[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXTREMIST MADRASSAS, GHOST SCHOOLS, AND U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN: ARE WE
MAKING THE GRADE ON THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT CARD?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
of the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 9, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-17
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
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37-093 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2007
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSISGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman
TOM LANTOS, California TOM DAVIS, Virginia
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN L. MICA, Florida
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts CHRIS CANNON, Utah
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
DIANE E. WATSON, California MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts DARRELL E. ISSA, California
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York KENNY MARCHANT, Texas
JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina
Columbia BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota BILL SALI, Idaho
JIM COOPER, Tennessee ------ ------
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
PETER WELCH, Vermont
Phil Schiliro, Chief of Staff
Phil Barnett, Staff Director
Earley Green, Chief Clerk
David Marin, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts DAN BURTON, Indiana
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
Dave Turk, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on May 9, 2007...................................... 1
Statement of:
Kojm, Christopher, president of the 9/11 Public Discourse
Project and Deputy Director, 9/11 Commission; Samina Ahmed,
South Asia project director for the International Crisis
Group; Lisa Curtis, senior research fellow, South Asia,
Asian Studies Center, the Heritage Foundation; and Craig
Cohen, deputy chief of staff, and fellow, Post-Conflict
Reconstruction Project, International Security Program, at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies......... 15
Ahmed, Samina............................................ 23
Cohen, Craig............................................. 41
Curtis, Lisa............................................. 32
Kojm, Christopher........................................ 15
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Ahmed, Samina, South Asia project director for the
International Crisis Group, prepared statement of.......... 26
Cohen, Craig, deputy chief of staff, and fellow, Post-
Conflict Reconstruction Project, International Security
Program, at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, prepared statement of............................. 43
Curtis, Lisa, senior research fellow, South Asia, Asian
Studies Center, the Heritage Foundation, prepared statement
of......................................................... 35
Kojm, Christopher, president of the 9/11 Public Discourse
Project and Deputy Director, 9/11 Commission, prepared
statement of............................................... 18
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 13
Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Massachusetts, prepared statement of.............. 6
EXTREMIST MADRASSAS, GHOST SCHOOLS, AND U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN: ARE WE
MAKING THE GRADE ON THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT CARD?
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 9, 2007
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Tierney
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Tierney, Lynch, Higgins, Yarmuth,
Braley, McCollum, Van Hollen, Welch, Shays, Platts,
Westmoreland, McHenry, and Foxx.
Staff present: Leneal Scott, information systems manager;
Dave Turk, staff director; Andrew Su, professional staff
member; Davis Hake, clerk; Andy Wright, counsel; A. Brooke
Bennett, minority counsel; Grace Washbourne, minority senior
professional staff member; Nick Palarino, minority senior
investigator and policy advisor; Benjamin Chance, minority
clerk; and Dawn Hu, minority intern.
Mr. Tierney. Good morning. A quorum is present and the
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs' hearing
entitled, ``Extremist Madrassas, Ghost Schools, and U.S. Aid to
Pakistan: Are We Making the Grade on the 9/11 Commission Report
Card'' will come to order.
I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking
member make an opening statement. Without objection, so
ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept
open for 5 business days so that all members of the
subcommittee be allowed to submit a written statement for the
record. Without objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that the following written
statement be placed into the hearing record: Professor Husain
Haggani, director of the Center for International Relations and
associate professor of international relations at Boston
University, as well as the former Pakistan ambassador to Sri
Lanka. Without objection, so ordered.
With all that business out of the way, good morning to our
witnesses, and thank you for your participation and your
assistance here today, Mr. Shays.
America awoke to a new and terrible chapter in our history
on September 11, 2001. We watched in horror as the Twin Towers
disintegrated, as a Pentagon wing collapsed in flames, and as a
Pennsylvania field smoldered with wreckage. Every American
knows with clarity where he or she was on that morning.
Today, more than 5\1/2\ years later, the National Security
Subcommittee begins a series of hearings asking whether the
United States has an effective, long-term strategy for
confronting international terrorism.
We will begin with the 9/11 Commission, whose report
cautioned us of a ``generational struggle'' whose ``long-term
success demands the use of all elements of national power:
diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement,
economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland
defense.''
The 9/11 Commission also warned that ``[i]f we favor one
tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and
weaken our national effort.'' The Commission stressed the
importance that any offensive efforts ``be accompanied by a
preventative strategy that is as much, or more, political as it
is military.''
So let's now ask the question: how are we doing.
Today we are going to explore U.S. policy toward Pakistan,
its radical religious schools known as madrassas, and its
dysfunctional education system and what impact this has on
long-term national security.
The 9/11 Commission had some specific advice with regard to
Pakistan, stressing ``[i]t is hard to overstate the importance
of Pakistan in the struggle against Islamist terrorism,''
pointing out that ``[a]lmost all of the 9/11 attackers'' spent
some time in Pakistan and ``traveled the north-south nexus of
Kandahar-Quetta-Karachi,'' and warning of Pakistan madrassas
that ``have been used as incubators of violent extremism.''
The 9/11 Commission urged the U.S. Government to ``support
Pakistan's government in its struggle against extremists with a
comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support
for better education, so long as Pakistan's leaders remain
willing to make difficult choices of their own.''
In December 2005, the 9/11 Commission's Public Discourse
Project issued a report card that is reflected on the screen to
the sides of the room. As you can see, we got a C+ for our
efforts in supporting Pakistan against extremists. The report
card notes: ``U.S. assistance to Pakistan has not moved
sufficiently beyond security assistance to include significant
funding for education efforts. Musharraf has made efforts to
take on the threat of extremism, but has not shut down
extremist-linked madrassas or terrorist camps. Taliban forces
still pass freely across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and
operate in Pakistani tribal areas.''
This, despite the fact that President Musharraf has
repeatedly promised to crack down on extremist madrassas. In
2003 he stated, ``We must finish off religious extremism. . . .
We must not use the mosques to spread hatred.'' In January
2005, he said, ``[t]he use of mosques and seminaries as
producers of hate and extremism must be stopped.'' And in
August 2005, President Musharraf said, ``[W]e will not let any
madrassa harbor terrorists or teach extremism and militancy.''
But the madrassas remain to this day.
Here is a clip of a recent Frontline show entitled,
``Return of the Taliban.''
[Film clip shown.]
Mr. Tierney. Last month, I led a congressional delegation
to Pakistan and Afghanistan with subcommittee members Betty
McCollum and Patrick McHenry, as well as the Education and
Labor Chairman George Miller. In Afghanistan, senior United
States, NATO, and Afghan military officials told us of their
forces being continually attacked by Taliban foes who plan and
stage their insurgent operations in Pakistan before pouring
across the border to kill our troops.
But if we think these Pakistani breeding grounds of terror
only threaten Afghanistan, we need to think again. The 2005
London subway terrorist bombings involved at least one British
national trained in a Pakistani madrassa.
And just last week terrorists were convicted in the United
Kingdom in a conspiracy to conduct an attack there with
fertilizer-based bombs. Five of the seven men tried attended
either madrassas or training camps in Pakistan. Yet, these
extremist madrassas remain open for business.
This is a picture of a madrassa that is just outside of
Islamabad. As we sit here in this hearing room today, madrassas
affiliated with the Red Mosque in Islamabad continue to flout
Pakistani national laws by squatting on national land. They
harbor foreign terrorists. They move large numbers of burga-
clad women into the compound as protection. They establish
religious vigilante raids on shopkeepers and assault and kidnap
indecent--or what they term indecent--women.
These madrassas have threatened a campaign of suicide
bombings if they don't get their way.
This picture of the Red Mosque madrassa students burning
books, CDs, and DVDs was taken just 2 days after our
Congressional delegation left Pakistan. During our stay we were
told of women in Islamabad having acid doused on their faces
for failure to wear burgas and harassment of women who were
just driving cars. And we saw first-hand, billboards in which
women's facial images had been ripped away because of their so-
called immodesty.
The extremists once confined to the outer reaches of
Pakistan are bringing their venom right into the heart of
Pakistan's manicured capital. Last week our own State
Department concluded ``Pakistan remains a major source of
Islamic extremism and a safe haven for some top terrorist
leaders.''
Extremism and Jahadi curriculum in madrassas is only one
side of the problem, however, as Pakistan's public school
system has utterly failed to provide a viable alternative for
millions of poor Pakistani families.
In December 2005 the 9/11 Commission gave the U.S.
Government a D grade for not doing enough to support secular
education in Muslim countries. The report card warned; ``The
U.S. has no overarching strategy for educational assistance and
the current level of education reform funding is inadequate.''
The United States also received a D for funding educational
and cultural exchange programs designed to foster mutual
understanding between the United States and Muslim countries.
The grade specifically notes recent closures of American
libraries in Pakistan.
There is a bar chart that we would like to show at this
time. This chart compares our Pakistan education assistance aid
versus our military support. I know it is hard to see the bar
for education funding because it is 15 times less than what we
are spending on military funding.
Remember that the 9/11 Commission spoke of the need to use
all the tools in our toolbox, and of the need in Pakistan
specifically for a comprehensive effort that extends from
military aid to support for better education.
But in its latest budget submission the administration has
requested a 33 percent funding cut for Development Assistance
to Pakistan, a category that includes funding for basic
education programming.
Here is the scope of the problem that we are up against:
UNICEF estimates that some 13 million 5 to 9 year old children,
out of 27 million total are not enrolled in school at all. That
is nearly half of all Pakistani kids. And of those students who
are enrolled, approximately half of them will drop out before
completing primary education.
Looking at the scope of the problem, the 9/11 Commission's
Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton characterized our education aid
level as a ``drop in the bucket.'' A recent Washington
Quarterly article co-authored by one of today's witnesses put
it this way: The United States is spending a scant $1.16 per
child per year for more than 55 million school-aged Pakistani
children.
Pakistan, itself, only spends a minuscule 2 percent of its
gross domestic product on education. The United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization recommends at
least 4 percent. Untrained, unmotivated, and absenteeism-
plagued teachers have led to the phenomenon of the so-called
``ghost schools,'' where a building sits idle and filled with
students chaperoned by minders instead of educators.
All of us hope to support Pakistan and its people in their
efforts to achieve for themselves a stable, prosperous, and
free nation, but our national security interests and the future
of Pakistani children is still more acute. Will we be safe over
the next 5, 10, or 15 years as thousands--and perhaps
millions--more children learn Jihad at extremist madrassas
instead of learning real-world skills to become productive
citizens in their own communities?
The Pakistani people are treading water during a rising
tide of extremism; a tide that threatens their society and
their children's futures; a tide that exposes our soldiers in
Afghanistan to attack; and a tide that threatens us here at
home to a gathering, new generational wave of terror.
In recent polling that has taken place, the view of the
current U.S. Government by Pakistanis was viewed 15 percent
favorably and 67 percent unfavorably. They thought that the
United States was seeking to control world events and seeking
to weaken and divide Islam and to spread Christianity at the
expense of Islam. If you go on down into the different polling
levels, you see the misperceptions exist in great number.
As the 9/11 Commission warned in a world of great mobility
and even greater weapons: ``the American homeland is the
planet.'' We simply must follow the 9/11 Commission's sage
advice to use all the elements of our power--including military
might, of course, but public diplomacy, intelligence
capabilities, and developmental assistance--to ensure that
waves of terror never build and never crash again on our
shores. That should be our job that is facing all of us here
today.
[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this hearing, and to our witnesses.
Today the subcommittee examines education reform in
Pakistan, as our chairman has pointed out. On the surface this
may seem far removed from the corners of this subcommittee, but
it is not. The government of Pakistan's success overriding the
persuasion of Islamic extremism in its educational system
directly affects national and international security. But as we
go into this inquiry we must keep in mind the inherent
limitations of U.S. policy and U.S. aid affecting dramatic
cultural change.
Education reform in Pakistan takes on two meanings: one,
strengthening of the educational institutions; and, two, having
influence over Islamic schools better known as madrassas. Both
Presidents Bush and Musharraf have stated success in
eradicating terror cannot be accomplished without dramatic
improvement in Pakistan's education system.
The problems affecting public education in Pakistan range
from the lack of qualified teachers to the limited number of
school buildings. In some of the less-developed regions,
teachers serve as child minders or sitters, not educators. At
the other end of the spectrum, in the earthquake-ravaged and
economically depressed areas, there are no physical structures
to accommodate school-aged children. An entire generation in
Pakistan is suffering from inadequate public education
opportunities. This void and, in some instances, financial
hardship has led some families to send their children to one of
the 12,000 tuition-free madrassas in Pakistan. The vast
majority of these madrassas teach the fundamental tenets of
Islam, but in many cases they lack a curriculum for science,
math, and English.
A minority of these madrassas are indoctrinating students
with anti-western, pro-Islamic fundamentalist messages. It is
these madrassas and Islamic extremists they beget which pose a
serious threat to regional and international security. This is
the life cycle of the terrorists. The first step is Islamic
indoctrination. The next step is graduation to terror training
camps, many of which have connections with Al Qaeda or Taliban.
Next, they move across the porous Pakistan-Afghan border into
Afghanistan to raid Jihad against Coalition forces.
But that is not the only front for these Jihadists. The
products of terrorist training camps have effected their terror
in western venues, as well. It is known that terrorists
responsible for the London underground bombing and the
disrupted United Kingdom fertilizer bomb plot had links to or
were trained in madrassas and terror training camps in
Pakistan.
Which cities and which innocent civilians will be the next
victim of this terrorism?
Pakistan has taken meaningful steps toward educational
reform. After 9/11, President Bush and President Musharraf said
education reform in Pakistan is a key to stemming the rise of
Islamist extremism and the rise of global terrorism. President
Musharraf is the first Pakistani leader in recent decades to
take an unpopular stand against schools and the camps used to
indoctrinate Pakistani youth with the principles of Islamist
fundamentalism.
In 2002, President Musharraf laid out a three-prong
approach: one, requiring registration and inspection of these
religious facilities; two, excluding foreigners from their
religious schools; and, three, requiring madrassas accept
National Education Board testing standards. But these reforms
have been difficult to implement, not only because of a lack of
governance capacity and oversight, but also because of
institutional resistance by the religious sector.
Critics say President Musharraf has done nothing to prevent
the proliferation of the madrassas and effect meaningful
reform. Other critics believe President Musharraf has provided
lip service to the meaningful reforms he promised and has bowed
to political pressure from Muslim political parties. And still
others say Musharraf will continue to do the bare minimum to
ensure continued unrestricted financial support from the United
States.
The bottom line is educational reform in Pakistan is
happening. Neither President Musharraf's success in
strengthening the education sector nor the successes of the
U.S. Agency for International Government Lead Projects can or
should be overlooked; however, substantial advancement still
lies ahead, and our role as legislators is to assess this
reform honestly, letting the chips fall where they may, and to
determine where the United States must apply pressure to ensure
successful and complete reform.
We should not forget we need Pakistan's help in fighting
terrorism. President Musharraf has accepted that mission. While
there are great questions about President Musharraf's ability
to confront madrassas, we must remain Pakistan's partner as it
struggles to reform the one sector which assures the
advancement and survival of their society: education.
Mr. Chairman, I sincerely congratulate you and your staff
on holding today's hearing. It is an opportunity for us to
learn from our esteemed witnesses the status of Pakistan's
education system, what accomplishments have been achieved, and
the prognosis and path to eliminating the teachings of Islamist
intolerance and fundamentalism.
I thank our witnesses for being here today and look forward
to their testimony. I also want to thank the U.S. Embassy in
Islamabad, especially Charge d'Affaires, Peter Bodde, for
making Ms. Ahmed's video testimony today possible.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Shays.
The subcommittee will now receive testimony from the
witnesses that are with us here today. I want to begin by
introducing those witnesses.
Mr. Christopher Kojm is the president of the 9/11 Public
Discourse Project and was a Deputy Director of the 9/11
Commission.
Dr. Ahmed, I don't know if you can see us. I know our
technology was having some bumps earlier, but we really are
grateful for you to join us. It is 9 hours difference in time
between here and your evening schedule over there. We really do
appreciate your joining us via videoconference from Islamabad,
Pakistan.
We have Ms. Lisa Curtis, who is a senior research fellow
for the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation.
And we have Mr. Craig Cohen, who is the deputy chief of
staff and fellow for the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Thank all of you for your work on the subject and for
sharing your expertise today.
It is our policy on the subcommittee to swear in witnesses
before they testify, so we are going to ask you to please rise
and raise your right hands, as well as any persons who might be
assisting you in your testimony and testifying today.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Tierney. The record will please reflect that the
witnesses all answered in the affirmative, including Dr. Ahmed.
Thank you very much.
We have 5 minutes allotted for each of the statements.
Obviously, we are not going to hold you exactly, strictly to
the 5-minutes, but we do ask you to generalize your statements.
Your statements will be placed in the record by unanimous
consent in their entirety, and we do want to get to questions
and answers, so if you would please proceed on that basis, I
think we are going to start with Mr. Kojm.
STATEMENTS OF CHRISTOPHER KOJM, PRESIDENT OF THE 9/11 PUBLIC
DISCOURSE PROJECT AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR, 9/11 COMMISSION; SAMINA
AHMED, SOUTH ASIA PROJECT DIRECTOR FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
GROUP; LISA CURTIS, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, SOUTH ASIA, ASIAN
STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION; AND CRAIG COHEN,
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, AND FELLOW, POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION
PROJECT, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, AT THE CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER KOJM
Mr. Kojm. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tierney, Ranking Member Shays, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before
you this morning.
I believe I can be brief, because the chairman has been
eloquent in outlining the work of the Commission and the Public
Discourse Project.
Governor Kaine and Mr. Hamilton have observed that all the
Commission's recommendations, those relating to education, have
really received the least amount of attention; therefore, they
are especially grateful for the work of this subcommittee in
shining a bright light, and they asked me to convey to you
their deep appreciation for your leadership, including the
leadership of Chairman Shays in the 109th Congress and the
leadership of Chairman Tierney with the ambitious series of
hearings he has outlined for this Congress.
The chairman has mentioned that the Commission felt
strongly that you cannot use just one tool of American foreign
policy; you need to use all the tools.
Former Secretary Rumsfeld on this point has been especially
eloquent. He said 4 years ago, ``Are we capturing, killing, or
deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the
madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and
deploying against us?'' The answer is no. The threat to us
today is not great armies, it is an ideology, the ideology that
propelled 19 young men and is propelling so many others to take
their own lives in the desire to harm us.
It is important to go after Bin Laden and those who support
him, to kill and capture them, but even more important are the
tens of millions of young Arabs, the hundreds of millions of
young Muslims who sympathize with this ideology. They represent
in the long term the true threat to us. They are the wellspring
to refresh the doctrine of hate and destruction.
Therefore, the Commission felt strongly that the United
States has to define for itself a positive image in the Islamic
world, a message of hope, a message of economic and educational
opportunity. Education that teaches tolerance, the dignity and
value of each individual, and respect for different beliefs is
a key element in any global strategy to eliminate Islamic
terrorism.
For this reason, as the chairman has outlined, the
Commission made the recommendations it did: three important
recommendations on education to combat the threat from
terrorism.
Those have been outlined, so I will just speak briefly as
to what has been achieved with respect to them.
On secular education, the Congress, in the December 2004,
Intelligence Reform Act, did authorize the creation of an
international youth opportunity fund; however, the President
has not requested funds. Congress has not appropriated funds
for such an endeavor.
There are educational efforts underway through the Middle
East Partnership Initiative, the work of USAID, but they simply
are not adequate for the task.
Our country needs a strategy for educational assistance
that is part of our overall foreign policy strategy for this
part of the world, and we need to fund it. We are just not
funding it at any level that is appreciable that can make a
difference.
On scholarship, library, and education programs, I think
the important point here is that, by and large, we are moving
backward. We are closing posts. We are limiting access. Much of
this, of course, relates to security, but security cannot trump
American national interests.
The most important part of public diplomacy is the last
three feet. In the conversation between our people and the
people of host countries, TV and radio is useful. I don't want
to criticize it. But what really matters is building human ties
and contacts. You can't influence people if you don't meet with
them.
And what has happened in our libraries, we have closed them
and we have substituted Web sites, we have substituted so-
called America's Corners in libraries. That is not good enough.
You need the human contact. Our libraries are not for just
books or magazines; it is for building relationships and
getting young people interested, many of them, in coming to the
United States and developing education and careers.
The hardest thing in public diplomacy is funding
scholarship and exchange programs, because in 1 year you can't
see any impact. In 5 years you can't see much impact. But in
the course of a generation there is nothing more important in
public diplomacy than what we invest in scholarship and
exchanges, because you shape attitudes for a generation, for
the leadership of Pakistan and other countries, that they know
the United States, they know how to work and relate with us,
and, as we hit rough patches, as we always will in our
relationship, at least we have interlocutors who have a
sensible understanding of what we are trying to achieve, even
if they don't agree with us.
Finally, the overall judgment of the Commission with
respect to our relationship, Pakistan is important to us. Of
course it is. We must have a relationship with Pakistan.
President Musharraf has done a great deal in terms of
apprehending bad guys. On the other hand, the Commission and
the Public Discourse Project noted, as the chairman has, that
there is still so much that needs to be done, especially along
the frontier, in terms of better cooperation.
Turning to madrassas, the Public Discourse Project,
frankly, was disappointed. The rhetoric has been good; the
actions have not been fulfilled with respect to educational
reform, either by Pakistani leaders or by the United States.
Let me just close by saying that Chairman Kaine and Vice
Chair Hamilton understood that we cannot solve the problems of
this part of the world. They are too great and our resources,
no matter how much we bring to bear, can't address the problem
comprehensively. Yet, it is critically important that people in
the Arab world, people across the Islamic world need to know
that America is on their side, that we stand for political
participation, personal freedom, rule of law, economic, and,
above all, educational opportunity.
Secular education opens doors to a better future. America's
support for education sends a powerful message. It is a message
of hope.
Thank you for your time and attention. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kojm follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Kojm. I appreciate your
remarks.
Now we are going to see if the committee really has the
technology down. We are going to go to Dr. Samina Ahmed and ask
for her remarks.
Doctor, please.
STATEMENT OF SAMINA AHMED
Ms. Ahmed. Mr. Chairman, vice chairman, distinguished
members of the committee, thank you so very much for this
privilege of testifying on behalf of the International Crisis
Group.
My testimony will focus on the state of Islamic radicalism
in Pakistan, because we have to look at the overall picture and
then look at the madrassas in that context.
President Musharraf joined the United States as an ally in
the war on terror. He has been the beneficiary of billions of
dollars of assistance. He has also been the beneficiary of
enormous U.S. diplomatic support. But we, the Crisis Group,
give him an F grade in dismantling Jihadi and violent sectarian
groups, in regulating the madrassas that sustain them, which
were, after all, key commitments that he had made to the United
States as a partner in the war on terror.
Yes, he has banned a number of Islamic radical groups, but
they are still operating freely with their infrastructure
intact, including those that have been declared terror
organizations by the United Nations and the United States.
The Jihadi madrassas, as the chairman talked about in some
detail, are one of our greatest concerns, as well as that of
the United States, with good reason. It is these Jihadi
madrassas or these extremist madrassas that provide and train
recruits for local, regional, and international Jihads.
The chairman talked about the Red Mosque Complex, which is
in Islamabad, itself. We have seen, since January 2007, the
Jihadi managers of the two madrassas associated with this
complex taking on the state, taking on the citizens, launching
a reign of terror, but the government's response has been to
cave in to their demands instead of enforcing rule of law,
instead of protecting Pakistani citizens.
The demands that they have caved in, for example, are that
the illegally constructed madrassas on state land will be
reconstructed. These were demolished because of good reason,
but caving in to their demand means that other Jihadi madrassas
will now be encouraged, use force, and then the state will cave
in.
But the president of the ruling party, Musharraf's ruling
party, has also said that the government will accept yet
another demand, which is to enforce the [foreign word], Islamic
law.
These are not the kinds of signals that should have been
sent to Jihadis who are challenging the right of the state and
who are, in fact, a threat to international security.
Other Jihadi madrassas are also flourishing, and if you
talk about madrassa reform, one of the things you have to
remember is that underpinning any madrassa reform is the
legislation. The legislation enacted by this government is
imperfect to the extreme. If you actually look at the
legislation, which is an amended act of 1860, it provides no
reliable statistics, even on the number of madrassas. The
government says there is something like 13,800. Independent
observers believe there could be anywhere between 20,000. Even
if 10 to 15 percent of these madrassas are extremist madrassas,
we have a serious problem on our hands.
Because of this imperfect nature of the legislation, we
don't know how many students are in those madrassas. Even more
so, it is extremely disconcerting that the religious, the
Jihadi, the tiering content of the curriculum has not been
addressed in this endeavor to actually reform the curriculum of
the madrassas. Until that is addressed in a meaningful fashion,
extremist madrassas will keep on preaching the Jihad, will keep
on indoctrinating young people. The extremist madrassas are
still distributing Jihadi material. They are still no ways of
telling in any meaningful way the means of funding, the donors
of these madrassas, how many foreign students are there. And
even the madrassas that are linked to the banned Jihadi groups
are still flourishing.
There is good reason that the State Department said, as
you, Mr. Chairman, have alluded, that Pakistan is a major
source of Islamic extremism and a safe haven for terrorist
leaders, the reason being that these Jihadi madrassas provide
recruits to the extremist organizations, the homegrown
terrorist organizations. And, as we have seen since 2002, these
homegrown terrorist organizations, many of them with links to
Al Qaeda, are still flourishing.
There has been no meaningful activity on the part of the
government to make sure that these organizations don't operate
under changed names, don't operate under fronts. What are the
compulsions of the regime? Is it because they don't have the
capacity? It seems much more so that there isn't a political
will.
Let's not forget that President Musharraf has a formal
alliance with the Jamaat-i-Islam. This is the pro-Taliban
party, the religious party, the largest party in the religious
alliance that forms the government of Balochistan. You talked
at Quetta? Well, Quetta is the provincial capital of
Balochistan. The reason for this alliance relationship is
because of regime constraints, because of the need to reach
[foreign word], to marginalize his main civilian opponents, the
moderate parties, the largest moderate parties being the PPP
and the Muslim League that still retain the vast majority of
popular support in a country where people are, for the very
large part, moderate Muslims.
There are new opportunities that are now arising, and let's
see if the United States takes up these opportunities in making
sure that this reform project that has been put on hold is
actually given new life. It is absolutely essential that, as we
are in 2007, an election year, that the United States decides--
another witness referred to rule of law and how important that
is to the United States. Rule of law and constitutionalism
should be central. A free and fair election and a democratic
transition should be central to U.S. policy, because it is then
when the moderate parties will come into their own. The
religious extremists and the extremist madrassas will face a
real challenge.
I am told when I have said this many times before, before
members of various branches of the U.S. Government, what then
happens? Can a moderate government, democratically elected
government control the military, which is essential to any
cooperation in the war on terror? I think it is absolutely
essential that the United States does not give the military a
blank check. There needs to be now clear benchmarks, benchmarks
on reform of the madrassas, including a demand that the Jihadi
madrassas must be closed down. There need to be benchmarks also
for a democratic transition and a clear signal sent that the
United States will not accept the military once again
intervening to stop a moderate government from implementing the
reforms that would stabilize Pakistan, that could benefit
Afghanistan, and that would work in U.S. national security
interests.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ahmed follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Dr. Ahmed. We appreciate it. We are
most grateful that the technology is working on that, as well.
Ms. Curtis.
STATEMENT OF LISA CURTIS
Ms. Curtis. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here
today to discuss U.S. assistance programs to Pakistan's
education sector and the role of madrassas in contributing to
extremism and militancy.
I will briefly summarize my written statement and ask that
my full statement be included in the hearing record.
Achieving a strong and effective education system in
Pakistan is essential to promoting stability, moderation, and
prosperity, and should be a top priority for Washington in its
relations with Islamabad. Lack of adequate education
opportunities in Pakistan has contributed to development of
extremist ideologies that have fueled terrorism and sectarian
tensions, as well as stifled economic growth.
Pakistan's public education system has suffered
tremendously over the last several decades. The overall adult
literacy rate is about 43 percent, with the female literacy
rate as low as 32 percent. With the population growth rate well
over 2 percent, Pakistan will add about 100 million people to
its population over the next 25 years. Pakistan must implement
significant education reforms and raise literacy rates and
skill levels so that the Pakistani youth of today will play a
productive role in the future economy.
U.S. assistance to primary education and literacy in
Pakistan more than doubled, from $28 million in fiscal year
2004 to $66 million in fiscal year 2005. The impact of the
findings of the 9/11 Commission report issued in July 2004,
which emphasized the importance of educational opportunity in
uprooting terrorist ideology, as well as increased
congressional oversight of USAID programs to Pakistan
contributed to the increase in education spending.
The fiscal year 2008 State Department congressional budget
request includes $52 million for general education programs and
an additional $50 million for earthquake reconstruction of
schools and health facilities.
USAID education programs focus on empowering the local
community by fostering partnerships between parents and
teachers that improve accountability for the children's
education. I had the opportunity to visit a USAID-funded school
outside of Islamabad in late 2005. I met the students,
teachers, and parents, and saw first hand the pride they took
in their school and their appreciation for the USAID support.
Through a grant of only $1,500, USAID had helped establish a
school for 500 children and built community support for the
teachers and the maintenance of the school facilities.
Washington also needs to encourage the Pakistan government
to follow through on its own reforms, including limiting
corruption and inefficiency within the education system.
The Musharraf government launched its education sector
reforms in January 2002, but has yet to fulfill its pledge to
raise the education budget to 4 percent of GDP, in line with
UNESCO recommendations.
The United States and other international donors should be
careful not to repeat the mistakes made in the World Bank
social action program implemented during the 1980's and 1990's.
Although billions were spent on this program, it failed to meet
basic objectives like increasing school enrollment and bringing
education to remote parts of the country. Some experts believe
the program failed because it did not address the problems of
corruption and inefficiency within the Pakistan education
bureaucracy.
The role of the madrassa in Pakistan and its contribution
to Islamic militancy has been the subject of intense debate in
U.S. academic and policy circles. Observers have argued over
the actual numbers of madrassas and madrassa students in
Pakistan. Recent statistics from the government of Pakistan
indicate there may be around 12,000 madrassas and between 1.5
to 2 million madrassa students; however, the number of
madrassas is not particularly relevant to assessing their link
to terrorism. Many of the older madrassas have well-established
reputations for producing serious Islamic thinkers, while
others provide welfare services to the poor through free
religious education, lodging, and food.
Most madrassas in Pakistan are not turning out terrorist
foot soldiers; however, there are a handful of seminaries that
do promote anti-west, pan-Islamic, and violent ideologies, and
it is on these few madrassas where U.S. policymakers and the
Pakistan authorities should focus their attention. Some of
these dangerous madrassas are in the Northwest Frontier
Province, including the semi-autonomous areas bordering
Afghanistan. Some are in southern Punjab, and others are in
major cities like Lahore, Islamabad, and Karachi.
Some of these madrassas have contributed to sectarian
tensions in Pakistan, while others have close institutional
links with the Taliban. The recently jailed leader of a
fertilizer bomb plot in England, Omar Khyam, was reportedly
inspired and trained by Pakistan-based terrorists connected
with the Kashmir militancy. In addition, one of the suicide
bombers that carried out the July 7, 2005, bombings of the
London transport system reportedly spent time at a Pakistani
madrassa.
Washington should press Pakistan to crack down on those
madrassas that continue to promote extremism and sectarian
policies that lead to terrorism and destabilization of
Pakistani society. The Pakistani authorities should be
encouraged to clean house and any madrassa found to have links
to international terrorist incidents. Islamabad should also
make clear that individuals who provide protection or safe
haven to Al Qaeda or like-minded terrorist groups will be held
to account.
We have to use skillful diplomacy to persuade the Pakistan
government to shut down completely all militant groups and to
reform or close down those madrassas promoting violence and
extremism. After 9/11, Pakistan did a 45-degree turn in ending
official support to the Taliban. In early 2004, Pakistan did
another 45-degree turn in sending troops to Wazirastan to
combat Al Qaeda and Taliban elements there. However, now we
need the government to complete the turn and end the permissive
environment for all militant groups, including those that
operate in Kashmir.
The United States should avoid, however, getting involved
in Pakistan's broader madrassa reform efforts and accept that
many of the traditional madrassas serve a useful purpose in
educating Islamic intellectuals and providing shelter and food
for impoverished youth. While a few Pakistani madrassas
represent an international terrorist threat and deserve
American scrutiny, most madrassas do not pose a threat.
The United States should also program more funds for
specific education and development projects, rather than
continue to provide the bulk of our economic assistance in the
form of a direct cash transfer to the Pakistan government.
Since 2004, the United States has provided $200 million
annually to Pakistan in the form of direct budgetary support.
We have established a consulting mechanism with Pakistan to try
to ensure a portion of this money is spent on health and
education; however, we cannot fully ensure that the U.S.
taxpayer money is contributing to economic and human
development in Pakistan.
The United States also reaps little public diplomacy
benefits with the broader Pakistani population from this type
of direct aid, which most Pakistanis view as benefiting the
Musharraf regime, not the average Pakistani citizen.
The U.S. Congress should require that at least two-thirds
of our total economic support fund [ESF], assistance be in the
form of USAID project assistance related to education, health,
and economic and democratic development.
To conclude, the development of a strong and effective
education system is central to promoting moderation, tolerance,
and economic development in Pakistan, and should, therefore, be
a key plank in our relationship with Islamabad. Convincing the
Pakistani government to take firm action against the handful of
madrassas supporting violent extremism also is necessary, not
only for the future stability of Pakistan, but to prevent
future incidents of international terrorism.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Ms. Curtis.
Mr. Cohen.
STATEMENT OF CRAIG COHEN
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, I want to thank
you and your distinguished colleagues for the opportunity to
testify before you today. It is with great humility that I do
so.
I am here because I am leading a CSIS study with Rick
Barton on U.S. assistance to Pakistan since 9/11. It is a study
about the U.S. Government approach to large aid recipients like
Pakistan. We spent the last year asking experts here in the
United States and in Pakistan: What are U.S. goals? Is there a
coherent strategy? How much are we spending, and on what? And
what has been the impact of our aid?
We have a report that is due out later this week, and with
your permission we would like to submit it for the record.
Mr. Tierney. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Cohen. The conclusion we reached from these
conversations is that the current U.S. Pakistan relationship is
the legacy of a deal made after 9/11: U.S. assistance in return
for Pakistan cooperation on counter-terrorism and the war in
Afghanistan. This may well have been the right deal to make
after 9/11, but it has run its course.
There are three main reasons why this is so.
First, we have put all our eggs in one basket, and that
basket may well be breaking. Musharraf's position is quickly
weakening, and recent protests may signal the beginning of his
political end.
Second, by most accounts, Pakistan is failing to deliver on
the key U.S. foreign policy goal, denying Taliban safe haven on
the western border. U.S. soldiers are dying in Afghanistan, and
the reconstruction project is under threat due to these cross-
border raids.
Third, we are not doing enough to help shape the Pakistan
that will emerge 10 to 20 years down the road. By 2030,
Pakistan will have 250 million people. It will be the largest
Muslim population in the world, and more than half of this
population will be below the age of 18.
There have been some genuine gains in the last 5 years of
cooperation on intelligence, on economic growth, on a throng of
relations with India, but too many in Washington and Pakistan
still see this as an alliance of convenience.
Our current assistance package has reinforced this notion
that America stands primarily behind Musharraf and the
Pakistani military rather than the Pakistani people.
Our research has shown that the United States has provided
Pakistan with over $10 billion worth of military, economic, and
development assistance in the past 6 years since 9/11. The
majority of this money, close to 60 percent, has gone toward
reimbursing the Pakistani military for its assistance in the
war on terror through Coalition support funds.
Roughly 15 percent has gone to security assistance. The
vast majority of this money has gone to purchase major U.S.
weapons systems which are better suited for military
confrontation with India, rather than against Al Qaeda or the
Taliban.
Another 15 percent has gone to direct budget support, a
cash transfer to the government of Pakistan, based on loosely
worded shared objectives with few real accountability
mechanisms built in.
This leaves about 10 percent for long-term development and
short-term humanitarian assistance, including our response to
the October 2005, earthquake. Education, which the 9/11
Commission rightly said was critical to making a long-term
commitment to Pakistan, comes in at only 3.4 percent of total
U.S. spending. We encourage the government of Pakistan to spend
4 percent of its GDP on education, but we don't even do this
with our own aid.
The United States is spending $64 million a year for over
30 to 50 million school-aged children in Pakistan. That is a
little over $1 to $2 per child per year.
U.S. objectives far outstrip our means of achieving them in
Pakistan. We all know the scale of the problem, and we have
heard it here today: women's literacy under 30 percent, school
enrollment under 30 percent, teachers who lack skills and
incentives and fail to show up for work, more Pakistanis
avoiding public schools and being drawn to madrassas.
Let me close by making three recommendations. First, let's
become the country that provides opportunity for young
Pakistanis rather than a country that is at war with Islam,
which is how we are perceived today. We can't sacrifice our
short-term security, but our long-term security may well depend
on such a shift.
Second, education reform requires governance reform. The
dominant view is that the Pakistani military is the only
effective institution in the country, but rather than reinforce
this through our assistance we should be supporting the long-
term civilian institution building and democratic processes.
Finally, rather than trying to gain leverage by
conditioning aid, which is unlikely to work, Congress ought to
take a harder look at what we are spending now in Pakistan and
consider a different mix of assistance and greater
accountability mechanisms. We need to trust, but we also need
to verify.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Cohen, and thank all of the
witnesses for their thoughtful testimony, as well as their
reports.
We are going to get to our question and answer period here.
With everybody's indulgence, I am going to start with a couple
of questions.
Dr. Ahmed, I noted the last thing that Mr. Cohen mentioned
is that education reform requires government reform, as well.
In your testimony you said, ``The choice that Pakistan faces is
not between the military and the mullahs, as is generally
believed in the west, including the United States; it is
between genuine democracy and a mullah military alliance that
is responsible for the religious extremism that poses a threat
to Pakistani, regional, and international security.'' Would you
elaborate on that for us, especially with respect to our policy
and what it should be coming up with the elections due in the
fall.
Ms. Ahmed. It is, I think, going to be the most crucial
issue there is in terms of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, because
this opportunity is here now. It is not going to last forever.
In 2007 you have an election approaching, in fact, two
elections approaching, one for the presidency, President
Musharraf's reelection bid; the second for the national
parliament that will actually form a government if these
elections are free and fair by going by all electoral records.
If you actually look at the entire history of Pakistan, the
mullahs on their own have never managed to get more than
perhaps 5 percent of the vote. The first time they have
actually managed to get more than that and to form two of the
state governments of Pakistan was under General Musharraf. In
2002 a rigged election allowed the mullahs the advantages of
state support, deprived the moderate parties and marginalized
them in the process of an even playing field, and, again,
through a bargaining process between the military and the
mullahs, you saw the mullahs taking over even the position of
leader of the opposition, which is the government awaiting in a
parliamentary system in the Federal parliament.
This happened because of the military support and because
of Musharraf said basically it was a necessity to sideline and
to marginalize his main civilian opposition.
Despite the rigged election, you saw the two moderate
parties, the Pakistan People's Party and Muslim Icnavas,
gaining the largest segment of the popular ward. The Muslim
Icnavas came in a fairly respectable third or fourth.
If there was an even playing field, then I think we would
see the outcome of the 2002 election reversed. The mullahs
would lose. They would shrink back to their 5 percent. The
moderate parties, one of the two, a center left party, a center
right party, would form a government. For that, however, if the
military intends to retain power, it will have to rely on the
mullahs. They are the only reliable civilian partners, given
the fact that the opposition comes from the largest moderate
parties.
In a rigged election what would we see? This is why I say
this is a crucial year. The JUI, the party that is, was in some
ways the creation of the Taliban, which remains a greater
supporter of the Taliban, and which is still a party that has
the largest network of the madrassas that produce the Taliban
recruits coming back into power with the military support in
those two crucial provinces that were mentioned, Balochistan
and the Northwest Frontier Province.
If we actually see what has happened in Afghanistan and
where the threat comes from, it comes from recruits in these
two provinces. It comes from Taliban command and control
structures in these provinces. It comes from, in actual fact,
state support because of the provincial governments, the state
governments are providing support to the Taliban, then it means
the Pakistani state is.
With a democratic transition, you would see that change,
but for the first step to a democratic transition obviously has
to be a free and fair election.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much for that answer.
The other panelists I would like to ask, I hear very
clearly that, obviously, the fact that somebody has a madrassa
doesn't mean that it is a Jihadist or extremist madrassa, that
as much as we have religious schools in this country, whether
they be Catholic or protestant or Jewish or whatever they might
be, that exists in Pakistan, but sometimes those schools may
not teach secular courses to the extent they should, and some--
too many, I would argue--are probably teaching extremism on
that.
How would we condition our aid? Mr. Cohen, you mentioned at
the end that you wouldn't necessarily put conditions on the
money that we do send as aid to Pakistan, but you said
something about not conditioning it but allocating it
differently, and, Ms. Curtis, you also mentioned that. Would
each of you address how you think the United States ought to
change its aid package? If not conditioning the money that goes
to the Pakistani government, how would we distribute it?
Ms. Curtis. Yes. I think this is an important point that
really the terrorist problem, the extremism problem is coming
from a handful of madrassas in Pakistan. This goes at the issue
of the U.S. needing to demonstrate clearly that our fight
against global terrorism is for protection of international
security and it is not a fight against Islam as a religion. So,
in particular, when we are talking about madrassas in Pakistan
I think it is very important for us to be clear that we are not
against, obviously, religious education and schools that
promote Islamic thought, etc.
I think this is really key, and that is why I had raised in
my testimony the importance of really honing in on those
madrassas that are feeding the militant groups. They have an
interdependent relationship with the militant groups. The
militant groups draw recruits from these particular madrassas
and the madrassas, in turn, receive armed protection from the
militant groups. So it is these few madrassas that we need to
be focusing our efforts on.
In terms of our aid programs, as I mentioned in my oral
remarks, I think we should really look seriously at this $200
million direct cash transfer that we have been delivering to
the Pakistanis over the last several years and look at that and
determine whether we can projectize more of that assistance so
it is more under U.S. control in terms of what we are doing to
help in education, democracy, health, and all of those issues.
So those are the issues that we need to be looking at.
And then, in terms of shutting down those madrassas that
are dangerous, of course, we are working with, you know, the
Musharraf government, and he has his own struggles within his
own government and within the Pakistani establishment, itself,
I think there is still debate on how much they are interested
in cracking down, particularly in groups they have supported in
the past in the Kashmir militancy. So that is the key problem.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Cohen, I am going to give you a chance, with the
indulgence of the committee members, but, just very quickly, I
think it might be helpful to the committee, is everybody on the
panel in agreement that there are a handful of madrassas that
might be extremists? Dr. Ahmed.
Ms. Ahmed. I wouldn't say that 10 to 15 percent, which is
what we were told by the authorities that should know about the
subject in Pakistan. When we did our madrassa reports, 10 to 15
percent of maybe 20,000 madrassas is not a handful.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. Mr. Kojm, what is your
understanding of that?
Mr. Kojm. Well, I think the witness who has just testified,
she has the most up-to-date information on it, and I am in no
position to state otherwise. I would simply make the
observation from the Commission that in the ideal world there
would be secular education that could reach most, if not all,
the population. That can't be done, so you have to prioritize
the problems you address, and so it has to be those madrassas
that are truly identified as those that contribute to extremism
and you have just got to go at them one after another. My
impression is that it certainly does not exceed what has
already been mentioned.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
And Mr. Cohen?
Mr. Cohen. I don't have information that contradicts what
Ms. Ahmed said.
I could speak to your aid question, if you would like.
Mr. Tierney. My apology to you. It has to be brief, if you
would, just how the distribution would go.
Mr. Cohen. OK. I think on the distribution you need a
better balance between short and long-term and between what
goes to the state and what actually reaches the people of
Pakistan.
Mr. Tierney. Directly more than through the state?
Mr. Cohen. Correct.
Mr. Tierney. All right. Thank you.
I thank the members of the panel for their indulgence on
that.
Mr. McHenry.
Mr. McHenry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before I begin my questions, I want to thank the chairman
for leading a co-del to Pakistan and Afghanistan before Easter,
and, along with my colleague from Minnesota, Ms. McCollum, it
was a very good trip, very well put together, and it was a very
good bipartisan trip. We met with Dr. Ahmed there, which was an
absolutely fascinating discussion, and thank you for your time.
I also want to thank the chairman for putting together that
trip, and very, very sincerely I thank you for your hard work
on this. The fruits of that trip are here today.
I want to commend your staff, as well, Andy Wright on your
staff, and on the minority staff A. Brooke Bennett, for their
work. Thank you.
Dr. Ahmed, you mention in your statement that there is a
link that the madrassas and the Jihadist groups depend on each
other in some way, shape, or form. Can you expand on that? I
think it is a very important point.
Ms. Ahmed. Thank you.
The reason why we stress the need to tackle the issue of
Islamic extremist madrassas is just that: the recruitment for
the homegrown terror groups comes from, the recruits come from
these madrassas. The indoctrination process takes place in
these madrassas.
Just think of what these children are being taught. They
are being taught Jihad is acceptable. They are being taught,
even as the chairman mentioned the madrassa of the Red Mosque
complex, that an anti-western Jihad in Afghanistan is what you
should be striving for. You have the managers of these
madrassas indoctrinating these young people to actually go out
and join the terror groups.
But then what you also have is a nexus between these terror
groups, which are homegrown terrorists, with cross-national
terror organizations, which is Al Qaeda, or regional terror
groups, such as the Taliban.
So there is then an organized input from the madrassas
systematically turning out Jihadis from the Jihadi madrassas,
of course, to the homegrown terror groups, to the Taliban, and
also to terror organizations within Pakistan that are
affiliated with Al Qaeda or believe in Al Qaeda's ideology.
Mr. McHenry. Dr. Ahmed, could you, as a followup to this,
is our current policy, the U.S. current policy toward Pakistan
in our long-term best interest?
Ms. Ahmed. The United States has to decide at this point in
time what does it want to see Pakistan become another 5 years
from now or 10 years from now. Pakistan can only become what
the United States would, I think, want to see--a democratic,
moderate country--if the democratic process is allowed to
proceed now, if there is a democratic transition now.
If you have another 5 years of indirect or direct military
rule, then I think you will see the moderate forces in Pakistan
marginalized to the extent that they will find it difficult to
make a comeback.
What we have seen, Congressman, in the past 2 weeks is
something that I think should be encouraging for the United
States: Pakistani citizens, civil society, political parties,
NGO's rising up to talk and defend rule of law, to defend what
they see as the central integral element to a democratic
framework, which is independence of the judiciary. That is the
vast majority, and I think U.S. policy should shape itself to
engage with that process.
Short-term benefits, which certainly the United States to
some extent has out of its engagement with this government,
don't translate into long-term benefits for the United States
so long as you still have these dynamics at work, which is the
moderate majority sidelined and the extremists benefiting from
military rule.
Mr. McHenry. Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Ahmed.
Ms. Curtis and Mr. Cohen, Egypt, Israel, and Jordan, along
with Pakistan, are the only countries in the world that receive
a direct budget support from us, and it is almost a check for
them to do whatever they would like with it, as you mentioned
in your testimony, Mr. Cohen. What is your suggestion to this
committee on how the United States can apply pressure to
Pakistan under this arrangement? I mean, you mentioned 3.4
percent of our support goes to education. Give me some
recommendations. Flesh that out for us on how we can use what
we have at our disposal to, in essence, push aside madrassas
and not make them a central part of society.
Mr. Cohen. My view is that it has to start with a more
honest dialog, that there is a mechanism in place for a
strategic dialog but it hasn't been taken advantage of to the
extent possible. I think that if we are more honest with what
we are looking for, I think what happens now, what we have
heard from many, many experts here in town and in Pakistan is
that different parts of the U.S. Government have different
priorities. Some may be most interested in the Taliban. Some
may be most interested in Al Qaeda. Others might be pushing for
democracy. I think this sends mixed messages, to some extent,
and there is not a clear strategy for what it is we are looking
for in return. So I think it has to start there.
I think Ms. Curtis' idea of trying to shift the money that
goes to budget support to education is a good idea. I think
getting better accountability, both for the Coalition support
funds and for the budget support--at present the Pentagon's
Comptroller's office has oversight of the Coalition support
funds, and the Government, OMB, as well, does oversight of the
economic support funds. But I think Congress could play a
greater role here, as well.
Mr. McHenry. Ms. Curtis, could you just finish out? And
thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Curtis. Yes. Just to repeat, I have a fairly clear
recommendation for the Congress to require that a portion of
that direct budgetary assistance not be provided directly but
be projectized, so that would require changing the makeup of
the aid budget, but I think this falls under congressional
authority.
I think one of the problems--and Mr. Cohen mentioned it--is
about transparency in our relationship with Pakistan. This is a
difficult issue. We are cooperating with Pakistan at different
levels, counter-terrorism. President Musharraf is under some
pressure. He receives a lot of criticism from the Pakistani
population for being seen as an American lapdog and for
cooperating too much with us. So it is a difficult issue, but,
to the extent that the transparency on what we are actually
doing with Pakistan and why the aid is so important I think
would be very helpful, if some of this transparency could be
brought to the surface.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. McHenry.
Ms. McCollum.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
There is so much to try to cover here in 5 minutes,
especially having had the opportunity, as it was pointed out by
both Chairman Tierney leading the delegation, I found Pakistan
a wonderful country, beautiful, industrious people, and full of
energy, and really wanting to move forward in a very positive
way. But there are some challenges, as has been pointed out,
and I don't know that the United States is doing its best and
trying to put its best foot forward in the way that we are
working with Pakistan to address these challenges.
I am going to lure a few things out and leave it open to a
discussion, maybe starting with the good doctor.
From the limited reading I did, and listening to people, it
is my understanding that, if we had public schools that were
well equipped, with teachers, and parents felt confident that
their children were going to receive a good education there,
the madrassas might be facing some competition. Competition for
the madrassas, the ones that still function in a way that do
not preach hate and violence between people in other parts of
the world, those madrassas would start competing to keep their
students by offering more math, more science, more history,
more of a balanced curriculum. So that would be one thing I
would like to maybe hear some speculation on.
We know that there is a youth bulge, so it would seem to me
that if we are really about peace and stability for the long
haul for the region, for the world, for ourselves, we wouldn't
be putting a drop in the bucket toward reaching the future
leaders and the future leaders' parents in that part of the
world. We wouldn't be just putting 10 percent into supporting
families, communities which lead to a healthier nation.
So I would like maybe discussion on that.
The issue--and it has been touched on quite a bit--of
President-to-President support, rather than people-to-people,
country-to-country, family to-family support, is very alarming
and it doesn't speak to we are really going to be there for the
long term to work in partnership.
One of the things that I heard--and maybe the doctor could
tell me if I heard this right--from people is they were fearful
that the United States was going to walk away. I don't think
they were fearful that the United States was going to walk away
from not supplying the military. Maybe the military is
concerned about it, the military guns and weapons, but that the
United States wasn't going to be there to be partners in what I
felt from them their desire to be more economically successful,
to have more opportunities for education, more opportunities
for engagement with the world.
So, with this, I am going to, especially to our U.S.
testifiers, with what is going on currently with the State
Department, with the realignment with USAID, with more focus on
targeted specific Presidential programs--and some of them I
support, like Pat Barr--are we showing a commitment to our
partners that we are going to be there as the youth bulge rose
for a more sustainable, peaceful, co-existent world that starts
person-to-person?
With that, Mr. Chair, I would just like people to jump in
as they can, maybe starting with our good friend in Pakistan.
Ms. Ahmed. Thank you, ma'am.
What you said was, I think, very, very important. I think
being a functioning public school system that provided people
the kinds of skills that would give them employment at the job
market, had the state supported that, the madrassas wouldn't
have been not even a third choice. Most of these madrassas
would have literally withered on the vine.
We have said, Crisis Group has said repeatedly in all our
reports--and we have done a report on public education, and we
found abysmal conditions there. But, more than that, its
actually not just the issue of ghost schools, in many areas
there were no schools at all. What could parents do? The
madrassas is a social net. We should justify that goal. It is
the responsibility of the state. By the way, it is the
constitutional duty of the Pakistani state to provide education
to its children.
For the state to abdicate its duty and its responsibility
to its child to the madrassas sector and then say, you know, it
plays a social function, etc.
The fact is that what we found in our research, most
parents would prefer to send their children to a public school
which is affordable and provides a good education. We have also
for that reason strongly stressed that international dollars
and, in particular, the United States should not fund madrassa
reform. It is absolutely essential they don't get into the
business of actually financing the madrassa sector.
The United States should focus its attention on the form of
the public education sector because that would pay dividends to
the Pakistani child and to the United States.
In terms of the engagement between societies, American
society and Pakistani society, unfortunately I would have to
agree with you. There is deep concern amongst a number of
Pakistanis in civil society that once the war on terror loses
its importance for the United States the military won't be
important, so it will also disengage from Pakistani civil
society.
I think that is where that commitment needs to be made now
and the message that should be a clear one: that the United
States is there for the long haul for the right reasons, which
is to strengthen that partnership between peoples in the
interest of the United States and the Pakistani people and,
frankly speaking, of the global community.
Thank you.
Mr. Kojm. In response to Representative McCollum's comments
and Dr. Ahmed's, I think all I can say is that the members of
the 9/11 Commission would agree wholeheartedly and completely
with your key observation about building a long-term
relationship with the people of Pakistan. That is where
America's national interests are and will be for the next
generation. Yes, a relationship with the president is
important. The Commission doesn't gainsay that. But our
national interests are with the long-term relationship.
Ms. Curtis. I had some further comments to Congresswoman
McCollum's comments, as well.
I think you are absolutely right that we are dealing with a
trust deficit here, because of the cutoff of assistance in 1990
and the fact that the U.S. turned its back on Pakistan and
Afghanistan after the Soviets left Afghanistan. I think we
still deal with that mistrust among the Pakistani people. It is
very deep-rooted. That is why I think it is dangerous when we
talk about cutting assistance or even conditioning assistance,
as has been raised in H.R. 1 in legislation before this body. I
think we have to really think twice about going down this path,
because we do risk losing support from the broader Pakistani
population for the overall U.S.-Pakistan relationship. That is
why I have talked about, rather than cutting or conditioning,
looking at how we allocate the assistance and, instead of
taking away, just ensuring that there is more of a people-to-
people feel to the assistance and more of an American touch at
the grassroots of society.
And the second point I wanted to make, I think the Pakistan
government has realized the need to expand the curriculum in
the madrassas. Before 9/11, in August 2001 the Musharraf
government promulgated the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board,
an ordinance of 2001, and tried to establish three model
madrassa institutions in three different cities, which would
include English, math, and other subject areas. So there is a
recognition within the Pakistan government about this problem
of having too narrow of a focus within some of the madrassas,
but they have just not been able to get the steam behind the
efforts. There has been resistance from the madrassas, from the
religious parties, and the government has not taken those
entrenched interests on as of yet.
The third point I wanted to make is getting back to this
question of whether it is a handful. Sir, I don't know the
exact numbers of Pakistani madrassas that are teaching
terrorist hatred ideology. My point is to say let's not throw
out the baby with the bath water. Let's not further alienate
the Pakistani population or send out a signal that somehow our
fight against terrorism is against the religion of Islam,
because certainly it is not, and we have to be very careful
when we deal with these sensitive religious issues. So that was
my point.
Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. I thank you for that, and your point is well
taken. I don't think it is missed by anybody up here. Handful
means different things to different people, and I think we have
to get an idea of what the scope of the issue is and then deal
with it in the context which you set forth. I think you are
right on that.
Mr. Cohen, I am not going to give you an opportunity unless
you have something entirely compelling to say that can't be
missed.
Mr. Cohen. You can go ahead, sir.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Platts.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
attention to this issue.
As a followup to Mr. McHenry's question, Ms. Curtis, you
just kind of referenced it about throwing the baby out with the
bath water. With the direct funding, the last 4 years I chaired
a different subcommittee of the Oversight and Government Reform
Committee dealing with financial management, and very much
focused on internal controls and accountability, how we spend
the taxpayer funds.
Given the amount of money we are giving Pakistan and
appreciate the importance of better, greater transparency and
better accountability with that, what impact do you think it
will have on our relations with Pakistan if we start putting
more strings on that money? And then I guess in the past we
withdrew some funding because of their nuclear pursuit and the
consequences then, that in doing what normally would be the
right thing, more accountability, controls on that money, that
could result in, you know, worsening our relationship, which
ultimately hurt us in the war on terror.
Ms. Curtis. Yes, I think this is a sensitive issue.
Obviously we want U.S. taxpayer money to be, you know, spent
efficiently and to meet our objectives that we have with our
international security policies with Pakistan, and weighing
that with the idea that we do have this historical relationship
of having withdrawn a huge aid program. We had thousands of
USAID workers throughout the 1980's serving in Pakistan,
building up goodwill between the United States and Pakistani
people, and when we withdrew our aid program we lost all that.
So we need to pay attention to that history and realize that
when we talk about conditioning or cutting assistance we are
touching on some very raw nerves. But at the same time,
obviously we need to encourage transparency, we need to make
sure that our assistance is reaching the people, that the
people of Pakistan know that it is U.S. assistance and that
they don't see that we are just trying to prop up the
government or provide a payoff, so to speak.
Mr. Platts. For you or for all the panelists, how confident
are you today that the money is reaching the intended purpose,
or, you know, achieving intended purpose and not being funneled
to somebody's pocket, you know, given the current level of
transparency?
Ms. Curtis. Well, it is difficult to say. I think the
problem is not so much the money that is programmed is not
having an impact, because I think that it is. I haven't
probably visited as many schools as Dr. Ahmed, but, you know, I
have seen some of the program in action, so I think that is not
the real question. I think the question is: is there enough
going to the assistance? As Mr. Cohen pointed out, only 3.4
percent or something of our total assistance to Pakistan is
going toward education, which is actually lower than what we
are asking the Pakistani government to commit as a percentage
of their GDP to education.
So I think the assistance that is programmed, the USAID
assistance that is programmed, which, as I indicated, about $50
million is being requested for the education sector in this
budget, I think that is probably making a difference, but the
question is: is it enough, or do we need to be increasing that
level?
Mr. Platts. Thank you. Do any of the other panelists want
to comment?
Mr. Cohen. I would just agree with Ms. Curtis and say that
you can have 1,000 successful projects but it could add up to
one collective failure.
Mr. Tierney. Dr. Ahmed, I thought I heard you trying to
kick in, as well.
Ms. Ahmed. Yes. I would actually like to follow this up
because I think it is a very important issue. It is not just
the U.S. taxpayers' money, but you do want to make sure that it
is used in a way that will have the most impact on Pakistani
public opinion, as much as on the government's own interest. It
is that balance which is the problem issue, not just the issue
of transparency and accountability, which I think is absolutely
essential, as well. Every cent that is spent in Pakistan is
badly needed, whether it is needed for health or any other sort
of sector. But there is an imbalance between the economic and
the military. That was one of the issues touched upon.
I would also like to say here that I think I disagree with
this issue of conditionalities. Without any conditionalities,
without any strings there is no accountability of assistance
given.
In the Pakistani context, it is now one of the largest
recipients of U.S. military assistance, for example, not just
economic but also military assistance. If there are no
conditionalities, if H.R. 1 language is thrown away because it
is considered as well a signal sent that might not be well
received, the signal won't be sent at all. I think that is part
of the problem that the United States had in engaging with this
particular government. In the past, unfortunately, and Lisa
pointed that out, it was economic assistance cut. That was not
the thing to do. It should never have been done in that manner.
But certainly at this point in time if there are no
conditionalities put at all on assistance, in particular
military assistance, then there is no signal sent that the
United States really does want to see that kind of reform on
the ground.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Platts.
Mr. Welch.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Welch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cohen, I just want to try to summarize to see if I
understand this.
First of all, on these madrassas--and, Ms. Curtis, you,
too--there is a question of whether there is foot dragging by
the Musharraf government or political weakness, so that even if
they wanted to do something could they. I mean, what is your
conclusion, each of you, on that?
Mr. Cohen. I think that what we are seeing is the Pakistani
government employs a hedging strategy, essentially, where he is
a friend but he is a friend with a lot of problems at home and
there are a lot of stakeholders in his government that he has
to cater to.
Mr. Welch. Right, but the reason I asked this question is
this: if it is foot dragging, then obviously more pressure from
Washington may be advisable; if it is political weakness, then
it will be counterproductive. We have to have some of our own
evaluation of which it is. Which do you think it is?
Mr. Cohen. I mean, it has been 5 years and, despite the
rhetoric, he hasn't taken any action that he said he had, so--
--
Mr. Welch. OK. Ms. Curtis.
Ms. Curtis. Sir, you may not like the answer, but I think
it is a little bit of both. I think you are looking at a
situation where it is really a strategic decision. As I
mentioned in my oral remarks, we saw a 45-degree change after
9/11. Pakistan ended its official support to the Taliban. We
saw another 45-degree change in 2004 when the Pakistan military
spent troops up to fight in Waziristan. But we need the full
turn. We need a complete crackdown on all militant groups,
including those who have fought militancy in Kashmir, including
the Taliban. And we have not gotten there yet, and there are
many challenges to getting there. But I think President
Musharraf deserves our support. He has shown himself to be an
ally in the war on terrorism and we need to continue to work
within that framework. But certainly I think skillful
diplomacy, carrots, sticks--I think in the past we have not
been as willing to use the sticks as perhaps we should have
been, and that could be something that we could sharpen our
diplomacy a bit on.
Mr. Welch. Well, you know, I don't know what that means
specifically. I mean, what would that mean the Secretary of
State did tomorrow? But let me just ask, if I understand it, if
there is some consensus. Right now our aid is about $10
billion. My understanding is that about 75 percent of that is
military, direct military, $6 billion, and about $15 billion is
for other security interests and the sales of weapons systems.
Is it the general view that you have that may be upside-down or
that it has to be supplemented so that we are actually trying
to build or help build an educational infrastructure, No. 1,
and, No. 2, move aggressively into regional trade stability and
promote trade and not just leave that to China?
Mr. Cohen. That is my view, sir. I mean, we are referred to
often as a fair weather friend, China as an all weather friend.
China has had 22 trade deals with Pakistan in 2005.
Mr. Welch. OK. Mr. Kojm, how about you?
Mr. Kojm. I would agree with your observation. We need
balance. We don't have balance. There is severe imbalance in
the nature of our assistance. We need a broader relationship
that must include the economic components.
Mr. Welch. All right. Doctor, how about you?
Ms. Ahmed. It is that imbalance that really in some ways is
adversely affecting American perceptions in Pakistan. Most
people here see the assistance coming but they see it go
directly to the military.
Mr. Welch. Right.
Ms. Ahmed. The impact on the ground, and those figures were
given in comparative terms per citizen per year, how much of it
is effective enough. Trade, absolutely. I think that is a very
important relationship that has been neglected and perhaps
should be focused on.
But again let me say this: it doesn't matter how much the
balance is changed, it does matter who it goes to. If it goes
to President Musharraf not to the Pakistani people, it is not
going to have an impact.
Mr. Welch. Thank you.
I yield my time.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Welch.
Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. In 5 minutes I would like to accomplish three
tasks. One, I would like to share my concern about national
security. My sense is that a greater U.S. presence in Pakistan
is not one that would be appreciated and that, because of a
lack of real law and order, our folks are at risk.
Another issue I want to get to is, Dr. Ahmed, you are
basically responsible for my view that, whereas I thought
Musharraf was trying to push people and the government away
from being religious, that he actually overthrew a non-
religious government. At least that was my interpretation of
what you had said to me before. I would like to speak about
that. I would like all of you to comment.
And my third concern relates to religious freedom. I find
it somewhat ironic that, you know, in our country where we have
religious freedom we are telling them in their schools and so
on what they can teach and so on. I mean, I realize why, but it
seems to me that it would be highly offensive to them to say
you stay out of our culture and you stay out of what we teach
in our church schools and so on.
So if you could talk to security, if you could tell me why
I should like Musharraf and want to see him stay and want to
prop him up, and if you could speak to the issue of security.
We will start with you, Dr. Ahmed.
Ms. Ahmed. Thank you, sir.
Starting off with the issue of security, you are absolutely
right, it is very difficult right now, given the circumstances,
for American nationals to walk outside a few cities. You know,
it is really important to remember this: that in 1999, when the
coup took place, there were no such constraints. U.S. nationals
could travel freely, work anywhere. Why is it that since
October 1999, the coup, and now that we have seen the internal
security situation change from a country that was moderate to a
country where there are major extremist threats, major terror
threats, and that under a government that claims to have
effectively taken every possible action it can in the war on
terror, which leads me to your second question, which is that
did the military overthrow a non-religious government.
It overthrew not just a government that was cooperating
with the United States in the war on terror. In fact, this was
a government that actually agreed to let the United States
target Osama Bin Laden. It had also taken action against
sectarian terror groups, not because of the United States
saying so but because it thought in its own interest. Was it a
secular government in the American sense of the term? I don't
think it was. It was moderate. It is a center right party. It
is socially conservative.
But here's the thing: it was an elected government. It had
support and it could take those political risks. A military
government depending on the mullahs can't.
That takes me to your third question, which is: how do you
actually restructure this relationship, as well as look at the
cultural sensitivities of the people? Let me tell you, sir,
that there are laws in Pakistan against hate speech. Those laws
are not applied. What the extremist Madrassas preach is
something which is against the law of the land. It is not
something that the United States needs to tell Pakistan to do.
All the Pakistan government needs to do is apply its own laws.
Jihad, violence, sectarian hatred--these folks are breaking the
law every day.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. Why don't we go right down
the line here as quick as we can, and maybe you can just pick
one or two of those questions.
Mr. Kojm. I will just pick two here. The focus of the
Commission's work really has been on secular education,
creating secular educational alternatives, and did not speak to
reform of madrassas in any detail except to stop the violence.
Now, in terms of the future leadership of Pakistan, the
Commission spoke about enlightened moderation. These are the
words of the president, President Musharraf. In the
Commission's understanding of that, that means free, fair, and
open elections. That is the stated policy of the United States.
That is what the Commission believes. That is what the
Government of the United States in the coming year should act
upon and carry out.
Ms. Curtis. I think we have seen, through the recent
demonstrations over the dismissal of the Supreme Court Justice
that there is definitely a hunger for democracy, more democracy
in Pakistan. I commend to you a recent IRI poll which shows
that the PPP, the Pakistan People's Party, commands more
grassroots support than any other political party in the
country, contrary to the belief or thought here that perhaps a
free and fair election might bring the religious parties to
power. I think that if you just look at the grassroots support
numbers, the mainstream secular PPP still commands the most
grassroots support.
So it seems to me there has to be a transition back to
democracy, and this may take some time but the United States
needs to be encouraging in this process. Given some of the
recent threats that we have seen from anti-state radicals--this
is the Taliban elements in the Northwest Frontier Province--
which are increasingly using the threat of violence to close
down girls' schools, to close down CD book shops, etc., as well
as what we are seeing in the heart of Islamabad, this is even
more reason for the Musharraf government to find a way to
develop a conciliatory relationship with the mainstream parties
that have his same vision for an enlightened, moderate
Pakistan.
You are right that the Musharraf government, its reliance
on the religious parties has actually strengthened them over
the last few years, so we need to give that some thought.
And, just to emphasize Dr. Ahmed's point about enforcing
the rule of law, this has not been done with regard to militant
groups. There has been an ambivalent attitude toward how to
handle these groups. Sometimes the groups are picked up,
detained, they are released a few weeks later, so there is
still this permissive environment for militant groups,
particularly those related to Kashmir, that the government does
need to begin enforcing the rule of law.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Cohen, next time we are going to go right to
left, but I do want to give you an opportunity for a brief
statement.
Mr. Cohen. I think that we actually have to bear more risk.
The U.S. Government can't hunker down behind a fortress of an
embassy. We all bear risks when we visit. You do when you
visit. I think we could do better on that.
Mr. Shays. Could I just say, Mr. Chairman, I have to go and
speak on the House floor but I do want to come back, and I
appreciate your holding this hearing. Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Braley is gone. Mr. Van Hollen.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding
this hearing, and thank you to all our witnesses this morning.
Mr. Kojm, thank you for your service on the 9/11 Commission
and keeping some focus on the recommendations. As you mention,
some of those recommendations seem to be either forgotten
recommendations, like we are addressing this morning. I think
they are very important that we follow through, and I agree
with your conclusion in your testimony that, unfortunately,
with this set of recommendations we have not had much success
to date.
I would just like to pick up a little bit on the
conversation Mr. Shays was having, because, as Dr. Ahmed said
in her testimony, General Musharraf has managed to present
himself in the west as the one thing that is really standing
between stability and extremism in Pakistan, and that we need
to make sure that we support him at all costs or we risk having
religious extremists take over. But the testimony this morning
is pretty clear, and Dr. Ahmed is unambiguous in her statement
that he relies in many ways on the religious parties. Just to
quote from Dr. Ahmed's testimony, ``Lacking a civilian
constituency, Musharraf remains dependent today on the
religious parties.''
So it does get at this question really that we started to
talk about in response to the last questions about really being
insistent, from the U.S. perspective, on free and fair
elections coming up and insisting that we allow greater
participation in the political process.
I agree with what you said, Ms. Curtis, about it was a huge
mistake in the 1980's for the United States to withdraw
essentially from Pakistan its assistance, but I guess, in terms
of sending the signals now--and this goes to the question of
conditioning the assistance--Dr. Ahmed suggests that we
condition assistance to Pakistan on free and fair elections.
The signal I understand from her testimony that would then be
sent to the Pakistani people is not that we are interested in
withdrawing, but that we want to be a partner with you in open
and free elections and making sure someone cannot be the head
of the military and at the same time the head of the civilian
government.
So if you could speak a little bit more to that issue,
because it goes to the sort of global question about whether or
not greater openness in the political process will lead to
greater participation, will actually lead to less influence
from religious parties if their overall influence in the
population is actually less than sometimes appears, and allow
voices of moderation to come to the fore, and maybe in the
longer run that is the best strategy, because you said, Ms.
Curtis, we have to stand behind Musharraf, and sometimes people
interpret that I think is at all costs. In other words, he is
the last thing standing between stability and extremism in
Pakistan. And he has used that sort of sense effectively, and
some of the testimony here today suggests that is really not an
accurate presentation of the situation.
I am interested in people's perspective on conditioning aid
or other ways we can really send a strong message this time
that we are serious about free and fair elections in Pakistan.
Having been born in Pakistan, I have a little interest in this.
Mr. Tierney. The question to Ms. Curtis?
Mr. Van Hollen. It is for everybody. We will start with Ms.
Curtis.
Ms. Curtis. Yes. I just wanted to clarify, I absolutely
agree with you that it is not accurate to say that President
Musharraf is the only thing that stands between a stable and
radicalized Pakistan. You are absolutely correct about that.
And what I have indicated is that, under President Musharraf's
leadership, the Pakistan government did make the right decision
right after 9/11. They have handed over several senior Al Qaeda
leaders, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed just to name one. Who knows how
many more acts of violence would have been perpetrated
internationally had he not been arrested.
That said, as I indicated, we are seeing this growing
hunger for democracy in Pakistan. I think, you know, we
shouldn't underestimate the vibrant civil society that is in
Pakistan, sophisticated politicians that are there. There is
more to Pakistan, obviously, than one military leader, and we
need to recognize that. That is why we are seeing, I think, a
productive stance for the U.S. Government would be to encourage
President Musharraf to move toward democracy, realizing the
process may take some time, but we really do need to begin
thinking about that and not being afraid that free and fair
elections will somehow lead to radicalized regime coming to
power. Pakistan is not Lebanon. It is not Egypt. It is not the
Palestinian territories. The situation is a lot different. So I
think the more people understand that and understand the
situation in Pakistan, that we will see that we do not need to
fear democracy and, in fact, in the long run it is going to
help in terms of turning Pakistan into a moderate, prosperous
state.
Mr. Van Hollen. Does anyone have an overwhelming comment to
make? We would be happy to hear it.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Cohen, you have been shut out before. I
would like to give you the opportunity and then we will go to
Dr. Ahmed.
Mr. Cohen. I will just say that military leaders in
Pakistan have a shelf life. That is what history has shown. So
if we are not willing to encourage an opening of the democratic
process now, then we have to at least prepare for a more
difficult or violent transition.
Mr. Tierney. Dr. Ahmed, are you getting ready to comment?
Ms. Ahmed. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a very
important issue that was raised, one of timing. For us to say
now the coup took place in October 1999, the elections will
take place in 2007, that the military still needs time and
there should still be a gradual transition that, I think, is
not the way to go. This is an election year. For the United
States now not to be supportive of the process of a free and
fair election would send the signal that the United States is
not interested in a democratic transition in Pakistan. It is
way too long a time to say well, let it be gradual.
The first step, as I said in my testimony, as well, to a
democratic transition is a free and fair election, and it is
not going to be another 8 years from now. I think the
opportunity will be lost.
The electoral time table is now before this country, before
Pakistan, and it is also before the United States of America.
There are two choices for the United States right now. It can
either stay outside the process--in other words, it will not
support the process or it will support the process of a
democratic position. The fence-sitting period I think is coming
to an end. The United States has to decide its own interests,
to see a moderate democratic Pakistan and to back a process of
free and fair elections, or else, as I said, the opportunity in
some ways will be lost.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much. And thank you, Mr. Van
Hollen.
Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just want
to take it to a more macro level with respect to the Arab
Muslim world.
I think one thing that is profound is the demographics of
the Arab Muslim world. I think it is a common strand through
the 9/11 Commission's report that there seems to be a
disproportionate focus on the here and now and not enough focus
on the future. You know, when you look at 170 million people in
Pakistan, disproportionately very, very young, the literacy
rate is less than 50 percent. Males are twice as literate as
females in that society.
When you look at the situation in Iraq, you know, 50
percent of the population is under the age of 18. Places like
Iran, 75 percent of the population is under the age of 25.
Despite the leadership of a lot of these countries
transitioning and more permanent, the populations are very
vulnerable to influences. I think the profound failure of
American diplomatic policy in the Middle East is not to focus
more attention on the future and those young people who are
very susceptible.
When you look at the conflict that has pervaded the Middle
East, you know, most of these families are fatherless or they
are disproportionately fatherless. So what these young Arab
Muslim populations are looking for is a paternal influence, so
it is either going to be positive or negative, and I think our
role as a Nation has to be to promote not only a strong
military presence but also a generous spirit consistent with
American military policy in the aftermath of World War II, and
helping these countries evolve. Much easier said than done, but
my concern is for, you know, cultural violence that has been
perpetrated on young Arab Muslims, and obviously it is in our
best interest to find a way through education, through cultural
exchange, and through economic development to change the
direction there.
So I think it is true, as the 9/11 Commission said, it is
military struggle versus the war of ideas. It is not Bin Laden
any more; it is those who sympathize with him. It is not Al
Qaeda; it is Al Qaedaism. And I think the very narrow and
myopic focus of the administration has been, you know, as
Donald Rumsfeld had said, the measure and the success of the
war on terrorism, are we stopping more terrorist activity than
is being created every single day, or so I paraphrase.
I think the answer is I think we are losing a larger
struggle, which speaks profoundly and urgently to the need for
a more strategic diplomatic strategy with both friend and foe
in the Arab Muslim nations, and particularly focused on the
emerging generations who will serve the basis for the
leadership in those nations, as well.
I know it is more of a general comment, but I think it is
profoundly important. I would just like your thoughts on it.
Mr. Kojm. Congressman, since you started with the
Commission I think I should at least start the answer here.
Thank you for your generous comments about the Commission
report.
I think your points are exactly on the mark. If you look at
Pakistan, itself, which we have talked so much about today,
where has the United States had the greatest influence in
shaping popular views? There is no question about it. It is the
assistance we provided in the aftermath of the terrible,
terrible earthquake in Kashmir. American helicopters delivering
aid, the wonderful logistics capacity of our young people in
the military made a difference in people's lives. This changes
people's views. It is emblematic of the nature of the
relationship that the United States should have across the
board in terms of making a difference in people's lives,
education, economic opportunity, hope for the future.
Ms. Curtis. Just building on those comments, yes, we did
receive a lot of appreciation from the Pakistani people after
our robust and rapid response to the horrible earthquake which
occurred in October 2005 in Pakistan. Unfortunately, a few
months later there was--not unfortunately, but what happened as
a result of an operation that was aimed at targeting al-
Zawahiri, Al Qaeda No. 2, was that there were civilian
casualties in that strike, and a lot of the goodwill that had
been built up by our earthquake assistance dissipated.
So we do have a problem, and it is a challenge that we have
to live with, in that there are people who hate us and who are
not going to change and who are plotting the next 9/11 who we
need to target and we need to handle a certain way.
On the other hand, we need to show, as you said, our
generous spirit to the large majority of the population, you
know, that doesn't support violence against Americans. There
has been a new poll out by worldpublicopinion.org that came out
just about 2 weeks ago which shows the majority of Pakistanis
do not support violence against the United States, but they do
sympathize with some of the goals of Al Qaeda.
So I think what I am trying to say is there is really a
dual approach, and I agree totally with you that we need to
focus more resources on these kind of people-to-people
exchanges, assistance issues, because we do see that it does
make a difference in people's opinion of America when we act
out of sheer goodwill and demonstrate our interest in the
betterment and development of the people, themselves.
Mr. Cohen. I would just add that the poll that Ms. Curtis
cited also said that only 2 percent of Pakistanis who were
surveyed believed Al Qaeda was behind 9/11, and if that is the
premise of our posture there is that we are there and we are
giving the assistance because of 9/11, then we start to see the
problem.
I think after 9/11 America began exploiting fear and anger,
and we need to get back to exploiting optimism.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Higgins.
I want to thank all of our witnesses.
Do any of the Members wish to ask a followup question at
all? I don't want to shut anybody off. But, failing that, I
would just like to close with one group of thoughts.
Obviously I think we have all seen the importance of
education and ramping up our attitude about educational aid to
Pakistan and trying to make sure that we do that in an
appropriate way that doesn't try to interfere with the reform
of the madrassas so much as make sure we put up good viable
public institutions as an alternative and make sure that the
Musharraf government does take action against the more radical
extremist madrassas on their own.
The other aspect of that is, of course, we need free and
fair elections, and how do we go about making sure the U.S.
position is consistent and clear on that.
I would like to ask Dr. Ahmed just one last question on
that. If we are going to assist in free and fair elections,
does that necessarily mean that they have to insist on the
return to Pakistan of the leaders of two of the major parties,
Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Sharif, both of whom have outstanding legal
matters against them, and I think some people might see that as
interference of the United States in domestic matters, or will
a free and fair election be possible without their return? Can
you give us a little perspective on that?
Ms. Ahmed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On that particular issue of an even playing field for all
the political parties, if there are legal matters against that
would hamper the return of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif,
well, the Pakistan government has to deal with those legal
matters. But for the United States to say that we will not
support the participation of major party leaders in an
electoral exercise would also be problematic. By just
specifically supporting a level playing field for all the
political parties--in other words, the removal of all
restrictions on freedoms of association and expression--that,
alone, I think sends a clear enough message to the Pakistan
government.
I would say, though, that the United States is already
engaged with the Pakistan government as far as the election
process is concerned, but not quite in an effective way,
because it appears at the moment the only engagement goal
taking place through USAID is with the Election Commission of
Pakistan, which is, after all, not autonomous and not
independent. So there are already mixed messages being sent,
which is why the necessity, as you said, very clearly of
clarity of that message, that the United States will support a
free and fair process.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Doctor.
Mr. Lynch, would you like to ask some questions before we
close?
Mr. Lynch. I would, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tierney. Five minutes.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
having this hearing.
I, like several members of this committee, have just
returned from an area that is seeing a lot of activity from the
Taliban right on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border near
Waziristan.
I have a couple of questions. One is sort of a long-term
question and it deals with some of the situations we are seeing
with the Taliban-connected Madrassas and other radical Islamic
madrassas. Is there right now an honest broker or an entity
that we could support? Let's face it, the United States has
lost any credibility that it has had in that part of the world,
so our opportunity to go in and offer a competing model to the
madrassas right now openly would be very difficult. I am just
wondering if there is an entity or a movement within Pakistan
that we could support either openly or clandestinely that would
offer a competing model to the more radical madrassas. I feel
we have probably already lost the youngest generation in
Pakistan already because we really haven't had a strong
competing model and we have been beaten to the punch.
So that is the first half of my question. I would just like
to get a sense of what the panel thinks.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Cohen, why don't we start with you.
Mr. Cohen. Well, it is not a political organization, but I
think the rural support development programs that exist there
succeed for the same reasons the madrassas do, which is they
have local knowledge and people see that they are part of the
community. From what I have seen--maybe others can comment--
they have been successful.
Mr. Lynch. I am sorry? Can you repeat that again?
Mr. Cohen. Sure. There is a rural support development
network which has Pakistani mobilizers in communities, and they
do building schools, building roads, very grassroots types of
activities, but they are spread out through a fair swath of the
country, and people are from those communities and that is what
gives them credibility.
Mr. Lynch. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Would the gentleman yield for a second? Who
sponsors those people? I mean, who are they?
Mr. Cohen. They get funding from a number of donors,
including USAID, including the World Bank, Asia Development
Bank, so it is an indigenous organization, though, I believe.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Ms. Curtis. I had the opportunity when I was in Pakistan
several years ago to meet with the Baluchistan rural support
program which he was talking about, and they are doing good
grassroots work. The Aga Khan Foundation is another private
foundation that is doing a lot of good work on the education
front.
I think one thing we have to look at is the overall
government effort, as well. As I indicated in my testimony,
there is need for major reform of the sort of overall education
bureaucracy in Pakistan. As I mentioned, the World Bank spent
billions on Pakistan in the 1980's and 1990's without
substantially increasing enrollment rates, literacy rates, etc.
So we need to think very carefully about the organizational
setup of the education system and think about the good work
that is being done at the local level, and how could we sort of
organize that and bring that together so that it is a more
systematized setup rather than having, you know, a bunch of
diverse private efforts.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
Mr. Kojm.
Mr. Kojm. Thank you. I would really defer to my colleagues
on the panel, especially Dr. Ahmed, on the best local
institutions for us to work with.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Dr. Ahmed.
Ms. Ahmed. There are any number of local citizen-run
initiatives in Pakistan where that model we were talking about
is already being applied with huge success in some of the
poorest of cities. I give you one example, which is called the
Citizen's Foundation School System. It is actually run in the
poorest of slum areas where the children would be more
susceptible to either being taken in by the madrassa managers
because their parents can't support them, or to those kinds of
influences. These schools, by the way, are as good as some of
the best American schools, run in the slum areas of Pakistan.
So it is not as though the madrassa don't exist, but I
agree with Lisa. I think it is really important that the public
school sector is where the focus needs to be. The state needs
to reform the public school sector. It needs to make that,
because that is where the largest number of children will go.
It needs to make that more viable, more sustainable, to give
the children a sense of direction but also skills so that they
can be productive citizens in the work force.
I would want to add that I don't think you should be so
despondent about the youth of Pakistan. You would be surprised
that the vast majority, despite the poverty and despite the bad
winters, the vast majority of Pakistanis, barring a tiny fringe
radical element, are moderate, democratic, and support all the
ideals that the United States also believes in.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Lynch.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, if I could, just one final question for Dr.
Ahmed.
Mr. Tierney. Sure.
Mr. Lynch. Dr. Ahmed, you note in your testimony that,
``The choice that Pakistan faces is not between the military
and the mullahs, as is generally believed in the west,
including the United States; it is between genuine democracy
and a mullah military alliance that is responsible for the
religious extremism that poses a threat to Pakistani, regional,
and international security.''
Could you talk about this point? This is hitting the nail
on the head right here about what the alternatives are and who
we can make our alliances with. I would just like to hear your
remarks on that.
Ms. Ahmed. Thank you, Congressman, because I think that is
where the problem lies in U.S. policy at this point in time,
not quite understanding that it isn't the military as the only
partner in the war on terror, but actually if the United States
was to adopt the right policy directions now, or at least tweak
its policy directions, it will be the Pakistani people. Why I
say that is simply this: what we have seen in the past 8 years,
really, under General Musharraf is the mullahs come into their
own, not the mullahs being sidelined by the military. What we
have seen is the moderate parties being sidelined by the
military.
As a result of this partnership between the military and
the mullahs, two out of the four state governments of
Pakistan--unprecedented, by the way, in this country's
history--are in the hands of the mullahs. Are we then saying
that we want to keep the status quo or change it? How can we
change it, and what are the most reliable partners the United
States can find? Trust me, Congressman, it is the Pakistani
people who are the most trusted partners, for a very simple
reason: if they want free and fair elections, they would vote
for the moderate parties who would have the best partnership,
largely because they would, A, have legitimacy; B, the support
of their constituents; and, C, share the same goals.
There is a Charter of Democracy signed between the two
major parties, and I would suggest that perhaps you should have
a look at it. These are the two major parties that would, in a
free and fair election, form a government and be the largest
party in opposition.
The charter specifically says that they will fight
extremism and terrorism in Pakistan's national interest, and
that is exactly what the United States should be looking for,
not a quid pro quo, we will give you so you will give us, but a
commitment to eliminating terrorism and radicalism in a
strategic country, which is absolutely essential if the war on
terror is to succeed.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Lynch, we have copies of that charter if
you or any other Member would like to have a look at it, as
well.
I want to thank all of our witnesses today for their time
and for the valuable testimony. I think it was certainly a help
to all of the Members.
I also want to thank the U.S. Mission in Pakistan for
assisting our videoconferencing of Dr. Ahmed to the hearing,
our friend Zharzhay Peter Boney for his cooperation in that.
I want to say one last thing. The subcommittee invited
representatives of the U.S. Department of State and the U.S.
Agency for International Development to participate in today's
hearing, specifically invited Mr. John Anthony Gastright, Jr.,
the Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs at the
State Department and Mr. Mark S. Ward, Senior Deputy Assistant
Administrator of Asia and the Near East at USAID.
These officials were invited to testify, but the State
Department and USAID declined our invitation. It seems that
these agencies expressed an unwillingness to address any issue
raised by the first panel in close proximity to the first
panel's offerings. We find that highly questionable and
unacceptable, but rather they insisted on testifying first. We
are not in the habit of having the administration or anybody
else set the schedule of the agenda for our hearings. We think
it was important to hear what today's witnesses had to offer
and then to hear from people in the State Department and USAID
as to what they were doing in contrast to the comments we
heard.
So after this hearing I will talk to other members of the
subcommittee to determine whether we are going to give a second
opportunity for those individuals to testify at some later
hearing on that.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Again
I thank all of our witnesses and participants today.
Dr. Ahmed, thank you for joining us long distance.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]