[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-15]
ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND DEVELOPMENT IN
U.S. STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 13, 2007
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Tenth Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina DUNCAN HUNTER, California
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas California
ADAM SMITH, Washington MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California KEN CALVERT, California
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
RICK LARSEN, Washington JEFF MILLER, Florida
JIM COOPER, Tennessee JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam TOM COLE, Oklahoma
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB BISHOP, Utah
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
NANCY BOYDA, Kansas CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
KATHY CASTOR, Florida
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Julie Unmacht, Professional Staff Member
Aileen Alexander, Professional Staff Member
Margee Meckstroth, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2007
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, February 13, 2007, Assessment of Security and Stability
in Afghanistan and Development in U.S. Strategy and Operations. 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, February 13, 2007....................................... 41
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2007
ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND DEVELOPMENT IN
U.S. STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Eikenberry, Lt. Gen. Karl W., Former Commanding General, Combined
Forces Command-Afghanistan, U.S. Army.......................... 7
Gastright, John A., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
South and Central Asian Affairs and Coordinator for
Afghanistan, Department of State............................... 10
Long, Mary Beth, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense...... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Eikenberry, Lt. Gen. Karl W.................................. 55
Gastright, John A., Jr....................................... 72
Long, Mary Beth.............................................. 45
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Mr. Andrews.................................................. 78
Ms. Tauscher................................................. 77
ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND DEVELOPMENT IN
U.S. STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 13, 2007.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Ladies and gentlemen, the meeting will come
to order. I realize the weather is worsening outside but we
will do the best we can. Our witnesses are here and I am sure
the members will move in and out based upon their ability to
get here this morning.
We meet today to continue our discussion regarding
Afghanistan. With us are several distinguished guests, Mary
Beth Long, who is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Affairs at the Defense Department. We appreciate
you being with us. And the gentleman who has done yeoman's work
and now is back with us, Lieutenant General Eikenberry. We
thank you for your service. John Gastright, he is the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of South and Central Asian Affairs and
Coordinator for Afghanistan at the State Department. So welcome
to each of you and particularly, General Eikenberry, thank you
for your excellent service.
I was in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraq a couple of weeks
ago as part of a delegation led by Speaker Pelosi, and coming
away from that trip you and our military leaders there have
done an exceptional job, General, and our efforts continue to
face severe challenges. The bottom line, however, I came away
convinced that we can defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda in
Afghanistan if we stay focused and if we devote the right
troops in the right numbers and have the right strategy, at the
end of the day we will get it done. I am pleased to see the
Administration recently focusing more on Afghanistan and on its
strategy. We lost critical time because of insufficient forces
and inadequate resources. Recently there has been movement, new
Afghanistan strategic review, request for supplemental
assistance in the budget package, which includes funds for the
Afghan security forces and efforts to press our North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to fulfill commitments. We
will get into that during our discussion.
These developments are part of what is needed to a well-
coordinated and comprehensive strategy that demonstrates long
commitment to security and stability in that country.
Afghanistan has been the forgotten. Some opportunities
there have been squandered, but there is still a chance to set
things right, particularly if we seize the moment and establish
real security. We must do much more to secure and stabilize
that country.
Most critically and, General, we will appreciate your
comments on this later, our NATO partners must do more. They
made commitments to the fight in Afghanistan, some have been
involved in heavy combat and sustained losses but many
commitments remain unfulfilled. Our NATO partners must
seriously step up their efforts by fulfilling their obligation
for both troops and freeing their forces from restrictions that
limit their ability to fight.
For NATO to operate effectively each member must be able to
rely on every other member of NATO to carry its share of the
burden. The delegation I recently traveled with to Afghanistan
all reached the same conclusions. So did the experts who
testified at this committee's hearings on Afghanistan just the
day after I returned from that country. I am particularly
concerned about the anticipated spring upturn in the
insurgency.
The last thing, to secure Afghanistan necessarily involves
the border region with Pakistan and development of competent
Afghan security forces. By the way, we had a very interesting
discussion with President Musharraf on that very issue. It was
a positive discussion, as Secretary Gastright will probably
comment on a bit later.
There will be problems, ones that won't be overcome
quickly, but I would like to have our witnesses help us
understand what it will take to defeat the anticipated spring
offensive and what it will take to defeat the Taliban and al
Qaeda in Afghanistan for good and, last, what are we doing to
increase the support from our NATO partners, our old friends,
NATO partners, and get them to live up to those all important
commitments.
Let me turn to the gentleman from California, my friend and
colleague the ranking member, Duncan Hunter.
STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding
this hearing. I think it is an excellent hearing and very
timely and to our guests I join the chairman in giving you a
warm welcome this morning. Thank you for being with us and
stepping out into the elements to come over and be with us.
Over the last six years coalition and Afghan officials have
made significant progress in Afghanistan and I recognize though
that there is a lot that still has to be done. Afghanistan's
continued dependence on poppy cultivation and narcotics
trafficking still poses an extremely serious threat to long-
term security and stability and U.S. officials and experts
agree that last year was the highest poppy yield ever produced
in Afghanistan, resulting in nearly 6,100 metric tons of opium,
an amount that is likely to be repeated in 2007 if we don't
address the situation promptly and comprehensively.
It is also my understanding that Afghanistan's poppy
production and narcotics trade provides for about one-third of
the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and likely finances
some of the violent activities of the Taliban-led insurgents.
So I hope you will talk to this issue this morning and
specifically what the U.S., Afghanistan, NATO, and other
coalition partners are doing to address this narcotics problem.
One solution that has been talked about and discussed quite
a bit by this committee is the idea of alternative agriculture
products. The one area that appears to me to be especially
promising but one that we haven't made as much headway on as I
would hope would be replacing the poppy fields with orchards.
It would make sense that if you have an almond crop or pecan
crop or some other type of a fairly high dollar cash crop that
is manifested in an orchard, farmers are going to be much less
likely to go in and chain saw their trees to put in a poppy
crop.
So I would like you to talk about that and how we are doing
in terms of offering this replacement to the farmers in
Afghanistan and whether they are receptive to it and along that
line obviously you have a traditional system in Afghanistan,
especially in the smaller communities and villages, the so-
called shuras, which is the meetings of the tribal leadership
and community leadership. And I understand if we are going to
sell this alternative agriculture path to these folks, we are
going to need to sell it through their leadership and through a
following of the traditions that are already in place and
through these traditional forms. I would like to know how you
are going to do that. I have heard--of course we all conduct
oversight by anecdotes and stories and statements from folks
that have been there, but we have heard folks talk about the
idea that you have big contractors who stay behind the wire, so
to speak, do a lot of things through intermediaries and in the
end a lot of these poppy fields that could be replaced with
orchards haven't been.
And again I am reminded that if you give people work, if
you simply pay them to go out and put an irrigation ditch in or
something else, that is work for a day, but that doesn't
displace them on a permanent basis from this very lucrative
trade of narcotics. So tell us how we are going to get this
thing done. I have often thought maybe it would be a good idea
to simply replace a legion of our bureaucracy personnel, who
are very fine personnel but to replace a lot of them in these
hands-on areas simply with agriculture professionals, farmers
and people that know how to get irrigation systems in and how
to get trees up and how to use pesticides and how to make
things grow, how to harvest, how to get money, how to market,
get hands-on ag professionals in these places, and they might
be better diplomats than the folks who are emanating from the
State Department and from the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) who don't have hands-on ag
experience.
So let us know how on a practical common-sense basis we are
going to be able to start getting this replacement system, the
substitute system into place and thereby depress the number of
acres that is now being put into drug crops.
We have got 25,000 people in Afghanistan, U.S. military
service members. Half of them are serving in this NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). And we
understand that ISAF has responsibility for military operations
and reconstruction efforts throughout Afghanistan. A very
significant leadership role. But I am also aware of the fact
that, as the chairman has mentioned, that the United States is
still carrying by far, even though we are conducting the
operation in Iraq without the help of a number of our NATO
partners, we are conducting--we are carrying a burden far
disproportionate in Afghanistan if you use our GDP or our--or
the number of countries involved who are members of NATO in
theory available to carry this security burden, and I would
like to know what we are doing to inspire our NATO allies,
cajole, inspire, contract or whatever it is going to take to
get them to step up to the plate and take their burden.
Years ago I looked at the formula, I searched for the
formula for burden sharing in NATO operations. How do you
determine who brings what and how much they bring. And the
answer that I got was there is no formula. This is like potluck
and some people will bring the T-bone steaks to the potluck and
others will bring the plastic forks. Historically the United
States has brought the T-bone steaks; that is, we brought the
money, in aerial operations we bring to air-to-air refueling,
strike aircraft, we bring munitions, and you have a little
bitty ground crew trot out with five, count them five, or ten
personnel from a NATO ally and that makes it a NATO operation.
America is dominant in terms of leadership but also dominant in
terms of dollars supplied.
I want to know how you are going to change that. I think
that Afghanistan is a prime site for some precedent setting
arrangements with out NATO allies to bring them into this
burden sharing and bring them into the thick of the operation,
understanding the folks that we sometimes call the usual
suspects, affectionately, the Brits, Canadians have difficult
areas of operations (AORs). They are in contentious areas,
others are not. But let us know how we are going to move NATO
into a more supportive role.
So thanks for your testimony here today. I look forward to
listening to you and especially if you could address the
question of burden sharing with NATO, and the displacement, the
substitute ag programs, I would appreciate it. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman, my friend from
California. Let me ask our witnesses if possible--we of course
will take your prepared statements into the record. If you
could condense it as best you can within four minutes, please,
that will leave more time for questioning.
Mr. Hunter. Mr. Chairman, before you start could I ask a
question here. Mr. Chairman, at the last hearing we had
Secretary Gates was testifying and we had a hearing with
respect to Iraq. I was told after the hearing that we had some
of the folks who don't like the Iraq policy were standing in
the hearing room. I think decorum requires that they should be
seated if we are going to have guests. All our guests are
seated. But I heard beyond that that it was reported that they
were whispering fairly derogatory comments to the witnesses
from right behind them while they were testifying. I think in
something this serious, in having hearings on these very
serious areas of operations, we should have decorum in this
room and certainly whispering things to the witnesses,
witnesses as they are trying to talk to us and listen to us
surely goes beyond the rules of decorum.
I would think also having folks standing up in the room
when everybody else is sitting down does the same thing, and I
would just ask if we couldn't ask our guests, all of our guests
to be seated when they come into the hearing room. I think that
is a reasonable thing.
The Chairman. I heard the same comment about them
whispering. I had not heard--had they been heard by me at the
time they would have been thrown out. The people who were
standing at my request did move to the back and they did not
disrupt anything. Any gestures or noise, they of course will be
removed. Thank you for your comments.
Mary Beth Long.
STATEMENT OF MARY BETH LONG, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. Long. Chairman Skelton, Congressman Hunter, members of
the committee, the first thing I would like to do is thank each
and every one of you for the tremendous support that the
committee gives to the Department of Defense and to our men and
women in Afghanistan. Your support is appreciated and it is an
honor to be here to testify in front of you.
It has been about six months since I have been here to talk
to you about Afghanistan, and I am pleased to note that there
has been tremendous progress in that country and that many of
you have had the opportunity to see that progress on the ground
firsthand, the progress made by our coalition troops, our NATO
allies, the U.S. forces there, and of course the continuing
growth of the Afghan government.
As you know, the Secretary of Defense as one of his first
acts after taking office traveled to Afghanistan and he
recently returned from Seville, where he met with NATO members
to discuss NATO efforts in Afghanistan.
In these last years NATO has actually shown tremendous
growth and the allied coalition in Afghan has been impressive.
NATO has grown tremendously since its first undertaking of the
Afghan mission, its first ever deployment outside the European
theater and arguably probably the most challenging in its 57-
year history.
NATO now commands 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
and as of October is in command of and responsibility of
Afghanistan, and that is all the areas. The regional command
south was the most recently turned over. Still, NATO must do
more, the European Union (EU) must do more, the international
community must do more, and we all must do more to enable the
Afghans to do more for themselves. The U.S., we remind
ourselves, is only one of the NATO partners, and we have
recently committed to do more.
Before Congress for approval is a budget and a defense
budget for $5.9 billion to enhance the Afghan security forces,
and that is in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget as well
as $2.7 billion in the fiscal year 2008 global war on terror
(GWOT) budget.
This is for urgently needed equipment for the Afghan police
and the Afghan National Army. This equipment includes things
like advanced first aid, better weapons, assault rifles,
helmets and personal security equipment. I urge you to support
that budgetary request.
In addition, the Department is doing more in its recently
announced undertaking to extend troops in Afghanistan in order
to augment its combat capabilities in the springtime as the
Taliban and insurgents draw near. Only days ago our Supreme
Allied Commander, General Craddock, presented NATO with a
revised combined joint statement of requirements (CJSOR), for
those of you familiar, the CJSOR forum. This is a list of
required military support for NATO and ISAF efforts.
While we are encouraged with the preliminary offers of new
resources, and I would like to take a moment to highlight here
the offers from Poland, Turkey and the Czech Republic, we look
forward to additional offers as our NATO allies take this list
home in the next days, review them in their nations and respond
with additional contributions.
As Secretary Gates indicated recently in Seville, allies
who have made a commitment should fulfill that commitment. We
remind ourself that NATO is indeed a military organization and
while all share in the financial burden, all must also share in
the risks.
We recognize, however, that security alone will not win in
Afghanistan. To complete the transition from a terrorist safe
haven to a moderate and independent state, Afghanistan will
need additional infrastructure, economic development and
improved governance and services. Military efforts must be
balanced with the appropriate mix of economic, political and
developmental activities. A comprehensive approach is needed
and is being implemented.
To that end, the Commander's Emergency Relief Program
(CERP). Many of you know that CERP is a key element of our
strategy in Afghanistan. Aside from addressing the threat to
Afghanistan by building internal security capacity----
The Chairman. Just a moment, please. The Chair is tolerant
but anyone that is disrupting either by gesture or by movement
is not welcome. If you are going to stand, stand, but turning
around and disrupting anything will not be tolerated. Do you
understand? Please proceed.
Ms. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Aside from addressing
the threat in Afghanistan by building internal security
capacity and facilitating reconstruction and other
developmental efforts, we are working to address regional
actors as well, and notably Pakistan. As recently as this
morning Secretary Gates returned from a trip to visit President
Musharraf. On the heels of a Seville discussion the Secretary
thanks the President for his continued Pakistani support for
our GWOT and Afghan efforts and impressed upon him the need to
eliminate the Taliban and continue his efforts against
insurgents of all types.
It is important to remind ourselves that our involvement in
Afghanistan should be viewed in a broader context and not just
simply our true presence as a result of 9/11 and the place
where the terrorists came from. Just look at the neighborhood.
Afghanistan abuts Pakistan, the largest Muslim nation in the
world and one in which tribal areas have heretofore been
ungoverned by a modern governed nation. Pakistan is also a
nuclear country.
To the west, Iran, a growing regional power and one that is
involved in undermining our efforts in Iraq and a nuclear
aspirant. To the northeast, China, and to the north Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, all former Soviet republics
struggling to become responsible international players.
Both China and Russia have made it very clear that U.S.
presence in the region is unwelcome and need to look only at
the Shanghai cooperation organization in order to bear witness
to that intent. Strategically placed in the middle of this
neighborhood astride these trade routes and access to important
national resources is Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a traditional
Muslim country where the people as a whole have committed
themselves to the idea of a democratically elected government.
It is one that still welcomes coalition and U.S. forces. In its
first year, in fact, the Assembly of Afghanistan confirmed a
cabinet, it made Supreme Court appointments, and it passed a
national budget.
While Afghanistanis have the will, they need continued
involvement. They need our commitment, our expertise and our
assistance of the U.S. and the international community in order
to succeed. With the additional congressional support that we
have requested, the men and women of the Department of Defense
stand ready to further our continued successes and advancements
in Afghanistan in conjunction with the government of
Afghanistan and its people.
I thank you again for the opportunity to be here, for your
continued support and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Long can be found in the
Appendix on page 45.]
The Chairman. Thank you so much.
General Eikenberry.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. KARL W. EIKENBERRY, FORMER COMMANDING
GENERAL, COMBINED FORCES COMMAND--AFGHANISTAN, U.S. ARMY
General Eikenberry. Chairman Skelton, Congressman Hunter,
members of the committee. Having just departed from command of
the Combined Forces Command--Afghanistan, it is an honor to
provide the committee an update on the mission there and to
represent the American soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and
civilians who are performing brilliantly in Afghanistan.
Before answering your questions I would like to provide a
very brief update on campaign progress to date, current threat
assessment and outline four major areas that I believe are
essential for future campaign success.
First, regarding campaign progress to date. Our mission in
Afghanistan as you know has been twofold: First, the defeat of
al Qaeda and their Taliban militant extremist allies, and
second, to help create the conditions inside of Afghanistan
where international terrorism could never again find support
and sanctuary.
We have achieved much since 2001. A ruthless, deadly
international terrorist-controlled regime has been defeated.
Afghanistan now has a moderate constitution, a democratically
elected President, a sitting parliament, a confirmed cabinet,
increasingly effective Afghan national security forces, a
dramatic increase and expansion of key social services and
ongoing economic reconstruction and development.
However, we do face major challenges. There is a
reconstituted Taliban enemy, slow growth of governance capacity
and a rise in narcotrafficking. Our significant near-term
threat to campaign success is the insurgency focused in
southern Afghanistan and directed by the former Taliban regime.
The longer term threat is the loss of legitimacy of the
government of Afghanistan. We need with more urgency to build
Afghan government capacity and help connect it to the Afghan
people.
To overcome these threats and achieve campaign success
there are four major areas which I would like to address: NATO
command, transition to Afghan leadership, the need for more
non-military means in the campaign, and the regional nature of
terrorism and insecurity.
First, with regard to NATO, on 5 October 2006 NATO-
International Security Assistance Force, or NATO-ISAF, as we
say, assumed command of the Afghanistan-wide international
military mission. The Afghan operation has now grown to what is
clearly the most ambitious in the alliance's 57-year old
history, making it the first ever deployment outside of Europe.
NATO-ISAF is currently comprised of some 36,000 personnel
from 37 nations; that is 26 NATO members plus 11 other partner
countries. The U.S. does provide the majority of the combat
forces and the critical military capabilities to NATO-ISAF.
While having achieved much thus far, NATO must do more to
fulfill its commitments to provide sufficient forces and
capabilities to the mission and NATO must also increase its
level of support to the training and the equipping of the
Afghan national security forces.
The second key area for campaign success is completing the
transition to Afghan leadership. Here a critical U.S. military
task has been to develop Afghan national security forces; that
is, the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police
Forces. Today over 32,000 Afghan National Army and 59,000
Afghan National Police have been trained, equipped and they are
engaged in security operations alongside our forces. We are now
expanding the Afghan National Army basic training class sizes
to 2,000 per cycle, a very important increase in capacity.
Afghans are finding pride in serving in their Afghan
National Army and Afghan National Army units are directly in
the fight.
Comprehensive reform of the Ministry of the Interior and
its police forces is underway. Progress is being made, but we
face very formidable challenges in delivering timely results.
The key third area for campaign success is in non-military
means. While we have enjoyed success with the assumption of the
Afghanistan mission by NATO and in the development of Afghan
national security forces, Afghanistan's continued development
will depend much upon increasing emphasis on the government of
Afghanistan and the international community focusing on the
non-military aspects of the mission.
Throughout Afghanistan's 34 provinces rebuilding the so-
called middle ground of civil society ravaged by three decades
of warfare remains the primary concern of the majority of the
Afghan people. According to a recent survey, almost 90 percent
of the Afghan people consider reconstruction and economic
development the most important requirement to improve their
lives.
The international community must provide more resources in
the areas of governance, justice, counternarcotics and economic
development.
The final area of emphasis is effectively addressing the
regional nature of terrorism and insecurity. We cannot win this
fight by concentrating in Afghanistan alone. Pakistan faces
similar internal challenges, including militant extremism that
grows in ungoverned spaces. Pakistan is working hard to address
the growing threat of Talibanization within its own borders as
well as contributing extensively to the global war on terror.
As we work toward improving governance, economic
development and security in Afghanistan, we must maintain and
strengthen cooperative relations with Pakistan. However, I will
emphasize that al Qaeda and Taliban leadership presence inside
of Pakistan remains a very significant problem.
In closing, allow me to emphasize that we are now at a
critical point where a strategic investment in Afghan
capabilities is needed to accelerate the progress toward the
desired goal of helping establish a moderate, stable, and
representative government of Afghanistan. This requires
significant resources, it requires time, it requires patience
and it requires commitment. We are carrying out an
extraordinarily difficult task in Afghanistan. We are trying to
build an Afghan values-based army and national police force
while we simultaneously fight a war.
The fiscal year 2007 supplemental investment proposed by
the Administration would permit the Afghan Army to continue to
expand to the internationally agreed level of 70,000 and enable
the Afghan National Police to increase to the size of 82,000 by
the end of calendar year 2008. That supplemental appropriation
will also equip the Afghan National Army and Police with the
protection, fire power, weapons, enhanced training and mobility
that is required to meet the increased insurgent threat.
In addition, the Administration's fiscal year 2007
supplemental request would permit a significant increase in
spending for roads, for power, and for economic development
addressing the non-military means. The leadership of
Afghanistan is committed to being an active partner in the
global war on terror in the long term. The Afghan people and
their nation's leaders are absolutely worthy of our trust, our
confidence and our support. It is in the United States'
national interest to gain and keep a partner and a friend who
we can count on in this critical region of the world.
Please accept finally my deepest thanks for continued
support of the committee, to our great soldiers, sailors,
airmen and Marines and to our civilians. Their sacrifices and
those of their families continue to enable the establishment of
an Afghanistan with its goal of reaching a secure, free and
stable nation. It was a privilege and honor to serve with the
members of the coalition. I look forward, Chairman, to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Eikenberry can be found
in the Appendix on page 55.]
The Chairman. Thank you. Secretary, as I understand it
Ambassador to be, Gastright.
STATEMENT OF JOHN A. GASTRIGHT, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS AND COORDINATOR
FOR AFGHANISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary Gastright. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter,
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
participate today. Let me just start by noting how honored I am
to appear with General Eikenberry. As Commander of Combined
Forces Command--Afghanistan, General Eikenberry was an
invaluable leader and a partner in our efforts to win in
Afghanistan. I once heard him refer to his State Department
colleagues as his teammates. Let me say it is an honor to be a
part of that team.
Mr. Chairman, as you suggested in your opening statement,
this afternoon you will hear from General Eikenberry and Ms.
Long about the challenging spring we are going to face in
Afghanistan and the efforts that we are going to make to
counteract Taliban and other elements working against the
government of Afghanistan, the United States and our allies
this spring.
My State Department colleagues and I share this assessment.
In the face of these challenges we are better prepared this
year to tackle the threats we faced than we were last year.
U.S., Afghan and allied partners have more tools in our toolbox
than ever before. We start 2007 in a better position, with more
police, more Afghan national troops, more ISAF troops, better
governance, more roads, better in the south particularly than
ever before.
This summer we concluded an interagency assessment of what
we are doing in Afghanistan and we concluded that Afghan--parts
of Afghanistan, especially in the east, were successfully
stabilized when military action was followed closely by the
injection of good governance, including competent governors and
police and economic opportunity. Integration of all these
elements together in a comprehensive manner have produced
sustainable results, whereas military success without the
follow-on political, economic and development efforts often led
to a merely temporary calm.
We also clearly recognize that the international community,
including the United States, needed to increase the level of
support, joined together in endorsing and implementing this
comprehensive approach, and focused even more sharply on the
needs of the Afghan people. We believe that if we take this
comprehensive approach and put it to work in more of
Afghanistan we will see increased stability and strengthened
Afghan government presence across the country.
To enable this comprehensive approach, on January 26th
Secretary Rice announced a request for more than $10.6 billion
in new assistance over the next 2 years, including more than
6.7 billion in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental and more than
4 billion in fiscal year 2008. That assistance, which will go
to both reconstruction and development of Afghan security
forces, is vital not only for success this spring but also to
help secure long-term success for the government and the people
of Afghanistan. We hope that the Congress will support this
request in its entirety.
The United States is certainly determined to do its part,
but as you suggested, the allies in NATO and elsewhere need to
do more as well. NATO needs to meet the requirements it set
when taking on the NATO mission in Afghanistan and drop the
caveats that hamper our cooperation and effectiveness and
supply the forces that commanders need to succeed in their
efforts.
This is the message that Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates
have taken to recent NATO ministerials in both Brussels and
Seville. We have seen positive offers from a number of
countries increasing their commitments, but we need to see even
more and will continue to talk with donor nations about what
they can to do to support the government of Afghanistan.
We are also working closely with the government of Pakistan
to identify additional actions it can take to help destruct the
Taliban this spring. They are serious about this effort and
have demonstrated it with a number of important activities
designed to deal with militants using their territory such as
raids and attacks in border regions in recent months against
both Taliban and al Qaeda targets. The Pakistani military
continues operations and has regretfully taken casualties in
this fight against a mutual enemy.
Mr. Chairman, although we have come a long way in
Afghanistan, no one seeks to underestimate the challenges
ahead. Our international partners in the government of
Afghanistan expect the United States to lead the way in the
stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan.
The strong long-term U.S. commitment that we display is
making the difference and must continue with intensity. We at
the Department of State appreciate all that this committee does
to support this most important endeavor. Thank you again for
this opportunity to appear before the committee. I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Gastright can be found
in the Appendix on page 72.]
The Chairman. I am going to reserve my comments until a
later moment. After I call on the ranking member Mr. Hunter, I
will go directly to Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all of
our witnesses for your opening statements. General Eikenberry,
tell us about the participation by the NATO allies. Secretary
Long went over the 36, or the 26 NATO allies plus I think you
said 26 other nations that are involved, although the United
States carries the majority of the combat load. Give us a
description of the six or seven or eight major players besides
the United States and give us a brief description of their
location and their mission as part of the overall mission in
Afghanistan. Where are they, what are they doing?
General Eikenberry. The critical contributors, of course,
as you indicated, led by the United States, there is currently
about 36,000 NATO-ISAF forces and of those forces currently
about 16,000 of those 36,000 are United States. We have other
forces in Afghanistan. We have a total of 27,000, but of our
27,000, 16,000 are under the NATO flag of the total NATO-ISAF
force of 36,000. So 20,000 non-U.S. NATO forces.
Our forces are throughout Afghanistan. Those under the NATO
flag are primarily in eastern Afghanistan, which is a dangerous
area, where there is an active counterinsurgency. We are also
making a very important contribution to southern Afghanistan,
where they also are fighting a counterinsurgency. Other major
troop contributors are the United Kingdom. United Kingdom's
combat force are primarily in southern Afghanistan where they
are engaged in an active counterinsurgency. Canada makes a very
significant contribution; their forces in southern Afghanistan.
Mr. Hunter. About how many folks are in the British and
Canadian contingents?
General Eikenberry. Congressman, the contribution of the
United Kingdom in its combat capability in southern Afghanistan
is about 3,000, and I believe their total force contribution in
Afghanistan is over 4,000. So they are doing other tasks as
well. I will get back to you with the exact numbers. The
Canadian contribution; the Canadian contribution is well over
2,000. Again I will get back with you on significant numbers. A
vast majority of that is in Kandahar in southern Afghanistan.
Other major contributors, the Germans have a very significant
contribution to the NATO forces. They are primarily in northern
Afghanistan. Northern Afghanistan is not fighting a dangerous
counterinsurgency. I would like to emphasize Afghanistan by its
nature can be a dangerous place at any time so wherever forces
are, where international forces are, they can be under attack,
to include the German forces I mentioned have been under
attack. German forces are also located in the greater Kabul
area contributing to security there. The Italians----
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Hunter. On that point, General Eikenberry, I think who
was it Tony Cordesman who said that the Germans aren't forward
leaning in their exposure, that they are in a fairly well-
garrisoned situation and are not involved in confrontational
military activities. Can you describe what they are doing?
General Eikenberry. The Germans are conducting stability
operations in northern Afghanistan. I have visited the German
forces, I visited them about six months ago. Congressman, I was
impressed when I went up there with the manner in which they
are conducting stability operations. However, their forces are
not in eastern Afghanistan and they are not in southern
Afghanistan and that is where we are continually fighting and
having to fight offensive combat operations against a very
dangerous enemy. So it is two very different environments.
My sense was when I visited them though in the north within
that particular environment with that particular mission I
thought that they were doing well.
In western Afghanistan another major troop contributing
country is the Italians. Western Afghanistan, again, different
from eastern and southern Afghanistan where there is an active
insurgency. We also have a very significant Dutch force in
Oruzgan Province, southern Afghanistan. It is a dangerous area.
And then the other major troop contributors that I would
highlight would be the Turkish and the French. Their forces are
primarily located in the greater Kabul area providing security
and patrolling in the greater metropolis there.
I would make several points about the entire NATO force
then that is on the ground now. As was highlighted by all of us
during our opening remarks, Congressman, as you indicated as
you opened, that there are shortfalls with NATO. There is
significant shortfalls. Politically the alliance has approved a
set of military forces, capabilities and requirements to deploy
to Afghanistan. Those remain under fulfilled, about 85 or 90
percent. We have shortages of what we call a tactical theater
reserve force in Afghanistan, about an infantry battalion that
can be used anywhere. We are short military intelligence, short
rotary wing aircraft helicopters, more fixed wing aircraft.
They have to do more.
The second challenge that NATO is facing is that their
forces committed have various sets of national restrictions
placed upon them. Those restrictions are operational
restrictions that may preclude them, for instance, from going
to one region of Afghanistan and then going to other areas
where they might have to fight offensive combat operations.
The more restrictions that are placed on those forces, the
more inefficient the command is, and the only way you can
offset those restrictions is then by having more forces to
compensate.
Then the third point I would make with NATO, though, and a
good point I think, Congressman, is that we do have to go back
to the baseline of 2003 when NATO first assumed the missions in
Afghanistan. When they went in in 2003 they had a very narrow
mandate; it was for the security of the greater Kabul area. As
Secretary Long indicated, it is the first time in NATO's 57
years history they have been outside of Europe and conducting
offensive ground operations. So a huge challenge.
They have grown in their missions since 2003. They went to
the north in 2004, they expanded to the west in 2005, and the
significant expansion to the south and east in 2006 and 7. They
have shown that over that time they continue to adapt and grow.
But this is the most significant step that they made in October
2006 when they took over the whole mission. They are fighting
an active counterinsurgency and they have to adapt and grow
faster and more into this mission.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Taylor. I will remind the committee of
the excellent work you have been doing on the five-minute rule
and we will once more remind you of that.
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Want to thank our
witnesses for being here.
General Eikenberry, it has now been five years and five
months since the events of September 11th. General Eikenberry,
it has been five years and five months since September 11th,
2001, and apparently the mastermind of that event is still on
the loose.
Using the analogy of Iraq and to a certain extent our hopes
were that with the capture of Hussein that the insurgency would
diminish. That did not prove to be the case. My question to you
is in your professional opinion if Osama bin Laden were
captured today what effect, if any, would that have on the
insurgency in Afghanistan? To what extent do you think he is
involved in the resurgence of the Taliban there, and if he is
not a major player, then who or what groups would you identify
as the organization of the Taliban?
General Eikenberry. Congressman, I do not believe that the
capture or killing of Osama bin Laden would have a significant
immediate impact on the insurgency in Afghanistan. Certainly
the elimination of bin Laden would have reduced some of the
perhaps ideological support that is generated from him being on
the loose within the international global terrorist network,
but I don't think it would have any kind of operational impact
within Afghanistan. Bin Laden remains one person, an important
person that we need to bring to justice, but he remains one
person in a much larger global international terrorist network.
Then what is driving the insurgency in Afghanistan? To
answer your question, first of all, there is a nexus or there
is collaboration between international terrorism in that part
of the world and their network and the senior leaders of the
old Taliban regime and other allied groups with them, the group
led by Hekmatyar, a group led by the Haqqani clan. And they do
have command and control and more coherent command and control
I believe now than they might have been able to generate
several years ago.
We do have a problem with sanctuary and safe havens in that
regard and this is a problem that needs to be addressed more
effectively.
The second problem that we have got with the insurgency
though, Congressman, that I would really emphasize is that the
challenge remains in Afghanistan about trying to build the
institutions of the state and then expand governance in
Afghanistan, which is a very difficult process because our
baseline that we begin with in 2001 is really just ashes, a
country decimated by three decades of warfare and through the
occupation of international terrorism. And so we are trying to
build from that. Mixed in with the topographical challenges,
the geographical challenges that we face in Afghanistan, it is
a daunting prospect. There are no areas in Afghanistan today
where the government has had firm control, providing reasonable
security to the people and providing basic social services.
There are no areas of Afghanistan, to include southern
Afghanistan, where insurgents have been able to push that out
and establish their own presence.
So it is a challenge of defeating the command and control
and it is a challenge of continuing to stand the government of
Afghanistan up and push it out into new areas.
Mr. Taylor. I am curious, I guess one of the worst kept
secrets of the Cold War is our Nation's very active resupply of
the insurgents against the Russians. To what extent, if any,
are outside players involved in resupplying the Taliban?
General Eikenberry. Our belief is that Taliban and the
insurgents, Congressman, that the assistance that they get from
the outside is through financing, it is through the provision
of foreign fighter trainers coming into ungoverned spaces and
providing assistance to the Taliban insurgents. This though is
not any kind of outside state that is directing assistance to
these groups, these are all nonstate actors.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you very much. Thank you, General. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank the witnesses for
being with us today. Secretary Gastright, you used the phrase
``drop the caveats'' in your remarks, and, General Eikenberry,
you talked about eliminating restrictions. Are we talking the
same thing here? Let me start with you, Secretary Gastright.
Are you talking about--when you say the caveats, these are
caveats from the NATO participants that don't allow them to do
certain things, is that right?
Secretary Gastright. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Kline. Yours is the same, General Eikenberry, is that
correct, that you can't go into certain areas of the country or
engage in certain kinds of operations as well, is that what you
are talking about as well?
General Eikenberry. That is exactly right, Congressman.
Mr. Kline. From anybody, what do you see as progress that
is being made today toward getting rid of those caveats or
restrictions. I don't know who to go to here, but clearly we
are working on trying to change that. What is happening?
Ms. Long. As recently as the Secretary Rice's visit January
26th in Brussels and as well as the CJSOR summit some of the
countries pledged to reduce some of their caveats in particular
when it came to coming to the aid of another country throughout
Afghanistan. There were other offers made to lift or condition
caveats in a more flexible way, and we are working with those
countries now to get a firm commitment to lift the restrictions
on moving their forces.
Mr. Kline. Are we seeing progress? Do we like the feedback
we are getting?
Ms. Long. In CJSOR we did see some progress, in particular
when it came to moving forces out of the north and some of the
other countries to come to the aid of forces in the south and
the east if need be.
Mr. Kline. Then, General Eikenberry, just following up on
that, what this tells me is that all the forces are not the
same. We can list 26 countries or 36 countries or something and
some countries have 2,000 or 3,000 or 200, but they are very
different in what they are able to do, is that not correct?
General Eikenberry. Congressman, that is a very important
point, that there is a question of numbers and then there is a
question of the capabilities associated with those numbers or
questions of, let's say, quantity and quality. So that is an
important consideration.
Mr. Kline. In some cases it is even capability in the sense
that the soldiers from one country may be capable of doing
something but if they are not allowed to leave the compound,
pursue and so forth, that would translate into limited
capability. So when you add the total numbers, that doesn't
really tell you where we are and what we are able to do, is
what I am getting at here.
General Eikenberry. Numbers, of course, numbers matter at
one level because numbers are important in trying to generate
forces. You do need to look at numbers at some level. But your
point is an important one, that what kind of effects can you
achieve with those numbers and those effects that you can
achieve are going to be dependent upon a variety of factors,
but the two important factors that you have addressed are
operational restrictions, in which case they won't be able to
receive 100 percent effects or they may have limitations in
their equipment and training.
Mr. Kline. Okay. We have had much discussion in this
committee over the past several months, even years over a
breakdown, I think what we see as a breakdown in the
interagency process in this country back here in the States and
deployed overseas principally in Afghanistan and Iraq where we
are not able to communicate together very well.
I would like a comment on how that is working in
Afghanistan, and just seems to me that that whole process, the
problems have got to be greatly exacerbated by this issue we
were just talking about where you not only have interagency
perhaps failure to communicate but clearly you have this
problem in different countries. I am almost out of time so a
comment from anybody on how that interagency process is
working.
Secretary Gastright. From this side, from the Washington
angle, I think we have superb interagency coordination. I
communicate with Ms. Long on a daily basis. Again, General
Eikenberry refers to State and USAID colleagues as teammates so
we are pleased to be on that team.
Mr. Kline. I will accept that for now. That is something we
will have to explore for another day. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Eikenberry, I
want to direct my questions to you, two quick ones. Some weeks
ago I saw a press report that some Taliban official was
announcing the opening of Taliban schools in the south. Was
that accurate or what is the significance of that? Do you have
any comments about that? Just one press report I saw.
General Eikenberry. We think that we found that
interesting, that the Taliban spokesman indicated that. The
enemy--the kind of objects, the kind of targets that the enemy
attacks tells us a lot about the nature of the enemy. The enemy
over the past several years has attacked schools in
Afghanistan. They have killed teachers in front of students;
they have burned schools down; they have threatened parents
with attacking their children in schools if they attend those
schools. Why does the enemy attack those schools? It is because
what the enemy fears is the opening of the mind. This is as
Islamist extremist, militant, fascist movement and it is
through the closing of the mind and through intimidation and
fear that they hope to make gains.
And so as they look in Afghanistan now at the progress that
is being made within Afghanistan, the remarkable expansion of
social services that is occurring, some now six million Afghan
children in school, two million of those are girls. There has
been 14 universities opened over the last several years,
starting from zero with 42,000 students and about 9,000 of
those are girls. So the Taliban fears this advance because they
fear then the building of this middle ground of civil society
and the opening of the mind.
So it was interesting; we took from that their statement
that they are going to try to open schools is they wish to try
to compete against that progress. Now what they teach in those
schools we would disagree with.
Dr. Snyder. I appreciate that comment, General. My question
is are there areas that they consider to be safe enough havens
that they have the ability to open a Taliban school and to be
untouched by NATO forces?
General Eikenberry. Congressman, it is fair that I would
think in parts of southern Afghanistan there could be remote
districts where they may be able to do that, but it would not
be a widespread phenomena.
Dr. Snyder. My second question, if you could give a brief
answer so I can get on the third question, when you fly out of
here and head back to where you do all the good work that you
do, when you look at money for road construction do you have
adequate money for road construction tomorrow?
General Eikenberry. We do for eastern Afghanistan and
southern Afghanistan if the fiscal year 2007 supplemental that
we referred to is approved.
But the international community has to match these U.S.
efforts. There has to be matching efforts throughout the rest
of Afghanistan for us to achieve success. Throughout the
country there is still an inadequate level of physical
infrastructure investment.
Dr. Snyder. We have had discussions before this committee
within the last year, and somebody made a comment that the
three priorities for Afghanistan ought to be roads, roads and
roads as a key to economic development; and we are still
hearing that.
General Eikenberry, you are one of the real thinkers in the
military and have an incredible both experiential warfighting
and academic background. Would you describe the progression of
your thinking over the last five years with regard to the war
in Afghanistan?
I don't think it has progressed like everyone hoped or
thought it would. I would like to hear what your thinking has
progressed to. And how do you think we have gotten to where we
are today and where we are heading; how you see it for the next
five years?
General Eikenberry. If I looked back to my first tour in
Afghanistan in 2002 and 2003 and if I could go back in time and
be able to, together with the international community and with
the Afghans, do things differently, what were the surprises
from that period of time, first of all, I would give four
things.
The first would be the destruction that occurred to the
physical infrastructure was beyond our imagination. We have,
over time, now begun to address this, but the losses of the
past 30 years were staggering.
The second and maybe more profound was the destruction to
human capital and to civil society in Afghanistan that occurred
over 30 years of warfare. So you have three generations without
education. Very tragic.
And so the challenge of building the state to build the
institutions of the state, the army, the police force, to build
good governance, again it is the Phoenix we are trying to
create, rising from the ashes. There are laws of physics and
laws of nature. One law of nature is, it takes time to develop
competent, disciplined, well-educated leaders. And so that is a
real limit that we are facing.
The third is the regional nature of the threat. I talked
about that in the opening statement. We have a challenge that
has to be more effectively addressed. I know we are working
hard at that.
Finally, more of a tactical point would be that we are
working hard right now to develop the police forces of
Afghanistan. We have a good, comprehensive program. The program
as it began in 2002 was internationally led. It was a more
narrow program that was focused just on training. As a result
of that--because it wasn't ambitious enough, as a result of
that, the police force of Afghanistan is several years behind
the development of the army. We are paying some security prices
for that.
Once again, the supplemental that has been proposed, we
believe with the additional money we have a pretty good program
structured that over the next several years we could see some
important improvements in the police forces.
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Snyder.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the members of
the panel and those behind them. I always want to express
appreciation for your valiant and gallant commitment to human
freedom.
General, I know that, at least in my mind, there is no
enemy that the armed forces of the United States cannot defeat
on even terms.
That said, related to Afghanistan and the potential or the
actual reality of insurgency from hidden protected areas of
Pakistan and our rules of engagement related to that, if you
can speak to that outside of the confines here, respecting any
classified considerations obviously, what challenge does that
present to the forces of the United States of being able to not
only protect our soldiers, but to continue the effort to build
and maintain peace in Afghanistan?
General Eikenberry. Congressman, I will address two
aspects, inside of Afghanistan and then the regional aspect.
First of all, inside Afghanistan the enemy is not strong
militarily. It is still a problem that the institutions of the
state of Afghanistan are extraordinarily weak.
As you have pointed out, wherever U.S. forces and, I
highlight, increasingly wherever Afghan national army forces
who are taking more casualties than the NATO and U.S. forces
are now, as they move to the front line of the fight, wherever
they engage the Taliban, they defeat the Taliban. It remains
very much a question of trying to advance the governance into
ungoverned spaces.
I believe we are well postured now in early 2007 with the
additional commitment of U.S. forces and combat power to make a
big difference in the spring and summer. I truly believe this
spring and summer it is not going to be a Taliban offensive; it
is going to be a NATO offensive. However, I also emphasize that
it was U.S. contributions that made that difference, and non-
U.S. NATO needs to step up increasingly now.
With regard to the sanctuary issue, that requires that we
move forward through a cooperative approach with Pakistan and
with Afghanistan. We have established what we call a military
tripartite commission with Pakistan and Afghanistan, and now
NATO has moved up and taken the lead in the place of the U.S.-
led coalition. And we do have very good military cooperation
with the Pakistani army along the border. We share
intelligence. We coordinate our operations when appropriate.
But at the same time, we are still left with areas right
now in Waziristan and areas inside of Pakistan where our strong
belief is that midlevel and especially senior level command and
control of the Taliban and al Qaeda is, it is hard space to get
into. The Pakistan Government faces the same problem that is
faced on the Afghanistan side: ungoverned space.
But our belief is that a combination of a comprehensive
counterinsurgency approach by the Pakistan Government, which I
know that President Musharraf and his Administration are trying
to move forward with, with our assistance, and at the same time
a steady, direct attack against the command and control in
Pakistan in sanctuary areas is essential for us to achieve
success.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, General.
Ms. Long, we have heard testimony in this committee that
essential to winning any war is the ultimate need to break the
enemy's will in a sense. And, of course, with the ideological
enemy that we face in Afghanistan, and for that matter almost
anywhere in the Islamic world, that is a big challenge because
they look to break our will at home.
Sometimes it is the water on the inside of the ship that
sinks us. With that in mind, can you speak to how you think the
Afghan people are holding up? What is the index of their will
to prevail to freedom, and how do you think terrorist elements
in Iraq, or anywhere else, consider our own will and how do you
think that those dynamics play out in the ultimate end here,
the ultimate goal here?
Ms. Long. My understanding from polling efforts undertaken
under General Eikenberry's tenure in Afghanistan is that the
Afghan people remain committed to a democratically elected
government and have the very highest esteem for a central
government, in concept.
President Karzai is still popular, and most Afghans are
looking for a central government, for the infrastructure that
is being built slowly to better their lives. That is a good
thing.
Interestingly, the enemy, as Lieutenant General Eikenberry
points out, is uniquely good at picking at small cracks in the
disappointment, perhaps, of the Afghan people, not to see
economic and development progress to the point where it impacts
at the individual grass-roots level, to play upon that
potential disappointment in order to reingratiate itself, and
also to use fear and intimidation against the Afghan people.
One of the things that we discuss with our NATO and
coalition partners is a strengthened effort to communicate
strategically within Afghan not only what Afghanistan, the
government itself, is doing for the people, but what the
coalition and NATO countries are doing. Under Lieutenant
General Eikenberry there was a great effort to get Afghan
central leaders, including President Karzai, out to the
villages to communicate that.
The Chairman. Mr. Adam Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will ask primarily
about reconstruction and what the challenges are.
Following up on Representative Franks' line of questioning
in terms of how the Afghan population is reacting and where the
hearts and minds are at, there was a time a few years back when
the criticism of President Karzai was that he was really the
mayor of Kabul more than the President of Afghanistan. The
outlying areas were not getting the support and reconstruction.
I am curious, from all of your perspectives, how is that
going in the outer regions? How are the Afghan people
responding to that? What is their level of sympathy for the
Taliban? Focus not so much on what the Taliban is doing, but
the fact that the current government is not providing for us,
so we are looking at our options; how are we doing on
overcoming that big challenge?
General Eikenberry. Congressman, I think we are doing quite
well. Every poll, every survey of the Afghan people that is
taken will come back with the findings that well over 90
percent of the Afghan people reject a return to Taliban.
Now, you have levels of frustration of the Afghan people
with their government, but that does not equate to a desire for
the return of the Taliban. You have areas in southern
Afghanistan and eastern Afghanistan that were more traditional
Taliban strongholds where there is sympathy with Taliban.
There are areas where misgovernance by the Government of
Afghanistan has probably increased sympathy for the Taliban.
But very broadly, there is very firm support for the Government
of Afghanistan.
I think the Afghan people, almost all of them, believe that
this is their moment now. They have had an unprecedented degree
of international support, and they maintain that support, and
their hope is still very much with the commitment of the
international community to enable a modern, stable Government
of Afghanistan.
Mr. Smith. From an infrastructure standpoint, what are the
Afghan people most concerned about? Picture it like the local
city council: The garbage is not being picked up; the roads
aren't built; there is insufficient security. What are they
most concerned about? What do we need to address?
General Eikenberry. In Afghanistan, the answers were always
the same to the question: What do you need? The Afghan people
say, ``We need roads,'' because roads permit security and
social services and they permit an economy to develop.
Second, they will talk about power. And third, the
provision of water.
And social services, the two are always schools and health
clinics.
Mr. Smith. Do either of you want to add anything?
Secretary Gastright. The supplemental request that has been
submitted and the $653 million that is in the State Department
side of this supports those priorities exactly. The majority of
the money is dedicated to roads. We have put additional
resources into generating power. Six percent of the country has
access to power; we want to shoot for 40 percent in the next
couple of years so that we have the ability to generate a rural
economy that can employ some of these young people.
There is a saying that Afghanistan is a country that grows
tomatoes, but imports tomato paste. You can't run a rural
economy on that that employs the masses of rural youth when you
grow tomatoes, but import the tomato paste from across the
border, from Pakistan.
So those are our priorities. Our resource requests line up
exactly with what General Eikenberry identified.
Mr. Smith. Are the Taliban and al Qaeda targeting
infrastructure in any sort of similar way that they are doing
in Iraq?
General Eikenberry. They are not. Interestingly, in
Afghanistan, they do not target major physical infrastructure.
There is one exception in Helmand Province where they put
pressure on a critical dam renovation project. But in the main,
they have not.
What they have attacked, they have attacked schools.
Mr. Smith. Is that because they don't have the capability
or is it that they are thinking that would alienate the
population and be counter to their interests?
General Eikenberry. Our belief is the Taliban thinks it
would alienate the population.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Joe Wilson, South Carolina.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
General, Secretary, thank you for being here today. I am
particularly pleased to note that Secretary Gastright is a
graduate of the Citadel in my hometown of Charleston, and I
have a very high regard for the Military College of the South.
I have visited Afghanistan twice. I was so impressed by
President Karzai; I have met with him here, and I was very
impressed by members of their parliament. It is awesome to
think that they have had the first free elections in the
several years of civilization that have existed in that region.
Additionally, I was very impressed--I visited a provincial
reconstruction team, U.S. and Korean. I saw firsthand efforts
being made, working with local government officials, and I also
had an extraordinary opportunity to fly out to Khowst to a
forward operating base, Salerno. I was startled to learn there
was a university in Khowst, I certainly didn't anticipate that,
and to hear there are 42,000 students now in colleges and
universities. That is a remarkable achievement that I wish the
American people knew.
Additionally, I look forward to working with you. I am the
cochair of the Afghanistan Caucus with Congresswoman Jackson
Lee and so we look forward to working for the betterment of the
people of Afghanistan.
Additionally, I have a very particular interest in
Afghanistan in that the South Carolina Army National Guard, the
218th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, is in training today at Fort
Riley and Camp Shelby in preparation to serve in Afghanistan to
work with the Afghan army and help train the army. I was in the
218th for 25 years, so I know of the wonderful, capable people
of that brigade. They are looking forward to serving.
What I would like to know is, are the efforts of training
the army and police making progress? What more needs to be
done?
General Eikenberry. Congressman, first I would say that I
am honored to be flanked by two Citadel graduates.
If I could say, first of all, about the 218th, sitting
behind me is Major General Bob Durbin. He has been in command
of the headquarters in Afghanistan, the U.S.-led headquarters
that is responsible for the training and equipping of the
Afghan national army and provides a lot of support to the
police.
Major General Durbin just visited Fort Riley and had an
opportunity to see the 218th, and he reported yesterday that
they are doing extraordinarily well. We are looking forward to
them deploying to Afghanistan.
Our main line of mission in Afghanistan is the development
of the Afghan national army and police. How are we doing at
that task? I think we are doing reasonably well at that task. I
gave some statistics in my opening remarks.
With the supplemental that has been requested, I think we
can make a lot more progress. The Afghan national army over the
last several years, under the leadership of Minister Wardak and
their chief have really worked hard in improving leadership.
They are at that point right now where with higher levels of
equipment, better kinds of vehicles, they are going to be able
to take these on now. Their forces are going to be able to
operate and maintain them, and they need this equipment in
order to fight side by side and, increasingly, to lead the
fight.
On the Afghan national police, it is tougher going. As I
mentioned, a comprehensive effort to reform the police did not
begin until late 2005, and over that four-year intervening
period, the police force of Afghanistan established its own set
of business practices which are not necessarily good.
We are trying to reform an organization which has been in
existence for four years. On the other hand, there is a very
good commitment from the Afghan political leadership to police
reform. President Karzai's Administration very recently made a
decision where 40 senior police chiefs, who were really,
frankly, unqualified for the task of being police chiefs in a
modern state, were replaced.
So they are showing signs of stepping up to do their part
of the bargain which is to provide good leaders. And meanwhile,
our end of the bargain is, given that, provide good training
and equipment and facilities and support.
Mr. Wilson. I share your view of General Wardak. I met him,
and I was very impressed.
What is the success of recruiting and retention in
Afghanistan? Are their sufficient troops, persons available?
General Eikenberry. We have sufficient recruits available
for the army and sufficient recruits available for the police.
The challenge has been retention of those forces. We have made
pretty good progress, and I give great credit to Minister
Wardak and to General Durbin behind me here for the great work
that has been done.
When General Durbin assumed command, the absence rate of
the Afghan National Army was about 25 percent. Unacceptable.
With good leadership reform and hard work by our forces, the
absence rate now for the Afghan National Army is down to about
12 percent. We need to get it lower, but very significant
progress.
The police, with the reform that is ongoing, I think we are
also going to achieve better results in recruiting in that
area. There is pay reform right now in the police, which is
really helping, and I think we are going to do a lot better in
the area of retention, but it is going to be slower than the
rate of success we are having with the army.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Tauscher.
Mrs. Tauscher. General Eikenberry, Secretary Long and
Secretary Gastright, thank you for your service.
I was in Munich this weekend at the security conference;
lots of NATO countries and lots of our supporters in
Afghanistan were there. I think that there is a heightened
sense of immediacy to the fact we had better get it right this
spring. We have gotten jumped the last two springs, the largest
poppy crops ever grown, each year beating the last. But the
idea of an offensive that we know is coming with the better
weather and the opportunity for the enemy to come out of the
Pakistan hills is obvious. It had better be our offensive
because there is an offensive coming.
It is impressive to see how much dovetailing there is in
your testimonies, and that makes me feel more comfortable about
the interagency process.
My first concern, twofold, al Qaeda, Taliban. These terms
are meshed together a lot. I consider the Taliban to be the
indigenous version of the terrorists that ran Afghanistan and
enabled it to be a platform from where the September 11 attacks
were launched on the United States.
Can you, General Eikenberry, give us a sense for what the
current definition and what the distinctions between Taliban
and the al Qaeda are?
And, second, I want to know about Pakistan. If we do not
have a better engagement with Pakistan, and if President
Musharraf does not begin to step up more in these ungovernable
territories, in the tribal territories in the western part of
Pakistan and the eastern part of Afghanistan's border, it is
going to be difficult if there is a place for people to hide
and secrete themselves and rearm and regenerate themselves. It
is going to be continuously hard for us to deal in the last
offensive we hope to have, which is this spring.
I understand that President Karzai and President Musharraf
right now are not talking to each other, very little
cooperation. I know Secretary Gates was there yesterday trying
to get this to be a little better. But both of these gentlemen
are in terrible political situations themselves. Both have been
attacked and have had assassination attempts.
Can you give us a sense of how you think the Pakistan-
Afghanistan relationship is going?
General Eikenberry. Representative Tauscher, I would first
say with regard to al Qaeda and the Taliban that there is a
symbiotic relationship between them, a complex cooperative
relationship. I will give you one example. For instance, the
Afghan Taliban leader Hakimi who was in Waziristan, in
Pakistan, they direct attacks against Afghanistan. They also
direct attacks against the Pakistan military.
At the same time, we see a relationship between them and
foreign fighters. I would say over the last several years as
some of the Taliban senior leadership has been able to
reorganize itself, we have seen closer cooperation between the
foreign fighters, the al Qaeda network, and the Afghan militant
leaders.
Mrs. Tauscher. Is the Taliban, the Afghan version, almost
the beachhead in Afghanistan for al Qaeda, and are they a
fungible version? Are they virtually the same?
General Eikenberry. No, they are not. The extremist Taliban
movement is focused on Afghanistan. The al Qaeda, the
international movement, the aid-and-abet Taliban, international
terrorism, I think their view is that the modern jihad was born
inside of Afghanistan against the Soviets, and it has mutated
since that time and become international and very deadly.
But international terrorists wish to maintain their
presence inside of Afghanistan and Pakistan. They have no good
options if they move out of that area. In that regard, Taliban
provides a kind of assistance to them and security. They help
with the training of Taliban and with the financing. But the
international network that exists in that part of the world,
their focus is global.
Congresswoman, the first thing I wanted to say with regard
to Pakistan in terms of level of effort, let me make clear that
over the last four years, the Pakistan army has had far more
soldiers killed in combat against the same enemy who is
attacking U.S. forces, NATO forces, and Afghan forces.
Mrs. Tauscher. If I can ask General Eikenberry to give us
something in writing off the record, I would appreciate that.
The Chairman. If the gentlewoman would follow through on
that.
Mr. Hayes.
Mr. Hayes. General Eikenberry, Secretary Long and Secretary
Gastright, thank you for being here today.
I visited you in theater not that long ago. Adam Smith, he
and I were down in Fort Bragg, the epicenter of the universe,
and we visited with your teammate, Colonel Reeder, just a
couple of days ago. I was with the colonel, Joe Wilson, on a
recent trip.
There have been remarkable changes from the time that the
chairman, Mr. Skelton and I were there with Ms. Pelosi a couple
of years ago. It is remarkable what you and the men and women
who serve have done; and to kind of cap that feeling off, to
have members of the newly elected Afghan parliament appear in
the gallery of U.S. House of Representatives and see how we
conduct business. I am not sure what they took away from that,
but that is remarkable, what you have done, and I hope people
realize how important it is.
For a moment, as a general, as a man who has seen it all in
theater in Afghanistan, help remind people what the enemy
really looks like and help remind people that this is a war. It
is not a political action or something that we are doing just
because we want to keep our military busy.
But describe the enemy. Just pick a situation that you may
remember. Joe talked about Khost. We saw in the newspaper a
couple of days that Colonel Nicholson, there was some question
about where artillery shells were landing. I didn't see any
fences over there, so it is kind of hard to tell, but just
remind people what the enemy looks like. If they are coming in
from Waziristan, what would their tactics be if they captured
somebody?
General Eikenberry. I think, Congressman, to give several
examples, we are against an enemy that about six months ago, it
fired rockets into a school in Asadabad and killed eight
schoolchildren in order to try to intimidate the parents and
shut the education down.
It is an enemy that took an uneducated young man with no
hope, no employment and trained him to be a suicide bomber, and
then to attack one of the greatest governors of Afghanistan, a
patriot living in Australia who came back to Afghanistan with
no more dream than to help the Afghan people recover from this
brutal occupation and civil war, and they jumped onto his
vehicle to kill him and intimidate the Afghanistan people.
That is the nature of the enemy we are fighting. It is an
enemy that seeks to intimidate and impose its stark ideology on
Afghanistan. If they succeed, the United States is at risk
again.
Mr. Hayes. I think it is important again to emphasize what
we are up against. It is not conventional rules of engagement.
These are terrorists.
We talk about expanding the government and projecting it
outward, which is vitally important in Afghanistan. But as far
as I can tell, the enemy would love to project their reign of
terror, fear, killing, beyond Afghanistan.
Let's just say hypothetically, we turn Afghanistan over to
them. Would that satisfy them? Would they stop there?
General Eikenberry. No, they will keep moving. We can walk
away from Afghanistan. If we walk away from Afghanistan, the
terrorists will follow us to the United States.
Mr. Hayes. I wish people could have been with Joe Wilson
and me, as were others that night, on the top of the United
States embassy having a meal with these legislators. It was
reminiscent of a county commission meeting because here were
these elected officials with cell phones communicating with
their provinces, ``We have a problem over here; how are we
going to fix it?'' again, progress is happening.
One last thing, the revenue in Afghanistan, people have
talked about roads. Their only tax is on trade. So if there is
no road there is no trade; there is no border and no duty, and
they can't support education, police and so on and so forth. So
again, given the chance, people know what the enemy looks like.
They would love a crack at us as well.
General Eikenberry. Congressman, I agree. The nature of the
enemy, all they have to do is get through and kill a teacher.
How long does it take us to build a school and train a teacher?
So it is a tough war that we are in, and it is back to time,
patience and commitment; but if we give it to the Afghans, they
will prevail.
Mr. Hayes. And doesn't bother them at all to kill that
teacher.
The Chairman. Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank each of the panelists for their testimony and for
their service to our country. It is truly appreciated.
Secretary Long, in your statement you note that both
Afghanistan and Pakistan must cooperate against extremists in
both countries to end the insurgency in Afghanistan and to
reverse increased extremist influence in Pakistan. And you then
go on to describe the trilateral dinner agreements.
If Pakistan were to be doing everything we wanted it to do
to help defeat the terrorist activity, what would that be? What
are they failing to do today that we want them to do?
Ms. Long. I think, as General Eikenberry pointed out, I
would like to preface my comment by the reality that Pakistan
has suffered more casualties as a result of its assistance
against insurgents than arguably any other force. And in fact
on a daily basis, Pakistani military, frontier corps, and other
related organizations, border guards, are striving to close the
border and to contain the insurgents.
One cannot answer that question without being a realist
regarding the Pakistani domestic political situation. President
Musharraf has a dynamic and diverse political constituency of
many different parties and many different tensions. There are
Pakistani elections coming up next year, and he is walking a
tightrope, as we see in all of these developing countries, with
many different voices speaking loudly. That is the nature of a
messy democracy and one that we should continue to support,
much like our own.
In a nutshell, the continued participation of Pakistan in
the tripartite is going to be valuable, particularly as NATO
assumes a growing role in that organization.
Border arrangements along the east, and in particular in
northern Waziristan, need to be tightened and increased.
I think you have heard both Afghanistan and Pakistani
leaders talk about sealing the borders. In Quetta, we are
concerned regarding the Taliban and other leadership that are
in Baluchistan and other tribal areas, who continue to manage
and direct Taliban and al Qaeda activities. Activities against
those will be needed. Any shuras the Taliban are continuing to
drain, madrassas and camps, particularly those camps in the
tribal and federally administered tribal areas (FATA) areas, we
will need action against those.
Mr. Andrews. I very much appreciate the specificity of your
answer. Thank you.
This committee has responsibility for and authority over
some significant military relationships between our country and
Pakistan. We value those relationships; we want them to
continue. But frankly we would like to use whatever influence
we have to try to move the Pakistanis closer toward the goals
you have enumerated. I say that in full recognition of the
sacrifices that Pakistan has made and the acute difficulties
President Musharraf faces, but I do want to know where the goal
line in.
Secretary Gastright, you used an interesting phrase, that
``Afghanistan grows tomatoes, but imports tomato paste.'' if
the optimal result were to occur in the economic development of
Afghanistan over the next five years, what would Afghanistan's
principal exports be?
Secretary Gastright. It is going to be a rural-based
economy for years to come. A large segment of the population is
based on some form of agriculture. But really agriprocessing is
the next step in this process where they can do light
manufacturing and export those things out of their country on
the new roads that we are trying to build.
Mr. Andrews. Collectively, are you satisfied that we are
properly emphasizing in our development aid technology an
infrastructure that will help develop that agriculture
potential? And are we investing in the right industries in
Afghanistan to help achieve that result?
Secretary Gastright. Again, it is more foundational than
that. It is really, develop the roads so the farmer can get his
crops to market before they turn into mush. It is, develop the
power system so there can be cold storage so it can be properly
packaged and shipped out.
Mr. Andrews. One question for the record: I would ask if
the witnesses could submit their data on the cost of training
Afghani military personnel and police personnel, submit that to
us for the record. Thank you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 78.]
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Before I call on Mr. Turner, I must leave the chair to
repair to the Chamber, and I will ask Mr. Marshall to assume
the gavel, if I may. We will have in the near future two votes.
I would hope that we could resume after those two votes.
Excuse me, there are four votes. I hope that the Chair
under Mr. Marshall's gavel can resume the hearing subject to
the witnesses' availability.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
I want to thank you for your hospitality when I visited
Afghanistan in August. I had a gentleman from my office who,
when we invaded Iraq, got up from his desk and went and signed
up for Special Ops training and was ending his first tour in
Afghanistan, and you were kind enough to assist me in meeting
up with him in Konar Province. I appreciate your assistance in
doing that.
I learned a great deal about the operations that were
ongoing and our efforts in training the Afghan national army,
and the issues that you raised when I was there continue to be
issues raised in this hearing.
I understand the number of casualties that Pakistan has
sustained. It certainly shows a level of commitment.
Nonetheless, when I was in Afghanistan, one of the issues and
concerns that was raised was the border of Pakistan being a
sanctuary. If we are pursuing individuals and they cross over
to Pakistan, our ability to continue their pursuit and/or to
receive assistance from the other side, how that can be both an
impediment for us; and if there is not appropriate action that
is being taken on the other side, it can exacerbate the
difficulty of our pursuing and holding accountable those who
are trying to disrupt Afghanistan.
The second item that was raised is the support that you
need in order to continue your operations, specifically those
that come from unmanned aerial vehicles. The Iraq drain
certainly has an impact on the resources that have been
available to Afghanistan and how you see that trending or what
you see needs to be done.
I want to echo the thanks for the service of each of you in
what is clearly a very important task that you outlined for us.
It is not just the issue of Afghanistan; it is an issue of the
war on terror and our efforts to be victorious.
General Eikenberry. Congressman, on the cross-border issue,
I would like to make clear--and I think you understand this--
our forces have the necessary authorities that are required,
that when we come under threat regardless of where the threat
comes from, that we have the necessary authorities to protect
our forces and to attack.
In fact, we have very good cooperative relations with the
Pakistan military along the border. We share common radio
systems. We meet frequently. We have good protocols that have
been established. So along the border itself, we are reasonably
confident that we have a good, cooperative approach and we
certainly have the necessary authorities.
The nature of the threat that we are talking about when we
talk about command and control is located not directly along
the border area, and I should probably not go much further than
that in talking in this open forum about that.
I would be ready, of course, Congressman, in another forum
to answer any questions if you wanted to go into in more
detail.
Mr. Turner. Is that different than in August?
My impression in August was, there was a concern with the
issue of the border of Afghanistan representing a sanctuary
where troops that were fighting can go and restock and rest and
receive retraining, then only to come back again; and that lack
of cooperation did impact our ability to be successful.
General Eikenberry. No, let me clarify what I said,
Congressman.
That the enemy is able to move across the border. It is a
very difficult border to control. And so the enemy does come
from areas deeper inside of Pakistan and they can project
across that border.
I was talking in the border area itself when our forces are
under threat. But the threat itself does not sit right at the
border area; the threat sits off of the borders. Our ability
when we are in direct contact with the enemy or under threat,
we fight effectively. We have the necessary authorities and we
coordinate well with the Pakistani military. But the nature of
that threat sits farther back.
Mr. Turner. I understand. Thank you.
General Eikenberry. Second, with regard to reconnaissance
capabilities and our intelligence gathering, I think every
commander in the field in today's world would tell you they
need more of what we call persistent ISR, or intelligence
surveillance reconnaissance, capabilities, especially a
capability like the Predator. No commander has enough of it.
Sure, we could use more of it in Afghanistan.
The second shortfall that I think we all face is capability
to exploit some of the intelligence that we gather. Here in
particular I am talked about trained Pashtu linguists who are
capable of listening in on the Pashtu language and the Dari
language, and that is a shortfall we still face today.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Marshall [presiding]. We are going to have to break for
votes. I think Mr. Skelton intends that we get back together,
and I am going to have ask, do we have an estimate when votes
will be over with? It is certainly not going to be before
12:30, would you say?
I don't think we will reconvene before 12:30. Maybe that
gives you an opportunity to grab something to eat and come back
in. I don't know how many people will be coming back. I think
there will be some additional questioners.
General, first of all, I very much appreciate the time we
have spent together on different occasions and how candid you
are and how thoroughly you understand what is going on over in
Afghanistan. And I appreciate the service of all of you.
General Eikenberry, on page five of your testimony you have
got a very interesting and perhaps troublesome paragraph. You
describe the long-term threat to campaign success is the
potential irretrievable loss of legitimacy of the Government of
Afghanistan. You say, ``The accumulated effects of violent
terrorist insurgent attacks, corruption, insufficient social
resources and growing income disparities, all overlaid by a
major international presence, are taking their toll on Afghan
Government legitimacy. A point could be reached at which the
Government of Afghanistan becomes irrelevant to its people and
the goal of establishing a democratic, moderate, self-
sustaining state could forever be lost.''
I won't read more of your testimony, but I have the
impression that you think that is imminent and could occur
fairly soon. I guess, you know, it causes me to think about the
history of counterinsurgencies and that is essentially what we
are in right now.
That history of counterinsurgencies is one that suggests
that these things take a long time to deal with. It is not a
one- or two- or four-year process, it is a 10- or 15-year
process. And it does appear as if the Taliban and al Qaeda,
particularly the Taliban, are determined here, that they are
not going to back off, and that they are resurgent in a sense.
I am wondering whether or not we have got here--and I would
like your opinion about this--we are facing a situation in
which the government shortly is going to lose its credibility
and then, if what you say is correct in this paragraph, we are
going to lose the ability to win this conflict.
We tend in our conflicts generally to move too quickly, to
try to do too much too fast. I had the impression in
Afghanistan we weren't doing that, we were moving along in due
course and we weren't creating a whole bunch of vacuums, for
example, and we were prepared to rely upon local warlords, or
jirgas, and what have you, and not simply say they are all
gone, we have one fiat, and it is the Afghan Government, and
Karzai is more than just the mayor of Kabul.
Can you talk about that dilemma, that we have vacuums and
we do have an insurgency and they typically take a long time,
and yet you have this problem of the government's credibility
facing us?
General Eikenberry. Congressman, several years ago we
captured a Taliban commander and when he was being
interrogated, the commander was saying that the Americans wear
watches, but the Taliban has time. This question of time,
patience and commitment, generational kind of effort, I think
that is understood by all of us.
I want to clarify, when I talked about the longer-term
threat, I am not talking about imminent here, I am talking
about three, four or five years from now. The reason I
highlight that is because I think we are making great progress
in many domains, especially in the Afghan security forces. We
are making progress, as I indicated, just through the
statistics that we have provided in terms of aspects of
governance and the development of social services and economic
reconstruction.
I think the areas that do need to be addressed urgently,
because if you address them urgently you do not start to
translate urgent address into effects on the ground for a year
or two years, is in the area of a comprehensive justice system.
Police are inadequate; police are one component of a
justice system. We talk about cops, courts and correctional
institutes. We have a pretty good system right now for the
delivery of police. We need a complementary effort over the
longer term that starts to deliver courts and starts to deliver
correctional institutes.
Governance is another instance. We have a great training
program for Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. We
don't have a complementary program yet from the international
community for the training of Afghan governance.
And then the final area that I have already highlighted is
within the area of counternarcotics. A lot of effort is being
applied in trying to pull together the very strands of the
counternarcotics effort in a coherent manner, and that still
remains a challenge for us.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, sir.
We are going to go ahead and adjourn until 12:30. It may be
a little after 12:30, but certainly you have until 12:30.
[Recess.]
Mr. Marshall. Call the meeting to order again, the hearing
to order again. I will note for the record that both the Chair
and the ranking member are from Georgia, so I am pleased to
recognize Mr. Gingrey. I think it is your time for questioning.
Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you for
acknowledging the fact that we have got the opportunity for two
Georgia peaches up here at the same time. Of course, I would
like for the seats to be reversed, but be that as it may, I
appreciate the Chairman recognizing me.
Let me thank our witnesses, Madam Secretary, Secretary
Gastright and, of course, General Eikenberry. Your patience for
being with us and for returning, and you have done a great job
this morning, and I know the hour is getting late, so I
appreciate that.
General Eikenberry, I think I will confine my questions to
you, and I have got two questions. The first, in regard to
Operation Medusa, back in August of 2006, in which NATO ISAF
forces removed the Taliban fighters near Kandahar and the
British forces then entered into a peace agreement with local
tribal leaders whereby the tribes would secure the main town
absent NATO.
So our forces essentially, as I understand it, went in,
they cleaned house, and they left the local tribesmen to keep
order. Doesn't this seem counter-intuitive? And how were the
British forces able to unilaterally enter into this agreement?
I mean, they are working under NATO, this is a NATO ISAF force,
and I am sure a cohesive force, but what gives some countries
the opportunity to operate on their own accord if indeed this
was the case? That is the first question I wanted to ask.
Second, President Karzai has expressed an interest in a
long-term United States military presence in Afghanistan. Do
you think a long-term U.S. and/or NATO military presence is
required to attain security and stability in the country? And
if so, for how long? You hear that often; I am sure you have
been asked that before. What are the criterion for determining
when the Afghan national security forces are capable of
independently maintaining security and stability?
So if you want to take the last one first and then go back
to the question about what happened in Operation Medusa.
General Eikenberry. Thanks, Congressman. With regard to the
presence of the international military forces, U.S. forces,
success in Afghanistan is going to be measured over progress
one year at a time, and there is much that remains to be done.
What I would say, though, in terms of defining the levels of
our presence, the key condition will be the progress that the
Afghan national security forces make, the army and the police
forces. And therein, going back to the request for the
supplemental, this $5.9 billion requested for fiscal year 2007,
we believe very firmly that with that kind of investment and
then, in fiscal year 2008, about another $2.7 billion
investment, that the Afghan national security forces will start
to advance to a point that, whereas currently they have to
remain very tethered to coalition forces because we have so
many of the capabilities that any military needs to fight that
they don't have yet, our sense is they will advance to a level
that, beyond that point, we can start to adjust our forces and,
very importantly, we start to save a lot in terms of operating
expenses.
It costs about $15 billion a year for us to maintain our
U.S. forces in Afghanistan. So look at this as a good trade.
Congressman, beyond that, beyond that next several years,
we are still going to, I believe multiyear beyond that, have to
look at a significant presence of trainers and mentors for the
Afghan national security forces. Ultimately those levels are to
be decided by of course the government of Afghanistan in
consultation with us.
Now if I could turn to what you referred to about the
combat operations in southern Afghanistan. I know I don't have
much time. Briefly, the first operation you talk about,
Operation Medusa, that was primarily a Canadian, U.S., Afghan
national army police operation in southern Afghanistan,
successful combat operation, but there was an inadequate plan
to maintain security past the operation it conducted. Frankly,
that is a challenge that U.S. forces have had, lessons that we
have had to learn over time, so it was a good operation, but
there was an inadequate security perimeter that was placed out,
and then that forced NATO to have to go back in, but successful
combat operations.
The agreement that you are referring to with the British
forces in Helmand Province was centered around a town named
Musa Qala. That was an agreement that was done in consultation
with the government of Afghanistan, the terms of that agreement
appear now to have been broken, clearly, by the Taliban. And I
think that appropriate actions look like they will be taken by
the government of Afghanistan with NATO support now to deal
with that security situation.
Dr. Gingrey. Thank you. Thank you, General.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Marshall. I recognize the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Davis.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, and thank you to all of you for being here and
certainly for sticking with us this afternoon. I wanted to
follow up on Mr. Marshall's question, really, looking at some
of I think your words, General, and I can understand what you
said is that, while there is great concern about the people's
ability or their confidence in their government, that this is
really a longstanding issue and one that may not be resolved in
the short term but at least has room to grow, if I am
characterizing that correctly. I appreciate that.
I was wondering if you could help us, though, and perhaps
even the other witnesses to understand and sort of characterize
that, what we call winning the hearts and minds of the people
there and their ability to, I think, sustain some of the
activities that are going on and to push back against those who
would bribe them for not cooperating. There was a story on, I
think, CNN last night about an aid worker who was suggesting
that. How would you characterize that?
Are we able to gain intelligence from local people, and are
we being as smart as we can be in working with some of the
local warlords, recognizing that there are issues, such as the
drug trade, that get in the way of some of that activity?
General Eikenberry. Congresswoman, what we have learned
over time and now over six years in Afghanistan is that key to
success is a sequential approach moving into what I have
characterized this morning as this ungoverned space. The first
is to contact local leaders. We have talked about shuras,
tribal leaders, the leadership with Afghan character, unique
Afghan characteristics, and talk to them about what the needs
are in their areas.
What they will always come back with if they are threatened
by criminal elements, extremists, their question is going to
be, are you going to stay when you come into the area? That has
been a lesson we have learned over time, and now I think we are
very firm in our doctrine.
So if you can convince the people you are going to stay
with good security, then their next question is then, how will
you differ from the extremist elements? How will you differ
from the criminal elements? And that gets to provision of good
government social services.
Ms. Davis of California. Are we aware of that or is it true
that the general population is being bribed to not cooperate?
General Eikenberry. Congresswoman, in places where the
extremists are trying to gain influence, have influence, they
are being intimidated to not cooperate, and that gets back to
the first question the people always have, if you come into the
area, are you going to stay? Because if we don't stay, and
leave, then people will be murdered for cooperation with the
government of Afghanistan.
So I think we have got the right approach right now. We
always need more means in order to deliver back to the non-
military means. Roads, the delivery of roads and a health
clinic can be more decisive than an infantry battalion of
Afghan National Army or U.S. forces.
I use the term, though, about hearts and minds, et cetera,
that for us, the international military force, the U.S., our
center of gravity in Afghanistan is actually with the
government of Afghanistan, trying to help them develop a
government that in turn allows that government to affect the
hearts and minds of their own people.
Ms. Davis of California. If I could turn to a follow-up
question on the interagency cooperation as well. We certainly
have had some experiences in Iraq that differ, I hope, from
those in Afghanistan with our provisional response teams there
as well. How have we then found the skill sets available,
whether it is in the State Department, the aid community, to be
able to raise the level, I think, of confidence of the people
that we are dealing with there? What has been different? Do we
have linguists in the area that are actually able to
communicate directly? And what more should we be doing to
enable that program really to be as strong as necessary?
General Eikenberry. Congresswoman, the amount of
interagency cooperation we have in Afghanistan is
unprecedented, excellent teams that we form between the
military, the State Department, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the USAID. The challenge we have in Afghanistan is
that, when we talk about this kind of special expertise that is
needed for reconstruction and development for government
programs, there we have shortages.
We need more agricultural experts, we need more justice
experts. I can go on. So the ability to develop an
expeditionary capability, so to speak, within our government
that can deliver----
Ms. Davis of California. Is it because people aren't able
to or willing to be there to answer those needs? What is the
problem?
General Eikenberry. I think there is a shortage of the
available expertise to deploy.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you.
Mr. Marshall. Let me move to Mr. Ellsworth from Indiana.
Mr. Ellsworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all of the witnesses for being here today. I will
jump right into the questions. General Eikenberry, there is a
little bit of talk going on this week about surges and upping
the troops. My question to you will be very direct: If you had
the sole say, would we surge troops in Afghanistan to combat
what we are hearing is the Taliban, al Qaeda, making a
stronghold or increasing themselves there? And should we, could
we, might we expect a call for a surge in Afghanistan in the
near or the next couple of years?
General Eikenberry. Congressman, the decision that was made
by the President and the Secretary of Defense to extend the
presence of a brigade of infantry of the 10th Mountain Division
which was due to redeploy back to the United States now but is
now being extended for 120 additional days even while their
replacement forces arrive on schedule will make a profound
difference in NATO combat capabilities over the next several
months.
There is further consideration now being debated over even
a further extension of forces or additional forces over that
120-day period, not the same brigade, but that will make a very
significant difference. I believe that it will give the NATO
commander the amount of forces that he needs to deal very
effectively against the threat, indeed will allow him to
conduct offensive operations.
But I will say, as I said again this morning, that is a
commitment that is made by the United States, not U.S.-NATO
forces. Additional non-U.S. NATO forces and capabilities are
required in Afghanistan consistent with the political
agreements that NATO has made and made last year to provide
forces and capabilities to levels that they have not achieved.
Mr. Ellsworth. Thank you. All three of you talked about and
voiced support for the supplemental increase. My question, in
my short time here in Congress, I have been talked to by
several members of the armed forces talking about shortages in
equipment; planes that we can't fly at top speed, boats,
submarines. A variety of equipment. And yet we all talk about
the supply.
Seems so many of these relationships are based on dollars.
Haven't we experienced that--I support the foreign aid, but how
many of these friendships have we seen that ended after our
dollars ran out or that they have turned and used those dollars
after we have supported them with billions of dollars, turned
against us once the checkbook closed? I would appreciate a
comment on that, please.
General Eikenberry. Well, I can only talk about the
investment that we are making, Congressman, here inside of
Afghanistan. It is in our vital national interest to succeed in
Afghanistan. Failure to succeed in Afghanistan would permit a
return to the state that Afghanistan existed before our
homeland was struck on 9/11, struck by an enemy that occupied
90 percent of Afghanistan, enjoyed open sanctuary there and
plotted the attacks against our homeland in the United States
of America.
So we have a firm alliance with the Afghan people, with the
Afghan leaders, and I believe that we are achieving great
progress there, and I have every bit of confidence in the years
ahead that the Afghans will be very strong allies of the United
States of America.
Mr. Ellsworth. I would only add to that that with the
reports we get on accountability and weapons coming up missing
and just that we do due diligence to keeping those weapons in
our hands and in our friends' hands and not to be turned
against us. I would yield any time, unless you have a comment
to that.
General Eikenberry. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Ellsworth. Thank you very much.
Mr. Marshall. The gentleman from the great State of
Georgia, Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
your service to your country and also for appearing here today.
Today, the testimony was that we have made tremendous progress
in Afghanistan over the last six months. However, at a January
30th briefing here at this committee, Ambassador Karl
Indurfurth stated in his testimony, quote: Half measures in
Afghanistan by the United States and the international
community are failing to provide security, rebuild the country,
or combat the exploding drug trade. They are also threatening
to undo what progress has been made since U.S.-led military
forces toppled the Taliban from power in 2001. Indeed, much has
been accomplished since the Taliban were overthrown, but it is
also true that Afghanistan is still very much at risk. The
Taliban and their extremist allies have made a powerful
comeback, especially in the eastern and southern parts of the
country. Afghanistan remains the world's leading drug supplier
of opium. Corruption is on the rise. And many Afghans are
asking, five years after the international community arrived,
where are the promised roads, the schools, the health clinics,
the electricity, the water? U.S. and NATO officials are
predicting heavy fighting in the spring and say that
Afghanistan is facing a bloody year in 2007.
I am paraphrasing Ambassador Indurfurth's statement. And
also, Ambassador James Dobbins in his statement to this
Committee on January 30th said that Lieutenant General Karl
Eikenberry the senior U.S. commander in Afghanistan reported in
early 2007 that the number of suicide attacks had increased by
more than 400 percent, from 27 in 2005 to 139 in 2006; remotely
detonated bombings had more than doubled, from 783 to 1,677;
and armed attacks nearly tripled, from 1,558 to 4,542. This
violence led to more than 4,000 deaths in Afghanistan last
year. Last year was by far the bloodiest year in the country
since 2001. Today the Taliban has infiltrated villages in the
south and east of Afghanistan and are expected to mount major
operations in Kandahar, Helmand and other provinces this
spring. Their ability to use Pakistan as a sanctuary has been
critical. Interviews with U.S., NATO and U.N. forces indicate
that the Taliban regularly ship arms, ammunition and supplies
into Afghanistan from Pakistan. Most suicide bombers came from
Afghan refugee camps located in Pakistan. Components for
improvised explosive devices are often smuggled across the
Afghan-Pakistan border and assembled at safe havens in such
provinces as Kandahar. The degree of official Pakistani
complicity in this insurgency is a matter of some controversy.
Speaking in private, knowledgeable U.S., NATO, Afghan and U.N.
Officials are nearly unanimous in asserting that the Pakistani
intelligence service continues to collaborate with the Taliban
and other insurgent groups operating out of its border regions.
Having said all of that, I want to ask a question: Did the
huge focus of U.S. political, military and economic support in
the war in Iraq necessarily divert attention away from
Afghanistan. And the second question is, what are we doing to
ensure that Pakistan is not doing what we accuse the Iranians
of doing, and that is arming our foes.
Ms. Long. I think that we would agree that many of the
problems that you articulated from Ambassador Indurfurth and
Mr. Dobbins are continuing problems, and we have tried to
outline those problems in our statements. That is not to say,
however, that Afghanistan hasn't made terrific strides in the
last six months.
Mr. Johnson. Does the war in Iraq divert our attention?
Mr. Marshall. Use the microphone, Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. I am sorry. Did the war--did we divert our
attention and resources away from Afghanistan into the war in
Iraq at the peril of the war in Afghanistan?
Ms. Long. No, Congressman, we did not. In fact, the program
and programmatics in Afghanistan have been in compliance with
the campaign planned. In fact, the campaign plan that
Lieutenant General Eikenberry and the embassy and the Joint
Interagency developed some years ago and in fact the transition
to NATO and coalition forces has been and indicates steady
progress in increasingly allowing NATO and ISAF and, more
importantly, the Afghan security forces to play an increasing
and more important role in governing its own territory.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. Ms. Long.
Now the gentlemen from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for their endurance and I
want to compliment General Eikenberry and your description of
what is at stake in Afghanistan, how important it is to our
security to make sure we succeed there.
I wanted to ask, though, about a report that was in the
press yesterday, actually, that read, the headline: U.S.
artillery rounds target Taliban fighters in Pakistan. It was
describing some remote outpost where U.S. troops were firing
artillery into Pakistan, which again it appears it was in
complete self defense and totally justifiable in terms of the
safety of our troops. But the article sort of goes on to
pinpoint an agreement that the government of Pakistan reached
with the Taliban and Waziristan as sort of a problem in terms
of increasing rather than decreasing the number of attacks that
are coming from I guess it is southern Afghanistan, if I read
the stories correctly.
I was just wondering if you could comment in terms of
whether those criticisms of that agreement that the government
of Pakistan made are in fact worsening the situation rather
than improving it.
General Eikenberry. Congressman, the agreement that you are
referring to is the so-called North Waziristan Agreement
negotiated by the government of Afghanistan with tribal leaders
in the North Waziristan area. The North Waziristan area is part
of what is called the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal
Areas. Historically still today it has a great deal of autonomy
and challenges in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas with,
as we would call it, ungoverned space and lack of government
control.
So the agreement that was reached with the government of
Pakistan was an effort to try to bring security to the area.
The broad outlines of the agreement, the characteristics of it
we were supportive of in terms of, the agreement did not allow
for insurgents to use North Waziristan to cross over and attack
Afghanistan, did not allow for the presence of active foreign
fighters.
Now how has the agreement played out? Since that agreement
was negotiated on the 5th of September, there has been problems
with it. Indeed, if we were to compare the same periods of time
since that agreement, same months to one year ago, the amount
of cross-border attacks, what we would think are suicide
bombers coming across the border from North Waziristan, those
have increased anywhere from two times to three times as much
over that same period of last year. You want to compare month-
by-month because weather changes, and as the weather starts to
set in along the frontier, of course incidents are going to go
down.
So the agreement to this point has not achieved the results
that we were expecting of, hopeful for, and there still remains
a very significant threat against our forces and indeed against
Pakistani forces emanating from North Waziristan.
Secretary Gastright. General Eikenberry described
previously President Musharraf's frontier initiative, and the
North Waziristan Agreement was a part of one of the pieces of
this initiative, which has three pillars. It has an economic
development pillar. It has a security pillar, where he is
trying to inject security forces into this very rugged terrain,
which is considered one of the harshest environments in the
world to operate in. And then, finally, it has a political
pillar.
This agreement was designed to be part of that political
pillar to gain the consent of the governed, and as General
Eikenberry indicated, it has not been completely successful.
The Pakistanis have said it hasn't reached their expectations
as well, but they remain committed to finding solutions and one
of those solutions will undoubtedly involve the use of security
forces to compel compliance.
Ultimately, the vision is, squeeze out extremists, squeeze
out the terrain that the extremists operate in today. And we
support the overall frontier strategy as a way to develop that.
It is a classic counter-insurgency campaign.
Mr. Courtney. Again, I think you described the sacrifice
that the Pakistanis have made, which has to be acknowledged and
recognized. And obviously, the government is in a very
precarious position politically as also was described, but it
does seem that the description that Secretary Gates gave
yesterday of success in that area was maybe a little
overstated, given the fact that we are actually at the point
where we are actually firing artillery into that area.
Again, I appreciate your answers. Certainly there is a
concern. We don't want conflicts widening rather than trying to
control them.
General Eikenberry. If I could just briefly comment on
that, Congressman. I would like to emphasize that along the
border, again, the military cooperation communications between
the Afghan army, our Army, NATO and the Pakistanis is
excellent. The enemy effectively crosses over the border and
crosses back. When we make contact with that enemy, we are in
close coordination frequently with the Pakistan military and
take actions in coordination with the Pakistani military to
attack the insurgents who are our enemies and their enemies.
So the idea then of a cross-border attack with artillery,
that is something that could be done in conjunction with the
Pakistan military.
Mr. Marshall. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Sestak.
Mr. Sestak. Thank you. I apologize. I swore when I got
elected I would sit through all the hearings. Great record,
huh. I apologize if these questions have been asked.
General, can you tell me if Iran is being helpful in
Afghanistan?
General Eikenberry. Iran has traditionally had a cultural
influence and an economic influence in western Afghanistan, and
some of the economic modernization and reconstruction that
western Afghanistan is experiencing today, experienced since
the fall of the Taliban regime, which was an enemy of Iran as
well, is very much due to----
Mr. Sestak. So you would say some of their interests there
are not dissimilar to ours?
General Eikenberry. I would say that I believe that--I
don't want to speak for Tehran's leadership. I don't suppose to
define their intentions, but our assessment is that Iran does
not desire to see a return of a Sunni----
Mr. Sestak. So is it wrong to say that, at times, Iran can
have interests similar to ours? Do it for different reasons,
but they want stability there, correct?
General Eikenberry. Strategically, our belief is that the
Iran regime is broadly supportive of the Karzai Administration.
Clearly, the Iranian----
Mr. Sestak. Do we work at all with Iran, sir?
General Eikenberry. They have an interest as well in
fighting narco trafficking. It is also fair to say that Iranian
intelligence maintains active collaboration with Taliban as a
kind of hedging strategy against the NATO and against the
United States.
Mr. Sestak. I am sorry to interrupt, they only gave me 30
minutes. A.Q. Khan, Mr. Secretary, are we going to have access
to him? If not, why not? We are working well with Pakistan;
aren't we?
Secretary Gastright. The key is access to the information.
And we have close coordination with Pakistani intelligence
agencies to that information and the desire, obviously the goal
of both our government and the government of Pakistan----
Mr. Sestak. I hate to interrupt. How do you know the
information they are giving us is accurate?
Secretary Gastright. We have been able to shut down the
A.Q. Khan network as a result of that.
Mr. Sestak. So we have an instance where something has
proven to be good. But we are not going to have access to him?
Secretary Gastright. At this time, again, my information is
we have excellent collaboration that the information is
yielding positive results.
Mr. Sestak. This one was probably already asked; how are we
going get any other NATO countries to try to change the rules
of engagement?
Is that yours, ma'am?
Ms. Long. Yes. Most recently, Secretary of State Rice and
the Secretary of Defense recently met with NATO, the NATO
foreign ministers meeting in Brussels and most recently in
Seville. We have gotten some initial indications of some
additional support. We haven't gotten enough, quite frankly,
and we are going to have to continue to push.
Mr. Sestak. General, the last one is, do you think you have
enough troops to deal with the spring offensive?
General Eikenberry. That is a question, Congressman, more
appropriately for General Dan McNeill. I will say, though, that
based on my experience on the ground, the commitment that the
United States has made with the President and Secretary Gates
announcing the decision then to keep a combat brigade of the
10th Mountain Division inside of Afghanistan for yet another
120 days will give the NATO forces sufficient combat capability
that indeed they should be able to take the offensive now from
what has traditionally been a period of time in the spring when
the Taliban surge, and I believe NATO forces will dominate.
Mr. Sestak. Thank you. I think your comment was very well
done, for whatever it is worth, in your testimony where you say
we need the strategic investment and capabilities in order to
accelerate progress. I was on the ground in Afghanistan two
months after the war began, brought my carrier battle group
back, took a left turn, went to that tragedy in Iraq, came back
and was on the ground in Afghanistan 18 months later for some
short period of time. And some senior military officer said, we
have our finger in the dike because our resources and attention
were turned toward Iraq. That is one of the tragedies of Iraq,
I think. I do think if something needs a surge in troops, it
would be Afghanistan, to try not to have this country slip
aside a second time from having been impacted by our policy
here in the United States. I do think these words were right.
Thank you.
Mr. Marshall. I thank the gentleman.
There are no further witnesses--pardon me, there are no
further questioners at the moment. If the witnesses have just a
little bit longer, I have an observation and perhaps question.
General, in describing the Waziristan agreement you
suggested that perhaps it wasn't working very well because the
number of suicide bombers had increased coming across the
border during this month, et cetera. I was struck by that kind
of argument, and the reason I am is because it doesn't prove
one way or the other whether the agreement is functioning well.
It would be that, absent the agreement, the number of suicide
bombers that would have come across the border, instead of
doubling, would have quadrupled.
Something else needs to be used to determine whether or not
the agreement is functioning appropriately than reference to
those kinds of statistics, it seems to me. Do you have anything
else that suggests that we are having additional troubles from
the tribal region there?
General Eikenberry. That is fair, Congressman. The metric
that I am using is, of course, the one that we are most
directly concerned with, which is the force protection of our
forces and our Afghan national allies. But other indicators
that we have about challenges of the North Waziristan
Agreement, we have seen indicators of further Talibanization
politically within towns and villages of north Waziristan. We
have seen instances of moderate leaders, moderate tribal
leaders within Waziristan, North Waziristan, who have been
executed or assassinated by militant extremists. We have also
seen aspects of al Qaeda perhaps gaining more strength in North
Waziristan. And I could go into a separate forum, Congressman,
and lay out more, but it had--that analysis that I gave did
have more than based upon just attacks on our forces.
Mr. Marshall. I understand. Do any of the members present
have additional questions for the witnesses?
Admiral.
Don't force yourself. I am sure they are not anxious.
Mr. Sestak. I did write down four others, but I am just
grateful for letting me have time here at the very end.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Marshall. I thank the witnesses, and this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:18 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 13, 2007
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 13, 2007
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 13, 2007
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER
Ms. Tauscher. Characterize the US-Pakistan relationship in the
fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda: What is the level of
cooperation, success, areas that need improvement? How serious/
effective are Pakistan's efforts?
General Eikenberry. Pakistan is a critical partner in the global
war on terror, and has made significant sacrifices in the fight against
Islamist terrorism. Pakistan has lost over 500 soldiers since 2001 in
this fight. Pakistan has also captured many high-level al Qaeda and
Taliban operatives. Pakistan provides significant logistical support
for U.S. operations in Afghanistan. NATO and American operations in
Afghanistan would be extremely difficult to conduct without the active
cooperation of Pakistan.
Pakistan has 80,000 Army and Frontier Corps troops based along the
border with Afghanistan, and recently transferred two Army brigades
from the Indian border to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA), which is a demonstration of its serious commitment to the war
on terrorism.
More can be done. A number of senior Administration officials, to
include the Vice President and the Secretary of Defense, have visited
President Musharraf to press for greater Pakistani action against
terrorists operating in Pakistan's territory bordering Afghanistan.
Pakistan's capabilities, particularly those of the Frontier Corps,
could be improved. The Frontier Corps, whose officers are seconded from
the Army, is raised among Pashtuns in the FATA and is theoretically the
best force to conduct counterinsurgency operations against Taliban
rebels operating in the FATA and then across the border in Afghanistan.
The Frontier Corps lacks basic communications and target acquisition
capabilities, particularly night vision capability. DOD views enhancing
the Frontier Corps capability as a major supporting effort for our
troops in Afghanistan.
Ms. Tauscher. Characterize the Afghan-Pakistan relationship in the
fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda: What is the level of
cooperation and where are there problems?
General Eikenberry. The relationship between Afghanistan and
Pakistan is strained. The Afghans blame insurgent violence on Pakistan.
Pakistan has approximately 80,000 security forces positioned in the
frontier areas adjacent to Afghanistan. They cite the inability of
coalition forces to deliver security and development into the Pashtun
dominated areas. The Government of Pakistan (GOP) appears to be is
doing everything it can to secure the border. Unfortunately, true
border security calls for dealing with a powerful Pashtun tribal
influence that more often sides with the Taliban than the government.
Since 2001, the GOP has worked to gain access to the tribal areas
through a series of military and political engagements. Direct military
confrontation only served to embolden the tribal elements and resulted
in significant combat loses for Pakistan's military, who are considered
a ``foreign'' force in the tribal areas. Nevertheless, a military
contingent continues to occupy the tribal areas and along the immediate
border. Only recently have diplomatic efforts begun to achieve results
when South Waziristan Agency (SWA) militants with Pakistani military
support expelled AQ sympathetic Uzbek fighters from SWA. The GOP views
accountability as key to true border security and despite Afghanistan's
objection, initiated construction of a border fence in March. Other
accountability measures including biometric monitoring again met Afghan
resistance. On a diplomatic front, the GOP considers bilateral
agreements with Afghanistan key to securing the border and both parties
have agreed to discuss future and ongoing efforts during talks in
Turkey. Pakistan and Afghanistan have demonstrated an ability to work
through complex, controversial refugee and military issues using
Tripartite forums with the United Nations and United States. Defeating
the insurgency in Afghanistan requires that Pakistan and Afghanistan
work together to develop shared solutions to the many factors
contributing to the insurgency.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ANDREWS
Mr. Andrews. I ask if the witnesses could submit their data on the
cost of training Afghani military personnel and police personnel.
Secretary Gastright. In fiscal year 2006 Combined Security and
Transition Command Afghanistan executed $108.6 million of Afghan
Security Forces Funds in the training Sub Activity Group (SAG) for
Afghan National Army. For these dollars, Combined Security and
Transition Command Afghanistan provided medical training, property book
training, management training program, English language training,
embedded trainer support, and a mentoring program. This included the
training of 9,616 new Afghan National Army soldiers.
Additionally, Combined Security and Transition Command Afghanistan
executed $425 million of Afghan Security Forces Funds in the training
Sub Activity Group for the Afghan National Police. For these dollars,
Combined Security and Transition Command Afghanistan provided basic
police training, tactical training initiative, provincial police
training, field police training, criminal investigation training,
instructor training, tactical driving course training, mentors,
operational maintenance expenses for regional training centers and the
central training center. This included the training of 8,875 new Afghan
National Police Officers.