[House Hearing, 110 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office] [H.A.S.C. No. 110-40] HEARING ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 AND OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ FULL COMMITTEE HEARING ON BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, NORTHERN COMMAND, TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, AND SOUTHERN COMMAND __________ HEARING HELD MARCH 21, 2007 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 37-320 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008 --------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866)512-1800 DC area (202)512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES One Hundred Tenth Congress IKE SKELTON, Missouri JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina DUNCAN HUNTER, California SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas JIM SAXTON, New Jersey GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi JOHN M. McHUGH, New York NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii TERRY EVERETT, Alabama MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland SILVESTRE REYES, Texas HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, VIC SNYDER, Arkansas California ADAM SMITH, Washington MAC THORNBERRY, Texas LORETTA SANCHEZ, California WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California KEN CALVERT, California ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey W. TODD AKIN, Missouri SUSAN A. DAVIS, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia RICK LARSEN, Washington JEFF MILLER, Florida JIM COOPER, Tennessee JOE WILSON, South Carolina JIM MARSHALL, Georgia FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam TOM COLE, Oklahoma MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB BISHOP, Utah DAN BOREN, Oklahoma MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana JOHN KLINE, Minnesota NANCY BOYDA, Kansas CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania PHIL GINGREY, Georgia HANK JOHNSON, Georgia MIKE ROGERS, Alabama CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut THELMA DRAKE, Virginia DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida KATHY CASTOR, Florida Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director Paul Oostburg Sanz, Professional Staff Member Aileen Alexander, Professional Staff Member Margee Meckstroth, Staff Assistant C O N T E N T S ---------- CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 2007 Page Hearing: Wednesday, March 21, 2007, Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act--Budget Request from the U.S. Strategic Command, Northern Command, Transportation Command, and Southern Command........................................................ 1 Appendix: Wednesday, March 21, 2007........................................ 45 ---------- WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 2007 FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, NORTHERN COMMAND, TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, AND SOUTHERN COMMAND STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2 Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1 WITNESSES Cartwright, Gen. James E., Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Marine Corps.............................................. 5 Keating, Adm. Timothy J., Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, U.S. Navy............ 7 Schwartz, Gen. Norton A., Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Air Force................................................. 8 Stavridis, Adm. James G., Commander, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Navy........................................................... 9 APPENDIX Prepared Statements: Cartwright, Gen. James E..................................... 54 Keating, Adm. Timothy J...................................... 73 Schwartz, Gen. Norton A...................................... 94 Skelton, Hon. Ike............................................ 49 Stavridis, Adm. James G...................................... 118 Documents Submitted for the Record: [There were no Documents submitted.] Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record: Mr. Abercrombie.............................................. 147 Ms. Bordallo................................................. 148 Mr. Skelton.................................................. 147 FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, NORTHERN COMMAND, TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, AND SOUTHERN COMMAND ---------- House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 21, 2007. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Today's hearing is part of our annual series of posture hearings with combatant commanders. I am pleased to welcome General Cartwright of Strategic Command (STRATCOM); Admiral Keating of Northern Command (NORTHCOM), who will soon be taking the reins at Pacific Command; General Schwartz at Transportation Command (TRANSCOM); and Admiral Stavridis. Do me a favor. Pronounce that correctly for me again. Admiral Stavridis. Sir, it is Stavridis. The Chairman. I got it. Thank you--of Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). And we are honored to have all four of you today. Appreciate what you do, and especially want to express gratitude to each of those who work with you and for you, in and out of uniform. Although the challenges we face in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere consume so much energy and resources, our attention should be in other parts of the world, as well. In Colombia we have spent over four billion dollars since 1999 to stem the flow of illegal drugs into our country and to aid the Colombians in their fight against homegrown terrorists. But according to the latest figures from the Justice Department, the supply and purity of illicit narcotics in our streets has not changed much. The administration of President Uribe is also currently embroiled in a criminal investigation into a seemingly widespread conspiracy between high-ranking government officials and leaders of the paramilitaries. Guantanamo Bay, a name that now rings throughout our country--I would like to begin a discussion as to whether we should continue to use the naval station there as a detention facility. Although recent legislation, Supreme Court decisions, and Department of Defense directives have probably improved the nature of interrogation and detention at that place, I think it may be a bit too late. It has become in the minds of many of our allies a textbook example of how not to run a detention facility. NORTHCOM--Admiral Keating, I am interested in the status of planning and training activities between NORTHCOM on the one hand, and national guard and reserve components and local responders on the other. And as you know, the response to Katrina highlighted the need to better coordinate these activities, as cited in the recent Guard and Reserve Commission report, the commission on which someone who used to work in your shop, Stanton Thompson, has sat. Traditionally, I have been a strong proponent of the total force concept of integrating the reserve and active components into one effort. And yet, I am concerned about reports that NORTHCOM does not adequately understand the capabilities of the guard and reserve due to the fact that NORTHCOM is overly staffed by active duty personnel. With regards to STRATCOM, we are interested in the warfighter's perspective on the balance between nuclear and conventional forces in the future. I understand, General Cartwright, that you do recognize the need for a national discussion on this important issue, and I think that in that regard, I look forward to hearing your thoughts about the Reliable Replacement Warhead and Conventional Trident Modification programs, and what you can say publicly. I follow with interest the expanded role the warfighter has been playing in the missile field defense business, particularly in the context of the North Korean test of a long- range missile last summer. In regard to TRANSCOM, General Schwartz, I believe that the critical issue for the committee will be to understand better the nature of our future mobility requirements. We are reaching ultimate decision points on strategic airlift production and modernization that will impact our capabilities. I ask that the total of my statement be put into the record. And I ask my ranking, my friend, Duncan Hunter. [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 49.] STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me join in welcoming our guests. It is always good to have combatant commanders before us, because, gentlemen, you are directly in the chain of command and carry out the orders of the commander-in-chief, and you have extremely important pieces of this great operation called the American security apparatus. So, thank you for being with us this morning. Congratulations to Admiral Keating on your recent confirmation as commander of the Pacific Command. I know we will look forward to meeting with your replacement in NORTHCOM, General Renuart, in the near future. You know, in 2005, Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the importance of NORTHCOM's mission of support to U.S. civil authorities. And the recently released National Guard Commission report recommends that NORTHCOM should increase its capacity to execute its civil support mission. So, at the appropriate time, I hope you comment on how NORTHCOM executes its civil support mission and how it is reaching out to the national guard and working with state and local entities to ensure that it has full situational awareness. Admiral Stavridis, welcome to your first hearing as SOUTHCOM commander. We have had a chance to visit a little bit. Obviously, Latin America and the Caribbean are America's neighbors. And although there are no conventional threats in the region at this time, developments in the region do impact U.S. security. The U.S. and South America continue to work together. And while there are examples of progress, there continue to be regional security and political challenges. Illegal drug production and trade, particularly in the Andean Ridge, continues to be a problem. In Colombia, President Uribe, the first modern Colombian president to win reelection, is fighting narcoterrorism in his country with U.S. support. And I know we have chatted a little bit. You see good trends with respect to that issue. In Venezuela, President Chavez maintains close relations with Cuba and Iran, while aggressively importing arms and defense capabilities not proportional to its defense needs. And furthermore, there are indications that radical Islamists may be taking advantage of instability in that region. So, I am interested in learning how SOUTHCOM is working with its regional and interagency partners to address these challenges. Last, this committee continues to remain focused on SOUTHCOM's responsibilities for Guantanamo Bay. And I am going to reserve most of my comments until next week, when the committee intends to hold two hearings, but let me make one quick point. We, as a nation, cannot afford to close Guantanamo. It houses dangerous people who are intent on killing innocent Americans. And if you need a reminder of this fact, all you have to do is read this recently released transcript of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's statements to the effect that he did, in fact, involve himself in the killing of thousands of Americans and sees no problem with killing more Americans, if given the opportunity. And I would just say that we have all seen the reports percolating that there may be moves to close Guantanamo and remove these terrorists into the United States. I think one of the most dangerous things we could do is move people who have expertise in explosives anywhere close to the general prisoner population in the United States. I think isolation is absolutely appropriate. And as a guy who has been down to Guantanamo with some of my colleagues on the committee, and having looked at the conditions, at the outstanding medical care that is given people in Guantanamo, you know, their health care there would rival that of most health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the United States. The food is excellent. They are given taxpayer-paid-for prayer rugs and Qurans, and their routine is interrupted five times a day for prayer. When you look at the reports from international agencies that complain about lack of square footage and other things that I would consider not to be substantial complaints, I think it is very clear that Guantanamo is being run very professionally. But beyond that, it is a necessity in this war against terror. So, maybe you can touch to some degree on Guantanamo. I know we are going to have extensive hearings on Guantanamo shortly. General Cartwright, thank you for testifying before us twice in a couple of weeks. In this post-Cold War environment, we have got to have a full range of capabilities to deter and respond to multiple threats and adversaries that span the gamut from transnational terrorists and rogue nations like North Korea, who just tested this missile that the chairman mentioned a few minutes ago, and is working to develop ways to deliver its new-found nuclear capabilities. So, I think the committee would appreciate also hearing about our Nation's strategic posture needs. And I am particularly interested in the Conventional Trident Modification Program and hearing about the need for the Reliable Replacement Warhead and the combatant commander's missile defense needs. So, if you could talk about that briefly, that would be good. Last, the chairman mentioned the Chinese anti-satellite test (ASAT) that occurred in January. And though its target was a Chinese weather satellite, it sent a clear message. Most people do not try to attain the capability to shoot down their own satellites. And I think that that heralded a new era of military competition in space, whether we want it or not. So, understanding this is not a classified hearing, maybe you could testify a little bit about your thoughts with respect to that recent test. General Schwartz, welcome to you. You obviously are a critical player in the nation's warfighting operations today. And let me just thank you. You have always been extremely responsive to all the services and their transportation needs, especially in the warfighting theaters. I know you have some thoughts on where we are going to go with lift, and you are going to have to make some difficult choices. Thanks for your efforts on behalf of all the warfighting forces. And please let us know how we can help you become more efficient and stretch those TRANSCOM dollars. So, gentlemen, thank you for being with us today. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. It is absolutely timely and critical to the nation's defenses, and I look forward to the testimony. The Chairman. Thank the ranking member. Since we have four witnesses today, I hope that you will do your best to confine your remarks. And we will, without objection, put your prepared statements in the record. I would also recommend to the members, since we are under the five-minute rule, that you may wish to confine your questions on the first round, at least, to one or two of the witnesses. So, without any further ado, General Cartwright, welcome, sir. STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS General Cartwright. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter, I appreciate this opportunity to come and testify today. Since I have had the opportunity to testify before some of your subcommittees, and that is a matter of record, I am not going to go into any great detail until we get to the question- and-answers, and leave it for that. But I think there are a couple of issues that were highlighted by both the chairman and Congressman Hunter that are worth at least a mention here in the preamble. The threat out there is growing, and it is expanding. And as was said earlier, it spans from the conventional or the nation-state challenges that we have to rogue states and extremists. And this is a broader threat than we have taken on in the past. And so, trying to define a deterrence strategy for the 21st century and the capabilities necessary to lend credibility to that deterrence is what STRATCOM has focused its efforts on. And I think, in moving forward here, I am going to hit just a couple of points, the first being on our offensive capabilities and the discussion about our nuclear capabilities. And given that this is an open hearing, let me just say that we entered into an agreement with the Russians called the Moscow Treaty. It set limits on our active stockpiles and drawdown, and a goal for 2012. In 2007, which is where we are today, was the midpoint in that drawdown, and both we and the Russians have reviewed our progress in that activity. Both of us are ahead of schedule in shutting down systems and the active stockpile. But the active stockpile is only one part of our stockpile. There is also the inactive portion of it. In the strategy that has been put forth by this Administration, and that we are working toward is, the lowest number of nuclear weapons necessary for national security. That is the objective. And so, as we move forward on the drawdowns in response to the Moscow Treaty, we need to increase our other capabilities as alternatives and replacements for the drawdown of the nuclear weapons that we have in our stockpile. Part and parcel to that, in that drawdown through 2012, is refurbishing the stockpile that we have. And the activity that we are undertaking here is to ensure that the weapons that we have are the safest they can be for the people who use them and handle them, that they are as secure as modern technology will allow us to make them, and that they are reliable. All three of those attributes will help us draw this stockpile down. All three of those attributes will have effect on both the active and the inactive stockpiles. That is critical. The Reliable Replacement Warhead, which just finished its first study efforts, is now entering into the second phase of study. That is our intention, to move into the more detailed engineering studies. The activity associated with that and the capability that we are seeking with this Reliable Replacement Warhead is first, safe, secure, and reliable; second, its form, fit, and function replacement for the existing weapons. In other words, there are no new delivery vehicles. There is no new capability. This is taking my 1966 Mustang and making sure that it has got four-wheel brake disc brakes, it has got seat belts--it has got all of the things that it ought to have to be responsible, to maintain control over and be able to use and develop these weapons in a safe, secure way. And that is our intent with the Reliable Replacement Warhead. In order to get to the lowest numbers necessary for national security, we have got to see the emergence of conventional capabilities to replace or augment some of the existing nuclear capabilities. One of those that was mentioned in the opening statement was the conventional Trident. What we are seeking here is prompt, global strike. And with the technologies we have today, we can do that with conventional weapons. And we can draw down the number of nuclear weapons necessary to accomplish prompt global strike, number one. And number two, we can have a capability that is beyond nuclear. In other words, today, if something happens quickly and we have to respond quickly, the only choice that we have in a global capability is a nuclear weapon. That is unacceptable for the range of threats that we are going to face in the future. We need a conventional capability. It will be more appropriate for several of the scenarios, and I am happy to discuss that, to the extent that we can, in this hearing. The second piece of this activity is a defense that is credible. In other words, what we want is a balanced offense- defense capability. Offense is not always the right answer, and it is usually where you do not want to end up. What we want to be able to do is drive this to a non-confrontational issue, whatever happens to occur. And so, a defensive capability gives us a way to defuse things, to devalue things. The asset out there in the world that has got the biggest market right now are short-and medium-range ballistic missiles. And we have got to find a way to respond to those. They launch quickly, and they arrive quickly. They do not wait for conventional force to close. They threaten neighbors. How do you devalue those, so that they stop proliferating? How do you make the governments who have them think twice about using them, number one, and think twice about the effect that they are going to have? How do you change the adversary's calculus about his opportunity to be successful with these short-and medium-range ballistic missiles? That is the next phase that we have got to start to take on with ballistic missile defense. The phase after that that we are starting to look at is cruise missiles. And what are we going to do against the proliferation of cruise missiles and their increased sophistication? What we are convinced, at least inside of STRATCOM, is you do not want to build a completely separate system for cruise missiles. You want to leverage the lessons that we have learned and the capabilities and command and control and sensor management that we learned in ballistic missile and apply that to cruise missile, rather than building a separate system. And that is the path that we are on. I would be happy to have more discussion about that. Two other areas. Space: There were questions about space and the ASAT test. I would be happy to discuss that. But the position from the command is, number one, just because there is a threat in space does not mean you have to respond in space. We do not need an arms race in space. And the last piece is cyber. In cyber, this country is under attack on a daily basis, whether it be in the commerce and industry sectors, in the academic sectors or in the defense sectors. We have to start to understand how we are going to contest this environment, provide defenses for the country, rather than, as we do today, just defend the terminals, wait for a patch and lose money the whole time, or lose intellectual capital the whole time that we are waiting for somebody to fix a vulnerability. We have got to start to extend our defensive perimeters out beyond the terminals, beyond the computers and the firewalls. Mr. Chairman, I will yield the rest of my time here to my counterparts. [The prepared statement of General Cartwright can be found in the Appendix on page 54.] The Chairman. General, thank you so much, and we will look forward to asking you those questions to which you referred. Admiral Keating, I guess this is your last appearance in your present role. Admiral Keating. I think so. The Chairman. Thank you for your excellent service in the past. We look forward to your future service. Admiral Keating. STATEMENT OF ADM. TIMOTHY J. KEATING, COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, U.S. NAVY Admiral Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter, members of the committee. It is a privilege to appear before you this morning to represent the men and women of North American Aerospace Defense Command and the United States Northern Command. Homeland defense is the core of our national military strategy. And while NORAD and NORTHCOM are separate commands, we operate with complementary missions. We work together for our sacred mission of defending our homelands. We operate within a common security environment. We share a headquarters staff. We embrace common values. We understand the importance of executing our duties with a sense of urgency in the face of very real and present dangers. It is my honor to represent all those fine young men and women before you today. The core capability to accomplish our missions resides in our people. We are grateful for your support, Mr. Chairman, and all the Congress, for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen. Their welfare and the welfare of their families is our highest priority. We remain resolutely committed to defending the United States and Canada and Mexico against all threats. To address a couple of questions, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Hunter, that you asked in your opening comments, we are vitally interested in providing the American people the capabilities that they need to defend our homeland and to provide support to civil authorities when we are directed. That means an integrated team of active, reserve and guard forces. That is our sole focus, the integration of this team. We have seven general officers on our staff at the United States Northern Command who are reserve or guard officers-- seven. Over 150 troops come through our doors every morning who are reserve or guard or Air Guard forces. We have an annual conference in the late winter with all of the hurricane adjutants general--the adjutants general from New York all the way around the Atlantic Coast and the Gulf Coast of Texas. Ten to a dozen adjutants general come every spring, and we discuss the requirements that may well be levied upon us if a hurricane is of sufficient import. I have met with each and every adjutant general of the United States and discussed face-to-face with them their issues and our issues. I am convinced that we are on the same page, Mr. Chairman, and that we have a common purpose: to provide the American people with the support that they deserve. I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Admiral Keating can be found in the Appendix on page 73.] The Chairman. Admiral Keating, thank you, sir. General Schwartz. STATEMENT OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter and members of the committee, it is also a pleasure and a privilege for me to represent the 150,000 folks in the Transportation Command who basically move by air, land and sea the materiel and personnel of the Department of Defense. We, during 2006, I think, have provided noteworthy support to the department, as well as made considerable efforts to advance the distribution processes and systems that we depend upon, along with the remainder of the logistics community. Fundamentally, I think we have focused our attention on making sure that the right personnel, the right equipment, the right sustainment and support is delivered at the right place and time in order to support, as you suggested earlier, our warfighters. In addition, we have the responsibility of being the distribution process owner for the department. And in that, we are laboring to improve the precision, the reliability and the efficiency of the DOD supply chain, simply by improving business process, by making information systems interoperable and by securing enhanced mobility assets. I would also note, Mr. Chairman, that we take particular pride in the rewarding aero-medical evacuation mission. And we do that with special care. I could not be prouder of our joint team and our national partners. We all are supporting the global war on terror while making a concerted effort to transform the military deployment and distribution enterprise. I am grateful to you, sir, and to the committee for allowing me to appear before you today, for the essential support that you provide in enabling our capabilities. And I am prepared to take any questions that you have, sir. Thank you. [The prepared statement of General Schwartz can be found in the Appendix on page 94.] The Chairman. Thank you so much, General Schwartz. Admiral Stavridis, welcome. STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, U.S. NAVY Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hunter, distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to come before you today and discuss some of the issues, what we are doing, and the challenges we face throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. I want to thank each of you personally for your service. And I would encourage each of you to come travel in the region. And I would encourage you to come to Guantanamo Bay and see it for yourself, if you have not done so. On behalf of all of us at Southern Command, thank you for the support you provide to us, just as you do to my wingmen here today. I do want to say to General Cartwright and Admiral Keating and General Schwartz, thank you for all the support you give to U.S. Southern Command. We appreciate it greatly. Our mission down south is straightforward: to promote security cooperation and conduct operations with the 32 countries and 13 territories that are down south of Mexico. About 450 million people live down there. And we feel our work contributes to the defense of the United States. Our ability to accomplish the mission is significantly influenced by our understanding of the diversity and the culture down south, and that is an important part of what we seek to do at U.S. Southern Command. On that note, I would say all of us in the United States think and understand that we live in a shared home called the Americas. We tend to think of the term American as applying to a citizen of the United States, but we are all Americans in this hemisphere. It is an extraordinary and diverse part of the world. And I would argue that the part of the world that I am engaged in is not America's ``backyard.'' I do not like that expression much. I would not even call it America's front porch. It is part of a shared home that we all have together. I have been in the job about five months. I have had a chance to travel pretty widely since then, and I can tell you that our partners in the region are making, I think, good, strong progress. They face significant threats and challenges: narcotics, we have talked about a little bit; gangs--``pandillas'' and ``maras'' they are called--to the south; illicit trafficking in human persons. The challenges of this region are many, but they are not straightforward military challenges. And thus, there is a particular emphasis in this part of the world on working with the interagency, working with our partners at State, with Homeland Security, particularly the Coast Guard or the Drug Enforcement Agency and many others. I would tell you that everything we do in Latin America and the Caribbean, frankly, depends on strong interagency linkages. Given that, I think it is important to understand the great potential of the region. And if we can unlock that together-- the United States and the other nations of the region working together--we and the military-to-military realm want to be part of that in a very positive way. And that is what we seek to do. I would like to close, as my compatriots have, by just saying how proud I am to serve alongside the men and women of the U.S. Southern Command: active duty, reservists, civilians, soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen. I could not ask, as we would say in the Navy, for better shipmates anywhere ashore in the world. Thank you again to the members of the committee, the chairman and the ranking member. Appreciate your time, and I look forward to your questions, sir. [The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis can be found in the Appendix on page 118.] The Chairman. I certainly thank you gentlemen for your excellent testimony. I will ask one question of Admiral Stavridis and then turn to my ranking, and then we will be off and running on the five- minute rule. Admiral, the United Nations, some members of the Congress and other people in and out of our country have raised the issue of the detention and interrogation facilities at Guantanamo. Could the detainees be held elsewhere within your area of responsibility with the same security and effectiveness? Admiral Stavridis. No, sir. I do not believe they could be held anywhere in my area of responsibility with the same degree of security and effectiveness. I believe at Guantanamo Bay we are operating a humane, a legal, and a transparent detention and interrogation facility. Transparent--we have had over 2,000 journalists visit it over the last four years. We have had over 2,000 high-level visitors, including many, many members of Congress. Most recently, Senator Levin and Senator Graham came down just this past week. We fully follow Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. We follow the laws of the United States. We will continue to do that. I believe it is a humane facility. I think compared to any facility in the world, it is a very humane and well-run operation. I personally cannot think of another location in my area of responsibility that would make sense to move these particular individuals. And I believe they must be kept in a place where they are not free to do the kinds of things that have occurred before in terrorist acts against the United States. The Chairman. My friend, Duncan Hunter. Mr. Hunter. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Chairman, following your custom here, I see Mr. Conaway and Mr. Davis down in the front row. I would be happy to pass on my time and yield them my time under the five-minute rule, and I will ask a few questions at the end of the hearing. The Chairman. You bet. Which one do you choose? Mr. Hunter. You know, I think Mr. Davis is getting up there. The Chairman. All right. Mr. Davis is recognized for five minutes. Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you, Ranking Member Hunter, for the opportunity. One question that many of us are interested in, particularly as we deal with the challenges of the rising problems with Islamic radicalism, seeing the action of our agencies, particularly during Hurricane Katrina, other issues that we have run into, I am very curious about your views of interagency reform needs, in Southern Command in particular. And generally from a Northern Command and homeland defense standpoint, if Admiral Keating and Admiral Stavridis might comment on some statutory changes that might improve the interagency process, to make our interagency community a little bit more expeditionary, but also more integrated, to anticipate the types of things, particularly the non-military types of things, where we can preempt or minimize the likelihood of conflict. Admiral Keating. Congressman Davis, I would be happy to start, and then Jim can provide his perspective. We have 60, at Northern Command, different agencies represented in our headquarters. So, that is true interagency representation. It goes beyond that, however. There is actual productivity. It is not just activity, but it is productivity during the courses of exercises--and we conduct a number of those--during the courses of real-world operations. We benefit significantly from the presence and the expertise represented by those 60 different agencies. And it is not all federal. About two-thirds of those are Federal agencies, and a third are non-federal, like Red Cross, World Health Organization, and folks like that. As far as the imposition of statutory concerns for us, I am unaware of any that would be of significant early benefit compared to the day-to-day operations that we conduct and day- to-day staff work, though I think there is merit in some consideration, and I believe this is under way for the similar Goldwater-Nichols-like education and joint duties as requisites for promotion within other agencies, sir. Admiral Stavridis. Well, as is often said on Capitol Hill, I would like to associate myself with Admiral Keating's remarks. I would echo the fact--the good news is that there is an awful lot of interagency partnering that is going on in all the combatant commands and with all the partners exactly as Admiral Keating indicated. What we do at Southern Command is, we have just stood up a new directorate. We call it the J-9. So, it is one of our key functionalities within the command, that is devoted to the interagency. It is staffed with interagency partners. Various agencies around the government have volunteered to put people into this group down in Miami. And I would argue that, as we look forward at the future of combatant commands, they will start to look a lot more interagency, more combined, more international partners involved and in the headquarters. We have six international partners who are in our headquarters with us. And again, I agree with Admiral Keating, that exactly the type of wisdom that Congress had in passing Goldwater-Nichols, which led to a better level of jointness between the services, I think that is an extremely rich area for study, and should be pursued. And again, we are trying to do it at our own level, but it certainly would be a sensible topic to pursue. Again, certainly in Southern Command, where so many of the tasks we face, the challenges we face are not direct military kinds of things. We are not launching Tomahawk missiles downrange in SOUTHCOM. We are launching ideas. And we need interagency partners to help us do that. Mr. Davis of Kentucky. That is one area that we would like to work with you on, having seen a consistent pattern of challenges faced, whether it was during Hurricane Katrina in Haiti, the military can only get the ball so far down the field. And I think we are dealing with the same things in Iraq and Afghanistan right now, where the visible cost is so much higher. But a lot of the types of challenges that could be faced by a more integrated--and I still get the sense that there will have to be statutory change to amend personnel policies and to change some of these priorities, you know, ranging from reconstructing a banking system after a hurricane to more complex matters. So, thank you. I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much for all the great work that you all do. Admiral Stavridis, in your testimony, you state that your region is a highly likely base for future terrorist threats. And you comment, coupled with the significant reduction of the Navy presence in the Gulf Coast--you know we shut down the only deepwater base we had, which was Naval Station Ingleside. And it was not too long ago we had a big meeting here, and the question came up about who were the gangs involved. One of the gangs, prominent gangs, that came up was the Mara Salvatrucha. You are probably very familiar with them. Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. Mr. Ortiz. But, you know, I am also concerned with the drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. I am concerned with keeping the commercial sea lanes open in the Gulf of Mexico. I am concerned with all the refineries in the Gulf of Mexico. We do not have a deepwater sea port. You are doing a great job by doing exercises with the different countries in that area. But you know what? I am very, very concerned. And I read in the statement that you said that the economic linkage between the nations of the Americas has risen dramatically over the last decade, with north and south trade comprising about 40 percent. Well, it seems to me that the Navy does not look north and south--at least the overall Navy. I was told that they look east and west. But are you happy with what we have there? Could we do more? I am very, very concerned. They are our neighbors, and it seems to me that we have not really focused. And I know it is not entirely your responsibility. We have to do something to help you. And then you mention about Hezbollah, as well. That terrorist group has a prominent--and now, I know I am asking too many questions, but they are very much in that area. And I am concerned that we do not have enough militarily to respond in case we do have a crisis. Maybe you can respond to--your statement was a great statement, maybe because I come from Texas, from the Gulf of Mexico. But that was a very, very good statement, Admiral. Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir. I am going to ask Admiral Keating to chime in here, because he is actually the combatant commander who has principal responsibility for the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. My border kind of runs just south of Mexico itself, and so, he owns those waters. I own the Caribbean waters immediately adjacent. But I think your question is relevant to both of us. As far as the Navy's posture and where it is located, I would certainly leave those questions to the chief of naval operations, who has the requirement to do the training, equipment, and organize. I would mention that last summer we had a Navy aircraft carrier come through those waters. A very successful deployment. We called it the Partnership of the Americas carrier. Did a whole series of exercises that ranged from military readiness to counterterrorism to counternarcotics to humanitarian and civic projects. We have multiple ship visits on any given day throughout the waters of the Caribbean. And this summer, as you may have seen, the President just announced that he approved an initiative that we sent up to bring a hospital ship into those waters. Clearly, it does not bring offensive power. But again, in this theme that we are not sending missiles downrange in Latin America, we are sending ideas and interactions and humanitarian assistance in so many ways. And that contributes to our long- term security. We will have the Comfort in the region for over four months, which I think is very positive. We were also operating something called Enduring Friendship, which is a counterterrorism use of funds that the Congress allocated under section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) last year. That puts radars, boats and command and control apparatus in place in eight different nations of the region, which I think are helpful against the kinds of threats you so aptly identified. Last, the Navy is approving the deployment of something under an experimental type of concept called Global Fleet Stations, which will be a high-speed vessel, a swift, which will come into the area of operations and operate throughout the Gulf, partnering with our nations there to try and take on these kinds of threats that you, again, correctly articulated. Admiral Keating, anything to add to that, sir? Admiral Keating. Congressman Ortiz, I would share your concern about the threat to our homeland from terrorists. We share that concern, and we are working across the spectrum with those capabilities in the Department of Defense, not just from a Navy perspective, though we are actively working with the Navy, the Coast Guard and Air Force in particular. Their forces are integrated in the this overall system-of- systems that we have, that we think is doing an adequate job of addressing approaches to our homeland, whether they are air, land or maritime. Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much. My time is up. Thank you so much. The Chairman. Thank you. It looks like Mr. Kline. Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Two of the happiest four-stars maybe in the world are sitting here. I know General Cartwright, because he is a Marine aviator on an Air Force base, and Admiral Keating, because he has taken a back-to-back hardship tour, moving from Colorado Springs to Honolulu. Congratulations to you both, and to all of you. I want to associate myself with the remarks and discussion about the interagency process. Admiral Keating and I have had discussions about this a number of times. And if I have the chance, I would like to get back to that. But I would like to go to SOUTHCOM, if I could, for just a minute. And while we were gathering before the hearing, you were speaking in Spanish for a minute or two and sounded conversant, if not fluent. After sort of ``buenos dias'' and ``bienvenidos,'' I tend to run out. But the question is, your whole area of responsibility-- well, absent Brazil and Belize and maybe one or two others--is Spanish-speaking. How are you staffed? What is the competency in Spanish of your staff right now? Admiral Stavridis. It is one---- Mr. Kline. Don't even think about it. Admiral Stavridis. Estudio studiando espanol una hora cada dia, porque es muy importante por el jefe o commando sur. I know Congressman Ortiz got that. Mr. Kline. I will ask for a translation from him later. Admiral Stavridis. Okay. I said I am studying Spanish about an hour a day, because I think it is very important for the commander of U.S. Southern Command. Of 450 million people, about 180 million speak Portuguese, which is similar to Spanish. The rest, largely, sir, you are correct, speak Spanish. I think it is a crucial part of what we need to do. If we are going to be involved in this region, we must learn the languages. These are not extremely difficult languages, as Japanese would be for a U.S. speaker, or Arabic or Pashto or Hindu. These are Romance languages. They are very similar to English in many ways. What we are doing at U.S. Southern Command is, we have set a goal that 60 percent of the personnel assigned will speak a second language, one of the languages of the region. That is a stretch goal. It will be a challenge to achieve it. We are putting resources behind that, everything from computer programs that people can self-learn, to having classes, to having testing of the---- Mr. Kline. Excuse me. Where do you think you are now toward this---- Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I think I am at 40 percent, which is extremely high. DOD-wide, it might be 20 percent. But at U.S. Southern Command, because we are lucky enough to be in the Miami area, a lot of people volunteer to come down who are of Hispanic descent. So, we have a rather high number of native Spanish speakers, which helps the rest of us as we seek to improve our facilities. I believe, to learn another man's language is to understand his life. I think it is an important aspect of integrating and acting in an area of operations. So, I am putting serious resources against it in this part of the world. Mr. Kline. Thank you. I agree with you, and I applaud you for that effort. I don't know. I guess we are always looking for ways that we can help, so if you will stay in dialogue with us. I am a little reluctant to put something like that in a statute. But, again, I commend you for that effort. And I am glad to hear it is moving that way. Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir. And I would mention that the Department of Defense has recently increased the incentives for individuals in the armed forces to learn foreign languages broadly around the world, and that is very helpful. And that is being funded by the Congress, and we appreciate it greatly. Mr. Kline. Right. Thank you very much. Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. Mr. Kline. The light is still green. It will not be for much longer. But, Admiral Keating, we have had discussions on a couple of occasions in your offices and in mine about this interagency process. And you have been able to get quite a bit done. I mean, we talked about plans that you have on the shelf, and those involved interagencies. One of my concerns is, this is personality, it can be personality-driven. If there is something that we can help with for process in institutionalizing it, we would like to be able to help. If you have got any comments now, the light is about to turn red, but I would like to---- Admiral Keating. And nothing directly, Congressman. I do not know that a statutory imposition is a good idea. But your active and abiding concern, which many of you have demonstrated by visits, not just in Northern Command, but throughout the United States and visiting folks like civil support teams that are national guard and active duty, and the embedded defense coordinating officers that are Title 10 folks with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions. As you course around the country and visit your constituents, I would recommend those locations to you. Mr. Kline. Thank you. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Keating, I am doing my best to try and figure out just what it is, four and a half years later, that the Northern Command does. Who is in charge of what? I have read through your testimony. I have gone through the staff preparation on mission and organization. I see a lot of words in here about homeland defense, referring to a concerted national effort to secure the homeland from threats and violence, as differentiated from homeland defense, referring to military protection of the United States, civil support areas, called C.S., in the area of homeland defense, with the DOD as the lead agency. Are you or are you not in charge of civil support defense of the United States? And if you are, who is subordinate to you, and what is the reporting hierarchy? Admiral Keating. I would answer the question, Congressman, that I am not in charge of civil support homeland defense. I am tasked by the secretary of defense and the President for defending the homeland and providing defense support to civil authorities. And I think the words matter here and the distinction is important. Mr. Abercrombie. I think so, too. I cannot figure out what you do. As far as I can tell, you have a group of people, approximately 500, because these budgets all disappear into joint task forces and all kinds of integrated team efforts. I cannot even find--I am doing my best to try and figure out where all your budget is. What precisely do you do? Admiral Keating. Defend our homeland and provide defense support to civil authorities. Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. Then what is your relationship to the Department of Homeland Security and the National Guard Bureau? Admiral Keating. The relationship to the National Guard Bureau is informal. As far as my dealings with General Steve Blum--who is a good friend; I talk to him frequently--he has, as you are aware, budgetary authority for the national guard and the international guard. And so, we work with him to advocate certain programs for him. But he has an $18-billion-a-year budget, and ours is $130 million. So, our impact on his budget is primarily through advocacy. In terms of our relationship with the Department of Homeland Security, it is not a statutory relationship. It is one that is based upon a common goal of providing security and support for the citizens of the United States. Mr. Abercrombie. What does that mean? Aside from being good friends and aside from speaking to one another, what does it mean? Admiral Keating. It is a lot more than that, Congressman. It is exercising frequently. It is sharing plans. It is sharing officers and staff workers. It is engaging in comprehensive activities across the broad range of our assignments and Department of Homeland Security's requirements to ensure that we are not again attacked, and that in the event of a catastrophe, whether natural or manmade, we work, when we are directed by the President, to operate closely with the Department of Homeland security to mitigate suffering and save human lives. Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. That is all very well and good. The National Guard Commission report says that, after four and a half years, the Northern Command should develop plans for consequence management--whatever that is--and support the civilian authorities that account for state level activities and incorporate the use of national guard and reserve forces, as first military responders. We have had four and a half years to plan that. Admiral Keating. The plans are done, Mr. Congressman. They are on the shelf. Mr. Abercrombie. They were not done as of March 1, 2007, according to the National Guard Commission report. Admiral Keating. The report is in error, sir. Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. Mr. Chairman, maybe we will need to get the National Guard Commission here, because Admiral Keating says that this commission report, which you have referred to, is in error. The Chairman. The National Guard Commission will be testifying before this committee on this Friday, as a matter of fact. Mr. Abercrombie. You do have plans now for consequence management and support of civil authorities that account for state-level activities and incorporation of the national guard and reserve forces in a first responder military activity in response to an attack on the United States. They are in existence. Admiral Keating. They do exist and have for some time. Mr. Abercrombie. Then who is in charge? Admiral Keating. It depends on what the President decides, whether he gives it to the Department of Homeland Security or Department of Defense. By statute, it is the Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Abercrombie. Oh, so you have Title 10 and you have Title 32. Admiral Keating. Yes, sir. Mr. Abercrombie. Now, that is already established as to whether the governor calls up a national guard unit under state status for payment by the state or by the Federal Government. And you bring in the posse comitatus situation under Title 10. We already know that that is established. I want to know who is in charge of these plans. Who executes them? Do you, or the national guard, or the individual states, or the Department of Homeland Security? Admiral Keating. It depends on the situation, the gravity of the consequence management challenge presented. And we are prepared to do it, if we are tasked. We in the Northern Command are prepared to execute that mission. Mr. Abercrombie. Or do you figure it out as you go along? Admiral Keating. It depends on the situation and it depends on who gets the assignment from the Department of Defense and the President of the United States. Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we have to examine very, very closely whether this needs to go on, or that this is just another proliferation of tail-chasing bureaucracy. The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Franks. Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you, as always. Let me always express gratitude every time you come before a committee like this. Those of you who pay the price for human freedom, at least as we know it in America. I am very grateful to each one of you. General Cartwright, I have had an opportunity to talk to you in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee a number of times. And I am glad you are on our side. Let me first talk to you a little bit. It seems like most of the threats that this country has had in the past, just historically, for some reason, the trend has been that we never seem to recognize something before there is blood on the wall. There was a time when the Nazis were just a bunch of guys in brown shirts riding across the bicycles in France, and they were no threat to anybody, except that they had a dangerous ideology that had the ability to take hold. The Cold War began when we got one of our secrets lost in Los Alamos and the Russians kind of took it and ran with it. In each case, we could have probably responded earlier and maybe prevented some of the great challenges that we had. And I think that these things sneak up on us a little bit. But there is one thing in the distance that is not sneaking up on us, and that is the growing power and capability of China. I do not think they are being very quiet. And I think there is a rumble in the distance there, and that we need to be very aware of what is occurring there. Their ASAT test concerns me greatly. And obviously, I think it is important that the United States gain some superiority in space, as soon as possible, given the implications of that ASAT test. With that in mind, do you think there is enough urgency in this Congress and in this country related to our missile defense capabilities in space, our capabilities to defend this country in general, in that growing frontier? General Cartwright. Sir, I think, in regards to China, and in regards to the ASAT test, that we have set the conditions over the past five years to improve our situation awareness, to start to understand what is an appropriate defense in space, sensors and capabilities, and to understand that our responses to threats in space do not necessarily have to be directed or accomplished in space. The question for me--and I think you have rightly described it--is, are we moving quickly enough to foster ourselves in this environment? Should we be doing something else to make ourselves ready? And it is always difficult. I mean, the crystal ball is always better on Monday morning than it was on Friday before the game. And so, we have moved aggressively to improve our space situation awareness. There is a substantial amount of organizational construct. And we talked a little bit here about--we have listened to some interagency discussion on how we change. Many of those changes associated with space have been accomplished, and we are now in the process of executing those relationships, and starting to put them into beyond the personal, to actual directive, to connect the dots, so to speak, between the different agencies and their equities in space. The second piece is, as you alluded to, where is China going in this activity and how are they approaching it versus how we are approaching it? They have started to field what we call a continuum of capability, from the lowest end of capability all the way through the most sophisticated, and filling in all of the blocks en route. And ASAT, a direct ASAT, a direct ascent ASAT, is something that is effective against low-earth orbit satellites. It does not reach out into highly elliptical or other types of orbits out to geostationary. But it can reach many of the valuable satellites that we have down in low-earth orbit. Mr. Franks. General, forgive me. I hate to interrupt you, but I am almost out of time, and you did good, but I want to get this on the record, as well. Related to some of the missiles that we have been testing, we have had seven out of eight attempts with the missile three successful, and the missile two, the block two-four, against short-range target missiles in May of 2006--all successful. Isn't it time--and help me understand why not--that these be placed on our Aegis ships, so that at least we have that capability, in case it should ever be needed? General Cartwright. Yes, sir. And we are doing a limited deployment, but you always run the risk of transitioning while you are still testing, of building too many, and then finding out that the configuration needs to be changed, and now you have got to go back and re-change. We have built what we call a hedge--we are fielding that right now--sufficient missiles and ships that are matched in capability that can be deployed forward in extremis. And that is the hedge capability. We are trying not to overbuild until we have a good understanding of what the end state ought to be and finish all of the testing. Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sometimes the price of trying to aim ahead for some of these dangers is sounding a little bit overwrought before everyone else is. Thank you. The Chairman. Thank you. The next gentleman is Dr. Snyder. Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Schwartz, I wanted to ask you--this topic has come up before--this issue of the statutory language that we put in the defense bill, I think, last year and maybe some other years also, in which we essentially prohibit you all from retiring old C-5s, old C-130E models. I think there are some other planes. It has been difficult for me to understand why we do that. Would you discuss that issue? My guess is that members get concerned that, if a plane is retired it will mean that there will not be any replacement coming to a particular local base. But what is the reality of that? How much money is it costing us? As somebody who has C-130Es with wing box problems in their district, I would just as soon they would be retired and we would try to replace them. I do not think they are doing anybody any good. But what is your perspective on that? General Schwartz. Congressman Snyder, in prior times when Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) was a major concern, these issues about holding on to old iron perhaps had greater relevance. At the moment, we are in a situation where it is very challenging for the Air Force to manage the fleet in a way that optimizes their support of my mission. In the case of the C-130's, as you are aware, we have had difficulty retiring the old E models. And, as a matter of fact, those E models we have retired have to be maintained in recoverable status out in Arizona at the bone yard, if you will, which is a more expensive way to maintain the retired asset than if you simply retired it outright. And so, my point as the operator on this--and, of course, the Air Force is the organize, train and equip entity--but that I recommend that you give the Air Force the flexibility to manage the fleets to best effect, to support the joint force mission. And that means accessing old platforms and really making them go away, rather than remaining on the ramp, where the youngsters have to continue to maintain them. A key point--the maintainers that support the airplanes are really the coin of the realm. And if we have to spread their talent over a larger population of air frames, some of which we cannot really fly--it is true in the KC-135 fleet and also in the 130 fleet--it is not the right way to run this operation. Dr. Snyder. Do you need affirmative language from us in the defense bill? Or do you just need us not to put prohibitive language into the defense bill? General Schwartz. Sir, I think the latter is the approach, which would be not to have language which specifically affects certain aircraft---- Dr. Snyder. The KC-135s, the C-130s---- General Schwartz [continuing]. Certain locations, and so on. That is correct. Dr. Snyder. Are those the---- General Schwartz. And for that matter, C-5s. Dr. Snyder. Are those the three, the C-5s, the KC-145s and C-130Es? General Schwartz. On the lift side, that is correct, sir. Dr. Snyder. On another topic, would you make a comment about the mobility capability study? There are some who have expressed concerns--I think the Government Accountability Office (GAO) is among them--that the study--I think maybe some people thought it was going to be a more far-reaching or revolutionary, or whatever word you want to use, that it seemed to endorse kind of a status quo look ahead. Now, that may not be a fair statement. Sometimes you look ahead and there is not a revolution on the horizon. But what are your thoughts about that? General Schwartz. Sir, the mobility capability study was not bold. I think that---- Dr. Snyder. I am sorry. What? I am sorry. General Schwartz. It was not bold. Dr. Snyder. It was not bold, okay. General Schwartz. In other words, the way it came out, for example, was, for big airplanes there was a range of 292 to 383, and this was a matter of how much risk you were willing to accept. It would have been more satisfying, I think, to all of us, had the study given us an objective. For me, big airplanes, big cargo lift airplanes, roughly 300 airplanes is the right target. And that is what I would recommend to you as the target. Studies inevitably are based on assumptions. And there are people--people can argue about whether the assumptions entailed with Mounted Combat System (MCS) was adequate. I can tell you, sir, that our sense is that about 300 big airplanes, about 400 C-130-like airplanes. And it remains to be seen what the tanker fleet looks like, but probably somewhere in the 400 to 500 aircraft range. Dr. Snyder. Thank you. I do not mean to ignore the other gentlemen, but thank you all for being here. Thank you, General Schwartz. General Schwartz. Yes, sir. The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Castor appears to be the last on the before-the-gavel list, unless someone comes back that was on it. Ms. Castor is recognized. Ms. Castor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Admiral, when it comes to Southern Command and enhancing our national security, I strongly believe that, yes, we need to continue to work on the partnerships with the nations there, yes, militarily, but also economically and politically. And I thought I would give you a short list of a few, and ask you to comment upon them. The Panama Canal right now is going through a widening and modernization. Could you comment on that, what you know about the status and the safety and security of that very important asset moving forward? Also, the struggles that we are having in Haiti. If you could comment briefly on Cuba, I would appreciate that. That could take much longer than five minutes. And then also, the Southern Command's medical readiness training exercises. When I think about, as we consider the markup and the resources that need to be spanned across the globe, I think it will be very important to enhance our national security, like I said, on the peacekeeping in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America. Talk to me then--have you asked for enough on humanitarian and civic assistance, your New Horizons program? And if we were able to target additional resources, where would you recommend? Admiral Stavridis. Thank you. And if I do not get through all that, I will get back to you taking the question for the record. But I think I can get through most of this quickly. Panama Canal--I am a naval officer. In fact, I am a ship driver within the Navy. We do have pilots and submariners, but I drive ships. I have driven ships through the Panama Canal, both when it was run by the United States of America and during the period of time now when it has been run by the Republic of Panama. It is an excellent, safe, professionally run facility. And I am very, very impressed with the work the Panamanians have done in the canal. It is really the beating heart of the economy of the Americas, when you look at the flow through the canal. It is extremely important. And I think it is a very well-run facility. We do an annual exercise with 20 different countries to look at the security of the Panama Canal. It is called Panamax. It looks at counterterrorism threats, which are always an issue. And it will be going on this June. Haiti, I think, is at this moment in a stable place. It is the poorest and most impoverished country in the region, as I am sure you know. The United Nations is there with about 6,600 peacekeepers. About half of those are provided from nations of the region. They are doing a very credible job building a base of stability from which, hopefully, prosperity can emerge. I am traveling to Haiti, in fact, with your colleague, Congressman Meek, in April, and I am looking forward to the trip. We do not have a large investment in terms of U.S. military presence. I would call it a success story by the United Nations in terms of what they are doing, and I look forward to learning more about it when I go down there personally. Cuba is obviously in an interesting moment in its history. Fidel Castro's health is a question mark. The degree to which his brother, Raul, has taken the reins of power is also under some question, given the health of Fidel. So, I think it is very difficult to make a prediction from this moment as to what will happen. We continue to watch the situation closely. Medical readiness--we have a series of projects to which you alluded, and I thank you for doing so, called the New Horizons, which are training projects for U.S. military folks who go down into countries in the region and provide services ranging from building a clinic to putting in a well to doing medical treatments. They are very successful as a means of both exercising the military and of undertaking the kinds of strategic communication we are talking about here, about launching ideas into the region. I will couple that with--the deployment of the Comfort this summer will be matched up with some of that. We treated, last year, 250,000 patients. We treated 80,000 animals. There is a veterinary part of this that goes with it. It is a very robust part of our program. We have requested funds from the Congress for it, and I think they are adequate to our needs. And I solicit your support for them. Thank you. Ms. Castor. Thank you. The Chairman. The next person is Mr. Saxton. Mr. Saxton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General Cartwright, I would just like to make a remark, and ask you if you would be willing to work with me. I have got a question that is probably best answered off-line. It relates to Boost Phase Intercept. I have noted the preponderance of our investment and activity and effort on mid-course and terminal intercept. And I had some folks from the Navy in the other day, and we were talking about boost phase. And it seems to me like we might be spending a little more time looking at boost phase, particularly from naval platforms. I would like to sit with you someday and spend some time just discussing that phase of missile defense, if that is possible. General Cartwright. I would be happy to do that, sir. Mr. Saxton. General Schwartz, thanks for being here this morning. I appreciate it very much. I was first elected to Congress in 1984. It seems like a long time ago. And one of my great experiences was to go out to McGuire Air Force Base, which is in my district, and spend some time with the then-21st Air Force commander, Don Logeais. And one of the activities that we did that day was to just ride along the flight line and look at the C-17s that were sitting out there--the CE-141s, excuse me--that were sitting out on the flight line. And I think, if my memory serves me correctly, there were 62 birds that were assigned to McGuire at that time. And I remarked what a remarkable fleet it was. And General Logeais said--now, this was 1985--``They are wearing out.'' And we went and had lunch and he said, ``There is one more thing I want to show you.'' And we went around the corner to a little reception room. And there on the wall was an artist's rendering of an airplane. It was a C-17, in 1985. And it would be six years until the next one, until the first operational model came off the line. It was actually in June. It was June 14, 1991, that it rolled off the line. That was 16 years ago. And we did not know, when we started rolling them off the line, how many we were going to buy. First we said--I think the initial number was 100 or 115. And I think we arrived at that number for budgetary reasons. And then we bought 15 more for special ops, because we thought we needed them. And then we said, ``We are going to have to increase the size of the fleet,'' and then we went to 180. Last year we bought 10 more and we went to 190. And these birds, some of which are now 16 years old--I am going to use Don Logeais's words--are going to wear out and are on the way to wearing out. For a whole bunch of reasons: We are flying them more than we thought we would. We have been at war more than we thought we would. We are increasing the size of the military that we carry with them, more than we thought we would. The activities--we are doing tactical lift with them in theater in Iraq. Never thought we would do that. The C-130's wore out and made us do that. So, this is not the first time you and I have had this conversation, and I always appreciate having this conversation. But I think it is important that we put on the record here today, what, if any, plans you have to expand the buy of C-17s, and what needs to be done in order for us to have the resources to do that. General Schwartz. Congressman, I would ask only that we not focus exclusively on the C-17. Lift, on the air side, is a combination of platforms that are U.S. Government-owned and -operated--clearly, the C-5 and the C-17 principally. And, as well, there is a significant commercial component that contributes to our ability to operate the Department of Defense's transportation and distribution mission. A quick example, when we deployed the first of the five plus-up brigades to Kuwait and Iraq over the holiday period, 29 of the 34 aircraft that supported that deployment were commercial. So, it is a significant piece of what we do. And what we need to do, sir, is to have the right number of organic airplanes and the capability to maintain our commercial partners. My belief is that, what we need is around 300 total, large- lift, modern and reliable aircraft. Your point about airplanes getting tired is certainly valid. And you can compensate for that either through maintenance and repair of the aircraft or buying new. In the end, this is a question about opportunity cost. And if we buy additional C-17s, the question is, what else might we not get, like a new tanker, which, as you know, I believe is a more pressing requirement than additional C-17s. However, sir, if the collective wisdom is we need to continue to procure C-17s, what I would recommend is that you allow the department to adjust the fleet mix accordingly. That means to take down lesser utility aircraft, and that means C- 5As. That is the trade space. And that is what I would recommend. The Chairman. Ms. Bordallo, the gentlelady from Guam. Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker. Admiral Keating, first let me publicly welcome you to the Pacific area. Admiral Keating. Thank you. Ms. Bordallo. There are some exciting changes and challenging times ahead, particularly in my area, the Territory of Guam, and the Pacific Command. I welcomed your visit yesterday, and I do look forward to working with you in the years to come. Welcome. General Schwartz, as the commander of Transportation Command, I respectfully request that you help provide the committee information on an issue of particular importance to my constituents; that is, military retirees who live on Guam who are referred off-island for specialty care and are forced to travel to those locations at their own expense. Prior to 2005, however, the Department of Defense reimbursed retirees for the travel expenses they incurred as a result of such medical referrals, or retirees were able to move on MILAIR flights from Guam and Honolulu that flew on a regular basis. But as a result of the loss of this MILAIR service and the change in policy and practice to no longer reimburse travel costs associated with referred specialty care, the costs are borne solely by the retiree. These trips to access referred specialty care in Hawaii or the state of California cost thousands of dollars. I have raised this issue with the assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, Dr. Winkenwerder, on a number of occasions, and did so most recently on March 8th. I am awaiting a response from the Pentagon about whether retirees on Guam, who had been referred off-island for specialty treatment, can currently travel on military aircraft on a space-available basis to receive that medical care. The retirees on Guam deserve resolution brought to this matter. Insofar as TRANSCOM plays a role in the policy for Space-A travel, and in the scheduling of MILAIR traffic in the Pacific region, I respectfully ask that you examine this issue. What I have proposed as an interim solution until we can adequately resolve the underlying transportation service and reimbursement issue, is that the department revise its policy to report our military retirees, who are medically referred away from Guam to receive specialty care, access to aircraft on a space-available basis. I have proposed that retirees should qualify for Space-A travel at the category two priority level, and therefore, treated the same as authorized personnel on environmental morale leave status. Can you comment? General Schwartz. Congresswoman, thank you for this input. This is a system issue that I was not aware of and one that I will certainly look into as you have requested. Let me just give you a little bit of background, though. The retirees are entitled to Space-A travel, notwithstanding their medical condition. And that is category three priority. We recognize that, because of the level of effort that is currently being devoted to Central Command, that, in the Pacific--and Admiral Keating will soon discover this--that the way we have compensated is by having commercial aircraft move cargo and people in the Pacific theater. That has limited space-available opportunities. In order to compensate, ma'am, what we have tried to do-- and we issued instructions to military aircraft in the Pacific, to maximize their Space-A capacity. So, for example, where the tankers routinely did not carry Space-A passengers, KC-135s, they now will. And they have guidance to do so. That is part of the solution. I will look at this question about the relative priority of retirees seeking specialty medical care, and I will get back to you, ma'am. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 148.] Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, General, and I appreciate your response. The Chairman. Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Chairman, following up on some of the conversation earlier, I want to encourage the committee to look further into this interagency process issue. I received, yesterday, a written report from one of my constituents who just got back from Iraq. And his belief is that this is one of our greatest deficiencies, is the inability of different agencies to effectively work together. And I would hope that, even though it extends, of course, beyond this committee's jurisdiction, I would hope that we can at least explore some of the problems, which was mentioned earlier. Let me try to get to two areas, briefly. Admiral Stavridis, we vote every year on funding for our efforts in Colombia, with some people arguing that we are making no progress. Can I get your view as to how things are going there? Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. I think, when thinking about Colombia, it is important to decide where you are going to start measuring the progress. And I would argue, we should look probably in the 1997, 1998, 1999 timeframe, when Colombia was in really difficult straits. And there is a rich literature of the difficulties Colombians faced in those days. If you come forward from about the year 2000, moving forward, let me give you a couple of metrics that I would say are strong indicators of progress. One is that today, in 1,098 municipalities, there is a strong police presence all around Colombia. Another is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has been diminished in its membership, probably by about 30 percent, from 18,000 to 12,000. Additionally, one of the three insurgent groups of those days, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), has been demobilized through a negotiated settlement with the government. Kidnappings are down 76 percent. Murders are down about 50 percent. The current president, President Uribe, enjoys very high, positive ratings in public polls by internationally recognized firms, well above 75 percent. Conversely, the FARC's approval rating is below 10 percent. I think those are metrics. Atmospherically, in my own travels in Colombia, I find you can move about far more freely than you could five or six years ago. My sense is, Colombia is far from perfect. They continue to strive to improve their human rights record. They are dealing now with a political problem associated with folks who perhaps had interactions with some of the right wing insurgent groups. But they are dealing with those in a mature, sensible way, the way a strong democracy does. It looks at a potentially difficult situation, and it goes to the courts and it resolves them. So, my sense is, Colombia is a nation on the move and they are doing well. And we should be proud of the efforts of the United States in that country, including the finances that were provided by the Congress, and the work of the very small number of U.S. military folks, less than 500, who have been in the country over that period of time. Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. General Cartwright, there is a press report today that the British have foiled an al Qaeda plot to take down the internet in Britain. You have been quoted in some trade press as not being satisfied, shall we say, with our country's approach to defending cyberspace. Can you elaborate a little more on what your concerns are and issues that you think we need to pay particular attention to in cyberspace? General Cartwright. I think, first, I am never satisfied, and I am always paranoid. To me, where we need to improve, one, we have taken effort, both in the Department of Defense over on the director of national intelligence and homeland security, to start to integrate offense and defense, so that the defenders have the capability to protect themselves, so to speak. Second is to start to layer this capability, like we would any other defensive plan, both in the cyberspace in defending the terminals, defending the backbone, defending the switches-- all of those things that are components of the internet, in this case--and start to do that in a way that is consistent with the way we defend the rest of our capabilities, onshore and expanding offshore, to be able to understand what is out there and what might be coming toward us. The key to doing that, and the challenge in this environment is that--let's take as an example Baghdad and a virus, say, that was launched from that part of the world toward someplace in the United States. Even if it takes the long route from Baghdad to geosynchronous orbit and back down to Chicago, it is only about 300 milliseconds. This is a very, very tight timeline to be able to assess the threat, figure out what the appropriate response is, take that action and have it be effective, before the threat reaches us. That means a tight command and control between the interagency process, all of those who would have equity--and the commercial sector--to be able to do this for the country. Understanding how to do that, understanding how not to disrupt freedom of speech--because a lot of things travel across these internet pipelines--understand what is a threat and what is not a threat, in those timelines, are the technologies we need to start to understand and acquire, and are also the factors we need to start to understand in statute. Do we have this right? Can we apply the appropriate authorities to a fight that occurs that quickly and does not have a lot of respect for geographical boundaries? Those are the challenges we are trying to understand, and that is where my frustration is, trying to get the technology, understand the fight that occurs in milliseconds, and understand how to apply the appropriate authorities to that fight so we do not abrogate freedom of speech and other things. The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Reyes. Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning, and thanks for your service. I want to start out with Admiral Keating. First of all, thank you for the things you have done at NORTHCOM. And as you prepare to leave, I would like you to comment on three things. First of all, the work that you have done with the Canadian government to monitor our northern border, the work that has been done with Mexico and our southern border. And if you could contrast those, I would appreciate it. And then third, if you can address the progress that we have made with former Joint Task Force (JTF)-6, now JTF-North, and its ability to expand its agenda, not just in support of all law enforcement agencies, but in its ability to expand from narcotics and immigration into terrorism, antiterrorism issues, as well. Admiral Keating. Yes, sir, I will do my best. And if I could wrap all three by starting with Joint Task Force North, Congressman. Mr. Reyes. Okay. All right. Admiral Keating. From your district, of course, Brigadier General Tony Ierardi is now the commander, about 150 folks in his headquarters. But I would recommend to you that their impact is much greater than their relatively small size. Examples: They have conducted many operations in the past two and a half years I have been fortunate to be at Northern Command, that are broad, interagency efforts. Relatively small, very small Title 10 or even reserve and guard inclusion--or rather, the forces are included--in these comprehensive efforts. In San Diego and the Pacific Northwest, down off the coast of Brownsville and one in southern Florida are the four most recent. And in each case it was interagency representation, Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Patrol, integrations in customs, active, reserve and guard forces-- using active and guard forces that were training for missions overseas, integrating those capabilities into this broad network of border protection activity. And in each case, we satisfied several intelligence priority objectives. Are there terrorists trying to get into the country? We did not capture any. And we continue to think that, while they may have plans to get in, they are not executing those plans. There is no known nexus between narcotraffickers and terrorists. We do continue, in support of the Coast Guard, principally, to find a significant flow of narcotics out of Jim's AOR into ours, primarily. And it is not just from south to north--this addresses your Canadian border interest--there is significant traffic from north to south. So, Joint Task Force North working both the southern and northern borders--all domains, not just land domain--to increase the security of our borders. We are working with Canada. They now have, as you are aware Canada Command, CANCOM, which is rather a counterpart to Northern Command. It is a newer combat organization, but they are our Northern Command counterpart, if you will, north of the border. And we have extensive liaison with them. Their commanding officer, Lieutenant General Dumais, is a good friend, and they are standing up their command. We are increasingly active on our southern border with the new leaders there, and my relief, General Renuart, will visit them within the next month. The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Reyes. I really did not get my five minutes. That red light stayed on from the time that I was--could I ask for a ruling from the chair? The Chairman. If your feelings are hurt, you may go ahead and ask one more question. [Laughter.] Mr. Hunter. Mr. Chairman, my time is coming up. I would be happy to let Mr. Reyes have a minute or two of my precious time. Mr. Reyes. Thank you. Mr. Hunter. But he will really owe. Mr. Reyes. Actually, I just wanted to thank Admiral Keating and wish him well in his new position, as well. And then just finish up by asking Admiral Stavridis to address the issue, because there is a lot of interest in Congress about the allegations of corruption in the Colombian government. Can you give us your perspective specifically? I know you referred to it as a political problem, but I am concerned that that may become a bigger issue here in Congress, in spite of all the progress that you cited in Colombia. So, if you can just address that, I would appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Stavridis. Certainly, sir. I am not an expert on that. I think your question would best be addressed to our American ambassador there, who is an extremely capable person, Ambassador Bill Wood. From my perspective in the military-to-military contacts I have, what I sense is a willingness in the country to grapple with the issue. It is not being swept under the rug. It is being covered on the front pages of the newspaper. People have been indicted. They are pursuing it vigorously, as best I can tell, looking at it. They are looking it in the eye. And I would look at that as a sign of progress in the country, although certainly it is unfortunate, if the allegations are true. And again, I would close by suggesting you would get a richer understanding of the situation from our State Department counterparts who are actually in the country on a day-to-day basis. Mr. Reyes. Has that hampered our abilities to work with the Colombian government, in terms of our operations under Plan Colombia in any way? Admiral Stavridis. No, sir, it has not. Mr. Reyes. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Jones. Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Admiral Stavridis--and I mispronounced that. I very much-- -- Admiral Stavridis. No, you are good, sir. Mr. Jones. Well, you know, when you have got a name like Jones, it just makes everything else more difficult---- Admiral Stavridis. I am thinking about changing my name to Jones. We will see. [Laughter.] Mr. Jones. No, I am going to practice, so next time it will not be a problem. Admiral Stavridis. That is fine, sir. Mr. Jones. Admiral, the reason--I want to ask you, with the responsibility--and, of course, you said you had been there five or six months, and maybe Admiral Keating or someone else can assist with this. I had the opportunity to meet with a gentleman--and I do not want to talk too much about this--who is now an American citizen, that helped our Federal Government in a way that he would qualify for special citizenship, and I will leave it at that--but he is from Honduras. And he brought to my attention that, in certain countries under your command, that there seems to be a migration of Arabs moving in--and I am not talking about terrorists, but I am talking about Arabs who are coming into the population, starting businesses and becoming a part of the community. Are you seeing in any of these countries, or your staff, where there are a fair number of Arabs moving from other countries into some of these Central American countries for the purpose, not of terrorism--I want to make that clear--but to become part of the society? Admiral Stavridis. There are concentrations of Arab populations, as well as Islamic populations, throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, sir. Numbers are hard to define, as they always are, and nailing down either religious or ethnic, particular, specific numbers in many countries. But the numbers I have seen are in the range of three million to six million Islamic. And of that, a significant population traces their roots to the Arab world. The total population in the region is about 450 million, so you are probably in the 1 percent range. The areas in which there are some concentrations, I think most well-known is the so-called tri-border area, which is the point in southern South America where Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay come together. In that region, there is a fairly robust Lebanese population. There are additionally some significant pockets in southern Brazil in a couple of their larger cities, particularly Sao Paulo. And on the northern coast of South America, there are some additional pockets. Again, you are in the one percent range. As is always the case, my assessment would be, the vast majority of those people are living in peace and are attempting to integrate themselves into the societies and in the country. However, we are concerned in some of those populations that there are indications of Hezbollah financing, recruiting, and proselytizing. Our intelligence folks are working closely with their counterparts in those countries as part of the global effort against the war on terrorism. Mr. Jones. Well, the gentleman that I am making reference to suggested that I get the book, I think the title is The Dove and Abdullah. And his concern--of course, he is now an American citizen--was that many of those people, as you said yourself, Admiral, are coming there with true purposes, the right purposes. But there could be those who have relationships, or want to see relationships that you made mention to, develop. And I have thought for a long time about that, as a Member of Congress, and nothing I can really do about it but speak out and show interest. But I have felt for too long that this nation has not paid the right attention that it needed to with Central and South America, really from an economic standpoint, that if we cannot help the natives of those countries, then they are going to look elsewhere. And that could really present a serious security problem for us. So, thank you very much for your answer. Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir. Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Jones. Mr. Sestak. Mr. Sestak. Generals, Admirals. General, if I could ask you a couple of questions on the Reliable Replacement Warhead for the Conventional Trident Missile, the ballistic missile conventional. General, how will a foreign nation discriminate between a nuclear and a conventional ballistic missile coming from the center of the ocean? Russia, China--by the time we have it out there, 2013--potentially Iran, India. General Cartwright. The ambiguity issue is one that we have talked a lot about. We, today, have treaty and protocol activities associated with contacts. So, if we are testing or we are doing some sort of a---- Mr. Sestak. Yes, sir. But this is a sudden crisis, one hour. General Cartwright. Understand. But these are in place for our exercises, and whatnot, and have been in place for a lot of years. We have done about 470 Trident launches with these protocols in place, where we exchange information--principally with the Russians today, trying to expand that out to the Chinese. What we are trying to establish for operational activities is what is called the Joint Data Exchange Center, which is set up right now with Russia, so that we share real-time information---- Mr. Sestak. So, in a real crisis--General, if you don't mind--in a real crisis, you would actually let them know that within an hour you are going to launch? General Cartwright. That is the---- Mr. Sestak. So, you would let Russia and China know that. General Cartwright. That is the intent today. Mr. Sestak. India? Iran? General Cartwright. We are working to expand that out. But the initial effort over the past year is to codify this with the Russians. Mr. Sestak. Well, how do you feel about China and Russia developing the same capability? General Cartwright. To me, to start to reduce the numbers of weapons of mass destruction is a positive attribute. To the extent that we can replace them and get the attributes we need in an offensive system with something other than a mass destruction, that is a positive vector. The question is second-and third-order effects, and being able to understand what those might be. Ambiguity---- Mr. Sestak. So, but what do you feel about China and Russia developing one? General Cartwright. I think that they are---- Mr. Sestak. Is that a good thing? General Cartwright. I would certainly encourage---- Mr. Sestak. A conventional ballistic missile from their submarines. General Cartwright. From their submarines, from their silos---- Mr. Sestak. And they would warn us an hour before they would launch it, so we would know it would not be a nuclear one. General Cartwright. Again, there are multiple activities going on here. Overflight, is it anywhere near your country, et cetera. But, yes, to reduce that ambiguity to the maximum extent practicable---- Mr. Sestak. General, what are two scenarios you can see us using this in? General Cartwright. Two scenarios that would come to mind are targets that are deep. Let us take as an example the recent ASAT test. If the target is deep and you want to go in there and ensure there cannot be a second launch, then having a conventional capability against something that was launched that was conventional in nature, as the ASAT is, that seems to me to be an appropriate target to defend our interests in space. Another is a fleeting target, in which the timelines are short, whether they be short-range or medium-range ballistic missiles or a terrorist camp, where you have an offensive action that is already under way, and you are trying to be appropriate in maintaining control over escalation and drive this away from a weapon of mass destruction. That would be another scenario where this one might be appropriate---- Mr. Sestak. What is the end-to-end architecture needed in order to be able to use something within one hour of detection and launch? General Cartwright. We look at three key pieces, the command and control, to be able to make the decisions and do the planning in those timelines. The second is the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), to connect what we call the fixed piece, and then find, fix, and then finish. So, you need the missile and the warhead, in this case in the submarine. You need an ISR capability that connects the dots and provides the right location of the target. And then you need the command and control to---- Mr. Sestak. What is the commensurate timeframe you think we would be able to have this? And even if you have an idea of the costs? General Cartwright. The easier targets are the ones that are fixed in known locations. That helps you a lot. The harder targets are the mobile targets, those that are hidden. The harder the target, the longer today. But today, the command and control, we believe is in place. The ISR needs to be integrated better, and we are working on that. And that is not terribly expensive. It is more about connecting the right dots. Mr. Sestak. But the satellite system, does this require transformational satellite (TSAT) and---- General Cartwright. No. No. We have in place both the air, the space and the terrestrial capabilities to move this information in that timeline. Mr. Sestak. But actually to see a fleeting target in one hour that you have been hunting for, and then strike it within that hour? General Cartwright. Again, the easier---- Mr. Sestak. This with space-based radar---- General Cartwright. You see, your timelines are associated with the fixed targets. The more challenging are the mobile targets. They may take longer than an hour. It just depends on if it is in some place you knew about, or you are going someplace you had no idea, and you get down to mensuration, and things like that. Mr. Sestak. So, you are comfortable that the word from the Chinese and the Russians, that that is not a nuclear weapon, is what we will rely upon. General Cartwright. We are on a path to ensure that that is the case and to reduce the ambiguity to the maximum extent practical. Mr. Sestak. Thank you, sir. The Chairman. Thank you. Dr. Gingrey. Dr. Gingrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Stavridis, in your written testimony, you included background information pertaining to the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, WHINSEC, and briefly discussed its mission. I have got a number of questions that I want to ask you in regard to that. Can you elaborate for the members of this committee on this program and what it is achieving? Is it effective in promoting relations with other nations? Is it succeeding in its mission to spread democracy while preventing human rights abuses? And I ask these questions, Admiral, because I know--I am sure you know--that there are members of this House of Representatives, and, indeed, maybe even members of this committee, who would want to cut off funding for WHINSEC. And I, as a member of the Board of Visitors, representing this committee on the minority side, formerly on the majority side, am very concerned. And I want to also ask you specifically, as commander of the United States Southern Command, do you believe we should fund this institute? And what would be the consequences of actually cutting the funding to WHINSEC? Admiral Stavridis. Thank you very much, sir. I am going to ask Admiral Keating to also comment, because Mexico is part of the equation, I believe, in answering this question correctly. The Western Hemisphere Institute is a superb, superb operation. Now, it does not work for me. I am on the Board of Visitors, sir, as you are, as is Senator Levin, representing the majority side. So, I think there is a balanced representation on the Board of Visitors. And I believe all of us on the Board of Visitors who have actually spent time would attest to the fact that this 200- person faculty, which is drawn from nations all around the region, in addition to U.S. military personnel, has a curriculum. It is taught in Spanish. We talked earlier about the importance of languages here. A subset is taught in Portuguese for our Brazilian counterparts. We put well over 1,000 students through the school in any given year. And we create an opportunity for a real generation of mid-grade officers to come to the United States, study and learn about our military, and do it in their own language, while having the opportunity to interact with our citizens here. They then go back to their countries, and they go on to positions of senior leadership. The institute is one of the strongest methodologies we have to connect us with the nations of this region. I want to specifically mention, it is, without question, the crown jewel for the study of human rights and how a military ought to respect human rights. It is fundamental to the curriculum. Every student who comes gets between 20 and 50 hours of instruction in human rights and I believe leaves the institute with a rock-solid basis to go back to their own military and inculcate that view of the importance of human rights in a military. So, I believe it is an exemplary institution. Again, it does not work for me, so I am not blowing my own horn here. I am observing another command's institute. It is part of the U.S. Army, and I believe it is superbly run and vitally important. Dr. Gingrey. Admiral Keating, would you care to comment, as well? Admiral Keating. And, Doctor, I will try and be brief. Because of our increasingly robust theater security cooperation efforts with Mexico, we, too, place high importance on the institute's progress. And we welcome them twice a year, I believe. If that is not right, I will get back to you. As part of their course, their curriculum, they come to Northern Command and we spend about a day, a day-and-a-half with them. So, we share the same opinion as the commander of Southern Command. Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, in just the few seconds that I have got left, I just want to say for the record that, of course, I have been to the WHINSEC facility on several occasions, and I certainly can attest to the value of the program. And I appreciate the admirals sharing that with us. WHINSEC is succeeding in its mission to provide professional education and training to military personnel. Actually, in addition to them, law enforcement officials, civilians that support the democratic principles of the charter of the Organization of American States. So, I am gravely concerned about any movement toward defunding such a great program, and I certainly appreciate the testimony of Admiral Keating and Admiral Stavridis, and I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Stavridis. Sir, may I just add, sir, that I would encourage any congressman who has any doubt to come and visit the institute. Dr. Gingrey. Well, Admiral, thank you. Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me, I was going to suggest the very same thing. I think it would be a great CODEL for the members of this committee in a bipartisan way to go down to Columbus, Georgia, the home of the infantry, a great part of my state, formerly in my district. And I think it would be--you know, what you see with your eyes is worth 1,000 words. And I think that is exactly what we ought to do. And I thank you, Admiral, for that suggestion. The Chairman. I associate my thoughts with the gentleman from Georgia. I am familiar with the institute quite well, and actually, its predecessor, which I had the occasion to visit when I was sitting down on the front row of this committee. So, thank you for your thoughts on that. Last but not least, the gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter. Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Chairman, I have another question I would like to ask. The Chairman. Yes. As soon as Mr. Hunter has finished. Mr. Hunter. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for the hearing, an excellent hearing. And I will try to be brief. I know we have votes coming up pretty shortly. General Cartwright, you have got this missile defense responsibility, at least in terminal phase. And the combatant commands are arranged mostly geographically, with areas of responsibility that an incoming missile is going to transit fairly rapidly. Just generally speaking, really two questions: What are your thoughts on how effectively we are organizing to be able to handle the transit of a single missile over several areas of responsibility? And second, what is your personal take on how effectively and efficiently we are developing our missile defenses? Just your general, personal take on how things are going. General Cartwright. The first is the command and control question. Just using the example of the activities in July with North Korea, you are spanning about nine time zones and you have at least four different combatant commanders with equities in the activity, not the least of which is probably the target in Northern Command. And so, how we work this activity, because the sensors may live, so to speak, in different AORs. They may not even belong to the Department of Defense. They may not belong to the United States. And so, we have to work this in a way that is very cross- compartment in ways that we have never had to integrate systems before. And that has been a challenge. I have to say, though, that the technology has moved us in a direction to solve most of those challenges and to ensure that the visibility is out there for each combatant commander that has equity. They can see what is happening. They can know immediately what their equities are, whether it is consequence management, whether it is part of the fire control solution, whether it is notification that something is going to fly over someone's territory. So, the technology has helped us move in the right direction. I think that we are moving in a direction that says that, if you have an equity in this, you need to be able to have a voice. You need to be able to see what is happening and make that transparent, and then be able to register any concerns that you might have with an intercept that is occurring, even though the decision timelines are down in the four- to six-minute timeline. That system is starting to emerge. We run it daily in exercise, to start to train to this. The most difficult challenge is, most of the time we try to do this by voice, when we get the senior leadership together. Voice tends to be a very slow way to get discovery of situation awareness and make a decision. We have got to do that part of it better. We are exercising that now. The secretary of defense has put in place an exercise program that will start to move us more to a data picture, so you can see very quickly what the situation is that everybody shares. And when we get that, I think we will be in better stand. That is the first piece of the question. How is the system moving? To me, the credibility, the deterrent value has gone up significantly since the activities associated with the 4th of July and North Korea. There is no doubt in our mind, and clearly in the minds of our allies, that there is value in missile defense. It offers you an alternative to an offensive-only strategy, for many countries. That is point one. Point two is, I think we have to start focusing on our deployed forces and our allies, and allowing them to plug into this system and develop for them what they believe are the attributes of a defensive system, whether it is the Israelis and the aero system, or the Brits--or whoever needs this. That is the direction we have to start to move. Mr. Hunter. Mr. Chairman, I might just ask, with my remaining time, if any of our witnesses have anything that they have not talked about that is on their mind, as we conclude this hearing. Gentlemen, any parting shots you would like to give the committee here? General Schwartz. Congressman Hunter, if I may, quickly, I do have one concern. And that relates to an issue under consideration by the House related to the Armenian genocide in the early 1900s. The resolution, I am told, will come to the floor either later this month or in the very early part of April. I just want to alert the members that that resolution may trigger a reaction from the Turkish government, which would limit our access at Incirlik Air Base, which we operate there. That cargo hub moves almost 75 percent of the cargo we send to Iraq, and last year was 55,000 tons. And so, I just wish to alert the members that an unintended consequence of that resolution could be to make our job much harder to support the troops downrange. Thank you, sir, for that opportunity. Admiral Stavridis. If I could, sir, I would simply encourage the committee and the members of the committee to come travel in the region. There is no substitute for personal contact, personal knowledge. Senator Nelson came down recently, Senator Reid, over on the Senate side. I am going, I believe, with Representative Meek down to Haiti in a few weeks. I would really welcome the opportunity to see the members come travel in this important part of the world. Thank you. The Chairman. Before I call Mr. Meek, General Schwartz, my recollection is that the French assembly--correct me if I am wrong--the French assembly passed a resolution regarding the 1915 genocide occurrence. And as a result thereof, Turkey cut off all military connection, as well as the contracts with France. Am I correct? General Schwartz. Sir, not all military-to-military relationships. For example, the NATO relationships, as I understand it, remain intact. But those commercial interfaces certainly were cut off. As I understand it, the Office of Defense Cooperation that France has in Ankara closed. In addition, the blanket overflight clearance, which Turkey had allowed France to exercise, was also terminated. And for us, the overflight clearance issue would be a significant matter. The Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Meek. Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I must say that, you note that I am a little delayed here today, but I did get here in time. I have, Mr. Chairman, the congressman-to-be with me. He is on spring break this week, so we are working together here in the Capitol--my son. Generals, Admirals, I am glad that you all have come before us today. And I think the question on the resolution, General, that you just outlined, that is the kind of information we need to know here in Congress. And, Admiral, as you know, we are going to go down to Haiti in a couple of weeks. And I guess I wanted to ask you a question, because we have two free trade agreements, I believe, that is in your area, that is being considered before Congress. Have you heard anything from your counterparts on the other side, on the military's part? Is State working with you? Because I know, down in your command, basically, the Southern Command has been our attache, our State Department-- everything. And I know that we are trying to refocus down there with Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and a number of other agreements, but we have two that are pending. Have you heard anything? Admiral Stavridis. Thank you for the question, sir. I have, indeed. As I travel and talk to my interlocutors in the military- to-military venue, there is strong support, as they perceive it, as a matter of security, to have that kind of agreement with the United States. And they often refer, as you just alluded to, sir, to the Central American Free Trade Agreement, which the Congress passed, and has been of significant benefit in Central America in strengthening our relations there. So, as always, the lead on those kinds of things is with the State Department, with the Department of Commerce, and so forth. But from a security perspective, what I hear from my counterparts is support for that. Mr. Meek. Okay. Mr. Chairman, and I must say that you and the ranking member now, Mr. Duncan, have been supportive of not only my movements in Haiti, but also then very successful within the mark, to be charitable, not only to the Southern Command, but also to our mission. As you know, in the last 10 years we have--or last 15 years--we have had to go down twice to bring about peace in Haiti. Now, more than ever, we have the opportunity, not only through the U.N. and the United Nation Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and other countries like Canada and others that are contributing in Haiti, may very well assist us in securing the kind of democracy that we need in Haiti. And I would encourage, just like the admiral did, members of the House and of the Senate to travel to Haiti and travel in the Southern Command region. Admiral, one other question as it relates to the trip, as it pertains to Cite Soleil, I know that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has a presence there. As it relates to the future and security, I know that taking down Cite Soleil--and MINUSTAH took out the gangs--but long-term security, Haiti so many times has been like a roller coaster. It is secured and it is non-secured. And because of the drug activity that is taking place, the gang activity--for most, thuggery--what kind of plans do you feel long-term that we can put in place so that we do not have to continue to give our military assets to a country that really should not need it, because the Haitian people are peaceful people? And also, as a mission to stop Haitians from taking to sea, and that usually gets the attention of not only the United States, but the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos and other islands? Long term where are we? We know we made a $20 million investment recently, but where are we as it relates to long- term plans? Admiral Stavridis. Thanks for the question, Congressman. First of all, I want to really applaud the excellence of the United Nations mission there, which is doing a fine job. As you know, there are 6,600 peacekeepers on the ground, about half of them coming from the region. So, this is very much a regional effort in security. And I think the first and best thing we can do, we the United States, is to encourage that kind of a regional solution in Haiti, to continue to ask the nations that are contributing peacekeepers, people like Brazil and Argentina and Colombia and Chile and Uruguay, to go the next step and to be participants in economic efforts in the country of Haiti. Second, in terms of the narcotics, I think that is absolutely correct. That is a growing concern, and we need to-- we the United States government, through interagency means-- need to bring partnership and capability to our friends in Haiti, so they can rid themselves of this drug scourge, and so it does not undermine this very fragile democracy in Haiti. So, regionalism, interagency approaches, I think are the way to go here, and a continued judicious approach with the use of U.S. aid, which, of course, is not my purview. And, of course, you will be hearing testimony from Department of State representatives there. For our purposes we have, at U.S. Southern Command, we have a military group commander there who is very helpful in working with the Haitian military, and you and I will have a chance to get a briefing from him on this subject when we go down. Overall I am hopeful about Haiti. I think it could be an example of where regionalism and interagency efforts, which we have talked about this morning, could really solve a real problem in our hemisphere. Mr. Meek. Well, thank you so very much, Admiral. I want to thank also the generals for being here. And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to ask the questions. And I just would want to say to both of you publicly, I appreciate your support, not only for the Southern Command, but also the support that you have given me as a member of this committee, to go down on behalf of the committee and learn more about our activities under our jurisdiction there in Haiti, so thank you. The Chairman. Thank the gentleman from Florida. It is always good to welcome members of families, so they can see their parents hard at work. And, Kendrick Meek, Jr., we welcome you, sir. Glad to have you in the audience. Thank you very much. Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Keating, by the time you get to the Pacific Command, you may be thinking that this will be a relief for you. Are you a member, I mean, institutionally, of the Homeland Security Council? Admiral Keating. No, sir. Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. That is unfortunate. I am making reference here to the Joint Force headquarters, the National Capital Region at Fort McNair, because that deals with incident management in terms of homeland defense. And then the Joint Task Force Civil Support at Fort Monroe in Virginia. The reason I mention that is that, that has, at least in my information, command and control responsibilities with regard to catastrophic events, including nuclear or high-yield explosive events. The reason I bring that up is that, there is a story today--and I bring it to your attention not expecting you to necessarily have it in front of you, because it is so recent--a story today in The Washington Post concerning a government report provided by the Homeland Security Council and the Energy Department, with regard to the lack of definitive plans for a situation in which you might have a nuclear attack or a terrorist attack using the so-called dirty bombs radiological attack. Northern Command, again, I will not get into an argument or a colloquy about what control and command means, or what coordination means, and so on. But I am bringing it to your attention, because what the contention is, is that the government lacks rules and standards for sending out first responders in radiated areas to save people or warn them of approaching fallout, even including standards for firefighters, et cetera. Now, it would seem to me, at a minimum, that this is the kind of coordination, should it exist, that needs to take place. Now, if this is, in fact, so, or if this is the contention, can you state with any certainty that, as a result of your various exercises and planning sessions and so, that this report would also be inaccurate? Admiral Keating. Congressman, we conducted an exercise in the fall, we in Northern Command and Department of Homeland---- Mr. Abercrombie. Excuse me. I should have said parenthetically, they made specific reference to Washington, D.C. That is why I cited the two, the Fort Monroe and Fort McNair. Admiral Keating. So, as a little bit of preamble, we conducted an exercise in the fall--not just Northern Command, but a broad interagency effort, including the Department of Homeland Security and the Michigan National Guard in which, during the exercise scenario, a radiological dispersal device, a dirty bomb was detonated in Detroit, Michigan, and fallout went across the river into Canada. So, we did not just---- Mr. Abercrombie. I am familiar with that. Admiral Keating. So we had international implication, as well as significant national implication. Major General Bruce Davis, National Guard office, deployed from Joint Task Force Civil Support Headquarters, with the lead element of his assessment team--that is what Joint Task Force Civil Support does--to the area. They physically went to Detroit, integrated with state and local responders and Department of Homeland Security officials to assess the damage, figuratively, and begin to provide the command and control and collaboration and coordination that you describe, in a simulated event with real-world folks moving around. So, we exercise to that scenario, Congressman. Joint Task Force National Capital Region, and one of our subordinate commands, tasked with a broader set of requirements for addressing defending--the many aspects of defending the National Capital Region, including the integrated defense system of the missiles that ring the National Capital Region. So, with those two examples for JTF Civil Support and JTF National Capital Region, I am satisfied that I can report to you that we have plans on the shelf for responding to disasters--natural or manmade--up through and including nuclear disasters, on a combatant commander level. Mr. Abercrombie. Would it be fair to say, then, that this report--and these, by the way, are at least two years old. And my guess, my estimation is that it is probably at least two years. Since the time these reports were done, or these observations were made, would it be fair to say that your contention is that that issue, or those issues raised in that report, as I outlined them to you, have been taken into account and you are trying to exercise or make plans to be able to address the kinds of situations that I raised for you? Admiral Keating. Precisely. Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. Let us leave it at that. I commend that to your attention, particularly the one from the National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA, of the Energy Department. Admiral Keating. Thank you, sir. Mr. Abercrombie. And we will take it from there. Thank you very much. I have some questions also for, Mr. Chairman, for TRANSCOM, which I would like to submit for the record to get an answer. The Chairman. Without objection. Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you very much. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Abercrombie. I wish you good fortune and aloha, Admiral, as you head to Honolulu. Admiral Keating. Looking forward to it, Congressman. The Chairman. The good news is you inherit Mr. Abercrombie. [Laughter.] Admiral Keating. Can't wait. The Chairman. You will love it. Mr. Abercrombie. You are used to dealing with challenges, right? The Chairman. He is great to work with, Admiral. Admiral Stavridis, I understand that the Afghan National Interdiction Unit is attending an 18-week jungle commando course in Colombia. Do you know anything about that? Admiral Stavridis. I do not have the details on that. I will be happy to get them and give them to you for the record, sir. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 147.] The Chairman. Would you do that, please? Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. The Chairman. The military is always trying to apply lessons learned. At least that is part of nearly every briefing we receive. Admiral Keating, lessons learned from Katrina. What did you learn, positive, negative? Admiral Keating. Some of both, Mr. Chairman. And we are working very hard to differentiate between lessons observed and lessons learned. All kinds of folks have long lists of should- have, would-have, could-have. Throughout the agencies where we spend our time-- principally FEMA, DHS and DOD--we are working hard to take lessons observed and make sure they are lessons learned, and hopefully not mistakes repeated. Examples would include communication. We have, since Katrina, contracted for--through your direct help, you will recall--and obtain funding for three separate cell phone farms, if you will, so if the infrastructure is wiped slick, let's say, in Congressman Taylor's region of Gulfport, Mississippi, we airlift or through air, land or water, media. We will get the cell phone farms where we put up a tower, we fire up a generator and we pass out hundreds and hundreds of cell phones--don't care who gets them--and satellite phones. DHS has a dozen-plus of those same systems. National Guard has a dozen-plus. So, where there were none, there are now upwards of 30, I think is the number, but it is between 20 and 30 of these entirely self-sufficient organic cell phone farms. We have defense coordinating officers embedded full-time, active duty colonels, who are trained in the art of disaster response, who are embedded in each of the FEMA regions. We have provided our planning expertise--and I use that term advisedly. You will appreciate it better than most, perhaps, because we in the military have this planning culture, because we have had the opportunity to capitalize on the educational reform that you have provided for us. We have provided planners to FEMA, to the Department of Homeland Security. And we have full-time representatives in FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security, and they have full-time representatives in our headquarters. So, we have taken the larger strategic issues and tried to rectify those, and we are down even in the tactical level for ability to communicate. And we do not care, it is not just guard or reserve or active forces. Whoever needs a cell phone, we will pass it out until such time as the commercial infrastructure can re-support. The Chairman. I think you might find it of interest, Admiral, that in Missouri National Guard, particularly the unit in Jefferson City at the headquarters there, is training in the communication challenge that we might have, should there be another New Madrid Fault earthquake, which last happened in 1811, which caused the Mississippi River to flow backward. And it evidently was a local disaster all along the Mississippi River Valley. I jokingly told a Missouri guardsman that they are training in this communication operation for something that is not going to happen for another 400 years. And hopefully I am right. But they did seem very, very serious in what they were doing. General Cartwright, very quickly, describe the process involved in setting the nuclear force structure requirements. General Cartwright. In setting the nuclear force---- The Chairman. Force structure requirements. General Cartwright. Force structure requirements. The Chairman. Yes. General Cartwright. We are given guidance as to the types of capabilities that our adversaries possess, that the government desires to hold at risk. We look at that. We compare the desired effect to the inventory required to get that effect. And then we match them with timeliness factors to obtain those objectives. And we set that down. We write it down, we exercise it, we war-game it, and we pass it back up. We have a feedback loop to learn as we move forward. There are a lot of factors in this that change our equations--precision, timeliness, delivery factors, reliability of weapons. All of that is considered in that activity. The Chairman. Thank you. I thank you, gentlemen. I do have one last question for General Schwartz. Very quickly, can you touch on the thoughts of retiring C-5s, in 25 words or less? General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, again, I would not recommend retiring C-5s unless we have access to additional C- 17s. In which case I would recommend retiring the older airplanes, the A models, first, both in a manner which we could harvest the crews and maintenance to apply to the new airplanes and, likewise, enhance the reliability of the entire system as a result. The Chairman. Thank you very much. It has been an excellent hearing, and I appreciate, all of us appreciate, you gentlemen being with us. Admiral Keating, good luck in your new assignment. Thank you very much. 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SKELTON The Chairman. Admiral Stavridis, I understand that the Afghan National Interdiction Unit is attending an 18-week jungle commando course in Colombia. Do you know anything about that? Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I do believe that you may be referring to the Afghan Initiative, and I can certainly speak to that. The Afghan Initiative was created to have Colombian counter-drug personnel share tactics, techniques, and procedures with their Afghan counterparts in prosecuting the war on drugs. To accomplish this goal, the governments of the United States, Britain, Colombia, and Afghanistan are coordinating various exchanges between Colombia and Afghanistan. An Afghan delegation, headed by the Counternarcotics Minister, visited Colombia in August 2005. This delegation visited the Colombian Ministry of Defense and the Colombian National Police (CNP) Headquarters in Bogota. They also visited the CNP Training Center in Espinal to observe the Colombian Anti-narcotics Police Jungla Commando Course. This Afghan Delegation requested that a team of Colombian subject matter experts conduct a training seminar in Afghanistan. The Colombian anti-narcotics police team visited Afghanistan in late July, 2006. The team included the Interdiction Chief and former Director of Anti-narcotics Intelligence, a fixed wing pilot and former Intelligence Officer, a Hughes 500 attack pilot, Head Instructor from the Anti-narcotics Police Training Center), and NAS Bogota Advisor to Jungla Airmobile Companies. Enroute to Kabul, the team had a three-day stopover in London where the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence provided briefings on counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. Upon arrival in Afghanistan, the team gave seminars to all key Afghan anti-narcotics officials (police, army, and ministry-level), the U.S. trainers and advisors in Afghanistan (Drug Enforcement Agency and Blackwater), UK Embassy Kabul personnel, the commander of the Kabul International Airport, and the rank and file members of the INL-funded Afghan Narcotics Interdiction Unit (NIU). The briefings focused on how Colombian police officers conduct their counterdrug operations. The Colombian police identified that personnel selection, training, organization, equipment, intelligence, and planning are the keys to success. During the Colombian team's outbrief to the Afghan Counternarcotics Ministry and U.S. Ambassador, Kabul, the Colombian team proposed three immediate follow-on exchanges: (1) Send five Afghan Narcotics Interdiction Unit (NIU) members to the Jungla Commando Basic Course in Espinal, Tolima (Feb. 12-June 16, 2007) (2) Send two Colombia Jungla School instructors to the Afghan NIU training center in Kabul (March 12-May 1) (3) Send the Commander of the Kabul International Airport and staff to Colombia to visit the CNP airport security and counternarcotics programs (June 2007) In April 2007, INL asked that the Colombians conduct a six week seminar for 10 Afghan NIU members starting in September 2007. During a visit by Representatives Dennis Hastert and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen to Colombia in May, 2007, it was also proposed to send five mid-level Colombian Anti-narcotics Police to Afghanistan to observe Afghan NIU operations. ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE Mr. Abercrombie. Given the personnel end strength increases of the Army and Marine Corps contained in the Future Years Defense Plan, do you believe the conclusions and assumptions of the 2005 Mobility Capability Study remain valid in determining the Department of Defense's mobility requirements? General Schwartz. The 2005 Mobility Capability Study was based on the 1-4-2-1 Department of Defense National Defense Strategy. The assumptions used for the MCS study have not been invalidated. The Army and the Marine Corps state the increases in their personnel end strength are focused on increasing home station dwell time. Therefore, unless the Services and Combatant Commanders identify a change in their concepts of operations, the conclusions reached in the MCS will remain valid. The next MCS, anticipated to begin in early 2008, will fully incorporate any changes in plans and requirements as a result of the Service force structure end strength increases. Mr. Abercrombie. The Air Force and the Army are contemplating procurement of a Joint Cargo Aircraft to complement the C-130 fleet and to increase efficiency of cargo capacity used during intra-theater airlift operations. What is the requirement, concept of operations, and what command authority will exercise operational control and tasking of both the Army and Air Force Joint Cargo Aircraft? General Schwartz. Various intra-theater studies are being conducted to explore the intra-theater demands to include the use of the JCA. The Intra-theater Lift Capability Assessment looked at in theater movement to the brigade rear. Additionally, the USTRANSCOM Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center is analyzing the movement forward from the brigade rear to the point of use and examining potential gaps and solutions for joint future theater airlift. The next Mobility Study, anticipated to begin in early 2008, should fully incorporate these analyses, and reconfirm the JCA requirement. JCA employment concept has not yet been finalized. However, the Draft CONOPS states ``during wartime, JCAs will be assigned to a Unified Combatant Command structure, and while in this capacity, will support combatant commanders' directed operations, across the range of military operations. The Joint Forces Commander (JFC) will have OPCON of all JCAs in the Joint Area of Operations. The JFC determines air capabilities/forces made available for joint air operations, in consultation with component commanders.'' ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO Ms. Bordallo. I have proposed that retirees should qualify for Space-A travel at the category two priority level, and therefore, treated the same as authorized personnel on environmental morale leave status. Can you comment? General Schwartz. I take seriously your concerns regarding the appropriate priority level for retirees participating in the Space-A travel program. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) was notified of your proposal and concerns. They are currently looking at possible courses of action in order to recommend a solution equitable not only to residents of Guam but also other retirees that might be in the same circumstances.