a single command that is
the right operational model, as I told you.
We established a work group last year to take a look at all
the different jobs that are in a sector and validate training
and qualifications related to that.
As a result of that, we have changed the curriculum and the
syllabus for training our marine inspectors as it relates to
hull inspection, safety equipment and so forth. We have changed
the content of the training and the qualifications that our
inspectors are using based on the technologies they are
encountering out there at the time.
I can provide a detailed review of before and after on how
the safety inspections are being conducted and how that
training is provided, sir.
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7368.014
Mr. Cummings. Finally, tell us specifically. Mr. Young was
very kind to talk about resources, and I was glad he did. I
think that what you have here is a bipartisan group of
Congresspersons who want to help.
Tell us, in order for you to carry out the mission that you
want to carry out and for safety, for this whole program to be
all that you want it to be, what do you need from us?
Admiral Allen. Well, I think it is a two-part question,
sir.
First of all, I need to give you a staffing model and a
qualification model. Only we can do that. We are the ones that
have to look at the task and what do we have now, what needs to
be changed. We have done that over the last six to twelve
months and can provide that to you.
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7368.015
Admiral Allen. The second thing is if you have a higher
level of training and qualifications that you need, then you
have to have the ability to take time to do that. That starts
moving into the resource area.
So there are two drivers on capacity. One of them is
increased training requirements to make our people competent in
the new technologies they have to deal with, and the second one
is workload associated with the changing technology.
Sir, as you and I have talked before, the vast growth in
LNG tankers coming to this Country, we have over 40 permits
that are pending. With the pending towing vessel regulations
that are coming out, the potential adds 7,000 more vessels to
our inspection program.
There is a qualitative aspect to this in how you train and
maintain the competencies. Then it is how many people you have
to do it, sir.
The former, we can do. The latter is a resource discussion,
sir.
Mr. Cummings. We received testimony from lifesaving
manufacturers that some factories haven't seen a Coast Guard
inspector in over a decade. Do you think that is accurate?
Admiral Allen. I don't know, sir. If you give me the
information, we will follow up and answer for the record.
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7368.016
Mr. Cummings. All right. That should be happening, though,
shouldn't it?
Admiral Allen. It depends on what the article is. Again,
the procedure is that we would inspect the first article and
then after that, if there is an underwriter lab or some
certification of a third party, that would happen and we would
do spot checks.
To the extent there should have been a spot check and it
was not happening in a particular manufacturer, I would be
anxious to know that.
Mr. Cummings. We will get that information to you.
Mr. LaTourette, thank you.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you very much, Admiral. It is good to
see you again.
I see that Admiral Salerno drew the short straw and he is
here two days in the same week.
Admiral Allen. We rewarded him with a promotion
[Laughter.]
Mr. LaTourette. In your opening remarks, you talked about
tour length. One of the observations being made by some folks
is that perhaps the marine safety mission is not seen within
the Coast Guard as a good career path for promotion and other
things, not where the action is. Do you have an observation
whether that is accurate or not?
Admiral Allen. I get questioned at all-hands meetings about
where we are going with a program, and any time there is a
program in transition, if you work in that program, you are
going to wonder what is the impact on me.
I have been very clear in my communication to the field. In
fact, I have sent messages to all commands and I actually sent
a global e-mail to everybody in the Coast Guard, reinforcing
the value of this mission, where it stands with me and the
value of this mission inside the Coast Guard mission set. So I
don't think there is any doubt about what I have communicated.
Now I am not the only one that sends signals. The greatest
impact on the morale of our marine inspectors right now is the
fact this hearing is being held.
Mr. LaTourette. Do you or does the Service have the ability
to offer special skill pay or incentive pay for billets in
certain missions and do you?
Admiral Allen. We do. Some of it requires legislative
authorities. Right now, in the officer ranks, it would be
aviation pay and things like that. At the enlisted level, we
have the authority to offer incentive pay for special ratings
and bonuses for re-enlistment, but there is a structure there
where it can be used.
Mr. LaTourette. In particular, if there is a weakness in
the marine safety end of things, do you have the authority or
did you just say you need statutory authority to do it to
attract more people on the marine safety side?
Admiral Allen. I believe there are some things we can do to
incentivize that, but I think actual pay itself may require a
legislative authority, but I will check and answer for the
record if that is okay. That is a good question.
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7368.017
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you.
There are some folks who are proposing that there be the
creation of a new Marine Safety Administration, that the marine
safety mission be removed from the Coast Guard and transferred
to the Department of Transportation. I think I know your
answer, but for the record, would you sort of comment on your
view of a proposal like that?
Admiral Allen. Well, as I alluded to in my opening
statement, the evolution of the Coast Guard for over two
centuries has been one of increasing responsibilities. So the
people who have the capacity and capacity to operate imports
and on the water are doing that for the Nation rather than
different agencies doing it.
By extension, offshore, NOAA and the National Marine
Fishery Service do not operate cutters offshore. We do that for
them and enforce those regulations. It creates a great value to
the Country.
But I will tell you beyond that, having been a former
Captain of the Port in Long Island Sound, the ability to bring
together response forces, to be able to take control under a
captain of port authority and direct vessels to anchorage or
movement of vessels, to be able to bring in technical
assistance in the form of inspecting officers and marine
inspectors to inform issues like stability of grounded ships
and what you should do with a damaged ship, to bring that
together in one unified command to optimize response for this
Federal Government, priceless.
Mr. LaTourette. In both this hearing and the hearing that
we had on Tuesday on the ALJ business, the Chairman in his
opening remarks has talked about some information that has come
to his attention that people are afraid. They are afraid of the
ALJ system. They are apparently afraid of the marine safety.
I don't know if I know who those people are, but it
concerns me to hear the Chairman say that. Could you just
comment for a moment about what cooperation and/or
participation level the Coast Guard has with the mariner
community and do you think there is a reason that people should
be afraid of the service.
Admiral Allen. Well, I am not going to attribute a motive
to somebody else's behavior when I don't sit inside their head.
I can tell you this and I think it should be apparent to
the Committee and anybody that has ever known me. I live by a
couple of rules in my life. One is transparency of information
breeds self-correcting behavior and anybody that works for me
has to be able to speak truth to power.
I will meet with anybody, anywhere and talk about any
issue. I don't think anybody that has ever known me doesn't
think that I am approachable as a senior leader, and I have
directed my field commanders to reach out to the industry.
We have area maritime security committees that help us
execute our security duties. We have area committees who help
us do oil spill response planning. We exercise that. We just
completed a spill of national significance exercise in the
Memphis area as a result of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
requirements. We are all over the ports, working every day with
these stakeholders.
If there is a problem or they feel they can't talk to the
Coast Guard, then somebody needs to stand up their own height
to walk in and tell the Captain of the Port that.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. What about telling you? Let me be real clear.
Admiral Allen. I get e-mails from industry from time to
time.
Mr. Cummings. Let me be very clear. Let me be very clear. I
didn't raise that as something light.
Admiral Allen. I understand, sir.
Mr. Cummings. There are probably very few Members of
Congress that spend as much time making sure that witnesses are
treated properly. I have said it in the last hearing, and I
will say it again. I have actually apologized for Members of
Congress for the way they treated witnesses, so that is very,
very significant to me because I think it goes to the very
essence of what we do here.
Now I understand the question, but I can tell you that
there were people who were concerned about coming to testify,
and there may be some in the audience, who were worried that if
they testified that there might be some type of retaliation at
some point, not from you--not from you--but I am just telling
you that. We can act like it doesn't exist, but when I see it I
am going to raise it.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. I roger the signal. We will look
into it, sir.
Mr. Cummings. I am sorry.
Admiral Allen. I roger the signal. We will look into it,
sir.
Mr. Cummings. Yes, I know you will back me up on that.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. That was not directed towards you. I want to
make that clear. As you have heard me say many, many times, I
have the utmost confidence. But I just wanted to make that
clear because I think it gets in the way of us doing what we
are supposed to do up here, and so that is all.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Allen, good to see you again.
I have some questions about the Pacific Northwest. There
are examples cited in our memo, prep memo about the situation
with our four Steel Electrics and the Washington State ferry
system.
I think in fairness the story, if you will, told in the
prep memo is not a full story of all the issues. It focuses
strictly on the Coast Guard, but there are many issues around
the problems that we have with the four Steel Electric ferries
and the Washington State ferry system: 80 years old, our
inability to site a new dock, the inadequacy of the current
terminals in Keystone and Port Townsend to accommodate larger
ferries and, again, the subsequent inability to site terminals
in a different place for a variety of reasons, none of which
have to do with the Coast Guard, I might add.
I think as far as that goes, there is a bigger story to
tell. I want to be clear about that. I have talked to your
local folks on this issue because there has been some press
around it, not with regards to the Coast Guard but with regards
to our own State Department of Transportation and what we are
doing.
Also, the legislature has a piece of the story. Our own
legislature has a piece of the story. It is a much bigger story
than I think what is conveyed herein our prep memo. I want to
be clear about that.
With regards to the Coast Guard role, there are I think
some good questions to ask and are asked in the prep memo. In
conversations with your folks, they have done a good job of
being open and clear and transparent about what their role has
been, but I do have a couple good questions here to ask.
I do have some questions about how the COI is issued, the
certificate of inspection, that says this thing is safe to go,
send her out in the water. A good question is that each of the
Steel Electrics have received a certificate of inspection
within the last eight months, and yet there have been some
cracks in some hulls.
In fact, the Illahee just came out of dry dock two day ago.
It was in the water yesterday and got a six inch crack in it
again, so now it is back in dry dock. I personally think that
was probably more a function of it being 80 years old as
opposed to anything else, but can you help me understand that
process, how a COI gets issued in this kind of circumstance?
It is important that we have these ferries. We are a little
ways from replacing them, but they need to be safe as well.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. The issue with the ferries in
Puget Sound is a real interesting one because it kind of
highlights some built-in tensions that operate in ports and
they are natural tensions. There is not a good or a bad. There
are competing issues, as you noted yourself.
One of the things that the Coast Guard sees itself as doing
is being an honest broker in resolving those tensions of which
there is not a clear black or white answer. It is usually gray
or plaid or something.
Now, in this case, these ferries which have been operating
since about 1927 are getting old. Our inspectors detected a
real problem with being able to examine the hulls, as you know,
because they had put cement ballast to make the ferries ride
better. It got to the point where we didn't feel from the Coast
Guard standpoint that we could issue a certificate of
inspection without properly being able to assess the hull and
could not do that with the concrete in place.
That resulted in the order being given that the concrete
ballast had to be removed. That caused several other issues
related to the timing of the dry docks and then the other
issues with the damage that was done to the one ferry as a
result of the dry docks.
This is one of those things where sometimes it becomes as
much an art as it is a science. You know what the structural
issues are with the ship. We know what the needs of the
community are. We know that when it went down to a one ferry
service, there was going to be significant impact on the
community.
This is one of those cases where you sit down and you
communicate openly with the Coast Guard. We lay out what the
requirements are.
I don't normally quote the press, given the last year or
so, but I would just like to quote this from the Peninsula
Daily News: ``Coast Guard safety inspectors in June ordered all
concrete ballast removed from the Nisqually and three other
Steel Electric ferry hulls to allow for closer inspections. The
Coast Guard's Inspection Division Chief ... ''
This is not the sector commander. This is the guy that is
empowered, the subject matter expert at that command.
`` ... John D. Dwyer, had originally set a deadline of
today to pull the Nisqually if state ferries had not yet
removed the concrete ballast. However, considering the
extenuating circumstances, Dwyer allowed the extension.
`` 'We just wanted to make sure we had two boats to serve
the community,' said Marta Coursey, State Ferries Director of
Communications. 'It was a matter of contacting Coast Guard
officials and saying this is going to put our communities in
stress.' ''
These are the day to day issues that we work at the port
level, and that is the reason it is so important they were able
to have inspection capability, their issues with traffic
management, their issues with land management, of the movement
of vehicles and the queueing of vehicles.
Sometimes you have to sit down and take a look at what the
regs say, what is the best safety decision you can make,
understanding the need to facilitate commerce, and they are
always the same, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Can I just have a follow-up, Mr. Chairman?
To get at one of the concerns that are being brought up, in
this case, it seems to me, and I don't want to put words in
your mouth, but this is not a function of whether or not the
Coast Guard has the capacity to do an appropriate and effective
marine safety inspection regime.
Admiral Allen. No. This is a competency issue.
Mr. Larsen. It is a much more complex issue.
Admiral Allen. The judgement and competency issue, yes.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, my concern is this interest of moving the safety
part into another agency. In your opinion, how would that
improve safety, number one, and, number two, wouldn't it be
better to have the maritime safety regulatories in the same
service, knowing what one another are doing?
I have been in this business long enough to know that a lot
of times agencies don't even talk to one another. That is why
we created the Homeland Security Bill.
So if we go back and create a new agency, who will know
better than this Committee?
By the way, Mr. Chairman, if that was to happen, it would
go to the Armed Services or, no, it would stay in
Transportation and be okay, but it would be a little bit
different.
I don't see the improvement here. Again, I like what you
have said about what you are doing now, and I think that is
what we have to start pursuing.
Admiral Allen. Let me give you a microcosm for an answer,
sir. When I was the Captain of the Port of Long Island Sound
from 1993 to 1996, I had Captain of the Port authority. I was
not the officer in charge of marine inspection which is the
marine safety function. I was covered by an area that was
basically serviced out of New York.
I had a tank barge ground off New Haven and two to three
million gallons of oil in the barge. I had to make decisions
about controlling the waterway, responding to a potential
spill, managing the issues associated with that, had to compete
with another command to have them release an inspector to come
up and give me technical support.
Long Island is now a sector and has its own marine
inspectors assigned to it. If that barge grounds again today,
the organic capability exists to simultaneously manage the
waterway, manage a potential spill and how you would manage
that, and have an inspector there to consult with on structural
issues related to the disposition of the barge as part of a
unified command.
If you can expand that to an agency to agency setting, it
will become more difficult, sir.
Mr. Young. You mentioned something about civilian
employees. One of the things I am interested in is have you a
cadre of retired inspectors or people who have gone to other
careers available to you to fulfill the job of inspections?
Admiral Allen. We don't now, but as part of my earlier
answer, we have found in other areas, specifically search and
rescue, search planning at our operations centers and our
vessel traffic systems, similar to the ones in Valdez and
Seattle, where we have had issues with turnover and continuity
especially in summer transfer seasons, that we have taken
former military and, in most cases, former Coast Guard folks
and hired them back as civilians.
So we have a blended workforce of civilians who have
corporate memory and the young folks that are coming in that
are getting needed training on how these systems work and
gaining their competencies. Moving forward, we are going to
have to take a look at that blended workforce and the number of
civilians and how we access civilians, but there is no doubt in
my mind we need additional civilians for the continuity that
you all have mentioned.
Mr. Young. The industry itself--and I should know this
answer--do they have their own inspectors for vessels also and,
if so, who trains them?
Admiral Allen. That is a good question, sir.
Right now, a large portion of those inspections are done by
classification societies. The largest one in the United States
would be the American Bureau of Shipping. Quite frankly, they
access their engineers and inspectors the same way we do.
I am affiliated, by my status as the Commandant of the
Coast Guard, with the American Bureau of Shipping. I can tell
you all the marine industries in this Country right now are
challenged accessing inspectors, engineers, and people of that
type of background. With the growing needs we have in the
Country, the workforce out there that we are competing for is
small, sir.
Mr. Young. I have read most of the testimony from the
future witnesses. I won't be here. But I have not found any
testimony to say they want to transfer the regulatory safety
issues to another agency.
I have seen where some of them are testifying that they
think there could be more civilian involvement in inspections
and enforcement of under the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard. I
guess it has been done before, and it probably could be
addressed again.
My interest here, as again I think it is the Chairman's
interest, is to make sure we have the safest and how do we best
achieve that. I still think it should stay within the agency
that has the most knowledge and the most control.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Young.
Just one real quick question before we go to Mr. Oberstar,
how do you suggest we put folk in the pipeline?
It sounds like we need some folk in the pipeline, getting
to eventually become a part of that program. I guess you have
given that some thought.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. We have done that two ways right
now. One of them is restructuring how we access enlisted folks
to warrants and warrants into marine safety field. These are
really folks that have a lot of experience, and they are
terrific for us.
The second is a revised curriculum and syllabus on how we
are actually training the people who are going to our ports
right now. It took over the last year, we have developed, and
that is going into effect. That is the information I offered to
provide you for the record.
Admiral Allen. We also access folks into the program from
other maritime universities, Merchant Marine Academy, New York
Maritime, Cal Maritime and so forth.
Then the big question before us is if we are going to
create a civilian cadre to ensure some of the continuity we
have been talking about here, how do you describe those
positions? At what level do you do that? Then how do you access
them in?
My sense is, as we found out with search and rescue and
vessel traffic systems, there are plenty of folks out there
that are ready for a second career that could do that, and I
think there is an applicant pool waiting, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Oberstar.
Mr. Oberstar. I thank you for chairing the hearing, Mr.
Cummings.
I had intended to be here and support this hearing right
from the very outset, but a matter of a bridge tragedy in
Minnesota has derailed my day as did the markup that was very
long and following which I had a news conference. I apologize
to Members for not being here, but we have an ongoing problem,
as does the Coast Guard have an ongoing problem.
Admiral Allen, thank you for your candor, for your
responsiveness to the proposal that I have offered. If nothing
else, it has sure mobilized you. You have covered the Country
from one end to the other. Homeland Security has been in high
gear ever since this proposal got out on the waterways.
You have, to a very large degree, intimidated all these
witnesses who are coming before us today.
Mr. Young said, well, he said he read the testimony and
people are not saying establish a separate entity. That is
because they are damn scared of saying it.
Let us be candid about it. They don't want to be at sword's
point with you and those who do the vessel inspections and who
do the certification of seafarers. Of course, not.
You know Mr. Young and I were the contrary voices over at
the White House. The President called the Chairs and Ranking
Members of the House and Senate Committees to discuss his
proposal for a Department of Homeland Security.
I will remember as long as I live Mr. Young saying, don't
mess with my Coast Guard, a very possessive spirit about it,
and I backed him up on it. Leave it in the Department of
Transportation. Don't mess with it.
Well, it has been co-opted just like FEMA has and with the
result that one of the witnesses says the face that the
industry sees on the waterfront is now a distinctly military
one: guns, boots, an aura of martial law.
Prior to September 11th, the Coast Guard's proud military
heritage was softened on the waterfront because it was seen
first as an organization of seasoned marine safety
professionals. That is how we have all thought of the Coast
Guard.
Today's Coast Guard is a stranger on the working
waterfront. That is the real spirit of those who are concerned
about what has happened to the Coast Guard in this era of
homeland security.
What I have been concerned about increasingly is that the
certifications functions, that the expertise of personnel, the
pool of human resources that are committed to the marine safety
functions have been diverted. It has been diverted just as FEMA
was. They sliced off the top 250 personnel, shifting them
around the Department of Homeland Security, cut of $500 million
of their budget, shifted it elsewhere within the Department of
Homeland Security, and then they weren't ready for Katrina.
Thank God, the Coast Guard was. Thank God, the Coast Guard
was out there with its helicopters and its surface vessels and
its skills and expertise in rescuing people.
Thank God, the President had the good judgment to send you
down there to the Gulf and set things aright. You did it. It is
a great tribute to you and a great tribute to the Coast Guard.
But it is no denigration to the Coast Guard to say that the
marine safety programs are not necessarily a military function.
I would like you to describe for me what homeland security
responsibility is involved in certification of vessels and
certification of seafarers.
Admiral Allen. Well, sir, it is not directly a homeland
security mission, but it is a mission that the Coast Guard has
accomplished for a number of years. In accordance with Section
888 of the Homeland Security Act, we were transferred intact
with all of our missions intact.
My challenge as the Commandant, my responsibility as the
Commandant is to execute the missions assigned. That is the
reason I said in advance of your arrival, Mr. Chairman, that I
am glad this hearing is being held. It is the right hearing at
the right time. We are not talking about the competency.
Mr. Oberstar. You haven't described, you haven't provided a
link to homeland security and certification of a vessel,
homeland security and certification of seafarers and
relicensing of seafarers. There really isn't a direct linkage,
is there?
Admiral Allen. Well, sir, I think you could say that the
safety and the viability of the maritime transportation system
in this Country is endemic to the infrastructure that the
Department is responsible for protecting, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. In a secondary way, yes, but the primary
function of certification of vessels and the annual safety
inspection of vessels is not a security function. It is a
safety function which the Coast Guard is skilled at doing,
right?
Admiral Allen. Sir, search and rescue is a safety function.
I don't see any proposal that that be moved out of the Coast
Guard, sir. Safety is a broad range of activities.
Mr. Oberstar. If I had my way, I would move the whole Coast
Guard right back to Department of Transportation.
Admiral Allen. I understand that is your position, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. That is no secret around this town.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. I would say that safety and
security, as I said many times, are two sides of the same coin.
You get a benefit for security when you improve safety, and you
get a benefit to safety when you improve security. Having them
together does create a synergy, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. We have seen that same side by side in
aviation. That is why we created a whole new category of
personnel to do the security function at airports and not leave
it up to the airlines who were doing a very bad job of it,
contracting it out to the lowest bidder.
Had we continued with that practice, then in the
Transportation Security Act, we might have moved the FAA over
to Homeland Security because the airport screeners are
performing a security function. Well, in fact, that is done,
but the safety side of FAA stayed. I really don't think that
bifurcating safety and security was reasonable, but the safety
side stayed with FAA in the Department of Transportation.
Another witness says, ``The recently issued documented
entitled U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety,
Security and Stewardship is disappointing in its brevity,
characterization and direction. Only a single page of the 54
page charter is devoted to marine safety.''
That is a powerful statement, isn't it?
Admiral Allen. Are you looking for a response, sir? I am
sorry.
Mr. Oberstar. Yes.
Admiral Allen. The Maritime Strategy for Safety, Security
and Stewardship is a top level document that came out of
something called the Evergreen Process in the Coast Guard that
was intended to encompass all of our missions. We have missions
that are in being out there. We have mission that are emerging.
The security mission is emerging more than the other missions
right now.
The actual amount of ink in that strategy which is a top
level document is not indicative of the base resources in the
Coast Guard that are applied to these things in our day to day
operations. It is intended to guide strategy, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. Well, another example is the longstanding
inability of the Coast Guard to timely issue licenses and
merchant mariner documents as required by law. They are
required by law to have those documents.
The witness does go on to say that problem predates
September 11, but it has been exacerbated by post-September 11
as the Coast Guard in an earlier reference has been committed
to a more specific law enforcement role rather than a marine
safety role.
Admiral Allen. Sir, our merchant mariner documentation has
been a problem for a long time. I had issues with this when I
was the Seventh District Commander back in 1999 when we had a
significant fraud case at our regional exam center in San Juan.
I have always been in favor of overhauling this process,
and we are right now. We are automating and centralizing the
document process. We are going to go to online payments, online
status of documentation. We are in a two year transition period
right now.
I mentioned before you arrived that it is incumbent on me,
the Coast Guard and the folks that are working out there in the
port that we sustain the service level and if it is not being
sustained right now, we have to get it right, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. Before I arrived, you announced, Admiral, if
I have it right, that you are proposing the establishment of an
Assistant Commandant for Maritime Safety and Security.
Admiral Allen. And Stewardship, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. And Stewardship.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. Why does security have to be in that? That is
exactly what all those folks sitting behind you are worried
about.
Admiral Allen. Again, sir, if you are operating in a port,
it is very difficult to disassociate safety and security
activities because they combine together to provide the
assurance of the maritime transportation system there, sir.
Our focus is to have a senior maritime security authority
in the Coast Guard accessible by industry for all matters
related to the port, but they will be the individual
responsible for safety. There is another Coast Guard flag
officer assigned the responsibility for prevention activities
who will work for that flag officer. We have a senior executive
service person that is responsible for standards. At the last
flag board, we selected two marine safety officers for flag,
sir
Mr. Oberstar. But listen to what has happened in FEMA which
you took charge of and, in effect, ran and put it aright.
Volunteer fire departments are required in their submission of
grant applications for firefighting apparatus, for clothing,
for fire resistant clothing, for pumper trucks to show a
connection to homeland security.
Look, the terror on the border in Minnesota is fire. If you
put security into this safety function, you are just
compounding the problem. What we need is what we have in the
FAA, skilled personnel who have years of seasoning, who aren't
shifted year after year from one post to another with only
three years on staff.
Take the example of the Corps of Engineers. They do have a
military commander. They have a district engineer and the
division engineers and in each of the districts, there is
usually a major or lieutenant colonel, and he is there for
three years and then goes to something else, but the civilian
personnel stay in place. Why couldn't you do that in the Coast
Guard?
Why do you have to have security in marine safety? I think
that would be a separate function.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. First of all, I am not sure I am
qualified to comment on homeland security as it relates to fire
trucks in Minnesota, but I do understand your point, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. Well, I don't ask you to do that and for your
own good, you probably shouldn't.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. You will get the Secretary hopping mad. If he
is mad at me, that is okay, but I don't want him to be mad at
you.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. Here is what I would propose, Mr.
Chairman. I roger what you are saying. I roger what the
industry is saying.
What I propose is you tell me what is wrong and let me tell
you the plan to fix it before we go to the more drastic step of
reorganization and changes because I feel we are competent to
do this mission. I think there are resources involved. I think
we can do what you and the Country expect of us, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. My logic behind this proposition is that we
will take this function, move it into where it had been until
World War II, into a civilian department, and then fill those
spaces with the necessary Coast Guard uniformed personnel that
you need to carry out all these functions that the Congress has
given you over the 32 years I have served in Congress and have
not provided sufficient personnel although we do increase the
number in the current Coast Guard Authorization Bill which will
come to the floor right after the August recess.
We will give you, the Coast Guard, the uniformed personnel
you need to carry out those functions, do the homeland security
role and put the civilian function in the Department of
Transportation where you can have longtime career professionals
doing that job and keep the enforcement side with the Coast
Guard.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. I understand your point
completely, and I am not trying to be argumentative. I would
just tell you I think we are up to the task.
Mr. Oberstar. You should be. That is your role. That is
your responsibility. You are advocating for the Coast Guard.
You defended yourself well in that document you gave me. I
understand. That is the purpose of hearings is to have exchange
of views. I want to hear your views.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. We are ready to be responsive to
the issues raised by the Committee and industry regarding
issues on staffing qualification and continuity of marine
inspectors. We have a plan to move out on that and with a
blended hybrid workforce that includes more civilians. We are
competent to do this. We can do it, but it is probably going to
require some resources.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Chairman, I see we have votes in progress
here. I thank you for the time.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Coble.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
Admiral, you have been pretty thoroughly examined today. I
don't think you have been asked this question. We continually
hear from the Coast Guard regarding safety and security. Is
there anything to be gained or lost by separating regulators
from an enforcement agency?
Admiral Allen. Well, right now, we can pretty much develop
a single package for a ship that is entering port regarding
inspections and boardings that have to be accomplished. What
you run the risk for when you separate the functions of
sequential boardings and inspections that we are subjecting the
ships and vessels that are coming into port to increased burden
on them and increased time on processing.
What we ultimately need to do is to unify all of our
actions in regard to a vessel, both safety and security.
Now if there is a customer interface issue where people are
wearing blue uniforms and we need to communicate better with
industry what we are doing and there is a dockside manner
issue, we can work with that. I would just say in response to
an earlier comment, those people that pulled 33,000 people out
in New Orleans were all wearing blue uniforms.
Mr. Coble. I thank you, Admiral, and one more question, Mr.
Chairman.
I just don't believe we can remove the marine safety
mission in a smooth, harmonious way. I think it would be
difficult. Am I right or wrong, Admiral?
Admiral Allen. I think it would be disruptive, and it is
already causing morale issues, the fact the hearing is being
held.
Mr. Coble. I thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too will be brief.
Admiral Allen, nice to see you again. I want to go back to
this issue that Mr. LaTourette was raising of the rotation
issue. It seems to be a sore point. I think I can understand
multiple rotations from the Coast Guard point of view,
developing breadth of experience and so on, but it also seems
that the down side of that is that we are constantly putting
people in frontline positions where they are on a pretty steep
learning curve.
And so, my question to you is do you foresee changing the
rotations for marine safety inspectors and, if you do, do you
have the capacity to undertake that on your own or do you need
greater authority?
Admiral Allen. No. We can look at the rotation policies,
and that is within my authority to manage. Whether or not it is
a three, four or five year tour, those are things that I can
manage.
I think the real issue is getting what I would call the
structure of the workforce right, and I mentioned that earlier.
Mr. Bishop. Do you agree, though, with the assessment of
some that frequent rotations tend to drive down the level of
expertise that ought to be present on the frontline?
Admiral Allen. I think that is true.
Here is the quandary we are faced with. Sooner or later, as
you get promoted in the Coast Guard, you become a commanding
officer. If you get selected for flag, you become a district
commander and maybe even a Commandant. When you get to there,
you become a general. You are representing the entire
organization.
We have an issue of needing specialists, subject matter
experts, but at some point we need to generalize these folks
and give them other experiences if they are going to be
promotable and move up to become executives in the
organization. In corporate America, for example, if you are a
vice president, everybody needs to understand corporate
finance.
What we have developed inside the Coast Guard is the notion
of what we call a broadened specialist. What we need to look at
is maintaining the subject matter expertise that is critical to
mission execution and then how we can broaden these people at a
later date and still make them promotable. They want to be able
to move up in the organization as well.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you.
I have other questions, Mr. Chairman, but I will yield to
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. I thank the gentleman. Thank you, Mr. Bishop.
Commandant, number one, I empathize with your situation,
and I want you to know that. I very much appreciate what the
Coast Guard did after Katrina.
And, you get thrown a monkey wrench called the 123s.
Deepwater didn't help. So you have got a lot of challenges, and
I would not want to be in your shoes right now, although they
are still pretty good shoes to have.
Admiral Allen. I am proud to be in them.
Mr. Taylor. There is only one Commandant of the Coast
Guard.
My point, I heard you mention trying to bring in other
groups to help out to fill this billet, and I heard you mention
the Merchant Marine Academy and the other marine academies.
Hardly a conversation goes by between me and an alumnus of the
Merchant Marine Academy where they don't worry about the future
of it.
In fact, just the other night, I had a senior at the
Merchant Marine Academy who is getting ready, whose goal upon
graduation is to be an Army Ranger. Number one, I thought, gee,
what a great kid to go after that very, very tough task. On the
flip side, I am thinking, geez, the taxpayers have invested a
heck of a lot of money to teach this guy to be a maritime
officer, and he is going to go be an Army Ranger. That doesn't
seem to make sense.
Given that MARAD, and I have great respect for Sean
Connaughton, often strikes me as an agency in search of a
mission and given the maritime academies that seem to be on a
roller coaster where all their graduates have work, none of
their graduates have work, all of their graduates have work, I
really do think there is a natural opportunity for the Coast
Guard to work with those academies like you said.
But what I think is missing, what I sense is missing, given
some conversations I have had with senior officials at the
Merchant Marine Academy is I am not so sure it has ever been
clearly articulated that we need X number of graduates a year
and we can fill this billet.
I will flip that around with a conversation I had with one
of the senior officers of the academy just last weekend where
they are now in negotiations with the Chief of the Guard Bureau
where he has actually articulated a number--I think the number
is between 40 and 50--of people that he wants to bring over to
the Guard Bureau to make them more aware of the maritime
situation in the homeland defense mode.
So my question to you is how specific have you gotten,
either with Secretary Connaughton or with Admiral Stewart or
any of the other academies?
How specific have you gotten in saying I have got this many
billets that I am going to need for X number of years and can
you work on your curriculum to help me fill those billets?
Admiral Allen. I can be very specific, sir.
First of all, I agree Sean Connaughton is a great partner
and a former Coast Guard officer. His undergraduate
institution, I will leave to another day. We play Merchant
Marine our first football game this year.
We actually have a plan every year for accessing maritime
academy graduates into the Coast Guard, and I can give you.
Mr. Taylor. No. Towards this goal, towards this need right
here.
Admiral Allen. Oh, sure, they are a great choice. They are
a great source, yes.
Mr. Taylor. But again, to what point are you going to
Admiral Stewart or Sean Connaughton and say: I have got a
vacancy. I have got billets that I need to fill in my maritime
safety offices. Can you adjust your curriculum to help me fill
that?
Again, just given my limited experience with the Coast
Guard, I do think that it was frowned upon, the short side
billets, and that guys who wanted to have as much gold on their
sleeves as you have thought that the only way they were going
to get there was to go to sea. Whether you say it or not, I do
think that there was a reluctance on the part of many of your
officer corps to take a job like this.
Admiral Allen. I don't believe that is correct. We take
graduates right now and, if we had positions, I would be more
than happy to get together with Sean and the other folks and
pull those folks over. What you have to have is the authorized
position. That takes us back to resources. In other words, we
access those people right now.
Mr. Taylor. Okay. So to what extent?
Admiral Allen. Given an increase in billets, they are a
perfect source, sir. I absolutely agree with you.
Mr. Taylor. Admiral Allen, none of us are mind readers. So
to what extent are you articulating that to Sean Connaughton?
To what extent are you saying I need this many people to
Admiral Stewart, and above all to what extent are you sending a
letter to the Chairman here, saying I need X number of dollars
to fill this need?
Again, none of us are mind readers.
Admiral Allen. I understand.
Mr. Taylor. So has the Chairman gotten a letter towards
that end?
Admiral Allen. What I would propose is as part of the
assessment that I talked about earlier in the testimony about
this blended workforce, I think what we owe you is an
organizational construct on how that comes together between the
three components. Those are accessed through enlisted and
warrant officers we bring in from either our academy or the
Merchant Marine Academy and what we propose to do as far as
creating a civilian cadre.
Mr. Cummings. How soon can we get that?
Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Taylor. Certainly.
Mr. Cummings. How soon can we get that, Admiral?
Admiral Allen. Sixty days.
Mr. Cummings. We will hold you to it.
The Chairman said a month.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Chairman, I have just one comment,
briefly. We have to break for the vote.
I just have to say, Admiral, that creating a new structure
within which you have uniformed Coast Guard and just a couple
of civilian personnel who would be career people who can absorb
all that documentation and be able to handle it like an
aircraft mechanic does is not sufficient. That is not a
sufficient answer to the need.
Admiral Allen. I think we need to make the case then to
you, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Admiral. We are finished
with you.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Allen. Mr. Chairman, it is always a pleasure. These
questions are good for both of us, and it has been my pleasure
to testify.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
We will resume the hearing. We have, as we understand it,
one vote that might get stretched, so we will see. We will be
back as soon as the vote is over. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Cummings. We will call the hearing back into order.
We now have Richard Block of the Gulf Coast Mariners
Association; Mr. Tim Brown, President of the International
Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots; and Mr. Richard
Doyle, Director of Government Affairs and Deputy General
Counsel with the Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association.
I am sorry Mr. Quick is substituting for Mr. Brown. I
apologize.
I would remind our witnesses that we have, after you, six
others to come. I know that you all have great things to say,
and we want to hear them, but we just ask you to be as brief as
you possibly can be. We will give each one of you five minutes.
Keep in mind, we have your written statements, and so
basically what we would like for you to do is summarize.
Mr. Block.
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD BLOCK, SECRETARY GULF COAST MARINERS
ASSOCIATION; GEORGE QUICK, VICE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION OF MASTERS, MATES AND PILOTS; WILLIAM DOYLE,
DIRECTOR OF GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS AND DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL,
MARINE ENGINEERS' BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION
Mr. Block. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee, it is my honor to be invited to appear before you
today to testify on the challenges facing the Coast Guard
marine safety program.
My name is Richard Block. I am the Secretary of the Gulf
Coast Mariners Association. I have given a brief bio in my
original statement here.
In our attempts to improve safety and working conditions
for our mariners, we always presented our problems to the Coast
Guard first, often bringing them up in correspondence or
advisory committee meetings.
However, whenever the Coast Guard proved to be either
unable or unwilling to move on these issues, we reached an
impasse. This happened a number of times in the past eight
years. When this happened, we would send a report to your
Subcommittee, and we have sent a total of 14 reports in on an
irregular basis.
Our association speaks for lower level mariners. By lower
level mariners, I am speaking of mariners who serve on vessels
of under 1,600 gross tons. We are a majority of all merchant
mariners. The Coast Guard lists 204,000 licensed and documented
mariners.
Out of the 204,000, we speak for 126,000 plus a large
number of people the Coast Guard appears to have been forgotten
about that don't hold licenses or documents and they work on
the inland rivers, inland waters and offshore on vessels under
100 gross tons. So we probably represent almost 200,000 people.
We try to do it as well as we can with extremely limited
funding. One of our greatest challenges we face is that a
branch of military superintends our civilian mariners. Now as a
former Army officer, I understand and respect the military
lifestyle. However, most of our mariners have never served in
the Armed Forces. They do not understand the military
lifestyle. They do not understand Coast Guard rank. They don't
understand how the military operates.
I have spent 10 years in dealing with the military. I have
some limited understanding of how the military works, and it
just hasn't worked too well in looking after our mariners.
One of the first areas that I would like to touch on, I
have five that I may be able to cover here. We reported this
February on the substandard Coast Guard merchant marine
personnel services. I am talking about licensing,
documentation, examinations conducted by the National Maritime
Center, by regional exam centers.
The report dealt with 50 individual mariners. Each of these
mariners came to me with a problem, and we tried to solve it
through the National Maritime Center. We asked the people at
the top. We found them very helpful. However, the answers that
we received and the time it took them to give us the answers
was not acceptable. I turn you to that particular report.
Also, we would recommend that civilians replace the Coast
Guard officers at the National Maritime Center.
We have other problems with Coast Guard investigations. We
have probably on record over 600 accidents that we have
studied. We have asked the Coast Guard to analyze some of the
data that they have given us. Unfortunately, this hasn't been
done. I think that this part of the Agency needs to be
civilianized.
The two-watch system, this is an area where we are in
desperate need of a new law which would apply not only to
masters, pilots and so forth but also to the unlicensed people.
I think my time is up.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Quick.
Mr. Quick. Well, good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members
of the Subcommittee.
Captain Timothy Brown, the President of our organization,
who was scheduled to speak today has a minor medical problem,
and he has asked me to appear on his behalf.
My name is George Quick, and I have served as Vice
President of the International Organization of Masters, Mates
and Pilots since 1982. I have been involved in the maritime
industry since graduation from the United States Merchant
Marine Academy. For the past 50 years, I have earned my
livelihood in an industry that has been regulated by the Coast
Guard.
For many of those years, I have been in positions where I
have had to interact with the Coast Guard on national and
international regulatory issues. I have made many friends
within the Coast Guard over those years. I have come to
appreciate what the Coast Guard does very well, and I have also
come to realize where there are problems within the system and
why friction sometimes exists between the Coast Guard and the
regulated industry and mariners.
One of the frictions between the Coast Guard and
professional mariners is often inadequate communications and
the lack of understanding and trust that runs in both
directions. A large part of the cause is the differing cultures
of the Coast Guard and the merchant marine. The Coast Guard
sees accomplishing their self-defined mission as of paramount
importance while we see moving passengers and cargo safely and
efficiently as our reason for existence.
The Coast Guard is trained in military and law enforcement
mold that expects unquestioned respect for authority. They are
involved in drug interdiction, law enforcement activities and
security operations where you don't consult with the suspects.
Shifting to regulating a civilian workforce with
sensitivity and concern for their opinions must require a gear-
stripping change in attitudes. There is a need to realize that
the merchant marine has its own tradition and customs, or
mission, which is every bit as old as the Coast Guard and that
is also deserving of respect.
There is a need to bring more merchant vessel operating
experience into the regulation of the maritime industry both
for their technical competency and their ability to interact
with the industry on the basis of shared experiences. This
could be accomplished in a number of ways.
There is also a need to review the Coast Guard accident
investigation procedures to ensure that both U.S. and foreign
mariners that are involved in marine accidents are treated
fairly in accordance with standards accepted within the
international maritime community.
There is not enough time to go in any detail in an opening
statement, but I look forward to answering questions from the
Subcommittee and providing more details in a follow-up
statement. I am also hopeful of establishing a productive
dialogue with the Coast Guard on the subjects of concern to us
sometime in the future.
Thank you.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Quick.
Mr. Doyle.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Chairman Cummings, Ranking Member
LaTourette and the rest of the Committee, for allowing me to
speak today. MEBA President Ron Davis is unavailable due to a
scheduling conflict.
The challenges facing the Coast Guard marine safety program
represent challenges for the entire maritime industry, both
labor and management. This hearing is a good step toward
overcoming them.
My name is William Doyle, and I am the Director of
Government Affairs and Deputy General Counsel of the Marine
Engineers' Beneficial Association and a U.S. Coast Guard
licensed officer in the merchant marine.
For 132 years, MEBA has represented Coast Guard licensed
deck and engineering officers serving in all aspects of the
merchant marine. We have long been partnered with the Coast
Guard in ensuring the safe and secure movement of water-borne
commerce throughout our Country and the world.
The Coast Guard has earned its reputation by accepting
mission and mission even when they aren't given additional
resources. Their record of achieving much with little is
commendable.
However, the constant addition of new missions has resulted
in less public attention for the Coast Guard's core missions
like marine safety. This has made solving the challenges that
we currently face within the marine safety program all the more
difficult. I am confident, however, that through the public-
private partnership model that we in maritime have successfully
implemented since the founding days of our Republic, we can
work to solve these challenges together.
The issues that we face in the marine safety program are
both internal structural challenges that arise out of the Coast
Guard's founding as a military organization and the external
challenges that arise out of the needs to balance safety and
security with maintaining the steady flow of commerce.
The Coast Guard is fundamentally military, yet they also
are responsible for the majority of safety and security-related
regulatory functions in regards to the merchant marine. This is
the only branch of the Armed Forces that has such a role.
As such, there are situations where the adoption of
military style systems has not been effective. For example, the
current tour of duty system does not allow a sufficient amount
of time for uniformed personnel to learn their way around a
commercial vessel's engine room before they move on to a new
assignment.
Further, the Coast Guard's law enforcement function often
complicates their regulatory function and creates an
adversarial relationship where one does not need to exist.
Vessel inspection teams often seem more like police than
inspectors.
We feel that an increased number of civilian employees in
the areas such as safety inspections, merchant mariner
credentialing and investigatory positions would ensure the
needed consistency and level of experience to overcome the
challenges in this area. In addition, to recruiting from the
maritime academies, MEBA and most of the labor organizations
here today have access to a pool of retired but still working
age mariners, not Coast Guard retirees, mariners who could
easily fill such positions.
Consistency is another challenge that must be addressed.
Our companies make many decisions including decisions regarding
hiring, flagging of vessels, construction of vessels, wages and
benefits based on Coast Guard's interpretation of rulings and
various regulatory questions. Any decision made by the Coast
Guard has a wide impact on the maritime industry, and it is
critical that the Coast Guard be fair and consistent in their
interpretation of regulatory opinions.
The external challenges that are present in the maritime
safety program are fundamental and far-reaching. The prime
ongoing challenge is balancing safety and security with
ensuring the flow of commerce. Quite often in the zeal to make
the U.S. flag and the U.S. maritime industry the world's safest
and most secure, they make it extremely difficult for the
industry to compete internationally.
While the United States is a large part of the global
maritime community and has been a member of the International
Maritime Organization since 1950, you quite often find U.S.
Coast Guard standards that are much higher than those adopted
by IMO and used throughout the rest of the world. By holding
ourselves to a higher standard than the rest of the world, we
are handicapped when competing internationally.
This issue is highlighted most clearly in the debate over
the Transportation Worker Identification Credential. The TWIC
was designed to increase security in our ports, yet the TWIC
only applies to American mariners who move less than 2 percent
of the cargo entering and leaving the United States. Further,
the card is not compatible with the international standard for
seafarers' identity documents established by the International
Labor Organization.
We are concerned the TWIC will become just another example
of over-regulation without any increase in security.
There were several questions and comments that were raised
at the earlier panel regarding the civilian sector certificates
of inspection, fear of the Coast Guard, oily water separators
and oil pollution. I am a mariner. If you have any questions on
that, I can answer many of those questions.
Thank you.
Mr. Cummings. I want to thank you all for staying within
the time limits.
We are going to go straight to Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you. I am
sorry I walked in at the tail end of the testimony.
Mr. Doyle, I had asked this question of Admiral Allen, but
the question grew out of your testimony which has to do with
the rotation of Coast Guard inspectors.
It seems to me as if we are constantly replacing semi-
experienced people with inexperienced people who then become
semi-experienced and then they move on to their next
assignment. How real a problem is this and what do you see as
the fix?
Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Congressman.
Congressman Bishop, let me just break it down to what
happens on a ship. I will take it from an officer's perspective
coming out of a maritime academy, like I did.
You go through four years of school. You get your license
through the United States Coast Guard. It takes a minimum of
two years to move up from third, then to second, then to first,
then to chief engineer. You are looking at 16 years of
schooling in order to get schooling and training in order to
get your chief engineer's license. You are the person
responsible for the engine room and all the machinery on board
that ship.
What is very difficult for a chief engineer and a captain
from that perspective is somebody who comes in, who came from a
different rotation, does a Coast Guard inspection and there are
problems or communication breakdowns because they are not a
merchant mariner. They may not be a merchant mariner although
the Coast Guard does recruit from the academies and there are
merchant mariners that go into the Coast Guard.
It is difficult from a commercial sector as a chief
engineer or captain on the communication level on how a ship
should run. It is their ship. They feel that way, a chief
engineer and a captain. So it is very difficult if somebody
comes in for two years, does an inspection and then leaves and
a new person comes in. Merchant mariners are career people.
Mr. Bishop. You believe that the retired merchant mariner
can be a part of the solution here, correct?
Mr. Doyle. Absolutely.
Mr. Bishop. Now, the Coast Guard, Admiral Allen testified a
little while ago that he is committed to increased civilian
presence in this issue. Have you had discussions with him or
anyone in the Coast Guard with respect to the utilization of
retired mariners?
Mr. Doyle. Not on this specific instance, no.
Mr. Bishop. Do you think that a retired mariner would have
sufficient objectivity?
I mean he might find himself inspecting ships operated by
former colleagues. Do you see that as any problem at all?
Mr. Doyle. No, I do not.
Mr. Bishop. Tell me why.
Mr. Doyle. The reason why is because in my organization we
have what is called port engineers, and those port engineers
are union. What they do is they are responsible for the
shoreside part of the ship, making it safe. It is sort of like
a safety function. They outfit the ship. They make sure that
the machinery is running well.
Well, they are supervising officers on board the ship, a
supervisory role over them. There is no ifs, ands or buts about
it. It is safety first. They have a job to do, and they are the
company's representative onshore that interacts with the
shipboard personnel, and they hold them accountable.
I do not think that somebody retired at 50 years old and
wants to start another career, 55 years old, would have a
problem with objectivity of going over the ship. At the end of
the day, it is the safety and the lives of the people onboard
that ship that everybody is looking out for.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for your testimony.
Mr. Block, you used a phrase that I am not familiar with. I
think I know what it gets at, the two-watch system. Is that the
preferred hours of service, 12 hour shifts basically?
Mr. Block. It is six hours on, six hours off. The problem
with the two-watch system is that human beings require seven to
eight hours of sleep, and you are constantly running a sleep
deficit starting from the first day.
Now, you may be fortunate and if the vessel is tied up
alongside the dock for a while, you may be able to get a little
more sleep. But on vessels that run 24 hours around the clock,
eventually this deficit is going to catch up with you.
Mr. LaTourette. I understand. We just had a pretty good
negotiation in the Rail Safety Bill on limbo time and circadian
rhythms and things like that, and so I am pretty up on that.
But the question would be is that subject to collective
bargaining negotiations or is it set in statute for regulation?
Mr. Block. The problem that our mariners have is that most
of them do not belong to a union. They are not allowed to
belong to a union. There have been battles waged in the past 13
or 14 years in which the unions have always lost.
Mr. LaTourette. This two-watch system is set in regulation
under the Hours of Service?
Mr. Block. It is set in regulation.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you.
I had understood all of you to advocate increased civilian
participation in the marine safety. I didn't hear, and Chairman
Young isn't here, but I think I will ask the question he would
have asked were he here. I didn't hear anyone advocate
necessarily that that needed to be accomplished only by
transferring the marine safety responsibility out of the Coast
Guard and placing it with the Department of Transportation.
Does anybody have an opinion?
Mr. Block?
Mr. Block. I think it could probably be done within the
Coast Guard system. I think we need to get more civilian
mariners involved.
If I could bring something else up, the fear of retribution
by the Coast Guard. I don't feel any fear myself. However, my
mariners do feel this fear. If you go against the Coast Guard,
somehow they are going to get you.
Well, let me put it this way. The Members of the
Subcommittee here, if you pull all of these functions away from
the Coast Guard, all of a sudden 14, 15 Members here are going
to have to run all of these functions. The Coast Guard may not
cooperate very fully with you.
I notice in many ways that the Coast Guard doesn't always
explain everything to you gentlemen the way we think they
should, and I am kind of afraid that you might end up running
the whole system yourself.
Mr. LaTourette. I hope that doesn't happen.
Mr. Quick or Mr. Doyle, do you have an observation about
the proposal to perhaps create a new Marine Safety
Administration within DOT?
Mr. Quick. Our goal would be to have a civilian interface
between the industry and the regulatory body. Whether that is
accomplished by reorganizing every section in the Coast Guard
or by transfer to another agency is academic to us.
Mr. LaTourette. You don't care.
Mr. Quick. I would prefer or let me say I would believe
that reorganization within the Coast Guard should be the first
step, and if it doesn't prove successful, then the ultimate
step might be a separate agency.
Mr. LaTourette. That sounds reasonable just from my view
around here.
If you take FEMA, for instance, when FEMA was taken away
from the jurisdiction of this Committee and then thrust into
Homeland Security, I made the observation--a lot of different
people made the observation--that you are going to get an
agency that did a great job on natural disasters and you are
going to have two parts, emergency response and homeland
security, and we are not going to fund either one of them
properly.
I think we have seen that and paid the price for that.
Mr. Doyle, what about you on this issue of a separate
agency or maintaining it? I heard what you said about increased
civilian presence, but what do you think?
Mr. Doyle. I think that this oversight hearing is
fantastic. Admiral Thad Allen sat here and said that he was
going to provide information within 60 days. I believe in
giving people a chance to get back on their feet. They should
have an opportunity to get back up on their feet, but if it
fails, I think all avenues need to be explored, including that.
Mr. LaTourette. I appreciate that.
Then the last thing is, Mr. Doyle, you talked about TWIC.
The Chairman had a great hearing, I think, on TWIC a little
while ago, and I couldn't quite understand why the Department
of Homeland Security had not gone with the international
biometric standards and some of those things.
They said it is because we are going to be ahead of the
curve and have the greatest thing since sliced bread. But the
fact of the matter is it is over budget, it is over deadline,
and it is not compatible with what everybody else in the world
is doing.
So I appreciate your bringing that up, and I appreciate
your yielding me time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of you gentlemen for being here.
For the two graduates of the maritime academies, I am
curious. I don't know if you were, Mr. Block. I heard the other
two gentlemen mention it.
I am convinced that there isn't the proper utilization by
the Coast Guard of that or of MARAD. I am just curious if you
could be more specific in your recommendations how they could
be better employed in filling this need.
The second thing--and Mr. Chairman, I would encourage you
to consider--is that on the Armed Services Committee, it has
been a tradition to approach each of the Joint Chiefs when they
come before the Committee and ask them formally for an unfunded
requirement list.
If you think about it, looking back at what happened to
General Shinseki, looking back at what happened to Mike Parker,
they are under tremendous pressure to toe the company line even
if the company line is wrong, and anyone who speaks out of line
is either canned like Mike Parker or General Shinseki.
But with the unfunded requirement list, each year, we
basically give the generals and the admirals an opportunity to
say, but if I was given some more money, I would ask for this
ship or I would ask for this vehicle. It is a way of forcing
them to tell us what they are thinking even if the
Administration doesn't want them to say it.
I would encourage us to ask the Commandant for an unfunded
requirement list.
Mr. Cummings. If the gentleman will yield, that is an
outstanding suggestion, and we will jump on that immediately.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you.
To you gentleman, if the Commandant had an unfunded
requirement list and you happened to have been the Commandant
trying to address this problem, what would you ask for
specifically?
Mr. Quick. I would ask for bringing in retired officers
that still had 15 or 20 years of service ahead of them, that
had the experience to have an informed judgment when they do a
ship inspection.
Mr. Taylor. How many of them, Mr. Quick.
Mr. Quick. Oh, I don't know.
Mr. Taylor. Give me a realistic guess.
Mr. Quick. I would think you would probably need several
hundred officers in the civilian section of the Coast Guard.
Mr. Taylor. Is this to get you over a temporary problem or
is that a sustained level?
Mr. Quick. No, no. As a permanent basis, I think the Coast
Guard needs to have a civilian inspection force that covers
port state control, ship inspection, licensing, safety
inspections.
In foreign countries outside the United States, you go to
the Netherlands or Germany or Norway, that is a civilian force
that comes on. They are all retired masters or chief engineers,
and they become the inspection service for that country.
When they go aboard a ship, they are interfacing with chief
engineers and masters that have a shared experience. There is a
great deal of respect for the inspectors, and the inspectors
have a great deal of respect for the officers on the ship.
It is an effective system. You have expertise. You have
competence, and you have motivation. They obviously love the
maritime industry because that is their choice. It is not
something they have been assigned to as part of their tour of
duty and attaining a generalized background in the Coast Guard.
I think that is the way to go.
I would be reluctant to bring in recent graduates of the
maritime academy into this role because they have no more
experience than recent graduates of the Coast Guard Academy.
Until they have four or five years at sea at a minimum and at
least reach something like chief officer, a senior management
position, they don't have the experience they need to be an
effective inspector.
Mr. Taylor. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Doyle?
Mr. Doyle. Several hundred probably would be the number. I
don't know. I can't pinpoint it, somewhere between 500 and
1,000, because you are really looking at 2 things. You are
looking at the inspection side, and you are looking at the
investigatory side.
Even on the investigatory side, it is fearful because all
somebody has to do, a disgruntled crew member or somebody that
has a beef against a company, is make a phone call to the Coast
Guard and say that ship is coming into port and it was pumping
oil over the side. The problem is that if you pump oil over the
side, you are going to pay a heavy price. There are no
exceptions to polluting our waterways.
But what we have seen time and time again in the last three
years is that there is somebody that drops a dime on a ship.
What happens then is the Coast Guard and some local officials,
law enforcement officials come down on the ship.
They immediately separate the chief engineer, the first
engineer and the captain. They pull them aside. Everybody is on
basically a lockdown.
All the inspectors know how to do is run to the engine room
and find the oily water separator. Once they find the oily
water separator, they will trace the discharge line to the skin
of the ship, break the flange, wipe the inside of the pipe with
a rag, take a sample and then it goes into interrogation mode.
Now every discharge pump or line out there has some kind of
residue in there. You are not going to be able to find out
immediately right then and there whether or not it is oil, but
it is a very scary situation when you are an officer. You have
a family and this is your livelihood. When they come on, your
license and livelihood are in jeopardy, that moment right
there.
As the Deputy Counsel for my union, I have had to deal with
this many, many times. Saturdays, Sundays, late at night, the
call comes in, and we have to get somebody there.
So I think that you need these civilian people who have
sailed in the maritime industry to do the inspections,
licensing and the investigation. They should be there because
they have lived it and worked it, and it makes it a lot more
compatible between the two.
Whether or not we have to go into another agency right now
or whether or not it becomes completely civilian, I can't
answer that. I think that the Coast Guard needs an opportunity
to look at this.
Mr. Taylor. It is at the Chairman's discretion at this
point.
Mr. Block?
Mr. Block. I can't answer or really speak to the question
on the academies because the mariners that I speak for, we are
lucky if we have them as high school graduates. We have, if I
had to guess, I would say some place around maybe the ninth or
tenth grade level on the average.
When I went to teach in Louisiana back in 1970, I came down
from New York. We had 2,000 people that signed up for marine
courses. The average was between grade seven and eight. I used
to teach grade nine, so I have a pretty good idea of what I can
expect from ninth grade students.
We have the same problem today. It may not be quite as
acute as it was then. However, back in 1970, 1971, Captain
Newman was sent down to look at the situation on the Gulf
Coast, and his report I think is still pertinent today. We have
it on our web site. It would have to be brought up to date, but
really the Coast Guard has not paid an awful lot of attention
to the offshore industry since then.
I was told in 1980 that, oh, those education problems, they
have all been taken care of. That was a district commander that
said that. Well, maybe the Coast Guard believes that they have
been taken care of, but I have to deal with people who write on
the seventh, eighth, ninth grade level.
I am the only one at GCMA that writes. I edit their
letters. I don't edit their thinking. I can read what they
write. But they have had no way to express themselves, and
everybody is below college level. I am talking the majority of
the merchant mariners.
This is something that has gone over the Coast Guard's head
for years. It has affected examinations. People can't read the
questions.
Thank you.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Taylor.
I was just thinking. I want all of this to result in some
effectiveness and efficiency. Other than that, five years from
now, we will be talking about the same problems and things will
be worse.
You all heard the Commandant. Were you here when the
Commandant spoke?
Mr. Quick. Yes, sir.
Mr. Doyle. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And you know he said that he appointing
Admiral Salerno to be basically over this whole mariner safety.
Am I right, Admiral?
That was one of the things, and I thought that was major.
The fact is that the guy who he is appointing is sitting right
behind you.
Raise your hand, Admiral, so they will know. Don't worry, I
got your back. I am watching it.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Cummings. As I listen to you all, I just want you to
comment on what you heard from the Commandant with the issues
that you all are trying to address. That is number one.
Number two, Admiral Allen has told us that he is going to
get his plan to us in 60 days. We are going to hold him to
that.
There are two lines of thought. One, you take it out and do
this marine safety under the Department of Transportation or
you leave it in under the Coast Guard. Of course, whatever the
Commandant comes back with, of course, is going to be under the
Coast Guard.
Let us assume that you are trying to get into the head of
the Commandant. What would you want to see in that plan?
Do you follow what I am saying? Do you get both questions?
Yes, Mr. Quick.
Mr. Quick. I would like to see a plan that would phase in
over maybe a five or ten year period a new system of the old
219 officers where they brought merchant marine officers into
the Coast Guard as general line officers but with a maritime
specialty so that you had a uniformed force that had experience
in the industry and still had the capability of being flexibly
used within the Coast Guard.
I would like to see retired officers that had at least five
or ten years of experience. Some of our officers can retire in
their forties under the contracts we have. That is early
enough. There are enough good years left that they would become
specialists.
They wouldn't be able to be promoted up in the Coast Guard,
but they would be civilian specialists. They wouldn't become
captains and admirals. When a fellow retires after a career at
sea and he is 45, 50 years old, he might not be looking for a
future career advancement as Coast Guard officer. You make him
a civilian inspector, and he would fill the same role that they
fill in Germany and most maritime countries.
Most maritime countries do not have a uniform Coast Guard
acting as the maritime inspection service. They use maritime
professionals from the industry to fill that role.
I don't think you could change instantly. You couldn't have
a cadre of a couple hundred people come in and do it all at
once. It would have to be phased in.
Admiral Allen is talking about a blended workforce. I was
heartened by that statement. I think that is the right
approach. But a blended workforce should be the first step in
eventually becoming an all-civilian maritime professional
inspection service, and it would probably take five or ten
years to reach that.
In the interim, a blended workforce where you are using
some Coast Guard officers, some enlisted personnel and some
newly retained merchant marine officers who are maritime
professionals would have to be phased in.
One thing that disturbed me with Admiral Allen's proposal,
he still intends to have a blended workforce using enlisted
personnel who have never been to see in the merchant marine
even though they may be chief warrant officers and maybe even
though they have two years of training at Yorktown. Using them
as marine inspectors and interfacing at the professional level
with masters and chief engineers, that is in many of our
viewpoints an insult to the masters and chief engineers.
That they send a second class petty officer down to make a
determination of whether he is doing things right or wrong or
investigating his actions, that is not acceptable to us. It is
the way they do it, but most of us rankle at it.
When they send a petty officer down to represent the United
States' interest in enforcing international conventions on
foreign flag ships as a port state control officer, the foreign
masters, the Germans and the British, take offense that the
Coast Guard hasn't sent an officer down or a civilian personnel
with a maritime background.
Mr. Cummings. I want to get to you two, but let me just
interject this. You heard the Admiral say, and I am glad, Rear
Admiral, that you are still around to hear some of this. I see
you back there, taking notes, and I appreciate that.
Admiral Allen talked about the relationship , how important
it is that the mariner and the shipping community and ports
have a good relationship with the Coast Guard.
I have said this to many people. Since I became Chairman of
this Subcommittee, when I think about all of the players that I
have come in contact with, and I have come in contact with
every aspect of this whole Coast Guard-maritime community, I
have ever seen how just about every single person is trying to
reach for the very best, in other words, although there may be
some disagreements on some things.
We saw it in fishing safety. We see it in port security. We
see it with the TWIC. I mean everybody trying. It is not like
people just fighting. I am hoping we can maintain that, and the
Admiral talked about that.
So that is one of the reasons why I wanted, if we are going
to have that, it is important that we shouldn't be the only
ones to hear it. The Admiral and the Coast Guard need to hear
it too.
That is why I was so glad, Mr. Block, you said what you
said and why I was glad the Chairman said what he said with
regard to this feeling, particularly since 9/11, that we have
got the policemen, as in the Coast Guard, as opposed to before
it seemed like more of a working kind of relationship.
I am going to invite you all, and I am sure Admiral Salerno
will hopefully agree with me. I say this to this panel and the
next panel. I don't think it is a bad idea to let them know
some of the things that you would suggest because we cannot
legislate everything. I can tell you, we can't.
All of us know that if you can get a cooperative spirit
amongst folks or even bring it back, that would be helpful. We
may have to legislate some things, but all of us, we have to
work. This community is too important.
Now, going back to my question, Mr. Block and then Mr.
Doyle and then we will be finished with this panel unless
someone else has a question.
Mr. Block?
Mr. Block. To look at one item that lies ahead of us, we
have 5,200 towing vessels that are going to have to be
inspected. The question is who is going to inspect those
vessels? We will probably need new inspectors that are trained
on how to inspect and why can't these be civilians with
experience doing it?
The Coast Guard inspection program has gone on for 50
years. I have always encouraged that program. I have lived with
it on Subchapter T regulations. Certainly, civilians are
perfectly capable of doing it. You have to find the right
civilians, and I am sure that is not an impossibility.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Doyle?
Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Chairman Cummings.
The maritime industry operates off of government,
commercial and labor. Executive, congressional and the agency
levels work with the industry and labor. Nothing really gets
done or can get done unless we are all on the same page, and
that is the history of the maritime industry.
We all pull in the same direction, whether it is you as a
Congressman, whether it is the agency. It doesn't matter who is
the President. It is the agency level. That is how we get
things done for the maritime security program, the U.S. Coast
Guard authorization bills, whether it is LNG and the priority
for LNG tankers coming in.
To comment on Admiral Allen's statements that he said
earlier, I thought that they were very encouraging, and I think
he needs that opportunity.
As Chairman Oberstar said, when this first came on the map
and came on the radar screen, he has been all over the Country,
rallying the troops.
As far as the new position that he stated today, I have
worked with Rear Admiral Brian Salerno. I have worked with
people that have been under him when he was coming up, and I
think that the man is competent. Provided that they can come up
with a solution, we can help them with that solution. They
should have that opportunity to try it.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. LaTourette, did you have something else?
Mr. LaTourette. I did just to make a comment on Mr.
Taylor's excellent suggestion.
Counsel informs me that we have already statutorily given
the Coast Guard this unfunded needs list, but unfortunately one
former Commandant Collins took us up on it and submitted such a
list. Talk about intimidation. I am told that the appropriators
told him that if ever did it again, he would be defunded
completely.
So there is intimidation and then there is intimidation,
but we apparently already have the authority. I would be happy
to work with the Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. We will do that.
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I do appreciate your being here.
Mr. Quick, I would like to follow up on something you said
because when you said they needed hundreds of retired mariners,
I am trying to put a price tag on that. Later on, you said
something like you don't need some petty officers doing this.
I would have to disagree with you on that. I think the real
solution, and I hope you would think about this, is going to be
a mix of the two. I don't think you need someone with 20 years
sea experience to count life preservers or the condition of
them or to check the running lights out or a lot of the simple
things that are part of a Coast Guard inspection.
That is overkill. That would be like me hiring Ph.D.s to
help me with my mail. A typical congressional office has
everything from kids straight out of college to an old geezer
like myself, and it works pretty well.
I have got to believe that the Coast Guard organization
also envisions that not every task is as difficult as the next.
Obviously, to inspect a steam plant or turbine, a water
separator, something that is technical, you are certainly going
to need some technical expertise.
I hope I didn't mishear you on that, that the only people
capable of doing that are people that have had 10, 20 years of
sea experience.
Mr. Quick. I wouldn't disagree that they are probably
capable of doing it, but I think it is a question of perception
with the people they are working with.
A ship has a hierarchy almost like the military. It is
quasi-military. Masters, they have a certain perception of what
the junior officer's status in the world is and what the rating
status in the world is, and they do take offense at having a
Coast Guard petty officer, whether he is competent or not,
coming aboard and exercising governmental authority over his
operations.
I don't think it is a question of competency. I think it is
a question of interpersonal relationship based upon perceptions
and rank.
Mr. Taylor. If you were to draw up an organizational chart
of what needs to be done above and beyond what the Coast Guard
is doing now, give me an idea of what it looks like.
I am not in total disagreement with you because the Army
Corps of Engineers, for example. The vast majority of people I
deal with at the Army Corps of Engineers are civilians. At the
end of the day, though, they answer to the district commander
who is a colonel or a general. If something goes wrong, that is
who is ultimately responsible and whom everyone knows is their
boss, whether that guy is civilian or in uniform.
The concept that you are talking is not unique in
government. With the exception of Hurricane Katrina in New
Orleans, this works pretty well for the Corps.
Mr. Quick. Well, if I were doing it, I would re-establish
the 219 program and bring younger maritime officers into the
Coast Guard at lieutenant, lieutenant commander ranks and put
them on a career path where they did marine inspections but
they also did general line duty in the Coast Guard and looked
upon them when they became captains or admirals to be the
policymakers for the marine inspection service.
Then I would fill the ranks where they really interface and
do the work with civilian maritime professionals. They might be
assisted by Coast Guard petty officers, but I really don't look
upon that as a good solution.
It might be a possible solution, but if it were my
preference I would have 40 or 50 year old experienced
professionals that could interface with the people in the
industry on an equal basis and have them fulfill the role that
doesn't look for promotion. They become the specialists rather
than the generalists, not the policymakers but the
implementation of policy.
Mr. Taylor. Let me ask you the million dollar question. One
of the new House rules is pay as you go. It is pay as you go.
If a new program comes along, if the increase in the size of a
cost of a program comes along, we have to pay for it.
To what extent, if any, would the private sector be willing
to pay more to get their inspections done in a more timely
manner, to get their background checks done in a more timely
manner?
This is really million dollar question. What is the cost-
benefit ratio to the private sector?
Mr. Quick. Oh, I can answer that question very easily
except I represent a labor organization.
Mr. Taylor. Okay, let us start with the members of your
organization, who would be paying for these licenses.
Mr. Quick. Well, we are doing it now. Our license is paid
for. The licensing program is paid for by the people who
receive the licenses.
Mr. Taylor. But you are apparently concerned about the
delays. What would they be willing to pay extra to cut down on
the delays?
Mr. Quick. I think it would depend upon what grade of
license. The masters and officers on the large commercial ships
probably wouldn't object to a fairly substantial increase in
the fee if they got their license on the or were treated with
courtesy and respect. But if you are dealing with the
unlicensed or the lower level licensed people who are working
at non-union companies at something close to minimum wages,
they would have a different perspective on it.
Mr. Taylor. If you would be willing to put those thoughts
in writing, I would appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
I want to thank the panel very much. Your testimony has
been very helpful.
We will now call our next panel. As the next panel comes
forward, we are going to be taking a vote soon.
Come on up. Come on up. Please come up.
What we want to do is we want to finish this hearing before
we take the vote so that you all can go home. So we don't want
you to be here like we will be until 10:00 or 11:00 tonight.
We just ask you to say what needs to be said. Keep in mind,
we have your written testimony, and we do thank you all for
being so patient.
One of the things I would ask in the spirit of efficiency
and effectiveness is that those who feel like you could, I
would really like to hear your reactions to what you heard from
the Commandant.
We will first hear from Thomas Allegretti, President of the
American Waterways Operators. Then we will hear from Joseph
Cox, President of the U.S. Chamber of Shipping; then Peter
Lauridsen with the Passenger Vessel Association; and then B.W.
Tom Thompson, Executive Director of the U.S. Marine Safety
Association; Jim Weakley, President of the Lake Carriers
Association; and Ken Wells, President of the Offshore Marine
Services Association.
I want to be clear. I don't want you to say what you have
got to say, but I am also trying to be considerate of your time
too. Okay. If you all want to come, we will come back.
TESTIMONY OF THOMAS ALLEGRETTI, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN WATERWAYS
OPERATORS; JOSEPH COX, PRESIDENT, U.S. CHAMBER OF SHIPPING;
PETER LAURIDSEN, PASSENGER VESSEL ASSOCIATION; B.W. TOM
THOMPSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, U.S. MARINE SAFETY ASSOCIATION;
JIM WEAKLEY, PRESIDENT, LAKE CARRIERS ASSOCIATION; KEN WELLS,
PRESIDENT, OFFSHORE MARINE SERVICES ASSOCIATION
Mr. Allegretti. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr.
LaTourette, Mr. Taylor, Members of the Subcommittee. Thanks for
the opportunity to appear before you today. Thanks for your
leadership in raising this very important public policy and
safety issue.
Our members care deeply about this matter because of who we
are, because of what we do and how we try to do it. Our
industry is a critical segment of the U.S. transportation
system, and we depend heavily on the Coast Guard's marine
safety mission to facilitate the safe and efficient movement of
vessels and cargo on our Nation's waterways.
We also care about the Coast Guard's execution of its
marine safety mission because our top priorities are the lives
and health of our crew members, the safety of our vessels, the
integrity of our customers' cargos and the protection of the
natural environment. In today's market, safety is quite simply
our franchise to operate.
Mr. Chairman, this is an important opportunity for all of
us to step back and consider whether the Coast Guard marine
safety program is functioning at the level that Congress, the
public and our industry both need and expect. We understand we
share the concerns that have given rise to today's hearing.
I would like to describe for you our vision of an effective
and well run marine safety program and describe what our
industry sees as its baseline needs with respect to how
government handles the marine safety portfolio.
I would start by saying we believe that Congress, the Coast
Guard, the public and the maritime industry all have the same
core expectations of what an effective government safety
program should look like, and we think it has four critical
elements.
First, safety of life, the life and health of the men and
women who work aboard our vessels is protected and preserved.
Two, safety of property, vessels arrive safely at their ports
of call. Three, protection of the environment, discharges of
harmful substances into the marine environment are minimized
with the goal of eliminating them altogether and, finally,
facilitation of maritime commerce, maritime commerce flows
freely and impediments are either prevented or they are cleared
away quickly. That is our vision of an effective marine safety
program.
We think that for any Federal agency to attain all four of
those goals is going to need to do some things differently than
we are doing them today. I will tell you that our industry sees
these as baseline needs of any future marine safety program.
The Agency needs to make marine safety a clear priority.
Making marine safety a priority does not necessarily mean that
safety must be the only thing that the Agency does, but it does
mean that ensuring that there are necessary resources that are
allocated to the marine safety mission and that there is an
internal structure that supports that mission.
The Agency's personnel must have a deep understanding of
the maritime industry. Our industry sorely needs regulators who
understand the way our business is and our vessels work and who
know that the Nation's economy quite literally depends on goods
moving on time and on budget.
The Agency must have respectful dealings with vessel crew
members. A guiding principle of the Coast Guard's Prevention
Through People Program was Honor the Mariner. American mariners
need and deserve such respect. They are the hardworking
professionals without whom our economy would be in deep
trouble.
We need a Federal agency that deals with us efficiently
with a customer focus. We need consistency, and we need
continuity. We need regulators who know what the policy is and
how have the expertise to apply it properly.
The Agency must make the timely development of needed
regulations a real priority. When a clear regulatory need is
identified, it is in the interest of both government and
industry that we get it done and we get it done right as soon
as possible. In our view, if it is not worth doing
expeditiously, it is probably not worth doing at all.
Finally, the Agency must deploy its enforcement resources
based on risk. The Coast Guard Marine Safety Manual correctly
states that a balanced marine safety program helps companies
that are trying to comply with the law, punishes companies who
disregard the law and rewards those who go above and beyond the
law.
We think that is exactly right. Governmental enforcement
attention should clearly be tied to risk.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling the hearing today.
These are serious questions, and we thank you for getting us
started in trying to answer them.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Allegretti.
Mr. Cox.
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate that Tom was able to hit it almost within two
seconds of the five minutes. I will try and do the same.
Mr. LaTourette, Mr. Taylor, thank you for being with us.
Mr. Chairman, there is one thing I think that I haven't
heard today, but I think it is important to put into the
record, and that is that the American maritime community has an
outstanding safety and environmental protection record. It is
because of the people on our vessels and it is because of the
people in our companies who are operating those vessels.
The Chamber operates two award programs a year, one, the
safety award program. In June, we were able to hand over 800
vessels awards for safety, and they operated over 4,000 years
in a safe mode.
In September, and I certainly would invite Members to join
with us. I will be getting invitations out to you. We have an
environmental achievement award that is given out. Last year,
we gave that award out to over 380 vessels that had operated
4,400 years in environmental achievement. I think that is an
outstanding record that the American public does not
appreciate.
Mr. Chairman, as we went out to our members with the
substance of this Subcommittee's hearing, we got a lot of
stories back and a lot of anecdotal information. We tried to
characterize those under some items that could be identified.
The first one was what we call 24-7 which is that our industry
operates in a 24 hours a day, 7 days a week mode on behalf of
our customers who are cargo owners and we have to move that
cargo on behalf of the American public.
We recognize that there can be problems with the government
agencies that have to interact with us, but some of those
anecdotes refer to the fact that we are 24-7, and we think that
there ought to be an appreciation of that on behalf of those
who have to service our needs, and that includes government
inspections.
The second area is uniformity of Coast Guard actions and
activities and decisions. This is a perennial problem, Mr.
Chairman. It has been around for a long time. If I had a
answer, I think I would offer to sell it to Admiral Allen.
However, one Coast Guard office making a decision that is
at variance with another Coast Guard office or at variance with
an earlier decision that is made in the same office creates a
problem for the industry in that they are then unable to
operate in a mode around the Country with some feeling that
they are not going to be stopped for a different interpretation
of the same circumstance.
The third area, Mr. Chairman and Members, is redundancy. A
few years ago, we were very much complaining as an industry
about the fact that we were receiving inspections by our class
society and the very next day we were receiving inspections
from the Coast Guard. They were covering the very same issues,
and therefore our staff time aboard the ship and our staff time
from shore was not being utilized in the most expeditious
manner.
We got a very good receiving of our allegations by the
Coast Guard. We engaged in a program that took us a year to
develop, but it evolved into the compliance program, the
alternate compliance program, which we think is operating very
effectively to reduce examinations. We think that there are
still some redundancies in the system of inspection, and we
feel that could be addressed.
The fourth area, Mr. Chairman, is professional expertise.
You have heard a lot about that today. We heard a lot of
testimony with respect to how that could be addressed.
We only say it from the Chamber of Shipping of America's
viewpoint. Yes, it is a problem. There is a major concern. It
exists now. Looking down the road five to ten years, we think
that those concerns are going to be valid, and we have to do
something about it now.
The fifth area, Mr. Chairman, is resources. Our comments
there I think are echo that you have heard previously today
which is this is probably the key area. As you go up into all
the other areas that I pointed out, you probably go back to
resources and how do we do it. If I had an answer to that, once
again, I would make it available to you for a particular
consultant's fee.
There is not going to be an easy answer. It is not going to
be simple. But, Mr. Chairman and Members, this is the United
States. We are Americans, and we can solve these issues. We
have solved much more thorny issues in the past, and I expect
that we can attack and make sure that we do the right thing in
this particular area.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
We are proud of our safety and environmental record in this
industry. We are not critical of anyone in this industry at any
level. We are seeking improvements so that we continue to get
better and do our jobs.
Thank you very much, and I will respond to questions.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Cox.
Mr. Lauridsen.
Mr. Lauridsen. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I
am Peter Lauridsen, Regulatory Affairs Consultant for the
Passenger Vessel Association. Previously, I served the Coast
Guard 29 years, retiring as Deputy Chief of the Office of
Marine Safety, Security and Environmental Protection.
The Passenger Vessel Association is a national trade
association for U.S.-flagged passenger vessels of all types.
PVA is deeply concerned that as a result of changes after
September 11th, 2001, the Coast Guard no longer recognizes the
U.S. mariner and the U.S. vessel operator as an ally and
partner but instead views our industry segment as a hindrance
and afterthought and even a threat. This is an unfortunate and
dramatic change in philosophy from that exhibited previously in
the Prevention Through People Program and its guiding principle
of Honor the Mariner.
PVA members rely on the Coast Guard for inspection of their
vessels, issuance of licenses and documents to their employees,
and review and approval for plans for construction of new
vessels. PVA members need Coast Guard personnel to be
knowledgeable about the regulations that apply to U.S.
passenger vessels.
When the Coast Guard fails to meet these expectations, the
effect is to impose economic roadblocks that harm PVA members'
ability to conduct their legitimate businesses. This is an
important component of the Coast Guard marine safety efforts.
They facilitate marine commerce including the transportation of
passengers.
Too often in recent years the Coast Guard's performance in
its legacy marine safety functions has fallen short. The
telling symptom is the recently issued document entitled U.S.
Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security and
Stewardship.
Its discussion of the legacy marine safety program is
disappointing in its brevity, characterization and direction.
Only a single page of the 54 page charter is devoted to marine
safety. This, in a nutshell, unwittingly illustrates that
marine safety functions have been shouldered to the side by
security emphasis.
Another example is the longstanding inability of the Coast
Guard to timely issue licenses and merchant mariner documents
to U.S. citizens, an issue that this Subcommittee examined last
year.
Even if we see eventual improvements in the licensing and
seaman documentation arena, the U.S. passenger vessel industry
needs a similar enhancement of the program of annual safety
inspection of vessels. The cadre of Coast Guard vessel
inspectors seems to have more work than they can perform in a
commercially reasonable time frame.
The Coast Guard has always been able to adapt itself to the
needs of the Country. It moved to the new Department of
Transportation, aided in Vietnam, geared up to implement the
Oil Pollution Act, interdicted Cuban migrants, emphasized the
war on drugs and upgraded maritime defense. Many of these
phases drew on the marine safety programs for the expertise of
its personnel and its pool of human resources. The marine
safety programs would adapt and over time would be restored.
PVA worries that without prompt remedial action, the
unprecedented emphasis on homeland security will cause long-
lasting and perhaps irreversible degradation of the marine
safety functions.
The trauma of September 11th was so dramatic that it
changed the very character of the Coast Guard and continues to
do so. The marine safety programs furnished much of the
expertise and personnel needed to ramp up maritime security.
This time, there is less restorative capability to bring back
and maintain the legacy maritime safety capabilities.
A fundamental problem is that the new organizational
structure of the Coast Guard, the sector concept, has
effectively capped the traditional marine safety career
specialist in the field at about the lieutenant commander or
commander level. Thus, the relatively more junior marine safety
officers report to more senior officers who increasingly are
drawn from other mission areas of the Coast Guard.
Marine safety functions are not enhanced or facilitated by
a single, all-encompassing Coast Guard area commander concept.
The face that we see on the waterfront now is distinctly a
military one: guns, boots and the aura of martial law. Prior to
September 11th, the Coast Guard's proud military heritage was
softened because it was seen first as an organization of
seasoned marine safety professionals. Today's Coast Guard, in
many ways, is a stranger on the working waterfront.
The restoration of the vital marine safety program requires
an identifiable career progression. In Coast Guard
Headquarters, areas and districts, each unit needs a leadership
position held by a professional marine safety officer
identifiable as such. This will enable more junior Coast Guard
marine safety people to aspire to the position and to see a
clear career path to it.
The men and women of the Coast Guard are intelligent,
motivated and deliver a great service to the Country. The
members of PVA are proud of them.
That service, however, is not being fulfilled consistently
in the safety regulation role. By pointing out our concerns
about the current overshadowing of the marine safety program,
PVA is hoping that this Subcommittee will work with Coast Guard
leaders to remedy the situation.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Good afternoon, Chairman Cummings, Ranking
Member LaTourette and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you
for this opportunity to speak. I will be brief in my oral
statements but request that my full written statement be
entered in the record.
Mr. Cummings. So ordered.
Mr. Thompson. The United States Marine Safety Association
is a professional organization comprised of more than 150
companies and individuals. Members are involved in the design,
manufacturing, sale or service of lifesaving equipment or its
components, provide training in the use of such equipment and
systems or are career professionals in maritime safety.
Personally, I have worked in the maritime safety field for
over 20 years. I chaired the ISO Subcommittee on Marine
Lifesaving and Fire Prevention and served on the U.S.
delegation to IMO.
Lifesaving appliances are the last line of defense in
assuring safety of life at sea. Survival craft and personal
lifesaving appliances are the only protection passengers and
crew have from drowning and hypothermia in the event of a
commercial or recreational vessel casualty and therefore must
meet the highest standard of reliability.
In the past, Coast Guard helped assure this reliability and
oversaw the manufacture of lifesaving equipment, witnessed the
servicing of primary lifesaving equipment, specifically
lifeboats and inflatable life rafts. But over the past 10 years
and even more notably since September 11th, 2001, participation
and oversight has been significantly diminished.
The current Coast Guard specifications for approval of
inflatable life rafts were issued to incorporate technical
revisions from IMO SOLAS. As part of those revisions, changes
were made to Coast Guard requirements for inspection of life
raft manufacturing plants and servicing facilities.
After the initial approval of the raft, the servicing
facilities were no longer required to have a Coast Guard
inspector during life raft servicing. Therefore, attendance of
the Coast Guard inspector is now solely at the discretion of
the local marine inspection unit. The service facility is still
required to inform the local Coast Guard when servicing an
approved raft.
Since this change, Coast Guard attendance at life raft
servicing has all but disappeared. In some cases, it has been
more than 10 years since some of the service facilities have
seen a Coast Guard inspector. This change was driven by
resource availability and the assessment of associated risk.
In general, Coast Guard-approved rafts are being serviced
in the U.S. in a proper and correct manner. Although we are
aware that there are some problems, in all probability, these
would have been quickly resolved had there been active Coast
Guard involvement. The industry is essentially now self-
policing.
When a servicing facility finds a problem in a life raft,
the facility is required to notify the local Coast Guard and
the manufacturer. The facilities do indeed notify the Coast
Guard locally, but this is seen as one problem, a single
entity. Because of this, little priority is given by the local
Coast Guard to reports that appear to be single occurrence
issues as no one is in a position to perceive their extent or
the significance of the problem.
Therefore, U.S. MSA recommends that in addition to
reporting to local Coast Guard offices, problems and
deficiencies be reported also to the appropriate personnel at
Coast Guard Headquarters, who are responsible for the approval
of this critical lifesaving equipment.
Our members have made the following statements concerning
Coast Guard involvement and Coast Guard inspection and life
raft servicing:
Service facilities do notify the Coast Guard and marine
inspection office when Coast Guard-approved life rafts are
being serviced. Coast Guard has not visited some of the
facilities for a number of years, in some cases, up to 10
years.
Coast Guard often does send a representative when rafts
from Coast Guard cutters are being serviced. This is often,
however, an auxiliarist who is not familiar with life raft
servicing.
One facility noted that they trained Coast Guard inspectors
who were conducting onboard vessel inspections to show them
what to look for, to show them how rafts should be properly
installed and stowed on board.
There is common agreement that rafts are being properly
serviced, although from time to time there are deficiencies
found from previous servicing. Raising the level of oversight
would reduce the opportunity for improper servicing.
Often, inspectors have little familiarity or training in
the servicing of lifesaving equipment. Some inspectors have
checked lifesaving equipment calibration and facility
cleanliness and not have looked at a single raft being serviced
while they visited the facility.
The Coast Guard provides a unique perspective that extends
across manufacturers, service facilities and wherever U.S.-
flagged vessels' equipment is being manufactured, repaired or
serviced. They are the only authority in a position to provide
early identification of concerns or issues.
We believe the issues in general are reflective of
circumstances across the Coast Guard's marine safety program.
We urge Congress to support and restore this crucial and
longstanding mission of the Coast Guard and make suitable
resources available.
Specifically, we recommend that the Coast Guard establish a
program to assure quality manufacture and servicing through
periodic audit inspections, verify that life raft servicing
facilities have the correct information and technical
bulletins, and the Coast Guard has the personnel performing
these facility inspections and audits be properly trained and
have sufficient expertise to do the job.
Since we are now running over time, I will direct you to
the written part of the testimony which gives much more detail
and examples of what I have said.
Thank you for the opportunity.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Weakley.
Mr. Weakley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Since 1880, Lake Carriers Association has represented U.S.-
flagged commercial vessels. We represent 18 American
corporations that operate 63 U.S.-flagged lakers. The cargoes
that we carry drive the U.S. economy: iron ore for the steel
industry, coal for power generation, limestone and cement for
construction.
Our members could not meet the needs of commerce without
the dedicated men and women of the United States Coast Guard.
They open shipping lanes and maintain aids to navigation. Coast
Guard crews set out in the harshest conditions to free an
icebound vessel or to med-evac a sick crew member. No one
questions the dedication of the Coast Guard personnel stationed
on the Great Lakes.
I would like to describe my vision for the ideal marine
safety system, discuss some of the challenges posed by the
current system and make general recommendations.
Only through mutual understanding and cooperation between
government and the public it serves can the national security
interests of our Nation be met. This is a national security
issue: protect the economic interest of our citizens,
facilitate the commerce with our trading partners and guard the
physical security of our ports and waterways.
The marine safety program should ensure the availability of
qualified mariners and safe vessels. It must provide a level
playing field between U.S.-flagged and foreign-flagged vessels
calling on our ports. We need consistent application of the
law.
The ideal program also requires a learning organization,
one that builds on its experience and expertise and recognizes
that processes can be improved and that mistakes are possible.
We need an appeals process that results in a fair and
objective review of the facts and lays a foundation for better
decisions in the future. Marine safety decision-makers must
have the appropriate knowledge and experience to make judgments
regarding the seaworthiness of a vessel or a mariner.
An understanding of the general principles must be
augmented by specific expertise in the application of the
regulations and the vessel service. There is no substitute for
experience, particularly seagoing experience. You can read all
the theory you want, but until you have navigated a vessel in
congested waters, completed light-offs on a cold engine room or
traced out the fuel oil system, you cannot fully grasp the
complexity or the simplicity of the situation.
There is an additional element needed. I call it
appropriate posture.
Consider the vastly different jobs of a city building
inspector and a local police officer. Both are law enforcement
officers. Each approach their jobs differently, have different
training and take on a different posture depending on the
circumstances.
There are times when a law enforcement agency must take an
aggressive approach including a show or a use of force. In
other instances, a less aggressive or collaborative approach is
appropriate and better serves the public interest. No mayor
would send a building inspector to respond to a traffic
accident nor would he or she send a police officer to look at a
plumbing installation.
There are many challenges facing the marine safety program.
I worry about the program's ability to compete for money and
people as the Coast Guard continues to take on additional and
fundamentally different responsibilities.
Industry is often frustrated by inconsistent
interpretations. These may vary between sector commands or may
change with the rotation of a single individual. The program
needs institutional memory and coordinated enforcement to
ensure a level playing field and to reduce the cost of
unnecessary requirements.
When difference of opinions between Coast Guard offices or
Coast Guard officers takes place, industry pays the price. The
rotation of Coast Guard personnel after a few years denies both
industry and the Coast Guard the expertise that comes only with
experience.
On the Great Lakes, we operate in fresh water. This means a
properly maintained hull can last almost indefinitely. We
operate a cement carrier built in 1906. These vessels are well
maintained. They are like vintage muscle cars designed and
built in a different time but more than capable of getting the
job done.
The Great Lakes are truly unique. An inspector may see a
steam plant or a riveted hull for the first time when she steps
on board to conduct an inspection. He may not be familiar with
the regulations that apply to the vessel and may not even have
access to a copy of the applicable regulations.
We often have inspectors enforce OCEAN regulations on the
Great Lakes.
The Coast Guard must consider longer tours of duty. Another
option is civilian inspectors with specific geographic and
industry expertise. The Army Corps of engineers successfully
uses this model.
The marine safety program would benefit from an influx of
industry-specific expertise and experience.
An appeals process that results in a fair, objective and
timely review could improve the credibility of the marine
safety program and transform it to more of a learning
operation.
We have deep respect and hope to improve the marine safety
program. If done properly, active duty sailors can be free to
pursue other Coast Guard missions, our limited government
resources can be used effectively, and commerce can move more
safely and with greater efficiency.
The national security interests of the United States of
America demand that we remain vigilant and efficient.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Weakley.
Mr. Wells.
Mr. Wells. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the
Committee. Thank you for allowing OMSA to testify today.
Ever since September 11th, the Coast Guard has struggled to
find the balance between its traditional missions like marine
safety and its new mission of homeland security.
Our association, which represents the U.S.-flagged vessels
that work in the offshore oil and gas sector, wants to make
sure that the Coast Guard's safety functions are not allowed to
degrade or shunted off to some corner of the Agency, out of
sight, out of mind. If that were to be allowed to happen, we
are concerned that safety will suffer, the maritime industry
will suffer and the institution of the Coast Guard will suffer.
By way of example, because our association and most of our
members are located just outside New Orleans, we had box seats
for the response to both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. To put it
simply, as you know, it was the Coast Guard's finest hour.
There was no master plan for responding to that incident, those
incidents. The old rules didn't apply, and agencies that were
too rigid or unwilling to take chances failed miserably.
So why was the Coast Guard so successful? Here is our take.
Their officers in the field were experienced. On the Gulf
Coast, we have been fortunate to have a number of captain,
commander and lieutenant commander level officers who have
stayed in our area for long enough to become experts and to
have developed the experience in the field. They know our area.
They know the right people. They know how to get things done
quickly.
Second, they were problem-solvers. They didn't get
overwhelmed by the enormity of the destruction. They treated it
as a series of problems to be solved. They got the right people
in the room, and they went to work.
And, third, they weren't afraid to innovate. They were
flexible. They were open to finding new solutions.
Those qualities are, in our mind, a part of the culture of
the traditional marine safety program. If the Coast Guard loses
that culture, the stakes are very high for our Nation. For our
industry, what may be at stake is our continued progress on
safety.
In the past, our industry and the Coast Guard have had a
close partnership, and the results have been spectacular. It
has been one of the most remarkable industry-Coast Guard agency
partnerships in general.
We have just completed our latest internal safety survey,
and the results of our members' safety statistics show that
offshore work boats have a reportable incident rate that is
about one-tenth of the OSHA reportable incident rate for all
U.S. businesses. So what I am telling you is that our industry,
working on our boats is safer than working in a bank or in a
store or in a restaurant or just about any U.S. workplace.
We got there because we worked as partners with the Coast
Guard marine safety professionals. They were experts. They were
willing to approach safety as a problem to be solved. Finally,
they weren't afraid to be flexible to innovate and to trust us
to do what was right for our vessels.
We don't want to lose that because that is what has worked
for us. But, in truth, today we see that relationship as being
at some risk.
Our written testimony outlines the specific concerns, but a
theme that runs through all of our concerns is whether the
Coast Guard today is still putting the proper internal focus on
marine safety, whether they still emphasize marine safety as
much as we do.
Since September 11th, the Coast Guard has gone through a
number of reorganizations and restructurings. It is getting
harder and harder to know where marine safety sits on the
organizational chart.
From top to bottom, we are concerned. We want to make sure
that from the highest levels down to the field level, the Coast
Guard doesn't become isolated from the concerns of the maritime
industry and the Commandant doesn't become isolated from the
voices of his marine safety professionals.
Finally, we don't have a minute to lose because thousands
of Coast Guard personnel have come onboard since September
11th. Looking at it, about half the lieutenants, all the JGs,
ensigns, junior petty officers, all started since September
11th, and so this is the only culture they know. If the ship
does not turn around soon, the culture of the marine safety
professional may be lost.
Thank you.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Wells. I want to
thank all of you.
We have got about 15 minutes, so we are going to first go
to the Chairman, Mr. Oberstar, and then we are going to go to
Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. Oberstar.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very grateful
to you for spending all this afternoon on this hearing.
Mr. LaTourette, the Ranking Member, thank you very much for
your ever thoughtful and incisive questions and presence and
contribution to this hearing.
It is something I initiated. I felt an obligation to be
here. Unfortunately, I have been diverted with other matters
that have taken attention: the collapse of the bridge in
Minnesota and, more recently, a meeting with the Governor of
Virginia and the Virginia congressional delegation and the
Federal Transit Administration on the route to Dulles. All of
these are under our Committee jurisdiction. I stayed up some
time last night, reading testimony, and I was struck by the
common themes running through all of it.
Mr. Lauridsen, I quoted from you extensively to Admiral
Allen.
Mr. Allegretti, Mr. Cox, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Weakley and Mr.
Wells, all of you have common concerns, common themes that we
need to address, and that common theme is the Coast Guard is
being diverted from its marine safety mission to a security
mission.
I had I think a rather spirited exchange with Admiral Allen
about this matter. I see no homeland security connection
between the regulatory role that the Coast Guard fills with
respect to your industry, your respective segments of the
industry, and homeland security and marine safety. In fact, the
marine safety, as each of you has designated, is being
converted in one or another way.
Mr. Lauridsen, your theme of Prevention Through People,
Honor the Mariner, that really struck home with me. That has
been the relation ship of the Coast Guard with the maritime
community.
Mr. Lauridsen. Yes, sir. That is the recent, well, pre-9/
11, the Prevention Through People and the Honor the Mariner was
where we were at. We were transitioning from the 20th Century
reaction-oriented Coast Guard to a Coast Guard that realized
that industry was an equal partner, industry had certainly much
of the professional capability, that they couldn't do the job
alone, and so I think that partnership was very strong.
With the advent of 9/11, there was an influx of people, as
Ken points out. There was a lot of people that came in without
the background, without the historic feeling, the interaction
of having been brought up in the program and didn't see the
industry as partners, didn't see the industry as equally
professional and that sort of thing.
Mr. Oberstar. We want to restore that relationship. That is
the purpose of my legislation. It has stimulated a very wide
dialogue. It has spurred the Coast Guard, certainly Admiral
Allen, into, as I described it earlier, homeland security
protect the Coast Guard mode if not the homeland.
I posed for him the Corps of Engineers model where you have
a uniformed officer in charge of a very large seasoned, stable
civilian staff.
Now there are two models. One is take this function out of
the Coast Guard, establish it in the Department of
Transportation in the mode that it was prior to World War II as
a completely civilianized operation.
Another is to establish a sort of Corps of Engineers model
where you have an entirely civilian staff of seasoned,
experienced professionals who can digest those documents, apply
them, know the industry, work with the industry in the
Prevention Through People and honoring the mariners. You put it
so well.
Have a uniformed officer in charge who is there for more
than two years but with a civilian staff, would that work?
Would that work within the Coast Guard?
Would the other model work better outside of the Coast
Guard?
Mr. Lauridsen. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. All of you have skirted that issue.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Oberstar. I don't think I understated the issue one bit
when I said to Admiral Allen that he scared the living
daylights out of you.
Mr. Lauridsen. Mr. Chairman, I am a product of the blended
workforce. Some of the civilians I worked with are behind me.
Military and civilian mix can work and can work very well. I
think there are certain capabilities, responsibilities that
civilians possess that augment or enhance or are synergistic
couplings with the Coast Guard.
You point to those books up there, sir, and I can tell you
that people can memorize those word for word for word and will
still not be marine inspectors. Marine inspectors have not only
an understanding of the regulations, but they have an
experience base so that when it says the OCMI has a choice,
that they can make those sorts of decisions.
Mr. Oberstar. There is an instinctive quality to that
service, you are saying.
Mr. Lauridsen. Yes, sir. There is a maturing. There is a
progressive maturing. There is a mentoring. There is an
exchange of experiences and ideas, yes, sir.
I guess I didn't answer which Corps of Engineers or
whatever.
Mr. Oberstar. You are not picking a model for me.
Let me ask Mr. LaTourette if one or the other model is more
appealing.
[Laughter.]
Mr. LaTourette. Well, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. Not to be definitive but just to get your
thoughts about it.
Mr. LaTourette. I kind of like the Corps of Engineers
model. As a result of this hearing, I like what the Admiral,
the Commandant had to say about coming back to us with a plan
in 60 days and beefing up the civilian side. At least, that is
what I understood him to say.
Mr. Oberstar. But he doesn't need 60 days. He has had 30
years experience in this.
I asked him to give me a response to our bill. He said, I
will come back in a month. I said, you can do it in a week, and
he did.
Mr. LaTourette. Right. Well, if the Chairman would yield,
the Coast Guard can be intimidating and so can you. I will
withhold my other observations.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Oberstar. Not at all. Thank you.
Mr. Wells. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. Yes.
Mr. Wells. We like the idea of a blended workforce. The
great thing about civilians is their longevity. The wrong thing
with civilians is if you have the wrong civilian, he never
leaves. And so, the only cautionary is it didn't work well with
the RECs where you had an officer in charge and civilians who
never left.
We like a blend.
Part of the answer to I think what you are driving at is in
the old days when the inspection force was really humming,
there were these veterans who were in supervisory roles. When
the guy in the field had a question, he could go to someone
over him who knew the answer. That model is disappearing.
That is critical that we get back to that model where the
people who are in charge understand the topic and understand
the ins and outs of it.
Mr. Oberstar. Reflect on that thought is what I ask each of
you to do and give us a succinct response, just a couple of
paragraphs, in the next week or so because, frankly, I intend
to withhold action on the Coast Guard authorization until we
get this issue resolved.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Chairman, given the pending votes on
the floor, I want to thank our witnesses very much for coming
and withhold my questions.
I would like permission to perhaps submit a couple
questions in writing to them for follow-up later. In
particular, Mr. Cox, I was concerned about your observation
about having some uniformity of inspection procedures between
districts and even between offices, and those are the types of
questions I would like to propound.
But given the lateness of the hour and I respect these
gentlemen's time, I don't want you to wait another hour for us
to come back and ask you 10 minutes of questions. So you go
with our thanks and if I, with your permission, can follow up
with a couple questions.
Mr. Cummings. Yes, that is fine, and what I will be doing
is doing the same.
Gentlemen, first of all, I want to thank you for your
testimony. It has been extremely helpful. I have a few
questions, but I will submit them in writing.
Thank you very much to all of you. This has been extremely
important to us.
As you can see, our Chairman is a can-do kind of guy, and
he has set just an awesome agenda for us. I told him the other
day, I have never been busier in my life.
What we are trying to do, and I give him a lot of credit
for it, is take on these problems. Some of them are very, very
complex and very difficult, but he has made it clear that he
wants us to tackle every single problem so that the maritime
industry and our Coast Guard can have the best environment to
work in possible and so, of course, the Coast Guard can do its
job. Commerce can move along and we can, at the same time,
protect our environment and make sure that the environment is
safe for our mariners.
Mr. Chairman, did you have a last word?
Thank you all very much, and this hearing comes to an end.
[Whereupon, at 6:02 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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