[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-3]
MARINE CORPS FORCE
PROTECTION EQUIPMENT FOR
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JANUARY 16, 2007
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37-304 WASHINGTON : 2007
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SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi, Chairman
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
RICK LARSEN, Washington KEN CALVERT, California
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania
Jesse Tolleson, Professional Staff Member
John Wason, Professional Staff Member
Jason Hagadorn, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2007
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, January 16, 2007, Marine Corps Force Protection
Equipment for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring
Freedom........................................................ 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, January 16, 2007........................................ 37
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 16, 2007
MARINE CORPS FORCE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking
Member, Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee......... 2
Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman,
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee................. 1
WITNESSES
Alles, Brig. Gen. Randolph, Commanding General, Marine Corps
Warfighting Laboratory, Vice Chief of Naval Research........... 3
Brogan, Brig. Gen. Michael M., Commander, Marine Corps Systems
Command........................................................ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Alles, Brig. Gen. Randolph................................... 41
Brogan, Brig. Gen. Michael M................................. 56
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Mr. Abercrombie.............................................. 80
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 81
Mr. Courtney................................................. 82
Mr. Taylor................................................... 77
MARINE CORPS FORCE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, January 16, 2007.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3 p.m. in room
2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gene Taylor (chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Taylor. If the committee would come to order. The
purpose of this hearing is to provide members of the
subcommittee with the most current updates on the status and
effectiveness of the Marine Corps' force protection equipment
in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. The
subcommittee expects to hear how these current force protection
initiatives are being produced and fielded in an expedited
manner.
More importantly, this public hearing is an opportunity for
the moms, dads, wives, and husbands of our fighting men and
women to find what their leadership is doing to protect their
loved ones against the unconventional and asymmetric threats
that are the reality that our troops face in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
This hearing is not a debate on the war in Iraq. This
hearing was called to determine if everything that can possibly
be done is being done to protect our troops. Of predictable
interest to the subcommittee is the next generation of armored
vehicles, the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles commonly
referred to as MRAP. The committee will be very interested to
understand the acquisition plans for these vehicles and any
roadblocks in their rapid procurement.
I would like to welcome my mentor, my friend, and my fellow
chairman, Roscoe Bartlett, who is just absolutely the best
subcommittee chairman I could have been associated with, who
has taught me a heck of a lot about respecting old Members. So
if I ever fail to live up to your expectations, you let me
know.
We also are fortunate to have one of the newest Members of
Congress, retired Navy Admiral, Admiral Sestak from
Pennsylvania, joining us.
Mr. Courtney, thank you very much for showing up.
But, most of all, Generals, we want to hear from you.
It was about a year ago that I had a visit from the former
head of the Army Liaison Office, Colonel Jim Littig; and he
explained to me that, in addition to the steps we have taken to
up-armor the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle
(HMMWV)--better body armor, the jammers--that a continuing
mistake that was being made in Iraq was the fact that we were
sending a flat-bottom vehicle out that was regularly being hit
by mines. And all of the technology for V-bottom vehicles has
been used by the Russians, by the South Africans and others for
decades, that we are falling behind on that.
Particularly, a follow-up conversation that I was fortunate
to have with Lieutenant General Stephen Blum actually said it
is worse than a flat-bottom vehicle taking a blast, that
actually the channel in the bottom of the HMMWV that is
designed to protect the drive shaft actually has the
unfortunate effect of shaping the charge so that much of the
force of the blast ends up in the inside of the HMMWV.
So the HMMWV, the vehicle itself, is doing more than we
ever expected it to do, but it is time to move on on that
program for something that is safer for our Marines.
For the sake of the newer Members, I would hope you would
walk them through all of the acquisitions.
I want to thank both of you for meeting with me last week.
I was impressed with your knowledge. I was impressed with your
desire to get the job done. You set a very ambitious target
date to having these vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now that
you have set that date freely, this committee expects you to--
we are going to work with you to see that target is met.
So, without any further statement, Mr. Ranking Member, we
would welcome your remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
I would like to ask unanimous consent to submit my opening
statement for the record.
Mr. Taylor. Okay.
Testifying before our committee today is Brigadier General
Randolph Alles and Brigadier General Michael Brogan, both with
the United States Marine Corps.
General Alles is the Commanding General of the Marine Corps
War Fighting Laboratory. The War Fighting Lab is part of the
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, And its stated purpose
is to improve current and future expeditionary warfare
capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict.
Brigadier General Alles is also the subject matter expert
for improvised explosive devices (IED), IED jammers, and
electronic countermeasures. He also represents the Marine Corps
as a member of the Joint IED Defeat Organization.
General Brogan is the Commanding General of the Marine
Corps Systems Command. His organization is the Acquisition
Armor of the Marine Corps. He is responsible for all areas of
Marine Corps procurement, including an analysis of contractor
performance, an area I am sure we will examine today.
I want to thank both of you. It is the norm, under the
rules proposed by Congressman Skelton, for our witnesses to
speak for five minutes. That will not be necessary today.
Please take all the time that you feel necessary to inform the
committee what the Marine Corps needs to see and is doing.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. RANDOLPH D. ALLES, COMMANDING GENERAL,
MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING LABORATORY, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL
RESEARCH
General Alles. Mr. Chairman, Representative Bartlett, and
members of the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss Marine Corps force protection efforts.
The Marine Corps is fighting today's wars while remaining
focused on the challenges that lie ahead. We are mindful that
the struggle against enemies of this Nation and her allies is
multifaceted and generational in nature. Challenges to our
national security interests in the years ahead will be
characterized by a diverse array of emerging and deteriorating
nation-states and non-state actors such as transnational
terrorists and criminals. Our ability to achieve success on a
fluid and linear battlefield will require a very agile and
highly responsive force that is properly equipped, well
trained, and maintained at a high state of readiness.
A fundamental dictum to our survivability and success in
the current security environment is the need to structure
processes that increase our responsiveness to the warfighter.
We have streamlined the Urgent Universal Needs Statement
process, shortening the timelines such that most are approved
in under 90 days. The flexibility and timeliness to reprogram
funds toward unanticipated emergency requirements remains a
challenge and represents an area for improved support to
increase responsiveness to our forward deployed forces.
We are fighting a thinking enemy who is trying very hard to
kill us. As we modify our force protection measures, our
enemies mature in their sophistication and lethality. We
continue aggressively to adapt our training and equipment to
this changing threat. Congress has responded rapidly, and
generously, to our request for equipment and increased
protection; and we take seriously our responsibility to manage
these resources prudently.
The Marine Corps has made great strides in countering two
of the most prominent threats we face: the Improvised Explosive
Device and sniper. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab is leading
a four-pronged approach to countering the threat from snipers
that focuses on increasing the ability to sense and warn, deny,
protect, and respond. The Lab has leveraged the cooperative
efforts of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), the Army, the Navy, the National Ground Intelligence
Center, and numerous Marine Corps agencies in these efforts.
Future sense and warn capabilities include optical, acoustic,
and infrared detection and location.
We have made tangible progress countering IEDs. My written
statement expands upon programs such as IED Detector Dogs,
robotics, and IED neutralizers. These technologies provide a
responsive detection and neutralization capability.
The Marine Corps, in coordination with the Office of Naval
Research (ONR), is researching and investigating new materials
and designs for integration into improved body armor systems
that provide lightweight, modular protection for the individual
consistent with identified requirements, both current and
future.
Probably the single most effective item in protecting
Marines has been our various vehicle-armoring efforts; and
while we have saved countless Marine lives by doing so, the
enemy is extremely adaptive and responds to our increased
protection by making larger and more lethal types of IEDs. We
remain diligent in working with the Joint IEDDO and supporting
their various armor studies and tests, the results of which
will be invaluable in pending and future protection efforts.
The Army/Marine Corps Board has proven a valuable forum for
coordination of not only requirements but, also, rapid response
to Combatant Commander's requests such as Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) vehicles.
In addition to material and technology solutions, the
Marine Corps is working diligently to develop and implement
training and education programs that mitigate risk, enhance
force protection and contribute to our ability to accomplish
the mission. Our rapid and effective lessons learned management
system promptly captures the complexity of combat situations
faced by our marines and sailors around the globe to enhance
our training programs.
Looking ahead to the challenges of the long war, the Marine
Corps has enhanced its counterinsurgency capabilities by
completely revamping training and producing a body of
publications that educates and informs our small and large unit
leaders alike.
Through innovation, institutional adaptation and
congressional support, your Marine Corps is obtaining the
needed resources to prevail in the new security environment.
The challenges we face are enormous, yet our past is replete
with examples of how we have overcome daunting, seemingly
insurmountable barriers that tested our resolve.
On behalf of all Marines and Sailors, we thank the
committee for your continued support that has enhanced our
warfighting capability, saved lives and allowed us to protect
this great Nation in an uncertain world.
[The prepared statement of General Alles can be found in
the Appendix on page 41.]
Mr. Taylor. General Brogan.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. MICHAEL M. BROGAN, COMMANDER, MARINE
CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND
General Brogan. Chairman Taylor, Congressman Bartlett,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am honored to
appear before you this afternoon to discuss with you Marine
Corps force protection systems.
First, on behalf of all Marines, Sailors and their
families, I want to thank you for your continued support of our
Corps as we fight the long war on terror.
General Alles described for you the technologies that he
examines. For my part, I will describe to you our commitment to
providing force protection to our Marines to save lives, to
reduce casualties and to limit the severity of their injuries.
Our goal is to ensure that our force protection
requirements are quickly met with the best systems available.
By partnering with industry and teaming with our sister
services, we strive to meet this goal. We will describe for you
several of those systems.
Because the threat changes, we have direct day-to-day
communications with our U.S. Army counterparts. We discuss
strategies for changing our armor systems not only for
individual warfighters but also for our ground vehicles. We
frequently partner with the Army to test and procure these
armor systems. For example, through this partnership, we have
been able to rapidly test and modify the armor that we have
employed in our wheeled vehicle fleet.
Another area we are in close cooperation with the Army in
benefiting our warfighter is the acquisition and fielding of
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, or MRAP, as you
described, Mr. Chairman. These vehicles provide the best
available protection for our warfighters against improvised
explosive devices. These vehicles are designed with a V-shaped
hull to protect the occupants from all three primary kill
mechanisms of mines and IEDs: fragmentation, blast overpressure
and acceleration.
The Marine Corps has already fielded several variances of
MRAPs, the first of which was known at the time as the Cougar
Hardened Engineer Vehicle. Since the start of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, we fielded 27 Cougars in support of disposal teams and
combat engineers. We have also fielded an initial procurement
of 122 Joint Explosive Ordinance Disposal Rapid Response
Vehicles, or JERRV, in support of joint EOD teams throughout
the theater. We are on track to complete fielding of a follow-
on procurement for 79 additional JERRV vehicles.
Last month, I awarded sole source contract for 200
additional vehicles to a company that is already in production.
That is a bridge to get us in to a full and open competition so
that we can expand the protection base and more rapidly put
these vehicles in the hands of our warfighters. This effort
will procure and field up to an additional 4,060 MRAP vehicles
to our Nation's joint forces.
Another counter ID system that we are fielding is the
lightweight mine roller. These rollers protect convoys from
pressure-plate-activated mines or victim-initiated improvised
explosive devices.
The need for lightweight rollers originated with Marines in
the theater. Our initial urgent requirement, which we received
in June of 2006, was for 31 systems. A quick query of industry
identified only one company who had these in manufacture and
that was in the United Kingdom.
Subsequently, the Marine Corps developed its own design.
Then the Marine Corps logistics command fabricated 53 of these
systems to support the immediate need. In August, 2006, when
requirement was increased to 407 systems, the Naval Surface
Warfare Center, Panama City, Florida, developed a viable design
lightweight mine roller and provided that concept to U.S.
industry.
We now have two U.S. prime contractors producing these
systems. To date, we have fielded 256 of that 407 requirement
with another 74 in route to theater. These mine rollers have
already proven their value by saving lives and preserving
equipment. In effect, they absorb the blasts that were intended
for our Marines in occupied vehicles.
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the
need to continually evolve our personal protective vest system.
Therefore, beginning next month, we will start transitioning to
the newly designed Modular Tactical Vest, or MTV. This vest is
now in production, and even though it is virtually the same
weight as its predecessor, the Outer Tactical Vest, or OTV, it
is more easily integrated with our other personal protection
systems. It also provides greater comfort through the
incorporation of advanced load carriage techniques that
distributes the combat load over the torso and onto the hips.
The MTV incorporates our existing Enhanced Small Arms
Protective Inserts, or ESAPI, as well as side SAPI plates.
These plates are provided to every Marine currently in the
theater. They will also be provided to every Marine that
deploys to the theater. ESAPI provides the best protection
available against a wide variety of small armed threats, up to
and including 7.62.
Finally, in February, the Marine Corps will begin fielding
Flame Resistant Organizational Gear, sometimes referred to as
FROG. We will provide this gear to all of our deployed Marines
and those preparing to deploy. This life-saving ensemble of
clothing items--gloves, balaclava, long-sleeved fire-resistant
shirt, combat shirt, and combat trouser--is designed to
mitigate the potential injuries our Marines face from flame
exposure. These clothing items provide protection that is
comparable to that of the Nomex combat vehicle crewman suit or
flight suit.
With the mix of body armor undergarment and outerwear we
have provided operational commanders, they can determine what
equipment their Marines will employ based upon the mission
requirements and the environmental conditions.
We have positioned ourselves to innovate and modify our
equipment so that we can continue to meet the evolving threat.
By working with our sister service and our Nation's
manufacturing base, the Marine Corps continues to provide our
Marines the best available equipment against known and
anticipated threats. We take seriously our responsibility to
protect our Marines, and we want you to know we are doing
everything we can. With your continued support, we will
continue to accomplish that mission.
In closing, I would like to introduce to you Sergeant
Joseph Perez. Sergeant Perez is a decorated combat veteran who
has two tours of duty in Iraq. His personal combat declarations
include the Navy Cross, the Navy Marine Corps Combat, the Navy
Marine Corps Commendation Medal with Combat V, the Purple
Heart, and two Combat Action Ribbons.
I invited him along so that you can be provided an expert
opinion of the equipment we are fielding to our warfighters. He
has served in both Operation Iraqi Freedom I and Operation
Iraqi Freedom II as a squad leader in Third Battalion 5
Marines.
He has available to him on the table a representative
sample of the infantry combat load, much of which he wore
during the assault in Fallujah. Also in that battle he wore the
Outer Tactical Vest. Today, he has available to him the Modular
Tactical Vest. It is designed with a quick-release cutaway
system so that a Marine can rapidly egress from it should he
find himself in water or needing to escape a vehicle. It also
provides increased coverage particularly in the lower back;
and, as I mentioned, it better distributes the load off of the
shoulders onto the torso and hips.
He will remain after the formal hearing for anyone who
would like to come down and take a look at the gear or try any
of it on.
Again, I thank you for this opportunity to appear before
you and look forward to providing any additional information
that you require.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, General.
[The prepared statement of General Brogan can be found in
the Appendix on page 56.]
Mr. Taylor. I would like to, for the record, thank my
colleague, Congressman Neil Abercrombie, who is the chairman
for the Air and Land Subcommittee, for joining. He will be
having a hearing of his own that will be classified on much of
the same subjects at 4 o'clock in 2337. Thank you for being
here.
We have been joined by Congresswoman Bordallo of Guam, and
Congressman Ellsworth of Ohio.
On the Republican side, thank you, Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of the
Tidewater area of Virginia, for joining us.
I would yield to my colleague from Maryland.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Our witnesses were very generous with our time in a
classified briefing. I asked a number of questions, and they
answered them.
As you point out, the primary purpose of today's hearing is
to assure our fellow countrymen, particularly our service
members' families, that we are doing all that we can to meet
the challenges for protection in this theater. I am convinced
that we could not be moving more expeditiously. I want to thank
our two witnesses for their service to their country and for
really expediting the procurement of these protective systems.
As my custom is, Mr. Chairman, I generally yield my time to
the lowest-ranking member on our side of the aisle. I thought I
would be yielding to your side of the aisle, but Mrs. Davis has
joined us, and I will yield my time to her.
Mr. Taylor. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Generals Alles and Brogan, for being here today. And I
apologize that I missed your testimony, General Alles. I am
hoping that I don't ask a question that you already answered.
But, General Brogan, I understand that the current theater
requirement for the MRAP is 1,022, with 538 Category I, 420
Category II and 64 Category III vehicles. With the
approximately 4,000 more Marines that are supposed to deploy to
Iraq as part of the President's new strategy, do you anticipate
a need in an increase of these vehicles; and, if so, will the
required funding be taken from the fiscal year 2007 bridge
appropriation?
And, before you answer, I also understand that the
contractor has had a problem with meeting the schedule with
these vehicles in the past, and are you confident that the
mistakes will not be repeated?
General Brogan. Ma'am, there is an additional requirement
of vehicles that is making its way through Marine Corps
requirement command. I will expect that will take into account
the plus-up forces that will likely be sent to theater.
As you indicated, there were some initial problems with
that prime contractor when we started up. My experience in
acquisition is that it is not that unusual for a new start
production line. They now are actually producing ahead of
schedule, so I am confident that they will be able to continue
to produce vehicles.
As I mentioned, we are conducting a full and open
competition to seek additional sources for the category of
vehicles that you mentioned, Category I and Category II; and
because of the Category III vehicles, the Buffalo, the heaviest
and largest of these vehicles can be currently met by our
contractor. We have not competed any of those, but the large
quantities of Category I and Category II vehicles are being
competed.
I must temper my comments because we are in the midst of
source selection right now with that.
We did have a large number of potential offers. I met with
Secretary Etter this morning, and I now have the approval to go
forward and have discussions with those offers, and I expect to
be on contract with a large number before the end of this
month.
Our strategy will be to produce two vehicles from each
vendor. We will take those vehicles up to the Aberdeen Test
Center in Maryland and conduct two separate tests. The first
will be a survivability test where we blow up the vehicle; the
second will be a limited user evaluation to ensure that the
handling characteristics, maneuverability and things like that
meet the requirements our Marines and the other joint forces
needs. And given that the offers meet those hurdles, then we
have the ability to award Follow On production contracts and so
then can follow up in producing these vehicles.
Mrs. Davis. I hope we get everything to our warfighters as
soon as they need it and hopefully you will come back to this
committee if you have any other problems. We want to make sure
our Marines are protected and they have the best--that we have
the best that you have to offer.
Mr. Taylor. General, a continual frustration for those of
us who are trying to resolve problems is that we felt--I
personally felt many times during Secretary Rumsfeld's tenure
that we were not given the whole story, that we were often
given a requirement or told a requirement was filled that was
below 100 percent.
It started with body armor. We were told that the
requirement had been filled, only to find out from the moms and
dads of Guardsmen and Reservists they were issued the same body
armor as the regular forces. Then it was the up-armoring of
HUMMWVs, the requirement had been met, only to find out that
was a small proportion of the vehicles operating on the roads
of Iraq and Afghanistan.
So my question to you is, when you said your requirement,
as Ms. Davis has correctly pointed out, that we have 23,000
Marines over there, we are getting ready to send an additional
4,000, will the additional requirement that you are talking
about be enough vehicles so that every Marine who is traveling
the roads of Iraq or Afghanistan is in the best possible
vehicle?
General Brogan. My sense is, sir, that our requirements
have evolved over time. As I indicated in my oral statement,
the first MRAP vehicles, being the JERRV and the Cougars that
we procured, were primarily for EOD and combat engineers.
Clearly, as the ossification of the threats increased, it is
apparent that we need these vehicles for all of the forces that
are involved in operations outside of the operating basis; and
so that was the genesis of the 1,022 requirement that
Congresswoman Davis mentioned.
I also indicated that MASDC is now looking at a larger
number. It has not yet been delivered to me to go procure it. I
believe that MASDC does its validation of this requirement.
They will take into account the additional 4,000 Marines who
will be fielded into theater, and that will be calculated into
the new requirement.
So did we have it a hundred percent right the first time?
No, sir. I believe we used the best numbers that we had
available; and then, as the need for them increased, the
warfighter came back through the urgent UNS process and JUONS
to universal operational needs statement process and sought
these additional vehicles.
Mr. Taylor. Last week, in a classified briefing, you gave
me the target number of vehicles and you targeted a date of
delivery.
General Brogan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Taylor. To what extent can you inform this committee of
the number of vehicles? Because in my mind's eye, I have
trouble believing that this number should be classified. I
would think the moms and dads, the loved ones of the Marines
would like to know that you have a substantial number in mind,
that you have what I think is a very realistic but also very
aggressive target date in mind.
General Brogan. Sir, I believe there is probably two parts.
The first part is the requirement that has currently been
levied on me is to procure 4,060 vehicles. That is for--that
includes the 1,022 for the Marine Corps as well as vehicles for
the United States Army and the United States Navy that is
serving alongside of us. For the Navy, principally they are for
EOD teams and Seabees. Now for the Army, they will be used as
their force commanders see best.
The additional number is changing almost daily, sir.
Mr. Taylor. How about your target delivery date to get in
the Marine Corps' hands, and then you explained to me that
there is some additional work that is done by the Marine Corps
before they are sent to theater. What is your target date for
those vehicles? In your position, what is your target date to
have them fielded in theater?
General Brogan. As I indicated, I am not buying just for
the Marine Corps. So that 4,060 vehicles--I have set a stretch
goal for my team of the end of this year, 31 December, to have
those vehicles delivered to the U.S. Government. It takes me
approximately 60 days from that point to incorporate the
jammers, the radios, the Blue Force Tractor and, as we start
delivering these vehicles in quantity, surface ship them into
theater.
Right now, with the small quantities that we have been
dealing with, we have been flying them into theater as soon as
they are prepared. As these quantities increase, I suspect we
will have to move to sea transportation in order to get the
vehicles over there.
So I expect, from the time I get them, in my mind we will
do the integration of the government-furnished equipment and
transport them into theater in an additional 60 days. So my
stretch goal, as I indicated to you last week, sir, is to
deliver those 4,000 vehicles by the end of this year.
Mr. Taylor. General, one of the frustrations that this
committee had with the up-arming of the HMMWVs was the length
of time that it took. The goals were originally too small. And,
as members of the staff and as members looked into it, it was
disappointment after disappointment, that the steel
manufacturers did not put that steel at the top of their list,
that because the industry is pretty close to capacity they were
just putting the normal routine; and apparently no one at the
Department of Defense even bothered to call up the steel mills
and say kids are dying. You can save many peoples lives with
putting this at the top of the list.
We heard basically the same thing from the ballistic lab
folks. No one said this is more important than life and death;
this is more important than an office building in downtown
Miami or something else.
To what extent have you researched the pitfalls on the Army
acquisition plan and learned from their mistakes so that, when
the first of January rolls around, that those 4,000 vehicles
are ready to go and, quite frankly, in-house? Do you have the
manpower and the crews available so that when the vehicles are
delivered to you that that doesn't become a delay in getting
them fielded?
General Brogan. Sir, as to the first part of your question,
we are working with Defense Contract Management Agency to go
take a look at all of the subs and the vendors that were
included in the proposals that came from industry. As my folks
did, the Source Selection Evaluation Board, they looked at the
relationships and interrelationships not only among the primes
but also one tier below that at some of the vendors.
So there is some concern at overlapping capacity and
whether or not they will all be able to meet what they laid out
in their proposals as the quantities, and those quantities are
what I base my projection on. We have available to us DX and DS
ratings where we can implement a national security imperative,
if you will, on industry and move to the head of the line so
that government deliveries take precedence over anything else
that would--that they may be manufacturing. That is available
to us should it be required, and we have used it in a couple
instances in some of the things that we have been delivering to
theater.
So as DCMA takes a look at the capacity of the steel mills
to provide the steel that would be required for test vehicles
at the vendor base, at the part suppliers, we will look to
determine whether or not we need to implement these DX and DS
ratings. They are available to us by going up to the Office of
Secretary of Defense and requesting them, sir.
Mr. Taylor. So, just for clarification, all of the funds
that you need are there. Is there the appropriation? Is there--
you know of no hurdles at this moment that this committee or
the full committee or the appropriators need to address in
order to make this happen?
General Brogan. Sir, I have in hand moneys from the Marine
Corps for the first 805 vehicles. The delta between the 805 and
the 1,022 is included in our fiscal year 2007 full supplemental
request. I have a portion of the Navy's money, and I have not
yet received any money from the Army. We are working--the
Secretary of the Navy is working with the Secretary of the Army
to get those funds. They will probably have to come to you all
with a reprogramming action to move money out of a current
existing line. I believe they intended to fund it in their 2007
request, but I am not certain of that.
Mr. Taylor. Okay. I am going to formally request of you
that information.
I would also like to remind the committee that Chairman
Skelton has passed a new committee rule that we would get
information 48 hours in advance. Because of the gravity of this
situation, it was my call to have this hearing today because
the Marines did not get 48 hours' notice. There was no way that
we could have held them to that account. So we have agreed to
provide all of the testimony by this Friday; and, hopefully,
the request I just made of you will be included in that.
General Brogan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Taylor. In the order that the members arrived, we will
recognize Admiral Sestak from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Sestak. My questions are really just more relying on
what has already been brought up as you spoke about the
asymmetric type of threat that we face. How many pounds of
blasts are we seeing right now out there in Iraq, mine blasts,
and what do you expect it to be?
General Alles. I mean honestly, sir, it varies widely.
Mr. Sestak. What is the maximum?
General Alles. An average IED attack would be somewhere
around 250 2-millimeter artillery rounds. They vary
dramatically in size and what they use. Sometimes they are
completely improvised explosives, meaning they use accelerants,
propane, things like that. So there is no necessarily--if I
were going to say there was a standard attack, it would be that
152-millimeter round, but they vary wildly. I have got a
report----
Mr. Sestak. So they are not getting larger? It just varies?
General Alles. They are--no, as we have armored the
vehicles more heavily, they are increasing the size of the IED
so they will use more artillery rounds, C-4, TNT, whatever they
use in that particular attack. So they have increased the size
of the rounds.
But to try to give you a standard IED, that is part of the
issue, sir. They are improvised.
Mr. Sestak. The up-armor Hummer upgrade is for 12-pound
mine blast. That is what it is good for?
General Alles. I have to check the number.
Mr. Sestak. Is the MRAP at least more than that?
General Brogan. It is, sir.
Mr. Sestak. Do you know what it is up to?
General Brogan. I do, but I would rather not say in open
hearing.
Mr. Sestak. Is it going to take care of this increasing
growth of what the mine blast--I mean, it is the lead/lag
question.
General Brogan. If your question, sir, is there a mine that
can overcome an MRAP, yes, there is, but the V-shape hull does
a great deal for us to disburse that blast as well as the fact
that these vehicles are much higher above the ground. As you
know, in an explosion, space is your friend, because it allows
that wave to expand before it makes contact with the vehicle.
I would rather not in open session discuss the specifics of
what those vehicles are designed to protect against.
General Alles. I would make the comment it is counter-
countermeasure. We feel the solution--they develop a
countermeasure. We have to deliver another counter to that.
Mr. Sestak. My overarching question would be, as you look
back on nearly the last 4 years--and you have worked in groups
throughout DOD, including ones headed by Mr. Wolfowitz, trying
to address this issue--what is it from the warfighting policy
side to the acquisition procurement side is the overarching
lesson learned so that the lead/lag or the countermeasure, you
know, counter-counter-counter can be done in a much more
flexible way?
I mean, really watching this, it has always been great
efforts, but you are right. It has always kind of seemed to
have been watching it, watching to see their next step and--to
some degree and then catching up. It is always back and forth.
Is there anything for the speed or the procurement system, the
acquisition way, that you would sit back and say, this is the
lesson, we really should take care of this for the next type of
asymmetric threat, General Alles, that you laid out so well?
General Brogan. Sir, I would suggest that certainly there
have been a lot of indications or items where we have been
responding, but there are also several instances where, because
of our intelligence systems, we were out ahead of them. But you
are not going to read about those in the press because we are
not going to publicize those times where we are proactive and
out ahead and then tip our hand. So all that you ever hear
about or read about are those times where we are purely in a
reactive mode.
There are some things, sir, that I believe could help speed
up some of the acquisition processes in particular. I believe
last year the Congress provided two special operations command,
something called combat mission needs funds. This was a pot of
money provided to the commander and the acquisition executive
in Special Operation Command that we were allowed to use very
rapidly to respond to an emerging threat if something was
available to fulfill it. A similar ability for the services
would be very helpful.
Another area that could assist us is the below threshold
reprogramming limits. They have not been changed in a number of
years, and in some cases that affects our ability to move money
back and forth into some of the areas of more urgent needs at
the expense of some of our longer-term investment programs. So
I would suggest or offer that you could all take a look at
that.
General Alles. Sir, I would offer also that on one
important point is we need to maintain a close alignment with
the operating forces. So one of the initiatives that we took
from the warfighting lab was to put a counter-IED cell in Iraq
which is composed of seven officers that actually work at the
warfighting laboratory. That gives us a closer alignment
between the operating forces and the requirements as they come
to pass.
One of the issues that has come to the forefront is the
issue of counter-sniper technology. We have actually been able
to be in front of counter-snipers to a degree because we had
money we invested in years past in counter-sniper technology
based on what we were seeing from the operating forces and able
to field some near-term solutions. It is not a panacea. It is
helping, but, because of that close alignment, it has allowed
us to respond more rapidly.
Mr. Sestak. Thanks. I am up just about finished with my
five minutes. I did not mean my comments to be critical. I
mean, nobody does it better than the Marines.
General Brogan. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Sestak. And I mean that. It is just that it seems to
me--and having watched it from both sides--what you can know on
the inside and what you know on the outside is that there has
been or there is really an effort to step back from this for
the next inevitable conflict and what it really is to make sure
that we have drawn the study, the execution for this
acquisition system of ours we all critique and the tie to the
warfighters so that some of the--one little bit of lead/lag is
just too much. Has that been done yet?
General Brogan. General Alles mentioned the lessons
learned. We are attempting to capture those. I don't believe
there has been a systematic review of the acquisition
processes, sir.
He also mentioned the urgent universal needs statement.
That is the method by which the operating forces identify an
urgent requirement to the acquisition system. In order to help
shorten that cycle time, I have placed a liaison officer with
the MMEF so, as they begin to look up the urgent UNS, they can
begin to let us know what our project officers and program
managers need to begin looking at, seeing if there is anything
available in industry that can immediately fulfill that need
or, unfortunately, we have to embark upon a development effort,
which takes much longer.
Mr. Sestak. Thank you very much. And, you know, these great
things you do as you go along, if they were institutionalized
in the lessons learned, it would be good. Thank you, sirs, for
your time.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Admiral.
Something I should have mentioned, particularly for the
newer members, what we have found, sadly, in Iraq is that a
disproportionate legion of the casualties are of mines and IEDs
and a disproportionately high number of those have occurred on
trucks and HMMWVs. So, although the HMMWV is the most common
vehicle in the American inventory, there is still a
disproportionate percentage of the death in and amputations
that have resulted from attacks on them and that purpose of
this is to try to solve that problem for our Nation to move on.
Since our enemies talk to each other either face to face or
over the Internet, attacks in Iraq are again to be seen in
Afghanistan or someplace else in the world. So this is an
attempt in this committee to--we are aware of a problem which
we are trying to solve it.
Having said that, I want to recognize the gentleman--we do
this a little bit of out of order since we don't have many
Republicans. We want to be fair. Mr. Wilson from South Carolina
is recognized.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you for being here today. I am very
grateful.
I represent Parris Island; and, General Alles, I noted with
interest that you served at the Marine Air Station in Beaufort.
We really appreciate the impact of the Navy and Marines to the
communities that I represent.
I am particularly interested in the Cougar and Buffalo. And
I apologize that I was late. But I have even had the privilege
of visiting the manufacturing sites of these particular
vehicles, and--you touched on it; it may be repetitious--I
would like for you to review what has been the record of these
two particular vehicles and, in particular--I know you touched
on it a moment ago, but I would like to hear it again and the
unique V shape and how that has such a positive impact.
General Brogan. Yes, sir. The V-shaped hull is designed to
force the blast off to the side, away from the embarked spaces
in the vehicle, and the fact that the vehicles sit up high
provides space so that that blast can form and get larger and
not have as much impact on the hull of the vehicle.
The two vehicles that you mentioned, the Cougar and the
Buffalo, are both serving very well in theater right now. We
have not had a single Marine fatality in either one of those
two vehicles. Against the blast, shrapnel, effects of both IEDs
and mines, they are doing a tremendous job. So that is why we
have the imperative to get these vehicles into theater.
General Alles. I would just remark, sir, that that vehicle,
these V-shaped vehicles, which goes beyond just the Cougar and
Buffalo, account for 14 percent of our taxes, but only 3 and a
half percent of our casualties. So they are very mine-resistant
vehicles which are behind the impetus to move toward them.
Mr. Wilson. They are also very intimidating to the enemy.
To see the vehicle is awesome, and so it has to be very
assuring to Iraqi allies and intimidating to persons opposed to
us.
And I know, again, that this has been mentioned, and I
appreciate the question from the chairman a moment ago, but we
can assure family members that the Marines who deployed, the
Marines to be deployed, that they do have those in a combat
role, have up-armor vehicles in totality; is that correct?
General Brogan. They have up-armor vehicles yes, sir. The
majority of those are up-armor HMMWVs. This effort is to
increase the density of these V-shaped hull vehicles in the
operating forces.
Mr. Wilson. As an indication of my appreciation of what you
are doing, I am wearing a wristband today for a Marine who is
serving on--a Naval academy graduate currently in Iraq, and so
I wanted to thank you for your service. I want to thank the
young people who are protecting our families.
And I yield my time.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Courtney from Connecticut.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for sharing with us your experience and time here
today.
I want to go back to Congresswoman Davis' question, because
I was trying to follow the answer, General Brogan, in terms of
just the timing, of making sure that this new surge of troops
is going to be protected with the best armor possible.
The Baltimore Sun actually had a story a few days ago which
indicated that, in fact, two brigades are being sent over
without having these up-armor or strengthened, toughened
vehicles available to them. Senator Dodd from my state, I know,
has sent a letter to Secretary Gates inquiring about whether or
not that shortcoming is, in fact, the situation for the people
who are--the new troops that are being sent over to Baghdad.
And just listening to your description of the sequence of
the procurement, I mean, it did sound like if people are moving
over there even today, which most news accounts seem to
indicate, it is hard to see how those vehicles are going to
catch up to them.
General Brogan. Sir, these vehicles will not arrive before
the troops. The need for these vehicles is greater now than it
was when we first received the requirement. As I indicated,
requirement has increased from the first deployments that we
made just for EOD and combat engineers to now a much wider need
for these vehicles for all troops that are involved in
patrolling.
It is the policy--it is my understanding it is the policy
of the operation by commanders in theater that no Marine goes
outside the wire unless he is in an up-armor vehicle. That
could be a HMMWV or an MTVR, but they are not going outside the
wire in those vehicles, and I am fairly confident that that
requirement, that structure will remain in place even for these
additional troops.
The folks in Installations Logistics at Headquarters Marine
Corps are looking at how we will meet this plus-up troop
deployment with the equipment that we have on hand. There will
be some cross-leveling of gear that is currently in theater.
There will be some additional deployment of gear that is at
home stations. But we don't want to completely strip away our
training base because these vehicles handle differently than
the unarmored version, and we want to make sure our Marines, as
they go through Mohave Viper out of Twentynine Palms, are
familiar with the handling characteristics so we avoid needless
accidents in theater that could injure or kill marines.
It is my understanding that operational commanders are
ready to execute this cross-leveling so that all of the Marines
who operate outside of the forward operating bases (FOBs) will,
in fact, have up-armor vehicles. It is then incumbent upon me
and my staff to deliver as rapidly as possible these MRAP
vehicles as they come off the production lines.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. I didn't mean to suggest there was
any shortcoming, and it is obvious you are doing everything you
can to make sure our guys are protected and to make sure our
men and women are protected.
Another question I have which is an issue that seemed to be
out there in the public realm over the last couple of years or
so which is about families who are trying to use their own
resources to get their family members body armor that otherwise
might not have been available. I know legislation was passed to
provide for reimbursement for those families, and it seemed
that there was difficulty trying to figure out how to get those
payments where they--I wondered if you could give me a quick
sort of update, and I apologize not knowing the latest on that
information.
General Brogan. And I can only speak from a limited
knowledge standpoint from the Marine Corps. What I have been
told is that we had very few cases of that in the Marine Corps
that are in fact providing all of our folks with the ESAPI,
with the side SAPI plates as well as the quad guards and the
other pieces of the personal protective ensemble and then the
commanders tailor what they wear to the specifics of the
mission. To my knowledge, there has not been a problem with
that in the Marine Corps.
General Alles. We don't know the exact numbers of what has
been applied for for reimbursements. We have taken that for the
record, and we can get back to you.
Mr. Courtney. I would appreciate that.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 77.]
Mr. Taylor. Next in the new order would be Ms. Bordallo
from Guam.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I want to say it
is a privilege and honor to return to this subcommittee and to
serve under Chairman Taylor and Ranking Member Bartlett.
Generals, thank you for being here today; and I do have a
couple of questions.
The Marine Corps has a special place in Guam's heart, and I
represent Guam. They liberated us, and they are returning, 8 to
10,000 of them from Okinawa to Guam, in the next few years. So
we are all very excited about that.
I have been to Iraq many times, and I appreciate the
challenges that our Marines face in theater, and I also have
seen much of the new upgraded equipment. It has been explained
to us while we are over there in theater. And, as you might
suspect, since I represent Guam, I have seen Marines conducting
many training operations in the Pacific; and I do not want to
stray far away from our primary focus today and that is the
protection of our Marines serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.
However, I do, at times, worry about what implications our
current actions have on future operations. That is whether we
are creating tunnel vision on current operations to the
exclusion of potential future operations in other areas, the
Pacific, and let us mention North Korea here. Can you discuss
how the existing fielding procedures incorporate the full
spectrum of Marine operations, including amphibious operations,
and whether the Marine equipment development procedures have
taken into account missions that are unique to the Marines?
Whichever one of you would like to answer that.
General Brogan. Yes, ma'am. I believe our focus, main
effort, right now is certainly equipping the troops that are,
number one, in theater and those that are preparing to go next,
the ones that are in the training pipeline. With General Conway
becoming the commandant of the Marine Corps, he has set about
institutionally refocusing on all of the challenges that we
potentially face and ensuring that we remain relevant as Marine
ground task forces, not just as fighters in the realm of
counterinsurgency, the area in which we find ourselves today.
The urgent UNS process, the joint universal operational re-
extending process that we use very frequently to equip our
Marines in theater, has that focus, the Marines in theater. But
our ongoing programs of record are designed to equip the entire
Marine Corps for the entire conflict, not just for
counterinsurgency. I don't think we have completely taken our
eye off the ball, ma'am, but we are facing one direction more
than the other.
Ms. Bordallo. I know the situation is very serious today in
Iraq and Afghanistan, but it seems that you never know where
anything is going to erupt in the world.
General Alles. Ma'am, I think you have seen from the
commandant's planning guidance he is concerned about the
turnaround ratios, we call them, for our operating forces. In
some cases, they are low, one-to-one, for certain of our
operating forces; and one of his objectives is to get those
turnaround ratios raised to allow us to keep our focuses on the
areas of the world that we need them. That has been very
explicit in his guidance. It is critical how we do our training
in being prepared for where the Nation calls us to serve.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, and I am pleased to hear
that.
My second question is, in a hypothetical world, if you
could pick a single technology under development today to be
completed and fielded to all Marines in combat tomorrow, what
is that single technology and why? In other words, what is the
most important technology or item that you have in development
that will save lives in the current combat theaters and in the
future?
General Brogan. I think perhaps, ma'am, for that technology
that we have in our hands right now, getting the MRAPs into
theater as rapidly as possible will save lives. But, frankly,
if we were able to develop a system that would pre-detonate an
improvised explosive device, blow them up out ahead of our
vehicles, blow them up while they are being planned, then that
would go the furthest in protecting our folks.
General Alles. I would make the comment that there are a
number of efforts that are under way. They are classified
efforts. I think it would be beneficial for the subcommittee to
hear about those efforts. We gave some to the professional
staff members when we met with Congressman Bartlett and Taylor
last week. But, as with General Brogan, that would be a game-
changing technology to pre-detonate IEDs.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much. Thank you for your
service to our country.
Mr. Taylor. Again, in the order that they got here, would
be Congressman Ellsworth from Ohio.
Mr. Ellsworth. Indiana. We are pretty close.
Mr. Taylor. I apologize.
Mr. Ellsworth. Not at all. Ohio is a great state.
Thank you for your service and everything.
Mr. Taylor. Congressman, can I interrupt? We are going to
vary again, since we did not have--we gave the Marines very
short notice, turns out that Sergeant Joseph Perez, who is the
recipient of the Navy Cross, two tours in Iraq, has agreed to
make himself available for questions. We are proud of our
Admirals. We are proud of our Colonels. As a former enlisted
guy, I will tell you I am of the opinion that we appreciate the
officer corp, but they do not have a monopoly on everything.
If you would, we can find you a chair. We are going to put
you up at the panel and make you available for whatever
questions that the members may have and given. Thank you for
your service, and thank you very much for making yourself
available to this committee on such extremely short notice. We
are honored to have you here.
Mr. Ellsworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This may be the
appropriate time for this, because Mr. Perez might be the
appropriate person to ask this.
In my experience with wearing a vest, I know that a lot of
times my officers would improvise on their own when things were
not comfortable, and when they did not fit exactly right, they
would do things on their own, cut little Vs out here to make
them more comfortable. And I was going to ask him, and perhaps
you will be the best one to answer this, what kind of
feedback--because short of sewing somebody into a Kevlar
blanket, there are going to be crevices, and I know that you
have to be able to move, you know, everything to get around and
to do your job.
What is the feeling of the new technology, the new pads,
and do you find your people having to do that? Is that against
orders? I assume that destroying government property and
improvising may be, but are you finding where you can do your
job in the new, and what kind of feedback are you getting with
the new equipment, personal vests, I guess?
Sergeant Perez. All of the old gear is mainly the stuff
that I wore whenever I was in Iraq. It put a lot of stress on
the shoulders, and like you said, people would modify their
vests to fit them, because if you are out on a 4-hour patrol
and your back hurts, you are not very conscious of what is
going on around you.
This new vest that we have, the modular tactical vest, is a
lot more supportive only because it distributes the weight
throughout the body. It is very new, but from what I have seen,
I have actually put it on with the full load on, and it
distributes a lot better. I feel like I can patrol a lot
longer. I would be a little bit more happy with the outcome of
a four-hour patrol in the sun in that vest as opposed to the
other.
Some of the upgrades that they have added to it is the side
protection is now sewn on the inside, and it is hugging to the
body; whereas, the other one was more out and pushed your arms
out. The mobility in your arm movement was restricted due to
the placement of the vest--or of the side armor. You were not
able to get a proper shooting platform while using the other
vest.
So I think, you know, in the short time that I have been in
the Marine Corps, the gear has progressed very rapidly. I came
in with ALICE Packs that were made out of metal and horrible
cloth, and now we have all kinds of stuff that is ergonomically
correct, and it is helping. So I do believe that we are taking
a step in the right direction.
Mr. Ellsworth. Are any of the panels--and I am sorry I was
late. You may have shown this--able to be removed where, if you
do not need the neck pad, you can pull that off of Velcro and
replace them depending on the situation you are going into?
Sergeant Perez. What I had encountered when I was in the
operating force is most of the commanders dictate what you are
going to wear. You know, the mission of whatever you are going
out to accomplish dictates what you are going to wear for that
mission. So, yes, it is removable, but for the most part you
are going to wear most of it all the time due to the IED
threat.
Mr. Ellsworth. Thank you.
And I guess my second and last question, unless I think of
something else, would be, General--I think that you may have
answered this and do not want you to go into anything that, you
know, would be classified. Certainly the ability to blow these
IEDs up before we get--especially when they are being planted
would be a good time, in my book, but are there other things
that we are doing correctly--and I heard General Alles talk
about some of these are mortar rounds; some are, you know,
other materials. Are there things you can talk about
proactively that we are doing--now, I think back to stopping
the war on methamphetamine, that we are regulating
pseudoephedrine.
Are there things that we are doing in theater to control/
seize on end before it becomes a bomb, controlling the
fertilizer, controlling the fuel, whatever it is they are
making these bombs out of? And like I said, if it is
classified, just let me know, and I will catch it later.
General Alles. Sir, honestly, a lot of it is classified,
but there are efforts to reduce caches when we find them. That
is a source of IED material on the part of insurgents. There
are efforts to pattern-analyze how the IEDs occur as we go
after bombmakers and the like. A lot of the details are going
to be classified, but we do want to interrupt the kill chain.
In the emphasis to interrupt the kill chain before the blast
occurs, armor and the like is effective, but it is occurring at
the moment of the blast.
So I would agree that we can go after the networks and the
materials that they are utilizing in those networks. We are
aggressively doing that. There are a number of classified
programs against, which would have to be briefed in a closed
session, which are helpful in those areas. Again, it is not a
panacea, but a many-pronged effort to get at the IED problem.
General Brogan. If I might, sir, before we leave the MTV--
and as the Chairman indicated, officers do not have a lock on
all of the good ideas. What we did is interview the marines as
they were coming out of theater in both I MEF and II MEF. What
were their concerns with the OTV? What were the problems they
had with it? And that led directly to the MTV. After we found
out what their issues were, it had to do with weight
distribution, with comfort, with having the side SAPI plates
integrated into the system, with being able to rapidly egress
if they find themselves in water.
What we did then is held an industry day. Eighteen vendors
participated. We down-selected that to six, and then we took
those six vests down to Camp Lejeune and let 30 marines wear
all of them. If I recall correctly, 89 percent of them selected
what has become MTV.
So we do try to take the input of those enlisted marines,
the folks who actually wear the equipment day in and day out,
and include that in our design process.
Mr. Ellsworth. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Again, my apologies, and I will not make that
mistake again.
Sergeant, again, I want to tell you how much I appreciate
your making yourself available for this. The generals have had
a few days to prepare. You have had 20 seconds, and to be in
the presence of the recipient of a Navy Cross and someone who
has done as much as you have, I want to tell you I appreciate
your making yourself available.
And before I recognize the gentleman from Hawaii, since the
generals have had an opportunity to make an opening statement--
and I know I am putting you on the spot, but it is not every
marine who is going to get a chance to talk to a bunch of
Congressmen, and given this opportunity, if there is something
that either the generals have missed or we have missed as far
as the needs of the individual marines, something that is out
there, something that has been developed or has not been
developed that we need to be looking for, I would welcome your
thoughts on that.
Sergeant Perez. I think when--you know, a lot of the guys
that are operating on the ground, the infantrymen that are
actually patrolling, you know, the cities by foot or by mobile
patrols in HMMWVs or in some of the other vehicles, I think a
lot of emphasis is being put on, you know, hey--like they said
before, we cannot wrap ourselves in Kevlar blankets. A lot of
this gear is great, a lot of it is very hindering, and just
because you have a piece of Kevlar on every single inch of your
body does not mean that I am more effective on the battlefield.
I need to be able to shoot, move and communicate, and if I
cannot move, all of that protection that you have given me now
just made me a sitting duck, and it is pointless for me to have
it on anyway. So I guess, you know, if you could, keep in mind
that we do like better gear, but it is not necessarily to be
fully protected 100 percent all the time.
Mr. Taylor. As a follow-up, is there anything that we, as a
Nation, are buying that you think is poorly spent money? Is
there anything that you see out there that we are not buying
that you are aware of that we should be?
Sergeant Perez. I am not really aware of those types of
things, sir. The only thing that I see is, you know, on the
squad level, hey, what are my marines needing and what--you
know, and for the most part, the Marine Corps has--as a squad
leader, when I came back from Fallujah, I sat down for three
days and did after-action reports with my fellow squad leaders
and platoon commander, and that was, I am assuming, turned--you
know, given to higher, and they, in turn, turned it in to
higher, and it has turned into what it is now, you know, us
getting better gear. So, like I said, in the short time that I
have been in the Marine Corps, the gear progression has been
very rapid.
Mr. Taylor. This could be the ultimate after-action report
as far as getting your desires on the record, and so I want to
give you that opportunity. Again, we are never going to tell
you how to take a hill. We do buy--at the end of the day, we
are responsible for buying the things you need, and that is why
I am asking you this question.
Sergeant Perez. I mean, just put more ammo in our pockets,
and, you know, give us enough water to survive for a couple
days, and we are good to roll.
Mr. Taylor. I now yield to the Chairman of the Air and Land
Forces Subcommittee, the gentleman from Hawaii, Mr.
Abercrombie.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Sergeant, if you happen to think of something or want to
comment on something as we go along, please feel free to do so.
Can I ask both generals and perhaps the sergeant, too?
Because some of the phraseology and the acronyms that we
use are familiar to us, they may not be familiar to the
audience at large, and the hearing is being broadcast out
there, if it does not bother you too much, even though it may
sound repetitious and something that takes more time than it
should, I think we need to say what it is we are talking about.
If you are talking about a Modular Tactical Vest, I think we
need to say it, if it is okay with you folks. You are not going
to hurt our feelings, is what I am driving at, if you say it
out specifically each time because there are literally,
probably, thousands of people who may be tuning in who simply
do not know what we are talking about, and they are all
interested. That is why they are tuned in. That is for sure. Is
that okay? You will not hurt anybody's feelings.
General Brogan. I will try to remember, sir. It is a bad
habit we get into.
Mr. Abercrombie. Oh, no. It is a good habit, actually. I
mean, it moves things along, and a lot of times, in discussion,
when we go to the classified hearing, obviously you do not have
to keep on doing that kind of thing, but that is the only
thing.
General Brogan. Aye, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Besides, if you are in front of me in
hearings that I have, I am going to ask everybody to do that
anyway.
Most of the questions I have will have to wait, General
Alles, for the classified side of things that you have already
mentioned. There is simply too much to go into that would
require us to keep saying that, but I want to make sure that I
understand that some of the logistics involved with whatever is
evolving, including the rapid progression of useful equipment
to the sergeant and to the people under his command.
When you used the--General Brogan, when you used the term
or used the number 4,060, was that the total number of
vehicles; or when we are talking about not the equipment but,
rather, the up-armor HMMWVs or the V-hull or whatever we are
talking about here, was that the total number, did I understand
that correctly, of what you are shooting for in the next year?
General Brogan. The 4,060, sir, is the total number of Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected, or MRAP, Vehicles that I intend to
procure, that I have authority to procure right now. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Good. What is that in relation to the
Cougar Vehicles, the Rapid Response Vehicles?
General Brogan. Sir, the Cougar and the Joint Explosive
Ordinance Disposal Team Rapid Response Vehicle, those are
examples of a Category II, which is a Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected Vehicle. So we have broken them into classes.
Category I----
Mr. Abercrombie. Does the 4,000 include those kinds of
vehicles?
General Brogan. It does, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. That is your total number----
General Brogan. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie [continuing]. Regardless of the various
acronyms and the various vehicles that we are talking about?
General Brogan. Yes, sir. That is correct.
Mr. Abercrombie. We are talking about vehicles that can be
used for like carrying weapons or something, the MTVR, the
Medium Tactical Vehicle, right?
General Brogan. The Medium Tactical Vehicle is primarily--
--
Mr. Abercrombie. Is that part of the 4,000?
General Brogan. It is not.
Mr. Abercrombie. It is not. What are we looking at there?
General Brogan. I do not know off the top of my head, but
the numbers are on the chromium table, but we have met the
acquisition objective for those vehicles.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. The reason I am asking the question
about numbers is not to trap you into numbers, but to try and
figure out a clear direction for the Congress. This is for our
benefit to help you.
What is the relationship of the--these are all
replacements. That is what I am trying to get at. Do you have
the full complement of vehicles now in all categories? If you
do, what is the relationship of the 4,060 to that? If you do
not have the full complement now of vehicles in all categories,
what does it take to have that to bring you up to the standards
you would have liked to have had and then relate that to the
replacement progression?
General Brogan. Sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Am I clear?
General Brogan. I believe so, but let me try to make sure
that I understand your question.
We have a certain number of up-armor HMMWVs in theater now.
A portion of those are theater-provided equipment. They belong
to the commander of the land force component. They provide some
of those to the Marine Corps. As I field brand new M1114s,
which is the designation for an up-armor HMMWV, off of the
assembly line, that commander in the field can then give back
some of that theater-provided equipment to the joint commander.
Mr. Abercrombie. Got it.
General Brogan. So I am still fielding up-armor HMMWVs into
theater.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. But when you are just talking about
the commander in the field, does that include the Army? Are we
talking about the Army and the Marines together in terms of
vehicle provision, the provision of vehicles needed for the
various missions assigned?
General Brogan. Sir, I would not presume to speak for the
Army, but, yes, both of us are still fielding----
Mr. Abercrombie. And that is the goal?
General Brogan. I am sorry, sir?
Mr. Abercrombie. The goal is to have that----
General Brogan. Absolutely.
Mr. Abercrombie [continuing]. Complement because the
Marines and the Army have to work together in ops especially.
General Brogan. Absolutely. The Army is the service that is
in charge of the procurement of the HMMWVs.
Mr. Abercrombie. Right.
General Brogan. I get a portion of the new deliveries to
field to Marine forces.
Mr. Abercrombie. Right.
General Brogan. I believe at the heart of your question,
though, is whether or not the MRAP, the Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected Vehicle, is intended to replace on a one-for-one
basis all of the HMMWVs in theater, and the answer to that is
no. The unit commanders have indicated to us that there are
some places where, because of the imposing size of the Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles, they just cannot take
them, so there will remain a need for some quantity of up-armor
HMMWVs.
Mr. Abercrombie. Does that include--do the numbers you are
speaking of in the process that you are outlining here include
equipment that would have come with the National Guard units or
Reserve units in terms of their being deployed and bringing
equipment with them?
General Brogan. Sir, right now, in the Marine Corps zones
in Multinational Force West, our equipment is remaining in
place, and the troops are rotating in and out, so the troops
rotate in and fall in on that equipment. Whether it is an
Active battalion or a Reserve battalion makes no difference.
Mr. Abercrombie. And it falls into that equipment whether
the equipment is usable or not, right?
General Brogan. Sir, we have in place a method by which we
replace the gear as it is either destroyed or worn out. The
Marine Corps Logistics Command has placed in theater a pool of
assets that they call Forward In Stores from which commanders
can draw replacement items, and then I alluded to that theater-
provided equipment pool that belongs to the joint commander. So
those are available to ensure that we do not have equipment
shortfalls for the folks that are in the operating forces.
Mr. Abercrombie. Well, I have seen that, and that is why I
am asking this question. Last year we had been through this.
Some of us had the opportunity to see that, and I am very
impressed with it--do not get me wrong there--but it became
very difficult for me to understand how you could keep that up
no matter how good the sergeant and his folks are at the level
of repair and maintenance in theater and so on. Just the sheer
pressure of deployment now seems to me to be putting a strain
there.
General Brogan. Sir, I think you are absolutely right.
There is no question that the operations in Iraq are using up
equipment at a much higher rate than we would have seen in a
peacetime environment.
Mr. Abercrombie. The reason then--let me just go a bit
further. Again, I am not trying to lead you into anything. I am
trying to get a clear understanding of what we need to do now,
if you would just indulge me a moment more, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I want to make sure I have it correct, that the
committee has it correct. December 31st is, you feel--am I
correct that the 4,000 vehicles--given the explanations you
just outlined, December 31st is your goal for having these
vehicles in all categories manufactured or available up to the
up-armoring, if you will, like jammers, et cetera?
General Brogan. After they are manufactured so that I, as
the Government, have taken possession of them, and then I need
that additional 60 days to install----
Mr. Abercrombie. Now, they are not all going to appear at
once?
General Brogan. No, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. How many would you say a month are
coming----
General Brogan. Sir, because I am still in source
selection----
Mr. Abercrombie [continuing]. Or is that classified?
General Brogan. It is not classified, but it is
competition-sensitive.
Mr. Abercrombie. It is what?
General Brogan. Competition-sensitive.
Mr. Abercrombie. Well, I want to know something, but I will
not get into it with you, but then we are going to have to have
a talk with the Secretary of the Navy or something. I could
care less about that. Now, if that means you have got to pick
something--I put my trust in you. I went over your background
here, and, General Alles, you have got the people here. This is
your ``kulean,'' as we say in Hawaii. This is your area,
right----
General Alles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie [continuing]. That you have to deal with.
I will tell you what I am sensitive to. I am sensitive to
somebody who is worried about whether he is going to make more
money than somebody else out of this and that that holds things
up. I could care less. That is a policy question.
General Brogan. If I may, sir, part of my intent is to use
competition as a lever and to encourage them to increase their
production capacity.
Mr. Abercrombie. I understand that. From what I have seen
or from what I am aware of, this competition, especially some
of the things we are talking about--that has been gone through
already. You know what you want.
General Brogan. I know the characteristics of what it is I
want. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Well, I am very concerned--and the last
point of this: Are you getting enough vehicles in all
categories to accommodate whatever is going to take place with
this so-called ``surge'' in terms of the influx of new
brigades, new squads as it comes down to--is that something we
can talk about now?
General Alles. Sir, if I could comment on the requirement,
because I think there may be some confusion here. Right now,
for MRAP Vehicles, the Marine Corps' requirement is 1,022. We
expect that number to triple in the next few weeks.
Mr. Abercrombie. Yes.
General Alles. There is a new requirement being worked that
will triple that amount of vehicles.
Back to Chairman Taylor's question about HMMWV
replacements----
Mr. Abercrombie. That is why I am asking the question.
General Alles [continuing]. That would be enough for the
HMMWVs I am aware of that we have in theater. Whether the
commanders choose to use those or not is an operational
decision, not our decision.
The other thing to specify is that--sorry. Right. The other
thing to specify is that they are already working numbers. You
mentioned the additional marines for units that will surge into
theater so that we have vehicles for those marines also; MRAP
vehicles I am talking about. They are also including those
numbers in that plus-up that we expect to see in the next few
weeks. It is working its way through our process in the Marine
Corps to be validated by a Marine requirements oversight
committee. I should also point out that additional funding to
buy those vehicles will be required.
Now, General Brogan mentioned what he already has funding
on hand for when we increase the amounts of vehicles to these
higher number requirements--triple the amount is the rough
number we are using right now--we will have to work on
reprogramming monies to pay for those.
Mr. Abercrombie. Has that money come out of the previous
supplementals that has not been spent?
General Alles. Sir, I honestly could not answer that.
General Brogan. Sir, I would anticipate that that
additional requirement will be included in the fiscal year 2008
supplemental request. Because I will be in production of those
first 4,000 vehicles, even if you gave me the money in 2007, I
would be unable to spend it----
Mr. Abercrombie. I understand that. That is why I am asking
the question. I realize the restrictions of time, but we have
to get through this in order to----
General Brogan [continuing]. But the beauty, I believe,
sir----
Mr. Abercrombie [continuing]. Figure out what to do.
Otherwise we are off in some kind of charade, and both the
forces under your command and the American public are going to
be misled as to what is taking place, and we will not be doing
what is required of us to support you.
General Brogan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. It is easy to talk about supporting the
troops. It is another thing entirely to do it in the context of
the legislative obligations that we have.
General Brogan. Sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. So the answer I am getting from you is
that you think you can handle it in terms of the numbers that
will be required over the next 6 weeks to 6 months.
General Brogan. Yes----
Mr. Abercrombie. Am I correct, General Alles?
General Brogan [continuing]. Because I think the beauty is,
once we have that production base established, then we can keep
it running and continue to turn out these vehicles to meet the
requirements of the operating forces.
Mr. Abercrombie. So equipment support will not be an issue
in this surge?
General Alles. For the Marine Corps. It will require some
cross-leveling of equipment, but I do not see that as an issue.
They can work that, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. I presume you are working with the Army on
this, and they are going to be involved in this. It has got to
be done together. I am not quite sure when you say, ``For the
Marine Corps.''
General Alles. I am not aware of what the Army requirements
are, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Well, we have got to start talking to one
another about it. I have got--because Chairman Taylor and I
have to make the recommendations together on this.
General Brogan. I understand, sir. Unfortunately, we do not
have the knowledge available to answer your question about the
Army's requirements.
Mr. Abercrombie. Well, if Representative Taylor and I can
talk, do you suppose you might be able to talk with your Army
counterparts?
General Brogan. Sir, that is being done----
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay.
General Brogan [continuing]. Just not by the two of us.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. Well, you understand where we are
going and what we need to have. We have to have from the Army
and from you whether or not we need to do some changes. And the
final thing I want to say on that, Mr. Chairman, is we need to
think about--I do not know--remobilization, total mobilization.
It is no secret to members of this committee and probably to
some of the folks that I have worked with over the years here,
I was opposed to this from the get-go, but what I am more
opposed to is other people letting other people take the
responsibility and make all the sacrifices.
It is impossible for me to understand how you cannot
command mobilization. If you need these vehicles, they have to
be built, and that means if they have to shove some trucks to
be sold to some idiot watching the Super Bowl commercial, then
that is what has to be done. So we need to know what you need
to have, and if that requires us then to even take legislative
activity and make sure you get what you need, then that needs
to be done. I do not think we can fight this thing on the
side----
General Brogan. Sir, I appreciate your----
Mr. Abercrombie [continuing]. As a side issue.
General Brogan. And I also appreciate your offer for us to
come back to you if we need your assistance.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Abercrombie, and, Generals,
since the Gentleman from Hawaii used the word ``we'' in several
statements, we want to make it very clear. This is for the
troops. If we get angry, it is going to be at industry and not
at you. It is going to be that you did not challenge us enough.
So we want to work with you on this. We want to expedite
the fielding of the equipment that you need. We saw mistakes
with the up-armoring of the HMMWVs. We do not want to see those
mistakes made again, and we want to work with you to make sure
that that doesn't happen.
For the newer Members, what you will find is that, in the
good times and times of feast, you will be scrambling for
programs that are important, some things that may be made in
your district that you think we need for times of war, and we
talk about preserving the industrial base, and all of us have
done it from time to time. I have served in as much, if not
more, than most, but the reason we go to bat for the industrial
base in times of peace is so that it will be there when we need
them, and that is why a lot of us get very disappointed when
our industrial base lets us down in times of war where they do
not make the needs of the warfighter a priority, and that
mistake was made again repeatedly with the up-armoring of the
HMMWVs.
The purpose of this hearing and hopefully of other hearings
is that we do not make that mistake again, that the industrial
base that we have fought to preserve, that have made in America
laws that we have preserved so that we can be self-dependent on
our own weapons serve--that those things are there to serve us
in times of need, and this is a time of need.
I would now like to yield to the Gentleman from Maryland
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
As I mentioned earlier, within the limits of the system, I
am convinced that you are moving as expeditiously as possible
to identify this need and to procure the appropriate equipment.
What I would like to ask you to do with your knowledge of the
system is I would like to ask you to take off your uniform;
imagine you have a loved one in harm's way over there. What
could we have done better? What do we need to change so that we
can speed up the sequence of events?
General Alles. I will go first.
Sir, one of the things that is of concern is we have to
reprogram money frequently, and that, you know, is an emergent
requirement. We are facing an adaptive enemy, and that enemy is
changing. As he changes, we have to counter his counters, and
that typically requires some form of new programs.
As we have worked with the Joint IED Organization, we have
noticed that they have a tremendous amount of flexibility in
their appropriation. That appropriation allows them basically
to put the money to whether it is acquisition or research at
the time they are going to execute that, and that kind of
flexibility would be very useful to the Marine Corps in the
execution of our Title 10 responsibilities.
There are other things that could be done, but that is one
that comes to mind off the top of my head that would be
helpful, and also accelerate the process, because there is
always at least somewhat of a time delay as you work through
reprogramming actions.
Mr. Bartlett. What you are telling us is that, at least to
some extent, the availability of funds has limited how rapidly
you could proceed.
General Alles. To some degree, yes, sir, it does. I mean,
again, I would not so much say ``availability'' as that they
are in the correct, you know, program element or correct
appropriation line.
Mr. Bartlett. I understand, but availability to you. They
may be there, but not available to you.
General Alles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. Okay. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, that is something we ought to be able to
change, I would think.
Mr. Taylor. I would hope so, and again, I will reiterate my
request for you that, as to any funding needs that you see for
this program to see that your target date of January 1 is met,
any messages that we need to pass on to the appropriators for
the supplemental, we have made the request. You are off the
hook, as far as I am concerned, that no one on the other side
of the river should be opposed to our making that request, and
I would be disappointed if you do not fulfill it.
General Brogan. Aye, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. General Brogan, do you have any additional
suggestions of how we might have made this go quicker and
better?
General Brogan. I believe, sir, my comments would probably
be more philosophical along the lines of what Congressman
Abercrombie indicated.
I am sometimes asked as the acquisition individual in the
Marine Corps, if we could build an LST in 8 days in World War
II, why does it take us 8 weeks to get an assembly line started
for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles? My sense is that
there has not been the total commitment by the industrial base
to mobilize to fulfill the requirements that we find ourselves
facing. So I am not sure that you all can solve that. I think
it is in our national psyche to enjoy what we enjoy here and
continue to provide the wherewithal for our troops in harm's
way in addition to it rather than in lieu of it.
Mr. Bartlett. I appreciate those comments. I am old enough
to have lived through World War II. It was the last war where
everybody was involved. We have had wars since then, and
families have loved ones who have been involved, but beyond
that, not everyone was involved. In World War II, everybody
that could had a victory garden. We all saved our household
fats and took them to the central repository. You could not buy
tires for your car. No new cars were made for 3 full years
because the industrial base was busy making things for the war
effort. And I think we need to have a greater sense of urgency
than we have, and I appreciate the concerns you have with the
industrial base and how long it takes to get something done.
Mr. Chairman, I think that all of us would like to see the
sergeant don that vest. I do not know how you do that in a
formal hearing, but if he could don the vest and, just for a
couple of moments, tell us of the significant protective
features of the vest.
Mr. Taylor. Sergeant, we would appreciate your doing that,
please.
Mr. Abercrombie. You will not be appearing on the Bravo
channel, Sergeant, but I expect it will be shown elsewhere.
Hang on one second. Can the camera that you are using here get
it? Good. Maybe he could explain the functions of the various
parts of it.
General Alles. Sir, I think it would be helpful also if he
tells us a little bit about the weight of that vest and how
much standard equipment he had to carry in theater. That is
very important. That has been a big concern.
Mr. Taylor. General Alles, if you would, please, ask the
sergeant to walk us through the nomenclature, and one of the
questions, one of the follow-up questions, is just to give us
some idea of the weight of the individual parts and the
cumulative weight.
General Alles. So, Sergeant Perez, if you would tell us a
little bit about the gear, and then tell us about the weight,
and then tell us about what you had to carry in Iraq.
Sergeant Perez. Okay. I am more used to the different vest,
the Outer Tactical Vest. It is basically front and back
protection only. They added the side SAPI in for--like just
recently, probably in the last year or so, which happened after
I got out of theater. I have worn it with the side SAPI, and it
probably had my arms out about right here, okay? With this one,
it goes--you put it on over your head rather than putting it
on--like--kind of like a vest, and the improvement is this tab,
this black tab right here, all I have to do is pull that and
then unclip one of these, and I am out of the vest, okay?
If you will notice here, this cumberbund that I am wearing
that goes all the way around to the back distributes the weight
onto my torso rather than on my shoulders. Right now I feel
almost zero weight on my shoulders, so I could probably walk
around with this on for 3 or 4 hours and it not be a problem
for me to maneuver.
Other things--I mean, just--and also the SAPI plates. Like
I said before, these are now sewn on the inside so they are
tighter to your body. I can now assume a tighter platform, and
I can shoot. And also where the other one did not have the
webbing all the way around to the side where I can attach my
other gear, this one does have that available to it; and as you
can see in this one, it has this little flap right here. It
offers a little bit more back protection. A lot of people were
getting shrapnel due to narrow hallways, grenades coming down
those narrow hallways, and then turning away from them,
catching shrapnel in the back. This offers a little bit more
protection with the Kevlar on the inside.
Mr. Adams. Sir, if I may also add, Sergeant Perez is brand
new to the MTV. One of the other features, if you will turn
around, please, is this quick release up on each of the
shoulders. One of the enhancements we put on this vest came out
of Iraq, from the corpsmen, which is that with the old OTV,
since it is a front-opening vest, you have to open everything
up in order to perform any kind of casualty assistance on the
torso area. What this vest is designed to do is, if you unclip,
you can unclip either side. That allows the corpsmen to get up
underneath the vest, work on the chest area, provide life-
saving measures while keeping the rest of the body fully
covered. That is one of the other key advancements that came in
from the operating forces, from the corpsmen, particularly what
they needed in order to do their job of saving the marines.
A couple of the other features is we have beefed up the
shoulder area here. Again, we have taken the weight off of the
shoulders to integrate and for the marine to wear in their
assault pack. Part of the problem was it drove into the
shoulder blade areas, so we increased the amount of protection
in the thickness of the pads up in here.
We also redesigned the throat protector because the old
throat protector kept it very close to the throat area, and it
tended to trap heat, and the marines did not like to use it
very often, so they would just leave it hanging down. This new
design brings it further away from the neck. It is
ergonomically designed. It will also increase the level of
protection along with the use of a gap sitting in here along
the vest. This collar was designed so it would tuck closer to
the vest design area in order to provide more protection to
what previously was exposed area. And also, we redesigned the
yoke and collar assembly here where it sat a little bit further
away from the head because, again, it was trapping heat, and
also, when they wore the light-weight helmet and they were
sitting down, the back of their helmet would hit against the
back of the vest.
So the marines were going through the design process. We
redesigned the collar to open it up a little bit further and
make it more comfortable for the marines when they are both in
a sitting position and also if they are bending down or getting
into a prone position for shooting.
And the last enhancement I will point out is we put in a--
we added a rifle bolster because one of the other complaints
the marines had was trying to get a good stock weld to their
weapon. So we have a rifle bolster that can be moved to either
side--it depends if the shooter is right-handed or left-
handed--and that allows them to get a good sight picture. As he
brings his weapon up, that bolster helps hold the weapon in
close to the shoulder where it is supposed to be in order for
them to get a good sight picture.
General Alles. Can you talk about the weights?
Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.
The weight of the base vest--equivalent to the OTV, it is
approximately 13 pounds with the soft-armored panels in it. The
weight of the E-SAPI plates in both the front and the back vary
by size. For a large size E-SAPI plate, it is approximately six
pounds.
Mr. Abercrombie. ``E-SAPI plate'' means the Small Arms
Protective Insert?
Mr. Adams. Excuse me, sir. Yes, the Enhanced Small Arms
Protective Insert plate that sits in the front and the back.
They reach a little over six pounds each for this vest, for
this sized marine, and then on the side plate, the side
Enhanced Small Arms Protective Insert plate, it sits on the
side, a 6-by-8 plate. Its weight is approximately 2.3 pounds
each. On top of that is all of the rest of the gear. Depending
on what his mission is, he adds more weight to the vest with
his grenades and whatnot.
Mr. Abercrombie. Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Yes, I have a couple of questions.
Did they design armor with sleeves? I had heard at one time
there were sleeves, and also, if you are a medic or a radio
person out in the combat area, what additional weight is that
in addition to?
Sergeant Perez. Most of our Navy corpsmen carry a medic
bag, so they will have a combat load similar to what we are
wearing. The only thing is that they usually carry a shotgun,
so they are usually like less----
Ms. Bordallo. So what is the total weight then with all of
that?
Sergeant Perez. I would say probably in the realm of like
around 50 pounds.
Ms. Bordallo. Fifty pounds.
General Alles. Can you talk about the weights you carried
when you were there? How much do you weigh, and how much did
you have to carry?
Sergeant Perez. I weigh approximately 200 pounds. I wore--
what you see here was probably another four magazines so a
total of eight magazines with every single one loaded to a 27-
round maximum. I carried an M14-- or a PRC-148 radio which
attached to me, which was a smaller version of the manpack
radio, and then I also carried a sledgehammer and a pry bar for
gaining entry into houses.
Ms. Bordallo. Sergeant, what is the total of all of that?
Sergeant Perez. With weapon and everything, I would
probably say in the neighborhood of 70 to 80 pounds.
Mr. Adams. Ma'am, we have a chart that we normally carry
that talks about an average personal combat load. It is
approximately 90 pounds. Now, that includes--that is
everything. That is his uniform, socks, the whole kit that he
is wearing. Yes, ma'am.
Ma'am, also, this was the--you asked about the arm
protection and all of that. This is the arm protection part of
what is called QuadGuard, but this is not used by the
dismounted marines. This is used by marines operating at turret
to provide the forearms/upper arms protection, shoulders, and
there is also a trouser that they wear, again, just sitting in
a turret. In case of fragmentation, their legs are protected,
but at about 10 pounds, this is way too heavy for a dismounted
marine to be wearing.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Ellsworth.
I'm sorry. Are you finished, Ms. Bordallo?
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Ellsworth.
Mr. Ellsworth. What is more liable to compromise the vest,
shrapnel or a direct round? I maybe can guess that. And how is
it rated for what arm fire would penetrate this vest, and is
shrapnel worse or better than a bullet? And I do not know,
maybe I am----
General Brogan. There is not a clear answer to that.
The vests without--the Enhanced Small Arms Protective
Inserts, the E-SAPI plates, are designed to stop fragments.
That was generally the primary purpose of combat vests up until
this point. I mean, from World War II forward, we wanted to
stop shrapnel.
With these vests, with the insertion of the plates, we have
now gone to stopping bullets as well. Enhanced Small Arms
Protective Insert plates can stop up to a 7.62 round, but the
plate cannot cover anything, or we would compromise the
sergeant's mobility, as he indicated. So, in the areas, the
large vital organs that are covered by those plates, that is
the caliber that we are able to stop.
Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. I have one more question.
Mr. Taylor. Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. I am just curious. You know, in other wars,
we did not have this sophisticated armor and gear.
Do you have any idea how many lives we have--now, I have
visited the hospitals in Germany and Walter Reed and Bethesda,
and I have noticed that most of the injuries are to the limbs,
not to the torso, and I know that must be because of the armor.
So do you have any idea what are the percentages of those
during previous wars, you know, as being--as this war now with
the enhanced armor?
General Brogan. Ma'am, your instinct is correct.
We have marines, soldiers and sailors surviving incidents
that in the past would have killed them, and unfortunately, the
result of that is we have many more very serious extremity
injuries. I do not have the exact figures. We will have to take
that question for the record and then get that information back
to you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 81.]
Ms. Bordallo. I know it has to be much better, but I just
was curious as to----
General Brogan. Ma'am, our personal protective equipment is
saving a lot of lives, and marines who otherwise would have
died are surviving.
General Alles. I should mention also that this is our
state-of-the-art ensemble. The enemy recognizes where it is
vulnerable, and they shoot. That is why we are concerned about
snipers. They shoot intentionally where they think they know
the gaps are from observation and where they think they can
inflict the most grievous wounds on our marines.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, in spite of it all, it is quite
fashionable.
Mr. Taylor. General, you mentioned snipers and the
unfortunate situation where the enemy is getting better at
that. I am well aware of the upgrades to the armor.
A retired Army colonel who has done time in Iraq asked me
to ask you if you felt like the--that our helmets are adequate,
or should we as a Nation be looking at something other than the
existing helmet?
General Alles. I will let General Brogan address the
current helmet we have now.
We do have research efforts underway at the Office of Naval
Research both on body armor, on helmet improvements, on modular
designs to try to address some of the deficiencies. Those are
long-term efforts. We have put about $3 million a year in those
efforts. It will take us several years before we have an output
there.
I will let General Brogan address any--if he has anything
on the current designs.
General Brogan. I believe those long-term research
development efforts, sir--if they can reduce the weight of the
helmet, I think that would be significant. If you would ask the
sergeant what it is like to wear that helmet for the number of
hours that he does on patrol, I think he would be thrilled to
have the same level of protection in a much lighter
configuration.
The current helmets provide a significant level of
protection against shrapnel and against projectiles. Now that
we have switched to the pad suspension system, we are also
providing increased levels of protection against blunt force
trauma. I believe that the helmets are certainly the best that
we can provide today.
Mr. Taylor. Do you know if anything being used by our
allies or even the former Warsaw Pact is superior that we
should be looking at?
General Brogan. Sir, none of our former enemies are close,
and our allies generally use the same sort of technologies that
we are. My program manager for an expeditionary rifle squad
interacts routinely with our allies to look at their infantry
ensemble and ensure that there is nothing out there that is
better than what we are currently fielding.
Mr. Abercrombie. To follow up--thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
want to follow up on that because that was going to be the
second round of questions that I wanted to ask. Again, setting
aside any classified activity, I am very concerned about what
it means in this increased activity that you are going to be
facing in the next 6 weeks to 6 months with respect to the
Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior.
General Pace indicated at the full committee hearing last
week that the allies you will have in conducting your
activities include National Police, Baghdad Police, National
Army units, and now I am told that the politicians--well, I am
not--okay. I have got to be careful about this--that they are
even considering taking Kurdish units and bringing them into
Baghdad. Presumably they are aware that the Kurds are not Arabs
and that you are now mixing ethnicity in with religious
divisions, all of which Sergeant Perez and others are
apparently going to be able to figure out on the spot.
But if that is, in fact, going to take place--you have got
Kurds, at least two different sections of the Ministry of the
Interior Police, the Ministry of Defense Army working with
you--will they be using this equipment, or will we be
operating--and if they are using the equipment, how is it going
to be utilized in terms of intercommunication--intrasquad,
intraforce communication--and if not, how are you going to
conduct the issuing and carrying out of orders?
General Brogan. Sir, I am not able to tell you how the
other forces are going to be equipped.
Mr. Abercrombie. Well, let's let that aside for the moment.
What about the equipment side here then?
General Alles. Sir, I think that would be a question better
taken for the record. I cannot answer the equipment
requirements for the Iraqi police forces and the Iraqi Army.
Mr. Abercrombie. So there is not an issue. When we are
talking about the equipment here, we are talking strictly the
Marines and the Army. We are not talking about equipping the
Iraqi forces of various origins?
General Brogan. No, sir. I only equip U.S. Forces.
Mr. Abercrombie. Well, then how are you going to work
together? I am not quite sure how this is supposed to work then
out of these police stations--I am not trying to trick you--
because this is happening now.
General Brogan. I understand, sir. I am not qualified to
speak.
Mr. Abercrombie. I am being told as a Member of Congress
that I am supposed to stand around and watch while this takes
place because executive authority has decided to move you guys
in there and do it, and I am trying to figure out, okay, you
know, if Members of Congress cannot stop people from doing
things--again, it is easy to talk. It is another thing to find
out what the practical reality is, the kind of thing that Mr.
Bartlett was talking about. What we are about on this
committee, I can assure you, and what the committee as a whole
is trying to figure out is how to actually support you. Now,
that is why I am asking the question.
How does what you are planning to do right now work into
what is expected of you in the next six weeks to six months in
terms of the logistics, or is that yet to be determined?
General Brogan. Sir, I would expect that that will be
determined by the joint force commander in theater, and I am
unable to speak to that for you.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. Can we begin to take a look at that
if you can carry that back across the river and say--you know,
we are going to have to have this answered real quick.
General Brogan. Sir.
General Alles. Yes, sir, we will take that for the record,
but we are not--I am not qualified to answer that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 80.]
Mr. Abercrombie. Do you know whether the supplemental
budget has anything in it for equipping Iraqi allies?
General Brogan. I do not know.
General Alles. Sir, again, I cannot answer that question.
Mr. Abercrombie. Does the 2007 budget have anything in
there with respect to up-armoring or providing armor or
providing vehicles or equipment of any kind for the Iraqis?
General Alles. Sir, again, that is one we would have to
take for the record. It is not--I mean, we are aware of the
Marine Corps' programs and Marine Corps' budgeting actions, not
for the Iraqi Army, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. For the record then, the question that I
am asking is what is the relationship of them in terms of
budget and the kinds of things we are talking about here, what
is the relationship to equipping and working with Iraqi allies
or Iraqi cooperating forces, and do we need to cover that while
we are covering what you are doing?
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 80.]
General Brogan. I understand the question, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay.
General Brogan. I do not have an answer, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you very much.
Mr. Taylor. Any further questions?
Again, Sergeant Perez, thank you for your service. We want
to thank all of the marines present and enlisting for their
service and all of the men and women who have chosen to serve
our country.
Generals, I very much appreciate your being here.
General Brogan in particular, I want to appreciate your
setting what I think is a very realistic but also ambitious
goal. What I would ask of you are some milestones by month that
you expect to be met for the record so that we can help you in
tracking this, and should anything occur in the private sector
that is keeping those milestones from being met, I would hope
that you would come sooner rather than later to this committee
to see what we can do to help you to get these vehicles fielded
and the other things that the Marines need.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 77.]
General Brogan. Sir, thank you for that offer.
Mr. Abercrombie. One last thing just on a happier note.
General Brogan, have you had an opportunity to visit Kaneohe
since your original sojourns out there in the early 1980's?
General Brogan. I have not, sir. I have not been back to
Hawaii since I left. I would be glad to come.
Mr. Abercrombie. Well, then, perhaps we can arrange to have
you come with us then when we go out there because I would like
you to see Kaneohe Bay now----
General Brogan. I understand.
Mr. Abercrombie [continuing]. And the housing that is
there----
General Brogan. There are significant infrastructure
improvements at Kaneohe Bay.
Mr. Abercrombie. Including for the single marine, not just
the families.
General Alles. I have been out there, sir, and it looks
wonderful. I would like another assignment there.
Mr. Abercrombie. Yes. I remember General Krulak, before he
became Commandant, was commander out at Kaneohe, and then after
he became Commandant and we had worked on the quality-of-life
issues on housing out there, he said he was not sure that
Kaneohe should remain a Marine Corps base.
Are you aware, Sergeant, of why the Commandant thought
that?
Sergeant Perez. I am not, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. That is just a trick question. Good for
you.
The reason, he said, is it looked too much like a college
campus. He was not sure the Marines did not need something a
little more austere, but I do not notice anybody turning down
any of the housing.
Anyway, I would like you to come out and see it now some--
what? It will be 20, 25 years later, right?
General Brogan. It certainly would.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Bartlett, anything?
Okay. General Alles, the smart folks who work with me have
asked me to ask you. Your opening statement noted the urgent
need for rapid response, emerging requirements, and then,
third, existing reprogramming actions limited your flexibility.
For the record, could you expand on this if you choose to
do so now? And the other follow-up question was has your
flexibility been limited?
General Alles. Sir, we can expand on that in the record. It
goes back to what Mr. Bartlett asked me, which is we understand
that the Joint IED Defeat Organization's appropriation allows a
maximum flexibility because they can determine the purpose of
the funding at the point of execution. Each year the Marine
Corps reprograms monies or funding to meet our emergent
requirements because we have an enemy that is constantly
changing, and that there are always inherent delays when you do
those reprogramming actions.
Our mission, including our Title 10 mission, would be
greatly enhanced by the ability to--or the kind of
appropriation that the Joint IED Defeat Organization receives.
A similar type of appropriation would be very beneficial to us
and would help us meet these unforeseen requirements and
necessitate new funding streams.
Now, the front end of this, the science and technology part
of this, I can take care of with the Marine Corps Warfighting
Lab because we can, as necessary, redistribute monies inside of
my program element to meet whatever the emergent requirement
is. And we do that, but when it comes to the larger dollars
required to do procurement on General Brogan's side, that is
not something that can be met inside science and technology
funding; that is not what it is made for, and plus, there is
not enough of that money to do that kind of work anyway, and
that is what causes us to go through these reprogramming
actions.
So receiving appropriation authority similar to what the
Joint IED Organization has would be very helpful to us as a
service.
Mr. Taylor. Would you like to follow up on that, General?
General Brogan. Sir, as I mentioned, something similar to
the Combat Mission Needs Fund that was established for Special
Operations Command available to the services would be helpful,
and in looking at the below threshold with programming limits
for both the RDT--research, development, testing--evaluations
and procurement dollars, neither of those have changed in a
fairly significant time, so some consideration could be given
to changing those thresholds, which would provide a little bit
more of the flexibility that General Alles mentioned.
Mr. Taylor. If you would provide that request in writing, I
promise you we will get it in the hands of Mr. Murtha and the
appropriators.
General Brogan. Aye, sir.
General Alles. Sir.
Mr. Taylor. I want to thank you very much for your service.
Thank you very much for being here today. This committee is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
January 16, 2007
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
January 16, 2007
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR
Mr. Taylor. What I would ask of you are some milestones by month
that you expect to be met?
General Brogan. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Taylor. What novel armor solutions are currently out there? Are
the best options still aluminum and steel?
General Brogan. There no armor technological breakthroughs in the
near term that will defeat the full spectrum of the threat environment.
All armor design packages necessitate compromises between tactical
mobility, survivability and specific mission requirements. However, the
Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) is funding the Army Research
Laboratory's effort to improve the ability of armor to mitigate threats
faced today in theater. Current avenues of investigation include armor
composition, composite packaging and vehicle shape. Additionally, The
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is currently
conducting the Armor Challenge to identify revolutionary and promising
new armor systems for military vehicles. In conjunction with the Army
and Marine Corps, DARPA is developing the Hardwire DARPA Armor Program
to provide a composite armor door kit for the current generation HMMWV.
Current and forecasted armor solutions require a combination of
technologies including armors made from Rolled Homogenous Steel,
aluminum, ceramics and composite materials.
Mr. Taylor. Are any MAK HMMWVs with high back/troop box being used
outside the wire?
General Brogan. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Taylor. What vehicles are currently used to transport troops
outside secure forward operating bases?
General Brogan. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Taylor. Could you use the MTVR in a ``gun truck'' capacity to
serve as interim vehicle while MRAP is being procured?
General Brogan. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Taylor. Do these theater requirements take into account the
recent ``surge'' of an additional 4,000 marines to Iraq?
General Brogan. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Taylor. What are the advantages of V-shaped hulls and what
other concepts have been developed that offer improvements over the UAH
(include assessments of foreign vehicles if they can make them)?
General Brogan. V-shaped hulls mitigate the blast effects of an
underbody mine. Other factors which complement the shape of the hull
include ground clearance, armor composition, and vehicle weight.
When designing vehicles to counter IEDs, tactical mobility and
survivability are the primary factors that must be addressed. Both
industry and Government are exploring all technologies which improve
crew survivability while maintaining tactical mobility to develop the
Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) as the replacement for the
HMMWV. This technology requires significant research and development.
Mr. Taylor. What is the current theater policy for vehicle use
outside secure operating areas? What types of vehicles are allowed
these areas?
General Brogan. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Taylor. How are you planning on getting the MRAP vehicles to
theater? Airlift or by sea? Have you established contact with TRANSCOM?
Do you have enough lift assets available?
General Brogan. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Taylor. How long will it take to ship MRAPs by sea?
General Brogan. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Taylor. How much confidence do you have in the industrial
base's ability to rapidly produce Cougar/Joint EOD Rapid Response
Vehicles (JERRV)? There have been problems in the past, how have these
problems been solved?
General Brogan. The potential for the industrial base to meet our
growing requirement is encouraging.
With respect to Force Protection, Incorporated (FPI) and the
delivery of Cougar/JERRV MRAP vehicles, the production rates have
indeed been limiting. The recent teaming between FPI, is helping to
deliver the desired vehicles on or ahead of schedule.
Mr. Taylor. In terms of providing additional wheel well protection
to Up-Armor HMMWVs. How can we speed up this production and
installation process? Why not provide this armor to every Up-Armor
HMMWV?
General Brogan. Our Fragmentation Kit 2 effort is on schedule and
with installs projected to be finished during March. The kit is a unit
level install based on the local commander's priority of effort. All
Fragmentation Kit 5s have been fielded in-theater with installs
expected to be completed during March. The HMMWVA2 with MAK already
have the 3/8 RHA wheel well shield installed.
Mr. Taylor. Can you briefly discuss Distributed Operations and the
rationale behind this concept? How will this impact force protection
equipment requirements in theater?
General Brogan. Distributed Operations (DO) is an additive
capability that enhances application of the Marine Corps' fundamental
war fighting philosophy of maneuver warfare. It is a technique applied
to appropriate situations wherein units are separated beyond the limits
of traditional direct fire mutual support. The decision to employ DO
techniques rests with the commander and is based on his assessment of
the mission, threat, terrain/weather, and troops/fires support
available. DO is practiced by general purpose forces, operating with
deliberate dispersion, when necessary and tactically prudent. It
requires decentralized decision-making and, therefore, relies on the
ability and judgment of Marines at every level. DO has already had a
positive impact on small unit leader training and education, making
Marine tactical units more effective on the modern combined arms
battlefield, Phase 0 through Phase 5.
The rationale behind DO rests with an emerging security environment
that demands multipurpose Marine forces capable of operating with
greater autonomy across an expanded battle space, in all six phases of
a joint or coalition operation. Our adversaries' ever-increasing
gravitation toward irregular warfare and the continually increasing
lethality of modern weapons have resulted in a greater need for
dispersion. Commanders are faced with larger frontages and complex
areas of operation, with potentially fewer forces. Our enemies have
demonstrated a propensity to disperse, fight in complex terrain (urban,
mountain, jungle), and complicate our operations by engaging in war
among innocents. DO provides Marine Corps forces an additional means to
effectively operate in this emerging environment.
The Marine Corps views DO as evolutionary, Marine units past and
present have employed the dispersion espoused by DO to gain tactical or
operational advantage in specific situations. Circumstances now dictate
that this capability be institutionalized across the Marine Corps to
allow for even wider application. The Marine Corps Combat Development
Process continues to identify the necessary enhancements in manning,
training, and equipping to reduce or eliminate the barriers that
prevent current commanders from employing the level of unit dispersion
the modern battlefield often requires. To facilitate DO, enhancements
will be required across the battlefield functions of maneuver, fires,
intelligence, command and control, logistics, and force protection.
DO has already enhanced the most essential ingredient of individual
force protection, small unit leadership, by requiring an increased
level of training for the Corps' infantry non-commissioned officers. In
addition, dispersion on the battlefield will enhance overall force
protection by complicating our enemies' ability to target large bodies
of troops and likely routes of movement. From an equipment perspective,
there will be little impact on force protection equipment requirements
in theater, as DO does not alter the basic organization of tactical
units. While DO enhancements will result in an increase in tactical
vehicles for our infantry battalions, these vehicles will be armored
versions of the Marine Corps enhanced HMMWV. Ultimately, the fielding
of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle will supersede this requirement.
Mr. Taylor. How are you going to resource the surge increase?
General Brogan. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Taylor. Will MRAP vehicles be rated for off-road use?
General Brogan. Yes, MRAP vehicles will be rated for off-road use.
Mr. Taylor. What's the process in validating joint urgent
operational need statements in theater? What's the average timeline for
validation, production, and fielding.
General Brogan. The Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement (JUONS)
is the process that provides a mechanism for Joint Commands to elevate
their urgent needs to the Joint Staff.
Validation process: The JUONS must originate in a joint command in
theater. For Marines, this command is typically Multinational Forces--
West (MNF-W). MNF-W validates and approves the request for the
capability need and forwards the request to Multinational Coalition--
Iraq (MNC-I). MNC-I validates and approves the request and forwards the
capability need to the Central Command (CENTCOM) staff. CENTCOM
validates and approves the request and forwards the capability need to
the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff uses the Functional Capabilities
Boards and Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell to facilitate the funding,
procurement, and fielding of the validated capability.
Average timeline: The timeline associated with the validation,
production, and fielding of JUONS varies with each individual
requirement based on cost, availability (commercial of the shelf,
government off the shelf, yet to be developed), and complexity of the
validated materiel solution. The notional timeline for the staffing
process once the JUONS arrives at the Joint Staff requires 10-39 days.
At the end of this time period, the JUONS is handed to the lead Service
for procurement. Procurement timelines vary according to the amount of
development, integration and production capability that a solution
requires.
Mr. Taylor. When do you expect to achieve the theater requirement
for the Modular Tactical Vest? How many vendors will produce this vest?
General Brogan. The Modular Tactical Vest will achieve the theater
requirement of 60,000 by September 2007. One vendor, Protective
Products International, manufacturers this vest.
Mr. Taylor. What has been the feedback from theater regarding the
pad suspension systems for the Lightweight Combat Helmet (LWH)? Do
Marines like the system?
General Brogan. The Program Manager for Infantry Combat Equipment
(PM-ICE) has a helmet survey that is still being developed/revised and
expects to post to the PM-ICE website in mid-March. At that time, PM-
ICE will have the capability to gather feedback from theater regarding
the pad suspension systems for the Lightweight Combat Helmet (LWH) and
to further determine acceptance by Marines.
Mr. Taylor. Does the Marine Corps have a requirement for a vehicle
mounted active protection system?
General Brogan and General Alles. Yes. The Marine Corps has
identified a requirement for Active Protection Systems (APS) to enhance
force protection and vehicle survivability capabilities of vehicles in
the 14 to 35 ton weight class against Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs)
and Anti-Tank Guided Munitions (ATGMs). Specifically, Operating Forces
have expressed a need to defeat or reduce the effects of RPGs through
two Urgent Universal Need Statements. Additionally, the Light Armored
Vehicle and Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle operational requirements
documents identify RPG and ATGM defeat as Objective requirements; and
system threat assessments for the vehicles in the specified weight
class point to RPGs and ATGMs as significant threats. In support of the
identified requirement, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC)
conducted an APS Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA) to address this
force protection/vehicle survivability gap. MCCDC developed and
assessed all feasible Non-Materiel Approaches capable of mitigating the
gap. As part of the FSA, the team also conducted an Analysis of
Materiel Alternatives (AMA) to assess the capabilities of candidate
materiel solutions. This analysis, conducted in the spring and summer
of 2006, developed the following categories of gap mitigation:
Detection Avoidance
Mobile camouflage systems
Thermal signature management
Hit Avoidance (Soft-Kill Systems)
Soft Kill Systems do not physically intercept the
threat (e.g., electronic warfare)
Hit Avoidance (Hard-Kill Extended Intercept)
Integrated Army Active Protection System
Trophy
Iron Fist
Hit Avoidance (Hard-Kill Close In Intercept)
Close-In Active Protection System
Full-Spectrum Close-In Layered Active Protection Shield
Close-In Counter Munition
Quick Kill
Hit Avoidance (Hard-Kill Novel Approaches)
Novel Approaches intercept the threat by means other
than missle-to-missle defeat (e.g., Linear Shaped Charge or
Nets)
Additionally, the AMA evaluated Passive Penetration Avoidance
(e.g., slat/bar armor, ceramic armor, composite armor), Active
Penetration Avoidance (e.g., Explosive Reactive Armor, Non-explosive
Reactive Armor, Electromagnetic Reactive Armor), and Kill Avoidance
(spall liners, fire suppression systems, ammunition
compartmentalization) alternatives to gap mitigation.
The output of the FSA and AMA was a draft APS Initial Capabilities
Document waiver letter in August 2006. The FSA concluded that no single
system possessed all the required capabilities, but recommended further
study of the following categories of RPG and ATGM defeat mechanisms:
Soft-Kill/Novel Approach Combination, Hard-Kill (Novel Approach), Hard-
Kill (Extended Intercept), Hard-Kill (Close-In Intercept), and Active
Penetration Avoidance. Of particular note, the analysis and
participating subject matter experts identified significant concerns
with the fratricide threat from Hard-Kill APS solutions. The Marine
Corps intends to further refine the future APS requirement in the
specified class of vehicles and will seek funding to support this
effort through upcoming budget cycles.
Mr. Taylor. What is the Marine Corps official position regarding
the Trophy active protection system?
General Brogan and General Alles. The Trophy Active Protection
System was one of four Hard-Kill (Extended Intercept) systems assessed
during the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) sponsored
APS Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA) and Analysis of Materiel
Alternatives (AMA) in the spring and summer of 2006. The APS FSA
resulted in a draft Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) Waiver Letter
and recommended further study of the following categories of RPG and
ATGM defeat mechanisms: Soft-Kill/Novel Approach Combination, Hard-Kill
(Novel Approach), Hard-Kill (Extended Intercept), Hard-Kill (Close-In
Intercept), and Active Penetration Avoidance. The inherent risk of
fratricide with all of the Hard-Kill APS solutions will be a critical
component of future analysis. The Trophy Active Protection System will
remain one of the candidate materiel solutions as the Marine Corps
continues to refine the APS requirement for tactical vehicles.
Mr. Taylor. Is the Marine Corps experiencing high numbers of rocket
propelled grenade attacks in their respective area of responsibility in
Iraq?
General Brogan and General Alles. [The information referred to is
classified and retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Taylor. What is the situation in regards to equipping Iraqi
forces and what will the US provide?
General Brogan. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE
Mr. Abercrombie. So there is not an issue. When we are talking
about the equipment here, we are talking strictly the Marines and the
Army. We are not talking about equipping the Iraqi forces of various
origins? Then how are you going to work together? I am not quite sure
how this is supposed to work then out of these police stations--I am
not trying to trick you--because this is happening now. How does what
you are planning to do right now work into what is expected of you in
the next six weeks to six months in terms of the logistics, or is that
yet to be determined?
General Brogan and General Alles. The Marine Corps conducts
combined Coalition and Iraqi Security Force (ISF) operations throughout
the Al Anbar province. We employ embedded Transition Teams (TT) who
serve alongside the ISF in an advisory and training capacity. Over 700
of the nearly 28,000 Marines deployed in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom are part of the security TT in
Iraq and Afghanistan working to increase the proficiency, combat
effectiveness, and internal security capacity of these countries. The
Marine Corps will prepare over 80 teams during the current Fiscal Year
for tasks as military, border security and national police transition
teams.
While the USMC Fiscal Year 2007 Supplemental provides funding for
Marines based on plans to support the training teams, it does not
include any requests for equipment for Iraqi or coalition forces. The
Department of Defense ISF Fund received $1.7B for procurement and
fielding of equipment as well as to fund training needs of Iraqi
forces.
Mr. Abercrombie. What is the relationship of them in terms of
budget and the kinds of things we are talking about here, what is the
relationship to equipping and working with Iraqi allies or Iraqi
cooperating forces, and do we need to cover that while we are covering
what you are doing? (page 82)
General Alles. The Marine Corps budget does not contain any funding
for the Iraqis.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. Do you have any idea how many lives we have--now, I
have visited the hospitals in Germany and Walter Reed and Bethesda, and
I have noticed that most of the injuries are to the limbs, not to the
torso, and I know that must be because of the armor. So do you have any
idea what the percentages are of those during previous wars, you know,
as being--as this war now with the enhanced armor?
General Brogan. Navy-Marine Corps CTR Deployment Health Database
Naval Health Research Center
The anatomical distribution of combat wounds during major U.S.
conflicts is shown in Table 1. Extremity injuries comprised the
majority of wounds in all conflicts and are relatively stable. There
are a reduced proportion of wounds to the chest and abdomen in the
current conflict compared to previous conflicts.
Although injury severity was not objectively measured during WWII,
Korea or Vietnam, during OIF patients with extremity wounds were more
severely injured overall compared to wounded combatants without
extremity injuries.\1\ It is also important to note that head, face and
neck wounds are higher in OIF compared to other major U.S.
conflicts.\2\ This increase may be because of new injury patterns
resulting from improvised explosive devices and lack of protection for
the facial region.
Table 1. Percent wounds (fatal and nonfatal) by body region.
Body Region
War Head/Neck Thorax Abdomen Extremities
WWII \1\ 25% 13% 9% 53%
Korea \2\ 19% 8% 7% 53%
Vietnam \3\ 15% 8% 5% 55%
OIF 4, 5 29% 5% 6% 51%
References
1. Mohrle CR, Wade AL, Galarneau MR, et al. Extremity injuries among
U.S. combat casualties during Operation Iraqi Freedom: a report from
the Navy-Marine Corps Combat Trauma Registry. Naval Health Research
Center Report (under review).
2. Wade AL, Dye JL, Mohrle CR, Galarneau MR. Head, face, and neck
injuries during Operation Iraqi Freedom: results from the U.S. Navy-
Marine Corps Combat Trauma Registry. J Trauma, 2007;63:836-40.
3. Beebe GW, DeBakey ME. Battle Casualties, Springfield, Ill. Charles C
Thomas, 1952, Chapter 5, pp. 165-205.
4. Reister FA. Battle Casualties and Medical Statistics: US Army
Experience in the Korean War, Washington DC, The Surgeon General,
Department of the Army, 1973, Chapter 1, pp 35-54.
5. Whelan TJ, Burkhalter WE, Gomez A. Management of wars wounds, edited
by Welch CE, Advances in Surgery, Vol 3, Chicago, Ill, Year Book
Medical Publishers Inc, 1968, p 249.
6. Unpublished data, US Navy-Marine Corps Combat Trauma Registry, 1
March 2004 to 28 February 2005.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY
Mr. Courtney. Another question I have which is an issue that seemed
to be out there in the public realm over the last couple of years or so
which is about families who are trying to use their own resources to
get their family members body armor that otherwise might not have been
available. I know legislation was passed to provide for reimbursement
for those families, and it seemed that there was difficulty trying to
figure out how to get those payments where they--I wondered if you
could give me a quick sort of update, and I apologize not knowing the
latest on that information.
General Brogan. The Marine Corps has received nine claims for
reimbursement. Six of these claims were approved and paid. Two of the
six claims were for body armor.