[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-28]
AIR FORCE AND ARMY AIRLIFT AND AERIAL REFUELING FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT
PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 7, 2007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
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AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii, Chairman
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
ADAM SMITH, Washington California
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia TOM COLE, Oklahoma
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma ROB BISHOP, Utah
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
KATHY CASTOR, Florida GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
[VACANCY] W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
Heath Bope, Professional Staff Member
Lynn Williams, Professional Staff Member
Ben Kohr, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2007
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 7, 2007, Air Force and Army Airlift and Aerial
Refueling Fixed-Wing Aircraft Programs......................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 7, 2007......................................... 49
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 7, 2007
AIR FORCE AND ARMY AIRLIFT AND AERIAL REFUELING FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT
PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Air and Land
Forces Subcommittee............................................ 1
Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Ranking
Member, Air and Land Forces Subcommittee....................... 2
WITNESSES
Bolkcon, Christopher, Specialist in National Defense,
Congressional Research Service................................. 7
Chandler, Lt. Gen. C.H. ``Howie'', Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force; Lt. Gen.
Donald J. Hoffman, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, U.S. Air Force; Lt.
Gen. Mark Curran, Deputy Commander, Training and Doctrine
Command, U.S. Army; Maj. Gen. (Select) Jeffrey Sorenson, Deputy
for Systems Management, Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics and Technology, U.S. Army; Maj. Gen. Thomas P. Kane,
Director of Strategic Plans, Requirements and Programs, Air
Mobility Command, U.S. Air Force beginning on page............. 22
Solis, William M., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Issues, Government Accountability Office....................... 3
Sullivan, Michael J., Director of Acquisition and Sourcing
Management Issues, Government Accountability Office............ 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Bolkcon, Christopher......................................... 81
Curran, Lt. Gen. John M., joint with Maj. Gen. Jeffrey A.
Sorenson................................................... 110
Ortiz, Solomon P............................................. 53
Solis, William M., joint with Michael J. Sullivan............ 57
Hoffman, Lt. Gen. Donald, joint with Lt. Gen. Howie Chandler,
and Maj. Gen. Thomas Kane.................................. 102
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Defense Transportation, Study Limitations Raise Questions
about the Adequacy and Completeness of the Mobility
Capabilities Study and Report.............................. 117
Slides and map submitted by General Kane..................... 150
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Mr. Abercrombie.............................................. 157
Mr. Akin..................................................... 162
Mr. Johnson.................................................. 164
Mr. Meek..................................................... 164
Mr. Miller................................................... 159
Ms. Tauscher................................................. 161
AIR FORCE AND ARMY AIRLIFT AND AERIAL REFUELING FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT
PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Air and Land Forces Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 7, 2007.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:03 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon Ortiz
presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
TEXAS, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Ortiz.The subcommittee will come to order.
Chairman Abercrombie has been delayed in getting back from
Hawaii, so he has asked that I sit in to get the hearing
started.
Today we will receive testimony from the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service
(CRS) witnesses, plus Air Force and Army fighting experts,
about the airlift and the aerial refueling aircraft programs.
Today's hearing will focus on parts of the Department of
Defense's (DOD) recent mobility study and its conclusions,
which shape the Air Force and Army force structure requirements
for aerial refueling and airlift aircraft.
Over the past 10 years, the United States has reduced its
Cold War infrastructure and closed two-thirds of its forward
bases. Yet, we have increased our operational tempo of
deployments. Our aircraft platforms continue to age without
replacement due to procurement shortfalls that began in the
last century.
We now see the results of these challenges as we look at
our aging airlift and the tanker fleets of aircraft. These
aircraft, including even our new strategic airlifters, the C-
17s, are getting used up far faster than we had planned.
In January 2006, the Department of Defense released a
mobility capability study, or MCS, and they are currently
conducting other airlift and tanker studies.
There are many programs and associated issues that we would
like to discuss today regarding the C-17, the C-5, the C-130
airlifters, the KC-X, the KC-135 tankers, and the Joint Cargo
Aircraft (JCA).
To help us understand the results of the MCS, to give us
insight into program issues and the way forward, for
recapitalization, we have two panels of witnesses today.
For our first panel, I welcome Mr. Solis--good to see you
again, sir--Director of Defense Capabilities and Management of
the Government Accountability Office; Mr. Michael Sullivan,
Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management of the
Government Accountability Office; and, Mr. Chris Bolkcom,
Specialist in National Defense from the Congressional Research
Service.
We want to welcome you and thank you for joining us today.
But before we begin with witnesses' opening statements, let
me call on my good friend, the gentleman from New Jersey and
ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Saxton, for any remarks
that he would like to state today.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY,
RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I appreciate
you holding this very important hearing on airlift and
refueling programs for the Air Force and, of course, for their
best customer, the Army.
I am very pleased to be here because I believe the issues
we are addressing today are absolutely crucial to the nation's
ability to meet our nation's national security strategy.
We have several witnesses before the committee today, and
they come to us with a tremendous amount of knowledge on these
extremely important issues.
I would like to welcome all of you gentlemen. Thank you for
being here. We appreciate it, and I know I speak for myself as
well as for Chairman Abercrombie, who is not here of course.
We are here to examine the Department of Defense's airlift
and aerial refueling program requirements. These requirements
and capabilities have gaps that vary against a backdrop of
ever-changing global security challenges.
I am reminded, Mr. Chairman, of the first time I went to
Iraq and was briefed there on airlift capabilities and
requirements. We were using C-130's tactically in the country,
and, as you just mentioned, as the C-130's become less capable
because of wear and tear, we have supplemented them with a
permanent contingent of 20 C-17s in country to do tactical
lift.
The programs we are talking about are an enormous part of
the defense budget and, for that reason, we, the Congress, like
to be very sure before we commit to a course of action.
Part of being sure is to gather as many facts, study the
issue and to examine all of the alternatives.
We first saw mobility requirements study MRS-05 in the
spring of 2001. That study was designed to tell us how many
millions of ton miles per day of cargo capacity we needed to
meet our national security strategy. With those conclusions, we
could then go about the business of developing a fleet of
aircraft to fill that requirement.
The problem here, of course, is that MRS-05 was initiated
prior to the attacks of 9/11 and was outdated even before it
was released.
Next, we had, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the Mobility
Capabilities Study, MCS. Started in the summer of 2004, MCS was
designed to take a hard look at the nation's airlift
requirements as the global war on terror (GWOT) unfolded.
Unfortunately, the MCS, at least in my opinion, didn't say
much. It validated that we can do the things that we are doing
with the assets we have. There were no hard questions asked by
the MCS and there were certainly no answers in MCS. Yet, we
waited for MCS, hoping that it would steer us in the right
direction.
Along with MCS, we awaited the QDR to be released. The QDR
finally arrived only to call for five more studies related to
airlift requirements and provided us little insight into the
nation's true airlift capability needs.
Today we are waiting for MCS-06 to be released. MCS-06 is
designed to incorporate the findings of the five other studies
called for in the QDR.
On top of all these studies, we wait for DOD requirement
validations, Nunn-McCurdy certifications, operational test
results and fleet viability reports, while we are sitting
around waiting for these reports, studies and analyses.
In a world that is moving much faster than our bureaucracy,
we, as a nation and the Congress, are faced with some tough
decisions and everyone I talk to tells me they are waiting on
another study before they can answer our questions.
While we are waiting for those studies, let me share some
facts.
The fiscal year 2008 budget request is here. Long lead
suppliers for C-17 are being issued stop-orders. The line is
scheduled to close in 2009, although I received a call last
week that said it may close even sooner or may begin to phase
down even sooner.
The Army and the Marine Corps are increasing their end-
strength by 65,000 personnel, I believe, increasing the
requirement.
The weight of most armored vehicles now required in Iraq
precludes the use of C-130 aircraft. We do not know the final
weight of the Army's future combat system nor has it been taken
into account in establishing future requirements.
The number of improvised explosive Device (IED) attacks
continues to grow. The one sure way to keep our troops out of
that threat is to keep them off the roads.
The global war on terror is just that, a global war that is
being fought by many nations and many continents.
We are faced with several decisions regarding the nation's
airlift and tanker requirements. We cannot afford to put off
those decisions in order to wait on another report, because as
we wait, the world continues to change around us.
To be clear, I am not advocating disregarding any of our
current policies. I am making one simple point: Reports don't
make decisions; leaders make decisions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses.
Mr. Ortiz. Without objection, all witness statements will
be entered for the record.
And, Mr. Solis, it is all yours. You can proceed with your
opening statement, sir.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM M. SOLIS, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Solis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Ortiz, Ranking Member Saxton and members of the
subcommittee, I am pleased to be here to discuss the
development of aircraft program requirements and issues related
to the acquisition process.
Before I review our work concerning DOD's efforts to assess
our future mobility needs, allow me to summarize what I am
going to tell you: Good analysis equals good requirements,
which support good decision-making.
We have spent the last year reviewing DOD's efforts to
assess future mobility needs and can state emphatically that
this is a very complex process, with many moving parts.
There are no easy answers to very tough questions. However,
we do believe that distinguishing wants from needs starts with
good analysis based on good data modeling.
We recently issued our report on high-risk areas in the
Federal Government, which was DOD acquisition processes as one
of the longstanding areas of concern.
Acquisition has been on this list since 1990. As we have
reported, DOD knows what needs to be done to achieve more
successful outcomes, but finds it difficult to apply the
necessary discipline and controls or assign much needed
accountability.
We have reported in the past that a sound business case for
acquisition contains firm requirements, mature technologies, a
knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost
estimate, and sufficient funding.
However, we found that many of these elements are missing
or incomplete as DOD and the services attempt to acquire new
capabilities.
Persistent acquisition problems include failure to identify
needs versus wants and to limit cost growth, schedule delays
and quantity reductions, but fiscal realities will not allow
budgets to accommodate these problems any longer.
Today I will highlight some of the issues related to the
analysis supporting the DOD's mobility capabilities and
requirements and Mike Sullivan will discuss actions that are
needed to improve the outcome of weapons system acquisitions.
DOD has an obligation to deliver high-quality products to
war-fighters when they need them at a price the country can
afford. However, our work shows that acquisition problems will
likely persist until DOD provides a better foundation for
buying the right things the right way.
This foundation begins with setting requirements that are
based on adequate and complete analysis using current and
operational data and updated and effective models.
For the past several years, we have reported our concerns
with the analysis done to support requirements and have
recently issued two reports that raise concerns about the
quality of analysis underpinning programmatic decisions
surrounding the DOD airlift requirements.
In September 2006, we issued our report on DOD's mobility
capability study, or the MCS. The MCS determined that the
projected mobility capabilities are adequate to achieve U.S.
objectives with an acceptable level of risk during the period
fiscal years 2007 through 2013.
That is, the current inventory of aircraft, ships and pre-
positioned assets and other capabilities are sufficient in
conjunction with host nation support.
In our report, we stated that conclusions of the MCS were
based on incomplete data, inadequate modeling and metrics that
did not fully measure stress on the transportation system.
We further observed that the MCS results were incomplete,
unclear or contingent upon further study, making it difficult
to identify findings and evaluate evidence.
It is not clear how the analysis was done for the study to
support DOD's conclusions and we suggest that decision-makers
exercise caution in using the results.
This year we issued a report on the lack of mandatory
analysis to support a pasture or cargo capability for the new
replacement refueling aircraft, the KCX tanker.
Contrary to mandatory Air Force implementing guidance, the
Air Force proposed a capability without an identified need, a
requirement that was not supported by need and not underpinned
by analysis.
Air Force officials could not provide supporting
information sufficient to explain this discrepancy between the
required analysis and the proposal.
In closing, as I said at the beginning of my testimony,
acquisition problems will persist until DOD provides a better
foundation for buying the right things the right way.
This concludes my oral statement. I will be happy to answer
any questions that you may have.
I will now turn to Mike Sullivan for his comments.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Solis and Mr. Sullivan
can be found in the Appendix on page 57.]
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Sullivan.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR OF ACQUISITION AND
SOURCING MANAGEMENT ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittee.
Over the last several years, we, the GAO, have examined
weapon acquisitions from the perspective of best practices for
product development. We have found that successful product
development programs begin with a sound business case, as Bill
was alluding to, business cases that provide evidence that a
product can be developed and produced if it has proven
technologies at the outset, there is design knowledge at the
right times, and adequate and stable funding is available, and
then the business case must be executed through an acquisition
process that is anchored in knowledge to reduce risk.
Basic systems engineering practices should provide the
underpinning for all of this.
Without these kind of practices in place, a cascade of
negative effects results in cost increases and delays in
getting new capability to the war-fighter.
While DOD has included many of these best practices into
its acquisition policies, its programs still often do not
follow through on them. The underlying cause for this is the
department's inability to enforce those policies at the
programmatic level.
Airlift acquisitions are not immune to this and have
experienced unnecessary cost growth and schedule delays as a
result.
In the past 25 years, DOD has invested more than $140
billion on airlift and tanker forces. Between 2007 and 2011, it
plans additional investments of nearly $32 billion. Roughly a
third of this is planned for four ongoing programs under
discussion today.
These programs include programs to modernize the C-5 and
the C-130 avionics systems, re-engine the C-5 aircraft and
develop the C-130 airlifter.
All of these programs were considered low technological
risks because they relied on proven commercial technology when
they began. However, they have not delivered on their original
business cases.
As a result, each program has encountered some difficulty
in moving into production and delivering to the field.
Poor results in each program stem, at least in part, from a
failure to use basic systems engineering practices to do three
things. First, fully analyze requirements and the resources
that are needed to integrate the proven technologies into a
military system; second, begin system demonstration only after
you have stabilized the design; and, three, demonstrate that
the aircraft will work in its intended environment before you
make large production investments.
The net effect of the problems across all four of these
programs is additional unplanned expenditures so far of $962
million and a longer wait than planned for the war-fighter to
get the equipment delivered to him.
For example, the Air Force now expects by 2011 to have
completed the modification of about 135 fewer C-130 airlift
aircraft when compared to its plan 2 years.
There could be additional cost increases and schedule
delays reported in the near future. Programs' current budget
indicates that total costs have recently increased almost
another $700 million and planned quantities have been reduced
from 434 to 268, nearly doubling the unit costs for the
Avionics Modernization Program (AMP).
The program recently notified Congress of a critical Nunn-
McCurdy breach concerning this.
I will conclude by making five points.
First, DOD will continue to face big challenges in
modernizing its forces, especially with the new demands on the
Federal dollar.
Second, the four acquisition cases that I cite in this
testimony are not atypical and, in fact, were not as complex as
most major acquisitions. Even with no major technological
invention to meet war-fighters' needs in these cases, they have
achieved suboptimal results in terms of costs and deliveries.
Third, there are major consequences to these outcomes. The
war-fighter does not receive needed capability on time and the
department and the Congress must spend additional unplanned
money to correct mistakes.
Fourth, a product development process based in knowledge,
steeped in best practices from systems engineering can solve
many of these problems that happen before they start.
And, finally and perhaps most important, DOD knows how to
do this and, in fact, already informs its acquisition policy
with systems engineering rules. It should redouble its efforts
to enforce these policies on programs by ensuring, first, that
the right mix of programs, given all available resources, is in
the mix; second, establishing sound business cases for each one
of those programs; and, third, by holding people accountable
for better cost, schedule and performance results as they
execute those programs.
That concludes my remarks.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Solis
can be found in the Appendix on page 57.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Bolkcom.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER BOLKCOM, SPECIALIST IN NATIONAL
DEFENSE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. Bolkcom. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee,
thanks for inviting me to speak with you today about airlift
and aerial refueling. As requested, I will address the
potential oversight issues for this and future legislative
cycles.
First, I will address the KC-X, the Air Force's plan to
recapitalize its aging tanker fleet. The Air Force hopes to
begin replacing its 500 KC-135 tankers with a 179 new aircraft,
either the Boeing KC-767 or the KC-30, made by Airbus and
Northrop Grumman.
Media reports have raised concerns that this competition
may be biased against Airbus' larger aircraft. After an initial
review, CRS found that as DOD defined its tanker requirements,
the KC-X competition does not appear biased in favor of either
aircraft.
Another issue is whether the Air Force plan is affordable.
In 2006, DOD's tanker analysis of alternatives found that
buying new commercial aircraft was the most cost-effective way
to initially recapitalize the KC-135 fleet, but that overall
affordability was an important consideration.
Purchasing new aircraft is more capital intensive than
other options, such as re-engining KC-135Es, buying used
aircraft, and leasing aerial refueling services.
The Air Force has consistently objected to these other
options and hopes to purchase approximately 350 more new
aircraft after KCX.
Congress will have future opportunities to examine the
efficacy of buying used aircraft or leasing tanker services.
However, the Air Force wants to retire its last KC-135E
aircraft in fiscal year 2008. If it is successful, the re-
engining option will be moot.
The final point on tankers is that the requirement is
unclear. DOD's last study on tanker requirements in 2001 is
outdated. The 2006 mobility capabilities study, or MCS,
provided guidance on tanker capabilities, but it did not
estimate required force size.
Further, there is debate among the acquisition community,
the mobility community and the combatant commanders on specific
tanker requirements, such as airlift capacity.
My second subject is long-range airlift. The airlift
requirement is also imprecise and can be met in different ways.
The MCS found that DOD's airlift programs could meet the
national military strategy with moderate or acceptable risk.
But these are subjective terms and a close examination of this
classified study and the recent addition of 10 C-17s to the
plane inventory could lead many to perceive the risk as
actually being low.
As the C-17 production line wanes, pressure is building to
procure more aircraft. This brings C-17 funding in direct
competition with C-5 modernization.
There are strong arguments in favor of both programs, but
it is not simply an either/or competition. Broader tradeoffs
exist because more airlift capacity in the tanker fleet could
make smaller C-5 or C-17 fleets acceptable.
Because the C-17 can perform both long-and short-range
airlift, it may compete against programs like the C-130 for
funding and for mission.
Last, I will address short-range airlift, specifically the
C-130 and joint cargo aircraft programs.
Again, a number of aircraft are competing for limited
funding to satisfy an ambiguous requirement. C-130J procurement
competes with the C-17 and with the modernization of older C-
130 models.
In fiscal year 2006, for example, DOD proposed terminating
the C-130J, in part, because modernizing older C-130's was
cheaper. Since then, C-130J funding was reinstated and
procurement of nine aircraft is planed in fiscal year 2008.
Conversely, C-130 modernization programs are now being
reduced, as Mike just mentioned.
The Joint Cargo Aircraft program is, in many ways, a
shotgun marriage between Army and Air Force programs. There is
noteworthy disagreement between the services on how this
aircraft would be used.
Formally, the Air Force agrees with the Army's initial
vision, but is still defining its own final requirements.
An issue for Congress is whether the Army could begin
acquiring the Joint Cargo Aircraft only to find that the Air
Force's final requirements are not easily met by the aircraft
chosen. If this turns out to be the case, it could mean costly
retrofits or even the need for a different aircraft.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you and look forward to any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bolkcom can be found in the
Appendix on page 81.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much, Mr. Bolkcom.
Maybe you can expand a little bit to help us understand the
capabilities about the C-5 and the C-17 aircraft and why they
are important to the Air Force inventory.
Could you please compare and contrast what advantages both
give to the Air Mobility Command in moving cargo and supplies
to the war-fighter, if you can elaborate a little bit on that?
Mr. Bolkcom. I would be happy to, sir.
Both airplanes are long-range strategic platforms and what
distinguishes them from commercial carriers, such as Civil
Response Air Fleet (CRAF), are a number of things, but one of
the most important is the ability to carry outsized and
oversized cargo, like Patriot antimissile systems, Apache
helicopters and the like. They provide a certain capability
that you just can't find anywhere else in that regard.
I do note that in an earlier hearing, General Mosley
characterized the C-5 as ``a little bigger than the C-17.''
And, respectfully, I believe that General Mosley might have
misspoken, because Air Force planning factors show it is almost
twice as big. Depending on what you are carrying, it can carry
twice as many larger outsized objects or twice as many pallets.
So there is a nontrivial difference between the two in terms of
their size.
And the final point I will just make is although quite
capable, the C-5 is limited to large prepared runways, where
the C-17, of course, can do both short-range austere operations
and the longer operations.
Mr. Ortiz. The ranking member, Mr. Saxton.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Chairman, I think I would like to yield my
time to one of the junior members who may not have had an
opportunity to ask questions in the last hearing.
Mr. Ortiz. Do you want to single anybody out?
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Saxton. I greatly appreciate
that.
There are a couple things that interest me about the
subject matter that you have been testifying about.
One is General Mosley and Secretary Wynn have been talking
about concerns of the aerospace industry to meet the capacity
needs of the Air Force and it certainly seems that inherent in
all of our concerns with the acquisition process, the health of
the underlying industry's ability to meet our needs is
certainly an important one.
Do you have any thoughts or comments concerning the
aerospace industry's overall capacity in looking at future
acquisitions?
Mr. Bolkcom. I would be happy to address that, sir.
I think that the way you phrased it actually confuses me a
little bit, because when I look at the Air Force plans, they
are actually planning to purchase fewer aircraft than our
industry has the capacity to build.
The over-capacity tends to be the problem, not an under-
capacity. I didn't hear his testimony.
Mr. Turner. Their perspective was in the future, that as we
begin the process of turning the spigot off and constraining
what we are currently acquiring, that the loss of production
capacity can have an impact on our abilities in the future.
And, certainly, if you look at the issue of the tankers,
our acquisition planning for replacement and then looking at
those aircraft, the amount of time that will expire before all
the aircraft are replaced and what their service would have to
be before we then are able to replace them based on the
capacity of the aerospace industry is certainly a very lengthy
projection.
Mr. Bolkcom. Specifically on that, sir, I think you have
characterized it correctly. The days of buying 100 aircraft a
year are really gone. So those old models of the industrial-
government relationships have got to change and they have
changed and, frankly, that is one of the stronger arguments
against purchasing just new aircraft.
Certainly, that is an important part of recapitalizing the
fleet, perhaps the foundation, but I agree with that assessment
that buying 15, 17, 20 a year doesn't recapitalize the fleet
very quickly and still does not reduce the average age of our
fleet very quickly.
Mr. Turner. And, therefore, then has an impact of reducing
the overall capacity of the industry in case we should look to
trying to close the gap at a quicker pace or have higher needs.
Mr. Bolkcom. That would be one approach.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. We are going to try to see if we can stick to
the 5-minute rule, but at the same time, give sufficient time
for the witnesses to respond to the question, because we do
have two panels. This is the first panel, then we have the
second panel.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. I will strive to be quick, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate that.
First of all, I just want to thank you gentleman and the
Air Force for their work on the refueling tanker issue. I know
that wasn't easy, and I know my hometown company there at one
time or another didn't make it easy for you. So I appreciate
that that process is being moved forward and we have got a
decision date and the project is going forward. I know that
wasn't easy. I appreciate you working that.
My question is on the airlift piece, in terms of what we
need to have the airlift between the C-17 and the C-5 and the
130's, where you think we are at, what we need to add. I know
there are questions about that. Do we have sufficient airlift
now, a sufficient plan? What are the major challenges in that
area?
And, second, not to insert my own subcommittee into this
discussion, but I chair the terrorism subcommittee,
jurisdiction over special ops. Special ops folks in particular
have a need for an updated C-130, and they are, as you know,
dependent upon the Air Force for getting that set up to
transfer it over to them.
If you could give me an update on when that update--and the
130's specific to the special ops needs, how that is
progressing. So just those two pieces of the question.
And, forgive me, I don't know which one of you would be
best qualified to answer that, but I will let you figure out
amongst yourselves. Thank you.
Mr. Solis. I will take a first crack at it.
In terms of the needs, right now, if you go back, and
recognizing that there were limitations on the MCS, it didn't
indicate that there was adequate airlift in the inventory to
take care of the existing missions.
Having said that, there are things that have changed since
the MCS with regard to things like pre-positioning of Army
equipment that have changed possibly some of those ideas and,
also, recognizing that there are still studies under way for
intratheater lift.
So it is a little muddied at this point as to exactly how
much in terms of lift is needed at this point.
Mr. Smith. Do you have an idea of when we are going to
clarify those questions?
Mr. Solis. Well, the studies are under way. We don't have
visibility, that is, GAO doesn't have visibility over where
those studies are at. But my understanding is that they are
under way.
Mr. Bolkcom. I would add on that subject, sir, I think the
larger challenge is to take a holistic view of our airlift
needs and although the MCS was the first sort of comprehensive
study by the participants of the mission, it didn't look at
certain aspects of lift.
The thing I would also mention is that we do have an
evolving sort of need and it is questionable how useful
oftentimes the metrics are.
Mr. Smith. That is something I have often wondered about.
We do a fabulous study that takes two years and when it is
done, it tells you exactly what we needed two years ago. And
how do we make sure we update that a little bit more quickly?
That is obviously a problem throughout the military, but
this is an area----
Mr. Bolkcom. So really it comes down to comfort level in
terms of sort of public policy-making, how much risk are you
comfortable with, are you taking a holistic approach, looking
at pre-positioned stocks, capacity lift and the like.
My view, and I will make this my last comment, is the
military is incredibly flexible and creative in terms of
satisfying their military challenges and a shortfall in their
lift can be made up with another way.
Mr. Smith. And my second question I realize is better
suited for the next panel, unless one of you want to take a
stab at it. And I am not sure I am going to be here for the
next panel, so if not, those of you who are going to be on that
can consider that and submit it for the record and just get the
answer to my office when you get a chance.
Mr. Sullivan. Just so we understand, I guess, it is
something we could probably also get for you.
Were you asking about where they are in terms of
delivering----
Mr. Smith. Yes.
Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. For special ops.
Mr. Smith. Right.
Mr. Sullivan. I don't have a complete answer to that yet,
but we could certainly get that and get back to you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. LoBiondo.
Dr. Gingrey, do you have a question, sir?
Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am going to address
a question to Mr. Bolkcom.
Mr. Bolkcom, you outline in your testimony that the C-5A
fleet has at least 25 years of life remaining and investment in
the modernization would be recouped for decades. And,
additionally, current estimates of the per aircraft cost of AMP
and Eligibility Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP)
combined are one-third that of a new C-17.
And, in fact, as you pointed out, and I am glad you did
this, that the C-5 will actually carry almost twice the payload
of a C-17 and I also read in your testimony that we are leasing
Russian AN-124 Condor aircraft to carry outsized and oversized
cargo in both Operation and Enduring Iraqi Freedom, because we
didn't have enough C-5 availability.
So that DOD is outsourcing missions to Russian aircraft
shows us, I think, that C-5 can perform missions that no other
aircraft in our fleet can accomplish.
Doesn't this make the case that we should be supporting
modernization of an aircraft that can perform critical missions
no other aircraft can, especially in light of the fact that the
C-5 has a 70 percent service life remaining and it can be
modernized at a fraction of the cost of a new C-17?
And, again, any one of the three of you can respond to
this. In the president's 2008 budget, I didn't see any request
for C-17s. In fact, I think we have maybe 10 more than was
recommended in the fleet that we really need something like 190
aircraft.
So I am just not sure that we--all these studies and
everything would suggest that we need this balance, and, yet,
what we heard from the secretary and from the chief sort of
contradicted what was in the president's budget for 2008.
So if you can respond to that, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Bolkcom. Yes, sir. I couldn't have said it better
myself, but as a CRS guy, of course, I am not going to say
that. But I think your summation of the facts were very
powerful.
The point I would just make is the Air Force program of
record currently is to modernize all the C-5s. So that is their
plan.
And we have read in the open press that they have
experienced some cost growth in RERP especially that we have
heard anecdotally may cause some changes in the program, but
that, again, remains to be seen and it is really for the Air
Force to bring up.
Mr. Sullivan. I guess I would just note that I would
probably reinforce that a little bit. The thing that would be
troubling right now is the problems that the C-5 RERP has had
and I think they are looking at the costs now.
They are going to probably come out with a new cost
estimate. There are problems on the program that are going to
probably be fairly costly. So I think that is something we need
to keep in mind.
Dr. Gingrey. Maybe when we hear from my colleague from
Georgia, Mr. Marshall, we will find out a little bit more about
those costs and the specifics of that, because I know he is
extremely knowledgeable about it. But I appreciate it.
Any further comments from the GAO?
I yield back, then, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith [presiding]. A lot of pressure on you now, Jim,
but your expertise has been called upon and you are up. Mr.
Marshall?
Mr. Marshall. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
And I don't know whether I need to thank you, Mr. Gingrey.
I shouldn't have said anything about you riding up just one
flight earlier today. [Laughter.]
It is better for your health, by the way, to walk those
flights of stairs.
I do have questions about the C-5A, C-17 and joint cargo
aircraft. I have had lots of conversations on this subject.
If I recall correctly, it was the Institute for Defense
Analysis, at the request of the Senate, concluded in 2002,
after a lengthy study, that the RERP AMP for C-5A/C-5B made
absolute sense and they considered all different configurations
that we might go with.
I am not sure whether it is IDA or some other group, but
the study was quite clear and it wasn't a close call.
And so we decided to go ahead and do that. I now hear Air
Force saying, ``Lockheed, the costs are going up unacceptably
here,'' and the dynamic is changing and the cost may to get a
point where it is no longer cost-effective to consider RERPing
and AMPing these C-5As.
I have suggested to Lockheed that Lockheed lock in a price.
I don't see any reason why Lockheed can't do that and, frankly,
would advise Lockheed, if it wants to have this business, to go
ahead and do it rather than keep up in the air the question
concerning how much cost we are going to incur.
In talking with the Air Force, I understand there are 29 or
31 C-5--well, all but two of which are C-5As, two C-5Bs, that
Air Force simply considers to be, as Chief Mosley describes it,
``hard broke.''
Are you gentleman familiar with that? You are not.
We have torn down a C-5A and concluded that its frame was
good to go for quite some time, which would justify the RERP/
AMP investment and the viability board has said the C-5As are
good to go.
But we just need to hear more about those that have been
specifically identified as ones that should be retired.
So it is a twofold thing here. It is not retire all the C-
5As, but there are some that just seem to be so broken that it
doesn't make sense to fix them. They would like to permission
to retire those. We need to know more about that.
Then the second thing is this quandary we are in with
regard to rising costs and an inability apparently to manage
the program as well as it needs to be managed.
Where KC-X is concerned, are any of you gentlemen involved
at all in the process of thinking through how in the
acquisition process we get an agreement from the Original
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) that is appropriate so that we
know how sustainment, modernization, maintenance is going to
occur over the lifetime, the projected lifetime of the
platform?
Are you involved at all in any of that? If you are not,
just say ``no'' and we will go to the next panel.
Mr. Bolkcom. No, sir.
Mr. Marshall. Let me try one more here.
Mr. Sullivan. If I could, we look at acquisitions of the
major weapons systems, something like the C-17 program, for
example, and in doing so, we are focused mostly on what it
takes to develop and then procure the aircraft.
But there is also, especially in the past ten years or so,
this idea of performance-based logistics, which has become very
important.
The department and the services have tried much harder to
make the life-cycle costs part of the cost of acquiring--the
total ownership costs more important at the time they are
acquiring the aircraft.
Mr. Marshall. Mr. Sullivan, I don't really think it is a
just-in-the-last-10-years kind of phenomenon. I think,
historically, while we might not have taken that into account,
it was simply assumed that we, the government, would be in
control of the long-term maintenance, sustainment and
modernization process for everything we bought militarily.
It was all ours. We got all the data rights. You didn't
have to go back to the OEM for anything and you began
immediately developing the management process that you needed
in order to logistically take care of the platform over a long
period of time.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes.
Mr. Marshall. We quit doing and probably the most glaring
example of our failure in that regard, to the detriment of the
Air Force, the detriment of DOD and the American taxpayer, is
the C-17.
We have got a real problem with the C-17 because we didn't
think that through at that time and we don't know how, over the
long haul, we are going to wind up, what sort of partnership we
will develop that will enable us to, in a cost-effective way,
deal with that platform.
It was a real mistake and I am just hoping that we get to a
point--I think the KC-X is our opportunity to set a model that
makes sense in the long run and that is why I bring that up.
Mr. Sullivan. If what you are discussing is organic
capability versus contractor-based capability.
Mr. Marshall. It is more basic than that. Yes, that is
true, but it is more basic than that. We buy these things
without taking into account what they are going to cost over
the long haul and the kinds of understandings we need to have
up front that will help us with cost over the long haul.
We buy them cheaper to start out with, but in the long run,
if you discount the present value of what it is going to cost
us, we are spending more than we should.
May I, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Sullivan. I would just like to say, Congressman, I
think I am exactly with you there. And what I was trying to
say, I guess, is there are ways to build in reduced total
ownership costs or life-cycle costs when you acquire a weapons
system.
Mr. Marshall. Mr. Chairman, are we going to have a second
round?
Mr. Ortiz [presiding]. Well, we have another panel, but I
think if we move fast enough, we could have a second round.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you.
Mr. Ortiz. My good friend from Michigan, Ms. Miller.
Mrs. Miller of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be
brief, as well, knowing we have another panel.
And perhaps this question is better-suited for the second
panel. But let me ask you, gentlemen, if you have any comment,
since you are in the business, about how the Air Force and the
Army is coordinating, as they look to the future, in regard to
strategic airlift and specifically how are they looking to
accommodate Future Combat Systems, for instance?
That is really the Army's future there and being able to
strategically airlift those kinds of vehicles. Do you see good
coordination amongst the groups there? Could you comment on
that?
Mr. Sullivan. I could comment briefly on what the--the
Joint Combat Aircraft, I think, would be the best example right
now of where we see the Army and the Air Force having to come
together now to collaborate a little bit more and see if they
can get synergies out of the requirements process.
And I think you would have to give them an incomplete grade
at this point, because the process has really just gotten
started. I think they just stood up a joint program office and
some joint requirement-setting mechanisms to see how well they
can work together.
So it is kind of in its infancy in that regard.
Mrs. Miller of Michigan. One follow-up question, as well,
for Mr. Bolkcom from CRS.
You mentioned you thought there was quite a bit of
resistance about the possibility of leasing for refueling.
Could you flesh that out just a little bit about how much
resistance you think there is to that kind of a thing and if
that really is an appropriate way for us to go?
Mr. Bolkcom. Ma'am, I base my observations on ongoing
relationship with the Air Force at many different levels, but
their stated position is that there is a part B to the RFP, the
request for proposal. And they will conduct a business case
analysis (BCA) to look into this and see if it is worth doing
and then submit an RFP for refueling services. That is their
position. So it sounds like they are taking it under
consideration.
I think if you look at the proposed business case analysis,
the study design seemed to contain a number of assumptions that
might not have been favorable to fee for service compared to
other options.
So that raised some questions, in my mind. And just my
continued interaction with Air Force staff has kind of raised a
question mark. What has happened to it? The BCA was supposed to
have been completed.
I don't know who is doing it, its status, if one even
exists. So I think it is up to the Air Force to document
whether they are pursuing it or not.
Mrs. Miller of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you.
Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. Joint Cargo Aircraft, I am not as sanguine as
you are, Mr. Sullivan, about the current status of the
development of that. I almost feel as if I am emissary between
the parties at this point, listening to both sides and our Air
Force's worries about what Army is going to do and Army's
worries about what Air Force is going to do.
I am wondering what advice--and if you all can't do this,
if this is beyond you, fine with me, don't try and answer--but
what advice do you have to us? Is it Congress? Who in DOD, I
mean, who pulls these folks together and tries to make sure
that they are on the same page or at least if they can be
gotten on the same page, get them on the same page?
Mr. Sullivan. Well, one of the things that we look at when
we look at the major acquisitions is the joint capability
requirements process that the department has tried to put in
place, in some sense, trying to go more toward functional
capabilities in a way to set requirements as opposed to across
the services or platforms, if you will.
The department has worked very hard to try to institute
those policies. There are cultural problems with that. There is
stovepiping and things like that.
But we have reported quite a bit on some of the failings of
that process, some of the ways that the process and the funding
process, for example, mechanically, don't link up. So it makes
it more difficult for these services to come together.
Mr. Marshall. What worries me is that Army is about to make
a decision and that decision made by Army will be one that Air
Force will conclude it can't live with at some point down the
future.
And it seems to me that there ought to be some mechanism
for Congress or DOD or some other group to come in and stop the
stovepiping and the cultural problem between the two services
and if there is, in fact, some legitimate reason why there
needs to be two different pipe forms, fine, so be it.
It is going to cost us a lot of money to do that, it is not
smart economically, but maybe we have to live with it.
If, in fact, there is not a good reason, we ought to force
them together.
How do we force them together? I understand the problem.
How do we force them together? Who does that?
Mr. Sullivan. If you are asking me, mechanically, how would
that operate in the department, I think there it the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions probably would be the
right position to get up above.
Mr. Marshall. Would it be maybe this subcommittee that has
a hearing and says, ``Don't do this to us. Can you come to us
and explain why you can't do this jointly??
Mr. Sullivan. This subcommittee certainly has a stake in
them developing doable and efficient requirements that can take
advantage of the synergies across the services. It certainly
does, yes.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I understand that you gentleman tried to give us an
overview perspective on the planning, particularly in some of
these larger kinds of systems, and the line of questioning, I
want to stay on where we have been, which is particularly
airlift capacity.
I guess my first question is, do you know if the Air Force
or the Air Mobility Command, when they are trying to lay out
their requirements, have they been preparing for new and future
systems that have to be lifted to combat zones?
Has that been specifically built into their numbers? Maybe
that is for the second panel, I don't know if you know that.
The second question I have for you is it seems, from what
we have seen in the last number of years in Iraq, that there is
going to be a trend to go to more armor on almost everything
that we are hauling people around with.
Maybe at the point of making that case would be the mine
resistant ambush protected vehicles, MRAPS, that 4,000 of the
Marines are going to be using and it is probably quite possible
that the Army may be moving into more of those, too, which is
1.5 times the weight of an up-armored Humvee.
And then in my district, we are doing a lot of the
engineering work on Future Combat Systems and the idea was to
kind of keep it really light, but as you design it, it is
coming out almost a little too big a bite for a C-130.
So I guess my question is, is the trend that we see partly
projected because of Iraq, is that going to be typical for
military vehicles, that they are going to be heavier? And if
that is the case, is the Air Force doing the planning needed to
realize that we are going to have to be lifting heavier loads
into these combat zones, wherever we end up fighting?
Mr. Bolkcom. Sir, I will say I don't believe it is a truism
that all our ground equipment is always going to be heavier.
Certainly, we have a data point.
We are fighting an insurgency in this context, in this
environment, where the roadside bombs are a very effective
tool, then, yes, in this case we need more armor. But we don't
know that is always going to be the case.
And I will just mention I think that I have witnessed
pretty clear communication between Air Force and Army both
directions. The Army is designing vehicles to fit on particular
aircraft and the Air Force is considering what the Army is
working on.
So I see appropriate interaction.
Mr. Solis. I think it depends not so much on the vehicle,
per se, although that certainly is a consideration, but the
operational scenarios that they are planning for for the future
that would probably dictate more about what the aircraft and
the lift requirements are going to be into the future.
One of the problems, if we go back to Stryker, for example,
now, this was intratheater. There was the requirement that the
Chief of Staff of the Army laid out at one time to move that
brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours.
Noble goal, but then trying to figure out how to do that
became very problematic both strategically and intratheater,
given some of the weight of the Stryker and just what they were
trying to do and the number of assets, both C-5 and C-17, that
you would have to employ to do that.
The other thing, for example, with the Stryker, too, and
you notice all the Strykers in Iraq have the slat armor, you
are going to almost probably need to aircraft, like C-130's, to
move that, because you can't necessarily put all that armor on
that aircraft.
So, again, it probably depends on the particular scenarios
and how you are going to operate and what you are going to do
into the future.
Mr. Akin. So it sounds like ``all depends'' is your answer.
But somehow or other, I have a hard time visualizing that we
are going to send a whole lot of Humvees that don't have any
armor on them anywhere where we get in trouble in the world.
But you are saying, ``No, we may just be sending all these
very light pieces of equipment over.''
Mr. Solis. No, I am not saying that. I am just saying that
your airlift requirement may be dictated by that very thing
that you are saying, Congressman.
If we are going to have, for example, as I said, with the
Stryker, if you are going to be moving the Stryker and the
armor and everything else, the people that go with it, you may
need more aircraft, depending on the operational scenarios and
the requirements that are laid out.
Mr. Akin. That is what common sense seemed to dictate to
me, but I know you can sometimes look at one war and just plan
everything based on one scenario and things can change.
But still I am having a hard time seeing where future
combat systems seem to be going. I am having a hard time seeing
that we are getting lighter somehow.
It is true they are not battle tanks, but still, just
because of the physical size, as well as the weight, that is
what I am curious about.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Saxton.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Solis, you brought up an interesting subject that I
lived through. That was the----
Mr. Solis. I know. You and I talked about this at one time.
Mr. Saxton. Did we?
Mr. Solis. Yes, if it is the same question I think you are
going to ask.
Mr. Saxton. Let me go to the next chapter then. With regard
to Future Combat System and deployment, I believe the concept,
once again, is to deploy a brigade quickly with airlift.
My understanding, however, is that in carrying out the
mobility requirement study, as well as the MCS, that the Army
has not come up on the net yet to put the requirement forward
for the Air Force to meet that deployment and that, therefore,
conclusions that were drawn about how much airlift we need in
terms of C-5 or C-17, whichever, were made in the absence of
that requirement.
Is that true, and do you see that as a problem?
Mr. Solis. Congressman, I don't know. I can't answer
specifically.
What I would note, again, is that, for example, the study
on intratheater lift is still ongoing. I don't know what the
results of that may be, but, obviously, as I mentioned with the
Stryker, that was a big issue.
How are you going to move those vehicles within theater?
Are you going to do that by, in the case of C-130, going back
to what I know, the Stryker, or are you going to start moving
to buy other aircraft, such as C-17?
I can't answer specifically, but if you would like, we
could probably take it for the record.
Mr. Saxton. Do you know if the Stryker would fit on a C-130
with the slat armor on it?
Mr. Solis. I don't believe so.
Mr. Saxton. I don't believe so either.
My great friend, Jim Marshall, and my other great friend,
Mr. Gingrey, talked a little about the C-5 and its attributes,
and I agree that it is a great platform.
As I listened to Mr. Bolkcom and his analysis, he talked
about the size and its capability of carrying twice as much as
a C-17. I just wanted to point out--and I am sure this makes a
difference. I just wanted to point out that there is a reason
that the Air Force didn't build another great big airplane like
the C-5 and that was that the number of times that we fly it
fully loaded is really small. Very few times do we fly that
airplane fully loaded.
So when they went out to design the airplane that they
thought they needed that could land on a short runway and take
off on a short runway, carry a heavy load, they thought that
the C-5 fit the bill better than the C-17. There is something
to be said for having more tails that carry a partial load.
So I think we have to be very careful of saying that the C-
5 is the ultimate airplane because it can carry almost twice as
much as the C-17. Would you agree?
Mr. Bolkcom. Sir, I think that is very fair. I think the
DOD's transportation system is really elegant. If you look at
the layers of CRAF, the C-5, the C-17, they are very
complementary. So I think that is a very fair statement.
Mr. Saxton. Okay, thanks.
Now, let me just throw something else out. The C-5
modernization program is a good program, and I here in this
committee helped to put in place and promote it. And I think it
makes sense in some respect.
But I am not sure that it makes sense in modernizing, fully
modernizing both the C-5A and the C-5B, and here is why. In
order to modernize the C-5A, you start from a baseline of a
mission capability rate of 49.3 percent today and that is going
down. You start with a fleet availability rate of 35.5 percent
for C-5As. That means, I think in layman's terms, that they
have a lot of problems to fix.
And so this committee, some years ago, actually initiated
by the Senate, as Mr. Marshall pointed out, said that we should
do a test run on one bird, one C-5A, and that is in the process
of being done.
So I guess my question is, what needs to be done to correct
the problems that have these low mission capability rates?
And, incidentally, the C-17 has a mission capability rate
of 86.8 percent, not 49 percent. So my question is, what needs
to be done to the C-5A to correct the problems that result in a
49 percent mission capability rate and a 35 percent fleet
capability rate and how much does it cost?
And, finally, how does that relate to the tripwire in Nunn-
McCurdy?
Mr. Bolkcom. The C-5M, which will be the version that is
AMP'ed and RERP'ed, is estimated to be 85 percent mission
capable. I think that is, by comparison to most aircraft,
reasonable and effective.
So I think the answer to your first question is AMP and
RERP, if it works the way they would like it to work. That
should make it as available as you are going to make it.
In terms of the tripwire of Nunn-McCurdy, I guess, sir, I
really don't know how to answer that. You have got a tripwire
of, what is it, 15 percent over the initial baseline. I don't
know where RERP is.
Mr. Saxton. They haven't come up with a final cost
estimate, but I understand it is likely to trip Nunn-McCurdy
and that will set in motion a whole set of new requirements.
Mr. Bolkcom. Yes, sir. And I will just say, in conclusion,
that those laws and thresholds are there for a reason. That
sort of cost growth is of concern.
I will also note that the Air Force is very supportive of
some programs that have 200, even 300 percent cost growth.
Those might be different cases, but those are some data points
for you in terms of----
Mr. Saxton. When we get to this tripwire, we have the
responsibility of making a decision, if we have the
opportunity, if we don't let the C-17 line go down.
We then have the opportunity to say based on the cost that
resulted from the test of the C-5A rebuild, do we want to
decide to buy new airplanes or AMP and RERP C-5s, and I think
that is a decision point that we need to come to.
Does that make sense?
Mr. Bolkcom. Agreed, sir. That is a tradeoff one can make.
Mr. Sullivan. I guess I would add I think the redone cost
estimate for the C-5 RERP we are talking about here should be
available probably in the June-July timeframe. So that is when
we should know that, and the cost could be pretty high.
Mr. Saxton. When you say the cost could be pretty high, can
you elaborate on that?
Mr. Sullivan. Some of the indications we have had, some of
the problems they are having with touch labor on the program,
for example, I think the thrust reverser problems they have
had, designs like that, they are looking at that now and it
looks like there is going to be a lot more engineering effort
needed to redesign that.
It could be fairly substantial, Nunn-McCurdy breach kind of
numbers, I think.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Spratt.
Mr. Spratt. The C-5A experienced significant problems
fairly early in its life with wind damage, interior wind
damage, which have been indicated when the plane was being
constructed at Lockheed Georgia, because of dynamic testing
before the lane was operational showed damages in the spars and
struts inside the wing.
Later, the wing had to be replaced at a cost of about $2
billion, rebuilt for the C-5A.
In assessing the viable life, future life, given the stress
that the wings have to bear, has any study been made of the
wing? General Mosley mentioned that there were certain bad
apples that they wanted to get rid of.
Is there a particular set of problems that this airplane
has experienced that needs to be addressed? I mean, are they
still having structural problems with the wings, the old C-5As,
do you know?
Mr. Bolkcom. Sir, I don't have a specific answer. I think
right now the authoritative study on the C-5 is the Air Force's
own fleet viability board.
I don't recall seeing any mention of bad apples in that
report, but I would be happy to look at it more closely and get
back to you.
Mr. Spratt. How many C-5As are operational today?
Mr. Bolkcom. We have 60 in the inventory, sir. I don't know
how----
Mr. Spratt. Sixty?
Mr. Bolkcom. Yes, sir.
Mr. Spratt. There were 81 originally contracted to be
built. One burned up on the runway at Lockheed Georgia. One
crashed at Dover, and a couple of others were lost by other
means. That means there are about 20 that have been retired.
Mr. Bolkcom. Sounds about right, sir.
Mr. Spratt. Do we have any idea as to why those 20 were
retired as an indication of what is problematic about the
airplane?
Let me ask you this. Has anybody considered possibly
keeping the good, still viable C-5s, but putting in a system
where they would be utilized a lot less, so that you would have
this airlift capacity when and if needed, but you wouldn't fly
this airplane which is otherwise operationally much more
expensive to fly than the C-17, particularly if it is not fully
loaded?
Mr. Bolkcom. I haven't heard of such an idea, sir. One
challenge may be that you have air crews that need to fly these
and they need to get certain hours in and training and
experience.
So any movement in the number of airplanes or how they are
used tends to have a ripple effect through the force that you
would have to wrestle with.
But I want to just point out there are a number of
tradeoffs we can make in our larger system, as I said. It is a
very elegant system of CRAF and other capabilities.
So, certainly, some reduction in C-5s is one of the
tradeoffs you can make.
Mr. Spratt. It has the unique capacity to carry outsized
equipment. Is there anything that it can carry that the C-17
can't carry in smaller loads?
Mr. Bolkcom. Yes, sir. There is a list of things, an
engineering bridge comes to mind. Maybe the most significant is
a special operations force, a Sea Air and Land Forces (SEAL)
boat that the C-17 cannot carry, and the others escape me.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ortiz. I want to ask the members here that we are going
to have one 15-minute vote and then followed by three 5-minute
votes. It is going to take us at least 25 to 30 minutes before
we come back.
If we have any questions for these witnesses, do you all
have any questions? If not, we can dismiss them so that we can
get ready for the second panel. Is that okay?
And if you all have any questions, some of the members who
are not here, we will give them time to submit some of the
questions to you in writing.
Thank you so much. You have made good statements, and you
answered our questions. So thank you so much for joining us
today.
When we come back, we will be ready for the second panel.
Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Marshall [presiding]. Let me go ahead and recognize our
second panel and get started.
I am Jim Marshall. I am sitting in for Mr. Ortiz, who is
not feeling very well at the moment, and it wouldn't surprise
me if we have a much smaller group of members here, given other
things that members are doing this time of day.
For our second panel, we have Lieutenant General Howie
Chandler, Air Force deputy chief of staff for operations plans
and requirements; Lieutenant General Don Hoffman, Air Force
military deputy for the assistant secretary of the Air Force
for acquisition; Lieutenant General Mark Curran, Army deputy
commander for the training and doctrine command; Major General
Tom Kane, air mobility command of the Air Force director's
strategic plans, requirements and programs; and, Major General
Jeff Sorenson, Army deputy for systems management in the Office
of the Secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics and
technology.
Gentlemen, welcome.
Lieutenant General Chandler, if you would please proceed
with your opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. C.H. ``HOWIE'' CHANDLER, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR FORCE;
LT. GEN. DONALD J. HOFFMAN, MILITARY DEPUTY, OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, U.S. AIR
FORCE; LT. GEN. MARK CURRAN, DEPUTY COMMANDER, TRAINING AND
DOCTRINE COMMAND, U.S. ARMY; MAJ. GEN. (SELECT) JEFFREY
SORENSON, DEPUTY FOR SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. ARMY; MAJ. GEN.
THOMAS P. KANE, DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC PLANS, REQUIREMENTS AND
PROGRAMS, AIR MOBILITY COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. C.H. ``HOWIE'' CHANDLER
General Chandler. Sir, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Saxton, distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here
today to talk about Air Force airlift and tanker programs.
As you know, your Air Force is fully engaged around the
world fighting the global war on terror. We also stand guard as
our nation's strategic reserve, ready to respond rapidly to
conflict or humanitarian needs around the globe.
The combat and combat support missions your Air Force is
flying today are the latest in a string of 16 continuous years
of Air Force combat in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of
responsibility.
Through last March or March 1, 2007, your Air Force has
flown 82 percent of the coalition's over 282,000 sorties in
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and 78 percent of the coalition's
over 160,000 sorties in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
At home, we have flown almost 47,000 sorties in support of
Operation Noble Eagle and we are also supporting the war on
drugs, having flown over 3,000 counter-drug sorties since 1991.
Despite this operation's tempo, fiscal year 2006 was the
safest year ever in Air Force aviation. In 1947, the first year
the Air Force was an independent service, we recorded 1,555
major accidents, for a rate of 44.22 per every 100,000 flying
hours. In the process, we destroyed 536 aircraft at a cost of
584 lives.
In 2006, your Air Force recorded 19 major accidents for a
rate of .9 for every 100,000 flying areas, destroying eight
aircraft, with one fatality.
This record is indirectly attributable to the hardworking
men and women at all levels across the Air Force who focus on
performing our mission safely, even as we fly in combat.
Air Force mobility aircraft are essential to the
expeditionary nature America's armed forces. None of our
current operations would be possible without our airlift and
aerial refueling aircraft.
An Air Mobility Command aircraft departs a runway somewhere
in the world every 90 seconds, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year,
and through March 1, 2007, these aircraft have flown 315,000
mobility sorties, moving over 5 million passengers and 2.2
million tons of cargo in support of the war effort alone.
Air Force tankers provide global mobility and reach for Air
Force aircraft, the joint team and coalition forces. Through
the end of February 2007, our aerial refueling aircraft have
flown more than 92,000 sorties, offloading over 5 billion
pounds of jet fuel to more than 343,000 receiver aircraft in
support of the global war on terror.
While the average tanker is over 40 years old, KC-135s and
KC-10's nonetheless fly 30 tanker missions on a typical day in
Central Command and stand alert to provide additional endurance
for our aircraft performing homeland defense.
For the past 50 years, the Air Force's primary tanker
platform has been the KC-135 and it has served with
distinction.
However, we are carrying greater risks operating this
aircraft beyond expected service life. Some of the oldest
models already operate well beyond the point of cost-effective
repair.
Tanker recapitalization is not a new idea. In 1999, a GAO
report appreciated the declining operational utility of our
aging tankers and underscored the need for immediate investment
in recapitalization.
Given the increased operational requirements of the global
war on terror, procurement of a new tanker aircraft, a KCX, has
become both an operational necessity and the most fiscally
prudent option to maintain America's global presence and
expeditionary capabilities.
The KC-X is our number one procurement priority. KC-X
tankers will provide increased aircraft availability, more
adaptable technology, and greater overall capability than the
current inventory of KC-135E tankers they will replace.
Enhancements to every aspect of aircraft operation will
provide the joint war-fighter with more flexible employment
options.
It is imperative that we begin a program of smart, steady
reinvestment in a new tanker, coupled with measured timely
retirements of the oldest, least capable tankers.
Recapitalizing our tankers will ensure viability of this vital
national capability.
Sir, again, I thank you for the opportunity to be here
today. We deeply appreciate your support and the support that
you have provided for our Air Force as we pursue our chief's
three priorities--fighting and winning the global war on terror
as part of the joint team, developing and caring for our airmen
and their families, and recapitalizing and modernizing our
aging aircraft and space inventories.
Sir, I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Chandler, General
Hoffman and General Kane can be found in the Appendix on page
102.]
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, sir.
General Hoffman.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DONALD J. HOFFMAN
General Hoffman. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Saxton and
members of the committee, it is my pleasure to be here today to
discuss the military capability that truly makes the United
States a global power, and that is mobility.
Since last year's testimony cycle, the following things
have happened in the mobility acquisition area. We have retired
29 grounded KC-135E models. By the end of this year, an
additional 14 E models will have been grounded due to
expiration of the interim repair on engine pylons.
We need the flexibility to manage this aging fleet, to
include retirements and harvesting of key parts after
retirement.
The KC-X tanker is now in source selection with contract
award expected later this year. The Air Force has gone through
a rigorous review process for KC-X and we remain committed to a
competitive environment for this important program.
The Joint Cargo Aircraft is in source selection and we
expect results in the next several months.
The Air Force is in the final stages of the C-17 production
line. To date, 162 C-17 aircraft have been delivered. The
production line closure that was forecast for a year ago was
delayed by one year, with an additional 10 aircraft added to
the U.S. buy and nine additional foreign buys.
However, Boeing has already started sub-vendor line
closures, which require 34 months of lead time from production
delivery.
The C-130J contract was converted from a Federal
acquisition regulation Part 12 commercial contract to a Part 15
military contract. Thirty-eight aircraft remain on this multi-
year contract.
The C-130 AMP program, the first test aircraft has flown 24
sorties and a second aircraft will fly later this month.
This program is in a Nunn-McCurdy breach and we are working
with OSD to restructure and recertify this program.
C-5 AMP has delivered 23 aircraft. C-5 RERP delivered the
first two aircraft and the third will fly this month. The test
aircraft have flown 66 flights and the performance is meeting
our expectations.
However, this program has experienced significant cost
growth, and we are in the middle of a re-pricing process to
determine affordability and the way ahead.
In short, every major mobility program moved forward over
the last year.
I would ask for the committee's continued help on one area,
and that is the area of specialty metals. In last year's
Authorization Act, Congress provided some relief in the area of
electronic components, where the source of minute amounts of
specialty metals cannot be traced throughout the commercial
production supply chain.
This relief is certainly helpful, but I would ask that
there be further consideration for relief in the area of
commercial products.
Tracing the source of metals in commercial products is very
problematic for industry, particularly where DOD is a very
small part of their market.
The cost of creating a separate supply chain that is able
to trace specialty metals down to the lowest tier, such as
fasteners, is something industry has been unwilling to accept
if it is to remain commercial competitive.
While the Congress has authorized a waiver process, the
justification and support of the waivers can be labor-
intensive.
As an example, the waiver process last year for the
Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM), the
government contractors spent over 2,200 man hours to review
4,000 parts and produced the documentation to justify the
waiver. This documentation was eight inches tall in printed
form. All this work was to justify a waiver for $1,400 on an
item that is valued at $566,000.
I look forward to your questions and comments. Thank you.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, General Hoffman.
General Curran.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MARK CURRAN
General Curran. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Saxton and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to
talk about Army aviation. Both General Sorenson and I welcome
this opportunity and appreciate the outstanding support you
have provided to Army aviation and our soldiers engaged in the
global war on terror.
Just a little over 3 years ago, in February 2004, the
acting secretary of the Army terminated the Comanche helicopter
program to achieve the aviation transformation and
modernization plan, the plans that would restructure,
reorganize and equip Army aviation, to be prepared to execute
the full spectrum of military operations.
Critical to these plans is the Joint Cargo Aircraft. Last
year we promised you that the Army and Air Force would sign a
memorandum of agreement, establish a joint program office, and
conduct a joint source selection board.
We have done just that. In May of this year, the program
will proceed through the defense acquisition board for a
milestone C decision.
We, the Army and the Air Force, are a unified team, with a
common goal to provide the best support to the joint war-
fighter. We truly embody the premise, one team and one fight.
We are a joint team working together to field the best
equipment possible to meet the combatant commander's needs.
Fiscal year 2008 will be a pivotal year for Army aviation.
The resources provided to the Army to conduct operations, while
transforming and modernizing the aviation force, will determine
Army aviation's ability to continue to accomplish its mission
and to be postured to meet future commitments.
Your continued leadership and support in providing full,
timely and sustained funding is critical to our success. We are
facing the challenging tasks of winning the war on global
terrorism while simultaneously having to transform and
modernize our force.
Sir, we are ready for any questions that you may have.
Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of General Curran and General
Sorenson can be found in the Appendix on page 110.]
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, General Curran.
General Sorenson.
General Sorenson. Chairman, I have no statement at this
time.
Mr. Marshall. General Kane.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. THOMAS P. KANE
General Kane. Sir, if you would allow me. Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Saxton, thank you for the opportunity on behalf of General
McNabb, our commander, and the 161,000 active guard and reserve
total force members of the Air Mobility Command.
As the major command in the United States Air Force
responsible for airlift and tankers and as a component of the
U.S. Transportation Command, we appreciate the committee taking
the time to look at this very important part of our capability.
As you know, our nation drives the requirements of this
command and our Air Force in support of the services and the
nation. Recent examples of Katrina and Rita, the Pakistan
earthquake scenario, Lebanon, and, of course, what we do every
day in the global war on terror.
Our command today is performing over 900 sorties in support
of the nation. On all seven continents, the men and women of
the Air Mobility Command appreciate the opportunity to tell our
story today and to answer your questions.
Thank you.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you all for your statements.
The record, of course, is open for you to put written
statements into the record, if you wish to do so. Please feel
free to follow up with any of the questions or responses with
additional remarks that we can put in the record, as well.
You gentlemen were present earlier when I questioned the
preceding panel about the C-5A and this notion, and I guess
this is directed to Air Force here, this notion that some of
the C-5As and two Bs, apparently, have been identified as so
structurally broken that it doesn't make sense, in Air Force's
opinion, to RERP and AMP them and Air Force, at least the chief
tells me he would like to retire them.
Could you gentlemen tell us a little bit about that?
General Chandler. Sir, at this point, the program of record
is to continue with the AMP and the RERP modifications. There
may be a time, as we do that, when we take airplanes apart that
we may run into structural issues that would cause those kinds
of things to happen.
As an aviator, there are airplanes that fly better than
others, quite honestly. Some of them are a little easier to
maintain than others, for whatever reason.
So you can have some that don't fly as well as others
might. We are going to have to dig a little deeper, though,
before we actually come up with a list of airplanes that we
would necessarily like to retire.
Mr. Marshall. General Chandler, if I could interrupt.
So do you not have within Air Force a team that has been
specifically looking at different planes, trying to figure out
whether or not it makes sense?
General Chandler. Sir, the fleet viability board does that
and they looked at the C-5 and, as you heard earlier, they have
said that there are 25 years of serviceable life left in the
aircraft.
Mr. Marshall. But beyond that, has there been an attempt,
instead of just generally making the comment about the fleet,
an attempt to look at individual planes and do an analysis of
whether or not that individual plane is, as Chief Mosley would
say, ``hard broke?''
General Chandler. Sir, if I may, let me defer to General
Kane from the M.C. staff to see if they have a list at their
level. We do not keep that on----
General Kane. Sir, I would answer the question this way. We
have heard earlier that the reliability rates for the C-5A
range in the 40 percent to 50 percent range.
The C-5Bs, which are operated with a total force formula,
Dover and Travis Air Force Base, and now at Westover, range
about 55 percent in their mission capable rates.
What General McNabb looks at, because the airplanes are in
maintenance cycles, PDM, going through RERP or AMP
modifications, that the availability of that fleet is much
lower.
The availability of the C-5As today is only 36 percent. So
those A models that are in the fleet today, most of them in the
ARC, in the Air Reserve component, are available to the war-
fighter about 36 percent of the time.
The B models, on the other hand, are available about 47.5
percent of the time, again, reflecting the AMP program that is
going on that has taken airplanes out of the mix.
Today in the theater, in GWOT, we have five C-5s flying in
support. On the other hand, you have about 22 dedicated C-17s
to the theater and there is about 40 that are operating in
support of the combatant commander in CENTCOM.
Mr. Marshall. That doesn't really answer my question and
maybe I am just talking out of turn here a little bit.
General Kane. Sir, we don't have a list that we keep.
Mr. Marshall. So if you could just look into that.
General Kane. Yes, sir.
Mr. Marshall. Is there somebody out there that is
evaluating individual C-5s? Is there a list of C-5As and C-5Bs,
particular planes that have been identified as ones where a
case can be made that these individual planes, not the fleet
entirely, but these individual planes should not be RERP'ed and
AMP'ed?
I think we need to know that. We are going to make a big
decision here shortly on how we are going to fund different
things and we need to know whether or not you are on the verge
of making a recommendation to us with regard to specific planes
and retiring those planes.
I am going to give a quick summary here and just correct me
if I am wrong.
The C-5Bs that have already been RERP'ed and AMP'ed, and I
think there are two of them----
General Hoffman. Negative, sir. We have 23 C-5s that have
been AMP'ed. Only the three test aircraft have been RERP'ed and
our production ramp-up rate for the RERPing runs over several
FYDPs. It is a long-term process.
Mr. Marshall. But I am talking about you have got three--I
thought it was two, but you have got two airplanes here----
General Hoffman. Two are flying right now. The third one
will fly probably tomorrow.
Mr. Marshall. All right, great.
But what you have is you have got two at this point that
have gone through the entire process.
General Hoffman. Yes.
Mr. Marshall. And at this point, they are performing as we
anticipated.
General Hoffman. Correct.
Mr. Marshall. And as we anticipated, of course, costs now
seem to be spiraling out of control, but as we anticipated,
their level of availability was going to come close to matching
the C-17's general level of availability.
Is that what we are experiencing?
General Hoffman. It would be 10 percent to 15 percent
higher than the baselines that they are operating from right
now. That is the expectation from an AMP'ed, RERP'ed aircraft.
Mr. Marshall. Well, that is not directly responsive to what
I asked. What I understood, based on testimony that we have
received over the last couple of years, the expectation by Air
Mobility Command was that the RERP'ed and AMP'ed As and Bs were
going to wind up being about 5 percent off the average
performance level of the C-17s.
Am I mistaken?
General Kane. Sir, it is a 10 percent increase in the RFP.
We will give you that number and that is what it is.
General Hoffman. But, Mr. Chairman, the comment that you
have time to decide on how far we go into RERPing here, because
of the rate at which we are entering this program, we have only
done three and our production rate is fairly slow over the next
couple years.
One other statistic, though, that I think General Mosley is
referring to when he talks about bad actors, and he kind of
goes by the fleet, the B fleet and the A fleet, it is one thing
to talk about mission capable rates, but a more telling
statistic is how hard do we have to work to keep them in the
air.
And for every flying hour that they fly, over the last 16
years, the A model C-5s require 61 percent more maintenance man
hours per flight hour. So it is a significant burden on the
backs of the airmen to keep that aircraft flying.
Mr. Marshall. I am with you, but we have decided to do this
RERP/AMP thing. We are about to have A, right? And I guess we
will see what those same figures are with regard to the A that
we are about to have come on.
General Hoffman. Right.
Mr. Marshall. I will have more questions later, but I want
to move to the ranking member here, my good friend and great
Member of Congress, Mr. Jim Saxton.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just continue on the other side of the lift. Let me
ask some questions.
Let me start here. The requirement for lift has been
elusive, it seems to me, and I would just like to ask you where
we are on defining the requirement at this point given the
major events that have happened in recent times and given the
requirements that exist going forward.
Where are we now on the requirement?
General Chandler. Sir, I know the first panel discussed
earlier a bit about the requirement and we talked about the
mobility, the MCS, mobility capabilities study.
We in the Air Force need to stay on the glide path we are
on with RERP and AMP with the C-5 program. One hundread and
eighty was the number for C-17s and we thank you for the plus-
up, because that certainly helps offset the wear and tear for
the global war on terror and the loss of the C-5 we had at
Dover.
As well, if we stay where we are at with the C-130J, we can
stay on glide path to meet the minimum requirement.
Now, we understand that is the minimum requirement and we
also understand that the world has changed. We are looking at
potentially a larger Army and Marine Corps. We are looking at
the Future Combat System and, as we talked about earlier, still
defining how we are going to do that in terms of a concept of
operations between the Army and the Air Force.
That leaves us also in a situation where Air Mobility
Command (AMC) has gone back to take a look at the appropriate
fleet mix which will bring in the C-17 and the C-130 and where
we need to go with that end of the airlift spectrum in terms of
intra and intertheater lift.
But to answer your question directly, those requirements
are yet to be defined. We hope to have the AMC work done by the
end of this year.
Mr. Saxton. A reasonable person could conclude then, based
on what you just said in your statement, particularly the
closing part of your statement, that if we include the
requirements caused by the war on terror, if we include the
requirements resulting from a larger force, and if we include
the requirement that comes from a new weapons system in the
future, known as the FCS, we might want to order some more C-
17s at some point.
General Chandler. Congressman, I think that is a reasonable
statement.
Mr. Saxton. Here is my problem and here is your problem and
my problem.
The line is going to close and so we could, at some point,
be precluded from making a decision to buy more if we don't
make the decision in a timely manner.
And just let me say this for the record and I am not trying
to be--it is not my nature to say things to be contrary, but
the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of the Air Force,
last year, when Jim Marshall and I and others were fighting for
those 10 airplanes that you just said thanks for, the Air Force
said we didn't need them and based on the requirement that the
Air Force had defined.
Now, I don't blame the Air Force for that and here is why.
We here and the folks over at the White House and other parts
of the administration define the needs of our country and send
you a list of things to do and then we authorize and
appropriate money to do it and we give you a cost level here
and send you this much money. So I am contrary to all of us.
The real problem here is, this is my view anyway, this is a
chart, which I have a bigger one someplace, but I couldn't find
it, it is a chart that shows the defense budget as a percentage
of GDP.
You have all seen it, I am sure. It says that during World
War II we spent 34.5 percent of GDP on national security.
During Korea, we spent almost 12 percent. During Vietnam, we
spent almost 9 percent of GDP.
During the big rig and buildup, we spent almost 6 percent
of GDP, and today we are spending--in 2005, we were spending
3.9 percent of GDP.
So this is more of an endemic problem for all of us to
solve than just the Air Force. But having said that, we are now
at a crossroads where, last Friday, a very high official in the
contractor office in C-17 called me at home and said if we
don't have an answer on C-17 in 2 months, we are going to have
to start taking the line down.
And that is where we are today. And so I know you know
this, because I have had this conversation with you before,
like yesterday, but this is a conversation to be had on the
record and somehow, in the next few months, we are either going
to have to decide that we are going to be able to do without C-
17s or else we are going to have to tell the contractor that we
are going to order some more.
So anyway, that is that.
Now, on the Army side, on the Air Force and Army side, the
Future Cargo Aircraft, General Curran, you said that we, that
you and the Air Force, the Army and the Air Force signed the
memorandum of agreement and I have got a copy of that right
here. It was signed on June 20, 2006. That is a good thing.
I am wondering what decisions remain to be made by the Army
and the Air Force subsequent to the signing of this agreement.
General Curran. Yet to be completed based upon that
memorandum of agreement?
Mr. Saxton. Let me tell you one thing that concerns me
here. In defining roles and missions, in the first paragraph,
it says, ``It is understood that the Air Force is DOD's
provider of fixed-wing intratheater airlift. However, that does
not preclude the Army from operating weapons systems in a
service organic airlift role.''
I think that says the Army can do this and the Air Force is
the provider of fixed-wing theater airlift and I am not sure
exactly--I am not sure precisely what that means.
I mean, you told me earlier in a private conversation that
the Air Force is going to have 75 of these new aircraft to fly.
Is that right?
General Curran. Sir, we talked about the Army, at least its
analysis of alternatives, is pursuing 75 and the Air Force is
still determining exactly what they are going to pursue, but it
could be as many as 70.
Mr. Saxton. If the Air Force is provider, do they have
access to the Army airplanes?
General Curran. The Air Force, as the general support
provider to the joint force commander, would clearly have
whatever joint cargo aircraft they would have. The Army
component commander would have whatever he had.
When those aircraft that the Army is operating are not
flying in time-sensitive, mission-critical sensitive missions
for the Army component commander, they would be available to
the Air Force and to the joint force commander for operational
support aircraft.
General Chandler. Congressman, if I could add one thing.
That is not anything different really than we do today with
the Sherpa that the Army is trying to recapitalize.
Any excess airlift over and above what General Curran
talked about in terms of mission-essential and time-critical
come back to the joint force air component commander (JFAC) to
be distributed to support the joint force commander's
requirements.
The Air Force aircraft, on the other hand, are part of the
transportation command (TRANSCOM) transportation system that
the CFAC or the JFAC would work with to meet, again, the joint
force commander's lift requirement.
So the statement on the memorandum of agreement (MOA), to
me, is a restatement of what we do today in terms of fixed-wing
aircraft.
Mr. Saxton. Here is my concern. The Army, I believe, and
correct me if I am wrong, is planning on replacing capabilities
that are carried out by CH-47 and other current aircraft that
is used by the Army for this mission.
And I think we want to be sure that when it comes time for
the Army commander on the ground to say that, ``I have got to
fly these ten guys and their ammo and equipment from point A in
theater to point B in theater,'' that the Air Force doesn't
somehow have the aircraft that is necessary to do that mission
in a timely fashion.
General Chandler. Sir, I would tell you that any Combined
Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) worth his or her salt
would have exactly the same concern. We deliver goods and can
deliver goods that last tactical mile to the Army, as required,
just as we deliver ordnance off F-16s. We have that capability.
Now, I will be honest with you, there is always friction
that surrounds efficiency and effectiveness, but, again, the
CFACC understands the effectiveness part of that. So that in
some cases, we will not be as efficient as we necessarily might
be in order to meet the effectiveness needs of the Army.
Mr. Saxton. I assume that the efficient type are the well
planned routes that we run kind of on a regular basis.
General Chandler. Well, I would describe it more as
collecting and filling the aircraft, so you have got the
maximum use out of the aircraft to distribute whatever it is
you are trying to distribute at the time.
Said another way, you may not fill all the pallet
positions. You may simply go with people or pallets or
backhaul, wounded or whatever is required.
Mr. Saxton. And that is a different concept than the Army
commander on the ground has when he has a need to get from
point A to point B now.
General Chandler. Well, sir, what I just described, I
think, matches with what the Army commander would want in terms
of effectiveness.
General Kane. Sir, if I could give you one more comment. In
the current scenario in CENTCOM, the joint force commander
CENTCOM drives through his J-4 an analysis of the larger stuff
that comes into theater and then works that with the service
components.
They do that through the J-4 and then a deployment
distribution operations center, which TRANSCOM chops to the
combatant commander. That gives them visibility from the depot,
DLA, where they are building pure pallets, all the way into
theater to the war-fighter.
We acknowledge the fact that there is, and today I think
the number is about seven to ten percent of time-sensitive,
mission-critical mission that the Army component or the Marine
component engaged in combat need real-time supply.
We have worked with the theater in a way that makes our
assets available, as General Chandler has described, to the
CFACC and the MD. One of the initiatives is we are putting more
Aircraft Liason Officers (ALOs) in with the Army and the Marine
components. We are dedicating 25 more people next year for
those units engaged in combat, so that they can better clarify
those requirements.
And then, last, I would say things like joint precision
airdrop, a joint program between the Army and the Marines and
the Air Force, we are trying to define new ways to deliver into
areas like in Afghanistan, where the helicopters are getting
shot at.
Today we have mobility airplanes being shot at at a higher
rate because we are trying to satisfy the needs of the war-
fighter engaged in combat.
General Curran. If I could just add. We agree absolutely
with all that. That is the process. That is what we are
attempting to achieve.
The land component commander has capabilities nested within
his organization force. If he has a critical requirement, he
will use up his assets first to meet that requirement.
If he can't meet it with his own assets, he will then take
it to the CFAC or the joint force commander to satisfy those
requirements. That is the way we have worked it in the past.
That is how we plan to work in the future.
Mr. Saxton. Very good. One final question. Can you explain
to us the difference in requirements that the Air Force may
currently believe it needs and how they are different from the
requirements that the Army may think it needs in the platform?
General Curran. Well, to start with, and then Howie can
pile on, as we have gone through the process of turning an Army
program and an Air Force program into a single program,
somewhat already clearly stated in the MOA, but in the process
of building those requirements documents, we have partnered
with each other and reviewed what those key performance
parameters (KPPs) will be for the base aircraft.
And from that, we have agreed that that is a good start, a
good base from which we could then build our capabilities on.
The Air Force will define what specific mission packages I
believe that they will need for their particular use of a JCA
and then be able to add those as we go to a block two of that
platform.
I think that is how we have kind of laid out.
General Chandler. Sir, that is exactly right. There will be
some differences. One thing that comes to mind is the ability
to fly in national and international airspace and the right
avionics and equipment to be able to do those kinds of things,
night vision goggle equipped.
Some of those things are still being worked out with regard
to what is in the basic aircraft and then, of course, AMC will
help us define over and above that.
We can get you a list of those requirements for the record,
if you would like us to do that.
Mr. Saxton. I would be interested in seeing it.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Marshall. Let me recognize the gentlelady from Florida,
Ms. Castor.
Ms. Castor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good evening, gentlemen.
On the KCX, General Mosley was quoted recently that he
believed awarding the tanker replacement contracts to more than
one company would have some utility, because the Air Force
would be able to purchase a mix of larger and smaller tankers
to mirror this current fleet.
Is that an accurate reflection of the position of the Air
Force?
General Hoffman. That is what the article said, but what I
believe General Mosley said is that we will have a mixed fleet.
In fact, we have a mixed fleet today. We have KC-130's, we
have KC-135s, we have KC-10's. So we see a mixed fleet all the
way out into the future that will be medium size and some large
size tankers.
So he is talking about a mixed fleet and, in fact, until
the last R model goes away, we are going to have a mixed fleet
for 40 years no matter what we do.
But tour present competition right now is to pick a single
tanker and this is just the first wave, this is what we call
the first traunch. We know we need around 500 tankers. We are
sizing this first traunch at about 179 and we did that because
no matter what commercial aircraft we pick, they only make
commercial aircraft for 10 to 15 years.
If they run longer than that, it is a very successful run,
but even then they have different models, different engines,
different lengths of fuselages and so forth.
So to pick a commercial aircraft that we think is going to
be made for 40 years probably won't happen.
Ms. Castor. But it is not your intention to bifurcate this
contract award. You are going to stick with awarding it to a
single----
General Hoffman. No, because of the duality of separate----
Ms. Castor [continuing]. The first wave that you said of
179.
General Hoffman. Right. We see all 179 as being the same
type of aircraft. To go down a dual track would require
doubling our expense in the development and having both vendors
develop an aircraft, produce an aircraft, test an aircraft and
then produce it, and you get the inefficiencies there with two
sustainment lines, two training lines, et cetera, et cetera.
So we see 179 single aircraft. Now, 10 or 15 years from
now, if they are still making that aircraft, we love that
aircraft, we may just continue. That is a separate decision
that can be made later if that option still exists. But we see
that option probably will close at some point.
Technology will move along and other commercial aircraft
will be available. So the second traunch may look the same or
may look different.
Ms. Castor. Thank you for clarifying that.
One vendor right now is producing tankers for Italy and
Japan. Another is maybe selling tankers to Saudi Arabia,
Britain, Australia.
Are any of those out of testing yet? Explain where they
are. Are any operational yet?
General Hoffman. They are not operational yet, but they are
built and they are in various phases of the test phase. And you
are right, both vendors have a strong tanker with cargo
capability and some other capabilities that are out there
flying for foreign customers.
Now, unlike the first panel had said, here are the two
answers to the KCX, we don't know what they are going to bid.
They may pick the ones that they have already built for someone
else. They may offer a different commercial aircraft.
So we don't know what they are going to bid, or they may
offer two bids from a single vendor.
So you would think that those that are already out there
and developed would be stronger contenders and would be more
competitive for those companies to bid something that they have
already built than to start from scratch.
Ms. Castor. Does the Air Force actively monitor those
aircraft for other countries that are testing those right now
as they move into operations?
General Hoffman. They are direct commercial sales. We don't
have a government role. But we do pay very close attention to
their progress.
Ms. Castor. I am a new member and I am going back and
trying to learn some history about the KC-X or KC-135 and I
know that due to not having a full rate of the KC-135, the
recapitalization program under way, the Air Force was
legislatively restricted from retiring 114 KC-135E aircraft in
fiscal year 2005 and 2006, but then Congress allowed retirement
of 29 aircraft in fiscal year 2007.
In reviewing the materials, it wasn't clear to me what your
recommendation is for 2008 and then looking out into 2009 and
2010.
General Hoffman. We would like permission, as the other
services have permission, to manage their fleets. We want to do
what we call fleet management and make a timely decision when
it is right to retire an aircraft, to not have boundaries put
on that retirement, like even the permission we got last year
for the 29s said they had to be recallable, which means you
have to leave them in kind of inviolate status there.
Then they sit in the desert and they are going to age out
very useful parts on those aircraft. So the remaining fleets,
even the R models, could benefit from some of those parts.
So we would like permission in 2008 to have the ability to
fleet manage our fleets. There are 85 remaining E models. We
would like permission to retire and fleet manage those
remaining 85 aircraft.
General Kane. Ma'am, if I could add one thing to that.
Today we have grounded airplanes that are combat ineffective
sitting on the ramps that our Guardsmen and Reservists of the
135 fleet or active duty in the C-130 fleet are taking care of
at an expense to the country and, frankly, it is these people
who are already stressed.
It is disheartening to them and lowers their morale when
they have to take care of an airplane they know will never fly.
So we do applaud the Congress for giving us the permission
to retire 15 C-130Es and 29 KC-135Es, but we need to go the
distance in managing the fleet, because it come on the backs of
our people.
Ms. Castor. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Ms. Castor.
Now, to the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just ask a hypothetical. You have got some C-5A
models--this is for the Air Force--and you start taking a look
at fixing them up because they are costing you a lot to
maintain and you think, ``Well, we are going to put some money
into these things,'' and each one you take apart, you are
looking at a couple of them, each one you take apart, they are
more just stress cracks, I mean, they are completely--you are
going to have to replace the whole airplane.
Now, do you have the flexibility that if you wanted to,
that you could retire those planes?
General Hoffman. Not at the present time. We are restricted
from retiring any C-5As until the first C-5A that is going
through the RERP process, which should fly we think tomorrow or
Friday, until that goes through operational evaluation, which
will take until the 2009-2010 timeframe before we have the test
results on that, that is a present legislative restriction.
Mr. Akin. So currently we are going to close down a
potential source of a replacement airplane and burn that bridge
behind us before we really have any data.
So in a way, it is almost like Congress has been
micromanaging your job to manage your own air fleet, haven't
we?
General Hoffman. I think the chief and secretary they want
authority, as other chiefs of services, to manage the fleet and
they are restricted in not C-5s, but it is 130's, it is F-117s,
it is B-52s. There are multiple aircraft out there that we have
specific language that binds our hands.
Mr. Akin. But we put these restrictions on so that you
really can't manage the fleet.
General Hoffman. That is right. Your comment is right
there. I wouldn't describe it so much as burning the bridge. We
can talk about storage of tooling and line closure on the C-17
there and there are expensive ways and less expensive ways of
doing that, but there is definitely a line break and a gap and
a timeframe requirement and significant costs to retool and
restart that line.
But the bridge is not totally burned. We will keep the
blueprints for the bridge, if we have got to rebuild it.
Mr. Akin. But you have got all kinds of subcontractors and
sub-subcontractors that are going to have to be rehired and re-
contracted. So there is going to be a tremendous cost of trying
to get that thing back up and going again, right?
General Hoffman. Right.
Mr. Akin. And I think what I heard you say, also, so in
other words, if we could put some language in to release you in
terms of the C-5, particularly A models, is that where you
would start?
General Hoffman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. And give you the flexibility that if you need to
retire those things, you can do it. If you want to rebuild
them, you could still rebuild them, but you would have that
flexibility to take a look and, at the same time, you would
have the flexibility, if you wanted to retire a few of them,
because you have got a pretty good number of them, right?
General Hoffman. Sir, we have a 111 total C-5s and about
half of them are C-5As.
Mr. Akin. So you have got 50 at least. So if you wanted to,
you could retire a certain number of them and get a replacement
airplane or something like that now and then the ones that you
have done this rebuilding on, you can evaluate that as quickly
as you can.
General Hoffman. Yes, sir. We will not make the decision to
actually RERP or even if we make the decision today, we won't
actually be getting around to doing that modification for many
years, because they will follow the B models in their
modification process.
Mr. Akin. So that seems to make sense for us to be working
along those lines.
Now, I think what I heard you say was that the Air Force or
Air Mobility Command has not really built in the requirement
for heavier lift that might be required by a lot of these new
additions of armor to things that weren't as heavy before, that
that is something that is going to be sort of built into the
equation next year, but that isn't in this year. Is that right?
General Chandler. Yes, sir. The existing mobility
capabilities studies do not address some of the things that we
talked about in terms of the potential for a larger Army,
larger Marine Corps, those kinds of things.
Mr. Akin. Larger in terms of more numbers or heavier
equipment?
General Chandler. People and the definition, as you
suggest, the Future Combat System and what that airlift
requirement will actually be.
AMC today is taking a look at how that all fits together
with our smaller aircraft fleet, the fleet that flies
intratheater and intertheater, to see how that all fits
together.
Mr. Akin. Right. So that has still got to be built into the
equation.
General Chandler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. I think you have pretty much answered the
question.
I guess I have one question for the Army and this is more
because I am not that familiar.
The Joint Cargo Aircraft, how is that different than a C-
130 and does it do anything a C-130 wouldn't do? Is there any
reason to build it or what is the logic on that?
General Curran. Sir, the Joint Cargo Aircraft is a smaller
aircraft than the C-130, but it is compatible with the C-130 in
that it will handle the same palleting system that is in the C-
130 for ease of cross-load of cargo and equipment.
It has an additional capability of being able to land with
a smaller load, but land on a shorter runway than you would
find with a C-130, given both the Air Force and the Army
greater flexibility with smaller loads and into more austere
locations.
So those are some of the significant differences, I guess,
between the C-130 and the JCA.
Mr. Akin. So what is the load relative to C-130, two-thirds
or something of the load or half the load?
General Curran. It is about half, sir.
Mr. Akin. Half. So it is significantly smaller,
significantly smaller.
General Curran. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. And do we have trouble landing C-130's in short
landing strips? Because it seems like, to me, we manage to drop
them down pretty fast over in Iraq and didn't seem like it took
a whole of pavement to get them up or down on the C-130's.
General Curran. C-130's are operating on, what would you
say, 3,000 to 5,000 foot runways, based upon what loads they
are carrying today. We are looking at a platform that could
operate on 2,000 to 3,000 feet, based upon what its load is, to
give you a relative comparison.
Mr. Akin. And you think there is a need for that short of
landing strips in some of the possible scenarios and places we
might get involved.
General Curran. Yes, sir. There are F series analysis and
analysis that we have done have indicated that we do have a gap
there.
Mr. Akin. And just one make sure to make sure I got my
numbers right.
I think what I was hearing you say, with the rebuild, this
is back to the Air Force again, I am sorry, with the rebuild of
the C-5A models, I assume that includes new engines.
I don't know the AMP and RERP and those things.
General Chandler. Sir, the AMP program is an avionics
enhancement program. It is a precursor and a requirement before
the RERP, which is the acronym for the re-engining program.
Mr. Akin. So you put those two together, you have got
currently a 35 percent reliability rate and you think that you
may jump it as much as 50 to 51 percent.
General Chandler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. And what is the reliability rate of a C-17?
General Chandler. That reliability rate will run in the mid
80's, sir.
Mr. Akin. So you are talking 51 versus mid 80's.
General Chandler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. So if you are planning a mission and you have got
these rebuilt A models, unless you are a gambling man, you are
going to send two sets of gear for every one that you want to
land and do the job.
General Chandler. Yes, sir. There is no doubt that the
aircraft is going to be less reliable based on a number of
issues.
Mr. Akin. This is one that you rebuild.
General Chandler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Well, that doesn't sound like a very good way to
go.
General Chandler. Let me ask if there is some distinction?
Tom, if you want to----
General Kane. Sir, the one thing I might point out is the
way we operate the C-5 today, and it was pointed out in the
earlier committee, that there are about nine pieces of
equipment this nation depends on on the C-5 to carry and we
will provide that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 162.]
General Kane.But, in fact, we have been challenged to
change the concept of operations for the C-5 to do major hubs
where we have the logistics base to support that airplane.
Today, in support of GWOT, we have airplanes going into
like Turkey, drooping off very large loads, particularly armor,
that are moved forward on C-17s. That concept of operations
(CONOPS) works very well and the C-5 performs very admirably in
a system that I would call managed.
So that is the challenge is to use that. Remember that the
mobility capabilities study number, the base number was 292. We
have always questioned why do you pick the bottom of the range,
because when the C-5 crashed at Dover last April, it drove us
to 291 and gave the Congress some impetus to try to replace at
least one of those airplanes or the 10 that we got.
I would suggest that the C-5, in those kind of roles, in a
two major contingency operation scenario, is what drove that
number in the requirement and left the risk at moderate.
So those fleets of 111 remaining C-5s is important to a
global power that has to look two ways and overlap two
scenarios. That is where that number came from.
Mr. Akin. You went a little faster than I could go with
that explanation, but I think what I am hearing you say is
there are needs for some C-5s, just because of the massive lift
that it can do.
General Kane. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. But that you have got to be in an environment
where you can really manage that and it has a low reliability
rate.
General Kane. There are seven Russian sailors alive today
because our C-5 delivered the undersea submersible at Kamchatka
Peninsula last year. And even though the British beat us there,
we had the support equipment to download and save those
sailors.
Mr. Akin. So the point isn't to retire them all, but
certainly to have the flexibility to manage your fleet. That
just is common sense and sooner is a lot better than later
right now in terms of cost of if we have to start to try to
restarting a line or something.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Marshall. I thank the gentleman.
I want to pick up, if I could, where Mr. Akin just left
off, and it is back to the C-5.
I made reference to what I understand to be an analysis
done by Air Force or some team of different specific C-5 planes
and we are going to make a difficult decision here and if, in
fact, Air Force is on the verge of being able to say, ``We
think these specific planes should be retired for these
specific reasons,'' clearly, if they are going to be retired,
that is going to drop those numbers down below the mobility
capabilities study's bottom number.
And most of us think the mobility capabilities study is
flawed to start out with, that the range should be a good bit
higher, for reasons that are evident just reading the study.
So that would be pretty persuasive to us on buying more C-
17s, but we need to know it now. It makes no sense at all to
close down the C-17 line if, in fact, we are going to add more
C-17s later, because we are getting rid of some of the C-5As.
And I understand it is two C-5Bs and one of the C-5As.
I would like to clarify something. When you say 51 percent
availability, that is a term that most of us I don't think
understand particularly well. In part, that is because of the
way the platform is managed with Guard and Reserve.
It is not that the platform is--if you manage the C-17
fleet the same way you have been managing the C-5A fleet, its
availability would drop dramatically, as well.
So if we are comparing apples to apples, the idea behind
the RERP/AMP program, as we understood it, was that C-5A would
get pretty close to the reliability rate of the C-17. So that
we could figure when a C-5A took off, or a C-5B or whatever it
is, this RERP/AMP'ed platform, when it took off and landed, it
was going to be able to take off again and do the next leg and
the next leg and the next leg and we weren't going to have to
worry about that.
It is not going to get stuck in Argentina and we are going
to have the embarrassment of Argentina telling us they won't
take any C-5s, that sort of thing.
Am I correct?
General Chandler. Yes, sir, I agree with that. We make most
of our money in the re-engining, quite honestly, although the
avionics program is important. It is a precursor to give you
the electronic backbone to be able to do those things.
But the ability to take off with heavier loads from shorter
runways, climb to higher altitudes faster, cruise at higher
altitudes using less fuel, then, in turn, less tanker
requirements if you do that, is important to us for all the
reasons that General Kane described earlier and that we
discussed earlier here.
It is a cleaner, more efficient airplane overall and it
would give you the dependability then that would allow you to
leave it at the kind of rates that we leave it at when it is in
the Air Reserve Component (ARC) and then bring it up to
standard should we need that surge capability and that is the
way the fleet is managed today.
Mr. Marshall. I think it was IDA, I am not sure, I can't
recall now who it was, did the study at the request of Senator
Warner back in 2002 of our air mobility choices and that study
clearly shows, dollars and cents-wise, that we should go
through the RERP/AMP process even with the C-5As, tear one
down, determine whether or not, in fact, it has got all these
structural problems.
Well, we have done that. We tore a C-5A down and concluded
that it was in good shape, it was good to go for 25 years or
so.
So that study specifically said that this made financial
sense, but that, of course, assumes certain costs associated
with RERP and AMP. Now, these costs are spiraling out of
control either because we can't manage it particularly well or
because Lockheed is having problems managing things from its
end.
I said earlier, and I say again, I really think Air Force
and Lockheed need to be talking to one another and Lockheed, if
it is interesting in having this continued business RERPing and
AMPing, needs to be talking to the Air Force about how to
control these costs and maybe locking in a cost so that we know
what this is going to be cost-effectiveness-wise as we move
forward.
I would just make that observation. I hope you are talking
to Lockheed along those lines.
KCX, General Hoffman, you, I am sure, saw that GAO has
raised some concerns that Air Force hasn't done an adequate
analysis validating the uplift, the airlift capability of the
new tanker.
Could you, just for the record--I am sure you are
interested in replying to that. So for the record, could you
comment on----
General Hoffman. Yes, sir. This is a requirements issue, so
I will turn it over to my comrade here, General Chandler.
Mr. Marshall. General Hoffman is not interested in
responding to that.
General Chandler. Sir, I am interested in requirements, but
if I could ask you to rephrase the question. I was writing as
you were talking, I apologize.
Mr. Marshall. I am sorry, I asked it to the wrong person.
I am sure you have heard the GAO has raised some concerns
about whether or not the Air Force has gone through an
appropriate analysis that validates the airlift capacity of the
new tanker.
And if you could, just for the record, respond to that.
General Chandler. The mobility study that we talked about
earlier actually recognizes the ability to carry cargo and
people as a secondary mission in the tankers.
The joint doctrine addresses the ability to do that. Common
sense, from an operator's perspective, would tell me that if we
had the capability to put people and cargo on an aircraft,
particularly during a deployment phase, where airlift could be
at a premium and tanker requirements would be minimum, then it
would make sense to look at the ability to carry cargo on a
tanker aircraft, particularly from an operational perspective.
I would tell you, sir, that the tanker program that we are
looking at today, the KCX, is probably the most studied program
that I have seen in my 33 years in the Air Force.
I am convinced we have got the requirements right. The
JROC, the joint requirements process, is convinced that we have
it right and that the 6 percent cost over the life-cycle of
this tanker, to have a cargo-passenger capability is worth the
money.
We think we are on solid ground and we are in an effort
here to progress with a transparent program to produce a
tanker.
I guess if I could add just one more thing. It is important
for us to get started from the aspect of when we will actually
be able to retire the last KC-135R. If we would look at that,
we are going to have some airframes that are nearly 80 years
old in order to keep tanker availability where we need to if we
are going to continue to maintain the----
Mr. Marshall. I regret, by the way, that Mr. Bartlett's not
here. He would object to any suggestion that 80 years is too
long to be around.
General Chandler. But I guess that is what I would say in
terms of the KCX. We think it has been thoroughly scrubbed. We
think we are on solid ground with the requirements and General
Hoffman and his folks are proceeding with an open and fair,
transparent acquisition process.
Mr. Marshall. General Kane.
General Kane. Sir, if I could add just a couple things.
Airlift has always been a part of the aerial refueling
mission. To formalize that in this requirements document was
important.
In 1991, during the Gulf War, we learned that units who
could self-deploy on the tanker, fighter units, F-18s, A-10
units, saved a lot of lift that was more important to support
the Army and the Marine Corps moving their heavy equipment.
We have re-learned that lesson again today.
In 1996, we were a little confused, because the GAO told us
at that time that any future aerial refueling platform should
consider the airlift responsibilities. In fact, if we look
today, while it will cost some more to put that capability on
the airplane, it will cost a lot more if we de-scope that
airplane and not take advantage of the cargo.
So I think that is very important. In addition, I would
answer the studies part of the question, we use the mobility
capabilities study aerial refueling scenarios, program analyses
and evaluation (PA&E) allowed us to do that.
We ran those scenarios with the airlift KPPs involved and
we proved again that that was important and the analysis
supported the use of airlift in that platform.
Mr. Marshall. Would you gentlemen get together with whoever
in GAO has----
General Kane. Yes, sir.
Mr. Marshall. --produced the report and narrow your
difference of opinion, resolve the difference of opinion, if
possible, at the very least, just narrow it, and then get back
with staff on the committee with where is the difference of
opinion here, so that we clearly understand what it is?
General Kane. Yes, sir.
Mr. Marshall. Let me stay for KCX. For some time now, I
have not been a one-man show, but I have really been beating
the drums here about using this as a model for how to do it
right with the C-17 acquisition as a model for how to get it
wrong, at least with regard to the long-term questions of
maintenance, sustainment, modernization.
It is the life-cycle issue, which is 75 percent of the cost
of the craft and sometimes more than that. And I know there is
this temptation to buy it cheap upfront. Car dealers will tell
you in a heartbeat, and I used to represent a bunch of those
guys, I will sell a car for no profit, anticipating that I will
make my money at the tail end on repairing that car.
We have got depot issues, core issues, all kinds of other
things to be thought about and it just looks like we are
stovepiped on this stuff and that it is inappropriate
stovepiping and acquisition doesn't really pay attention to
what the long-term sustainment folks do.
And somehow we need to bring the two together and I know it
is troublesome, because it means that maybe the cost of initial
acquisition goes up, so you don't get as many as quickly, and
nobody ever wants that, typically.
But it is something that we need to do and I thought that
the KC-X was a good opportunity here, because one of the
bidders is France--well, France, in a sense--and, at the
moment, we are not terribly fond of France. Maybe we will get
over that.
But we don't want to be beholding France for data rights,
equipment, management of this thing, long-term management of
sustainment, modernization, et cetera, in any way.
So I expect that whoever is the team that includes Airbus
is going to be making a proposal, should make a proposal which
shows that we will never be subject to that, directly or
indirectly, and then it seems that Boeing would have to do the
same thing just to make it fair and we could use that as a
model.
Are you heading in that direction at all?
General Hoffman. Sir, I think the acquisition community
holds hands very closely with the sustainment community and we
are striving to do that better and better with every
acquisition.
There have been some encouraging changes over the last year
on CSAR-X, on JCA, and on KC-X. We specifically included in the
RFP data rights issues that aren't in previous examples of
acquisitions.
In other words, we want them to price to us all the data
rights that we will need to do our own organic sustainment,
should we choose to go that route in the future.
If we choose and source select and then we say, ``Oh,
forgot about data rights, go back'' and we have already source
selected, there is no competitive advantage there. That is
going to be sky-high.
So in the competitive environment, we are going to have all
the vendors price the data rights and we will execute that
option in later years, if, in fact, we choose to go organic.
But that is a business case decision that evolves over time
about how much is organic, how much is not.
We might take in certain elements, leave engines out, bring
in the airframe. There are all kinds of combinations of how we
do long-term sustainment.
Mr. Marshall. But we would be managing that and wouldn't be
beholden----
General Hoffman. Initially, especially on commercial
aircraft, which all three of these are commercially-derived
aircraft or other, they have a prior life like the H-47, but we
didn't know which CSAR-X we were going to select at the time,
because there were some commercial ones out there.
Commercial aircraft tend to have more traceability for
sustainment argument in the commercial side. KC-X is going to
be FAA-certified aircraft, which means will sustain that in
accordance with FAA standards and a growing part of our
workforce in the depot is now FAA-certified to do that level of
work.
It also allows us to benefit by the wide network that is
out there for engines and other parts, if it is a commercially-
derived tanker, to use other sources of vendors that are FAA-
certified to do repair.
So we are not wedded to that original OEM necessarily.
Mr. Marshall. One problem we have got with the C-17 right
now is even if we had the data rights available to us, we don't
have the infrastructure to manage the supply chain, et cetera.
General Hoffman. Depot standup is always one of the
elements. It is one of the elements that gets scraped off first
when you are under budget pressure in a program, is the
facilitation of a depot standup.
It doesn't matter what the program is, whether it is F-22,
F-16, KC-X and all that. We want to baseline our programs
properly that have a cost line in there to say this is the cost
of standing up organic depot.
Mr. Marshall. Well, that sounds very encouraging. Where
Joint Cargo Aircraft is concerned, again, we have had this
question concerning how are we going to maintain it in the long
run.
When I first talked to Army about this, Army's business
case was CLS and forget about it, that is it, that is what is
going to happen.
General Hoffman. We had that discussion when the Army had
their RFP. In fact, we amended the RFP after dialogue with the
Army to allow the data rights entry to be there.
Mr. Marshall. I had a great conversation with the chief of
staff. I was in Jerusalem and it was 2 in the morning. He was
in his plane over Russia and we talked about this for an hour
about a year ago.
So I am glad that progress has been made.
I am getting some feedback, though, that there have been
some problems agreeing on what the requirements should be, that
Air Force is pushing back on some of the things that Army wants
and Army's pushing back on some of the things that Air Force
wants, and that there may be a separation.
You heard my question to the prior panel along those lines.
I have heard a specific reference to the size of this
thing. Will it carry the standard pallet that Air Force
typically moves around? Army is focused on a pallet that will
go into a Chinook. I have heard things like that.
Now, of course, General Curran, when you were talking just
a minute ago, you said, if I understood you correctly, that the
pallet size for this was going to be one that is the C-130 size
and if that is the case, then it seems to resolve the pallet
size, but there may be other things.
How are you all getting along as far as the requirements
under this?
General Chandler. Sir, at this point, with the MOA, signed
by the vice chiefs, we work closely with the Army to do exactly
what we have been asked to do.
There are still two outstanding things that we are working
in each service. Mark and his folks are working their mission-
essential, time-critical needs. We on the Air Force side are
seeing how this will fit in with our C-130/C-17 fleet mix.
All of those things have to come together in the May
timeframe for a milestone C decision.
I would tell you that is where we are today.
Mr. Marshall. So that is a general description. What are
some of the specific issues here where you see a possible
difference of opinion that could cause Air Force to say, ``We
are not on board,'' or Army to say, ``We are not on board?''
General Chandler. At this point, sir, I would tell you I am
not sure there are issues like that.
Mr. Marshall. Do you think you are going to get there?
General Chandler. I think we are going to get there at this
point.
General Curran. Sir, I don't know of any that come to mind.
Mr. Marshall. I guess we are asking for bids with data
rights. Is Army still telling Air Force Air Force has to pay
for the data rights, Army is not interested?
General Sorenson. Sir, let me address that. As was
mentioned before, in the RFP, we have requested contract line
items for the vendors to basically bid the data rights and, at
some point in time, the Army and the Air Force will do the
business case analysis, sometime, per statute, over the next
five years to make a determination is it better to proceed with
contracts for logistics support or do we take those data
rights, excise that particular CLIN option, buy the data rights
and do organic support.
The business case analysis will be done after the award is
made and the milestone C decision.
Mr. Marshall. The Army recognizes that Air Force has a
slightly different circumstance than the Army finds itself in.
Air Force has depots capable of managing this thing and has
core requirements that necessitate that those depots have
workload.
General Sorenson. That is why those contract line items are
there to be priced in the RFP as they provide their response.
Mr. Marshall. Well, that is very encouraging.
Mr. Saxton.
Mr. Saxton. The other day, when the Chief of Staff was here
with the Secretary of the Air Force, they talked a little bit
about the aircraft retirement issue and I was wondering if you
could give us a list, just a verbal list here of the aircraft,
the types of aircraft that are old and need to be retired and
why they need to be retired.
General Chandler. Sir, there are five different systems
that are involved. The B-52 is one of those. The B-52 has been
a great workhorse for us. We think we can do the job with fewer
of those aircraft.
We have a three-pronged approach really to the next
generation long-range strike aircraft, said another way, a new
bomber. One of those is to modernize the existing fleet.
One of the ways for us to do that is to decrease the size
of the B-52 and use the funds remaining to modernize and
continue to upgrade the existing fleet and we think that is a
viable way to do business.
C-130E, you are familiar with some of the stresses that we
have got on that aircraft in terms of the center wing box
problem and that is primarily the reason for retirement and the
fact that we don't want to AMP those airplanes either.
The F-117A has been a great airplane for us. It is first
generation stealth. It is a very expensive airplane to fly. We
have replacements coming online in the F-22 and if you look at
what we can do with the B-2 and the F-22 combined, we think it
is acceptable to let that aircraft go to the bone yard.
We hate to do it. It is a great airplane and it has served
us well. I think we tend to forget that it was in the black
world for a long time and we were flying it for quite a while
before it was generally known that we had that aircraft.
KC-135E, I think we have been through all the issues with
regard to the engine mounts and why we would like to retire the
last 85 of those aircraft.
Then the U-2, again, has been a great aircraft for us. It
is, again, getting to be old, difficult to maintain. Global
Hawk gives us a lot more persistence when you take the person
out of the cockpit. We can now get a lot more persistence than
we can get with a U-2, for example.
We think we can meet the combatant commander's needs. We
realize that we need to meet those needs before we start to
bring the U-2 offline. So we are going to have to make the
Global Hawk program work as advertised.
But those are the five systems, sir.
Mr. Saxton. I may have missed it, but I thought you said
earlier that there were a few C-5s.
General Chandler. I am sorry. C-5 is also a part of that. I
would tell you there is a knee in the curb somewhere, as we
described earlier, as we talked, about how many C-5s we need to
do the job. We will provide you the list of outsized cargo.
We have got the Patriot battery in its full mode is one of
those and, as the GAO described, there are some other systems
that can only be hauled in that aircraft. But whether or not we
need the full 111 in that program AMP'ed and RERP'ed, which is
our program of record today, is going to be dependent on
whether or not we can make AMP and RERP work for us the way we
thought it was going to work.
Mr. Saxton. And the chief and the secretary, also, one of
them mentioned a figure, a cost figure to keep airplanes around
that we are not using because they are not safe or that we
don't need and I was astounded to find out from them that they
thought that figure was about $1.7 billion a year.
Can you tell us how we run up a bill like that?
General Chandler. Sir, that bill basically involves about
400 aircraft, I think the number is 407, to be exact.
That bill totals up storage costs, as well as the costs to
keep them in storage and the inspections required and, in the
meantime, it also includes the cost to fly and maintain those
aircraft that we would like to retire until such time as we
could retire them.
Mr. Saxton. And I understand that, not being an
aeronautical guy myself, I understand that when an airplane
sits like that, you have to do things to it to maintain it,
even though it never flies.
General Chandler. Yes, sir. Part of the language that we
are dealing with right now involves inviolate storage, which
means we have to be able to bring that aircraft out of storage
in a certain amount of time and be able to fly it.
So not only are you paying the storage costs and the
required inspections in storage to make sure that it is at that
status, there is a cost avoidance issue in terms of not being
able to cannibalize parts from those aircraft to keep the
remainder of the fleet flying that we are talking about, also
Mr. Saxton. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.
Mr. Marshall. Just following up a little bit on that.
It would be enormously helpful to us and I suspect to Air
Force if this bend or knee or whatever you were talking about
there, if you have an analysis that suggests that in the mix,
meeting the mobility capabilities study's minimum at least, it
would be better to have fewer C-5s for some reason and more C-
17s, I mean, that is the kind of thing we need to know now.
We also need to know if, in fact, there are some C-5s out
there, As, Bs, that for reasons we are unaware of and certainly
aren't suggested by the teardown of the one C-5A, because that
indicated to the fleet viability board that the C-5A fleet was
fine, but for reasons that we are just not aware of at this
point, that some of those really do need to be retired.
General Chandler. Sir, we will work with General Kane and
Air Mobility Command. We owe you a list of aircraft out there,
if that lists exist, and we will also go back and look at the
appropriate mix.
We appreciate that question.
Mr. Marshall. And we may need to real quickly think about
how do we establish that, in fact, these things are going to be
too expensive to fix. Obviously, Air Force came in and said,
``Let's retire all the C-5As'' and Congress, for whatever
reasons, part political, part not, I suspect, said, ``Let's get
IDA to look at it'' and then IDA came back and said, ``No, the
most cost-effective thing to do here is RERP/AMP. Keep the C-5A
around.''
So it is very different from what Air Force wanted to do
and so we may be in a position where somebody needs to be
talking to somebody like IDA to say, ``Hey, fellows, we are
going to have to do this on a hurry up schedule here. We have
got some planes that we really think ought not to be flying and
we may need you to lend your voice to Congress on this
subject.''
I would encourage you to think along those lines.
General Chandler. Sure, we will take that for the record.
Mr. Marshall. I guess I would end by saying that we
appreciate your service and your patience here today and the
service of all those who managed to stay awake behind you
through your testimony and then all of those who serve for us
in the armed forces. God bless you all.
The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:51 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 7, 2007
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 7, 2007
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March 7, 2007
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 7, 2007
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE
Mr. Abercrombie. Does the Air Force see the Joint Cargo Aircraft as
necessary in meeting its intratheater airlift requirements and
obligations for Air Mobility Command? Why would additional procurement
of C-130J aircraft not meet these requirements?
General Chandler and General Kane. The JCA and C-130J have similar
capabilities for use in the intra-theater airlift role. Both are
capable of short takeoff and landing at fields as short as 2000 feet
and in high altitude and hot conditions (95 degrees F at 6000 ft
pressure altitude). Both aircraft are capable of moving the
department's standard 463 L pallet and can airdrop container delivery
system bundles. Additionally, both aircraft will be equipped with all
the requisite communications, navigation, and defensive gear to operate
as an integral part of our combat theater airlift system.
Still, the C-130J offers capabilities that the JCA does not, and
the JCA offers efficiencies not available in the C-130J. The C-130J is
faster and offers greater cargo capacity, higher climb gradients, and
more flexibility on similar sized runways than the JCA. The C-130J is
compatible with all current Air Force Material Handling Equipment (MHE)
and can accept a 463L pallet configured at a standard height of 96
inches, both of which the JCA cannot. Finally, the C-130J can carry
many vehicle types that the JCA cannot (Stryker, Fire Engine, Up-
armored HMMVVE etc). However, our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan
shows frequent, and required, movement of less-than-C-130 sized loads.
In these situations, the JCA offers more efficiency than the C-130J
because its cost to operate per flight hour is less. Similarly,
depending on which aircraft is selected for the JCA, it may burn fewer
pounds of fuel per passenger or pallet mile than the C-130J.
Mr. Abercrombie. There have been concerns raised about promoting
fair and open competition during the tanker recapitalization program in
regards to World Trade Organization subsidy allegations between the
U.S. and European Union, Berry Amendment compliance for specialty
metals, and International Traffic in Arms Regulations for construction
and final assembly. How do you plan to mitigate these issues during the
KC-X program and what factors go into source selection?
General Hoffman. Our planned approach for all of the issues listed
is focused on legal and regulatory compliance, rather than issue
mitigation. Our specific actions taken on each issue are detailed in
our Request for Proposal (RFP) and listed below. None of these concerns
are considered as separate or specific evaluation factors in the RFP
and all offerors must comply with all applicable laws and regulations.
World Trade Organization (WTO): Wording in the special clauses
section of the RFP (Section H034) disallows contractor pass-on of costs
resulting from past, present, or future WTO rulings:
``H034 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION DISPUTE--COSTS UNALLOWABLE Any
penalties, taxes, tariffs, duties, or other similar-type costs
imposed by a Governmental entity as a sanction, enforcement or
implementation measure resulting from a decision in the Matters
of European Communities and Certain Member States Measures
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, United States -
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft before the
World Trade Organization shall not be included in the
negotiated price of this contract, nor shall such costs be an
allowable direct or indirect charge against this contract.''
Berry Amendment: Offerors must comply with applicable specialty
metals restrictions, although offerors may submit waiver requests in
accordance with applicable law and regulations. Per the RFP, paragraph
8.3.3, Berry Amendment Compliance:
``If an Offeror is unable to comply with the specialty metals
restrictions set forth in the clause, and intends to seek an
exception under 10 USC 2533b(b) (``Availability Exception''),
the Offeror shall submit a request for a Domestic Non-
Availability Determination (DNAD) waiver no later than 30 days
after release of the RFP. Offerors requesting a DNAD shall
provide factual information to justify approval of the
determination as part of their DNAD request.''
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR): Offerors must
comply with established ITAR guidelines and regulations.
Mr. Abercrombie. How do you plan to fairly evaluate the airlift and
aerial refueling capabilities of the KC-X bidders' submissions and what
metrics will you use?
General Hoffman. Our acquisition planning has focused on ensuring
the KC-X program proceeds in a fair, full and open competition and all
efforts have been made to present program information in a fully
transparent manner. We emphasized this environment of fairness in the
source selection planning and in the evaluation. The following KC-X
program Request for Proposal sections are included to highlight our
evaluation process and list the metrics used in the source selection
evaluation. The following is an excerpt from the KC-X request for
proposal, Section M001 Source Selection and Section M002 - Evaluation
Factors:
``The Government will select the best overall offer, based upon
an integrated assessment of Mission Capability, Proposal Risk,
Past Performance, Cost/Price and the Integrated Fleet Aerial
Refueling Assessment (IFARA). Contract(s) may be awarded to the
offeror who is deemed responsible in accordance with the FAR,
as supplemented, whose proposal conforms to the solicitation's
requirements (to include all stated terms, conditions,
representations, certifications, and all other information
required by Section L of this solicitation) and is judged,
based on the evaluation factors and subfactors, to represent
the best value to the Government. The Government seeks to award
to the offeror who gives the AF the greatest confidence that it
will best meet, or exceed, the requirements. This may result in
an award to a higher rated, higher priced offeror, where the
decision is consistent with the evaluation factors and the
Source Selection Authority (SSA) reasonably determines that the
technical superiority and/or overall business approach and/or
superior past performance, and/or the IFARA of the higher
priced offeror outweighs the cost difference. The SSA will base
the source selection decision on an integrated assessment of
proposals against all source selection criteria in the
solicitation (listed below). While the Government source
selection evaluation team and the SSA will strive for maximum
objectivity, the source selection process, by its nature, is
subjective and, therefore, professional judgment is implicit
throughout the entire process.
2.1 Evaluation Factors and Subfactors
The following factors and subfactors will be used to evaluate
each proposal. Award will be made to the offeror submitting the
most advantageous proposal to the Government based upon an
integrated assessment of the evaluation factors and subfactors
described below. The Mission Capability, Proposal Risk, and
Past Performance evaluation factors are of equal importance and
individually more important than either Cost/Price or IFARA
evaluation factors individually. The IFARA is equal in
importance to Cost/Price. Within the Mission Capability factor,
the five (5) subfactors are listed in descending order of
relative importance from 1 to 5. In accordance with FAR
15.304(e), the Mission Capability, Proposal Risk, Past
Performance, and IFARA evaluation factors, when combined, are
significantly more important than Cost/Price; however, Cost/
Price will contribute substantially to the selection
decision.''
List of Evaluation Factors and Subfactors:
Factor 1: Mission Capability
Subfactor 1: Key System Requirements
Subfactor 2: System Integration and Software
Subfactor 3: Product Support
Subfactor 4: Program Management
Subfactor 5: Technology Maturity and Demonstration
Factor 2: Proposal Risk
Factor 3: Past Performance
Factor 4: Cost/Price
Factor 5: Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment
Mr. Abercrombie. Does the Army view the Joint Cargo Aircraft as a
core asset? Does the Air Force, Air Mobility Command and/or regional
air component commander adequately meet intra-theater airlift
requirements of the Army by moving required equipment and supplies the
``last tactical mile''?
General Sorenson. The Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) is a core asset to
the Army for delivery of time-sensitive mission-critical supplies. As
per Joint Publication 4-0 (Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint
Operations), it is the Service Component's responsibility to distribute
supplies to their subordinate units after the component receives the
supplies at the Service Component hand-off point, which in most cases
is the Sustainment Brigade area. The Army's JCA complements the Air
Force Common-user Airlift pool. Both are necessary to get things where
they need to be (point of need) when they need to be there
(timeliness).
Given the amount of supplies that must be transported, the JFC must
ensure this is done efficiently. Most bulk supplies (such as fuel, non-
perishable food, and water) are moved by surface transport (ships and
trucks). Other supplies must be transported more rapidly (such as low
density or high demand repair parts, ammunition, perishable goods,
blood and medical supplies, etc). These are typically moved by air to
the theater by strategic airlift, and further distributed within the
theater by Air Mobility Command assets OPCON to the JFC. These common-
user airlift assets routinely deliver their cargo to Service Component
hand-off nodes, typically Army Sustainment Brigades. These supplies,
now under the ownership and control of the Ground Component, must be
further distributed to the point of need - ``the last tactical mile.''
This portion of tactical distribution (i.e., ``the last tactical
mile'') is the responsibility of the Ground Component Commander (Army).
To effectively accomplish this tactical distribution of supplies to the
point of effect, the Ground Component Commander uses a mix of ground,
rotarywing and fixed wing transportation assets under his control. The
Army JCA will be used to provide responsive transport of time-sensitive
mission-critical assets to forward units - ``the tip of the spear.''
Mr. Abercrombie. In September 2005, GAO completed a report titled
Air Mobility Command Needs to Collect and Analyze Better Data to Assess
Aircraft Utilization; what lessons were gained from that report and
what actions have been taken in response to the GAO report?
General Kane. Air Mobility Command's (AMC) Air Mobility Master Plan
(AMMP) recognizes that ``Accurate tracking of cargo is critical to
efficient deployment and sustainment operations.'' Improving data
collection and subsequent analysis is an ongoing effort within AMC and
TRANSCOM. Innovative technologies, such as Radio Frequency
Identification Tags (RFID), have been incorporated into the Global
Transportation Network (GTN) to significantly improve in-transit
visibility. Requisitions may now be tracked in a manner similar to UPS
or Federal Express. Further, the formation of the Joint Distribution
Process Analysis Center (JDPAC) will consolidate the analytic power of
the Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) and the AMC
Analysis Directorate (A9) into one center of excellence; improving the
distribution process from an end-to-end perspective.
Mr. Abercrombie. General Schwartz, Commander, United States
Transportation Command, and General McNabb, Commander, Air Mobility
Command, testified in March 2006, that no more than 200 C-17s would be
the ideal C-17 force structure as long as it did not affect procurement
of the KC-X tanker aircraft. Further, given the increased C-17
utilization rate for intra-theater airlift operations, the condition of
the C-130E/H fleets, the lack of defined airlift requirements for Army
modularity and Future Combat Systems operations, and the personnel end
strength increases of the Army and Marine Cops, what does Air Mobility
Command now believe is the ideal number of C-17s to have in the Air
Force inventory?
General Kane. Air Mobility Command, through United States
Transportation Command, is currently engaged with the joint community
to help define the scope of the planned Army/Marine Corps end strength
increase and its impacts on air mobility. Quantifiable insights in
response to this question are anticipated in the early June 2007
timeframe.
Neither the most recent Mobility Capability Study (MCS) published
in 2005 nor the follow-on excursions in MCS-06 included the force
structure in question. OSD and the Joint Staff anticipate the next MCS
round to begin in the Spring of 2008. This study should fully
incorporate and examine the changes to Service force structure and
impacts on mobility (air, land, sea, and prepositioning).
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER
Mr. Miller. What is the current critical need of the Joint Cargo
aircraft and the status of the acquisition?
General Hoffman and General Chandler. Based on experience in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the JROC validated the JCA Capability Development
Document (CDD) to address a capability gap for delivery of time-
sensitive/mission-critical cargo.
The Milestone C decision to proceed to Low Rate Initial Production
(LRIP) is planned for 30 May 07. Assuming approval to enter LRIP, the
Joint Program Office will announce the winner of the JCA competition in
the summer.
Mr. Miller. Have there been major conflicts regarding the JCA
between the Army and the Air Force?
General Hoffman and General Chandler. Sir, to answer your question
up front--absolutely not. The Army and the Air Force have been rapidly
moving out on this joint program ever since receiving guidance in
December 2005 to join the Army's Future Cargo Aircraft (FCA) and the
Air Force's Light Cargo Aircraft (LCA) programs. The Army and Air Force
Vice Chiefs of Staff signed a Joint Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that
outlines the way ahead addressing roles and missions, command and
control, standardization and training, sustainment, resources and
public affairs efforts. On the current timeline, we anticipate a
milestone decision in late May with source selection announcement to
follow about a week later. The Army and the Air Force are on track to
jointly procure the same basic aircraft platform for the Joint Cargo
Aircraft program.
Mr. Miller. What is the current critical need of the Joint Cargo
aircraft and the status of the acquisition?
General Curran and General Sorenson. The JCA is one of the key
elements of Army Aviation Transformation, specifically in regards to
the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. The JCA will replace
aging and inadequate C-23 Sherpas, C-26s and some C-12 aircraft with a
more capable, modernized, cargo aircraft. The JCA will also provide
relief to the CH-47 fleet which is currently carrying a large portion
of the logistics transportation burden. The JCA will reduce stress on
the CH-47 fleet for logistical transport, while increasing the
availability of CH-47s for tactical missions. The JCA will also reduce
ground tactical convoys and risk to Soldiers.
The JCA will meet the Army's critical need for a robust, multi-
functional fixed wing cargo aircraft able to operate on short, austere,
unimproved landing areas. Service component commands are responsible
for logistic support of their forces, including the distribution of
supplies from the Service hand-off point to the point of need. The Army
JCA will deliver critical cargo and personnel to the point of need--the
last tactical mile. The Army's primary mission for the JCA is
responsive, on-demand transportation of time-sensitive/mission-critical
cargo and key personnel to forward deployed tactical units. The JCA
will deliver cargo as far forward as feasible, either directly to the
tactical maneuver units or the closest forward support base for further
movement by Army rotary wing aircraft or ground transportation. On
return missions, the JCA will backhaul personnel and repairable
equipment for repair.
The JCA is a joint Army/Air Force program with the Army as the lead
agency. A joint program office was established on 1 October 2006. The
Army and the Air Force have agreed that the Army and Air Force JCA will
be the same basic platform. However, the Air Force may include selected
mission equipment packages (MEP) on the JCA to address broader intra-
theater airlift requirements. The Army will initially procure 64 TOE
aircraft plus 4 training and 7 operational readiness floats, for a
total of 75 JCAs. These aircraft will be split 75/25% between the Army
National Guard and the Army Reserve. The Air Force will initially
procure 40 JCAs. Further Air Force JCA procurement plans are pending
completion of an intra-theater fleet-mix analysis in December 2007.
On 17 March 06 the Defense Acquisition Executive approved the
Acquisition Strategy for a nondevelopmental aircraft for the JCA, and
the Request for Proposals was subsequently released. The JCA is
currently nearing the completion of the source selection process.
Milestone C is scheduled for 30 May 2007. The Army plans to start
fielding the JCA in late 2008 with the first unit to be equipped in
2010. The Air Force will start fielding the JCA in 2012.
Mr. Miller. Have there been major conflicts regarding the JCA
between the Army and the Air Force?
General Curran and General Sorenson. Today the Army and the Air
Force are working closely together towards the fruition of the Joint
Cargo Aircraft (JCA) program. To the Army, the JCA shores-up its direct
support capability to deliver time-sensitive/mission-critical equipment
to Brigade Combat Teams and subordinate units on the current and future
asymmetrical battlefield. To the Air Force, it supplements it current
intra-theater bulk hauler, the C-130, with added efficiency and
effectiveness. The benefits to both Services are clear and consequently
we are working together towards this common end.
Only a year ago both Services were still grappling with the
challenges inherent in merging two programs into one as directed by the
Director, Acquisition Executive for Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Army had a two year jump start with its Future Cargo Aircraft
program and had obtained Joint Staff approval and OSD approval. The Air
Force had just determined a possible need for a light, bulk hauler to
compliment its C-130 fleet, but did not have the opportunity to begin
the analysis to determine the specifics defining the requirement.
Obviously this program mismatch in regards to concept and requirement
development resulted in initial clashes between the Army and Air Force
in regards to platform, utilization and the defining lines of
debarkation between Army and Air Force pertaining to operating on the
battlefield. Over the past few months, the Army and Air Force have
resolved these issues as witnessed in obtaining Joint Staff and OSD
approval for the program in regards to business case analysis, Joint
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and programmatics. The program's
Milestone C decision is schedule for May 2007, we anticipate contract
award following that decision.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER
Ms. Tauscher. The USAF Program of Record supports modernization of
the entire C-5 Fleet (A/B/Cs). The 2006 QDR and 2005 Mobility
Capabilities Study validated that 292 strategic airlifters meets
national requirements and included modernized C-5s as part of that
solution set. Your FY08 PB submission fully supports both AMP and RERP
programs for the entire C-5 fleet. These documents and reports indicate
complete DoD support for the C-5 modernization program, yet recent AF
comments in testimony and to the media raise questions regarding your
commitment to this important program, and quite honestly, are sending
mixed signals. For the record, does the AF support the results of their
own studies to modernize the entire C-5 fleet? If not, what new studies
have the AF done that would now suggest that fleet modernization of the
C-5s is not the right solution?
General Chandler. A November 2000 Analysis of Alternatives on
Outsize and Oversize Cargo Airlift Capability came to the conclusion
that the C-5 RERP program offered the best value approach at that time,
and the Air Force crafted its program based on that conclusion. No new
formal studies, along the lines of the 2005 Mobility Capabilities
Study, have addressed this issue. However, the Air Force continually
examines force structure options based on the most up-to-date
information available and is currently refining analyses to inform
decisions on the most cost-effective mixture of C-5s and C-17s to meet
strategic airlift requirements. Also, the Department is examining
options and inputs from ongoing analyses associated with defense
planning that may impact strategic airlift requirements.
Ms. Tauscher. AF and Industry studies have previously affirmed the
value of C-5 modernization as the most cost effective solution for the
entire fleet. In a fiscally constrained environment, it simply makes
sense to modernize all the C-5s as part of your baseline capability and
if there is a need for more airlift, you build additional capability
with C-17s? The AF has testified that it would prefer to rid itself of
C-5As and buy more C-17s, yet the AF's own data suggests they have
similar annualized O&M cost, and the C-5 already has a cheaper cost
per-ton-mile. Trading serviceable C-5s simply doesn't seem to be good
stewardship of the taxpayer's money, especially when C-5s carry twice
as much cargo and you can RERP three C-5s for the cost of one C-17. It
seems to me that a more balanced approach is the right way to go and
that for the AF to enter into a trade--discussion is simply not the
correct way to view the current situation. Why isn't a fully modernized
111 C-5 fleet and 190 C-17s (or more if needed) an adequate solution?
Why does the AF feel compelled to make this an either/or discussion on
C-5As and C-17s?
General Kane. Since the AMC Outsize and Oversize Cargo Analysis of
Alternatives recommended modernization of the C-5 fleet in August of
2000, projected modernization costs have risen significantly.
Additionally, the C-5A fleet has begun to exhibit stress corrosion
cracking that must be repaired. This further adds to the investment
needed to maintain the viability of the fleet. Hence, the years
required for operational cost savings from C-5 RERP to recover expenses
of the program have increased. At current projected prices, an
investment to modernize 40-year-old C-5s makes much less business sense
than it did just a few years ago. Adding to this concern is the looming
shutdown of the C-17 line, currently projected to start in October of
this year and be complete in September 2009. Should production line
shutdown begin, and we then decide to procure more C-17s, the cost to
start a new aircraft line would be very high, not to mention the
potential operational cost we'd pay as we dealt with the production
gap.
Operationally, the C-17 provides improved reliability over the C-5,
even the fully modernized version, and is more flexible and responsive
to warfighter needs with the ability to safely fly into more short and
unimproved airfields. Overall, it's the best platform for providing
enhanced support to the warfighter on a dispersed battlefield. To
maintain our baseline strategic airlift capability we need a mix of C-
5s and C-17s. Current cost projections combined with the operational
advantages of the C-17 point to the retirement of some of our oldest C-
5As and replacing them with newer, more flexible C-17s that cost less
per flying hour.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. AKIN
Mr. Akin. So if you are planning a mission and you have both of
these rebuilt A models--unless you are a gambling man--you are going to
send two sets of gear for every one that wants to land and do the job?
General Kane. Some of the payloads the C-5 can carry are the Mark V
Special Ops Patrol Boat and towing vehicle; Navy FFG-7 Frigate
Reduction Gear on Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV); Navy Deep Submergence
Rescue Vehicles on LTV; Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor and LTV;
Minuteman SSCBM; and the Mobile Medical 53 ft. Hospital. These are six
common ``C-5 only'' payloads as certified by the Air Transportability
Test Loading Agency.
1. Mark V Special Ops Patrol Boat and towing vehicle
2. Navy FFG-7 Frigate Reduction Gear on LTV
3. Navy Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicles on LTV
4. Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor & LTV
5. Minuteman SSCBM
6. Mobile Medical 53 ft Hospital
These are six common ``C-5 only'' payloads. See below for
other ``C-5 only'' ATTLA certified loads
Additional List of ``C-5 Only'' Items:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEAWOLF PROPULSOR AND TALBERT HEAVY LIFT TITAN IV STAGES 1 & 2 CORE
TRANSPORTER. VEHICLE TRANSTAINER
------------------------------------------------------------------------
45 TON LIMA TRUCK CRANE TITAN IV UPPER FLIGHT
SECTION UFS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BATCH PLANT AGGREGATOR CEMENT MIXER TITAN IV UPPER FORWARD
ADAPTER SIMULATOR UFS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MILLER ADVANCED TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM MATS ATLAS II/CENTAUR II
VAN
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARBAU-KLAUS KM32 SIDE LOADING CRANE, ARBAU AN/TSM-163 Maintenance
KLAUS Center-Battalion
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFOG THEATER VAN WITH HYDRAULIC FIFTH Small Repair Parts
WHEEL TRACTOR Transporter (SMPT) M-1032
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BW SHIPPING CONTAINER TRAILBLAZER AN/TSM-164 Maintenance
COMPONENTS Center-Battery
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFE-PRO 93-03 SV-424 TRAILER AFE/PRO 93-03 DGA TRUMP D40-D DEICING
TRUCK, DG-A DEICING TRUCK
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DSV SEACLIFF TURTLE MINI MUTES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SM97,NAUTILE,FRENCH SUBMERSIBLE, FRENCH M703 TRAILER, M-313 TRAILER,
SUBMARINE M-656 HMTT, S-280
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CATERPILLAR 3516 POWER PLUS MODULE AN/TSQ-112 GENERAL PURPOSE
GENERATOR/TRANSFORM DETECTING SET (TACELIS)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
S/C CONTAINER PPLU TRAILER TDRSS NASA S101, S102 SHELTERS, M113
PERSONNEL CARRIER
------------------------------------------------------------------------
GODDARD MODIFIED
------------------------------------------------------------------------
GPS-12 SPACECRAFT AFRTS SYSTEM
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LMSC VBG EQUIPMENT VERTEX EARTH STATION, NABORS
TRI-AXLE TRAILER
------------------------------------------------------------------------
HUGES SYNCOM IV LEASAT Spacecraft and COMMUNICATIONS RESTORAL
Associated Equip SYSTEM AN/TSC-115
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ESS SPACECRAFT TRANSPORTER/SPACECRAFT DBA SYSTEMS ELECTRONICS
HANDLING FIXTURE VANS, INTERNATIONAL F-2375
------------------------------------------------------------------------
XTE X-Ray Timing Explorer Transporter MILSTAR MOBILE CONSTELLATION
System CONTROL STATION MMCCS
(Lockheed)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
GLOBAL GEOSPACE SCIENCES (GGS) POLAR DORSAY TRL.MODEL DDG &
PROJECT SPACECRAFT/TRANSPORTER FREIGHT -LINER TRACTOR
MODEL 120
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TITAN II PAYLOAD FAIRING, MARTIN MARIETTA MOBILE ADVANCE DISASTER
ELEMENT - ONE (MADE-ONE)
FEMA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMERCIAL TITAN MISSILE, CORE VEHICLE 40 FOOT VAN ID# B17890 SV-
STAGES I AND II 459
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARFOR Trailer (Mobile Training Classroom Mobile Telemetry Data System
with HVAC extension) (MTDS) Trailer
------------------------------------------------------------------------
P&H 430-ATC Crane (Harnischfeger) JPL ELECTRONICS VAN TRAILER
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SMC Missile Transporter Tractor/Trailer AN/MSQ-118, CSS SHELTER
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AVCATT-A Simulators & Electrical Equipment AFE/PRO 94-01 ALUMINUM BODY
Trailers TS1 TRAILER
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USCENTAF 609 ACOMS Van Trailers AFE/PRO 96-04 AND 96-05
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PTS Support Benson 48-ft aluminum single Milstar Mobile Constellation
drop flatbed Control Station (MMCCS)
with Antenna Deployment
Enhancement Sattelite
Communication Control
Central (SCCC) AN/TSQ-180VO
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PTS support Fontaine 48'-70' Single Drop Mine Hunter
flatbed (7D-FT-5-4AW Extend)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PTS Support Great Dane 48-ft Flatbed Advanced Seal Delivery
trailers (GPS-248) System (ASDS) Navy & LTV
Submersible on Trailer
------------------------------------------------------------------------
JSF F-35 Air Transportability & Wing Thule Tracking Station A-
Fixture Side Upgrade Program
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CECOM Harris/Mobilized Systems 40' x 14' x Deployable Trailers for AH-
10.5' Shelter SEES & SBX (ref 2002.11.25) 64 Aircrew Trainer Devices
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boeing Spacecraft Next Generation Shipping AFE/PRO 00-01 (Stacked S/V
Container shipping container)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CALIPSO Sattellite on NASA double drop AFE/PRO 00-01 (Stacked S/V
trailer shipping container) Amended
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MK V Special Operations Craft (SOC), Mobile Training Semi Trailer
Production version with Trailer
------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-18 Recovery Medium Payload Transporter
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-5 AMARC Horizontal Stabilizer Trailer
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACTION OFFICER INFORMATION
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Action Officer's Name and Phone Office Symbol
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lt Col Christopher Smith, DSN 779-2266 AMC/A8XL
------------------------------------------------------------------------
COORDINATION
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office Symbol Action Name Phone Date Comments
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AMC/DA5/8-1 Coord Mr. Scott 779-3314 13 Apr
McMullen
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AF/A5RM Coord Col 697-4939 17 Apr
Genshiemer
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AF/A5R Coord Brig Gen 695-3018 18 Apr
Sabol
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AF/A3/5 Approve Lt Gen 697-3331 19 Apr
Chandler
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON
Mr. Johnson. The National Guard is responsible for Civil Support
Teams (CST) to support homeland security threats (Biological, Chemical
and Nuclear) in each state and territory. These teams consist of 22
personnel and 8 vehicles and that must be air/land transportable and be
able to deploy CONUS wide to support any and all threats in the three
categories mentioned as well as natural disasters. However, I
understand that these teams cannot be transported on the Army's two
Twin-engine Joint Cargo Aircraft candidate aircraft due to the limited
size of the cargo compartment. In these times of war and tight budgets,
I am questioning if we have the luxury of purchasing an aircraft that
has limited utility in the theater airlift mission and for Homeland
Security mission without any flexibility for growth potential that may
be required for future. Can you comment on these observations?
General Kane. To address the main issue of purchasing the JCA at
this time; the Air Force and the Army have collectively determined
there is a need for JCA now and in the future. The JCA will have a dual
role: Homeland Security/Defense, and a combatant commander support at
home and abroad. The JCA will help satisfy the critical needs of the
Combatant Commanders as well as Governors.
The JCA fits a niche as a light cargo tactical airlifter. It will
be capable of landing and taking off on short, unimproved surfaces
while being able to carry as much as 6,000 pounds of cargo in a hot and
high pressure altitude environment, much like Afghanistan or Nevada.
Additionally, the JCA will be able to fly 1200 nautical miles with
18,000 pounds of cargo.
As the question relates to a CST package; the primary method to
transfer a CST package to an incident is by land versus air due to 250
NM response radius. CST's teams were established to deploy rapidly in
order to assist local first-responders in determining the nature of an
attack, provide medical and technical advice, and pave the way for the
identification and arrival of follow-on state and federal military
response assets.
Currently, there are 55 CST packages that are strategically
positioned throughout the United States. Stationing criteria used to
identify the CST locations included coverage of major metropolitan
areas based on population density; minimizing overlap with adjacent
CSTs and other DoD response elements; and availability of existing
facilities and support capabilities. The use of airlift requires
coordination and additional time. The use of airlift is conditions-
based depending on the disaster scenario (e.g., earthquakes, weather)
which causes decision makers to employ CSTs via the most expeditious
means. Airlift is always a consideration; however, CST responders have
built their Concept of Employment around ground movement. The JCA would
augment responding forces especially to response times needed.
If an incident location is greater than 250 miles away from the CST
package, airlift may be considered; however, this is a decision for the
supported COCOM to make (in this case USNORTHCOM) it would depend on a
number of factors, such as weather, airfield availability/conditions.
The current airlift requirement for a CST package is either 6 C-130's,
2 C-17's, or 1 C-5.
[See map and slides in the Appendix beginning on page 150.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MEEK
Mr. Meek. As you undertake the KC-X acquisition to buy the next
generation Tanker, can you comment on how you will ensure our taxpayers
get the best value (best capability for best price) for our future
warfighting requirements?
General Hoffman and General Kane. Our documented and approved KC-X
acquisition plan and source selection strategy is based on obtaining
the best value (best capability for best price) for the taxpayer, while
meeting all warfighter Key Performance Parameter thresholds. We have
provided excerpts from the KC-X Request for Proposal that highlight our
focus on a best value source selection. Per the KC-X Request for
Proposal, section M001 - SOURCE SELECTION, 1.1 Basis for Contract
Award:
``The Government will select the best overall offer, based upon
an integrated assessment of Mission Capability, Proposal Risk,
Past Performance, Cost/Price and the Integrated Fleet Aerial
Refueling Assessment (IFARA). Contract(s) may be awarded to the
offeror who is deemed responsible in accordance with the
Federal Acquisition Regulations, as supplemented, whose
proposal conforms to the solicitation's requirements (to
include all stated terms, conditions, representations,
certifications, and all other information required by Section L
of this solicitation) and is judged, based on the evaluation
factors and subfactors, to represent the best value to the
Government. The Government seeks to award to the offeror who
gives the AF the greatest confidence that it will best meet, or
exceed, the requirements. This may result in an award to a
higher rated, higher priced offeror, where the decision is
consistent with the evaluation factors and the Source Selection
Authority (SSA) reasonably determines that the technical
superiority and/or overall business approach and/or superior
past performance, and/or the IFARA of the higher priced offeror
outweighs the cost difference. The SSA will base the source
selection decision on an integrated assessment of proposals
against all source selection criteria in the solicitation.''