[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-31]
THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND (USSTRATCOM)
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 8, 2007
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STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
RICK LARSEN, Washington MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
JIM COOPER, Tennessee MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
Eryn Robinson, Professional Staff Member
Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
Jason Hagadorn, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2007
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, March 8, 2007, The Posture of the U.S. Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM)........................................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, March 8, 2007.......................................... 35
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THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2007
THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND (USSTRATCOM)
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Everett, Hon. Terry, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking
Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee.......................... 4
Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., a Representative from California,
Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee........................ 1
WITNESSES
Cartwright, Gen. James E., Commander, U.S. Strategic Command..... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cartwright, Gen. James E..................................... 39
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Mr. Everett.................................................. 69
Ms. Tauscher................................................. 61
THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND (USSTRATCOM)
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 8, 2007.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:02 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ellen Tauscher
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Ms. Tauscher. The hearing will come to order.
First, before we begin the hearing, I would like to
acknowledge the presence of our distinguished Ranking Member,
Mr. Everett of Alabama.
And I know that I am speaking not only for myself and my
family, but my constituents in California and the American
people. We want to wish our condolences to Mr. Everett for the
tragedy that occurred in his district when the tornado struck
just last week resulting in the loss of his constituents and
friends from his constituency. And we want to offer him our
condolences, and condolences to the families in his
constituency.
Mr. Everett. And I thank my friend and colleague.
And thank you for your remarks, General Cartwright.
And the other colleagues in the Congress that have
mentioned it, thank you.
Ms. Tauscher. Today, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee
meets to receive testimony from General James Cartwright,
Commander of United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).
General, thank you, again, for being here.
This hearing is an important opportunity for the
subcommittee to consider the posture of our Nation's strategic
forces. Nuclear weapons have and will continue to play a
central role in deterring threats to the United States and our
allies.
However, today, we face significant choices on the role and
size of our strategic forces to meet evolving threats from
nation states and terrorist groups.
We also have to consider new threats to our space assets
and cyber-systems, particularly in light of China's recent
anti-satellite (ASAT) test. It is imperative that our military
capabilities adapt to these new threats and address possible
vulnerabilities.
General Cartwright, I am grateful that you agreed to appear
here today to discuss these matters. Your service to our
country is second to none. As STRATCOM Commander, you have one
of the broadest job descriptions in the military.
STRATCOM merged with U.S. Space Command in 2002 and, just a
year later, was assigned four additional mission areas: global
strike; missile defense integration; information operations;
and global command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Like you, my
concern is to ensure that all of these missions and tools fit
together seamlessly.
Since 9/11, U.S. strategic posture has changed
significantly. The Bush Administration's Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR), released in 2002, proposed a change in paradigm from the
Cold-War nuclear TRIAD of intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and
bombers to a new TRIAD composed of both nuclear and non-nuclear
offensive-strike systems, both active and passive defenses, and
responsive infrastructure.
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), completed in 2006,
built upon these changes by calling for a wider range of non-
kinetic and conventional strike capabilities while maintaining
a robust nuclear deterrent.
A conventional global strike capability that can hold
fleeting targets anywhere in the world at risk is a powerful
concept. But there are a number of important questions that
need to be answered before moving forward with any particular
program.
Specifically, in last year's defense authorization bill,
Congress expressed concerns about the proposed Conventional
Trident Modification Program's concept of operations (CONOPS)
and assurance strategy.
General, I would be interested in hearing your views on the
issues raised by the Congress in the fiscal year 2007 Defense
Authorization Act.
I strongly believe that we a need a public debate on the
nature of strategic deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons.
General, as you know, I believe that finding ways to
prevent the spread and possible use of nuclear technology,
material and weapons is at least important as the future of the
nuclear arsenal. And I know you recognize that these two issues
are intimately connected.
Today, I would like to hear your perspective on how we will
ensure strategic stability in the future and prevent nuclear
terrorism.
Finally, I would be interested in your thoughts on how we
might expand the public debate on these issues.
One of the key issues before us today involves the nuclear
arsenal, and it is called the Reliable Replacement Warhead
Program (RRW). While the recently announced RRW proposal would
not--would not--have new military characteristics--and I do not
consider it to be a new weapon--I am still seeking more
information about this program.
We must ask, first and foremost, do we really need a
significant modernization of our existing nuclear capabilities,
particularly in light of the recent plutonium ageing study
which found that plutonium pits have a lifespan of 85 years or
more.
In particular, what current or planned programs would be
foregone as a result of RRW? Will the reliability improvements
promised by RRW allow us to significantly reduce the size of
our nuclear arsenal? Will it require live testing of the
nuclear component of the weapon? Will the RRW program
ultimately reduce production costs within the nuclear weapons
complex?
And I would also like to know how you believe the recent
plutonium-ageing study will impact plans for and the cost of
the pit facility.
These are the types of in-depth questions we will be asking
in the days ahead.
While a great deal of attention has been paid to RRW
recently, Congress has made no decision to build RRW, nor will
we make a decision in this budget year. A baseline design has
been selected for further study. Only after detailed design
work, and development of a cost, scope and schedule plan, will
Congress face the decision to proceed to engineering work.
Nonetheless, I look forward to hearing your perspective on the
Reliable Replacement Warhead program.
Another aspect of our strategic posture which needs
attention are threats to our space-based assets and
infrastructure, the recent Chinese ASAT test being the case in
point.
It is my understanding that you believe that the most
important action we can take now is to expand our Space
Situational Awareness (SSA) capabilities. I am concerned these
activities have not received the appropriate consideration and
resources in the past, due to emphasis on rapid deployment of
transformational space platforms, such as Space Radar and
Transformational Satellite (TSAT) Communications.
General, I would be interested in your thoughts about the
level of resources required to improve our Space Situational
Awareness capabilities.
I have similar concerns with regard to missile defense. I
believe the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been too focused
on research and development (R&D) activities at the expense of
meeting our near-term requirements for our warfighters. One of
my key priorities as chairman is to ensure that our Nation's
warfighters receive the capabilities they need to successfully
conduct global missile defense operations.
In January 2002, then-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
exempted the Missile Defense Agency from the traditional
Department of Defense (DOD) requirement process, which
effectively removed the warfighter from playing a major role in
the development of the missile defense system.
STRATCOM and the Missile Defense Agency have sought to
correct this problem through the creation of the Warfighter
Involvement Program, which I was briefed on recently.
General Cartwright, I am interested in hearing your
thoughts as to whether you are satisfied with the current role
that STRATCOM and other combatant commanders are playing in
decisions affecting the missile defense development process and
future force structure.
With that, General Cartwright, I would also like to thank
you, again, for being here today, and I look forward to your
testimony.
Let me, right now, recognize my very good friend and
colleague, the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Everett.
Mr. Everett.
STATEMENT OF HON. TERRY EVERETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA,
RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Everett. Thank you very much, and I appreciate the
earlier words from my chairman and friend.
First and foremost, I would like to echo the chairman's
comments and thank General Cartwright for appearing before us
today. We have had several opportunities this year to meet with
you, and we appreciate each time you come back.
We also know that you have a staff of dedicated
professional men and women working 24-7 to support STRATCOM's
missions. We are grateful for the job that you and your staff
perform--and what you have done for the Nation.
As the first Marine officer to lead STRATCOM, you have
brought your get-it-done mindset to the command and broken down
barriers to getting the job done.
Under your commendable leadership, I have seen STRATCOM
transform the way it does business. Your innovations have
brought operators, intelligence analysts and decision-makers
together in real-time to share information.
As the chairman remarked, this is an important hearing for
our subcommittee. Our Nation's strategic posture serves as a
framework for identifying the composition of our strategic
forces and the capabilities that are needed.
During the Cold War, our deterrent strategy and strategic
posture was rather simple and focused, ensuring mutual shared
destruction by possessing a survival second strike nuclear
capability.
The Pentagon's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review recognized
that today's threats are markedly different and require
tailored deterrence, but STRATCOM must remain a strong nuclear
deterrent.
It also must posture itself with wide-ranging capabilities
to address new security challenges that include non-state
terrorism networks, which are undeterred by traditional
strategic bombers and nuclear weapons; rogue nations like North
Korea and Iran, who are pursuing missile and nuclear
capabilities and proliferation; and advanced military power
like China, who, unofficially, advocates asymmetric warfare.
I expect you to talk about these challenges and how they
have affected STRATCOM's missions, strategic posture and
pursuit of new capabilities.
There are several key issues germane to the Nation's
strategic posture in the areas of space, missile defense and
nuclear forces that I would like to ask you to discuss today.
In the space arena, I am most concerned about our ability
to protect our space assets. China's recent anti-satellite test
was clearly a shot, in my estimation, across the bow.
However, it is only one of several capabilities that China
and others are developing, which pose a serious threat to U.S.
space assets.
To the extent you can discuss this in an open forum, I
would appreciate your thoughts on the warfighter's space
protection and survivability needs and how this event might
influence the composition of our future space forces and
architecture.
Commanders, in previous testimonies, have stated their need
for more missile-defense inventory to keep pace with the
threat. Just yesterday, the Pacific Command (PACCOM) and U.S.
forces career commanders made a similar statement.
I would like your assessment on how well the combatant
commanders' need for missile-defense capabilities and
operational support is being met and whether opportunities for
improvement exist.
In 2006, this committee drafted and enacted, with
bipartisan support, legislation setting forth the objectives of
a Reliable Replacement Warhead.
I continue to strongly support RRW and the means to
achieving a safer, more secure, and more reliable nuclear
weapon for our strategic forces.
General, as the agent responsible for the operational
readiness of our Nation's nuclear forces, please explain why
you have greater confidence in RRW, over the long term, than
Life Extension Programs (LEPs).
Additionally, though it is still very early in the design
phase, there will be future decisions on RRW--quantity, legacy,
stockpile, life extensions, and--and delivery systems or
modernizations. Please comment on these moving parts and
discuss any force structure STRATCOM has.
Last, I would like to say I would appreciate a discussion
of gaps or shortfalls in challenges you face in the areas of
intelligence, command, control and communications, and
particularly cyberspace.
STRATCOM is truly a global command with a breadth of
missions befitting that global scope.
General, thank you, again, for your leadership and service,
at this time of great transition in our Nation's strategic
forces, our position and capabilities. I look forward to your
testimony.
And, again, I thank our chairman for calling the hearing at
this particular time. Thank you.
Ms. Tauscher. I thank the ranking member.
General Cartwright, the floor is yours. You have submitted
significant and very comprehensive testimony way before the
deadline. You are not meant to do that, by the way. It is meant
to be late like everybody else's is. [Laughter.]
But we have thoroughly reviewed it. But we are interested
if you would like to talk to us extemporaneously, answer some
of the questions we have put forward.
We are happy to take your testimony. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, COMMANDER, U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Cartwright. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and
Congressman Everett.
I, too, would like to acknowledge we have had a series of
briefings back and forth at the staff levels and at the member
levels for individual issues and for more comprehensive
reviews. And that has been very valuable in framing this
discussion, number one.
And, number two, it also acknowledges the fact that things
don't just happen in the spring, that we have engagement all
year long, and that it is important to keep that dialogue
going. And it is probably one of the more valuable things,
particularly for something in the strategic side with both
significance to the country and the regret factors if we get it
wrong. Having a continual dialogue is critical to this
activity.
I will keep my comments very short here, because I would
like to spend the time responding to you all. But just to go
back over a few things: deterrence--and I think it has been
framed very well by both of the opening comments--the breadth
and the scale of the activities that have emerged since 2001
are significant. And our ability to stay ahead of those threats
and to actually affect and deter has been challenged.
As was mentioned, we have moved from the old strategic
TRIAD construct of the bombers, the submarines, and the
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) to one that is more
integrated and offers the country a broader range of activities
that can deter and assure our allies, and this is critical.
The idea of having an offensive capability, a defensive
capability that is balanced and can be tailored within the
region, bounded by the lessons that we have learned in the
conventional forces on a responsive infrastructure, so that--
similar to what we experienced in the first Gulf War, when we
built mountains that were called iron mountains--rather than
doing management by inventory, to get to a responsive
infrastructure that allows us to adapt, to respond to
operational and technical surprises, and to not manage by
inventory is critical in how we move forward in our strategic
capabilities, because these are expensive capabilities.
If we put them together, many times, some of the programs
that have been brought forward in space, in the strategic side
of our weapons and in our platforms, have oftentimes been
guilty of being legacy before Initial Operational Capability
(IOC). And we have got to find a way to respond to a threat
that lives in an age that is more driven by Moore's Law than by
the industrial constructs that we have often worked against.
So I look forward to the opportunity to start to understand
where we can get this leverage, where we can adapt and be
responsive, because, quite frankly, our crystal ball is no
better than anyone else's. We can make mistakes. We can be
surprised. And we have got to acknowledge that fact in our
strategy.
And so having a balanced offense/defense infrastructure
underpinned by command and control and intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) is critical to the
strategy.
The command has set up components. We did this very
differently than the standard model. This command was about
4,000 man years when we started this activity. We have reduced
that significantly, moved those authorities and resources out
to the components to allow the organization to flatten out to
handle these global challenges. And the scale and the magnitude
and the number of transactions that are part of an activity
like that are significant. And to bring that into one
headquarters would really be unwieldy for the Nation, and our
ability to stay ahead of our adversaries would be questionable.
This is a different construct. For instance, in my
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance component, rather
than build one from scratch, the commander of the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) is my commander of ISR; the same for
the cyber side, we used the commander of the National Security
Agency (NSA).
Rather than building new constructs, build ones that can be
joint from the start, can move to a combined or allied type of
configuration when it is appropriate, and for which we have
existing partnerships, centers of excellence, relations with
industry, relations with the rest of the interagency already
built in, so that we don't have to build those at the time of
crisis. We grow those. We train in that configuration and it is
essential.
They also have the ability to define requirements, resource
appropriate activities and manage acquisition in a way that
this headquarters does not and cannot, and should not be tied
down with. Okay?
So it is a very different construct, and it is worth
watching. It is worth understanding where value is gained in
it, and it is worth questioning where maybe there isn't value.
We are about two years into a three-year endeavor to put
that together. The reason we took three years was to ensure
that we did not disrupt families. So we stayed in the three-
year military rotation cycle.
So the third tranche of people and resources will move this
year to make these components hold. All of them have declared
initial operating capability. And all of them will declare full
operational capability probably some time toward the end of
this year. And so they have moved along, both in their
credibility and their capability as we have stood these
commands up.
On the offensive side--and I am just going to step through
a couple of highlights on the TRIAD, just to frame some issues
and respond quickly to a few that were highlighted in the
comments--we look at three areas here. And Marines tend to deal
in threes. So triangles work out for us.
But in the offensive side of this, the nuclear-strike
capabilities framed in the Moscow Treaty, which is drawing us
down significantly from 2001 through 2012, with 2007, this
year, being an evaluation half point. How are we doing? Is it
working?
Now, the reductions between 2000 and 2012 were to be
commensurate with increases in capability in the other areas,
and so what I am here to report about is how well have the
other areas moved in response to the planned reductions? And
where are we in that drawdown?
And I will tell you that we are well ahead of schedule at
the midpoint, that because of the capabilities that have been
demonstrated on the conventional side of the house and the
capabilities that we have demonstrated in the defensive side--
and I will talk to each one of those--we have elected to take
additional risk and draw down quicker to free up resource, so
that we don't have to ask for resource to do things like,
Reliable Replacement Warhead, the Complex 2030, that is
associated with revitalizing the national infrastructure
associated with nuclear weapon production. Those things are
critical in order to be able to move forward, and we have to
pick and choose.
What is nice here is that we have got offensive
capabilities and defensive capabilities against which to manage
the risk. And so I will step through those.
On the conventional side, the fielding of what has been
called the J-coded weapons, but the GPS-guided J-DAM, the J-
SOW, which is a glide-type weapon, and the newly-emerging two
cruise missiles, one being sea-launched and one being air-
launched, have really given us a significant amount of
offensive capability and precision and survivability under
stressing threats, and otherwise, that have put us in a
position that our conventional forces are second-to-none.
Where we have a hole, where we have a gap is in the prompt
global strike (PGS) side of the equation. And the chairman
identified this in her comments. But, today, for those high-
regret factors, fleeting targets that we would want to address,
we only have a nuclear weapon as an alternative.
And in the diverse threats that we deal in, that is not
necessarily appropriate across the spectrum of threat, and we
really need to be able to provide a capability for the Nation
below the nuclear threshold that can address these fleeting
high-value, high-regret factor type threats.
And we can talk more about some of the issues that emerged
in the discussion last year--I am happy to do that--and how we
are trying to move forward in that area, but I see that as a
scene that is causing us undue risk.
Now, the question is, when do you match up the threat with
the capability? How early do you want to have it? How much of a
deterrent value does this conventional capability bring to the
table, so that if you bring it out earlier than the threat, it
prevents or at least inhibits the adversary from fielding the
threat?
Those are the questions that ought to be asked. Again, my
crystal ball is no better than anybody else's, but I will give
you my best advice on that.
I am sorry; I forgot the non-kinetic side of this on the
offensive weapons. Suffice it to say that we have stood up a
component with the National Security Agency. And for me, and
for the Nation, our judgment was that the center of excellence
for working in this environment is going to be where the Nation
has its highest concentration of cryptologists, mathematicians
and computing power, and that is the National Security Agency.
It is today, and it is likely to be into the future.
We need to encourage the national lab system to start to
bring to the table the intellectual underpinning for the R&D
and future concepts that are going to dominate the cyber
environment.
But for the Nation, the bulk of our transactions in the
commerce side of the house and in just general business are
occurring on these networks. Our competitive edge lives on
these networks. This Nation's ability to compete
internationally lives on these networks. Our military
capabilities live on these networks.
We must understand this environment. We must have access to
this environment. And we must be able to protect our interests
in this environment. It is not drastically different than the
sea or the air or space. And we have to start to understand and
organize ourselves to be able to operate in this environment.
And I think that we are on a footing to move in that
direction organizationally and with the intellectual
underpinning. But we have got to bring a more holistic
approach. We have got to be able to integrate ourselves with
industry, as appropriate, with Homeland, with the Department of
Energy (DOE), all of these organizations--Justice. All have
equities in this area.
The paradigms that have been established in policy and law
are sufficient. We may want to tweak them a little bit, but
they give us a good guidepost to go out and start understanding
how to operate in this medium, and then understand where we
might be challenged and come back to you all and explain that.
And I will be happy to have a more detailed discussion, but
that would probably have to be in a closed session, and we can
do that at a future date.
On the defensive side, missile defense. Missile defense has
emerged over the past year in the relationship that has been
established between Strategic Command and our component
integrated missile defense with the Missile Defense Agency. And
the test programs have moved to a much more successful footing,
technically, because MDA has done a great job.
Operationally, because we have integrated the warfighter
into the test programs, started to drive the program in a
direction that is more appropriate for fielded capabilities--in
other words, the warfighter involved in the Warfighter
Improvement Programs and information programs--and started to
drive this in a direction that gives us an operational
capability.
This year, we are in a configuration to be able to do
operational work. We demonstrated that through an extended
period of time around the Fourth of July, when the North
Koreans fired off several missiles. We stayed in an operational
configuration for an extended period of time. The system worked
well. We learned a lot.
The system can be moved to an operational configuration
anytime. It will be the end of this year before we are in a
position where we can concurrently do R&D and development work
along with sustained operations. And that is our goal, is to
drive the system to that posture.
The focus this year that we are driving MDA toward is the
part of the capability--when we talked about this capability,
it was against rogue states to defend the Nation, but it was
also for forward-deployed forces, allies and friends. Forward-
deployed forces, allies and friends is the focus this year. We
have got to start to understand how to move out.
The good news is we have many allies who want to
participate in this capability, who want to understand how to
use it. The credibility against an emerging, proliferating
threat of ballistic missiles--particularly short- and medium-
range--their quick reaction times are things that threaten
nations.
To give them the capacity, both to stand on their own feet
and to integrate with us or anyone else to build layered and
mutual defenses, is where we want to end up in this capacity.
And driving toward that is going to be essential.
The key R&D test points, many of them will occur this year.
And we must watch those. We must drive those. But that is where
the next real leverage point will come in missile defense. And
we ought to be watching that this year.
The other piece of defense that I think is absolutely
critical in understanding how we can start to take the pressure
off of a strategy that was focused purely on nuclear weapons
for deterrence is in the counter-proliferation, non-
proliferation side of the house, also in our mission area and
starting to work in those areas to expand our capability out.
Part of the strategy that we are advocating at STRATCOM is
that we generally look at conflict in five phases, zero through
five. So--Marine math, it is really six, but zero through five.
And the idea here is that zero and one are pre-conflict.
And that is where you want to win. That is where you want to be
most effective. And, heretofore, we have not done as good a job
as we could, particularly at STRATCOM, on focusing on zero and
one.
The capabilities like missile defense, the capabilities
like working in non-proliferation and counter-proliferation
focus on phases zero and one in the conflict, trying to prevent
it. The better you are at that, the less you need in your
stockpile of offensive capabilities.
They ought to reinforce each other. They ought to be able
to be tailored for the region, so the problems that we may face
in Southeast Asia versus Southwest Asia, North--you pick the
region. We ought to be able to tailor a balance between offense
and defense in the tools we use. And counter-proliferation,
non-proliferation capabilities offer us a wide range of
opportunities to do that. And we have got to focus in that
area.
The other piece here in the defensive side that I think is
important to understand is the defense of our networks and how
we are going to move to defend our networks and defend the
activities on our networks, both at home and abroad.
And, today, you know, bless it, but the Internet was really
designed around the terminals. Everything was designed around
protecting the terminals. We put firewalls and patches in our
terminals, in our computers, in our servers, et cetera.
We have got to start to look and not walk away from that,
but we have got to start to expand out our awareness of the
networks, so that we know what is going to attack our terminals
before the attack occurs, so that we can configure them in a
way that makes sense. That is a difficult technical problem,
but not beyond the reach of this country and its intellectual
capital. We have got to start to do that.
The day when we can afford in American commerce to be
attacked, shut down, wait two weeks to two months for a patch
to arrive, and then come back online cannot be passed off to
the consumer anymore. It is just too expensive. We have got to
find a more responsive way to defend our networks. And we are
working on that. We are pushing on that, both on the R&D side,
but also on the architectural side of how we are going to do
this.
We are not alone in this activity. Homeland Security is our
partner in this, Justice, the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI). All of us are playing together in
this and working to understand how we can better defend the
Nation's networks. This is a critical part. It is how we fight
wars, but it is also how we do business as a nation. And it is
going to be important as we move forward.
The responsive infrastructure, which is the last leg in the
new TRIAD. To me, this is critical. This underpins our ability
to have a flexible and dynamic deterrent capability. Having an
infrastructure that can respond to operational and technical
surprise is critical.
In the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's, when most of our nuclear
arsenal was put together, it was put together under a constrict
where we used inventory to manage operational and technical
risk.
If a weapon had a flaw that we discovered at a certain part
in its life and we lost that entire character of weapon, we had
to have an alternative weapon that would fit into that slot. We
had to have a big enough inventory to go through and repair all
of those weapons and do it in a timeline that was sufficient to
not have a gap in our capability. So we had--had and have--very
large inventories to manage operational and technical risk.
We have long since learned--and I will go to a grunt
mentality here, but--with the 155 round in artillery, that most
of what was going on out there was associated with the
logistics of moving huge inventories to the fight, and it
consumed us. And we built large iron mountains to make sure we
were ready.
We really can't afford to do that. It reduces our
nimbleness. It reduces our flexibility to be surprised, because
if somebody comes up with an alternative that defeats that
weapon, we have an iron mountain that is useless and we have a
hole in our capability. We can't afford that.
Precision changed that dynamic for the 155. It allowed us
to have less rounds, but, coupled with precision, was an agile
infrastructure, one that could be warm and building, in time,
to affect the fight. That is critical.
We have to think the same way about the nuclear enterprise.
We have to have an infrastructure that is responsive to
technical and operational surprise. We have to have a weapon
that is safe to the user, and the handler is secure, in that--
for me, nirvana is that if the wrong person gets a hold of it,
it is a paperweight. That is where we really want to be.
And we have got to have reliability, because the
reliability means that the number of weapons against any
problem is the minimum number necessary. And the goal of the
Administration, as stated, is the fewest weapons necessary to
ensure national security. And to move in that direction, we
need to move toward a safe, secure, reliable weapon and an
infrastructure that is responsive to operational and technical
surprise.
RRW puts us on the path. It is not the only element. It is
a form, fit, function replacement in that we are not changing
any of the delivery vehicles. In fact, we are reducing
substantially the number of delivery vehicles it goes in. It
has the same operational characteristics, but it is safer for
the people who have to handle it. It is secure, so that one of
these weapons does not end up in the wrong place and used in
the wrong way. And it is reliable, which draws down the number
of platforms I need and the number of weapons we have to
deliver.
It puts us on the right path toward drawing this stockpile
down to the minimum number necessary for national security,
which I think is essential.
We have two domains that we are responsible for at
STRATCOM, the cyber domain and the space domain. We have talked
a little bit about cyber. Let me just touch on space, and then
I will quit. I promise.
The space domain. We had the test with the ASAT here
recently. That is not something that is unprecedented, in that
the United States and, at the time, the Soviet Union both
conducted ASAT tests.
When we conducted those tests, we did so in a way that we
thought was responsible, but we did create debris in the
atmosphere when we tested. And this was back in 1985. And when
we tested in 1985, we tested at the lower end of what is
considered the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) belt. Even testing at the
low end of the Low Earth Orbit belt, it took over 20 years for
that debris to come down out of space and burn up in the
atmosphere.
The recent test was in the upper area of the Low Earth
Orbit belt. That means that material, over the next 20-plus
years, will have to migrate down through all of the--what we
would call appropriate users of the Low Earth Orbit regime
through that area and then down into the atmosphere. That is
going to take a long time.
This test occurred above the altitude at which the
International Space Station is in orbit. It occurred above
where most of the satellites that use the Low Earth Orbit
regime orbit. So we are going to have to make significant
adjustments as collision, or, as we call it, conjunction
opportunities occur over the next 20-plus years.
Every time you move a satellite, you are saying to a
vendor, ``You are going to expend fuel, which reduces the life
of a satellite and changes the investment criteria that you
assumed when you put that satellite up.'' That is going to have
an effect on business, on commerce. And it is going to have an
effect on our national assets that are in Low Earth Orbit,
because we are going to have to move to avoid this debris when
it occurs. That is an impact on us. We would like to have not
had that happen, but it did. And so we are where we are.
Both the Chinese and our National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) have programs associated with manned
flight, today and into the future, flight that intends to go
beyond Low Earth Orbit and out to the lunar exploration, et
cetera. You are going to have to pass through this debris. You
are going to have to understand the risks that you are now
going to have to take to move through that. So that is one
attribute associated with space that we are going to have to
work on.
Because of that, STRATCOM, and the military space side of
this, is responsible for predicting where that debris will be,
advising users of space when they are going to conflict with
it, so if you plan a manned launch, where are the gaps, so that
you do not run into this debris.
We have been in what I will call a cataloguing posture in
space for the last 50 years. We look and see what is up there,
based on what we know was launched. Based on multiple passes
over our radars and optical sensors, we try to get a good
estimation of what is up there and where it is.
Inside of geosynchronous orbit (GEO), from 23,000 miles in,
there are approximately 40,000 pieces of debris and intended
satellites, et cetera, that we are trying to manage on a
regular basis.
The timeliness of that knowledge is a catalog. We post this
on open source, so the commercial vendors globally can use
that. And then we give them high-resolution information for
launch-type activities, et cetera.
But we are reactive in this. We are going to have to change
our posture to one of predictive, to understand where this
debris is going to be with longer lead times, so that we can
better plan launches, have increased safety margins for manned
flight, which many countries are starting to move back to--not
many, but, clearly, those involved with the International Space
Station and those who are involved with space exploration. That
means greater margins. We have got to reconfigure ourselves in
order to do that.
The expense is not that--I never say this the right way--
the expense is there. We are working our way through this. But,
first, we have got to change the mindset in the organizational
construct and put us in a position where we are thinking more
about capabilities that are predictive in nature, and move
ourselves to the computing power and the sensor integration
that will allow us to do that.
We started that about three years ago. We are well on our
way to that. Those are funded programs, and I think they are in
good shape.
But I would be happy to talk in more depth on those.
Probably have to move to closed session to get to technical
detail, but general capability, we can do.
And I will leave it at that, Madam Chairwoman.
[The prepared statement of General Cartwright can be found
in the Appendix on page 39.]
Ms. Tauscher. Well, General Cartwright, thank you for a
thorough vetting of many of the questions that I think I asked
and the ranking member asked in our opening statements. And I
think this is a great compliment to your significant, and, as I
said, very comprehensive statement.
I am going to ask a couple of questions and turn to the
ranking member.
We have got members here that have questions, and we are
going to use the five-minute rule.
I just, very quickly, wanted to talk to you, get back to
something you talked about, because RRW has been in the news
recently. And I just really want to have you state for the
record almost unambiguously, once again, whether RRW will
deliver any new military capabilities?
And, forgive me, General, the reason I bring it up is
because I want to note for the record that the last time the
Administration brought a proposal forward for a new nuclear
weapons capability--the redundantly named, Robust Nuclear
Penetrator--I helped kill it. So I wanted to be sure that--I
just wanted to get your view. Is RRW a new weapon?
General Cartwright. It is a component. When we look at a
weapon, it is a combination of the delivery vehicle, the
systems that navigate to take you from Point A to Point B, and
then put you in a position to have the effect that was
desired--in this case, a nuclear weapon.
RRW is a component of that--with no different
characteristics than the weapons that we have today, other than
it is safer, more secure, and more reliable. But from a
standpoint of weapon effect, from a standpoint of the delivery
vehicle and its intended use, there is no change.
Ms. Tauscher. Same yield?
General Cartwright. Within percentages, one or two percent.
In other words--I am smiling, because I am trying to make sure
I don't go outside the box of classification here--but the way
we are getting the capability and keeping the same weapons
effect and yet having safety improved and reliability improved
is that we are allowing the designers to reduce, when
appropriate, the size and the yield--and we are talking just in
very small numbers, single-digit-type numbers--in order to
optimize for larger margins to assure that we don't need to
test, to assure that we can put additional safety and security
measures inside.
Some of that volume is compensated by the fact that we have
moved from tube technology to microcircuits, so we can gain
some advantage there. But, where necessary, we have allowed
them to reshape components--including the physics packages, so
to speak--to fit into this volume, optimizing for no testing,
higher security, higher safety, higher reliability.
Ms. Tauscher. I am going to suspend my questions for the
time being. I am going to yield five minutes, or as much time
as he might use, to the Ranking Member, Mr. Everett.
Mr. Everett. Thank you, Chairman. I am going to basically
do the same thing. I just have a couple of questions.
Let me talk a bit about space. We have had a lot of
hearings, and you referred to the use of space in our economy.
I think last hearing we had, globally, there was about a $90-
billion industry. Don't remember, but I think it was growing
somewhere in the rate of 16 percent a year.
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Mr. Everett. That will continue. We, on this committee, and
most of the Congress, recognizes that, while we have
redundancy, it would be a severe loss to our military to lose
our space systems.
In that light, let me mention that there are a number of
ways to achieve greater survivability--protection of our space
assets, hardening on-orbit spares, redundancy, distributed
architectures, alternatives such as unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), active prevention and denial, non-material solutions
and rapid replenishment.
Along those lines, in your opinion, what is the military
utility for operation response to space?
General Cartwright. I think you have characterized this
very well, Congressman Everett.
There is more than one way to skin this cat. But what we
have to start to understand in the larger construct here is can
we change the risk equation from the standpoint of we have, in
many sectors in space, moved in a direction that it is
expensive to go to space, so we increase the likelihood of
success, so we build a bigger motor, more reliable motor, more
redundant systems.
We make the payload bigger, because, since it is going to
cost so much to get there, we gotta stay there a long time. So
we put additional redundancy, which turns to weight, which
means the motor has to be bigger. And we work ourselves into a
spiral that the risk equation here is zero tolerance for
failure, which puts us in a high-cost environment.
Some systems need to be exquisite. They need to be cutting
edge, and they need to have those characteristics, but not all.
And we can get resilience, and we can get survivability with a
very different risk equation and the combination of both
commercial assets, military assets, lower-tech assets,
particularly for the warfighter. Many times, we do not need the
level of technology that is necessary for, say, technical
intelligence.
So getting a balance in space is critical. Having it be
responsive--I will express that I have concerns when people put
a label on a capability like responsive space, because then it
becomes a buzz word and everybody defines their capability
based on some metric of responsive. Responsive to do what-is-
what is important for me to understand and for the command to
understand.
We can be responsive with on-orbit assets and tailor them
to problems. We have done that for many years, and it just
takes a software reprogramming, a different orbit that can be
adjusted. Many things can be responded with the assets that we
have today. And we do that very well between ODNI, STRATCOM,
and DOD.
Some assets, we could change the risk equation and build
much cheaper capabilities that don't last any longer, but can
augment or replace or replenish, based on the scenario,
particularly with communications.
When you know that you are going to need much greater
bandwidth in a particular region, surging to that, rather than
putting something up there that would otherwise be an overage
of capability for, say, an extended five- to ten-year period,
may make a lot more sense.
It also allows us to start to broaden the industrial base
out and keep it warm, instead of building something, waiting 10
years and then trying to re-gather the people and rebuild
again. So we have got to take all of the pieces that have been
laid out here.
Responsive, to me, is using those on-orbit assets in ways
that we maybe didn't design them, but could be done. Next is
having a warm industrial base that can allow us to respond
quickly to either surge, replenish or replace, to have the
capability in that warm industrial base, then, and the
intellectual capital to see a new problem and respond to it. I
mean, between those three things, that is what I would look for
in the definition of responsive for space.
We are trying to move in that direction with a responsive
space capability. I am focused on the capability. Others may be
focused on defining it as an acquisition practice, et cetera.
But, for me, it is delivering capability and understanding what
is driving the timelines and not overreacting in those.
I mean, we could buy responsive with large numbers of
assets in the barn, so to speak, assets stored on orbit, et
cetera. That, to me, at this stage in the game, is not
necessary.
What we have got to understand is what is it we are trying
to do and what is the timeline for response when we are
surprised, technically or operationally.
Is that----
Mr. Everett. That is very consistent with what you said in
Omaha last October, and I appreciate that.
Mr. Reyes and I had the opportunity to be at Kirkland when
the 14th Air Force was stood up.
And I have one other question. And I will admit to some
personal feelings about this, but, last year, this committee,
as well as the Intel Committee, had information or had in our
bill that the Air Force could not close down the U2 program
before the Secretary of Defense certified to the appropriate
committees that there would be no loss of ISR.
The Air Force plans again this year to close down the U2. I
am not sure that, at this point in time, we have--and Golden
Hawk is what we are talking about. I don't think that we yet
have the sensors that we need that would replace the U2. And I
would just ask you if you have an opinion on that.
General Cartwright. Sir----
Mr. Everett. Air Force, Marine----
General Cartwright. The U2 has been part of our stable of
capabilities for a lot of years and has been an incredibly
capable asset. And it has a long legacy. And it has been
adapted over the years. The engines have been upgraded. The
avionics have been upgraded to be as relevant as they can be.
And so it has been a workhorse.
Today, its primary limitation--and this is not pejorative--
but its primary limitation is the fact that it has a pilot.
That pilot is generally good for X number of hours. And that is
what limits the duration on station.
It also is challenged in being able to enter into a threat
environment. It is not survivable in a high-threat environment.
But we have a substantial amount of activity that does not
occur in high-threat environments.
The Global Hawk is to focus on those areas that are not
high threat, but allows us the routine sorties today that we
are flying with Global Hawk in theater, generally about 22-1/2
hours on station. That is a significantly longer period of it.
So the Global Hawk offers us a movement forward in availability
of sensors.
The Global Hawk has had its challenges in production, and I
won't go technically into those. I think having the Air Force
in here might allow you to do that in more detail, but we are
working through those.
The objective, here, capability is to move to a more
persistent platform, one that is able to stay on station
longer, give us the sensor phenomenologies to be able to aid
the warfighter in real-time and give him or her the information
they need in order to prosecute.
The trade between Global Hawk and U2 is one that we have
got to manage. The Global Hawk has to demonstrate its
capability, both in the upgrades and the numbers, before we
want to let go of the U2. How much risk we are willing to take
is the balancing act that the Air Force is trying to work
through for the Department.
For STRATCOM, I cannot afford a gap in capability. And that
is the way we responded to the query from last year is we can't
afford the gap in capability.
Having said that, there are certain theaters in which the
U2 is extremely valuable because of its sensor package. So as
we draw it down, we have to retain, particularly in those
theaters, that capability until we are absolutely certain that
we have a replacement that is on station and ready to replace
it.
There are other places where we use U2s where we can afford
to take a little risk. So prioritizing that is what we did from
a command position to the Air Force. We listed the highest
priorities to the lowest priorities and where we could afford
to take risk as a Nation in the transition between Global Hawk
and U2. And that should help inform the debate as we move
forward in this area.
Mr. Everett. Well, I thank you.
Of course, this committee and the Intel Committee's only
position was that we would be certified that there was no loss
to ISR to the warfigher.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Tauscher. You are welcome, Mr. Everett.
I am happy to yield five minutes, now, to Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
And, General Cartwright, five minutes applies to my
questions and your answers in total, the way the rules run. So
I am going to be quick, and----
General Cartwright. I will try to be the same.
Mr. Larsen [continuing]. I would like you to be quick as
well.
About a month ago, I met with a People's Liberation Army
(PLA) general who is equivalent of the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS). He was in D.C., met with a few
folks. We had a conversation about the Chinese ASAT test in
which we brought up the issue of debris, and he characterized
the issue of debris as a baseless concern.
We did our part to enlighten him on what we thought was a
good foundation for having that concern. It wasn't a very
pleasant conversation, but we got through it and only would
suggest that if you can find that opportunity to explain,
through your appropriate chain of command, to the Chinese how
you described it to us, it might enlighten them further on what
the problem is--one part of the problem--with their ASAT tests.
Also, I have some questions on China, but I submitted them
for the record to Secretary Gates and General Pace when they
were before us. You probably will be getting copies of those
questions to participate in developing those answers.
But along that line, one question I think is important for
us to talk about has to do with Space Situational Awareness.
One of the problems we have been struggling with in the
committee has been the investment into transformational
satellite systems, as it has been called, the amount of money
we have invested. I think Dr. Sega has done a good job
explaining how they are trying to get that under control, but
whether or not we are investing in the right thing.
And so I would like to ask you if we are investing enough
in Space Situational Awareness capabilities that are needed to
deter, defend and recover from possible threats against our
space assets and their related ground infrastructures? And, if
not, what are the greatest needs in that area?
General Cartwright. Different approaches to Space
Situational Awareness. The first is to be able to survey space
and know what is there and know it with some accuracy, so that
you can have access and passage in a safe way for any who want
it. And that is the first capability.
And what we have done is net together, initially,
terrestrial capabilities, radars, et cetera. And, now, we are
starting to move toward netting together our space sensors, so
that they are integrated with the ground and we are integrated
in a way that gives us a higher degree of fidelity and a higher
degree of reliability that we are actually seeing everything
that is out there that we need to see.
Mr. Larsen. In your opinion, is the technology to do that
mature enough to do this and do it right once?
General Cartwright. Yes, from the standpoint of taking
advantage of everything that we have and everything that is a
program of record today that is funded.
We have a couple of capabilities that we are planning over
the next few years to launch that will fill in gaps of systems
that have lapsed. But given that, yes, I believe that we have
what we need in those areas.
What we have to do now is get ourselves organized, so that
the information flow and the uplinks and downlinks in the
ground infrastructure is netted together in such a way as to
have the information processed and provided, so that it can be
responded to inside the decision cycle of having to act. Okay?
And I believe that we are on the path to do that, and that
we have the resources necessary to do that in the aggregate.
There may be disconnects--either programs that have technical
issues, et cetera--but we are down to a point where we are
close. That is the first piece.
The second piece that you alluded to was the
phenomenologies to be able to utilize space as we utilize other
areas for sensor knowledge understanding awareness. And the
Department has been a large advocate of radar, because it
washes away the night, and it washes away bad weather, to a
large extent. And so it gives us eyes and ears when nighttime
comes and when we have bad weather, which is important to us to
be able to dictate the tempo of any conflict. That is why radar
is so critical.
The question, now, are there more and more capabilities
being associated with radar, as we move to the future. How many
of those are appropriate from space? How many of those are
appropriate from air and terrestrial sensors? Air and
terrestrial being a little easier to adapt, change, fix, et
cetera.
What we are trying to understand, and what the command is
focused on is not having to look at the problem as if you are a
space person. If I ask a space person to solve a problem, I get
a space answer. If I ask an air person to solve it, I get an
air answer.
We are trying to sit in a position where we can look at the
integration of air, space and terrestrial, understand the
balance, not go too heavy in any one area, and then integrate
them in a way that is appropriate. I am not convinced yet that
we have that framed correctly for Space Radar.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. And I would say if you ask Congress, you
will get a congressional answer, which may not be, sometimes,
helpful, but if you need help on that----
So just in conclusion here, what I hear you saying is that
not that we are radar heavy, but that the future allows us to
have capability that may not just be focused on radar. And we
may be able to do that in a leaner way with pretty good
effectiveness.
General Cartwright. Integrating between the mediums and
between the Intelligence Services (INTS).
Mr. Larsen. So that you have a better way of approaching
this problem.
Thanks.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Larsen, do you want to submit a form of
your correspondence to General Pace and Secretary Gates to
General Cartwright for questions for the record?
Mr. Larsen. Yes, I would actually like to do that, yes, if
I could.
Ms. Tauscher. So ordered.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you very much.
I am happy to yield five minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General, you have been quoted in some publications recently
as being somewhat concerned, as I read it, about the
fragmentary nature of our cyber efforts as a Government. Can
you briefly outline for us what your concerns are, the kinds of
things you think we ought to be thinking about?
General Cartwright. My concern on the cyber side is really
on an organizational level. And it was the fragmentation of
defense organizations responsible for defending networks,
organizations responding for operating and doing what we call
reconnaissance on those networks, setting the--being in the
cyber environment. They were separated by, organizationally,
not a common commander.
And so what we were advocating for was, as the mission came
to STRATCOM, part of what we needed to do was get unity of
command, unity of effort, so that we could get balance of
offense and defense, understand that balance and articulate it
to the Congress, because, right now, one group comes to you and
asks about defensive capabilities. Another group comes in at a
different area and talks about offensive capabilities. And you
don't know whether or not this has been integrated. That is
really the heart of the issue for me.
I believe, one, having the mission come to STRATCOM. Two,
allowing us to put a head, which, in our framework, is--the
National Security Agency is the senior head. We have Defense
Information Services Agency (DISA), which worries about day-in,
day-out running your service, running your backbone, but, also,
the defensive nature, integrating the two of them together, so
that I have got one commander who I turn to, who deconflicts.
Now, the next piece that we need to do is do that for the
Government. I mean, you have to have somebody that knows what
is going on out there to deconflict.
So those are my concerns, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I am interested in working further
with you on it, because I agree. I think we do need a
government-wide approach to it.
I also want to ask about RRW and responsive infrastructure.
My impression is--and from listening to you again today--is
that the two things have to go together.
And my further impression is that the Department of
Defense--and primarily you, I guess--are going to have to be
much more involved in making sure that responsive
infrastructure is really there, rather than--as it has been in
the past, in my view--Department of Defense turning to the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and saying,
``Produce what I want, and I don't care how you do it.''
To have responsive infrastructure, you are going to have to
be more involved in monitoring the--not day to day,
necessarily, but making sure, year by year, that that
infrastructure is responsive and not being allowed to
deteriorate. Am I on the right track with that?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir, you are. We had to do that--
and I will go back to the 155 round just because I am
comfortable being a grunt.
But, you know, we had to enter into a partnership with
industry, because we had to set certain criteria about a warm
base, make sure that the lines for various munitions stayed
warm and that the expertise was there to respond, if we needed
it, enter into a partnership that understood the cost of doing
that to industry, et cetera. But you could not just sit back
and say, ``I want.'' It really demanded a partnership. And this
demands a partnership.
And I am hopeful, because we have set some precedents here.
We took risk on the operational side to draw down, in order to
free resource for the DOE to be able to move aggressively in
and start to move on RRW, but also on their Complex 2030
program.
It has to be a trade back and forth. And we have got to
understand each other's risk when we do that. But it has to be
done in partnership. You are exactly right.
Mr. Thornberry. Let me just ask this: If you are watching
and you see either the RRW delayed or the Complex 2030 not
happening like it should, seems to me your response, based on
what you have said, is, ``Okay, you have to slow down
dismantlements,'' because, now, we are relying on numbers to
protect us, and if we can't have the RRW move ahead on schedule
and the responsive infrastructure on schedule, our country's
only option is to keep thousands of nuclear warheads.
Am I on the right track with that?
General Cartwright. I think you are exactly right. The only
thing I would add to it is that there is at least a partial
ability to look at other parts of the TRIAD and say maybe they
have advanced in a way that allows you to continue to reduce.
But, at the end of the day, we will have to stay with an
inventory management scheme until we are absolutely convinced
that we have something to replace it. The regret factors for
the Nation, in this area, are too high to let go of the trapeze
before you know you have got something to grab onto.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Ms. Tauscher. If the gentleman--your time is up, but if you
will yield, because I think there is a corollary to that, too,
that is interesting, and before we go to Mr. Spratt, the other
piece of it is we are still spending enormous amounts of money
on LEP programs and other things.
So, I mean, I am not an advocate of RRW, but I think that
there is another piece to this, which is instead of reducing
weapons and doing other things, we are still extending the life
of these weapons and spending an enormous amount of money to do
that. And the question of a responsive infrastructure and the
right size of the complex and all that, that question is left
out there, too, if we don't make some of these decisions. I
agree with you.
Thank you, Mr. Thornberry.
I am happy to yield five minutes to the chairman of the
Budget Committee----
Mr. Spratt. General Cartwright, thank you for your
excellent testimony, as always, your lucid explanations.
I have, however, some clarifications I would like to get
from your written statement, particularly with respect to RRW.
First of all, you have chosen Livermore as the primary
entity to care for the RRW program. Could you give us, quickly,
just a timeline that you expect for bringing the first RRW
warhead to completion for substitution?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir. There are several disciplined
acquisition points at which we would move through, stop, move
forward for either a technical review or a policy or oversight
review. And the one that we have just finished is kind of what
we would call preliminary design. So we have stopped at that
point.
We have had a certain set of criteria that are associated
with preliminary design. We have looked at those. We have made
a down select, understood the attributes associated with that
down select.
The next area we enter into is a detailed design activity
focused on what we think is the most promising design. At the
end of that, we would come back and ask for permission to enter
into development, and then on into fielding.
Objectively, what we are trying to accomplish here is that
the Moscow Treaty put us on a drawdown through 2012. At 2012,
we would like to be in a position where we have high confidence
that we have a design and a manufacturing capability that would
allow us to start to replace, to move into the trade between
draw down and demilitarization of weapons----
Mr. Spratt. Does that mean that you can link or associate
the significant drawdown with a replacement of the RRW, that
the two could be packaged more or less together?
General Cartwright. Sir, yes, sir.
Mr. Spratt. Is that part of the strategy of trying to
advance the idea of this----
General Cartwright. It has to be from the standpoint that
the design has to give us a capability to handle operational
and technical surprise, absent doing it with inventory. In
other words, modularity, interoperability, a responsive,
trained workforce that can respond to a surprise, rather than
an inventory that is so diverse and so large that you don't
worry about being surprised. You just bring in more inventory.
Mr. Spratt. Does the RRW anticipate the construction of a
new Re-entry Vehicle (RV)?
General Cartwright. It does not. It is form, fit, function
into the existing systems.
Mr. Spratt. Now, you say here, on page six of your
testimony, ``We lack the capability to respond globally to
globally-disbursed or fleeting threats.''
Then, on the next page, you say, ``The new TRIAD, when
mature, will provide improved agility and flexibility in
dealing with a wider range of contingencies.''
It gives me a little pause, because I read into that the
possibility you are saying that the new warhead would have
tactical utility, that we are resurrecting an old idea that we
might be using nuclear warheads early in a threat, as opposed
to the ultimate strategic reserve to respond to a threat.
General Cartwright. That was not my intent, sir. If I have
stated it unclearly, the intent, here, is that the mature TRIAD
would have a conventional alternative that would allow us to
address targets more appropriate for conventional munitions
than nuclear, A.
B, for those tactical things where we used to have all the
way down to artillery, to now be in a position where we have
the new J-coded weapons, we have both the cruise-missile
variant and the gravity variants and the glide variants, along
with a prompt global strike, we have more appropriate responses
for--when we have a mature TRIAD--for threats that are more
appropriately addressed by conventional munitions and effects.
May not have been able to do that in the past, because our
conventional capabilities weren't----
Mr. Spratt. But you are talking about a conventional
alternative to round out the TRIAD for----
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Mr. Spratt [continuing]. Prompt and fleeting threats, not a
nuclear alternative.
General Cartwright. That is correct.
Mr. Spratt. Okay. Still got time?
Ms. Tauscher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Spratt. Page 10, there was an intriguing statement at
the top of the page. Maybe I missed something in the story
about it, but on July the 4th, 2006, the North Koreans fired
several missile launches.
You state there, rather briefly, that we had our nuclear--
our ballistic-missile defense system up and in operation. Can
you shed some light on exactly what it was doing and what we
learned from that experience?
General Cartwright. Without going into the operational
details, we moved to an operational footing, brought the
sensors to command and control and the ground-based
interceptors (GBIs) online in a posture where, if necessary, we
could have responded.
We had ambiguous activities going on at that time. We had
several missiles that were being poised to be launched,
including one that had the potential to be intercontinental in
range. And so we took that opportunity to bring the system out
of R&D configuration into an operational configuration.
We held it in that operational configuration for an
extended period of time, which allowed us, on the warfighter
side of the equation, to validate the training that we had been
doing, the certification of crews, certification of equipment,
run that equipment for an extended period of time in
operational conditions.
We learned a significant amount of information, mostly
associated with our ability to do command and control of an
operational missile defense system, because, understand, this
system--part of the challenge here is--in the command-and-
control side--is U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) has
responsibility for defending the continental United States.
U.S. Pacific Command has responsibility in the Pacific
Theater. The United States European Command (USEUCOM) has
responsibility for Europe, but also Russia, as the new
construct has been put together. This threat covered all of
those simultaneously.
So managing the defense, we learned a lot about how to net
these organizations together, work with sensors that are spread
across all of those regions, but keep them on a common footing,
and how to manage day-in and day-out the routine maintenance
that must occur with any machine over an extended period of
time and not have a gap in our coverage.
Much of that work was done at our integrated missile
defense headquarters out at Schriever Air Force Base in
standing them up and then confirming the capabilities, but
there are nodes all over the world that have to be netted
together to make this work. This was our opportunity to put
that together, demonstrate that it could.
The good news here is that the mechanical side of this
worked very well. The command-and-control side, we made some
adjustments, but it worked very well.
We had allies looking over our shoulder the whole time.
They were very compelled by what they saw, as you can see in
the response by the Japanese and how they have started to move
to integrate and build a defensive capability.
And, at the end of the day, what we were looking for was a
credible deterrent capability that offered an alternative to an
offensive-only capability, offered timelines that were
consistent with the threat that was out there and capabilities
that were not shield, but certainly were enough to put doubt in
your adversary's mind about the veracity of whether or not they
could act inside your timelines and inside your capability to
respond. And, to me, that is what we learned over the July 4th
activity.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you very much.
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Spratt.
I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from
Arizona, Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Tauscher. You are welcome.
Mr. Franks. And, General, thank you for being on our side.
You know, your acumen and your ability is just so obvious to
all of us, and we appreciate you being such an advocate for
human freedom.
You know, I was struck by a couple of your phrases that I
suppose all good soldiers use to emphasize the graveness of the
situation by sort of a subtle understatement.
You used the term, ``conjunction opportunities,'' related
to the space debris from the ASAT test from China. And, of
course, that paints the picture in my mind of something
slamming into the space station at high velocity and knocking
out the command and control and seeing it plummeting to the
Earth. But the subtle understatement there is still
appreciated.
You also used the ``high-regret factor'' when we are
talking about missile defense. And I think that is a concept
that needs to be emphasized to a tremendous degree, because if,
in fact, there ever comes a time when missile defense becomes
critical to us, that high-regret factor could be something that
would be clear in all of our minds.
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Mr. Franks. Unfortunately, it seemed like about half the
population thinks we have a full-blown system that is
completely operational. And while our systems are real, we are
not there yet. And the other half of the population thinks that
that is just something that is, you know, just pie charts and
something that we hope for.
But I think the North Korean incident probably demonstrated
the operational availability of the system more than anything,
including in the Aegis system and the Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense (GMD).
One of the things I am concerned about is related to--you
know, the operational commanders are doing a good job saying
what is necessary and what is needed, and the Missile Defense
Agency is doing a good job in making sure that we have
interceptors. But the services haven't all taken ownership of
those yet. And can you tell me what the timeline--is there
another dynamics there that we are not aware of?
General Cartwright. It was alluded to earlier that we used
a different requirement, resourcing, and acquisition strategy
to field this capability.
Missile defense, historically, has been more focused, for
this Nation, on aircraft that might fire a missile--cruise
missile, et cetera--and on short-range type activities. And
even in the short-range ballistic, we really have had a
capability, but nascent, at best.
The dynamics, since the early 1990's, when we had the fall
of the wall, but moved out of the Cold War, ballistic missiles
have become a weapon of choice in proliferation, because they
can be fleeting. In other words, they can be moved to
someplace. So they are hard to track. Their time of action is
very, very quick. And, until you make the decision to use them,
you are not flying every day, et cetera, and expending money.
So they have become something that has proliferated.
And so the threat associated with them has grown. And we
watched this in the first Gulf War, moving into the second and
really into the age that we are in today.
What we are trying to understand, as we do missile defense,
is, one, what is the right construct, and not be bounded by
service lines or acquisition lines or requirements lines that
have grown up in--not stovepipes--let's call them ``vertical
cylinders of excellence'', okay--but be able to move across
these and find excellence and find leverage, and, when we do,
to build the compelling argument that this might be a better
way to look at the problem.
And once we build that, then to try to say, ``In this
vertical structure, let's optimize Aegis.''
Mr. Franks. General, my time is about gone here.
General Cartwright. I am sorry.
Mr. Franks. I wanted one other question on the record here.
General Cartwright. Please go ahead.
Mr. Franks. Yesterday, at PACCOM, I had asked General Bell
how important ballistic missile defense (BMD) was to our
warfighters. And he responded, ``I have got 800 of these
missiles pointed at U.S. troops right now in South Korea. So I
would support vigorously a robust approach to theater ballistic
missile defense, intercontinental ballistic missile defense. It
is a very important part of the total approach to this very
serious problem.''
And I would sure like to get you on the record in about
those same kind of terms.
General Cartwright. You can use that quote for me.
But the idea here is that we don't want to build a missile-
defense system for short range, a different system for cruise
missiles, a different one for intercontinental. We have got to
find a way to leverage the sensors across these mission areas,
across these vertical organizations in a way that makes sense.
And the only way to do that is to take a look at it, find the
value and then advocate, ``Army, will you take this? Air
Force?'' You have to have one of those services come on board
at some point.
Some of that is very obvious. Aegis is a straightforward
mix. Once we build it, the Navy assumes it. The land-based
missiles have been pretty straightforward.
It is the sensors where we are trying to understand who
ought to be responsible. If the sensor is on the water, but
really serves for space or for air, who should run it and how
should we manage it? And we are working our way through that.
We have got a good forum with the warfighters to do it. We are
not at a point where that is critical yet on these new sensors,
but discovery is part of this activity in understanding it.
But, at the end of the day, the Nation does not want four
or five different ways to address these problems. You really
want a combined way.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Tauscher. You are welcome, Mr. Franks.
I am happy to yield to the Chairman of the Intelligence
Committee, Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General, good to see you again.
I have two different tracks that I want to ask you a couple
of questions about. The first one kind of builds on the
questions that you were just asked, because, in the past,
combatant commanders have expressed their concerns that they do
not have sufficient numbers of Patriot PAC-3 missiles,
depending on the location, to deal with missile threats that
they are facing and their troops are facing.
So my questions are, are you satisfied that the current
numbers of Patriot PAC-3 missiles in inventory are sufficient?
General Cartwright. If PAC-3 is the only defense, we don't
have enough of them. What we are trying to understand, though,
is, in combination with the emerging Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) system----
Mr. Reyes. Right.
General Cartwright [continuing]. In combination with----
Mr. Reyes. But it will be a while before the THAAD
inventory----
General Cartwright. The line is hot, and we are producing.
We have a warm industrial base. We are upgrading those
missiles, based on new technology and new threat, and I believe
that we are in a good position.
If we had to freeze in time and we didn't have any of these
other systems, you would need more PAC-3--commanders would ask
you for more PAC-3.
Mr. Reyes. Right.
General Cartwright. But given that we are starting to bring
on Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) from--the naval variance of these
capabilities--that THAAD has had a very good test record now,
as we have--we have put it back on the--we are trying to
understand--keep that line warm and producing, but understand
what the right balance is going to be for the Nation as we
move----
Mr. Reyes. Combination of THAAD and PAC----
General Cartwright. THAAD, PAC-3, the sea-based
capabilities.
Mr. Reyes. Is that a conversation that is ongoing----
General Cartwright. Yes.
Mr. Reyes [continuing]. Right now, from your perspective,
with the Secretary of Defense and others?
General Cartwright. It is a conversation that is being
informed by tabletop technical war games within the Department,
external to the Department and the Government and external with
our allies, because they have a big stake in this.
And so we have a series of war games and tabletop exercises
that we run to understand these balances and trades, because it
is not just our American systems, really. We are looking at
systems associated with NATO, associated with other alliances
to augment this. And they should inform our investment
decisions also.
Mr. Reyes. There are areas in different parts of the world
where, basically, the Patriot is the only protection they have,
thinking about Japan----
General Cartwright. Right.
Mr. Reyes [continuing]. Some areas in the Middle East.
Some of the NATO countries, as they have had discussions
with us, feel that that is their only protection, at this
point, against the Iranian missiles.
General Cartwright. Right.
Mr. Reyes. Would you agree with all that?
General Cartwright. There are many countries that have
fielded PAC-3 or PAC-2 as their primary defensive capabilities.
Others have gone with indigenous systems.
There is great value in having some diversity, in having
some of these indigenous systems, but PAC-3 is the--kind of the
weapon of choice.
Mr. Reyes. Kind of a staple.
General Cartwright. It really is.
Mr. Reyes. Just switching to space for a moment, we know
that there are multiple ways to achieve greater survivability
and protection of our space assets to include hardening, on-
orbit spares, redundancy, alternatives, such as UAVs and other
such systems.
Can you tell me what the Department's overall strategy for
assuring support from space systems--what is the strategy for
that?
General Cartwright. I think all of the things that you just
highlighted in the diversity of the approaches to space are
key.
In addition to that, trying to now net together for the
U.S. all of those who have utility in space--commercial, other
agencies within the Government, the intelligence community, et
cetera. We have, at STRATCOM, endeavored to bring those
communities together in a common room, keep each other informed
of intelligence, of threats. We take responsibility for the
defensive side to make sure people understand what is out
there, but netting together.
Now, what is different from when I talked to you last year
is that the DNI and DOD's space operations centers are
virtually netted together. They have common deputy commanders.
So, in other words, we have a military person that is in both
places in common.
So I have a unity of command, quick information whenever
anything is conjunctioned in nature or other types of threats.
And we are developing that with the commercial sector. We have
got to move that to an international footing, and that is the
next step.
Mr. Reyes. All right. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Cartwright, I also want to pursue some
questions on missile defense. And, you know, last year the
committee expressed concern that MDA's program had been very
focused on what we consider to be long-term R&D efforts, such
as Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), at the expense of nearer-
term capabilities like THAAD and Aegis BMD.
And I am impressed, I did see in Colorado Springs your
Warfighter Involvement Program. And I think that there is a lot
that you have done to integrate with the other combatant
commanders the sense that this is not a system looking for a
buyer.
We also have, besides the warfighter, we have our allies,
and, obviously, our homeland are the most important things for
us to protect. We have Japan, obviously, working with us on--we
have got PAC-3s and other situations.
What are we doing to integrate the allied situation to make
sure that we have not just ourselves, and what are we doing to,
once again, make sure that people understand that this is a
defensive weapons system?
General Cartwright. A couple of activities that are going
on. We alluded to the exercise programs and the tabletop work.
That helps inform people of the capabilities. And, oftentimes,
these systems are attributed with capabilities they don't have
or are attributed with less capability than they really have.
Much of what has been focused on in missile defense is the
ground-based interceptor. The reality is, for STRATCOM in
particular, the larger capability here is one of a technology
that does not demand that you have to buy a certain sensor or a
certain weapon or have a certain command-and-control system.
The technology of today allows us to integrate, in a plug-
and-play way, in ways we never have been able to do before.
That allows you to build a collective defense mindset, rather
than, ``Let me show you how I could do something for you.''
This allows nations to bring to the table their
capabilities, tailored for what they believe are their national
priorities, their role in a collective defense, and contribute,
and build partnerships, as they come to the table and
understand the threat in the environment that they feel is
appropriate to respond to for their national needs. That is
what is significantly different about this system, that and the
ability to integrate across, not just short-range ballistic,
but a wide range.
So we saw South Korea announce that they wanted to focus on
short-range capabilities. It was appropriate for their problem,
but they can tie into the larger system in a way that allows
them to be an ally.
Take Australia or the United Kingdom. They tend to move
with us on a global nature. But they bring to the table
different weapons systems, different platforms to allow them to
immediately join and not have to go through an unnecessary
change in their configuration, et cetera, allows more nations
to come to the table, understand that this is a defensive
capability, be able to articulate the characteristics that are
necessary for them, participate in a different scenario, if it
is Iraq, as it was here recently, and still be a viable
contribution.
That is what is different about this system is its ability
to move and align policy and technical capability and intent
and sovereignty into one system.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, General.
Mr. Everett.
Mr. Everett. More questions?
I have often said that missile defense hasn't lacked
funding so much as it has lacked focus. It has gone off in
pursuit of different things at different times. And one
perennial that keeps cropping up is space-based systems,
satellite-based systems.
Given your concern about counter-space systems and the
problems they carry with them, is there any money requested
this year for space-based interceptors or something that might
serve that function?
General Cartwright. The only thing that I am aware of--and
I will go back and be very precise in the record--but the only
thing I am aware of that we are endeavoring to do in space is
to increase our sensor capability.
Right now, we have a set of sensors that allow us to
characterize very quickly a launch from anyplace on the Earth.
We are going to the next generation of that capability. It is a
program of record----
Mr. Everett. Space Based Infrared Surveillance (SBIRS)----
General Cartwright. This is the SBIRS-low portion of--
remember SBIRS-high?
Mr. Everett. Yes.
General Cartwright. SBIRS-low? The SBIRS-low piece is
coming into its initial test demonstration does-this-work
phase.
That money is in the budget. I believe--and I would have to
go back, but I believe it is like 2016 before we actually go
to--assuming that everything worked, we would go to a fielding
of that, but, in this budget, is resourced to start to work our
way through the SBIRS-low side of this, where you get the high-
fidelity, quick-reacting knowledge that something has been
launched.
Mr. Everett. Would you like to comment--as long as there is
a little time, would you like to comment on the complications
of placing both radars and potential interceptors in Europe? If
this is not the right setting, I will understand, but----
General Cartwright. No. This is obviously an ongoing
activity. So I am trying to be cognizant and not prejudice that
activity in the negotiations that are ongoing. But I think it
goes back to the attributes that we would like to find of a
collective defense, a defense alternative, an alternative to
offense that is a credible defense.
What does it look like? What are the attributes of the
system? How do nations retain a certain amount of sovereignty
and articulate their needs versus the global need? How do they
fit in? Those are the questions. And what does that do--I think
one of the key issues here is what does it do to the balance
out there?
If an adversary is focused on offense-only capabilities and
you introduce a defensive capability, what could be positive is
that you dissuade them from moving in a direction here--in the
proliferation of ballistic missiles--in a direction that would
have them further proliferate ballistic missiles.
But you have to be sensitive to the balances of offense and
defense in the region. And so you have got to tailor it for the
region. And the region has to make a decision on how it wants
to move forward, and whether it finds value in defensive
capabilities as an alternative to offensive only.
Mr. Everett. Thank you very much.
One other question. What is the role of your command in
putting together a package of what we call Nunn-Lugar
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)?
General Cartwright. I am glad you asked that. And I made
mention in my opening statement about how important I find
counter-proliferation, non-proliferation activities.
Mr. Everett. It was cut below the $400-million traditional
benchmark this year.
General Cartwright. I think that Nunn-Lugar and CTR, has
been an important vehicle in moving us forward, in helping us
get to a point where we have reduced the threat levels.
We really need to think about that construct, the
attributes of Nunn-Lugar, in a broader context for nations who
are not necessarily today a threat, but who, if we gave them
the right tools, could, not only move in an appropriate
direction in the international community, but help themselves.
Nunn-Lugar gives us the ability to help nations police
their borders, understand what is happening inside of their
borders, control that, report, when it is appropriate to
report, to a larger organization that, ``Hey, I have got a
problem. Something is here.''
It has had many successes. It has had many challenges. But
it has had many successes. What we would like to do is build on
those successes, helping nations help themselves, in phase zero
and phase one, long before we get to a conflict-type stage.
I believe there is an awful lot that we could do in those
areas that would be hugely leveraging. We are pushing hard to
start to understand that, working with our counterparts at the
State Department and trying to understand a framework in which
we could move this forward on a larger scale than what Nunn-
Lugar had envisioned from the standpoint of the former Soviet
states.
Mr. Everett. Thank you, sir.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Madam Chairman, I didn't know we were going to
have another round here. I thought that these other guys were
just more important than me.
Ms. Tauscher. At this moment, no one is more important than
you.
Mr. Franks. Thank you.
Ms. Tauscher. For the next three and a half minutes.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Franks. Well, General, appreciate getting another
chance here.
You know, I obviously agreed with your assessment of the
importance of later defense, which includes protecting our
space assets. But given the aggression--or perhaps that is a
bad word--just the developments in China, Iran and North Korea,
how do you advise legislators about our current and future
missile-defense priorities?
I mean, I know that has been touched on a lot, both in
terms of funding, and, as Mr. Spratt has said, you know, the
focus of where those priorities should be.
General Cartwright. On the missile-defense side, and
referring to priorities for fulfilling operational need, we
have advocated for continuing to complete defense of the United
States, but really to start more focus on deployed forces,
allies and friends, building an integrated cooperative
defensive capability globally.
To me, the deployed forces capabilities and the allies and
friends, integrating them in, is where we want to be focused
over the next few years, not to the exclusion, but it offers,
operationally, a significant amount of leverage in our
capability and a way to balance our operational offensive
capabilities, not necessarily just our strategic, but our
operational forces, because, again, if Aegis only had offensive
capabilities to bring to the fight, it would send a message by
its presence, and there are other messages you could use that
platform to send that would be reducing tension, rather than
posturing to increase it.
And having defensive capabilities on your tactical and
operational, conventional, general-purpose forces is equally
important to having it in your strategic forces. Does that make
sense?
Mr. Franks. Sure.
Let me just see if I could just key off that, you know. I
think, as you say, you know, when you have a defensive
capability that has no intrinsic threat to potential opponents,
it sort of lowers the decibel level a little bit.
With that said, you know, with some of the--to use your
phrase--the forward-deployed forces, allies and friends being
at potential risk across the world, and, of course, with our
homeland as well, what do you think--you have stated that there
is a great advantage in maintaining a defensive posture.
What do you think the risks are associated with reducing
the numbers of our interceptors or reducing our emphasis on
missile defense, as it were, both in the minds of our potential
adversaries and in real terms?
General Cartwright. The initial--and you never know on
second-, third-order effect, but the initial piece is that you
would have--what we are trying to build is something that we
can tailor. So the adversary who has a perception of threat
that is unique to that adversary, we will reduce the tool kit
that we have to keep them from going to conflict.
Having more defensive options, in addition to a reasonable
set of offensive options, allows us to tailor against more
adversaries, against the adversaries changing their mind and
changing the character of the threat, as we saw with, say, the
emergence of terrorists and things like that, the ability to
have a reasonably comprehensive continuum of capability, which
goes from non-conflict-type activities to defensive activities
to conventional to nuclear, having that continuum so that the
commander of the Pacific Command can look at a particular area
and say, ``This is what will effect them the most.'' If he has
a hole in his capability, he is going to have to overbalance
with something else.
And so, I mean, you can carry this to an extreme, and I am
not trying to drive you in that direction, but having a
reasonable continuum that allows you to tailor appropriate for
what it is you are trying to address is where we want to get.
If we end up with no conventional long-range prompt
ballistic or we end up with a gap in our capability on the
defensive side, say, against chemical munitions or something
like that, that becomes a seam, and you have to overbalance to
compensate for the existence of that seam.
Mr. Franks. Okay. Well, General, just a last brief
question. Given the potential of rogue states to gain even a
nuclear capability, but perhaps with an unorthodox delivery
system, do you still think that missile defense is important
and pertinent to, say, again, terrorists getting hold of some
type of weapon that they might try to deliver--how important do
you think missile defense is to addressing that problem?
General Cartwright. From the standpoint of an actual
scenario, difficult to lay out, but, generally, with a
terrorist organization, they are looking for a seam by which to
be aggressive toward you.
Oftentimes, in the calculus of an adversary, what we are
seeking to do is take their objective away. So if you take away
the high-end objectives, they may have been able to afford
them. They may not have.
If you take away even the mid-level objectives of, say,
being able to take a crude weapon or a crude airplane or turn
some vehicle--if you start to take those away, then you get to
the very difficult, which is to take away from an individual
who is willing to sacrifice their life for what they believe is
a cause. How do you deter that type of an individual? What type
of defenses do you put together?
And the reality is, again, you are still trying to take
away their objective. You may do it through what we would call
consequence management. In other words, make it very difficult
to approach a building or to get through an airport, et cetera.
So you have to layer this in, but you don't want to leave a
hole in order to go--you don't want to play ninth-grade soccer,
where everybody goes to the ball. You really want to build a
continuum.
But it is--the most difficult is to take away from an
individual who answers to no one in their timing and is very
difficult to monitor at the entity level, take away their
objective from them. That is what you seek to do in consequence
management.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Thank you, General. I still love your Marine
understatement.
Ms. Tauscher. General Cartwright, for an hour and 45
minutes, you have captivated this committee with one piece of
paper in front of you. I think you may have referred to it once
or twice. It probably tells you where you are going next. We
want to thank you and--see if Mr. Reyes has anything else.
You want to add another question?
Mr. Reyes. Just one quick question.
General, the U.S. currently does not have the capability to
support Aegis BMD operations in Central Command's (CENTCOM)
area of responsibility. This is primarily due to the fact that
all BMD-capable Aegis ships are assigned to the Pacific and
there are no naval magazines certified to handle this--missiles
in the CENTCOM AOR.
Given the current and emerging Iranian ballistic missile
threat to the region, what steps are you taking to ensure that
we can conduct Aegis BMD operations in CENTCOM's AOR?
General Cartwright. The fielding rate now includes ships
configured and capable. We have to work our way through the
magazines this year. If we had to act absent the magazines
being certified, et cetera, we could do that. It would take
airlift and some other things to work our way through that. We
can do that.
It is really more of a policy question, and what is it we
want to be able to do and what effect do we want to create. And
it is wrapped up in the larger debate about missile defense in
Europe and all that. All of these pieces have to come together
in a way.
But this highlights for you it could be that we decide we
want a missile defense capability in that part of the region,
but not in the--so what would be appropriate? SM-3 gives us an
awful lot of flexibility in those types of things, as does
Patriot.
So we can respond in that area if we believe that that is
consistent with how we want to posture in that region, and I
turn to, in this case, currently John Abizaid, but, eventually,
Admiral Fallon, here as he takes the reins, to think our way
through that, exercise work with the partners, decide what is
appropriate, and then when do you want to introduce that
capability, because you have to be sensitive to the offense-
defense balance that is there now, and the allies that live in
the region, how they want to posture.
But, technically and logistically, we can do this.
Mr. Reyes. All right. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Tauscher. General Cartwright, thank you very much. We
want to extend our best wishes to you and the thousands of
people that you command in STRATCOM. Please extend to them our
very best wishes and thank them for their service. We thank you
for your service. You are certainly a strategic asset to this
country.
We appreciate your time. And we look forward to having you
testify again before us in the near future. Thank you.
General Cartwright. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 8, 2007
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March 8, 2007
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 8, 2007
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER
Ms. Tauscher. Today, while USSTRATCOM is active in setting
warfighter's requirements for military capabilities, it is the
responsibility of the services to fund and develop those capabilities.
a. Please describe the working relationship between USSTRATCOM and the
services. b. Is there a gap between USSTRATCOM's mission needs and the
services' ability to fund and carry out the needed programs? c. Do you
perceive a trending convergence or divergence between warfighter
requirements and the services' programs to carry them forth?
General Cartwright. a. Processes are in place to address Service
funded Combatant Commander warfighting requirements, such as the
Integrated Priority List (IPL), Senior Warfighter Forum (SWARF), Joint
Requirements Oversight Council and other Senior Leader Forums. While
the Services are largely responsive to Combatant Commander
requirements, today's constrained resource environment leads to
inevitable disagreements on some issues. The current DOD Planning,
Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process anticipates
``friction points'' and incorporates checks and balances, to include
direct appeal to the Secretary of Defense, prior to finalizing the
President's Budget for submission to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). b. Fiscal constraints prevent fully funding all of
USSTRATCOM's mission requirements; however, the DOD Planning,
Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process provides ample
opportunity for the Services, COCOMs, Joint Staff and OSD principals to
vet and determine DOD funding priorities. c. Convergence is perceived
between warfighter requirements and service programming actions.
Ms. Tauscher. Over the past 15 years, USSTRATCOM has evolved to
become a command with many missions. How do you envision the command to
change in the next 15-20 years?
General Cartwright. The transformation of U.S. Strategic Command
over the past 15 years has been one borne out of necessity. All of the
mission areas, while diverse in their detailed characteristics, are
strategic in nature and global or unconstrained by geographic
boundaries. The recent implementation of joint functional components
places a strong operational focus on the mission areas, while the
headquarters staff focuses on supporting the President and Secretary of
Defense, providing strategic guidance to the command, and ensuring
synchronization across all of the commands efforts.
Looking into the future, I believe Strategic Command will take on a
role similar to U.S. Special Operations Command as a force provider of
unique global capabilities, responsible for cradle to grave
development, fielding and employment of capabilities in support of
global operations.
New or currently unidentified adversaries will continue to emerge.
Strategic Command will have a greatly increased role in our nation's
daily defense, as adversaries continue to seek an advantage by avoiding
our traditional strengths in conventional military forces. In
particular, cyberspace will become a central front in our national
defense as criminals, terrorists, and nation states attack our
vulnerable seams.
The Strategic Command organizational structure will continue to
evolve as the New Triad of capabilities is fully fielded. Within 20
years, most of the capabilities now under development will be fully
operational and legacy systems designed for the Cold War will be
gradually phased out. Allied and interagency collaboration will have a
significantly larger role within Strategic Command's mission areas and
as a result our relationships beyond the Department of Defense will
need to be as robust as those internal to DOD are now.
Ms. Tauscher. In a 2006 report, GAO found that better guidance and
communications between the STRATCOM leadership and its components was
needed to enhance the command's ability to execute its missions. a.
Please describe the relationship between the USSTRATCOM's service
components and the new JFCCs. Has this relationship had an opportunity
to fully mature? b. How has the execution of USSTRATCOM's mission
improved since the implementation of JFCCs?
General Cartwright. Initially, USSTRATCOM HQ, its service
components, and functional components relied principally on telephone
and electronic mail for connectivity and synchronization. These methods
were far from optimum. Today, new tools are in place. All components
now enjoy full real-time collaborative connectivity via the STRATCOM
Knowledge Integration Web (SKIWeb) and Global Operations--Collaborative
Environment (GOC-CE) at all levels of security. Their employment has
fostered a much better level of understanding/interaction amongst all
components; hence a greater ability for timely and on-the-mark
functional component execution, supported by the capabilities and
resources supplied by the service components. b. The implementation of
JFCCs has created synergy among USSTRATCOM's assigned missions. We have
gained tremendous effectiveness by the alignment of our JFCCs with
service or agency centers of excellence. We continue to mature this
capability through robust exercise and training opportunities.
Ms. Tauscher. According to a September, 2006 GAO report, USSTRATCOM
JFCCs lack adequate direction and criteria for declaring Full Operating
Capability. According to that same report, all of the JFCC's were
scheduled to reach the FOC milestone in 2006 or 2007. What measures
have been taken to ensure that when the JFCC's reach the FOC milestone
they have, in fact, achieved the required capability?
General Cartwright. Our focus in 2006 was to achieve an Initial
Operating Capability across the command as adequate resources were made
available. We have established an integrated training and exercise
program that will evaluate and enhance JFCC and command-wide
operational capabilities. We will continually monitor the command's
progress on six month increments. Our components are resourced and
operational today and we will continue to improve our capability as we
move toward full operational capability.
Ms. Tauscher. Please describe the process involved in setting
requirements for the future nuclear force structure. What is
USSTRATCOM's role? What obstacles or challenges might be impeding more
specific definition of military requirements for the future nuclear
force structure?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM provides warfighter force structure
requirements to the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) through the Nuclear
Weapons Stockpile Memorandum (NWSM) development process. The process
culminates in an annual memorandum to the President from the
Secretaries of Defense and Energy that specifies the size and
composition of the stockpile. Implementation of the New TRIAD,
particularly in the areas of offensive strike and responsive
infrastructure, will enable us to better define future military nuclear
force structure requirements.
Ms. Tauscher. Does USSTRATCOM have a position on ratification of
the CTBT, given that one of the key objectives of RRW is to minimize
the likelihood of testing?
General Cartwright. RRW provides a path forward for the long-term
sustainment of nuclear capabilities in the absence of underground
nuclear testing. RRW transformation, therefore, will address many of
the stockpile sustainment concerns raised with respect to ratification
of the CTBT. RRW, however, is still in the early stages of development
and a national decision has not been made to proceed. If that decision
is made, it will take decades to replace all the legacy warheads in the
stockpile. RRW has the potential to be a key element in the
ratification of CTBT if we continue through the various development and
fielding milestones.
Ms. Tauscher. What is the warfighter's need for RRW? Can the
warfighter's needs be satisfied by maintaining just the current
stockpile through the Stockpile Stewardship Program and LEPs?
General Cartwright. A long-term strategy based on extending the
life of legacy warheads leaves the nation heavily reliant on a limited
number of aging, increasingly costly and difficult to maintain warhead
types for its nuclear deterrent. Such a strategy does not adequately
exercise the facilities, scientists, engineers, and technicians needed
for a responsive infrastructure. Many of our legacy warhead types need
to be refurbished or replaced over the next several decades when the
scientists, engineers and technicians that developed, tested and
fielded legacy nuclear weapons will be retired.
As a result, we continue to maintain a large and costly ``hedge''
of non-deployed warheads to mitigate the risks of technological and/or
operational surprise. It is difficult to predict if, or when, the
current strategy may become unsustainable or when we will face a
technical challenge we may not be able to resolve without testing.
Delaying transformation until we reach that point may put stockpile
readiness and the nuclear deterrent at significant risk.
Life Extension Program strategies address individual component
issues without regard to end-to-end design. Eventually, (10-15 yrs.)
the number of component changes compromizes our ability to certify in
the absence of testing.
Ms. Tauscher. How do decisions on future delivery systems (e.g.,
ICBM, bomber modernization) impact RRW capabilities and timelines?
Conversely, how do RRW decisions influence development of future
delivery systems?
General Cartwright. Future delivery system decisions have little
impact on RRW capabilities and timelines. The health of the legacy
stockpile, infrastructure, and planned life extension activities are
the principal drivers for RRW development and deployment strategy. RRWs
will be sized to the same dimensions as the legacy warheads they
replace and provide similar military capability. RRWs will be
integrated into their delivery systems during development. Modularity
and interoperability enable compatibility with existing and future
delivery systems and provides a spiral development pathway for the
future. The first RRW, for example, will be compatible with the Navy's
D5 submarine launched ballistic missile and adaptable to the Air
Force's MinuteMan III inter-continental ballistic missile and follow-on
long-range strike delivery systems. Future delivery systems will enable
us to take full advantage of RRW's features through common interfaces
and the use of common modular components.
Ms. Tauscher. Have the warfighter's needs been adequately captured
in the RRW design and decision-making process?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM was an active participant in the RRW
Feasibility Study and the Nuclear Weapons Council decision making
process and remains actively engaged to ensure RRW meets warfighter
needs. These warfighter requirements have been validated in a Joint
Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum.
Ms. Tauscher. What role will RRW play in the nation's overall
strategic deterrence and New Triad objectives, particularly given
investments in a conventional PGS capability?
General Cartwright. RRW coupled with a responsive infrastructure is
an important element in our tailored deterrence strategy.
Transformation of the nuclear enterprise, coupled with other elements
of the New TRIAD, will further reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons.
Ms. Tauscher. What risks do you see, if any, in pursuing a ``Life
Extension Program-only'' strategy as opposed to proceeding with the
reliable replacement warhead?
General Cartwright. A long-term strategy based on extending the
life of legacy warheads leaves the nation heavily reliant on a limited
number of aging, increasingly costly and difficult to maintain warhead
types for its nuclear deterrent. Such a strategy does not adequately
exercise the facilities, scientists, engineers, and technicians needed
for a responsive infrastructure. Many of our legacy warhead types need
to be refurbished or replaced over the next several decades when the
scientists, engineers and technicians that developed, tested and
fielded legacy nuclear weapons will be retired.
As a result, we continue to maintain a large and costly ``hedge''
of non-deployed warheads to mitigate the risks of technological and/or
operational surprise. It is difficult to predict if, or when, the
current strategy may become unsustainable or when we will face a
technical challenge we may not be able to resolve without testing.
Delaying transformation until we reach that point may put stockpile
readiness and the nuclear deterrent at significant risk.
Life Extension Program strategies address individual component
issues without regard to end-to-end design. Eventually, (10-15 yrs.)
the number of component changes compromizes our ability to certify in
the absence of testing.
Ms. Tauscher. Do you perceive a capability gap in the Prompt Global
Strike arena? If so, when evaluating options for Prompt Global Strike,
can the warfighter afford to accept the risk imposed by that capability
gap for the next 12-15 years or more until an alternative technology
might first be available?
General Cartwright. A capability gap in the Prompt Global Strike
arena exists. The nation requires the capability to deliver prompt,
non-nuclear kinetic effects under all conditions across a range of
scenarios. Given adversarial offensive space activities, missile and
WMD proliferation and aspirations, and the potential of emerging high
value, time sensitive targets in the global war on terror (GWOT), a
near-term solution to deploy a PGS capability is essential. We also
require a alternative prompt global strike capability in order to avoid
high risk, self deterring scenarios.
Ms. Tauscher. Six years have passed since the 2001 Nuclear Posture
Review laid out the framework of the New Triad, yet the U.S. has yet to
implement this new vision. What is your vision for the New Triad? What
technologies are of greatest importance to the warfighter in trying to
implement this New Triad?
General Cartwright. We envision a broad suite of integrated
offensive and defensive capabilities enabled by persistent global
command and control (C2), robust planning and intelligence, and a
responsive defense infrastructure that provides improved agility and
flexibility in dealing with a wider range of contingencies.
Technologies of greatest importance include robust offensive,
defensive, and exploitation cyber capabilities in order to defend the
Nation's economic base, cruise and ballistic missile defense
integration into a collective defence network, horizontally integrated
persistent ISR capabilities, and a broader array of offensive prompt,
precise kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities are essential.
Ms. Tauscher. In the Fiscal Year 2007 National Defense
Authorization Act, Congress expressed a number of concerns with the
Conventional Trident Modification proposal including the maturity of
the concept of operations and risk of misinterpretation. Do you believe
the concerns raised by Congress have been adequately addressed?
General Cartwright. The Department has worked hard to address
congressional concerns. In March 2007, we delivered the Conventional
Trident Modification (CTM) Report to Congress which addressed the CTM
concept of operations as well as our recommended approaches for
addressing misinterpretation. The potential risk of misinterpretation
of a CTM missile launch as a nuclear attack is extremely low and can be
effectively managed. The United States and the Russian Federation now
have a more cooperative and less adversarial relationship than during
the Cold War, and this new relationship provides improved transparency
and understanding to any launch of a ballistic missile.
Ms. Tauscher. According to one press article, the Conventional
Trident Modification submarines would use a weapon virtually identical
to its nuclear-armed twin; would remain on patrol typically just off
Russian coasts, potentially posing at least a debris threat to Russia;
would likely be closed to Russian onsite inspection; and would possibly
take hours or longer to receive target data and steam within range of
nations where fleeting threats may appear. By comparison, this article
claims that ``a land-based missile could be configured so it is
incapable of carrying a nuclear payload and use a trajectory to its
target that would not threaten other nuclear weapons nations. It also
could be inspected by the Russians under existing arms control regimes,
based on a U.S. coastline so launch debris could fall in the ocean
rather than on land, and made capable of being rapidly retargeted.''
What are your views of the merit of this comparison between the
Conventional Trident Modification and a possible conventional ICBM?
General Cartwright. Both land based and sea based prompt global
strike capabilities are envisioned to be part of the options available
to national leadership in the future. Both land and sea based prompt
global strike concepts have unique considerations and characteristics.
Our approach to prospective concept of operations and international
engagements seeks to minimize constraints and risks and maximize
capability. We support continued development of a broad array of prompt
global strike options to support tailored deterrence in the 21st
century. Conventional Trident Modification (CTM) is a ``hedge''
opportunity to begin closing the gap, and is part of a broader, time-
phased strategy leading to a robust suite of PGS capabilities.
Ms. Tauscher. In October 2006, the President issued a new national
space policy. How has, or will, this policy affect STRATCOM missions
and operations?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM ensures all mission planning,
coordination and operations are consistent with National Space Policy.
The revised space policy in 2006 served to echo the already on-going
efforts at USSTRATCOM in promoting the use of space by all nations for
peaceful purposes while preserving our rights, capabilities, and
freedom of action in space.
Ms. Tauscher. We have seen considerable coverage of the Chinese
anti-satellite test since our subcommittee met with you immediately
after the January test. Now that the community has had time to reflect
on the significance of the event: a. What lessons learned have you
taken from the event and what aspects of our space operations need
improvement? b. What type of counterspace and space situational
awareness systems do you think will be needed in the future to combat
threats to space? c. Do you see the priorities for space acquisition
outlined in the 2008 President's Budget altered due to the Chinese ASAT
test?
General Cartwright. The Chinese ASAT test increases the risk to the
manned and unmanned space assets for all space-faring nations and, as a
result we are re-examining our ability to continue to operate
effectively in the event of kinetic or non-kinetic ASAT employment by
an adversary. The test also reaffirmed our need to increase our space
situational awareness (SSA) abilities. The Air Force, as the Executive
Agent for Space, identified the need to increase SSA as its number one
space funding priority. USSTRATCOM will work closely with the services
to define the appropriate SSA architecture, as well as a viable
protection strategy for our spacecraft. Vulnerability of low earth
orbit satellites to increased space debris caused by destructive
testing or direct attack also highlighted the need to rapidly adjust
our space readiness levels, and for improved capability to quickly
launch and augment or reconstitute a space-based asset. b. First, we
must better understand the ``Who, What, Where, and Why'' regarding
every space based object and activity. Improvements to our ground and
space-based Space Situational Awareness (SSA) capabilities will allow
us to differentiate between environmental and ``man-made''
unintentional or malicious effects on the Nation's space assets.
Capabilities that incorporate improved defensive space posturing
measures may include shutter controls, anti-jamming, sensor detection,
proximity warning, enhanced ground facility security, cryptological
user equipment protection upgrades and other alternatives. c. Yes.
Additional discussion is classified.
Ms. Tauscher. What is USSTRATCOM's position on the development of a
code of conduct or ``rules of the road'' for space-faring nations?
General Cartwright. While existing Treaties and Conventions provide
adequate guidance on proper space-faring conduct, we are looking at the
potential utility of a code of conduct or ``rules of the road'' for
additional value in providing a common understanding or defining
differences in acceptable or unacceptable behavior within a medium
shared by all nations.
Ms. Tauscher. There are a multiple ways to achieve greater
survivability and protection of our space assets--hardening, on-orbit
spares, redundancy, distributed architectures, alternatives such as
UAVs, active prevention and denial, non-material solutions, and rapid
replenishment. a. What is the Department's overall strategy for
assuring support from space systems? If possible, please comment on the
costs and operational considerations of the different strategies. b. In
your opinion, what is the military utility of an operationally
responsive space capability?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM is working to better integrate both
space and non-space capabilities across multiple domains. This
integration extends across our national services and agencies to allied
forces and commercial entities. The resulting ``network'' of
capabilities, includes communications, Intelligence Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR), and Space Situational Awareness (SSA) sensors,
and will maximize our capacity to support the warfighter while
providing redundancy to critical assets, reducing potential single-
points-of-failure. This approach will diversify our risk portfolio
across multiple mediums and multiple participants. Better integration
will further transform the warfighter's perspective of space from
``platforms and programs'' to ``capabilities and effects.''
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) will enable improved
integration through rapid deployment/employment of new, pre-planned, or
existing capabilities. It will link operational, acquisition, industry
partners, and science and technology communities to rapidly exploit
emergent capabilities to fill operational gaps. ORS will generate
warfighting effects for operational and tactical use in response to
urgent or unanticipated needs. The focus is on responsiveness. Tasked
by a Joint Force Commander, it will be timely and targeted to the need,
while enhancing survivability and adversary deterrence. b. The
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) concept is intended to rapidly
deliver space capabilities to the Joint Force Commanders. This will
enable the warfighter to integrate space capabilities when and where
needed to produce the desired effect. ORS strategy includes rapid
exploitation of new or innovative space technical and operational
capabilities, augmenting space capabilities in time of crisis, and
reconstituting capabilities when required. ORS is presently in the
experimentation and demonstration phase.
Ms. Tauscher. The current national security space architecture is
comprised of big, complex, and costly satellite systems which require a
decade of development. Cost overruns and schedule delays in space
acquisition programs, such as SBIRS-High, GPS-IIF, and NPOESS, continue
to be attributed to requirements growth, inadequate cost estimating,
and lack of systems engineering, to name a few. a. To what extent have
these acquisition issues impacted the warfighter? b. What changes to
the current and programmed national security space architecture would
you recommend? c. TSAT and Space Radar are costly ``transformational''
programs. In this budget constrained environment, is it wise for DOD to
invest so much of its resources in systems that will not be available
until 2016 at the earliest? Should the DOD reconsider its
transformation goals and concentrate on providing users with evolved or
cloned systems based on those currently under development?
General Cartwright. Freedom of action in space requires the
dexterity to counter or out pace threats that are always evolving. The
Nation continues to depend on complex, robust systems to provide our
warfighters the necessary tactical, operational and strategic
advantage. One of the focus areas for space acquisition is continuity
of service, especially in missile warning, strategic communications,
and positioning, navigation, and timing. Delays in these programs could
jeopardize the assured continuity of space support to the warfighter.
Delaying the capabilities provided by these systems impacts the
warfighter with increased reliance on aging less reliable, less
responsive systems. This may result in delay information delays and
reduced battlefield decision cycles at all echelons. b. USSTRATCOM is
working to better integrate both space and non-space capabilities
across multiple domains. This integration extends across our national
services and agencies to allied forces and commercial entities. The
resulting ``network'' of capabilities, includes communications,
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and Space
Situational Awareness (SSA) sensors, and will maximize our capacity to
support the warfighter while providing redundancy to critical assets,
reducing potential single-points-of-failure. This approach will
diversify our risk portfolio across multiple mediums and multiple
participants. Better integration will further transform the
warfighter's perspective of space from ``platforms and programs'' to
``capabilities and effects.''
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) will enable improved
integration through rapid deployment/employment of new, pre-planned, or
existing capabilities. It will link operational, acquisition, industry
partners, and science and technology communities to rapidly exploit
emergent capabilities to fill operational gaps. ORS will generate
warfighting effects for operational and tactical use in response to
urgent or unanticipated needs. The focus is on responsiveness. Tasked
by a Joint Force Commander, it will be timely and targeted to the need,
while enhancing survivability and adversary deterrence. c. USSTRATCOM
continuously looks to balance the promise of transformational
capability advances with evolved capabilities. We continue to advocate
for the attributes inherent in TSAT and Space radar. An incremental/
block approach coupled with these attributes:
--Integration across domains
--Integration of allied communications capabilities
--Diversified risk portfolios
Ms. Tauscher. Some have observed a ``friction'' between the DOD and
Intelligence Community on space matters. a. What areas of black-white
space integration need improvement? b. In your opinion, is the current
national security space organization and management structure
responsive to the warfighter? c. If not, what changes to the
organization and management would you recommend?
General Cartwright. Black-white space integration continues to
improve. A far more collaborative operational relationship exists today
than in the past. Numerous operational examples of collaboration
include the sharing of data and best practices. Data previously held
only in black channels is now routinely passed to white world operators
to help build a comprehensive space activity picture. In our
organization and management areas, there are many successes, which
include crossflow of personnel and the establishment of the NRO's
Deputy Director for Mission Support wearing a second hat as the Deputy
Commander of my Joint Functional Component Command for Space. These
initiatives further reinforce on-going collaboration efforts and
improve situational awareness for both the black and white communities.
We continue working with the intelligence community on issues of
classification. b. Recent national security space organizational and
management structure changes continue to facilitate responsiveness to
the joint warfighter. The establishment of the USSTRATCOM Joint
Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC SPACE), designation of the
Deputy Director of Mission Support for the National Reconnaissance
Office to serve as the JFCC Space Deputy Commander, and the
establishment of a Director of Space Forces (DIRSPACEFOR) within the
theater for support to the Joint Force Commander have been positive
steps to improve integration of space capabilities into joint
operations. c. There are no additional organization and management
changes needed at this time. We continue to look for ways to improve
our support to warfighters around the globe.
Ms. Tauscher. In 2002, former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
exempted the Missile Defense Agency from the normal DOD requirements
process. In understand that STRATCOM and MDA have developed a new
program called the Warfighter Involvement Program (WIP) to ensure
warfighter views are incorporated into the missile defense development
process. To date, are you satisfied with WIP process? Are there areas
where the process could be improved?
General Cartwright. The Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP) has
become the accepted means for advocacy of needed missile defense
capabilities; however, the process is still growing to meet the demands
of the warfighter. We are working with the Missile Defense Agency to
develop a single document describing our respective roles,
responsibilities, and objectives under the Warfighter Involvement
Process (WIP). Creation of this formal document establishes a reference
for the entire missile defense community and serves as the standard
against which we may gauge future process improvements.
Ms. Tauscher. In the 2006 Prioritized Capability List (PCL), the
annual list that STRATCOM provides to MDA outlining the warfighter's
prioritized list of capability needs for future missile defense
systems, you outlined a number of key requirements. These included,
among others: ensuring missile defense communications; maintaining the
operational availability of the GMD system; and expanding our
capability to defeat ballistic missiles in their terminal phase. To
what extent has MDA been responsive to STRATCOM's requirements as
outlined in the PCL? What areas need improvement?
General Cartwright. MDA adheres to a capabilities-based ballistic
missile defense systems acquisition approach. To enhance warfighter
needs and system development efforts, MDA has partnered with USSTRATCOM
to develop the Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP). The WIP enables
prioritized guidance on needed Combatant Commander capabilities to
MDA's developmental efforts. MDA has announced plans to focus their
2007 Summer Study around the just delivered second iteration of
USSTRATCOM prioritized capabilities list (PCL). By taking this
approach, MDA has clearly indicated their willingness to further
incorporate warfighter needs into system development and acquisition
processes. We continue to improve and refine our Warfighter-MDA
information exchange processes. This includes better definition of the
capabilities sought in the PCL and greater granularity in the
capability development plans included in MDA's PCL response.
Development continues on an effective means for warfighter appraisal of
these development plans.
Ms. Tauscher. MDA (and its legacy organizations SDIO and BMDO) is
first and foremost a research and development organization, whose
primary responsibility is to develop future capabilities. Because the
services have generally been reluctant to assume responsibility for
fielding missile defense capabilities, MDA has been forced to take up
the slack. Given its new and emerging missions, is MDA currently
structured to provide optimal support to the warfighter? If not, what
changes to MDA's current structure would you recommend?
General Cartwright. MDA is an effective research and development
activity that focuses on warfighter BMD needs. Recently, MDA leadership
activated the Warfighter Support Center, located at Schriever Air Force
Base. The Warfighter Support Center's mission is to coordinate enhanced
operations and logistics support to warfighting activities. We are
begnning to take steps to integrate the BMD architecture with the
appropriate Cruise Missile Defense (CMD) architecture. Military
Services are developing CMD capabilities independent of a warfighter-
centeric architecture that integrates command and control, battle
management, sensors, and weapons across these service capabilities.
Integrating these CMD architectures with those of BMD is problematic
when CMD lies outside MDA's charter. MDA is focused on providing
products and services that meet warfighter needs. An example of MDA
effectiveness includes the BMDS Transition and Transfer planning
process which provides a framework for the operationalization of BMDS
elements. We should leverage the ballistic missile defense work MDA has
completed to date by expanding their focus to include cruise missile
defense configuration and architecture. A MDA configuration management
role over service Cruise Missile Defense (CMD) capabilities, responsive
to a single Air and Missile Defense Integrating Authority that would
balance and integrate MDA BMD and service CMD development would ensure
common data standards, command and control, and situational awareness
integration.
Ms. Tauscher. In 2002, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigned
STRATCOM responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating
global missile defense operations. However, mission execution (i.e.,
pulling the trigger) remains the responsibility of each geographic
combatant commander in their respective area of responsibility (AOR).
Do you believe you currently have sufficient authority to
``adjudicate'' disputes that could arise between combatant commanders
during missile defense operations? How are you using your current
authorities, as outlined in the UCP, to minimize disputes from
occurring?
General Cartwright. We do not have the authority to adjudicate
disputes, rather we provide a recommendation for leadership to consider
in the deliberation and decision process. We provide supporting
capabilities to enable mission execution by designated geographical
combatant commanders. Where issues arise over prioritization of forces,
through the Request for Forces (RFF) process, we provide a
recommendation to the Global Force Management Board in determining
allocation of high demand missile defense forces. We conduct
collaborative planning and work with the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) to
resolve areas where disagreements arise. One avenue is the Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS) Management Structure, with
representatives from the OCOMs, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and other
partners to resolve issues at an early stage. This has been successful
to date in resolving issues. We continue to conduct wargames such as
Nimble Titan and exercises with Combatant Commanders to increase our
knowledge of ballistic missile defense operations. We insert new
knowledge and lessons learned into current operational procedures and
plans.
Ms. Tauscher. STRATCOM recently completed a Capabilities Mix Study,
which outlines the combatant commander's future missile defense force
structure requirements. What were the key findings from that study? How
were the results of that study taken into account in the President's
FY08 budget request?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM participated in the Joint Staff-led
Joint Capabilities Mix (JCM) Study that explored weapon and sensor
mixes to counter expected threats in three major operation areas in
future epics. Part I recommended an increase to the number of Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Firing Units and interceptors, an
increase of Standard Missile (SM-3) interceptors, and continued support
of the Sea-Based Terminal program. Once approved, Part II (completed in
March 2007) will provide an initial recommendation for the minimum
number of upper-tier THAAD and SM-3 interceptors required for combat
operations in 2015 for a near-simultaneous two MCO fight. Joint Staff-
led Joint Capabilities Mix (JCM) I concluded in April 2006 and
influenced MDA's programmatic decisions to increase the number of
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Firing Units and
interceptors, increase the number of SM-3 interceptors, and continue
support of the Sea-Based Terminal program.
Ms. Tauscher. In the past, combatant commanders have expressed
concern that they do not have sufficient numbers of PATRIOT PAC-3
missiles and sea-based Standard Missile-3 interceptors to deal with
short, medium, and intermediate range missile threats. Are you
satisfied with the current number of Patriot PAC-3 missiles and
Standard Missile-3 interceptors in the inventory? If not, have you
raised this issue with the Army, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and the Missile Defense Agency? What has been their response?
General Cartwright. We will make appropriate recommendations on the
missile inventory as we continue to define and demonstrate Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense capabilities (THAAD). We believe that THAAD
effectiveness will have significant impact on the interceptor mix
quality. In response the Army has increased the buy of PAC-3 missiles,
and, as a result of the Joint Capabilities Mix (JCM) Study (JCM I
concluded in April 2006), MDA has increased the number of programmed
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Firing Units and
interceptors, increased SM-3 interceptors, and started a Sea-Based
Terminal program. However, interceptors alone are not sufficient to
meet the threat posed by potential adversaries. USSTRATCOM is uniquely
structured to leverage and synchronize other capabilities, such as
attack operations and non-kinetic options, in support of the geographic
combatant commanders.
Ms. Tauscher. The President's FY08 budget request contains
sufficient funding for the deployment of a European missile defense
site. For a number of reasons, deploying long-range interceptors in
Europe will raise serious command and control challenges. To what
extent have STRATCOM and other combatant commander begun to plan to
operate a European missile defense site? What do you believe are the
key command and control challenges associated with a European missile
defense site?
General Cartwright. We have just begun to work with USEUCOM and
USNORTHCOM for operations of the Ground-Based Interceptors and
Midcourse Discriminating Radar in Europe, but have not yet developed a
formal operations concept.
(1) Coordinating the Command and Control relationships.
(2) The integration with current and emerging NATO systems and
C2 architectures (Active Layered Theater BMD, and the possible NATO
Missile Defense Feasibility Study-recommended capabilities).
(3) Bilateral support arrangements with Host Nations.
Ms. Tauscher. In 2004, STRATCOM conducted a Military Utility
Assessment of the initial set of ground-based missile defense
capabilities deployed in California and Alaska. The purpose of this
assessment was to determine how military effective those capabilities
were. That said, how confident are in the current capabilities resident
in the GMD system? Are there areas where you believe improvements need
to be made? Do you have any plans to conduct another Military Utility
Assessment of the GMD system in the near future?
General Cartwright. We assess that the Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS) has the potential to defend the homeland, deployed
forces, friends, and allies against a limited attack of from ballistic
missile threats. Command and Control and Battle Management are areas
where we need to continue improving. MDA and the Services continue to
develop and provide BMD and Cruise Missile Defense (CMD) weapons,
sensors, and command and control systems. The effective use and
integration of the C2 and Battle Management capabilities remains the
warfighters greatest challenge. The Combatant Commands, MDA, and
Service Force Providers continue to work together to develop and
implement our tactics techniques and procedures for fighting with these
expanding capabilities. Version 2007 of the BMDS MUA has completed
general/flag officer coordination and once finalized will be forwarded
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. EVERETT
Mr. Everett. The Air Force indicates that it intends to start
retiring U-2 aircraft in FY 2008--one in FY08, five in FY09, eight in
FY10, one in FY11, and fifteen in FY12. Last year, Congress prohibited
U-2 retirement unless the Secretary of Defense could certify it no
longer contributed to mitigating ISR gaps identified in the Pentagon's
2006 Quadrennial Defense review. a. Given the issue you raise in your
testimony about warfighter information needs not being met, is this
retirement in the best interest of the nation? b. In your testimony,
you mentioned we can afford to take risks in some mission areas. What
mission areas will see greater risk given the retirement profile of the
U-2? c. In what timeframe do you anticipate follow-on capabilities with
equal or greater capability to be proven and fielded, and how might
current budget constraints or programmatic issues associated with
potential follow-on systems impact this fielding timeline?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM conducted a study that evaluated the
Department's plan to replace the U-2 with Global Hawk and determined
that the U-2 drawdown introduced regional risk but did not result in a
significant reduction in enterprise capacity or cause a technical
collection gap. As a result, the Air Force revised their U-2 to Global
Hawk transition plan to cover the STRATCOM identified regional risk and
ensure continued support of the combatant commander's intelligence
requirements. This plan sequences the U-2 divestiture with successful
demonstration of Global Hawk capabilities to ensure no overall loss of
high altitude airborne ISR capability.
b. Transition to Global Hawk provides for persistent coverage not
today available from legacy systems such as U-2s, effectively
increasing coverage by a factor of 2-3 times. The current Air Force U-2
to Global Hawk transition plan addresses regional risk identified by
USSTRATCOM, sequencing the U-2 divestiture with successful
demonstration of Global Hawk capabilities to ensure no overall loss of
high altitude airborne ISR capability.
c. The Global Hawk program has undergone restructuring due to Nunn-
McCurdy requirements, to include its fielding schedule. Fielding of the
block 30(M) Global Hawk aircraft will provide an integrated, multi-
intelligence sensor suite consisting of electro-optical, synthetic
aperture radar, and signals intelligence payloads, providing greater
capability and more flexibility than the U-2. Block 30(M) aircraft will
begin arriving in the field starting in FY11. Global Hawk will enable
increased mission duration, greater area coverage, and signals, radar,
and imagery collection simultaneously from one aircraft on one mission,
resulting in greater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) effects delivered to our joint warfighers. Unanticipated resource
challenges could extend the transition. Platform ``offramps'' have been
developed to ensure no loss in capability.
Mr. Everett. Does STRATCOM see any barriers to fully implementing
the Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs)? If so, what are
they?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM does not foresee any barriers to
fully implementing the Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs).
Mr. Everett. Please provide your assessment of the state of black-
white space integration. What is working well and what areas need
improvement? Consider this question in the context of operations,
planning and acquisition, and organization and management.
General Cartwright. Black-white space integration continues to
improve. A far more collaborative operational relationship exists today
than in the past. Numerous operational examples of collaboration
include the sharing of data and best practices. Data previously held
only in black channels is now routinely passed to white world operators
to help build a comprehensive space activity picture. In our
organization and management areas, there are many successes, which
include crossflow of personnel and the establishment of the NRO's
Deputy Director for Mission Support wearing a second hat as the Deputy
Commander of my Joint Functional Component Command for Space. These
initiatives further reinforce on-going collaboration efforts and
improve situational awareness for both communities. We continue working
with the intelligence community on issues of classification.
Mr. Everett. How will the Chinese anti-satellite test affect the
warfighter's priorities in space? How do you foresee this event
affecting the composition and attributes of our national security space
architecture?
General Cartwright. The Chinese ASAT test increases the risk to the
manned and unmanned space assets for all space-faring nations. We are
re-examining our ability to continue to operate effectively in the
event of kinetic or non-kinetic ASAT employment by an adversary, to
include the use of both space- and terrestrially based capabilities.
The test also reaffirmed our need to increase our space situational
awareness (SSA) abilities. The Air Force, as the Executive Agent for
Space, identified the need to increase SSA as its number one space
funding priority. USSTRATCOM will work closely with the services to
define the appropriate SSA architecture, as well as a viable protection
strategy for our spacecraft. Vulnerability of low earth orbit
satellites to increased space debris caused by destructive testing or
direct attack also highlighted the need to rapidly adjust our space
readiness levels, and for improved capability to quickly launch and
augment or reconstitute a space-based asset.
Mr. Everett. In the 2006 Prioritized Capability List (PCL), the
warfighter's list of prioritized missile defense capability needs,
STRATCOM outlined a number of key requirements. These included, among
others: ensuring missile defense communications; maintaining the
operational availability of the GMD system; and expanding our
capability to defeat ballistic missiles in their terminal phase. a. To
what extent has MDA been responsive to STRATCOM's requirements as
outlined in the PCL? b. What areas need improvement?
General Cartwright. MDA adheres to a capabilities-based ballistic
missile defense systems acquisition approach. To enhance warfighter
needs and system development efforts, MDA has partnered with USSTRATCOM
to develop the Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP). The WIP enables
prioritized guidance on needed Combatant Commander capabilities to
MDA's developmental efforts. MDA has announced plans to focus their
2007 Summer Study around the just delivered second iteration of
USSTRATCOM Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL). By taking this
approach, MDA has clearly indicated a willingness to further
incorporate warfighter needs into system development and acquisition
processes. b. We continue to improve and refine our Warfighter-MDA
information exchange processes. This includes better definition of the
capabilities sought in the Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL) and
greater granularity in the capability development plans included in
MDA's PCL response. We are also looking at the possibility of
integrating the development of Cruise Missile Defense capabilities with
ongoing Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) efforts.
Mr. Everett. To what extent are the Combatant Commanders
influencing the Services force structure planning? More specifically,
to what extent are the COCOMs missile defense requirements being
incorporated into the Services long-term operational force structure
sizing?
General Cartwright. In general, combatant commanders influence
Service force structure planning through Senior Leadership Review
Groups as part of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
Process; annual Integrated Priority Lists (IPL); and Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) processes. For missile
defense, combatant commanders present their capability needs to the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) via the Warfighter Involvement Process
(WIP) and the Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL). As systems are
developed and mature, MDA uses the BMDS Transition and Transfer
planning process as the venue where developmental and fielding plans,
through negotiations with designated lead Services, are incorporated
into Service force structure planning.
Mr. Everett. Assume for a moment that the nation did not go forward
with RRW but rather maintained the existing stockpile through stockpile
stewardship and Life Extension Programs (LEPs), then fast forward 10-15
years from now. Do we start to take risk and if so, in what areas? What
impact would this have on our nation's stockpile readiness and the
ability of the stockpile to meet our nation's strategic deterrence
needs?
General Cartwright. A long-term strategy based on extending the
life of legacy warheads leaves the nation heavily reliant on a limited
number of aging, increasingly costly and difficult to maintain warhead
types for its nuclear deterrent. Such a strategy does not adequately
exercise the facilities, scientists, engineers, and technicians needed
for a responsive infrastructure. Many of our legacy warhead types need
to be refurbished or replaced over the next several decades when the
scientists, engineers and technicians that developed, tested and
fielded legacy nuclear weapons will be retired.
As a result, we continue to maintain a large and costly ``hedge''
of non-deployed warheads to mitigate the risks of technological and/or
operational surprise. It is difficult to predict if, or when, the
current strategy may become unsustainable or when we will face a
technical challenge we may not be able to resolve without testing.
Delaying transformation until we reach that point may put stockpile
readiness and the nuclear deterrent at significant risk.
Life Extension Program strategies address individual component
issues without regard to end-to-end design. Eventually, (10-15 yrs.)
the number of component changes compromizes our ability to certify in
the absence of testing.