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**ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY AND STABIL-  
ITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND DEVELOP-  
MENT IN U.S. STRATEGY AND OPER-  
ATIONS**

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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HEARING HELD  
FEBRUARY 13, 2007



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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

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**ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHAN-  
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ERATIONS**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 13, 2007.*

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTA-  
TIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED  
SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, the meeting will come to order. I realize the weather is worsening outside but we will do the best we can. Our witnesses are here and I am sure the members will move in and out based upon their ability to get here this morning.

We meet today to continue our discussion regarding Afghanistan. With us are several distinguished guests, Mary Beth Long, who is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Affairs at the Defense Department. We appreciate you being with us. And the gentleman who has done yeoman's work and now is back with us, Lieutenant General Eikenberry. We thank you for your service. John Gastright, he is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of South and Central Asian Affairs and Coordinator for Afghanistan at the State Department. So welcome to each of you and particularly, General Eikenberry, thank you for your excellent service.

I was in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraq a couple of weeks ago as part of a delegation led by Speaker Pelosi, and coming away from that trip you and our military leaders there have done an exceptional job, General, and our efforts continue to face severe challenges. The bottom line, however, I came away convinced that we can defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan if we stay focused and if we devote the right troops in the right numbers and have the right strategy, at the end of the day we will get it done. I am pleased to see the Administration recently focusing more on Afghanistan and on its strategy. We lost critical time because of insufficient forces and inadequate resources. Recently there has been movement, new Afghanistan strategic review, request for supplemental assistance in the budget package, which includes funds for the Afghan security forces and efforts to press our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to fulfill commitments. We will get into that during our discussion.

These developments are part of what is needed to a well-coordinated and comprehensive strategy that demonstrates long commitment to security and stability in that country.

Afghanistan has been the forgotten. Some opportunities there have been squandered, but there is still a chance to set things right, particularly if we seize the moment and establish real security. We must do much more to secure and stabilize that country.

Most critically and, General, we will appreciate your comments on this later, our NATO partners must do more. They made commitments to the fight in Afghanistan, some have been involved in heavy combat and sustained losses but many commitments remain unfulfilled. Our NATO partners must seriously step up their efforts by fulfilling their obligation for both troops and freeing their forces from restrictions that limit their ability to fight.

For NATO to operate effectively each member must be able to rely on every other member of NATO to carry its share of the burden. The delegation I recently traveled with to Afghanistan all reached the same conclusions. So did the experts who testified at this committee's hearings on Afghanistan just the day after I returned from that country. I am particularly concerned about the anticipated spring upturn in the insurgency.

The last thing, to secure Afghanistan necessarily involves the border region with Pakistan and development of competent Afghan security forces. By the way, we had a very interesting discussion with President Musharraf on that very issue. It was a positive discussion, as Secretary Gastright will probably comment on a bit later.

There will be problems, ones that won't be overcome quickly, but I would like to have our witnesses help us understand what it will take to defeat the anticipated spring offensive and what it will take to defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan for good and, last, what are we doing to increase the support from our NATO partners, our old friends, NATO partners, and get them to live up to those all important commitments.

Let me turn to the gentleman from California, my friend and colleague the ranking member, Duncan Hunter.

**STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE  
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON  
ARMED SERVICES**

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding this hearing. I think it is an excellent hearing and very timely and to our guests I join the chairman in giving you a warm welcome this morning. Thank you for being with us and stepping out into the elements to come over and be with us.

Over the last six years coalition and Afghan officials have made significant progress in Afghanistan and I recognize though that there is a lot that still has to be done. Afghanistan's continued dependence on poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking still poses an extremely serious threat to long-term security and stability and U.S. officials and experts agree that last year was the highest poppy yield ever produced in Afghanistan, resulting in nearly 6,100 metric tons of opium, an amount that is likely to be repeated in

2007 if we don't address the situation promptly and comprehensively.

It is also my understanding that Afghanistan's poppy production and narcotics trade provides for about one-third of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and likely finances some of the violent activities of the Taliban-led insurgents. So I hope you will talk to this issue this morning and specifically what the U.S., Afghanistan, NATO, and other coalition partners are doing to address this narcotics problem.

One solution that has been talked about and discussed quite a bit by this committee is the idea of alternative agriculture products. The one area that appears to me to be especially promising but one that we haven't made as much headway on as I would hope would be replacing the poppy fields with orchards. It would make sense that if you have an almond crop or pecan crop or some other type of a fairly high dollar cash crop that is manifested in an orchard, farmers are going to be much less likely to go in and chain saw their trees to put in a poppy crop.

So I would like you to talk about that and how we are doing in terms of offering this replacement to the farmers in Afghanistan and whether they are receptive to it and along that line obviously you have a traditional system in Afghanistan, especially in the smaller communities and villages, the so-called shuras, which is the meetings of the tribal leadership and community leadership. And I understand if we are going to sell this alternative agriculture path to these folks, we are going to need to sell it through their leadership and through a following of the traditions that are already in place and through these traditional forms. I would like to know how you are going to do that. I have heard—of course we all conduct oversight by anecdotes and stories and statements from folks that have been there, but we have heard folks talk about the idea that you have big contractors who stay behind the wire, so to speak, do a lot of things through intermediaries and in the end a lot of these poppy fields that could be replaced with orchards haven't been.

And again I am reminded that if you give people work, if you simply pay them to go out and put an irrigation ditch in or something else, that is work for a day, but that doesn't displace them on a permanent basis from this very lucrative trade of narcotics. So tell us how we are going to get this thing done. I have often thought maybe it would be a good idea to simply replace a legion of our bureaucracy personnel, who are very fine personnel but to replace a lot of them in these hands-on areas simply with agriculture professionals, farmers and people that know how to get irrigation systems in and how to get trees up and how to use pesticides and how to make things grow, how to harvest, how to get money, how to market, get hands-on ag professionals in these places, and they might be better diplomats than the folks who are emanating from the State Department and from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) who don't have hands-on ag experience.

So let us know how on a practical common-sense basis we are going to be able to start getting this replacement system, the sub-

stitute system into place and thereby depress the number of acres that is now being put into drug crops.

We have got 25,000 people in Afghanistan, U.S. military service members. Half of them are serving in this NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). And we understand that ISAF has responsibility for military operations and reconstruction efforts throughout Afghanistan. A very significant leadership role. But I am also aware of the fact that, as the chairman has mentioned, that the United States is still carrying by far, even though we are conducting the operation in Iraq without the help of a number of our NATO partners, we are conducting—we are carrying a burden far disproportionate in Afghanistan if you use our GDP or our—or the number of countries involved who are members of NATO in theory available to carry this security burden, and I would like to know what we are doing to inspire our NATO allies, cajole, inspire, contract or whatever it is going to take to get them to step up to the plate and take their burden.

Years ago I looked at the formula, I searched for the formula for burden sharing in NATO operations. How do you determine who brings what and how much they bring. And the answer that I got was there is no formula. This is like potluck and some people will bring the T-bone steaks to the potluck and others will bring the plastic forks. Historically the United States has brought the T-bone steaks; that is, we brought the money, in aerial operations we bring to air-to-air refueling, strike aircraft, we bring munitions, and you have a little bitty ground crew trot out with five, count them five, or ten personnel from a NATO ally and that makes it a NATO operation. America is dominant in terms of leadership but also dominant in terms of dollars supplied.

I want to know how you are going to change that. I think that Afghanistan is a prime site for some precedent setting arrangements with out NATO allies to bring them into this burden sharing and bring them into the thick of the operation, understanding the folks that we sometimes call the usual suspects, affectionately, the Brits, Canadians have difficult areas of operations (AORs). They are in contentious areas, others are not. But let us know how we are going to move NATO into a more supportive role.

So thanks for your testimony here today. I look forward to listening to you and especially if you could address the question of burden sharing with NATO, and the displacement, the substitute ag programs, I would appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman, my friend from California. Let me ask our witnesses if possible—we of course will take your prepared statements into the record. If you could condense it as best you can within four minutes, please, that will leave more time for questioning.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, before you start could I ask a question here. Mr. Chairman, at the last hearing we had Secretary Gates was testifying and we had a hearing with respect to Iraq. I was told after the hearing that we had some of the folks who don't like the Iraq policy were standing in the hearing room. I think decorum requires that they should be seated if we are going to have guests. All our guests are seated. But I heard beyond that that it was reported that they were whispering fairly derogatory com-

ments to the witnesses from right behind them while they were testifying. I think in something this serious, in having hearings on these very serious areas of operations, we should have decorum in this room and certainly whispering things to the witnesses, witnesses as they are trying to talk to us and listen to us surely goes beyond the rules of decorum.

I would think also having folks standing up in the room when everybody else is sitting down does the same thing, and I would just ask if we couldn't ask our guests, all of our guests to be seated when they come into the hearing room. I think that is a reasonable thing.

The CHAIRMAN. I heard the same comment about them whispering. I had not heard—had they been heard by me at the time they would have been thrown out. The people who were standing at my request did move to the back and they did not disrupt anything. Any gestures or noise, they of course will be removed. Thank you for your comments.

Mary Beth Long.

**STATEMENT OF MARY BETH LONG, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Ms. LONG. Chairman Skelton, Congressman Hunter, members of the committee, the first thing I would like to do is thank each and every one of you for the tremendous support that the committee gives to the Department of Defense and to our men and women in Afghanistan. Your support is appreciated and it is an honor to be here to testify in front of you.

It has been about six months since I have been here to talk to you about Afghanistan, and I am pleased to note that there has been tremendous progress in that country and that many of you have had the opportunity to see that progress on the ground firsthand, the progress made by our coalition troops, our NATO allies, the U.S. forces there, and of course the continuing growth of the Afghan government.

As you know, the Secretary of Defense as one of his first acts after taking office traveled to Afghanistan and he recently returned from Seville, where he met with NATO members to discuss NATO efforts in Afghanistan.

In these last years NATO has actually shown tremendous growth and the allied coalition in Afghan has been impressive. NATO has grown tremendously since its first undertaking of the Afghan mission, its first ever deployment outside the European theater and arguably probably the most challenging in its 57-year history.

NATO now commands 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and as of October is in command of and responsibility of Afghanistan, and that is all the areas. The regional command south was the most recently turned over. Still, NATO must do more, the European Union (EU) must do more, the international community must do more, and we all must do more to enable the Afghans to do more for themselves. The U.S., we remind ourselves, is only one of the NATO partners, and we have recently committed to do more.

Before Congress for approval is a budget and a defense budget for \$5.9 billion to enhance the Afghan security forces, and that is

in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget as well as \$2.7 billion in the fiscal year 2008 global war on terror (GWOT) budget.

This is for urgently needed equipment for the Afghan police and the Afghan National Army. This equipment includes things like advanced first aid, better weapons, assault rifles, helmets and personal security equipment. I urge you to support that budgetary request.

In addition, the Department is doing more in its recently announced undertaking to extend troops in Afghanistan in order to augment its combat capabilities in the springtime as the Taliban and insurgents draw near. Only days ago our Supreme Allied Commander, General Craddock, presented NATO with a revised combined joint statement of requirements (CJSOR), for those of you familiar, the CJSOR forum. This is a list of required military support for NATO and ISAF efforts.

While we are encouraged with the preliminary offers of new resources, and I would like to take a moment to highlight here the offers from Poland, Turkey and the Czech Republic, we look forward to additional offers as our NATO allies take this list home in the next days, review them in their nations and respond with additional contributions.

As Secretary Gates indicated recently in Seville, allies who have made a commitment should fulfill that commitment. We remind ourselves that NATO is indeed a military organization and while all share in the financial burden, all must also share in the risks.

We recognize, however, that security alone will not win in Afghanistan. To complete the transition from a terrorist safe haven to a moderate and independent state, Afghanistan will need additional infrastructure, economic development and improved governance and services. Military efforts must be balanced with the appropriate mix of economic, political and developmental activities. A comprehensive approach is needed and is being implemented.

To that end, the Commander's Emergency Relief Program (CERP). Many of you know that CERP is a key element of our strategy in Afghanistan. Aside from addressing the threat to Afghanistan by building internal security capacity—

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, please. The Chair is tolerant but anyone that is disrupting either by gesture or by movement is not welcome. If you are going to stand, stand, but turning around and disrupting anything will not be tolerated. Do you understand? Please proceed.

Ms. LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Aside from addressing the threat in Afghanistan by building internal security capacity and facilitating reconstruction and other developmental efforts, we are working to address regional actors as well, and notably Pakistan. As recently as this morning Secretary Gates returned from a trip to visit President Musharraf. On the heels of a Seville discussion the Secretary thanks the President for his continued Pakistani support for our GWOT and Afghan efforts and impressed upon him the need to eliminate the Taliban and continue his efforts against insurgents of all types.

It is important to remind ourselves that our involvement in Afghanistan should be viewed in a broader context and not just simply our true presence as a result of 9/11 and the place where the

terrorists came from. Just look at the neighborhood. Afghanistan abuts Pakistan, the largest Muslim nation in the world and one in which tribal areas have heretofore been ungoverned by a modern governed nation. Pakistan is also a nuclear country.

To the west, Iran, a growing regional power and one that is involved in undermining our efforts in Iraq and a nuclear aspirant. To the northeast, China, and to the north Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, all former Soviet republics struggling to become responsible international players.

Both China and Russia have made it very clear that U.S. presence in the region is unwelcome and need to look only at the Shanghai cooperation organization in order to bear witness to that intent. Strategically placed in the middle of this neighborhood astride these trade routes and access to important national resources is Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a traditional Muslim country where the people as a whole have committed themselves to the idea of a democratically elected government. It is one that still welcomes coalition and U.S. forces. In its first year, in fact, the Assembly of Afghanistan confirmed a cabinet, it made Supreme Court appointments, and it passed a national budget.

While Afghanistans have the will, they need continued involvement. They need our commitment, our expertise and our assistance of the U.S. and the international community in order to succeed. With the additional congressional support that we have requested, the men and women of the Department of Defense stand ready to further our continued successes and advancements in Afghanistan in conjunction with the government of Afghanistan and its people.

I thank you again for the opportunity to be here, for your continued support and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Long can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much.  
General Eikenberry.

**STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. KARL W. EIKENBERRY, FORMER  
COMMANDING GENERAL, COMBINED FORCES COMMAND—  
AFGHANISTAN, U.S. ARMY**

General EIKENBERRY. Chairman Skelton, Congressman Hunter, members of the committee. Having just departed from command of the Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan, it is an honor to provide the committee an update on the mission there and to represent the American soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and civilians who are performing brilliantly in Afghanistan.

Before answering your questions I would like to provide a very brief update on campaign progress to date, current threat assessment and outline four major areas that I believe are essential for future campaign success.

First, regarding campaign progress to date. Our mission in Afghanistan as you know has been twofold: First, the defeat of al Qaeda and their Taliban militant extremist allies, and second, to help create the conditions inside of Afghanistan where international terrorism could never again find support and sanctuary.

We have achieved much since 2001. A ruthless, deadly international terrorist-controlled regime has been defeated. Afghanistan

now has a moderate constitution, a democratically elected President, a sitting parliament, a confirmed cabinet, increasingly effective Afghan national security forces, a dramatic increase and expansion of key social services and ongoing economic reconstruction and development.

However, we do face major challenges. There is a reconstituted Taliban enemy, slow growth of governance capacity and a rise in narcotrafficking. Our significant near-term threat to campaign success is the insurgency focused in southern Afghanistan and directed by the former Taliban regime. The longer term threat is the loss of legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan. We need with more urgency to build Afghan government capacity and help connect it to the Afghan people.

To overcome these threats and achieve campaign success there are four major areas which I would like to address: NATO command, transition to Afghan leadership, the need for more non-military means in the campaign, and the regional nature of terrorism and insecurity.

First, with regard to NATO, on 5 October 2006 NATO-International Security Assistance Force, or NATO-ISAF, as we say, assumed command of the Afghanistan-wide international military mission. The Afghan operation has now grown to what is clearly the most ambitious in the alliance's 57-year old history, making it the first ever deployment outside of Europe.

NATO-ISAF is currently comprised of some 36,000 personnel from 37 nations; that is 26 NATO members plus 11 other partner countries. The U.S. does provide the majority of the combat forces and the critical military capabilities to NATO-ISAF. While having achieved much thus far, NATO must do more to fulfill its commitments to provide sufficient forces and capabilities to the mission and NATO must also increase its level of support to the training and the equipping of the Afghan national security forces.

The second key area for campaign success is completing the transition to Afghan leadership. Here a critical U.S. military task has been to develop Afghan national security forces; that is, the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police Forces. Today over 32,000 Afghan National Army and 59,000 Afghan National Police have been trained, equipped and they are engaged in security operations alongside our forces. We are now expanding the Afghan National Army basic training class sizes to 2,000 per cycle, a very important increase in capacity.

Afghans are finding pride in serving in their Afghan National Army and Afghan National Army units are directly in the fight.

Comprehensive reform of the Ministry of the Interior and its police forces is underway. Progress is being made, but we face very formidable challenges in delivering timely results. The key third area for campaign success is in non-military means. While we have enjoyed success with the assumption of the Afghanistan mission by NATO and in the development of Afghan national security forces, Afghanistan's continued development will depend much upon increasing emphasis on the government of Afghanistan and the international community focusing on the non-military aspects of the mission.

Throughout Afghanistan's 34 provinces rebuilding the so-called middle ground of civil society ravaged by three decades of warfare remains the primary concern of the majority of the Afghan people. According to a recent survey, almost 90 percent of the Afghan people consider reconstruction and economic development the most important requirement to improve their lives.

The international community must provide more resources in the areas of governance, justice, counternarcotics and economic development.

The final area of emphasis is effectively addressing the regional nature of terrorism and insecurity. We cannot win this fight by concentrating in Afghanistan alone. Pakistan faces similar internal challenges, including militant extremism that grows in ungoverned spaces. Pakistan is working hard to address the growing threat of Talibanization within its own borders as well as contributing extensively to the global war on terror.

As we work toward improving governance, economic development and security in Afghanistan, we must maintain and strengthen cooperative relations with Pakistan. However, I will emphasize that al Qaeda and Taliban leadership presence inside of Pakistan remains a very significant problem.

In closing, allow me to emphasize that we are now at a critical point where a strategic investment in Afghan capabilities is needed to accelerate the progress toward the desired goal of helping establish a moderate, stable, and representative government of Afghanistan. This requires significant resources, it requires time, it requires patience and it requires commitment. We are carrying out an extraordinarily difficult task in Afghanistan. We are trying to build an Afghan values-based army and national police force while we simultaneously fight a war.

The fiscal year 2007 supplemental investment proposed by the Administration would permit the Afghan Army to continue to expand to the internationally agreed level of 70,000 and enable the Afghan National Police to increase to the size of 82,000 by the end of calendar year 2008. That supplemental appropriation will also equip the Afghan National Army and Police with the protection, fire power, weapons, enhanced training and mobility that is required to meet the increased insurgent threat.

In addition, the Administration's fiscal year 2007 supplemental request would permit a significant increase in spending for roads, for power, and for economic development addressing the non-military means. The leadership of Afghanistan is committed to being an active partner in the global war on terror in the long term. The Afghan people and their nation's leaders are absolutely worthy of our trust, our confidence and our support. It is in the United States' national interest to gain and keep a partner and a friend who we can count on in this critical region of the world.

Please accept finally my deepest thanks for continued support of the committee, to our great soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines and to our civilians. Their sacrifices and those of their families continue to enable the establishment of an Afghanistan with its goal of reaching a secure, free and stable nation. It was a privilege and honor to serve with the members of the coalition. I look forward, Chairman, to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Eikenberry can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Secretary, as I understand it Ambassador to be, Gastright.

**STATEMENT OF JOHN A. GASTRIGHT, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS AND COORDINATOR FOR AFGHANISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Secretary GASTRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to participate today. Let me just start by noting how honored I am to appear with General Eikenberry. As Commander of Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan, General Eikenberry was an invaluable leader and a partner in our efforts to win in Afghanistan. I once heard him refer to his State Department colleagues as his teammates. Let me say it is an honor to be a part of that team.

Mr. Chairman, as you suggested in your opening statement, this afternoon you will hear from General Eikenberry and Ms. Long about the challenging spring we are going to face in Afghanistan and the efforts that we are going to make to counteract Taliban and other elements working against the government of Afghanistan, the United States and our allies this spring.

My State Department colleagues and I share this assessment. In the face of these challenges we are better prepared this year to tackle the threats we faced than we were last year. U.S., Afghan and allied partners have more tools in our toolbox than ever before. We start 2007 in a better position, with more police, more Afghan national troops, more ISAF troops, better governance, more roads, better in the south particularly than ever before.

This summer we concluded an interagency assessment of what we are doing in Afghanistan and we concluded that Afghan—parts of Afghanistan, especially in the east, were successfully stabilized when military action was followed closely by the injection of good governance, including competent governors and police and economic opportunity. Integration of all these elements together in a comprehensive manner have produced sustainable results, whereas military success without the follow-on political, economic and development efforts often led to a merely temporary calm.

We also clearly recognize that the international community, including the United States, needed to increase the level of support, joined together in endorsing and implementing this comprehensive approach, and focused even more sharply on the needs of the Afghan people. We believe that if we take this comprehensive approach and put it to work in more of Afghanistan we will see increased stability and strengthened Afghan government presence across the country.

To enable this comprehensive approach, on January 26th Secretary Rice announced a request for more than \$10.6 billion in new assistance over the next 2 years, including more than 6.7 billion in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental and more than 4 billion in fiscal year 2008. That assistance, which will go to both reconstruction and development of Afghan security forces, is vital not only for success this spring but also to help secure long-term success for the

government and the people of Afghanistan. We hope that the Congress will support this request in its entirety.

The United States is certainly determined to do its part, but as you suggested, the allies in NATO and elsewhere need to do more as well. NATO needs to meet the requirements it set when taking on the NATO mission in Afghanistan and drop the caveats that hamper our cooperation and effectiveness and supply the forces that commanders need to succeed in their efforts.

This is the message that Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates have taken to recent NATO ministerials in both Brussels and Seville. We have seen positive offers from a number of countries increasing their commitments, but we need to see even more and will continue to talk with donor nations about what they can do to support the government of Afghanistan.

We are also working closely with the government of Pakistan to identify additional actions it can take to help destruct the Taliban this spring. They are serious about this effort and have demonstrated it with a number of important activities designed to deal with militants using their territory such as raids and attacks in border regions in recent months against both Taliban and al Qaeda targets. The Pakistani military continues operations and has regretfully taken casualties in this fight against a mutual enemy.

Mr. Chairman, although we have come a long way in Afghanistan, no one seeks to underestimate the challenges ahead. Our international partners in the government of Afghanistan expect the United States to lead the way in the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan.

The strong long-term U.S. commitment that we display is making the difference and must continue with intensity. We at the Department of State appreciate all that this committee does to support this most important endeavor. Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before the committee. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Gastright can be found in the Appendix on page 72.]

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to reserve my comments until a later moment. After I call on the ranking member Mr. Hunter, I will go directly to Mr. Taylor.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all of our witnesses for your opening statements. General Eikenberry, tell us about the participation by the NATO allies. Secretary Long went over the 36, or the 26 NATO allies plus I think you said 26 other nations that are involved, although the United States carries the majority of the combat load. Give us a description of the six or seven or eight major players besides the United States and give us a brief description of their location and their mission as part of the overall mission in Afghanistan. Where are they, what are they doing?

General EIKENBERRY. The critical contributors, of course, as you indicated, led by the United States, there is currently about 36,000 NATO-ISAF forces and of those forces currently about 16,000 of those 36,000 are United States. We have other forces in Afghanistan. We have a total of 27,000, but of our 27,000, 16,000 are under

the NATO flag of the total NATO–ISAF force of 36,000. So 20,000 non-U.S. NATO forces.

Our forces are throughout Afghanistan. Those under the NATO flag are primarily in eastern Afghanistan, which is a dangerous area, where there is an active counterinsurgency. We are also making a very important contribution to southern Afghanistan, where they also are fighting a counterinsurgency. Other major troop contributors are the United Kingdom. United Kingdom's combat force are primarily in southern Afghanistan where they are engaged in an active counterinsurgency. Canada makes a very significant contribution; their forces in southern Afghanistan.

Mr. HUNTER. About how many folks are in the British and Canadian contingents?

General EIKENBERRY. Congressman, the contribution of the United Kingdom in its combat capability in southern Afghanistan is about 3,000, and I believe their total force contribution in Afghanistan is over 4,000. So they are doing other tasks as well. I will get back to you with the exact numbers. The Canadian contribution; the Canadian contribution is well over 2,000. Again I will get back with you on significant numbers. A vast majority of that is in Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. Other major contributors, the Germans have a very significant contribution to the NATO forces. They are primarily in northern Afghanistan. Northern Afghanistan is not fighting a dangerous counterinsurgency. I would like to emphasize Afghanistan by its nature can be a dangerous place at any time so wherever forces are, where international forces are, they can be under attack, to include the German forces I mentioned have been under attack. German forces are also located in the greater Kabul area contributing to security there. The Italians—

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. HUNTER. On that point, General Eikenberry, I think who was it Tony Cordesman who said that the Germans aren't forward leaning in their exposure, that they are in a fairly well-garrisoned situation and are not involved in confrontational military activities. Can you describe what they are doing?

General EIKENBERRY. The Germans are conducting stability operations in northern Afghanistan. I have visited the German forces, I visited them about six months ago. Congressman, I was impressed when I went up there with the manner in which they are conducting stability operations. However, their forces are not in eastern Afghanistan and they are not in southern Afghanistan and that is where we are continually fighting and having to fight offensive combat operations against a very dangerous enemy. So it is two very different environments.

My sense was when I visited them though in the north within that particular environment with that particular mission I thought that they were doing well.

In western Afghanistan another major troop contributing country is the Italians. Western Afghanistan, again, different from eastern and southern Afghanistan where there is an active insurgency. We also have a very significant Dutch force in Oruzgan Province, southern Afghanistan. It is a dangerous area. And then the other

major troop contributors that I would highlight would be the Turkish and the French. Their forces are primarily located in the greater Kabul area providing security and patrolling in the greater metropolis there.

I would make several points about the entire NATO force then that is on the ground now. As was highlighted by all of us during our opening remarks, Congressman, as you indicated as you opened, that there are shortfalls with NATO. There is significant shortfalls. Politically the alliance has approved a set of military forces, capabilities and requirements to deploy to Afghanistan. Those remain under fulfilled, about 85 or 90 percent. We have shortages of what we call a tactical theater reserve force in Afghanistan, about an infantry battalion that can be used anywhere. We are short military intelligence, short rotary wing aircraft helicopters, more fixed wing aircraft. They have to do more.

The second challenge that NATO is facing is that their forces committed have various sets of national restrictions placed upon them. Those restrictions are operational restrictions that may preclude them, for instance, from going to one region of Afghanistan and then going to other areas where they might have to fight offensive combat operations.

The more restrictions that are placed on those forces, the more inefficient the command is, and the only way you can offset those restrictions is then by having more forces to compensate.

Then the third point I would make with NATO, though, and a good point I think, Congressman, is that we do have to go back to the baseline of 2003 when NATO first assumed the missions in Afghanistan. When they went in in 2003 they had a very narrow mandate; it was for the security of the greater Kabul area. As Secretary Long indicated, it is the first time in NATO's 57 years history they have been outside of Europe and conducting offensive ground operations. So a huge challenge.

They have grown in their missions since 2003. They went to the north in 2004, they expanded to the west in 2005, and the significant expansion to the south and east in 2006 and 7. They have shown that over that time they continue to adapt and grow. But this is the most significant step that they made in October 2006 when they took over the whole mission. They are fighting an active counterinsurgency and they have to adapt and grow faster and more into this mission.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor. I will remind the committee of the excellent work you have been doing on the five-minute rule and we will once more remind you of that.

Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Want to thank our witnesses for being here.

General Eikenberry, it has now been five years and five months since the events of September 11th. General Eikenberry, it has been five years and five months since September 11th, 2001, and apparently the mastermind of that event is still on the loose.

Using the analogy of Iraq and to a certain extent our hopes were that with the capture of Hussein that the insurgency would diminish. That did not prove to be the case. My question to you is in your

professional opinion if Osama bin Laden were captured today what effect, if any, would that have on the insurgency in Afghanistan? To what extent do you think he is involved in the resurgence of the Taliban there, and if he is not a major player, then who or what groups would you identify as the organization of the Taliban?

General EIKENBERRY. Congressman, I do not believe that the capture or killing of Osama bin Laden would have a significant immediate impact on the insurgency in Afghanistan. Certainly the elimination of bin Laden would have reduced some of the perhaps ideological support that is generated from him being on the loose within the international terrorist network, but I don't think it would have any kind of operational impact within Afghanistan. Bin Laden remains one person, an important person that we need to bring to justice, but he remains one person in a much larger global international terrorist network.

Then what is driving the insurgency in Afghanistan? To answer your question, first of all, there is a nexus or there is collaboration between international terrorism in that part of the world and their network and the senior leaders of the old Taliban regime and other allied groups with them, the group led by Hekmatyar, a group led by the Haqqani clan. And they do have command and control and more coherent command and control I believe now than they might have been able to generate several years ago.

We do have a problem with sanctuary and safe havens in that regard and this is a problem that needs to be addressed more effectively.

The second problem that we have got with the insurgency though, Congressman, that I would really emphasize is that the challenge remains in Afghanistan about trying to build the institutions of the state and then expand governance in Afghanistan, which is a very difficult process because our baseline that we begin with in 2001 is really just ashes, a country decimated by three decades of warfare and through the occupation of international terrorism. And so we are trying to build from that. Mixed in with the topographical challenges, the geographical challenges that we face in Afghanistan, it is a daunting prospect. There are no areas in Afghanistan today where the government has had firm control, providing reasonable security to the people and providing basic social services. There are no areas of Afghanistan, to include southern Afghanistan, where insurgents have been able to push that out and establish their own presence.

So it is a challenge of defeating the command and control and it is a challenge of continuing to stand the government of Afghanistan up and push it out into new areas.

Mr. TAYLOR. I am curious, I guess one of the worst kept secrets of the Cold War is our Nation's very active resupply of the insurgents against the Russians. To what extent, if any, are outside players involved in resupplying the Taliban?

General EIKENBERRY. Our belief is that Taliban and the insurgents, Congressman, that the assistance that they get from the outside is through financing, it is through the provision of foreign fighter trainers coming into ungoverned spaces and providing assistance to the Taliban insurgents. This though is not any kind of

outside state that is directing assistance to these groups, these are all nonstate actors.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank the witnesses for being with us today. Secretary Gastright, you used the phrase "drop the caveats" in your remarks, and, General Eikenberry, you talked about eliminating restrictions. Are we talking the same thing here? Let me start with you, Secretary Gastright. Are you talking about—when you say the caveats, these are caveats from the NATO participants that don't allow them to do certain things, is that right?

Secretary GASTRIGHT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KLINE. Yours is the same, General Eikenberry, is that correct, that you can't go into certain areas of the country or engage in certain kinds of operations as well, is that what you are talking about as well?

General EIKENBERRY. That is exactly right, Congressman.

Mr. KLINE. From anybody, what do you see as progress that is being made today toward getting rid of those caveats or restrictions. I don't know who to go to here, but clearly we are working on trying to change that. What is happening?

Ms. LONG. As recently as the Secretary Rice's visit January 26th in Brussels and as well as the CJSOR summit some of the countries pledged to reduce some of their caveats in particular when it came to coming to the aid of another country throughout Afghanistan. There were other offers made to lift or condition caveats in a more flexible way, and we are working with those countries now to get a firm commitment to lift the restrictions on moving their forces.

Mr. KLINE. Are we seeing progress? Do we like the feedback we are getting?

Ms. LONG. In CJSOR we did see some progress, in particular when it came to moving forces out of the north and some of the other countries to come to the aid of forces in the south and the east if need be.

Mr. KLINE. Then, General Eikenberry, just following up on that, what this tells me is that all the forces are not the same. We can list 26 countries or 36 countries or something and some countries have 2,000 or 3,000 or 200, but they are very different in what they are able to do, is that not correct?

General EIKENBERRY. Congressman, that is a very important point, that there is a question of numbers and then there is a question of the capabilities associated with those numbers or questions of, let's say, quantity and quality. So that is an important consideration.

Mr. KLINE. In some cases it is even capability in the sense that the soldiers from one country may be capable of doing something but if they are not allowed to leave the compound, pursue and so forth, that would translate into limited capability. So when you add the total numbers, that doesn't really tell you where we are and what we are able to do, is what I am getting at here.

General EIKENBERRY. Numbers, of course, numbers matter at one level because numbers are important in trying to generate forces. You do need to look at numbers at some level. But your point is an important one, that what kind of effects can you achieve with those numbers and those effects that you can achieve are going to be dependent upon a variety of factors, but the two important factors that you have addressed are operational restrictions, in which case they won't be able to receive 100 percent effects or they may have limitations in their equipment and training.

Mr. KLINE. Okay. We have had much discussion in this committee over the past several months, even years over a breakdown, I think what we see as a breakdown in the interagency process in this country back here in the States and deployed overseas principally in Afghanistan and Iraq where we are not able to communicate together very well.

I would like a comment on how that is working in Afghanistan, and just seems to me that that whole process, the problems have got to be greatly exacerbated by this issue we were just talking about where you not only have interagency perhaps failure to communicate but clearly you have this problem in different countries. I am almost out of time so a comment from anybody on how that interagency process is working.

Secretary GASTRIGHT. From this side, from the Washington angle, I think we have superb interagency coordination. I communicate with Ms. Long on a daily basis. Again, General Eikenberry refers to State and USAID colleagues as teammates so we are pleased to be on that team.

Mr. KLINE. I will accept that for now. That is something we will have to explore for another day. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Eikenberry, I want to direct my questions to you, two quick ones. Some weeks ago I saw a press report that some Taliban official was announcing the opening of Taliban schools in the south. Was that accurate or what is the significance of that? Do you have any comments about that? Just one press report I saw.

General EIKENBERRY. We think that we found that interesting, that the Taliban spokesman indicated that. The enemy—the kind of objects, the kind of targets that the enemy attacks tells us a lot about the nature of the enemy. The enemy over the past several years has attacked schools in Afghanistan. They have killed teachers in front of students; they have burned schools down; they have threatened parents with attacking their children in schools if they attend those schools. Why does the enemy attack those schools? It is because what the enemy fears is the opening of the mind. This is as Islamist extremist, militant, fascist movement and it is through the closing of the mind and through intimidation and fear that they hope to make gains.

And so as they look in Afghanistan now at the progress that is being made within Afghanistan, the remarkable expansion of social services that is occurring, some now six million Afghan children in school, two million of those are girls. There has been 14 universities opened over the last several years, starting from zero with 42,000 students and about 9,000 of those are girls. So the Taliban

fears this advance because they fear then the building of this middle ground of civil society and the opening of the mind.

So it was interesting; we took from that their statement that they are going to try to open schools is they wish to try to compete against that progress. Now what they teach in those schools we would disagree with.

Dr. SNYDER. I appreciate that comment, General. My question is are there areas that they consider to be safe enough havens that they have the ability to open a Taliban school and to be untouched by NATO forces?

General EIKENBERRY. Congressman, it is fair that I would think in parts of southern Afghanistan there could be remote districts where they may be able to do that, but it would not be a widespread phenomena.

Dr. SNYDER. My second question, if you could give a brief answer so I can get on the third question, when you fly out of here and head back to where you do all the good work that you do, when you look at money for road construction do you have adequate money for road construction tomorrow?

General EIKENBERRY. We do for eastern Afghanistan and southern Afghanistan if the fiscal year 2007 supplemental that we referred to is approved.

But the international community has to match these U.S. efforts. There has to be matching efforts throughout the rest of Afghanistan for us to achieve success. Throughout the country there is still an inadequate level of physical infrastructure investment.

Dr. SNYDER. We have had discussions before this committee within the last year, and somebody made a comment that the three priorities for Afghanistan ought to be roads, roads and roads as a key to economic development; and we are still hearing that.

General Eikenberry, you are one of the real thinkers in the military and have an incredible both experiential warfighting and academic background. Would you describe the progression of your thinking over the last five years with regard to the war in Afghanistan?

I don't think it has progressed like everyone hoped or thought it would. I would like to hear what your thinking has progressed to. And how do you think we have gotten to where we are today and where we are heading; how you see it for the next five years?

General EIKENBERRY. If I looked back to my first tour in Afghanistan in 2002 and 2003 and if I could go back in time and be able to, together with the international community and with the Afghans, do things differently, what were the surprises from that period of time, first of all, I would give four things.

The first would be the destruction that occurred to the physical infrastructure was beyond our imagination. We have, over time, now begun to address this, but the losses of the past 30 years were staggering.

The second and maybe more profound was the destruction to human capital and to civil society in Afghanistan that occurred over 30 years of warfare. So you have three generations without education. Very tragic.

And so the challenge of building the state to build the institutions of the state, the army, the police force, to build good govern-

ance, again it is the Phoenix we are trying to create, rising from the ashes. There are laws of physics and laws of nature. One law of nature is, it takes time to develop competent, disciplined, well-educated leaders. And so that is a real limit that we are facing.

The third is the regional nature of the threat. I talked about that in the opening statement. We have a challenge that has to be more effectively addressed. I know we are working hard at that.

Finally, more of a tactical point would be that we are working hard right now to develop the police forces of Afghanistan. We have a good, comprehensive program. The program as it began in 2002 was internationally led. It was a more narrow program that was focused just on training. As a result of that—because it wasn't ambitious enough, as a result of that, the police force of Afghanistan is several years behind the development of the army. We are paying some security prices for that.

Once again, the supplemental that has been proposed, we believe with the additional money we have a pretty good program structured that over the next several years we could see some important improvements in the police forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Snyder.

Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the members of the panel and those behind them. I always want to express appreciation for your valiant and gallant commitment to human freedom.

General, I know that, at least in my mind, there is no enemy that the armed forces of the United States cannot defeat on even terms.

That said, related to Afghanistan and the potential or the actual reality of insurgency from hidden protected areas of Pakistan and our rules of engagement related to that, if you can speak to that outside of the confines here, respecting any classified considerations obviously, what challenge does that present to the forces of the United States of being able to not only protect our soldiers, but to continue the effort to build and maintain peace in Afghanistan?

General EIKENBERRY. Congressman, I will address two aspects, inside of Afghanistan and then the regional aspect.

First of all, inside Afghanistan the enemy is not strong militarily. It is still a problem that the institutions of the state of Afghanistan are extraordinarily weak.

As you have pointed out, wherever U.S. forces and, I highlight, increasingly wherever Afghan national army forces who are taking more casualties than the NATO and U.S. forces are now, as they move to the front line of the fight, wherever they engage the Taliban, they defeat the Taliban. It remains very much a question of trying to advance the governance into ungoverned spaces.

I believe we are well postured now in early 2007 with the additional commitment of U.S. forces and combat power to make a big difference in the spring and summer. I truly believe this spring and summer it is not going to be a Taliban offensive; it is going to be a NATO offensive. However, I also emphasize that it was U.S. contributions that made that difference, and non-U.S. NATO needs to step up increasingly now.

With regard to the sanctuary issue, that requires that we move forward through a cooperative approach with Pakistan and with

Afghanistan. We have established what we call a military tripartite commission with Pakistan and Afghanistan, and now NATO has moved up and taken the lead in the place of the U.S.-led coalition. And we do have very good military cooperation with the Pakistani army along the border. We share intelligence. We coordinate our operations when appropriate.

But at the same time, we are still left with areas right now in Waziristan and areas inside of Pakistan where our strong belief is that midlevel and especially senior level command and control of the Taliban and al Qaeda is, it is hard space to get into. The Pakistan Government faces the same problem that is faced on the Afghanistan side: ungoverned space.

But our belief is that a combination of a comprehensive counterinsurgency approach by the Pakistan Government, which I know that President Musharraf and his Administration are trying to move forward with, with our assistance, and at the same time a steady, direct attack against the command and control in Pakistan in sanctuary areas is essential for us to achieve success.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, General.

Ms. Long, we have heard testimony in this committee that essential to winning any war is the ultimate need to break the enemy's will in a sense. And, of course, with the ideological enemy that we face in Afghanistan, and for that matter almost anywhere in the Islamic world, that is a big challenge because they look to break our will at home.

Sometimes it is the water on the inside of the ship that sinks us. With that in mind, can you speak to how you think the Afghan people are holding up? What is the index of their will to prevail to freedom, and how do you think terrorist elements in Iraq, or anywhere else, consider our own will and how do you think that those dynamics play out in the ultimate end here, the ultimate goal here?

Ms. LONG. My understanding from polling efforts undertaken under General Eikenberry's tenure in Afghanistan is that the Afghan people remain committed to a democratically elected government and have the very highest esteem for a central government, in concept.

President Karzai is still popular, and most Afghans are looking for a central government, for the infrastructure that is being built slowly to better their lives. That is a good thing.

Interestingly, the enemy, as Lieutenant General Eikenberry points out, is uniquely good at picking at small cracks in the disappointment, perhaps, of the Afghan people, not to see economic and development progress to the point where it impacts at the individual grass-roots level, to play upon that potential disappointment in order to reingratiate itself, and also to use fear and intimidation against the Afghan people.

One of the things that we discuss with our NATO and coalition partners is a strengthened effort to communicate strategically within Afghan not only what Afghanistan, the government itself, is doing for the people, but what the coalition and NATO countries are doing. Under Lieutenant General Eikenberry there was a great effort to get Afghan central leaders, including President Karzai, out to the villages to communicate that.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Adam Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will ask primarily about reconstruction and what the challenges are.

Following up on Representative Franks' line of questioning in terms of how the Afghan population is reacting and where the hearts and minds are at, there was a time a few years back when the criticism of President Karzai was that he was really the mayor of Kabul more than the President of Afghanistan. The outlying areas were not getting the support and reconstruction.

I am curious, from all of your perspectives, how is that going in the outer regions? How are the Afghan people responding to that? What is their level of sympathy for the Taliban? Focus not so much on what the Taliban is doing, but the fact that the current government is not providing for us, so we are looking at our options; how are we doing on overcoming that big challenge?

General EIKENBERRY. Congressman, I think we are doing quite well. Every poll, every survey of the Afghan people that is taken will come back with the findings that well over 90 percent of the Afghan people reject a return to Taliban.

Now, you have levels of frustration of the Afghan people with their government, but that does not equate to a desire for the return of the Taliban. You have areas in southern Afghanistan and eastern Afghanistan that were more traditional Taliban strongholds where there is sympathy with Taliban.

There are areas where misgovernance by the Government of Afghanistan has probably increased sympathy for the Taliban. But very broadly, there is very firm support for the Government of Afghanistan.

I think the Afghan people, almost all of them, believe that this is their moment now. They have had an unprecedented degree of international support, and they maintain that support, and their hope is still very much with the commitment of the international community to enable a modern, stable Government of Afghanistan.

Mr. SMITH. From an infrastructure standpoint, what are the Afghan people most concerned about? Picture it like the local city council: The garbage is not being picked up; the roads aren't built; there is insufficient security. What are they most concerned about? What do we need to address?

General EIKENBERRY. In Afghanistan, the answers were always the same to the question: What do you need? The Afghan people say, "We need roads," because roads permit security and social services and they permit an economy to develop.

Second, they will talk about power. And third, the provision of water.

And social services, the two are always schools and health clinics.

Mr. SMITH. Do either of you want to add anything?

Secretary GASTRIGHT. The supplemental request that has been submitted and the \$653 million that is in the State Department side of this supports those priorities exactly. The majority of the money is dedicated to roads. We have put additional resources into generating power. Six percent of the country has access to power; we want to shoot for 40 percent in the next couple of years so that we have the ability to generate a rural economy that can employ some of these young people.

There is a saying that Afghanistan is a country that grows tomatoes, but imports tomato paste. You can't run a rural economy on that that employs the masses of rural youth when you grow tomatoes, but import the tomato paste from across the border, from Pakistan.

So those are our priorities. Our resource requests line up exactly with what General Eikenberry identified.

Mr. SMITH. Are the Taliban and al Qaeda targeting infrastructure in any sort of similar way that they are doing in Iraq?

General EIKENBERRY. They are not. Interestingly, in Afghanistan, they do not target major physical infrastructure. There is one exception in Helmand Province where they put pressure on a critical dam renovation project. But in the main, they have not.

What they have attacked, they have attacked schools.

Mr. SMITH. Is that because they don't have the capability or is it that they are thinking that would alienate the population and be counter to their interests?

General EIKENBERRY. Our belief is the Taliban thinks it would alienate the population.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Joe Wilson, South Carolina.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

General, Secretary, thank you for being here today. I am particularly pleased to note that Secretary Gastright is a graduate of the Citadel in my hometown of Charleston, and I have a very high regard for the Military College of the South.

I have visited Afghanistan twice. I was so impressed by President Karzai; I have met with him here, and I was very impressed by members of their parliament. It is awesome to think that they have had the first free elections in the several years of civilization that have existed in that region.

Additionally, I was very impressed—I visited a provincial reconstruction team, U.S. and Korean. I saw firsthand efforts being made, working with local government officials, and I also had an extraordinary opportunity to fly out to Khowst to a forward operating base, Salerno. I was startled to learn there was a university in Khowst, I certainly didn't anticipate that, and to hear there are 42,000 students now in colleges and universities. That is a remarkable achievement that I wish the American people knew.

Additionally, I look forward to working with you. I am the co-chair of the Afghanistan Caucus with Congresswoman Jackson Lee and so we look forward to working for the betterment of the people of Afghanistan.

Additionally, I have a very particular interest in Afghanistan in that the South Carolina Army National Guard, the 218th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, is in training today at Fort Riley and Camp Shelby in preparation to serve in Afghanistan to work with the Afghan army and help train the army. I was in the 218th for 25 years, so I know of the wonderful, capable people of that brigade. They are looking forward to serving.

What I would like to know is, are the efforts of training the army and police making progress? What more needs to be done?

General EIKENBERRY. Congressman, first I would say that I am honored to be flanked by two Citadel graduates.

If I could say, first of all, about the 218th, sitting behind me is Major General Bob Durbin. He has been in command of the headquarters in Afghanistan, the U.S.-led headquarters that is responsible for the training and equipping of the Afghan national army and provides a lot of support to the police.

Major General Durbin just visited Fort Riley and had an opportunity to see the 218th, and he reported yesterday that they are doing extraordinarily well. We are looking forward to them deploying to Afghanistan.

Our main line of mission in Afghanistan is the development of the Afghan national army and police. How are we doing at that task? I think we are doing reasonably well at that task. I gave some statistics in my opening remarks.

With the supplemental that has been requested, I think we can make a lot more progress. The Afghan national army over the last several years, under the leadership of Minister Wardak and their chief have really worked hard in improving leadership. They are at that point right now where with higher levels of equipment, better kinds of vehicles, they are going to be able to take these on now. Their forces are going to be able to operate and maintain them, and they need this equipment in order to fight side by side and, increasingly, to lead the fight.

On the Afghan national police, it is tougher going. As I mentioned, a comprehensive effort to reform the police did not begin until late 2005, and over that four-year intervening period, the police force of Afghanistan established its own set of business practices which are not necessarily good.

We are trying to reform an organization which has been in existence for four years. On the other hand, there is a very good commitment from the Afghan political leadership to police reform. President Karzai's Administration very recently made a decision where 40 senior police chiefs, who were really, frankly, unqualified for the task of being police chiefs in a modern state, were replaced.

So they are showing signs of stepping up to do their part of the bargain which is to provide good leaders. And meanwhile, our end of the bargain is, given that, provide good training and equipment and facilities and support.

Mr. WILSON. I share your view of General Wardak. I met him, and I was very impressed.

What is the success of recruiting and retention in Afghanistan? Are their sufficient troops, persons available?

General EIKENBERRY. We have sufficient recruits available for the army and sufficient recruits available for the police. The challenge has been retention of those forces. We have made pretty good progress, and I give great credit to Minister Wardak and to General Durbin behind me here for the great work that has been done.

When General Durbin assumed command, the absence rate of the Afghan National Army was about 25 percent. Unacceptable. With good leadership reform and hard work by our forces, the absence rate now for the Afghan National Army is down to about 12 percent. We need to get it lower, but very significant progress.

The police, with the reform that is ongoing, I think we are also going to achieve better results in recruiting in that area. There is pay reform right now in the police, which is really helping, and I think we are going to do a lot better in the area of retention, but it is going to be slower than the rate of success we are having with the army.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Tauscher.

Mrs. TAUSCHER. General Eikenberry, Secretary Long and Secretary Gastright, thank you for your service.

I was in Munich this weekend at the security conference; lots of NATO countries and lots of our supporters in Afghanistan were there. I think that there is a heightened sense of immediacy to the fact we had better get it right this spring. We have gotten jumped the last two springs, the largest poppy crops ever grown, each year beating the last. But the idea of an offensive that we know is coming with the better weather and the opportunity for the enemy to come out of the Pakistan hills is obvious. It had better be our offensive because there is an offensive coming.

It is impressive to see how much dovetailing there is in your testimonies, and that makes me feel more comfortable about the inter-agency process.

My first concern, twofold, al Qaeda, Taliban. These terms are meshed together a lot. I consider the Taliban to be the indigenous version of the terrorists that ran Afghanistan and enabled it to be a platform from where the September 11 attacks were launched on the United States.

Can you, General Eikenberry, give us a sense for what the current definition and what the distinctions between Taliban and the al Qaeda are?

And, second, I want to know about Pakistan. If we do not have a better engagement with Pakistan, and if President Musharraf does not begin to step up more in these ungovernable territories, in the tribal territories in the western part of Pakistan and the eastern part of Afghanistan's border, it is going to be difficult if there is a place for people to hide and secrete themselves and rearm and regenerate themselves. It is going to be continuously hard for us to deal in the last offensive we hope to have, which is this spring.

I understand that President Karzai and President Musharraf right now are not talking to each other, very little cooperation. I know Secretary Gates was there yesterday trying to get this to be a little better. But both of these gentlemen are in terrible political situations themselves. Both have been attacked and have had assassination attempts.

Can you give us a sense of how you think the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship is going?

General EIKENBERRY. Representative Tauscher, I would first say with regard to al Qaeda and the Taliban that there is a symbiotic relationship between them, a complex cooperative relationship. I will give you one example. For instance, the Afghan Taliban leader Hakimi who was in Waziristan, in Pakistan, they direct attacks against Afghanistan. They also direct attacks against the Pakistan military.

At the same time, we see a relationship between them and foreign fighters. I would say over the last several years as some of the Taliban senior leadership has been able to reorganize itself, we have seen closer cooperation between the foreign fighters, the al Qaeda network, and the Afghan militant leaders.

Mrs. TAUSCHER. Is the Taliban, the Afghan version, almost the beachhead in Afghanistan for al Qaeda, and are they a fungible version? Are they virtually the same?

General EIKENBERRY. No, they are not. The extremist Taliban movement is focused on Afghanistan. The al Qaeda, the international movement, the aid-and-abet Taliban, international terrorism, I think their view is that the modern jihad was born inside of Afghanistan against the Soviets, and it has mutated since that time and become international and very deadly.

But international terrorists wish to maintain their presence inside of Afghanistan and Pakistan. They have no good options if they move out of that area. In that regard, Taliban provides a kind of assistance to them and security. They help with the training of Taliban and with the financing. But the international network that exists in that part of the world, their focus is global.

Congresswoman, the first thing I wanted to say with regard to Pakistan in terms of level of effort, let me make clear that over the last four years, the Pakistan army has had far more soldiers killed in combat against the same enemy who is attacking U.S. forces, NATO forces, and Afghan forces.

Mrs. TAUSCHER. If I can ask General Eikenberry to give us something in writing off the record, I would appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. If the gentlewoman would follow through on that.

Mr. Hayes.

Mr. HAYES. General Eikenberry, Secretary Long and Secretary Gastright, thank you for being here today.

I visited you in theater not that long ago. Adam Smith, he and I were down in Fort Bragg, the epicenter of the universe, and we visited with your teammate, Colonel Reeder, just a couple of days ago. I was with the colonel, Joe Wilson, on a recent trip.

There have been remarkable changes from the time that the chairman, Mr. Skelton and I were there with Ms. Pelosi a couple of years ago. It is remarkable what you and the men and women who serve have done; and to kind of cap that feeling off, to have members of the newly elected Afghan parliament appear in the gallery of U.S. House of Representatives and see how we conduct business. I am not sure what they took away from that, but that is remarkable, what you have done, and I hope people realize how important it is.

For a moment, as a general, as a man who has seen it all in theater in Afghanistan, help remind people what the enemy really looks like and help remind people that this is a war. It is not a political action or something that we are doing just because we want to keep our military busy.

But describe the enemy. Just pick a situation that you may remember. Joe talked about Khost. We saw in the newspaper a couple of days that Colonel Nicholson, there was some question about where artillery shells were landing. I didn't see any fences over

there, so it is kind of hard to tell, but just remind people what the enemy looks like. If they are coming in from Waziristan, what would their tactics be if they captured somebody?

General EIKENBERRY. I think, Congressman, to give several examples, we are against an enemy that about six months ago, it fired rockets into a school in Asadabad and killed eight schoolchildren in order to try to intimidate the parents and shut the education down.

It is an enemy that took an uneducated young man with no hope, no employment and trained him to be a suicide bomber, and then to attack one of the greatest governors of Afghanistan, a patriot living in Australia who came back to Afghanistan with no more dream than to help the Afghan people recover from this brutal occupation and civil war, and they jumped onto his vehicle to kill him and intimidate the Afghanistan people.

That is the nature of the enemy we are fighting. It is an enemy that seeks to intimidate and impose its stark ideology on Afghanistan. If they succeed, the United States is at risk again.

Mr. HAYES. I think it is important again to emphasize what we are up against. It is not conventional rules of engagement. These are terrorists.

We talk about expanding the government and projecting it outward, which is vitally important in Afghanistan. But as far as I can tell, the enemy would love to project their reign of terror, fear, killing, beyond Afghanistan.

Let's just say hypothetically, we turn Afghanistan over to them. Would that satisfy them? Would they stop there?

General EIKENBERRY. No, they will keep moving. We can walk away from Afghanistan. If we walk away from Afghanistan, the terrorists will follow us to the United States.

Mr. HAYES. I wish people could have been with Joe Wilson and me, as were others that night, on the top of the United States embassy having a meal with these legislators. It was reminiscent of a county commission meeting because here were these elected officials with cell phones communicating with their provinces, "We have a problem over here; how are we going to fix it?" again, progress is happening.

One last thing, the revenue in Afghanistan, people have talked about roads. Their only tax is on trade. So if there is no road there is no trade; there is no border and no duty, and they can't support education, police and so on and so forth. So again, given the chance, people know what the enemy looks like. They would love a crack at us as well.

General EIKENBERRY. Congressman, I agree. The nature of the enemy, all they have to do is get through and kill a teacher. How long does it take us to build a school and train a teacher? So it is a tough war that we are in, and it is back to time, patience and commitment; but if we give it to the Afghans, they will prevail.

Mr. HAYES. And doesn't bother them at all to kill that teacher.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank each of the panelists for their testimony and for their service to our country. It is truly appreciated.

Secretary Long, in your statement you note that both Afghanistan and Pakistan must cooperate against extremists in both countries to end the insurgency in Afghanistan and to reverse increased extremist influence in Pakistan. And you then go on to describe the trilateral dinner agreements.

If Pakistan were to be doing everything we wanted it to do to help defeat the terrorist activity, what would that be? What are they failing to do today that we want them to do?

Ms. LONG. I think, as General Eikenberry pointed out, I would like to preface my comment by the reality that Pakistan has suffered more casualties as a result of its assistance against insurgents than arguably any other force. And in fact on a daily basis, Pakistani military, frontier corps, and other related organizations, border guards, are striving to close the border and to contain the insurgents.

One cannot answer that question without being a realist regarding the Pakistani domestic political situation. President Musharraf has a dynamic and diverse political constituency of many different parties and many different tensions. There are Pakistani elections coming up next year, and he is walking a tightrope, as we see in all of these developing countries, with many different voices speaking loudly. That is the nature of a messy democracy and one that we should continue to support, much like our own.

In a nutshell, the continued participation of Pakistan in the tripartite is going to be valuable, particularly as NATO assumes a growing role in that organization.

Border arrangements along the east, and in particular in northern Waziristan, need to be tightened and increased.

I think you have heard both Afghanistan and Pakistani leaders talk about sealing the borders. In Quetta, we are concerned regarding the Taliban and other leadership that are in Baluchistan and other tribal areas, who continue to manage and direct Taliban and al Qaeda activities. Activities against those will be needed. Any shuras the Taliban are continuing to drain, madrassas and camps, particularly those camps in the tribal and federally administered tribal areas (FATA) areas, we will need action against those.

Mr. ANDREWS. I very much appreciate the specificity of your answer. Thank you.

This committee has responsibility for and authority over some significant military relationships between our country and Pakistan. We value those relationships; we want them to continue. But frankly we would like to use whatever influence we have to try to move the Pakistanis closer toward the goals you have enumerated. I say that in full recognition of the sacrifices that Pakistan has made and the acute difficulties President Musharraf faces, but I do want to know where the goal line is.

Secretary Gastright, you used an interesting phrase, that "Afghanistan grows tomatoes, but imports tomato paste." if the optimal result were to occur in the economic development of Afghanistan over the next five years, what would Afghanistan's principal exports be?

Secretary GASTRIGHT. It is going to be a rural-based economy for years to come. A large segment of the population is based on some form of agriculture. But really agriprocessing is the next step in

this process where they can do light manufacturing and export those things out of their country on the new roads that we are trying to build.

Mr. ANDREWS. Collectively, are you satisfied that we are properly emphasizing in our development aid technology an infrastructure that will help develop that agriculture potential? And are we investing in the right industries in Afghanistan to help achieve that result?

Secretary GASTRIGHT. Again, it is more foundational than that. It is really, develop the roads so the farmer can get his crops to market before they turn into mush. It is, develop the power system so there can be cold storage so it can be properly packaged and shipped out.

Mr. ANDREWS. One question for the record: I would ask if the witnesses could submit their data on the cost of training Afghani military personnel and police personnel, submit that to us for the record. Thank you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 78.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Before I call on Mr. Turner, I must leave the chair to repair to the Chamber, and I will ask Mr. Marshall to assume the gavel, if I may. We will have in the near future two votes. I would hope that we could resume after those two votes.

Excuse me, there are four votes. I hope that the Chair under Mr. Marshall's gavel can resume the hearing subject to the witnesses' availability.

Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

I want to thank you for your hospitality when I visited Afghanistan in August. I had a gentleman from my office who, when we invaded Iraq, got up from his desk and went and signed up for Special Ops training and was ending his first tour in Afghanistan, and you were kind enough to assist me in meeting up with him in Konar Province. I appreciate your assistance in doing that.

I learned a great deal about the operations that were ongoing and our efforts in training the Afghan national army, and the issues that you raised when I was there continue to be issues raised in this hearing.

I understand the number of casualties that Pakistan has sustained. It certainly shows a level of commitment. Nonetheless, when I was in Afghanistan, one of the issues and concerns that was raised was the border of Pakistan being a sanctuary. If we are pursuing individuals and they cross over to Pakistan, our ability to continue their pursuit and/or to receive assistance from the other side, how that can be both an impediment for us; and if there is not appropriate action that is being taken on the other side, it can exacerbate the difficulty of our pursuing and holding accountable those who are trying to disrupt Afghanistan.

The second item that was raised is the support that you need in order to continue your operations, specifically those that come from unmanned aerial vehicles. The Iraq drain certainly has an impact on the resources that have been available to Afghanistan and how you see that trending or what you see needs to be done.

I want to echo the thanks for the service of each of you in what is clearly a very important task that you outlined for us. It is not just the issue of Afghanistan; it is an issue of the war on terror and our efforts to be victorious.

General EIKENBERRY. Congressman, on the cross-border issue, I would like to make clear—and I think you understand this—our forces have the necessary authorities that are required, that when we come under threat regardless of where the threat comes from, that we have the necessary authorities to protect our forces and to attack.

In fact, we have very good cooperative relations with the Pakistan military along the border. We share common radio systems. We meet frequently. We have good protocols that have been established. So along the border itself, we are reasonably confident that we have a good, cooperative approach and we certainly have the necessary authorities.

The nature of the threat that we are talking about when we talk about command and control is located not directly along the border area, and I should probably not go much further than that in talking in this open forum about that.

I would be ready, of course, Congressman, in another forum to answer any questions if you wanted to go into in more detail.

Mr. TURNER. Is that different than in August?

My impression in August was, there was a concern with the issue of the border of Afghanistan representing a sanctuary where troops that were fighting can go and restock and rest and receive retraining, then only to come back again; and that lack of cooperation did impact our ability to be successful.

General EIKENBERRY. No, let me clarify what I said, Congressman.

That the enemy is able to move across the border. It is a very difficult border to control. And so the enemy does come from areas deeper inside of Pakistan and they can project across that border.

I was talking in the border area itself when our forces are under threat. But the threat itself does not sit right at the border area; the threat sits off of the borders. Our ability when we are in direct contact with the enemy or under threat, we fight effectively. We have the necessary authorities and we coordinate well with the Pakistani military. But the nature of that threat sits farther back.

Mr. TURNER. I understand. Thank you.

General EIKENBERRY. Second, with regard to reconnaissance capabilities and our intelligence gathering, I think every commander in the field in today's world would tell you they need more of what we call persistent ISR, or intelligence surveillance reconnaissance, capabilities, especially a capability like the Predator. No commander has enough of it. Sure, we could use more of it in Afghanistan.

The second shortfall that I think we all face is capability to exploit some of the intelligence that we gather. Here in particular I am talked about trained Pashtu linguists who are capable of listening in on the Pashtu language and the Dari language, and that is a shortfall we still face today.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MARSHALL [presiding]. We are going to have to break for votes. I think Mr. Skelton intends that we get back together, and I am going to have ask, do we have an estimate when votes will be over with? It is certainly not going to be before 12:30, would you say?

I don't think we will reconvene before 12:30. Maybe that gives you an opportunity to grab something to eat and come back in. I don't know how many people will be coming back. I think there will be some additional questioners.

General, first of all, I very much appreciate the time we have spent together on different occasions and how candid you are and how thoroughly you understand what is going on over in Afghanistan. And I appreciate the service of all of you.

General Eikenberry, on page five of your testimony you have got a very interesting and perhaps troublesome paragraph. You describe the long-term threat to campaign success is the potential irretrievable loss of legitimacy of the Government of Afghanistan. You say, "The accumulated effects of violent terrorist insurgent attacks, corruption, insufficient social resources and growing income disparities, all overlaid by a major international presence, are taking their toll on Afghan Government legitimacy. A point could be reached at which the Government of Afghanistan becomes irrelevant to its people and the goal of establishing a democratic, moderate, self-sustaining state could forever be lost."

I won't read more of your testimony, but I have the impression that you think that is imminent and could occur fairly soon. I guess, you know, it causes me to think about the history of counterinsurgencies and that is essentially what we are in right now.

That history of counterinsurgencies is one that suggests that these things take a long time to deal with. It is not a one- or two- or four-year process, it is a 10- or 15-year process. And it does appear as if the Taliban and al Qaeda, particularly the Taliban, are determined here, that they are not going to back off, and that they are resurgent in a sense.

I am wondering whether or not we have got here—and I would like your opinion about this—we are facing a situation in which the government shortly is going to lose its credibility and then, if what you say is correct in this paragraph, we are going to lose the ability to win this conflict.

We tend in our conflicts generally to move too quickly, to try to do too much too fast. I had the impression in Afghanistan we weren't doing that, we were moving along in due course and we weren't creating a whole bunch of vacuums, for example, and we were prepared to rely upon local warlords, or jirgas, and what have you, and not simply say they are all gone, we have one fiat, and it is the Afghan Government, and Karzai is more than just the mayor of Kabul.

Can you talk about that dilemma, that we have vacuums and we do have an insurgency and they typically take a long time, and yet you have this problem of the government's credibility facing us?

General EIKENBERRY. Congressman, several years ago we captured a Taliban commander and when he was being interrogated, the commander was saying that the Americans wear watches, but

the Taliban has time. This question of time, patience and commitment, generational kind of effort, I think that is understood by all of us.

I want to clarify, when I talked about the longer-term threat, I am not talking about imminent here, I am talking about three, four or five years from now. The reason I highlight that is because I think we are making great progress in many domains, especially in the Afghan security forces. We are making progress, as I indicated, just through the statistics that we have provided in terms of aspects of governance and the development of social services and economic reconstruction.

I think the areas that do need to be addressed urgently, because if you address them urgently you do not start to translate urgent address into effects on the ground for a year or two years, is in the area of a comprehensive justice system.

Police are inadequate; police are one component of a justice system. We talk about cops, courts and correctional institutes. We have a pretty good system right now for the delivery of police. We need a complementary effort over the longer term that starts to deliver courts and starts to deliver correctional institutes.

Governance is another instance. We have a great training program for Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. We don't have a complementary program yet from the international community for the training of Afghan governance.

And then the final area that I have already highlighted is within the area of counternarcotics. A lot of effort is being applied in trying to pull together the very strands of the counternarcotics effort in a coherent manner, and that still remains a challenge for us.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, sir.

We are going to go ahead and adjourn until 12:30. It may be a little after 12:30, but certainly you have until 12:30.

[Recess.]

Mr. MARSHALL. Call the meeting to order again, the hearing to order again. I will note for the record that both the Chair and the ranking member are from Georgia, so I am pleased to recognize Mr. Gingrey. I think it is your time for questioning.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you for acknowledging the fact that we have got the opportunity for two Georgia peaches up here at the same time. Of course, I would like for the seats to be reversed, but be that as it may, I appreciate the Chairman recognizing me.

Let me thank our witnesses, Madam Secretary, Secretary Gastright and, of course, General Eikenberry. Your patience for being with us and for returning, and you have done a great job this morning, and I know the hour is getting late, so I appreciate that.

General Eikenberry, I think I will confine my questions to you, and I have got two questions. The first, in regard to Operation Medusa, back in August of 2006, in which NATO ISAF forces removed the Taliban fighters near Kandahar and the British forces then entered into a peace agreement with local tribal leaders whereby the tribes would secure the main town absent NATO.

So our forces essentially, as I understand it, went in, they cleaned house, and they left the local tribesmen to keep order. Doesn't this seem counter-intuitive? And how were the British

forces able to unilaterally enter into this agreement? I mean, they are working under NATO, this is a NATO ISAF force, and I am sure a cohesive force, but what gives some countries the opportunity to operate on their own accord if indeed this was the case? That is the first question I wanted to ask.

Second, President Karzai has expressed an interest in a long-term United States military presence in Afghanistan. Do you think a long-term U.S. and/or NATO military presence is required to attain security and stability in the country? And if so, for how long? You hear that often; I am sure you have been asked that before. What are the criterion for determining when the Afghan national security forces are capable of independently maintaining security and stability?

So if you want to take the last one first and then go back to the question about what happened in Operation Medusa.

General EIKENBERRY. Thanks, Congressman. With regard to the presence of the international military forces, U.S. forces, success in Afghanistan is going to be measured over progress one year at a time, and there is much that remains to be done. What I would say, though, in terms of defining the levels of our presence, the key condition will be the progress that the Afghan national security forces make, the army and the police forces. And therein, going back to the request for the supplemental, this \$5.9 billion requested for fiscal year 2007, we believe very firmly that with that kind of investment and then, in fiscal year 2008, about another \$2.7 billion investment, that the Afghan national security forces will start to advance to a point that, whereas currently they have to remain very tethered to coalition forces because we have so many of the capabilities that any military needs to fight that they don't have yet, our sense is they will advance to a level that, beyond that point, we can start to adjust our forces and, very importantly, we start to save a lot in terms of operating expenses.

It costs about \$15 billion a year for us to maintain our U.S. forces in Afghanistan. So look at this as a good trade.

Congressman, beyond that, beyond that next several years, we are still going to, I believe multiyear beyond that, have to look at a significant presence of trainers and mentors for the Afghan national security forces. Ultimately those levels are to be decided by of course the government of Afghanistan in consultation with us.

Now if I could turn to what you referred to about the combat operations in southern Afghanistan. I know I don't have much time. Briefly, the first operation you talk about, Operation Medusa, that was primarily a Canadian, U.S., Afghan national army police operation in southern Afghanistan, successful combat operation, but there was an inadequate plan to maintain security past the operation it conducted. Frankly, that is a challenge that U.S. forces have had, lessons that we have had to learn over time, so it was a good operation, but there was an inadequate security perimeter that was placed out, and then that forced NATO to have to go back in, but successful combat operations.

The agreement that you are referring to with the British forces in Helmand Province was centered around a town named Musa Qala. That was an agreement that was done in consultation with the government of Afghanistan, the terms of that agreement ap-

pear now to have been broken, clearly, by the Taliban. And I think that appropriate actions look like they will be taken by the government of Afghanistan with NATO support now to deal with that security situation.

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you. Thank you, General.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. MARSHALL. I recognize the gentlelady from California, Ms. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of you for being here and certainly for sticking with us this afternoon. I wanted to follow up on Mr. Marshall's question, really, looking at some of I think your words, General, and I can understand what you said is that, while there is great concern about the people's ability or their confidence in their government, that this is really a longstanding issue and one that may not be resolved in the short term but at least has room to grow, if I am characterizing that correctly. I appreciate that.

I was wondering if you could help us, though, and perhaps even the other witnesses to understand and sort of characterize that, what we call winning the hearts and minds of the people there and their ability to, I think, sustain some of the activities that are going on and to push back against those who would bribe them for not cooperating. There was a story on, I think, CNN last night about an aid worker who was suggesting that. How would you characterize that?

Are we able to gain intelligence from local people, and are we being as smart as we can be in working with some of the local warlords, recognizing that there are issues, such as the drug trade, that get in the way of some of that activity?

General EIKENBERRY. Congresswoman, what we have learned over time and now over six years in Afghanistan is that key to success is a sequential approach moving into what I have characterized this morning as this ungoverned space. The first is to contact local leaders. We have talked about shuras, tribal leaders, the leadership with Afghan character, unique Afghan characteristics, and talk to them about what the needs are in their areas.

What they will always come back with if they are threatened by criminal elements, extremists, their question is going to be, are you going to stay when you come into the area? That has been a lesson we have learned over time, and now I think we are very firm in our doctrine.

So if you can convince the people you are going to stay with good security, then their next question is then, how will you differ from the extremist elements? How will you differ from the criminal elements? And that gets to provision of good government social services.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Are we aware of that or is it true that the general population is being bribed to not cooperate?

General EIKENBERRY. Congresswoman, in places where the extremists are trying to gain influence, have influence, they are being intimidated to not cooperate, and that gets back to the first question the people always have, if you come into the area, are you going to stay? Because if we don't stay, and leave, then people will be murdered for cooperation with the government of Afghanistan.

So I think we have got the right approach right now. We always need more means in order to deliver back to the non-military means. Roads, the delivery of roads and a health clinic can be more decisive than an infantry battalion of Afghan National Army or U.S. forces.

I use the term, though, about hearts and minds, et cetera, that for us, the international military force, the U.S., our center of gravity in Afghanistan is actually with the government of Afghanistan, trying to help them develop a government that in turn allows that government to affect the hearts and minds of their own people.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. If I could turn to a follow-up question on the interagency cooperation as well. We certainly have had some experiences in Iraq that differ, I hope, from those in Afghanistan with our provisional response teams there as well. How have we then found the skill sets available, whether it is in the State Department, the aid community, to be able to raise the level, I think, of confidence of the people that we are dealing with there? What has been different? Do we have linguists in the area that are actually able to communicate directly? And what more should we be doing to enable that program really to be as strong as necessary?

General EIKENBERRY. Congresswoman, the amount of interagency cooperation we have in Afghanistan is unprecedented, excellent teams that we form between the military, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the USAID. The challenge we have in Afghanistan is that, when we talk about this kind of special expertise that is needed for reconstruction and development for government programs, there we have shortages.

We need more agricultural experts, we need more justice experts. I can go on. So the ability to develop an expeditionary capability, so to speak, within our government that can deliver—

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Is it because people aren't able to or willing to be there to answer those needs? What is the problem?

General EIKENBERRY. I think there is a shortage of the available expertise to deploy.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Mr. MARSHALL. Let me move to Mr. Ellsworth from Indiana.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all of the witnesses for being here today. I will jump right into the questions. General Eikenberry, there is a little bit of talk going on this week about surges and upping the troops. My question to you will be very direct: If you had the sole say, would we surge troops in Afghanistan to combat what we are hearing is the Taliban, al Qaeda, making a stronghold or increasing themselves there? And should we, could we, might we expect a call for a surge in Afghanistan in the near or the next couple of years?

General EIKENBERRY. Congressman, the decision that was made by the President and the Secretary of Defense to extend the presence of a brigade of infantry of the 10th Mountain Division which was due to redeploy back to the United States now but is now being extended for 120 additional days even while their replacement forces arrive on schedule will make a profound difference in NATO combat capabilities over the next several months.

There is further consideration now being debated over even a further extension of forces or additional forces over that 120-day

period, not the same brigade, but that will make a very significant difference. I believe that it will give the NATO commander the amount of forces that he needs to deal very effectively against the threat, indeed will allow him to conduct offensive operations.

But I will say, as I said again this morning, that is a commitment that is made by the United States, not U.S.-NATO forces. Additional non-U.S. NATO forces and capabilities are required in Afghanistan consistent with the political agreements that NATO has made and made last year to provide forces and capabilities to levels that they have not achieved.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you. All three of you talked about and voiced support for the supplemental increase. My question, in my short time here in Congress, I have been talked to by several members of the armed forces talking about shortages in equipment; planes that we can't fly at top speed, boats, submarines. A variety of equipment. And yet we all talk about the supply.

Seems so many of these relationships are based on dollars. Haven't we experienced that—I support the foreign aid, but how many of these friendships have we seen that ended after our dollars ran out or that they have turned and used those dollars after we have supported them with billions of dollars, turned against us once the checkbook closed? I would appreciate a comment on that, please.

General EIKENBERRY. Well, I can only talk about the investment that we are making, Congressman, here inside of Afghanistan. It is in our vital national interest to succeed in Afghanistan. Failure to succeed in Afghanistan would permit a return to the state that Afghanistan existed before our homeland was struck on 9/11, struck by an enemy that occupied 90 percent of Afghanistan, enjoyed open sanctuary there and plotted the attacks against our homeland in the United States of America.

So we have a firm alliance with the Afghan people, with the Afghan leaders, and I believe that we are achieving great progress there, and I have every bit of confidence in the years ahead that the Afghans will be very strong allies of the United States of America.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I would only add to that that with the reports we get on accountability and weapons coming up missing and just that we do due diligence to keeping those weapons in our hands and in our friends' hands and not to be turned against us. I would yield any time, unless you have a comment to that.

General EIKENBERRY. Thank you, Congressman.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you very much.

Mr. MARSHALL. The gentleman from the great State of Georgia, Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for your service to your country and also for appearing here today. Today, the testimony was that we have made tremendous progress in Afghanistan over the last six months. However, at a January 30th briefing here at this committee, Ambassador Karl Indurfurth stated in his testimony, quote: Half measures in Afghanistan by the United States and the international community are failing to provide security, rebuild the country, or combat the exploding drug trade. They are also threatening to undo what progress has been

made since U.S.-led military forces toppled the Taliban from power in 2001. Indeed, much has been accomplished since the Taliban were overthrown, but it is also true that Afghanistan is still very much at risk. The Taliban and their extremist allies have made a powerful comeback, especially in the eastern and southern parts of the country. Afghanistan remains the world's leading drug supplier of opium. Corruption is on the rise. And many Afghans are asking, five years after the international community arrived, where are the promised roads, the schools, the health clinics, the electricity, the water? U.S. and NATO officials are predicting heavy fighting in the spring and say that Afghanistan is facing a bloody year in 2007.

I am paraphrasing Ambassador Indurfurth's statement. And also, Ambassador James Dobbins in his statement to this Committee on January 30th said that Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry the senior U.S. commander in Afghanistan reported in early 2007 that the number of suicide attacks had increased by more than 400 percent, from 27 in 2005 to 139 in 2006; remotely detonated bombings had more than doubled, from 783 to 1,677; and armed attacks nearly tripled, from 1,558 to 4,542. This violence led to more than 4,000 deaths in Afghanistan last year. Last year was by far the bloodiest year in the country since 2001. Today the Taliban has infiltrated villages in the south and east of Afghanistan and are expected to mount major operations in Kandahar, Helmand and other provinces this spring. Their ability to use Pakistan as a sanctuary has been critical. Interviews with U.S., NATO and U.N. forces indicate that the Taliban regularly ship arms, ammunition and supplies into Afghanistan from Pakistan. Most suicide bombers came from Afghan refugee camps located in Pakistan. Components for improvised explosive devices are often smuggled across the Afghan-Pakistan border and assembled at safe havens in such provinces as Kandahar. The degree of official Pakistani complicity in this insurgency is a matter of some controversy. Speaking in private, knowledgeable U.S., NATO, Afghan and U.N. Officials are nearly unanimous in asserting that the Pakistani intelligence service continues to collaborate with the Taliban and other insurgent groups operating out of its border regions.

Having said all of that, I want to ask a question: Did the huge focus of U.S. political, military and economic support in the war in Iraq necessarily divert attention away from Afghanistan. And the second question is, what are we doing to ensure that Pakistan is not doing what we accuse the Iranians of doing, and that is arming our foes.

Ms. LONG. I think that we would agree that many of the problems that you articulated from Ambassador Indurfurth and Mr. Dobbins are continuing problems, and we have tried to outline those problems in our statements. That is not to say, however, that Afghanistan hasn't made terrific strides in the last six months.

Mr. JOHNSON. Does the war in Iraq divert our attention?

Mr. MARSHALL. Use the microphone, Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am sorry. Did the war—did we divert our attention and resources away from Afghanistan into the war in Iraq at the peril of the war in Afghanistan?

Ms. LONG. No, Congressman, we did not. In fact, the program and programmatic in Afghanistan have been in compliance with

the campaign planned. In fact, the campaign plan that Lieutenant General Eikenberry and the embassy and the Joint Interagency developed some years ago and in fact the transition to NATO and coalition forces has been and indicates steady progress in increasingly allowing NATO and ISAF and, more importantly, the Afghan security forces to play an increasing and more important role in governing its own territory.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. Ms. Long.

Now the gentlemen from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the witnesses for their endurance and I want to compliment General Eikenberry and your description of what is at stake in Afghanistan, how important it is to our security to make sure we succeed there.

I wanted to ask, though, about a report that was in the press yesterday, actually, that read, the headline: U.S. artillery rounds target Taliban fighters in Pakistan. It was describing some remote outpost where U.S. troops were firing artillery into Pakistan, which again it appears it was in complete self defense and totally justifiable in terms of the safety of our troops. But the article sort of goes on to pinpoint an agreement that the government of Pakistan reached with the Taliban and Waziristan as sort of a problem in terms of increasing rather than decreasing the number of attacks that are coming from I guess it is southern Afghanistan, if I read the stories correctly.

I was just wondering if you could comment in terms of whether those criticisms of that agreement that the government of Pakistan made are in fact worsening the situation rather than improving it.

General EIKENBERRY. Congressman, the agreement that you are referring to is the so-called North Waziristan Agreement negotiated by the government of Afghanistan with tribal leaders in the North Waziristan area. The North Waziristan area is part of what is called the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Historically still today it has a great deal of autonomy and challenges in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas with, as we would call it, ungoverned space and lack of government control.

So the agreement that was reached with the government of Pakistan was an effort to try to bring security to the area. The broad outlines of the agreement, the characteristics of it we were supportive of in terms of, the agreement did not allow for insurgents to use North Waziristan to cross over and attack Afghanistan, did not allow for the presence of active foreign fighters.

Now how has the agreement played out? Since that agreement was negotiated on the 5th of September, there has been problems with it. Indeed, if we were to compare the same periods of time since that agreement, same months to one year ago, the amount of cross-border attacks, what we would think are suicide bombers coming across the border from North Waziristan, those have increased anywhere from two times to three times as much over that same period of last year. You want to compare month-by-month because weather changes, and as the weather starts to set in along the frontier, of course incidents are going to go down.

So the agreement to this point has not achieved the results that we were expecting of, hopeful for, and there still remains a very significant threat against our forces and indeed against Pakistani forces emanating from North Waziristan.

Secretary GASTRIGHT. General Eikenberry described previously President Musharraf's frontier initiative, and the North Waziristan Agreement was a part of one of the pieces of this initiative, which has three pillars. It has an economic development pillar. It has a security pillar, where he is trying to inject security forces into this very rugged terrain, which is considered one of the harshest environments in the world to operate in. And then, finally, it has a political pillar.

This agreement was designed to be part of that political pillar to gain the consent of the governed, and as General Eikenberry indicated, it has not been completely successful. The Pakistanis have said it hasn't reached their expectations as well, but they remain committed to finding solutions and one of those solutions will undoubtedly involve the use of security forces to compel compliance.

Ultimately, the vision is, squeeze out extremists, squeeze out the terrain that the extremists operate in today. And we support the overall frontier strategy as a way to develop that. It is a classic counter-insurgency campaign.

Mr. COURTNEY. Again, I think you described the sacrifice that the Pakistanis have made, which has to be acknowledged and recognized. And obviously, the government is in a very precarious position politically as also was described, but it does seem that the description that Secretary Gates gave yesterday of success in that area was maybe a little overstated, given the fact that we are actually at the point where we are actually firing artillery into that area.

Again, I appreciate your answers. Certainly there is a concern. We don't want conflicts widening rather than trying to control them.

General EIKENBERRY. If I could just briefly comment on that, Congressman. I would like to emphasize that along the border, again, the military cooperation communications between the Afghan army, our Army, NATO and the Pakistanis is excellent. The enemy effectively crosses over the border and crosses back. When we make contact with that enemy, we are in close coordination frequently with the Pakistan military and take actions in coordination with the Pakistani military to attack the insurgents who are our enemies and their enemies.

So the idea then of a cross-border attack with artillery, that is something that could be done in conjunction with the Pakistan military.

Mr. MARSHALL. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Sestak.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you. I apologize. I swore when I got elected I would sit through all the hearings. Great record, huh. I apologize if these questions have been asked.

General, can you tell me if Iran is being helpful in Afghanistan?

General EIKENBERRY. Iran has traditionally had a cultural influence and an economic influence in western Afghanistan, and some of the economic modernization and reconstruction that western Afghanistan is experiencing today, experienced since the fall of the

Taliban regime, which was an enemy of Iran as well, is very much due to——

Mr. SESTAK. So you would say some of their interests there are not dissimilar to ours?

General EIKENBERRY. I would say that I believe that—I don't want to speak for Tehran's leadership. I don't suppose to define their intentions, but our assessment is that Iran does not desire to see a return of a Sunni——

Mr. SESTAK. So is it wrong to say that, at times, Iran can have interests similar to ours? Do it for different reasons, but they want stability there, correct?

General EIKENBERRY. Strategically, our belief is that the Iran regime is broadly supportive of the Karzai Administration. Clearly, the Iranian——

Mr. SESTAK. Do we work at all with Iran, sir?

General EIKENBERRY. They have an interest as well in fighting narco trafficking. It is also fair to say that Iranian intelligence maintains active collaboration with Taliban as a kind of hedging strategy against the NATO and against the United States.

Mr. SESTAK. I am sorry to interrupt, they only gave me 30 minutes. A.Q. Khan, Mr. Secretary, are we going to have access to him? If not, why not? We are working well with Pakistan; aren't we?

Secretary GASTRIGHT. The key is access to the information. And we have close coordination with Pakistani intelligence agencies to that information and the desire, obviously the goal of both our government and the government of Pakistan——

Mr. SESTAK. I hate to interrupt. How do you know the information they are giving us is accurate?

Secretary GASTRIGHT. We have been able to shut down the A.Q. Khan network as a result of that.

Mr. SESTAK. So we have an instance where something has proven to be good. But we are not going to have access to him?

Secretary GASTRIGHT. At this time, again, my information is we have excellent collaboration that the information is yielding positive results.

Mr. SESTAK. This one was probably already asked; how are we going get any other NATO countries to try to change the rules of engagement?

Is that yours, ma'am?

Ms. LONG. Yes. Most recently, Secretary of State Rice and the Secretary of Defense recently met with NATO, the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels and most recently in Seville. We have gotten some initial indications of some additional support. We haven't gotten enough, quite frankly, and we are going to have to continue to push.

Mr. SESTAK. General, the last one is, do you think you have enough troops to deal with the spring offensive?

General EIKENBERRY. That is a question, Congressman, more appropriately for General Dan McNeill. I will say, though, that based on my experience on the ground, the commitment that the United States has made with the President and Secretary Gates announcing the decision then to keep a combat brigade of the 10th Mountain Division inside of Afghanistan for yet another 120 days will

give the NATO forces sufficient combat capability that indeed they should be able to take the offensive now from what has traditionally been a period of time in the spring when the Taliban surge, and I believe NATO forces will dominate.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you. I think your comment was very well done, for whatever it is worth, in your testimony where you say we need the strategic investment and capabilities in order to accelerate progress. I was on the ground in Afghanistan two months after the war began, brought my carrier battle group back, took a left turn, went to that tragedy in Iraq, came back and was on the ground in Afghanistan 18 months later for some short period of time. And some senior military officer said, we have our finger in the dike because our resources and attention were turned toward Iraq. That is one of the tragedies of Iraq, I think. I do think if something needs a surge in troops, it would be Afghanistan, to try not to have this country slip aside a second time from having been impacted by our policy here in the United States. I do think these words were right. Thank you.

Mr. MARSHALL. I thank the gentleman.

There are no further witnesses—pardon me, there are no further questioners at the moment. If the witnesses have just a little bit longer, I have an observation and perhaps question.

General, in describing the Waziristan agreement you suggested that perhaps it wasn't working very well because the number of suicide bombers had increased coming across the border during this month, et cetera. I was struck by that kind of argument, and the reason I am is because it doesn't prove one way or the other whether the agreement is functioning well. It would be that, absent the agreement, the number of suicide bombers that would have come across the border, instead of doubling, would have quadrupled.

Something else needs to be used to determine whether or not the agreement is functioning appropriately than reference to those kinds of statistics, it seems to me. Do you have anything else that suggests that we are having additional troubles from the tribal region there?

General EIKENBERRY. That is fair, Congressman. The metric that I am using is, of course, the one that we are most directly concerned with, which is the force protection of our forces and our Afghan national allies. But other indicators that we have about challenges of the North Waziristan Agreement, we have seen indicators of further Talibanization politically within towns and villages of north Waziristan. We have seen instances of moderate leaders, moderate tribal leaders within Waziristan, North Waziristan, who have been executed or assassinated by militant extremists. We have also seen aspects of al Qaeda perhaps gaining more strength in North Waziristan. And I could go into a separate forum, Congressman, and lay out more, but it had—that analysis that I gave did have more than based upon just attacks on our forces.

Mr. MARSHALL. I understand. Do any of the members present have additional questions for the witnesses?

Admiral.

Don't force yourself. I am sure they are not anxious.

Mr. SESTAK. I did write down four others, but I am just grateful for letting me have time here at the very end.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. MARSHALL. I thank the witnesses, and this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:18 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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**A P P E N D I X**

FEBRUARY 13, 2007

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

FEBRUARY 13, 2007

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**TESTIMONY FOR**  
**MS. MARY BETH LONG**  
**PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR**  
**INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS**  
**U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**  
**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**  
**Tuesday, February 13, 2007, 1000 hrs**

Thank you for your invitation. It has been more than six months since my last testimony on Afghanistan. In that time there have been many significant military, political, and economic developments. I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak to about Afghanistan again, especially so soon after a recent visit there by Secretary Gates.

**MUCH HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED**

The Secretary's focus during his trip was to ensure we are seeing advancements and setting the conditions for continued progress in Afghanistan. As you know, there has been much visible progress in Kabul. President Karzai, elected in 2004, has popular support and continues to have broad-based legitimacy throughout Afghanistan and the international community. Although the government is still maturing, the people have, as a whole, committed themselves to the idea of a democratically elected government. The Afghan National

Assembly has proved to be an impressive symbol of Afghan governance. Though many observers feared the Assembly would serve as a vehicle to legitimize bad actors, the group had an impressive first year: it has confirmed Cabinet and Supreme Court appointments, passed a national budget, and reviewed Presidential decrees.

Equally impressive has been the increased commitment of our allies. To echo Secretary Gates' comments, it is remarkable that over three dozen countries have determined that Afghanistan is important to their national interest. And it has been a largely successful commitment: on October 5<sup>th</sup> of last year, NATO's International Security Assistance Force completed the expansion of its mission, three years after it took the decision to seek command over all of Afghanistan. ISAF, currently commanded by U.S. General Dan McNeill, is supporting stability, security, and reconstruction throughout the country with combat forces and 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams. ISAF also executed the successful Operation Medusa which thwarted a significant Taliban attack on the city of Khandahar this past fall, demonstrating ISAF's willingness to stand, fight and defeat a major Taliban attack.

Though our allies are taking a larger role, we cannot forget that the backbone of our efforts in Afghanistan is a U.S.-Afghan partnership that is growing stronger, both strategically and operationally. We consider the partnership enduring. Next month, a USG delegation will travel to Kabul to

continue the important work begun in 2005 with the signing of the Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership. During a visit last month to the Forward Operating Base Tillman, Secretary Gates met with U.S. and Afghan National Army forces; and saw first hand how they live together, how they work together, and how they fight together. In fact, the Afghan National Security Forces, soldiers and policemen, trained and equipped with Allied support are approximately 90,000. They are taking the lead at an increasing rate on operations to secure their country and form a foundation that other national institutions can emulate and build upon.

#### **MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE**

Yet, with all of this progress, the new Afghanistan is still vulnerable. This past summer, the Taliban launched an aggressive campaign of violence against Afghan and international forces in the south and east. This spring, we expect the Taliban will attempt to leverage both real and propaganda gains from 2006, as well as operating from improved safe havens, to launch a stronger offensive. The Taliban do not need to win in traditional military fashion in Afghanistan to achieve success – they only need to undermine the Afghan people's sense of security and confidence in their government.

Much of our success in Afghanistan comes from the fact that we are operating in a generally benign and supportive operational environment. The vast

majority of Afghan citizens welcome our presence and our efforts. The Taliban seek to turn the population against us this spring. We will not let that happen.

To support the new democratic government in Kabul, we have conducted a review of our overall policy and are adopting a complete approach that works to integrate military efforts with political support, counternarcotics programs, a development agenda and regional diplomacy. If there is to be an “offensive” this spring, it will be our offensive, and it will be comprehensive.

However, in spite of the clear warning signs of increased Taliban activity, NATO forces need to do more to fully prepare. Many allies have provided forces for Afghanistan but have tethered them by restrictive national caveats which do not allow the NATO commander the flexibility to deploy forces as he sees fit. NATO still has shortfalls in meeting its force requirements and still needs effective mechanisms to coordinate and facilitate assistance to the government of Afghanistan. Secretary Gates, during last week’s Defense Ministerial in Seville, discussed these deficiencies and their impact on our efforts in Afghanistan in very candid terms. We will continue to work within NATO to remedy these shortcomings and will work with our partners to generate the political will necessary to make the difficult choices required for success.

#### **SHIFT IN THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT**

This past year's increase in violence and narcotics production represents a shift in the strategic environment. Taliban presence and strength have grown in some areas of the country, especially in the South, and the relatively weak institutions of the GoA enable insurgents to operate in the absence of a government or coalition presence. As a result, the United States, in cooperation with our ISAF partners, must accelerate and increase our efforts in order to achieve the desired effects of extending governance, increasing prosperity and providing security in Afghanistan.

In the security sector, the shift in the strategic environment highlighted the need to revise and strengthen the ANSF training and equipping program. The \$5.9B requested in the FY07 GWOT Supplemental and the \$2.7B requested in the FY08 GWOT budget request will enable the ANSF to respond to the resurgent Taliban by accelerating the pace of our ANSF train and equip program and expanding the size and capabilities of these forces. The ANSF needs to be a professional, capable, respected, multi-ethnic, and sustainable force. The ANSF we are building must be less reliant on international forces presence in the long term and more capable of independently bringing the fight to the Taliban.

The 'build' phase of the accelerated programs for both the ANA and ANP will require significant upfront investment, primarily for infrastructure and equipment, which we are looking to fund primarily through the \$5.9B FY07 Emergency Supplemental and complete with the \$2.7B FY08 GWOT budget

request. Our focus in the out years will then shift to sustainment which we estimate at approximately \$2B annually.

### **Afghan National Army**

The program to train and equip the ANA builds on the current success. The Afghan Ministry of Defense, through effective recruiting and ethnic integration has created a national army that is representative of Afghans of all backgrounds. Additionally, the Ministry should be praised for its effective efforts to decrease its absentee rate, now reduced to an average of 12% from a high of 38%, as well as its largely successful program to ensure new recruits are properly vetted. ANA soldiers have fought bravely side-by-side with the international forces and won the respect of the Afghan people, despite less reliable weapons and weaker force protection. Building upon the strong foundation established at the Ministry level, the acceleration program will arm Afghan soldiers with reliable and more capable weapons including assault rifles, machine guns, and mortars. Soldiers will also receive body armor, Kevlar helmets, armored vehicles, and advanced first aid kits to ensure care for those who are injured.

The full 70,000 person force of 14 brigades will include better capabilities such as a small, but capable air corps that will significantly increase the Army's combat mobility and agility. Six battalions will receive specialized training to

become the rapid response Commando Battalions, focused on the counterinsurgency mission. In addition, the Army will now include combat support units, including engineering units, military intelligence companies, and military police.

#### **Afghan National Police**

The revised program recognizes that a more robust police force is required for the mission and also seeks to help the police catch up with the Army, which has received more U.S. attention and resources to date. The Departments of Defense and State plan to train and equip an expanded force of 82,000, which again will build upon important strides made in the last year at the Ministry level. The Ministry of Interior, with help from U.S. and international mentors, is in the final stages of completing reform of its pay and rank system. As of last week, thirty two of Afghanistan's thirty four provinces will have instituted an electronic pay system which will have a critical impact on recruiting and retention for police. Additionally, the Ministry of Interior is making strides in culling bad actors from its senior ranks. This clear initiative on the part of the Afghans will again form the basis for our accelerated program which will now include enhanced specialized units to address some of Afghanistan's key issues.

One example of these units, the Counternarcotics Police (CNP-A) program, will be accelerated to develop a force modeled on the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. The CNP-A will target drug traffickers and producers, improving

Afghanistan's interdiction capabilities. This year and next, we expect to complete helicopter deployments to support the CNP-A's National Investigative Unit, improve overall investigative capacities, and expand the reach of the CNP-A to regions outside of Kabul. The Afghan Border Police (ABP) also will receive additional capabilities and equipment to improve its ability to perform its mission. This increased Afghan capacity to arrest major traffickers and remove corrupt officials linked to trafficking will be essential to helping the Afghans address the scourge of illicit narcotics that threatens the foundations of this young government.

Additionally, a new unit will be established to fill a gap in ANP capability. The Civil Order Police (COP) with tactical gear, improved force protection, and specialized equipment, will be the rapid specialized response force for civil emergencies like the May 2006 Kabul riots.

It is important to note, the international community also has a role in building the ANSF. The U.S. cannot achieve or sustain these ANSF objectives alone. Millions of dollars of equipment have been donated by countries for both the ANA and ANP, but it falls far short of what is needed and what has been pledged. Germany has played a key part with its police training program, and ISAF countries contribute Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) that embed with trained ANA units to provide in-the-field mentoring. These teams are critical, and we are working with NATO to fulfill its pledge of 69 teams as it

explores near and long-term ways it can do more to assist with training and equipping.

We recognize that security alone will not win in Afghanistan. To complete the transition from terrorist safe haven to a moderate, independent state, Afghanistan will need infrastructure, economic development, and improved governance and services. To that end, the Commander's Emergency Relief Program (CERP) funds are a key element of our military strategy in Afghanistan. CERP provides the commander with the funds required to bring needed assistance and reconstruction to areas that have been affected by conflict. Unlike other U.S. or other international community resources, CERP provides a quick impact and demonstrates immediate benefits to the people of Afghanistan.

Aside from addressing the threat to Afghanistan by building internal security capacity and facilitating reconstruction, we are working to address regional actors as well, notably in Pakistan. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan must cooperate against extremists in both countries to end the insurgency in Afghanistan and to reverse increased extremist influence in Pakistan. Despite some indications of greater cooperation, cross-border insurgency remains a problem. We are working to build on the Presidents' tri-lateral dinner agreements from September by encouraging the planning and coordination of the agreed Joint Jirgas to address the border areas and by supporting Pakistan's Frontier Strategy for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). We are increasing our

engagement with Pakistan and encouraging the international community, especially NATO and individual contributors to ISAF, to do the same.

### **WAY AHEAD**

But these challenges are manageable. We are making steady headway in Afghanistan. We can secure our gains and continue to make progress. In the near-term, this requires us not only to respond to the Taliban offensive, but also to enforce a decisive setback to the Taliban. Such gains in the security sector will enable progress towards a moderate, stable Afghanistan which is so essential to our strategic security. Consequently, we must continue to make progress in all sectors. For the Afghan National Security Forces, this will mean an increase in size and capabilities of the forces. To lead, the ANSF must be trained and equipped to face their enemy. This development must also be accelerated to ensure that the Afghans have the right capabilities in place to respond to an adaptive enemy. While the Afghans have the will, they need the continued commitment, expertise, and assistance of the international community to succeed. It is imperative now for the United States and the international community to deliver on those pledges and ensure the people of Afghanistan see an improved and secure quality of life now and for future generations. Continued success depends upon timely Congressional support for this supplemental request, and I look forward to your questions.

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STATEMENT OF  
LIEUTENANT GENERAL KARL W. EIKENBERRY, U.S. ARMY  
FORMER COMMANDING GENERAL  
COMBINED FORCES COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN  
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
AN ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN  
FEBRUARY 13, 2007

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
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**Opening statement of Lt. Gen Karl Eikenberry  
Former Commander, Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan  
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee  
13 February 2007  
Washington, D.C.**

**(As prepared for delivery)**

Chairman Skelton, Congressman Hunter, members of the Committee.

Having just departed from Command of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan, my second tour of duty in Afghanistan, it's an honor to provide the Committee an update on the mission there, and to represent the 27,000 American Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen Marines, and civilians who are performing brilliantly in Afghanistan day in and day out. Commanding Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan was high privilege for me, and I can honestly say that my 21 months of command were the most rewarding tour during my 33 years of service. Headquarters, Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan was recently inactivated, as part of the reorganization of US headquarters, in light of NATO assuming theater-level operational control across Afghanistan.

My update today will include a broad discussion of campaign progress to date, a current threat assessment and an outline of four major areas that I believe are essential for campaign success.

When the United States and its Coalition partners began Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001, we entered a broken country suffering from nearly 30 years of strife, with infrastructure destroyed and human capital devastated, riven by factionalism, with no economic viability. Our mission was twofold: First, defeat Al-Qaeda and their Taliban militant extremist allies; and second, together with the Afghan people and the international community, help create the conditions where international terrorism could never again find witting support and sanctuary.

Progress in Afghanistan, when viewed in the broader perspective, is an inspiring story ... even if individual snapshots can bring discouragement. Indeed, viewed from the baseline of October 2001, the progress made to date is truly significant: a moderate Constitution, a democratically-elected president, a sitting Parliament, a confirmed Cabinet, Afghan National Security Forces that are steadily growing in strength and capability, a dramatic increase and expansion of key social services, and ongoing reconstruction projects across the country that are improving the lives of the Afghan people. For example, since 2002, 622 schools have been constructed or refurbished and across Afghanistan there are over 5.3 million school-age children

enrolled in schools, a five-fold increase from 2001, and girls account for more than 34% of school attendees. Furthermore, 632 clinics or health facilities have been constructed or refurbished, and 82% of Afghans now have access to health care, up from just 8% in 2001, with 7.3 million children having been vaccinated against polio. Economically, whereas the Gross Domestic Product in 2002 was estimated at \$4.08 B, it is now estimated at an impressive \$8.9 B. I would also note that this growth represents a significantly higher rate of increase of the licit economy over the illicit (poppy) economy.

Against this progress, we continue to face major challenges, some of which we did not predict in late 2001 and 2002, such as a reconstituted enemy, the slow growth of governance capacity, and the cancerous effects of the narco-economy. Today, Afghanistan remains the target of a determined insurgency, drug traffickers and a hardened criminal element. Not all violence can be attributed to the Taliban or al-Qaeda, as narco-trafficking, tribal conflicts and land disputes also add to the overall security challenge. But the most significant near-term threat to campaign success is the insurgency focused in southern Afghanistan, directed by the former-Taliban regime leadership that has reconstituted itself. Tough and near-continuous combat operations over the course of the summer and fall of 2006

throughout southern Afghanistan by US and non-US NATO forces, partnered with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), defeated Taliban forces on the battlefield. However, remote areas currently out of reach of the Afghan government and international reconstruction activities remain vulnerable to enemy influence and control.

The long-term threat to campaign success, though, is the potential irretrievable loss of legitimacy of the Government of Afghanistan. If the Afghan Government is unable to counter popular frustration with the lack of progress in reform and national development, the Afghan people may lose confidence in the nature of their political system. The accumulated effects of violent terrorist insurgent attacks, corruption, insufficient social resources and growing income disparities, all overlaid by a major international presence, are taking their toll on Afghan Government legitimacy. A point could be reached at which the Government of Afghanistan becomes irrelevant to its people, and the goal of establishing a democratic, moderate, self-sustaining state could be forever lost. Our center of gravity in this campaign is not the people of Afghanistan--it is the Government of Afghanistan; we need with more urgency to build Afghan government capacity and help connect it with the Afghan people. The key question is: "Is the Government of Afghanistan

winning?" In several critical areas--corruption, justice and law enforcement, and counter-narcotics--it is not. Moreover, to the extent that the government is not seen as winning, both regional and internal actors will adopt hedging strategies that will, in turn, further weaken the state.

To overcome these threats and achieve campaign success, there are four major areas which I will outline: NATO command, the transition to Afghan leadership, the need for non-military means, and the regional nature of terrorism and insecurity.

First, since I last appeared before this Committee, the Afghanistan mission has undergone a number of significant evolutions. Most important of those was the 5 October assumption of command by NATO's International Security Assistance Force, (or NATO-ISAF), of the Afghanistan-wide international military mission. The smooth, effective transition from a US-led Coalition to a NATO-led alliance was a hallmark success of 2006, and was due to the extraordinary teamwork displayed between the Afghan Ministry of Defense, NATO-ISAF, and the US-led Coalition.

The US provides the majority of combat forces and critical military capabilities to NATO-ISAF in Afghanistan, while the US

military continues its leading role in executing the missions of counterterrorism, the training & equipping of the Afghan National Security Forces, and support for the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan through the Army Corps of Engineers.

By any measure, NATO and NATO-ISAF have achieved much since August, 2003 when the Alliance undertook the limited ISAF mission confined at the time to the greater Kabul area. The Afghanistan operation has now grown into what is clearly the most ambitious in the Alliance's 57-year-old history, marking its first ever deployment outside European borders. Militarily, NATO-ISAF, currently comprised of some 36,000 personnel from 37 nations (26 NATO members and 11 other partner nations), has demonstrated capable nation-wide command & control, conducted effective offensive counter-insurgency operations, and proven supportive of US military counter-terrorist operations. Moreover, NATO's presence has significantly complicated the task of Al Qaeda and Taliban militant extremist propagandists. Their enemy is no longer simply the US; the war must now be waged against a powerful international military alliance operating under a UN mandate.

Since NATO-ISAF assumed responsibility for all counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan this past October, it has conducted

operations which focused on objectives that ranged from protection of Non-Governmental Organizations employed in reconstruction work, to offensive disruption of insurgent safe havens, to maintaining freedom of movement on the pan-Afghanistan Ring Road, to promoting governance and development.

At the same time, NATO must fulfill its commitments to provide sufficient forces and capabilities to the mission, must increase its level of support to the training & equipping of the Afghan National Army and Police, and must eliminate operational restrictions, or so-called caveats, that some nations have placed on units that they have deployed to Afghanistan.

With regard to NATO's future, the long view of the Afghanistan campaign is that it is a means to continue the transformation of the Alliance. Some say that failure in Afghanistan could "break" the Alliance. The converse is also true; success in Afghanistan could "make" the Alliance, with real military transformation being driven by NATO's experiences fighting a difficult counterinsurgency. The Afghanistan campaign could mark the beginning of sustained NATO efforts to overhaul Alliance operational practices in every domain: command & control, doctrine, force generation, intelligence, and logistics. Indeed, the US can facilitate selected Allied

nations' military modernization using Afghanistan deployments as the readiness goal.

The second major area essential to campaign success is the transition to Afghan leadership. While important in every domain, I will concentrate on our US military task of developing the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), along with the National Directorate of Security (a rough equivalent of a combined FBI and CIA), are all steadily gaining strength and have achieved impressive levels of vertical & horizontal integration under Coalition mentorship. Today, over 32,000 Army and 62,000 police are trained, equipped and engaged in security operations. The ANSF, partnered with NATO and Coalition units, are expanding their reach and presence throughout Afghanistan. They are increasingly playing a major role in ensuring the stability of their nation, as evidenced by their successful participation in every NATO and Coalition operation this past year.

We have established in concert with our Afghan partners an effective and quality training base for their Army. For instance, we are now expanding Basic Training class sizes to over 2,000 soldiers per cycle. Afghans are finding pride in

serving in the ANA. Afghan units are directly in the fight, bravely serving side by side with NATO-ISAF forces. We see continuous evidence that unit combat skills are improving, and they are developing competent and confident leaders. Most importantly, individual and unit pride and esprit de corps are growing. Special programs such as the training & equipping of a Commando force are receiving international support and will greatly add to the overall capability of the Army.

The ANP includes Uniformed and Auxiliary Police, Civil Order Police, Border Police, and Counter-Narcotics Police. Reform of the Ministry of Interior and its police force is underway. Recent positive steps include President Karzai replacing 40 provincial police chiefs and other senior officials. In addition, overall pay and rank reform are progressing and on track. Police operations are improving and partnership opportunities with US Military Police units and Special Forces are being developed.

It is imperative that the international community maintain its support and commitment to the building of this essential institution of the Afghan State--the ANSF. As mentioned earlier, there are equipment requirements for the ANA and ANP

and requirements for training teams that NATO and the international community need to address.

The third major area essential to campaign success is the provision of sufficient non-military means. While we have enjoyed success with the assumption of the Afghanistan mission by NATO and in the development of ANSF, Afghanistan's continued development will depend on simultaneously increasing emphasis by the Government of Afghanistan and international community on the non-military aspects of our mission. These non-military efforts are the heart of our long-term effort to make Afghanistan a viable, self-sustaining member of the international community free from international terror. In short, we must rebuild Afghanistan's "Middle Ground"--that is, its civil society, ravaged by three decades of warfare, extremism, and terrorism. Throughout Afghanistan's 34 provinces, rebuilding the "Middle Ground" remains the primary concern of the Afghan people. According to a recent survey, almost 90% of the Afghan people consider reconstruction and economic development the most important requirement to improve their quality of life. We have enjoyed some important success in building that Middle Ground. But in the areas of governance, justice, counter-narcotics and economic development, the International Community must provide more resources. These efforts must include increased capital

investment, technical and functional experts in relevant areas, and sufficient numbers of managers capable of planning and executing resource-intensive, multi-year programs. This is not to say that excellent efforts have not been made in all of the above areas; the fact is, that the scale of problems are more immense than originally assessed and program implementation in Afghanistan is extremely difficult work.

For example, reconstruction efforts to date in Afghanistan have been nothing short of remarkable, but daunting challenges remain. In a campaign such as this, the construction of roads and infrastructure can be just as decisive as military actions. The US Army Corps of Engineers' Afghanistan Engineering District (AED) has partnered with USAID and our Provincial Reconstruction Teams by executing \$55M worth of roads and infrastructure in 2006. In 2007, AED will execute nearly one-billion USD worth of projects ranging from the construction of hundreds of facilities for the ANA and ANP, to providing hundreds of kilometers of new roads. Yet to truly expand the reach of the central government, thousands of kilometers of more roads are needed.

Importantly, the Government of Afghanistan today maintains broad popular support, and political discourse is guided by constitutional processes--not by the rule of gun. In addition,

pledges for international support for Afghanistan are significant. At the London Conference in January 2006, 64 nations pledged over ten-billion USD over the next five years to Afghanistan's reconstruction & development. With additional US contributions to the ANSF and economic development expected in early 2007, the totals will be even more impressive. Underpinned by what is assumed to be NATO's multi-year commitment to Afghanistan's security, the Afghan Government, partnered with the international community, has the clear potential to achieve victory. However, increased US and international resources must be urgently applied to those critical areas that in the long-term threaten our campaign center of gravity--the Government of Afghanistan.

The fourth and final area essential to campaign success is understanding and effectively dealing with the regional nature of terrorism and insecurity. The fact that terrorism is not bound by borders drives us to examine the region surrounding Afghanistan as we work to eliminate a common threat. We cannot win this fight in Afghanistan alone. There are common interests in the region that we can use to leverage cooperation; for instance, the growing narcotics trafficking industry threatens the populations of all Afghanistan's neighbors as well as Eurasian and European nations, and will require the cooperation

of all affected countries to counter. Economic development in the region will be key to thwarting the insurgency, as much of the enemy force is drawn from the ranks of unemployed men looking for wages to support their families.

Pakistan faces similar internal challenges, including militant extremism that grows in ungoverned space. Pakistan is working hard to address the growing threat of Talibanization within its own borders, as well as contributing extensively to the global war on terror. Pakistan's military and security forces have taken significant casualties against the same enemy that we in Afghanistan face.

As we work toward improving governance, economic development and security in Afghanistan, we must maintain and strengthen cooperative relationships with Pakistan. Continuing to build a closer and friendlier Afghan-Pakistani bilateral relationship will bring benefits across a broad spectrum encompassing governance, economics and security. Helping Pakistan and Afghanistan find political solutions to their problems will help us reach success in our own campaign.

However, I do emphasize that Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership presence inside Pakistan remains a significant problem that must

be satisfactorily addressed if we are to prevail in Afghanistan and if we are to defeat the global threat posed by international terrorism.

In closing, allow me to emphasize that we are now at a critical point where a strategic investment in capabilities is needed to accelerate the progress toward the desired goal of helping establish a moderate, stable, and representative Government of Afghanistan. The shield behind which the institutions of the Afghan state are developing, a shield now provided by our NATO forces, can eventually be provided by the Afghan National Army and Police. However, this requires significant resources, commitment, and patience. In particular, NATO and the International Community must now also make greater long-term military and non-military investments to ensure success.

We are carrying out the extraordinarily difficult tasks of trying to build a values-based Afghan National Army and National Police Force while simultaneously fighting a war. The FY07 Supplemental investment proposed by the Administration would permit the Afghan Army to continue to expand to the Bonn-agreed level of 70,000, and enable the Afghan National Police to increase to 82,000 by the end of calendar year 2008. That Supplemental appropriation will also equip the Afghan National

Army and Police with the protection, firepower, weapons, enhanced training and mobility to meet the insurgency threat. As the ANSF grows in capacity and capability, we can accelerate the defeat of the insurgency and extend the government's influence across the country. With the Afghan National Army on a solid path toward independent operations, the ANP force is now our leading priority.

In addition, the Administration's FY07 supplemental request also would permit a significant increase in spending for roads, power, and a level of economic development, especially in those areas most affected by the ongoing insurgency. I believe this request, if approved, will effectively address important aspects of the non-military means required for success that I addressed earlier.

The leadership of Afghanistan is committed to being an active partner in the Global War on Terror for the long-term. The Afghan people and their nation's leaders are worth our investment, and it is in the US national interest to gain and keep a partner and a friend we can count on in this critical region of the world. US, NATO-ISAF and Afghan forces are serving brilliantly under the most challenging and hostile conditions, from the extreme cold and high altitudes of the

Hindu Kush to the unforgiving heat of the red desert in summer. But, if we fail to see this mission through with the international community, Afghanistan will again become an open breeding ground and sanctuary for international terrorism from which terrorists will reconstitute and follow us to our homeland to strike us again.

Please accept my deepest thanks for your continued support of our great Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, Marines and civilians who are ensuring our security 8,000 miles from here. Their sacrifices, and those of their families, continue to enable the Government of Afghanistan to pursue its goal of a secure, free and stable nation. It was a privilege and honor to serve with them. I look forward to your questions.

**STATEMENT OF JOHN A. GASTRIGHT  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL  
ASIAN AFFAIRS  
AND  
COORDINATOR FOR AFGHANISTAN**

**BEFORE THE  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

**FEBRUARY 13, 2007**

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

Let me begin by noting how honored I am to appear today with Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry. As commander of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan, General Eikenberry has been an invaluable leader and partner in our efforts in Afghanistan, and throughout his tenure has fostered and maintained excellent partnership with the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. He and Ambassador Neumann have formed a superb team and we will certainly miss working with him in the field. We are confident that ISAF Commander General McNeill will continue the tradition of close civil-military cooperation that has been so essential to our success thus far.

This afternoon you will be hearing from General Eikenberry and my colleague from the Defense Department about the extremely challenging spring we face in Afghanistan and the military efforts we are making to counteract the Taliban and other elements working against the Government of Afghanistan, the United States and our Allies. My State Department colleagues and I share this assessment. In the face of these challenges, we are better prepared this year to tackle the threats we face than we were last year. U.S., Afghan and Allied partners have more tools in our toolbox than ever before. While we face tremendous challenges and there is so much more to be done, we start 2007 in a better position, with more police, more Afghan National Army troops, more ISAF troops, better governance, more roads, and more development projects – particularly in the south – than we were in one year ago.

With these tools and five years of experience under our belts in Afghanistan, we have made the strategic decision that we will not sit back to

wait for our enemies to attack us. Instead, we are taking actions now to threaten, squeeze and otherwise disrupt those who oppose the ever growing Afghan Government. In essence, if there is going to be a spring offensive, it will belong to the Government of Afghanistan, the United States and our international partners.

This summer the interagency conducted a strategic review of our policy in Afghanistan to understand what was working well and what needed refining. We studied the successes of this summer whereby parts of Afghanistan, especially in the east, were successfully stabilized when military action was followed closely by good governance – including competent governors and police – and economic opportunity. Integration of all of these elements in a comprehensive manner has produced sustainable results, whereas military success without the follow-on political, economic and development efforts often led to merely a temporary calm.

We also clearly recognized that the international community, including the United States, needs to increase its level of support, join together in endorsing and implementing a “comprehensive approach,” and focus even more sharply on the needs of the Afghan people. We believe that if we take this comprehensive approach and put it to work in more of Afghanistan we will see increased stability and a strengthened Afghan Government presence across the country.

To enable this comprehensive approach, on January 26 Secretary Rice announced a request for more than \$10.6 billion in new assistance over the next two years, including more than \$6.7 billion in the FY 2007 supplemental and more than \$4 billion in FY 2008. That assistance, which will go to both reconstruction and the development of Afghanistan’s security forces, is vital not only for success this spring but also to help secure long-term success for the Government and people of Afghanistan. We hope that the Congress will support this request in its entirety.

The United States is determined to do our part, but our Allies in NATO and elsewhere need to do more as well. NATO needs to meet the requirements it set when taking on the NATO mission in Afghanistan and drop the caveats that hamper our cooperation and effectiveness. This is the message that Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates have taken to recent NATO Ministerials in Brussels and Seville. We have seen positive offers from a number of countries increasing their commitments to Afghanistan, but we

would like to see even more and will continue to talk with donor nations about what they can do to support the Government of Afghanistan.

We are also working closely with the Government of Pakistan to identify additional actions it can take to help disrupt the Taliban this spring. They are serious about this effort and have demonstrated it with a number of important activities designed to deal with militants using their territory, such as raids and attacks in the border regions in recent months against both Taliban and Al Qaeda targets. The Pakistani military continues vigorous operations and is taking casualties in this fight against this mutual enemy.

Mr. Chairman, although we have come a long way in Afghanistan, no one seeks to underestimate the challenges ahead. Our international partners and the Government of Afghanistan expect the United States to lead the way in the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan. The strong, long-term U.S. commitment that we display is making the difference, and it must continue with intensity.

We at the Department of State appreciate all that your committee does to support this most important endeavor. Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before this committee. I look forward to taking your questions.

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**QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE  
RECORD**

FEBRUARY 13, 2007

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### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER

Ms. TAUSCHER. Characterize the US-Pakistan relationship in the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda: What is the level of cooperation, success, areas that need improvement? How serious/effective are Pakistan's efforts?

General EIKENBERRY. Pakistan is a critical partner in the global war on terror, and has made significant sacrifices in the fight against Islamist terrorism. Pakistan has lost over 500 soldiers since 2001 in this fight. Pakistan has also captured many high-level al Qaeda and Taliban operatives. Pakistan provides significant logistical support for U.S. operations in Afghanistan. NATO and American operations in Afghanistan would be extremely difficult to conduct without the active cooperation of Pakistan.

Pakistan has 80,000 Army and Frontier Corps troops based along the border with Afghanistan, and recently transferred two Army brigades from the Indian border to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which is a demonstration of its serious commitment to the war on terrorism.

More can be done. A number of senior Administration officials, to include the Vice President and the Secretary of Defense, have visited President Musharraf to press for greater Pakistani action against terrorists operating in Pakistan's territory bordering Afghanistan.

Pakistan's capabilities, particularly those of the Frontier Corps, could be improved. The Frontier Corps, whose officers are seconded from the Army, is raised among Pashtuns in the FATA and is theoretically the best force to conduct counterinsurgency operations against Taliban rebels operating in the FATA and then across the border in Afghanistan. The Frontier Corps lacks basic communications and target acquisition capabilities, particularly night vision capability. DOD views enhancing the Frontier Corps capability as a major supporting effort for our troops in Afghanistan.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Characterize the Afghan-Pakistan relationship in the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda: What is the level of cooperation and where are there problems?

General EIKENBERRY. The relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan is strained. The Afghans blame insurgent violence on Pakistan. Pakistan has approximately 80,000 security forces positioned in the frontier areas adjacent to Afghanistan. They cite the inability of coalition forces to deliver security and development into the Pashtun dominated areas. The Government of Pakistan (GOP) appears to be doing everything it can to secure the border. Unfortunately, true border security calls for dealing with a powerful Pashtun tribal influence that more often sides with the Taliban than the government. Since 2001, the GOP has worked to gain access to the tribal areas through a series of military and political engagements. Direct military confrontation only served to embolden the tribal elements and resulted in significant combat losses for Pakistan's military, who are considered a "foreign" force in the tribal areas. Nevertheless, a military contingent continues to occupy the tribal areas and along the immediate border. Only recently have diplomatic efforts begun to achieve results when South Waziristan Agency (SWA) militants with Pakistani military support expelled AQ sympathetic Uzbek fighters from SWA. The GOP views accountability as key to true border security and despite Afghanistan's objection, initiated construction of a border fence in March. Other accountability measures including biometric monitoring again met Afghan resistance. On a diplomatic front, the GOP considers bilateral agreements with Afghanistan key to securing the border and both parties have agreed to discuss future and ongoing efforts during talks in Turkey. Pakistan and Afghanistan have demonstrated an ability to work through complex, controversial refugee and military issues using Tripartite forums with the United Nations and United States. Defeating the insurgency in Afghanistan requires that Pakistan and Afghanistan work together to develop shared solutions to the many factors contributing to the insurgency.

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ANDREWS**

Mr. ANDREWS. I ask if the witnesses could submit their data on the cost of training Afghani military personnel and police personnel.

Secretary GASTRIGHT. In fiscal year 2006 Combined Security and Transition Command Afghanistan executed \$108.6 million of Afghan Security Forces Funds in the training Sub Activity Group (SAG) for Afghan National Army. For these dollars, Combined Security and Transition Command Afghanistan provided medical training, property book training, management training program, English language training, embedded trainer support, and a mentoring program. This included the training of 9,616 new Afghan National Army soldiers.

Additionally, Combined Security and Transition Command Afghanistan executed \$425 million of Afghan Security Forces Funds in the training Sub Activity Group for the Afghan National Police. For these dollars, Combined Security and Transition Command Afghanistan provided basic police training, tactical training initiative, provincial police training, field police training, criminal investigation training, instructor training, tactical driving course training, mentors, operational maintenance expenses for regional training centers and the central training center. This included the training of 8,875 new Afghan National Police Officers.

