[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-40]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, NORTHERN COMMAND,
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, AND SOUTHERN COMMAND
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 21, 2007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Tenth Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina DUNCAN HUNTER, California
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas California
ADAM SMITH, Washington MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California KEN CALVERT, California
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
RICK LARSEN, Washington JEFF MILLER, Florida
JIM COOPER, Tennessee JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam TOM COLE, Oklahoma
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB BISHOP, Utah
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
NANCY BOYDA, Kansas CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
KATHY CASTOR, Florida
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Paul Oostburg Sanz, Professional Staff Member
Aileen Alexander, Professional Staff Member
Margee Meckstroth, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2007
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 21, 2007, Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act--Budget Request from the U.S. Strategic
Command, Northern Command, Transportation Command, and Southern
Command........................................................ 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 21, 2007........................................ 45
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 2007
FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST
FROM THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, NORTHERN COMMAND, TRANSPORTATION
COMMAND, AND SOUTHERN COMMAND
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Cartwright, Gen. James E., Commander, U.S. Strategic Command,
U.S. Marine Corps.............................................. 5
Keating, Adm. Timothy J., Commander, U.S. Northern Command and
North American Aerospace Defense Command, U.S. Navy............ 7
Schwartz, Gen. Norton A., Commander, U.S. Transportation Command,
U.S. Air Force................................................. 8
Stavridis, Adm. James G., Commander, U.S. Southern Command, U.S.
Navy........................................................... 9
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cartwright, Gen. James E..................................... 54
Keating, Adm. Timothy J...................................... 73
Schwartz, Gen. Norton A...................................... 94
Skelton, Hon. Ike............................................ 49
Stavridis, Adm. James G...................................... 118
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Mr. Abercrombie.............................................. 147
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 148
Mr. Skelton.................................................. 147
FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST
FROM THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, NORTHERN COMMAND, TRANSPORTATION
COMMAND, AND SOUTHERN COMMAND
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 21, 2007.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Today's hearing is part of our annual series of posture
hearings with combatant commanders.
I am pleased to welcome General Cartwright of Strategic
Command (STRATCOM); Admiral Keating of Northern Command
(NORTHCOM), who will soon be taking the reins at Pacific
Command; General Schwartz at Transportation Command (TRANSCOM);
and Admiral Stavridis.
Do me a favor. Pronounce that correctly for me again.
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, it is Stavridis.
The Chairman. I got it. Thank you--of Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM).
And we are honored to have all four of you today.
Appreciate what you do, and especially want to express
gratitude to each of those who work with you and for you, in
and out of uniform.
Although the challenges we face in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere consume so much energy and resources, our attention
should be in other parts of the world, as well.
In Colombia we have spent over four billion dollars since
1999 to stem the flow of illegal drugs into our country and to
aid the Colombians in their fight against homegrown terrorists.
But according to the latest figures from the Justice
Department, the supply and purity of illicit narcotics in our
streets has not changed much.
The administration of President Uribe is also currently
embroiled in a criminal investigation into a seemingly
widespread conspiracy between high-ranking government officials
and leaders of the paramilitaries.
Guantanamo Bay, a name that now rings throughout our
country--I would like to begin a discussion as to whether we
should continue to use the naval station there as a detention
facility.
Although recent legislation, Supreme Court decisions, and
Department of Defense directives have probably improved the
nature of interrogation and detention at that place, I think it
may be a bit too late. It has become in the minds of many of
our allies a textbook example of how not to run a detention
facility.
NORTHCOM--Admiral Keating, I am interested in the status of
planning and training activities between NORTHCOM on the one
hand, and national guard and reserve components and local
responders on the other.
And as you know, the response to Katrina highlighted the
need to better coordinate these activities, as cited in the
recent Guard and Reserve Commission report, the commission on
which someone who used to work in your shop, Stanton Thompson,
has sat.
Traditionally, I have been a strong proponent of the total
force concept of integrating the reserve and active components
into one effort. And yet, I am concerned about reports that
NORTHCOM does not adequately understand the capabilities of the
guard and reserve due to the fact that NORTHCOM is overly
staffed by active duty personnel.
With regards to STRATCOM, we are interested in the
warfighter's perspective on the balance between nuclear and
conventional forces in the future.
I understand, General Cartwright, that you do recognize the
need for a national discussion on this important issue, and I
think that in that regard, I look forward to hearing your
thoughts about the Reliable Replacement Warhead and
Conventional Trident Modification programs, and what you can
say publicly.
I follow with interest the expanded role the warfighter has
been playing in the missile field defense business,
particularly in the context of the North Korean test of a long-
range missile last summer.
In regard to TRANSCOM, General Schwartz, I believe that the
critical issue for the committee will be to understand better
the nature of our future mobility requirements. We are reaching
ultimate decision points on strategic airlift production and
modernization that will impact our capabilities.
I ask that the total of my statement be put into the
record. And I ask my ranking, my friend, Duncan Hunter.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the
Appendix on page 49.]
STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me join in welcoming our guests. It is always good
to have combatant commanders before us, because, gentlemen, you
are directly in the chain of command and carry out the orders
of the commander-in-chief, and you have extremely important
pieces of this great operation called the American security
apparatus.
So, thank you for being with us this morning.
Congratulations to Admiral Keating on your recent
confirmation as commander of the Pacific Command. I know we
will look forward to meeting with your replacement in NORTHCOM,
General Renuart, in the near future.
You know, in 2005, Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the
importance of NORTHCOM's mission of support to U.S. civil
authorities. And the recently released National Guard
Commission report recommends that NORTHCOM should increase its
capacity to execute its civil support mission.
So, at the appropriate time, I hope you comment on how
NORTHCOM executes its civil support mission and how it is
reaching out to the national guard and working with state and
local entities to ensure that it has full situational
awareness.
Admiral Stavridis, welcome to your first hearing as
SOUTHCOM commander. We have had a chance to visit a little bit.
Obviously, Latin America and the Caribbean are America's
neighbors. And although there are no conventional threats in
the region at this time, developments in the region do impact
U.S. security.
The U.S. and South America continue to work together. And
while there are examples of progress, there continue to be
regional security and political challenges.
Illegal drug production and trade, particularly in the
Andean Ridge, continues to be a problem. In Colombia, President
Uribe, the first modern Colombian president to win reelection,
is fighting narcoterrorism in his country with U.S. support.
And I know we have chatted a little bit. You see good trends
with respect to that issue.
In Venezuela, President Chavez maintains close relations
with Cuba and Iran, while aggressively importing arms and
defense capabilities not proportional to its defense needs. And
furthermore, there are indications that radical Islamists may
be taking advantage of instability in that region.
So, I am interested in learning how SOUTHCOM is working
with its regional and interagency partners to address these
challenges.
Last, this committee continues to remain focused on
SOUTHCOM's responsibilities for Guantanamo Bay. And I am going
to reserve most of my comments until next week, when the
committee intends to hold two hearings, but let me make one
quick point.
We, as a nation, cannot afford to close Guantanamo. It
houses dangerous people who are intent on killing innocent
Americans. And if you need a reminder of this fact, all you
have to do is read this recently released transcript of Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed's statements to the effect that he did, in
fact, involve himself in the killing of thousands of Americans
and sees no problem with killing more Americans, if given the
opportunity.
And I would just say that we have all seen the reports
percolating that there may be moves to close Guantanamo and
remove these terrorists into the United States.
I think one of the most dangerous things we could do is
move people who have expertise in explosives anywhere close to
the general prisoner population in the United States. I think
isolation is absolutely appropriate.
And as a guy who has been down to Guantanamo with some of
my colleagues on the committee, and having looked at the
conditions, at the outstanding medical care that is given
people in Guantanamo, you know, their health care there would
rival that of most health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in
the United States.
The food is excellent. They are given taxpayer-paid-for
prayer rugs and Qurans, and their routine is interrupted five
times a day for prayer.
When you look at the reports from international agencies
that complain about lack of square footage and other things
that I would consider not to be substantial complaints, I think
it is very clear that Guantanamo is being run very
professionally. But beyond that, it is a necessity in this war
against terror.
So, maybe you can touch to some degree on Guantanamo. I
know we are going to have extensive hearings on Guantanamo
shortly.
General Cartwright, thank you for testifying before us
twice in a couple of weeks.
In this post-Cold War environment, we have got to have a
full range of capabilities to deter and respond to multiple
threats and adversaries that span the gamut from transnational
terrorists and rogue nations like North Korea, who just tested
this missile that the chairman mentioned a few minutes ago, and
is working to develop ways to deliver its new-found nuclear
capabilities.
So, I think the committee would appreciate also hearing
about our Nation's strategic posture needs. And I am
particularly interested in the Conventional Trident
Modification Program and hearing about the need for the
Reliable Replacement Warhead and the combatant commander's
missile defense needs. So, if you could talk about that
briefly, that would be good.
Last, the chairman mentioned the Chinese anti-satellite
test (ASAT) that occurred in January. And though its target was
a Chinese weather satellite, it sent a clear message. Most
people do not try to attain the capability to shoot down their
own satellites. And I think that that heralded a new era of
military competition in space, whether we want it or not.
So, understanding this is not a classified hearing, maybe
you could testify a little bit about your thoughts with respect
to that recent test.
General Schwartz, welcome to you. You obviously are a
critical player in the nation's warfighting operations today.
And let me just thank you. You have always been extremely
responsive to all the services and their transportation needs,
especially in the warfighting theaters.
I know you have some thoughts on where we are going to go
with lift, and you are going to have to make some difficult
choices. Thanks for your efforts on behalf of all the
warfighting forces. And please let us know how we can help you
become more efficient and stretch those TRANSCOM dollars.
So, gentlemen, thank you for being with us today.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. It is
absolutely timely and critical to the nation's defenses, and I
look forward to the testimony.
The Chairman. Thank the ranking member.
Since we have four witnesses today, I hope that you will do
your best to confine your remarks. And we will, without
objection, put your prepared statements in the record.
I would also recommend to the members, since we are under
the five-minute rule, that you may wish to confine your
questions on the first round, at least, to one or two of the
witnesses.
So, without any further ado, General Cartwright, welcome,
sir.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, COMMANDER, U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Cartwright. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter, I
appreciate this opportunity to come and testify today.
Since I have had the opportunity to testify before some of
your subcommittees, and that is a matter of record, I am not
going to go into any great detail until we get to the question-
and-answers, and leave it for that. But I think there are a
couple of issues that were highlighted by both the chairman and
Congressman Hunter that are worth at least a mention here in
the preamble.
The threat out there is growing, and it is expanding. And
as was said earlier, it spans from the conventional or the
nation-state challenges that we have to rogue states and
extremists. And this is a broader threat than we have taken on
in the past.
And so, trying to define a deterrence strategy for the 21st
century and the capabilities necessary to lend credibility to
that deterrence is what STRATCOM has focused its efforts on.
And I think, in moving forward here, I am going to hit just
a couple of points, the first being on our offensive
capabilities and the discussion about our nuclear capabilities.
And given that this is an open hearing, let me just say
that we entered into an agreement with the Russians called the
Moscow Treaty. It set limits on our active stockpiles and
drawdown, and a goal for 2012. In 2007, which is where we are
today, was the midpoint in that drawdown, and both we and the
Russians have reviewed our progress in that activity.
Both of us are ahead of schedule in shutting down systems
and the active stockpile. But the active stockpile is only one
part of our stockpile. There is also the inactive portion of
it.
In the strategy that has been put forth by this
Administration, and that we are working toward is, the lowest
number of nuclear weapons necessary for national security. That
is the objective.
And so, as we move forward on the drawdowns in response to
the Moscow Treaty, we need to increase our other capabilities
as alternatives and replacements for the drawdown of the
nuclear weapons that we have in our stockpile.
Part and parcel to that, in that drawdown through 2012, is
refurbishing the stockpile that we have. And the activity that
we are undertaking here is to ensure that the weapons that we
have are the safest they can be for the people who use them and
handle them, that they are as secure as modern technology will
allow us to make them, and that they are reliable.
All three of those attributes will help us draw this
stockpile down. All three of those attributes will have effect
on both the active and the inactive stockpiles. That is
critical.
The Reliable Replacement Warhead, which just finished its
first study efforts, is now entering into the second phase of
study. That is our intention, to move into the more detailed
engineering studies.
The activity associated with that and the capability that
we are seeking with this Reliable Replacement Warhead is first,
safe, secure, and reliable; second, its form, fit, and function
replacement for the existing weapons.
In other words, there are no new delivery vehicles. There
is no new capability. This is taking my 1966 Mustang and making
sure that it has got four-wheel brake disc brakes, it has got
seat belts--it has got all of the things that it ought to have
to be responsible, to maintain control over and be able to use
and develop these weapons in a safe, secure way.
And that is our intent with the Reliable Replacement
Warhead.
In order to get to the lowest numbers necessary for
national security, we have got to see the emergence of
conventional capabilities to replace or augment some of the
existing nuclear capabilities. One of those that was mentioned
in the opening statement was the conventional Trident.
What we are seeking here is prompt, global strike. And with
the technologies we have today, we can do that with
conventional weapons. And we can draw down the number of
nuclear weapons necessary to accomplish prompt global strike,
number one.
And number two, we can have a capability that is beyond
nuclear. In other words, today, if something happens quickly
and we have to respond quickly, the only choice that we have in
a global capability is a nuclear weapon.
That is unacceptable for the range of threats that we are
going to face in the future. We need a conventional capability.
It will be more appropriate for several of the scenarios, and I
am happy to discuss that, to the extent that we can, in this
hearing.
The second piece of this activity is a defense that is
credible. In other words, what we want is a balanced offense-
defense capability.
Offense is not always the right answer, and it is usually
where you do not want to end up. What we want to be able to do
is drive this to a non-confrontational issue, whatever happens
to occur.
And so, a defensive capability gives us a way to defuse
things, to devalue things.
The asset out there in the world that has got the biggest
market right now are short-and medium-range ballistic missiles.
And we have got to find a way to respond to those.
They launch quickly, and they arrive quickly. They do not
wait for conventional force to close. They threaten neighbors.
How do you devalue those, so that they stop proliferating?
How do you make the governments who have them think twice about
using them, number one, and think twice about the effect that
they are going to have?
How do you change the adversary's calculus about his
opportunity to be successful with these short-and medium-range
ballistic missiles?
That is the next phase that we have got to start to take on
with ballistic missile defense.
The phase after that that we are starting to look at is
cruise missiles. And what are we going to do against the
proliferation of cruise missiles and their increased
sophistication?
What we are convinced, at least inside of STRATCOM, is you
do not want to build a completely separate system for cruise
missiles. You want to leverage the lessons that we have learned
and the capabilities and command and control and sensor
management that we learned in ballistic missile and apply that
to cruise missile, rather than building a separate system.
And that is the path that we are on. I would be happy to
have more discussion about that.
Two other areas. Space: There were questions about space
and the ASAT test. I would be happy to discuss that.
But the position from the command is, number one, just
because there is a threat in space does not mean you have to
respond in space. We do not need an arms race in space.
And the last piece is cyber. In cyber, this country is
under attack on a daily basis, whether it be in the commerce
and industry sectors, in the academic sectors or in the defense
sectors.
We have to start to understand how we are going to contest
this environment, provide defenses for the country, rather
than, as we do today, just defend the terminals, wait for a
patch and lose money the whole time, or lose intellectual
capital the whole time that we are waiting for somebody to fix
a vulnerability.
We have got to start to extend our defensive perimeters out
beyond the terminals, beyond the computers and the firewalls.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield the rest of my time here to my
counterparts.
[The prepared statement of General Cartwright can be found
in the Appendix on page 54.]
The Chairman. General, thank you so much, and we will look
forward to asking you those questions to which you referred.
Admiral Keating, I guess this is your last appearance in
your present role.
Admiral Keating. I think so.
The Chairman. Thank you for your excellent service in the
past. We look forward to your future service.
Admiral Keating.
STATEMENT OF ADM. TIMOTHY J. KEATING, COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN
COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman
Hunter, members of the committee. It is a privilege to appear
before you this morning to represent the men and women of North
American Aerospace Defense Command and the United States
Northern Command.
Homeland defense is the core of our national military
strategy. And while NORAD and NORTHCOM are separate commands,
we operate with complementary missions. We work together for
our sacred mission of defending our homelands.
We operate within a common security environment. We share a
headquarters staff. We embrace common values. We understand the
importance of executing our duties with a sense of urgency in
the face of very real and present dangers.
It is my honor to represent all those fine young men and
women before you today.
The core capability to accomplish our missions resides in
our people. We are grateful for your support, Mr. Chairman, and
all the Congress, for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines
and Coast Guardsmen. Their welfare and the welfare of their
families is our highest priority.
We remain resolutely committed to defending the United
States and Canada and Mexico against all threats.
To address a couple of questions, Mr. Chairman and
Congressman Hunter, that you asked in your opening comments, we
are vitally interested in providing the American people the
capabilities that they need to defend our homeland and to
provide support to civil authorities when we are directed.
That means an integrated team of active, reserve and guard
forces. That is our sole focus, the integration of this team.
We have seven general officers on our staff at the United
States Northern Command who are reserve or guard officers--
seven. Over 150 troops come through our doors every morning who
are reserve or guard or Air Guard forces.
We have an annual conference in the late winter with all of
the hurricane adjutants general--the adjutants general from New
York all the way around the Atlantic Coast and the Gulf Coast
of Texas. Ten to a dozen adjutants general come every spring,
and we discuss the requirements that may well be levied upon us
if a hurricane is of sufficient import.
I have met with each and every adjutant general of the
United States and discussed face-to-face with them their issues
and our issues.
I am convinced that we are on the same page, Mr. Chairman,
and that we have a common purpose: to provide the American
people with the support that they deserve.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Keating can be found in
the Appendix on page 73.]
The Chairman. Admiral Keating, thank you, sir.
General Schwartz.
STATEMENT OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, COMMANDER, U.S.
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter and
members of the committee, it is also a pleasure and a privilege
for me to represent the 150,000 folks in the Transportation
Command who basically move by air, land and sea the materiel
and personnel of the Department of Defense.
We, during 2006, I think, have provided noteworthy support
to the department, as well as made considerable efforts to
advance the distribution processes and systems that we depend
upon, along with the remainder of the logistics community.
Fundamentally, I think we have focused our attention on
making sure that the right personnel, the right equipment, the
right sustainment and support is delivered at the right place
and time in order to support, as you suggested earlier, our
warfighters.
In addition, we have the responsibility of being the
distribution process owner for the department. And in that, we
are laboring to improve the precision, the reliability and the
efficiency of the DOD supply chain, simply by improving
business process, by making information systems interoperable
and by securing enhanced mobility assets.
I would also note, Mr. Chairman, that we take particular
pride in the rewarding aero-medical evacuation mission. And we
do that with special care.
I could not be prouder of our joint team and our national
partners. We all are supporting the global war on terror while
making a concerted effort to transform the military deployment
and distribution enterprise.
I am grateful to you, sir, and to the committee for
allowing me to appear before you today, for the essential
support that you provide in enabling our capabilities. And I am
prepared to take any questions that you have, sir.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Schwartz can be found in
the Appendix on page 94.]
The Chairman. Thank you so much, General Schwartz.
Admiral Stavridis, welcome.
STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN
COMMAND, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hunter, distinguished members
of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to
come before you today and discuss some of the issues, what we
are doing, and the challenges we face throughout Latin America
and the Caribbean.
I want to thank each of you personally for your service.
And I would encourage each of you to come travel in the region.
And I would encourage you to come to Guantanamo Bay and see it
for yourself, if you have not done so.
On behalf of all of us at Southern Command, thank you for
the support you provide to us, just as you do to my wingmen
here today.
I do want to say to General Cartwright and Admiral Keating
and General Schwartz, thank you for all the support you give to
U.S. Southern Command. We appreciate it greatly.
Our mission down south is straightforward: to promote
security cooperation and conduct operations with the 32
countries and 13 territories that are down south of Mexico.
About 450 million people live down there. And we feel our work
contributes to the defense of the United States.
Our ability to accomplish the mission is significantly
influenced by our understanding of the diversity and the
culture down south, and that is an important part of what we
seek to do at U.S. Southern Command.
On that note, I would say all of us in the United States
think and understand that we live in a shared home called the
Americas. We tend to think of the term American as applying to
a citizen of the United States, but we are all Americans in
this hemisphere. It is an extraordinary and diverse part of the
world.
And I would argue that the part of the world that I am
engaged in is not America's ``backyard.'' I do not like that
expression much. I would not even call it America's front
porch. It is part of a shared home that we all have together.
I have been in the job about five months. I have had a
chance to travel pretty widely since then, and I can tell you
that our partners in the region are making, I think, good,
strong progress.
They face significant threats and challenges: narcotics, we
have talked about a little bit; gangs--``pandillas'' and
``maras'' they are called--to the south; illicit trafficking in
human persons.
The challenges of this region are many, but they are not
straightforward military challenges. And thus, there is a
particular emphasis in this part of the world on working with
the interagency, working with our partners at State, with
Homeland Security, particularly the Coast Guard or the Drug
Enforcement Agency and many others.
I would tell you that everything we do in Latin America and
the Caribbean, frankly, depends on strong interagency linkages.
Given that, I think it is important to understand the great
potential of the region. And if we can unlock that together--
the United States and the other nations of the region working
together--we and the military-to-military realm want to be part
of that in a very positive way. And that is what we seek to do.
I would like to close, as my compatriots have, by just
saying how proud I am to serve alongside the men and women of
the U.S. Southern Command: active duty, reservists, civilians,
soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen. I
could not ask, as we would say in the Navy, for better
shipmates anywhere ashore in the world.
Thank you again to the members of the committee, the
chairman and the ranking member. Appreciate your time, and I
look forward to your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis can be found
in the Appendix on page 118.]
The Chairman. I certainly thank you gentlemen for your
excellent testimony.
I will ask one question of Admiral Stavridis and then turn
to my ranking, and then we will be off and running on the five-
minute rule.
Admiral, the United Nations, some members of the Congress
and other people in and out of our country have raised the
issue of the detention and interrogation facilities at
Guantanamo.
Could the detainees be held elsewhere within your area of
responsibility with the same security and effectiveness?
Admiral Stavridis. No, sir. I do not believe they could be
held anywhere in my area of responsibility with the same degree
of security and effectiveness.
I believe at Guantanamo Bay we are operating a humane, a
legal, and a transparent detention and interrogation facility.
Transparent--we have had over 2,000 journalists visit it
over the last four years. We have had over 2,000 high-level
visitors, including many, many members of Congress. Most
recently, Senator Levin and Senator Graham came down just this
past week.
We fully follow Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.
We follow the laws of the United States. We will continue to do
that.
I believe it is a humane facility. I think compared to any
facility in the world, it is a very humane and well-run
operation.
I personally cannot think of another location in my area of
responsibility that would make sense to move these particular
individuals. And I believe they must be kept in a place where
they are not free to do the kinds of things that have occurred
before in terrorist acts against the United States.
The Chairman. My friend, Duncan Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, following your custom here, I see Mr. Conaway
and Mr. Davis down in the front row. I would be happy to pass
on my time and yield them my time under the five-minute rule,
and I will ask a few questions at the end of the hearing.
The Chairman. You bet. Which one do you choose?
Mr. Hunter. You know, I think Mr. Davis is getting up
there.
The Chairman. All right. Mr. Davis is recognized for five
minutes.
Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank you, Ranking Member Hunter, for the opportunity.
One question that many of us are interested in,
particularly as we deal with the challenges of the rising
problems with Islamic radicalism, seeing the action of our
agencies, particularly during Hurricane Katrina, other issues
that we have run into, I am very curious about your views of
interagency reform needs, in Southern Command in particular.
And generally from a Northern Command and homeland defense
standpoint, if Admiral Keating and Admiral Stavridis might
comment on some statutory changes that might improve the
interagency process, to make our interagency community a little
bit more expeditionary, but also more integrated, to anticipate
the types of things, particularly the non-military types of
things, where we can preempt or minimize the likelihood of
conflict.
Admiral Keating. Congressman Davis, I would be happy to
start, and then Jim can provide his perspective.
We have 60, at Northern Command, different agencies
represented in our headquarters. So, that is true interagency
representation.
It goes beyond that, however. There is actual productivity.
It is not just activity, but it is productivity during the
courses of exercises--and we conduct a number of those--during
the courses of real-world operations. We benefit significantly
from the presence and the expertise represented by those 60
different agencies.
And it is not all federal. About two-thirds of those are
Federal agencies, and a third are non-federal, like Red Cross,
World Health Organization, and folks like that.
As far as the imposition of statutory concerns for us, I am
unaware of any that would be of significant early benefit
compared to the day-to-day operations that we conduct and day-
to-day staff work, though I think there is merit in some
consideration, and I believe this is under way for the similar
Goldwater-Nichols-like education and joint duties as requisites
for promotion within other agencies, sir.
Admiral Stavridis. Well, as is often said on Capitol Hill,
I would like to associate myself with Admiral Keating's
remarks. I would echo the fact--the good news is that there is
an awful lot of interagency partnering that is going on in all
the combatant commands and with all the partners exactly as
Admiral Keating indicated.
What we do at Southern Command is, we have just stood up a
new directorate. We call it the J-9. So, it is one of our key
functionalities within the command, that is devoted to the
interagency. It is staffed with interagency partners. Various
agencies around the government have volunteered to put people
into this group down in Miami.
And I would argue that, as we look forward at the future of
combatant commands, they will start to look a lot more
interagency, more combined, more international partners
involved and in the headquarters. We have six international
partners who are in our headquarters with us.
And again, I agree with Admiral Keating, that exactly the
type of wisdom that Congress had in passing Goldwater-Nichols,
which led to a better level of jointness between the services,
I think that is an extremely rich area for study, and should be
pursued.
And again, we are trying to do it at our own level, but it
certainly would be a sensible topic to pursue. Again, certainly
in Southern Command, where so many of the tasks we face, the
challenges we face are not direct military kinds of things.
We are not launching Tomahawk missiles downrange in
SOUTHCOM. We are launching ideas. And we need interagency
partners to help us do that.
Mr. Davis of Kentucky. That is one area that we would like
to work with you on, having seen a consistent pattern of
challenges faced, whether it was during Hurricane Katrina in
Haiti, the military can only get the ball so far down the
field. And I think we are dealing with the same things in Iraq
and Afghanistan right now, where the visible cost is so much
higher.
But a lot of the types of challenges that could be faced by
a more integrated--and I still get the sense that there will
have to be statutory change to amend personnel policies and to
change some of these priorities, you know, ranging from
reconstructing a banking system after a hurricane to more
complex matters.
So, thank you.
I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you so much for all the great work that you all do.
Admiral Stavridis, in your testimony, you state that your
region is a highly likely base for future terrorist threats.
And you comment, coupled with the significant reduction of the
Navy presence in the Gulf Coast--you know we shut down the only
deepwater base we had, which was Naval Station Ingleside.
And it was not too long ago we had a big meeting here, and
the question came up about who were the gangs involved. One of
the gangs, prominent gangs, that came up was the Mara
Salvatrucha. You are probably very familiar with them.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ortiz. But, you know, I am also concerned with the
drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. I am concerned with keeping the
commercial sea lanes open in the Gulf of Mexico. I am concerned
with all the refineries in the Gulf of Mexico. We do not have a
deepwater sea port.
You are doing a great job by doing exercises with the
different countries in that area. But you know what? I am very,
very concerned.
And I read in the statement that you said that the economic
linkage between the nations of the Americas has risen
dramatically over the last decade, with north and south trade
comprising about 40 percent. Well, it seems to me that the Navy
does not look north and south--at least the overall Navy. I was
told that they look east and west.
But are you happy with what we have there? Could we do
more?
I am very, very concerned. They are our neighbors, and it
seems to me that we have not really focused.
And I know it is not entirely your responsibility. We have
to do something to help you.
And then you mention about Hezbollah, as well. That
terrorist group has a prominent--and now, I know I am asking
too many questions, but they are very much in that area. And I
am concerned that we do not have enough militarily to respond
in case we do have a crisis.
Maybe you can respond to--your statement was a great
statement, maybe because I come from Texas, from the Gulf of
Mexico. But that was a very, very good statement, Admiral.
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.
I am going to ask Admiral Keating to chime in here, because
he is actually the combatant commander who has principal
responsibility for the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. My border
kind of runs just south of Mexico itself, and so, he owns those
waters. I own the Caribbean waters immediately adjacent. But I
think your question is relevant to both of us.
As far as the Navy's posture and where it is located, I
would certainly leave those questions to the chief of naval
operations, who has the requirement to do the training,
equipment, and organize.
I would mention that last summer we had a Navy aircraft
carrier come through those waters. A very successful
deployment. We called it the Partnership of the Americas
carrier. Did a whole series of exercises that ranged from
military readiness to counterterrorism to counternarcotics to
humanitarian and civic projects.
We have multiple ship visits on any given day throughout
the waters of the Caribbean. And this summer, as you may have
seen, the President just announced that he approved an
initiative that we sent up to bring a hospital ship into those
waters.
Clearly, it does not bring offensive power. But again, in
this theme that we are not sending missiles downrange in Latin
America, we are sending ideas and interactions and humanitarian
assistance in so many ways. And that contributes to our long-
term security.
We will have the Comfort in the region for over four
months, which I think is very positive.
We were also operating something called Enduring
Friendship, which is a counterterrorism use of funds that the
Congress allocated under section 1206 of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) last year. That puts radars, boats and
command and control apparatus in place in eight different
nations of the region, which I think are helpful against the
kinds of threats you so aptly identified.
Last, the Navy is approving the deployment of something
under an experimental type of concept called Global Fleet
Stations, which will be a high-speed vessel, a swift, which
will come into the area of operations and operate throughout
the Gulf, partnering with our nations there to try and take on
these kinds of threats that you, again, correctly articulated.
Admiral Keating, anything to add to that, sir?
Admiral Keating. Congressman Ortiz, I would share your
concern about the threat to our homeland from terrorists. We
share that concern, and we are working across the spectrum with
those capabilities in the Department of Defense, not just from
a Navy perspective, though we are actively working with the
Navy, the Coast Guard and Air Force in particular.
Their forces are integrated in the this overall system-of-
systems that we have, that we think is doing an adequate job of
addressing approaches to our homeland, whether they are air,
land or maritime.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much. My time is up. Thank you so
much.
The Chairman. Thank you.
It looks like Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
Two of the happiest four-stars maybe in the world are
sitting here. I know General Cartwright, because he is a Marine
aviator on an Air Force base, and Admiral Keating, because he
has taken a back-to-back hardship tour, moving from Colorado
Springs to Honolulu.
Congratulations to you both, and to all of you.
I want to associate myself with the remarks and discussion
about the interagency process. Admiral Keating and I have had
discussions about this a number of times. And if I have the
chance, I would like to get back to that.
But I would like to go to SOUTHCOM, if I could, for just a
minute. And while we were gathering before the hearing, you
were speaking in Spanish for a minute or two and sounded
conversant, if not fluent. After sort of ``buenos dias'' and
``bienvenidos,'' I tend to run out.
But the question is, your whole area of responsibility--
well, absent Brazil and Belize and maybe one or two others--is
Spanish-speaking. How are you staffed? What is the competency
in Spanish of your staff right now?
Admiral Stavridis. It is one----
Mr. Kline. Don't even think about it.
Admiral Stavridis. Estudio studiando espanol una hora cada
dia, porque es muy importante por el jefe o commando sur.
I know Congressman Ortiz got that.
Mr. Kline. I will ask for a translation from him later.
Admiral Stavridis. Okay. I said I am studying Spanish about
an hour a day, because I think it is very important for the
commander of U.S. Southern Command.
Of 450 million people, about 180 million speak Portuguese,
which is similar to Spanish. The rest, largely, sir, you are
correct, speak Spanish.
I think it is a crucial part of what we need to do. If we
are going to be involved in this region, we must learn the
languages.
These are not extremely difficult languages, as Japanese
would be for a U.S. speaker, or Arabic or Pashto or Hindu.
These are Romance languages. They are very similar to English
in many ways.
What we are doing at U.S. Southern Command is, we have set
a goal that 60 percent of the personnel assigned will speak a
second language, one of the languages of the region. That is a
stretch goal. It will be a challenge to achieve it.
We are putting resources behind that, everything from
computer programs that people can self-learn, to having
classes, to having testing of the----
Mr. Kline. Excuse me. Where do you think you are now toward
this----
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I think I am at 40 percent, which
is extremely high. DOD-wide, it might be 20 percent.
But at U.S. Southern Command, because we are lucky enough
to be in the Miami area, a lot of people volunteer to come down
who are of Hispanic descent. So, we have a rather high number
of native Spanish speakers, which helps the rest of us as we
seek to improve our facilities.
I believe, to learn another man's language is to understand
his life. I think it is an important aspect of integrating and
acting in an area of operations. So, I am putting serious
resources against it in this part of the world.
Mr. Kline. Thank you. I agree with you, and I applaud you
for that effort.
I don't know. I guess we are always looking for ways that
we can help, so if you will stay in dialogue with us. I am a
little reluctant to put something like that in a statute.
But, again, I commend you for that effort. And I am glad to
hear it is moving that way.
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.
And I would mention that the Department of Defense has
recently increased the incentives for individuals in the armed
forces to learn foreign languages broadly around the world, and
that is very helpful. And that is being funded by the Congress,
and we appreciate it greatly.
Mr. Kline. Right. Thank you very much.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kline. The light is still green. It will not be for
much longer.
But, Admiral Keating, we have had discussions on a couple
of occasions in your offices and in mine about this interagency
process. And you have been able to get quite a bit done. I
mean, we talked about plans that you have on the shelf, and
those involved interagencies.
One of my concerns is, this is personality, it can be
personality-driven. If there is something that we can help with
for process in institutionalizing it, we would like to be able
to help.
If you have got any comments now, the light is about to
turn red, but I would like to----
Admiral Keating. And nothing directly, Congressman. I do
not know that a statutory imposition is a good idea.
But your active and abiding concern, which many of you have
demonstrated by visits, not just in Northern Command, but
throughout the United States and visiting folks like civil
support teams that are national guard and active duty, and the
embedded defense coordinating officers that are Title 10 folks
with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions.
As you course around the country and visit your
constituents, I would recommend those locations to you.
Mr. Kline. Thank you.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Abercrombie.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Keating, I am doing my best to try and figure out
just what it is, four and a half years later, that the Northern
Command does. Who is in charge of what?
I have read through your testimony. I have gone through the
staff preparation on mission and organization. I see a lot of
words in here about homeland defense, referring to a concerted
national effort to secure the homeland from threats and
violence, as differentiated from homeland defense, referring to
military protection of the United States, civil support areas,
called C.S., in the area of homeland defense, with the DOD as
the lead agency.
Are you or are you not in charge of civil support defense
of the United States? And if you are, who is subordinate to
you, and what is the reporting hierarchy?
Admiral Keating. I would answer the question, Congressman,
that I am not in charge of civil support homeland defense. I am
tasked by the secretary of defense and the President for
defending the homeland and providing defense support to civil
authorities.
And I think the words matter here and the distinction is
important.
Mr. Abercrombie. I think so, too. I cannot figure out what
you do. As far as I can tell, you have a group of people,
approximately 500, because these budgets all disappear into
joint task forces and all kinds of integrated team efforts. I
cannot even find--I am doing my best to try and figure out
where all your budget is.
What precisely do you do?
Admiral Keating. Defend our homeland and provide defense
support to civil authorities.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. Then what is your relationship to
the Department of Homeland Security and the National Guard
Bureau?
Admiral Keating. The relationship to the National Guard
Bureau is informal.
As far as my dealings with General Steve Blum--who is a
good friend; I talk to him frequently--he has, as you are
aware, budgetary authority for the national guard and the
international guard. And so, we work with him to advocate
certain programs for him. But he has an $18-billion-a-year
budget, and ours is $130 million. So, our impact on his budget
is primarily through advocacy.
In terms of our relationship with the Department of
Homeland Security, it is not a statutory relationship. It is
one that is based upon a common goal of providing security and
support for the citizens of the United States.
Mr. Abercrombie. What does that mean? Aside from being good
friends and aside from speaking to one another, what does it
mean?
Admiral Keating. It is a lot more than that, Congressman.
It is exercising frequently. It is sharing plans. It is sharing
officers and staff workers.
It is engaging in comprehensive activities across the broad
range of our assignments and Department of Homeland Security's
requirements to ensure that we are not again attacked, and that
in the event of a catastrophe, whether natural or manmade, we
work, when we are directed by the President, to operate closely
with the Department of Homeland security to mitigate suffering
and save human lives.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. That is all very well and good.
The National Guard Commission report says that, after four
and a half years, the Northern Command should develop plans for
consequence management--whatever that is--and support the
civilian authorities that account for state level activities
and incorporate the use of national guard and reserve forces,
as first military responders.
We have had four and a half years to plan that.
Admiral Keating. The plans are done, Mr. Congressman. They
are on the shelf.
Mr. Abercrombie. They were not done as of March 1, 2007,
according to the National Guard Commission report.
Admiral Keating. The report is in error, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, maybe we will need to get the National Guard
Commission here, because Admiral Keating says that this
commission report, which you have referred to, is in error.
The Chairman. The National Guard Commission will be
testifying before this committee on this Friday, as a matter of
fact.
Mr. Abercrombie. You do have plans now for consequence
management and support of civil authorities that account for
state-level activities and incorporation of the national guard
and reserve forces in a first responder military activity in
response to an attack on the United States. They are in
existence.
Admiral Keating. They do exist and have for some time.
Mr. Abercrombie. Then who is in charge?
Admiral Keating. It depends on what the President decides,
whether he gives it to the Department of Homeland Security or
Department of Defense. By statute, it is the Department of
Homeland Security.
Mr. Abercrombie. Oh, so you have Title 10 and you have
Title 32.
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Now, that is already established as to
whether the governor calls up a national guard unit under state
status for payment by the state or by the Federal Government.
And you bring in the posse comitatus situation under Title 10.
We already know that that is established.
I want to know who is in charge of these plans. Who
executes them? Do you, or the national guard, or the individual
states, or the Department of Homeland Security?
Admiral Keating. It depends on the situation, the gravity
of the consequence management challenge presented. And we are
prepared to do it, if we are tasked. We in the Northern Command
are prepared to execute that mission.
Mr. Abercrombie. Or do you figure it out as you go along?
Admiral Keating. It depends on the situation and it depends
on who gets the assignment from the Department of Defense and
the President of the United States.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we have
to examine very, very closely whether this needs to go on, or
that this is just another proliferation of tail-chasing
bureaucracy.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank all of you, as always. Let me always express
gratitude every time you come before a committee like this.
Those of you who pay the price for human freedom, at least as
we know it in America. I am very grateful to each one of you.
General Cartwright, I have had an opportunity to talk to
you in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee a number of times. And
I am glad you are on our side.
Let me first talk to you a little bit. It seems like most
of the threats that this country has had in the past, just
historically, for some reason, the trend has been that we never
seem to recognize something before there is blood on the wall.
There was a time when the Nazis were just a bunch of guys
in brown shirts riding across the bicycles in France, and they
were no threat to anybody, except that they had a dangerous
ideology that had the ability to take hold.
The Cold War began when we got one of our secrets lost in
Los Alamos and the Russians kind of took it and ran with it.
In each case, we could have probably responded earlier and
maybe prevented some of the great challenges that we had. And I
think that these things sneak up on us a little bit.
But there is one thing in the distance that is not sneaking
up on us, and that is the growing power and capability of
China.
I do not think they are being very quiet. And I think there
is a rumble in the distance there, and that we need to be very
aware of what is occurring there.
Their ASAT test concerns me greatly. And obviously, I think
it is important that the United States gain some superiority in
space, as soon as possible, given the implications of that ASAT
test.
With that in mind, do you think there is enough urgency in
this Congress and in this country related to our missile
defense capabilities in space, our capabilities to defend this
country in general, in that growing frontier?
General Cartwright. Sir, I think, in regards to China, and
in regards to the ASAT test, that we have set the conditions
over the past five years to improve our situation awareness, to
start to understand what is an appropriate defense in space,
sensors and capabilities, and to understand that our responses
to threats in space do not necessarily have to be directed or
accomplished in space.
The question for me--and I think you have rightly described
it--is, are we moving quickly enough to foster ourselves in
this environment? Should we be doing something else to make
ourselves ready?
And it is always difficult. I mean, the crystal ball is
always better on Monday morning than it was on Friday before
the game.
And so, we have moved aggressively to improve our space
situation awareness. There is a substantial amount of
organizational construct. And we talked a little bit here
about--we have listened to some interagency discussion on how
we change.
Many of those changes associated with space have been
accomplished, and we are now in the process of executing those
relationships, and starting to put them into beyond the
personal, to actual directive, to connect the dots, so to
speak, between the different agencies and their equities in
space.
The second piece is, as you alluded to, where is China
going in this activity and how are they approaching it versus
how we are approaching it?
They have started to field what we call a continuum of
capability, from the lowest end of capability all the way
through the most sophisticated, and filling in all of the
blocks en route.
And ASAT, a direct ASAT, a direct ascent ASAT, is something
that is effective against low-earth orbit satellites. It does
not reach out into highly elliptical or other types of orbits
out to geostationary. But it can reach many of the valuable
satellites that we have down in low-earth orbit.
Mr. Franks. General, forgive me. I hate to interrupt you,
but I am almost out of time, and you did good, but I want to
get this on the record, as well.
Related to some of the missiles that we have been testing,
we have had seven out of eight attempts with the missile three
successful, and the missile two, the block two-four, against
short-range target missiles in May of 2006--all successful.
Isn't it time--and help me understand why not--that these
be placed on our Aegis ships, so that at least we have that
capability, in case it should ever be needed?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir. And we are doing a limited
deployment, but you always run the risk of transitioning while
you are still testing, of building too many, and then finding
out that the configuration needs to be changed, and now you
have got to go back and re-change.
We have built what we call a hedge--we are fielding that
right now--sufficient missiles and ships that are matched in
capability that can be deployed forward in extremis. And that
is the hedge capability.
We are trying not to overbuild until we have a good
understanding of what the end state ought to be and finish all
of the testing.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Sometimes the price of trying to aim ahead for some of
these dangers is sounding a little bit overwrought before
everyone else is.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
The next gentleman is Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schwartz, I wanted to ask you--this topic has come
up before--this issue of the statutory language that we put in
the defense bill, I think, last year and maybe some other years
also, in which we essentially prohibit you all from retiring
old C-5s, old C-130E models. I think there are some other
planes.
It has been difficult for me to understand why we do that.
Would you discuss that issue? My guess is that members get
concerned that, if a plane is retired it will mean that there
will not be any replacement coming to a particular local base.
But what is the reality of that? How much money is it
costing us? As somebody who has C-130Es with wing box problems
in their district, I would just as soon they would be retired
and we would try to replace them. I do not think they are doing
anybody any good.
But what is your perspective on that?
General Schwartz. Congressman Snyder, in prior times when
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) was a major concern, these
issues about holding on to old iron perhaps had greater
relevance.
At the moment, we are in a situation where it is very
challenging for the Air Force to manage the fleet in a way that
optimizes their support of my mission.
In the case of the C-130's, as you are aware, we have had
difficulty retiring the old E models. And, as a matter of fact,
those E models we have retired have to be maintained in
recoverable status out in Arizona at the bone yard, if you
will, which is a more expensive way to maintain the retired
asset than if you simply retired it outright.
And so, my point as the operator on this--and, of course,
the Air Force is the organize, train and equip entity--but that
I recommend that you give the Air Force the flexibility to
manage the fleets to best effect, to support the joint force
mission.
And that means accessing old platforms and really making
them go away, rather than remaining on the ramp, where the
youngsters have to continue to maintain them.
A key point--the maintainers that support the airplanes are
really the coin of the realm. And if we have to spread their
talent over a larger population of air frames, some of which we
cannot really fly--it is true in the KC-135 fleet and also in
the 130 fleet--it is not the right way to run this operation.
Dr. Snyder. Do you need affirmative language from us in the
defense bill? Or do you just need us not to put prohibitive
language into the defense bill?
General Schwartz. Sir, I think the latter is the approach,
which would be not to have language which specifically affects
certain aircraft----
Dr. Snyder. The KC-135s, the C-130s----
General Schwartz [continuing]. Certain locations, and so
on. That is correct.
Dr. Snyder. Are those the----
General Schwartz. And for that matter, C-5s.
Dr. Snyder. Are those the three, the C-5s, the KC-145s and
C-130Es?
General Schwartz. On the lift side, that is correct, sir.
Dr. Snyder. On another topic, would you make a comment
about the mobility capability study?
There are some who have expressed concerns--I think the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) is among them--that the
study--I think maybe some people thought it was going to be a
more far-reaching or revolutionary, or whatever word you want
to use, that it seemed to endorse kind of a status quo look
ahead.
Now, that may not be a fair statement. Sometimes you look
ahead and there is not a revolution on the horizon.
But what are your thoughts about that?
General Schwartz. Sir, the mobility capability study was
not bold. I think that----
Dr. Snyder. I am sorry. What? I am sorry.
General Schwartz. It was not bold.
Dr. Snyder. It was not bold, okay.
General Schwartz. In other words, the way it came out, for
example, was, for big airplanes there was a range of 292 to
383, and this was a matter of how much risk you were willing to
accept.
It would have been more satisfying, I think, to all of us,
had the study given us an objective. For me, big airplanes, big
cargo lift airplanes, roughly 300 airplanes is the right
target. And that is what I would recommend to you as the
target.
Studies inevitably are based on assumptions. And there are
people--people can argue about whether the assumptions entailed
with Mounted Combat System (MCS) was adequate.
I can tell you, sir, that our sense is that about 300 big
airplanes, about 400 C-130-like airplanes. And it remains to be
seen what the tanker fleet looks like, but probably somewhere
in the 400 to 500 aircraft range.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
I do not mean to ignore the other gentlemen, but thank you
all for being here.
Thank you, General Schwartz.
General Schwartz. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Castor appears to be the last on the before-the-gavel
list, unless someone comes back that was on it. Ms. Castor is
recognized.
Ms. Castor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
Admiral, when it comes to Southern Command and enhancing
our national security, I strongly believe that, yes, we need to
continue to work on the partnerships with the nations there,
yes, militarily, but also economically and politically. And I
thought I would give you a short list of a few, and ask you to
comment upon them.
The Panama Canal right now is going through a widening and
modernization. Could you comment on that, what you know about
the status and the safety and security of that very important
asset moving forward?
Also, the struggles that we are having in Haiti. If you
could comment briefly on Cuba, I would appreciate that. That
could take much longer than five minutes.
And then also, the Southern Command's medical readiness
training exercises. When I think about, as we consider the
markup and the resources that need to be spanned across the
globe, I think it will be very important to enhance our
national security, like I said, on the peacekeeping in the
Caribbean Basin and Latin America.
Talk to me then--have you asked for enough on humanitarian
and civic assistance, your New Horizons program?
And if we were able to target additional resources, where
would you recommend?
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you. And if I do not get through
all that, I will get back to you taking the question for the
record. But I think I can get through most of this quickly.
Panama Canal--I am a naval officer. In fact, I am a ship
driver within the Navy. We do have pilots and submariners, but
I drive ships.
I have driven ships through the Panama Canal, both when it
was run by the United States of America and during the period
of time now when it has been run by the Republic of Panama.
It is an excellent, safe, professionally run facility. And
I am very, very impressed with the work the Panamanians have
done in the canal. It is really the beating heart of the
economy of the Americas, when you look at the flow through the
canal. It is extremely important. And I think it is a very
well-run facility.
We do an annual exercise with 20 different countries to
look at the security of the Panama Canal. It is called Panamax.
It looks at counterterrorism threats, which are always an
issue. And it will be going on this June.
Haiti, I think, is at this moment in a stable place. It is
the poorest and most impoverished country in the region, as I
am sure you know.
The United Nations is there with about 6,600 peacekeepers.
About half of those are provided from nations of the region.
They are doing a very credible job building a base of stability
from which, hopefully, prosperity can emerge.
I am traveling to Haiti, in fact, with your colleague,
Congressman Meek, in April, and I am looking forward to the
trip.
We do not have a large investment in terms of U.S. military
presence. I would call it a success story by the United Nations
in terms of what they are doing, and I look forward to learning
more about it when I go down there personally.
Cuba is obviously in an interesting moment in its history.
Fidel Castro's health is a question mark. The degree to which
his brother, Raul, has taken the reins of power is also under
some question, given the health of Fidel. So, I think it is
very difficult to make a prediction from this moment as to what
will happen. We continue to watch the situation closely.
Medical readiness--we have a series of projects to which
you alluded, and I thank you for doing so, called the New
Horizons, which are training projects for U.S. military folks
who go down into countries in the region and provide services
ranging from building a clinic to putting in a well to doing
medical treatments.
They are very successful as a means of both exercising the
military and of undertaking the kinds of strategic
communication we are talking about here, about launching ideas
into the region.
I will couple that with--the deployment of the Comfort this
summer will be matched up with some of that. We treated, last
year, 250,000 patients. We treated 80,000 animals. There is a
veterinary part of this that goes with it. It is a very robust
part of our program.
We have requested funds from the Congress for it, and I
think they are adequate to our needs. And I solicit your
support for them.
Thank you.
Ms. Castor. Thank you.
The Chairman. The next person is Mr. Saxton.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Cartwright, I would just like to make a remark, and
ask you if you would be willing to work with me. I have got a
question that is probably best answered off-line. It relates to
Boost Phase Intercept.
I have noted the preponderance of our investment and
activity and effort on mid-course and terminal intercept. And I
had some folks from the Navy in the other day, and we were
talking about boost phase. And it seems to me like we might be
spending a little more time looking at boost phase,
particularly from naval platforms.
I would like to sit with you someday and spend some time
just discussing that phase of missile defense, if that is
possible.
General Cartwright. I would be happy to do that, sir.
Mr. Saxton. General Schwartz, thanks for being here this
morning. I appreciate it very much.
I was first elected to Congress in 1984. It seems like a
long time ago. And one of my great experiences was to go out to
McGuire Air Force Base, which is in my district, and spend some
time with the then-21st Air Force commander, Don Logeais.
And one of the activities that we did that day was to just
ride along the flight line and look at the C-17s that were
sitting out there--the CE-141s, excuse me--that were sitting
out on the flight line.
And I think, if my memory serves me correctly, there were
62 birds that were assigned to McGuire at that time. And I
remarked what a remarkable fleet it was. And General Logeais
said--now, this was 1985--``They are wearing out.''
And we went and had lunch and he said, ``There is one more
thing I want to show you.'' And we went around the corner to a
little reception room. And there on the wall was an artist's
rendering of an airplane. It was a C-17, in 1985. And it would
be six years until the next one, until the first operational
model came off the line. It was actually in June. It was June
14, 1991, that it rolled off the line.
That was 16 years ago. And we did not know, when we started
rolling them off the line, how many we were going to buy. First
we said--I think the initial number was 100 or 115. And I think
we arrived at that number for budgetary reasons. And then we
bought 15 more for special ops, because we thought we needed
them.
And then we said, ``We are going to have to increase the
size of the fleet,'' and then we went to 180. Last year we
bought 10 more and we went to 190.
And these birds, some of which are now 16 years old--I am
going to use Don Logeais's words--are going to wear out and are
on the way to wearing out. For a whole bunch of reasons: We are
flying them more than we thought we would. We have been at war
more than we thought we would. We are increasing the size of
the military that we carry with them, more than we thought we
would. The activities--we are doing tactical lift with them in
theater in Iraq. Never thought we would do that. The C-130's
wore out and made us do that.
So, this is not the first time you and I have had this
conversation, and I always appreciate having this conversation.
But I think it is important that we put on the record here
today, what, if any, plans you have to expand the buy of C-17s,
and what needs to be done in order for us to have the resources
to do that.
General Schwartz. Congressman, I would ask only that we not
focus exclusively on the C-17.
Lift, on the air side, is a combination of platforms that
are U.S. Government-owned and -operated--clearly, the C-5 and
the C-17 principally.
And, as well, there is a significant commercial component
that contributes to our ability to operate the Department of
Defense's transportation and distribution mission.
A quick example, when we deployed the first of the five
plus-up brigades to Kuwait and Iraq over the holiday period, 29
of the 34 aircraft that supported that deployment were
commercial. So, it is a significant piece of what we do.
And what we need to do, sir, is to have the right number of
organic airplanes and the capability to maintain our commercial
partners.
My belief is that, what we need is around 300 total, large-
lift, modern and reliable aircraft.
Your point about airplanes getting tired is certainly
valid. And you can compensate for that either through
maintenance and repair of the aircraft or buying new.
In the end, this is a question about opportunity cost. And
if we buy additional C-17s, the question is, what else might we
not get, like a new tanker, which, as you know, I believe is a
more pressing requirement than additional C-17s.
However, sir, if the collective wisdom is we need to
continue to procure C-17s, what I would recommend is that you
allow the department to adjust the fleet mix accordingly. That
means to take down lesser utility aircraft, and that means C-
5As. That is the trade space. And that is what I would
recommend.
The Chairman. Ms. Bordallo, the gentlelady from Guam.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker.
Admiral Keating, first let me publicly welcome you to the
Pacific area.
Admiral Keating. Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo. There are some exciting changes and
challenging times ahead, particularly in my area, the Territory
of Guam, and the Pacific Command. I welcomed your visit
yesterday, and I do look forward to working with you in the
years to come. Welcome.
General Schwartz, as the commander of Transportation
Command, I respectfully request that you help provide the
committee information on an issue of particular importance to
my constituents; that is, military retirees who live on Guam
who are referred off-island for specialty care and are forced
to travel to those locations at their own expense.
Prior to 2005, however, the Department of Defense
reimbursed retirees for the travel expenses they incurred as a
result of such medical referrals, or retirees were able to move
on MILAIR flights from Guam and Honolulu that flew on a regular
basis.
But as a result of the loss of this MILAIR service and the
change in policy and practice to no longer reimburse travel
costs associated with referred specialty care, the costs are
borne solely by the retiree. These trips to access referred
specialty care in Hawaii or the state of California cost
thousands of dollars.
I have raised this issue with the assistant secretary of
defense for health affairs, Dr. Winkenwerder, on a number of
occasions, and did so most recently on March 8th. I am awaiting
a response from the Pentagon about whether retirees on Guam,
who had been referred off-island for specialty treatment, can
currently travel on military aircraft on a space-available
basis to receive that medical care.
The retirees on Guam deserve resolution brought to this
matter. Insofar as TRANSCOM plays a role in the policy for
Space-A travel, and in the scheduling of MILAIR traffic in the
Pacific region, I respectfully ask that you examine this issue.
What I have proposed as an interim solution until we can
adequately resolve the underlying transportation service and
reimbursement issue, is that the department revise its policy
to report our military retirees, who are medically referred
away from Guam to receive specialty care, access to aircraft on
a space-available basis.
I have proposed that retirees should qualify for Space-A
travel at the category two priority level, and therefore,
treated the same as authorized personnel on environmental
morale leave status.
Can you comment?
General Schwartz. Congresswoman, thank you for this input.
This is a system issue that I was not aware of and one that I
will certainly look into as you have requested.
Let me just give you a little bit of background, though.
The retirees are entitled to Space-A travel, notwithstanding
their medical condition. And that is category three priority.
We recognize that, because of the level of effort that is
currently being devoted to Central Command, that, in the
Pacific--and Admiral Keating will soon discover this--that the
way we have compensated is by having commercial aircraft move
cargo and people in the Pacific theater. That has limited
space-available opportunities.
In order to compensate, ma'am, what we have tried to do--
and we issued instructions to military aircraft in the Pacific,
to maximize their Space-A capacity.
So, for example, where the tankers routinely did not carry
Space-A passengers, KC-135s, they now will. And they have
guidance to do so. That is part of the solution.
I will look at this question about the relative priority of
retirees seeking specialty medical care, and I will get back to
you, ma'am.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 148.]
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, General, and I
appreciate your response.
The Chairman. Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Chairman, following up on some of the conversation
earlier, I want to encourage the committee to look further into
this interagency process issue.
I received, yesterday, a written report from one of my
constituents who just got back from Iraq. And his belief is
that this is one of our greatest deficiencies, is the inability
of different agencies to effectively work together.
And I would hope that, even though it extends, of course,
beyond this committee's jurisdiction, I would hope that we can
at least explore some of the problems, which was mentioned
earlier.
Let me try to get to two areas, briefly.
Admiral Stavridis, we vote every year on funding for our
efforts in Colombia, with some people arguing that we are
making no progress. Can I get your view as to how things are
going there?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
I think, when thinking about Colombia, it is important to
decide where you are going to start measuring the progress. And
I would argue, we should look probably in the 1997, 1998, 1999
timeframe, when Colombia was in really difficult straits. And
there is a rich literature of the difficulties Colombians faced
in those days.
If you come forward from about the year 2000, moving
forward, let me give you a couple of metrics that I would say
are strong indicators of progress.
One is that today, in 1,098 municipalities, there is a
strong police presence all around Colombia. Another is the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has been
diminished in its membership, probably by about 30 percent,
from 18,000 to 12,000.
Additionally, one of the three insurgent groups of those
days, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), has
been demobilized through a negotiated settlement with the
government. Kidnappings are down 76 percent. Murders are down
about 50 percent.
The current president, President Uribe, enjoys very high,
positive ratings in public polls by internationally recognized
firms, well above 75 percent. Conversely, the FARC's approval
rating is below 10 percent. I think those are metrics.
Atmospherically, in my own travels in Colombia, I find you
can move about far more freely than you could five or six years
ago. My sense is, Colombia is far from perfect.
They continue to strive to improve their human rights
record. They are dealing now with a political problem
associated with folks who perhaps had interactions with some of
the right wing insurgent groups.
But they are dealing with those in a mature, sensible way,
the way a strong democracy does. It looks at a potentially
difficult situation, and it goes to the courts and it resolves
them.
So, my sense is, Colombia is a nation on the move and they
are doing well. And we should be proud of the efforts of the
United States in that country, including the finances that were
provided by the Congress, and the work of the very small number
of U.S. military folks, less than 500, who have been in the
country over that period of time.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
General Cartwright, there is a press report today that the
British have foiled an al Qaeda plot to take down the internet
in Britain.
You have been quoted in some trade press as not being
satisfied, shall we say, with our country's approach to
defending cyberspace.
Can you elaborate a little more on what your concerns are
and issues that you think we need to pay particular attention
to in cyberspace?
General Cartwright. I think, first, I am never satisfied,
and I am always paranoid.
To me, where we need to improve, one, we have taken effort,
both in the Department of Defense over on the director of
national intelligence and homeland security, to start to
integrate offense and defense, so that the defenders have the
capability to protect themselves, so to speak.
Second is to start to layer this capability, like we would
any other defensive plan, both in the cyberspace in defending
the terminals, defending the backbone, defending the switches--
all of those things that are components of the internet, in
this case--and start to do that in a way that is consistent
with the way we defend the rest of our capabilities, onshore
and expanding offshore, to be able to understand what is out
there and what might be coming toward us.
The key to doing that, and the challenge in this
environment is that--let's take as an example Baghdad and a
virus, say, that was launched from that part of the world
toward someplace in the United States. Even if it takes the
long route from Baghdad to geosynchronous orbit and back down
to Chicago, it is only about 300 milliseconds.
This is a very, very tight timeline to be able to assess
the threat, figure out what the appropriate response is, take
that action and have it be effective, before the threat reaches
us. That means a tight command and control between the
interagency process, all of those who would have equity--and
the commercial sector--to be able to do this for the country.
Understanding how to do that, understanding how not to
disrupt freedom of speech--because a lot of things travel
across these internet pipelines--understand what is a threat
and what is not a threat, in those timelines, are the
technologies we need to start to understand and acquire, and
are also the factors we need to start to understand in statute.
Do we have this right? Can we apply the appropriate
authorities to a fight that occurs that quickly and does not
have a lot of respect for geographical boundaries?
Those are the challenges we are trying to understand, and
that is where my frustration is, trying to get the technology,
understand the fight that occurs in milliseconds, and
understand how to apply the appropriate authorities to that
fight so we do not abrogate freedom of speech and other things.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning, and
thanks for your service.
I want to start out with Admiral Keating. First of all,
thank you for the things you have done at NORTHCOM.
And as you prepare to leave, I would like you to comment on
three things. First of all, the work that you have done with
the Canadian government to monitor our northern border, the
work that has been done with Mexico and our southern border.
And if you could contrast those, I would appreciate it.
And then third, if you can address the progress that we
have made with former Joint Task Force (JTF)-6, now JTF-North,
and its ability to expand its agenda, not just in support of
all law enforcement agencies, but in its ability to expand from
narcotics and immigration into terrorism, antiterrorism issues,
as well.
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir, I will do my best. And if I
could wrap all three by starting with Joint Task Force North,
Congressman.
Mr. Reyes. Okay. All right.
Admiral Keating. From your district, of course, Brigadier
General Tony Ierardi is now the commander, about 150 folks in
his headquarters. But I would recommend to you that their
impact is much greater than their relatively small size.
Examples: They have conducted many operations in the past
two and a half years I have been fortunate to be at Northern
Command, that are broad, interagency efforts. Relatively small,
very small Title 10 or even reserve and guard inclusion--or
rather, the forces are included--in these comprehensive
efforts. In San Diego and the Pacific Northwest, down off the
coast of Brownsville and one in southern Florida are the four
most recent.
And in each case it was interagency representation,
Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Patrol,
integrations in customs, active, reserve and guard forces--
using active and guard forces that were training for missions
overseas, integrating those capabilities into this broad
network of border protection activity.
And in each case, we satisfied several intelligence
priority objectives. Are there terrorists trying to get into
the country? We did not capture any. And we continue to think
that, while they may have plans to get in, they are not
executing those plans.
There is no known nexus between narcotraffickers and
terrorists. We do continue, in support of the Coast Guard,
principally, to find a significant flow of narcotics out of
Jim's AOR into ours, primarily.
And it is not just from south to north--this addresses your
Canadian border interest--there is significant traffic from
north to south.
So, Joint Task Force North working both the southern and
northern borders--all domains, not just land domain--to
increase the security of our borders.
We are working with Canada. They now have, as you are aware
Canada Command, CANCOM, which is rather a counterpart to
Northern Command.
It is a newer combat organization, but they are our
Northern Command counterpart, if you will, north of the border.
And we have extensive liaison with them. Their commanding
officer, Lieutenant General Dumais, is a good friend, and they
are standing up their command.
We are increasingly active on our southern border with the
new leaders there, and my relief, General Renuart, will visit
them within the next month.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Reyes. I really did not get my five minutes. That red
light stayed on from the time that I was--could I ask for a
ruling from the chair?
The Chairman. If your feelings are hurt, you may go ahead
and ask one more question. [Laughter.]
Mr. Hunter. Mr. Chairman, my time is coming up. I would be
happy to let Mr. Reyes have a minute or two of my precious
time.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you.
Mr. Hunter. But he will really owe.
Mr. Reyes. Actually, I just wanted to thank Admiral Keating
and wish him well in his new position, as well.
And then just finish up by asking Admiral Stavridis to
address the issue, because there is a lot of interest in
Congress about the allegations of corruption in the Colombian
government.
Can you give us your perspective specifically? I know you
referred to it as a political problem, but I am concerned that
that may become a bigger issue here in Congress, in spite of
all the progress that you cited in Colombia.
So, if you can just address that, I would appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Stavridis. Certainly, sir.
I am not an expert on that. I think your question would
best be addressed to our American ambassador there, who is an
extremely capable person, Ambassador Bill Wood.
From my perspective in the military-to-military contacts I
have, what I sense is a willingness in the country to grapple
with the issue. It is not being swept under the rug. It is
being covered on the front pages of the newspaper.
People have been indicted. They are pursuing it vigorously,
as best I can tell, looking at it. They are looking it in the
eye.
And I would look at that as a sign of progress in the
country, although certainly it is unfortunate, if the
allegations are true.
And again, I would close by suggesting you would get a
richer understanding of the situation from our State Department
counterparts who are actually in the country on a day-to-day
basis.
Mr. Reyes. Has that hampered our abilities to work with the
Colombian government, in terms of our operations under Plan
Colombia in any way?
Admiral Stavridis. No, sir, it has not.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Admiral Stavridis--and I mispronounced that. I very much--
--
Admiral Stavridis. No, you are good, sir.
Mr. Jones. Well, you know, when you have got a name like
Jones, it just makes everything else more difficult----
Admiral Stavridis. I am thinking about changing my name to
Jones. We will see. [Laughter.]
Mr. Jones. No, I am going to practice, so next time it will
not be a problem.
Admiral Stavridis. That is fine, sir.
Mr. Jones. Admiral, the reason--I want to ask you, with the
responsibility--and, of course, you said you had been there
five or six months, and maybe Admiral Keating or someone else
can assist with this.
I had the opportunity to meet with a gentleman--and I do
not want to talk too much about this--who is now an American
citizen, that helped our Federal Government in a way that he
would qualify for special citizenship, and I will leave it at
that--but he is from Honduras.
And he brought to my attention that, in certain countries
under your command, that there seems to be a migration of Arabs
moving in--and I am not talking about terrorists, but I am
talking about Arabs who are coming into the population,
starting businesses and becoming a part of the community.
Are you seeing in any of these countries, or your staff,
where there are a fair number of Arabs moving from other
countries into some of these Central American countries for the
purpose, not of terrorism--I want to make that clear--but to
become part of the society?
Admiral Stavridis. There are concentrations of Arab
populations, as well as Islamic populations, throughout Latin
America and the Caribbean, sir.
Numbers are hard to define, as they always are, and nailing
down either religious or ethnic, particular, specific numbers
in many countries. But the numbers I have seen are in the range
of three million to six million Islamic. And of that, a
significant population traces their roots to the Arab world.
The total population in the region is about 450 million, so you
are probably in the 1 percent range.
The areas in which there are some concentrations, I think
most well-known is the so-called tri-border area, which is the
point in southern South America where Brazil, Argentina and
Paraguay come together. In that region, there is a fairly
robust Lebanese population.
There are additionally some significant pockets in southern
Brazil in a couple of their larger cities, particularly Sao
Paulo. And on the northern coast of South America, there are
some additional pockets. Again, you are in the one percent
range.
As is always the case, my assessment would be, the vast
majority of those people are living in peace and are attempting
to integrate themselves into the societies and in the country.
However, we are concerned in some of those populations that
there are indications of Hezbollah financing, recruiting, and
proselytizing. Our intelligence folks are working closely with
their counterparts in those countries as part of the global
effort against the war on terrorism.
Mr. Jones. Well, the gentleman that I am making reference
to suggested that I get the book, I think the title is The Dove
and Abdullah. And his concern--of course, he is now an American
citizen--was that many of those people, as you said yourself,
Admiral, are coming there with true purposes, the right
purposes. But there could be those who have relationships, or
want to see relationships that you made mention to, develop.
And I have thought for a long time about that, as a Member
of Congress, and nothing I can really do about it but speak out
and show interest. But I have felt for too long that this
nation has not paid the right attention that it needed to with
Central and South America, really from an economic standpoint,
that if we cannot help the natives of those countries, then
they are going to look elsewhere. And that could really present
a serious security problem for us.
So, thank you very much for your answer.
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Jones.
Mr. Sestak.
Mr. Sestak. Generals, Admirals.
General, if I could ask you a couple of questions on the
Reliable Replacement Warhead for the Conventional Trident
Missile, the ballistic missile conventional.
General, how will a foreign nation discriminate between a
nuclear and a conventional ballistic missile coming from the
center of the ocean? Russia, China--by the time we have it out
there, 2013--potentially Iran, India.
General Cartwright. The ambiguity issue is one that we have
talked a lot about.
We, today, have treaty and protocol activities associated
with contacts. So, if we are testing or we are doing some sort
of a----
Mr. Sestak. Yes, sir. But this is a sudden crisis, one
hour.
General Cartwright. Understand. But these are in place for
our exercises, and whatnot, and have been in place for a lot of
years.
We have done about 470 Trident launches with these
protocols in place, where we exchange information--principally
with the Russians today, trying to expand that out to the
Chinese.
What we are trying to establish for operational activities
is what is called the Joint Data Exchange Center, which is set
up right now with Russia, so that we share real-time
information----
Mr. Sestak. So, in a real crisis--General, if you don't
mind--in a real crisis, you would actually let them know that
within an hour you are going to launch?
General Cartwright. That is the----
Mr. Sestak. So, you would let Russia and China know that.
General Cartwright. That is the intent today.
Mr. Sestak. India? Iran?
General Cartwright. We are working to expand that out. But
the initial effort over the past year is to codify this with
the Russians.
Mr. Sestak. Well, how do you feel about China and Russia
developing the same capability?
General Cartwright. To me, to start to reduce the numbers
of weapons of mass destruction is a positive attribute. To the
extent that we can replace them and get the attributes we need
in an offensive system with something other than a mass
destruction, that is a positive vector.
The question is second-and third-order effects, and being
able to understand what those might be. Ambiguity----
Mr. Sestak. So, but what do you feel about China and Russia
developing one?
General Cartwright. I think that they are----
Mr. Sestak. Is that a good thing?
General Cartwright. I would certainly encourage----
Mr. Sestak. A conventional ballistic missile from their
submarines.
General Cartwright. From their submarines, from their
silos----
Mr. Sestak. And they would warn us an hour before they
would launch it, so we would know it would not be a nuclear
one.
General Cartwright. Again, there are multiple activities
going on here. Overflight, is it anywhere near your country, et
cetera. But, yes, to reduce that ambiguity to the maximum
extent practicable----
Mr. Sestak. General, what are two scenarios you can see us
using this in?
General Cartwright. Two scenarios that would come to mind
are targets that are deep. Let us take as an example the recent
ASAT test.
If the target is deep and you want to go in there and
ensure there cannot be a second launch, then having a
conventional capability against something that was launched
that was conventional in nature, as the ASAT is, that seems to
me to be an appropriate target to defend our interests in
space.
Another is a fleeting target, in which the timelines are
short, whether they be short-range or medium-range ballistic
missiles or a terrorist camp, where you have an offensive
action that is already under way, and you are trying to be
appropriate in maintaining control over escalation and drive
this away from a weapon of mass destruction. That would be
another scenario where this one might be appropriate----
Mr. Sestak. What is the end-to-end architecture needed in
order to be able to use something within one hour of detection
and launch?
General Cartwright. We look at three key pieces, the
command and control, to be able to make the decisions and do
the planning in those timelines. The second is the
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), to
connect what we call the fixed piece, and then find, fix, and
then finish.
So, you need the missile and the warhead, in this case in
the submarine. You need an ISR capability that connects the
dots and provides the right location of the target. And then
you need the command and control to----
Mr. Sestak. What is the commensurate timeframe you think we
would be able to have this? And even if you have an idea of the
costs?
General Cartwright. The easier targets are the ones that
are fixed in known locations. That helps you a lot.
The harder targets are the mobile targets, those that are
hidden. The harder the target, the longer today. But today, the
command and control, we believe is in place.
The ISR needs to be integrated better, and we are working
on that. And that is not terribly expensive. It is more about
connecting the right dots.
Mr. Sestak. But the satellite system, does this require
transformational satellite (TSAT) and----
General Cartwright. No. No. We have in place both the air,
the space and the terrestrial capabilities to move this
information in that timeline.
Mr. Sestak. But actually to see a fleeting target in one
hour that you have been hunting for, and then strike it within
that hour?
General Cartwright. Again, the easier----
Mr. Sestak. This with space-based radar----
General Cartwright. You see, your timelines are associated
with the fixed targets. The more challenging are the mobile
targets. They may take longer than an hour. It just depends on
if it is in some place you knew about, or you are going
someplace you had no idea, and you get down to mensuration, and
things like that.
Mr. Sestak. So, you are comfortable that the word from the
Chinese and the Russians, that that is not a nuclear weapon, is
what we will rely upon.
General Cartwright. We are on a path to ensure that that is
the case and to reduce the ambiguity to the maximum extent
practical.
Mr. Sestak. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Gingrey.
Dr. Gingrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Stavridis, in your written testimony, you included
background information pertaining to the Western Hemisphere
Institute for Security Cooperation, WHINSEC, and briefly
discussed its mission.
I have got a number of questions that I want to ask you in
regard to that.
Can you elaborate for the members of this committee on this
program and what it is achieving? Is it effective in promoting
relations with other nations? Is it succeeding in its mission
to spread democracy while preventing human rights abuses?
And I ask these questions, Admiral, because I know--I am
sure you know--that there are members of this House of
Representatives, and, indeed, maybe even members of this
committee, who would want to cut off funding for WHINSEC.
And I, as a member of the Board of Visitors, representing
this committee on the minority side, formerly on the majority
side, am very concerned.
And I want to also ask you specifically, as commander of
the United States Southern Command, do you believe we should
fund this institute? And what would be the consequences of
actually cutting the funding to WHINSEC?
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you very much, sir. I am going to
ask Admiral Keating to also comment, because Mexico is part of
the equation, I believe, in answering this question correctly.
The Western Hemisphere Institute is a superb, superb
operation. Now, it does not work for me. I am on the Board of
Visitors, sir, as you are, as is Senator Levin, representing
the majority side. So, I think there is a balanced
representation on the Board of Visitors.
And I believe all of us on the Board of Visitors who have
actually spent time would attest to the fact that this 200-
person faculty, which is drawn from nations all around the
region, in addition to U.S. military personnel, has a
curriculum.
It is taught in Spanish. We talked earlier about the
importance of languages here. A subset is taught in Portuguese
for our Brazilian counterparts.
We put well over 1,000 students through the school in any
given year. And we create an opportunity for a real generation
of mid-grade officers to come to the United States, study and
learn about our military, and do it in their own language,
while having the opportunity to interact with our citizens
here.
They then go back to their countries, and they go on to
positions of senior leadership. The institute is one of the
strongest methodologies we have to connect us with the nations
of this region.
I want to specifically mention, it is, without question,
the crown jewel for the study of human rights and how a
military ought to respect human rights. It is fundamental to
the curriculum.
Every student who comes gets between 20 and 50 hours of
instruction in human rights and I believe leaves the institute
with a rock-solid basis to go back to their own military and
inculcate that view of the importance of human rights in a
military.
So, I believe it is an exemplary institution. Again, it
does not work for me, so I am not blowing my own horn here. I
am observing another command's institute. It is part of the
U.S. Army, and I believe it is superbly run and vitally
important.
Dr. Gingrey. Admiral Keating, would you care to comment, as
well?
Admiral Keating. And, Doctor, I will try and be brief.
Because of our increasingly robust theater security
cooperation efforts with Mexico, we, too, place high importance
on the institute's progress. And we welcome them twice a year,
I believe. If that is not right, I will get back to you.
As part of their course, their curriculum, they come to
Northern Command and we spend about a day, a day-and-a-half
with them. So, we share the same opinion as the commander of
Southern Command.
Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, in just the few seconds that I
have got left, I just want to say for the record that, of
course, I have been to the WHINSEC facility on several
occasions, and I certainly can attest to the value of the
program. And I appreciate the admirals sharing that with us.
WHINSEC is succeeding in its mission to provide
professional education and training to military personnel.
Actually, in addition to them, law enforcement officials,
civilians that support the democratic principles of the charter
of the Organization of American States.
So, I am gravely concerned about any movement toward
defunding such a great program, and I certainly appreciate the
testimony of Admiral Keating and Admiral Stavridis, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, may I just add, sir, that I would
encourage any congressman who has any doubt to come and visit
the institute.
Dr. Gingrey. Well, Admiral, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me, I was going to suggest
the very same thing. I think it would be a great CODEL for the
members of this committee in a bipartisan way to go down to
Columbus, Georgia, the home of the infantry, a great part of my
state, formerly in my district. And I think it would be--you
know, what you see with your eyes is worth 1,000 words. And I
think that is exactly what we ought to do.
And I thank you, Admiral, for that suggestion.
The Chairman. I associate my thoughts with the gentleman
from Georgia. I am familiar with the institute quite well, and
actually, its predecessor, which I had the occasion to visit
when I was sitting down on the front row of this committee.
So, thank you for your thoughts on that.
Last but not least, the gentleman from California, Mr.
Hunter.
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Chairman, I have another question I
would like to ask.
The Chairman. Yes. As soon as Mr. Hunter has finished.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks
for the hearing, an excellent hearing.
And I will try to be brief. I know we have votes coming up
pretty shortly.
General Cartwright, you have got this missile defense
responsibility, at least in terminal phase. And the combatant
commands are arranged mostly geographically, with areas of
responsibility that an incoming missile is going to transit
fairly rapidly.
Just generally speaking, really two questions: What are
your thoughts on how effectively we are organizing to be able
to handle the transit of a single missile over several areas of
responsibility?
And second, what is your personal take on how effectively
and efficiently we are developing our missile defenses? Just
your general, personal take on how things are going.
General Cartwright. The first is the command and control
question. Just using the example of the activities in July with
North Korea, you are spanning about nine time zones and you
have at least four different combatant commanders with equities
in the activity, not the least of which is probably the target
in Northern Command.
And so, how we work this activity, because the sensors may
live, so to speak, in different AORs. They may not even belong
to the Department of Defense. They may not belong to the United
States.
And so, we have to work this in a way that is very cross-
compartment in ways that we have never had to integrate systems
before. And that has been a challenge.
I have to say, though, that the technology has moved us in
a direction to solve most of those challenges and to ensure
that the visibility is out there for each combatant commander
that has equity.
They can see what is happening. They can know immediately
what their equities are, whether it is consequence management,
whether it is part of the fire control solution, whether it is
notification that something is going to fly over someone's
territory.
So, the technology has helped us move in the right
direction. I think that we are moving in a direction that says
that, if you have an equity in this, you need to be able to
have a voice.
You need to be able to see what is happening and make that
transparent, and then be able to register any concerns that you
might have with an intercept that is occurring, even though the
decision timelines are down in the four- to six-minute
timeline.
That system is starting to emerge. We run it daily in
exercise, to start to train to this.
The most difficult challenge is, most of the time we try to
do this by voice, when we get the senior leadership together.
Voice tends to be a very slow way to get discovery of situation
awareness and make a decision. We have got to do that part of
it better. We are exercising that now.
The secretary of defense has put in place an exercise
program that will start to move us more to a data picture, so
you can see very quickly what the situation is that everybody
shares. And when we get that, I think we will be in better
stand. That is the first piece of the question.
How is the system moving? To me, the credibility, the
deterrent value has gone up significantly since the activities
associated with the 4th of July and North Korea.
There is no doubt in our mind, and clearly in the minds of
our allies, that there is value in missile defense. It offers
you an alternative to an offensive-only strategy, for many
countries. That is point one.
Point two is, I think we have to start focusing on our
deployed forces and our allies, and allowing them to plug into
this system and develop for them what they believe are the
attributes of a defensive system, whether it is the Israelis
and the aero system, or the Brits--or whoever needs this.
That is the direction we have to start to move.
Mr. Hunter. Mr. Chairman, I might just ask, with my
remaining time, if any of our witnesses have anything that they
have not talked about that is on their mind, as we conclude
this hearing.
Gentlemen, any parting shots you would like to give the
committee here?
General Schwartz. Congressman Hunter, if I may, quickly, I
do have one concern. And that relates to an issue under
consideration by the House related to the Armenian genocide in
the early 1900s.
The resolution, I am told, will come to the floor either
later this month or in the very early part of April.
I just want to alert the members that that resolution may
trigger a reaction from the Turkish government, which would
limit our access at Incirlik Air Base, which we operate there.
That cargo hub moves almost 75 percent of the cargo we send
to Iraq, and last year was 55,000 tons.
And so, I just wish to alert the members that an unintended
consequence of that resolution could be to make our job much
harder to support the troops downrange.
Thank you, sir, for that opportunity.
Admiral Stavridis. If I could, sir, I would simply
encourage the committee and the members of the committee to
come travel in the region. There is no substitute for personal
contact, personal knowledge.
Senator Nelson came down recently, Senator Reid, over on
the Senate side. I am going, I believe, with Representative
Meek down to Haiti in a few weeks. I would really welcome the
opportunity to see the members come travel in this important
part of the world.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Before I call Mr. Meek, General Schwartz, my
recollection is that the French assembly--correct me if I am
wrong--the French assembly passed a resolution regarding the
1915 genocide occurrence. And as a result thereof, Turkey cut
off all military connection, as well as the contracts with
France.
Am I correct?
General Schwartz. Sir, not all military-to-military
relationships. For example, the NATO relationships, as I
understand it, remain intact. But those commercial interfaces
certainly were cut off.
As I understand it, the Office of Defense Cooperation that
France has in Ankara closed. In addition, the blanket
overflight clearance, which Turkey had allowed France to
exercise, was also terminated.
And for us, the overflight clearance issue would be a
significant matter.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Meek.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I must say that, you note that I am a little delayed
here today, but I did get here in time.
I have, Mr. Chairman, the congressman-to-be with me. He is
on spring break this week, so we are working together here in
the Capitol--my son.
Generals, Admirals, I am glad that you all have come before
us today.
And I think the question on the resolution, General, that
you just outlined, that is the kind of information we need to
know here in Congress.
And, Admiral, as you know, we are going to go down to Haiti
in a couple of weeks. And I guess I wanted to ask you a
question, because we have two free trade agreements, I believe,
that is in your area, that is being considered before Congress.
Have you heard anything from your counterparts on the other
side, on the military's part? Is State working with you?
Because I know, down in your command, basically, the
Southern Command has been our attache, our State Department--
everything. And I know that we are trying to refocus down there
with Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and a number
of other agreements, but we have two that are pending.
Have you heard anything?
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you for the question, sir. I have,
indeed.
As I travel and talk to my interlocutors in the military-
to-military venue, there is strong support, as they perceive
it, as a matter of security, to have that kind of agreement
with the United States.
And they often refer, as you just alluded to, sir, to the
Central American Free Trade Agreement, which the Congress
passed, and has been of significant benefit in Central America
in strengthening our relations there.
So, as always, the lead on those kinds of things is with
the State Department, with the Department of Commerce, and so
forth. But from a security perspective, what I hear from my
counterparts is support for that.
Mr. Meek. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, and I must say that you and the ranking
member now, Mr. Duncan, have been supportive of not only my
movements in Haiti, but also then very successful within the
mark, to be charitable, not only to the Southern Command, but
also to our mission.
As you know, in the last 10 years we have--or last 15
years--we have had to go down twice to bring about peace in
Haiti. Now, more than ever, we have the opportunity, not only
through the U.N. and the United Nation Stabilization Mission in
Haiti (MINUSTAH) and other countries like Canada and others
that are contributing in Haiti, may very well assist us in
securing the kind of democracy that we need in Haiti.
And I would encourage, just like the admiral did, members
of the House and of the Senate to travel to Haiti and travel in
the Southern Command region.
Admiral, one other question as it relates to the trip, as
it pertains to Cite Soleil, I know that the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) has a presence
there. As it relates to the future and security, I know that
taking down Cite Soleil--and MINUSTAH took out the gangs--but
long-term security, Haiti so many times has been like a roller
coaster. It is secured and it is non-secured.
And because of the drug activity that is taking place, the
gang activity--for most, thuggery--what kind of plans do you
feel long-term that we can put in place so that we do not have
to continue to give our military assets to a country that
really should not need it, because the Haitian people are
peaceful people?
And also, as a mission to stop Haitians from taking to sea,
and that usually gets the attention of not only the United
States, but the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos and other islands?
Long term where are we? We know we made a $20 million
investment recently, but where are we as it relates to long-
term plans?
Admiral Stavridis. Thanks for the question, Congressman.
First of all, I want to really applaud the excellence of
the United Nations mission there, which is doing a fine job. As
you know, there are 6,600 peacekeepers on the ground, about
half of them coming from the region. So, this is very much a
regional effort in security.
And I think the first and best thing we can do, we the
United States, is to encourage that kind of a regional solution
in Haiti, to continue to ask the nations that are contributing
peacekeepers, people like Brazil and Argentina and Colombia and
Chile and Uruguay, to go the next step and to be participants
in economic efforts in the country of Haiti.
Second, in terms of the narcotics, I think that is
absolutely correct. That is a growing concern, and we need to--
we the United States government, through interagency means--
need to bring partnership and capability to our friends in
Haiti, so they can rid themselves of this drug scourge, and so
it does not undermine this very fragile democracy in Haiti.
So, regionalism, interagency approaches, I think are the
way to go here, and a continued judicious approach with the use
of U.S. aid, which, of course, is not my purview. And, of
course, you will be hearing testimony from Department of State
representatives there.
For our purposes we have, at U.S. Southern Command, we have
a military group commander there who is very helpful in working
with the Haitian military, and you and I will have a chance to
get a briefing from him on this subject when we go down.
Overall I am hopeful about Haiti. I think it could be an
example of where regionalism and interagency efforts, which we
have talked about this morning, could really solve a real
problem in our hemisphere.
Mr. Meek. Well, thank you so very much, Admiral.
I want to thank also the generals for being here.
And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to ask the
questions.
And I just would want to say to both of you publicly, I
appreciate your support, not only for the Southern Command, but
also the support that you have given me as a member of this
committee, to go down on behalf of the committee and learn more
about our activities under our jurisdiction there in Haiti, so
thank you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman from Florida. It is
always good to welcome members of families, so they can see
their parents hard at work.
And, Kendrick Meek, Jr., we welcome you, sir. Glad to have
you in the audience. Thank you very much.
Mr. Abercrombie.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Keating, by the time you get to the Pacific
Command, you may be thinking that this will be a relief for
you.
Are you a member, I mean, institutionally, of the Homeland
Security Council?
Admiral Keating. No, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. That is unfortunate.
I am making reference here to the Joint Force headquarters,
the National Capital Region at Fort McNair, because that deals
with incident management in terms of homeland defense. And then
the Joint Task Force Civil Support at Fort Monroe in Virginia.
The reason I mention that is that, that has, at least in my
information, command and control responsibilities with regard
to catastrophic events, including nuclear or high-yield
explosive events.
The reason I bring that up is that, there is a story
today--and I bring it to your attention not expecting you to
necessarily have it in front of you, because it is so recent--a
story today in The Washington Post concerning a government
report provided by the Homeland Security Council and the Energy
Department, with regard to the lack of definitive plans for a
situation in which you might have a nuclear attack or a
terrorist attack using the so-called dirty bombs radiological
attack.
Northern Command, again, I will not get into an argument or
a colloquy about what control and command means, or what
coordination means, and so on.
But I am bringing it to your attention, because what the
contention is, is that the government lacks rules and standards
for sending out first responders in radiated areas to save
people or warn them of approaching fallout, even including
standards for firefighters, et cetera.
Now, it would seem to me, at a minimum, that this is the
kind of coordination, should it exist, that needs to take
place.
Now, if this is, in fact, so, or if this is the contention,
can you state with any certainty that, as a result of your
various exercises and planning sessions and so, that this
report would also be inaccurate?
Admiral Keating. Congressman, we conducted an exercise in
the fall, we in Northern Command and Department of Homeland----
Mr. Abercrombie. Excuse me. I should have said
parenthetically, they made specific reference to Washington,
D.C. That is why I cited the two, the Fort Monroe and Fort
McNair.
Admiral Keating. So, as a little bit of preamble, we
conducted an exercise in the fall--not just Northern Command,
but a broad interagency effort, including the Department of
Homeland Security and the Michigan National Guard in which,
during the exercise scenario, a radiological dispersal device,
a dirty bomb was detonated in Detroit, Michigan, and fallout
went across the river into Canada.
So, we did not just----
Mr. Abercrombie. I am familiar with that.
Admiral Keating. So we had international implication, as
well as significant national implication.
Major General Bruce Davis, National Guard office, deployed
from Joint Task Force Civil Support Headquarters, with the lead
element of his assessment team--that is what Joint Task Force
Civil Support does--to the area.
They physically went to Detroit, integrated with state and
local responders and Department of Homeland Security officials
to assess the damage, figuratively, and begin to provide the
command and control and collaboration and coordination that you
describe, in a simulated event with real-world folks moving
around. So, we exercise to that scenario, Congressman.
Joint Task Force National Capital Region, and one of our
subordinate commands, tasked with a broader set of requirements
for addressing defending--the many aspects of defending the
National Capital Region, including the integrated defense
system of the missiles that ring the National Capital Region.
So, with those two examples for JTF Civil Support and JTF
National Capital Region, I am satisfied that I can report to
you that we have plans on the shelf for responding to
disasters--natural or manmade--up through and including nuclear
disasters, on a combatant commander level.
Mr. Abercrombie. Would it be fair to say, then, that this
report--and these, by the way, are at least two years old. And
my guess, my estimation is that it is probably at least two
years.
Since the time these reports were done, or these
observations were made, would it be fair to say that your
contention is that that issue, or those issues raised in that
report, as I outlined them to you, have been taken into account
and you are trying to exercise or make plans to be able to
address the kinds of situations that I raised for you?
Admiral Keating. Precisely.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. Let us leave it at that.
I commend that to your attention, particularly the one from
the National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA, of the
Energy Department.
Admiral Keating. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. And we will take it from there. Thank you
very much.
I have some questions also for, Mr. Chairman, for TRANSCOM,
which I would like to submit for the record to get an answer.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Abercrombie. I wish you good fortune and aloha,
Admiral, as you head to Honolulu.
Admiral Keating. Looking forward to it, Congressman.
The Chairman. The good news is you inherit Mr. Abercrombie.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Keating. Can't wait.
The Chairman. You will love it.
Mr. Abercrombie. You are used to dealing with challenges,
right?
The Chairman. He is great to work with, Admiral.
Admiral Stavridis, I understand that the Afghan National
Interdiction Unit is attending an 18-week jungle commando
course in Colombia. Do you know anything about that?
Admiral Stavridis. I do not have the details on that. I
will be happy to get them and give them to you for the record,
sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 147.]
The Chairman. Would you do that, please?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. The military is always trying to apply
lessons learned. At least that is part of nearly every briefing
we receive.
Admiral Keating, lessons learned from Katrina. What did you
learn, positive, negative?
Admiral Keating. Some of both, Mr. Chairman. And we are
working very hard to differentiate between lessons observed and
lessons learned. All kinds of folks have long lists of should-
have, would-have, could-have.
Throughout the agencies where we spend our time--
principally FEMA, DHS and DOD--we are working hard to take
lessons observed and make sure they are lessons learned, and
hopefully not mistakes repeated.
Examples would include communication. We have, since
Katrina, contracted for--through your direct help, you will
recall--and obtain funding for three separate cell phone farms,
if you will, so if the infrastructure is wiped slick, let's
say, in Congressman Taylor's region of Gulfport, Mississippi,
we airlift or through air, land or water, media.
We will get the cell phone farms where we put up a tower,
we fire up a generator and we pass out hundreds and hundreds of
cell phones--don't care who gets them--and satellite phones.
DHS has a dozen-plus of those same systems. National Guard
has a dozen-plus. So, where there were none, there are now
upwards of 30, I think is the number, but it is between 20 and
30 of these entirely self-sufficient organic cell phone farms.
We have defense coordinating officers embedded full-time,
active duty colonels, who are trained in the art of disaster
response, who are embedded in each of the FEMA regions.
We have provided our planning expertise--and I use that
term advisedly. You will appreciate it better than most,
perhaps, because we in the military have this planning culture,
because we have had the opportunity to capitalize on the
educational reform that you have provided for us.
We have provided planners to FEMA, to the Department of
Homeland Security. And we have full-time representatives in
FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security, and they have
full-time representatives in our headquarters.
So, we have taken the larger strategic issues and tried to
rectify those, and we are down even in the tactical level for
ability to communicate. And we do not care, it is not just
guard or reserve or active forces. Whoever needs a cell phone,
we will pass it out until such time as the commercial
infrastructure can re-support.
The Chairman. I think you might find it of interest,
Admiral, that in Missouri National Guard, particularly the unit
in Jefferson City at the headquarters there, is training in the
communication challenge that we might have, should there be
another New Madrid Fault earthquake, which last happened in
1811, which caused the Mississippi River to flow backward. And
it evidently was a local disaster all along the Mississippi
River Valley.
I jokingly told a Missouri guardsman that they are training
in this communication operation for something that is not going
to happen for another 400 years. And hopefully I am right. But
they did seem very, very serious in what they were doing.
General Cartwright, very quickly, describe the process
involved in setting the nuclear force structure requirements.
General Cartwright. In setting the nuclear force----
The Chairman. Force structure requirements.
General Cartwright. Force structure requirements.
The Chairman. Yes.
General Cartwright. We are given guidance as to the types
of capabilities that our adversaries possess, that the
government desires to hold at risk. We look at that. We compare
the desired effect to the inventory required to get that
effect. And then we match them with timeliness factors to
obtain those objectives.
And we set that down. We write it down, we exercise it, we
war-game it, and we pass it back up. We have a feedback loop to
learn as we move forward.
There are a lot of factors in this that change our
equations--precision, timeliness, delivery factors, reliability
of weapons. All of that is considered in that activity.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I thank you, gentlemen.
I do have one last question for General Schwartz. Very
quickly, can you touch on the thoughts of retiring C-5s, in 25
words or less?
General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, again, I would not
recommend retiring C-5s unless we have access to additional C-
17s. In which case I would recommend retiring the older
airplanes, the A models, first, both in a manner which we could
harvest the crews and maintenance to apply to the new airplanes
and, likewise, enhance the reliability of the entire system as
a result.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. It has been an excellent
hearing, and I appreciate, all of us appreciate, you gentlemen
being with us.
Admiral Keating, good luck in your new assignment.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 21, 2007
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March 21, 2007
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 21, 2007
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON
The Chairman. Admiral Stavridis, I understand that the Afghan
National Interdiction Unit is attending an 18-week jungle commando
course in Colombia. Do you know anything about that?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I do believe that you may be referring to
the Afghan Initiative, and I can certainly speak to that.
The Afghan Initiative was created to have Colombian counter-drug
personnel share tactics, techniques, and procedures with their Afghan
counterparts in prosecuting the war on drugs. To accomplish this goal,
the governments of the United States, Britain, Colombia, and
Afghanistan are coordinating various exchanges between Colombia and
Afghanistan.
An Afghan delegation, headed by the Counternarcotics Minister,
visited Colombia in August 2005. This delegation visited the Colombian
Ministry of Defense and the Colombian National Police (CNP)
Headquarters in Bogota. They also visited the CNP Training Center in
Espinal to observe the Colombian Anti-narcotics Police Jungla Commando
Course. This Afghan Delegation requested that a team of Colombian
subject matter experts conduct a training seminar in Afghanistan.
The Colombian anti-narcotics police team visited Afghanistan in
late July, 2006. The team included the Interdiction Chief and former
Director of Anti-narcotics Intelligence, a fixed wing pilot and former
Intelligence Officer, a Hughes 500 attack pilot, Head Instructor from
the Anti-narcotics Police Training Center), and NAS Bogota Advisor to
Jungla Airmobile Companies. Enroute to Kabul, the team had a three-day
stopover in London where the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and
Ministry of Defence provided briefings on counternarcotics efforts in
Afghanistan. Upon arrival in Afghanistan, the team gave seminars to all
key Afghan anti-narcotics officials (police, army, and ministry-level),
the U.S. trainers and advisors in Afghanistan (Drug Enforcement Agency
and Blackwater), UK Embassy Kabul personnel, the commander of the Kabul
International Airport, and the rank and file members of the INL-funded
Afghan Narcotics Interdiction Unit (NIU). The briefings focused on how
Colombian police officers conduct their counterdrug operations. The
Colombian police identified that personnel selection, training,
organization, equipment, intelligence, and planning are the keys to
success.
During the Colombian team's outbrief to the Afghan Counternarcotics
Ministry and U.S. Ambassador, Kabul, the Colombian team proposed three
immediate follow-on exchanges:
(1) Send five Afghan Narcotics Interdiction Unit (NIU) members to
the Jungla Commando Basic Course in Espinal, Tolima (Feb. 12-June 16,
2007)
(2) Send two Colombia Jungla School instructors to the Afghan NIU
training center in Kabul (March 12-May 1)
(3) Send the Commander of the Kabul International Airport and staff
to Colombia to visit the CNP airport security and counternarcotics
programs (June 2007)
In April 2007, INL asked that the Colombians conduct a six week
seminar for 10 Afghan NIU members starting in September 2007. During a
visit by Representatives Dennis Hastert and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen to
Colombia in May, 2007, it was also proposed to send five mid-level
Colombian Anti-narcotics Police to Afghanistan to observe Afghan NIU
operations.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE
Mr. Abercrombie. Given the personnel end strength increases of the
Army and Marine Corps contained in the Future Years Defense Plan, do
you believe the conclusions and assumptions of the 2005 Mobility
Capability Study remain valid in determining the Department of
Defense's mobility requirements?
General Schwartz. The 2005 Mobility Capability Study was based on
the 1-4-2-1 Department of Defense National Defense Strategy. The
assumptions used for the MCS study have not been invalidated. The Army
and the Marine Corps state the increases in their personnel end
strength are focused on increasing home station dwell time. Therefore,
unless the Services and Combatant Commanders identify a change in their
concepts of operations, the conclusions reached in the MCS will remain
valid. The next MCS, anticipated to begin in early 2008, will fully
incorporate any changes in plans and requirements as a result of the
Service force structure end strength increases.
Mr. Abercrombie. The Air Force and the Army are contemplating
procurement of a Joint Cargo Aircraft to complement the C-130 fleet and
to increase efficiency of cargo capacity used during intra-theater
airlift operations. What is the requirement, concept of operations, and
what command authority will exercise operational control and tasking of
both the Army and Air Force Joint Cargo Aircraft?
General Schwartz. Various intra-theater studies are being conducted
to explore the intra-theater demands to include the use of the JCA. The
Intra-theater Lift Capability Assessment looked at in theater movement
to the brigade rear. Additionally, the USTRANSCOM Joint Distribution
Process Analysis Center is analyzing the movement forward from the
brigade rear to the point of use and examining potential gaps and
solutions for joint future theater airlift. The next Mobility Study,
anticipated to begin in early 2008, should fully incorporate these
analyses, and reconfirm the JCA requirement.
JCA employment concept has not yet been finalized. However, the
Draft CONOPS states ``during wartime, JCAs will be assigned to a
Unified Combatant Command structure, and while in this capacity, will
support combatant commanders' directed operations, across the range of
military operations. The Joint Forces Commander (JFC) will have OPCON
of all JCAs in the Joint Area of Operations. The JFC determines air
capabilities/forces made available for joint air operations, in
consultation with component commanders.''
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. I have proposed that retirees should qualify for
Space-A travel at the category two priority level, and therefore,
treated the same as authorized personnel on environmental morale leave
status.
Can you comment?
General Schwartz. I take seriously your concerns regarding the
appropriate priority level for retirees participating in the Space-A
travel program. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics) was notified of your proposal and concerns. They are
currently looking at possible courses of action in order to recommend a
solution equitable not only to residents of Guam but also other
retirees that might be in the same circumstances.