[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
WEAPONIZING SPACE: IS CURRENT U.S. POLICY PROTECTING OUR NATIONAL
SECURITY?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
of the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 23, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-18
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.oversight.house.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
37-094 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2007
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSISGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman
TOM LANTOS, California TOM DAVIS, Virginia
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN L. MICA, Florida
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts CHRIS CANNON, Utah
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
DIANE E. WATSON, California MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts DARRELL E. ISSA, California
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York KENNY MARCHANT, Texas
JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina
Columbia BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota BILL SALI, Idaho
JIM COOPER, Tennessee ------ ------
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
PETER WELCH, Vermont
Phil Schiliro, Chief of Staff
Phil Barnett, Staff Director
Earley Green, Chief Clerk
David Marin, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts DAN BURTON, Indiana
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
Dave Turk, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on May 23, 2007..................................... 1
Statement of:
Grego, Laura, Ph.D., staff scientist, Global Security
Program, Union of Concerned Scientists; Theresa Hitchens,
director, Center for Defense Information; Jeff Kueter,
president, the George C. Marshall Institute; and David
Cavossa, executive director, Satellite Industry Association 52
Cavossa, David........................................... 107
Grego, Laura............................................. 52
Hitchens, Theresa........................................ 67
Kueter, Jeff............................................. 93
Mahley, Donald, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Threat
Reduction, U.S. Department of State; Major General James B.
Armor, Jr., Director, National Security Space Office, U.S.
Department of Defense...................................... 24
Armor, Major General James B., Jr........................ 32
Mahley, Donald........................................... 24
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Armor, Major General James B., Jr., Director, National
Security Space Office, U.S. Department of Defense, prepared
statement of............................................... 35
Cavossa, David, executive director, Satellite Industry
Association, prepared statement of......................... 109
Grego, Laura, Ph.D., staff scientist, Global Security
Program, Union of Concerned Scientists, prepared statement
of......................................................... 56
Hitchens, Theresa, director, Center for Defense Information,
prepared statement of...................................... 69
Kueter, Jeff, president, the George C. Marshall Institute,
prepared statement of...................................... 95
Mahley, Donald, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Threat
Reduction, U.S. Department of State, prepared statement of. 26
Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Massachusetts:
Prepared statement of.................................... 14
Various statements....................................... 3
WEAPONIZING SPACE: IS CURRENT U.S. POLICY PROTECTING OUR NATIONAL
SECURITY?
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 23, 2007
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m. in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Tierney
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Tierney, McCollum, Platts, and
Foxx.
Staff present: Leneal Scott, information systems manager;
Dave Turk, staff director; Andrew Su and Andy Wright,
professional staff members; Davis Hake, clerk; A. Brooke
Bennett, minority counsel; Christopher Bright, minority
professional staff member; Nick Palarino, minority senior
investigator and policy advisor; and Benjamin Chance, minority
clerk.
Mr. Tierney. Good afternoon, everybody. Thank you for
joining us here today. I am pleased that our witnesses are able
to make it here today.
I want to briefly take care of some business, if I might,
before we get started.
A quorum is present for the subcommittee hearing on
Weaponizing Space: Is the Current U.S. Policy Protecting our
National Security? The hearing will come to order.
I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking
minority member of the subcommittee make an opening statement,
provided that the ranking minority member can delegate that to
another Member. Without objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept
open for 5 business days so that all members of the
subcommittee may be allowed to submit a written statement for
the record. Without objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that the following written
statements and materials be placed into the hearing record: a
statement by Mr. David McGlade, the CEO of Intelsat General
Corp.; a written statement from Iridium Satellite LLC; a
written statement from Dr. Jeffrey Lewis of the New America
Foundation; a written statement from Dr. James Clay Moltz, the
deputy director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at
the Monterrey Institute for International Studies; and two
articles from Space News International and two articles from
Defense News authored by Dr. Michael Krepon from the Henry L.
Stimson Center.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILBLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Tierney. Since the dawn of the space age, the U.S.
leadership has put a man on the Moon, has allowed us to see to
the edge of the universe, saved countless lives by helping to
better predict hurricanes, and revolutionized the way the
peoples of the world communicate.
Our country's leadership over the years in helping to
establish a clear understanding among all nations that the
peaceful use of space is of paramount importance has repaid us
untold benefits, and it promises to increasingly do so in the
future.
Our country owns or operates 443 of the 845 active
satellites around our planet. It is a $100 billion a year
industry. Global Positioning System technology is taking off,
and even space tourism is becoming more and more of a reality.
And our military and intelligence capabilities have become
huge beneficiaries of a weapons-free space. Without space, our
smart bombs would not be precise. Without space, our troops in
Afghanistan and Iraq would not have the real-time information
they need. Without space, crucial intelligence gathering would
simply vanish. Satellites have, quite literally, become the
eyes and ears of our national security.
However, there are potentially ominous clouds on the
horizon. Space experts, some of whom we will hear from at
today's hearing, charge that over the last handful of years the
current administration has undertaken a series of actions and
changes in policies that could have a profound impact on the
future of space and the future of our national security.
Exhibit A is President Bush's new space policy. Though the
new policy had been widely anticipated for years, the
unclassified version was stealthily posted on a Web site late
on the Friday prior to Columbus Day weekend in 2006. The rest
of the world, both our allies and our potential adversaries,
took notice, particularly at its aggressiveness and unilateral
tone.
The previous space policy spoke of the need for a ``stable
and balanced national space program,'' one in which ``[t]he
United States will pursue greater levels of partnership and
cooperation in national and international space activities and
work with other nations to ensure the continued exploration and
use of space for peaceful purposes.''
The Bush administration policy, on the other hand, treats
space as one more battlefield besides air, land, and sea, and
states unequivocally, ``The United States will oppose the
development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that
seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space.
Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not
impair the right of the United States to conduct research,
development, testing, and operations or other activities in
space for U.S. national interests.''
But the aggressive and unilateral record of this
administration is not just limited to the one document. For
example, in 2002 the United States withdrew from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty on the grounds that it needed greater
capabilities against rogue states following the September 11th
terrorist attacks.
In September 2004, then Under Secretary of State John
Bolton stated, ``We are not prepared to negotiate on the so-
called arms race in outer space. We just don't see that as a
worthwhile enterprise.''
In October 2005, the United States was the only country in
the world to vote against a United Nations resolution calling
on the need for a treaty to limit weaponization of space; 160
countries voted in favor.
The Air Force doctrine during the Bush administration has
also been criticized as being overly unilateral and aggressive.
Air Force doctrine and top officials repeatedly speak of
``space dominance,'' with one document noting: ``Space
superiority provides freedom to attack.''
Our hearing today will explore the Bush administration's
space policies and actions and what impact they have had and
will have in the future.
Will others in our world use the administration's language
and actions as justification and cover to build their own
weapons capabilities in space, thereby threatening the very
assets and advantages we seek to protect? Or will other
countries in the world ramp up their own space weapons
capabilities no matter what United States policies and actions
are? In other words, is the weaponization of space inevitable,
and to think otherwise would only cause us to lose ground?
Our hearing will also explore the apparently successful
anti-satellite missile test by China earlier this year. China
has long been viewed as a potential competitor to the U.S.
interest in space and a potential threat because of its
emerging space program and the increased frequency of its
satellite launches. We have watched them closely. We were well
aware when they attempted two anti-satellite missile tests in
2005 and 2006.
So it should not have been a surprise to anyone when China
used a ground-based ballistic missile to successfully hit their
own orbiting weather satellite in January of this year. We knew
when they were going to conduct the test and were certain which
satellite they were going to hit. We stepped up monitoring of
the satellite and Chinese launch pads. We knew that the test
would cause thousands of shards of space debris to float around
for decades in low-earth orbit, potentially harming everything
and anything in their path.
But following the destruction of the satellite the silence
was deafening. Though they didn't do anything to hide their
launch preparations, the Chinese did not initially own up to
the test, and the United States apparently decided not to do
anything beforehand to try to prevent the Chinese test.
We understand that this single Chinese test alone raised
the threat to satellites in frequent low-earth orbits by as
much as 40 percent. This incident should caution all of us
about the stakes of getting space policy correct.
What, if anything, could our country and our allies and our
partners around the world have done to prevent all that debris?
What should have done, if anything?
This hearing will explore the administration's space
policies and actions and ask the simple question of whether
this is the path we should be going down.
By alienating friends and potential adversaries alike, is
the current approach weakening our national security through
its actions and inactions toward space policy? Should our
country take a leadership role in engaging our allies
bilaterally and through multilateral institutions, such as the
Conference on Disarmament and the Committee on Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, in order to preserve space for peaceful and
commercial interests? Should we work with other countries to
lay out rules of the road for space conduct; to put in place
confidence-building measures and to work together to limit
space debris?
Or is the administration's approach the only real option
for us in a world in which it and some others contend
international cooperation and treaties will only serve to
weaken our national security assets and interests?
Up until the present, space has been a frontier that has
been used peacefully by all of mankind, in many respects
because it is inherently a global commodity.
As the undeniable leader in space, the U.S. actions and
policies will play a huge role in shaping the future of space
and how it impacts our economy, our science, our exploration,
and our national security. We must act with a sense of
responsibility here and ask tough questions now while this
renewed interest in the weaponization of space is in its
infancy. We must ask tough questions now, before it is too
late.
Over the first 50 years of space exploration and use we
know where U.S. leadership has taken us. This hearing will
essentially ask where U.S. leadership should take us over the
next 50 years.
[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Tierney. I would now like to yield to the ranking
member for an opening statement, Mr. Platts.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of Ranking
Member Chris Shays and myself, we appreciate your holding this
important hearing on a vitally important topic, and also that
we have with us today two panels of witnesses, both
representing the administration and outside experts.
Today's safe and secure access to space is essential for a
wide range of commercial activities. Satellites are an integral
component of telephone and television service. They also
provide GPS services used daily by many Americans, and they aid
in weather forecasting, mapping, and many other functions.
Space is also critical to American security. Satellites
provide important capabilities to the intelligence community
and the Defense Department. They are an indispensable tool on
the global war on terror.
The integration of space capabilities into most aspects of
modern military operations is one of the distinctive and
essential ingredients of America's military prowess. Therefore,
it is absolutely necessary that the United States and all other
nations continue to enjoy safe and peaceful access to space.
This makes some events in recent years very troubling. Most
disturbing is what occurred in January, China fired a ballistic
missile into space and destroyed one of its own outmoded
satellites. This created a huge amount of debris in orbit and
had the potential to damage or destroy other satellites.
Many experts wonder what motivated China to take such
provocative action. They question whether China was signaling
that it had dangerous capabilities which they might use against
the United States in the event of some future crisis.
Today we will hear about the Bush administration's national
space policy, which is meant to guide every aspect of America's
endeavors in space. Some have suggested that the points it sets
forth are a radical departure from past practice. Critics have
claimed that it will cause other nations to threaten our space
capabilities. Others vigorously disagree with all of these
contentions.
We will be honored to hear from several experts with
varying perspectives today. I look forward to their
presentations, to their assessment of the Chinese action, and
to their evaluation of the appropriate American response.
I am also interested to learn the perspective of the
witnesses on the viability of arms control agreements or other
regulatory efforts to restrain threats in space. I wonder if
such treaties will be enforceable, and certainly question the
effect of such treaties, given that terrorist groups would
certainly not consider themselves bound by them.
Finally, I seek to find out what one means when referring
to weaponizing space. I am not certain if this is an allusion
to arms placed in orbit, weapons fired into space from the
ground, or simply ground-based arms which travel through space.
Mr. Chairman, we stand together in recognizing the
indispensable role which space plays in the American economy
and the Nation's security. I look forward to hearing our
witnesses' testimony and the opportunity to have questions
thereafter.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
I want to begin now, for our witness testimony section by
introducing our witnesses on the first panel. We have
representatives from both the Department of Defense and the
Department of State. Ambassador Donald Mahley, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Threat Reduction, and we have Major
General James B. Armor, Jr., Director of the National Security
Space Office within the Pentagon.
I want to thank you both for coming and welcome you to our
hearing today.
It is the policy of this subcommittee to swear you in
before you testify, so would you please stand and raise your
right hands, and if there is anybody else that will be
testifying with you, we ask that they also stand and take the
oath.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Tierney. Let the record reflect that both witnesses
answered in the affirmative.
With that, Ambassador Mahley, would you be kind enough to
begin with your statement? I think you know from ample past
experience it is a 5-minute clock. We try not to be too strict
on that, but you need not read directly from your remarks if
you do not care to. You can summarize it any way you wish. The
remarks for both you and the General will be placed on the
record, at any rate.
Thank you.
STATEMENTS OF DONALD MAHLEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
THREAT REDUCTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; MAJOR GENERAL JAMES
B. ARMOR, JR., DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE OFFICE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
STATEMENT OF DONALD MAHLEY
Mr. Mahley. Chairman Tierney, members of the committee,
staff, thank you very much. I greatly appreciate the fact that
you have already indicated that my written statement will be
placed on the record. I would, if I could, like to summarize it
orally in just a few short sentences.
In accordance with the committee's request, my statement
encompasses three topics: The administration's national space
policy; China's January 11th anti-satellite test; and the
administration's position on space arms control.
I would offer two caveats to my testimony at the outset.
First, because it is an unclassified hearing, there is, of
course, a certain limit on some discussion of some sensitive
topics that will occur. Second, the Department of State does
not execute the material elements of national space policy. For
that information, I will, of course, defer to my very able
colleague from the Department of Defense sitting to my left
here.
In June 2002, the President directed an interagency review
of national space policy. The resulting directive, signed by
the President on August 31, 2006, and publicly released on
October 6, 2006, supersedes the space policy directive signed
by President Clinton nearly a decade earlier.
This policy reaffirms the basic principles articulated a
half century ago by President Dwight Eisenhower, our Nation's
commitment to a free exploration and use of outer space by all
nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all
humanity.
U.S. space policy also continues to recognize the necessity
to protect our assets in space. Defense and intelligence-
related activities in pursuit of national security interests
fall within the scope of and are consistent with the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty's provisions mentioning the peaceful uses of
space.
On January 11, 2007, the People's Republic of China
conducted a test of an ASAT weapon that destroyed an old
Chinese weather satellite in orbit. The administration has
conducted numerous classified briefings to Congress in the wake
of that test, and some even preceding it. The United States has
sought an explanation from China regarding its test. To date,
we have not received a satisfactory response.
And it is also true the Chinese test generated some 1,500
pieces of trackable debris, and is estimated to pose a risk to
both human space flight and satellites for the next 100 years.
The Chinese proposals for arms control negotiations in
outer space would only ban a ground-based ASAT weapons testing
and use, not its deployment or development. An additional space
treaty would not improve the existing legal regime which has
functioned effectively for over 40 years. A number of U.S.
administrations have recognized the futility of seeking
additional formal space arms control agreements. However, in
response to international interest, as Ambassador Roca recently
noted in Geneva, the United States is prepared to discuss but
not to negotiate outer space topics in the Conference on
Disarmament.
I do thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mahley follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Ambassador.
General.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL JAMES B. ARMOR, JR.
General Armor. Chairman Tierney, Congressman Platts,
members of the subcommittee, I am honored to appear before the
subcommittee today as the Director of the National Security
Space Office and the Executive Secretariat for the Department
of Defense Executive Agent for Space.
It is a very timely issue to discuss national space policy
and the policy implications of China's counter-space
development, specifically their January 2007, anti-satellite
test. I must admit I am heartened by both your comments in
pointing out the critical importance to national security in
space. I also appreciate having Ambassador Mahley at my side
here to discuss the Department of State policy issues.
Our appearance today is our affirmation that space
capabilities are vital to U.S. national interests and
underscores the importance of continued unity of effort in
implementing U.S. national space policy. I have been in the
space business over 30 years, and every President since
President Dwight D. Eisenhower has addressed space policy.
Each administration has evolved space policy to reflect the
increasing maturity and cumulative experience of the Nation's
activities in space. Basic policy tenets have remained
remarkably consistent: free passage and peaceful use of space;
compelling need for a strong civil, industrial, and national
security space sectors; and that, since they are vital to
national interests, the United States has the inherent right to
defend those interests in space.
The current national space policy issued by the President
last August addresses current opportunities, challenges, and
threats facing the United States and our space capabilities.
The policy provides direction as we conduct a host of space
activities.
The evolution of space technology coupled with continued
integration of space capabilities into our Defense forces has,
as you noted, revolutionized U.S. military operations. Space
technology has radically enhanced the effectiveness of our now
smaller combat forces, and reduced collateral effects on non-
belligerence.
Space capabilities enable us to employ our armed forces
within the guidelines established by the international laws of
armed conflict.
Space capabilities provide us with the eyes and ears that
give us unmatched battlefield awareness, advanced warning and
characterization of missile attacks, precise application of
force, synchronization of our combat forces, and essential
command and control functions.
More broadly, space capabilities form the bedrock of our
Nation's infrastructure, including diplomatic, informational,
military, scientific, and economic elements of our national
power.
The new policy, consistent with previous national space
policies, reaffirms longstanding principles: U.S. commitment to
the use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes,
continued encouragement to cooperate with others, strict
adherence to existing international agreements regarding the
use of outer space, rejection of any claim of sovereignty by
any nation over outer space, the right to use or acquire data
from space, and the free passage through and in space without
interference.
The Defense Department's goal for space and space-related
activities is to possess the necessary space capabilities to
achieve our national security objectives. The Secretary of
Defense is further charged with developing capabilities, plans,
and options to ensure freedom of action in space and, if
directed, to deny that to its adversaries.
Along these lines, our focus is on, first, space
situational awareness, then preservation of our space
capabilities, protection of our space capabilities, and,
finally, protection of our terrestrial forces, our boots on the
ground, if you will, from harm by adversary's space
capabilities.
Many nations and organizations around the world have
recognized the benefits of space, and with the growing
availability of technology, the general economic prosperity,
and longstanding free passage and useful peace of space created
under the current treaties, space has become a critical enabler
for the global economy. China is one such nation, and they are
pursuing space capabilities on a very broad front--economic,
scientific, military, intelligence. They should be rightly
congratulated for the impressive technical achievement of
becoming the third nation in history to conduct manned space
flight.
Other nations have also recognized the asymmetric advantage
in space power that the United States retains. Potential
adversaries have and will continue to seek capabilities and to
deny our advantage in space, and, as was made dramatically
clear by China's test of an ASAT, space is now a contested
environment. We believe China's testing of a direct ascent ASAT
system, specifically the on-orbit destruction of a satellite
that resulted in thousands of pieces of long-lived orbital
debris, is not responsible behavior for a space-faring nation.
It is inconsistent with China's stated position on preventing
an arms race in outer space, its signed agreement to mitigate
space debris, and the constructive relationship outlined by
President Bush and President Hu.
China is developing a wide range of anti-access and aerial
denial capabilities, such as direct ascent ASAT, radio
frequency jammers, and other capabilities, as part of a general
transformation of their military forces. In addition to the
counter-space capabilities, China is developing and deploying
modern intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
satellites with advanced command and control, communications,
and targeting capabilities.
Today many nations are taking their first steps as space-
faring nations. These nations should strive to adhere to
international outer space legal guidelines and ensure they are
ready to operate safely in space.
The United States has long urged the international
community to focus on gaining universal adherence to current
treaty guidelines. Not all countries have signed the Outer
Space Treaty, for example.
Space activity is strategically significant to the health
of our Nation's security, defense, and economic well-being. The
U.S. Government and Department of Defense policies recognize
that fact, and access and use of space are central in
preserving peace, protecting U.S. national security, and
promoting civil and commercial interests. Space, bottom line,
is vital to U.S. national interest.
I thank you for allowing me the opportunity to discuss the
implications of the new national space policy and the anti-
satellite test by China, and look forward to any questions you
might have.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Armor follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, General. Thank you both for your
testimony, both oral and what will be submitted on the record.
Let me just start the questions by asking this. Under
Secretary John Bolton made a statement I mentioned in my
opening remarks on September 2004. He said, ``We are not
prepared to negotiate on the so-called arms race in outer
space. We just don't see that as a worthwhile enterprise.''
Ambassador, why isn't that a worthwhile enterprise?
Mr. Mahley. Mr. Chairman, I think I could answer that most
succinctly by saying that no arms control is better than bad
arms control. We have indicated in the Conference on
Disarmament that we are prepared to discuss the topic and see
if we can find some way in which one could frame it in a
fashion which might be constructive. But, frankly, the kind of
framework that has long been promoted as the prevention of arms
race in outer space [PAROS], and the Conference on Disarmament
documentation, including the most recent P-6 proposal, the A-5
proposals that were there for a long time, allow things that
simply do not have either a verifiable or an enforceable means
of trying to actually prevent an arms race that would be
inimical to our national interest.
As I indicated in my opening statement, the particular
proposal there, for example, would, indeed, make it illegal for
the Chinese to exercise an anti-satellite weapon, but it would
not in any way constrain them from developing it and deploying
it. So we do not believe that is simply a means by which we are
going to advance our national security in that kind of a
negotiation.
Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Do you think that would be some of the things
that you would be negotiating?
Mr. Mahley. It is my experience in these, at least, that
when we start out with a negotiation that already has that kind
of a serious flaw in it, the exercise is one in which you are
going to try to find out how many more flaws you end up with,
as opposed to trying to get rid of some of those that are in
there. It has simply been there for a long time that no one was
prepared to take that out in terms of the opening proposal,
despite the fact that we have frequently indicated that is one
of the things which is unacceptable.
Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Just on a personal note, you have testified
before us, we discussed outside, on chemical, biological. Your
consistent opinion is you can't verify any of these treaties,
so we shouldn't do them, period, right?
Mr. Mahley. It is my view that when you have a treaty it is
the responsibility of everybody that is a party of that treaty
to comply with it, and that, unfortunately, in the course of
the world there are probably going to be countries at one time
or another which are not going to want to do that because they
seek some advantage.
In that case, the inability to determine that they are,
indeed, not complying with their obligations is a serious, if
not fatal, drawback.
Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. So bottom line is no treaties ever, in your
view?
Mr. Mahley. I would not wish to draw that conclusion,
because I think we have done some in the past, and I think
there is even the possibility of looking at things in the
future that might be able to meet those standards, but I do
think that we shouldn't get into any that don't meet the
standards.
Mr. Tierney. Give me a call some time, Ambassador, when you
think of one that you think you might support, all right,
because your numerous testimony, I think we haven't got there
yet on that.
General, where we are talking about debris and things of
that nature, wouldn't that be at least something that we would
want to be concerned about, the amount of debris that any of
these actions, like China's action, happen, and something we
want to engage rather vigorously in trying to make sure that we
mitigate or stop?
General Armor. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. And there are
ongoing international discussions on debris mitigation. I think
it is the Interagency Debris Coordination Committee, of which
China was a signatory. This ASAT was not consistent with their
signature on that.
I know that, consistent with the international discussions
we have on those rules, we have Department directives that
direct us to minimize debris on all of our space activities,
and it is pretty rigorously enforced.
Mr. Tierney. When you talk about the United States
establishing international space debris mitigation guidelines,
essentially that is what they are, guidelines, and just----
General Armor. Yes, sir, voluntary guidelines, if I
understand it correctly. I am not a lawyer.
Mr. Tierney. Has there been, to your knowledge, any
negotiation trying to get some sort of regime that goes beyond
the voluntary compliance aspect?
General Armor. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Tierney. Do you think that would be useful?
General Armor. I am sorry, sir?
Mr. Tierney. Do you think that such a regime would be
useful, given the amount of debris--this is one incident--and
the potential that exists if others were to follow suit.
General Armor. These guidelines are very useful, sir.
Mr. Tierney. Are you saying that there would be no use for
having something that could be enforced?
General Armor. I don't know what enforce means in that
context, sir, but guidelines like this that help stimulate
responsible behavior and good rules in space are, I think,
beneficial to all responsible users, all space powers.
Mr. Tierney. It wasn't too beneficial to us with respect to
China's actions, was it?
General Armor. Well, we are a little bit----
Mr. Tierney. Guidelines.
General Armor. We are a little bit mystified as to China's
intent and behavior in this case, sir.
Mr. Tierney. But we weren't mystified to the fact that they
did it, because we knew well in advance that they were gearing
up to do it, right?
General Armor. There were intelligence indications. Yes,
sir.
Mr. Tierney. Are you able to share with us why it is that
we made the decision to not even make any public statement in
advance that might have stopped them from doing that, or at
least shined a light on them to make them think twice about
doing it?
General Armor. I would defer to others on that, sir. I had
no insight into that decision process.
Mr. Tierney. Who are the others that you would defer to?
General Armor. I would defer to the White House and the
other departments.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Platts.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, Mr. Ambassador, on the question of the current
administration's not pursuing a space arms control agreement,
and that would be an effective approach to take, am I correct
in saying that is consistent with the previous several
administrations, as well, that President Clinton, President
Bush 41, President Carter, that they took this similar
approach?
Mr. Mahley. Sir, I think what is most accurate to say is
that the last time that we attempted to negotiate a legally
binding outer space treaty was in the Carter administration
with the then Soviet Union. We did that for a number of years
and we came to a conclusion that we could not even define the
terms of what we were trying to negotiate at that point, let
alone the question of what actually constituted weaponization
of outer space and what would constitute an effective means to
try to prevent it in any fashion.
Since that time, I can say that there have been a number of
internal deliberations in which we have tried to look at, in
various U.S. administrations, things that might appear to be
effective. And you are absolutely correct that it is a
consistent view for at least the last four administrations that
I am aware of that we have not been able to find anything that
looked like it would be a productive means of trying to reach
an international legally binding agreement. Yes, sir.
Mr. Platts. On the issue of China, I think both of you
reference in your statements the inquiries, both through the
military channels and diplomatic channels, as to seek to get an
explanation, and nothing of substance has been forthcoming. In
this setting are you able to share what answers we have been
given thus far?
Mr. Mahley. Sir, the only thing that I can share with you
diplomatically, because it happens to constitute the extent of
my knowledge on the matter, not necessarily because it is all
there is--and I will be happy to take the question to give you
a more complete answer in terms of exactly what we have heard
back from the Chinese. But the issue is that we demarged them
about that and we have not as yet gotten from them anything
which, in our general terminology, we consider satisfactory. By
that I mean we have gotten nothing which attempted to indicate
what their purpose was or to indicate what their intent was in
doing it.
We have gotten a flat statement from them which, in
diplomatic terms, is sort of a push off, which simply says that
it was not directed at any specific country. That is fine. It
wasn't. It was their own satellite. We knew that to begin with.
And beyond that, we have gotten no constructive dialog from the
Chinese in response to our query.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Platts. Mr. Ambassador and General, would you, either
one, want to conjecture, given that China has been one of the
nations pushing for arms control agreement, that since they are
the only nation in the last 20 years that has actually pursued
a weapon in space, as this test or this action in January
exemplifies, their thought process? They are the only ones that
have done it, yet they are seeking to limit that ability, from
a diplomatic standpoint or a military standpoint.
Mr. Mahley. Sir, I will take a stab at that, even though
getting inside Chinese minds is not one of the things which is
useful in most cases, or possible.
I think the answer would, in some respects, be that the
Chinese have generally been developing an overall military
improvement operation, and so therefore that would make--and I
would defer to my Defense colleague to contradict me if he
thinks I am incorrect here--but therefore that kind of a test
would not be inconsistent with their overall general military
policy that they have been pursuing.
In terms of why they would do that when they are continuing
to push the preventions arm race in outer space idea and
Conference on Disarmament, again, I would refer you back to my
opening statement when I indicated that certainly their
proposal for an agreement would not have prevented their
development and deployment of such a system. The fact is that
it wasn't a choice in place, and so therefore it could well be
something like a nuclear test. If you will recall back when we
were doing the CTBT negotiations, the Chinese went through an
entire series of nuclear tests when they thought they might
want to try to get that done before the conclusion of the
negotiations.
Whether that same kind of philosophy was engaged here, I
really have no knowledge to say, but I would simply refer that
to you historically.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Platts. General, did you have something you would like
to add?
General Armor. Congressman Platts, no, I really don't have
that much to add. I mean, that test is consistent with the
broad Chinese investment in space, and so if you are pursuing
that technology, that is a logical technology thing to do, but
it is not consistent with the other things they have said
openly and/or in agreements at the President-to-President
level, so I am still a little mystified.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tierney. In October 2005, I mentioned this also in the
opening remarks, we had sort of an annual vote at the United
Nations, and the vote generally talks about preventing an arms
race in outer space, the need to do that, and in past years the
United States has always voted present. This year it was a 160-
to-1 vote. The United States was the one to vote no.
Ambassador, what was the change of heart there for that
vote change? Just being obstinate, or was there something
deeper in policy?
Mr. Mahley. Well, sir, I would not try to tell you that I,
again, am perfectly familiar with all of the internal
deliberations that went into making the determination on that
vote, but I will tell you the following: this year the
resolution did have changes in the wording, and what it did is,
particularly in conjunction with the other things that were
going on in the Conference on Disarmament proposals at that
same time, led us in language down a slippery slope into
exactly the kinds of things that we had been protesting about
in the Conference on Disarmament that we were not going to
engage in, and so therefore it was the judgment of the
administration that we ought, in this case, to simply make very
clear that we were not going to let that language then be
thrown back at us in the Conference on Disarmament context as
having agreed to something which we were not prepared to agree
to, and therefore the best way to do that was to vote no.
Mr. Tierney. General, in your written testimony you made
the statement that China is pursuing a broad-based,
comprehensive transformation of its military forces to include
space, counter-space, and information operations, including a
modern intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
architecture with advanced space-enabled command and control
and targeting capabilities, also developing a wide range of
anti-access and aerial denial capabilities, including the
direct ascent anti-satellite radio frequency jammers, lasers
supporting space surveillance and information, warfare
capabilities. Then you go on to talk about the lack of
transparency in their expenditure.
Are you able to say that the United States and other
nations are not walking down the same path?
General Armor. Other nations not walking down----
Mr. Tierney. Not pursuing a broad-based, comprehensive
transformation of forces, including space, not dealing with
counter-space, not dealing with information, operations, not
doing any of that?
General Armor. We can share intelligence assessments on all
the space-faring nations with you, gentlemen, in another venue,
and we have shared those intelligence----
Mr. Tierney. And I have seen them, so I am not asking you
for specifics.
General Armor. I see.
Mr. Tierney. I am asking you for a broad statement. Are you
able to state that no other country except China is taking that
path or doing those things?
General Armor. As broadly as China is doing it, I believe
they are the only ones, as well as us, that are that broad and
deep from----
Mr. Tierney. So the United States and China?
General Armor. Yes, at the current time.
Mr. Tierney. OK. Now, there is some information out there
that some people in the Chinese community didn't know that the
test was happening. It was a relatively small group of people
that were informed about that, and, in fact, the Chinese
Foreign Ministry might have been largely cut out of the
decisionmaking process on that. Is that something we should
believe, Ambassador Mahley, or is that something they would
like us to believe but is not real?
Mr. Mahley. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any specific
information, so when I tell you that I don't know the answer to
that question it is not that I can't share it with you, it is
that I don't know the answer to that question. But I will tell
you that it has been my experience, in dealing with the Chinese
government over a number of years and over a number of topics,
that they have internal communications problems within their
government at times, and so therefore it certainly would not
surprise me to hear that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was
not fully briefed by their Ministry of Defense on that test and
the impending nature of that test. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. General, do you want to add anything to that?
I think that is what you were signaling me?
General Armor. No, sir.
Mr. Tierney. Ms. Hitchens, who is going to testify on the
second panel today, makes an important observation in her
written testimony and states, ``The more the United States
seeks high-power means to both protect itself in space and
ensure that others cannot use space against it, the more
threatening U.S. intentions seem and the more others will seek
to counter U.S. actions.'' Do you gentlemen agree with that
observation? If not, why not? General?
General Armor. Let me start. No, I don't really agree with
that. I think most countries are now recognizing that space is
in their national interest, economically, and a wide variety of
domains, and they are going to pursue it to the extent that
their nation is able to. There are even some organizations,
consortiums that see the economic benefits and will put
resources in space. Space tourism, like you said, is another
example of another organization. So I just see this as a
general growth and mankind expanding into the space domain, and
I don't see it as necessarily one versus the other.
Mr. Tierney. Let me proceed a little on that, because we
just talked about the comment that at least the United States
and China, with some depth, and others in less depth, are
pursuing comprehensive transformation of military forces to
include space, counter-space, information operations,
intelligence, all those things, so yes, they are all doing it,
but I think Ms. Hitchens point seems to be--we will hear more
from her--that the more the United States seeks sort of hard
power, or China or any of these others, to protect themselves
in space and ensure that others can't use space against them,
the more threatening this whole thing becomes, and it has a
potential to spin a little bit out of control. You don't agree
with that?
General Armor. No, Mr. Chairman, I don't. I mean, we are
the world's super power. We sort of are on the leading edge in
space. When you say space, people think of America. It has been
that way for decades now. And so I think this is just part of
the natural evolution of other nations expanding into the space
domain.
We are No. 1 so you could say that we were the cause of all
of their behavior, but I also think this is a natural
progression of expanding into the space domain.
Mr. Tierney. And that includes all the military uses and
things of that nature?
General Armor. Well, yes, sir, when mankind goes anywhere,
it tends to take its defensive nature with it, as well.
Mr. Tierney. And both of you gentlemen are fine with the
idea that we shouldn't do anything on the diplomatic end about
trying to get some sort of a treaty or agreement to slow that
down or stop it?
General Armor. Well, just like in the air and the sea,
there are conventions and rules and guidelines that are very
helpful to responsible behavior, navigation of the seas. Our
militaries follow all of the air rules for traveling in air
space, as does our Navy traveling in sea space, and so I
believe that rules like that are genuinely signed up to an
agreed-to conventions, rules--I am not a lawyer. I am not sure
I know the right terminology, but those are generally helpful
to prevent purposeful interference or to create situations
where there is miscalculation of intent or just good,
responsible behavior in the space domain.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Platts.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to make sure I understand both your positions on the
issue of pursuing or the ability of a space arms treaty, that
the position you have is based on the complexity of the issue
and the ability to actually pursue one that would not
compromise our national security and be verifiable and it is
the issues around a space arms treaty that is why this
administration and previous administrations have not pursued
and actually engaged in one. It is not that you are not
receptive, but it is just not a possibility that is going to
not diminish our national security in today's environment.
Mr. Mahley. Mr. Platts, I think I would answer that in the
following fashion. The United States has as a policy right now,
the fact that we are prepared to pursue equitable, effectively
verifiable treaties that are in the national security interest
of the United States and its allies. Now, that is not new. That
is a policy that has been generally the nature of U.S.
negotiating practice for at least the last 15 years that I have
been engaged in negotiations.
So, therefore, I think that it is safe to say that if we
could find that kind of a treaty, that there is no inherent
reason we would not be prepared to pursue it. But, as we have
indicated, I think that we have had a number of false starts in
the space area along that line which have been unsatisfactory.
When I say false starts I go all the way back, as I say, to the
ASAT negotiations that we engaged in with the Soviet Union
some--I hate to look as old as I am, but some 30 years ago in
that. And then the case that we have had, for example, the
prevention of arms race in outer space proposal the Chinese
have and the Conference on Disarmament. That has been around
with only minor modifications for at least the last 12 years,
and so therefore all of that is something which says those are
not the ways to do that answer.
I would also point out, with just one side note, the
Chinese have been pursuing an active anti-satellite program for
at least the last decade, so again I don't think that is
because of any wording that is in the current national space
policy that caused them to do that.
Thank you.
Mr. Platts. General.
General Armor. I have been impressed with the Outer Space
Treaty the last 40 years and the framework that it has laid
out. Look at the way space has prospered now over the last 40
years. Again, I do feel that, now that there is more and more
space-faring nations and entities in space, that we do need to
help augment the rules or just coordinate guidelines on how to
operate responsibly in space. In fact, we have made our space
situational and space surveillance data available on an
Internet site to all users in space; www.spacetrot.org goes
right into the Cheyenne Mountain data base so that people who
are moving in space can sort of see that they don't bump into
each other and otherwise know what is going on. That is the
kind of responsible behavior that I think we would like to try
and stimulate.
Mr. Platts. On the issue of a specific arms treaty, the
actions of China in January kind of add additional concerns why
that is not necessarily feasible if we take the answer of the
Chinese Defense Ministry not well communicating with the
Foreign Ministry in the sense of the military trumping
diplomacy. An arms treaty, in essence, is a diplomatic
agreement, and it kind of makes the point that, when dealing
with China, we maybe all the more need to be careful because
within their government some friction between their foreign
ministry and diplomatic efforts and their military pursuit of
expanded and more-developed capabilities. Is that a fair
statement?
Mr. Mahley. Congressman, I think it is always a fair
statement to say that when you have any kind of friction like
that you tend to get policy which does not necessarily satisfy
all the kinds of things that you would like to have done with
it. And by that I mean that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has
certainly been among the people in the Chinese Government that
have been pursuing the PAROS Agreement in Geneva.
I would not want to say that the Ministry of Defense was
trying desperately to undercut their efforts in Geneva, but I
will say that it is not clear that diplomatic effort by the
Chinese in Geneva constitutes a consensus opinion of the
Chinese government, in which case you may get actions which are
not consistent with it. And certainly we think that the ASAT
test was not consistent with any kind of an arms control
agreement that they have been pursuing.
Mr. Platts. And certainly the actions in January, the
launching of the satellite, didn't bolster the diplomatic
efforts, and the refusal to give very much information in
response to the launch doesn't bolster the diplomatic position
of the Chinese.
Mr. Mahley. No. Neither that action nor their response to
the action, not only to us but to a number of other countries
that have made an inquiry, has done anything to promote their
diplomatic efforts to try to get a negotiation going on outer
space. That is a fair statement.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do have one more. One other one for both of you. If you
had to highlight the most significant difference between the
1995 directive under President Clinton for a space policy and
this one, what would you highlight as the most significant
change? General?
General Armor. Why don't I start. I thought it was easy. I
have been working in the framework of the 1996 policy for 10
years, and when I read the new one the two things that jumped
out at me was, No. 1, more cooperation internationally, and
especially with our allies. So I personally have been doing
that. I have been out talking with our allies. I went to Geneva
to the U.N. Institute of Disarmament Research a couple of
months ago. I am planning another trip to Europe here soon, and
working with the Australians. So there was an emphasis in the
new policy about, hey, working with allies and cooperative
countries works, why don't we do more of that.
The other one was creation of new organizations within the
executive branch, the Director of National Intelligence,
Homeland Defense Department also, to bring more unity of effort
within the executive branch.
Those were the two things that jumped out at me, from my
experience.
Mr. Platts. Thank you. Mr. Ambassador?
Mr. Mahley. Substantively I think I would first of all
agree with General Armor. I would also say that I think the
language is more explicit in identification of space as not
only a top priority but as being vital to our national
security. And I also think that there are some welcome changes
in the new space policy in terms of the bureaucratics in the
sense of organizing and assigning responsibility for the
establishment of the resource base to pursue space policy that
we need to pursue.
Those are the things that I would think are changes, sir.
Thank you.
Mr. Platts. Thank you both for your testimony and your
answers.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Platts.
I think we are pretty much at the end of this particular
panel.
I only make the note that the Foreign Ministry in China
might be at odds with its Defense Department. That would never
happen in this country. The Secretary of State's office would
be at odds with the Department of Defense? We have not seen any
of that in our recent history at all.
I do want to thank both of our witnesses for appearing here
today and for your testimony, both oral and written.
At this point, with your assent, we will move on to the
next panel, and we give you our gratitude for your time and
effort here today.
Thank you.
Mr. Mahley. Mr. Chairman, I am going to impose on just one
comment. If it were the case that the Defense Department and
the Department of State were at odds with each other in this
Government, we wouldn't tell the Congress about it, but we will
tell the Congress that we think that is the case with the
Chinese. Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Ambassador.
We are going to take about a 2-minute break here, if the
witnesses of the second panel would like to come forward and
take their places. We will change the name tags. Mr. Platts
will be back, I think he said in a minute or two, and we will
get started on the second panel. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Tierney. We are going to reconvene the meeting.
Mr. Platts is tied up for a couple of moments, and he has
said he is fine if we start to proceed. He will join us when he
can.
I want to introduce our second panel, which represents the
scientific community, space and nonproliferation experts, as
well as the commercial space industry. On this panel we have
Dr. Laura Grego, staff scientist from the Union of Concerned
Scientists based in Cambridge, MA; Ms. Theresa Hitchens, who is
the Director for the Center for Defense Information; Mr. Jeff
Kueter, who is the president of the George C. Marshall
Institute; and Mr. David Cavossa, who is the executive director
of the Satellite Industry Association, originally from Lowell,
MA, just outside my district in Massachusetts, and I may have
some family members moving in.
Welcome to all of you.
Again, it is the policy of the subcommittee to swear in
witnesses before they testify. I am going to ask you to stand
and raise your right hands, and if there are any other persons
who are going to be responding to questions, might they also
rise.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Tierney. The record will please indicate that all
witnesses have answered in the affirmative. In case you didn't
hear me the first time, we would love you to give a summary of
your comments. You can read, if you wish, but a summary of
about 5 minutes. We won't hold you strictly to that, but in
order that all of you get your statements in and we allow for
some questioning and answering, that would be a terrific thing.
Your full statement will be put in the record, in any event.
Thank you.
Ms. Grego.
STATEMENTS OF LAURA GREGO, PH.D., STAFF SCIENTIST, GLOBAL
SECURITY PROGRAM, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS; THERESA
HITCHENS, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION; JEFF
KUETER, PRESIDENT, THE GEORGE C. MARSHALL INSTITUTE; AND DAVID
CAVOSSA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SATELLITE INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
STATEMENT OF LAURA GREGO
Ms. Grego. Mr. Chairman and distinguished representatives,
thanks for allowing me the opportunity to testify before you
today.
I would like to address the question of what approach the
United States should take to develop an effective and
sustainable policy toward space security. I am a physicist by
training and currently apply my technical background to
analysis of space security issues.
An important part of understanding security issues is
understanding both the possibilities and the limits of
technical approaches to security.
I have four main points that I made in my submitted
statement, and I thank you for submitting that to the record.
They are discussed in more detail in there, but I will
summarize them quickly.
The first is that in recent years the United States has
taken a largely unilateral approach to space security, based on
pursuing technical measures and capabilities. The unclassified
version of the national space policy released in 2006
formalized at the highest Administrative levels what was
essentially already U.S. policy. Arms control and diplomatic
approaches are considered largely irrelevant to solving
outstanding space security issues.
Two, while there are useful technical measures the United
States can and should take to improve security, because of the
increasing technical capabilities of other countries and the
dual use nature of micro satellites and other space
technologies, the current unilateral technical approach is
ultimately going to be neither effective nor sustainable.
Defensive space weapons are not a solution to providing
security to our critical satellite capabilities.
The third point is that, as a result, there is a need for
diplomatic efforts to pursue rules of the road and operational
constraints on space operations, as well as verifiable legal
constraints on systems intended to damage and destroy
satellites. In the future, limits on specific technologies will
not be sufficient and operational constraints and other rules
of conduct will be essential to maintain security.
And the last point was that, as a first step toward
controlling anti-satellite systems, an international ban on
debris-producing anti-satellite weapons similar to the weapon
that China tested in January will be a way of starting an
international process in taking an important step toward
preserving the use of space for the future. If such a ban could
be negotiated and respected, it would prevent the production of
a large amount of space debris that would be generated in
testing programs, and the single biggest threat to the future
of the space environment could be mitigated. It would also
reduce the military utility of extant or developing destructive
ASAT weapons due to the decreased confidence in an untested or
an incompletely tested system. Such a ban would be verifiable,
perhaps with already existing surveillance assets.
A ban on destructive anti-satellite weapons will derive
still greater relevance and usefulness as part of a
comprehensive regime of technical measures to preserve
satellite capability and arms control measures, rules of the
road for space conduct, and confidence-building measures
between space-faring nations.
In the remaining time I just wanted to spend a few minutes
talking about in more depth a couple of points in my written
testimony. The first is space debris. The Chinese ASAT test in
January increased the amount of debris in low-earth orbits by
about 20 percent. I would like to emphasize that the
approximately 1,600 pieces of debris cataloged in the space
catalog by the U.S. Air Force are only those that can be
tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network, specifically,
pieces of debris bigger than about 10 centimeters or 4 inches
in size. That does not include the pieces of debris that are
too small to track reliably but which still can create
significant damage to a satellite during a collision.
The destruction of the Fengyun 1C satellite released,
according to our calculations, over 40,000 pieces of debris of
that untrackable but still very dangerous type.
Fortunately, the absolute risk to satellites due to this
debris is still low. However, the situation could become much
worse if China or other countries continue testing these
weapons, and it is critical to stop this now. We have been
calculating the amounts of debris that would be produced by
destructive ASAT weapons, and find that destroying a single
large satellite such as a U.S. spy satellite would double the
amount of dangerous debris in low-earth orbit. This is the same
amount of debris that would be avoided during 70 to 80 years of
space activity under the strict debris mitigation guidelines of
the kind being considered at the United Nations and to which
the United States is a consulting party.
At the Union of Concerned Scientists we continue to conduct
research on the subject of the debris from ASAT attacks and
would be happy to provide our expertise to Congress.
This brings me to my comments on the lead up to China's
ASAT test. The Chinese research program on hit-to-kill
technologies appears to have begun in the 1980's, probably
sparked by observing the United States and Soviet Union
developing and testing ASAT weapons during that time and the
United States pursuing homing missile defense technologies. The
research likely continued at a low level through the 1990's and
may have been boosted in recent years in response to U.S.
missile defense tests, as it would be in the Chinese self
interest to understand this technology if it wanted to counter
it for its own missile defense and to plans released by the
United States for new military uses of space.
The Chinese ability to master the difficult technical
challenge of maneuvering a high-speed interceptor to hit a
high-speed satellite about the size of a golf cart indicates
the advanced state of China's space technology. However, the
complexity of this technology does also indicate that, without
further testing, this nascent ASAT weapon could not be
considered an operational military capability.
We are not privy to the internal decisionmaking process
that led China to pursue this final destructive test, but we do
know that the United States was not taken by surprise by the
test, having observed the preparations for it, which reportedly
China made no attempt to disguise, and the United States did
see it take place.
We also know that the United States also observed at least
two previous tests of the ASAT system reaching back at least 18
months in which the interceptor passed near to but did not
collide with the satellite.
It has been reported again that, after seeing the earlier
tests, that the United States decided not to contact China to
protest or ask about them. Since China would have known that
the United States could see this test with its early warning
sensors and understand it for what it was, it may have
interpreted the lack of reaction by the United States as a lack
of concern, if not tacit approval. So one does wonder what
might be characterized as unverifiable about that.
While the responsibility for this test rests fully with
China, the United States may have missed an opportunity to
avoid it if it used thoughtful diplomacy. Reports indicate that
the U.S. officials assumed China was committed to this test and
let the United States have little leverage to stop it. This
assumption can't be evaluated since the United States didn't
actually attempt to dissuade China. Moreover, we do have
evidence that suggests this assumption may not be correct.
Based on information we have collected about the January
test, there appears to be an ongoing debate within China about
the wisdom of this test and about possible future tests. It
appears that the Chinese leadership did not anticipate the
strong international reaction to the test. The decision process
may have included a narrow set of people, in particular the
Foreign Ministry appears to have been largely cut out of the
decision to conduct that test, which may have led to this
surprise. And Chinese decisionmakers may not have been
adequately advised on the degree of consequences and the harm
it would do to other space-faring nations, a number of which
China has strong partnerships with.
Had the United States raised this issue with China prior to
the test, that would have almost certainly broadened the set of
people who were involved in the decisionmaking process. This
could have had a significant effect on the Chinese decision.
So what happens next or doesn't happen is important. Some
in the United States argue that the ASAT program is central to
China's military strategy of disrupting U.S. space assets, so
it would not have stopped the test even if the United States
had protested; that it would continue developing and testing
the program, despite the strongly negative international
reaction.
The system, itself, cannot yet be considered a proven
capability. If China refrained from future tests, this would
call into question just how central China sees this ASAT system
is to its military posture, and that Chinese decisions may be
influenced by international concerns.
I will leave you with the idea that technical solutions
cannot get us all the way to a secure future in space.
Diplomacy and arms control measures will be essential to
building our future in space, a future where the enormous
potential of space as an agent of prosperity and stability is
realized.
I urge the distinguished members of this committee to ask
the hard questions. Why isn't the United States using all the
tools available to ensure security on space and on earth? Why
are we not vigorously pursuing all the potential diplomatic
avenues, when there are many? And while the United States has
apparently abandoned the development of its own kinetic energy
ASAT weapon back in the 1980's, it has taken a very welcome
leadership role in developing international guidelines for
debris mitigation and has the most to lose from space debris,
owning over half the active satellites in orbit. Why doesn't it
do more to make sure that no other country develops and tests
this kind of weapons? Specifically, why did it apparently stand
by and watch while China tested its massive kinetic energy ASAT
system and did not vigorously try to dissuade the Chinese from
the test in which they actually destroyed a satellite,
especially with so much at stake?
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Grego follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Ms. Hitchens.
STATEMENT OF THERESA HITCHENS
Ms. Hitchens. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, for inviting me today to discuss what I believe
is one of the most important subjects for the 21st century, and
that is the future security of space and, in particular, the
impact of U.S. policy on that security.
Warfare in space would endanger all space operations,
civil, commercial, and military. As the world's preeminent
space power, the United States will have the most to lose if
space becomes a battlefield. Unfortunately, U.S. policy is
leading us in exactly that direction, toward embracing space
weaponization and away from international diplomacy that could
reduce future threats to our space assets.
As has been stated, the Bush administration on October 6,
2006, released international space policy superseding the
previous Clinton policy. While there are similarities to
previous policies in that new national space policy, the
wording is strikingly different from its predecessors in its
unilateralist tone and its focus on the exercise of military
space power. In seeking to assert unhindered U.S. rights to act
in space, the new policy, at best, ignores the rights of others
under the Outer Space Treaty, which deems space a global
commons.
The new policy not only repeats the 1996 language asserting
a right to deny U.S. adversaries the use of space, but it goes
further by stating U.S. intentions to deter others from even
developing capabilities that can challenge U.S. freedom of
action in space. That is a difficult thing to uphold,
considering that most space technologies are dual use.
It stops short of overtly authorizing space weapons, but
when read in concert with current military documents designed
to implement it, which detail the missions of offensive space
control and space force application, U.S. intentions to pursue
such weaponry seem clear.
Reaction to the new policy, especially abroad, has been
exceedingly negative. Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese of the U.S. Navy
War College provided this assessment: ``The blunt and even
confrontational language of the new policy puts the United
States at odds with the priorities of other space-faring
nations. The language is so broad that it reads more like a
blanket claim to hegemony in space.'' And the document, as the
chairman has already noted, further distances the United States
from international efforts to establish collective security in
space.
Sadly, this aggressive U.S. declaratory policy and the Just
Say No attitude to diplomacy is utterly failing to protect
America's interest in space. To the contrary, it is backfiring,
alienating allies and prompting our potential adversaries into
seeking ways to counter any expansion of U.S. space power.
Certainly if the aim of U.S. policy is to dissuade and
deter others from obtaining capabilities to threaten us, it has
failed at doing so. As we heard, China has tested an ASAT
weapon. India is threatening to develop similar capabilities
which would no doubt spark an Asian ASAT arms race involving
Pakistan and possibly others. And we have already heard about
the debris problem.
The time has come for the United States to rethink its
failing strategy. A first step would be to engage other space-
faring nations in efforts to define peacetime rules of the
road, as mentioned by General Armor. A space code of conduct
would bolster U.S. national security by serving to reduce
tensions and making it easier to identify and constrain bad
apples.
Second, the United States should renounce not only the
development and deployment of debris-creating ASATs, but it
should also urge an international ban on testing and use of
these indiscriminate satellite killers. While such a ban may
not prevent people from working on them, it certainly would
discourage other nations from using them or testing them, which
is where I mentioned would make it less likely that they would
want to rely on them in warfare.
As they say, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of
cure, and in the case of space debris this is doubly true since
there are currently no technologies available for cleaning it
up. There is no such thing as a Space Hoover.
Finally, the United States needs to sit down with other
space-faring nations to discuss how to avoid an arms race in
the heavens, and I am glad to hear that Ambassador Mahley said
that the United States is no longer refusing informal
discussions in the CD. That is a change, and it is a welcome
one. But I would hope that we would be willing to at least talk
about crafting a treaty to ban space-based weapons, even though
we know it would be fiendishly difficult to do. Certainly there
can be no harm from an honest discussion.
My last point is that a new focus on diplomacy and
collective security in space does not and should not mean that
the United States should abandon necessary efforts to protect
its satellites, for example, by improving space situational
awareness, but the fact is that what any one operator does in
space directly affects all others, and not any one nation, not
even the United States, can guarantee safety and security in
space on its own.
Thank you. I will be happy to take any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hitchens follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Ms. Hitchens.
Mr. Kueter.
STATEMENT OF JEFF KUETER
Mr. Kueter. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss this
very important issue. I agree completely with Theresa that it
is, I believe, the national security question of the 21st
century.
Our use of space has clearly changed, and what it means for
the strategic environment has clearly changed. As has been
mentioned, the missions provided by space are integral to the
American way of warfare. This way of warfare brings us enormous
advantages. It requires less manpower, puts fewer U.S. forces
in harm's way, and integrates all space-based missions into
real time boots-on-the-ground and stand-off precision strike
operations.
By fulfilling these real-time war fighting needs, as well
as the broader strategic reconnaissance and intelligence
missions, space assets no longer just tell us where people are
and what they are doing, they are integrated with and improve
the effectiveness of weapons systems that are used to target
and destroy. That is not a convenience to the war fighter; they
are now part of the weapons systems that we use every day, and
not an insignificant part of that.
These capabilities are uniquely American strength and
provide clear incentive for attacking American spacecraft.
Other nations have clearly taken notice. China's demonstration
of its direct-ascent anti-satellite system in January 2007
shows those emerging capabilities. Last September, reports
surfaced that China had successfully conducted laser blinding
tests against U.S. reconnaissance satellites, and further
investigation reveals that these blinding tests had been
ongoing for several years. China has made no secret of its
efforts to develop techniques to jam navigation satellites, as
have many other nations.
China's perceptions of its security environment and the
nature of the future conflicts explain their investment in
military space capabilities. They understand that the control
of space is essential to success in future warfare. Without
control of space, Chinese military leaders believe neither they
nor an adversary can expect to assert air or naval dominance or
win a ground war.
In light of this changed environment, what are we to make
of the national space policy? Released after many years in the
making, the policy charts a reasonable course, upholding
established beliefs about safeguarding the security of the
United States in space while preserving the flexibility needed
to respond to the uncertain security environments of the
future.
The policy is not without its failings, but it does
reiterate the commitment to preserving and protecting U.S.
assets in space, as has been directed by Democratic and
Republican Presidents, alike, over the years. But as the first
space policy written for the age of the space-enabled
reconnaissance strike complex, the policy rightly asserts that
the national security establishment should ``develop
capabilities, plans, and options to ensure freedom of action in
space and, if directed, deny such freedom of actions to
adversaries.''
This goal draws its origins from the earliest days of the
U.S. space program, nor is there really anything unique about
directing the security establishment to develop plans and
options to deny freedom of action to adversaries. Even
President Carter ordered the Defense Department to ``vigorously
pursue development of an anti-satellite capability'' and
allowed for the production of such systems.
Nevertheless, this mandate is widely interpreted as
presaging the deployment of new U.S. space weapons rather than
for what it actually is, a reaffirmation of the continuing
strategic approach.
The declaration that the United States will ``oppose the
development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that
seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space'' also
is offered as evidence that the new policy is part of some
nefarious framework to expand U.S. hegemony in space. Instead
of just simply a statement that the United States will not
support international agreements that it considers contrary to
its interests, it is not the blanket prohibition on arms
control, as is often asserted.
Past space policies include similar qualifying language.
For example, President Clinton's 1996 policy stated that the
United States should ``conclude agreements on such measures
only if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance
the security of the United States or our allies.'' The new
policy sends the same message as the old policy: the United
States will not become a party to an agreement that it feels is
contrary to its interests. Nevertheless, the new policy does
not eschew internationally. For example, it strongly calls on
the United States to assume leadership on overall debris
mitigation.
So the question now facing America's leaders is, how does
the United States best deter, deny, and dissuade the Chinese
and other emerging space powers from hostile actions in space?
The first step I suggest is moving beyond the tired lexical
dispute over what is militarizing or weaponizing space. That is
too late. Space is already both of those. A positive step would
be to build on recognition of the new reality in space to
enable public and political support necessary to begin the work
to protect critical space programs. A new emphasis on policies
and programs likely to improve our capabilities to respond and
react to incidents in space is needed. The United States should
not foreclose the option of developing active defenses, if
necessary. And, finally, diplomatic efforts can play important
roles in preserving U.S. security, but only in combination with
other measures.
There are a number of topics that I suggest we consider
there, most importantly involving more actively our NATO
allies.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kueter follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Kueter.
Mr. Cavossa.
STATEMENT OF DAVID CAVOSSA
Mr. Cavossa. Mr. Chairman, Representative McCollum,
Representative Platts, on behalf of the Satellite Industry
Association it is my goal today to provide you with an overview
of the critical role satellites play in our global economy, the
role they play in support of our military and first responders,
and then finally speak for a few moments on the importance of
space situational awareness and being a responsible actor in
space.
Whether broadcasting television programming to viewers
throughout the world, enabling the U.S. military to conduct
large and small scale operations across large distances, or
providing communications to first responders during disasters,
satellites are there.
Today satellites permeate our every-day lives and
contribute over $106 billion to our global economy. Today
commercial satellites support daily activities such as truck
fleet management, credit card validations, pay-at-the-pump
services, ATM withdrawals, high-speed Internet access, traffic
and weather reports, and almost all television and radio
distribution. In rural areas where terrestrial communications
do not reach all residents, satellite broadband, satellite
television, and satellite radio provide consumers services they
otherwise would not have access to through terrestrial means.
As we all know, satellite communications have also played a
critical role during the response to each of the natural and
man-made disasters in recent memory. In 2005, satellite
communications provided a lifeline for aid workers and victims
in the remote islands of the Indian Ocean following the Asian
tsunami, and in the earthquake-desolated towns and villages of
Pakistan. In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the
recent tornadoes in Kansas, satellite communication's once
again proved their essential value when all other forms of
terrestrial communications were wiped out. In many of these
affected areas, satellite communications provide the only means
of communication.
Military forces are also perhaps the most dependent upon
satellite communication systems today. Telemedicine via
satellite puts the resources of the world-class specialists and
surgeons at the disposal of medical teams in the field.
Unmanned aerial vehicles such as the Predator and Global Hawk
are heavy users of satellite bandwidth today. Other bandwidth-
intensive activities such as secure video teleconferencing and
encrypted command and control are also supported by satellite
communications. The DOD estimates that satellite systems
provided over 60 percent of all communications during Operation
Iraqi Freedom.
Given this reliance on satellite communications, during the
last 5 years the satellite industry has spent thousands of
hours and millions of dollars working with the government, both
domestic and allied, to improve the performance, security, and
reliability of our satellite infrastructure. These activities
are being coordinated, again, both domestically and with our
allied partners through what is called the Commercial Satellite
Mission Assurance Working Group [MAWG].
Through the MAWG we meet on a regular basis with
representatives of the combatant commands, the military
services, and Defense agencies, as well as the U.S. State
Department, the intelligence community, and representatives of
allied governments. The issues we discuss are space situational
awareness, information sharing, jamming and intentional
interference to commercial communication satellites, and how to
handle close approaches in space between commercial satellites
and government satellites.
For the past few years our companies have worked closely
with the U.S. Government to develop a series of best practices
to reduce the chances of orbital collisions and close
approaches between commercial satellites and government
satellites. As part of that effort, for the past 3 years our
companies have used space surveillance data provided by Air
Force Space Command. Their commercial and foreign entities
pilot program is very essential to avoid collisions with other
natural or man-made objects in space.
A key piece of this coordination effort, as General Armor
mentioned during the question and answer session, is in
jeopardy, however. The CFE program, or the Commercial and
Foreign Entity program, is currently on a list of unfunded
priorities in the DOD budget, and therefore we urge Congress to
fully fund the CFE program to ensure we are all able to
continue safe operations and responsible operations in space.
We need that data from the Department of Defense.
We believe that the U.S. Air Force should fully implement
the congressional mandated CFE program and that the program
should include launch support, conjunction assessment, end-of-
life and re-entry support, anomaly resolution, and emergency
services during close approach times. This will all help us
operate safely.
In closing, satellite systems, as I have mentioned,
represent a critical infrastructure for the United States, its
allies and our trading partners. As such, Congress must ensure
that space commerce is as protected as maritime commerce is
today, and therefore we need to invest to raise the robustness
of the space infrastructure to mute the effect an attack would
have on any one object.
The commercial satellite industry is fully focused on
reducing potential vulnerabilities in our systems and, further,
we are working proactively with the U.S. Government and with
allied governments to establish these best practices that I
have referred to to promote safe and responsible operations.
Mr. Chairman and committee members, thank you for having me
today. I look forward to answering any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cavossa follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much. Thanks to all the
witnesses on the panel.
If you are good enough to key up a small video that I would
like to play just for a minute and a half on this, this is a
video by sellerstrack.com, which uses debris data from the Air
Force. As we watch it, I think we can remember the model-sized
piece of debris in low-earth orbit would hit a satellite with
the same force as a one ton safe dropped from a five-story
building on earth. But after this I want to ask a question of
Mr. Cavossa.
[Video presentation.]
Mr. Tierney. The red that you see there is obviously a
depiction of the debris from the Chinese satellite being shot
down.
[End of video presentation.]
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Cavossa, can you talk to us a little bit
about the challenges of space debris to your commercial
satellite sector?
Mr. Cavossa. Our commercial satellite operators are located
both in low-earth orbit, in relative proximity to what you saw
there in that illustration, but a great number, a majority of
our satellites are located in geostationary orbit, which is
23,000 miles away, quite a bit further away. But our satellite
operators today, both in low-earth orbit and geostationary
orbit, work very closely with each other. They make sure that
when a satellite from one company is going to perhaps maneuver
to a different orbital slot, it coordinates with all the
satellites around it to make sure that everyone knows, hey, I
am about to move, and give that data on where you are going to
move your satellites so everyone is aware. We call it Nation
Watch of Space Situational Awareness.
Mr. Tierney. But debris doesn't give you much of an
opportunity to plan with anything, does it?
Mr. Cavossa. No. If it is, of course, debris that we don't
know about, that is a problem, and that is why this CFE program
that I mentioned that the Air Force Space Command runs is so
critical to commercial satellite operators. We don't have the
ability to track objects in space, the same ability that the
U.S. Government has.
Mr. Tierney. So you think tracking would be enough if a
number of nations decided they were going to test as China did
and all that debris got in there? Do you think the ability to
track that would give comfort to your commercial sector?
Mr. Cavossa. Well, sir, tracking alone would be important,
of course, but if there was quite a bit more debris up there,
yes, that would cause a problem for our satellites.
Mr. Tierney. Ms. Hitchens, would you respond a little bit
to Mr. Kueter's testimony and to the first two witnesses of
this concept that we can't really verify any treaty on that, we
can't define the terms, I think the first panel said what's
weaponization, they can't determine what's a violation, can't
be verified and can't be enforced. Do you have a reaction to
that?
Ms. Hitchens. I think everyone who works on this issue
recognizes that it would be very difficult to craft a sort of
generic space weapons ban treaty, and Laura referred to it with
the idea of the difficulty of banning technology, and in
particular the difficulty of discerning between dual use
technology on what is a weapon and what is not a weapon.
On the other hand, that doesn't necessarily mean that it is
not doable. The United States has signed treaties that don't
have verification provisions. Correct me if I am wrong, but I
believe the Biological Weapons Convention does not have
verification protocol, because the United States insisted that
it did not.
Certainly there are other approaches like the ASAT testing
and use ban, which we have rejected, and I don't know why
because you can verify testing and use of a debris-creating
ASAT.
So there are a lot of different approaches that need to be
explored. The problem here has largely been a lack of will and
not a lack of way.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Kueter, on that other point, I heard you
say pretty clearly that U.S. warfare and intelligence relies on
satellites. I don't think anybody disputes that, or that it is
a useful thing to have, but can't we differentiate between not
interfering with a nation's ability to use satellites for those
purposes and the prospect of people attacking those satellites
and then creating debris from it or other difficulties on that,
and then go back to Ms. Hitchens' point of wouldn't it be
useful to at least make a differentiation and then talk about
having some agreement that would not allow people to do that.
Mr. Kueter. The satellites that we use for real-time war
fighting capabilities, the communication satellites, the GPS
signals that enable precision navigation and timing, are
integrated into terrestrial power projection capabilities
today. That is the point that I am trying to make in terms of
why those assets are now very attractive strategic targets for
a real or potential adversary of the United States to go after.
If they were to successfully eliminate our access to those
capabilities or deny our use of those capabilities when we
desire to use them, they would gain an enormous asymmetric
advantage over us at a particular point in time.
Mr. Tierney. I guess that is the point. So isn't that what
we want to negotiate with them so that they wouldn't be able to
do that without some sort of agreement prohibiting that?
Mr. Kueter. Well, sir, there are two specific responses to
that. The first is I don't see where it would be in the
interest of any other nation to negotiate their right away to
exploit that asymmetric advantage at some future point in time;
and, second, I don't believe that it is possible to verify all
of the numerous ways that one might hold those assets at risk,
both electronic, which we have not talked about very much, or
through direct threats, such as the direct-ascent ASAT that we
have talked about.
Mr. Tierney. On the first point, isn't that a little bit
like saying people won't want to negotiate away their right to
have nuclear weapons, so we shouldn't have any weapons
nonproliferation agreements in that respect, and biological,
chemical, the whole idea that somebody might want an advantage
that they think they can get some day means that they will
never negotiate in good faith and preclude that?
Mr. Kueter. Well, the first point I guess I would make
against that statement is that we are talking about a set of
capabilities today that China clearly possesses and that other
nations have nascent capabilities to possess. In the sense of
being able to launch a ballistic missile from the surface of
the earth carrying a nuclear warhead into space, exploding it,
and destroying any number of satellites in its path, those
capabilities exist in the hands of numerous nations today. So
you would be talking about an arms control effort that would
require rolling back capabilities.
I would suggest that we have very few arms treaties that we
can point to that suggest a rolling back of capabilities on a
multilateral level.
Mr. Tierney. I can name a few.
Ms. Hitchens and Ms. Grego, why don't we ask you for a
comment on that?
Ms. Grego. Well, I think really the question is are we
better off in a world where we have unrestrained ASATs or not.
You can argue that you can't define every threat, that you
can't verify every threat, and that may be true. I don't think
that we have gone far enough to really determine that. But the
question is: would we be better by moving ahead with diplomatic
efforts to restrain the most dangerous technologies; for
example, direct-ascent ASATs. I think the answer really is yes.
And I think that is the type of ban that is actually
verifiable, that is doable with our capabilities right now.
Whether or not countries have the technology to approach or
to develop those weapons, well, I think soon enough anyone who
is interested or finds it in their interest to have an ASAT
weapon would be able to develop some technology that can do
that. That is the reality we have to face, and I think we will
best face that if we have some kind of comprehensive arms
control agreement to manage that transition to the future.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Platts.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, Mr. Cavossa, as to the specific national space
policy for your industry, do you think it adequately addresses
the role of commercial space travel and involvement as it is
written currently?
Mr. Cavossa. Sure. Representative Platts, as an industry
association, we are a consensus-based trade association, so all
30 members of our group have to agree before we go forward with
any position, so on that issue the industry doesn't have a
position of supporting or opposing.
I can highlight, though, that there was some interest in
the things we did see in the space policy we hadn't seen in the
past, which was the focus on interference becoming a problem.
Jamming up commercial communication satellites is a problem,
and it was mentioned in the national space policy as an issue
that the U.S. Government was looking at and viewed as a serious
threat. So we were happy to see that.
Mr. Platts. OK. And certainly you mentioned the funding on
the CFE issue, not part of the space policy but just the
importance of that to your industry?
Mr. Cavossa. Yes, sir.
Mr. Platts. OK. Ms. Hitchens, you talk about in your
testimony that the space policy, we are, in essence, giving
China an excuse or a basis to pursue the weaponization of
space. Given the timing of this launch in January, I think it
is fair to say it was really under the language of the last
policy of 1996, because the new policy had just come out in the
fall of 2006. So how do you reconcile that if this new policy
is so dramatically different and more military focused, China
went ahead with their launch, anti-satellite launch, under the
Clinton policy, so why would this one be more encouraging given
that it happened already under the Clinton policy?
Ms. Hitchens. I think there are two parts to that question,
sir, so I am going to try to answer maybe the last one first.
It is obvious that China has been interested in what we
call counter-space technologies, things we have been pursuing
for more than a decade, for a long time due to their
recognition that United States and other's space power is
something that might be vulnerable. OK? So there is no denying
that.
Second, it is probably not true that China's test was a
direct response to the new national space policy. I think what
I was trying to say in my testimony is that such a national
space policy that can be read as very aggressive, especially
when you read it along with Air Force doctrine that talks about
counter-space operations, offensive counter-space operations,
attacking satellites, you can see that it could give political
cover to the Chinese to say we are doing this because the
United States is a threat.
And the Chinese, indeed, have said that we are a threat,
the United States is a threat, both with its efforts to create
hegemony in space and contain the Chinese and, second, with the
U.S. missile defense effort, which the Chinese have long been
concerned will nullify their very small nuclear deterrent.
So U.S. space power has been an issue for China for more
than a decade, and it has numerous factors.
Mr. Platts. So is it your contention, then, that if we had
just continued under the Clinton space policy, China would not
be pursuing its endeavors as it is?
Ms. Hitchens. Actually, no. I think obviously the Clinton
administration didn't pursue space arms control, either.
Although they did not, they ruled out space weapons and anti-
satellite weapons. They canceled programs. Despite the language
in the policy, their implementation of it was very, very
different. They did not approve of the weaponization of space.
That said, I don't necessarily think the Chinese might not
have gone down this path if we would have continued the Clinton
policy, because we have failed. This administration has taken a
harsher line, but we have failed for more than a decade to
properly pursue diplomacy as one end of our space policy.
Mr. Platts. I guess when I read the sections of the 1996
policy that you quoted and the 2006, I would look at it
similarly to Mr. Kueter that I don't see a whole lot of
difference. There are some slight words, but I think the key
is, when they talk about an arms control agreement, only if
they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhances the
security of the United States and our allies.
Maybe they put that at the end of the sentence as opposed
to lead with that, but the focus is still we are not going to
pursue and enter into arms agreements that are not in the
national security interest of our country.
Ms. Grego. No country would enter into an arms control
agreement that wouldn't be in their interest. That would be
silly. And I don't believe that is what I or others who are
advocating for certain kinds of agreements and diplomacy are
trying to advocate. Indeed, in my humble opinion it is in the
U.S. national security to try to use diplomatic tools to
counter some of these problems, because I don't believe that we
can do that using hard power.
Mr. Platts. One real quick.
Mr. Tierney. We have four votes coming up, so that
everybody gets a chance to ask questions.
Mr. Platts. OK. Final one is just, 1996, the last policy,
is a very different world coming out of the end of the cold war
to 2007 and the global war on terror and the threat that exists
today. Would you acknowledge that you can't compare 1996 and
the decisions then directly to 2006, given the changes in the
threats to American security?
Ms. Hitchens. I actually think that is a very good point,
sir. One of the things that I believe that we need to look at
currently with regard to space is the fact that there are more
and more space actors and that the technology has spread, and
we have to really think about how we handle space in a
globalized world as opposed to in a bipolar world, and that
makes it a lot more difficult but it makes it a lot more
crucial that we figure out things like rules of the road for
space actors. I think that is what you and General Armor were
talking about, the expansion of space technology and the need
to----
Mr. Platts. I would like to explore further, because the
issue that has not been mentioned is the difference in
terrorism today versus 1996 in a global sense, but I am out of
time.
I thank all of you for your testimony.
Mr. Tierney. There may be more time for you after Ms.
McCollum, but I want to make sure Ms. McCollum has an
opportunity.
Ms. McCollum.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
To the difference in language--and I might add that the
Bush administration, when it is working on language like this
product doesn't hold discussions, hearing from the best and
brightest in a public venue, talk to Members of Congress about
things. Usually it gets released on a Friday after Congress has
adjourned to go home to work for the weekend in our Districts.
But I found it interesting in your testimony, Ms. Hitchens, I
think words do have meaning, and I think the meaning is very,
very different.
The Clinton policy: ``Consistent with treaty obligations,
the United States will develop, operate, and maintain space
control capabilities to ensure the freedoms of action in space,
and if directed denies such freedom of access to adversaries.
These capabilities may also be enhanced by diplomatic, legal,
or military measures to preclude an adversary's hostile use of
space systems and services.'' Clearly, going to defend the
country but clearly wants to work with the international
community for a solution.
This is our new doctrine: ``The United States considers
space capabilities, including ground segments, as supporting
links and vital to its national interest. Consistent with the
policy, the United States will preserve its rights and
capabilities of freedoms and actions in space.'' But here's
where the language, I think, in my opinion, really changes:
``Dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or
developing capabilities to do so, to take actions necessary to
protect space capabilities, to respond to interference and
deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities
hostile to the United States' interest.''
One is inclusive, kind of to what you were saying about
your industry doesn't have a position on it but let's get
people together and talk about what is in the common good,
making sure that the U.S. security interests are taken care of,
and the other one is saying I don't have to worry about the
common good, I just have to worry about my good. And when I
just worry about myself, or if we just worry about the United
States, other countries quite often perceive that as hostile,
that they are not being included in it.
So if you could comment, internationally what have you
heard from even some of our allies internationally on this
different tone that is being taken, and perhaps you, as well,
sir, from the industry perspective internationally.
Ms. Hitchens. Well, as I said, the reaction, particularly
internationally, to the new space policy was exceedingly
negative. I want to point out that this didn't just come from
places that would be likely to bash the Bush administration or
the United States. I mean, Aviation Week, the industry journal,
called the new policy judalistic and fretted that it would harm
NASA's ability to find partners for the Moon and Mars. The
Times of London called the policy comically proprietary about
the United States' wish to control everyone's access to space.
And you heard my quote from Joan Johnson-Freese, who is a
tenured professor at the Naval War College. So we are not
exactly talking about the flaming liberal left commentators
here.
Language is important. Language is important, and the
language in this policy talks about U.S. rights, U.S. rights,
protecting U.S. freedom of action; whereas, if you look at the
Clinton policy and you look at the words, it talks about
sovereign rights of any nation. Those are differences. In fact,
the Reagan policy talked about sovereign rights of any nation.
So this is a change in tonality.
While we may think that is no big deal in the substance, on
the international stage that is what diplomacy is about. It is
not only about what you say, but it is about how you say it.
Mr. Cavossa. Congresswoman, all I can say is, as an
industry we tend to be a global industry. The satellite
industry is very much the telecommunications industry, so the
companies that are represented by the Satellite Industry
Association across the board are U.S. and non-U.S. companies.
What we have seen, I mentioned in my testimony the Mission
Assurance Working Group, that we have been working with the
Department of Defense and allied governments. In those
meetings, allied governments are in the room, representatives
of the government or of the ministries of defense are there,
and they are trying to work with us. To the DOD's credit, they
are inviting them to be involved in these discussions.
That is all I can speak to.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much.
We are going to have to go to vote, but if anybody has a
final comment that they want to make in 30 seconds, I will give
you each an opportunity to do that, and then apologize for the
fact, but I don't want to make you wait around for another hour
before we come back.
Does anybody care to say anything? Mr. Kueter.
Mr. Kueter. I would just like to comment on your question.
I think the reactions that we saw in the immediate aftermath of
the release of the policy reflect the greatest failure that the
administration pursued in releasing this policy, which was the
failure to come out publicly and articulate what they meant
when they used the language in this particular document. I
think the language that you quoted compared to the Bush
administration or the new space policy is consistent in terms
of an interpretation that one could put on it.
And I would say that, in terms of the real rubber meets the
road part of international cooperation, I would refer you to
General Armor's comments on the first panel, where he said
that, in fact, from his perspective the new policy encouraged
greater international cooperation on a military-to-military
side, something that he didn't see in the earlier program.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Cavossa, anything to close?
Mr. Cavossa. No, sir.
Mr. Tierney. Ms. Grego.
Ms. Grego. No, thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Ms. Hitchens.
Ms. Hitchens. I just want to mention that I do want to
thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the panel for undertaking this,
because I believe this has been the first hearing on space
policy, the first public debate, and we really do need to have
more of these.
And the second thing I wanted to say is the one thing I
think you will hear agreement on across the board here if you
listen hard is the question of rules of the road and the idea
of establishing new rules for people to operate together
particularly in peacetime. That is an issue that I think there
is more and more consensus about, and I would really urge the
committee and the subcommittee to look into that in more depth.
Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. Thank you all very, very much for
your time, patience, and your contributions.
I would invite you to write the committee with any
suggestions you have on what a further hearing would focus
upon. If it could be helpful to the debate, we will then
discuss it as a committee and decide if we are going to do
that. We do want to make sure that this issue gets covered. We
think it is important also or we wouldn't have had the hearing.
Thank all of you, thank my colleagues.
[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]